Abstract

Role of Women in the Struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

West Asian Studies
(Political Science)

By
SEEMA PARVEEN

Under the Supervision of
Dr. Ghulam Mursaleen

DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH
2014
Abstract

In this thesis, I have tried to study the role of Palestinian women and different aspects of their involvement with regard to their struggle to liberate their country, Palestine. I also have discussed the history of Palestine with other related studies and how the First and the Second Intifada came into being. And finally I have talked about the extent of the participation these women have during their struggle.

The thesis has been divided into six chapters. The first chapter serves as introduction to the main thesis in which research objectives, scope and significance of the study, methodology, literature review have been discussed in detail apart from some general details on women status from very beginning to the present time have also been narrated.

The second chapter deals with the brief history of Palestine since ancient time to the Ottoman rule, society under the Ottomans, mandate and the beginning of Arab-Jewish conflict. It also deals with the creation of Israel and expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland and lastly, I have discussed the condition and status of Palestinian women from very early times to the creation of Israel.

The third chapter devotes in describing about the formation of PLO and participation of women in liberalization struggle. In this chapter, I have also given an account of women’s participation in Armed Struggle in detail along with Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon as well as Sabra and Shatila Massacre in Lebanon 1982.

The fourth chapter covers the first Intifada and Feminist Movement, social practices and rituals during the Intifada, the Peace Process and Question of Palestine.

In the fifth chapter, I have discussed in detail about the Palestinian uprising: Al-Aqsa Intifada in general, aspects of Palestinian-Israeli violence, regional implications and role of women since Al-Aqsa Intifada to the present time in particular.

And lastly, a comprehensive conclusion, in the sixth chapter, has been provided which also serves as the gist of the thesis.
However, before dealing with the role of women in Palestine, a question arises that who is a Palestinian while there is no geographical boundary of Palestine today. So here it will not be out of place to mention some very basic and historical facts in this regard. Today Palestinian society is fragmented, isolated and disarranged. Prior to the World War-I, Palestine had been a distinct region with its distinguished geographical boundary and remained an important and sacred state of West Asia throughout the Ottoman Empire. It was conquered, dismembered and colonized by the British in 1922 and also reduced to a fraction of its original geographical contiguity. However, during the British mandate, the long struggle between the native Arab Palestinians and the Jewish settlers came to an end in 1948 with the defeat of both the Palestinians and the Arab states that supported them. Hence, it was 1948 when the first major political change took place and Jewish national homeland was created in Palestine. As a result of 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian territory was divided into three parts: one namely West Bank was captured by Jordan; the other Gaza went under the control of Egypt; and the rest of Palestine remained in the hand of the Jews which is being governed by them in the name of Israel, a newly created country and also recognized by the United Nations in 1948. An estimate of number of Palestinians who became refugees in this war varies from 700,000 to 900,000. However, since then the Palestinian Arab population was split in two groups. One group included those Palestinians who lived as refugees outside Palestine, whether in the neighbouring Arab states (like Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq) or in Europe and United States of America. The second group was consisted of those Palestinian Arab populations who lived within the border of Palestine. ¹

In another war of 1967 between the Arabs and Jews, West Bank and Gaza were occupied by the Jews who included them into the territory of Israel. This is the second time when many thousand more Palestinians were dispossessed of their homes and herded again as destitute refugees. Even then, today, there are 19 refugee camps

in the West Bank and a very few camps are also in Gaza Strip where about half a million Palestinians live whereas the total Palestinian population in the world is estimated to be over four millions in which Jordan has the largest population of the Palestinians living anywhere in the world. Ninety per cent of all these Palestinians are Sunni Muslims while the rest of ten per cent are the Christians. However, the role of women can be divided into four different periods: (1) from 1917 to 1948; (2) 1948 to 1987; (3) 1987 to the end of Fist Intifada; and (4) from the beginning of Second Intifada till date.²

(1) Role of Women during 1917 to 1948

Palestinian society has been fundamentally feudal and patriarchal. The birth of a boy was normally more welcome and celebrated than of a girl who was considered a burden on the family. Women must be fertile and bear ‘fruit’ especially sons. The women who are not able to have children, are considered without value and dispensable and the women who do not produce sons/son would either be divorced or be supplemented by another wives. Man were considered responsible for women’s actions. Since the childhood, girls are taught to be obedient and are constantly watchful. If she was late in returning home, whatever be the reason, she would be punished. Even married women were beaten. Women are considered to be as wives and mothers and restricted to the four walls of homes. Marriages are arranged by the parents and grooms and brides can see each other only after marriages.³

However, the role of women in the struggle of Palestine started after the formation of first women’s associations in Jerusalem in 1919. It was as early as 1920 (27 February), when a considerable number of women came out on the streets of Jerusalem and joined in protests and demonstrations with their counter parts to show their anger against the British mandate and Jewish expansionist aims in Palestine. The first women’s congress was held in Jerusalem in 1929 in which 300 women participated. It was an important step towards a more organized movement that

---

² Ibid.
³ Rubenberg, Cheryl A., pp. 36-40.
adopted resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Balfour Declaration and the prohibition of Zionist emigration into Palestine. As a result of this congress, the Palestinian women's Federation came to existence. The birth of the first Palestinian women's organization was simultaneous with the beginning of the resistance to Zionist immigration in Palestine.

In 1933, the members of the congress participated in a march of veiled women to protest against the visit of Allenby to Jerusalem and the failure of the British to fulfill the promise of Liberation. As the Palestinian nation was then transformed into a settler colonial state under Zionist leadership in Israel, the resistance of Palestinian people including women intensified. Hence, in the revolution of 1936-9 against the British, women participated actively with arms in their hands and also by carrying arms and provisions to the male fighters. The first Palestinian female martyr was Fatimah Ghazzal who was killed by the British colonialist bullets in a battle at Azzoun on July 26, 1936.

This had been a fashion for middle and upper middle class women of urban areas to belong themselves to women's organization, participate in social activities and to voice their support for nationalist causes. Although the majority of women live in the rural areas, but both the women either they were living in urban areas or rural, were always prepared to volunteer their services in the struggle to resist the British and Zionist settler also by going out on missions with their men and helping them with supplies of ammunition and other provisions. This continues till the massacre of Deir Yassin in which hundreds of Palestinian including women and children lost their lives.

5. Ibid.
With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the majority of the Palestinian people was dispersed and dragged out of their places and no formal organization of Palestinian women existed. It was forbidden for Palestinians of both sexes in Israel to form political parties or organizations. However, women's activities centred on social services such as child welfare, literacy campaigns, and training of sewing, spinning, weaving and embroidery.\textsuperscript{7}

(2) Role of Women from 1948 to 1987

After 1948, there were no records of political activities overtly organised by the Palestinian women in Israel, as the Israeli authorities restricted these. However, women's Associations were organised in many towns of the West Bank and a few in Gaza. Their programmes were expanded to meet the needs precipitated by the dispersal of the Palestinian people. Some began operating orphanage and nursery schools to provide childcare for working mothers, as this was the need to confront economic situation. Other activities, which these societies undertook, were to establish homes for old people, family planning clinics and schools for the blinds, the dumb and the retarded. After occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 by Israel, few international organizations showed their interest in maintaining these ongoing programmes to preserve Palestinian identity and culture.\textsuperscript{8}

With the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, a handful of women were allowed to join the meetings of this political organization under the domain of the male. Then the General Union of Palestine women (GUPW) was established in 1965, with some former objectives like raising the standard of women, eradication of illiteracy and care for the Palestinian family. One clause in the charter of GUPW was the participation of the Palestinian women in the activities organized by men to liberate their homeland. However, following the 1967 June war, the remaining territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) of what had been Palestine were captured by Israel. From then, women started resisting the occupation strongly and a new development in women's political struggle occurred that they participated in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{8} Nakhleh, Khalid, p.161 and Phoolwanti, *Tear Drops Turn into a Dagger: Palestinian Struggle Goes* www.Peoplesmarch.com/archives/2004/sept2k4/Tear.htm
\end{itemize}
armed activities of the revolution and they started to foster their sons and daughters with commitment for the struggle to liberate Palestine. In the beginning, female participation in the PLO structure was limited and that to mostly feminine in nature as they were concentrated on support services like collecting contributions, visiting fighters, nursing the injured, caring for families of prisoners and martyrs, etc. Later on, women started leading strikes and demonstrations involving themselves in individual and collective acts of resistance that encouraged others. Following the killing of three women by Israeli army in Gaza, Muslim and Christian women staged a hunger strike in the Church of Jerusalem in February 1969. Since 1970 women’s role changed from support to participation in all activities especially in Jordan whereas in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, they were depended upon their men.  

The popular front of the Liberation of the Palestine organized women in the occupied areas by assigning them distribution of pamphlets, smuggling of arms and providing the other needful for freedom fighters. Later on women were given military training and sent out on missions with the men. The women who actively participated in the Palestinian revolution were generally young and educated and belonged to the middle class families, where as the women belonging to the lower class could not take active part as the males of this group did not like mixing of their women with the men.

(3) Role of Women from 1987 to the end of Fist Intifada

The women played very active and important role in the Palestinian Intifada (uprising), which started in December 1987. During the Intifada, from varied social backgrounds marched in silent protest to roadblocks and participated in the struggle, they along with their children threw stones in protest against Israeli soldiers to protect their militant men. As a result of their political participation, they were often beaten, shot, killed and sometimes-suffered imprisonment, torture, rape and tear gas attacks. In this on-going struggle, women did not only participate politically, but they were also very active in many aspects of society in protecting and rescuing their homes,

9. Ibid.
children and men from the continuous onslaught of Israeli forces. They also took a leading role in boycott campaign against Israeli products in the Gaza and West Bank during the Intifada. This boycott initiative proved to be a failure to achieve the goals due to lack of Palestinian’s native industries. To make it successful, it was necessary to provide Palestinian families with alternative sources of income and products which was impossible, because, during the Intifada, often curfew was imposed, schools and universities were shut for months, boarders with Israel were closed for Palestinian workers and hence sometimes Palestinians families suffered without income for months. Palestinian women tried their best to confront these crises by establishing some of their own industries like cheese making, jam making, bread making, etc., in order to provide some relief to daily needs of their people. Moreover, Palestinian women, during the closure of schools by the Israeli army, established underground community schools which their children could attend. When the Israeli soldiers arrest any child, Palestinian women enmass would come out demanding the release of the child. Every woman would claim that the child was her own; consequently often they would succeed in releasing the child.\footnote{Phoolwanti and Nuseibeh, Saida, \textit{Palestinian Culture and Identity and the role of Palestinian Women}, \url{www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm}}

Palestinian women extended their activism and organisational skills in the service of the uprising and helped mobilise people in different communities to perform important meetings. They set up units to collect and store food. They vigilied to warn their community in the event of the enemy approach. They helped in providing medical relief and first aid. Apart from all these, they engaged directly in confrontation with the Israeli army at the cost of their lives and repeated ravage and rape.\footnote{Ibid.}

Israeli military has used multiple strategies to suppress the unprecedented political mobilization of women. To deter women from political participation, Israeli military used tear gas on them, which caused miscarriages, and to suppress their demonstrations women suffered sexual harassment and sexual violence in addition to other means of torture humiliation, arrest and rape etc. But despite all these, women
young and old have continued to resist armed and un-armed struggle declaring their resistance as their rights and duty. 13

Israeli Women’s Protest and their Support to Palestinian Struggle

All these unjust, tyranny and violence by Israeli men against the fearless Palestinian women, prompted Israeli women to make a solidarity with the Palestinian women in support of their national cause. Ten Israeli Jewish women, in solidarity with the Palestinian women, stood in black dress in January 1988 in Jerusalem to protest against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Gradually more and more women both Jewish and Palestinians from Israel and also from occupied territories joined protest in solidarity activities. In this way, demonstration of women dressed in black spread to various towns and villages of Israel. By July 1990 there were about thirty such groups (consisting of both Jews and Palestinians from Israeli) which were performing demonstration against the occupation on every Friday at the same time and place. Hence women’s peace movement was steadily developing as widespread opposition against the occupation. In December 1990, about six thousand Israeli and Palestinian women, along with the women from Europe and USA participated in a march for peace in Jerusalem demanding the Israeli government to hold a peace talks with the PLO and to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But the Gulf War of January 1991 made the Jewish and Palestinian women on opposite sides. Israeli Jewish women identified themselves with the West in general and USA in particular while Palestinian women recognized themselves with the third world and especially the Arab world. Despite of all these obstacles the struggle of Palestinian women continued till the advent of peace process. 14

(4) Since the Beginning of Al-Aqsa Intifada till date

The Oslo Peace Accord, however, was signed on 13 September 1993 between Palestinians and the Israelis. In the negotiation, women were not included in the discussion. The Oslo deal was, in fact, signed by the wealthy Palestinians in the Diaspora. They wanted a home for their hard earned money, and in return, they accepted for Palestinian people to be as apartheid hoping more to come later. After

13 ibid.
14 Phoolwanti and Nuseibe, Saida, Palestinian Culture and Identity and the role of Palestinian Women, www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm
this peace agreement, women faced a new phenomenon of a large number of divorce cases, women suicides and extreme poverty. Women received the lowest wages. Moreover, all small businesses went out of business making way for the new Palestinian wealth mass production with cheap prices. Monopolies were shaped in the market on the hands of PA (Palestinian Authority) leadership in almost all fields. The PA also oppressed women further with reactionary laws and regulations. There was also a group in the PA that was getting benefits from the existence of occupation by way of partnership and joint ventures. As a result, Palestinian women movement split in two groups over their agenda and approach to the women struggle. One group of the women believed that it is now time for peace and that the social issues should be dealt with later during the peace times. This group was very well funded by the NGO's. The second group believed that occupation still existed and that the National Liberation and Women Liberation should go hand in hand. However, a very confusing situation prevailed until the second uprising (al-Aqsa Intifada) broke out. Now, as always, Women began to participate firmly in crises and all types of demonstrations. They protested against the unjust policies of not facilitating visits of families to their political prisoners in the Israeli jails and participated in funerals that take the form of mass demonstrations. The women believe that for every funeral there is a wedding and for every death there is a birth.  

With the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a new phenomenon of committing suicide attacks by women is found. Women were also used for terrorist purposes and sabotage activities against Israeli targets. Since a woman is generally thought to be soft, gentle and innocent, she can be lesser suspicion. The women who carried out sabotage activities, made their appearance as Westerners, by way of wearing short skirts or maternity clothes and having modern haircuts. Among these women were both well educated professionals and common un-educated and non-professional young females. Mention can be made about more than twenty women who committed suicide bomb attacks. We also can name here some of very prominent

ones such as; wafa Idris, Andleeb Taqatamah, Ahlam Tamimi, Sana Shahada and Shaafa al-Koudsi.  

However, the continuous suicide bombing by the Palestinian women was very barbaric and murderous activities which were criticized by both Israeli and Palestinian feminists. Consequently, peace activists insisted Israeli government to accept their demands by withdrawing their forces along with the Jewish settlements from the Occupied Territories, so that the mounting death toll would be stopped. Moreover, Israeli’s coalition of women for a just peace -- consisting of nine different women’s peace organizations -- has made the following five point demands from its platform:

1. The Occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip must end;
2. The Occupation must end with a sovereign independent and secure Palestinian state;
3. Jerusalem must be the capital for both Israel and Palestine;
4. Israel must acknowledge its responsibility for the refugees and negotiate a just solution; and
5. There must be a shared cooperative destiny between Israel and Palestine which removes the enormous economic disparity between Israelis and Palestinians.

The above peace declaration was read on April 15, 2002, by Jerusalem Center for Women and Bat Shalom (one of the Israel’s prominent feminist peace organizations). These organizations, further, states that “there is one future for us both and we believe that women can develop an alternative voice promoting sound approaches and effective peace initiatives between our two nations and peoples.”

Women’s Dilemma

Palestinian women are facing with many serious factors which have endangered their status and role in the struggle, because, they have to struggle on two

---


fronts. At the time of fighting against Israel, they face serious conflicts within their own patriarchal family and society. Even one of the very prominent women in the struggle like Hanan Ashrawi, bowed down before her family pressures against her more active role in politics. PLO policies on struggle for liberation are also not favourable to women. Secondly, the decline of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front (revolutionary movements for the liberation of Palestine) has also been a setback to women in regard to conflict with men on the issue of gender equality. Thirdly and most importantly is the rise of the Islamist forces like Hamas (one of the most powerful religious and national movements) which damaged the political status achieved by the women during the last forty/fifty years. Fourthly, it is the international NGOs which are creating internal division within the women’s movement and trying to delink between the women’s struggle and the nationality struggle especially to divert them to their own western interests. Therefore, women’s struggle has to be multifaceted and complex too and they are indeed fighting on several fronts such as; national, socio-economic and social. 18

However, Palestinian women from the very beginning played a very pivotal role in the struggle for liberation of Palestine from the hand of Israel. Women defied traditional restriction to participate in the popular resistance and it was also the women who were the first to take to the streets. They demonstrated loudly and non-violently throughout the West Bank for an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Palestinian women also played a major role in the Uprising and from the beginning they actively participated in the demonstrations and stone-throwing. For the sake of the struggle, they did not care their female sexuality which is so sacred to the honour of the Arab family and clan. Because, sometimes they were threatened by the Israeli soldiers through sexual harassment in the homes and the prisons. But, this did neither intimidate Palestinian women nor prevent them from further participation in the struggle. With the rise of the Intifada, women’s perception changed and the Intifada gave women a new self-confidence and strength. However, at the time of the Intifada, when peace process started, women’s achievements gains began to be questioned threatened. It is because thousands of the released Palestinian males from

18 Nusseibeh, Saida.
Israeli jails were requiring their wives, daughters and sisters to go back to the old traditional and social values, fearing from the newly achieved freedom and domains of women. At the same time, women were also afraid lest they will suffer from the fate of their Algerian sisters, who despite of their great role in the struggle against the French, yet lost all their right after liberation.19

However, women’s struggle has a long way to go while there is no structure, no real state and the whole people are oppressed and without a nation or an economy of their own. Palestinian women are very similar to the women of third world in regard to poverty, social and religious oppression. The only difference is that these women have no homes which they could call theirs, no country to reside in, they lie scattered. To sum up, the sentiments of an activist, Um Leila are here mentioned:

“*In spite of all obstacles, in spite of war and death, in spite of oppression from the men, Palestinian women will participate in the liberation struggle. It is very important. They believe in revolution and will teach their children to believe in it. Without the women the revolution would be without a future. Every day people are killed amongst us, everyday produces a martyr If people don’t understand the situation in which we live, they don’t understand the pain that makes mothers’ wish, more than anything else, for their sons and daughters to become commandos.*”20

---

19For detail see Phoolwanti and Rubenberg, pp. 209-40
20Phoolwanti.
ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE OF PALESTINE SINCE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy
IN
WEST ASIAN STUDIES
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)

Submitted By
SEEMA PARVEEN

Under the supervision of
DR. GHULAM MURSALEEN

DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)
2014
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis entitled "Role of Women in the Struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada" submitted by Ms. Seema Parveen under my supervision is her own original contribution and suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Ph. D.

Further certified that Ms. Seema Parveen has been engaged in full time research and that she has put in required attendance as prescribed by the University.

(Ghulam Mursaleen)
Associate Professor
Supervisor

(Prof. Mohammad Gulrez)
Chairman
DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “Role of Women in the Struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Aligarh Muslim University is my own work. The thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or any other University.

Seema
(Seema Parveen)
Dedication

For possible.

My been

parents, have

without not

whose would

constant love and encouragement this thesis
CONTENTS

Acknowledgement

Preface

Chapter - I  Introduction: Conceptual Framework  1 - 25
   I.  Research Objectives
   II. Literature Review
   III. Women during the Early Islamic Period
   IV. Women in the Modern Period: Reclaiming their Full Citizenship

Chapter - II  Status of Women in Palestinian Society  27 - 78
(Mandatory Period)
   I. Palestine under the Ottomans
   II. The Mandate and beginning of Arab-Jewish Conflict
   III. Creation of Israel and Expulsion of Palestinians
   IV. Status of Women – General Discussion

Chapter - III  Formation of PLO and Participation of
Women in Liberalization Struggle  79 - 124
   I. Arab League Conference and the Decision to form PLO
   II. Palestinian Women and Armed Struggle
   III. Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) in Lebanon
   IV. Sabra and Shatila Massacre in Lebanon 1982

Chapter - IV  Role of Women in the First Intifada  125 - 170
   I. The First Intifada and Feminist Movement
   II. Social Practices and Rituals During the Intifada
   III. Intifada and the Peace Process
   IV. State Formation and Question of Palestine
Chapter – V  Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Participation of Women 171 – 209

I. Palestinian Uprising : Al-Aqsa Intifada
II. Aspects of Palestinian-Israeli Violence
III. Regional Implications and Reactions
IV. Role of Women since Al-Aqsa Intifada

Chapter – VI  Conclusion 211 – 224

Bibliography 225 – 246
Appendices 247 – 262
Acknowledgement

All the praises and thanks are for Allah, the Almighty, for bestowing me the ability and zeal to pursue the research on "Role of Women in the Struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada" in the Department of West Asian Studies, at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. I record my acknowledgement and indebtedness to all the authors and their writings which I very frequently utilized in my work.

I am highly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Ghulam Mursaleen whose constant efforts and encouragements played a significant role in the completion of this thesis. During my interactions with him throughout the last four and a half years, he always remained in credibly tranquil and patient with my ways of involvement in the work. It is his insight that helped me in completing my work in this very form.

I am especially indebted to Prof. Mohammad Gutrez, Chairman, Department of West Asian Studies for his cooperation, encouragement and immense help throughout the period of the study. Thanks are in full measure due to all teachers of the Department for their valuable suggestions and advices in the preparation of the thesis.

I also deem it a great pleasure to express my gratitude and thanks to Dr. Jawaid Iqbal who has always been available to suggest and advise me on different issues related to my research whenever I consulted him during the entire period of my research.

My thankful acknowledgement to all the members of the Seminar library, the Department of West Asian Studies, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh as well as the library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for providing me necessary facilities during the collection of the research material.

I am also grateful to all my friends and colleagues for their help and support which they provided during the course of this study by any means. It will not be justified if I would not pay sincere thanks to all the office staff of the Department of West Asian Studies who always gave me administrative help.
My sincere gratitude is also due to all my relatives for their prayers and encouragement. It is because of their prayers that my research work has been completed within the sufficient period. No words can adequately express my debt of gratitude to my beloved mother, my (late) father, brothers and sisters for their affection, encouragement and sacrificial devotions to which I ascribe all my success.
Preface

The unfortunate partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947 led to the creation of the Zionist state of Israel on May 14, 1948.

Many studies have focused on various aspects of Palestinian society and culture: history, politics, political science, the refugees, relationships between Palestinians and other Arabs, Palestinian education and literature, Palestinian women’s family status and their rights and so forth. The subject of Palestinian women’s role in the struggle to liberate it from Israeli occupation has been tried to explore in this thesis. It is not intended to be a definitive survey of the women’s problem in Palestine, but an effort to mention their predicament.

The present thesis entitled, “Role of Women in the Struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada” covers the status of women and their role in the struggle to liberate Palestine from the Jewish control, the establishment of Israel to the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The thesis has divided into six chapters.

The first chapter serves as introduction to the main thesis in which research objectives, scope and significance of the study, methodology, literature review have been discussed in detail apart from some general details on women status from very beginning to the present time have also been narrated.

The second chapter deals with the brief history of Palestine since ancient time to the Ottoman rule, society under the Ottomans, mandate and the beginning of Arab-Jewish conflict. It also deals with the creation of Israel and expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland and further, I have discussed the condition and status of Palestinian women from very early times to the creation of Israel.

The third chapter devotes in describing about the formation of PLO and participation of women in liberalization struggle. In this chapter, I have also given an account of women’s participation in Armed Struggle in detail along with Palestinian
Resistance Movement in Lebanon as well as Sabra and Shatila Massacre in Lebanon 1982.

The fourth chapter covers the first Intifada and Feminist Movement, social practices and rituals during the Intifada, the Peace Process and Question of Palestine.

In the fifth chapter, I have discussed in detail about the Palestinian uprising: Al-Aqsa Intifada in general, aspects of Palestinian-Israeli violence, regional implications and role of women since Al-Aqsa Intifada to the present time in particular.

And lastly, a comprehensive conclusion, in the sixth chapter, has been given which also serves as the gist of the thesis.
Chapter - I

Introduction: Conceptual Framework
Chapter - I

Introduction: Conceptual Framework

Preamble

The name of Palestine is derived from Philistines who occupied and lived in the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C. It had been a region of the eastern Mediterranean comprising parts of modern Israel, Jordan and Egypt. The area is sacred to the all the three monotheistic religions, i.e., Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The major holy places are concentrated in the region of Jerusalem. Other important districts are Galilee for Judaism and Christianity and Hebron for Judaism and Islam.

Palestine has witnessed several historic periods, such as, i) Stone Age: Paleolithic Period, Mesolithic Period, Neolithic Period, and Chalcolithic Period; ii) Bronze Age: Early Bronze Period and Middle Bronze Period; iii) Iron Age: Israelite (tribes) Period and Assyrian and Babylonian Period; iv) Alexander the Great Period and the Periods of Ptolemy, Seleucids, Hasmonaen Priest Princess and Herodian; v) Roman Palestine Period. ¹

Palestine has since ancient times been a crossroads between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Its climate is arid. The southern half, the Negev, is desert, but in the north there are several fertile areas. The principal water source is the Jordan River, which flows south through lake Tiberius into the Dead Sea.

After the advent of Islam, Palestine was conquered first by Orthodox caliph period and continued to be under Muslim Dynasties like Umayyads, Abbasids and Fatimids. Lastly, Palestine remained under control of the Ottomans for four centuries.

The history of Palestine can politically be divided into three stages; the first stage starts from 1876 to 1917. During this period Palestinian Muslims, Christians and Jews shared a common cultural heritage that had prevailed with some interruptions from 638 C.E. to 1917 and Palestinian society was mainly consisted of peasant class (fellahin), ruling class and commercial bourgeoisie.

The second stage starts from 1917 up to creation of Israel in 1948. This period is very important for the study of the developments which witnessed the collapse of Ottoman Empire, British Mandate over Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, British free hand in implementing the Balfour Declaration, Palestine Arab Revolt of 1936 - 1939 and finally the creation of Israel in 1948. Without knowing these developments, one cannot understand about the conflict/problem of Palestine. However, the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 in which British promised the Jews to support a Jewish National Home in Palestine had been the starting point of long lasting struggle between the Palestinians and the Zionists immigrants which is still going on. It is a historical fact on record that the Palestinians comprised of 90 per cent of total population of Palestine till the First World War. But the Jews increased the number of their population through migration from other places of the world to Palestine as rapidly as their population reached from 9.7 per cent in 1919 to 35.1 per cent in 1946 and this process continued up to very recently and thus Jews over numbered the original Palestinians.

In fact, the struggle between Palestinians and Jews was over status quo. In the beginning, between 1917 and 1936, the Palestinians wanted to achieve the status quo through political and other means of debates etc., but later they started to achieve their goal through armed rebellion during 1938-1939 and latter. As opposed to Palestinians, the Zionists’ effort was to change the status quo through mass immigration and land acquisition from the Palestinians. However, various factors such as, Zionist settlement activity and British colonial policies etc. affected the Palestinian society very badly. Due to these, the peasant class which constituted about two-third of the Palestinian society had been the worst affected segment of the population. Consequently, the peasant class due to their increased depressions had no option except to adopt rebellious activities against the Zionists.

However, before discussing the role of women in Palestine, today, a question arises that who is a Palestinian while there is no geographical boundary of Palestine. So here it will not be out of place to mention some very basic and historical facts in this regard. Today Palestinian society is fragmented, isolated and disarranged. Prior to World War-I, Palestine had held a distinct region with its distinguished geographical boundary and remained an important and sacred state of West Asia throughout the Ottoman Empire. It was conquered, dismembered and colonized by the British in
1922 and also reduced to a fraction of its original geographical contiguity. However, during the British mandate, the long struggle between the native Arab Palestinian and the Jewish settlers came to an end in 1948 with the defeat of both the Palestinian and the Arab states that supported them. Hence, it was 1948 when the first major political change took place and Jewish national homeland was created in Palestine. A result of 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian territory was divided into three parts: one namely West Bank was captured by Jordan; the other Gaza went under the control of Egypt; and the rest of Palestine remained in the hand of the Jews which is being governed by them in the name of Israel, a newly created country also recognized by the United Nations in 1948. An estimate of number of Palestinians who became refugees in this war varies from 700,000 to 900,000. However, since then the Palestinian Arab population was split in two groups. One group included those Palestinians who lived as refugees outside Palestine, whether in the neighboring Arab states (like Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq) or in Europe and United States of America. The second group was consisted of those Palestinian Arab populations who lived within the border of Palestine.

In another war of 1967 between the Arabs and Jews, West Bank and Gaza were occupied by the Jews who included them into the territory of Israel. This is the second time when many thousand more Palestinians were dispossessed of their home and herded again as destitute refugees. Even then, today, there are 19 refugee camp in the West Bank and a very few camps are also in Gaza Strip where about half million Palestinians live whereas the total Palestinian population in the world is estimated to be over four millions in which Jordan has the largest population of the Palestinians living anywhere in the world. Ninety per cent of all these Palestinians are Sunni Muslims while the rest of ten per cent are the Christians.

Research Objectives

The study has a broad objective which is divided into several sub-objectives.

---


3. Ibid.
Broad Objective:

The study attempts to analyze the role of women in the struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Sub-Objectives:

The broad objective of the study is divided into four categories of sub-objectives:

- Category one; social role and participation of women: These women played important roles in social and cultural tasks of Palestinian society during Intifada. The Intifadas have changed the biological, cultural and social life priorities of the Palestinian women and thus have great influence on Palestinian families, as there is a widespread correlation, empathy, unity and patriotism among family members of the society.

- Category two; educational role and participation of women: These women encouraged children and teenagers to protect their motherland by embracing martyrdom, amplifying the patriotic mentality and forming educational teams for them.

- Category Three; political role and participation of women: Women’s participating against Zionists in Intifadas has a salient growth. In these battles, women confront Israel more and as time goes by more women arrest or martyr by Zionists. In these battles and detentions, women Israelis aggression and torture. Women in prisons also were in inappropriate situations and no one treats them according to fourth convention rules of Geneva about political prisoners.

- Category Four; economic role and participation of women: This includes different parts: (a) Women try to diminish financial needs of warriors by hoarding subventions and help others to find food and shelters. (b) Hoarding financial and kind subventions and distributing them between people who lose their home during occupancy. (c) Forming small workshops at houses: most of these women plant grain and vegetables in the garden of their houses and in this way they have reduced the financial pressure.

Scope and Significance of the Study

In this research we have tried to study the role of Palestinian women and different aspects of their involvement and participation in the struggle to liberate Palestine. We have also talked about the history of Palestine and how the First and the Second Intifada came into being. And finally we have talked about the extent of the participation these women had. We have also understood about the effective role of
these women in cultural, social, religious, ideological and educational aspects. In our opinion, these roles have been influential factors in the continuation of the Al-Aqsa Intifada till the present time.

Women have played an important role in the rise and fall of a society. The planners of a country should study the life aspects of their women as it may help solve many problems. The studies which were done on history of nations and the sociological studies as well as the mythological studies pertaining to the West Asian countries reveals that the role women had been very important with regard to historic events. In view of women's role in the development of movements in societies, we have tried to study the Palestinian women and the aspects and extend of their cooperation in Al-Aqsa Intifada in this work. Intifadas are very important occurrences in the contemporary history of the West Asian region; and particularly the Al-Aqsa Intifada is of great importance to the uprising of Palestinian People as a whole.

Methodology

In order to analyze the role of women and their participation in the struggle of Palestine since Al-Aqsa Intifada, various methods have been used in this work. The descriptive and explanatory methods have been mainly applied to collect the data for the study. Primary data on this Subject cannot be used as it needs field trip of the region especially of Palestine for which it was not possible for me. Therefore, I have also referred to the holy Quran and Hadiths at some places. The thesis is based on the secondary sources available in different libraries of India and literature available on internet on the subject.

Literature Review

As far as review of literature is concerned, I have gone through a plenty of books related to my topic mainly on Palestine with regards to the establishment of Israel in the area. But the number of books which are related to women affairs especially their role in struggling and fighting against the Jews is very few and those could not do my needful to complete my research work. Therefore, I have been compelled to take support from internet. However, I am briefly giving below an account of some of the general books regarding women role in the Middle East which highly impressed upon my mind:

*Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank*
(Rubenberg, Cheryl A.)

The book examines the social and economic relations, cultural practices, and power dynamics among the West Bank rural village and refugee camp Palestinian women. It reveals their perception of their social world and the position they occupy in it. The book further explores how gendered identities are constructed and reproduced and examines social hierarchies and structural inequalities, and investigates the gendered division of labour. This also analyzes how gender discrimination is deeply entrenched at every level of Palestinian camp and village society—from the home to the school, and out into the labour market and political life of women. It also describes the verifying strategies these women use to maneuver within their socially defined roles to maximize their individual interests. However, these and other descriptions have been dealt in eight chapters of this book.

Resistance, Repression, and Gender politics in Occupied Palestine and Jordon
( Frances S. Hasso)

The book is an insightful study, not only of a transformation in the women workers' consciousness, but of the history of the Palestine nationalist movement itself. The author demonstrates that the authoritarian Israel occupation produced different models of opposition. However, the occupied Palestine territories, the entire Palestinian population opposed the Israel military governance. This enabled leftist organizers to develop a successful model of massed-based mobilization that was democratic, flexible, and decentralization. Women were able to organize themselves and to play a much larger role in public life than in previous years...this book also focuses on the central party apparatus of the Democratic Front of the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which established in the occupied Palestine Territories and the Palestine Federation of Women's Action Committees in the occupied territories. Till now, no study of a Palestinian political; organization has thoroughly engaged with internal gender issues. Students of gender and West Asian Studies, especially those with a specialty in Palestinian studies, will find this work to be of critical importance. This book will also be of great interest to those working on political protest movement and role of women in participation of struggle movements in Palestine.

Women and politics of Military Confrontation (Palestinian and Israeli Gendered Narratives of Dislocation)

This book is edited by Nahla Abdo and Ronit Lentin, an Israeli and a Palestinian scholar, and is very remarkable collection, with contribution by
Palestinian and Israeli women, offers a vivid and harrowing picture of the conflict and
of its impact on daily life, especially as it affects women’s experiences that differ
significantly from those of men. But, it is unfortunate on my part that I could not find
it in any library of my town. However, I found its review on internet, and am
mentioning below one of the review:

"...a fascinating collection of political commentaries which constitute a clear,
and deep, anti-nationalist voice ... The book offers those readers prepared to listen an
opportunity of hearing how Zionism can be empowering, particularly for those who
experienced the Shoah, not eschewing a sharp critique of Israeli state and society. On
the other hand, the book allows us to hear the national suffering voice, infused by
collective rage, of Palestinian women, who are well known as courageous fighter
against their own societal patriarchal violence." 4.

Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing
Platform (Ed., by Mahnaz, Erika Friedl)

The book is a collection of essays by different female academics. These essays
are related to women’s issues which were discussed in UN World Conference on
Women held in Beijing in 1995 and where 189 nations signed an accord on women’s
status, referred to as the Platform for Action. It was particularly ensued in this
convention (the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women) that governments do not use religion or culture to justify discriminatory
actions against women. There are also some very enlightening cases of studies about
various Muslim countries have been discussed in detail. These essays also deal with
the possible steps that should be taken in Muslim countries regarding the
implementation of political and social reforms.

Women in Islam and the Middle East: A Reader (Ed., by Ruth Roved)

It is a valuable collection of extracts from a range of sources dating from the
early Islamic period to very recent time. The readings contain various aspects
pertaining to women’s experiences about legal, domestic, political, religious and

cultural affairs. These extracts are accompanied by introductions which explain the background of each and discuss some of the questions that may arise in the minds of readers. The book displays well the impact of Islam on women as a religion and a political ideology as it casts light on Islam’s treatment of women in public and private life. The book also directs its readers to additional bibliographical material.

*Women in the Middle East and North Africa* (Nashat and Tucker)

The book is about the gender inequalities and injustices in Muslim countries. In the beginning of the book, it is claimed that it would take a ‘non-western’ approach to the situation of women in the Muslim and Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The writer of this book intend to produce a work that would give a new way of looking at gender issues in this very region of the world and employ a ‘Third World’ perspective that would give a further insight into the plight of women. The book deals with the topics related to slavery, labour outside home health and creative art etc.

*Women and Power in the Middle East* (Ed., by Joseph and Slyomovics)

This is also a collection of essays by prominent female historians and academicians focusing on cultural imperatives of women in the Muslim countries. These essays, while, touch on cultural trends in twelve Muslim countries, the primarily focuses on the relationship between post-colonial ideologies such as Islamism and Pan-Arabism and the emergence of Muslim women in political affairs. Several issues like patriarchy, the role of family, civil society, state, etc. have been discussed in this book. The essays also take into account the political questions that were prevalent in twentieth century regarding the state, women and men etc.

**The Transformation of Palestine**

This book has been edited by Ibrahim Abu Lughod with a foreword by Arnold J. Toynbee. It supports the Arab case in the conflict over Palestine. The presentation is factual in this book and will be enlightening for those readers who are working on any aspect related to Palestine. The facts regarding partisan are well documented and these facts are set out by scholars whose first concern is to ascertain and communicate the truth. There are five chapters in this book; (i) Palestine and the Zionist Movement,
(ii) Land and People, (iii) Palestinian Resistance under the Mandate, (iv) Sovereign Conflicts, and (v) International Perspectives. These all titles have been well described in this book with in-depth and very useful as well as informative studies.

Religious literature

Following is a description of women as it is found in the Quran and Hadith Literature:

Women in the Quran

The Quran is a foundational document which is strictly adhered by the Muslim men and women and is always referred to it as a commanding book. There are a great number of passages which regarding to women's special role. The debate on the role of women is very vast. However, according to the teaching of Quran, men and women are equal with a difference. Women have a distinctive role to play, differing from that of men, even if as human souls they are reckoned as equal. At the same time it is clear that men are in authority and bear the full responsibility for providing their wives and family. (For detail see Al-Quran 33:35 & 4:34)

There is detailed legislation on family life in the Quran, related to marriage, divorce and inheritance. This is on the basis of the code of personal law included in the Muslim Law. Women had the right to own property from the time of the Prophet onwards, while many scholars point out that woman in the West for centuries could dispose of nothing of her own and was under control of her husband financially. Though, the name of only one woman, Mary (the mother of Jesus) is mentioned in the Quran but a large number of verses have been referred to women and according to an estimate about 80 per cent of the legal text in the Quran refers to women.

There is no scriptural authority for the Muslim men to blame women for their sins whereas some Christian theologians have done it much. However, many Quranic contexts clearly show that Muslim women have sufficient ideological justifications to live as complete human beings. They are not inferior to their male counterparts and therefore being a woman she cannot be considered to be a handicap. Consequently, the religion of Islam calls that life is full and free and men and women should walk together.
**Hadiths on Women**

Hadith, after the Quran, is the second commanding authority in Islam. Although there is no explicit verse in the Quran which excludes women from the political arena but there are many traditions that restrict women for not participating in politics etc. For example, Al-Bukhari in one of the hadith (sayings) of the Prophet, reports that ‘A people who place women in charge of their affairs will never prosper’. An eminent women scholar and historian, Fatima Mernissi recognizes the significance of this statement and impact of its unquestioned place in Islam:

“This hadith is the sledgehammer argument used by those who want to exclude women from politics... This hadith is so important that it is particularly impossible to discuss the question of women’s political rights without referring to it, debating it and taking a position on it”.

Similarly, Imam Ibn Hanbal reported that Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) is to have said “Men perish if they obey women”. Strict interpretations of these hadiths show that women have no role in politics, be it through suffrage or representation and that any attempt to bring them into politics amount to bid’

a (innovation which is forbidden in Islam). But such a strict interpretation clearly seems to be out of favour with even more prohibitive of Muslims and Arab society as well. Mernissi has proven contextually unreliable a number of anti- women traditions especially which authority is disputed. More so, women had been transmitters of the Prophetic narrations. If woman’s wise counsel is not to be trusted how come she is considered as repository of Prophetic traditions?

Among the women traditionists, Aisha (favourite wife of Mohammad) were the first generation one to whom 1210 traditions are related while some 1000 other companions of the Prophet were female tradionists (All of them were trustworthy transmitters of the first generation). Thus, the legitimacy of women as oral transmitters of this significant and crucial Islamic literature is established and the collections made by women are considered authenticate and valued, so women also

---

7. Denise Spelling
8. Fatima Mernissi, op.cit., p. 5
attained prominence. Hence, the hadith literature is full of praise for virtuous and chaste women. The Prophet, in this context, is reported to have said as follows:

The world and all things in the world are precious but the most precious thing in the world is a virtuous woman. He once told the future caliph Umar. "Shall I not inform you about the best treasure a man can hoard? It is virtuous wife who pleases him whenever he looks at her, and who guards herself when he is absent from her." 10

Before the advent of Islam, women were treated often worse than animals. The Prophet wanted to put a stop to all cruelties against women. He preached kindness towards women. The Prophet was very emphatic in enjoining upon Muslims to be kind to their women when he delivered his famous farewell Khutba before one hundred and twenty four thousand of his companions who had gathered at Arafat for the Hajj al-Wada. With this Khutba, he ordered those present, and through them all those Muslims who were to come later, to be respectful and kind towards women. The Prophet also said:

Fear Allah regarding women. Verily you have married them with the trust of Allah, and made their bodies lawful with the word of Allah. You have got (rights) over them, and they have got (rights) over you in respect of their food and clothing according to your means".11

According to Islam a woman is a completely independent personality. She can make any contract or bequest in her own name. She is entitled to inherit in her position as mother, as wife, as sister and as daughter. She has complete liberty to choose her husband. In the pagan society of pre-Islamic Arabia, some tribes had an irrational prejudice against their female children by burying them alive. Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) was totally opposed to this practice. He showed them that supporting their female children would save them from the fire of Hell.12

Woman as mother commands great respect in Islam. The Quran mentions the rights of the mother in considerable number of verses. It enjoins Muslims to pay respect to their mothers and serve them well even if they are infidels. The Prophet states emphatically that the rights of mother are paramount. Even at other place, the Prophet advised a believer not to join the war against the Quraish in defense of Islam but to look after his mother and remain in her service, saying that his service to his

10. *Misnad Ahmad and Sahih Muslim.*
mother would be a cause of his salvation. It is because under the feet of mother there is paradise. ¹³

The followers of the Prophet accepted his teachings and brought about a revolution in their social attitude towards women. They were no longer considering women as mere chattels, but now as an integral part of society. For the first time, Islam gave women the right to have share in inheritance. In the new social climate women rediscovered themselves and became highly active members of society rendering useful services during the wars. They carried provisions for the soldiers, nursed them and even fought alongside men wherever it was necessary. This became a common sight to see women helping their husbands in the fields, carrying on trade and business independently and going outside of their homes to satisfy their needs. ¹⁴

The predominant idea in the teaching of Islam related to men and women is that a husband and wife should be full-fledged partner in making their home a happy and prosperous place that they should be loyal and faithful to each other and genuinely interested in each other’s welfare and the welfare of their children. A woman is expected to exercise a humanizing influence over her husband and to soften the sternness inherent in the nature of her husband. A man is enjoined to educate the women in his care so that they cultivate the qualities through which they would excel by means of their natural behavior. These aspects were much emphasized by the Prophet. He exhorted men to marry women of piety and women to be faithful to their husbands and kind to their children. He said: “The best of you is he who is best to his family and I am the best among you to my family.” ¹⁵

However, Muslim society, both past and present, has usually been regarded, in Muslim circles or elsewhere, as a man’s world. But, it is surprising that before more than fourteen hundred years, a number of women in Ambia had played pivotal roles.

Women during the Early Islamic Period

It would probably not be out of place to mention here social conditions of the time when Islam came and started to reshape human perception of women. There were many contrasting threads in the pattern of the society in which the Prophet Mohammad grew up. There is a romantic side to it also, represented by the pre-

¹³. Musnad Ahmad and Abu Daud and Musnad Ahmad.
¹⁴. See example of Aisha in Sahih Bukhari.
¹⁵. Tirmizi.
Islamic poets. They sang of beauty and adventure of lovely women and well bred horses in the desert settings. However, Prophet Mohammad, as a young man entered the employment of a rich and twice widowed woman, Khadija who was belonging to a leading tribe of Makkah, the Quraish. Despite of the limitations of women, in her position she was able to own and run an import and export business and sending her caravans too far off places and employing agents and managers for her business. One of these managers was Mohammad whom Khadija later chose to marry with her. Hence, women played a prominent part in the mission of the Prophet whereas few groups of men and women in history had lived through changes a radical and as influential in history as did those women around the Prophet.

Aisha, the young wife of Mohammad through her life managed to play an active part in affairs. She is the source of much intimate knowledge of her husband’s life and practice. Mohammad himself said that she was his best beloved. He seems to have prized her wisdom and spiritual insight. Moreover, Aisha was the only wife in whose company Prophet used to receive revelation from the Angel.

Another woman was Fatima, the youngest daughter of Mohammad whose personality is fulfilled and who spent her whole life in the service of the Islamic mission. Aisha, was one of those who, during the battle of Uhud carried water in leather bags for the wounded and warriors whereas Fatima dressed the face-wound of her father. In early Islam, it was also a practice that women nursed the wounded even sometimes they fought the enemies.16

There are many more women who did marvelous acts and active participation on many occasions since the advent of Islam till now. After Mohammad (Peace be upon him), Nailah wife of caliph Uthman, lost the finger of one of her hands as she strove while she was protecting her aged husband from his assassins.17 After that there was the Battle of the Camel – as named because Aisha commanded the battle from the back of a camel. Then during the following period, Umayyad and Abbasids, numerous record have been preserved for active participation of women at different events. Three famous queens graced the courts of the caliphs during the first century of Baghdad existence. First of the three was Khaizuran, who by beauty and wits won her way from slavery o becoming the wife of Al-Mansur’s son Al-Mahdi, and subsequently became the mother of two caliphs, Al-Hadi and the very popular Harun

---

al-Rashid. Second was Zubaidah, of royal birth, married to her cousin Harun al-Rashid. She was the mother of Al-Amin who was short-lived successor. The third was Buran, who was married at a wedding that became proverbial for splendor. She was the daughter of a fabulously wealthy minister of Al-Mamun. All these three were influential in the affairs of the government and the patrons of the arts and generous benefactresses.  

18

**Woman Bears the Torch of Knowledge**

Islam had made it clear that acquiring knowledge was essential for belief and faith for both men and women. So Muslim male and female paid their special attention to flourishing their civilization and establishing educational institutions. Since the Umayyad period, primary schools (*Kuttab* or *Maktab*) started to be established where minimum knowledge to be a good Muslim was taught.

A famous scholar of fifteenth century, Mohammad b. Abd al-Rahman al-Sakhawi (died 902 AD) composed a biographical dictionary, *Al-Zaw al-Lami li ahl al-Qarn al-Tasti* which was published from Cairo in 1353 AH. The book consists of several volumes and describes the life sketches of more than eleven thousand prominent personalities who died in the ninth century of Islamic calendar. The last volume of the book devotes specially for the biographies of more than one thousand popular women of the time. A considerable number of these women studied and obtained the certificates (*Ijazah*) of their learning for working as teachers in other institutions. one of the most prominent and learned women of the medieval period was Aisha, daughter of Muhammad b. Abd al-Hadi. She trained herself in *Sahih Bukhari*, *Sahih Muslim* and *Sira* of ibn Hisham and was granted licenses by a number of very prominent luminaries of the time.  

Another book in this regard is *Kitab al-Nisa* a source for the social and economic history of Muslim women during the fifteenth century AD in which a chapter, *Women in the Islamic Biographical Collections*, deals with the number of learned women cited in this work from the time of the Prophet to the modern period.

---

19. For further detail about the life sketches of the women, see: *Al-Zaw al-Lami li ahl al-Qarn al-Tasti*.  
20. Jonathan Berkey's *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo* (New York, 1947) also provides an excellent introduction to the subject.
Women and Medieval Courts

Since Muslim women were aware of their constitutional rights, they did never sit at homes while their male colleagues were defending them. The legal documents of the Muslim courts bear testimony to this fact. These records show that women appeared regularly in the courts of law as litigants. The percentage of their cases varies between 17 and 68 depending upon time and place. Their cases were generally related to marriage, divorce and guardianship as well as a wide variety of property issues ranging from inheritance to estates and commercial transactions as well. As the Islamic law was the law of land, Muslims, Christians and Jews all were coming to courts of law to settle down their disputes.21

A Description of some traditional female professions based on the historical material may be found in Ahmad Abd al-Raziq, La femme au temps des mamlouks en Égypte which provides an overview from the perspective of Istanbul on women's activities in the sixteenth century.22

In fact the Muslim Women are legally allowed to establish endowments and did so has long been evident in the names of buildings -- such as the Khasseki Sultan in Jerusalem, and other geographic sites -- such as the Zubaïda Road for pilgrims from southern Iraq to Mecca and Medina. Right here in Aligarh, Sultan Jahan Manzilas a witness to this legacy. Studies of large numbers of endowments, deeds and other documents from various regions and periods have shown that the proportion of women among founders of endowments ranges between 17 per cent and 50 per cent. While this is less the proportion of women in the population, it shows that large number of women owned property and if wished they could dispose it.23

Women and Spiritual Leaderships

Muslim women found no ideological road block in their way to spiritual development whereas Christianity propagated the idea that women have no souls hence prone to temptation. Throughout Islamic history, we have a number of women luminaries known for their exceptional piety. These Sufi women are generally not so

much acknowledged. Abd al-Rahman b. Ali Ibn al-Jawzi (d.1200 AD) has recorded in his collection of the biographies some 240 in which women’s share is about one quarter. The larger number and proportion of women is specifically cited in the introduction as one of the reasons for the superiority of his work over that of his predecessors. Men generally neglect to mention the female worshipper of Allah due to their feminine shortcomings even though the noted Sufi Sufyan al-Yhawri learned from the woman Rabi’ a and was guided by her words as Ibn al-Jawzi wrote.

