WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON EPISTEMOLOGY

ABSTRACT

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

PHILOSOPHY

BY

Maisar Hussain Untoo

Under the Supervision of

Dr. Roshan Ara
(Associate Professor & Chairperson)
SUPERVISOR

Dr. Sanaullah Mir
(Associate Professor)
CO-SUPERVISOR

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA)

2013
ABSTRACT

The present thesis is comprised of six chapters in the following order:

Chapter I  Introduction
Chapter II  A Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy
Chapter III  Picture Theory of Language
Chapter IV  Game Theory of Language
Chapter V  Wittgenstein’s Impact on Epistemology
Chapter VI  Critical Evaluation

The first chapter ‘Introduction’ brings out that western philosophy has registered a radical paradigm shift in twentieth century. The post-Kantian re-examinations of philosophy have fructified into various methodological approaches to philosophy. These approaches pushed substantial ontological, cosmological, teleological, axiological and even epistemological questions to background and underlined the need for an exploration of the very nature, role and function of philosophy itself. Such a methodological approach to philosophy was triggered off by great strides in scientific research and technological development. The outstanding results achieved in science focused the attention of philosophers to the circumlocutory character of philosophical discourse. Consequently, wide-ranging methodological studies of philosophical problems were carried out from various angles of interpretation or within various paradigms of understanding.

Thus, an existentialist approach to philosophy brought out that traditional philosophers have wrongly metamorphosed existential problems
into speculative disagreements. While philosophy ought to have been engaged in illuminating of our individual existence or awakening of our innermost authentic responses, it was quagmired into perennially irresolvable abstract disagreements about truth, knowledge, meaning, value, reality etc. On the other hand, the sociological approach to philosophy also rejected the superscientific conception of philosophy. The sociological approach to philosophy does not treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned agent but a person functioning within his deep cultural and ethnocentric prejudices. According to this approach, a philosophical world-view cannot be susceptible to logico-mathematical demonstration or empirical verification; for our philosophical responses are deeply conditioned by our cultural presuppositions. Karl Marx went to the extent of deeming philosophy as an ideological tool in the political and economic conflict between capitalist haves and proletarian have-nots. The analytical approach to philosophy pioneered by Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein underlined that an indepth investigation of the linguistic origin, genesis and development of philosophical formulations can be greatly helpful in the resolution of philosophical problems. It deemed an analysis of philosophical language in a comparative methodological framework to be highly important in achieving clarity of 'philosophical disagreement'. The foremost analytical philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, unambiguously promulgated the dissolutionistic conception of philosophy underlining that philosophical problems are impervious to resolution but can be dissolved through appropriate linguistic analysis.
The present dissertation work, in the main, seeks to study the impact of Wittgenstein’s logical and linguistic theories of what is called his early and later phases on his epistemological views. These views he put forward in his last works such as *On Certainty* and *Last Writings on Philosophy and Psychology* etc. This followed a pattern since his mentors in philosophy, particularly G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell had had similar course of philosophical development. As is well-known, philosophy in the first two decades of twentieth century Britain was dominated by the neo-Hegelian ideas that were out of tune with the scientific temper of times and these two philosophers represented a kind of revolt against their peers who practiced that older mode of philosophizing. Wittgenstein himself was informally associated with the positivistic ideas of Vienna circle in Austria/Germany but had had his philosophical grooming in British universities under the tutelage of Moore and Russell.

The *second chapter* ‘Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy’ advances an overview of analytic philosophy with special reference to Moore and Russell. Moore almost pioneered the method of linguistic analysis in resolving the old disputes on the reality or unreality of the physical world. The presence of the physical objects could be affirmed or denied not by indulging into metaphysical speculation. All that one has to do was to analyse the propositions about them and verify their subjects by the seeing, hearing, touching, feeling etc. It was through the act of analysis that the world of common-sense could be affirmed and the theory of idealism could be reputed.
Like Moore, Russell's sympathies were also with a realistic view of the world but he theorized his ideas through a procedure of logical analysis. His early interests were in the domain of mathematical philosophy that however led to his two famous theories namely, theory of types and theory of descriptions and finally to his theory of logical atomism that was also the starting print of Wittgenstein's own philosophizing in his first phase. In the case of Russell, however, the idea of 'descriptions' as complex propositions generated the idea of logical 'samples' that were to be designated as 'names' and were also to be perceived directly i.e. through 'knowledge by acquaintance' which was contrasted by 'knowledge by description' of complex entities and facts. Through years Russell ruminated over the questions of knowledge and reality formulating a number of theories. Both Moore and Russell popularized the terminology of sense-data and Wittgenstein, too, has had a lot to say on this following the line of his predecessors.

After presenting a historical sketch of the logical and linguistic approaches of Russell and Moore, especially as they generated some new epistemological reflections, an exposition of Wittgenstein's own philosophical theory presented in his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is attempted in the *third chapter* 'Picture Theory of Language'. It is seen that, unlike Russell and Moore, Wittgenstein's concern was not so much to develop a philosophy of Realism, or even to refute idealism or any other philosophical theory for that matter. His association with the philosophers of Vienna circle had inculcated in him the ambition to develop a scientific or positivistic view of the world.
Philosophy had to be subservient to science and not the other way round as has historically been the case. Scientific world-view was seen to be opposite of metaphysical views where some extra-material entities were seen to be more real than the entities of physical world. Metaphysics has thus to be done away with. While the logical positivist had, in their imagination, accomplished this object by having their famous ‘verification theory of meaning’ Wittgenstein arrived at his deconstructive conclusions through a further developing of Russell’s theory of logical atomism.

Propositions could be either analytic (tautological/contradictory) or synthetic. Analytic proposition were (universally) true or false on the basis of their very logical structure and did not need any reference to external facts for their verification or falsification. The synthetic statements, on the other hand, were true/false on the consideration of their reference to an external fact or a state-of-affairs. A true proposition was true when its subject and predicate terms corresponded to objects out there in external world and stated some relation as present between the objects. A proposition, in other words, had to be a faithful picture of a state-of-affair in the outside world in order to be called true. By applying rigorously this criterion of correspondence and picturisation, the metaphysical propositions were automatically eliminated from the domain of logically meaningful propositions. The terms line ‘God’ or ‘merciful’ did not correspond to any observable objects and hence a proposition like ‘God is merciful’ could not be called a meaningful proposition at all.
These views of his own, however, were contested by Wittgenstein in his second major work *Philosophical Investigations*. The *fourth chapter* of this thesis, 'Game Theory of Language' accordingly, is concerned with this phase of his philosophy. Mainly, Wittgenstein's emphasis here shifts from logic to language. It is the language, not so much the logic, that plays a crucial part in man's understanding of his world. Language, indeed could be said to have a life of its own. The solution of philosophical difficulties could be found through the understanding of the working of language i.e. a correct analysis of linguistic representations of the factualities of world. Most of our commerce with world as represented in our communicative devices and strategies does not follow the logical pattern. Linguistic devices are diverse and complex of which logical presentations are only a part. Language is a larger idea while the logic has only its restrive use.

What is needed then is to understand these diverse and complex uses of language. In other words, we have to understand how we play the game of language. Basically, Wittgenstein stressed, language is embedded in our life world and our playing the language-game is meaningful when the rules of the game are strictly followed. When the rules are breached, the language 'goes on a holiday'; it becomes dysfunctional. Most of the confusions and controversies in philosophy have arisen because the philosophers have not played the language-game in accordance with the correct rules. The muddles of metaphysics can also be avoided by identifying the breaking of rules of the philosophers who build metaphysical systems.
The fifth chapter titled ‘Wittgenstein’s Impact on Epistemology’ explores the implications of his theory of language or theory of knowledge. The issues pertaining to knowledge or justified true beliefs etc., can have their own complex logic. There can be various criteria of knowledge or various conditions of knowledge. There can be various theories of knowledge as well as various theories of truth. Philosophers can engage in numberless disagreements with regard to knowledge, truth and justification. They can negotiate various conditions of knowledge, truth and justification and even stipulate various conditions thereof. However, they cannot afford to be oblivious to the basic methodological distinctions or sophistications with regard to the logical terrain of language. They cannot afford to be ignorant with regard to the logical topography of language. For if they cannot command a clear view of the logical terrain of language, they can perennially get circumlocut ed in the labyrinthine tangles of language and may never be negotiating the orbit of propositional truth or untruth in view of their blissful ignorance of basic methodological distinctions within the multicomplex terrain of language. Being aware of the logic of language may not be the sufficient condition of knowledge but it is a necessary condition of knowledge. The philosopher must know how language is actually operating across the spectrum. He must be aware of the descriptive and non-descriptive operations carried out by a given language. He must grasp the multifunctional, multidirectional and multicontextual character of language.
Only then can a philosopher grasp that all that glitters at the propositional plane need not be golden at the epistemic plane. Language carries out an infinite number of operations. In this onward march of linguistic infinitum, there are propositions that are referentially true and contextually meaningful. However, the primary business of language is not to go on engaging in truth-operations or knowledge-operations. Language as such is not addressed to exploring truth or arriving at sure and certain knowledge. Scientific researchers can aspire to discovering correspondent truth or mathematicians and historians can aspire to exploring coherent truth and thereby expand the frontiers of knowledge. However, the fundamental mood or direction of any given language is pragmatic. We employ language with a view to doing something. We carry out myriad operations through language and in all such operations, words and sentences are perfectly meaningfully employed. We never question the doing character of language; the functional or operational mode of language. However, the questions pertaining to truth and knowledge, are, broadly speaking, irrelevant to the fundamentally doing character of language. As it happens, language is, primarily oriented to pragmatic operations or commercial transactions and only figuratively or metaphorically extrapolated to questions pertaining to truth and knowledge.

We have this irresistible quest for truth, for understanding, for realization. However, as Wittgenstein underlined, there is no pure or unalloyed truth, understanding or realization. Human understanding is co-extensive with language. There is no non-linguistic understanding. Our understanding can
have pictorial components. Besides early Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language or meaning even later Wittgenstein talked of our being trapped into mental or conceptual pictures. However, for later Wittgenstein, our understanding is primarily interpretative or hermeneutical and, more importantly, there is no translinguistic understanding which can yield absolutely clear truth or unqualified knowledge.

The sixth chapter attempts a ‘Critical Evaluation’ of some of the main concepts and theories of Wittgenstein. It is seen that the epistemological quest for objective knowledge, in view of the above considerations, is impossible of realization. A philosopher who is itching for a final, objective, transcendental, universal, and eternal metaphysical account of reality or final account of true knowledge is to be treated as suffering from conceptual illusions and linguistic confusions. He is to be treated as a patient and relieved of his confusions and misconceptions, through requisite and appropriate methodological field-illumination. Bringing out the multiple functions, purposes and uses of language is the most appropriate method of liberating the philosopher from his puzzlement. This conception of philosophy advanced by Wittgenstein can have its' own merits and demerits. However, we need to bring out the limitations of Wittgenstein’s approach as well.

Wittgenstein while bringing out the linguistic genesis of philosophical problems fails to appreciate their sociological or situational context. Philosophical problems do not originate merely from linguistic sources, they are sociologically or situationally inspired as well. The emergence and
development of human behavior of various dimensions and orientations is a function of various crises that we encounter in our societies. Wittgenstein also completely ignores the existential axiogenetic or value-genetic character of philosophy.
WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE
AND ITS IMPACT ON EPISTEMOLOGY

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
PHILOSOPHY

BY
Maizer Hussain Untoo

Under the Supervision of

Dr. Roshan Ara
(Associate Professor & Chairperson)
SUPERVISOR

Dr. Sanaullah Mir
(Associate Professor)
CO-SUPERVISOR

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA)

2013
DEDICATED TO

Mom, Dad

&

Manzoor, Nusrat, Majid & Ishfaq

Things of Beauty & Joy forever....
Certificate

This is to certify that the thesis titled "Wittgenstein's Theory of Language and its Impact on Epistemology" is an original piece of research carried out by Ms. Maiser Hussain Untoo (En. No. GC-2058) under our supervision and the same has not been published or submitted elsewhere for the award of any other degree.

Ms. Maiser Hussain has consulted all the relevant and appropriate research material with regard to the topic of her Ph.D. project. In our opinion, the present research work is of high quality and fit to be submitted for the award of the Degree of the Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Philosophy of the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

Dr. Roshan Ara
(Associate Professor & Chairperson)
Supervisor

Dr. Sanaullah Mir
(Associate Professor)
Co-Supervisor
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>i – ii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>iii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I</strong></td>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1 – 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II</strong></td>
<td><strong>A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY</strong></td>
<td>15 – 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III</strong></td>
<td><strong>PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td>50 – 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter IV</strong></td>
<td><strong>GAME THEORY OF LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td>79 – 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter V</strong></td>
<td><strong>WITTGENSTEIN'S IMPACT ON EPISTEMOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>126 – 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VI</strong></td>
<td><strong>CRITICAL EVALUATION</strong></td>
<td>179 – 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>194 – 211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

There is a time to think, a time to act and a time to thank. Now is the time for thanks giving;

    Dr. Roshan Ara (Supervisor), chairperson, Department of Philosophy, has been a source of encouragement and inspiration. Dr. Sanaullah Mir (co-supervisor) has been extremely helpful during the preparation of this thesis. Professor Jalal-ul Haq has always been a source of enlightenment and encouragement. Dr. Latif Hussain Kazmi has been both inspiring and encouraging. Mr. Muhammad Muquim has always encouraged and inspired me. Other teachers in the Department such as Mr. Zulfiquar Ahmad, Dr. Tariq Islam, Dr. Hayat Amir, Dr. Preeti Sayeed and Dr. Naushaba Anjum have also inspired and encouraged me. I am beholden to them all for their kindness and encouragement.

    Sara Begum, Azad and Kainat have stood by me through thick and thin. It is my pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to them all.

    Dr. Asma Kazmi, Mrs. Amina Hayat and Ummi Hani Zainab have been very kind and affectionate to me. It is a privilege to register my thanks to them all.

    My parents have always showered their blessings on me. Nusrat Di, Manzoor Jiju, Majid and Ishfaq, are extremely loving and kind. My uncles Mohd. Shafi Chan and Mr. Ghulam Mohd. Chan, have been very kind to me. My cousins Farooq, Zayad, Adil, Faizan, Farhan, Aqib, Basit and Adnan have been very loving and sweet to me. I express my gratitude to them all.

    Safiya has been a source of strength and joy. Swaleheen has given me sweet companionship during my years at Aligarh. I am my indebted to them both.
S. Bhat, Ajaz, Ishafq, Shahid, Nadeem, Saleem & Saleem, Jakir, Aslam, Ilyas, Zameer, Sarim, John, Irfan, Humaira, Sumaira, Shaista, Nidhi, Nisha, Salina, Nazima, Nasima, Saba, Asifa, Nusrat, Saiqa, Saima, Nida, Iram and Shumaila have been so sweet and lovely to me, I express my love to them all.

Ms. Farzana, Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan and Mr. Qazi of the Dean Office, Faculty of Arts, have been highly kind and co-operative. I am thankful to them all.

I also express my sincere thanks to former Seminar Librarian (Mukhtar Apa), Dr. Anwar Saleem, Nishat Apa, Mohsina Apa, Kafeel bhai, Arif bhai and Shakir bhai for their support and co-operation.

My deepest thanks to Mr. H.K. Sharma for neatly typing my thesis. Mr. Faizan deserves my thanks for beautifully binding this thesis.

Allah alone is besought for help and on Him alone we depend.

D-116, Begum Sultan Jahan Hall
A.M.U., Aligarh
January 07, 2014

(Maiser Hussain Untoo)
### ABBREVIATIONS

#### Books
- **BB** - The Blue and Brown Books
- **OC** - On Certainty
- **PI** - Philosophical Investigations
- **RFM** - Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
- **T** - Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus

#### Articles
- **A** - Analysis
- **BJPS** - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- **I** - Inquiry
- **JP** - Journal of Philosophy
- **M** - Mind
- **PAS** - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
- **PBA** - Proceedings of the British Academy
- **PPR** - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- **PQ** - Philosophical Quarterly
- **PR** - Philosophical Review
- **PSC** - Philosophy of Science
- **RM** - Review of Metaphysics
- **TLS** - Times Literary Supplement
Chapter I

Introduction
CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy has had a chequered career from being classically defined as ‘Love of Wisdom’ or ‘Mother of all Sciences’ to being deemed as a method of ‘clarification of Propositions’ in twentieth century. The Classical, Medieval and even Modern expectations from Philosophy were large and wide. It was deemed to be an exploration of universal and eternal truth transcending all cultures, languages, historical twists and turns and civilizational paradigms. Plato defined philosophy as an exploration of the eternal and immutable Beauty, Justice and Truth. For Descartes philosophy is the study of the perfect knowledge of all things that man can know; it seeks to provide a secure foundation for all knowledge. For Spinoza, the ultimate end of philosophy is nothing but appropriation of truth. Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel and many more expounded that philosophy aims at giving us a true account of things or of reality.

However, contemporary western philosophy has registered a radical paradigm-shift. The post-Kantian re-examinations of philosophy have fructified into various methodological approaches to philosophy. These approaches pushed substantial, ontological, cosmological, teleological, axiological and even epistemological questions to background and underlined the need for an exploration of the very nature, role and function of philosophy itself. Such a methodological approach to philosophy was triggered off by great strides in
scientific research and technological development. The outstanding results achieved in science focused the attention of philosophers to the circumlocutory character of philosophical discourse. Consequently, wide-ranging methodological studies of philosophical problems were carried out from various angles of interpretation or paradigms of understanding.

Thus, an existentialist approach to philosophy brought out that traditional philosophers have wrongly metabolized existential problems into speculative disagreements. While philosophy ought to have been engaged in illuminating of our individual existence or awakening of our innermost authentic responses, it was quagmired into perennially irresolvable abstract disagreements about truth, knowledge, meaning, value, reality etc. On the other hand, the sociological approach to philosophy also rejected the superscientific conception of philosophy. The sociological approach to philosophy does not treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned agent but a person functioning within his deep cultural and ethnocentric prejudices. According to this approach, a philosophical world-view cannot be susceptible to logico-mathematical demonstration or empirical verification; for our philosophical responses are deeply conditioned by our cultural presuppositions. Karl Marx went to the extent of deeming philosophy as an ideological tool in the political and economic conflict between capitalist haves and proletarian have-nots. The analytical approach to philosophy pioneered by Betrand Russell, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein underlined that an indepth investigation of the linguistic origin, genesis and development of philosophical formulations can be
greatly helpful in the resolution of philosophical problems. It deemed an analysis of philosophical language in a comparative methodological framework to be highly important in achieving clarity of ‘philosophical disagreement’. The foremost analytical philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, unambiguously promulgated the dissolutionistic conception of philosophy underlining that philosophical problems are impervious to resolution but can be dissolved through appropriate linguistic analysis.

The present thesis is an exploration of Wittgenstein’s theory of Language and its’ impact on epistemology. We shall be outlining Wittgenstein’s two paradigms of interpretation popularly known as early and later Wittgenstein with a view to figuring out Wittgenstein’s theory of language. It would be in the fitness of things to provide an outline of these two paradigms in this introductory account.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) originally hailing from Vienna, Austria and subsequently a professor of philosophy at Cambridge university, was the foremost analytic philosopher during the first-half of 20th century. He pioneered two methodological frameworks known as (1) logical atomism and (2) linguistic analysis. The earlier Wittgenstein following Bertrand Russell, gave a clear and categorical version of logical atomism in his book “Tractatus-Logico- Philosophicus”. His Picture Theory Of Propositions or of Language, is apparently a direct outcome of his atomistic analysis.
Propositions are logical pictures of the situations. They have the same structure. Language mirrors the logical form of the universe. The function of analysis is to resolve all complex propositions into their ultimate units of unanalysable names and their combinations, which represent and mean the ultimate units of unanalysable simples of the world. The task of analysis is to make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it describes. There is an essential correspondence between the structure of the sentence and structure of the fact. The world or reality is mirrored in the basic patterns of rational discourse. Given the syntax of a scientifically correct language, one can determine the ontological structure of objective reality. A perfect language would reveal the fundamental ontological structure of the world.

In the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein developed the clearest formulation of the Russelian notion that the world as it would be described by a perfectly lucid and logically immaculate language of science, is composed of elementary states which constitute the irreducible and simple elements of what there is. The world, he said is everything that is the case. But the world also divides into facts, any of which can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remains the same. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. An atomic fact is a combination of objects or the configuration of the objects. Any “object” which can enter into a “configuration” and which is not itself a configuration, must be an unanalysable and simple “entity”. The basis of any true sign must be statements which describes atomic facts, that is configuration of things that are themselves
Chapter I  Introduction

absolutely simple. Such statements, moreover, are themselves logical “pictures” of atomic facts, and from an analysis of their essential forms, one can gain, as it were, a logical photograph of the elementary atomic structure of the real world. In short, an analysis of the basic forms of a proper scientific language, automatically provides a kind of mirror of the fundamental structure of reality itself. Wittgenstein believed that all general scientific truths are nothing but logical compounds of true atomic propositions, that is, again, propositions which picture basic atomic facts.

Wittgenstein asks as to what makes it possible for a combination of words to represent a fact in the world? How is that by producing a sentence I can say something, can tell someone that so- and —so is the case. Wittgenstein’s explanation consists in the striking idea that a sentence is a picture .Apparently this thought first occurred to him during the first world-war, when he saw in a magazine an account of how a motorcar accident was represented in a law court by means of small models. So he said: “A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we think it to be”. The dolls and toy-cars could be manipulated so as to depict different ways in which the accident might have taken place. They could be used to construct different propositions about the accident —to put forward different accounts, different models of what took place. Similarly when we put a sentence together, we construct a model of reality.

Thus the central question of the Tractatus is how is language possible? How can one, by uttering a sequence of words, say something? And how can
another person understand him? Wittgenstein was struck by the fact that a man can understand sentences that he has never previously encountered. The solution that burst upon him was that a sentence that says something (a proposition) must be "a picture of reality". A proposition shows a situation in the world. His picture theory seemed to explain the connection between the signs on paper and a situation outside in the world. In their completely analyzed form, the propositions are arrangements of simple signs that are correlated with simple elements of reality so that the picture touches reality, so to say.

The following propositions from Tractatus can provide us a fair idea as to how language operates in relation to the world:

4.021- A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.

4.01(2)- A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.

4.04- In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents.

2.14- What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

2.15(1)- The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
2.13- In a picture objects have the elements of a picture corresponding to them.

2.131- In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.

One would not normally think that a sentence printed on a page is a picture. According to the Tractatus it really is a picture, in the ordinary sense, of what it represents. Wittgenstein conceived the proof of this to be that although words we have not previously encountered have to be explained to us, when we meet for the first time a sentence that is composed of familiar words, we understand the sentence without further explanation. "I understand a sentence without having had its sense explained to me" (4.021). This can appear to one as a remarkable fact. If it is a fact, the only possible explanation would be that a sentence shows its sense. It shows how things are if it is true (4.022). This is exactly what a picture does. A sentence composed of old words is able to communicate a new state of affairs by virtue of being a picture of it.

In any picture, according to the Tractatus, there has to be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the things in the state of affairs it represents. If one element of a picture stands for a man and another for a cow, then the relationship between the picture element might show that the man is milking the cow. A picture is a fact, namely the fact that picture elements are related to one another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that the things the picture elements stand for are related in the same way as are the picture elements.
Since a sentence is held to be a picture, there must be as many elements to be distinguished in it as in the state of affairs it portrays. The two must have the same logical or mathematical multiplicity. Again, this does not seem to be true of our ordinary sentences. For Wittgenstein this means not that it is not true but that our sentences possess a concealed complexity that can be exhibited by analysis.

According to the Tractatus a picture must have something in common with what it pictures. This common thing is the picture's "form of representation". There are different kinds of pictures, different pictorial notations, different methods of projection. But all pictures must have in common with reality the same logical form in order to be able to picture reality at all, either truly or falsely. This logical form, also called "the form of reality", is defined as the possibility that things in the world are related as are the elements of the picture (2.18, 2.151). Sentences, since they are pictures, have the same form as the reality they depict.

Wittgenstein pointed out in Tractatus that, from the point of view of logical atomism, propositions could be stated significantly only if they could correspond to an atomic fact or be truth-functions of propositions that did. The propositions of Tractatus too were not significant for they did not state facts. They, however, show us the insignificance or meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions and therefore are relevantly meaningless. They can be thrown away as the ladder, after one has climbed up on it. The right method in
philosophy would be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of science.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was aiming at the construction of a perfect model of language, a language which would be a kind of picture of the world. In this ideal language each word has a fixed meaning and there would be something common between the structure of each statement and the structure of each fact.

The Tractatus, Wittgenstein can be regarded as proposing an ultra-realist position. Propositions are laid against the world in order to determine their truth-value. They either picture facts, in which case they are true, or they do not, in which case they are false. The world is fully described by the totality of true propositions. As a consequence the limits of language are the limits of my world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' (1953), advanced a radical interpretation of language. He saw the nature of language in a different light. Wittgenstein came to realize the inadequacies of the theory of language upon which his earlier book *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* rested. It was inadequate because it assumed that language has really only one function, namely, to state facts. It further assumed that sentences for the most part derive their meanings from stating of facts. It assumed that the skeleton of all language is a logical one.
Chapter I  

Introduction

What struck Wittgenstein now was the somewhat obvious point that language has many functions besides simply “picturing” objects. Language always functions in a context and therefore has as many purposes as there are contexts. Words, he said, are like “tools in a tool-box; there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws- the functions of words is as diverse as the functions of these objects”. What made him think earlier that language had only one function? He had been held captive by a picture of language as being the giving of names to all things.

Language has multi-functional character. There are numberless or countless ways in which language can be used. It can be used metaphysically, ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, metaphorically, allegorically, parabolically, exhortatively, evocatively, prescriptively descriptively, informatively, invocatively, investigatively, affirmatively, negatively etc. joking, praying, co etc., are other uses of language. There is no common factor in all these uses of language and, in view of the same, a proper definition of language is almost impossible of formulation.

A language-game is a specific activity carried on with language. Different language-games highlight the different roles that linguistic expressions can play and the purposes for which they may be used. Just as there are a number of games and there is a set of rules for each game and there is no one common element in games, similarly there is no single core embedded in various language-games.
Wittgenstein's purpose is to undermine the assumption that words have just one role viz; to describe or to refer to. Different language-games serve to bring out the different roles that language can play and the different purposes it can serve. The need is to clarify the rules and make the games more understandable. Words derive their meanings from their use and each word has a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context. Therefore, the Wittgenstein's dictum "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for the use".

Later Wittgenstein came to realize that an account in terms of facts is not the only way to describe the world. He rejected his own logical atomism and became suspicious of ideal languages as useful tools in any significant programme of philosophisation. He felt that it is useless to pinpoint meanings, for no words which are philosophically interesting have a fixed meaning.

We are the victims, he said, of "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". Our incorrect picture of language is "produced by grammatical illusions". To analyse grammar might lead one to discover some logical structure in language. But that cannot justify the conclusion that all language has essentially the same rules, functions and meanings. It occurred to Wittgenstein that the assumption that all language states facts and contains a logical skeleton was derived not by observation but by "thought". It was assumed that all language, in spite of certain superficial differences, is alike, the way all games are alike. Wittgenstein uncovered the flaw in this analogy by taking the case of games and asking, what is common to them all? - Do not say:
there must be something common, or they would not be called "games"- but
look and see whether there is anything common at all. For if you look at them
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships,
and a whole series of them at that. To repeat "do not think, but look". He was
apparently saying that logical atomism was the product of thought, of theory,
and not of careful observation of the way in fact language operates and is used.
Wittgenstein therefore shifted the programme of analysis from a preoccupation
with logic and the construction of a "perfect" language to the study of the
ordinary usages of language. He moved away from what Russell and Carnap
were doing and turned now in the direction of G.E. Moore's earlier emphasis
upon the analysis of ordinary language. Wittgenstein was now of the opinion
that language does not contain one single pattern alone, that it is as variable as
life itself, indeed, he said that 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form
of life". For this reason, analysis should consist not in the definition of
language or its meanings but rather in a careful description of its uses: we must
do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place.

By recognizing the diversity of the functions of language, Wittgenstein
inevitably altered the task of philosophy. The function of philosophy was now
to liberate the philosopher from confusion, puzzlement and bewitchment. Its
role was now therapeutic. It had to battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language. Linguistic analysis had "to show the fly the
way out of the fly-bottle". The words had to be brought back from their
metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, philosophy will not be
Chapter I

Introduction

adding to our knowledge or providing us new information. It will leave everything as it is. It will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful description of language.

There is no single supreme method of doing philosophy or working out philosophical analysis, although according to Wittgenstein, there are various methods like various therapies, which can relieve us of our philosophical puzzlement. Because philosophical problems grow out of language, it is necessary to acquire a basic familiarity with the usages of language out of which each problem arises. As there are many sets of the rules of the games, similarly, there are many forms of ordinary language of work, play, worship, science, metaphysics, poetry, theology etc. Under these circumstances, the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders of the way language is used as a way of clarifying the origin, genesis and development of philosophical problems.

In his later work Wittgenstein denies any attempt to provide an overall metaphysical picture at all. We find ourselves caught in a language-game, a game that provides us with what we understand as the world. The overall metaphysical picture of the relationship between language and reality lies outside our grasp, for it lies outside language. As a consequence Wittgenstein abandoned any notion of truth as correspondence with or picturing of reality, and instead understood meaning and truth as an internal function of language. The meaning of a word or sentence was not to be found in some external reality but simply in terms of its use within language.
Previously, thoughts or ideas were deemed to be lurking somehow behind or within 'words'. It has come to seem progressively more inadequate and in need of replacement by a radically improved perspective. If the root idea of the older view is that thought and language are, in principle, wholly independent, correspondingly the basic insight of the newer position is that there can be no fully articulated thought without symbolic embodiment.

Language is no longer perceived to be a medium of exchange between ideas, but as the very "stuff" of which "ideas" are made. To separate thought from language is like separating mind from its embodiment in a human organism.

For later Wittgenstein, therefore, not only is there no objective reality, but there is no single meaning. Any sentence or proposition has as many meanings as there are contexts. Furthermore, anyone who desires to provide a final account is to be treated as if suffering from a philosophical disease. There are no answers in any ultimate sense, there are only responses within a language.