Rabi’ a al-Adawiyya (d. 801 AD) was the most famous saint who has credited with having introduced the concept of unquestioning love with God to the ascetic movement. Margaret Smith has written a scholarly biography of Rabi’ a namely Rabi’ a the Mystic and Her Fellow Saints in Islam.24

It is generally accepted in the Muslim milieu that women could be as saintly as men, though this view sometimes require some sort of defense. Al-Ghazali, the great reformer who owed much to the life and teaching of Rabi’ a, says to his readers: Consider the state of God-fearing woman and say to your own soul O’ my soul, be not content to be less than a woman, for a man is contemptible if he comes short of a woman, in respect of her religion, and her relation to this world. So we will now mention something of spiritual state of the women who have devoted themselves to the service of God.25

Then, he cites a number of well-known women saints as examples of those who attained the spiritual life. Another writer from Damascus, Taqi al-Din al-Hisni (d.1426 AD) wrote a book only about female saints. We may read in the introduction of this book;

When He exhorted the creatures to be obedient, He did not single out the men, but spoke of the Muslims, men and women, and the believers of the both sexes and those who observed the law, men and women, and the verses dealing with this are many and are not secret.26

The prayers of Rabi’ a still hold our imagination as we intend to purify our motives. She is a role model of attaining spiritual ecstasy both for men and women:

26. Ibid.
O' God my whole occupation and all my desire in this world, of all worldly things, is to remember Thee, and in the world to come, of all things my desire to meet Thee. This is on my side, as I have stated; now do whatever Thou wilt.27

Women in the Modern Period: Reclaiming their Full Citizenry

The Muslim mind, owing the colonial onslaughts in the eighteenth century onward, expressed some reservation about the Muslim women's social role. When the doors of *ijtiad* were closed to protect the purity of Islamic message from outside intrusions, it was supposed wise to keep women protected from alien influences and civilization. However, the issue of closing doors has always been a subject of debate among the Muslim scholars. This strategy of shutting the gate of fresh thinking (*ijtiad*) and withdrawing women from the danger of outside world proved nonsense and a vigorous movement for renewed role of women started since the nineteenth century. Hence, in the latter years of the nineteenth century, voices for calling reform in the conditions of women were raised in many parts of Muslim world. All the thinkers who were seeking for renewal of Islam united in condemning the imposed limitations and endeavouring to persuade public opinions for keeping women in seclusion and ignorance have never been a part of Islam in real sense. This crying need for renewed status and dignity was felt and widely expressed by the turn of this very century.

The background of the advancement of women in Muslim countries during the twentieth century was an important part of the discussions for a new phase of women's participation in the work and running of the world as well. Women have their own distinctive and valuable contribution to make to this whole development and below is a brief account women's status and their role in the Arab world as the modern reformers discussed.

The Egyptian Qasim Amin, the disciple of Muhammad Abduh (See, Leila Ahmad, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of Modern Women in Islam, Cornell Press, Mew Haven, 1992) was, undoubtedly, the first most influential reformer who started the gender debate in the Arab/Islamic world. Qasim Amin produced a well-known and controversial treatise namely, *Tahrirul Mar'ah* (The Liberation of Women), to which, it is said that Muhammad Abduh was supposed to be his mentor.

---

by secretly contributing to this work. After one year of its harsh criticism, from many of his opponents, Amin reproduced the work with some revision and additions with a new title *Al-Mara'ah al-Jadidah* (The New Woman). Qasim Amin, since then, has been regarded as the epitome of the struggle for liberation of women in the Islamic history.  

It is not out of place to have a look at general features of Amin’s observations and thoughts so that one may make a sense of his thoughts on feminism in the perspective of Islam. Amin wrote an interesting remark in the first paragraph of his work:

Some people will say that I am publishing heresy. To these people I will respond: Yes, I have come up with heresy, but the heresy is not against Islam. It is against our tradition and social dealings, which out to be brought to perfection.

Qasim Amin, from the very beginning, was in deep awareness that this type of undertaking to open up the doo of investigation into the women’s condition is vulnerable to be alleged as a *bid’ah* in Muslim society. As we see in his remark, Qasim Amin was aware from the start of the discourse on women liberation is an essence directed against the orthodox Islam. The call for *tahrirul mar’ah* or liberation of women in Amin’s view is a heresy not against Islam but it is against the orthodoxy. In the continuing paragraph, Amin says that the status of women reflects the level of civilization and progress. In Amin’s view, the liberation of women is the key answer to the question of backwardness of Muslim world.

Qasim Amin’s approach in *al-Mar’ah al-Jadidah* (The New Woman) was extremely controversial among the scholars. Amin is still criticized a an influential apostle of westernization who misled people rather than enlightened them. He attacked, in his first book, the prevalent treatment of women as a violation of Islam. Dr. Zaki Badwi points out, “His first book sought to prove that the freedom of the woman was the intention of the Sharia; his second ignored the Sharia altogether and drew its concepts from the West”.  

30. *Bid’ah* in Islamic terminology is an unwarranted innovation in religion. The terminology has been used by Muslim clerics as a theological tool to sideline their opponents and dismiss their views as heretical ideas.
This is important to note that the question of backwardness, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, was among the common intellectual preoccupation of Muslim thinkers. Many efforts to answer this depressing question have been made. Why do Muslims lag behind while the others progress? The Muslim thinkers have been amazed while look at the level of progress achieved by western countries and the backwardness of the Muslim world at the same time. Amin seemed to think that the answer should be found in the status relegated to women by Islamic traditions. Qasim Amin strongly argued for the equal treatment of women as mandated by the Islamic spirit of egalitarianism. According to Amin better education to women is compulsory so that status of women would be enhanced for the development of Muslim society. Therefore, Amin vigorously argued that unless Muslim society achieve a better treatment of women and their status and unless they discover the essence of Islam which put a greater emphasis on egalitarianism, Muslim world will never be at par with the progress of western world. In view of Amin, resumption of social and political role to women was a prerequisite for the progress and development of the Muslim world as well as society.

Just one year after the publication of Tahrirul Mar’ah in 1899, oil first time in the region was discovered in 1900. Both the events are very significant because it was the beginning of historic changes in the region. Women’s movement in West Asia and the Middle East became flourishing whereas due to oil exploration, the region started to become more and more wealthy. As a result of these social change in the future of women began to seen and the development of a new role for women was assured.

Apart from the gender debate which started with the publication of Qasim Amin, there was another important change at this turn of the century. It is because of Jamaluddin al-Afghani who became the leader of reformist movements in Turkey and Iran as well as in Egypt and one of his followers Shaikh Muhammad Abduh. These two leaders faced the challenge posed to Muslim world by the upheavals in the West, such as; the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the rapid developments and expansion that took place due to new scientific discoveries. According to Al-Afghani Islam is “a world religion, thoroughly capable by reason of its inner spiritual forces of adaptation to the changing conditions of any change”. These both scholars saw the future in terms of the renewal of true Islam and Muhammad Abduh advocated for

32. Shaikh Arsalan, Limada Takkhara al-Muslimun wa Tajadduma Ghairuhum.
many social reforms which consist of the empowerment of women and the restoration of women’s rights given by the Quran.

The debate on the issues of reforms was much held in Cairo. A very outstanding woman of culture was Prince Nazli Fadil, daughter of Mustafa Fadil, who later formed her private library still known as National Library in Egypt. She also organized in the 1880s a “salon intellectual” where she received scholars and political leaders like Al-Afghani, Abduh, Qasim Amin and Sa’ad Zaghlul. The very surprising thing is that in the beginning Qasim Amin was strongly an opponent to empowerment of women. An interesting account of such conversation that took place is being given below:

He became converted to the cause when Darcourt, a French judge in the mixed tribunal in Cairo, published a book in which he said that the main cause of the retarded state of development in Egypt was the Harem system and the veiling of women. Qasim Amin opposed him. Princess Nazli Fadil invited him to her house, and from the very first meeting she managed to sway him towards the cause of women. Later he became the champion of women’s emancipation.\(^\text{34}\)

Basically, Amin had to face severe oppositions and Abduh, who is much respected scholar of Islam, also had faced the same treatment. Much of the changes proposed by Muhammad Abduh were strongly opposed in Cairo. Despite all these criticism, Abduh was appointed Rector of Al-Azhar University in 1899. Muslim education under the leadership of Abduh later changed the very way.

After the death of Amin in early forties of his age, the debate continued about women. A woman, working with him in his life time, Malak Hifni Nasif, and who grew up in the midst of the controversies aroused by the growing clamour for reform, was a gifted teacher and writer. Her father gave a liberal education who was a distinguished member of the group of Muhammad Abduh. Hifni joined a training college for teachers and remained associated with a secondary school where she played a prominent role in training the Egyptian women. She wrote a pioneering book Bahithat al-Badiyah.

Many vital changes occurred in the Middle East during the twentieth century which impinged on women and men equally. The major of these was the increasing

contact of Middle Easterners with the West, a cultural interchange in which the central issue has been related to the status of women. The climate of the colonial time politically worked as catalyst to women who were reclaiming their socio-political participation in all the fields. In fact, in 1919, it was at the height of Egypt’s national revolution against the British that the first women’s organization was established under the patronage of nationalist movement and a woman, Huda Sharawi (d.1947) from an upper class family, actively engaged in Egyptian politics, was selected as the head of women’s committee. Just after the death of her husband in 1923, Sharawi founded the Egyptian Feminist Union and succeeded in leading a delegation of Egyptian women to a meeting of the international Union of Women in Rome (Italy). After her return from Rome, she removed her veil in public in a dramatic way: Sharawi left the Wafd Nationalist Party in 1924 and devoted herself to the Egyptian Feminist Union fully.

The Arab women’s conference was first time organized in Cairo in the late 1930s as a by-product of the transformation of the Palestine question into an all-Arab issue as well as the rise of pan-Arabism. Parallel with the steps toward the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1944, the Arab Feminist Union was founded also. Sharawi vehemently declared in the opening of her speech at the pan-Arab women’s conference:

The Arab woman who is equal to the man in duties and obligations will not accept, in the twentieth century, the distinction between the sexes that the advanced countries have done away with.... . The women also demand, her loudest voice, to be restore her political rights, rights granted to her by the Sharia and dictated to her by the demands of the present.35

After the death of Huda Sharawi, Duriya Shafiq (1908-75) founded another Egyptian women’s organization known as Bint al-Nil (Daughters of Nile). Shafiq wrote her doctoral thesis on “The Egyptian Women and Islam” while she was studying at Sorbonne. Just after returning to Egypt from Sorbonne, she founded a woman’s journal and remained herself engaged in the working of Bint al-Nil. The main goals of this organization were to combating female illiteracy help acquiring political rights for women as well. She also dedicated herself to the nationalist

struggle providing parliamentary training for women to participate them, against the
British, in their popular movements.36 Duriya Shafiq’s relentless struggle for
women’s political rights was very impressive in the waning years of the monarchical
period – when about one thousand women broke into the parliament demanding for
their right to vote and to contest for election and thereafter the revolution of 1952 –
during this period she headed a group of women in a hunger strike and threatened the
government to continue the strike starving till death if the right to vote would not be
granted to women. Consequently, the president promised the women for the
constitution of 1956 and granted women political rights despite an Islamic legal
judgment (fatwa) by a very prominent religious scholar. In the year 1957, two women
candidates were elected to the parliament of Egypt.

Another important female of the recent time has been Nawal al-Sadwi (born
1931)37 who has also raised the issue of gender. While serving as Director-General of
Health Education in Egypt, she wrote a book entitling Women and Sex due to which
she was dismissed in 1972. Then she started working for United Nations and
published several books from Lebanon living there. She returned to Cairo in 1980 and
published her best known book, The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Muslim
World. The book was first published in Arabic later it was translated to other
languages, such as, English etc.

During the period of Anwar Sadat, Sadawi was arrested along with many
activists from the left and right-wing in 1981 and was released by Hosni Mubarak as
part of his liberalization policy. Again she returned to public life working for the
establishment of a new feminist organization and publishing a considerable number of
books. Nawal Sadawi, however, managed to overcome the local opposition and
publish the feminist journal, Noon, since 1989.

Zainab al-Ghazali (1917-2005), affectionately called as the “mother of the
Muslim brothers”, was though not a feminist but her contribution to women
empowerment is much larger. Zainab was considered as representing the mainstream
Muslim woman and was working to invigorate the Muslim society. She was founder
of the Muslim Women’s Association in 1936. She, although, wrote that it was a

37. Nawal al-Sadwi is undoubtedly the most well known Arab woman in international feminist circle.
Her numerous publications have been translated into English, such as, The hidden Face of Eve
(1980), Women at Point Zero (1983), Two women in One (1985), Memoir from the Women’s
crime for a woman to seek a divorce, she did not make secret the fact that she herself sought divorce from her first husband as she was feeling hindrances in her public career and life. She described in her memoir how she her husband that her oath of loyalty to Hasan al-Banna meant that her devotion to the Islamist cause would always come before her marriage, and if ever the two would conflict, the marriage would be ended:

If that day comes (when) a clash is apparent between your personal interests and economic activities on the one hand, and my Islamic work on the other, and that I find my married life is standing in the way of Da’wah and the establishment of an Islamic state, then, each of us should go our own way. I cannot ask you today to share with me this struggle, but it is my right on you not to stop me from jihad in the way of Allah. Moreover, you should not ask me about my activities with other Mujahideen, and let trust be full between us. A full trust between a man and a woman, a woman who at the age of 18, gave her full life to Allah and Da’wah. In the event of any clash between the marriage contract’s interest and that of Da’wah, our marriage will end, but Da’wah will always remain rooted in me.\(^{38}\)

Zainab described with this justification of her stated belief in a woman’s rightful role. Though it looks as her childlessness, but proved as blessing to her, because after this statement she was free to participate in public life as per her mission.

Zainab, after the assassination of Hasan al-Banna in 1949, was instrumental in re-organizing the Muslim Brotherhood. She was imprisoned in 1965 for her activities and was sentenced to twenty five years of hard labour. After her release in 1971 under the presidency of Anwar Sadat, she described her prison’s experience including suffering from many heinous forms of torture.\(^{39}\)

However, one of the most vocal feminists of today is Fatima Mernissi who openly challenges the research techniques in traditional historiography which has led to the marginalization of Muslim women, in her opinion. Her most influential publication is *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society.* The major contribution of Mernissi is her successful dismantling of the effects of some oft-repeated but mostly fabricated anti-woman Hadith literature. Mernissi, in her

---

book, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights, proved that during the Medina period of early Islamic society women enjoyed substantial equality with their counterparts. She further says that prior to proclamation of God regarding hijab was actually to provide women some extra-space in early Islam by permitting women to be politically and religiously outspoken. Fatima Mernissi argues that the role of Prophet Mohammad staked out for women in Medina were one of self-empowerment and active participation in all aspects of society. Prophet Mohammad took her wives to the battle sites with him who means inclusion of women in military forces and their involvements in politics. Mernissi also asserts that women had their direct contact with political forums, e.g., Prophet’s favourite wife, Aisha in an apartment which directly opened into the Mosque, where religious as well as political discussions were held. There were also the apartments for the rest of Mohammad’s wives adjacent to the Mosque likewise. These apartments were so permeable that the voice of the Prophet could be clearly heard as Umm Salma narrated that she heard the Prophet in the Mosque reciting his revelation regarding the equality of the sexes as believers in Islam while she was combing in her apartment. Therefore, Mernissi forcefully advocates that to be true to early Islamic ethos one must not debar Muslim women from political and social sphere.

Amina Wadud, on March 18, 2005, made an international headline by leading a congregational prayer in New York. In this way, she attempted to reclaim women’s citizenry in Islam and by doing so she had the support of Muslim history on her side. Before this, Wadud was considered as an established scholar known for her pioneering work, Quran and Women: Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. Wadud like many other reformers and scholars is in favour of the re-examination and re-interpretation of religious texts. She breaks down the specific texts and key words that are being used to limit women’s public and private role and she displays successfully that there is no gender bias or prejudice in the essential language of the Quran. Wadud, lucidly, argues affirming that the Quran holds the greater possibilities for guiding human society to a more fulfilling and productive

41. Ibid. pp.107-118.
mutual collaboration between men and women and moreover, it does not prescribe one timeless and unchanging social structure for men and women.⁴²

This is the intellectual fermentation that contributed to the making of new women in the Arab world. However, with the arrival of oil money, the women's participation in society became attainable as it helped establish a modern education system and the female landscape witnessed a radical change in all spheres.

⁴² Amina Wadud, *Quran and Women: Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective*. USA, 1999.
Chapter - II

Status of Women in Palestinian Society

(Mandatory Period)
Chapter II

Status of Women in Palestinian Society

(The Mandatory Period)

The Palestinian territory covers a total area of 10,435 square miles of which 10,163 square miles (about 6,389,755 acres) comprise of land area whereas 272 square miles is water area. The water area includes Lake Huleh (5 square miles), Lake Tiberius or the Sea of Galilee (62 square miles) and half of the area of the Dead Sea (405 square miles). The other half of the Dead Sea was in use of Trans Jordan.

Palestine is largely an agricultural country which may be divided in four distinct soil regions: (i) The coastal planes (which consist of first class fertile land with an abundance of underground water and a plentiful of rainfall); (ii) The hill region (predominantly rocky region which is very suitable for the planting of deciduous trees, such as olives plantation; (iii) The Jordan Valley (which lies below sea-level where the soil is good for any kind of cultivation including citrus and tropical fruits); and (iv) The Southern Desert also known as Negev (this area comprises about half of the Palestinian land, i.e., 3,144,246 acres and the northern portion of the area is very suitable and good for irrigation).  

However, at the end of World War I in 1918, Palestine was an Arab country same as other the Arab countries of the world. Its population was about 700,000 of whom 574,000 were Muslims, 70,000 were Christians and only 56,000 were Jews at that time. About 12,000 Jews from their total number were living in Palestine as farmers while the rest of them engaged in business and living mainly in Jerusalem or other main cities. But, all the population irrespective of their diversified religions was considered each other as the Arabs.

The total Jewish holdings in 1918 calculated as 162,500 acres, (about 2% of the total land area of Palestine which consisted of 59 Jewish settlements and that too in different principal towns of the country. At the

44. Ibid. P. 11.
time when British Mandate, in 1948, terminated and Jewish state came into existence, the total land holding increased to only 372,925 acres (5.67% of the total land area of Palestine) which was an insignificant figure to justify the participation of Palestine.  

However, Palestine has since ancient times been a crossroad between Asia, Europe, and Africa which climate is arid. It has the central importance to all the three monotheistic faiths: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. History shows that the region was among the earliest in the world to see human habitation, agricultural communities and civilization and the country was inhabited when the Israelis invaded the land of Canaan in 1200 B.C. and Israeli kingdom lasted for two centuries only. After that Assyrians occupied the northern kingdom between 733 B.C. and 721 B.C. and the Israeli rule came to an end. After Assyrians, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans came and the Palestine remained under the control of Christian rulers from 4th to 7th century A.D. The Muslim Arabs conquered Palestine in 637 A.D. while Turks conquered Palestine in 1518 and it remained under their control until 1917. It is; therefore, wrong to say that the Palestinian Arabs were invaders. However, Palestinians were pre-Islamic people inhabiting Palestine and other parts of the Middle East before the advent of Islam and it was only in 1948 that the original inhabitants were displaced by the Israelis.

I. Palestine under the Ottomans

Palestine remained under Muslim Arabs (caliphs/rulers) from 638 and lastly under the Mamluks who were defeated by the Ottomans in 1516 and then they (Ottomans) ruled Palestine for the next four hundred years until 1917-18. From 1516 until the end of World War I, the whole region of western Asia remained as the part of the Ottoman Empire. The majestic superstructure of the walls encircling the Old City of Jerusalem, were built by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman, the Magnificent (1520-66). Since the history of Palestine goes back to thousands of years before their appearance on the scene of events, it is clear that it is not the place of origin of the Ottomans. Moreover, Palestine had been governed by many rulers/countries. Just who the modern Palestinians are is a matter of discussion. Palestinian Arabs claim various

45. Ibid.
lines of descent some of which seem more legendary than factual one. The Nusseibeh family claim to have descended from the Arab invaders under Omar in about 640. The Dajani claim descent from an Arabian knight, The Husseini family seems to be associated with Ottoman invaders of 1510s. The Nashashibi family is apparently descended from Bowmen of Salah Eddin. Izzedin Al Qassam, the Palestinian national hero, was born in Syria.

However, the Ottoman Turks conquered Palestine in 1516. Local governors appointed by the Ottoman rulers collected revenues which were forwarded to Constantinople, the capital of Ottomans. The Ottomans promoted important works for public welfare. Suleiman the Magnificent rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem in 1537. On the one hand, the Druzes attempted to establish their own state in northern Palestine during the early Ottoman era and Napoleon conducted one of his earliest campaigns in the Middle East, seizing Cairo and areas in Palestine in 1798, on the other. The Palestinian Arab population played an important role in the political reforms seeking to modernize the Ottoman Empire between 1876 and 1908 under the Tanzimat. The Ottomans divided Palestine in two administrative parts consisting of the autonomous Sanjak (district) of Jerusalem which was subject to the High Porte in Constantinople. The Sanjak included an area from Jaffa to the River Jordan in the East and from the Jordan south to the Egyptian borders. The other area was part of the Wilayat (province) of Beirut. This part included the Sanjak of Balka (Nablus) from Jaffa to Jenin, and the Sanjak of Acre, which extended from Jenin to Naqura. During the Ottoman rule, Palestinian Arabs held many important political and military posts. The Ottoman Empire initiated some political reforms in the late 19th century and as a result a constitution and parliament came to existence. Most of the representatives in the Parliament were Arabs. The President of the Council of the House of Representatives in the first Parliament was a Jerusalem Deputy, Yusif Dia Pasha Al Khalidi. The people of Arab territories were free to elect their Administrative Councilors. The Councils were elected in all the provinces, districts, and sub-districts to facilitate the administration of the territory. These Councils were having extensive powers in administration, finance, education, and other developmental works. However, The Ottoman Empire was politically unstable by the 19th century. Though the Empire was controlled by Turks, but they were a minority within the Empire which included large number of Balkan Christians, Armenians, Arabs and others. The
control of the Government was seized by Young Turks who were not about to relinquish control to non-Turkish people. However, as earlier mentioned, Palestine remained under Ottoman rule until the World War I and it is difficult to understand the political attitudes of Palestinians to the Ottoman rule.  

Conquest (1516)

The Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II, who reigned from 1481 to 1512 paid considerable attention to his navy and he used to extend the reach of Ottoman power in the Mediterranean and ahead of it. He managed to join his navy with the North African corsairs and to displace Venice and Genoa which were the dominating naval power in the eastern and central Mediterranean at that time. Sultan Selim I known in the history as Selim the Grim drove south conquering the Arab lands of Syria and Palestine which had been ruled by the Egyptian Mukluks in 1516. These conquered countries were then included in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire/territory. Selim continued his campaign and drove the last of the Mamluk sultans from his throne in 1517 in Cairo. Then Egypt was made a satellite of the Ottoman Empire and Selim I was also recognized as guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Due to the effective control of the holy cities, the Ottoman sultans acquired the title of Caliph which gave them a very reputed and respectful status among the then Muslim world.  

Napoleonic Campaign (1798-1801)

Napoleon Bonaparte conducted one of his earliest campaigns in 1798 in the Middle East during the British protectorate period. He was in view of that if he seized Egypt, he could disrupt the supply line of the British Empire. Since the Suez Canal was not then built, Egypt was the closest trade route to India and other eastern countries. Napoleon proceeded to invade Egypt which later proved to be a serious mistake. It was the time when Egypt was under a British protectorate and ruled by the Mamluks. Mamluks originally were the decedents of slaves who became soldiers and then warlords in Egypt along with its neighbours. In 1798, he seized Cairo and some parts of Palestine. Napoleon captured Jaffa, Ramle, Lydda, Nazareth and Tiberias, but was unable to take over Acre under his control. In the beginning of these victories, the

---

48. Ibid.
Egyptian campaign proved to be a disaster. An interesting aura surrounded the campaign and France and Britain were swept with an interest in Egyptology and archeology. Bonaparte when made military expedition accompanied with him 167 scholars. During the time when Napoleon was engaging the Mamluks with considerable success, Lord Nelson was searing for the French fleet and the opportunity to engage it. The British Royal Navy squadron finally located the French fleet. At the Battle of the Nile fought in Aboukir Bay in 1799, Nelson defeated the French fleet (Myerson). Then the French army was isolated. At that time Napoleon found himself engaged not only with the Mamluks, but also with the British as well as Ottomans, which made the French position weak. Perhaps, Napoleon abandoned his army and eluded the British fleet to get back to France. At the time when Napoleon arrived back in France, he found the government about to be collapsed. Consequently, Napoleon had to seize control of the government. It is said that some historians looked this as the end of the French Revolution. During this period, the French forces in Egypt were cut off and forced to surrender in 1801. As a result of the surrender they were forced to hand over the Egyptian treasures and antiquities many of which can now be found in London museums today as the British officials took these valuables to their country. The Rosetta Stone was one among these antiques which proved to be the key to puzzling ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics (ancient Egyptian picture-writing). 49

Egyptian/ Arab Revolt (1831-40)

In 1516, the Ottomans conquered the Levant (entire coastal area along the Mediterranean Sea between modern Egypt and Turkey and today the Levant includes Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and part of southern Turkey) and turned Egypt into a dependent country in 1517. At the time when Ottoman power began to decline, Egypt was able to exert an increasing degree of independence from Britain. Muhammad Ali was then nominally the Ottoman Governor of Egypt, but by 1830 was an independent ruler of Egypt. He conquered Palestine from the Ottomans. During this period the Ottomans were struggling to retain control of Greece and called on Muhammad Ali for military assistance against the Greek forces. Muhammad Ali’s/Mehemet Ali’s son Ibrahim Pasha was while leading Egyptian troops in 1831

captured Acre. The native Palestinian population in turn revolted in 1834 against Mehemet Ali. Generally, Ottoman authorities protected the minority groups throughout their rule, but with the Ottoman control thrown off, Palestinian Arabs apparently targeted the Jewish minority. Muhammad Ali prepared his army to provide full protection to the Muslim Palestinians in the territory. However, the Palestinians resisted service in Muhammad's army, whereas Qassam Lakhama in Nablus called for a Palestinian revolt. The peasants (fellahin) joined them in all over the surrounding villages. They in protest marched to Jerusalem and seized it on 31 May. The Rioters started attacking Christians and Jews, but the rebel commander ordered to stop. When Ibrahim Pasha, with a substantial force reached Jerusalem on June 3 and the rebels fled away. But the Jews of Safed were not as lucky as the Palestinians attacked the Jews there. This appears to have been a direful pogrom. However, the period from 1831 to 1840 remained very disturbing for the area and finally, after considerable turmoil, the Ottomans regained control of Palestine in 1840 from the Egyptians.  

Economic Situation

As far as the economic status of Palestinians under Ottoman rule is concerned, this has been noticed that the people in general were very poor. The fair statement is that the general financial conditions of all the Arabs living within the territory of Ottoman Empire were not good. Detailed information about actual income levels is not available. However, Israelis were arguing that Jewish immigration would bring prosperity to Palestine while the Arabs complain that the Jews have exploited Palestinians. To know how the Palestinians compared to other Arab populations inside and beyond the Ottoman Empire is very difficult. But, it is found in one source that Palestine was one of the poorest regions within the entire Ottoman territory. However, this is not yet confirmed that this was the true. It is said so because Palestine is always described by travelers as an arid and largely uninhabited wastelands while it is not the case as it is also told to be a fertile one.


34
However, the finance of the province in pre-Tanzimat period had in practice though not in the theory been in the hands of the governor, were now carefully regulated and controlled by the Ministry of Finance in Constantinople and the approval of the provincial budget was approved by this Ministry. According to Provincial Law of 1864 and of 1871, the governor was not given the power of decision regarding the revenues and expenses of the district under his control. Similarly, the administrative councils, while being given the power to 'control' revenues and expenses, and certain other powers relating to the 'execution' of financial matters, were denied the final word on where the money would come from and where it would go to. Any modification in taxation required the approval of the government whether expenses are small or big, not included in the budget, and was subject to the authorization of the Sublime Porte. 51 Therefore, it made little difference to the overall welfare of the province whether its revenues happened to be greater than what had been estimated and already approved. The reports show that the revenues of the province of Jerusalem were generally on the rise and that there was increasing efficiency in the collection of taxes from the population throughout the period.52 One of the measures of the governor's success depended on raising the income of his province and it was no wonder that most of them did put great energy into the collection of taxes from the population. However, it did not mean that there was necessarily more money for the improvement of services, for public works, or for the development of new resources or betterment of other requirements of the public. For the interests of the Empire's treasury, the governors were constantly required to transmit sums of money to Istanbul, and there was a perennial shortage of money for anything beyond the minimal requirements for the administration of the province. Actually, there were frequent delays and interruptions in paying even meager salaries to the employees generally.53

51. Text of the 1864 and 1871 laws is to be found in Dostur, First Series, Vol. 1, pp. 627-28 and in George Young, Corps de droit ottoman, Oxford, 1905-6, Vol. 1, pp. 49-50.
52. The budget of Jerusalem province for 1893-4 lists the figure of TL 130,079 whereas in 1907-8 the figure is TL 216,410. This makes a significant rise in revenues. It was partly due to the expansion of cultivation and higher taxes, and also due to greater efficiency in tax collection. Dickson to Currie, 13 July 1894, FO 195/1848; Belch to Barclay, 10 July 1908, FO 195/2287.
53. The total transfer of sums to Istanbul in 1896-7 amounted to TL 29,103, while in 1907-8 it reached to TL 88,725, a substantially higher rise than that of the revenues. Dickson to Currie, 5 July 1897, FO 195/199; Belch to Barclay, 10 July 1908, FO 195/2287. For the actual shortage of money in the province, see, e.g., Dickson to O’Connor, 12 August 1904, FO 195/2175.
Much information about education in Ottoman Palestine is not found. Whatever could be known is that, there was no public education system even in the early-20th century before World War I. It is presumed that the mosques sponsored Islamic education through madrasahs. However, little information about the general and primary education and attendance of the students are available whereas any information concerning secular education in Palestine among the Arab population is not found. Hence, educational achievement was very low. An Arab observer expressed it with the statement, "culture in this country is dead". This was an Arab view written by the editor of a Jerusalem newspaper in 1912.\(^{54}\) Literacy rate may have been as low as 2 per cent. It was a general problem throughout the Ottoman Empire; therefore Palestine may have been among the areas with the least educated population, while secular education was at some advanced level in the Christian localities of the Empire. Though Christians were a minority within the Empire, but more Christians attended secular schools in comparison to Muslims.\(^{55}\) It is also because many of the Christian schools received support from foreign churches and charitable organizations of the then advanced countries. Due to this advantage, Christians in areas of mixed population such as Constantinople gained greater economic success and developed resentment among Muslims. But Palestinians seem to have a higher educational level than many other Arab national groups. Although our information is still very limited but the main factor here is the Christian Palestinians who were studying Christian schools founded in Palestine by them. This is why Palestinians were having relatively substantial secular outlook. It was main interesting thing that Palestinian Arabs at the time of the Israeli-Arab conflict seem better educated than many other Arab nationalities/countries. Interested readers can know more about Palestinian Arab education by looking into many sources. The condition is different for the early Zionist settlers who founded schools, as many of the early Zionists were secular and wanted secular schools for their children to study. 

The Jews of Palestine had alliance with Israélite Universelle in Paris which was an early supporter of Jewish education in Palestine. The language of teaching and

---

54. Ayalon, p. 17.
learning of the schools they founded was French. Apart from the Israélite Universelle in Paris, the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (Welfare Society of German Jews) also provided assistance for largely secular Jewish schools in Palestine in the beginning of the 20th century. The schools assisted by Germans were bilingual, teaching in Hebrew as well as German and they worked with both German and Ottoman officials. Actually, German officials wanted to promote German culture during the Ottoman rule especially in the Palestine and neighbouring areas which the Germans were cultivating and willing to make the region as a potential ally. On the other side, the Ottomans also apparently saw improving education as helpful in their efforts of modernization. In this way, within a very short time before World War I, the Hilfsverein group had established in Palestine a substantial network of Jewish schools which included kindergartens, primary schools, and a teacher’s training school, a seminar for kindergarten teachers, a commercial high school, and a rabbinical college all with full facilities. All the Hilfsverein schools were in Jerusalem mainly. The Germans came to serve about half the Jewish children particularly who were attending secular schools. They also planned to open a technical college (Technicum) in Haifa in 1914, but the opening was delayed, because of differences between Hilfsverein and Zionist Jews over the principal language of instruction for teaching and training. Obviously, the Hilfsverein wanted German used while the local Jews wanted Hebrew language. The issue which eventually had given rise concerning Jewish education and Zionism brought Jews of many nationalities to Palestine from other countries. Since the Jews living in Germany had considerable freedom and opportunity, they did not prefer to migrate to Palestine and thus German Jews remained as a small minority there. As far as other European Jews were concerned, they did not want their children taught in German which only few of them spoke whereas Hebrew was a logical compromise, a lingual franca for the Jews of various nationalities/countries. The main problem was that there were few books and teaching material and that too available in Hebrew language. All these schools were founded by foreign nationals and, therefore, operated largely independent from Ottoman control. After the Young Turks

revolution in 1908, authorities began to pay their attention and interest in these foreign schools.  

General Condition

Ottomans captured most of the towns of Palestine in late 1516 with relatively little force. The Ottoman conquest probably improved general conditions and increased security, order and production for the rural population of the provinces of Palestine as well as Southern Syria. Since many aspects of the new regime did not constitute a radical departure from Mamluk Sultan, both the former and the later were ethnically of Turkish origin. Though Turkish was the official language of government under the Ottomans, but the local vernacular remained Arabic language. The development and expansion of settlement and production were experienced within an established framework of the native people. Perhaps the change of government was felt more by the local urban elites, who with very difficulty accommodated the Ottoman officials sent from the capital (Constantinople) to perform the military, judicial and financial administrative task.

In this process, Ottomans subdued the traditionally rebellious mountain regions and checked the Bedouin tribes from raiding and plundering the cultivated lands. After maintaining security and stability, new governmental and administrative practices were introduced and established. The system of taxation was thoroughly reviewed, modern courts were set up for proper law enforcement, and local administration was expanded to include representative for provincial councils and municipalities. Some new services such as education and public health were also established. An effort was also made in both the judicial and the administrative system to apply the over-riding principle of the Tanzimat reforms, namely, equality between Muslims and non-Muslims (Christians and Jews).

Palestine was divided among the three provinces (sing. Sanjak or Mutassariflik) Jerusalem, Acre and Nablus from the middle of the nineteenth century, it is indeed Jerusalem which was given greatest attention always. Jerusalem had been the paramount city in Palestine, replacing Acre which had held this position from the

57. Ibid., pp. 294-301.
58. Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1994, pp. 3-4
late eighteenth century until the Egyptian occupation in the 1830s. It, as the centre of the Holy Places, was the focus of a swelling stream of Christian pilgrim, and the place where many Europeans and Americans actually settled establishing a host of religious and charitable institutions. The foreign consulates of Europe and America quickly followed and along with other factors, this foreign influx helped to make Jerusalem, and Palestine in general, a scene of bitter competition between the powers of many countries, each hoping to increase its sphere of influence in this region. For example, it was not new in the annals of the country that the rivalry over the Holy Places assumed during this period acute and dangerous proportion as manifested by the outbreak of the Crimean War. There was nothing strange in this that the Ottomans were quick to notice this remarkable change in the position of Jerusalem and its surrounding areas. The Ottomans also became aware of the potential dangers which Jerusalem’s new international standing carried for the sovereignty and integrity of the Empire due to the existence of a semi-independent Egypt on the southern borders of Palestine.60

One of the important accomplishments of Tanzimat reforms was separation of judicial authority from the administration, obliterating the old tradition of governors performing judicial functions as well as Sharia judges were exercising some administrative duties also. This process gradually culminated in the 1864 Provincial Law and the judicial regulations of 1869, as the Ottomans set up regular civil and criminal courts throughout the empire.61 The principle of separation of powers was reaffirmed by the Ottoman constitution of 1876, and a series of laws and regulations issued in 1879 and in the following years went a long way in attempting to insure the independence of the courts, the proper procedures of trials and the standards of the judges were promulgated.62 Although the records show, there was one thing to aspire to an efficient and honest judicial system, and quite another to aspire to realize the goal practically. For example, there were still frequent delays in judicial action, slackness in carrying out the sentences and neglect in following the proper procedures. Despite of all these precautions, the good and well-qualified judges who were appointed, there were still many dishonest and even corrupt judges. Favoritism

60. Ibid.
62. Shaw and Shaw, pp. 177-8.
and bias were very common among the judges, who were mostly local men, as cases of discrimination against non-Muslims were done. 63 Although the Young Turks adopted major reformist steps, the situation of the courts following the revolution seems even to have been worsened. 64 Since the judiciary was separated from the executive branch of the government, the governors had become powerless to intervene in the affairs of the courts and to correct the shortcomings of the judiciary system. Indeed, it might have suited them, at times, to shoulder the responsibility for not being able to clamp down on crime and violence upon the courts, but it is noteworthy, in any event, that governors were the ones commonly praised by outside observers as being honestly interested in law and order, while only the judges and their courts were often criticized. 65

The cases of maltreatment of non-Muslims (foreigners and Ottoman citizens alike) by members of the Muslim population were another frequent subject of intercourse and contention between governors and consuls. There were still many cases of discrimination and abuse directed towards them at the hands of fanatic Muslims despite of the Tanzimat reforms and the newly acquired rights of non-Muslims. From time to time, tensions between the communities mounted, and in some cases minor incidents turned into serious disturbances and even in riots between the communities. Moreover, it was natural for the foreign consul, as the guardian not only of his respective subjects, but also of his ‘protected’ community and of non-Muslims as a whole, to intervene in the matter to seek the solution. The guardian would demand proper punishment of the guilty, or alternatively ask for the undertaking of all necessary precautions lest a minor incident might turn into inflamed and get out of control. During the period of inter-communal tension he would invariably ask the governor to reinforce the security forces of the province to serve as deterrent against any unfortunate outburst of emotions. As the governor was interested in maintaining law and order situation, normally acted with determination and vigor to quell any source of trouble and take the necessary measures against the responsible violators of the non-Muslims rights especially. 66

63. E.g., Layard to Salisbury, 15 October 1879, FO 424/91.
64. Gueyraud to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 July 1909, CPC, Palestine, 132.
65. Moors to Layard, 16 February 1878, FO 195/1201; Patrimonio to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 January 1882, CP, Jerusalem, p. 15.
However, there were some other issues within the foreign or non-Muslim communities themselves which required the attention and decision of the Ottoman governor: for example, the rivalry between France and other Christian representatives over the protection of Catholic interests, or the rift within the Greek Orthodox community between the Arab flock and the Greek high clergy. But nothing could be compared with the continuous and intense rivalry among the Christian communities over the rights in the Holy Places particularly regarding Bait al-Maqdis. Several events leading to the Crimean War were by no means the last episodes, and the petty conflicts continued to the end of the Ottoman Empire, involving, at one time or another, especially because of all the Christian communities were having some foothold in the Holy Places. This would be very difficult to give a detail account of them. It is sufficient to say that at all times they reached dangerous proportions and even result in violence between clergymen and monks. Often the governor would invariably become involved, was called in to calm the excitement, investigate the incident, and, failing a quick solution on the spot, which was rare, and refer the whole matter to the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The Governor would normally not only report on the circumstances of the affair, but also attempt to establish whatever rights the parties were having. True and false claims and counter-claims were voiced by all sides, and with heavy pressures exercised on him, the governor’s task was indeed an intricate one. It was a most delicate matter for both the local authorities and central government, as there was also a fear that the other powers on the side of their respective clients would not be involved and thus the complexity of the matter would increase.57

Some other issues were also the subject of much negotiating and haggling between the governors and the consuls and other representatives of the non-Muslim communities living in the area. Due to The delicacy of the matters caused the governors to refer most of the issues to the Foreign Ministry in Istanbul, and much correspondence between Jerusalem and Istanbul was made to solve an issue. Very frequently, vague and sometimes conflicting instructions (which were by no means typical of ‘foreign affairs’ alone) made the governors’ task very difficult, and forced them into further correspondence with their superiors asking for clarifications or explaining the difficulties in applying one regulation or implementing an order. The

57. Ibid.
governor often wrote to Istanbul to clearly demonstrate the instructions and sometimes made endless requests to change or to clarify the regulations pertaining to Jewish immigration as this problem was very complex one.  

Now it may be said that in a broader sense, this was also a reflection of the Tanzimat’s achievements in the provinces, where they failed, very much as in the central government and perhaps even more so, to bring about a total overhaul of the administrative set-up. Therefore, the reforms failed, first of all, to provide for honest and competent officials at all the levels of the hierarchy. A governor not only remained formally dependent on the central government but also subject to the current political and personal changes and shifts which marked the working machinations of the high circles in the capital of the empire. The reforms did achieve a remarkable differentiation between the various branches of government – military, administrative, financial and judicial – and did endow the system with a semblance of modernity. At the same time, during the process they added obstacles in the path of the governors, who were supposed to be the main agents of reform in the area. At least in this case, modern principles of government and administration proved detrimental to the very cause of modernization which was dear to all reforms adopted by the Ottomans.

World War I

The First World War broke out in Europe during August 1914. At the beginning of the War Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire. The main population of Palestine was then mostly Arabs with some Jewish settlements and that too due to the European Zionist movement. Since the Germans sought to bring the declining Ottoman Empire into the War to draw Russian and British resources from the two main fronts of the War, the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in October 1914. The Ottomans had suffered significant territorial losses in the Balkans and the Caucasus at the hands of the Russians and saw allying themselves with the Germans was the only way to regain the lost territory from the besieged Russians. The War turned quickly into a disaster when the Ottoman army invaded the Russian Caucasus and was defeated decisively. They (Ottomans) launched an offensive from Palestine soon after entering the War in November 1914. After crossing the Sinai, they reached

68. The material is supplemented by the papers of Ali Ekrem Bey, Governor of Jerusalem from 1906 to 1908, located in Record Group 83 in the Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, documented 14, 21, 24.
at some locations on the Suez Canal, but the British compelled them to return back by beating them. Meanwhile the British encouraged an Arab Revolt in Arabia which turned into a major threat to the Ottomans. T.E. Lawrence assisted and helped the Arab Revolt to weaken the Ottoman position in Arabia as a whole and Palestine in particular. As a result, Palestine turned from an Ottoman backwater into the frontline of World War I and at the same time the British made commitments to the Arabs, after the War, for making an independent Arab state. While they made conflicting commitments to their French ally also. Initially Zionists were split by the War but they were in all the major belligerent powers. It was largely changed by the Balfour Declaration. A major offensive against the Ottomans in Palestine was mounted by the British. Marshall Edmund Allenby commanded the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force Field and made little progress against the Ottomans in the beginning, but finally the British took Jerusalem in December 1917. In this success, Australian Light Cavalry played an important role in taking it over. Ultimately, the Ottoman Army in the Levant was broken at the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918. After that the British with the Arab Army on its right moved to seize Damascus and finally captured it. During the War, the British made conflicting commitments to the Arabs, Zionists, and even the French. In fact, they wanted to maintain calm and peace in Palestine at that time in accordance with their plan of making Palestine as a Mandate under them whereas the Palestinian Arabs were not willing to participate in the institutions Mandate.\(^69\)

Arab Revolt

Many studies are required to know the political attitudes of Palestinians towards Ottoman rule. However, the desert tribes, supported by the British, gave very effective resistance to Ottoman rule when the Ottomans entered the War on the side of the Central Powers as these desert tribes did not like this alliance. With the encouragement of the British correspondence, Sharif Husayn launched the armed Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire on June 5, 1916 and with this he also declared himself "King of the Arabs" in October 1916. The Ottomans very much surprised when the Arab revolt broke out on 5 June, 1916 in the Hejaz. It is because British and French agents played a major role in inducing the Arab revolt. Col. T.E.

---

\(^69\) Ayalom, Ami, pp. 30-38
Lawrence, Emir Faisal, and his father Sherif Hussein, "King of the Hejaz" played leading role in the Arab Revolt. The Ottomans first lost their garrison at Aqaba. After this, the Arab Revolt was becoming harsh and finally broke out in full force during January-September 1918. When the Arabs took control of Arabia cutting rail lines, Ottoman garrisons were isolated and besieged throughout the Peninsula. Ultimately the Ottomans hard pressed by the British in Palestine and they were unable to deal with the Arab Revolt and finally they had also to lose their control over Palestine in 1917. 70

II. The Mandate and Beginning of Arab-Jewish Conflict

Until World War I, Ottoman Empire remained under the rule of the Turks. After the end of this war, the Turks were defeated by the British forces which were led by General Allenby. After the war, some parts of the Ottoman Empire were handed over to the French to control and the other parts were handed over to the British – including Palestine in accordance with the peace talks. This area was then governed by Britain from 1920 to 1948 under a League of Nations and called British mandate. While the Arab population who were living in Palestine were promised by the McMahon-Hussein Agreement of October 1915 that after World War I, land previously held by the Turks would be returned to the Arab nationals who lived in that land in exchange of their support against the Turks, but after defeating the Turks, British claimed that the agreement gave no such type of promise and denied it. The Zionist efforts to achieve Zionist goals were led by Dr. Chaim Weizmann and it was in 1917 that the British Government rewarded him with the Balfour Declaration. 71

However, The British Government decided to espouse the Zionist cause and Arthur Balfour, the then British Foreign Secretary, addressed a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, declaring Britain’s sympathy with the Jewish aspirants:

"His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their

70. Ibid., pp. 30-40.
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights or political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

The content of this letter clearly intended to please the Zionists without annoying the Arabs. The Jews understood it a promise towards the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, whereas the Arabs understood that the ‘national home’ for the Jews in Palestine meant the establishment of a Jewish political order in Palestine. However, when in April 1920, the Allied Supreme Council met in San Remo, it granted Britain the mandatory power on Palestine, which was finally confirmed in July 1922 by the League of Nations.

However, before the Balfour Declaration there was no ‘Palestine problem’. At that time although Palestine formed a province of the Ottoman Empire it was very much a part of the Arab home land as well, being under the uninterrupted occupation of the Arabs for more than 1300 years, and sharing the hopes and aspirations of the rest of the Arab world. As earlier mentioned that, it was the British Government which promised of immediate independence to the Arabs in 1916 to return for the Arab revolt against the Turkish rulers and the significant role Played by them in the ultimate defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

It was the Balfour Declaration promoted by the exigencies of the first world war and issued at the instance of the Zionists, and as a bait for world Jewry support which set the Arabs and the Jews against each other; their relations were until then quite friendly, and the Jews had been treated much better by the Arabs than by the Christians. According to Professor Parkes, "Islam set up no barriers to the social and economic freedom of the Jews" again in his words, "We find Jews in every imaginable occupation from prime minister and ambassador to scholar, merchant, landowner, and peasant, skilled artisan in a hundred trades, money - changer or money - lender, manufacture, and dealer in livestock". The Arab Palestinian Jews did

75. Ibid.
not conceive and propagate the idea of the Jewish state but it were the European Jews who did flout this idea. This was a confrontation of two irreconcilable nationalisms -- political Zionism and Arab nationalism which gave rise to the troublesome "Palestine question" of earlier years, the more recent Arab - Israeli hostilities, and the explosive Arab Israeli dilemma challenging the whole world till now.\textsuperscript{76} However, the Balfour Declaration was not legally binding, it undoubtedly strengthened the Zionist cause and the Balfour Declaration has been rightly characterized as the original foundation stone of the Jewish State constituted in Palestine then.

\textbf{Arabs's Opposition}

Due to this endorsement of Mandatory Government through Balfour Declaration aroused the Arab sentiments. For the Arabs, it meant sheer contradiction of the promises of post-war independence to the Arabs, contained in the Sharief Hussain-McMahon correspondence,\textsuperscript{77} President Wilson's fourteen points formula and 1918 Anglo- French declaration.\textsuperscript{78} However, The Arabs condemned the mandate on moral and legal grounds, by challenging that Britain had no right to promise Palestine to a third party to rule. They argued that Palestine did neither belong to Britain, nor did it belong to Turkey. Like the other Arab countries, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Arabs themselves were in revolt against Turkey, and fighting on the side of Allies for the sake of their national independence only. Morally it was invalid, insofar as it conferred any right on Jews against the wishes of overwhelming majority of Arabs in Palestine. It was also legally invalid because it was incompatible with the honest fulfillment to the Arabs of the solemn pledges that Britain made to them before a year. Therefore, it should be pointed out that the terms of the mandate (Jewish home in Palestine) were the clear violation of article 22 of the


\textsuperscript{77} George Antonious, pp.70-5.

\textsuperscript{78} The Mandatory Powers had proclaimed on 7 Nov. 1918, in a document known as the 'Anglo-French' declaration "the object aimed at by France and Britain in prosecution in the East the war loosed by German ambition is the complete and definite emancipation of the people so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national government and administration deriving their authority from the initiative and the choice of their indigenous population"; see George Antonious, pp. 435-6.
league covenant which recognized independence of all Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in principle.  

In addition, part second of the text of the declaration was a complete distortion of the existing facts of the Palestinian population. The Muslim and Christian Arab inhabitants were mentioned in such a way as to give an entirely false picture of their position in the country and their 'indubitable right' to it. They were referred as the existing non-Jewish communities, was simply intended to give the erroneous impression that they were an insignificant minority occupying a position subordinate to the Jews. Sami Hadawi, an eminent Arab scholar of contemporary Arab history stated that, "this clause, by purporting to protect the right of the Arabs as the existing non Jewish communities in reality aimed at robbing them in due course of their rights to the country as owners and inhabitants". Indeed, it is a matter of some significance as to the intentions of the authors of the 'Declaration' that the Arabs who numbered 644,000, i.e., 92 per cent of the total population were not mentioned by name only once. Mentioning them as non-Jewish communities was certainly to undermine the position Muslim Palestinians.

Inspire of Arabs stray resentment and protest, the mandatory administration was finally established which soon granted permission, technically under the obligation of Article 6 of the constitution, to the Jewish immigration into Palestine. During this early stage of the mandate, the British seemed keen to honour their commitment to the Jews by directly contributing to the furtherance of the Zionist cause at the cost of the indigenous Arab majority. Zionists' first major act of discrimination in this direction was the appointment of a Zionist enthusiast, Herbert Samuel, to the most important executive rank of the high commissioner of Palestine, who immediately issued the ordinance of 26 April, 1920 permitting 16,500 Jewish immigrants to enter into Palestine.

The Arabs then, with the increasing number of the aliens began to feel the danger to their security and national existence and they decided to resist waves of immigration and official discriminations. They feared lest the Jewish colonization would eventually lead to their political and economic domination over the Arabs and consequently, they would be squeezed out into the surrounding Arab territories to

---

make room for the increasing bulk of Jewish immigrants into Palestine.\footnote{80} As a result they were compelled to struggle to stop the immigration, and sale of lands to Jews and also refused to cooperate with the authorities.\footnote{81} This anxiety of Arabs soon culminated in the outbreak of anti Jewish and anti British disturbances more seriously in 1922, 1923 and again in 1929 which nearly parlayed the entire set up of the administration.

The rise of Hitler in Germany made the situation more complicated and precarious as several thousand Jews left Germany and reached to settle in Palestine permanently.\footnote{82} Due to this new wave of immigrants, further unrest took place among the Arabs and it gave impetus to violent activities in Palestine (1936 - 39), with its repercussions all over the Arab world.

All these disturbances occurred at a time when Britain and her Allies were preparing for a ‘second’ round fight with the Nazi and Fascist forces. This is because, they were most anxious not to antagonize the Arabs whose hostility might have adversely affected the war efforts of Britain. In that situation, Arabs cooperation became all the more essentials Italy was advancing then in the Mediterranean. At this critical juncture, the Arabs seemed more amenable to the Nazi propaganda. Amazingly, the fascist ideas were receiving good response from king Faruk, Ali Maher, the prime minister of Egypt. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Rector of Al-Azhar and several other prominent Arab leaders. Therefore, impelled by war consideration and unable to appease Arab sentiments on the question of Palestine, the British decided to treat the ‘Jewish homeland’ as a second priority and sent several commissions to Palestine to investigate and suggest a solution acceptable to both the contending parties – Jews and Muslims.\footnote{83}

However, reports of these commissions appeared unfavorable to the Zionist aspirations, because the suggested restrictions on Jewish immigration invoked the principle of “absorptive capacity” and called for a new statement of policy to define and safeguard Arab rights.\footnote{84} The Peel Commission report of the 1930 was a little

---

\footnote{81}{Peter Young, \textit{The Israeli Campaign 1967}, London, 1967, p. 23.}
\footnote{82}{By 1922 there were 151,000 Jews in Palestine, by 1932, 180,000 and by 1936, after three years frenzied flight from the new Nazi regime in Germany, their number increased to 400,000, see, Peter Young, p. 23.}
\footnote{83}{For example, The Shaw Commission of 1929, The Hope-Simon Commission of 1930, The Royal Peel Commission of 1936 and The Woodland Commission of 1938.}
\footnote{84}{Janowski, p. 322.}
different in the sense that it recommended partition of Palestine with a portion being allotted to the Arabs and another portion to the Zionists. This solution, not being acceptable to either was soon undone by the finding of the Woodland Commission of 1938, that the partition was a completely unsatisfactory and unworkable solution. Lastly in 1939, as a result of the Arab rebellion, the British government issued a final statement of policy, which, after referring to the terms of the mandate, referred to, "the Royal Commission and previous Commission of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the mandate, such as the expression ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine. They have also found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy, a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Jews and Arabs. In the interest of peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine, the government was convinced that a clear definition of policy and objectives was essential. Finally, the British government declared that neither their undertakings to the Jews nor the national interests of Britain warranted that they should continue to develop the national Jewish home beyond the point they reached already. Therefore, the government decided:

1. That the Jewish national home as envisaged in the Balfour declaration and in previous statements of British policy had been established;
2. That to develop it further against Arab wishes would be a violation of Britain’s undertakings to the Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried out by the use of unjustifiable force;
3. That, therefore, after the admission of a final quota of 75,000 more Jewish immigrant over a period of five years, Jewish immigration should stop;
4. That during this period of five years, a restriction should be placed on the acquisition of further land in Palestine by the Jews; and
5. That at the end of five years, self-governing institutions should be set up in the country.\(^8\)

The white paper of 1939 imposed many restrictions on the Jewish immigration and economic activities as well as presented two alternatives for Zionism. The first option was to return to the eschatological and classical Zionism of Maimonides or the ritual-cultural emphasis of Abad Han. The other was to follow in the path of Moses, Leo Pinski and Theodor Herzl. In the light of their history in the shadow of their first option seemed to them depressing. However, the second option seemed still workable with the support of Great powers stricken by surprise, guilt and tor. The other alternative promised, at least, that the next injustice would happen a change to someone else (The Arabs of Palestine).

The Zionists, deciding in favour of the second alternative, grew more zealous in their achievement of their objective of immigration policy. By that time, there been "little opposition to the mandate administration," henceforward, they died to violent methods to make the British accept their viewpoint. The British organized and armed the Haganah to act as Jewish police force, but they turned on the British themselves and started killing, looting and harassing them. At the same time, the Zionists intensified their activities on the political front also. When the point came to spell the end of Britain's military might, the Zionistsjudged that Britain was "too weak a reed on which to rely more". Therefore, the centre of gravity of their movement is shifted to Washington where the public and politicians were believed to be more sympathetic to the Jewish cause, and where a well-financially affluent Jewish community was having its weight on the trends of politics and policy as well as on the then government. Keeping this realization in mind, the top Zionist leaders, Ben-Gurion and Dr. Weizmann, in 1942, visited the United States. The American Zionist organization in May, adopted the so-called "Chinmore program" which resolved to work openly for nothing short of statehood of Zionists.87


For text of the programme, see, "Palestine: New Heaven" (ESCO foundation publication II), p. 1054. Also Lenczowski, p. 327. In brief the Baltimore programme called: The establishment of a Jewish state, which could embrace the whole of Palestine: The creation of a Jewish army: The repudiation of the white paper of 1939.
However, the U.S.A. responded in favour of the Zionists. Due to the dreadful Nazi oppression of the Jews in Europe, deep sympathies evoked among the western powers, and established in their minds and notably in the minds of the American people a feeling of obligation to provide recompense for the horrors which the Jewish people of Europe were facing. Parties and press now, demanded the government "to use its good office with Britain to allow Jews to enter Palestine freely."\(^{88}\)

The Jewish question became a major concern of the U.S. Congress in early 1945. In spite of a resolution committing United States' support to the creation of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, could not get through' due to the disfavour of the state department and the war department which did not support the resolution.\(^{89}\)

However, the Jewish question became a real live issue during the presidential election of the U.S.A. The pro and opponent, both the parties "sought to outbid one another in the process of their support to the Zionist cause." In his message to the convention of the American Zionists in 1944, President Roosevelt promised that efforts will be made to find appropriate methods and means of effectuating this policy as soon as possible. He also mentioned that he knew how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. Furthermore, he assured and was convinced that the American people would give their support to this and if he was reelected, he would help bring this into a realization.\(^{90}\)

The successor of President Roosevelt, President Truman wrote to Prime Minister Atlee, on August 31, 1945 urging him that 100,000 Jews be admitted into Palestine. This he did under heavy pressure of the local and international Zionists, public opinion and the pledges of his predecessor. He invited the U.S. to cooperate

\(^{88}\) For text of the congressional resolution in favour of the Jewish aspirations dated December 1945, see U.S. Statutes at large, Vol 59, p. 848-9 for extracts see, Janowski, op. cit., p. 163. Also Lilienthal, p. 90-2. On Nov. 2, 1942, a supporting declaration was signed by a majority of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In 1944 the democratic and republican national conventions 'vigorously' supported Jewish demands. Again in July, 1945, a majority of the members of both houses of Congress addressed a letter to the President calling upon him to press for the establishment of a democratic Jewish commonwealth in Palestine as well for unrestricted Jewish immigration.

\(^{89}\) On this resolution, Cordell Hull observed: "At the state Deptt. We felt that the passage of this resolution, although not being on the executive, might precipitate conflict in Palestine and other parts of the Arab world endangering American troops and requiring the diversion of forces from European and other combat areas. It might also prejudice negotiations with Ibn-Saud for the construction of a pipeline across Saudi Arabia which our military leaders felt was of utmost importance to our security."

with Britain in a joint inquiry into the conditions in Palestine and problems related to Palestine. In compliance, the U.S. accepted to share the responsibility of finding and implementing a solution which would be acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs.  

The main recommendation of the committee’s report called for the “Issuance of 100,000 certificates for admission of Jews into Palestine who have been the victim of Nazi and Fascist persecution as well.” This was also proclaimed that “neither Jews shall dominate Arabs, nor Arabs shall dominate Jews in Palestine which shall not be a Jewish state and not be an Arab state.” Lastly, the report rejected ‘partition’ as a solution of the problem of the problem.

There were quite varying reactions to this report. However, President Truman expressed his satisfaction on the recommendations as if his earlier demand would be endorsed for admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. It was also approved by the U.S. Congress by adopting the resolution which it had dropped last year despite of the insistence of General Marshall mentioning the security grounds. But, both the Arabs and Great Britain rejected the resolution.

Reactions of the Arabs

The Arabs reacted as it was a denial of their rights of self determination and violation of British pledges made time to time. A protest strike was called by the Arab higher committee and it was also declared that the Arabs would defend the country with all means and available to them. An extra ordinary session was too held by the Arab league council in Syria which adopted a resolution on the use of force to halt illegal Jewish immigration and decided on arming the Arabs in Palestine, if the British did not disarm the Jews and not prevent them from forceful immigration into Palestine. The Arab League Council also rejected the “intervention” made by the Anglo-American committee and the U.S. The then chairman of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, Jamal Husain, warned the western powers, that, the committee

---

91. U.K., House of Commons, parliamentary debates 415 (1945-6) the Anglo-American committee of enquiry Cols. 1927-34 was constituted on 10 December, 1945 with 6 Americans and 8 British members. The committee held its hearing in Washington, London, Palestine, Cairo, and other Arab centers. It submitted its report in April 1946 to the respective government. For text see : Dept. of state publication : No. 233, p. 1-12.

92. It is noteworthy that Truman’s statement on the report was motivated by pressures of domestic politics as well as exigencies of the forthcoming congressional election in which the Jews were expected to vote as a block.

93. John Campbell, in Defense of the Middle East, p. 315.
report doomed Palestine to be a land of misery and bloodshed. He also said that, “our only hope is to face the East, because the west has completely sold us to the Jews.”

Reactions of the Jews

The Jews rejected the Arabs’ reactions saying that it was denial of the fulfillment of their fundamental objective and breach of British promise mentioned in the Balfour Declaration (1917).

Stand of Britain

Britain, whereas, expressed its inability to implement the recommendations of the committee as these were unacceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, more particularly because Arabs had threatened to use force against those who would intercept their affairs. Therefore, Britain refrained itself to implement the recommendations also because of, it had stakes in the Middle East.

III. Creation of Israel and Expulsion of Palestinians

Palestine Question and the U.N.

Just after the end of the Second World War, unprecedented violence in Palestine took place in which ‘Hagana’ the illegal military organization of the Zionist movement and its two splinter groups -- Irgun and the Stringing played the most active role. The fact is that when the British were engaged with the war against Germany, these terrorist Jewish organizations were busy acquiring arms and training by their underground forces to perform terrorism and sabotage acts against civilians as well as the government obviously in support of their political aims and ambitions in the land of Palestine. The government of Britain was seriously alarmed and agitated over the Zionist campaign of terrorism, so much so that Sir, Winston Churchill, a sympathizer of the Zionist cause, had to condemn the act in the most

95. Early in October 1939, forty three Jews, wearing uniforms were arrested while engaged in military maneuvers and carrying rifles and bombs. The Palestine government discovered that arms and explosives in huge quantity were being stolen from its military establishment. It was soon found that the large scale stealing racket was connected with the Hagana. See Palestine, A survey of Palestine 1945-46, p. 58-68.
severe words on hearing of Lord Moyne's murder in Cairo by a Zionist terrorist on November 6, 1944. He said:

"If our dreams for Zionism are to end in smoke of an assassin's pistol and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past, if there is to be any hope of a peaceful and successful future for Zionism, these wicked activities must cease and those responsible for them must be destroyed root and branch."

However, his warning seemed to have had absolutely no effect on the condition of violence and terrorism. Establishments and buildings of the government continued to be blown up, railway tracks and telephone lines were cut, and Arab civilians were assassinated too. One wing of the King David hotel in which the government secretariat and part of the military headquarters were housed, blew up resulting in a grievous loss of life on 22 July 1946. "The Jewish community of Palestine" was held responsible by the general officer commanding in Palestine for the outrageous act of this violence. The officer was convinced that "the Jews in this country are accomplices and bear a share in this criminal act."

The British, in this frustrating situation of lawlessness, disorder and insecurity to their men and officers, felt helpless and unable to carry the White Man's burden further more. They were unable to find a solution of the Palestine problem which could be acceptable to both the Arabs and Jews. Besides, the growing American pressure in favour of the Jews, and their own war-exhaustion and preoccupation with internal post-war problems finally impelled them to refer the matter to the United Nations. On the request of British, a special session of the General Assembly was called on 28th April 1947, which set up a U.N. special committee on Palestine.

96. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs, London, 1959, p. 281. It is generally held that the assassination was an act of revenge for the anti-Zionist policy he was believed to have advocated. A Zionist writer made the following charges against the deceased: "He has been 'busy rigging up' the Arab league as a counterforce to Zionism; as a colonial secretary in 1941-42, he 'vehemently' opposed Jewish immigration; he had made a declaration in the House of Lords on June 9, 1942 that the Jews were not the descendants of the ancient Hebrews with no 'legitimate Claim' to Holy Land see Zoor, Isaac, Rescue and liberation: America's part in the birth of Israel (N. York, 1954), p. 115.


(UNSCOP) to study the Palestine problem and suggest solution about the rising critical position.\textsuperscript{99}

The reports of the special committee which was presented to the General Assembly were not unanimous at all.\textsuperscript{100} The majority of the members proposed partition of Palestine called thereafter ("Majority Plan"), into an Arab state and a Jewish state with a common economic union, while Jerusalem was placed under the U.N. administration as 'International City'. At the same time, the minority of members (Known as Minority Plan) suggested a single state with a federal structure.\textsuperscript{101}

The Arabs, before the final discussion and approval of the UNSCOP report by the two third majority of the assembly, favoured the 'Minority plan' in the absence of a better alternative, whereas Britain had already indicated that it would support and assist in the implementation of any U.N. decision if the British government did not find anything objectionable and if both the Jews and the Arabs would accept it 'freely'.\textsuperscript{102}

The balloting of final voting on the report which was scheduled to be held on 26 November was immediately called off as soon as it became clear, after hearing a number of speakers, that the 'Majority plan' might not secure the required majority.\textsuperscript{103}

Many debates and discussions at various committee levels as well as in the general assembly had unmistakably shown that majority was not in favour of the partition plan. It was a general view that if, at this stage, the Arabs had really exerted themselves to oppose the 'Majority plan' vigorously, there was the possibility that the partition would have been either rejected or at least postponed. The Arabs, however, unrealistically preferred to boycott the whole proceeding, while the Zionists were engaged in lobbying violently. The general assembly, consequently, met again after 24 hours' and it was very surprising that Philippines and Greece, who had earlier opposed the 'Partition' now either favoured the partition plan. The change of this

\textsuperscript{99} Peter Young, op. cit., p. 25-6.
\textsuperscript{101} The 'Minority Plan' was favoured by India, Iran, Yugoslavia. They proposed a 'Federation' which was to be composed of a Jewish state and an Arab state with local autonomy but a single Palestine nationality and citizenship. The federal government was to exercise full authority over such matters as national defense, foreign relations, immigration, currency, waterways, transport and communications.
\textsuperscript{102} Speaking at a meeting of the general assembly on 15 May 1947, the British representative, Mr. Creech Jones said: "we have tried for years to solve the problem of Palestine. Having failed so far, we now bring it to the U.N. in the hope that it can succeed where we have not.
\textsuperscript{103} U.N. General Assembly, plenary meeting (26 November, 1947), 1310-66.
decision from negative to affirmative was in fact due to the American pressure and compulsion upon the nations who were dependent on the United States and thus indifference was exchanged with favour decidedly. 104

It was viewed that America was exerting pressure on the six U.N. member states which had indicated their intention of opposing partition, seems to hold some truth in the light of comments from two 'well-informed' observers, one against the partition, the other in favour of it. According to Summer Wells it was the direct order of the White House that every form of pressure -- direct or indirect, would be brought to bear by American officer upon those countries which were outside the Muslim world, and that they were known to be either opposed to partition or would abstain. A number of representatives and intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would be secured at length. 105

But according to Kermit Roosevelt, the delegates of these six nations as well as their home governments were overfilled with telegrams, phone calls, letters, and visitations which were mainly filled from congressmen, and others, in which they invoked the name and prestige of the United States government. 106 A well known democrat with White House as well as ex-governor personally telephoned Haiti urging that his delegation be instructed to change its voting policy. A very prominent economist also close to the White House and acting in liaison capacity for the Zionist organization exerted his power to persuade upon Liberian delegate for voting. These are the two examples (out of many more) which reversed themselves and voted in favour of partition. Aside, the then the U.S. secretary of defense, Mr. James V. Forrestal was very important person (at that time) who had admitted these facts, referring to the manner in which his government forced the adoption of the partition plan, he said: "The method that had been used to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the general assembly bordered closely into scandal." 107 This was the effective American pressure for partition which should largely be considered

105. Summer Wells, We Need not Fail. Boston, 1948, p. 63.
107. Mills, Walter, Ed.
responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of Muslim as well as the Arab world. 108

Partition and the Arab-Israel War

After the approval of the partition plan by the General Assembly with a majority of 33 to 13 votes with 10 abstentions, 109 the Arab representatives walked out in protest and declared that they “did not consider themselves bound by the resolutions.” They also had a view that according to article 10 of the U.N. charter, the assembly has no power to enforce them, it can only be recommend.

They also argued that the action of the U.N. was against the basic principles of this organization. The UN, however, had set up to uphold the right of all peoples to self-determination. But it had violated its own charter. It also denied that the Palestine Arabs made the third majority of the country, the right to decide for themselves. According to them the partition of Palestine was against the principles laid down in the Atlantic charter of August 1914. The world at large the “no territorial change that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned,” would take place. Thus the U.S. and Great Britain assured them.

As the prosperity and fairness was questionable, the Arabs rejected the U.N. proposal and justified it. The political power was to be only in the hands of the Jewish ‘ruling body’ and the Arab population of the proposed ‘Jewish state’ was to be fifty per cent. The most glaring injustice has been a permanent source of irritation and quarrel between the Arabs and the Israelis which found in the scheme of territorial arrangement. The whole of the south of Palestine from Beersheba to the Gulf of Aqaba was given by the U.N. special committee to the Jews. A few Jews set up quite recently near Beersheba itself. Completely it was an Arab area. As on the Mediterranean the Jews wanted it to by-pass the Suez Canal in order to have a port on the red sea. It not only enabled them to cut off all Africa from Asia but also Egypt from Arabia. It can be understood through the following way “This was an example of seizing alien territory merely for its economic and strategic importance, without moral justification. It was surely an irony that, at the moment when the greatest


57
powers had abjured the seizure of land from weaker countries, the Jews should embark on a new imperialism of their own, and that they only succeeded in their enterprise owing to the fact that they enjoyed the support of the U.S., the avowed enemy of imperialism.”

As the Arab organization launched guerrilla warfare in Palestine, the Arab higher committee on 6 February, 1948 warned that “any attempt by the Jews or any other power or group of powers to establish a Jewish state in the Arab territory is an act of oppression which will be resisted in self-defense by force.” Jewish had willingly accepted because it felt the best they could legally achieve at that time and also nothing to lose by accepting the partition. However the students and political organizations staged demonstration against partition in Cairo, Damascus and other Arab capitals.

The Arab village of ‘Dair Yasin’ near Jerusalem was raided by the members of the ‘Irgun’ organization. During this massacre some 250 Arab including men, women and children. Thus on 9 April 1948 the climax of Arab-dispersal reached. And after few days on 22 April the ‘Hagana’ attacked the Arab quarter of Haifa. It marked a profound impact on the whole Arab world. However the cumulative effect of the happenings in Palestine could not influence. The two parties clashed very often. Consequently, there were heavy casualties. Against the partition of their own homeland Palestine to reinforce their brethren in their struggle the volunteers from Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries rushed to Palestine.

The partition plan was unworkable and thus the Arab sentiments affected American policy. It was realized by the President Truman. On 19 March the President Truman accordingly proposed for a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the U.N.


112. ‘Development of the quarter’ Middle East Journal, (July, 1948) 331. It is noteworthy here that at that time the Haganah members numbered no less than 60,000 Zionist Jews. It was a formidable force of fanatics who performed incomparable acts of terrorism against Arab civilians and ousted them from their native places. The same elements are primarily responsible for the continuing state of war and misery. Figure quoted in official report of the Anglo-American committee of inquiry. See cmd. 6873. PP. 3-4.

113. It is reported that by last February, the number of casualties had reached over 2,500, see, Lenczowki, p. 336-7.
trusteeship council. The Zionist along with the some of the U.N. members showed their disagreement and already realized that the trusteeship proposal failed since whatever the portion was allotted to them. Thus British took withdraw from Palestine and it became free.

On 15 May, 1948 Britain announced the termination of its mandate over Palestine. However the U.N. was still debating the American proposal for trusteeship. The very day, the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed and soon the United States recognized the member of the comity of nations, guaranteeing thereby the continued existence of the newly born state. A lot of development had been taken place and thus Arab was astonished to see the speed of these developments. They only focused to challenge to undo what the Zionists had achieved. The Palestinian still aroused the sympathies of the Arabs of the neighboring countries yet they were being killed, compelled and terrorized to remove from their homes. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia came at one platform to join them and declared war against Israel. On 14 may the U.N. secretariat was informed by the Arab league that the Arab states were “compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and of establishing law and order and putting an end to the massacre perpetrated by terroristic Zionist gangs against the Arabs and against humanity.”

The Arabs became failure and could not get success against Zionist forces in the battle-field. The exhibition of Arab’s firmness and striving to prevent it from taking place yet the state of Israel came into existence. As Zionists had already seized territory beyond the Jewish state that was assigned to it. The first orders of cease-fire,

114. It seems that the change in the U.S. policy was dictated by the failure of the U.N. commission on Palestine to secure peace and order. Secondly, the U.S. defense and the state department had stressed the need of Arab friendship and cooperation in view of the strategic importance of the area, its valuable resources, above all to check the increasing influence of Russia with the Arabs. The president could not have possibly ignored such winnings and considerations. See U.N. Doc. A/505- official records of the general assembly pp. 5-6 and 8-9.

115. Britain, France, Russia, China and Arab countries, etc. for details see Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 76- 80.


however, were issued on time on the insistence of the Security Council vide its resolution of 22 May 1948. Israel gave main focus on Jerusalem and occupied 77% of Jerusalem which was being internationalized instead of having the jurisdiction over 56% of the territory of Palestine. The focus had been given to this holy city and it considered as the capital of state of Israel and also declared that “Capital of the Jewish state; instead of Arabs being permitted to remain in their homes and country to lead a normal life, nearly one million men, women and children-Moslems and Christians—were forcibly expelled and dispossessed.”

Post 15 May Britain did not consent to stay for even a short time and even did not make any arrangement for the transfer of power to both the parties as it was envisaged in the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine. The United Nations, however, itself committed and showed the greatest act of irresponsibility during the issuing of partition plan. The United Nations issued the plan of partition in country in which the two bitterly hostile nations were already at each other’s throat. The United Nations did not make any provision for any measure of enforcing their orders or Jerusalem and Bethlehem, the international area even of taking over and had allotted to themselves. Thus this untold human misery responsibility and bloodshed must be placed squarely on Britain and the United Nations.

Causes of the Arab Defeat

During the battle-field there were a lot of internal and external causes for the loss of Arabs. Primarily the defeat of Arabs could not be denied since it was due to their own faults and shortcomings. Arab states did not make adequate cooperative planning of the campaign which was the root cause of the Arab’s defeat. Due to this there was insufficient mutual trust and lack of mutual confidence. Secondary the Jews were struggling for their very existence and many of the Arab troops had little stomach for the fighting. While the Jews launched the war with a coordinate organization, a unified and total conscription whereas the Arabs showed only disunity, no single command, diversity of plans, improvisation, a slackness and lack of seriousness during the war and also about winning the war which was the another

119. Hadawi, op. cit., p. 98.
reason. The Arabs' army of liberation was without training, proper organization and discipline and looking literally a tottered force of volunteers which came to Palestine to fight for the Arab cause. The Jewish armies, on the other hand, were perfect and excellent in every way. The Jews had been rigorously preparing themselves for the inevitable war since 1936 of the Arab' rebellion while the decision of Arabs to fight had been taken on the spur of the moment. Then they had foreseen that the force will decide the ultimate issue. The British formed a Jewish brigade and gave training to it during the Second World. It was trained level of efficiency comparable to that of European armies and had to bring into Europe and fought during the Italian campaign. The British gave also training to other Jews in guerilla tactics during the time when it was expected that the Palestine might be occupied by the Germans. Besides these the British army supplied or stolen a lot of arms into the country and large secret arsenals of weapons were located underground in the Jewish colonies. By 1948 mostly officers or soldiers had arrived in Palestine during the World War II. Thus with the help of these materials the Jews formed the Hagana or defense army into reasonable troops.

It was unrealistic, unwise and irrational approach to defeat the Jewish army while the Arab army was insufficient and untrained volunteer corps. They, the Arab, had no idea about the strength and disposition of the enemy's real power. The Jewish forces invaded on allotted territory of the Arab which was given it under the partition plan. Thus the Arabs were unable to inflict any harm on the Jews. Thus the futile operations of the Arab army gave away the greatest military asset which the Arabs possessed - the whole range of the Samarian and Judean mountains. A distinguished Arab writer Musa-Alami said that "in face of the enemy, the Arabs were not a state but petty states, groups not a nation, each fearing and watching the other and intriguing against it. What concerned those the most and guided their policy was not to win the war and save Palestine from the enemy, but what would happen after the struggle, who would be predominant in Palestine, or annex it to themselves, and how they could achieve their own ambitions." Further president Nasser also admitted his view that "once that the Arabs were defeated because they were "seven armies". "Had the Arab army been one, Palestine would have been saved." During the period of the U.N. imposed truces Israel had been receiving reinforcements, arms, ammunition and

volunteers from abroad. Besides Britain had stopped supplies of arms the Arabs' reserve of war material was running dangerously low were another important factors. 122

To maintain the hostilities Israel emerged from the truce stronger and better equipped and also during the four weeks of interval defied every provision of the cease-fire orders. Jon Kimche explained it in the following words: "Israeli emissaries scoured the whole of Europe and America for possible supplies. American Jews were contributing generous supplies of dollars and arms merchants were prepared to deal for dollars. The Czechs were most helpful. A regular airlift began to operate from Prague to 'Acre' in southern Palestine. Rifles, ammunition and guns were now arriving. So were the first bombers-flying fortresses smuggled from the United States, and Beaufort-Fighter- tricked out of England when the truce ended a coherent Jewish army with a tiny but effective air force and a small and daring navy was ready to give battle." 123

Further David Ben-Gurion made a statement on 10 June 1948 and gave their confirmation. He stated that: "Our bounds are set wider, our forces multiply, we are administering public services, and daily new multitudes arrive— all that we have taken we shall hold. During the cease-fire, we shall organize administration with fiercer energy, strengthen our footing in town and country, speed up colonization and Aliya (immigration) and look to the army." 124

Cease-Fire and Armistice

The U.N. appointed Folke Bernadotte as a mediator for the Palestine affairs on 20 May, 1948. The U.N. Palestine Commission had failed to resolve the disputes between Arabs and the Jews. So the Security Council decided to replace it by a mediator. 125 Thus the 'immediate cease-fire had come into being on 11 June after the council ordered. Since both the parties had regarded the treaty only a 'breathing spell' and the continuous fighting on the expiration of the four week peace treaty, the
Security Council thus ordered immediate cease-fire for "indefinite period" on 15 July. The Security Council had declared another new cease-fire on 17 October, as the Israeli military group attempted to pass through the Egyptian occupied territory the serious armed clashes broke out on 14 October. A timely action thus had been taken by the Security Council.

Thus the accomplishment of General Armistice agreement had been fulfilled between Israel and Egypt on 24 February, between Israel and Lebanon on 23 March, Israel and Jordan on 3 April and Israel and Syria on 20 July, 1949.

The agreement with Israel was a provisional measure, as the Arab states thought, to give the general assembly the opportunity to review its quick recommendation of partition. Thus the Arab states agreed to accomplish the Armistice agreement with Israel. "For the future government of Palestine" attuned with the principal by self determination (Italics mine) to find an impartial solution.

The Arab-Israeli war officially came to an end post the signing of these agreements. However it was not a permanent settlement according to the Arab states. During the twenty-two years of their eventful history the Arabs have constantly followed this line. However they always at the views that their signing of the armistice had not ended their war with Israel. "Armistices or truces" as defined in international law, "are all agreement between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities." In fact they are in no way to be compared with peace and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains between belligerents and neutrals on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities.

At the views of Israel 'Peace treaties' between Israel and the Arab states followed the ended of the War. Thus on the other hand the Israelis continually argued that the Arab states could no longer claim the right of 'belligerency' after the end of armistice.

To check the increasing number of such incidents Security Council decided to create a 'Truce supervision organization' (UNTSO) when the number of border

127. The incident occurred at a time when the general assembly was discussing Bernadotte's second report which had proposed a change in the territorial boundaries of the two states and repatriation of half a million refugees, Israel moved her troops into the Egyptian occupied "Pass" to reach the Jewish settlement in the Negev. This led to a serious clash between the armies of Egypt and Israel.

incidents became more serious and more alarming. Since Arab and Israel held their
grounds firmly the permanent peace could not be renovated. Due to lack of
cooperation and compliance from both sides the UNTSO had been unable to maintain
complete peace on the borders.

The fundamental provisions of the Armistice agreements were totally different
from the main contentions of the two parties in question. The successive events that
finally led to the major clash on 5 June, 1967 were so closely related to their meaning
and defiance. To determine the amount of responsibility more so it will be helpful to
point out them here to be able:

1. "The basic purpose of the Armistice demarcation line is to delineate
the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall
not move."

2. The principal affirmed in the agreements that "no military and political
advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security
Council."

3. "No aggressive action by the armed forces land sea or air of either
party shall be undertaken, planned or threatened."

4. "The Armistice demarcation line is not to be construed in any sense as
a political or territorial boundary and is delineated without prejudice to
rights, claims and positions of either party to the Armistice as regard
the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

5. "The provisions of this agreement are dictated exclusively by military
and not by political, consideration."

6. "The agreement also provided for the creation of demilitarized zones
and no-man's land areas. Four such demilitarized zones were created
along with the Armistice demarcation line. One in the north on the
Palestine Syrian border, a second, encircling the Hebrew university
and Hadassah hospital building on mount Scopus in Jerusalem, a third
on Jabal Mukabbur in Jerusalem, comprising the old government house
and Arab college buildings and environs. Was assigned a special status
as headquarters of the truce supervision organization and thus removed
from Arab or Israeli jurisdiction, and a fourth diamond-shaped area
around El-Auja in the south on the borders with Egypt. In addition, two
no-men's land areas were established: one in Jerusalem to separate the
Arab from the Israeli held sector of the city, the other in the Latrun area, consisting of some 15000 acres of agricultural land on the Jeffer-Jerusalem road.\textsuperscript{130}

In most of the cases however Israel has been violating the Armistice agreements which can be seen on record with plenty of evidence. It has unilaterally affirmed them invalid, inoperative and unbinding upon her.\textsuperscript{131} Along the demarcation lines and inside the demilitarized zones a brief survey of such incidents has been taking place since the signing of the armistices in 1949. Further the Israeli leaders claimed their view and concluded that these agreements with certain 'covert aims' in view. The Israeli leaders wanted to secure their initial military gains in Palestine. However they aimed to manipulate to their further advantage after achieving the previous objective. Further to support the above statement some of the important cases of purposeful violations of the GAA are mentioned below. However these cases are distinct from the two wars of 1956 and 1967. These supporting statements are as the following:

1. The Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement was signed on 24 February, 1949. According to the agreement, the Israelis were permitted to remain in occupation of the territory held, which in the direction of the Gulf of Aqaba was limited to within half the distance between the Gulf shore-line and the area they then actually held.\textsuperscript{132} The Israelis were excluded from access to the Gulf. But on March 1949 merely thirteen days after they had signed the armistice agreement they launched an attack on the southern Nageb which brought their forces down to the Gulf of Aqaba. The Arab village of Um Rashrash on the Gulf was occupied, the villagers were expelled and dispossessed and Eilat was thus established on Arab-owned land. This is quite significant in view of the role Eilat was later to play in 1967 when the closure of the straits of Tiran by Egypt and the denial to the Israelis of access to the Eilat port were used as the excuse for aggression against Egypt. Few people in the outside world remembered in 1967 that...


\textsuperscript{131} Ben-Curion's statement: "The Armistice with Egypt is dead, as are the Armistice lines and no wizard or magician can resurrect these lines." \textit{New York Times}, 8 November, 1956.

\textsuperscript{132} U.N. document S/1264/Rev. 1 of 24 February, 1948, p. II Annex II (B) to the GAA).
the controversial port had been occupied in violation of the armistice agreement with Egypt.

2. Another G.A.A violation by Israel on the Egyptian side also turned out to be significant in the light of later events. On 20 March 1950, Israel occupied Bir Qatta within the demilitarized zone, contrary to the ruling of the MAC.\footnote{133} When the Security Council was informed of the issue, Israel promised to withdraw her armed forces. On the strength of this assurance the council, in its resolution of 17 November, 1950 stated that “the Israeli armed forces will withdraw to positions authorized by the armistice agreement.” However, Bir Qatta was re-occupied by the Israelis in September 1955, and served as spring-board for the invasion of Sinai on 29 October, 1956.

3. On 2 September, 1950 the Israeli army expelled some 4,000 Bedouins form El-Auja demilitarized zone across Egyptian boundary into Sinai. In his report to the Security Council on 18 September, 1950 on the new situation, the Chief of staff of the U.N.T.S.O. indicated that:

(a) The Bedouins had lived in the Beersheba area under British mandate but had moved to El-Auja about two years before, because of Israeli pressure.

(b) That since 20 August, Israelis had conducted operations to clear the Bedouins, employing army troops with armored cars guided by reconnaissance aircraft.

(c) That after driving the Bedouins across the Egyptian international boundary the Israelis burned tents, crops and possessions and,

(d) That thirteen Bedouins were killed by Israelis during these operations.”\footnote{134}

On 17 November, 1950 the Security Council asked the Israeli-Egyptian mixed armistice commission to give urgent attention to Egypt’s complaint regarding the expulsion of the Bedouins and asked Israel to give effect to any finding of MAC concerning repatriation. MAC decided that the expelled Bedouins should be allowed to return. Mr. Ben-Gurion, However, refused to allow meetings of the MAC at El-Auja.


\footnote{134} U.N. Doc. S/1797.
4. But like other decisions of the Security Council affecting demilitarized zones, the latter resolution was ignored by the Israelis as more and more Arabs were expelled from their homes and lands. According to general Bennike between 6,000 and 7,000 Arabs were expelled from El-Auja demilitarized zone before May 1951 when the mixed armistice commission examined the matter and decided against Israel's action, 200 to 250 more were expelled in 1953.

On 21 September 1955, the Chief of staff U.N.T.S.O. reported to the Security Council that the Israeli army had occupied the demilitarized zone of El-Auja.

5. About a year later, on 21 August, 1956 he reported that Israel opposed "any meeting of the MAC at its headquarters at El-Auja situated in the demilitarized zone which is now occupied by Israeli troops."

6. And on 5 September 1956, the Chief of staff reaffirmed his previous reports to the effect that "the Israeli army continues to occupy the El-Auja demilitarized zone." And stressed that "El-Auja is not only the centre of the demilitarized zone it is also under article X Paragraph 2, the headquarters of the MAC." Referring to a recent contact with Mr. Ben-Gurion, the prime minister of Israel on 3 September, 1956, he added: "Mr. Ben-Gurion repeated his refusal to allow meeting of the MAC at El-Auja."

7. The representative of the U.N.T.S.O. (i.e., U.N. Truce supervision organization) stated before the Security Council on 9 November, 1953, that Israel had on the night of 30/31 March 1951, removed 785 Arabs from the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel I contravention of article V of the agreement and that these had not yet been allowed to return to their homes and property. The refusal was in total disregard of the ruling of the chairman of the mixed armistice commission, of the chief of staff of the U.N.T.S.O. and of the Security Council itself. To this day, the return of these villagers is barred by Israel.

136. U.N. document S/2040, section IV Para 3 and U.N. document S/2088. Para 8. The Security Council resolution in question is resolution 93 (1951) of 18 May 1951 U.N. document S/2157. This resolution decided that "Arab civilians who have been removed from the Demilitarized zone by the government of Israel should be permitted to return to their homes and that the mixed Armistice commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be
8. In four subsequent reports, the Chief of staff drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the Israeli authorities had refused to implement the Council’s resolution of 18 May, 1951. That Israeli police continued to occupy and to exercise general control over the demilitarized zone contrary to the armistice agreement which stipulated for local Arab police. That Israeli police controlled the movement of the Arabs and interfered with the freedom of movement of the chairman of the mixed armistice commission (MAC) and U.N. observers. And that Israeli police continued to maintain a check post on the main road to Mishmar-ha Yorden in the central sector of the demilitarized zone, contrary to the request of the chairman of MAC to remove it. On 27 October, 1953, General Vagn Bennike, the new chief of staff, reiterated the difficulties reported upon by his predecessor General Riley during the two previous years. He listed these as “the economic situation of the Arabs in the demilitarized zone, encroachments on Arab land, control exercised by the Israeli police over the greater part of the zone, Israeli opposition to the fulfillment by the chairman and united nations observers of their responsibility for ensuring the implementation of article V of the general armistice agreement.” He then suggested: “These difficulties can be solved if the provisions of article V of the general armistice agreement are applied in the light of the acting mediator’s authoritative comment accepted by both parties in 1949.”

Further Dr. Ralph Bunche gave a statement to the Security Council on 25 April, 1951 in the following words “In the nature of the case, therefore, under the provisions of the armistice agreement, neither party could validly claim to have a free

determined by the commission,” The Council further held that “no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, Armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the chairman of the mixed Armistice commission.


68
hand in the demilitarized zone over certain activity, while military activity was totally excluded.” General Bennike also drew their attention about the statement.  

The 72nd Emergency meeting of the MAC had been condemned by the Israel on 12 December, 1954 and thus he continued to isolate the GAA. The meeting was held failure to remove the regular police force from the demilitarized zone which it had recognized. The new Chief of staff General E.L.M. Burns gave the report on 8 January, 1955 that “police from the state of Israel, acting under orders from police headquarters outside the demilitarized zone, dominated the zone, and that repeated requests by the chairman of MAC to remove the police had been rejected.” In May 1956, firstly, General Burns had to raise the matter that pointed out that no change in the situation had taken place. This issue had brought before the Secretary General of the UN. The Arab territories beyond the armistice lines had been suffered with large-scale military attack. It has been quickly fated by the world organization and earnestly deplored by the leading statesmen throughout the world. The Arab villages of Qibya, Nahalin and Gaza are the few areas which faced the most serious raids. Hundreds of innocent people were killed; private homes and places of public amenities were destroyed during these raids. These inhuman acts severely condemned these ‘brutal acts of retaliations’ as “cold blooded murder” and the most

---

146. Qibya incident: During the night of 14 October, 1953 a force of about five hundred (or “absolute minimum of 250 as general Bennike stated in his report) armed Israelis, alleged to be regular troops crossed the Jordan Frontier and attacked the village of Qibya, killing 75 civilians, wounding 15 and destroying houses, a school and the village reservoir. The same it was reported also bombarded the village of ‘Shuqaba’ while a supporting unit shelled the village of ‘Badrus’ in retaliation for a counter Arab attack. The raid, report s said, was apparently intended as a reprisal for recent attack on an Israeli village by Jordan in which 3 civilians were killed.

The Nahalin Tragedy: It happened during the night of 28-29 March, 1954 when an Israeli force attacked a Jordan village, named Nahalin, threw hand-grenades into houses and were finally repelled after ‘severe’ fighting with the Arab legionaries and national guards. In this fighting 14 men and women were killed and 18 were wounded.

Attack on Gaza: The most serious of such incidents since the signing of Armistice in 1949, occurred on 23 February, 1955, when 38 Egyptians and 8 Israelis were killed in the fighting near Gaza. According to Egyptian statement, as also reported in the western press, two Israeli troops advance about two miles into Egyptian controlled territory; attacked and demolished a military post and a water pumping station, threw grenades into the Gaza station master’s house. While another Israeli unit crossed the Armistice demarcation line further to the south and ambushed a lorry bringing reinforcements. Israeli headquarters, on the other hand stated, that on Egyptian units had crossed the frontier and ambushed an Israeli patrol. (Kissing’s April 1955) 14157 A.
flagrant violation "of the cease-fire agreements and were criticized by the UN. 147
Further U.S., Britain and France also gave their view and expressed it "the gravest
violation so far, of the terms of the armistice." "It found no justification for Israeli
action." 148

Israel's regular armed forces carried out these justly condemnable acts of
retaliation without exception. 149 Reports, statements of the MAC and the censuring
resolution of the Security Council on record allow sufficient proof to the fact that
there is hardly any case involving Arab regular army units in any incident taking place
on the demarcation lines. There were a lot of such serious violations committed by
Israel. All of these were reported to the U.N. by its own trusted field staff and
condemned as such by the international body during the signing of the G.A.A. and the
June war of 1967. The Security Council particularly interpreted the status of the
'demilitarized zones', the obligations of the parties under the agreement and
responsibilities of the MAC, condemned treaty violations. It called for punishment to
those responsible for such incidents, recommended for repatriation of or sufficient
reward to the Arab refugees. However the practical value of all such measures and
indictments was equal to nothing because they were not backed by necessary actions
or sanctions. It was therefore, fairly suitable for the Israelis to "shrug off the
reprimand." The Arab naturally could not reunite with such a fake claim that Israel
legalized the attack of Arab lands by establishing the Jewish settlements, stationing
Israeli forces and police. Besides above these Israel started to refuse the admission of
the U.N. personal into such areas, and thereby claiming complete sovereignty over
them.

IV. Status of Women in Palestinian Society (General Discussion)

In the Arab world, women have a long history of fighting along with
their male counterparts against colonial and tyrant rulers. Since the very beginning,
they are playing an important role in different protests especially against the Zionists

147. The MAC condemned these incidents in the "strongest term" and called on Israeli authorities
to take effective measures to prevent such aggression in future and punish those responsible.
Similar was the statement of the U.S. State department dated 13 October.
148. In the debate on 29th March, 1955, the Security Council members stressed that they could not
condone a policy of organized retaliation by Israel, regardless of the repetition of incursions
across the border by Arab infiltrators and similar acts. Mr. Cabot Lodge (U.S.) enthusiastically
endorsed the views of his fellow-delegates in the Council. See U.N. Doc. SI003.
in their occupied territory. Hence, the Arab women were an integral part of the protest movements and they participated in the demonstrations demanding social and political change, calling for justice and fighting for human and social rights also.

Palestinian society has been fundamentally feudal and patriarchal. The birth of a boy was normally more welcome and celebrated than of a girl who was considered a burden on the family. Women must be fertile and bear 'fruit' especially sons. The women, who are not able to have children, are considered without value and dispensable and the women who do not produce sons/son would either be divorced or be supplemented by other wives. Men were considered responsible for women's actions. Since the childhood, girls are taught to be obedient and are constantly watchful. If she was late in returning home, whatever be the reason, she would be punished. Even married women were beaten. Women are considered to be as wives and mothers and restricted to the four walls of homes. Marriages are arranged by the parents and grooms and brides can see each other only after marriages. 150

However, the role of women in the struggle of Palestine started after the formation of first women's associations in Jerusalem in 1919. It was as early as 1920 (27 February), when a considerable number of women came out on the streets of Jerusalem and joined in protests and demonstrations with their counter parts to show their anger against the British mandate and Jewish expansionist aims in Palestine. The first women's congress was held in Jerusalem in 1929 in which 300 women participated. It was an important step towards a more organized movement that adopted resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Balfour Declaration and the prohibition of Zionist emigration into Palestine. As a result of this congress, the Palestinian women's Federation came to existence. The birth of the first Palestinian women's organization was simultaneous with the beginning of the resistance to Zionist immigration in Palestine. 151

For more than half a century Palestinian history and politics had received extensive coverage from scholars of the West Asia and others. But, studies on

Palestinian women had not been covered much in contemporary period. The main reason of studies on Palestinian women was very difficult to identify study and draw conclusions about persons who represented one geo-cultural area; but who were actually living in Diaspora. Basically Palestinians were located all over the world at that time. The Palestinian women were influenced in the other culture and their receptivity to the cultural influences of host countries varies, depending on such factors as the initial areas of residence, social class, level of education, types of employment and the degree of westernization before their dismemberment. Following is an attempt to describe the status of women in the traditional Palestinian home and the influence of the scattered families of Palestinians.

One significant element in Palestinian society was the *hamula* in which all members of an extended family were mutually responsible for one another. To maintain the social order in the private lives of all the family members, communal strictures were observed that sanction supervision of accepted customs and mores. If any member of the family deviates from the social norms, this brings shame to the collectivity and if any irregularity, murder, rape or other infraction happens against other families, each member of the *hamula* was liable to be an object of revenge for his kin. However, in those cases where ransom is agreed upon, all members participate in paying the designated amount. Sometime, this custom places the, burden of social conformity not only on each individual for himself but for each member of the *hamula*. In this regard, one very famous proverb was “help your brother (member of the *hamula*) whether he is victim or victimizer”. Thus the participation of every individual in the community and in supervising the behavior of other members of the group was fulfilled on the basis of equality.\(^{153}\)

For solving any personal problem of a member, *hamula*, collectively, resolves it as a social mechanism. They were very harsh to any intimation of trouble to outsiders and consider it as disliking and disagreement. It was because the members of the group worked together to maintain the social order and norms of the society. In the *hamula* system, the role and status of Palestinian women had been defined by centuries to maintain their cultural patterns and social restrictions were justified by religious sanctions. This traditional structure as a system of social control was utilized to maintain the local and alien governments for ruling the Palestinians and to

---

152. The Sociology of Palestinians,
avoid a conflict and facilitate the administration of the conquered territories. Besides, there were very harsh and severe punishments for shameful acts and behavior for both men and women even sometimes a person (male or female) might be killed or sacrificed. Although there was a sizeable Christian minority, Palestine had had a predominantly Muslim culture. This is informed by different religious thoughts and regulations that the culture of the West Asia in general with regard to women was the same as far as norms and mores are concerned. Though the general understanding for the position of women in the Palestinian culture was same as applied to all but there were also some specific regulations only for Muslim women.\textsuperscript{154}

In both the religions, Islam and Christianity, it was perceived that male and female in the genetic sense are equal before the God. But, both the religions advocate a difference in status when the role of the wife is discussed vis-à-vis her husband that she must be obedient to him and to look after his physical emotions and material needs. These religions commitments had stabilized the cultural customs for centuries so that this obedience has become a pattern of identity as far as the case of Palestinian women is concerned. Most of the people, however, recognized that it is not a justice to women in these patterns and involved seem to have been oblivious to any infractions on their rights since the twentieth century.

As the Islamic life has developed a system of religious law (Sharia) under which all aspects of life are defined and regulated to the extent that Islam is concerned. These have been considered as a blue print of Almighty’s order for humanity. The best possible social, economic and political system emerged in the society by following this Sharia.\textsuperscript{155}

Modern conservative writers gave explanation about the superiority of males over females.\textsuperscript{156} This distinction is not only made on the ground of economic dependency but also on biological, psychological, intellectuals and physiological in

\textsuperscript{153} Khalil Nakhleh and Elia Zureik, Ed., The Sociology of the Palestinians, Croom Helm, London,
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Sura 4:34.
\textsuperscript{156} J.J. Smith, ed., The role status of women in contemporary Muslim societies, Bucknell, Universal Press, pp. ???
nature which showed the basic difference between males and females. Since God has created male and females as humanity of two kinds. God have created them for specific role and requirement not for different. Thus as part of God's purpose for mankind the femininity and masculinity share in the cosmic order and it must be accepted. To seek roles against the God's will for women in consistent with those designed for them is observed as a rebellion.

The woman is neither autonomous nor is she ever responsible for herself. She is to be in custody of her closest male relative whether he may be her father, brother, husband or son most of the time. The religion have tended to identify the role of the women from birth until death as one of the belief on males for maintenance and protection as the Palestinian customers in attempting to be consistent with it. This has led to the tendency of females of marriageable age and those that are married in order to keep the property in the family to give up to their brothers and in the case of divorce, thus, guarantee the goodwill and support of the family. In either case i.e. widowhood or separation the family of girl is also answerable for her. She lives in her husband's house on his sufferance and can stay. She survives there as she fulfills her duties and obeys her husband and family. The right that she has to keep her maiden name acts as a constant reminder. Thus due to these dependency a great deal of pressure puts on the married woman in order to stay married to do her best, regardless of the abuse she may obtain from her husband and her family member.

Social Changes through Education & Employment

The existence of western residents and the opening of mission schools in different cities launched the process of change in Palestine. Thus in the Arab few social customs and norms world experienced and marked a change in the twentieth century. It was mainly the urban elite who started to follow the westerners and to institute change in their cultural patterns. These above said schools provided educational training in western norms and meanwhile the residents provided live models to be followed.

The new ideas were conveyed to the younger generations through education. Since the existing schools were not sufficient for them the elementary education
became compulsory for the Palestinian under Ottoman rule. There were only 1,480 girls in primary school in Palestine in 1914. There were a total of 131 female in private Muslim schools.\textsuperscript{158} A few more for girls were opened with opening the new institutions of the British Mandate over Palestine. British policy in comparison to development was based on providing education for the maintenance of a civil servants cadre. The British had no universal education. Due to lack of space, in fact, 41 percent of applicants to schools were rejected. Parents demonstrated against the educational policy of the mandate government and demanded more school for their children in 1931.\textsuperscript{159} Just only five percent of budget for education has used.

**Social Changes through Education & Employment**

The existence of western residents and the opening of mission schools in different cities launched the process of change in Palestine. Thus in the Arab few social customs and norms world experienced and marked a change in the twentieth century. It was mainly the urban elite who started to follow the westerners and to institute change in their cultural patterns. These above said schools provided educational training in western norms and meanwhile the residents provided live models to be followed.

The new ideas were conveyed to the younger generations through education. Since the existing schools were not sufficient for them the elementary education became compulsory for the Palestinian under Ottoman rule: There were only 1,480 girls in primary school in Palestine in 1914. There were a total of 131 female in private Muslim schools.\textsuperscript{160} A few more for girls were opened with opening the new institutions of the British Mandate over Palestine. British policy in comparison to development was based on providing education for the maintenance of a civil servants cadre. The British had no universal education. Due to lack of space, in fact, 41 percent of applicants to schools were rejected. Parents demonstrated against the educational

\textsuperscript{159} Khalid Tolah, Education in Palestine, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.164, 1932, p.156
\textsuperscript{160} Khalid Tolah, Education in Palestine, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.164, 1932, p.156
policy of the mandate government and demanded more school for their children in 1931. Just only five percent of budget for education has used.

There were 3,591 and 15,303 girls attended elementary schools in 1925 and 1944 respectively. Thus it showed the parents’ interest in the education of their daughters with the firm increase in the number of girls attending schools. Due to lack of facilities and even due hesitation of parents to send teenage daughters outside the home, very few people registered their wards for classes in secondary education. Since the majority of the people were denied educational opportunities. Therefore just only 34 percent of urban and 20 percent of rural school-age children were able to attend schools.

Isolated Palestinians were throughout the world appeared to have placed a high premium on education post 1948. Since the number of educated girls increased among the middle and upper classes particularly the pressure on education and training was reflected in female population consequently. As the education became an everlasting convenient commodity that could be used in whatever place a person settled. Thus Parents encouraged their daughters to go to school consequently.