This radical shift of perspective tends to make the study of language nearly co-extensive with the study of all human behavior. More importantly, it can be assumed that such a conception of language, can be deeply impactful on our quest for truth, knowledge and objectivity. Such a conception of language makes our very quest for truth or knowledge to be lingocentric and lingogenetic.
Chapter II

A Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy
CHAPTER-II

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

The analytical approach to philosophy came into prominence in English speaking countries throughout twentieth century. Sometimes, analytic philosophy has been designated as a movement rather than a school of philosophy. However, analytic philosophy has certain distinguishing characteristics. What unifies all analytic philosophers is their agreement concerning the central task of philosophy; viz. clarification of the meaning of language. To analyze means to break something down into its constituent parts. Analytic philosophy attempts to clarify by the meaning of statement and concepts by recourse to analysis. The fully-fledged analytical approach to philosophy comes into prominence during twentieth century. It started with Bertrand Russell and G. Edward Moore.

As against analytical philosophy, the post-Kantian continental philosophers worked out hermeneutical, historical, phenomenological and existentialist approaches to philosophy to arrive at interpretations and conclusions that are in many ways radically different from those of the analytical approach. The analytical approach to philosophy was inspired by the confusions that were the outcome of metaphysical system-building. Moore and Russell were the leaders of analytical approach. Moore defended common sense beliefs against the metaphysical and epistemological adventures such as
"matter does not exist", "time is unreal" and "knowledge is impossible of attainment" etc. Russell through logical atomistic analysis, theory of descriptions and more powerfully through symbolic logic initiated the emergence and application of analytical strategies to philosophical statements and propositions. Thereafter logical positivists and linguistic analysts pursued philosophical analysis. They succeeded in dislodging the traditional conception of philosophy. They were committed to clarify the logic of philosophical language and thereby the sources of philosophical disagreement. The analytical approach to philosophy ostensibly means to analyze philosophical judgments, arguments, proofs, refutations, theories and systems. For a fuller understanding of the real nature of philosophical disagreement, the analytical approach advocates an in-depth investigation of the origin and development of philosophical theories. By concentrating on the nature, function and use of metaphysical judgments, analysts hope to reduce and in ideal situations eliminate philosophical disagreement. However it does not mean that analytic philosophers come with identical answers to philosophers issues. What distinguishes them as a group is their common concern to raise certain meta-questions regarding the nature of philosophical problems.

The awareness that philosophical disagreements cannot be resolved through methods of empirical verification and logico-mathematical deduction inevitably focused the attention of analytical philosophers on the logic of language. It was natural because the meta-physician apart from manipulating language for the formulation of doctrines obviously does not resort to any
rigorous methodological research. Of course, he does advance arguments and deduce the subsequent doctrines in his overall system from his premises but his very premises are neither empirically verifiable nor logico-mathematically demonstrable. Therefore, subsequent doctrines remain shaky sharing the basic methodological fallaciousness of their respective premises. Analytical philosophers conclude that there is something wrong at the very bottom of metaphysical systematizations. The metaphysician divests ordinary words of their conventional uses so as to adjust them in his extraordinary metaphysical theorization. Therefore, in order to understand the dynamics of philosophical disagreement it is necessary to study at a deeper level the logic of language, its diverse uses and functions and the consequent role it plays in the rise of philosophical paradoxes.

Disagreement is a perennially characterizing feature of philosophy. Philosophical disagreements have been irresolvable throughout the history of philosophy. This irresolvability of philosophical disagreements invited the attention of philosophers to take a fresh look at the logic and methodology of philosophical discourse. The ever-increasing standardization of natural sciences through the application of experimental method and maximum possible standardization in social scientific research by recourse to appropriate methods, also invited the attention of philosophers to re-examine the very project of philosophy. In view of the same, philosophers concentrated on bringing out the nature, origin, genesis and function of philosophy instead of being engaged in the proliferation of metaphysical doctrines.
The analytical approach constitutes a very powerful critique of classical or traditional philosophy carried out with a view to arriving at a philosophical truth that is certain, objective, universal and eternal. It is a drastic revision of the super scientific pretensions of traditional philosophy. The pioneers of philosophical analysis were G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. They designed a trend of doing philosophy which despite themselves evolved into a radical thesis about philosophy.

The analytical approach to philosophy tries to analyze the statements, arguments, theories and systems worked out by various philosophers. It stands for fuller understanding of the role of various uses of language in the genesis of philosophical theories. Philosophical analysts are convinced that there is something wrong at the very bottom of philosophical language. They allege that philosophers divest ordinary words of their conventional use and superimpose upon them extraordinary philosophical uses and meanings. Therefore, the entire logic of philosophical language needs to be probed and reconsidered.

Analytical philosophers stress that the language of philosophical theories needs to be clarified with a view to resolving the controversies going on in philosophy. The central contention of linguistic philosophers is that philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved either by reforming language or by understanding more about language we use. The underlying assumption is that linguistic factor play a crucial role in the formation and continuance of philosophical disputes. In view of the same, neither empirical
research nor logical deductions do help us in the resolution of philosophical problems. The only way to understand dynamics of philosophical disagreement is to carefully analyze the discourse employed by philosophers.

Philosophical analysis is not interested in defending or rejecting any philosophical system. Philosophical analysis tries to be neutral, treating all theories with equidistance. The job of philosophical analysis is to bring out the merits and demerits of various philosophical theories in the light of established methodological criteria. Philosophical analysts do not formulate substantive philosophical theories themselves. Rather they try to examine the meaning and function of statements which constitute various philosophical theories themselves. For example, a philosophical analyst will not formulate or expound such metaphysical statements as: “Real is rational”, “Ideas are beyond space and time”. A philosophical analyst tries to explore the uses or meanings of multiple philosophical utterances or terms. His concern is to find out the logical status of various philosophical claims and statements.

The statements advanced by philosophical analysts do not belong to the domain of philosophy. They are not philosophical statements but statements on or about philosophy. They are remarks on the nature of philosophical propositions or about philosophy itself. They constitute an analysis or evaluation of philosophical discourse. In a word, these statements are metaphilosophical rather than philosophical.

The philosophical analysts do not ask such questions as: “What is Reality?”, “What is Knowledge?”, “What is truth?”, “What is freedom?” etc.
Rather, they pose such fundamental methodological questions as “What is the nature of Philosophy?”, “which of the statements are cognitive or non-cognitive?”, “What is the nature of philosophical disagreement?” etc.

In response to such methodological questions twentieth century philosophical analysts broadly agreed that philosophical propositions are devoid of any descriptive content. No data can be collected in support of a philosophical thesis. A philosophical contention is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by any criterion or method. A philosophical disagreement continues even when contending parties do not expect any new information to be forthcoming with a view to clinching the disagreement. A philosophical dispute seems to be inherently undecidable. Philosophical problems are not open to proof or disproof.

G.E. Moore (1873-1958), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Logical Positivists or Vienna Circle philosophers in between two world wars, have played a leading role in the development of analytical approach to philosophy. A brief overview of their contribution to philosophical analysis would be in order.

George Edward Moore (1873-1958), one of the most prominent British analytic philosophers was educated at Durwich College and entered Trinity College, Cambridge, with a scholarship in 1892. Having passed negotiated an intense religious crisis at the age of eleven to thirteen he never thereafter saw any good reason to believe in the existence of God. Russell persuaded Moore to
turn his attention to philosophy. Russell said about him: “for some years he fulfilled my ideal of a genius”. In 1898 he was elected to a prize fellowship at Trinity which he held until 1904. In 1903 he published his first book ‘Principia Ethica’. He was editor of Mind from 1921 to 1947. Subsequently, he published two collections of articles called ‘Philosophical Studies’, and ‘Some Main problems of Philosophy’.

It was Russell who engaged Moore’s interest in philosophy and philosophical discussions, and then led him, at the end of his first year, to start reading philosophy. His concern with the subject was in a sense indirect. As Moore said “I did not think that the world or science would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problem. What have suggested philosophical problems to me are things which other philosophers have said about the world or sciences”. In discussions at Cambridge he heard propositions asserted to which he could attach no clear meaning; and he sought to have it explained what their meaning was. He heard things stress which he could see no sufficient reason to believe and he tried to find out on what grounds the assertions were made.

The most striking feature of his philosophical analysis was perhaps its simplicity and directness. His mind had always worked most naturally in concrete terms. If time is unreal, ought we not to deny that we had breakfast before we had lunch? If reality is spiritual, does it not follow that ‘chairs and tables’ are far more like us than we think them to be? For Moore philosophy was not an exercise in displaying one’s intellectual brilliance and subtlety at the
expense of common-sense beliefs and convictions. Philosophy was the honest pursuit of truth and consistency in both thought and action. (William & Hennery. 1962, p.522)

Moore felt that he, for his part, could not brush aside so lightly a number of basic common-sense beliefs and convictions, viz. ‘I have a body’, ‘was born a certain number of years ago’. ‘There are physical objects and other persons outside me’ etc. He could not help thinking that these beliefs were almost certainly true. If so, he could not legitimately assert philosophical statements that were incompatible with these basic beliefs. Moore in his famous paper “A defense of common sense” underlined that common-sense beliefs and convictions were not merely respectable enough to be defended by philosophers, but were almost certainly true, and thus, did not stand in any need of defense. This led to a transformation of the philosophical enterprises as hitherto practiced. (Muirhead, 1962, pp.193-95)

What did Moore mean by analysis? Moore never went explicitly into metaphilosophical or methodological questions. He preferred to practice analysis rather than propounded a theory of analysis. But what he actually did was to attempt a logical translation of the statement that was sought to be analyzed. The analysis or the ‘analysians’ must be clearer and simpler than the ‘analysandum’ or the expression sought to be analyzed. To analyze was, thus, to reduce a statement to an equivalent but simpler statement. It was one which was further irreducible and whose meaning could be grasped only ostensively. Thus ‘this is a hand’ was not simple since it could be reduced to statements
about sense data e.g. ‘I see such and such a patch of such and such colour’. Now Moore’s trouble was that no attempted analysis could satisfy strict conditions of simplicity and equivalence that he had prescribed to himself. Both perceptual and ethical statements could not be analyzed without reminder. Thus, Moore was never happy with, say, a phenomenalistic analysis of physical object statements. Nor was he happy with the naturalistic analysis of ethical statements. Moore was thus compelled to say that ‘good’ was an unanalysable simple property, just like yellow. He was likewise led to admit that no preferred analysis of physical object statements was satisfactory, since the exact relationship between sense data and the ‘physical object’ though simple, was also unanalysable, like the term ‘good’ was an unanalysable simple property, just like yellow.

How and why was Moore led to lay a special emphasis upon analysis? He himself confessed his inability to understand such statements as, ‘Time is unreal’, ‘Reality is spiritual’ etc. advanced by philosophers. It was not that he could not significantly or correctly employs such statements or that he was unfamiliar with the English language in which they were made. As a matter of fact, at one time he himself employed similar statements while arguing about the ultimate nature of reality etc. But he, later on, realized his understanding of such statements was very inadequate (William and Hennery, 1962, p. 574).

Moore’s good sense, simplicity, directness and argumentative rigour had a powerful impact on conventional mode of doing philosophy. For the rest it is believed there is divergency between his theories so far as he ever had one, and
his actual practice. In theory he seems never to have abandoned the idea that the goal of philosophical inquiry is to establish very general truths about the world, even perhaps, about reality as a whole. He believed no doubt that such truths, if any such were established, would not be contrary to common sense, for he did not conceive of philosophy quite differently from his meta-physical predecessors. His practice, however, consisting as it mostly did in the pursuit of analysis, naturally tended to give rise to the idea that the business of philosophy is clarification and not discovery; that its concern is with meaning, not with truth, that its subject matter is our thought or language, rather than facts etc. In its influence the practice was far more important than the theory.

The starting point of G.E. Moore's philosophical analysis was his sense of unease with certain philosophical propositions that violated common sense. Moore felt that such metaphysical generalizations as 'Matter does not exist', 'Time is unreal?' etc. violated our common-sense beliefs and convictions. He felt called upon to defend such common sense beliefs as 'All of us were born at certain points of time', and 'All of us do possess physical bodies', etc. Therefore, philosophical utterances about time being unreal or matter being non-existence seemed to him to be very strange. Even philosophers in their non-philosophical moments themselves could not believe what they professed in their philosophical moods. Moore could never doubt the truth of commonsense propositions. However, he was not clear as to their proper analysis.
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970):

Russell began his philosophical career as an idealist, but was persuaded by G.E. Moore to appropriate common-sense empiricism. He co-authored with Whitehead three volumes Principia Mathematica on the philosophy of mathematics, wherein like Frege, he attempts to show how mathematics could be derived from logic. His work in logic led him to examine language. One of the most crucial insights of Russell was that the grammar of ordinary language was misleading. He thought that the world was ultimately composed of atomic facts, and that proposition, if true, would correspond to these atomic facts. One of the tasks of philosophy was to analyze propositions to reveal their 'proper logical form'. Russell thought that terms such as 'The average man' could lead to confusion. In the sentence, 'The average woman has 2.6 children', the term 'average woman' should be understood as a logical construction. The term is not an atomic fact but a complex statement relating to the number of children to the number of women. Russell thought that the terms like 'the state' and 'public opinion' were also logical constructions and that philosophers were mistaken in treating these concepts as though they really existed.

Now, what Russell wants to be analyzed? Russell postulates that the world is composed of complex facts. In fact, the very concept of analysis presumes that there are complex and compound facts which are to be reduced to simple or what Russell calls atomic facts. The philosophical analysis should start with facts and not with objects or things. Things and objects are related to one another in multiple possible ways in the world and that they are
situationally related in complex ways are the facts about the world, although admittedly, on the other hand, the objects or things are the substance of the world. In order to get the actual picture as it is, we will have to resort to the analysis of facts which sum up what is obtaining in the world (Russell, 1960, pp.33-7).

A consideration of the analysis of facts naturally leads Russell to the analysis of propositions which in turn are composed of words. Now, there are vague, ambiguous and complex words like 'truth', 'philosophy', 'proposition' etc. which are reducible to multiple and varying interpretational and definitional possibilities. However there are also simple words like 'red' or 'yellow' which cannot be subjected to any further simple reductions in terms of analysis and which can only ostensively be defined or pointed out. We can only ostensively define the word 'red' i.e. only by acquaintance with this patch of colour can we understand what it signifies or symbolizes. So the word 'red' is a simple, unanalysable predicate or quality irreducible to any further analysis. Corresponding to such predicates as 'red' there must be, so Russell thought, other simple symbols the proper names which as a matter of fact must be qualified by such predicates. Therefore, an ultimately irreducible proposition will consist of a proper name and a simple predicate. Such types of propositions are called by Russell atomic propositions which correspondingly state atomic facts (Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1970, p. 97).

Now on the plane of language we have simple atomic propositions and on the level of what language talks about, the atoms are the simple atomic
facts, those expressible by atomic propositions. When we connect these atomic propositions by connectives like, 'and' or 'or', we get complex or molecular propositions which have no corresponding complex or molecular facts. While an atomic proposition corresponds to an atomic fact, there are no molecular facts corresponding to molecular propositions. The truth of an atomic proposition is determined by a corresponding atomic fact whereas the truth of a molecular proposition can only be indirectly confirmed by atomic propositions constituting a molecular proposition, to begin with. It is so because there are no molecular facts which could directly testify a given molecular proposition. So the fundamental thesis of logical atomism is that language must break down upon analysis, into ultimate elements that cannot be analyzed into any other propositions; and in so far as language mirrors or pictures reality the world must then be composed of facts that are ultimately simple. In this way, Russell thinks that the truth-functional character of ordinary discourse consisting of complex or molecular propositions will be made clear by analytic procedure and the truth claims embedded in it can be articulated or verified (Muirhead, 1962, pp.642-43).