Now a day’s education became a permanent source of investment and possession. The education possessed such importance just because of the loss of property in Palestine during uprisings. The education became so vital that it could not be usurped by alien colonizing forces. Further it seemed as the source to liberate from dependency from poverty, hunger and want. A lot of families became aware about the enhancement of education and they started to allow their daughters to travel alone away from home to attain university education. Thus it became the means to a better income to enrichment through a sense of achievement and master of destiny.

University education for woman is not encouraged among the conservative segments of the population, however, the apparent value of education became as a means of social mobility. It was due to the co-education which provided for mixing of the sexes. Without providing proper supervision for the protection of the family’s

161. Tibami, A.L., Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, London, 1956, p.49
163. Tibami, p. 49.
164. Tibami, p. 53.
honor restrictions on female mobility it led to a lag in women seeking employment as well as in educational opportunities. It places the female increasingly in compromising situation with providing no protection of the family's honor restrictions on female mobility.

The areas of liberalization of the family laws and female education became important and progressed during 1948 when the Palestinian was remained under Israeli rule. Polygamy, however, has been banned in Israel as due to social, demographic and political reasons. Though, the earning power and occupational attainment of Palestinians outside Israel is superior. Not only is the educational bench of Palestinian outside Israel higher than those who are under Israeli rule as the statistics.165

Palestinians regarded as homeless because there were various means counting expropriation of their land, their wives and children are employed as picker, in some case in the same orchards they previously owned, however, Israeli still claim to the country. They became wages-earners from land-owners. They, thus, were divided from their land, their source of income, their dignity and their identity. Arab women supposed two jobs i.e. one on the labor market and another at home as they were exploited by cheap labor. They received low salary did not give for labor sharing devices at home. They, however, had to pay high tax with low wages and it did not bother them.

In Israel the Palestinian family has continued to exist as the primary institution of belonging. As the stronger the family bond became grow the more aggressive environment emerged. The dependency and need for protection of women increased due to the vulnerability of the female in an alien and hostile environment. Therefore, for the intention of continuity and protection, the maintenance of traditions becomes necessary.

The cheap labor has been integrated into Israel force among more female Arab in the mid of 20th century. The most of the Galilee area women work as sharecroppers and some in factories. They, also, become labor in textile and food-processing factories. As they are not responsible for their own upkeep they are not permitted to maintain their earnings. As the fear of the loss of her income which

165. Adnan, M. Abu Chazaleh, Arab Culture Nationalism in Palestine during the British Mandate, Beirut, 1973, p. 89.
complements their own, some fathers begin to delay the marriage of their daughters. Young men, however, in order to collect enough money is permitted to save their salaries to get married.  

Under Israeli occupied area, the exploitation of Palestinian women is not restricted to areas as it has been observed. It also considered as common in other areas. It is the part of the general Arab cultural structure yet it is not uniquely Palestinian characteristic. The variety of roles played by women even educated females consider it tough to simplify about development. Thus educated females continue to depend on the male due to cultural restrictions.

The western Beirut became the most visible in which women appointment freely and fully participates in the ‘male’ world. Thus Palestinian elite emerges as in the urbanized which tends to begin western standards. The refugees from Ramallah in the United States and groups of assimilated Palestinians in Canada exist among them. Now they become free to choose their profession as they want. Their daughters are also given permission to mix. They completely take part in national life and emerge to all practical purposes. These have provided all connections with the traditions and customs of the old country.

The Palestinians have adhered to traditional customs appear to be in the refugee camps which was the most conservation areas for now. It exists on the periphery of urban areas such as Amman and Beirut. These are the camps in which Palestinians, without mixing with members of the host countries, continuous to maintain their identity. These camps have worked and considered as ghettos. The concentration of relatives has performed to re-enforce old patterns and preserves traditional customs. The persistence of old customs and mores has been led by this segregation. The appeals have tended to concrete together and sustain the rooms of traditional Palestinian culture among groups. These appeal among groups become operative. Education, employment and political participation became the main concern area of Palestinian women’s organization. Thus these three areas consider as the source to change the role and status of Palestinian women.

Chapter III

Formation of PLO and Participation of Women in Liberalization Struggle
Chapter - III

Formation of PLO and Participation of Woman in the Liberation Struggle

I. Arab League Conference & the Decision to form PLO

Gamal Abdul Nasir, the President of Egypt, called an assembly during January, 1964 in Cairo for a diplomatic coup in the Arab arena which was described as the first Arab summit. It was led Egyptian’s President Gamal Abdul Nasir with 13 Arab Kings, emirs. The main aim of this summit was to consider the Israel’s plans for the diversion of much of that valuable West Asian commodity water from the sea of Galilie along and aqueduct to the Najer desert. The importance of this summit can be analyzed and studied from the fact that it brought to Cairo even the Saudi Monarch, who weighing a bitter war against the Egyptian troops in North Yemen at that time. The Arab had a fear that Israel could settle a large number of new Jewish immigrants to extend their power and fastened their grip on the former lands of Palestine. But just after the summit the Israelis got success in their water diversion project. The decision of the summit became important and proved to have lasting effects and can be referred in the following cryptic words:

"The necessary the practical decision…….. in the field of organizing the Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and self-determination."  

Veteran Palestinian diplomatist Ahmed Shuqairy was an extravagant orator and had given his service for long years in the foreign services of Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League. He was entrusted with putting some flesh on the summit’s bare bones of an idea. Since 1949 the previous gatherings of Arab officials referring to the Palestine Problem and it had only called for 'application of the United Nations resolutions' on the issue. As mentioned above the new rougher formulation of 'the

167. Actually, two summit meetings of Arab heads of state had preceded the 1964 gathering, in May 1946 and November 1956. But the January 1964 summit has gone down in history as the First Arab Summit and the subsequent summits have been numbered accordingly. 
liberation of Palestine' was therefore an important departure for the heads of state and it was on the wings of this new slogan that the new organisation was launched: the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

For many Palestinians at that time whether the kings, emirs and presidents also intended Shuqairy to pass their life into their newly created place was highly questionable proposition. Shuqairy got a lot of criticism during and around his efforts as he made himself busy for travelling around the Palestinian diaspora to drum up support for the PLO's founding conference in May 1964. The venerable Hajj Amin al-Husseini now living in Beirut still led the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine (AHC) which was vocal in its criticism. The reasons for the AHC's hostility may be several and different. Hajj Amin has included continuing contacts with Yasser Arafat who was his distant younger cousin. Just after the conclusion of the First Arab Summit his Committee was putting out public statements which were highly critical of Shuqairy's planned organisation.169

The various pan-Arabism groups about the new entity had a different opinion. A consensus of Arab states had supported the PLO's foundation. Most still remained opposed to any hint of Palestinian separatism from the greater Arab cause. The PLO's foundation had been including those officially dedicated to the cause of pan-Arabism (primarily Egypt), there were many reservations in these groups about opposing it outright. The Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM), the Palestinian Liberation Front (Road of Return) and the Palestinian Arab Youth in Lebanon charted out these groups' were the few joint communiqué On 15 March 1964that shared expectations from the embryo entity. All of these claimed that it should be 'revolutionary', and conscript Palestinians from all Arab countries into the liberation struggle. It should include and contain the elements of democratic practice.170 Palestinian physicians George Habash and Wadi Haddad had founded the ANM and both had been considered the most influential proponents of pan-Arabism at that time and its support was seen as important for the new organisation.

Fatah was the group of underground organisers whose behaviour and attitude to the First Arab Summit's conception of a Palestinian organisation was more critical than this. In early 1964 Khaled al-Hassan expressed his view and claimed that the

169. See for detail, Al-Kitab al-Sanawi lil Qaddiyya al-Filastiniyya, 1964, pp. 95 & 98.
170. Ibid., p. 96. The ANM later founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Fatah leadership still sought an important function of organising in front of it before it could bring the armed struggle to which it was dedicated. But when the PLO was set up even those few who were with us, especially the military individuals, all of them wanted to leave us and said that:

'Well we have the Palestinian Liberation Army; we should join the Army. And now there is the PLO recognised by all the Arab countries, so why not help and support this PLO? Why has something new?' 171

Khalaf and Yasser Arafat had known Shuqairy since their student life in Cairo back in 1952 as Khalaf claimed. Khalaf involved in a protest and arrested in Cairo in November. After the personal intervention of Ahmed al-Shukeiry of the Arab League' he was released after 35 days. 172 The Fatah group agreed before the PLO's founding Conference despite their reservations about the proposed 'entity', to try to co-ordinate with its appointed leader.

According to Khaled al-Hassan, he and Zuhair al-Alami travelled to Cairo to make a visit with Shuqairy and there he further said few things in these words:

We made so many agreements! But he (Shuqairy) was not able to fulfil any of these because he was so strongly attached to Nasser.

The idea was that he would represent the international political organisation; we would be the military arm - the real functioning military arm, because the PLA was attached to the Arab governments at that time. And then behind the scenes there would be a joint leadership, a secret one, which controls the military and the political activities. 173

The Fatah group with its members have attended the inaugural session of PLO as delegates due to Shuqairy's failure to deliver on these agreements. Hassan who was the one of the member of these groups stated that they made success to secure their vote for many cases which they presented there. 174

The conference which held in East Jerusalem under Jordanian rule brought together 422 members of the Palestinian Diaspora. The main aim of this was to endure two documents presented to it by Shuqairy. The Palestinian National Charter

171. Interview with Khaled al-Hassan, April 1983.
174. Ibid. See also, the text of National Charter after some revised in 1968.
issued on 28 May and the Basic Constitution of the PLO were the two documents.\textsuperscript{175} The former 29 clause changed only once since 1968 and became the part of severe criticism in Western countries. While latter adopted with due attention to pomp and ceremony and messages of support from various Arab leaders, declared inaugurated.

On 2 July 1964 Shuqairy claimed that, besides the part lying east of the Jordan River the whole territory of the existing Kingdom of Jordan belonged to Palestine.\textsuperscript{176} Thus the organisation involved into internal controversy after the above said claim made by Shuqairy in the Jordanian capital Amman. This statement made Shuqairy the offender to Jordanian hosts and consequently Dr Fayez Sayegh publicly questioned to Shuqairy's right and claimed that such statements should have a prior discussion in the Committee before the public.\textsuperscript{177}

Post the Shuqairy's alteration with Sayegh breaks up the leadership of the PLO throughout the next three years. However it was just the first of many disputes. These disputes became almost ineffective which were rendered Shuqairy's Organisation. Also few constraints imposed on PLO activities by these states. Organisation of some units of the Palestinians, first regular army formations, the Palestinian Liberation Army were the few achievements during the period leading up to the 1967 Middle East war. After some time Palestinian activists agreed about the PLA's presence in Gaza which enabled Palestinian units to contribute to the defence of that sector during the 1967 war. However PLA units were not given the right to deploy in Jordan, the Arab country with the longest common frontier with Israel. It was to be become an unexpected work against the Israeli onslaught. PLA provided the necessary means for the guerrilla movements such as training and infrastructure after having control over the PLO apparatus.

Shuqairy was remembered for his great contribution as 'the man who gave the Palestinians a bad name by threatening to throw the Jews into the sea.' even by many Palestinians in later years. However he always strongly denied himself about their statements on the eve of the 1967 war. Despite all these the most significant thing is

\textsuperscript{175} Malaff, n.d., p. 1362. The claim has been rejected by the groups which have dominated the PLO since 1969. But it was later revived, interestingly enough, by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. By mid 1982, the latter was claiming volubly that the Palestinians already have one homeland, in Jordan, so they should not lay claim to another (in the West Bank and Gaza).

\textsuperscript{176} Malaff, n.d., p. 1363.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 1363.
that he was remembered in his own constituency forever.\textsuperscript{178}

Any of the Palestinian activist groups existing at that time did not give much importance to the inaugural Conference of the PLO in the late 1964. Hajj Amin's AHC gave a statement on 10 June 1964 and lambasted it as 'a colonialist, Zionist conspiracy aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian cause'.\textsuperscript{179} The Arab Nationalists' Movement scattered a view and a lot of bitter statements about the newborn PLO and said that 'it is an organisation which has no relations with the masses.'\textsuperscript{180} Their main preoccupation was now elsewhere due to the failure of its leaders' attempt to co-opt Shuqairiy into their own schemes as for Fatah and their continuing efforts to launch of Fatah's own long-promised armed struggle. Thus it was assumed that their preoccupation was present with the regular efforts.

During a heavyweight delegation of Fatah leaders including Arafat, Wazir and Farouq Qaddumi had travelled to Algiers with the invitation of President Ahmed Ben Bella, hero of the newly victorious FLN these above said preparations became primary and going ahead since December 1962.\textsuperscript{181} Besides Egypt's President Nasser who still had a fear that any concerted guerrilla action against Israel would provoke retaliations extremely damaging for Egypt and the other Arab states, the Algerian President did not want to act openly against its close ally. Further Khalaf recalled that 'It was only when Houari Boumediene came to power in 1965 that Algeria sent us a first arms shipment.'\textsuperscript{182} With the People's Republic of China, North Korea and the Vietcong, however, the Algerians gave the opportunity for Fatah's first direct contacts in other important way. Wazir stayed behind in Algiers since 1962 Fatah delegation to manage the new office oh group there. He made himself able to include into an official Algerian delegation to Beijing in early 1964. One day he launched his group's ideas on their behalf to his hosts. He drew himself with Chinese leaders for a long discussion. Now this was the beginning of new relation of Fatah with the People's Republic of China.\textsuperscript{183}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{178} For detail see, the footnote to International Document on Palestine, 1967.
\textsuperscript{179} Al-Khāb al-Sanawī lil Qaddīyya al-Filastīniyya, 1964, pp. 102.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p. 103.
\textsuperscript{181} Yaari, 1970, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{182} Abou Iyad, 1981, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{183} For detail, see, ch. 11.
\end{flushleft}
Air force commander Hafez al-Assad (who was to take over the reins of state power in a military coup in 1970) and Ahmed al-Sweidani who was the director of military intelligence were the two men in Syria’s military hierarchy were particularly helpful to the guerrillas. Thus the regime in Syria at the time played an important role in terms of the concrete contribution made to Fateh’s military preparations in the early 60s. Further regarding this Khalaf wrote, ‘It was because of them that we were able to use two training camps in Syria as of early 1964. Other fedayeen (guerrillas) underwent shooting exercises in desert regions, sometimes among the Bedouins. Still others, without revealing their membership in Fateh, received training by enlisting in the Palestine Liberation Army.’

The Palestinian group propounded the tactics for Sweidani and accorded closely with the theory of ‘popular liberation war’. He worked himself out for his own country’s confrontation with Israel. According to many Fateh thinkers the alliance with Syria was seen and even continued to be seen for some years, as an important strategic principle. As the Syrian officials saw as closely associated with the Egyptian regime they might also have seen some value in sponsoring Fateh back in 1964 as a counterweight in the Palestinian arena to have influence of the PLO. The Syrian officials considered Lebanon and Jordan as dangerously exposed to Israeli influence in all the direction and way. Syria, which is situated strategically between Lebanon and Jordan, still has direct contact with Israel. Thus it has been considered as providing a pivotal rearguard base.

Now Fateh’s new military apparatus was ready to use. The PLO’s own decision to establish a military wing which spurred on partly by the early autumn 1964 and thus the Fateh leadership had a session in Kuwait. Since a further meeting was scheduled in November at which the decision was taken by a single vote to go ahead. But the group had become weak and split down the middle as the time passed to launch military operations. Thus 31 December 1964 had been set for the Fateh’s first

186. Yair Evron, An American Israeli Defense Treaty, Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 1981, p. 44.
commando action against Israel. But due to some illogical reason and difference it was not launched in the name of Fatah. It was introduced as a fictitious front-organisation, Al-Asifa (The Storm).

'To our great people ... to our struggling Arab nation ... to liberators everywhere,' started Asifa’s Communiqué No. 1, issued on 1 January 1965:

From our people, steadfast to the limit, and from the conscience of our battling homeland, our revolutionary vanguards burst out, believing in the armed revolution as the way to Return and to Liberty, in order to stress to the colonialists and their henchmen, and to world Zionism and its financiers, that the Palestinian people remains in the field; that it has not died and will not die."187

In fact either Fatah or Asifa operation appears to have been less successful as compared to they claimed. Before the launch-date few group of commandos were arrested as they set out for Israel from Gaza. However, Fatah leaders claimed that other groups performed well and acted successfully in the West Bank area and Lebanon. The second Asifa operation was better than the first as the Salah Khalaf later claimed.188 It was better because it was a direct attack on Israel's controversial water-diversion projects. Jordanian troops shot one guerrilla named Ahmed Musa. Thus after his mission he came back from Israel to Jordan and assassinated by Jordanian troops. The Israelis also took Mahmoud Hijazi into prison.

The most Fatah leaders were easily prepared to admit that their beginning in the field of guerrilla action had indeed been modest by the early 80s. Fatah had an expectation to achieve its goal of liberating Palestine either through action or reaction during the beginning of the armed struggle and the 1967 war in 1982 as it was described by Khaled al-Hassan. He further explained that if we will make actions, the Israelis will make reactions. Similarly the Arab governments either will support us against the Israelis, or will fight us. The people will support us if they have fight with us. So in the case of people’s support to us will make the government to give their

support to us or confront us with their own people.

We wanted to create an Arab world which may struggle and fight for their right. But at last we failed to achieve these objectives.\textsuperscript{189} Asifa's military communiqués continued to log up successive guerrilla actions during the 1965. To associate Fatah's name openly with that of Asifa the Fatah leaders received confident and the success of their venture. It was subsequently retained as that of the Fatah military apparatus. Fatah addressed an open memorandum on 17 June 1965 on his own behalf and asked to U.N Secretary General U. Thant about the Mahmoud Hijazi whether he has been considered a prisoner-of-war. In the memorandum he described that "The Asifa forces belonging to the movement [Fatah], in their role as the armed forces of the Palestinian people, began their military operations inside the occupied lands of Palestine."\textsuperscript{190}

Post three months Fatah complained bitterly about Arab actions against the the guerrillas. So further he was sending an angry memorandum to the Third Arab Summit meeting in Casablanca, Morocco which stated that in the following words:

"In answer to all these [hostile measures], the movement sees a number of steps necessary, among them: calling off the pursuit of the liberation movement by various Arab states bordering and not bordering on Palestine; the release of all prisoners without questioning; lifting the news blackout imposed on the publication of news about the liberation movement in many Arab countries; not opposing the movement's men during the performance of their revolutionary work or when the movement's forces in the occupied territories are forced to take refuge in neighbouring Arab countries; and that the Arab countries should work for the defence of the movement's prisoners in Israel through various well-known means."\textsuperscript{191}

These certainly did not make threat which brought the Jewish state to its knees overnight, they were continuously criticise it, for Fatah whilst were acting as a

\textsuperscript{189} Interview with Khaled al-Hassan, October, 1982.
\textsuperscript{190} Al-Waṭṭa 'l-bāḥ al-Filsītīyya al-Αrabiyya, p. 353.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
powerful rallying-point among the Palestinian communities of the Diaspora as well as a potential, and uncontrollable, source of instability for several Arab regimes. However Fatah had already prepared for its activities by the end of 1965. It had also proved itself and made itself able to sustain a constant level of guerrilla operations against Israel. Fatah had already made an appeal to the United Nations, in faint augury of Arafat's triumphant (if not yet triumphing) appearance before the General Assembly nine years later. It became a great view which was known as to the Palestinian and Arab publics. It also formulated few terms and conditions in relation to the official Arab state system which required co-operation from the states.

Thus whole the picture and matter had become clear and existed continue up until June 1967 which already clearly drawn by the end of 1965. Shuqairy's PLO had to face continuous rifts and disputes. Besides these a few other groups of Palestinian activists tried to follow Fatah's lead onto the battle-field with Israel, but, with far less well-sustained success. Meanwhile Fatah with its continuing obsession and secrecy grew continuously but slowly.

The pressure was relentlessly building up between the Arab states and Israel during the 1966-1967. For the establishment of de facto control of the 1949-ordained demilitarised zone there and Israeli attempts dept turbulent the Syrian-Israeli border. Fatah undertook no means as Syria's sponsorship of intermittent guerrilla raids against Israel. As a result the Israelis retaliated for these with a lot of punishing raids against Arab targets in the Jordanian-held West Bank. Now these prompted clamorous began to demand from the West Bankers on King Hussein for arms and weapons to defend themselves. It brought a hostilities and pressure at least along these two fronts. But lastly it was the Fatah's military activities' effect not by any means. 192

During the 1967 Arab-Israel war every bit as devastating for the Arab states as the Filastinuna article had predicted and thus the case in any encounter between the regular Arab armies and Israel.

But it was the collapse of the previously existing system of inter-state relations in the Arab world which made a checks and balances and interrelated ideologies. All of these made a dynamic chance for growth arose of Fatah's. It was the chance that was to catapult Fatah and inspired him into the leadership of the PLO.

192. In Khalid al-Hassan' view 'We had nothing to do with the 1967 war at all' (Interview, April 1981).
II. Palestinian Women and Armed Struggle

Post the crushing defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 war made arms necessary to women and West Bank were instructed to collect arms abandoned by the Jordanians. The aim of it was to carry out the first acts of resistance. A secret woman's cells were formed in Jordan and now women had been recruited into the Resistance groups in relatively large numbers. Women received basic political and military training in these groups. It was the beginning of new era for women that the Young women started to join the movement. These Young women came from all over the world without the permission of their families, or without preparation for the rigours of life in a military camp. Further Leila Khaled describes that how the faint-hearted were weeded out in bases set up in the hills around Amman.\textsuperscript{193}

However the PRM had no considered plans for integrating and unifying women. Serious considerations of the subject were prevented by continuing Palestinian-Jordanian crisis. Its preparations were not completed even they forced by events to mobilise. To minimise the problem in the beginning of the 1965 armed struggle movement and a mass revolutionary atmosphere swept all along in its current issues. Now they started to remove the hurdle in the way of movement.

Fatah followed the policy of pragmatic. The women became separate from men and got the military training. They received training in which women gave their support activities that were 'natural' extensions of their domestic skills-nursing, providing food and uniforms for the fighters, setting up the social and cultural institutions that accompanied armed struggle etc. The Young women sent to the camps where they had to organise and train women and older ones recruited and directed into administration. Thus a division of labour emerged during these movements. This division of labour was to prove a lasting and bitter one. For the Palestinian masses the gun shows the symbol of power and commitment. So the Younger Fatah women identified with armed struggle—for them. The conventional division between male and female roles were supported by the Older Fatah women.'

A debate began with the publication of an article in a Fatah magazine in 1969\textsuperscript{194} might. It claimed women's liberation and wanted to be included in the goals of the Resistance movement. Also it made programmes to ease their integration


among its cadres and insisted on the need for studies of women's conditions at the home and works both. It also gave main focus on fundamental point in Farah thinking: that woman is responsible for their own politicisation, and that it is through struggle that they will change society's attitudes towards them. The article, however, expressed a minority leftist current of thought not the views of the leadership. Its call was never implemented or repeated within Fatah. It always worked for women empowerment and upliftment.  

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) did not differentiate between men and women members on the ground of its selective recruitment policy and with its bid to be the vanguard party. Many PFLP women were veterans and came from other parties. They had already fought for their right and took part in their independence battles with their families. However the mixed training camps of it were later criticised in a General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) study as 'clashing with reality'.

'The Revolution and the Liberation of Women Issue' was a pamphlet which was published in 1970. It laid out the theoretical position of the PFLP. The PFLP gave main focus on change in the 'autocratic and bourgeois' leadership of the women's movement. It also focused on women's entry into productive labour and its importance as an instrument of ending their dependence on men, and called for military training for all women cadres. This brought the women's liberation on the same footing as national and class liberation.

The women participation became more important in resistance movement and the Palestinian masses for armed struggle. The women began to join the resistance groups or going to the bases for military training from the camps. All of these showed the enthusiastic and vigour approach of the Palestinian women to become the part of these movements. In fact, the sight of women armed and in military uniform was deeply shocking. Mariyam Shadid who was a militant further admitted that:

... nous avions commis l'erreur de les braquer des le depart en montrant que nous etions differentes: nous etions habilbes en kaki, les camps d'entraînement etaient mixtes, et; no us iesavons en

A woman cadre told an anecdote and used to train girls in Wahdat camp. They illustrated how families were torn during the support for the Revolution and worried about their daughters. After the training sessions she mostly slept in the camp or in the home of one of the trainees. Once she reached a little late night. The girl’s mother started to scold her and repeated these words: ‘Do you want to be a "Hassan sobby"?’

The Revolution challenged the control over their girls. It was a basic element in the reproduction of the peasant family.

Black September

A small group within the GUPW undertook a study of the lessons after the Black September and the transfer to Lebanon. It was provided by the Jordanian experience. It nonetheless remains a serious and valuable attempt to evaluate women’s experiences in the Resistance.”

What follows is a summary of some of its main points which as the following:

(a) Most women cadres said that the PRM’s lack of a theory relating armed struggle to social change is a major weakness. It is not enough to raise the slogan that women’s liberations will come through their taking part in the national struggle, because this is to ignore the social obstacles that prevent women, especially the mass of women, from full participation. The PRM needs a clear stand, and a programme for changing gender relations inside the Revolution.

(b) In relation to problems with their families, most women interviewed said that their families respected their work; but, of these, most had male kin in the PRM. Several accused men of double standards, supporting women’s role in

199. Some women leaders from the pree 1948 Arab Women’s Union took part in setting up the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1974. The next year, the General Women’s Union was established.
200. The Abu Ali Study is based on interviews with 35 senior and 50 junior cadres and PLO women, and covers 10 distant aspects their experience, including women as fighters.
201. The struggle between the leadership of the GUPW and the Fatah leadership is illustrated by Abu Ammar’s rejection of the slogan chosen as theme for the fourth General GUPW Congress 1980; ‘Towards more effective participation in the Revolution’. He saw as too critical.
public, but not letting their own wives and daughters join parties. Even
husbands who allowed their wives to have political activities mostly did not
help with housework, and expected the same high standard of domestic care.
202

c) Freedom for women to get involved in struggle seemed closely linked to
achievement, with families reasserting their control in periods of stagnation. This
made it all the more necessary, women cadres said, for the PRM to come out
clearly with programmes for change.

(d) Most of the women cadres saw little change in the situation of the mass of
women since the beginning of the Revolution, and they saw most women as
unaware, or only partly aware, of their social oppression. This was less true of
women workers than of housewives.

(e) Commenting on their experience in the Resistance parties, women spoke of
some male comrades as 'dominated by convention'. It is clear that women
had been limited to special functions and subordinate levels, but it is
probable that party loyalty made them repress more specific complaints. 203

During the Abu Ali study an interesting point to emerge. This interesting point
was the difference in attitudes arisen between the PRM cadres (younger, mainly of
middle or small bourgeois background) and the older, better-off women in charge of
PLO institutions, with the latter less critical of the leadership, more accepting of
established gender and age relations, and less knowledgeable about the situation of
the mass of women. Abu Ali studied well and thus now an interesting point emerged
from this study. The connection between class and social conservatism was
established.

202. Most of the cadres interviewed were married. Drop-out after marriage (which is almost
universal except for upper-middle-class) was one of the GUPW's biggest problems,
preventing the building of the cadres. See the Jihan Helou interview, PFLP, Bulletin, No. 61,

203. A much fiercer critique of women's position in the party-sectarian battles in Lebanon is
mounted by Y. Polit-Charara in C. Souriau, op. cit.
III. Israeli Intervention in Lebanon

'Shalom ha Galil' (Operation peace for Galilee) was launched by Israel on 6th June 1982. It was an enormous land, sea and air offensive of Lebanon. The objective of the aggressive Israeli spokesmen declared was to drive the PLO beyond a line twenty – five miles from the border so that according to the Israeli Chief of staff, 'Israel would no longer be within PLO artillery range'. However, the Israeli army had gone well beyond the twenty five miles zone within a few days. The original and announced objective was soon shown to be a smoke screen for the real advance to Beirut during the landing of the commando units on the beaches near Beirut. It had always been in the minds of the military and political designers. Unlike the March 1978 invasion the procedure was perfect one. There were few fundamental goals which were linked with the June 1982 invasion. These fundamental goals were:

(a) Crushing and destroying the PLO both as a political and military force in Lebanon

(b) Inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon so as to affect its total or partial withdrawal

(c) Installation of Bashir Jumayil as the President of Lebanon and imposition of Lebanese front control throughout the Lebanese polity and

(d) Signing of a peace treaty with Lebanon.

Sabra and Shatila Massacre

With the help of Israeli power the new President was elected on 23rd August. The clearing of Palestinians was on the way and excited provisions had been going on during the weeks of blockade for the presidential elections. From west Beirut, a formidable alliance of Sunni leaders became the contradictory part during the Jumayil’s candidacy. The alliance of Sunni became contradictory with the parliamentary senates from Tripoli and northern Biqa and deputies owing allegiance to Fanjieh. Since the elections were being held under circumstances of occupation they appealed to boycott the elections.

For the successful Jumayil and to start the election procedure the sixty – two representatives were needed which was two – third of the total strength of the

204. Jerusalem Post, 7 June 1982.
Chamber. It became important for Israel and the Phalangists to confirm the existence and support of every one of the remaining sixty – two deputies because the holding of elections numbered thirty had been opposed by representatives. With the help of large amount of money as bribe Jumayil’s campaign manager Zahibustani wanted to mobilize support. Besides these the pressure was exerted on the Shiite deputies by Israel not to boycott the election.

Israel and the Phalangists had to manage to assemble sixty – two deputies during the voting on that day. The site of the election shifted from the parliament building in west Beirut to the military academy at Fayadiya barracks located in firm Christian territory. Squads of heavily armed Phalangists had been giving the way to some of them while the IDF airlifted some from the south. 206 They required only a simple majority to win in the second ballot while in the first ballot Jumayil was failed to win the support of all the sixty – two representatives. He got support only fifty – seven of the representatives in his favour, while five desisted. 207

Israel was well on its manner in the direction of achieving its ambitious objectives in Lebanon while Bashir Jumayil nominated to the Presidency of Lebanon. Israel had got a humiliating loss on the Syrian army which made necessary PLO to remove from Beirut. All of these brought about to get its foremost ally nominated to the uppermost office in Lebanon. These early successes, however, were at finest premature and made the expectation engender in the later developments.

The first setback to Israel’s decoratively conceived grand strategy came out in the mid September. In a dangerous explosion in his party’s headquarters in East Beirut the president – elect Jumayil was killed on the 14th of September. 208 The terrors were spread out among Israelis. They assumed that his death might throw the Israeli position in Lebanon into turmoil and all the Israeli achievements became the part of questions. Thus his murder became a major shock to the Israelis. Israel’s immediate response was to win west Beirut so as to be in a place to control

208. At the beginning of October, the Phalangists announced that a person responsible for the bomb blast had been detained. His name was given Habib Tanyus Shartuni. He was identified as a clandestine member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party ideologically committed to Damascus. A branch of the Syrian intelligence was rumored to have assisted Shaertuni in placing the bomb.
succeeding and a state of vagueness was thus shaped. The IDF, thus, moved into west Beirut in contravention of the treaty with Habib within times of Jumayil’s death. For the purpose of law and order Begin and Sharon justified their decision. Thus further the Israeli cabinet made a statement and claiming that the job had been carried out “in order to avoid the hazard of violence. Bloodshed and anarchy, while about two thousand terrorists equipped with present and heavy weapons remained in west Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement.” 209

A conference was held between Chief of staff Eitan and Phalangist offices in Beirut as the occupation of west Beirut on 15th September. Few major steps had been taken in the conference. Phalangists would arrive the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila to clear the camps of Palestinian guerillas, arrest the LPO headquarters and assemble weapons were the few decision which had been taken in the conference. At night the phalangists made an entrance into the Shatila camps passing through the positions of the IDF. General Amos Yaron, regional commander of the IDF organized the particulars of the Phalangist pass into the camps with Elie Hobeika, the intelligence Chief of the Phalangists and a man with long – standing reputation for violent acts against Palestinians in the subsequent day.

There were many symbols during the entrance of the Phalangists into the camps that they engaged in the assassination of civilians quickly. General Saguy was informed on Friday 17th September that the Phalangists were carrying out a massacre of civilians. A huge number of civilians in the camp had been slaughtered by the Phalangists on the same day. This information had been given by foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir through his cabinet collaborator Mordechai Tzipori. Both Saguy and Shamir completely overlooked the figures. Next day he had not single granted to the continuation of the Phalangist job until 5 am. He gave also permission to allow the entry of another Phalangist unit into Sabra. The Chief of staff notified Sharon by 9 pm on Friday that the Phalangists had involved in big measure murder of civilians also did not order the direct elimination of the Christian forces. Since a thousand men, women and children had been murdered the phalangists were lastly given the order to leave the camps. 210

The news had spread all over the world and received a storm of criticism all over the world at Sabra and Shatilaran specially. It also felt a fabulous

210. On the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla, see, Schiff and Yaari, pp. 250-78 and Jansen, pp. 91-107.
outcry within Israel which was very significant. A lot of sudden and immediate protests took place in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Eilat. The labour party blamed the government of indirect liability and wanted a judicial commission for the investigation. In Reply to a call by the labour party an enormous protest started against the government which took place in Tel Aviv on 25 September. An estimated 400,000 people participated in it and made it one of the chief protest demonstrations ever to be held in the country. 211 After facing with this expansion of unprecedented and public criticism, Prime Minister Begin was forced to appoint a enquiry commission on 1st October. The aim of this commission was to examine the charge for the massacres in the refugee camps in west Beirut. 212

The Begin government hastened to take out the IDF from west Beirut after getting Ashamed by the massacre and the responses. The MNF had withdrawn from Lebanon after the removal of Palestinians. The MNF met again and over deployed in numerous shares of the city. 213 Presidential elections were held once again in Lebanon to be a successor to the departing President Elias Sarkis in the intervening time. Amin Jumayil was selected to be the Phalangist Presidential applicant. He was the chief brother of assassinated Bashir Jumayil. He was distinct to his brother and had continued untainted by nearby relations with Israel. He was, therefore, far more adequate to the Lebanese Muslims. He was nominated President of Lebanon by a close consensus ballot of 77-3 on 21st September. 214

IV. The Rise and Growth of Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon

The Palestinian presence had started in Lebanon during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. A lot of refugees around 140,000 motivated and they were mainly from north Palestine (Eastern and Western Galilee) into Lebanon. They became the witness of this disastrous war. 215 There were no Palestinian refugees in the population of

211. Jerusalem Post, 26 September, 1982.
212. The Commission was chaired by President of the Supreme Council Chief Justice, Izhak Kahan. It had two more members: Supreme Court Justice, Aharon Barak and Major General (Retd.), Yona Erafat. Judge David Barter, the Registrar of the Supreme Court was appointed as the Kahan Commission’s Secretary. Senior advocates were appointed as special investigators.
Lebanon. They followed the Armenians. Both because this was the policy decreed by the Arab league in order to protect their national identity and because of Lebanese Christian opposition to such an increase in Lebanon’s Muslim population. Since 1950 onwards the Lebanese government started to transfer the Palestinians to camps spread throughout Lebanon. However these refugees were temporarily settled in transit camps built in southern Lebanon. 216

Since they had been rendered homeless Jordan was the main centre of Palestinian activities for almost two decade later. The Palestinian was concerned aties in political trouble such as the 1958 crisis in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Palestinian, especially in student circles (that of American University of Beirut in particular), became the main part of Lebanese politics also. 217 A lot of Palestinian activities became the part of Nasserite revolt on an individual basis during the crisis. At the same time they sympathized with the Lebanese Muslims also. 218 The Palestinians had lack of identity of their own, attentiveness of their role, sovereign means, a leadership of their own and theory of action to give direction to their


217. In 1958 Lebanon had been plunged into a brief civil war under the combined pressure of certain domestic and regional development. The upsurge of messianic pan Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser had aroused grave concern among the Lebanese Christians. A section of Christian leadership, headed by president Kamil Shamun advocated a resolute policy based on unavailing cooperation with the west against the wave of revolutionary pan – Arab nationalism. This was construed as a betrayal of the Arab cause and violation of the national pact by the Lebanese Muslims. The matter was further complicated by Shamun’s decision to modify the constitution to enable his re-election for a second consecutive term. A majority of the Muslim leaders and a few Christians opposed this and during the 1957 parliamentary elections Shamun sought to exclude them from the new parliament. Tensions mounted further after the formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 and a civil war broke out between Shamun’s supporters and his opponents most of whom were Muslims.


activities. Thus the role of the Palestinian refugees was limited within the domestic politics of Lebanon. They were no more than auxiliaries to Lebanese leaders of pan-Arab and Nasserite leaning

The Emergence of a Palestinian Identity

The Arab summit meeting was held in Cairo in 1964. It was an important milestone in the history of Palestinian and Lebanese. It initiated a turning point in relations between Lebanese and Palestinian. The summit had been held in order to organize a policy meant at counteract Israel’s recent action of diverting the waters of river Jordan for irrigation. The Jordan River’s headwaters initiate in Lebanon from the Wazzani and Hasbani rivers. Members of the Arab summit, therefore, suggested that these waters be diverted to Jordan and Syria while a united Arab command is straight along the Lebanese-Israeli attacks. Without the official request of Lebanon no Arab troops would be stationed, however, the Lebanese president Charles Hieu decided to the proposals. 219

The Arab league had handled all matters relating to the Palestine problem since the institution of the state of Israel. This was another important decision taken by Arabs in which the Palestine issue had no direct representation. The Arab league decided to establish a Palestine liberation organization (PLO) which would provide as the executive delegate of the Palestine national interest. Under the PLO, Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was to be set up and orders to enable the Palestinians to participate in the overall Arab effort aimed at liberating Palestine. Lebanon voted for the establishment of the PLO but insisted that its military arm, the PLA could have no bases in Lebanon. Leaving the country and renouncing the right to return were the few terms for the membership of PLO. These terms should be followed by any Palestinian resident of Lebanon who wanted to join the PLO. 220 A secret organization named Palestine national liberation movement formed in 1959 before the formation of PLO. It was known by a reversal of its Arabic initials as Fatah. It had been espousing armed struggle among Palestinian patriots living in various countries and led by Yasser Arafat. 221

219. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
220. Ibid., p. 23.
221. For the origins of the fatah see Alan Hart, Arafat: Peacemaker or Terrorist (London, 1984), pp. 121-37.
The vengeance Youth heroes of return and the Palestine liberation front were the three other guerilla organizations emerged during the Arab - Israeli war of June 1967 from 1965. The first two groups connected to the Arab national movement led by George Habash. The third group, the Palestine liberation front was formed by Palestinian officers training in Syrian army. All three groups became unite and merged into one platform under George Habash. The popular front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the result of these three groups. The Palestine resistance movement (PRM) got full support through Fatah and PFLP and these also constituted the base for that purpose since 1967. Due to the continuous loss of Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967 the popularity of the PRM became greater among the Palestinians and Arab masses. The sweeping Israeli victory "discredited not only the Arab regimes but also the PLO whose verbal extremism had not been matched by military successes during the brief war."  

Ahmed Shuquari the head of the PLO had to resign in December 1967 and thus PLO became weak due to the rise of PRM. Yahya Hammouda the successor of Ahmed Shuquari realized that the PIO would have to associate the guerilla organizations if it was to survive. In July 1968 an agreement was reached between the PLO, Fatah and PFLP according them representation in the Palestine national council (PNC). Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO executive committee in February 1969. During the year 1968 the guerilla became very influential within the PLO especially Fatah. 

The PRM Strikes Roots in Lebanon 

As the PRM became successful and influential and popular among Arab it led to a transformation of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon into strongholds of the guerilla organization after June 1967. Prior to 1967 faith had organized a few


223. There were two other guerilla organizations that belonged to the PRM. First there was the Syrian sponsored vanguard of the popular liberation war better known after its militia Saita. It was created after the June 1967 war and was the direct instrument of the Syrian regime. The other organization called Arab liberation front was much smaller and followed the directions of the Iraqi Baathist regime.


secret cells in some of the camps. The *Deuxième Bureau* (Army Intelligence Bureau) had, however, maintained a strict surveillance over the camps and foiled most of the attempts to infiltrate into Israel. As early as December 1965 one of the faith's commando Jalal Kawash was arrested by the Lebanese Army as he prepared to lead a military operation into Israel. He died in custody a few days later and a communiqué from the Lebanese Defense ministry announced on 11 January 1966 that Kawash had committed suicide during interrogations. Fatah claimed that Kawash had been tortured and brought to death. Thus Fatah contested this version strongly and raised the question of the death of Kawash. During the same year another commando was killed in a skirmish. It took place near the Israeli border between Lebanese security patrol and commandos. Syria had to intervene to get the independence as Sumer Arafat himself was arrested while entering Lebanon after a reconnaissance mission in Israel during the same year.

The commandos got a tremendous gain in sympathy among the ranks of the Lebanese Muslims next to the June 1967 war. The PRM was got a full support from the Jordan valley during the battle of Karameh in March 1968. Khalil al-Jamal was killed in action a quarter of a million people participated in his funeral in the following month. He was the first Lebanese volunteer in the Palestinian commando ranks. A demand for freedom of action for the PRM raised post the funeral pageant was turned into a gigantic demonstration.

The climax of commando bases and the training of commando militias in southern Lebanon continued at a rapid pace throughout 1968 due to the lack of official authorize. The Syrian authorities pressurized to develop special lines of supply connecting these bases with Syria and assisted the PRM in establishing commando bases.

**The PRM as a Domestic Factor**

The domestic politics of Lebanon had a great unwanted and unwelcomed impact during the growth of the PRM. For the Lebanese Muslims, particularly the

---

226. Arab world (Beirut), 12 January 1966.
227. Ibid., 24 June 1966
Sunnis who had always shown indignation at the artificial isolation of Lebanon from pan-Arab concerns the PRM presence was a welcome opportunity to involve Lebanon more actively with Arab world. The average Lebanese Muslim at the same time focused that “who saw the Christian political ascendancy in the country as a sort of domination, the presence of Palestinian commando movement appeared as a security? To let down the Palestinians, to him, was equivalent to letting down the Muslim Lebanese cause”.  

The issue of Maronite dominated political system continued presence and liberty of activity a rallying point around which their sphere of influence could be extended. To change the Maronite dominated political system the progressive and leftist forces saw in the PRM with a common interest. The traditional Druze leader and president of the progressive socialist party (PSP) Kamal Jumblatt led national movement (NM). They united in a front called the front of national and progressive parties and forces.

As the time passed the National Movement (NM) headed by Kamal Jumblatt increased its full support to the Palestinian cause in Lebanon. As a result of the mounting Muslim and leftist support to the Palestinian cause the catholic Christians predominantly its Maronite component began to view the PRM presence as a threat to their established position in Lebanon. Further the main Maronite leaders could rightly perceive that the PRM “might catalyze a movement for change among those sections of the Lebanese population who were either frozen out of effective participation or limited by custom to an inferior position vis-à-vis the Maronites.” On March 1968 the Phalangist party led by Jumayil, The national liberal party led by Kamil Shamun and The national Bloc led by Raymond Edde came together and formed an alliance known as the Triple Alliance. This was due to the growing concern regarding the PRM. Due to the PRM presence and the electoral gains scored by the coalition in the

---

232. Salibi, p. 54.
233. The NM was comprised of six major parties or organization. Apart from Jumblatt’s PSP, there were (1) the independent Nasserite movement led by Ibrahim Qualaiat, (2) Lebanese community party led by Niqula al - Shawi, (3) organization of community action led by Muhim Ibrahim, (4) Arab socialist Baath party led by Abd al-Majid Rifai, and 95) Syrian socialist nationalist party led by Inam Raai. There were a number of minor organizations allied to the NM the prominent ones being the 24th October movement of Farouq Maqaddam and the populist Nasserite organization led by Mustafa Saad.
parliamentary elections held that year the catholic Christians began to feel insecurity.

Israeli Raids against Lebanon: Objectives and Consequences

Except for infrequent incidents like burning down of an Israeli barn or theft of an Israeli herd or Lebanese villagers straying across the international boundary into Israel to graze cattle Israel and Lebanon in March 1949 signed the GAA? It had prevailed a quiet on the border between the two countries. Soon after the GAA had been signed, in April 1949 the UN had set up a conciliation commission for Palestine charged with the task of sponsoring Arab-Israeli peace discussions. A treaty of peace into an official internationally recognized boundary transformed the ADL between the two countries. The seat of the conciliation commission, Tel Aviv had proposed to Lebanon during the negotiations at Lausanne. 236

Israeli proposal had been dismissed by the Beirut and thus would have implied for its acceptance that:

(a) Lebanon’s defection from an Arab world hostile to Israel and

(b) A de facto alliance between the Jewish state and the catholic Christians of the Levant.

Lebanon on the other hand had made two counter proposals of its own which were as the following:

i. The Palestinians who had filed to Lebanon during the 1948 war be repatriated to Israel.

ii. The portion of Western Galilee which had been set aside by the UN partition plan of 1947 for the Arab sector of Palestine is handed over to Lebanon. 237

The discussions at Lausanne ultimately came to an end as the Israel rejected the Lebanese proposals as predictable enough. Lebanon thereafter settled into a policy of non recognition of Israel while at the same time trying its best to avoid any and all acts of aggravation that could bring about an Israeli military intrusion.

7th Article of the GAA recognized an Israeli – Lebanese mixed truce commission (ILMAC) under UN auspices. On the basis of unanimous consent the provision of the

237. Ibid., p.59
GAA the mission of the ILMAC was to enforce and thus ILMAC was authorized to establish two headquarters – one at the Israeli frontier posts at Ras an–Naquarh.  

A regular meeting of ILMAC had been going on at periodic intervals. During the meeting the ILMAC rarely had serious complaints to deal with. Minor disputes relating to cross-border thefts, wandering livestock or grazing of cattle on the wrong side of the ADL that were presented before it were expeditiously settled. Lebanon was always eager to see that the ILMAC performed effectively and this eagerness in fact bordered sometimes on obsequiousness. In 1995 some Israelis were killed by Arab infiltrators from Lebanon. The Lebanese authorities had warned about the incident. They set about immediately to remove “all refugees and people other than old recognized residents from a zone ten kilometers deep on the Lebanese face of the border.”

Lebanon brought long time of peace with its southern national as paying cautious attention to Israeli sensitivities. The situation began to change from the mid-sixties onwards with the rise and growth of PRM in southern Lebanon. While it is true that the Lebanese army maintained strict surveillance over Palestinian camps, there were limits to its capacity to control Palestinian activity in the south. The armed force of Lebanon had achieved the 13,200 strength in 1968 as it was small in size and such a small force found it extremely difficult to enforce discipline on a growing number of commandos who were receiving financial and logistical support from the other Arab states particularly Syria. Thus the Palestinian guerillas did manage to carry out infrequent commando operations in opposition to Israel despite the army’s strict surveillance.

The climb and expansion of the resistance movement in southern Lebanon brought in its wake Israeli raids, a phenomena from which Lebanon had been totally free till the mid-1690s. As the units of the Israeli Army crossed the frontier and dynamited three water reservoirs and the house of a Lebanese village chief thereby killing one Lebanese woman the first Israeli raid against Lebanon was launched on 28 October 1965.

Thus this type of raid became a custom matter in much of southern Lebanon. On the visage of it Israeli raids were in response to commando operations launched by the PRM from Lebanon in opposition to Israel and formed a part of its overall policy of retaliation against Arab states. In the language of strategic theory Israel’s reprisal policy exemplified coercive diplomacy intended to affect an opponent’s will rather than impose a military solution. This strategy was most often used in the mode of negative compel lance that is an attempt to persuade the target nation to stop taking certain actions. Israel wanted to oblige Arab government to cease permitting infiltration across their borders by convincing them that the cost of doing so were prohibitive. The reprisal policy had been initiated in the early fifties in the face of large-scale infiltration by Palestinian refugees from the West Bank and Gaza. In the beginning, Israel retaliated clandestinely in the primitive ‘eye for an eye’ fashion. IDF’s small group personnel would secretly cross the border, lay an ambush somewhere, causing thereby a number of causalities and then retreat. Israeli retaliation was usually “calibrated to the scale a linked to the timing and location of the Arab act directly preceding it”. 242

Israel changed its strategy to one of massive retaliation i.e. a deliberate disproportion between Arab provocation and Israeli response as a means of compelling Arab governments to take firm measures against Palestinian infiltration because this type of response failed to put an end to infiltrations. 243

Egypt, Syria and Jordan were the witness of this policy on which it had been applied. Such a policy had been become successful largely. An apprehension over Israeli reprisals was a major factor discouraging these countries from permitting Palestinian guerillas to operate on their territory. A deeper analysis of the Israeli raids against Lebanon, however, suggests that in applying this policy to Lebanon, Israel had certain fundamentally different expectations. To begin with, commando operations from Lebanon never really posed a serious threat to the security of Israel’s northern settlements and in any case remained far below those launched from Jordan which was the main base of the PRM till 1971. The camps in the Arkoub of Lebanon were severely auxiliary.

243. Ibid., p. 59.)
Jordanian army took part in the Jordanian civil war of September 1970 and the successive mopping-up operations in the spring of 1971. It became a reason the focus of PRM bustle to alter to Lebanon. ²⁴⁴

There were mainly two reasons as the raids from Lebanon into Israel remained limited in scope. First, the PRM was militarily weakened after the Jordanian crisis and simply did not possess the necessary wherewithal to carry on guerrilla activity on the scale on which it had done so before. 1971. Though commando buildup began in the Arkoub immediately after their expulsion from Jordan it took more than two years for the commandos to re-group, re-organize and re-equip themselves so as to partially offset the losses suffered in Jordan. Secondary, conducting raids from the Arkoub region was difficult task as the Israelis were in good positions in the overlooking hills, and had constructed a supply road, some of which lay within Lebanese territory. In summary, guerilla activity in southern Lebanon between the third and fourth Arab-Israeli wars was not particularly effective and had a very limited impact on northern Israel. The commandos were restricted for the most part to the Arkoub region of Lebanon with a few minor exceptions their cross-border activities were limited to the occupied Golan Heights and had little effect on Israeli settlements lying close to the ADL. It is worth noting that it was not until may 1974 that along with the ADL Israel started to make a barrier.²⁴⁵

The border between Lebanon and Israel did not have noteworthy physical obstruction during the 1965. At the same time Palestinian commandos first made their appearance in southern Lebanon and the summer of 1974. If the guerillas of Palestine did not pretense a serious military danger to Israel's a northern settlement then why is it that Israel resorted to a policy of conducting incessant raids against Lebanon? UN observers included twelve major operations from 14 June 1968 to 10 June 1974. It also reported 3036 Israeli violations of Lebanese territory during the same time.²⁴⁶

A lot of Lebanese apart from Palestinians citizens were either killed or wounded during these raids. As a result of the destruction of their health and hoes and the crops of many villages burnt to ashes during the raid. Thousands of people


became homeless. The intensity of Israeli raids suggests two things. First, the Israeli intention was to liquidate all or any manifestation of Palestinian nationalism particularly its militant variant so forcefully represented by the Palestinian guerillas. Second, the Israeli strategy was intended to facilitate the attainment of certain long term aims with regard to Lebanon. Israel was aware of the deep sectarian cleavages in Lebanon and the conflicting perceptions of Christians and Muslims towards the presence of Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon. By resorting to a relentless series of raids Israel’s aim in the long run was to bring about a polarization between the Lebanese Christians and Muslims over the issue of presence of Palestinian guerillas in the country. Such a polarization, Israel calculated, would undermine the uneasy national consensus, reinforce trends towards Maronite separatism as well as generate intense political strife. Israel had received the opportunity of asserting de facto control over southern Lebanon or even its annexation because Lebanon’s partition was now led by domestic political strife. This was the theme that showed that the Israeli leaders were not having strong opposition. 247

It was the Israeli objectives that a breakdown in the national consensus and domestic political upheaval. It is clearly visible by psychoanalysis of the scenery and prototype of Israeli raids during the Lebanese civil war from the late 1960s.

The Airport Raid and its Aftermath

The discordant repercussions of the PRM presence on the domestic politics of Lebanon had steadily started to surface during 1968. It was at this stage that Israel decided to step up its campaign of raids into Lebanon. The Israeli attack on 12 May 1968 on the Lebanese border village of Houla was the opening shot in this stepped up campaign. 248 Summer Lebanese border villages became the witness of heavy shelling. It led to destruction not only of homes but of crops and orchards which served as the principal means of livelihood of the people residing there. This was, however, a more prelude to what was going to take place in December that year. On 26 December an Israeli EL AL airliner was attacked on the tarmac in Athens by two Palestinians belonging to the PFLP. As the two Palestinians involved in the attack had come from Beirut a few days earlier Israel immediately held Lebanon responsible for the

incident. The Israeli transport minister Moshe Carmel declared that Israel would not “relieve the government of Lebanon from responsibility for acts of sabotage organized on Lebanese soil with governmental encouragement”.249

On 28 December Israel carried out a sensational one hour raid on the Beirut international airport. However Lebanese derails of any complicity in the Athens airport incident. Helicopter borne commandos destroyed thirteen civilian airline which they found standing on the tarmac. These commandos arrived at the airport at night from the direction of the coast landed.250

To create a political disturbance and instability in Lebanon this devastating attack was made. Over the issue of Palestinian presence, Israeli hopes were not belied for it led to one of the longest governmental crisis in the account of independent Lebanon.

The political situation in the country had already become worse and tense due to the Israeli raids. A bitter controversy had been raging as to what should be the Lebanese response to these raids. While the Muslims and leftists were demanding a strengthening of the armed forces, the Maronite leaders were calling for greater curbs on the Palestinians. Rising tension had led to violent clashes between the youth wing of the phalangist party led by Perre Jumayil’s son basher Jumayil and pro-Palestinian leaders charged that Pierre Jumayil, who was then the Interior Minister, was the brain behind the attack on the demonstrators. Pro-Palestinian students made a violence and rioting demonstration against the interior minister on 11 November. These students were from the Arab University of Beirut and from the schools in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods of Beirut.251

The Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese supporters had to face opposition and criticism after three days. Thus pro-Phalangist students came out in the streets of Beirut demanding against the Palestinian guerillas and making attack on their Lebanese supporters. The Palestinians leading to violent clashes and the death of one following which the government imposed indefinite curfew and a ban on all demonstrations in Tripoli.252

250. Of the thirteen planes destroyed eight belonged to Middle east airlines, three to Lebanese International Airways and two to trans - Mediterranean Airways, see Arab world, 29 and 30 December 1968).
251. Arab world, 8 and 12 November 1968.
The Israeli purpose was to make the circumstances worst by launching such type of sensational raid. Such a sensational raid on the Beirut airport in the midst of this surcharged political atmosphere clearly showed the bad intention of Israel. The comeback of the Lebanese authorities to the raid exposed almost unbelievable uselessness. The army's humiliating inaction angered the population. The Muslims and radical originsations immediately raised an outcry over the lack of protection at the airport and the failure of the army to move against the raiders during the time they were there. The Lebanese chamber of deputies demanded during a met in an emergency session to discuss the raid Jumbled "immediate conscription" as the only way to counter Israel. Defending the commandos he said that they" are the only ones who can defend our dignity as long as the officials cannot.253

During this time representatives of several political organizations gave their support to the commandos in Beirut. They met and issued a statement urging the government to enforce compulsory conscription. On 3 January 1969 students of Arab university of Beirut and Muslim schools went on a strike demanding resignation of those responsible for the failure to defend the airport, compulsory military service and distribution of arms in the south.254

Throughout the country condemnation of the effective of army and Popular demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinians were organized. Lebanon's Maronite leaders, however, was disparate to military mobilization. The Lebanese army from its very inception had been a Christian officered army while the rank and file included all the major religious sects. A major element of the sectarian system was that the army commander be a Maronite.255

A mass of Muslim officers would give threat to the Maronite monopoly of the officer's corps due to the Military conscription. Thus while the Muslim of the country were demanding conscription the Maronite leaders came out with the argument that Lebanon's best protection against Israeli raids. To curb the PRM itself which the cause of Israeli attacks were the few things to Israeli raids.256

256. For the reaction of Maronite leaders to Muslim demands, see, Arab World weekly, Beirut, no. 13, 11 January 1969, pp. 3-4.
Consequently on 8 January 1969 the giant pressure from his Muslim constituents to adopt a policy of militant support towards the Palestinians' premier Abdullah Yafi resigned.

**Armed Conflict between the Lebanese Army and Palestine Guerillas**

The Relationships between the Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese army became worst after the airport raid. However it had never been pleasant. Clashes between the two began to occur with increasing frequency from mid-January onwards. On 23 April clashes took place between the security forces and the protesters which led to the death of ten. In April popular demonstrations against the army were held throughout Lebanon.\(^{257}\)

Premier Karami (who had replaced Yafi in January) realizing that he ran the risk of antagonizing his Muslim constituents if he continued to associate himself with a regime that espoused only the Christian point of view resigned on 25 April. Thus a bloody clash led to the imposition of emergency. Speaking in a frank tone about the PRM presence, Karami in his resignation speech spelled out clearly the fact that there were two trends in Lebanon one supporting the PRM and the other opposed to it. "Therefore" he said "any government adopting one trend rather than the other will inevitably cause a split in the country".\(^{258}\)

The airport raid had begun to lead a second governmental acceptance within a short period of time i.e. four months. Thus political crisis came out of the airport raid. As the political disaster dragged on with no Muslim leader of national stature prepared to assume the office of the prime minister, Israel decided to employ air power for the first time against Lebanon. The Israeli air force (IAF) went against the Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon and took action against it on 11 August.\(^{259}\)

A huge amount of force of infantry attacked the Lebanese village of Halta, killing several people and destroying a large number of buildings in the following year. Once again Lebanese villages came under Israeli attack which led to an even larger loss of lives and property on 3\(^{rd}\) and 4\(^{th}\) October.\(^{260}\)

The new round of Israeli raids sparked off a large scale conflict between the guerillas and the Lebanese army. However, the political crisis still was simmering and tensions running high in the country during that time. On 28 August fighting broke

---


\(^{258}\) For the text of Karami's speech see *Arab world weekly*, no. 28, 26 April 1969, pp. vii -- viii.

\(^{259}\) *Daily star*, 12 August 1969.

\(^{260}\) Ibid., 6 September and 6 October 1969
out between the army and Palestinians in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli in North Lebanon. By October tensions raised to such an extent that US assistant secretary of state Joseph Sisco was prompted to publish a note of concern (on 12 October). Less than a week later, on 18 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Palestinians and Lebanese army units throughout southern Lebanon. Within a few days the hostilities spread to Biqa valley. On 23 October there were first signs of Syrian intervention as Saiqa units — though part of the PLO but in fact under the command of the military branch of the Syrian Baath party — attacked Lebanese army units in the border town of Masnaa. Simultaneously there was an attempt by the PRM to capture new positions in Muslim sections of Beirut and in Tripoli. At that time local Muslim and radical organizations joined the Palestinian fighters. Some of the severest clashes during this period took place around Tripoli when Palestinian guerillas on the outskirts of the city cut it off from highway access to Beirut. The forces of 24 October movement clashed with the security forces and led to large scale of causalities. Farouk Mukaddam led to this force inside the Tripoli. 

The Lebanese president evidently felt powerless of coping with the crisis and tuned to President Nasser for arbitration due to the rapidly spreading hostilities to all parts of the country and with early signs of Syrian involvement.

The Cairo Agreement

The commander — in Chief of the Lebanese army Emile Bustani and the PLO Chairman Arafat met with the Egyptian war Minister Lt. General Mahmoud Fawzi and an accord was signed which came to be known as the Cairo agreement. It can be done after the Three days of negotiations held in Cairo from 1-3 November. According to its terms which were supposed to be kept “secret” the Lebanese army agreed to allow the Palestinian guerillas free access to Syrian supply lines and relaxed restrictions previously placed on the refugee camps. The Palestinian armed struggle command (PASC) could set up armed units in the refugee camps. Palestinian residents were free to join the armed struggle. Representatives of the PASC were to meet the Lebanese army command regularly for purposes of coordination. Lebanon would continue to exercise full sovereignty over those areas where the PRM had set up bases. The PASC for its part would see to it that proper discipline was maintained.

among its ranks. In the matter of Lebanese internal affairs the Palestinians were forbidden to adopt any position. 262

For the establishment of a new government the agreement had been signed. Exactly seven months after he had resigned Karami once again formed a new cabinet in November. Since the specific terms were not discussed the harmony was ratified after a debate in the chamber of deputies.

To a conquest for the PLO, their Lebanese allies and a defeat for the Maronite dominated Lebanese government the Cairo harmony were amounted. It legitimized the right of the PLO to maintain centers in Lebanon. No other Arab government had ever agreed to such an arrangement before. The Cairo agreement therefore caused considerable alarm in Israel. In no case could Israel permit the transformation of the strategically important southern Lebanon into a Palestinian stronghold. Neither could it permit a Muslim or radical takeover of Lebanon — a takeover which the PLO presence could foster in the near future. The Cairo agreement itself was an indication of a shift in the sectarian balance of power inside Lebanon. The Israeli response was to intensify its raids against Lebanon still further in order to create such a state of chaos that it would lead to a total collapse of organized political life in the country. The Israeli response was to intensify its raids against Lebanon and it would lead to a total collapse of organized political life in the country. However the Israeli raids against Lebanon still further in order to create such a state of chaos that led to decline of the system.

Intensification of the Israeli Raids: From the Cairo Agreement to the Crisis of May 1973

Major General Mordechai Gur the Israeli Northern district commander threatened to “turn a six-mile stretch of southern Lebanon into a scorched – each desert” just after the signing of the Cairo agreement on 6 March 1970. 263 The Lebanese government had constrained to remove all Palestinian refugees from that same six mile strip fifteen years earlier. In May 1970 the IDF carried out a thirty –

262. For the text of the Agreement see, Al – Nahar, 20 April 1970 cited in Arab world, 20 April 1970. Abridged versions of the agreement had appeared earlier in many Lebanese newspapers. However, in April 1970, Al – Nahar for the first time published the full text of the Cairo agreement which — though the minister of information would not concede it — was apparently authentic. Al-Nahar was prosecuted by the government for having published the agreement.

263. Sobel, n. 35, p. 91.
two hour armored raid of the Arkoub in southern Lebanon. This large scale operation, the biggest penetration of Lebanon since the 1948 war marked the beginning of a new and far more aggressive phase in the Israeli offensive against Lebanon. The IDF occupied some villages and compelled their residents to flee and just before withdrawing resorted to a scorched earth policy. During the May operations the commander of the Lebanese army General Jean Nujaym instructed the units stationed near the border to return fire as a result of which the army suffered heavy casualties especially from the Israeli armored columns. Three Syrian aircrafts were blast down over Lebanese territory in the ensuing dog – fight with the Israeli air force. Syrian also sent some fighter bomber to invade the Israeli columns.264

A new policy of deploying permanent patrols on the Lebanese side of the border was initiated by the IDF next to the raid on Arkoub.. At the same time the IDF built a network of road on Lebanese territory connecting these with northern Israel.265 Apart from facilitating further Israeli raids, the Israeli moves signified a step-by-step approach towards the incorporation of border areas into northern Israel. In September Israel carried out an even bigger raid than that of May.266 It was preceded the days of continuous bombing by the IAF artillery barrage and smaller raids. In order to give the way for a possible Israeli livelihood of large sectors of southern Lebanon the unremitting series of raids was intended to empty the southern villages completely. During this period, this report started to appear in Israeli newspapers.267

Shiite Exodus from the South

Total interruption of normal life there was led by repeated Israeli sortie into Sothern Lebanon. The people worst affected by the Israeli raids were the poor Shiite peasants who in order to escape the wrath of the IDF abandoned their villages and began moving to safer zones in the north, particularly Beirut. This movement became an effective exodus as the severity of Israeli raids intensified in 1970. It was also the movement of Shiite peasants toward north which began in trickles in mid-1969.

Political leaders from southern Lebanon had raise demands for the distribution of arms among the villagers and fortification of border villages as early as May 1968. In June the Lebanese government allocated LL 1.25 million for “ensuring public

264. Hamizrachi, p. 35.
266. Daily star, 6 September 1970.
security" in Lebanese villages lying close to the armistice line. Part of the aid was intended to provide medical relief to the victims of Israeli raid. In view of the Christian opposition to conscription the government decided in December 1968 to set up "Partisan units" for the defense of the south. Those who were expected to support the army in the south the Lebanese army were given permission to recruit these volunteers.

To take certain measures for the defense of the south public outcry in the wake of the airport raid compelled the government. The army hastily submitted a draft law to the cabinet for the institutions of compulsory military service for all Lebanese at the age of eighteen. Due to Christian opposition the draft law, could not reach the statute books and remained a dead letter. But some steps were taken for the fortification of southern areas bordering Israel like the building of air shelters and trench. Besides, the army held meetings with the local headmen of southern villages to discuss plans for the instruction of inhabitants of these villages in the use of firearms. During 1969 there were persistent reports of the flight of southerners. In early January 1970 the southern deputies met and urged the government to take more energetic steps for the security of the region. Government embarked on a protest approach to draw the government attention to the plight of southerners. The movement for awareness in the south headed by Kamal Asad and the national congress for the fortification of the south (a grouping of socialists, Baath, communists and Nasserites) were the two bodies which led by the government.

A mass exodus from the south started to take place, sometimes connecting entire villages which were followed by the Israeli raid on Arkoub in May 1970 and extra Israeli raids. Official estimate at the end of May indicated that 30,000 residents of southern Lebanon had become refugees. However a lot of refugees at more than twice the executive figures were unofficially estimated.

A lot of refugees shifted to the shanty towns of west Beirut count to the already burgeoning population of the capital. Uprooted from their land and their traditional environment and stranded in the irritating combination of abject poverty and vulgar display of wealth, these Shiite peasants became an erupting volcano of

268. Arab world, 17 June 1968.
269. Ibid., 11 December 1968.
270. Ibid., 8 January 1969.
frustration. These refugees became the breeding ground for all sorts of essential ideologies and could not consider that where to go and they were idle, hungry and confused.

Imam Musa al-Sadar, and Iranian born Shiite cleric became the champion of the abject plight of these Shiite. In May 1970 Imam Musa called for a country – wide strike to protest the neglect of the south by the government. The nationwide strike held on 26 May was a complete success. Under intense pressure the Lebanon government proceeds to establish a “Council for the south” and allocated ten million dollars for the residents of the south. 58 The new measure taken by the government proved to be too late and too little and as there was an escalation in the level of Israeli raids in the coming months, the Shiite exodus from southern Lebanon went up even further. 272 The Shiite exodus from southern Lebanon went up further the government took new measure which proved to be too late and little. A mass of people departure went up further as there was an escalation in the level of Israeli raids in the coming months.

PLO’s Debacle in Jordan and Its Implications for Lebanon

Finally the Hashemite monarchy turned against the PRM in Jordan in September 1970. And also it began to subdue them – a process which was to take over twelve months to complete. The Palestinian guerillas were reduced, step by step, in a succession of encounters until their power in the country was completely destroyed and the Palestinian popular support for them was silenced. The crushing defeat of the PLO at the hands of the Jordanian army considerably weakened the resistance movement both in military as well as political terms. As a result of Jordan’s military campaign against the resistance large numbers of Palestinians fled to either Syrian or Lebanon. The PRM could operate with some degree of autonomous Lebanon now remained the only Arab country.

The PRM had learnt one important lesson after its debacle in Jordan. They learnt that never to isolate itself from the masses and progressive movements of the host country and not to pose as an alternative to these movements. In Jordan it had made a mistake of not winning over the Jordanian subjects of the king. The

predominant line of thinking among Palestinian leaders was that the Jordanian debacle occurred "precisely because the (Palestinian) revolution had abided by constraining principles of behavior vis-a-vis the Jordanian masses which had merely played into the hands of the Jordanian authorities, thus facilitating the letter's liquidation".\(^{273}\) In order to avoid a repetition of a Jordan-type situation in Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership particularly elements of the Palestinian left decided to forge close political and military links with the Muslim and progressive in the country. Between the Palestinian and various local groups represented in the NM a strong alliance had been forged by the end of 1972.

A possible Muslim radical takeover in Lebanon in conjunction with the PLO as the growing bonds between the NM and Palestinians further extended Israeli physical act and legal process. The result was a further escalation in Israeli raids. Now, Israel seized upon attacks on its property and personnel at home and abroad to launch devastating raids against alleged headquarters of resistance organization in Lebanon. For instance when in May 1972 Japanese gunmen belonging to the Japanese red brigade in collaboration with the PFLP launched a murderous attack in a crowded custom hall in Tel Aviv's Lod International Airport, Israel immediately chose to retaliate against Lebanon. It launched a devastating air, land and naval operation against Lebanon which lasted for four days and caused incalculable damages.\(^{274}\) Lebanon was subjected to Israeli attacks of unprecedented further sallying of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich by the black September organization after in September again.\(^{275}\)

Israel announced that it would no longer wait for commando acts or terrorist incidents before striking targets in Lebanon in October. Former Israeli chief of staff Chaim Herzog declared that the "Very presence of terrorists in the area between the border and the Litany River is a provocation and Israel is free to act against them".\(^{276}\) in effect Israel was outlining a policy by which it could now justify attacking Lebanon on the least pretext. As attacks by Israel against Lebanon mounted in the coming months, it led to a situation of tense insecurity throughout the country.

---

274. See, Arab world weekly, 24 June 1972, pp. 1-3.
government's inability or failure to confront the enemy led to an erosion of whatever little legitimacy it had in the eyes of the Lebanese Muslim. On the other hand the Lebanese Christians singled out the Palestinians as the cause of all of Lebanon's woe. A lot of clashes further contributing to the tension already prevailing in the country. Thus Clashes between Palestinians and one or other on occurring at regular intervals in the first half of 1973.

Assassination of Palestinian Leaders in Beirut

Israel began one of the most provocative attacks against Lebanon on 10 April 1973 in the midst of growing polarization between Christians and Muslims and eroding legitimacy of the state. In the early hours of that day an Israeli assassination team landed on the Beirut beach where they were met by six Israeli agents who had entered Lebanon earlier. Form here one group drove to the Sabra refugee camp located in the centre of Beirut where they shot dead three prominent Fatah leaders – Abu Yousef, one of the two Fatah representatives on the executive committee of the PLO, Kamal Adwan, an organizer of Palestinian resistance in the Israeli – occupied west bank and Kamal Nasser an official spokesman of the PLO. While the attack was being mounted in Beirut the other group entered the Shatila refugee camp near the city and destroyed the headquarters of the popular democratic front for the liberation of Palestine. Israeli naval units destroyed a Palestinian military command and control centre in a separate in Sidon. 277

As it were prevailing in the country already the raid had an electrifying impact on the tense situation in the country. In February an Israeli raid near Tripoli in northern Lebanon had given rise to speculations among Muslim circles that the Lebanese authorities had tacitly agreed to the raid. 278 As a result of this latest Israeli action the Palestinians and other Lebanese allies were convinced more than ever of collusion between Israel and the Lebanese government. Declaring that there was indeed "collusion in theory and practice between the Lebanese authorities, the Israeli government and the planners of this operation" Junblatt alleged that the security forces did not move against the Israelis simply because the interior ministry did not instruct them to do so. 279

277. Ibid., P. 128.
further proof of a likelihood of collusion came to light when Premier Saeb Salam declared that he had repeatedly telephoned the army commander Iskander Ghanem to move against the raiders but nothing had been done. Accusing Ghanem of insubordination and failure to defend the country he requested President Suleiman Franjieh to dismiss Ghanem. To undermine the authority of the Muslim premiership Franjieh turned down Salam’s request where upon Salam himself resigned accusing the president. For the dismissal of Ghanem he requested President Suleiman Franjieh.  

A second major confrontation between the Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese army was led by exacerbatng tensions a series of incidents. The fighting which started in Beirut soon engulfed the whole country. Progressive parties in Lebanon — principally the communist party of Lebanon, the organization of communist action and the Murabitun, the military arm of qualailat’s independent Nasserite movement played a very active role in backing the guerillas and participated militarily in the defense of the camps. The fighting caused Syrian president Hafez al-Assad to dispatch Syrian controlled Palestinian forces to Lebanon in strength while his foreign minister Abd al-Halim al-Khaddam arrived in Beirut to mediate. Assad pressurized the Lebanese president to order an immediate halt to the use of Lebanese air force against Palestinian camps. Syrian also closed its borders with Lebanon as a show of solidarity with the Palestinians.

An agreement was reached between the army commander Ghanem and the Palestinians at the Melkart hotel in Beirut. After this, Syrian mediation ultimately brought the conflict to a halt on 18 May. In essence, what became known as the Melkart agreement reaffirmed the basis of the Cairo agreement of 1969. An additional provision established a joint army — armed struggle command for the purpose of preventing future difficulties and misunderstanding that might arise from time to time. The May 1973 crisis brought the NM and Palestinians still closer. To the various Christian communities in Lebanon this growing unity between the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies raised the specter of “coptification” that is their reeducation in Lebanon to the status of a religiously tolerated but politically in signification minority like the Coptic Christians in Egypt. Moved by such apprehensions they drew closer

together within a loose umbrella known as the conservative Lebanese front (CLF) led by four formidable patriarchs of Maronite community, Jumayil, Shamun, Franjieh and father Sharbel Kassis, head of the powerful Maronite order of Monks. Besides heading his respective organization, each of the four also had his own well-armed and well-trained private militia.\(^{283}\) Perceiving themselves as the ultimate guardians of Lebanon’s traditional order, these forces now intensified their training recruitment and logistical preparations for what increasingly seemed like an inevitable showdown. In turn the Palestinian progressive coalition in Lebanon also stepped up its preparation as the popularity began to extend it likelihood of an all-out encounter. In turn the Palestinian progressive coalition in Lebanon also stepped up its preparation.\(^{284}\)

Rampant Escalation in Israeli Raids: From the Crisis of May 1973 to the Outbreak of Civil War

There was a rapid escalation in the level of Israeli raids against Lebanon during the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war. The immediate cause behind this was, in part, related to the ongoing negotiations for peace being conducted between Israel and the frontline Arab states. The peace negotiations had been initiated by the American secretary of state Henry Kissinger I the wake of the October 1973 war. Kissinger’s diplomatic initiative better known as the step – by step approach was based on the following guiding principles – (1) to avoid the Palestinian problem and the question of their involvement in the peace process even though it was the central problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict (2) to deal with each Arab state separately and step by step thus avoiding confrontation with a collective Arab position, and (3) to avoid linking initial diplomatic steps with the nature of the final peace agreement.\(^{285}\) From the very beginning of the peace negotiations, therefore, Kissinger assiduously side-tracked the Palestinian problem and avoided the PLO participation in the negotiation process trying instead to bring about a series of bilateral agreements between Israel and the

\(^{283}\) Jumayil headed the 15000 strong Kataib the military arm of the Phalangist party, Shumun led the 3500 strong Al–Ahrar (“Tiger”) militia, Franjieh (Zghorta Liberation army) and father Kassis each had a private army of over 1500 men. There were a number of other organizations and groups that were allied to the CLF. Among the most important group was Guardians of the Cedars. Their leader was the famous poet said Aql. It also had a thousand – strong militia.

\(^{284}\) Salibi, pp. 69-70.

front line Arab states. Disengagement agreement (May 1974) were in keeping with this approach of the Egyptian Israeli.

For the PLO an alarming development was the result of Kissinger’s step—by step diplomacy. Arab summit conference held at Rabat in October declared the PLO to be the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The conference was dominated by a dispute between Jordan and the PLO as to which of them should be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. After a protracted debate the conference resulted in a political victory for the PLO whose right was recognized not only to be the “sole and legitimate” representative of the Palestinians but also to lead them in establishing a “national Palestinian authority” on any part of liberated Palestinian. 286 The Rabat summit decision was a severe setback for Kissinger who was trying to restore sovereignty over the west bank to Jordan. PLO effectively restricted Jordan from arriving at any understanding with Israel with regard to the fate of the west bank as the PLO was now the only representative of west bank Palestinians.

With considerable international impact the Rabat summit was soon followed by another major Palestinian milestone. In November 1974 the UN general assembly adopted two resolutions with regard to the Palestine problem. The first one declared “the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they had been displaced and uprooted”. It further declared the Palestinian “right to self – determination without external interference” and to “national independence and sovereignty”. 287 The second resolution granted the PLO a permanent observer status at the UN general assembly and at other international conferences sponsored by the UN. These major political and public relations gave the way to the participation practically indispensable in any overall peace settlements and it also gained enhanced the prestige of the PLO.

The PLO escalated its war against Israel for the PLO hand to hand with this diplomatic offensive. The PLO escalated its war against Israel for the PLO knew fully well that forcing Israel to join the international recognition could not be achieved by diplomatic means only and that the armed struggle should continue alongside the diplomatic activity. as quiet began to prevail on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts the PRM began to escalate its operations against Israel. There was a new pattern in the

---

286. Keesings contemporary archives (Bristol), vol.20, 18-24 November 1974, p. 26813 A.
287. ibid., vol. 20 16-22 December 1974, 26862.
operations, namely that they took the form of suicide missions undertaken by three or four commandos at a time. The first of these operations took place in April 1974 when a suicide squad of three guerrillas from the popular front for the liberation of Palestine – general command (PELP-GC) \(^{288}\) carried out an attack on the selectmen of Kiryat Shmonah near the Lebanese border leaving behind eighteen dead. The PFLP-GC in its statement about the operation said that the purpose was to strike at the American sponsored submissive plans for a settlement.\(^ {289}\) This was followed by an attack on the Israeli border village of Maalot on 15 May by the democratic front for the liberation of Palestine (DFLP)\(^ {290}\), on Kibbutz Shamir on 13 June by the PFLP – GC, and finally a seaborne raid on the Israeli towns of Nahariya by fathom on 24 June. As a result of the four suicide missions into northern Israel between 11 April and 24 June 53 Israelis were killed.\(^ {291}\)

They launched an intense agitation against it, branding all Arab governments who showed an inclination to accept Kissinger initiatives as traitors. In December 1973, radical student groups and Beirut organized a strike to protest the first visit of Kissinger to the region in connection with the proposed peace settlement. Meanwhile within Lebanon radical Palestinians and their Lebanese allies loudly denounced the ongoing peace negotiations as a “surrender plan”. In February the following year there were more strikes and demonstrations in protest against the second of Kissinger’s visit to the region. A large clash had taken place between large-scale rioting and security forces.\(^ {292}\)

From the very beginning of the negotiations Israel had been adamant in its insistence that the PLO could not be a party to the negotiations. In order to defeat the Palestinian demand to be included as a party in its own right, it became imperative for Israel to crush the PRM in Lebanon which as its principal base of operation and

\(^{288}\) The DFLP headed by Nayef Hawatmeh was formed in 1969 as result of yet another split in the PFLP. See, Cobban, pp. 152-57.

\(^{289}\) It was shortly after the raid on Kiryat Shmonah that Israel decided to seal its border with Lebanon with twelve foot high security fence topped with barbed wire and equipped with electronic warning devices. A smooth dirt track was created on the Israeli side of the fence to pick up footprints and machine gun positions were established at intervals along the fence. See New York Times, 14 July 1974.

\(^{290}\) The DFLP headed by Nayef Hawatmeh was formed in 1969 as result of yet another split in the PFLP. See, Cobban, pp. 152-57.

\(^{291}\) See Arab world weekly, 29 June 1974, 298, p.4.

\(^{292}\) Salibi, pp. 74-74.
silence its Lebanese allies into submission. There was thus an all-time escalation of Israeli military operations against Lebanon. Israeli violation of Lebanese territory which had occurred at the rate of 1.4 violations per day for the period 1968-74 registered a quantum jump to seven violations per day during 1974-75. The diplomatic gains scored by the PLO and the voices being raised in Lebanon at the behest of radical Palestinians against the American-sponsored peace process caused considerable alarm to Israel. Israel's heavy-handed raids created a state of chaos and disorganization on an unprecedented scale. The new round of stepped-up Israeli raids led to total breakdown in view of the acute polarization between Lebanese Christians and Muslims.

Radicalization of the Shiite Peasantry

The Israeli raids bringing more and more areas of Southern Lebanon within its sweep the flight of Shiite peasants to the north also intensified in 1974. As the Israeli raids intensified. Some villagers who chose to remain behind were either too old or infirm to move or did so only at a great risk to their lives. Thus Village after village wees totally abandoned.

Beirut was being overloaded to explosive levels as a result. In March 1974 Imam Musa Sadr addressed a massive armed rally of 75,000 in Baalbek where he condemned the government for failing to protect the south or to care for its displaced people. Peasants from the south and Biqa, now subsisting precariously in the slums of Beirut, village artisans and agricultural laborers were Musa Sadr's principal supporters. Sadr dismissed as bogus the argument of some that the activities of PRM were largely to blame, noting that the Israeli attacks continued ever after the commandos suspended their operations. Sadr. Then offered to organize and protect Lebanese victims himself and declared "we must train a new generation which carries a rifle in one hand and a sickle in the other. I am going to train with you." A new organization Harakat al-Mahrumeen (Movement of the Deprived) was formed soon by the Baalbek rally Sadr.

294. Arab Report and Record, no. 6, 16-31 March 1974.
Inexorable Slide towards Civil War

For the defense of their camps the Palestinian were attaining large numbers of shoulder-version SAM-7 missile and other air-defense system going the head of the Lebanese government. In 1974, Palestinian camps had become the most favored target of the IAF in the villages in southern Lebanon and also in Lebanon. Nabatiya the camps which came under repeated attacks became destroyed completely during that year. The Maronite armed force accelerated their own weapon acquisition programme also post the Palestinians became success to achieve of air defense system. The port of Jounieh, North of Beirut became the main port of arrival of large shipments of arms. With full knowledge of the authorities the Tigers and the Karaib took that of large shipments of arms which reached the port of Jounieh, North of Beirut.

For the first time non-party members were hired by the Maronites armed force. The Maronite heartland the opening new training camps and conducting military parades in the towns of Mount Lebanon. The Maronite militias were liberally financed by the Maronite bourgeoisie who perceived them as the ultimate guardian of their privileges.

In situation of sensitive tension when the rival factions of society are polarized, any incident between them is likely to erupt into collective violence. Such an incident occurred on 13 April 1975 in the Christian suburb of Ayn al-Rummana. On this day, while Pierre Jumaiyyil was attending the consecration of anew Maronite church in Ayn al-Rummana, on this day, while Pierre Jumayyil was attending the consecration of a new Maronite church in Ayn al-Rummana, a car broke through the Kataib security line and shots were fired from the car in the direction of the church killing three. In the confusion that followed, the car managed to escape. On the same morning that this incident took place; Palestinians from various refugees’ camps around Beirut were attending a commando parade in one of the Muslim quarters of the city. One group of Palestinians while returning from the parade to Tall al-Zatar by bus in the afternoon, were ambushed by gunmen of the Kataib militia as they passed through Ayn al-Rummana. Twenty two passengers were shot dead and twenty other injured. These incidents triggered the civil war in Lebanon, conflict towards which the Lebanese had

296. Ibid., no.307, 31 August 1974, p.4, and no.310, 21 September 1974, p.4
297. Petran, n.81, p.151.
been gradually inching forward since the day Israel had launched its raid on the Beirut International Airport.

Any incident could explode into collective violence likely between them in a situation of sensitive tension during the rival sections of society are polarized. On 13 April 1975 such an incident occurred in the Christian community of Ayn al-Rummana. On this day, a car broke through the Kataib security line and shots were ablated from the car in the direction of the church killing three besides this Pierre Jumaiyyil was attending the dedication of a new Maronite church in Ayn al-Rummana. The car runs to escape due to the uncertainty that pursued. From a lot of refugees' camps around Beirut the Palestinians were attending a commando parade in one of the Muslim quarters of the city on the same morning. One group of Palestinians were trapped by gunmen of the Kataib militia as they passed through Ayn al-Rummana as it was coming back from the parade to Tall al-Zatar by bus in the afternoon. During this Twenty two passengers were shot dead and twenty other injured.\(^{299}\) As Israel had commenced its raid on the Beirut International Airport therefore the conflict towards which the Lebanese had been steadily crawling onward. This incident, thus, generated the civil war in Lebanon.

\(^{299}\) Ibid.
Chapter – IV

Role of Women in the First Intifada
Chapter - IV
Role of Women in the First Intifada

The Intifadas were key periods in modern Palestinian and Israeli history. These were socio-political movements that physically expressed Palestinian frustration and anger at the oppressive and colonialist policies of the occupation by Israeli. Intifada is an Arabic word which means "Civil Uprising", and literally means 'shaking off'. These Uprisings were named thus, to represent throwing off the Israeli regime; the feeling of national desolation, related to pre-existing weakness, was also to be discarded. The first intifada and second Al-Aqsa Intifada were though similar in their root causes, but they differed enormously in their characteristics. The role women played has been very significant, particularly how they were greatly more active in the first Uprising than in the second intifada. However, an attempt to discuss the roles women played before, during and after the first Intifada has been made below.

The first Intifada started on 9th December 1987, and was a mass mobilization and uprising of the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, against the injustice and repression of the Occupation by Israel. The Palestinians had to pay taxes enforced by Israel, and were often subjected to raids, detentions, and enforcement of curfew. Violence was a daily occurrence, and conditions were a constant reminder that their own national aspiration for independence had been denied. The injustice they felt was doubled by Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and the construction of settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza strip and Arab east Jerusalem. Palestinian frustration had been simmering for years, but the catalyst cause of the outbreak of the first Intifada, was a road traffic accident in which several Palestinians were killed by the vehicle of an Israeli. Actually, On December 8, 1987 an IDF vehicle crashed into a truck in Gaza carrying Palestinian labourers home from their work place. In this accident four Palestinians were killed and other seven were wounded severely. A Rumour spread alleging that the accident was an act of vengeance for an Israeli who had been stabbed to death in the previous week by some Palestinians. However, thousands of Palestinians joined the funeral procession of the deceased workers and turned into angry protest. The IDF watching the disturbance as routine demonstration, emerged to disperse the crowd with tear gas and live

127
ammunition, in which a twenty-year-old boy, Hatem al-Sisi was killed, who became the first martyr of the uprising which was named as the Intifada, an Arabic term meaning “shaking off.”

This first Intifada was a social phenomenon; a search for self-identity at the individual and cultural social levels. Hundreds of thousands of individuals were mobilized during the Uprising, the majority of whom had never before forayed into active resistance. They sidelined the traditional values in the struggle, and gender, age and class boundaries were essentially dissolved as men, women, and children of all ages and from all social strata united in favour of protest against Israelis. Vast media coverage, in particular images depicting women and youths facing armed Israeli soldiers, helped generate unprecedented international recognition and sympathy, and propelled women’s issues into the forefront of contemporary consciousness which were never seen before this.

In all over the world, women have long struggled for equality, recognition as valued members of society, and the opportunity to make their presence felt in the political arena as well. The struggles become even more prominent in times of war and conflict, a situation that is very familiar to the Palestinian women. Till the beginning of the 20th century, patriarchal authority and the religious and cultural traditions of Islam and the Arab world, meant female social standing was far lower than men’s, and women were relegated to the submissive. Prior to 1987, their role was embedded in tradition, and women were restricted to the private domain of their homes.

Muslim women in Palestine, however, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, have been attempting to make their collective voice heard, and reduce the division within their societies. The seed of feminist movement had begun to develop gradually, but it was the outbreak of the Intifada, and its accompanying demands, that greatly accelerated the development of women’s roles, and brought about social changes also: This made it possible, and even desirable, for women to be drawn out of their homes and sent them into the social and political affairs. 'Although it is often asserted that women’s traditional role in the family is an obstacle to public

---

political action...these barriers seem to have become permeable for Palestinian women during the Uprising.\textsuperscript{303}

As a result of the Intifada, women were able actively to participate more fully in social affairs. They continued with their traditional ‘women’s work’, although additionally adopted roles and duties that had previously been deemed male vocations. This is a classic example of reordering of societal norms, and is symptomatic of a population engaged in struggle: ‘when a community is involved in open conflict and all resources are directed towards an external threat.., there is likely to be some fluidity in social ordering.’ \textsuperscript{304}

The movement of feminism gained momentum, as women became more active and politically more conscious. ‘Women took up the fight, not only against Occupation, but also against the restrictive norms of their society’.\textsuperscript{305} The perception of Public concerning the role and status of women also began to change as they undertook prominent roles in the Intifada. This was the first time, when women stood shoulder to shoulder with their male counterparts, which thrust the subjects of gender equality and women’s rights. As a result of this, the feminist movement became synonymous with the nationalist struggle, and for many, the movements became inextricably coiled together.

\textbf{I. The Intifada and Feminist Movement}

The role that was played by Palestinian women in the initial popular stage of the Palestinian first intifada was not new, of course, for Palestinian women to take on a political role in the society, especially during the emergency period. In the streets of villages, towns and refugee camps women from all ages and social classes took part in demonstration, threw stones, burned tires, built roadblocks, raised Palestinian flags, and prevented soldiers from arresting people. As one can see a woman in traditional peasant dress carrying a bucket of rocks on her head to a middle-class woman in Beit Sahur, her high heels in one hand and a rock in the other, this type of images of

\textsuperscript{305} Augustins, ed. (1993), p.18.
women permeated the first months of the uprising. These activities were most intense in poor urban neighbourhood, in village, towns as well as refugee camps. 306

However, women's actions were sometimes extremely violent, and they engaged in serious confrontations with the Israeli army, despite women's activities were particularly characterised by acts of peaceful civil disobedience and resistance. In the first months of the uprising, every Friday became an occasion for their marches from mosques and every Sunday, for marches from churches.

The International Women's Day of 1988 witnessed the largest celebrations of these occasions ever. In the town of Ramallah, over five hundred women, from teenagers to grandmothers, marched through the streets, calling to the youth both boys and girls, 'No stones!' while Israeli soldiers attacked the marchers with teargas and rubber bullets several times before the women dispersed and several times they were violent. The Women's Day marches were the last large public organising efforts of women activists as Israeli army repression and arrests led to protests and community survival became an urgent task.

As the number of dead and wounded increased during the uprising and Israel mounted an offensive to crush the intifada, new critical needs for the people appeared and the grassroots organisations responded with new programmes and activities. When the Israeli authorities closed all primary and secondary schools in the West Bank in February 1988 'until further notice,' affecting three hundred thousand schools, women organised neighbourhood and home classes throughout the West Bank. The isolation of the Palestinian cities and towns from the countryside through curfews and restrictions on mobility revealed the importance of each community being self-reliant. This immediately resulted in an emphasis on conservation, local production, and boycotting of Israeli goods and services. 307

As the number of prisoners and martyrs increased, health insurance programmes were initiated for prisoners' wives and adoption of children of prisoners and martyrs was broadened, and solidarity visits with families became a daily activity. In all these activities, the Palestinian women's committees and individual women played a leading role at that time, often undertaking much of the practical work, whether teaching in their homes, growing and canning food, or extending emotional

307 Ibid., p.56.
and practical support to stricken families and rose their voices against the Israeli brutality.

Despite of all the impressive mobilisation and courageous activities of women activists and ordinary women, the structure of the women's committees had been transformed. The goals of the women's movement were subsumed not only to national priorities but also to the male-dominated political organisations that set these priorities. This impact of the intifada on the Palestinian women's movement had been contradictory. It demonstrated simultaneously both the strength and limitations of the existing women's organisations and their programmes as well as the power and influence of the movement and its activists. This also revealed the existence of traditional, social and political forces that had been relatively unacknowledged before the uprising, particularly political fundamentalist of Islam.308

Political Organisations and the Women's Committees

The significance of the women's movement was unprecedented, and since 1987, the movement emerged, in the format of various women's committees, as a key organizing force and a threat to many traditional Palestinian customs and values as well as to Israeli hegemony over the West Bank and Gaza, and a significant component to the effort to restructure the Palestinian economy, which was one of the essential goals of the Uprising.309

These organizations and committees, however, did not emerge in a vacuum. They had been in existence since 1978, with the aims of promoting awareness of women's issues and generating social flexibility and recognition. They made efforts to raise women's consciousness, and provided its members with training and practical skill development classes in order to increase their personal and social skills. These earlier committees provided a basis and model for the committees formed after 1987, and with the outbreak of Intifada this training evolved, and became broader in scope, to provide women with the training and means to support their own households and participate in the Uprising. There were only several hundred women belonging to women's committees before 1987, but after the outbreak of the intifada this number increased to about five thousand. The Women's Committees for Social Work by 1993 also recorded forty new committees.310

308 Samiuddin, Abida and Khanam, R., pp. 55-56.
There were four main women’s committees emerged, each of which was associated with a different political party. They were: the Association of Labour Committee, which was linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the Association of Working Palestinian Women, tied to the Palestinian Communist Party; the Association of Palestinian Women, linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); and the Women’s Association for Social Works, which was associated with the Fatah.

They were responsible for organizing the popular committees, and a number of splinter organizations were formed to address the different problems resulting from the Occupation of Israel. These included, amongst others, home economy, agriculture, medical, and neighbourhood committees. They were generally mixed gender, but women were more active in the majority of organizations, and made up a larger percentage of the membership. Nationalism was a primary incentive for women to take up active roles, but for some women, their role had to change, for as the political struggle escalated, large numbers of Palestinian men were jailed or exiled, and gaps were left in communities, which women had to fill in order to keep their neighbourhoods and families as well. The women’s committees facilitated this move, and women assumed leadership roles in political and communal organizations, and in popular committees which challenged the traditional economic division of labour force. 311

The agriculture committees were primarily established inside the refugee camps, and were designed to promote national economic independence from Israel and provide food for local neighbourhoods during the scarcity of food. Palestinians boycotted Israeli produce, and women grew “victory gardens” to generate goods for personal and marketable use so that they would not face the shortage of food and other useable things whenever curfew was enforced or local shops were closed. In this way, they were self-sufficient and not facing food shortages, as they relied on themselves. They raised animals and grew, pickled, and preserved fruits and vegetables, made jams, ice cream and biscuits for the emergency periods. Women specially stockpiled food for the period when curfews were implemented and smuggled food and goods to families during such times, whilst also covertly

311 Peretz (1990), p. 96.
distributing, publications discussing the ways of food storage and preservation and caring for plants and animals.\textsuperscript{312}

Hence, women's committees also addressed agricultural issues from a grassroots level and organized tuition for rural women in the basics of food production, accounting, and hygiene. Initiatives like this not only helped sustain the Palestinian economy and disrupt Israeli exportation, but also gave women a taste of economic independence, set the precedent for other women to join the movement, and created more jobs. Prolific committee member and women's rights activist, Um Khalid spoke of her participation in the committees:

\textit{Now I feel I am able to fight for my full right as a woman and as a human being. I am no longer just a housewife. No, I'm part of the workforce which is creating the direct change in my society... By being productive I can also be a full partner in establishing the structure of our society.}\textsuperscript{313}

Apart from the agriculture, women also addressed home economy issues. They approached churches and charitable organizations, which subsequently provided them with the materials to make handicrafts and clothes, which they then sold, or donated, to Palestinian prisoners. They started sewing workshops where women were taught practical skills by others. Such roles were of great importance, and earned women recognition and acceptance from the male population. However, such activities were not too far removed from traditional female duties, so it is debatable whether or not these roles aided the feminist cause or simply reinforced women's traditional role in society. Women belonging to these committees also performed their resistance "work" in addition to their household duties, thus showing that although the equality divide was diminished, traditional role boundaries were not completely dissolved.

Women also played significant roles in education committees, where they taught the pupils of the schools that had been shut during the strict curfews; often for long periods of time. When the neighbourhood committees were outlawed in August 1988, a small group of women still taught clandestine classes in their homes at great personal risk from Israeli Defense Force (IDF) raids and subsequent beatings. These teachers were respected by men as they were playing an important role in shaping the future generation of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{314}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{312} Nassor & Heacock (1990), p. 136.  
\textsuperscript{314} http://www.despicabletruce.org.uk/page19.html}

133
However, after the ban on committee, women’s roles changed once again. The number of committees declined, and the majority of women reverted back to the more traditional activities like needlework and home economy. Some scholars believe that the change in female role appeared to only last as long as their active participation, and by the end of 1988, tradition had superseded the “new” role of women which altogether changed the society.

In response to the huge number of injured Palestinians, medical committees were formed to provide an alternative place of treatment to Israeli hospitals and transport patients to Palestinian hospitals. Female members played a major role in sustaining their local communities’ health and welfare through participation in such committees. They managed to prepare blood-typed of whole neighbourhoods, and organized clandestine blood donor networks, as well as providing emergency local medical treatment as an alternative to hospital facilities. It was very important as it was commonly believed that injured Palestinians were arrested and detained by the IDF. Women’s committees helped in taking these injured to hospital for treatment, or they simply saved them from going to the hands of the IDF. Women with medical knowledge also taught first-aid to others and organized health lectures from medical relief personnel. This was particularly necessary as checkpoints made progress to medical facilities extremely slow, and during curfews it was near impossible to get medical help for the injured, so local treatment was of paramount importance for which women were doing their best efforts. 315

Generally, women participated in neighbourhood committees, which were more localized versions of the different committees of women. They coordinated activities prepared to help the survival of their neighbourhoods, and each had a splinter committee to deal with emergencies and ongoing services and supply of materials. These committees were taking care of all aspects of civilian life and became the driving force for individual neighbourhoods. All committee members supported their local communities, and attempted to consolidate community spirit by mobilizing their neighbours to visit the sick and wounded persons, as well as the families of Palestinians who had been killed by Israeli army. They cared for imprisoned Palestinian women and worked on behalf of all incarcerated Palestinians by contacting lawyers, arranging prison visits through the Red Cross, and making and

sending clothing and all necessary supplies to prisoners. Moreover, they organized sit-in demonstrations at local Red Cross branches to contest the terrible prisoners' conditions and mass detentions.

It was self-imposed responsibility of women to upkeep and repair of their neighbourhoods, and would survey the collateral damage after a raid and call for emergency services wherever it would be necessary. They ensured the cleanliness of roads and any rubbish was removed by them, so that daily-life could run as smoothly as possible (under the circumstances), and the shebab (young men) could continue their activities too. Women formed close knit groups, and neighbourhoods became like extended families, where all type of helps were provided to each and every Palestinian. It was also the duty of Committee members to address and tackle individuals' problems, and collect donations of food and money for women who were struggling to upkeep their family and household if their husbands were away fighting, or had been killed or imprisoned for the Palestinian cause. It was also the role of women in the neighbourhood committees to provide child-care facilities, (particularly in refugee camps and villages), so that their mothers could leave their homes in search of work, or to participate in the Intifada.\footnote{316}{Samiuddin, Abida and Khanam, R., pp. 57-58.}

However, some roles undertaken by women in neighbourhood committees went against traditional gender norms. Particularly one duty was that of neighbourhood night guarding, which previously unheard role which was assigned to women to perform. Women took themselves in the front-line of demonstrations and prepared ammunition for the Shebab, as well as termed themselves as Defense Committees. Many reports have even surfaced of women taking part in the violence: ‘We told the Shebab, stay home and sleep, today we're in charge’. These types of actions prompted one female activist to say: 'behind every man is a woman who strengthens his hands'.\footnote{317}{Nassor & Heacock (1990), p.141.}

The difference between the programmes of the clandestine political organisations and those of the grassroots women's committees, during the uprising, converged. The Palestinian masses were in the streets and everyone experienced oppression by Israeli army. The Palestinian women's committees had been founded primarily to mobilise for nationalist activity, and the moment of opportunity had now arrived. Integration of the women's committees' structure and the structure of political
parties occurred quickly due to women involvement in both day to day life and national aspirations.

The major reason for this integration was that both shared the same main aim: mobilisation. Moreover, it was dangerous and often impossible, due to curfews and restriction on movement especially Palestinian women movement, to gather people together for general assembly's or other public meetings. The massive scale of arrests led the political organizations to put women activists to work because women were less visible and suspicious. As the Israeli army's search for what it considered the 'leadership' of the uprising intensified, women expended endless energy in seeking new hiding places for wanted men and women.318

The establishment of neighbourhood committees in early 1988 provided a new focus for community survival and women empowerment, which brought many women temporarily into political activity at a local level. At the same time, the women's committees strove to adapt to these new forms of organisations:

"We dissolved the organisational units as they had been before and replaced them with specialised activity units like social solidarity; production units, health committees; etc.
In the end, however, the relationship between the political faction and the women's committees became one way, with women's independent activities subsumed. One leading women activist, also a political cadre, noted, "It was no longer possible to have the existence of a women's bureau within the organisation as before... Women's branches became subsumed within the organization's regional offices, which were mixed and mostly headed by men. We used to receive enormous amounts of complaints about the inability of comrades in the regions to understand and to follow the previous women's work. Their focus was only on how many women could be organised for the organisation."319

Almost all of the women's committees had essentially the same experience -- that the political organisations, through orders coming from above, was dictating to a great extent the women's committees' programmes and the details of their plans.

Institutionalisation

318 Samiuddin, Abida and Khanam, R., p. 57.
319 An Interview with Siham Barghouti, a founder of the Women's Action Committee, Ramallah, September, 1993.
At the time when the women's committees began to lose their autonomy, they, ironically, expanded their activities, due to the increase in relief and urgent service programmes and plans. Together with new funding sources, this led to hiring full-time workers instead of relying on volunteers. Majority of these workers were loyal organisation members with less or no professional experience, especially in production projects, cooperatives, and small factories of manufacturing daily use goods.

An increased institutionalisation led some committees to substitute internal relations of a voluntary, democratic type for ones that were centralised and business like; to substitute volunteers with employees; to become increasingly dependent on running offices with expensive equipment; and to rely on big budgets instead of on human resources as the basis of the work and job. Total dependency on outside financial resources coming from the PLO or from international donors to the proliferating non-governmental women political organisations in the occupied Territories became a main dynamics. For popular mobilisation, this phenomenon had been negative repercussions. Women began to deal with the committees as a source of income, and when the flow of money started to slow down, women employees simply looked for other jobs and work. At that time leadership required both managerial capacity and mobility, creating a wider gap between the leaders and the grassroots base of the committees. Generally, popular participation by grassroots women in decision-making dwindled almost to nothing. As one of the members stated:

"The women's union's executive bureau became a head without legs."