Besides logical atomism, Russell also propounds what has been called logical constructionism. The examples of logical constructions are 'nation', 'state', 'society', 'chair', 'table' etc. They are not platonic forms housed somewhere in some supersensible realm or having some trans-empirical reference there, but logical constructions calculatedly programmed in the gestalt of language for purposes of efficiency, economy and generality. They
are so to say constructed out of simples or particulars for classificatory and cataloguing purposes and are reducible to them without any remainder. A nation, for example, is not something over and above its nationals which compose it. Philosophical confusion arises when we take a logical construction for an ordinary name and think that it completely symbolizes some objective entity. It happens, for example, when we say:

England is at war, and think that besides Englishman engaged in the administration of warfare “England in itself” is also somehow participating in the war activity, “..... since logical constructions and descriptions appear to be just like ordinary names, and are apt be viewed by us as complex symbols standing for some objective entity, they tempt the unwary to posit descriptive phases or logical constructions as real constituents of objective facts, or as parts of the furniture of Reality. Analysis enables us to avoid such reification (Khawaja, 1965, p.85).

Yet another seminal contribution of Russell to philosophical analyses is that ‘Paradigm of philosophy’ the famous theory of descriptions. The main contention of Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’ is to show that definite descriptions, such phrases as ‘the author of Waverly’, ‘the present King of France’, ‘the tallest building in New York’, etc. do not signify or name any object although when couched in sentences their grammatical form readily misleads us in the naïve belief that they are doing so. Russell tries to show that even when definite descriptions are referentially used they still do not function
as names. The fact that they meaningfully function in ordinary discourse or correspondence does not warrant us to conclude that there is any object which they name or stand for.

The basic assumption underlying such a Russellian account is that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Now if we maintain that all definite descriptions name objects or are their meanings, what are we to say about definite descriptions like the 'round square' or 'the golden mountain'? No objective entities correspond to these descriptions and still we cannot dub such expressions as meaningless. It is so because although such a description as 'the round square' does not signify, any object the sentence, "'the round square' does not exist" does not express a false proposition, Russell through his theory of descriptions tries to clarify this apparent anomaly.

According to Russell, the trouble starts when we assume that any description say 'the author of Waverly' functions as a proper name, that, it is interchangeable with 'Sir Walter Scott', the novelist. This very assumption leads us into confusion and bewilderment 'The author of Waverly,' Russell maintains, has no denotative reference, and therefore for purposes of philosophical clarification we have got to abandon this assumption (Ayer, 1982, p.24).

It becomes clear when we try to understand the internal logical structure of the proposition containing a definite description. Analysis shows that the description does not function as a proper name in a particular propositional
context. Upon analysis it rather disappears while we cash the real logical import of the proposition. To take Russell's own example, the statement, "the author of Waverly was Scott" breaks down into three conjunctive statements: (A) at least one person wrote Waverly, (b) at most one person wrote Waverly, and (c) whosoever wrote Waverly was Scott; and these statements extract the real logical cash-value from the misleading grammar of the original statement, while the descriptive phase "The author of Waverly" in the process vanishes into insignificance.

By eliminating the descriptive phrase, "the author of Waverly", the analysis shows while the analyzed proposition or analysandum "The author of Waverly was Scott" appears to be a simple subject/predicate proposition and names some actual entity which is qualified by the following predicate, which, as a matter of fact, is not the case at all (Ayer, 1982, pp. 25-7).

Russell developed certain techniques of analysis, which revolutionized our way of doing philosophy. He did not question the traditional definition of philosophy as being the pursuit of truth. The logical atomism developed by him is itself considered a metaphysical thesis. However, even then the every philosophy of logical atomism, eventually, developed into what may be called analytical approach to philosophy.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. To begin with, Ludwig Wittgenstein was educated at home, but because of the
emphasis which his father placed on the technical aspects of his education, he
was unable to satisfy the classical requirements for entrance into any of the
Viennese gymnasiums. Thus, in 1903 Wittgenstein was enrolled in the real
schedule in Linz, where he could continue to pursue a more practical rather
than a classical education. Wittgenstein completed his Matura in Linz in 1906
and then planned to study Physics under Ludwig Boltzmann in Vienna.
However, following Boltzmann’s suicide in 1906, Wittgenstein began instead
to study mechanical engineering at the technical academy in Berlin.

Wittgenstein left Berlin in 1908 and with the encouragement of his
father; he entered the college of technology in Manchester, where he initially
performed experiments in aeronautics with kites at Glossop in Derbyshire. His
interest then shifted to the development of aeroplane engines, and he designed
a reactor jet which was powered by the hot gases from a combination chamber.
He then began working at the laboratory of the engineering department to
develop a gas discharge nozzle for this engine, which in turn led him to work
on the design of a propeller. It was during this time that Wittgenstein became
involved in a weekly discussion group devoted to the “foundations of
Mathematics” and it was here that he first heard about Russell’s Principia
Mathematica which had been published in 1903.

The earlier Wittgenstein substantially followed Russell in his account of
logical atomism. The Wittgenstein’s version of logical atomistic approach in
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus is only more rigorous and exacting than that of
Russell’s. Wittgenstein at the very outset also starts with analysis of facts as
according to him facts about the objects or things, are the stuff, into which entire world can be reduced ultimately.

For Wittgenstein the most facts about the world are highly complex and can be deduced from less complex facts which in turn are deducible from still less complex facts and this process continues till we ultimately reach a point where the analyzed facts cannot be further analyzed. These irreducible and unanalyzed facts are what Wittgenstein calls atomic facts. In the final analysis, these are the ultimate building blocks which compose the multi-complex world-situation. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe complexes completely" (Wittgenstein T. 2.0201).

Again, following Russell, Wittgenstein is led to postulate what he calls elementary propositions, those that cannot be analyzed into any further more basic ones. It is these elementary propositions which express atomic facts. Atomic facts are photographically mirrored by elementary propositions; they have a structural correspondence with these basic propositions (Ayer, 1982, p.110).

For Wittgenstein too, all complex propositions are the truth functions of elementary propositions and structurally correspond to atomic facts. It is when the complex or molecular propositions are reduced to their elementary constituent propositions that we get to understand their truth claims. The elementary propositions express the states of affairs that go to compose
complex propositions as non-elementary propositions are nothing but elementary propositions combined.

It means that all complex propositions are truth-functions of their constituent parts. If we were furnished with all the elementary propositions and if we knew which of them were true and which false, we would know everything that is to be known as the truth value of any molecular proposition depends entirely on the truth value of its constituent parts, that is elementary propositions:

If all true elementary propositions are listed, the world is completely described. A complete description of the world is given by listing all elementary propositions and then listing which of them are true and which false. (T. 4.26)

The central contention of later Wittgenstein is that words of a natural language are multifunctional and are used in a variety of ways. The traditional philosophers did not pay requisite attention to the multifunctional characters of words. Words have descriptive, explanatory, exhortative, interpretative, allegorical, metaphorical, symbolic, prescriptive, legislative and numberless other uses. Philosophical problems are generated by confusing these diverse uses with one another. The confusion of multiple uses or functions of language is the main source of philosophical problems. Therefore, the clarification of the logic of language is the most important technique of resolving philosophical disagreements (Peersen, 1969, pp.75-9).
As a matter of fact, we play multiple language-games in our daily engagements. We give orders, report events, formulate hypotheses, make up stories, tell jokes, guess riddles, thank, curse, great, pray, etc. All these uses of language are perfectly legitimate. However, in most of traditional philosophical discourses, philosophers have confused different uses of various words. For example, most traditional philosophers have assimilated all declarative sentences to one paradigm use, namely, 'the descriptive one'. Thus, a traditional philosopher will hardly differentiate between such sentences as: "the table is brown" and "real is rational", although the first sentence is descriptive and the second is interpretative. The logic of various uses of language is seldom differentiated in traditional philosophy (Pitcher, 1964, p. 224).

Logical positivists emerged as a fully-fledged movement in the first half of twentieth century. Their work in between the two wars especially attracted a very great deal of attention. Their main thesis is immediately intelligible. Schilick, Carnap, Waismann were its' leading lights. Logical positivists were deeply inspired by Russell's work in logic and Wittgenstein's powerful formulation of the relation of Logic and Language in the *Tractatus*. They were also deeply impacted by Wittgenstein's insights that metaphysics was impossible in view of limitations of the logic of Language. To differentiate themselves from the earlier Comtean positivists and to emphasize that they would combine the rigorous techniques of Logic with empirical temper of Hume, they called themselves logical positivists or sometimes logical empiricists. The basic contention of logical positivists was presented with
hypnotic clarity and force in A.J. Ayer's brilliantly lucid and powerfully argued book. *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936). The book popularized the classic position of Vienna Circle. It called for a blanket rejection of metaphysics and the grounds for this rejection were to be found in the Vienna Circle's famous verification principle, viz; 'The meaning of a statement is the method of its' verification' (Ayer, 1982, pp.130-34).

So the basic attitudes of the so-called Vienna circle from which logical positivism originated, were two: on the one hand, an extreme respect for Science and Mathematics; and on the other hand, an extreme distaste for Metaphysics. Its main aim was to devise some clear criterion by the use of which Science and Mathematics would be proved acceptable and metaphysics by contrast, would be condemned to the realm of insignificance. The logical positivists were not, as philosophers, concerned with the truth or falsehood of scientific statements. Their proper concern, as philosophers, was held to be with meaning. Accordingly, the criterion they devised was to be a test of meaningfulness or significance, a test which the sciences would pass and metaphysics would not. This criterion became ultimate court of appeal for logical positivists and was known as the verification principle (Cooper, 1996, pp.451-54).

With their strong empirical orientation and scientific temper of mind logical positivists put forward an ultra radical version of philosophical analysis, an approach worked out in their respective ways by Moore, Russell and earlier Wittgenstein. They were especially inspired by the central message of
Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, viz. “Philosophy does not result in ‘Philosophical Propositions’ but rather in the clarification of propositions”. It neatly summarizes the logical positivistic programme, both negatively and positively; what philosophy is not and what it is. Negatively speaking, philosophy is not the sum-total of factual propositions or a descriptive super science and positively it is the clarification of language calculated to determine what and what not can be meaningfully communicated (Cooper, 1996, p.459).

Logical positives divided language into two broad categories; (1) cognitive statements and (ii) emotive statements. The statements that can be interpersonally, intersubjectively, objectively or transculturally understood are cognitive statements. On the other hand, the statements that can stir our sentiments, impulses, convictions, beliefs or emotions can be said to be emotive statements. Logical positivists subdivide cognitive statements into analytic a priori statements and synthetic a posteriori statements. Logical and mathematical propositions are analytic apriori statements for they are true by analysis or definition and need no corroboration by empirical or evidential data. Scientific statements are synthetic a posteriori for they are not true by definition and need to be verified in the light of appropriate evidential data or suitable and reliable experimentation. The statements of metaphysics, mysticism, theology and literature etc. are neither amenable to logico-mathematical demonstration nor to experimental verification. They are neither true by definition nor by verification. Such statements can also not be falsified or disproved. In view of the same, such statements are neither true nor false but meaningless and
nonsense. The fundamental methodological criterion of demarcation between meaningful and meaningless statements is the method of verification. Any statement amenable to a method of verification can be said to be a meaningful statement. A statement that is not susceptible to any method of verification is simply and clearly meaningless and nonsense.

Moore and Russell on Knowledge

As analytical philosophers, both Moore and Russell dabbled in analyzing the phenomena of knowledge but from relatively non-conventional perspectives. Before them they had the legacy of Berkeley's subjective idealism with esse est percipi as the capsule principle and also the Humean skepticism to which the Berkeleyan theory supposedly led. Both philosophers were not in empathy with any of these two models and desired to have a 'realistic' view of the world and its knowledge. American theorists of naïve and critical versions of realism were not yet under circulation and the only model left was that of Mill's phenomenalism in which the objects were reduced to 'permanent possibilities of sensations'.

In his 'Defense of commonsense', as already seen, Moore's concern was to attempt the analysis of propositions of such kind as "This is a hand" and "That is a sun" etc., assuming already that the 'hand' and the 'sun' existed as facts. But while naively believing the existence of physical objects he was yet aware of the fact that these objects in themselves were not exactly and directly the subjects of the proposition about them. The real subjects were rather the
sense-data which the propositions were concerned about and which could not be identical with objects themselves. He was also sure that the sense-data were not identical with the surface of the objects which the propositions were supposed to be concerned with.

Were then the sense-data 'caused' by the surface of objects as is ordinarily supposed. Moore is not sure about this. He would rather say that there is some mysterious unanalyzable kind of relationship existing between the object's surface and the sense-data. He is non-committed too about the Mill's theory according to which the things as such did not exist but were bundles of sensations that in their successive configurations produced the illusions of material things. The sense-data (alternatively called 'sense-content') were themselves presupposed to be actual and this actuality could itself be ensured by merely the presence of a white envelope or a dog or the sun or hand etc.

What one saw while a white envelope was presented before him was a 'white patch of colour, of a particular size and shape'. And this is what constituted the sense-data that was the subject of the proposition about the white envelope. But the colour, size and shape were rather the qualities of the objects and there was some confusion on the part of Moore whether he thought these to be sense-data. Especially, he most often uses the term sense datum as particular e.g. to a white patch of colour, it could not be the group of qualities themselves. Be that as it may, however, Moore also considers hearing of a sound, feeling of tooth-ache etc. also as sense-data. Now these latter are all
mental events but Moore would never bring 'mind' in his discussion for fear of becoming even a part idealist. The realism was to be maintained at any cost. Commenting and criticizing this idea, A.J. Ayer writes:

"The mere fact that an object is directly apprehended is a sufficient condition for it to be a sense-datum. Moore does not, however, say that it is a necessary condition, because he still does not wish to commit himself to the proposition that sense-data cannot exist unperceived. In saying that it is a sufficient condition, he forgets that he has also spoken of abstract entities, like propositions, as being directly apprehended. But perhaps he could have said that the sense in which abstract entities are directly apprehended is different from that in which sense-data are" (Ayer, 1971, p. 234).

According to Moore, when for example one sees his right hand, he is also seeking something else and that in all cases of perception one always 'picks out' a sense-datum from a 'visual field'. It is a natural view that thing is identical not with his whole right hand but with that part of the surface which he is actually seeing but will also be able to see in changed conditions. Some parts of the surface are within the focus while there are other parts which are not in focus. The sense-data is what is in focus and what is picked out from the larger field. But obviously, as Ayer said, what was outside the visual focus was not the object of perception and hence was excluded from the meaning of sense-data. The sense-data cannot be distinguished from the physical objects the way one physical object or one sense-datum can be distinguished from the other. Moore's own conclusion, however, is that "sense-data cannot be
perceived otherwise than directly, and that from the fact that a sense-datum is directly perceived, it follows logically that it exists” (Ibid., p. 236).