In this way, it led to increased intervention from the political organisations in the women's programmes. Financial matters came under the purview of the political parties, which often took even their personnel decisions. With increased bureaucratisation the committees' programmes lost the flexibility to continue responding to the changing needs of members according to demands. In several cases, the committees were ordered to continue their social and political programmes that at

321 Interview with Barghouti.
322 Ibid.
one time had addressed needs stemming from the uprising but that had called to adapt to the changing reality also.323

**Feminist Movements in Crisis (1991-Present)**

Women's action, which was mainly nationalist, diminished with the decline in intensity of the uprising in 1991 and the waning of national resistance in general. The Palestinian national movement experienced a profound crisis in confidence and direction in the wake of the Gulf War in particular. Women's committee leaders began to re-examine their own activities, their relation to the political organisations, and women's status within the Palestinian society. The qualities of heroism of women in the intifada were not matched by concrete improvements in the status of women. As a result of a real deepening in the committees' feminist consciousness they began to realise the necessity of both returning to women's programmes and creating new women's agendas which was suppressed temporarily due to beginning of the Intifada.

The feminist consciousness intensified and occurred at many reasons. The enormous family, community, and political responsibilities that women took on during the uprising was neither acknowledged by the political leadership nor matched by any lasting political power/party. When male leaders were imprisoned during the uprising, many women activists took on leadership positions. One of such leaders described what happened when the men released and returned:

"After the release of political cadre, they came to me demanding that I choose between the political party and the women's committee. I refused the choice. I replied to them that they didn't put me in my place to remove me from it; my effort and my people were the reason I was in this position. I was running the whole political party for six months, alone in very difficult circumstances. All my energies and time were completely dedicated to the point that my young son started to call me 'aunt'."324

The Intifada also brought together and united independent academic women and the organised political women leading the women's committees. In this way, a process of mutual, enrichment, with the academic women's experience in research, theory and international networking meeting the deep practical experience and

323 Interview with Randa Nassar, member of the executive committee of Palestinian Women's Committee, Ramallah, August, 1993.
political consciousness of the activists, began to emerge. However, during the uprising, the Palestinian women's movement was exposed to the different feminist perspectives brought by scores of foreign delegations. Resultantly, participants in the international women's movement raised questions on feminist issues which the Palestinian activists realised and needed to be tackled at that time.

The Fundamentalist Challenge

One of the important developments of the uprising which deeply affected women was the increased influence of the Islamic movements in the Occupied Territories. Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement was founded in 1988 by activists of the Muslim Brotherhood (a pan-Islamic political movement founded in Egypt in 1937). The Palestinian nationalist movement itself had to face with an organised Islamicist challenge whose young activists in the streets were fully as willing to struggle against the occupation as the secular nationalists. The issue of women became an important tool of the Islamicists with its overlapping meanings of national purity, honour, and tradition. The role of women in the Ideology of Hamas was defined for the first time in the movement's covenant (mithag) in Article 17:

"In the resistance, the role of the Muslim Woman is equal to the man's. She is a factory to produce men, and she has a great role in raising and educating generations." The Covenant of Harkat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, Hamas, August 18, 1988. 325

Islamicist activists launched in 1990 a highly organised campaign to attack women wearing jeans and Western dress while participating in the demonstrations along with men. These activists urged their women to show respect and modesty in their behaviour by covering their heads with scarfs. According to anthropologist Rima Hammami:

"The hijab (wearing a head scarf) was promoted (and to some extent became understood) as a sign of women's political commitment, as women to the intifada." 326

The scarf had become the most prominent, quelling, and redefining sign of respect for martyrs, depicting bareheaded women as vain, frivolous, and...

326 An interview Naima al-Shiekh, head of the Women's Union for social work, Gaza, September, 1993.

139
antinationalist. These campaigns resulted in the imposition of head scarves on all women in Gaza, including Christians. Through such means they were writing slogans, throwing stones at bareheaded women, and calling from the mosques for wearing scarves. Secular and non-religious men also started to urge their women to wear head scarves to avoid problems in the streets. Other nationalist groups, particularly Fatah, participated in this campaign of wearing a scarf as an intifada activity.

However, the first organised reaction came from independent women during a seminal of December 1990 conference organized on "The Intifada and Some Women's Social Issues." The women's committees also began to mobilise the women activists and in particular pressured the male leadership of their political organisations to take a principled stand. The ongoing underground leadership of the uprising finally issued a belated condemnation, and Islamicists were unable to succeed in similar campaigns launched in Nablus and Hebron and some other places. A new struggle over the hijab underlined several trends, from new forms of feminist consciousness and activism to the silence of male-dominated nationalist movement and to the growing strength of fundamentalism. In the wake of the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in September 1993, women activists started recently grappling with a new alliance with Hamas and other secular leftist groups. As a result, the profound crisis of the women's committees has led them to take some important measures. Many activists also have started to set up independent interest groups concerning with women's issues in particular.327

II. Social Practices and Rituals During the Intifada

One of the consequences regarding intifada as a breaking point was a change in dower practices. It was often told that especially where intifada casualties had been high and Israeli repression particularly strong (such as in the old city of Nablus, in the refugee camps and in certain villages, such as Beit Furik or Beita), local leaders had called upon the population to lower the prompt dower, it is because, many men were unable to pay the sums required promptly after marriages.

It looks that the marriage contracts registered in the first year of the intifada went down as far as dower is concerned. These also show that this process had already started in the mid-1980s as a consequence of the recession and also in the interest of the time.

A question, then, arises why did people perceive such a sharp break with the intifada? This question may be answered that in the first months of 1988 people simply no longer held wedding festivities due to shortage of their resources and only a very small number of marriage contracts were recorded. It was also because that during the first demonstrations and waves of arrests, most families, specially, in the old city and the camps, had a neighbour or a relative killed, wounded or imprisoned, and therefore wedding celebrations were being cancelled. Moreover, the very insecure economic and political situation discouraged the arranging of marriage celebrations. It was the time when people started to realise that the intifada would continue for the foreseeable future and the marriage celebrations would then be arranged and weddings held also. But these marriages were, as people said, performed 'in silence'.

A general historical trend in wedding festivities has been towards commercialisation and less community involvement in these while until the 1960s weddings were public events, with whole villages and urban neighbourhoods involved, the wedding parties celebrated in the mid-1980s were different altogether. These were no longer held at homes, but in grand marriage halls, such as that of the Palestine Hotel, in downtown of Nablus. Marriage invitation cards were printed and sent out, pointing out that a doorkeeper would be present, that only those invited could attend, and, sometimes, that children were not allowed in these celebrations. This practice was though considerably more flexible, the setting of marriage festivities used to be was very different from the public community affairs. The rich persons may even go to Jerusalem or Amman to celebrate their marriages, while those who could not afford to hire the Palestine Hotel would choose one of the cheaper marriage places. Most marriages in the villages, like Hanan's, were celebrated at home, yet there community involvement was

also decreasing and women were hesitant to attend if they were not invited personally and respectfully. 329

The intifada did not lead to a sudden and sharp decline of the dower, but it brought about a considerable reduction in wedding costs, which the groom also had to pay, while the bride's side often toned down their demands for housing and other requirements. Brides, during the intifada, more easily accepted the idea of moving in with their in-laws 'for a limited period of time', which could well turn out to be longer than expected period. Since marriages were held 'in silence' and Israeli goods were boycotted, the groom's expenses went down considerably as he no longer had to hire the marriage hall, send out invitation cards, arrange for live music, and hand out a large number of drinks and sweets which had very bad effects on Israeli economy because the main suppliers of these goods were Israelis. Consequently, the Palestine Hotel closed its doors for marriage parties and was rented by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) for their staff members. Previously this place was full of beeping of car horns which gave an expression of happiness at the end of the wedding party, but from 1988 the beeping of cars at this place became a warning that the car was transporting wounded persons. 330

The commercial effects of the intifada on the costs of marriage are evident in the case of Samar, the eighteen year old daughter of Imm Said, whose wedding was attended by Annelies Moors, the author of Women, Property and Islam, in July 1989. The husband of Samar was a seller of falafel in the market area and was ten years senior to her. The brother of Samar was a university-trained and had agreed with his father that education was no longer an important selection criterion for a husband/man. Any seller of falafel could have a better income than he himself was earning as a government teacher in a school. In fact, he had also started to sell falafel from his house in the afternoons, as teachers were paid only half their salary because of school closures very frequently. The dower of Samar was about average for a lower-middle-class family. They had agreed, in 1988, on 1,000 JD as prompt, 2,000 JD as deferred and 1,000 JD for household goods, but after the devaluation of

329 Ibid.
the JD in early 1989 the prompt dower was raised to 1,500 JD, because the price of
gold then had gone up from 3.5 JD to 10.5 JD per gram. Samar, at her engagement,
was given a matching set of gold jewellery consisting of a necklace, bracelet and
ear-rings. The dower was consisted of six thin bracelets and three heavy ‘twisted
wire’ (mabarin) bracelets. It was because the groom’s costs were relatively very
low. Since the weddings were held at home ‘in silence’, the hosts took care that the
music of the tape recorder would not be heard outside and only a small number of
relatives, friends and neighbours were invited, there was no live music, and only
locally produced sweets and sodas were served in these programmes. Thus the costs
for the wedding party were limited to under 100 JD only. The husband had a piece
land, but had not be able to build a house, and after the wedding the new couple
moved into the rented apartment where the husband’s old mother was living
already.\footnote{Moors, Annelies, Women, Property and Islam: p. 22.}

However, under some special circumstances, intifada weddings could turn
again into a community affair and if the groom had a history of nationalist activity,
his wedding might turn into a political demonstration with large crowds of
attendees. Young boys wearing masks would suddenly appear to recite poetry in
honour of the groom, folding a Palestinian flag around the new couple and then
rapidly disappear again before the army spotted these young’s. Particularly such
weddings were quite common in camps.

Though the increase in the dower had already stagnated in the mid 1989, the
intifada and subsequent economic decline further contributed to it, and the
devaluation of the JD in January 1989 was often not fully compensated for by a rise
in the stipulated dower. Most of the men working abroad no longer returned to the
West Bank in the summer months for their marriages. This is true that even before
the intifada, with the recession in the Gulf States and increased repression in the
occupied territories; they had already become more hesitant about marrying.
But after the intifada it had become even more risky because they feared, lest
they would lose their jobs abroad if a curfew was imposed or the bridges to
Jordan were closed during their stay there. While the parents were more intent
to marry off their daughters at a younger age, as there was ‘nothing for them
to do. It was because, education for girls had been a major reason to postpone marriages due to closure of schools and universities very frequently and there were no longer opportunities for them to get their daughters educated. At the same time, there were incentives to have boys marry in their early age. The parents of youth (both boys and girls) might encourage them to marry to keep them out of trouble, expecting them to be less politically active and hoping that the army would be less inclined to arrest married men or women. In addition, when educational institutions did close, boys started to work and save money for their marriages at an early age. In this way, while up until the intifada the average marital age of girls had gradually increased, hereafter it went down slowly. Accordingly, a comparison of registered marital ages of girls in the mid-1980s and during the first year and a half of the intifada shows that the percentage of girls who were under 18 at marriage increased from 23 to 27 per cent in only Nablus city, from 26 to 40 per cent in the villages, and from 21 to 34 per cent in the camps of Gaza and West Bank.332

Thereafter, it became increasingly difficult for older women to find a husband or life partner. Here is the case of two single daughters of Imm Muhammad, Fadwa and Latifa; Fadwa, in her mid-twenties and Latifa in her late thirties, both were lowering their demands further and further. Both of them were out of work, the small factory in which Fadwa had worked it did close down and Latifa had been unable to find work as a teacher after she had returned from Saudi Arabia and had refused to work as an informer for any organisation. Latifa did no longer demand an educated husband, and told that she would be contented to marry an elderly villager as long as she would not have to work at any place, whereas Fadwa was actually thinking about becoming the second wife of an urban. It was because; they both were realizing that there was then no market for ‘older’ women to get a husband of their own choices.333

---

332 These percentages are based on the sample of marriage contracts; The mid 1980s refer to data from 1984 - 1987. The Intifada covers 1988 and the first of 1989.
333 Annelies Moors, p. 124.
III. The Intifada and the Peace Process (1987-91)

As it has earlier been mentioned that the Intifada did occur suddenly in December 1987 due to an accident by an IDF vehicle which crashed into a truck in Gaza carrying Palestinian labourers home from their work place. As a result, four Palestinians were killed, whereas some others were wounded. While many thousand Palestinians were participating in the funerals of the deceased workers, the masses all of sudden evolved into angry protest. The members of IDF, considered the disturbance as a routine demonstration, emerged to disperse the crowd with tear gas and live ammunition, in which a twenty-year-old Hatem al-Sisi was killed, who became the first martyr of the uprising. However, from here the Palestinian uprising started which was officially named as the Intifada, an Arabic term which meaning is 'shaking off.' 334

However, this fatal traffic accident ignited the anger and hatred of over 1.5 million Palestinian people indicates the level of cumulative and collective frustration that existed in the occupied territories. The Israelis viewed the funeral demonstrations as common occurrence. From the time of 1967 war Palestinians had chafed under occupation, with protests and resistance being a daily state of affairs. The main features of the territories were "stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, strikes, demonstrations, as well as refusal to pay increased taxes," while enduring "large-scale arrests, imprisonment without trial, deportations, punitive destruction of homes and property, beating, and the use of tear gas and live ammunition against the Palestinian masses." 335 According to one estimate between 1968 and 1975 the IDF counted 350 incidents of rebellion a year, or about one daily. But from the mid-1970s to the early-1980s the number increased to be doubled, and then into the 1980s it reached 3,000 incidents a year, which means eight per day approximately. During the first six months of the Intifada, however, the total number of incidents recorded was 42,355. 336

The highest increased desire to rebel that eventually led to the Intifada was in direct response to not only the occupation, but also a sense of political isolation.

of Palestinians at the international level. Nothing had been done by the Arab world in the way of aiding the Palestinians but left the Palestinians in the territories with a sense of abandonment; the PLO’s ultimate inability to make serious headway regarding Palestinian sovereignty and statehood was also another major issue. Despite of all these, Palestinians still supported the PLO as the symbol of their national unity and security. But the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza alike began to feel the necessity of taking affairs at their own control: “We support the PLO because we are the PLO.”

The primary concern and cause of Palestinian unrest were the miserable conditions in the occupied territories. Although the 1970s witnessed an increase in wages and living standards, particularly in the West Bank when compared to the times of Jordanian rule, but the 1980s saw a sharp economic decline in Israel. As a result the value of the shekel (Israeli monetary unit) went down, to which the Palestinian economy was tethered, directly affected the Palestinian territories. However, the economic fluctuations merely offered varying degrees of distraction and life under occupation was increasingly intolerable within the area, as the constant and growing number of incidents of unrest indicated.

The settlement activity too rose significantly especially with the rise to power of Menachem Begin and his Likud party during 1977 when the main focus was given on aggressive efforts to colonize in the West Bank and Gaza as much as possible. The estimated average of total number of settlers annually moving to the occupied territories from 1967 to 1977 was 770, whereas this average between the period of 1978 and 1987 reached annually to 5,690.

In addition, the increasing settlement obviously required extra land and resources to live in. Since the Six-Day War of June 1967 to the Intifada -- the first twenty years of occupation of Gaza and West Bank by the Israelis -- Israel had claimed half of the West Bank and a third of Gaza lands. Only in the West Bank, the increasing number of Israeli settlers reached from 20,000 in 1982 to 60,000 in 1986 within the span of these four years. This caused a fear and sense of insecurity

---


146
in the minds of native population which was about 800,000 in number.\textsuperscript{340} This drive of Israel into that territory ultimately achieved virtual annexation and ultimately expansion of its area. The possession of more and more land by Israel and by inhabitation of colonial population became unbearable for the Palestinians and their conditions were gradually worsening day-to-day.

During the occupation permanent fixtures of life such as; checkpoints, searches for youth, curfews, and school closures were very common features. Responding to these, the Palestinians adopted anti-occupation methods like strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, and clashes with Israeli forces. In fact, the pressure of the IDF’s rule over the territories inspired protest, which in turn increased IDF pressure on the Palestinians. As the levels of oppression and resistance increased, the older generations, also, began to move toward a less passive course of action. Now the concept of \textit{sumud}, \textsuperscript{341}(steadfastness, the non-violent resistance of the Palestinians against land confiscation and ethnic cleansing), had been the approach to life in occupied territories generally. This sustained act of passive resistance of the Palestinians in the territories remained on the land and refused to budge they created their own organizations and services to make easier their occupation life. At the same time some people of the occupied territories began to resist more actively, taking matters of leadership into their own hands, creating which was referred to as the “new \textit{sumud}” by some political scientists. Despite all these passive sorts of developments and when things came to a head in December 1987, the younger generation started and carried out the Intifada.\textsuperscript{342}

The concept of \textit{sumud}, old or new for young Palestinians, was lost on them. The generations of older had known better times and were more or less willing to suffer through and wait it out, expecting for the return of some kind of normalcy. But the young did not bear the injustices of Israel and grew up angry and less tolerant of the constant searches, curfews, and periodic shutting down of their schools. Children of the age between seven years and the teenagers organized, divided up responsibilities, tied \textit{khaffiyas} (Chickened headscarves) around their heads like masks and met head-on with the occupation troops of IDF. They barricaded roads, set on fire tires on different places, and stones and iron bars were

\textsuperscript{340} Tessler, \textit{History}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{341} Also see, Wikipedia.
hurled by them. These new leaders of the revolt were in their late teens and early
twenties, delegating authority down through the ranks that were composed age wise.
At the time, when smaller children lit fires and set up roadblocks, the bigger youth
handled direct confrontation with Israeli troops and took organizational
responsibilities against Israeli occupation. Ultimately this spontaneous grassroots
uprising quickly gave birth to a unified front. 343

At the time when the “children of the stones” were carrying on in the streets,
Palestinian society followed suit.344 They further distributed leaflets weekly with
various instructions to maintain political organizations and strikes, boycotts on
Israeli goods, food distribution to communities locked in by curfew, as well as day-
care for children were all concerns which were addressed by the various committees
of grassroots level. All average citizens as well as women’s groups, labour unions,
professional associations were now involved in this revolution. The Palestinian
family gardens became a symbol of resistance to Israeli authorities, who often
arrested Arabs for growing their own food, as happened in the village of Bayt
Sahur.345 The class lines of society began to dissipate in the heat of organization and
associations:

“The occupation had substantially weakened what ordinarily would
have been the most prominent and influential social class - that of the
landowners and merchants. While certainly not eclipsing all the
differences between rich and poor, the new institutional activities, led
by the university and high school graduates and aided by the general
antipathy to Israeli occupation, served as meeting grounds for diverse
groups of Palestinians. The occupation thus resulted in the first steps
toward a political levelling of the society and in bases for association
across formerly unreachable sexual and class lines - key elements in
the spontaneous outbreak of the Intifada.”346

The different Palestinian groups and task forces would eventually coalesce
into a framework larger size. The UNLU (Unified National Leadership of the
Uprising) formed an underground coordinating hub that issued directives, printed

343 Ibid.
344 Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman, used this phrase in praising the youth carrying out the intifada.
345 Smith, Palestine, p. 422, and also, see. Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States,
346 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinian People, pp. 292-3.
leaflets, and maintained the political trajectory of the uprising and statehood of Palestinians. A partnership formed by the PLO on the sidelines in Tunis between the two groups was wilfully recognized with the primacy of the exiled leadership. It was a signal of an Islamic revival and the beginning to sprout up the Muslim organizations,

The Muslim Brotherhood, an Egypt-based organization, focused more on religious education and less on politics and revolutionary acts. But the groups that splintered off the Brotherhood adopted militant philosophies during the uprising. Islamic Jihad was one of such groups, which founded in Gaza over the span of the first half of the 1980s and remained a movement at a smaller size. A new group Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)\textsuperscript{347} also emerged, from the Brotherhood in January 1988. The Muslim organizations wanted to establish an Islamic state in over former Palestine, to be achieved by armed and violent means, whereas the UNLU-PLO connection desired a secular state in the West Bank and Gaza brought about by civil resistance. With the fundamentalist perspective, jihad, or holy war, was the only mechanism by which a religious state could be established in whole of Israel. Hamas gained significant support, particularly in Gaza, and became the second largest organized effort in the territories after the UNLU. At the same time, during the Intifada Hamas adopted the measures through which confrontation with the PLO could be avoided. Hamas was though ideologically divergent from the secular leadership, it aimed to cooperate with the UNLU-PLO structure and maintain the integrity of the Intifada. However, this friction of divergence would increase over time.

In the beginning, Hamas organized the building of schools, mosques, and clinics, in addition to honing its political agenda and objectives. Viewing the religious groups as an alternative to the PLO, and possibly a competitor, Israel supported Hamas’s endeavours along with providing the group with financial assistance also.\textsuperscript{348}

In this way, the group’s militant intentions had been changed and brought to light its official charter of August 1988. It was the anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist document in nature, which made clear the organization’s interpretation of the struggle as a religious one. Some extracts from the Hamas Charter are:

\textsuperscript{347} Name of the Hamas comes from the Arabic acronym for Harkat al-Mugawara al-Islamiyya or Islamic Resistance Movement. The Arabic word hamas also means zeal or bravery.

"The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a, distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. In the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, oppression spreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars will break out.

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with.

The day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem. In face of the Jews' usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised."

The engine of the Intifada, irrespective of the various emerging factions and organizations (secular and religious), was the effort in the street; kids throwing stones and confronting well-armed and trained troops of Israel. However, with the advent of the Intifada, Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza were going from harsh and restrictive to worse. The policy known as an "iron fist" was a severe procedural response to the threat posed by organized rebellion among the indigenous Arabs. Although the IDF's stated method of "might, power, and beatings" was presented as a less severe policy which was made in response to strong domestic and international criticism of military brutality, the degree of violent suppression remained the same.

The measures of pre-Intifada now seemed mild compared to Israel's heightened reaction to the Intifada. The organizations of human rights issued reports and made cases at the UN regarding gross violations of international law in the area. Therefore, in late 1988 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution (43/21) criticizing Israel's "persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people":

"The United Nations Condemns Israel's persistent policies and practices violating the human rights of the Palestinian people in the

---


350 This policy was announced by the then Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, see, Peretz, Intifada, p. 45.
occupied Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, such acts as the opening of fire by the Israeli army and settlers that result in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians, the beating and breaking of bones, the deportation of Palestinian civilians, the imposition of restrictive economic measures, the demolition of houses, collective punishment and detentions, as well as denial of access to the media." 351

But the only two nations, the United States and Israel, voted against the resolution. The IDF’s tactics continued despite of the international consensus. The act of house demolition was done so rapidly as by mid-1990, 300 homes had been razed and this act of levelling homes was usually carried out in response to stone throwing by Palestinians, and based on the suspicion that the perpetrator were living there in those houses. 352

From 1991 the Intifada began to lose its momentum, though skirmishes and uprisings of lesser intensity continued into 1993 also. In the end of 1992 over 100 Israeli civilians and non-civilians had died whereas by the end of 1993 over 1,000 Palestinians were dead, roughly 28 per cent of whom were the teen agers; the number of wounded reached up to tens of thousands. 353 From 1987 to 1991, these four years of resistance and protest had not only withstood severe suppression but was further unified by it too and the focus of the Intifada was slowly replaced with an increase in fighting among Palestinians themselves in cases of suspected traitors. The militant group of religious fundamentalism was also on the rise in the occupied territories, and brought with it acts of armed terrorism instead of stone throwing. As far as the “external” leadership is concerned, the PLO in Tunis, turned their eyes to the international arena with the intent of securing a settlement through politics and diplomacy, instead of rebellion and confrontation. Although the Intifada had been sustained, nothing positive results had come in this regard. What had been achieved in this direction by PLO might be said, namely, world attention and a new focus on the issue of Palestinian statehood, into a further, more concrete political achievement.

However, meeting of the PLO’s parliamentary body, the Palestinian

351 For the text of UN General Assembly Resolution 43, 21, see, http://www.domino.un.org/unispal.msf

151
National Council (PNC), was held in Algiers in November 1988. The Chairman
Yasser Arafat in this meeting announced the State of Palestine in a formal
declaration of independence. 354 He also proclaimed statehood and a two state
solution, the PNC issued a resolution calling for an international peace
conference, one based on Resolutions 242 and 338, and addressing “the issue of
the Middle East, especially the question of Palestine.” Although acceptance of the
PLO’s announcement of statehood garnered significant acceptance, with over one
hundred countries recognizing the declaration, the US was less enthused, claiming
the Palestinian leadership was involved in terrorism. Moreover, the Americans
refused to grant a travel visa to Yasser Arafat to speak before the forthcoming UN
meeting to be held in New York. The session of General Assembly was moved to
Geneva, Switzerland, where Arafat spoke in December 1988. As a result of two
speeches by Arafat, emphatically renouncing terrorism and clarifying his peace
proposal in a more acceptable way to the US; Washington agreed to enter into
dialogue with Arafat for the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel conflict.
However, Israel began to feel pressured into producing a response with the PLO
meeting US demands and the resultant dialogue. 355

Although, according to the Camp David Accords of 1978, the territories
would be allowed “self-rule” during an interim period until a decision for
“permanent solution” would be made. But Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
rejected negotiations with the PLO and opposed "the establishment of an
additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and
Jordan as against his proposal of May 1989 that elections would be held in
“Judea, Samaria and Gaza”. 356 This plan was rejected by PLO, while the US
looked on it with favour, the Arabs in general viewed it as a hoax and a ploy to
stall the matter, and Shamir’s own party members felt he was giving away too
much. Consequently, the plan went into futile and died shortly after it was issued.
Another proposal which was made by the US and Egypt in autumn 1989 met with
Israeli rejection, bringing the phase of diplomacy to a standstill. A small faction
within the PLO made an unsuccessful attack on the coast of Tel Aviv in the spring
of 1990. A demand of condemnation of the act, and discipline of the perpetrators

355 Ibid., pp. 349-53.
356 Ibid., pp. 359-62.
was made by the US, but Arafat made only a general and limited response emphasizing his lack of involvement in the affair. Resultantly, the US discontinued its dialogue with the PLO chairman.

The Peace Process: Madrid, Oslo I and Oslo II

Palestinians and their Arab fellows in the immediate neighbourhood have bore the brunt of Israeli policy of aggressions, of territorial aggrandizement and the policy of the slaughtering of Palestinian Arabs. The latest example is the slaughtering of Palestinians in the Gaza strip, as horrifically presented by the UN established Goldstone led commission of enquiry report of the Israeli aggression of the Gaza strip in December 2008 and January 2009.

In this backdrop the idea of a two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli problem has been put forth by the Arab community as the basis of reconciliation for resolving the problem. From the Arab and Palestinian community perspective this must be taken as the U-turn stand. This is the maximum unilateral concession a party to the conflict like this has ever conceded in history on its own. This must be accepted and appreciated as the unprecedented peace offer from the league of Arab states on behalf of the dispossessed, brutalized and victimized Palestinian community. This also must be appreciated as the maximum collective unilateral concession from the Arab side for the cause of the peace in the region.

A two-state framework was the basis of the Madrid peace conference and the Oslo peace accords where the guiding principles were the UN resolutions numbers of 242 and 338. But unfortunately this process was aborted in the midway and since then the situation on the ground has become further complex, precarious and volatile. During the post Oslo period the Palestinian territory and the community have subjected to undergo multiple fragmentations caused by the Israeli colonial and apartheid policy. The contiguity of the Palestinian lands has virtually been disappeared. The Palestinian occupied territories have been reduced to non-contiguous tiny patches of lands under the domination and jurisdiction of the Zionist regime. This “fact” on the ground is deliberate and is in complete violation of international legality and moral norms. The ground reality has been fundamentally altered in the favour of the occupying regime. Therefore a great deal of genuine
diplomatic maneuverings is required for implementing peace settlement in Palestine.

The Oslo peace deal was aborted in the midway. Palestinians were subjected to undergo the ordeal of the most horrendous kind of occupation regime. This led to the emergence of the second Intifada with dreadful consequences. The subsequent post Oslo peace initiative like the Middle East quartet “Road Map” has been proved a diplomatic farce so far. It has badly failed to take off. The Quartet lacks credibility and legitimacy in the region. The reasons are many. But the chief reason is open identification of some of its members with the Israeli occupation regime in the Palestinian occupied territories. The Quartet has failed to differentiate between the occupier and the occupied people. It has refused to recognize the power asymmetry and disparities between the direct parties involved in the conflict and its implication. It treats both equally, which is immoral in nature and approach. Therefore it is destined to fail.

However, The Arab peace plan formally laid down the framework for a two-state solution of the problem in 2002, by the crown prince Abdullah of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the Arab League summit meeting in Beirut. This was adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in its summit meeting in the Malaysian capital in the same year. The Arab League summit meeting in Riyadh in 2007 again ratified and reiterated its resolve to solve the problem based on a two-state framework.

The Arab peace plan has huge potential to provide great boost to the cause of diplomacy over confrontation for achieving durable and sustainable peace settlement in the region. The Arab peace plan is the most pragmatic and comprehensive in the sense that it very categorically envisages future peaceful relationship between all the states including between Israel and the Arab and Muslim world and it is also in complete conformity with the UN resolutions and the Middle East Quartet motivated “Road Map”, which reflect the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the world community. In fact, the Arab peace plan is the over extension of the general will expressed by the world community through the stands taken at the global intuitions like the UN, International Court of Justice, the non-aligned summit meeting, etc.

358 Ibid.
The Saudi sponsored Arab peace plan, in the perspective of the traditional Saudi stand on the issue, is nothing new and not all of a sudden in the context of the so called changing conflict scenario in West Asia. King Abdullah peace proposal is anchored in, and is an extension of late King Faisal views and the late King Fahd peace plan of early 1980’s. Like the current Arab peace plan, all other peace initiatives by Saudi Arabia were having complete backing of the Arab and Muslim world. 359

Some of the recent policy pronouncements, especially on the part of the USA do reflect the impact of the Arab peace plan. Though these are symbolic and are I the process of getting translated into visible reality nonetheless give some encouraging signs. The stand taken by the Bush II in favour of the two state solution and now President Obama’s recent public pronouncement on the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders categorically reflect the imperative of the Arab peace initiative and its covert acceptance by the USA.

One best diplomatic strategy on the part of the protagonists of the peace, especially from the West can be the public acceptance of the Arab peace plan as the basis of a two-state solution of the problem. This will definitely broaden the diplomatic support for the peace in the region and therefore legitimacy of the reconciliation process for achieving peace on the ground. Without this, Arabs cannot be honorably accommodated on the board of peace process and therefore its outcome. And without them any solution will not be counted seriously and therefore will be looked upon “imposed” from the above and from the outside. Of course, this would not be a good sign for desired durable and sustainable solution of the most intractable problem, which has the potential to manifest a powerful spillover effects touching the immediate region, and beyond. 360

IV. State Formation & the Question of Palestine

Three weeks before the first anniversary of the Intifada, on the 15th of November, 1988, the Palestine National Council issued the Palestinian Declaration of independence and called for the convening of an international peace conference on the basis of the universally accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in November, 1967. This Resolution calls for, inter alia, negotiation among the parties to the West Asia conflict to arrive at a comprehensive

359 Sohrab, Mohammad, “The Arab peace Initiative....
360 Ibid.
settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict and thus establish permanent peace in the area. The call and Declaration of independence for the peace conference are historic manifestoes. While, on the ground, the Palestinian situation has probably worsened as a result of Israel's more brutal efforts, futile though they may be, to suppress the Intifada, the Palestinian call for peace has already altered significantly the discourse on the Question of Palestine; moreover, it has provided a serious impetus for translating to reality a genuine peace - making process that would resolve all issues of contention - land, people and political sovereignty - among the parties to the issue of conflict. The call of National Council for peace was further specified and made clear by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in his major address to the General Assembly of the United Nations and in his follow-up press conference in Geneva on December 13-14, 1988. The political commitments very explicitly enunciated by Arafat are of course derived in the first instance from the Declaration of Independence as well as the Political Resolutions adopted at the same session of the National Council; but it should be clear that these have a profound history of political and militant struggle which the Palestinian people have waged for more than seven decades that quite clearly reached its acme with the Uprising.

This was now felt that possible achievement of Palestinian independence and the termination of Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza which would realize peaceful coexistence between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews are almost within reach for both of them. It was also the time when the process of conciliation is completed the historical struggle for state formation by a people who have been engaged very successfully in the task of nation-building under adverse and occasionally tragic conditions would reach to successful end.

The expectation for independent Palestinian nation-state whose realization was forcibly denied for so long would be felt as factual thing to be met out. The people, then could state that the Question of Palestine is finally resolved. Obviously, the task of the peace process which has been so strongly supported by the Palestine National Council is to address the core of the Question of Palestine; that core revolves around the actual realization of the independent State of

---

II

The good hope for a Palestinian nation-state has a historical foundation that clearly precedes the emergence of the Question of Palestine as that has been conventionally understood for a short period. If one take a very cursory examination of the literature, he would clearly reveal that the Question of Palestine essentially refers to the conflict between the Palestinian - a people and the European adherents of Zionism over the political and thus socio-cultural destiny of Palestinian people. This was explicitly understood that the achievement of political sovereignty of one of these two communities would in effect deny the other not only sovereignty but the good results of this independence politically.

Both the communities strongly believed that political sovereignty is exclusive despite the ambiguity of the discourse on Palestine and thus the triumph of one constitutes absolute defeat of the other community. It is of course very difficult because such a conflict conveys a clash of commitments for statehood in the same space, what has not been adequately emphasised is the process of state formation in which the Palestinians were engaged that did not revolve primarily around the national conflict between two historically opposed communities of Palestine. Therefore, this discussion will take into an account of both the conflict - and as implication for state formation - as well as the historically independent process of State formation with which the Palestinians have been engaged from the very beginning. It can be contended that the Palestinians engaged in the process of state formation prior to the appearance of Zionism in Palestine; that their efforts for state formation was obstruct first by the British colonial administration and eventually by Israel as well as the West at some extent.  

Despite of all these, the Palestinians continued their endeavours, struggled against British colonialism and Israel to bring to fruition the process of state formation in Palestine; it may not be possible to say with certainty the precise point in time when the process state formation will be completed, but the signs indicate in a clear direction. It was at this time felt that the Palestinians were much closer to success than earlier. Whatever the political impact of the Intifada would be on the Palestinians - the Declaration of Independence and the call for the International Peace

362 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation....
363 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation....
Conference on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 - Israelis, Arabs and the world as a whole have much to do with the imminent possibility of success in this direction.

III

The Arab scholars of West Asia have from the very beginning recognized that the state system as it is presently constituted is of recent phenomenon which is associated specifically with two historical processes that are still not perfect. The first one is the gradual, almost imperceptible and properly considered only retrospective, building-up of local/regional power which became critical in the process of state formation throughout the Middle East for long. The second is explicitly the projection on these and other geographic as well as administrative units, of a colonial map intended to serve the interests of the colonial system of Europe. In general, Arab nationalists tend to emphasize the kinship of the present state-system with the cultural foundation of the Arab national community; but they more emphasis on considerable weight to the negative impact of the European colonial system which may change the shape of the present state system of the Arabs. Today no one doubts that the present geopolitical map of most of the Arab world is essentially a colonial map, same as the case of Africa's contemporary political map which is also essentially imposed by Europeans. The present state-system attempts to both consolidate the process that made the system-geopolitically possible and regulate the behaviour of its members which is exemplified by the League of Arab States.364

It is clearly point out that the emergence of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and most of the North Africa countries started alienating from the multi-national Ottoman/Islamic State just after the First World War. There are some instances which clearly identify “nationalism” as an important force in facilitating that alienation/isolation. It is, however, clear that “dynastic” and other forms of hegemonic ambitions helped considerably in the gradual transformation of each of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire and their appearance as separate states. The system of European colonialism took advantage of this process of alienation and occasionally strengthened it; it contributed immeasurably to its eventually artificial. There is no doubt in saying that European treaties and agreements such

364 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, “State Formation....
as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 916, others concluded with the Gulf and North African countries gave final shape to the geopolitical frontiers that became the hallmark of the present, and also rigid state system to some extent. The present statuses of the Arab States are territorially fully consolidated, but this issue is beyond the scope of this study. However, as far as the process of Palestinian State formation is concerned, it can be maintained that somewhat similar in origin to the process that gave rise to the other Arab States yet differed in important details and outcome clearly.365

Indeed, the crucial factor that accounts for that difference is the Zionism/Israel variable; more than any other factor that variable account for the emergence of the Question of Palestine as today one can understand it. The other Arab States emerged over the century, struggled against their colonial powers and gradually achieved their independent territorially-based national status and identity whereas the process of Palestinian-State formation was somewhat stymied (despite their Arab nationalist commitment).

IV

Good reasons are found there for the relatively more frequent discussions of the processes of State formation of say Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Tunisia, but it is difficult to discuss Palestine issue. The fact is that the latter's development in modern times is narrated and discussed invariably in terms of the conflict between struggling and fighting communities of Palestine. It has had the effect of obscuring the fact that processes of social, economic and political transformation were taking place in Palestine as in other parts of the region. If Zionism had not been intruded into Palestine, these processes undoubtedly would have not culminated in independent Palestinian statehood at a time when other Arab provinces of the same Ottoman State attained their statehood and independent. And if The Zionism/Israel had not been intervened variably, the considerable delay in the process of state formation, would not give rise to issues that appeared to be unrelated to the process of State formation historically.366

In the latter part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the study of Palestine is in its formative period and enough is known to suggest that some type of Palestinian national consciousness had emerged before the appearance of

365 Ibid.
366 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation....
Zionist settlers in Palestine. The emergence of Dhaher al-Umar and its rebellious movement of in the eighteenth century were clearly aimed at the consolidation of power within territories explicitly identified with Palestine today. It can be associated with the emergence of the Lebanese state with the rise of the Maronite the Shi'abis, the same process of State formation in Palestine can be clearly associated with the attempt of Dhaher al-Umar to curtail the power of the Ottoman State in the region.

The other thing is that there is now strong evidence to suggest that an important part of the Palestinian elite of the early twentieth century who actively participated in the Pan-Arab nationalist movement was highly conscious of its territorial base and aimed at the consolidation of Palestinian power. This is very important to point out that the most significant opposition to Zionist settlement in Palestine came from these nascent Palestinian elite; that were of course expressed long before there was any sizeable European Jewish migration to and acquisition of land in Palestine from their natives. They were those elites who raised Ottoman and Arab consciousness on the potential danger of the Zionist movement and its attempts at land acquisition in Palestine from their natives. 367

The Palestinian elite yet contributed to the Arab Revolt of 1915 within the framework of Arab nationalism, it behaved politically in a manner not dissimilar to that of the Syrian or Iraqi elites, the Arab national consensus at that time aimed at the severance of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire. Either that entailed the establishment of a single Arab State encompassing all the Arab provinces as some Nationalists suggested, or several territorially-based states cannot be determined decisively. It is, therefore, well known that the Arab aspiration for political separation from the Ottoman State and the achievement of national independence was frustrated by the imposition of European colonial control that was, at least in the countries of the Fertile Crescent, consistent with the terms of inter-European Agreements of the 1916 Sykes-Picot. This was one of those parallel agreements which assigned Palestine to the control of British imperialism. 368

Britain, before the completion of its military conquest of Palestine, committed

itself (the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November, 1917) to "facilitate the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine." There were three aspirations and ambitions which thus came into conflict: the Palestinian aspiration for independent statehood, the Zionist movement's expressed goal of setting up what Theodore Herzl called the "Jewish State" in Palestine and Britain's imperial policy which simultaneously denied the Palestinian right to self-determination and tried to oblige the Zionists. Whenever the Question of Palestine specifically refers to this conflict, it should be evident that for the Palestinians the primary issue remained one and that is their independent statehood their own land (Palestine).

The insistence of Palestinians on attaining independent statehood, seemingly strengthened internationally by article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which accorded the Palestinians the status of "provisional" independence which collided with Britain's imperial ambition and commitment to Zionist people. In the course of nine decades, the Palestinians, have struggled to complete the process of state formation and simultaneously to resolve the Palestine Question.369

V

No matter if Palestine that emerged from the wreckage of the Ottoman State after the First World War corresponded to the territorial aspiration of the Palestinian elite that was active in promoting the process of State formation, or conforms more closely to the stipulations of the Sykes-Picot Agreement is not an issue to discuss here. But what is needed to recall is that for the very purposes of the Mandate Palestine connoted a very specific territorial governance. This was within that framework that Britain wished to meet the commitments implied in the Balfour Declaration and thus had to deny the implementation of the Palestinian Right to self-determination, statehood and governance. The British Mandate which was imposed in 1922 was opposed by the Palestinians consistently and sometimes violently, as a result, a "dependent" Palestinian State came into existence. The existence of a specific domain was recognized by the League of Nations, as well as other states, explicitly delimiting an area, as that of Palestine.

The Zionist/Israel spokesmen, in the light of the historic allegation that the Palestine of the Mandate included Transjordan, which Britain partitioned, an allegation that gave rise to the slogan "Palestine is Jordan," was used by Lord Herbert

Samuel, Britain's first High Commissioner in Palestine to reproduce the relevant part of the Report on Palestine which, submitted to the League of Nations in 1925. Mr. Samuel stated: When the war ended, Transjordan found itself within the administrative area which was entrusted to his highness the Emir Feisal, the third son of King Hussein of the Hedjaz. His capital was at Damascus. In July, 1920, the Emir came into conflict with the French authorities, who exercise the mandate for Syria, and left the country. At that moment Transjordan was left politically derelict. The frontier between the two mandatory zones, as agreed between Great Britain and France, cut it off from Syria, but no authority had been exercised from Palestine. The establishment of a direct British Administration was not possible since Transjordan was part of the extensive area within which the British Government had promised in 1915 ... to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs ... These conditions having arisen soon after my arrival in Palestine, I proceeded to Transjordan.... The rest of the statement of Mr. Samuels further amplified the evident distinctness of the two-territories. This distinction derived from the geopolitical practices of the Ottoman State as well as its separate history. 370

The population of Palestine had a very peculiar type of significance, at that time numbering about eight hundred thousand (excluding the population of Transjordan), whose "provisional" independence was earlier acknowledged in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Of course the government of the territory was entrusted to the colonial power which had to discharge two conflicting commitments; one to develop self-governing institutions so that Palestinians can achieve full independence and the other to implement the Balfour Declaration which was included in the terms of the Mandate over Palestine.

The Palestinian State of the Mandate period was dependent one that constitutes the domain in which Palestinians fought with the British colonial Administration and secondarily the growing Zionist settlements to attain their independence; moreover, it was within that domain which they fostered and, developed the national institutions which helped them in the continuous process of "nation-building". This should be clear that an important distinction between two processes of integration/development have been made: one is clearly the process of

370 The statement of Samuel has been reproduced in the United States, Department of State, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, The Palestine Mandate: collected United States Documents relating to....., Salisbury, N.C., 1917, pp. 23-24.
State formation which may or may not correspond to the second process, namely that of nation building of Palestinians. It can safely be suggested that the Palestinian Arabs who were subjects of a dependent state in which they exercised little or no control over their affairs, nevertheless succeeded in giving rise to national social, cultural, political and economic institutions which clearly made them as a distinct national community different to others. Their continuing course of struggle for independence - that is to consummate successfully the process of independent state-formation - they forged bonds of solidarity, and underwent specific national experiences which increased and intensified their distinctiveness as a territorially-based national community different to others.371

VI

The available studies of the Palestinian people recognize that a profound sense of Palestinian nationalism underlay the drive for independence of Palestinians. Before the imposition of the Mandate, its development is noted during the struggle against Britain and Zionism, in the post-dismemberment of Palestine period and eventually with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 war. This is a unique type of nationalism which is premised on a strong ethnic consciousness that is shaped and formed by specific historical experiences which the people of Palestine underwent on their land. The Palestinians' consciousness of themselves as a people, whose historic social, cultural, economic and religious experiences - distant and more recent - differentiated them from others in the area, contributed to the strength of Palestinian nationalism immeasurably. In fact the Zionism aimed at the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and that Britain was committed to help in that process constituted an important "national" threat to the Zionists.

The violent encounters which were taking place periodically between the Palestinians and their adversaries during the Mandate period widened the gulf of differences that separated both the communities and simultaneously strengthened the "national" consciousness. There were two distinct national communities in Palestine developed progressively. In certain spheres, though they may have overlapped, but in actuality they were separate, distinct and conflicting communities. In this way, politically, economically, socially, educationally etc., Palestinian Arab national institutions acquired sufficient strength to sustain the Palestinians, not only during the

371 Abu Lughod, Israel and the Question of Palestine, in The Arab Studies Quarterly (Special Issue), 1985.
Mandate period, but more significantly after the dismemberment of Palestinian state. In view of broader spectrum of social organizations, economic enterprises such as, industrial, commercial and agricultural, trade and other professional unions, political parties, media and cultural institutions, sport associations, etc. emerged and developed in Palestine that contributed considerably to the process of national/territorial integration and unity. The development of the Palestinians institutionally within the very specific geographic space of the Palestine of the Mandate was accompanied by a host of other experiences and developments.

During their resistance to the British colonial administration, a considerable number of Palestinians were killed, imprisoned, tortured, suffered banishment and exile all foreshadowing the harrowing experiences of the Palestinians under Israel's military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, in resisting Zionist settlements during the Mandate and subsequently, Palestinians underwent the national experience of dispossession of their land as well as their houses. A number of Commissions that were given the task of investigating the causes of what the British called then (as Israel today refers to) Palestinian "riots" or "disturbances" were always in agreement in their findings: the Palestinians willing to achieve their independence by the depth of their hearts.372

As a result of delineating specific issues as possible causes of the "riots/disturbances" which such commissions identified the eviction of Palestinian peasants whose lands were purchased/confiscated by Zionist establishments as an important cause of disturbances since its inception.373 The main reason became dispossession which was well anticipated, a "national" experience with the establishment of Israel and its continuing confiscation of lands and homes from the Palestinians. The experience of exile also became national due to the traumatic events of 1948. The Total number of displaced and expelled Palestinians reached to more than half of their population; more than three hundred thousand Palestinians have been expelled since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in June, 1967. Due to these experiences of exile added to the powerful force of Palestinian nationalism enormously.

373 For detail, see, the comments of one such commissions in Great Britain, Royal Commission on Palestine (Peel), Report presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament, July, 1937, London.
It was the 15th of May, 1948 in the history when the dependent Palestinian State of the Mandate passed. At that time Israel concluded the Armistice Agreements with the adjacent States of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and extended its control over 80 per cent of the land of Palestinian. It was the emergence of Israel and the simultaneous political oblivion of the Palestinians which neither did resolve the Question of Palestine, nor did it undermine the bases of nationalism of Palestine. Contrarily, Palestinian nationalism grew and encompassed bigger sectors of society as a consequence of new national experiences, obviously negative, in Palestine and for those living in exile. Palestinians, though, acquired the national status of some other countries like Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, but many of them remained stateless (without national of any country). Leaving aside their national status, Palestinians recognized their existential reality as exiles wherever they would live. Palestinians became the victims of either legal or social/economic oppression in all areas of concentration; their power and ability to fashion or develop any aspect of their national, cultural or political life was seriously constrained and un-natural. The Palestinians managed to maintain their identity with considerable difficulty at the beginning of their exile. They gave rise to new institutions to support that identity, sometimes in the form of "refugee" offices and social clubs, but more frequently by spatial proximity and social interaction until they overcame the trauma of the exodus. The Palestinians, taking advantage of a new and more sympathetic social and political order in the Arab State system and with assistance from progressive Arab national movements, began in the mid-sixties the process of reclaiming Palestine, reclaiming their identity and reclaiming their primacy in the struggle to resume the process of state formation and resolve the Question of Palestine.  

The establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964/5 and the growth of political movements specifically associated with the Question of Palestine had a decisive impact on the course of Palestinian development affairs. This was the collective and sustained activity of these movements on political, social, cultural, economic fronts - that the previous institutional bases of the Palestinian people were restored, strengthened, and expanded even through the Palestinians as a people continued to remain stateless functionally. The available literature on the Palestinian

---

374 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation....
people in the post-dismemberment of Palestine period provides detailed evidence and manifestations of the processes of nation-building undertaken by a variety of Palestinian institutions and organizations across the Palestinian world as a whole. The Palestinians' success in reconstructing their nationally Palestinian status, structure and orientation made it possible for the Palestine Liberation Organization to be accepted as their sole representative (a major breakthrough in accordance with the legitimacy to the Palestinian right to self determination) and to accord both legitimacy and credibility to its political programs and plans.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, increasingly, became the central focus of Palestinian political loyalty; its leadership and moral authority throughout the Palestinian world became nationally decisive factor. The structures and institutions of Palestine helped the Palestinians in their endeavours to overcome the objective condition of their geopolitical fragmentation and subordination to the other states governments. This also helped in undermining the effects of Israel's colonial occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the subjugation of Palestinians in other places. This was equally very important that the Palestine Liberation Organization assumed the primary role in the conduct of the political/militant struggle against Israel and others who posed threats to the national existence of the Palestinian people and their identity.

The hopeful development of the Palestine Liberation Organization in assuming these complex roles quite clearly contributed to the process of Palestinian "independence" from the guardianship of the Arab States; the latter formally acknowledged the primacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Arab Summit Conference held in 1974 at Rabat. No doubt, the Palestinians paid a very heavy price to achieve that independence from the Arab States, but it has been much more costly to achieve Palestinian independence in the West Bank and Gaza, at the same time.375

VIII

The growing institutional strength of the Palestinian people, irrespective of place and the achievement of a viable national consensus as well as the primacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization, gave rise to what may be referred to as the surrogate State of Palestine. No doubt all Palestinians, despite their varied legal

---

375 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation...
statuses, identified and were being identified with that of surrogate State as well. The Palestinian State had a legislative authority, the Palestine National Council that was broadly representative of all sectors and political stances of the Palestinian natives. There is an Executive authority in the form of the Executive Committee which has organized, supervised and runs the various functional sub-divisions. However, the Palestinians felt bound by the norms, values, statements, political programs, and proposed solutions issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization and its different bodies. The Palestine Liberation Organization became a surrogate government for all significant political/social/cultural purposes. On behalf of the Palestinian people, it proposed, specific solutions intended to resolve simultaneously the Question of Palestine and to complete the process of state formation of Palestinians. Although there have been several such proposals, and there are significant differences among these, it is important to note that they are premised on the peaceful coexistence of Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews in the Palestinian land.\textsuperscript{376}

A number of such proposals have been proposed by the Palestinians: the first was during the Mandate period which we do not need to analyze here. However, the first serious proposal in the post 1948 period is the one associated with the non-confessional state that was first articulated in the Palestine National Council in Cairo in 1969 and subsequently advanced by Mr. Yasir Arafat in 1974 in his major address to the United Nations General Assembly.\textsuperscript{377} It (the proposal) called for the establishment of a Palestinian State in all of Palestine in which both the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli Jews would be citizens at equal level. While the second proposal took into account Israel’s rejection of the concept of the non-confessional state and was adopted by the National Council at its session of 1977 in Cairo; that entailed the acceptance of the two states without specifying the corresponding territorial domain in Palestine. The proposed solution of 1988 which was adopted by the National Council is much more precise and explicit.