The terminology of sense-data was also used by Moore’s contemporary Russell more extensively and more systematically though only in an altered sense. Like Moore, Russell, too, was an analytical philosopher but his analysis was more in the domain of logic than language as such. This meant that he approached the epistemological issues rather directly instead of analyzing the proposition about the objects known. He was indeed involved in the discussion of epistemological problems as a result of the consideration of his logical atomism, particularly his theory of types and theory of descriptions. Logically, a ‘name’ is what refers to an object which is purely existent. Now, in strict logical sense is what is given in our direct experience i.e. the sense-data like redness, hardness, sweetness etc. The knowledge of these ‘simples’ is knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge of things which are inferred from these sense-data are knowledge by description as they are described by and analyzable into names which stand for sense-data.

It may be seen that according to these definitions most of our words which we take as names are not names at all. Words like ‘Scott’, ‘table’, ‘horse’ are not names as they are known to exist only through sense-data i.e. the qualities which they supposedly inhere. But before all this could be said, there was at first the rejection of ‘naïve realism’.

“We all start from “naïve-realism” i.e. the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is
cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false” (Russell, 1912, p.13).

Knowledge, in strict logical sense, is knowledge by acquaintance i.e. of sense-data. The datum occurring to me at present moment is all that I can be sure of knowing at the present. The descriptive knowledge of material things is inferred and therefore uncertain. When I say I see a table, what actually I know is a red patch of colour; my knowledge of the table to which I think the given datum belongs has grounds other than experiential. I think that table must exist whether or not I see it. When the table is covered by a cloth, we do not see the table. But as the cloth cannot rest miraculously in the air, we infer that there is a table which the cloth covers. Similarly, if I reduce for example the cat into the data that it gives to me, then our saying that the cat is hungry would mean that sense-data are hungry which is preposterous. Again, I cannot say that the cat becomes non-existent when I shut my eyes and comes again in existence when I reopen them. It is much more natural to say that the reason of my seeing and not seeing the cat is to be found in myself and not in the cat itself. Thus,
our "instinctive faith" in the persistence of material things to cause different appearances leads us to assert our knowledge of them.

In his first philosophical work *Problems of Philosophy* Russell admitted that knowledge of material things is based upon instinctive faith. But what about the mind whose contact with sense-data constituted a case of knowledge. Is it known directly i.e. by acquaintance or indirectly i.e. by description? Russell is hesitant to give any clear and categorical answer to it. On the one hand, it is clear that when I think introspectively of myself, what I come across are bits of thoughts and not the self disemboweled of its contents. This means that the bare self is known only indirectly. But, on the other hand, man is said to be privileged in being self-conscious as against the animals who are only conscious. An animal only sees the sun, but I know that I see the sun. This means that in a case of knowing the whole object of my knowledge is 'I (or self) acquainted-with-sun', that is to say, the self and datum both are objects of my acquaintance in a case of knowing.

The knowledge of bare selves or minds, whether direct or indirect must be admitted, as it is indispensable in explaining the perceptual knowledge. Russell, indeed, refuses to believe that the mind is known by acquaintance in his subsequent philosophy of phenomenalism. He however continued asserting it on the ground that it is a necessary term in the occurrence of relation called 'knowing'. Knowledge, according to him, is essentially a relational occurrence. It is when mind comes in relation to data that the knowing occurs. Both the subject and object are necessary and any attempt to reduce one into other is,
according to Russell, doomed to be a failure where the explanation of perceptual knowledge is required.

Idealists reduce the objects into subject saying that in every case of knowledge, it is our knowing of a thing that makes that thing known. Were the mind non-existent, the knowledge and for that reason known object also could not exist. But, for Russell, this was a fallacious reasoning. In a case of experience, the object experienced must be distinguished from the act of experiencing. The latter is mental, but the former need not necessarily be mental. We are conscious of data; or, in other words, data are what are given or presented to mind which means that they are independent of and external to mind. The knowing is a mental occurrence while the object known is something physical.

Russell also rejects the content theory upheld by American critical realists according to which the sense being dependent upon the mind are part of it. One stick looks straight and bent in two different conditions and it is argued that the dissimilarity must be in the appearances not in the stick itself. Thus, the appearances pertain to the mind and are parts of it. It is not the stick itself which has become bent when dipped into water, but our experiencing it has made it appear defectively. Russell, however, denies the argument by saying that the so-called defective appearances are in fact not defective. The stick, inasmuch as it is seen bent, it is bent. It is not at all wrong to say that visually the stick is bent. It would however, be wrong to say that tactually also it is bent. A ghost may also be real inasmuch as it is seen. Thus, the fact of a thing as
appearing in an unusual manner cannot make it unreal or a fancy of the mind. The appearance is quite real, objective and external to mind.

Besides idealism and content theory there is the Jamesean doctrine of neutral monism which stands for the reduction of mind and making the mere sense sufficient to explain knowledge. Both mind and material substance are inexperienced and therefore non-existent. Only sense-data are known and it is their inter-relation that constitutes knowing. But Russell rejects this doctrine also. James said that one sensum comes in contact with another sensum and the event called knowing occurs. From this it followed that if only one datum occurred in the biography of a person, he could not know anything. But this is incorrect. Russell says that logically it is perfectly possible that a mind exists for a fraction of a second, experiences a datum and ceases to exist. Moreover, when I experience a sensum, there is a sort of intimacy and immediacy between myself (I) and the object (‘this’). This immediacy cannot be explained by the non-relational theory of neutral monism. The argument is what Russell calls argument from emphatic particulars. Russell also says that even if you explain perceptual knowledge without invoking mind you cannot explain the ‘belief’, ‘remembering’, ‘knowledge of non-temporal object’ etc. which are purely mental occurrences. In all of these no external presentation is involved, yet we know that we know something. Positively, Russell says that the mere fact that mind is not directly known does not make it to be non-existent. That there is a mind is shown by the fact of privacy and subjectivity that characterize an experiencing-subject. When I experience something, what I experience is
strictly mine. The object I experience may be experienced simultaneously be other people. But my experiencing of the experienced object is my own and cannot be experienced by another person. Thus, though inexperienced, mind must be believed because in its terms alone we can explain the essentially relational character of perceptual knowledge.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World* which represents Russell's second stage in the development of his ideas concerning the problem of perception, Russell felt it necessary to assume the mind to render perceptual phenomena explicable. He however did not feel the same necessity in regard to material substance. The principle of Occam's razor made it desirable to reduce, if possible, the inferred entities into their functions. Russell, in this book formed a construction of what he called "sensibilia" and showed it doing all the functions that were done by substantial material things. Sensibilia included actual sense plus those hypothetical which were inferred from the former. This inference of hypothetical sense from actual ones admitted lesser risk as compared to the inference of substantial things from them. It was less hazardous to deduce from the sense-data the entities of same nature and status than to deduce from them the things of radically different nature. And this was the justification behind Russell's endeavor to replace the material thing by their sensible functions. The greatest advantage of it was that if it was believed there did not remain the gulf between the world of sense and the world of physics which is caused when we admit physical things on an apriori basis.
But phenomenalism is half neutral monism. The analysis of knowledge that leads to phenomenalism, when carried further, leads to neutral monism. We reject the material substance on its inexperienced and inferred character and we can do the same with regard to mental substance as well. The theory of neutral monism was, indeed, for many reasons, quite luring for Russell. For one thing, it involved minimum of assumptions and, being so, conformed fully to Russell’s formula of Occam’s razor. Moreover, it was in consonance with the results of some of the new theories in physics and psychology. Quanta physics and theory of relativity disembowelled matter of its ‘materiality’ and behaviouristic psychology eviscerated mind of its ‘mentality’. It was thought that a synthesis can be made between these two opposite trends by treating the ultimate stuff as metaphysically neutral. In Russell’s own philosophy, the sensibles were already doing the function of material things and if the mind could be dispensed with, they could also be shown to be the function of mind.

Russell wished he believed in neutral monism. But the above stated objections prevented him from doing so. He, however, made great efforts to overcome these objections and when he wrote Analysis of Mind, he was a full-fledged neutral monist. He abandoned the objection based upon emphatic particulars saying it to be too abstract and farfetched. The mental occurrences like beliefs, memory etc. were explained by saying that they are not mental in their essence. They are intrinsically alike with sensations which are physiological and neutral. Only they observe laws which are different from the laws observed by sensations and physical objects. Physical objects are governed by physical
laws and are studied by physics. Beliefs, memories and other such occurrences observe psychological laws and are studied by psychology. Sensations are neutral in being subject to both physical and psychological laws.

Perception, according to this theory, consisted in a sensation coming in relation to 'mnemic phenomena which it itself gives rise. When, for example, I experience a prick due to the pinching of some needle, the occurrence becomes associated with a similar occurrence occurred in my biography in the past. Photographic plates also experience the events inasmuch as they record them, but they are not said to 'perceive them, as there does not arise in their context the mnemic association characteristic to men. Experiences do not only give rise to maemic phenomena but are also influenced and modified by them. My present experience of the words which I see in the books would have been different if I had not already experienced them on many occasions in the past.

This definition of perception was non-relational in that it explained perception without bringing in the notion of mind. A sensation with its mnemic associates constituted perception. Russsell presented this theory in his *Analysis of Mind* which was published in 1921. But when again he came to write his *Analysis of Matter* (published in 1927) he abandoned this theory. Russell thought that this theory, although logically unassailable, was, however, against certain very strong assumptions of common sense and physics. In physics, for example, we believe in universal causal laws. We see on many occasions a certain event producing another event and postulate a law about the causal connection between the two events. On the basis of this law we infer the
presence of an unexperienced cause-event when the effect-event is experienced. It is clear that if in a case the effect-event is actual, its cause-event must also be actual whether or not experienced. But according to non-relational theory, a cause-event, when unexperienced, existed only hypothetically or 'ideally. This implied that even an ideally existing cause could produce an actual effect. This is clearly improbable; it is much more natural to say that an actual cause exists whether or not experienced, when the effect is experienced.
Chapter II  A Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


49
Chapter III

PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE
PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE

*Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* is a comprehensive work of exceptional originality. It is comprised of a series of remarks numbered in decimal notation. The following propositions of Tractatus may be cited as typically bringing out the basic philosophical vision as well as structure of the book.

1. The world is everything that is the case. (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 1961, T.1)

2. What is the case, the fact is the existence of states of affairs. (Ibid. T.2)

3. A logical picture of facts is a thought. (Ibid. T.3)

4. A thought is a sentence with a sense. (Ibid. T.4)

5. A sentence is a truth function of elementary sentences. (Ibid. T.50)

6. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof, one must be silent. (Ibid. T.7)

As already discussed in the introductory chapter, Wittgenstein developed his philosophical ideas under the influence of Russell and against the background of positivist ruminations of the scholars of Vienna Circle. They were apparently two divergent streams of thought located in two different places. Russell was an epistemologist and a metaphysician in a more or less traditional sense while the philosophers of Vienna circle were anti-metaphysicians having their background not so much in academic philosophy but other disciplines. The concern with logic and language was, however, what bound them together.
It was this consideration of logic and language that made Wittgenstein being in empathy with both Russell and the Vienna circle philosophy. Like Russell he came to the consideration of the nature of world and reality by the consideration of the logical structure of propositions and statements. Firstly, it was clear that the logical statements stated or pretended to state the facts of the world or the state-of-affairs. But since facts were almost universally complex or composite facts the propositions which pictured them were also complex and compound. To put it the other way round, since the propositions were almost universally complex the facts they described were also complex and composite.

It was therefore the question of analyzing both the complex propositions and compound facts in their simpler constituents such that the one may correspond to the other in a logical way. The question was however what kind of relationship existed in a proposition and the corresponding fact to bind them together and also to become mentally comprehensible. Frege who was also associated with of Vienna circle had said that every descriptive statement carried a ‘thought’ but this thought was not what happened in the mind of an individual but something that referred to a reality in objective world that can be equally thought of by several individuals. Wittgenstein, simplifying the matter, simply said that the propositions simply referred to external facts in order to make sense.

In other words, the ‘sense’ of a proposition was the fact which it referred to or represented. A true proposition represented an existing or actual fact or
state-of-affair. But what about a false proposition. The problem here was that if a true proposition represented a 'true' fact, a false proposition would represent a false fact. But a false fact was a contradiction in terms. Wittgenstein wriggles out from this difficulty by saying that the facts or situation may be either actual or possible or existent or non-existent. He also describes them to be 'positive facts' and 'negative facts'. Explaining it, he says that some combinations of objects may actually exist while some others may be non-existent. Our actual world then consists of positive facts which are composites of positive atomic facts. In the words of Pitcher:

The world, then, includes all the positive atomic facts, all the existing states of affairs in their state of existing; reality is wider, and includes all the positive and negative facts, all the existing and non-existing states of affairs in their respective states of existing and non-existing. If this interpretation is correct, then Wittgenstein has apparently given to non-actual states of affairs a shadowy kind of being; full existence is not attributed to them, of course, but rather some kind of subsistence in a strange realm of non-existence, of mere possibility... it would seem that states of affairs... can reside in either of two realms; either in the realm of existence, in which case they are positive atomic facts and parts of the world, or in the realm of non-existence, in which case they are parts not of the world, but merely reality in general (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 47-8)
As already seen, a fact is combination of objects and these objects must be actual to make facts. The facts, whether actual or possible, existent or non-existent, are always composed of objects which are actual in all cases. There may be possible facts but there cannot be possible objects. The facts therefore, even when possible, are composed out of actual objects. The actual objects in their right arrangement and combinations make the true actual fact while in their wrong configuration they make the non-existent facts. When, for example, we say that 'the cat is on the mat', it is an existing fact comprised of existing objects. But when we say the 'tree is on the bird' it is a false fact because the objects 'tree' and 'bird' are arranged falsely. But in both cases the objects, i.e. the cat and the mat or the bird and the tree are genuine objects.

It also follows that the false or non-existent objects do not make either a true fact or a false fact. The 'fairies' and the 'giants' are, for example, false objects and hence any fact comprising of two in their interrelationship (e.g. 'the giant kidnapped the fairy') will be neither actual nor possible fact. It will not be a fact at all. All talk of non-existent objects, then, including the suggestion that non-existent states of affairs might be non-actual arrangements of them, is necessarily nonsensical. So, all states of affairs, both existent and non-existent, are arrangements of existent objects only.

Wittgenstein even goes on to say that a proposition may represent a fact (that constitutes its 'sense') both in a positive and negative way. When, for example, we utter the proposition "the cat is on the mat" it will refer positively to its corresponding fact when the objects are in their proper arrangement. But
the same proposition will also represent, albeit negatively, the fact when the objects are supposed not to be arranged in the natural or normal way. Since, in other words, the mat and cat cannot be hanging together in air without some support, any proposition purporting to describe that kind of false situation will be a false proposition.

There are negative descriptions of states of affairs but no negative fact as such according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein thought it impossible to admit the existence of negative states of affairs. There are negative non-elementary propositions which describe negative non-atomic situations. For example, it is a negative fact that Indira Gandhi was the president of India or that Indira Gandhi was born in England. But the negativity of these propositions can be ascertained by reducing them to nothing by analyzing them into atomic propositions. A proposition must describe a positive state of affair and a negative proposition would describe a negative state of affair. This negative state of affairs will differ from the positive one for reasons of there being present an extra ‘not’. The negative state of affairs could be very like the positive one except that it would contain one more object. Similarly, two elementary propositions – one positive and the other negative – would be alike except that the negative one would contain one more name.