This is interesting to point out that Israel’s response to the Palestinian proposals ratified by the Palestine National Council; it proposed alternatives that substantively call for the politicise of the people of Palestine. The historical record indicates that the Zionist Movement, as well as Israel, either denied the existence of a

\textsuperscript{376} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{377} The text of Mr. Arafat’s address to the United Nations have been reproduced in \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1975, pp. 181-192.
Palestinian people or denied its national identity. Accordingly, Israel has not accepted the Palestinian right to self-determination including their rights to national identity, independence, representation by their chosen authority. Further, the alternatives that Israel has proposed have been consistent with this rejection and complete denial. On the contrary, Israel has offered consistently to deal with one or more of the Arab States to resolve the Palestine Question. Thus Israel has not accepted the principle of negotiating with the representative of the Palestinian people and secondly, the only substantively political solution which Israel has proposed revolves around "autonomy" of the people under its control in these particular lands.378

The historic rejection of Israel for the Palestinian right to self-determination has been accompanied by repressive policies in the West Bank and Gaza and punishing assaults on Palestinians living in exile. The intention of Israel has been clear: destruction of any manifestation of Palestinian nationalism and stamping out any effort - ideological, political, structural and institutional - that may lead to national independence of Palestinians. This was what in the pursuit of those objectives that Israel launched its devastating invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which climaxed years of assaults, air raids and bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps there (in Lebanon). At the same time, it launched its latest version of repression in the West Bank and Gaza which General Rabin characterized as the policy of "iron fist". This policy capped couples of decade's years for the brutal military occupation of Israel.

Neither its repeated attempts at Palestinian decapitation, nor its devastating invasion of Lebanon nor finally its severely crippling policies in the West Bank and Gaza succeeded in stamping out the Palestinian assertive stand. Moreover, in the midst of the twentieth year of military occupation on December 7, 1987, and seventy years after the British commander General Allenby entered Palestine in December, 1917, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza engaged in an Intifada/uprising unprecedented in its scope, magnitude and impact which is already discussed. Reacting to militant but non-violent techniques of national resistance, the Palestinians conveyed dearly and unambiguously their determination to bring to an end the Israeli's brutal military occupation. The resistance of Palestinians has brought forth Israeli measures of suppression that are similarly unprecedented in the Palestinian

378 Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation....

168
encounters with colonial brutality. The kind and the extent both to which these measures have been used, such as killing, burying people alive, imprisonment in concentration camps, torture, destruction of homes, banishment, beating with intent to permanently maim have so offended the world as to bring about severe censure to Israel from its allies and its adversaries as well.\textsuperscript{379}

These mindless Israeli measures of suppression did not weaken the Palestinian resolve to achieve their right to self-determination. Consequently their resistance to Israel, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have successfully disengaged themselves and their society from the occupation of Israel. As a result, one may say that now it is clear to Palestinian and Israeli, as well as other observers, that the military occupation is not a solution to this problem. Despite the fact that the Israeli army obviously can maintain itself by sheer force, it can no longer discharge the normal functions of an administrator. The oppressed Palestinians, in an important and historically decisive way under occupation and in exile, have provided a creative incentive for Israel to bring to an end its military occupation. The uprising/Intifada has signalled Israel clearly that the occupation is now more costly and the economic benefits which Israel derived from the occupation are turning into very costly affairs.

Secondly, the Intifada has demonstrated to Israel that it does not have a military solution against the Palestinians. Though Israel can oppress, suppress, occupy, and imprison; it cannot impose its political will on the Palestinian people. Resultantly, one can say that the only solution for the conflict is fundamentally a political one. For arriving at this solution, both the parties must agree on a set of principles which would make negotiations possible and amicable.\textsuperscript{380}

Now this has become clear that there are two principles of a political solution: first is the acceptance of the existential right of the people of two communities to coexist on the land of Palestine must be affirmed; secondly that a settlement must be negotiated between the two legitimate representatives of the concerned people. In fact King Husayn has removed himself as a claimant of any part of Palestine -- King Husayn's vacating of claims was made imperative by the Intifada -- should be helpful as the negotiating party in projecting the clear role of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Of course, it is assumed that a successful international peace

\textsuperscript{379} The Department of State's \textit{Report on Human Rights} released in December which is very critical of Israel's violation of Palestinian human rights in the West Bank and Gaza

\textsuperscript{380} Abu Lughad, Ibrahim, "State Formation..."
conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and in accordance with the international consensus would lead to a settlement of the issues of contention between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In this way, the Question of Palestine may be resolved; the Palestinian people would thus be enabled to resume the process of state-formation and practice the independence of the State of Palestine which was declared in Algiers by them.
Chapter – V

Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Participation of Women
Chapter - V

Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Participation of Women

I. Palestinian Uprising: Al-Aqsa Intifada

Intifada is an Arabic word which means "the shaking off". This term is particular to the revolt against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories and is translated into English as "uprising". The first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) occurred in December 1987 and continued up to 1993. However, al-Aqsa Intifada, also known as the second Intifada, was Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation — this was a period in which Israeli-Palestinian violence was intensified badly. This uprising known as Al-Aqsa Intifada also because, it refers to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the place where this second intifada started. This is a mosque, constructed in the 8th century CE at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, known as the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. This place is considered the holiest site in Judaism and third holiest place in Islam after Mecca and Medina. This Intifada started in September 2000, when Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon made a visit to the Temple Mount. Palestinians considered this as highly provocative and Palestinian demonstrators threw stones at police, who were dispersed by the Israeli army, using tear gas and rubber bullets with other weapons. Israelis and Palestinians both caused high numbers of casualties: the Palestinians by numerous suicide bombing and gunfire; the Israelis by tank and gunfire and air attacks, by numerous targeted killings, and by harsh reactions on demonstrations. As a result the death toll is estimated to be about 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis, as well as 64 foreigners including both military and civilians.381

President of United State of America, Bill Clinton with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Chairman of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat summoned a trilateral meeting at Camp David on July 11, 2000. Though, the summit lasted till 24 July, 2000 could not reach to an agreement and proved to be a failure. However Israeli-Palestinian agreement on all permanent status issues has been facing closing date to finalize it. On September 13, 2000, Palestinian Central Council


173
(PCC) determined to hold up the declaration of Palestinian statehood. Thus, the West Bank and Gaza Strip became the witness of comparative peace. During the peace process, obviously, most of the Palestinians felt inherent frustration. Ariel Sharon the head of Likud party led a tour of al-Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount on September 28, 2000. Prior to this tour the frustration erupted and Palestine with many observers analyzed it as challenging. A lot of massive clashes among Palestinian civilians, the Fatah Tanzeem, the Palestinian Authority (PA), police force, Israeli civilians (both Jewish and Arab), and the Israeli police and army ignited after the consequent protests. During these clashes 306 Palestinians, 43 Israeli Jews, and 13 Israeli Arabs were killed as of January 10, 2001. Total casualty counted as 362. In turn, an extensive disappointment and anger within the Israeli and Palestinian communities about the other's commitment to the peace process have been produced during these clashes.382

The policy of Israel taking up "internal" and "external" closures had caused chaos on the poor Palestinian economy. A dramatic economic repercussion had been possessed by the Palestinian rebellion besides the severe toll of casualties. Intifadas had been supported by the Arab states as Arab states had donated large sums of money and amounts of humanitarian goods. In turn, the financial condition of Israel had become worst as a loss in foreign investment including tourism revenues and decline in a possible long-term. Consequently a masses of people refused of U.S. goods had removed from the region. Thus the extensive assurance in the Arab world that United States foreign policy was partial towards Israel.

As the generate fear of a wider conflagration with Lebanon and Syria the violence had also spread to Israel’s border with Lebanon. Hezbollah- a leading Lebanese Shi’ite organization took the benefit from these clashes and demonstrations. He formed a well-planned attack and captured three Israeli soldiers in the disputed Sheba’a Farms region. The exchange of the soldiers for Lebanese and other Arab political prisoners had been held in Israeli jails were the few demand of Hezbollah as he further announced it. The rebellion has had significant implications, and had drawn extensive Arab and Islamic support for the Palestinian position beyond Lebanon. It, however, appeared that Hezbollah was uninterested in opening

up a full-fledged second front with Israel. The bills that gave support to the action of Israel and encouraged the U.S. Administration to counter any anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations were introduced by the members of 106th Congress. It also called upon Palestinians, if they did not end the rebellion and protest, to discuss a resolution and imposed to stop financial aids to the Palestinians. Besides these measures the members of 106th Congress reacted to the al-Aqsa Intifada.\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.}

However, by the end of 2008, the Palestinian population reached 10.6 million; out of which 48.1% live in historic Palestine, that is 5.1 million people, of which further distributed as 3.88 million in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 1.22 million in Israel. Around half of the Palestinian people in and outside Palestine are Women; there are 100 females for each 103 males in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This ratio, which is known as gender ratio, is almost the same among the Palestinians living in Israel.\footnote{Mohsen Saleh (Ed.), al-Taqrib al- Istratijji al-Filastini li Sonat 2008 (The Palestinian Strategic Report 2008) (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2009).}

Palestinian communities face difficulties harder than those around them in historic Palestine or in refugee hosting countries. The impact of Israeli occupation was some harder on women. Yakin Ertürk says "It entered every aspect of their lives, blatantly violating their economic, social, and cultural rights, in addition to civil and political rights".\footnote{An Overview of the Conditions of Palestinian Women in 2007 (Arabic), Palestinian Women’s Information & Media Center, 30/3/2007, see: http://www.pwic.org.ps/center/women01.htm} For example, 40803 Palestinians including 842 children and 163 women were killed by the occupation forces between the beginnings of al-Aqsa Intifadah on 28/9/2000 till 29/5/2008.\footnote{Statistics of al-Aqsa Intifada 29/9/2000-29/5/2008 (Arabic), Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, date N/A, see: http://www.pchrgaza.org/arabic/statista_intifada.html} Apart from this, Israel has arrested around 69 thousand Palestinians, eight thousands of who are still in custody, including 34 women, 342 children, and hundreds of ill people, detained under harsh and inhumane conditions since al-Aqsa Intifadah.\footnote{Abdul Nasser Farwana, A Comprehensive Statistical Report presented to the Annual Conference about prisoners (Arabic), Palestine Behind Bars website, 24/11/2009, see: http://www.palestinebehindbars.org/forwana24n2009.htm}

Despite all these sufferings and other miserable conditions, the Palestinian women have been present as a mothers, sisters or daughters. They are taking responsibilities for fulfilling the roles of missing individuals, who are victims of arrest, murder, injury, unemployment or other financial damages. The construction of
the Separation Wall by Israel as a measure of movement restrictions caused raising the rates of poverty and unemployment which have deprived Palestinian women and girls of education and they are unable to meet with their families and relatives due to this wall. Besides, the countries which are hosting these refugees, the Palestinian women of these countries are being affected by the poor socio-economic conditions of the refugee camps. They are facing high rates of poverty and unemployment and very few job opportunities are available for them. Moreover, their housework and childrearing, the woman has to work and provide money to increase income of their families to fulfill their living expenses. Moreover, they are preserving their patriotic role of the national and cultural identity and passing it to their children and youth. Women are not in a better condition in Israel also, where Israeli authorities are continuously discriminating against all Arabs and at every level.\(^\text{388}\)

Although, Israelis were targeting the social status of women, but Palestinian women were able to deal with their hardships and maintaining the demographic challenge in historic Palestine and consequently their significant role in the struggle against the occupation continues. According to estimates by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the fertility rate of Palestinian women went up to 4.6 children per woman in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in and 3.68 children per woman in Israel 2006.\(^\text{389}\) While, the fertility rate in Israel was 2.8 children per woman due to obvious reasons. As a result, this high fertility rate makes the Palestinian society a young one, because 45.5% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are below 15 years old and only 3% are of 65 years old and above.\(^\text{390}\)

However, the marriage rate in the Palestinian territories remained approximately the same throughout the years of al-Aqsa Intifadah, i.e., since 28/9/2000,12 and the rate of un-married women recently increased due to deterioration in living conditions and because of the Israeli siege of their localities. According to studies done before 2000, the percentage of un-married women was

---

\(^{388}\) For more information on this topic, please see: ‘Abbas Ismail, ‘Unsuriyat Israel (The Israeli Racism), Book Series: Am I not a Human? (1), (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2008).


\(^{390}\) The figure is as provided by the Population Division in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UN), in: At a glance: Israel, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Website, Date N/A, see: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/israel_statistics.html
approximately 5%, now it is above 33%, and some estimates raise it up to 39.3%.

13 It means, a lot of women are left alone and facing the Israeli forces, life difficulties, and income scarcity, whereas men are given priority in careers and a better chance in public life in this environment.

**Women Injured and Killed**

Women were not excluded from continuous violation by the Israeli occupation and they were victims of Israeli assaults and attacks very frequently. No statistical figure about injured women is available, but the number of women killed by Israeli assaults soared to 163 during the period between 28/9/2000 and 29/5/2008. The women killed or injured were attacked either inside or near their homes, or while moving from one village to another, to a report by Amnesty International, Palestinian. According to this report, it is known that some women died under the wrecks of their homes which were demolished by the Israeli army over their heads, and that some other girls were killed by the occupation forces while they were studying inside their schools.

Here, one thing is to be noted that several international reports such as special UN reports and the reports of Amnesty International have rejected Israeli claims of un-intentional shooting of civilians. It is because a number of international representatives, observers and foreign journalists have witnessed many cases where the occupation forces have attacked innocent Palestinian civilians or have made aerial raids in crowded residential areas.

Almost all these reports includes sorrowful incidents of women’s suffering due to the Israeli violations, such as the targeting girls on their way to school or at schools, e.g., Raghda al-A‘sar, Ghadir Mukhaymar, Ranya Aram, Iman al-Hams, etc. and murdering women inside their houses, e.g., Suzan Hijjo with her baby girl Iman and her elderly mother etc. One student of al-Najah University in Nablus, Eriza al-Minawi, was accompanying the 20 years old Palestinian at the balcony of their house, the aunt of Eriza told the story as follows: We saw two Israeli “Jeeps” on the road.

---

394. Ibid.
crossing below. One vehicle had already been there, then when the second came, an Israeli soldier stepped out of one of the vehicles and shot upwards. Eriza was standing at the rails drinking a cup of coke. The bullet penetrated through her left wrist and into her heart. She fell down murmuring “my hand” and died immediately. There are many more incidents narrated by relatives of different victims such as, incident of Hikmat al-Malalihah, etc.

There are deficiencies in reporting figures of women who killed and injured according to age groups, body parts targeted, or means of attack, but the only figures which is prepared and classified the incidents by the Palestinian Woman’s Information and Media Center (PWIMC) may be considered as reliable. This report covers all the incidents from 29/9/200 to 28/2/2005 by territory wise. According to PWIMC, 49% of women killed (44.9% in the West Bank and 53.7% in Gaza Strip) were shot all over their bodies, 20.5% (13.8% in the West Bank and 28.1% in Gaza Strip) were shot in the head and the neck, and 8.1% (8.7% in the West Bank and 7.4% in Gaza Strip) were shot in the chest and abdomen.

Women Prisoners

Israeli Occupation violence and brutality against the Palestinian people were the same as male and female are concerned and hence Palestinian women were not excluded in any of the forms of torture. Women constituted a significant percentage of arrests during the last 47 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967 and bear the same treatment as men.

According to the data and statistics of the Census Department in the Palestinian Ministry of Detainees, the Israeli occupation forces have arrested more than 10 thousand Palestinian women from 1967 till the end of 2008, of whom 800 were arrested during al-Aqsa Intifadah, and 75 were still in custody till the end of


396. Statistical Report on Women Martyrs of al-Aqsa Intifada (Arabic), Palestinian Women’s Information & Media Center, Date N/A, see: http://www.pwic.org.ps/derasat/derasat5.html


*Abdul Nasser Fevrenah, A Report on the Work of the Ministry of Detainees & Liberated Affairs (Arabic), Palestine behind Bars, 22/10/2007, see:
http://www.palestinebehindbars.org/n27.htm
2008. Without considering their gender, these women were held under worst conditions, basic rights, or certain special needs had not been provided to them; even nine minor girls were arrested.399

Here, it is not out of place to mention that the International Law, Geneva Conventions, UN Convention against Torture, and UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly recommend dignified treatment of prisoners, especially women. On the contrary, Israel still violates the rights of prisoners and treats women prisoners in a very degrading and harsh manner, confines them in prisons with poor conditions, deprives them of adequate health-care and nutrients, and from nursing their children etc. Moreover, interrogators as well as guards are generally men who contradict the International Law which specifies that women be guarded and inspected by female guards only. According to another report by the UN, Palestinian women prisoners in Israeli jails face significant level of violence during the interrogation and detention.400

It is very tragic that UN Commission on the Status of Women reported that a Palestinian pregnant prisoner was forced to sit on a small chair with her hands cuffed and eyes banded, and she was beaten on her face; many other women prisoners were imprisoned and tied to their beds.401 According to the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), eight pregnant Palestinian prisoners gave birth inside jail, 31 women prisoners were not allowed to take care of their babies, six women prisoners were deprived of family visits, and eight women prisoners were diagnosed with severe psychological problems wrongly as well as intentionally.402


It is also reported by Amnesty International that Palestinian women were slapped, beaten, or punched in their faces, then tied in an uncomfortable posture during interrogation, and that interrogators, who are males, often sat near them till their bodies touch in order to humiliate, intimidate and embarrass them very badly. The Israeli forces while they arrest Palestinian women threaten them by way of abusing and demolishing their homes, arresting their family members especially the old family members and children.403

The extent of Israeli violations of Palestinian women continues to like no other imprisonment in the world. They are treated violently, exposed to degrading strip search, sexually abused, threatened, and are caused dread by sudden entrance of male guards to their rooms at night. Moreover, there are grave violations of pregnant prisoners. The Israelis very cold-heartedly impose harsh restrictions on pregnant women even at the time of giving birth without considering the health of either mothers or babies. Although international laws entitled pregnant prisoners special care for their health and needs. However, there are many cases where pregnant women gave birth to their babies inside prison in very tiresome and harsh conditions without any medical care; they are taken to the surgery room under strict surveillance, with their hands and legs tied to beds in very miserable conditions.404

Same are the cases of these newly born babies they are put in the same harsh conditions as their mothers, deprived of their basic rights as babies, and treated cruelly such as having cold water or gas poured over them, in addition to the scarcity of warm water, the spread of large number of insects and the absence of ventilations which are dangers to the health of babies. Apart from these, the jail administration frequently seizes the toys and private things which were given by the Red Cross to the babies.405 This is noteworthy that Palestinian women, despite of all these suffering in Israeli prisons, are still strong and persistent; and they are still holding on to their challenge and resistance against the occupying forces of Israel.

403. Amnesty International.
404. Ibid.
II. Aspects of Palestinian-Israeli Violence

Confrontation in Jerusalem

Ariel Sharon who was a Likud Party leader and former defense minister led a Likud Party Knesset group on a tour of religious area of al-Haram ash-Sharif/Har HaBayt (Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount) in the Old City of Jerusalem on September 28, 2000. As the site of the First and Second Temples the Jews respect the Temple Mount while Muslims admire the Noble Sanctuary as the terminus for Muhammad’s visit to heaven and as the current site of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Since defeating the Crusaders in the 12th century the Muslims have controlled al-Haram ash-Sharif/Har HaBayt. Israeli authorities have made the site unavailable to groups of Jews. Due to possibilities of hurtful Muslim sensibilities a group of Jews try to demonstrate or pray there. Jews make pray at the adjacent Western (or Wailing) all, which, as an outer preserving wall of the structure that supported the Second Temple, is considered to be sacred. Some Jews will not enter the area due to the fear that they might unintentionally go to walk on sacred ground in obedience to many rabbinical decisions.

The Jews and an Israeli made a visit to sites sacred to Judaism, a stance supported by many Israelis. Similarly Sharon expressed his visit as an exercise of his rights. However other expected that Sharon planned his visit to spoil the peace process by provoked the Palestinians. Thus generating arguments that would force Israel to withdraw the special consideration offered at Camp David. The role of Sharon as Defense Minister during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and in the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) Unit 101 were indirectly implicated in the massacre of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, near Beirut and often attacked Arab villages in the 1950s respectively. There were few who thought that the visit of Sharon were either to make stronger Sharon's position in an projected challenge with former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for leadership of the Likud Party or further to bring the Barak government weak.

Approximate 200 to 300 Palestinians started to throw stones at the accompanying police post Sharon's tour of the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount. Besides the West Bank towns of Qalqilya, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Ramallah, and the Netzarim junction in the Gaza Strip the confrontation spread to other areas of the

occupied territories on September 29, 2000. Fight broke out between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs in Nazareth Umm al-Fahm, and Jaffa inside Israel on 1st October. Post Palestinian snipers started shooting at the Israeli military post, Israeli helicopter gunships made fire on Palestinian sniper locations in apartment buildings near the Netzarim junction. According to the available reports of incidents that the Palestinian police joined forces with the Arab rioters and made an attack on Israelis while Israeli police joined with Israeli Jews started to attack on Arabs in Israel. Israeli tanks moved to the outskirts of Nablus and to the area near Joseph’s Tomb to provide protection to the Israeli military post and religious seminary in the area on 1st October. Helicopters and tanks were kept outside the Bethlehem, Hebron, Ramallah and on other cities of West Bank. Some reports of incidents were found where the Palestinian police joined with Arab forces and attacked Israelis while Israeli police joining Israeli Jews attacked the Arabs.

Excessive Farce Issue

There 21 Israeli military and 22 Israeli civilians had been killed by Palestinians by January 5, 2001. Within the Israel, Israeli police killed 13 Israeli Arabs in the incidents. Thus there have been more than 400 Israelis and 12,000 Palestinians suffered from injury during the fighting. Israeli military and settlers killed 300 Palestinian Arabs during September 28 through January 5.

Richard Boucher was the State Department spokesman mentioned few words on November 21, 2000 and thus he said “... we expect (the Palestinian Authority) to do all they can to stop the violence and restore calm. In addition, while we are pressing the Palestinians, we think the Israelis also need to understand that the use of excessive force is not the right way to go.” However the irregular nature of the sufferer figures and in trying to restore order, Israel’s use of exist ammunition, tanks, and helicopters prompted Israeli, Palestinian, and international human rights organizations to accuse Israel of taking up inconsistent levels of force. The necessities of strong measures were felt by Israeli authorities to control the violence.

and some Israelis criticized the government for not responding with even greater force. The Israeli broke the rules and regulations of commitment applied equally to armed Palestinians. Thus due to the danger of Israeli lives, Israeli military commanders continually issued orders to shoot to kill.

Israeli armed forces or intelligence officers murdered 20 Palestinian activists with the use of shootings, long-range sniper fire, car bombs, tank fire, or helicopter gunships during September 28, 2000 to January 4, 2001 as claimed by Palestinians.410 The activists who were suffered and assassinated belonged to the members of Fatah, Yasser Arafat’s mainstream wing of the PLO. Besides these a few were Islamists who belonged to either Hamas or Islamic Jihad and who had been imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority (PA) but released during the first week of the Intifadah. Israel now had adopted a policy of tracking down some Palestinian Intifadah activists and killing them. This Israel policy had been confirmed by a senior Israeli Defense Force (IDF) officer on 17th December.411

"Icons" of the Battle

 Israeli forces attacked on Palestinian demonstrators from a police post and thus assassinated 12-year-old Muhammad Jamal al-Durrah of Briej refugee camp on 30th September, 2000. A Palestinian icon symbolizing innocent Palestinians at the mercy of Israeli force which can be seemed as in the pictures of the frightened boy and his father ducked after a barrel to avoid the shooting and then gave way to the gunfire. Palestinian police arrested two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah and brought them to the Ramallah police headquarters on 12th October. A mob stormed the police station and killed the two Israelis, and threw one of the bodies out a second story window. Israel's icon of Palestinian brutality has the pictures of the bloody hands and the injured Israeli. The vivid pictures of Palestinians beating the two dead Israelis and a Palestinian youth proudly holding aloft his bloody hands were the pictures conveyed by Israeli television.

A debate had begun about the assassination of that boy of Briej refugee camp.

Israel and Palestine both started to blame each other for the murder of that boy. Muhammad al-Durrah was caught in a cross-fire, implying that either Palestinian or Israeli bullets may have killed the boy as the Israel claimed. While Palestinians admitted that Israeli gunfire killed the boy and claimed that there were no Palestinians firing in the area. Further Israel said that under Palestinian police control area two Israelis, who were army reservists, lost their way in Ramallah. The murderous mobs were not being stopped by Palestinian police authorities as Israel mentioned. Two members of an Israeli military unit that commonly dress in civilian clothes to kidnap or kill Palestinian activists as Palestinians assumed also. Besides tightened the closure in the occupied territories, the police headquarters and Palestinian Authority offices in Ramallah, and a police station and coast guard headquarters in Gaza were the main target of Israel which responded to the Ramallah incident. Local Palestinian police commander made an unsuccessful effort to defend the two Israelis as a local Palestinian police commander mentioned.412

Diplomacy

Madeleine Albright U.S. Secretary of State made an announcement on 2nd October, 2000 that Arafat and Barak would make a visit with her in Paris to appeal a cease fire. Arafat and Barak with French President Jacques Chirac and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan ordered their military and police commanders to draw back from confrontational points and requested for an end to the violence on 4th October meetings. But the two Israel and Palestine could not agree on a mechanism for investigating the causes of the conflict. To find real causes of the conflict Arafat and Barak had different views as former wanted an international effort, possibly led by a U.N., to investigate and report on Israeli actions in the conflict, while the latter wanted a U.S.-led investigation into the causes of the conflict. However, the poisonous and deadly interactions and exchange had become regular as Israel removed its tanks from other sites and also from the points near Nablus, Bethlehem, and Ramallah.

A meeting was held among Arafat and Secretary Albright with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak with regard to peace and causes of conflict to Sharm al-Shaykh following the Paris meetings. But Barak refused to attend the meeting and

412. Clyde Mark, Kenneth and others, p. 47.
thus it became endless and could not get success. Meanwhile, United Nations tried to enclose a resolution that would make an end to the fighting without casting blame on the request of the United States. The United States withdraw on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1322 On October 7, which censured the provocation that led to the fighting, and called for an end to the conflict and a continuation of the peace negotiations. The French and U.S. Presidents continuously were looking for conflict resolution and a resumption of the peace talks. They joined hand with Annan, United Kingdom foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanovo, and European Union official Javier Solana in quest for peace and conflict resolution.413

A summit was held by Mubarak and chaired by President Clinton at the Egyptian resort town of Sharm al-Sheikhdom October 16-17, 2000. Barak, Arafat, Annan, Solana, and King Abdullah of Jordan attended it. It aimed at achieving a cease fire and agreeing upon a format for an international investigation of the incidents. President Clinton read a three-part statement post 24 hours of meetings and summarizing an agreement as: “first, that Barak and Arafat would issue statements calling for an end to the violence; second that a U.S.-led fact finding mission in consultation with the United Nations would report on the events of the past several weeks; and third, that the United States would consult with Israel and the Palestinians on resuming the peace negotiations.” Thus President Clinton listed measures that would finish the argument such as restoring law and order, enhancing security cooperation (both apparently aimed at the Palestinians), pulling back armed forces from points of friction, ending the closure of Palestinian areas, and re-opening Gaza airport (apparently aimed at Israel) according to the first point. Israel’s preference for a U.S.-led fact-finding group and the Palestinian preference for a U.N. investigation of the three-week argument were the formula for the fact-finding mission which emerged to compromise between these two.

President Clinton gave name of five men to serve on the fact-finding commission mentioned on November 8, 2000 at Paris and Sharm al-Shaykh. These names were: former U.S. Senators George Mitchell and Warren Rudman, former Turkish President Suleiman Demirel, Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorboern Jagland, and European Union Chief of Security and Policy Javier Solana. The commission began too late, was working with a vague purpose, and would produce a

413. Ibid.
useless document as the Opponent recommended suggested. With the objective of preventing a recurrence the commission was to evaluate the current crisis. Thus the commission started its investigation on December 10 and aimed of submitting its report in March 2001.\textsuperscript{414}

Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Barak took part in a meeting with President Clinton met at the White House on November 9 and November 12 respectively. However the meeting ended with no positive result and thus could not produce peace and cease fire in the rebellion. The two sides continued meeting in private, away from public scrutiny as the Israeli and Palestinian press claimed. Meanwhile, an international force of observers to report on Israeli actions and to protect the Palestinians in the occupied territories as the Palestinians advocated introducing. Due to lack of an agreement to end the violence Israel regularly opposed an international presence. A resolution to create the proposed international observer force did not get nine votes in the U.N. Security Council on December 18. With the difference that almost immediately, rumors began circulating that they were making progress. However Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met at Bolling Air Force base outside Washington on December 19 with the invitation of President Clinton.

Prime Minister Barak made an announcement on December 9 that he would resign the next day. A December change in the peace dynamic may be attributed, in part, to the changing Israeli political scene. On December 12 his resignation became official under Israeli law, to be followed by an election for prime minister in 60 days. Ariel Sharon, head of the Likud Party was the Barak’s opponent in the February 6, 2001 election. He considered by most analysts to be a hawk opposed to the Oslo peace process and to surrendering any West Bank or Gaza land to a Palestinian state. Barak wanted to complete the peace process and hoping to run as the prime minister who delivered a peace agreement as the Observers considered. Others speculated that fearing that a Sharon government would withdraw pending Israeli offers and reverse the Oslo process. Also, others considered However Arafat would be willing to a peace agreement under Barak.\textsuperscript{415}

On January 2, 2001 Arafat at the White House met with President Clinton to consider the few matter including cease-fire and the President’s proposal for peace.

\textsuperscript{414} Ibid.
On January 4, Arafat replied from Cairo that the PLO accepted the Clinton proposal "with reservations." Israel, had accepted the Clinton proposal and also with "reservations", the week before. However practically, it appeared unlikely but supposedly; it is possible to arrange a cease-fire and a peace agreement before Clinton leaves office on January 20.

III. Regional Implications and Reactions

The irritation over Sharon's visit to al-Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount, outrage at the number killed and injured Palestinians and rising doubt over the delayed peace process had increased reaction against the United States throughout the Arab world to a smaller amount. But all above these filled anger and fueled a strong reaction against Israel during peace process. Besides few friendly nations to the United States, and in some non-Arab Muslim countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia, the most of the Arab countries had become the part of pro-Palestinian demonstrations. Gulf States had been active in providing relief to Palestinians during the crisis that the most of the Arab governments, disappointed by the turn of events, have walked a tight rope between supporting the Palestinian cause, condemning Israeli actions, and curbing popular outbursts that might jeopardize stability in their own countries. The termination of ties with Israel and the United States, termination of peace talks with Israel, a boycott of Israeli and U.S. products, and support for Palestinian military action against Israel was the few severe actions had been taken by some hard line states and various Palestinian groups.

Besides attendees strongly criticized U.S. support for Israel, the decision of Arab League summit conference had reached during its summit on October which generally reflected the positions of more moderate Arab leaders. In its concluding statement the conference raised the few points such as the conference accused Israel of sole responsibility for the clashes, created funds to support families of Palestinian fighters and to help "preserve the Arab identity of Jerusalem" called for dispatching an international peacekeeping force to the occupied territories, and recommended that Arab states suspend participation in international conferences involving Israel and delay any new steps toward regulating relations with Israel. Thus conferences promised to break diplomatic relations with any country that moved its embassy to Jerusalem, although the statement did not mention the United States by name as
finally, in what was probably an indirect declining to the United States. Not only moderate Arab states had felt obliged to reduce relations with Israel during the maintaining their support for the peace process but also the fighting had continued in the aftermath of the October summit. The intifadah continued until the Palestinian goals are met as it urged by more militant leaders. They also condemned any recommencement of peace talks.416

Neighbouring States

Few Arab countries had summarized the level of their diplomatic ties with Israel while maintaining formal diplomatic relations. These two of the three Arab countries had also established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Post Israel attacked the Gaza Strip in response to an attack on an Israeli school bus, Egypt reminded its ambassador from Israel (only the second time it had done so since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty) on November 21. Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abu Raghib made an announcement that Jordan would defer sending its new ambassador-designate to Israel “until Israel ends its attacks and proves commitments toward the peace process” on the same day. On 22nd November a government spokesman denounced that “the Israeli military escalation against the Palestinian people, in particular the bombing of civilians. As fighting continued, there were further reactions in Egypt and Jordan at both the governmental and popular levels.” However Distant Mauritania claimed it more insulated from mainstream Arab reactions and further said it would maintain existing diplomatic links with Israel.

Egyptian President Husni Mubarak commented that citizens were reasonable in boycotting Israeli goods, but warned that they should consider carefully the effects of boycotting U.S. goods on December 12. Jordan, which is the place where a majority of the population is Palestinian and a strong Islamic movement exists, condemned the Israel. A militant Islamic group was leading to an Israeli decision to evacuate families of Israeli diplomats in Jordan and claimed responsibility for an attack on an Israeli diplomat on December 5. While looking for a continuation of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations both countries, however, continue to work with U.S. leaders. On December 10 in an editorial published, the Egyptian ambassador to the United States affirmed that “[t]he question before us is how, not whether, to resume

416 Clyde Mark, Kenneth and others, p. 60.
the peace process.” Thus President Clinton drifted a peace proposal in late December. Along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan had allegedly provided their support to the general concept of a further peace proposal more recently.417

Suspension of their ties with Israel in reaction to the intifadah by North African states Morocco and Tunisia. Oslo agreement, and Morocco under the late King Hassan II had long been a pioneer in facilitating Arab-Israeli contacts, also both countries had set up low level commercial relations with Israel in the aftermath of the 1993. The Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee of the 55-member Islamic Conference Organization is occupied by the King of Morocco (Hassan and now his successor Muhammad VI). An estimated 50,000 Israelis visited Morocco and 1,000 Moroccans, most of them from Morocco's Jewish community, visited Israel during the past year. It is not clear whether or not the conclusion of Israeli-Moroccan connection offices will influence tourism between these two countries. While pursuing Arab-Israeli peace efforts both Morocco and Tunisia, however, appear interested. A senior U.S. diplomat and former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited Tunisia and Morocco respectively on December. Latter visited for discussions with King Muhammad on the peace process while former to join, its support in December.418

Gulf States

Mainly concerning about Jerusalem Saudi Arabia’s leaders has aimed to balance their strategic and economic ties with the United States with their support for Palestinian positions. To achieve a just peace Saudi statements have contributed a combine measure of criticism of Israeli pressures on the United States with requests for continual U.S. efforts. Crown Prince Abdullah warned, shortly after the intifadah began, that Saudi Arabia with other Arab countries would not "just watch with their hands tied" as Palestinian casualties mounted, and the Crown Prince later told a group of Islamic leaders that “I place particular emphasis on the United States because it has been following the development of the peace process since it was launched.” Defense Minister Prince Sultan commented that “[w]e have no doubt that

418. Clyde Mark, Kenneth and others, p. 62.
the United States wants peace in the region, but we ask it to change its methods with
the Israelis in order to ensure a just and comprehensive solution.” Saudi Arabia has
not moved to use oil as a weapon to encourage the United States or its allies to
change their policies on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. If Qatar severs its low level
commercial ties with Israel, as Tunisia, Morocco, and Oman had done then Saudi
Arabia agreed to attend a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization in Qatar in
November 2000 only on above that condition.419

In the beginning stages of the intifadah, Ali Abdullah Salih the Yemeni
President said that “he wished Yemen had a common border with Palestinian
territories to serve as a conduit for “holy warriors” arid arms for the Palestinians and
condemned the resolutions of the October 23 Arab summit as insufficient.” Therefore
neighboring Yemen has been curiously honest in accusing Israeli actions barren
maintenance the Palestinian position. Further in another statement Ali Abdullah Salih
mentioned that “Yemen supports peace but insists that Palestinians have the means of
self-defense, expressed respect for America, but called for ending the Israeli
occupation of Palestinian territory.” The terrorist groups had been targeting U.S. and
allied military forces in the Persian Gulf region as the evidence has accumulated that
the attack had been planned some months earlier. On October 12, 2000 as the
bombing attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden was connected to the
Palestinian Intifadah appear incorrect.420

Oman not only closed its representative office in Tel Aviv but also pro-U.S.
government of Oman told Israel to seal its trade office in the capital of Oman Muscat.
In 1995 the trade office became exchange between these two countries.

On November 9, 2000 several Arab countries gave threat not to attend the
meeting of an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Qatar. Thus this issue had
been yielded by Qatar. It could be possible after several weeks of resisting Arab and
Islamic pressure to close Israel’s trade office. As Qatar never opened a reciprocal
office in Israel that office was opened in 1996. Qatar, however, did not make any
announcement to complete breaking of relations and Israeli and Qatari diplomats have
since continued to meet at the margins of international meetings and conferences.

419. David Butler, “Taking a lead”, Middle East Economic Digest, December, 1, 2000, p. 29.
420. For detail, see, CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Raphael Perl and Ronald O; Rourke, November 1, 2000, and CRS Report
RS20733, Yemen: US Relations, Assistance and the USS Cole Bombing, by Alfred B. Prados,
Israel's trade office head, Eli Avider, is still in Qatar and Israeli diplomats declare the trade office in Qatar is quietly still being allowed to operate at a reduced level. Without honestly offending Qatar's Arab and Islamic allies, this could make a suggestion that the state is trying to quietly allay U.S. concerns about Qatar's position toward Israel.  

Iraq's President Saddam Husain gave threat to Israel rhetorically at the birth of the Intifadah, and, in a symbolic gesture of support for the Palestinians, briefly moved a division of its Republican Guard westward toward Jordan. Yasser Arafat's PLO provided support to Iraq in the Gulf War and many Palestinians had often seen Saddam as a hero in a long term battle against Israel. The United States was studying the Iraqi troop movements closely as the U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen mentioned. The deployments, however, did not seem to represent an intended military move outside Iraq's borders. The Palestinians should keep their revolution continue and they should not agree to U.S. sponsored attempts to end the violence as the Iraq's President Saddam Husain urged.

Although extensive concern about the dilemma of the Iraqi people under more than ten years of U.N. sanctions, in early November Iraq started to begin transport medicine and foodstuffs to the Palestinians, and had even used some of its scarce currency reserves to donate up to $10,000 to the family of each Palestinian killed during the violence.  

Iraq thus had tried to draw some hidden linkages between supports for the Palestinians. Iraq's own struggle to decline international sanctions imposed on it because of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Iraq made promise to distribute about $880 million in oil revenues generated under its U.N. sponsored “oil-for-food” program to Palestinian families on December 9. Iraq's oil revenues, however, were put into a U.N. escrow account, and any donations from that account would have to receive U.N. Security Council approval. As the oil revenues were to be used for the assistance of the Iraqi people only, and not to further Iraqi political goals. The United States thus was possibly to show its opposition on the above said grounds for the donations.

Iran, including with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, arid the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, was

---
421. Clyde Mark, Kenneth and others, p. 63.
encouraging its allies to continue the violence against Israel.\textsuperscript{423} The peace process had always been opposed by Iran's Islamic government. The Palestinians cannot hope to accomplish a fair settlement with Israel, but Iran's President Mohammad Khatemi had made a statement that the several times since taking office in August 1997 that Iran would not work to spoil peace efforts were the few grounds to oppose peace process. According to official U.S. reports and statements, however, hard-line institutions in Iran had continued to provide material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups. Iran had publicly declared an announcement that training maneuvers between its hard-line security organs and anti-peace process groups. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i, who was aligned with the hard-line wing of Iran's regime, repeated an earlier statement on December 15 that Israel "has no right to exist," and that it is "a cancerous tumor that should be uprooted from this region."\textsuperscript{424}

\textbf{Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada}

The contribution of Palestinian women to the revolution was one of the elusive aspects as many have attempted to analyze various aspects of the intifada. Arab intellectuals besides Media analysts and reporters have had a great deal to say about the role of "hidden forces," the United National Leadership, and the outside leadership, responsible for the uprising. All of them, however, became fail to recognize the active participation of middle aged traditional women who sometimes set up human shields between the youths and the Israeli soldiers. The initial momentum which made women out of the private sphere of the home and drove into the public sphere of the street-to the extent that the term public and private were appropriate to life on the West Bank and Gaza was simply the desire to protect their children as it was argued. Women, however, had expressed eagerness to question traditional values which require their exclusion from the political sphere at the same time. The priorities of women had moved from protecting the traditional values at all costs to risking everything in order to loosen the grip of occupation. Their very participation shows a transformation of consciousness: women had made question of values that cover the economic security of the family, the safety of its members that

\textsuperscript{423} "Iran, Palestinians Discuss How to Continue Unrest", \textit{Reuters}, October 11, 2000.
\textsuperscript{424} "Iran's Leader Calls for Big Turnout at Israel Protest", \textit{Dow Jones Newswire}, December 15, 2000.
require women’s seclusion from the political sphere. The Intifada had feminized Palestinian society on the West Bank and Gaza by encouraging self reliance and nurturing trends as it can be assumed. Through Franz Fanon’s concept of violence the willingness of Palestinian women to reconsider traditional norms through their impact on resistance can best be understood. Fanon proposes that the act of violence directed at the source of oppression- in the case of the intifada the throwing of stones- should be measured not by degree of damage inflicted upon the oppressor but by the degree to which this act empowers the victim of oppression according to the writing of the Algerian revolution. The intifada can be read as beginning a process of liberation in a psychological sense by following Fanon. The fact of taking part in the intifada leads women to two fronts:

(1) Recognize the need to question their position vis-a-vis patriarchal domination.

(2) Given the influence women exert within the home, it is not difficult to imagine that their participation in the public sphere will have long-term repercussions on gender relations within the family, the exact nature of which remains to be seen. Thus these were two fronts on which sense of liberation takes place for Palestinian women.

Subalternity in Khalifeh’s Novels

Sahar Khalifeh had shown the same courage manifested in her inquiry into the role of women during her private life. She began divorce procedures to pursue a career in writing a step rarely taken by women in a traditional Arab society just after thirteen unhappily married years. She lived with her two daughters and completed

425. On the West Bank alone, there are thirty six registered organizations that offer literacy programmes, sewing programme, and social welfare programmes providing food, clothing and shelter for those who need it. The care now extended to one’s neighbour, in the form of growing vegetable gardens to and domestic animals to be shared and exchanged with community members. Almost all Palestinian homes in rural settings grow a vegetable patch and care for a chicken coup, generally tended to by women. Women’s responsibilities have now become a symbol of community cooperation. Finally, street demonstrations under the Jordanian rule and the Israeli occupation were carried out far more frequently by women’s groups precisely because the authorities tend to be reluctant to use violence against women.

her Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in Creative Writing and was then teaching in Jordan.

The Israeli authorities took away the only copy of her first novel; however, her second novel is currently out of print. Her third and fourth novels (so far only the former has been translated into English) are Wild Thorns, and its sequel, Abad El Shams (Sun Worshiper) respectively. The third novel narrates the life of four male characters, three of whom were laborers bussed daily to work in Israel while the fourth character, representing the young and more radical generation, was a mission to destroy those very busses that carried the workers to jobs in Israel, plunging the whole area into a deeper relation of dependency and subjugation. Her third novel, Abad El Shams narrated the lives of three women, two of whom were respectively widow and girlfriend to two laborers encountered in the first work. The accounts for the prominence that issue received in her work when Khalifeh wrote this novel the issue of working for the benefit of the occupying power was still being hotly debated on the West Bank.\footnote{http://www.jstor.org/stable/466520}

The relations of the first and second novel repeat this isolation instead of addressing the problem of social segregation of men and women. Wild Thorns does not have areas of inquiry into feminist issues: women characters were underdeveloped while the author’s intimated knowledge of the world of men, i.e. scenes inside the male prisons, were portrayed in fine detail. During the writing of Wild Thorns the author felt compelled to write a sequel that described the tribulations of women under occupation and was pre-feminist. As a woman bare to the mechanisms of social control had greatly improved her ability to explain the mechanisms of political control and the psychology of oppression in the context of occupation as it was argued by the author’s lived experience. The relation between the two forms of oppression may be approached through Gramsci’s notion of “subalternity,” behavior representing the subservience and obedience which consistently becomes develop in dominance situations, especially under colonization, but also the internalization of traditional norms in women in cultures were patriarchal authority is heavily entrenched. It was exactly her unique insight into the psychological makeup of the individual caught between financial dependencies and the desire to resist that gave Wild Thorns its special flavor, giving the work an historical dimension whereby the
young who had no parental responsibilities have greater freedom to refuse it status quo that seeks to diminish their being. Therefore Khalifeh made investigation on this phenomenon as a relation among three generations. 428

Laborers

In Israel, to work at least 120,000 laborers were bussed daily in which 55% of whom busy in construction, the rest were in agriculture and industry prior to the second intifada. 6.5% untrained day labor of the total Israeli work force were from the West Bank and Gaza. Their concentration in building new settlements was payable as their importance.

Sometimes hired labor to make resolution on land removed from their own villages a problem bounded the issue of construction workers. As comparison to gender conditions the class the way the national symbol was interpreted in Tawil's work. Poor land owners were disapproving out of self interest that could no longer struggle with the wages paid in Israel. The issue from a more nationalistic angle was the others view. The condemnation of the day laborer, however, had implication on workers' self-image, exacerbating their problem in either case. Khalifeh argued that the psychological impact of their new role could not be neglected as the workers' earning capacity had enhanced to some extent. The laborers were of that generation was affirming their national rights. They were remained to traditional values of marriage and family. The desire to resist occupation by asserting their national rights and economic responsibility toward the numerous mouths that depend on the laborers made a dual bind between these two accordingly. 429

The construction equipment made the fingers of Abu-Saber's right hand despoiled. An Israeli firm illegally hired the territories and did not give accident insurance to its workers. It setup through what they said, not through visual description; instead of seen the characters were heard. When it necessary, local idioms, proverbs and spontaneous verse composed against occupation by women in the public bath, arguments between women in the quarter, unflattering remarks to the soldiers, and even exchanges of insults were the few things by which she depicted her characters.

428. Ibid.
These forms of authority from the standpoint of the present harsh reality of life are asked by Khalifeh in the Casbah under occupation. All values, all ideological positions are advised through her use of language. Also through the language of the passage these were subject to contestation from the standpoint of their impact on the social and emotional well being of the most vulnerable strata of society. An affinity was created by her use of language between her politics and that of the young generation in her work. Her sympathies were with the laborers without a doubt because Khalifeh's language brings her closer politically to the position of the young generation. The income in Israel was high as the laborers earned a higher income in Israel. Thus the laborers earned a higher income in Israel than they would working for the semi-feudal, and they poor landlords. While they did not get benefits and their hourly wage was considerably less than the Israeli minimum. The price, however that the laborer paid in terms of his inner struggle made his predicament an impossible one according to the author.\textsuperscript{430}

The Landed Gentry

The portrayal of a life basic survival by Khalifeh was expressed in the direct and unadorned style of social realism. He did not provide work for a great deal of symbolism in her work. Symbolism becomes an essential tool in conveying her ideas, and that was in depicting the decaying role of the landed gentry was another example. This previously powerful class was paralyzed as deprived of its land-some of which was taken away to make settlements-and unable to contend with the Israeli market. The figure of Adel's father, the ailing patriarch of the family, and kept alive by a dialysis machine were the symbolically representation. A powerful image of a class was called up by the symbol of the dialysis machine whose position on the national issue was exacting a toll paid for with blood, the lives of two younger generations. The three generations of the Al-Karmi family represented the way and observed the solution to the problem. Her physical and political paralysis placed on the rest of the family members as Khalifeh articulated suffering of the father as well as the burden. She did never have a formula and method for any ideological position.\textsuperscript{431}

Foreign journalists and dignitaries, were the two representatives, would

\textsuperscript{430} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{431} Suha Sabbagh, "Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada", in \textit{Social Text}, No. 22 (Spring), 1989, pp. 73-74.
somehow bring about an end to occupation. The father's present, however, self-imposed mission believed that in pleading the case of the Palestinians abroad. His efforts, however, well intended to look for a solution from outside increases the toll placed on the shoulders of the children: young Bassil became unable to put forth any control over his own professional future in an economy set up to absorb only laborers. As a bussed laborer, in order to sustain through his meager resources his father's medical costs, Adel must work.

The validity of waiting for solutions to come from abroad was the Khalifeh questions. Her own position was more self-reliant. In the ending of Abad El Shams it mentioned: Sadia joins other mothers and their children in demonstrations and made abandon her search for an individual solution in the form of building her own haven away from the alley. Adel, now editor of a magazine called Al-Bald, and a progressive Israeli journalist meet and cover the demonstrations together. It was showed in the final scene of the same novel. The direct dialogues between the two parties concerned were supported by her.

The above historical deadlock to an end by making the populations unite behind the position of the young generation. To bring the collective punishments imposed from above deadlock. Bassil's first commitment was liberation. Thus, unlike Adel, the eldest brother whose first commitment was toward sustaining the family that of the new generation through him was freedom. The military governor issued orders for blowing up their ancestral home due to his involvement in unspecified acted of resistance cause. This opportunity became relief to Adel that dialysis machine that had cost him his future. He experiences a sense of relief as he watched the machine blow up together with the ancestral home and thus pretending that there was not sufficient time to remove it from the home. All indicating a greater radicalization as the old is discarded and new responses emerge towards occupation. Thus the scene could be read in a number of ways.432

The military governor to issue orders for blowing up their ancestral home due to his involvement in unspecified acted of resistance. Adel takes this opportunity to get rid of the dialysis machine that had become costly to him for his future. He felt experience a sense of relief as he watched the machine blow up together with the ancestral home although that there was not enough time to remove it from the home.

Thus the new responses emerge towards occupation as all indicating a greater radicalization as the old is discarded and the scene could be read in a number of ways.

The certain traditional values were demanding from the young generation as the old patriarch represents the toll. The way in which some traditional values unintentionally work together with the social mechanisms of occupation was an important aspect of Sahar's work lie in her ability to expose. The waiting for this generation to lead the struggle was preventing the young from leading full and normal lives. From restoring their right to be free and besides this gave respect for the views of the elderly were the few suggestions. 433

The New Generation

What were the forces that transform and radicalize the new generation? It was the question which anyone most timely could pose to Sahar's. When approximately 50% of the population of the West Bank and 70% of the population of the Gaza strip was under the age of 21 than it was when this book was written in 1976. Thus the question became more applicable today:

"So the only solution is emigration, which means working in Saudi Arabia, Libya and the Gulf. What's the result of all this? Educated people leave the country, and only workers and peasants remain. And that's exactly what Israel wants to happen. But whether its workers and peasants or doctors and engineers who stay, our mentality and our activity remain the same. We're humble in spirit, feeble-hearted. Men who work like machines, too scared to say "no" to anything." 434

Rejecting a status quo which seeks to destroy their sense of selfhood and the young generation saw its future suspended between emigrations. Due to their incapability to accomplish their financial and professional aspirations their frustration emerged. Basic human dignity comprises an equally important aspect of their struggle and it was achieved through national rights. They were concerned about the lack of jobs and lack of basic economic security.