According to Wittgenstein, while ascertaining the ‘sense’ of a proposition what is required is to ultimately arrive at the elementary or atomic propositions. The sense of any proposition can thus be stated completely by means of elementary propositions and what connects those propositions. Thus
if we have a list of all possible elementary propositions and their connectives, we could say anything that is sayable by simply making selections from the list. Non-atomic propositions are comprised of atomic propositions. They are, in other words, molecular propositions which are structures of atomic or elementary propositions. As to the question in what way are the atomic propositions combined to make the molecular ones, Wittgenstein's answer was that the latter are the 'truth function' of the former. Pitcher explains this idea thus:

All propositions, Wittgenstein says, are truth functions of elementary propositions. Given all the elementary propositions, if I knew which were true and which false, I would know everything which there was to know, because the truth value of any other proposition is entirely determined by the truth-value of its component elementary propositions. Even under these favorable circumstances, to be sure, I may not know at once the truth-value of a given molecular proposition, for I may not realize right away which elementary propositions are its components, nor precisely how they are truth functionally connected. Nevertheless, the whole truth about the world is determined solely by the truth-values of the elementary propositions. (Pitcher, 1964, p. 58)

Several questions arise here. The most important among them is can the universal propositions be called the truth function i.e. the logical equivalent of
atomic propositions in which it is analyzed. For Russell who had first used the term ‘truth-function’ and from whom Wittgenstein borrowed it, had said that the universal propositions are not exactly reducible to the totality of analysans. But for Wittgenstein, the analysans together do make up for the sense of the analysandum propositions. In fact, it may be said that even ordinary complex propositions cannot be called the sum total of atomic propositions in which they have been analyzed. The whole is never the sum total of its parts. A watch not all the parts of which it is comprised and so any proposition about the watch cannot be the truth-function of all the statements about its various parts. Just as the watch is more than the sum of its parts, the proposition about watch is also something more than the total of its constituting propositions.

A proposition is comprised of ‘names’ but is not merely a concatenation of names. The ‘names’ are to the propositions what the ‘objects’ are to the facts. Just as the objects exist in a certain arrangement to make up a fact so do the ‘names’ occurring in a logical structure that make up for a proposition. A proposition becomes understandable i.e. is seen as carrying a sense when the ‘names’ are ordered logically. This logical order ensures that propositions begin to make sense even when the corresponding facts are not observed or even when they could not be practically observed. It is moreover the case that by putting the names into different logical orders that new situations become perceivable and conceivable. Every new arrangement of names indicates a new situation. Wittgenstein says that just by looking at a proposition it is possible to tell what situation it describes. A proposition may entirely be new i.e. not heard
before but if the names do refer to some observable objects; it will always be possible to pictured in the mind what fact has been described even though that fact has not been observed as such.

Early Wittgenstein pointed out that his whole task consisted in explaining the nature of sentences. He was deeply puzzled as to how a string of words can represent a fact in the world, can say something or can tell someone that so and so is the case.

In response to the above query, Wittgenstein came up with the striking idea that a sentence is a picture. G.H. Von Wright has brought out that this idea was suggested to Wittgenstein by representation of a motorcar accident in a court of law by means of small models (Pitcher, 1964, p. 77). Accordingly, Wittgenstein came to realize that a proposition is a picture of reality or a model of reality (Paul, 1967, pp. 330-31). The dolls and toy cars could have been arranged in numerous ways depicting the occurrence of the accident in other possible ways. The different arrangements of dolls and toys could be used to construct different propositions about the accident. We could thereby formulate different accounts with reference to different models of representation. Construction of a sentence entails construction of a model of reality. It depicts a state of affairs or a situation. Words can be arranged in different contexts or modelled in different sequences with a view to grasping an altogether new state of affairs. This, according to Wittgenstein, constitutes a strong proof that a sentence or proposition is a picture of a given state of affairs (Pitcher, 1964, p. 77).
According to early Wittgenstein, in any picture there has to be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the things in the state of affairs it represents (Ibid, 81). If one element of a picture stands for a man and another for dog, then the relationship between the two might show that the man is fondling the dog. In a pictorial fact, the picture elements are related in a definite way. A sentence as a picture portrays as many elements as are portrayed in a state of affairs. If ordinary sentences do not seem to be like that, for early Wittgenstein, this means that the sentences under consideration possess a concealed complexity. Such a complexity can be brought out or shown by recourse to analysis. In point of fact, a picture has something in common with what it depicts. There can be different pictures and even different methods of projection. However, every picture must have in common with reality, the same logical form. Only such a common feature can enable a sentence to picture a reality. Such a logical form may also be said to be the form of reality, which "indicates the possibility of things being related as the elements of a picture. As propositions are pictures, they must be having the same logical form as the reality they picturise.

According to Tractarian analysis, a sentence picturized a corresponding reality and it must have as many elements as are in a given state of affairs it depicts. The given sentence and the given state of affairs must have the same logical or mathematical multiplicity. For early Wittgenstein, the given sentences in any language embody a concealed complexity, the job of the analysis is to show or bring out that complexity. A picture has to have
something in common with what it depicts. Pictures can be of different kinds. There can be different pictorial notations. There can be various methods of projection. However, all pictures have to have the same logical form as qualifies the reality to be picturized. Only by this common logical form can sentences depict reality either truly or falsely. This logical form or the form of reality indicates that objects in the world are related in the same way as are the elements of a picture.

A picture can depict reality, but it cannot depict its own form of representation. It depicts (represents) its subject from “outside”, but it cannot get outside itself to depict its own form of representation. A picture of another form might depict the representational form of a picture in colour. But in order for the one to represent the form of the other, there must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all” (Tractatus: 2.161). Therefore, logical form, the form of reality, which all pictures must possess, cannot be depicted by any picture.

The sentences like pictures can depict reality but cannot depict their own form of representations. As it happens, there is a pattern or configuration in which things are related in the world. Various sentences in given contexts try to describe how things are related in a certain way. However, it is beyond us to bring out how sentences succeed in representing reality, truly or falsely. We cannot bring out the form of representation which makes them pictures of reality. It is beyond our linguistic capacity to say how language represents the world. We just cannot formulate the sentences that can describe pictorial form
of all sentences. However, we cannot say anything definitively about the combination of elements of a sentence. A sentence does show its meaning and we can grasp it. However, Early Wittgenstein, insists that the main problem of philosophy is to bring out the line of demarcation between what can be said in propositions and what cannot be said, but can only be shown (Paul, 1967, p. 330).

The picture theory of language advanced in the *Tractatus* also brings out an account of the nature of thought. Language and thought are intimately related to each other. Thinking is a kind of language. As thought is a logical picture of a sentence, we can say it is a kind of sentence. Whatever is conceivable or thinkable, we can make a picture of it (*Tractatus*, 3.001). A thought is the possibility of a state of affairs. The logical form of a thought depicts how things in the world are combined. One of the fundamental jobs of philosophy is to bring out the distinction between what is sayable and what is unsayable. What cannot be said can be indicated only by clearly spelling out what can be said? The realm of unthinkable cannot be ruled out although we cannot say anything about it. However, that does not constitute a wholesale rejection of metaphysics as such. Early Wittgenstein only rejects the possibility of the conditions providing sense or meaning to metaphysical propositions. The impossibility of stating metaphysics does not constitute the rejection of the very realm of metaphysics.

One of the most important and fundamental assumptions of Early Wittgenstein is that language is comprised of propositions that can be reduced
to elementary propositions or atomic propositions that are simple and unanalyzable. They are deemed by early Wittgenstein to be absolutely basic propositions of which no further analysis is possible. These elementary propositions consist of names only (Tractatus: 4.22). However, Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘name’ is somewhat technical. A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a decoration, it is a primitive sign (Tractatus: 3.26). A name should be definable only ostensively. A name for Wittgenstein means only an object (Tractatus: 3.203). An elementary proposition is one that consists entirely of terms that denote simples. When genuine names are combined we get an elementary proposition. The analysis of propositions does bring us elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination (Tractatus: 4.221). An elementary proposition shows a certain configuration of simple objects. Wittgenstein held that all propositions whether elementary or non-elementary are pictures of reality.

All genuine propositions are analyzable into elementary propositions. Every genuine proposition has one and only one complete analysis into elementary propositions. A fact may consist of infinity in many state of affairs may be compared of infinity many simpler objects. However, the completely analyzed proposition will consist of simple names. The meaning of each simple name will be a simple object. How we combine the names will show that the simple objects in the world are related in the same way. We must be able to know what objects they stand for. If we understand the constituents of a
proposition we can thereby understand the entire proposition under consideration.

There are scholars who argue that the idea of the elementary propositions is an arbitrary assumption. Whether it is arbitrary or not requires a detailed elaboration. Wittgenstein was trying to solve the question of how language and thought can be related to reality. The basic intuition of early Wittgenstein was that language pictures reality. Accordingly, among the sentences of a language there must be some that show their sense immediately. If this basic intuition of Wittgenstein is correct then there must be elementary propositions showing their sense immediately. It furthermore entails that complex non-elementary propositions without this feature, possibly no sentence could not say anything nor could it be understood.

One of the fundamental insights of Tractatus was that the truth of logical statements is based on their logical structure. Logical statements are conclusions that are true under all circumstances. Their truth is independent of contingent facts of the world. Logical statements have no factual content and do not describe the world as such. The entire body of genuine propositions breaks down into (a) propositions of logic or analytic apriori propositions and (b) contingently true or false propositions about the world. The propositions of logic and pure mathematics are apriori but not synthetic.

The Tractatus was amenable to several interpretations. Logical positivists pointed out that Tractatus had categorically shown metaphysical
prepositions to be cognitively insignificant. It had shown that everything that can be expressed is knowable. Whatever can be meaningfully talked about is within the purview of our knowledge. In principle, all real questions are answerable; there are no insoluble problems (Schillick, p. 156). The Tractatus did establish the logical incoherence of all metaphysical propositions. It demonstrated that the so-called metaphysical propositions about an ineffable reality are unintelligible. Propositions are either contingently meaningful true or false expressions are meaningless compound propositions, which are true or false in all conceivable situations.

Western philosophers since Thales to Hegel raised metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, axiological, teleological and epistemological questions. They raised questions about ultimate Reality, nature of Being, origin and destiny of the cosmos, status of man in the universe, values, highest good, truth, beauty, justice, ideal state, society and economy etc. Their responses to these questions emerged and crystallized, in course of time, as philosophical theories. Philosophers such as Hume (1711-1776) and Kant (1724-1804) questioned the very possibility and validity of the traditional mode of doing philosophy. The methodological questions raised by them amplified and culminated into various critical approaches to philosophy in nineteenth century Europe. It was in the first half of twentieth century that analytical approach to philosophy emerged in Britain in contradistinction to Continental appraisals of nineteenth century.
The analytical approach to philosophy emerged as a powerful perspective on philosophy in early twentieth century. An exploration and explication of the semantic status of philosophical statements became the guiding or motivating force of the analytical approach to philosophy. Or, we can say that meaning of philosophical statements became the central concern of analytical approach to philosophy. Firstly, it tried to understand philosophical statements with reference to phenomena or objects comprising the external world. Bertrand Russell, an outstanding twentieth century British philosopher, was the first to offer the logical atomistic analysis by way of bringing out the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of philosophical discourse. Subsequently, Logical Atomism was sharpened and sophisticated by early Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Bertrand Russell brought out that things or objects comprising the external world are related to one another in multiple possible ways. The complex ways in which they are related to one another constitute the facts about the world. With a view to appropriating the actual picture about the world we will have to carry out analysis of facts. Our attempt at analysis of facts leads to an analysis of propositions embodying the facts of the world. The propositions in their turn are composed of words. Now, words comprising any given developed language are of various logical and grammatical categories. There are abstract nouns and adjectives like 'Truth', 'Justice', 'Beauty', 'Goodness', 'Spiritual', 'Political', 'philosophical', 'literary' etc., which can be subjected to multiple possible interpretations. However there are certain simple
words like 'stone', 'book', 'pen', 'toy', 'red', 'yellow', 'green', 'blue' etc. which are not amenable to analysis or to any further simpler reductions. Or, we can point them out only ostensively. For example, we can define the word 'red', only ostensively.

We can understand word 'red' only by acquaintance. No definition or description of 'red' can intimate to us its meaning. Such words as 'red' are simple, unanalysable predictates or qualities. No further analysis of such words is possible. They are irreducible, simple and ultimate. Besides such simple or ultimate words as 'red' or 'blue', Russell regarded proper names to be simple as well. They too cannot be subjected to further analysis of any kind whatsoever. In view of the same, an ultimately irreducible proposition will comprise of a proper name and a simple predicate. Russell designates such propositions as atomic propositions. These atomic propositions, correspondingly, are statements of atomic facts (Russell, 1960, pp. 33-7).

The language attempting to describe the world is comprised of atomic propositions. The world as it is, is comprised of atomic facts. These atomic facts are expressible by atomic propositions. The compound and complex propositions of any given language are amenable to analysis and therefore reducible to elementary, simple or atomic propositions. However, the world is not comprised of compound or complex facts. So, while atomic facts correspond to atomic propositions, there are no complexes or molecular facts to correspond to complex or molecular propositions. The complex or molecular
propositions are the truth-functions of atomic propositions for they have no corresponding complex or molecular facts.

The basic assumption inspiring logical atomistic analysis is that complex or compound language is amenable to reduction into ultimate elements. These ultimate or simplest possible elementary propositions must, by definition, be impervious to further analysis. As these simplest possible or most elementary propositions mirror or picture reality, the world must be composed of facts that are ultimately simple (Russell, 1960, pp. 40-3).

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was by training an engineer and deeply oriented to philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical logic. Originally hailing from Vienna, he subsequently became a professor of philosophy at Cambridge University. His interactions and conversations with Russell instilled in him a deep and abiding interest in philosophical analysis. His early book ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ is a categorical and sharpened version of Russell’s Logical Atomism. Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is the culmination of the atomistic analysis pioneered by Russell (Encyclopaedia, 1993, pp. 604-5), although Wittgenstein subsequently outgrew his earlier atomistic approach and emerged as the foremost linguistic analyst during the mid twentieth century. Whereas early Wittgenstein sought to establish the meaning of propositions with reference to the world which served as referential totality to any given language, later Wittgenstein strove to explore the meaning of propositions in the context of human culture, conventions, traditions and forms of life.
According to early Wittgenstein, propositions are logical pictures of the situations. The structure of the propositions reflects the structure of situations (Ibid, p 604). The logical form of the universe is mirrored or pictured by the language (Peursen, 1969, p. 17). Accordingly, philosophical analysis addresses itself to the task of resolving all complex prepositions into elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are further reduced into their ultimate units of unanalysable names and their combinations. They represent and mean the ultimate simples of the world. The function of analysis is to make every proposition an adequate picture of the reality it describes. The structure of the sentence and structure of the fact essentially correspond to each other. The basic patterns of rational discourse picturese or mirror the world or reality. The ontological structure of the objective reality can be determined by recourse to the appropriation or availability of the syntax of a scientifically correct language. The fundamental ontological structure of the world would be revealed by a perfect language (Pitcher, pp. 68-70).