Women

During the last 20 years the Women's employment on the West Bank had

433. ibid.
rised. Since most women work for the benefit of the Israeli economy, unfortunately, these figures did not reproduce an improved economic position. A lot of women selected in the chocolate manufacturing company; in agriculture, picking citrus fruit; by the garment industry; and in the services as cleaning employees for homes and hospitals before the intifada. As the women on the West Bank was 50 percent of what their counterparts receive in Israel, the rate of female employment had increased from 8.4 per cent to 24.8 per cent in 1980 since 1967. Contemporary Khalifeh wrote Abad El Shams in 1980, women became single heads of households were chastised by other women for departing from traditional modes of behavior by virtue of their new found responsibility. Due to the death or incarceration of their husbands they must provide help to their families. Thus Social norms had altered to provide accommodation the growing numbers of women since then.

Sadia was the attractive widow of Zuhdi and she worked as a seamstress for an Israeli shirt manufacturer. Thus the characters of all female in Sahar's work were become stronger than they realize themselves to be. Sadia's sudden jolt into, the work place in strata of society. However women did not work outside the house at this place. They take place at a faster pace than the parallel adjustments in the norms of the social system. Her wages, however, insufficient, exceeded the income of her departed husband. But, her flexibility in earning a living contrasts even more markedly with her inability to find the inner strength to challenge the values that condemn her behavior. She was concerned by her trips to the Big City, by the men who must visit her home against prevailing accepted norms, by her being seen with a less than reputable woman which she quickly denied. Thus the neighborhood women and Sadia herself doubt the “correctness” of her new behavior.435

She became fanatical with the dream of avoidance her present reality by building a home on the sunny side of town. She obsessed and trapped between her frustrations at being ostracized from the community, her loneliness for her departed husband, and her inner torment at her present behavior. The “Sun Worshiper” or “Sunflower,” was the title of the work and a plant which follows the warm rays of the sun, reflects her desperate attempt to flee an unbearable present. Her search for an individual solution draws a certain parallel with Abu-Saber’s desire to escape into a

435. Suha Sabagh, “Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada”, in Social Text, No. 22(Spring), 1989, p. 75.
more golden past. Sadia is able to feed her children better; they suffer from her anger and her frustration as she seeks to achieve her goal without sacrifice. Like Abu-Saber, however, she must face the fact that escape is impossible. As soon as she moves into her new haven, the authorities confiscate her land and demolish her home for the purpose of building a settlement in all the surrounding area. She joined her children and the crowds in demonstrating against the occupation. She finally discarded her search for the rays of the sun as she became as angry and on the verge of madness. The issues facing women can only be addressed in conjunction with the problem facing the as a whole s it given the historical conditions on the West Bank. But, her politicization in the end marked a shift; she would then be able to challenge traditional values from the point of view of the resistance. Sadia had enforced her own chastisement in seeking to escape her life in the alley.436

How Did Women Organize

The editor of a local Palestinian publication called Al-Awda (Return), closed down by the Israeli authorities named Raymonda Tawil. She was also an activist and a correspondent to various foreign journals. Through her contact with Western reporters and foreign diplomats visiting the West Bank she became quite familiar in the United States and Europe. She informed the reader that her objective was to provide “a bridge” between the occupied territories and the outside world in ‘My Home My Prison’. She formed a literary salon in her home to balance for the cultural life in Nablus. It became develop into a meeting place for diplomats, intellectuals, and local officials immediately. She received visitors together with the Western press, Israeli Leftists, Arabs from Israel, and sometimes even the local military governor and his aides after 1967 continuously.437

The military government imposed the disciplinary measures and thus as a reaction the ‘My Home My Prison’ became one of the few sources that suggests information on the way women organize as a reaction. The women's active involvement in preventing changes imposed by the military government in the school curriculum, and demonstrations carried out against the demolition of homes were the few specific events that is suggested by Tawil. After the national struggle

436. Ibid. p. 76.

200
had achieved its objectives Tawil, however, may be overly optimistic in her assessment of the strides are made by women on the West Bank or their ability to maintain these strides.438

During the 1967 war Tawil's explained the condition of the refugees who expelled from their homes and settled temporarily around her house. Thus she gave first priority to provide food, shelter and medical care. The two women began to set off to get the Israeli authorities to open up the UNRWA warehouse (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) together with Khalifeh. Tawil, however, grew up in the coastal city pf Acre after 1948. She was able to communicate with the soldiers in Hebrew. Their move was bold-at that point no one knew what to expect from the occupying power. The pragmatic and devoid of ideological posturing has been showed in their action. The women's organizations maintained the same directness in its approach which became the later agenda. Some men in Nablus have a high feeling offended to see the two women in the company of an Israeli official, the enemy, even if the issue was to save lives as we learned. The conflict between men and women's perception was based on the greater degree of dogmatism which informs men's approach. However, Tawil and Khalifeh define themselves as nationalist. As unessential, and pragmatism or nurturing as women's domain, viewed as the essential stuff of life as it also considered by Khalifeh and Raymonda.

"Talking to the enemy is collaboration!" someone says furiously. Sahar loses her temper. "We have suffered enough from slogans and ideologies!" she cries, "Ba’athism, Marxism, and all the rest. Now we have thousands of mouths to feed, hundreds of wounded to care for. We've talked enough! Now let's go to work and save what we can of the Palestinian people."439

The women's organization became the source of saving the life. Women began to organize around an extension of their nurturing role usually. Problem related to life of the family, school curriculum, food for needy families, medical care etc became the area of the Arab Women's Union, whose activities the author describes. The Women's positions emerge as the protectors of life and family concerns in the political context instead of being the grantor of life in their maternal context. The views had been neglected about women that women have no ideological views. The

438. Ibid.

201
women's organizations was the another different group within PLO. Their view, however, is basic and is concerned with survival. Their views influenced the nature of their involvement. The Arab Women's Union considers as a charitable organization and consists of middle-class women. Other organizations, however, are more involved with vocational training and self help. Tawil joined the armed resistance and presented some information on young women. As far as the greater numbers of women join demonstrations, sit-ins and act of civil disobedience. Their participation, however, was marginal in numerical terms.\textsuperscript{440}

Tawil imagines the nationalist nature of women's work to provide a form of protection against traditional norms as it became clear with the above passage. The very nature of their nationalist concern justified the violation of traditional boundaries as it felt by Women clearly. A foreign journalist characterized this attitude. It was remarked by a report in Tawil's book: traditional middle-aged women felt to lift up their skirts to show him the bruises left on their bodies by the soldiers, quite unbothered by traditional norms that require much greater modesty. Women's participation had then greater freedoms in Amal al Watani in time. Other clips for families in need were young women with fewer restraints placed by families on their mobility or their segregation and also most of the members of the committees responsible for providing food in the intifada.\textsuperscript{441}

Some traditional values that applied to women unwittingly cooperate with the objectives of occupation hampering the mobilization efforts of half the population as the broad lines of the work discussed above. As in the case of Abu-Saber might well be responsible for preserving the fiber of society under occupation traditional values that dictated generosity and support extended to one's neighbor in times of need. The texts considered did not show a direct challenge to the central patriarchal paradigm. The three authors look for to incorporate the role of women into the national picture in comparison to their feminist/nationalist approach. While Palestinians were faced with an imminent outside danger it was suspicious whether a more direct argument would take place at a time. The diversity of groups within the umbrella of the PLO the Women's demands would then receive the same priorities and political solutions. A

\textsuperscript{440} Suha Sabbagh, "Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada", in \textit{Social Text}, No. 22(Spring), 1989, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
lot of women had voiced their hope that the gains made by women and their contributions would become a platform for negotiations on the West Bank Gaza.442

IV. Role of Women since Al-Aqsa Intifada

In any society of the world, political participation is one the most important indicators of development. The role of women in such development, and their endeavour to impact upon developmental plans through the channel of political participation is an important parameter. There is a positive effect on development policies when there are high levels of effective women’s participation. Palestinian society is characterized by conservatism and a relatively low regard for the women’s abilities. Most of the daily activities are dominated by men, and women are expected to exert double the effort of their male counterparts. Political changes in Palestinian society have, however, given women a historic opportunity to improve their situation through engaging in popular struggle and mass action despite many challenges. During the first Intifada, for instance, Palestinian women were able to impose themselves on the country’s collective consciousness in both in the private and public spheres, and go on to lead many charitable organizations.443

Before dealing with the role of women since Al-Aqsa Intifada, it is better to give a brief account of the history of the women’s participation in the struggle to liberate Palestine from the hand of the Jewish control. Al-Aqsa Intifada is also known as the second Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation in which intensified Israeli-Palestinian violence took place. It started in September 2000, when Ariel Sharon made a visit to the Temple Mount. This time Palestinian demonstrators were highly provocative and while throwing stones at police, were dispersed by the Israeli army, using tear gas and rubber bullets in which massive casualties happened.444

Following the October 2000 events, disturbances and clashes inside Israel took place, mostly between Arab citizens and the Israeli Police for several days. The events also saw large-scale rioting by both Arabs and Jews. However, the Taba Summit between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was held from January 21 to 27, 2001, at Taba in the Sinai Peninsula. In this meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud

443. Ibid.
Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat came closer to reaching a final settlement than any previous peace talks but finally failed to achieve any success.445

However, Palestinian women’s participation in the national struggle started since the end of nineteenth century, when the first Jewish colony was built. It was the first remarkable female political participation, when women demonstrated against the construction of a new Jewish settlement in the town of Afula in 1893. The period of British mandate (1917-1948) witnessed the establishment of charitable organizations and an increase of social work, as well as the political participation of women. As the result of the killing of nine Palestinian women in the 1929 Western Wall riots in Jerusalem, the first Arab Women’s Association was founded. This was an addition to the Arab Women’s Union. These unions took part in managing several economic, social, cultural, and national efforts, such as organizing demonstrations and writing letters to Arab leaders to support Palestinian cause etc. In support of their male counterparts as a wife, a daughter or a sister, Palestinian women did not confine themselves and played an active role in resistance against the British Mandate and Zionism. Palestinian women also took up a major responsibility for sustaining armed resistance largely undertaken by men by trading in/selling their jewellery for rifles, as well as supplying food, arms and information to the fighters for Palestinian cause. During this time, some armed women’s organizations also existed, such as Zahrat al-Uqhawan which originally established by the two sisters Moheeba and Arabiya Khursheed as a social organization in 1933 in the city of Yafa. This organization transformed into an armed group because of the consequence of British Mandate sniper who did shoot in the head a Palestinian boy, while he was in his mother’s arms. Zahrat al-Uqhawan. This incident witnessed by Moheeba who then involved in fighting the Jewish armed gangs up until Yafa fell in 1948, where most of the city’s Palestinian population were ethnically cleansed. As a result, Moheeba lived in Jordan the rest of her life as a refugee. The other details of expulsion of Palestinians from their land have been earlier mentioned.446

446. https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab.../role-of-palestinian-women-in-res...
However, after the defeat in the June 1967 Six Day War, referred to as al-Nakba, as the West Bank, Gaza strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai were occupied by Israel, most of the publicly active women joined the Palestinian resistance factions and engaged in political activities. The participation of women at national level continued in that period whether in armed resistance, social work, or in secret organizational work in the West Bank and Gaza strip. As the first Intifada led to a grassroots popular resistance to the violence of the Israeli occupation, women were demonstrating with men in large protests. During this period, many women were arrested, detained and brutally beat up at the hands of the occupation forces. Since, the women's role in the Intifada was recognized as very crucial, but their social status did neither rise nor they were involved in political decision-making plans. With the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, relations of Palestinians with Israel normalized and ended the popular uprising, and conceded national principles of self-determination, liberation and justice in exchange for a promised consolidation of political and economic power. Though women were playing active role in non-governmental organizations and civil society, female participation in the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA) government marginalized and that too was very weak. The job opportunities for women were also limited to those of secretaries, typists, or teachers in public schools and other private sectors. Despite high levels of political activism, women are still underrepresented in the leadership of the main Palestinian political parties.  

With the launch of al-Aqsa Intifadah on 28 September, 2000, Israeli forces raised their brutality terror activities against Palestinians, implementing recursive military operations against the West Bank and Gaza Strip which were re-occupied, Israel resumed its policy of assassinating significant Palestinian leaders and resistance activists and of targeting schools, homes, universities, which scored huge number of Palestinians.

Due to such aggressiveness’s by the Israeli forces, the Palestinian public resistance surged and became better planned and implemented. However, Female participation was remarkable in al-Aqsa Intifadah on both civil and military levels and

447. Ibid.
they have already significant share in the Intifada. Therefore, it resulted in the participation of women in suicide bombing and martyrdom operations. The worst of its kind was Ayat al Akhras, who lived in the Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem and was only 18 years old when she detonated the explosive tied to her body outside a supermarket in Jerusalem in March 2002.449

As it is earlier mentioned that according to an Amnesty International report, Palestinian women have been killed and injured by Israeli occupation forces either inside or near their homes, or sometimes when were moving from one village to another place. It is also mentioned in the report that some women died under the wrecks of homes demolished by the Israeli forces. Many girls were killed by the occupation forces in their schools, such as 10-year-old Noran Deib who was killed in 2005 in her school playground in Rafah, Gaza.450

Palestinian women had no arms or weapons when they came forward to face Israeli soldiers and their tanks. The forces of Israel were directly showering bullets on their heads even in front of media. One remarkable member of the demonstration was the member of PLC Jamilah al-Shanti, who commented several, “The truth was greater and stronger than what you saw on satellite T.V. screens... we were adamant on ending that Israeli besiegement of the mosque even if it cost us our lives.” Since this brave statement could not be tolerated by occupation army, they responded by shelling her house by two air-ground rockets, killing her sister-in-law and her two bodyguards who were near her house although she was escaped as she was not there at that time.451

The women were also volunteering to help injured people reach to hospitals during the Israeli military operation against the Palestinians, when Israeli forces banned medical and first aid staff from doing their job.452

Pregnant women when they were arrested or detained were badly treated by not giving any pre- and post-natal care. Case of Samar Sheih may be mentioned here that she was arrested when she was two months pregnant, and frequently threatened

450. Linah Alasafln is a graduate of Birzeit University and is currently pursuing her Master’s degree at SOAS, London.
with abortion during her 18 hours a day interrogation for 66 days in the infamous Maskubiya detention camp. When she was due, she was transferred to a hospital with cuffs on both her hands and legs and accompanied by guards; her hands were released only for thirty minutes during her forced caesarean delivery. There are many more such cases which have heart-wrenching stories. According to a report, between 2000 and 2007, 69 women gave birth at military checkpoints, or were denied or delayed access to hospitals. As a result 35 newborn babies died.\textsuperscript{453}

However, despite of very severe examples of brutalities, Palestinian women have always stood side by side with their fathers, brothers, husbands, comrades to resist the Zionist occupation, to fight for freedom and legitimate rights. They were the first to go to the streets to protest the brutality of the Israeli military occupation, the first to organize sit-ins and marches demanding the release of their children, brothers and fathers from prisons of Israel. They are the best protectors, the supporters and most of all they are the comrades in the fight for a free Palestine. They protect their children, fathers, brothers and husbands from the Zionist invaders who very frequently come to kidnap, beat or kill them. The Palestinian women support their families when their fathers, brothers or husbands are imprisoned or killed by the Israeli terrorist troops or forces. They always remained embracing the land and kissing the olive trees.\textsuperscript{454}

\textbf{End of the Intifada}

The date of ending of the Second Intifada is disputed. Some commentators such as Sever Plocher considered the intifada to have ended in late 2004 with the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004.\textsuperscript{455} In fact, the Palestinians lost their internationally recognized leader of the previous three decades which lost the intifada momentum and led to internal fighting between Palestinian factions the Fatah–Hamas

\begin{footnotes}
\item[453.] https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab..role-of-palestinian-women-in-res..
\item[454.] For details on stories and incidents of brutalities of Israeli army against the Palestinian women can be studied: https://avoicefrompalestine.wordpress.com/...palestinian-female-prisoner.
\end{footnotes}
conflict etc. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, while leading to the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005 vowed that it would mark the end of the intifada.

However, as earlier mentioned, the first Intifada was organized from December 1987 to September 1993 and today, 15 years after the second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, that took place in September 2000 and continued up to February 2005, violence is on the rise again. Now, there is possibility of third Palestine uprising. It is because anger of Palestinians against the Israeli state is boiling due to their attacks occurring almost on a daily basis since October and November, 2014. The main question haunting Israelis are now-a-days their worries about whether the “Third Intifada” will start any day or has already started.

Omar Barghouti, one of the leaders of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement told RT: "It’s a different intifada, “Because in the first and the second intifada there was a very clear starting date... With this particular phase of the Palestinian struggle against apartheid and occupation, there has been no clear day when it started.”

Therefore, one of the most repeated themes littering political discussions and commentary by both Israelis and Palestinians involves when the next intifada will take place from. All the predictions have been failed which show that no one can foresee what combination of issues and actions might produce the collective popular uprisings against the Israeli occupation, while it is reasonable to assert that all the ingredients are present for a third Palestinian uprising.

However, the desire of Hamas leaders to ignite the West Bank and fan the flames of the uprising in East Jerusalem has not been a secret. They are calling upon

---

457. "The full text of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s declaration of a ceasefire with the Palestinians at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit". BBC News. February 8, 2005. Retrieved 28 September 2014. Today, in my meeting with Chairman Abbas, we agreed that all Palestinians will stop all acts of violence against all Israelis everywhere and, in parallel, Israel will cease all its military activity against all Palestinians anywhere.... The disengagement plan can pave the way to implementation of the roadmap, to which we are committed and which we want to implement. (However, the violence did not stop the following years.
459. Ibid.

208
the Palestinians to launch a third intifada and that is openly made during prayers in
the mosques, as well as by media channels affiliated with Hamas. They are
couraging the Palestinians to clash with the Israeli security forces and set out
independent terrorist attacks. According to a report submitted in December 2013 to
PA President Mahmoud Abbas by the PA adviser for security affairs, Gen. Tawfiq
Tirawi, shows that the failure of the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians
would push Hamas into trying to reorganize its military wing in the West Bank and
lead to a third intifada.\footnote{61}
Chapter – VI

Conclusion
Chapter - VI

Conclusion

Palestinian women from the very beginning played a very pivotal role in the struggle for liberation of Palestine from the hand of Israel. Women defied traditional restriction to participate in the popular resistance and it was also the women who were the first to take to the streets. They demonstrated loudly and non-violently throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip for an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Palestinian women also played a major role in the Uprising and from the beginning they actively participated in the demonstrations and stone-throwing. For the sake of the struggle, they did not care their female sexuality which is so sacred to the honour of the Arab family and clan. Sometimes they were threatened by the Israeli soldiers through sexual harassment in the homes and the prisons. But, this did neither intimidate Palestinian women nor prevent them from further participation in the struggle. With the rise of the Intifada, women's perception changed and the Intifada gave women a new self-confidence and strength. However, at the time of the Intifada, when peace process started, women's achievements and gains began to be questioned and threatened. It is because thousands of the released Palestinian males from Israeli jails were requiring their wives, daughters and sisters to go back to the old traditional and social values, fearing from the newly achieved freedom and domains of women. At the same time, women were also afraid lest they will suffer from the fate of their Algerian sisters, who despite of their great role in the struggle against the French, yet lost all their right after liberation. 462

Today Palestinian society is fragmented, isolated and disarranged. Prior to the World War-I, Palestine had been a distinct region with its distinguished geographical boundary and remained an important and sacred state of West Asia throughout the Ottoman Empire. It was conquered, dismembered and colonized by the British in 1922 and also reduced to a fraction of its original geographical contiguity. However, during the British mandate, the long struggle between the native Arab

462. For detail see, Phookwani and Rubenberg, pp. 209-40

213
Palestinians and the Jewish settlers came to an end in 1948 with the defeat of both the Palestinians and the Arab states that supported them. Hence, it was 1948 when the first major political change took place and Jewish national homeland was created in Palestine. As a result of 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian territory was divided into three parts: one namely West Bank was captured by Jordan; the other Gaza went under the control of Egypt; and the rest of Palestine remained in the hand of the Jews which is being governed by them in the name of Israel, a newly created country and also recognized by the United Nations in 1948. An estimate of number of Palestinians who became refugees in this war varies from 700,000 to 900,000. However, since then the Palestinian Arab population was split in two groups. One group included those Palestinians who lived as refugees outside Palestine, whether in the neighbouring Arab states (like Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq) or in Europe and United States of America. The second group was consisted of those Palestinian Arab populations who lived within the border of Palestine.463

In another war of 1967 between the Arabs and Jews, West Bank and Gaza were occupied by the Jews who included them into the territory of Israel. This is the second time when many thousand more Palestinians were dispossessed of their homes and herded again as destitute refugees. Even then, today, there are 19 refugee camps in the West Bank and a very few camps are also in Gaza Strip where about half a million Palestinians live whereas the total Palestinian population in the world is estimated to be over four millions in which Jordan has the largest population of the Palestinians living anywhere in the world. Ninety per cent of all these Palestinians are Sunni Muslims while the rest of ten per cent are the Christians. However, the role of women can be divided into four different periods: (1) from 1917 to 1948; (2) 1948 to 1987; (3) 1987 to the end of Fist Intifada; and (4) from the beginning of Second Intifada till date.464


464. Ibid.
(1) Role of Women during 1917 to 1948

Palestinian society has been fundamentally feudal and patriarchal. The birth of a boy was normally more welcome and celebrated than of a girl who was considered a burden on the family. Women must be fertile and bear ‘fruit’ especially sons. The women, who are not able to have children, are considered without value and dispensable and the women who do not produce sons/son would either be divorced or be supplemented by another wife. Men were considered responsible for women’s actions. Since the childhood, girls are taught to be obedient and are constantly watchful. If she was late in returning home, whatever be the reason, she would be punished. Even married women were beaten. Women are considered to be as wives and mothers and restricted to the four walls of homes. Marriages are arranged by the parents and grooms and brides can see each other only after marriages.465

However, the role of women in the struggle of Palestine started after the formation of first women’s associations in Jerusalem in 1919. It was as early as 1920 (27 February), when a considerable number of women came out on the streets of Jerusalem and joined in protests and demonstrations with their counter parts to show their anger against the British mandate and Jewish expansionist aims in Palestine. The first women’s congress was held in Jerusalem in 1929 in which 300 women participated. It was an important step towards a more organized movement that adopted resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Balfour Declaration and the prohibition of Zionist emigration into Palestine. As a result of this congress, the Palestinian women’s Federation came to existence. The birth of the first Palestinian women’s organization was simultaneous with the beginning of the resistance to Zionist immigration in Palestine.466

In 1933, the members of the congress participated in a march of veiled women to protest against the visit of Allenby to Jerusalem and the failure of the British to fulfill the promise of Liberation. As the Palestinian nation was then transformed into a settler colonial state under Zionist leadership in Israel, the


215
resistance of Palestinian people including women intensified. Hence, in the revolution
of 1936-39 against the British, women participated actively with arms in their hands
and also by carrying arms and provisions to the male fighters. The first Palestinian
female martyr was Fatimah Ghazzal who was killed by the British colonialist bullets
in a battle at Azzoun on July 26, 1936. 467

This had been a fashion for middle and upper middle class women of
urban areas to belong themselves to women’s organization, participate in social
activities and to voice their support for nationalist causes. Although the majority of
women live in the rural areas, but both the women either they were living in urban
areas or rural, were always prepared to volunteer their services in the struggle to resist
the British and Zionist settler also by going out on missions with their men and
helping them with supplies of ammunition and other provisions. This continues till the
massacre of Deir Yassin in which hundreds of Palestinian including women and
children lost their lives. 468

With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the majority of the
Palestinian people was dispersed and dragged out of their places and no formal
organization of Palestinian women existed. It was forbidden for Palestinians of both
sexes in Israel to form political parties or organizations. However, women’s activities
centred on social services such as child welfare, literacy campaigns, and training of
sewing, spinning, weaving and embroidery. 469

(2) Role of Women from 1948 to 1987

After 1948, there were no records of political activities overtly organized by
the Palestinian women in Israel, as the Israeli authorities restricted these. However,
women’s Associations were organised in many towns of the West Bank and a few in
Gaza. Their programmes were expanded to meet the needs precipitated by the
dispersal of the Palestinian people. Some began operating orphanage and nursery

467. Ibid.
469. Ibid
schools to provide childcare for working mothers, as this was the need to confront economic situation. Other activities, which these societies undertook, were to establish homes for old people, family planning clinics and schools for the blinds, the dumb and the retarded. After occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 by Israel, few international organizations showed their interest in maintaining these ongoing programmes to preserve Palestinian identity and culture.470

With the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, a handful of women were allowed to join the meetings of this political organization under the domain of the male. Then the General Union of Palestine Women (GUPW) was established in 1965, with some former objectives like raising the standard of women, eradication of illiteracy and care for the Palestinian family. One clause in the charter of GUPW was the participation of the Palestinian women in the activities organized by men to liberate their homeland. However, following the 1967 June war, the remaining territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) of what had been Palestine were captured by Israel. From then, women started resisting the occupation strongly and a new development in women’s political struggle occurred that they participated in armed activities of the revolution and they started to foster their sons and daughters with commitment for the struggle to liberate Palestine. In the beginning, female participation in the PLO structure was limited and that to mostly feminine in nature as they were concentrated on support services like collecting contributions, visiting fighters, nursing the injured, caring for families of prisoners and martyrs, etc. Later on, women started leading strikes and demonstrations involving themselves in individual and collective acts of resistance that encouraged others. Following the killing of three women by Israeli army in Gaza, Muslim and Christian women staged a hunger strike in the Church of Jerusalem in February 1969. Since 1970 women’s role changed from support to participation in all activities especially in Jordan whereas in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, they were depended upon their men.471

The popular front of the Liberation of the Palestine organized women in the occupied areas by assigning them distribution of pamphlets, smuggling of arms and providing the other needful for freedom fighters. Later on women were given military

471. Ibid.
training and sent out on missions with the men. The women who actively participated in the Palestinian revolution were generally young and educated and belonged to the middle class families, where as the women belonging to the lower class could not take active part as the males of this group did not like mixing of their women with the men.472

(3) Role of Women from 1987 to the End of First Intifada

The women played very active and important role in the Palestinian Intifada (uprising), which started in December 1987. During the Intifada, from varied social backgrounds marched in silent protest to roadblocks and participated in the struggle, they along with their children threw stones in protest against Israeli soldiers to protect their militant men. As a result of their political participation, they were often beaten, shot, killed and sometimes-suffered imprisonment, torture, rape and tear gas attacks. In this on-going struggle, women did not only participate politically, but they were also very active in many aspects of society in protecting and rescuing their homes, children and men from the continuous onslaught of Israeli forces. They also took a leading role in boycott campaign against Israeli products in the Gaza and West Bank during the Intifada. This boycott initiative proved to be a failure to achieve the goals due to lack of Palestinian’s native industries. To make it successful, it was necessary to provide Palestinian families with alternative sources of income and products which was impossible, because, during the Intifada, often curfew was imposed, schools and universities were shut for months, borders with Israel were closed for Palestinian workers and hence sometimes Palestinians families suffered without income for months. Palestinian women tried their best to confront these crises by establishing some of their own industries like cheese making, jam making, bread making, etc., in order to provide some relief to daily needs of their people. Moreover, Palestinian women, during the closure of schools by the Israeli army, established underground community schools which their children could attend. When the Israeli soldiers arrest any child, Palestinian women en mass would come out demanding the release of the

child. Every woman would claim that the child was her own; consequently often they would succeed in releasing the child.  

Palestinian women extended their activism and organizational skills in the service of the uprising and helped mobilize people in different communities to perform important meetings. They set up units to collect and store food. They remained vigilant sometimes throughout the night to warn their community in the event of the enemy approach. They helped in providing medical relief and first aid. Apart from all these, they engaged directly in confrontation with the Israeli army at the cost of their lives and repeated ravage and rape.  

Israel military has used multiple strategies to suppress the unprecedented political mobilization of women. To deter women from political participation, Israeli military used tear gas on them, which caused miscarriages, and to suppress their demonstrations women suffered sexual harassment and sexual violence in addition to other means of torture, humiliation, arrest and rape etc. But despite all these, women young and old have continued to resist armed and un-armed struggle declaring their resistance as their rights and duty.  

(4) Since the Beginning of Al-Aqsa Intifada till Date  

The Oslo Peace Accord, however, was signed on 13 September 1993 between Palestinians and the Israelis. In the negotiation, women were not included in the discussion. The Oslo deal was, in fact, signed by the wealthy Palestinians in the Diaspora. They wanted a home for their hard earned money, and in return, they accepted for Palestinian people to be as apartheid hoping more to come later. After this peace agreement, women faced a new phenomenon of a large number of divorce cases, women suicides and extreme poverty. Women received the lowest wages. Moreover, all small businesses went out of business making way for the new Palestinian wealth mass production with cheap prices. Monopolies were shaped in the

473. Phoolwanti and Nusseibeh, Saida, Palestinian Culture and Identity and the role of Palestinian Women, www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm
474. Ibid.
market on the hands of PA (Palestinian Authority) leadership in almost all fields. The PA also oppressed women further with reactionary laws and regulations. There was also a group in the PA that was getting benefits from the existence of occupation by way of partnership and joint ventures. As a result, Palestinian women movement split in two groups over their agenda and approach to the women struggle. One group of the women believed that it is now time for peace and that the social issues should be dealt with later during the peace times. This group was very well funded by the NGO’s. The second group believed that occupation still existed and that the National Liberation and Women Liberation should go hand in hand. However, a very confusing situation prevailed until the second uprising (al-Aqsa Intifada) broke out. Now, as always, Women began to participate firmly in crises and all types of demonstrations. They protested against the unjust policies of not facilitating visits of families to their political prisoners in the Israeli jails and participated in funerals that take the form of mass demonstrations. The women believe that for every funeral there is a wedding and for every death there is a birth. 476

With the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a new phenomenon of committing suicide attacks by women is found. Women were also used for terrorist purposes and sabotage activities against Israeli targets. Since a woman is generally thought to be soft, gentle and innocent, she can be lesser suspicion. The women who carried out sabotage activities, made their appearance as Westerners, by way of wearing short skirts or maternity clothes and having modern haircuts. Among these women were both well educated professionals and common un-educated and non-professional young females. Mention can be made about more than twenty women who committed suicide bomb attacks. We also can name here some of very prominent ones such as; wafa Idris, Andleeb Taqatamah, Ahlam Tamimi, Sana Shahada. Wafa Idris and Shaafa al-Koudsi. 477

However, the continuous suicide bombing by the Palestinian women was very barbaric and murderous activities which were criticized by both Israeli and Palestinian feminists. Consequently, peace activists insisted Israeli government to accept their

---


220
demands by withdrawing their forces along with the Jewish settlements from the
Occupied Territories, so that the mounting death toll would be stopped. Moreover,
Israeli’s coalition of women for a just peace -- consisting of nine different women’s
peace organizations -- has made the following five point demands from its platform:

1. The Occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip must end;
2. The Occupation must end with a sovereign independent and secure Palestinian
state;
3. Jerusalem must be the capital for both Israel and Palestine;
4. Israel must acknowledge its responsibility for the refugees and negotiate a just
solution; and
5. There must be a shared cooperative destiny between Israel and Palestine which
removes the enormous economic disparity between Israelis and Palestinians.

The above peace declaration was read on April 15, 2002, by Jerusalem Center
for Women and Bat Shalom (one of the Israel’s prominent feminist peace
organizations). These organizations, further, states that “there is one future for us
both and we believe that women can develop an alternative voice promoting sound
approaches and effective peace initiatives between our two nations and peoples.”

End of the Intifada

The date of ending of the Second Intifada is disputed. Some commentators
such as Sever Plocker considered the intifada to have ended in late 2004 with the
death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004. In fact, the Palestinians lost their
internationally recognized leader of the previous three decades which lost the intifada
momentum and led to internal fighting between Palestinian factions the Fatah-Hamas
conflict etc. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, while leading to the Sharm el-
Sheikh Summit of 2005 vowed that it would mark the end of the intifada.

478. For detail, see, Phoolwanti and Rubenberg, pp. 209-40.
479. For detail, see, Ruth Tenne (Autumn 2007), “Rising of the oppressed: and the second
Intifada”. International Socialism (116), Retrieved November 13, 2011, Review of Ramzy
Baroud; Kathleen Christison; Bill Christison; Jennifer Loewenstein (2006), The Second
480. For detail, see, Ramzy Baroud announced that the intifada has now completed and ended in
August 2005, (Gilmore, Inigo, February 4, 2005), “Palestinian ceasefire ends four-year
481. “The full text of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s declaration of a ceasefire with
the Palestinians at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit”, BBC News. February 8, 2005.
However, the first Intifada was organized from December 1987 to September 1993 and today, 15 years after, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, that took place in September 2000 and continued up to February 2005, violence is on the rise again. Now, there is possibility of third Palestinian uprising. It is because; anger of Palestinians against the Israeli state is boiling due to their attacks occurring almost on a daily basis since October and November, 2014. The main question haunting Israelis are now-a-days their worries about whether the “Third Intifada” will start any day or has already started.\textsuperscript{482}

Omar Barghouti, one of the leaders of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement told RT: “It’s a different intifada, “Because in the first and the second intifada there was a very clear starting dates... With this particular phase of the Palestinian struggle against apartheid and occupation, there has been no clear day when it started.”\textsuperscript{483}

Therefore, one of the most repeated themes littering political discussions and commentary by both Israelis and Palestinians involves when the next Intifada will take place from. All the predictions have been failed which show that no one can foresee what combination of issues and actions might produce the collective popular uprisings against the Israeli occupation, while it is reasonable to assert that all the ingredients are present for a third Palestinian uprising.\textsuperscript{484}

However, the desire of Hamas leaders to ignite the West Bank and fan the flames of the uprising in East Jerusalem has not been a secret. They are calling upon the Palestinians to launch a third intifada and that is openly made during prayers in the mosques, as well as by media channels affiliated with Hamas. They are encouraging the Palestinians to clash with the Israeli security forces and set out independent terrorist attacks. According to a report submitted in December 2013 to PA President Mahmoud Abbas by the PA adviser for security affairs, Gen. Tawfiq

\textsuperscript{482} rt.com/news/206443-palestinian-uprising-third-intifada/
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid.
Tirawi, shows that the failure of the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians would push Hamas into trying to reorganize its military wing in the West Bank and lead to a third intifada. 485

Women’s Dilemma

Palestinian women are facing with many serious factors which have endangered their status and role in the struggle, because, they have to struggle on two fronts. At the time of fighting against Israel, they face serious conflicts within their own patriarchal family and society. Even one of the very prominent women in the struggle like Hanan Ashrawi, bowed down before her family pressures against her more active role in politics. PLO policies on struggle for liberation are also not favourable to women. Secondly, the decline of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front (revolutionary movements for the liberation of Palestine) has also been a setback to women in regard to conflict with men on the issue of gender equality. Thirdly and most importantly is the rise of the Islamist forces like Hamas (one of the most powerful religious and national movements) which damaged the political status achieved by the women during the last forty/fifty years. Fourthly, it is the international NGOs which are creating internal division within the women’s movement and trying to delink between the women’s struggle and the nationality struggle especially to divert them to their own western interests. Therefore, women’s struggle has to be multifaceted and complex too and they are indeed fighting on several fronts such as: national, socio-economic and social. 486

However, women’s struggle has a long way to go while there is no structure, no real state and the whole people are oppressed and without a nation or an economy of their own. Palestinian women are very similar to the women of third world in regard to poverty, social and religious oppression. The only difference is that these women have no homes which they could call theirs, no country to reside in, they lie scattered. To sum up, the sentiments of an activist, Um Leila are here mentioned: 487

"In spite of all obstacles, in spite of war and death, in spite of oppression from the men, Palestinian women will participate in the liberation struggle. It is very important. They believe in revolution and will teach their children to believe in it."

485. www.al-monitor.com/.../israel-palestine-third-intifada-violence-hamas-ter...
486. Nuseibeh, Saida.

223
Without the women the revolution would be without a future. Every day people are killed amongst us, everyday produces a martyr If people don’t understand the situation in which we live, they don’t understand the pain that makes mothers’ wish, more than anything else, for their sons and daughters to become commandos.”

487. Phoolwanti.
Bibliography
Bibliography


- Abu Daud.

- Adnan, M. Abu Ghazaleh, Arab Culture Nationalism in Palestine during the British Mandate, Beirut, 1973.
- Al-Ghazali, M., Ilhya ul-Ulum al-Din, Cairo, A.H.1272.
• Arsalan, Shaikh, Limada Takhkhara al-Muslimun wa Taqaddama Ghairuhum.


* David Butter, "Taking a lead", *Middle East Economic Digest*, December 1, 2000.

* David Kushner, 'The "Foreign Relations" of the Governors of Jerusalem toward the End of Ottoman the Period', ed., in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*.


• Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, Washington, DC, 1961.


• Fraser, Nancy, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”, in Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80.


• George kirk, 'Short History of the Middle East', London.


• George Young, Corps de droit Ottoman, Oxford, 1905-6, Vol. 1.


232

• Hasso, Frances S., Resistance, Repression, and Gender politics in Occupied Palestine and Jordan, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 2005.


• Holt, Maria, Half the People: Women, History and the Palestinian Intifada, Jerusalem, 1992.


- Joseph and Slyomovies, (eds.), *Women and Power in the Middle East*,


Magida Abu Hassabo in Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank edited by Suha Sabbagh,

Mahmaz, Erika Friedl, eds., Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing Platform


Morrison, S.A., Middle East in tension, New York, 1954.


• *Musnad Ahmad*.


• Najjar, Orayb Aref with Kitty Warnock, *Portraits of Palestinian Women*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1992.

• Najjar, Orayb Aref, "Between Nationalism and Feminism: The Palestinian Answer", in *Women Narratives*, in *Nationalisms & Sexualities*, eds., Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris.


• Peteet, Julie, "No Going Back--Women and the Palestinian Movement", *MERIP Middle East Research and Information Project*, 146 (May-June 1986).


• Reem, Alnuweiri, *The Palestinian Women’s Struggle for Social and National Liberation*.

• Richter-Devroe, Sophie, “‘Here, it’s not about conflict resolution- we can only resist’: Palestinian Women’s Activism in Conflict Resolution and Non-violent Resistance”, in *Women and War in the Middle East*, ed., Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, Zed Books, New York, 2009.


• Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, Princeton, 1963.
• Rosenwasser, Penny, Voices from a 'Promised Land': Palestinian and Israeli Peace Activists Speak their Hearts, Curbstone Press, Willimantic, CT, 1992.
• Ruth Roded, ed., Women in Islam and the Middle East: A Reader,
• Sabbagh, Suha, "Palestinian Women Writers and the Intifada", in Social Text, No. 22(Spring), 1989, p. 75.

• *Sahih al-Bukhari*.

*Sahih Muslim.*


• Salibi, Rana, “Women’s Activities in Popular Committees during the Intifada”, in *Palestinian*


• Smith, Jane I, Women in Contemporary Muslim Societies, London, 1980


• Stephen, B.L. Penrose, the Palestine problem: retrospect and prospect (AFME, New York, 1954).


• Summer Wells, We Need not Fail, Boston, 1948.


• Tirmizi.


• Wadud, Amina, *Quran and Women: Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective*, USA, 1999.


• Yair Evron, *An American Israeli Defense Treaty*, Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 1981.


• Yossef, Olmert, "Lebanon", in Colin Legum (ed.), *The Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol. 6, 1981-82, Tel Aviv, 1983


Website

- www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm
- www.sonomacountryfreepress.com/Palestinian/Women2.html
- www.jiplipmagazine.org
- http://www.palestinebehindbars.org/n27.htm
- http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/body.asp?id=70102
- www.istor.org
- https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/.../9645-palestinian-women-changin...
- www.patheos.com/.../stripped-of-history-palestinian-womens-resistance/
- www.palestinianconference.org/wp/.../2013/.../PLO-PalestinianWomen.p...
- www.newjerseysolidarity.org/articles/womensstruggledp.html
- https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab.../role-of-palestinian-women-in-res...
- www.al-monitor.com/.../israel-palestine-third-intifada-violence-hamas-ter...
- www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/2000
- 2009/2003/1/The+Role+of+Palestinian+Women+in+suicide+Terrorism.htm
- www.palsolidaritygpr.org/Palestinian%20Women%20Struggle%20Atticle.htm
- www.sonomacountryfreepress.com/Palestinian/Women2.html
- www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm
- www.mideastweb.org/Palestinianwomen.htm
• http://worldnews.about.com/od/ijl/g/Intifada.htm
• http://worldnews.about.com/od/ijl/g/Intifada.htm
• http://www.palestinebehindbars.org/ferwana24n2009.htm
• http://www.unicef.org/info/country/israel_statistics.html
• http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/016/2005/endom-
  MDE150162005en.html
  dom-MDE150162005en.html
• http://www.pwic.org.ps/derasat/derasat5.html
• http://www.palestinebehindbars.org/n27.htm
• http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/body.asp?id=70102
• https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab.../role-of-palestinian-women-in-res...
• http://www.alasr.ws/index.cfm?method=home.con&ContentId=8400
• https://avoicefrompalestine.wordpress.com/.../palestinian-female-prisoner...
• www.liplipmagazine.org
APPENDICES

APPENDIX - 1

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: 1917

Foreign office, November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspiration which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

‘His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour
APPENDIX - 2


July 24, 1922

Whereas the principal allied powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the covenant of the league of nations, to entrust to a mandatory selected by the said powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the principal allied powers have also agreed that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said powers, in favour on the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in the country; and

Whereas the principal allied powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the council of the league for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the league of nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the above-mentioned article 22 (Paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the league, shall be explicitly defined by the council of the league of nations confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ARTICLE 1: The mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 2: The mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-government institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3: The mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 4: An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and subject always to the control of the administration to assists and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take step in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
APPENDIX - 3

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181: 1947 (extracts)

November 29, 1947

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

Part I. – Future constitution and government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

The mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The armed forces of the mandatory power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory power shall advise the commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish state, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

Independent Arab and Jewish states and the special international regime for the city of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab state, the Jewish state, and the city of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

The period between the adoption by the General assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish states shall be a transitional period.

B. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed state before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the state and no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter I: Holy place, religious buildings and sites existing rights in respect of Holy place and religious building or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

In so far as Holy places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other state and of the city of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum. Holy places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in a way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the government that any particular Holy place, religious
building or site is in need of urgent repair, the government may call upon the community or
communities concerned to carry out such repair. The government may carry it out itself at the
expense of the community or community concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable
time.

No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy place, religious building or site which was
exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the state.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate
between the owners or occupiers of Holy places, religious buildings or sites, or would place
such owners or occupiers in a position less favorable in relation to the general incidence of
taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the assembly's recommendations.

The governor of the city of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions
of the constitution of the state in relation to Holy place, religious building and sites within the
borders of the state and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied
and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which
may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community
with respect to such places, building and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such
privilege and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the state.

Chapter 2: Religious and minority rights

Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the
maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race,
religion, language or sex.

All persons within the jurisdiction of the state shall be entitled to equal protection of laws.
The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests,
including endowments, shall be respected.

Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no
measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable
bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on
the ground of his religion or nationality.

The state shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish
minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own
members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a
general nature as the state may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational
establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the state of any language in
private intercourse, in commerce, in religion in the press or in publications of any kind, or at
public meetings. (3)

No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab state) (4)
shall be allowed except for public purpose. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as
fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.

Part II. – Boundaries

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the city of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the city of
Jerusalem. (See part III, section B, below).

Part III. – City of Jerusalem (5)
A. A SPECIAL REGIME
The city of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The trusteeship council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the administering authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
The city of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Mosta); and the most northern Shu'fat as indicated on the attached sketch—map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY
The trusteeship council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the city which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:

Government Machinery; special objectives: The administering authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:
To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;
To foster cooperation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestine peoples throughout the Holy land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various people and communities.
Governor and Administrative staff: A governor of the city of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the trusteeship council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either state in Palestine.
The government shall represent the United Nation in the city and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of article 100 of the charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the governor to the trusteeship council and duly approved by it.

3. Local autonomy
The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.
The governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the trusteeship council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of New Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.
Security measures:
The city of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no Para — military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
Should the administration of the city of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non — cooperation or interference of one or more section of the population the governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.
To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

Legislative organization:
All legislative council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the statute of the city, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The statute shall grant to the governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

Administration of Justice:
The statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the city shall be subject to it.

Economic Union and Economic Regime:
The city of Jerusalem shall be included in the economic union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulation of the undertaking and of any treaties issued there from, as well as by the decision of the joint economic board. The headquarters of the economic board shall be established in the territory city. The statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the economic union, on the basis of equal treatment and non — discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

Freedom of transit and visit: control of residents:
Subject to considerations of security and of economic welfare as determined by the governor under the directions of the trusteeship council freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the city shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish states. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other states shall be controlled by the governor under the directions of the trusteeship council.

Relations with Arab and Jewish states:
Representative of the Arab and Jewish states shall be accredited to the governor of the city and charged with the protection of the interests of their states and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the city.
Official language:
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official language of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working language, as may be required.

Citizenship:
All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the city of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the state of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish state respectively, according to part 1, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.
The trusteeship council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the city outside its territory.
The trusteeship council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the city outside its territory.

 Freedoms of citizens:
Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the city shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition.
No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex. All persons within the city shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws. The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
The city shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirement of a general nature as the city may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the bases of their existing rights.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the city of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Holy Places:
Existing rights in respect of Holy place and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
Free access to the Holy places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.
Holy places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the governor that any particular Holy place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair.
The governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the city. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy places, religious buildings or sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favorable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at time of the adoption of the assembly’s recommendation.

Special powers of the governor in respect of the Holy places, religious building and sites in the city and in any part of Palestine:
The protection of the holy places, religious buildings and sites located in the city of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the governor.

With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the constitution of both states, and whether the provisions of the constitution on the Arab and Jewish states in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertain thereto are being properly applied and respected. The governor shall also be empowered to make decision on the basis of existing rights in case of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME
The statute elaborated by the trusteeship council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the trusteeship council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to examination by the trusteeship council in the light of experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the city shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modification of regime of the city.

Part IV. Capitulations
States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular Jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the ottoman empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish states and the city of Jerusalem.
APPENDIX - 4

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: 1967

22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledge of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity
   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the secretary-general to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.
APPENDIX - 5

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: 1978

September 17, 1978

The Framework for peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al - Sadat, President of the Arab republic of Egypt, and Meacham begin, prime minister of Israel, met with Jimmy carter, president of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East.

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolution 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict.

They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.

With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspect. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the west bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self - governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self - government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self - governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegation of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. Or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self - governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

c. When the self - governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period,
negotiations will take place to determine that final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

iii. Providing for the elected representative of the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.
APPENDIX - 6

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS: 1993

September 13, 1993

The government of the state of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian Palestine delegation to the Middle East peace conference) (the ‘Palestinian delegation’) representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israel – Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian interim self – government authority, the elected council (the ‘Council’), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on security council resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

ARTICLE II
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this declaration of principles.

ARTICLE III
ELECTIONS
In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as annex 1, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this declaration of principles.

These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
ARTICLE IV
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the council will cover West Bank and Gaza strip territory, except for issue that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

ARTICLE V
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area.
Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlement, security arrangements, borders, relation and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

ARTICLE VI
PREPARTORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Upon the entry into force of this declaration of principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence this transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the council. Immediately after the entry into force of this declaration of principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII
INTERIM AGREEMENT
The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the ‘Interim Agreement’).
The interim agreement shall specify, among things, the structure of the council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the council. The interim agreement shall also specify the council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
The interim agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the council, for the assumption by the council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with article VI above.
In order to enable the council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian electricity authority, a Gaza sea port
authority, a Palestinian development Bank, a Palestinian export promotion board, a Palestinian environmental authority, a Palestinian land authority and a Palestinian water administration authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the interim agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

After the inauguration of the council, the civil administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

ARTICLE VIII
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, the council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

ARTICLE IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
The council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the interim agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

Both parties will review jointly laws and military order presently in force in remaining spheres.

ARTICLE X
JOINT ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this declaration of principles and any subsequent agreement pertaining to the interim period upon the entry into force of this declaration of principles, a joint Israeli Palestinian liaison committee will be established in order to deal with issue requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

ARTICLE XI
ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this declaration of principles, an Israeli – Palestinian economic cooperation committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as annex iii and annex iv.

ARTICLE XII
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
The two parties will invite the government of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a continuing committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this committee.
ARTICLE XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
After the entry into force of this declaration of principles, and not later than the eve of
elections for the council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the
Gaza strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance
with Article XIV.
In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military force
should be redeployed outside populated areas.
Further redeployment to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate
with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian
police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

ARTICLE XIV
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached
as annex ii.

ARTICLE XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles: Or
any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be resolved by negotiations
through the joint liaison committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the
parties will establish an arbitration committee.

ARTICLE XVI
ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL
PROGRAMS
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting
a 'Marshall Plan' the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for
the West Bank and Gaza strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as annex iv.

ARTICLE XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
This declaration of principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
All protocols annexed to this declaration of principles and agreed minutes pertaining thereto
shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
APPENDIX - 7

ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN JOINT STATEMENT: 2001

The following is the official text of the joint statement released at the close of the Taba talks by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators as published in the Jerusalem post (Jan 28, 2001):
The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted during the last six days serious, deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties.
The Taba talks were unprecedented in their positive atmosphere and expression of mutual willingness to meet the national, security and existential needs of each side.
Given the circumstances and time constraints, it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed.
The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections.
The two take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish a security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of the Sharm el –Sheikh Memorandum.
The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people. The two sides took into account the ideas suggested by President Clinton together with their respective qualifications and reservations.
On all these issues there was substantial progress in the understanding of the other side's positions and in some of them the two sides grew closer.
As stated above, the political timetable prevented reaching an agreement on all the issues.
However, in light of the significant progress in narrowing the differences between the sides, the two sides are convinced that in a short period of time and given an intensive effort and the acknowledgment of the essential and urgent nature of reaching an agreement, it will be possible to bridge the differences remaining and attain a permanent settlement of peace between them.
In this respect, the two sides are confident that they can begin and move forward in this process at the earliest practical opportunity.
The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli – Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides and with the notion that they were never closer in reaching an agreement between them than today.
We leave Taba in a spirit of hope and mutual achievement, acknowledging that the foundations have been laid both in reestablishing mutual confidence and in having progressed in a substantive engagement on all core issues.
The two sides express their gratitude to President Hosni Mubarak for hosting and facilitating these talks.
They also express their thanks to the European Union for its role in supporting the talks.