The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus of early Wittgenstein outlined the thesis that the world is composed of simple facts to which correspond logical atoms comprising a given compound or complex language. A full-fledged correct description of the world can be executed in a perfectly lucid language of science. The world is everything that is the case. But the world also divides into facts any of which can either be the case or not be the case and everything else remains the same. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. An atomic fact is a combination of objects or the configuration of
objects. Any ‘object’ which can enter into ‘configuration’ and which is not itself a configuration, must be an unanalysable and simple ‘entity’. Any true science has to be based on statements describing atomic facts or absolutely simple configurations of things. Such statements are logical pictures of atomic facts. We can attain a logical photograph, so to say, of the elementary atomic structure of the real world from an analysis of the essential forms of a proper scientific language which provides a kind of mirror to the fundamental structure of reality. All scientific truths are nothing but logical compounds of true atomic propositions. These atomic propositions are pictures of atomic facts. (Ibid, p.72)

The idea that a sentence is a picture of a given situation or fact occurred to Wittgenstein during the first world-war when he saw in a magazine an account of how a motorcar accident was presented in a law court by means of small models. From this presentation Wittgenstein concluded that a proposition must be a picture of reality. Just as toy-cars could be manipulated to depict different ways in which accident might have taken place, so while putting a sentence together we construct a model of reality. A sentence that says something is a picture of reality. A proposition shows its sense; it shows a situation in the world. The elementary propositions are arrangements of simple signs that are correlated with simple elements of reality. In ideal cases the propositional pictures, so to say, touch atomic components of reality.
Wittgenstein’s basic idea as to how language operates in relation to the world may be illustrated with reference to the following quotations from the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*:

2.13 In a picture objects here the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

2.131 In a picture elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.

2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its’ elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

4.01(2) A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.

4.04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents.

2.15(1) The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.

Normally or ordinarily we would not deem a sentence to be a picture. However, for early Wittgenstein it is a picture for it represents a situation or state of affairs. We do understand a sentence without having its sense explained to us. The only possible explanation for this remarkable fact is that a sentence
show its' sense. Like a picture, it shows how things or states of affairs are out there. The fact that we can use familiar words with a view to communicating a new state of affairs or an altogether unfamiliar situation shows that words can be so combined and permuted as to show or picturise any new fact obtaining out there.

A picture represents a state of affairs. According to Tractatus there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the elements of a state of affairs it represents. For example, in a given picture depicting man and cow, there are two picture elements, namely, man-element and cow-element. A picture of man and cow might show man milking the cow. A picture is a fact, namely the fact that the picture elements are related to one another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that the things the picture elements stand for are related in the same way as are the picture elements (Ibid., pp. 82-85).

A sentence is a picture. Accordingly, the elements of the sentence must correspond to elements of the situation portrayed by the sentence. The sentence and the situation it depicts must be on the same logical and mathematical level of density and multiplicity. For early Wittgenstein such a correspondence cannot be negotiated directly or observed clearly. The correspondence between a sentence and a situation or state of affairs is concealed or hidden. It is by way of analysis that we can explicitly and categorically bring out this concealed or hidden correspondence between a given sentences depicting a specific state of affairs. In simple terms the picture
must have something in common with what it pictures. The common thing between a picture and what it pictures is the form of representation of the picture itself. There can be different kinds of pictures. We can have different pictorial notations. We can have different methods of projection. However, the reality as it is and all kinds of pictures have to have the same logical form. Only such a common logical form can ensure the very process or phenomenon of picturisation of reality by various possible propositions. Only such a common logical form can make possible the picturisation of reality, either truly or falsely. This ‘logical form’ means the possibility that the things in the world are related as are the elements of picture. Sentences as pictures have the same form as the reality they depict (Tractatus: 2.18).

Early Wittgenstein, following Bertrand Russell’s lead in logical atomistic analysis, maintained that significant or meaningful propositions could either be picturising atomic facts or be truth-functions of propositions carrying out such depictions. In the light of this principle, Wittgenstein is candid enough to admit that propositions embodying *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* are also devoid of significance for they do not picturise any atomic facts nor are they truth-functions of atomic propositions. However, in view of the fact that propositions incorporated into *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* bring out the insignificance or meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions, they can be deemed to be relevantly meaningless. They function as a ladder. One can throw away the ladder after one has climbed up on it. Only propositions of science are cognitively significant or meaningful. Philosophy ought to orientate us to
adequate methodological sophistication with a view to saying only what can significantly be said i.e. the propositions of science (Baker and Hacker, 1980, pp. 451-57).

In the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein was aiming at the construction of a perfect model of language such a language, Wittgenstein thought, would be a kind of picture of the world. All words would have fixed meaning in such an ideal language. In such an ideal language, the structure of each statement and the structure of each fact would share a common logical form. All propositions of such an ideal language will have to be laid against the world with a view to determining their truth-value. If the propositions picture facts they are true, if not, they are false. If we can assemble all the true propositions, it will constitute a total or complete description of the world. In view of the same, the limits of the language are the limits of the world (Tractatus: 5.6).

The upshot of early Wittgensteinian logical atomistic thesis is that an analysis of the meaning of any complex or compound proposition would lead us to nothing but elementary propositions. Only elementary or atomic propositions can completely state the sense or meaning of any compound or complex proposition. If we had a list of all possible elementary propositions, we could say anything that can be said or that is sayable. The complex or non-elementary propositions are just combinations of elementary propositions. They may be said to be molecular propositions. The molecular propositions are truth-functional accounts of nuclear propositions. If we could know all true and
false elementary propositions, we would know all that can be known for the
truth-value of any proposition depends entirely on the combined truth-value of
respective nuclear propositions. The true elementary propositions determine the
whole truth of the world. The true elementary propositions bring out the
complete truth about the world. (Ibid, 563-69)

All genuine propositions are molecules. These molecules are
constructed out of logical atoms or elementary propositions. The given
situations comprising the world confronting us too are molecules. However,
these molecules are constructed out of atoms or states of affairs. The
elementary or nuclear propositions are ultimately irreducible, unanalysable or
absolutely simple.

The names refer to objects and the propositions refer to facts. A
proposition becomes true when it represents an actual observed fact but if the
arrangements of objects being represented by the proposition are not correct
than the proposition becomes false. There may however be propositions which
are true in all circumstances and there may also be propositions which will not
be true in any circumstances or false in all conceivable circumstances. The
former kind of propositions is called by Wittgenstein as ‘tautologies’ and the
latter he calls ‘contradictions’. In the older scholastic logic the tautologies were
called necessary propositions but were not characterized as devoid of sense.
But Wittgenstein says that by their very nature these necessary or tautological
statements are independent of facts which they otherwise seem to refer to. That
the proposition “all black crows are black’ or that “all triangles have three
angles" are not only true necessarily and universally but are also not dependent on the objects and facts corresponding to the names occurring in those propositions. The same can be said about the contradictions. Their impossibility can be ascertained not by referring to them to some facts but just by looking at their structures. The proposition "the triangle has four angles" is necessarily false not because it refers to a negative fact but because a contradiction is involved in the subject name and predicate name occurring in that proposition.

On the basis of above analysis, Wittgenstein makes the interesting suggestion that all logical propositions are tautologies. We can know the truth of logical propositions with certainty being fully assured that they can never be reputed. These logical propositions are true simply by virtue of the definitions of their basic constituents. A triangle cannot be defined otherwise than by saying that it has three angles. And so, when it is said that triangles have three angles they cannot but be true logically and universally. Similar, when the converse is uttered i.e. when the triangles are said to have four angles. They cannot but be necessarily false:

There is no need whatever to postulate a special realm of timeless logical objects which reason can somehow miraculously perceive; what we need is much less exalted than that ..." (Pitcher, 1964, p. 109).

Wittgenstein concludes that the logical propositions as tautologies say nothing even though cannot be said to be entirely non-sensical. They are not non-
sensical when compared to a grammatically absurd sentence "table chair is sky made of". But they are empty of meaning in the sense that they do not refer to any objects, nor even that belonging to Platonic world of ideas. We have knowledge of them precisely because of their inherent emptiness. A tautology is empty and says nothing, simply because it is true under all conditions, no matter what kind of facts is out there.

Against the tautologies and contradictions are the 'descriptive' propositions which describe some definite situation. The truth of these descriptive propositions depends upon the existence of some observable fact. These propositions are, moreover, neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. They are, in fact, possibly true or false i.e. they may be true, and may be false. They describe situations which may exist or may not exist. We cannot tell apriori whether they are true or false.

To sum up, Tractarian atomistic analysis carried out by early Wittgenstein posits three types of significant propositions; tautologous, contradictory and descriptive. Logically speaking, the tautologous propositions such as "All triangles have three angles" are true under all circumstances; contradictory propositions such as "The teacher drew a square circle on the blackboard" are false under all circumstances; only descriptive propositions such as "Rose is red", "Diamond is the hardest metal" or "Oxygen helps in the burning of fire" etc. can be true and falsifiable or false and verifiable. The tautologous and contradictory propositions express only relations of ideas or they are true and false by implication. The entire intelligible discourse is
comprised of descriptive propositions which can be either true or false. The limits of language impose corresponding limits on the describable reality. There is no reality that is mysteriously beyond the limits of language. The limits of language and of reality are co-existent and correlative. What is sayable is accommodated in the propositions of natural sciences. Philosophical propositions do not belong to any natural science as such. Philosophical or metaphysical propositions are devoid of any sense or meaning. They are meaningless or nonsensical propositions. Philosophical analysis or methodology should make us understand that the so-called metaphysical propositions or typical traditional first-order propositions advanced by philosophers of varying hues and colours signify nothing cognitively and we must remain in the realm of sayable and advance only propositions of science or basic observable propositions. Metaphysical propositions, philosophical analysis reveals, are not false but devoid of sense. Most philosophical propositions and questions arise out of our logical and grammatical confusions. It is not the job of philosophy to discover new facts. Philosophy is not a body of true propositions; the job of philosophy is rather clarification of various types of propositions. (Pitcher, 1964, p. 109).

Early Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* is the most radical restatement of Bertrand Russell’s’ logical atomistic analysis. The foundational thesis of early Wittgenstein as outlined in Tractatus is that language is ultimately comprised of atomic statements and the world is ultimately reducible to atomic facts. The atomic statements are logical pictures
of atomic facts. These atomic statements can reveal a logical photograph of the structure of the real world. An analysis of the basic forms of scientific language can provide a kind of mirror to the fundamental structure of reality itself (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 172-75). In view of this basic thesis, early Wittgenstein declares metaphysical statements to be meaningless and nonsense. Meaning is a function of correspondence between atomic statements and atomic facts. Since there are no atomic metaphysical facts to which can correspond atomic metaphysical statements, the entire metaphysical discourse is devoid of sense. So are religious, theological, mystical and even ethical statements. They try to say what cannot be said.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Chapter IV

GAME THEORY OF LANGUAGE
CHAPTER-IV

GAME THEORY OF LANGUAGE

With the appearance of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953), a radical framework of interpretation of language was made available to philosophical analysts. Analysts saw the nature of language in a different light. Wittgenstein came to realize the inadequacies of the theory of language upon which his earlier book *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* rested. It was inadequate because it assumed that language has really only one function, namely, to state facts. It further assumed that sentences for the most part derive their meanings from stating facts. It also assumed that the skeleton of all language is logical one (Cooper, 1996, pp. 446-47).

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy emanates from his new perspective on philosophy. There is something fundamentally wrong with the philosopher and the problems of Philosophy. The philosopher is puzzled, perplexed and baffled; philosophical problems are puzzling perplexing and baffling. Philosophical problems are rooted into puzzlement. Philosophers cannot avoid puzzlements. Puzzlements are a pre-condition for being a good philosopher. Understanding the fullest implications of a philosophical problem inevitably lands us into deep disquietude, confusion and bewilderment. Philosophical problems are puzzling because they are unavoidably paradoxical. George Pitcher brings out the same in following lines:
He thought that these philosophical puzzles had certain characteristic features. One of them is that they are very like paradoxes. This is, a set of apparently true propositions about the matter at hand lands to a conclusion about it which is wildly implausible, which contradicts what we all know to be the case, or at least which contradicts another statement for which we have grounds that are just as good. Sometimes it lead to a conclusion which seems not so much implausible as positively senseless, which can only be expressed by what strikes us as an illegitimate combination of words (Pitcher, 1964, p. 190).

Our consideration of philosophical problems always places us on the horns of a dilemma. We are trapped into undecidability when we try to respond to following philosophical questions:

(a) Is man free or is he determined?

(b) Does God exist?

(c) How is mind related to body?

(d) Do intentions or consequences determine the goodness of an action?

(e) Are values subjective or objective?

(f) Is truth subjective or objective?

(g) Is reality material or spiritual?

(h) Is knowledge acquired through sense-experience or reason?
(i) What is good-maximization of pleasure or execution of duty?

There are always arguments for and arguments against these philosophical questions. For example, it seems that we all have free-will, that there are many actions we freely choose to do and others we freely choose not to do. We think this is what justifies us in holding people responsible for what they do and fail to do, in praising them for their good deeds and punishing them for bad ones. On the other hand, we all believe that everything that happens has some cause. An action by a human being is also an event that happens, and so it must be caused and its causes must themselves have had previous causes and so on. Hence ultimate causes of a human action are factors in the remote past on which a person who acts is in no way responsible. In this way, we are led to conclude opposite of what we all believe to be true. We are led to conclude that no one has free-will that no one ever really chooses to do the things he does, that each one of us while taking any so-called initiatives is already determined.

As Wittgenstein said:

A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room who wants to get out but doesn't know how. He tries the window but it is too high. He tries chimney but it is too narrow (Pitcher, 1964, p. 193).

The philosopher undertakes a great intellectual struggle to escape from his perplexity. However, each formulation of an argument is characterized by irresolvable difficulties. All philosophical arguments have to instantaneously or
simultaneously face the counter-arguments. Being philosophical is not only a thankless job; it is also a hopeless condition.

There are great difficulties encountered in other areas of investigation as well. However, investigators engaged in non-philosophical disciplines can hope that a new clue or new piece of information may resolve their respective difficulties. The philosopher according to Wittgenstein can entertain no such hope. He is not in need of new information or new facts. Everything is at his disposal. However, there is something profoundly wrong with his approach to and perspective on philosophy. There is something wrong at the heart of his ways of thinking. Philosophers commit special mistakes and entertain special misconceptions. It is not even what Ryle's calls a category-mistake. It is a mistake of framework, of paradigm, of understanding and of interpretation. It is a perspectival mistake. It is a mistake, in the philosopher's way of looking at problems, his way of thinking and talking about them etc., which is at the heart of philosophical puzzlement. It is the muddles that are felt as problems by philosophers. The philosopher's condition may thus be likened to that of a psychotic. A psychotic deeply feels that there is something wrong with the world. He feels that people are harmful and dangerous. However, the real source of trouble lies within him. The real source of difficulties lies within his reaction to the world. For Wittgenstein, a philosophical condition is comparable to a psychotic condition (Suter, 1982, p. 12).

The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sicknesses of the understanding before he can arrive at the
Chapter IV

Game Theory of Language

notion of sound human understanding. If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are surrounded by madness (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sec. 53).

Thus, profound puzzlement is a characterizing condition of being philosophical. A philosopher is intellectually sick and conceptually ill. The understanding of a philosopher is caught into traps or tied up in knots. Many a philosopher remain interminably puzzled throughout their philosophical careers. Various philosophers formulate philosophical systems and theories with a view to liberate themselves from their unhappy condition. Thus, depending upon manifold of variables, philosophers may take their sides. Various philosophical doctrines and metaphysical theories such as idealism and materialism, monism and pluralism, theism and pantheism, mechanism and vitalism, are the deposit of same philosophical quest. However, such a remedy is worse than the cure.

Now, the job of philosophy is to undertake appropriate analysis with a view to curing the philosophical puzzlement. Philosophy is to cure ills of the understanding. The aim of philosophy is to show the fly way out of fly-bottle. The philosopher is ill and needs to be cured; he is imprisoned and needs to get free. Philosophy is thus therapeutic. The complete dissolution of all philosophical problems will constitute complete therapy for the philosopher.

The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 133).
Philosophical theories don’t constitute a cure for puzzlement. The cure for philosophical puzzlement requires that the real source of difficulty be located and removed. Philosophical theories can at best be temporary painkillers. They are aspirin but what is needed is surgery. In order to cure philosophical puzzlement, we need to trace its sources and devise proper method of removing them (Pitcher, 1964, p. 197).

The fundamental contention of Wittgenstein is that words have various functions or uses. Language has many functions besides simply “picturing” objects. Language always functions in a context and therefore has as many purposes as there are contexts. Words, he said, are like “tools in a tool-box; there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws – the function of words is as diverse as the functions of these objects” (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 11). What made him think earlier that language had only one function? He had been held captive by a picture of language as being the giving of names to all things.

Language has a multifunctional character. There are numberless or countless ways in which language can be used. It can be used metaphysically, ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, metaphorically, allegorically, parabolically, exhortatively, evocatively, prescriptively, descriptively, informatively, invocatively, investigatively, affirmatively, negatively etc. Joking, praying, commanding, asking, promising, story-telling, play-acting, thanking, greeting, cursing, swearing, promising etc. are other uses of language. There is no common factor in all these uses of language and, in
view of the same, a proper definition of language is almost impossible of formulation (Ayer, 1982, p. 14).

A Language-Game is a specific activity carried on with language. Different language-games highlight the different roles that linguistic expressions can play and the purposes for which they may be used. Just as there are a number of games and there is a set of rules for each game and there is no one common element in games, similarly there is no single core embedded in various language-games.

Wittgenstein's purpose is to undermine the assumption that words have just one role viz. to describe or to refer to. Different language-games serve to bring out the different roles that language can play and the different purposes it can serve. The need is to clarify the rules and make the games more understandable. Words derive their meanings from their use and each word has a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context. Therefore, the Wittgenstein's dictum "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for the use" (Peursen, 1969, pp. 78-9).

Later Wittgenstein came to realize that an account in terms of facts is not the only way to describe the world. He rejected his own logical atomism and became suspicious of ideal language as useful tools in any significant programme of philosophisation. He felt that it is useless to pinpoint meanings, for no words which are philosophically interesting have a fixed meaning.

We are the victims, he said, of "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". Our incorrect picture of language is "produced by
grammatical illusions" (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 109). To analyze grammar might lead one to discover some logical structure in language. But that cannot justify the conclusion that all language has essentially the same rules, functions and meanings. It occurred to Wittgenstein that the assumption that all language states facts and contains a logical skeleton was derived not by observation but by "thought". It was assumed that all language, in spite of certain superficial differences, is alike, the way all games are alike. Wittgenstein uncovered the flaw in this analogy by taking the case of games and asking, "what is common to them all? — do not say: there must be something common, or they would not be called "games" — but look and see whether there is anything common at all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat, do not think, but look". He was apparently saying that logical atomism was the product of thought, of theory, and not of careful observation, of the way, in fact, language operates and is used (Hennery, 1962, pp. 714-15). Wittgenstein therefore shifted the programme of analysis from a preoccupation with logic and the construction of a "perfect" language to the study of the ordinary usages of language. He moved away from what Russell and Carnap were doing and turned now in the direction of G.E. Moore's earlier emphasis upon the analysis of ordinary language. Wittgenstein was now of the opinion that language does not contain one single pattern alone, that it is as variable as life itself. Indeed, he said that 'to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life'. For this reason, analysis should consist not in the definition of language or its meanings but
rather in a careful description of its uses: we must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 236-38).

Wittgenstein characterizes these similarities as “Family Resemblances”. Different languages-games have resemblances that can be fruitfully likened to resemblances among members of a family, who resemble in build, features, colour of eyes, temperament, gait etc. The resemblances of language-games may be said to be overlapping and criss-crossing the way members of a family overlap and criss-cross with regard to their various features. Language operates like spinning a thread of a wire in one twist of a fibre upon another fibre. The strength of the thread does not depend upon someone fibre running through all along but in the over-lapping of many fibres. Language also operates overlapping many games one into another (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 66).

Wittgenstein asks us to consider to what we call “Games”. There are board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games etc. Is there something common to them all? According to Wittgenstein, our natural response is that there must be something common to all. He asks us to look and see as to whether there is really anything common to them all. We shall justify similarities and relationships for Board-games have multiple relationships with one another. However, a consideration of card-games will reveal many correspondences with the board-games. Yet various common features may either drop-out or disappear. A further consideration of ball-games will similarly retain some common features and drop out some other features. Wittgenstein suggests that we can go on comparing and contrasting
immunerable games such as chess, tennis, etc. However, we shall never capture anything that can be singled out as the essence of all games (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 66).

Wittgenstein talks of different or countless uses or functions of words or symbols or sentences and He also talks of new types of languages, new language-games coming into existence and others becoming obsolete and forgotten. Wittgenstein cites following examples of language-games.

1. Giving orders and obeying them.
2. Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurement.
3. Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)
4. Reporting an event.
5. Speculating about an event
6. Forming and testing a hypotheses
7. Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams.
8. Making up a story; and reading it.
9. Play-acting
10. Singing catches
11. Guessing riddles
12. Making a joke; telling it.
13. Solving a problem in practical arithmetic
14. Translating from one language to another
15. Asking, thanking, greeting cursing etc. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 23).
By recognizing the diversity of the functions of language, Wittgenstein inevitably altered the task of philosophy. The function of philosophy was now to liberate the philosopher from confusion, puzzlement and bewitchment. Its role was now therapeutic. It had to battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Linguistic analysis had “to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle”. The words had to be brought back from their metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, philosophy will not be adding to our knowledge or providing us new information. It will leave everything as it is. It will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful description of language.

The meanings of words go on changing when used in different contexts. The diverse functions or uses of words are known to us all. We put words to multiple uses in our ordinary natural speech. However, we tend to overlook their differences while philosophizing. Philosophical problems arise, Wittgenstein says, because of an insufficient grasp over the logic of our language. We don’t command a clear view of diverse uses with one another. This confusion generates puzzles or paradoxes philosophers have been arguing for or against various paradoxes. However, they ignore the sources of paradoxes. Wittgenstein does not take sides in the ongoing march of philosophical paradoxes. He tempts to uncover the diverse functions of words their multiple in contexts, in order to expose the underlying confusions that have generated the question of dispute. Such a kind of analysis leads to the
dissolution of the problems. Thus, the philosopher is liberated from
philosophical perplexity (Khawaja, 1965, p. 98).

Confusion the diverse uses of language is one of the fundamental
sources of the genesis of philosophical problems. For example, if we, confuse
descriptive and evaluative functions of words we shall be landing ourselves
into great philosophical trouble. We shall be raising philosophical questions
and inspiring philosophical responses which can eventuate into irresolvable
philosophical disagreements. Let us take two statements:

a) Killing is bad.

b) Roses are red.

In the above statements ‘bad’ and ‘red’ both are adjectives. However,
they are radically different in terms of their functions. In the first proposition
the adjective functions evaluative. In the second proposition, the adjective has
descriptive function. In the second proposition, the adjective has descriptive
function. The first is a value-judgment and the second is a factual judgment.
This distinction is crucial, for ignoring such a distinction may persuade us to
raise the following questions: if all meaningful adjectives refer to some
qualities, what is the meaning of “good” or “goodness”, what is the essence or
core of goodness that must characterize all things or state of affairs that are
qualified by the adjective “good” etc. similar questions can be raised about
adjective like “real”, “beautiful”, “true” etc.
Such confusion can arise in the context of other two propositions as well. For example, we may assimilate “5 is a number”, “red is a colour” and maintain that numbers too exist as colours do exist. We may assume that numeral “5” must be having some objective referent. But since we can never point out the existence of “5” as distinguished from five books or five chairs, we are tempted to say that numbers subsist though they do not exists, than we may realize that colour cannot be pointed out in separation form coloured objects. We may then be tempted to say that all universals subsist in a trans-empirical realm of Being. Thus the problems of nominalism, realism and idealism are generated. The logic of “number” is poles apart from the logic of “colour”. By assimilating a mathematical predicate i.e., “number” with a descriptive predicate i.e., “colour”, we may create unnecessary philosophical questions and responses leading to paradoxical stand-points. The similarities of grammatical from should not conceal the dissimilarities of functions of words and statements (Khawaja, 1965, p. 100-02).

According to Wittgenstein, words of a natural language do not have a single use, or function. They have a complex logic. They are used in different contexts and for different purposes. However, philosophers are tempted to be held captive by selected models or uses of the words in a particular context. They then proceed to make it a standard or paradigm use. Thereafter, the questions that may appropriately be suggested by paradigm use or context, are then raised in those cases where the word is used in a different context. Such questions generate philosophical puzzles or disputes. For example, take the
word “measurement”. Ordinarily we can use this in various contexts. The following uses of the word may be illustrative.

1. The carpenter is measuring tables.
2. The psychologist can measure human intelligence.
3. Politicians must measure the feeling of the peoples.
4. We must measure the trends of time.
5. He must measure the depth of her love before taking a decision on separation.

Here the word “measure” is used in several contexts. Now with regard to the measurement of the time, if we ask how can measure the past that does not exist, we adopt the use of “measurement” in the case of measurement of rooms and tables as our paradigm case. By doing so, we ignore the case, e.g., the measurement of the past through the present observable effects of the past events or the measurement of intelligence etc. Similarly, we prove a theorem, a point of law, a scientific hypothesis, an ethical judgement, a philosophical interpretation etc. The word “Proof” is here used in multiple contexts. We cannot prove a philosophical interpretation the way we can prove a geometrical theorem or even a scientific hypothesis. A geometrical proof is deductive and a scientific proof in inductive whereas philosophical proof can be teleological. Some philosophers are questioning the teleological proof for the existence of God. They are assimilating teleological proof with the deductive proof of geometry. God, obviously can never be proved like a geometrical theorem (Khawaja, 1965, pp. 103-08).
This exclusive fixation upon one particular paradigm use of a word is caused due to an implicitly held one-to-one correspondence theory of the meaning of words. We implicitly assume that every single meaningful word must be referring to an objective entity. The statements too must be referring to an objective state of affairs. The correspondence theory of meaning is an illustration of the diverse uses of words in a single paradigm case. The simple one-to-one correspondence words such as the word “table” corresponding to the actual table or the word “book” corresponding to actual book or the word “tree” corresponding to actual tree etc. or the words which a child is able to grasp, to begin with are made paradigm cases. The more complex uses of word come much later. The correspondence theory of meaning makes earliest and simplest naming use to be the paradigm case, assimilating all other uses to it. The following words make it clear:

There is no one logically correct use of a word. But different philosophers or individuals are inclined to make one particular model of use as the standard or paradigm case, and to dispute with other against other chosen paradigms. However the business of philosophy is not polemics but conciliation. This is brought about by pointing out all the various models by an individual, i.e. the reason prompting a person to make that choice. This is repeated for all the different models or theories that exist. The comparative linguistic survey or mapping of ‘logical geography’ of words
releases the individual from exclusive fascination for or fixation upon a particular model. He is enabled to see the point of each and every rival theory or formulation, and thus conflict is resolved. The grip of a single formulation or model upon the individual’s mind is loosened, enabling him to move about freely in linguistic and logical space, instead of being bound or chained to a single paradigm case.

Philosophical perplexity in the symptom of a failure to grasp the logic of language, or more especially, the variety of the types of discourse and a concrete survey of their functions. The dissolution of philosophical perplexity is the essence of the proper solution of philosophical problems (Khawaja, 1965, p.104-05).

According to Wittgenstein philosophers have more than their fair share of “craving for unity”. They have craved for some first principle, for some supreme truth, which explains everything. Philosophers are especially tempted to scumb to carving for unity in their thinking but language. They are powerfully tempted to suppose that all sentences are used in the same way. Their “Craving for Unity” seeks to find a single function common to all sentences. This craving may lead them to assimilate words to a model or a paradigm. For example, individual words are assimilated to the familiar kinds of objects such as “chairs”, “trees”, “tables” or familiar names such as “John”,

94
“George” and “bill” and familiar properties like ‘red”, “white”, “yellow” etc. We master all these words from the very beginning and feel completely at home with them. The difficult philosophical words such as “time”, “mind”, “matter”, “knowledge”, “belief” etc. are easily modeled onwards which most familiar (Pitcher 1964, p. 203) Thereafter, difficult philosophical sentence too are assimilated on familiar kind of sentences. For example, “Reality is Spiritual” or “Ideas are beyond space and time” may be modeled on ‘Rose is red” and “Taking up such a weight is beyond my capacity”. Philosophers assimilate grammatically similar sentences to one another, leading to unavoidable philosophical puzzlements. One of the prime sources of philosophical puzzlements is confusing grammatical similarity of sentences with their logical similarity. For example, sentences such as “Real is rational” and “Diamond is hard” are grammatically similar but logically poles apart. The first is a metaphysical statement and second is a physical statement. The philosophers are strongly tempted to assimilate metaphysical statements to physical statements. No wonder that philosophers are convinced that their systems of metaphysics are super-scientific systems. Another source of puzzleament according to Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is our tendency to have a certain kind of a mental picture. Wittgenstein points out that we tend to have a picture or more than one picture of time, space, the mind, memory etc. and we tend to think and talk of these things in accordance to those pictures. We often picture time, for example, as a vast stream which flows form future towards present and into the past, carrying events along with it. Space is pictured as an
infinitely huge empty container. We picture the idea as a mental entity hovering before our consciousness. We picture the mind as a queer kind of place. Similarly, we picture various mental processes akin to physical processes only occurring in that place known as the mind (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 305-604).

In view of these pictures, we tend to talk about time or space or mind as if they are physical entities. Thus we may say that “Keep it in mind” and “Keep it in Pocket” and think that we are talking about similar logical entities. Philosophers talk about universals such as redness or goodness as if they are kind of particulars or individual substances. Such a picture develops quite naturally. For example, the word ‘red’ does not refer to any particular red thing, any particular red patch, or any particular red book etc. but the word ‘red’ can not designate all red things either. One is strongly inclined to suppose that even if all red things should be destroyed, the colour red shall remain forever. The colour “red” cannot be identified with any red objects. Redness seems to be a property or predicate which qualifies all red objects and yet seems to be transcending them all. The philosopher may then quite naturally argue that even though redness is exemplified or instantiated through red objects, the redness must be beyond space. Similarly redness can be shown beyond time as well (Wittgenstein, 1956, p. 203).

One cannot say that redness at one time did not exist and later came into being, or that redness changes, or that redness might cease to exist one day. Redness, then, like all universals must be an eternal object existing outside time.
as well. In this way, the philosopher is led to posit a separate realm of being, where non-spatio-temporal universals reside. Then, puzzling and perplexing questions start cropping up as in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides.

Parmenides asks, Socrates whether, when an individual thing participates in a ‘Form’ does it receive as its’ shares the entire “Form” or only a part of it. Socrates, at once, finds himself in a quandary, for there are, insuperable objections to either alternatives. If “Form” as a whole can be said to be in a number of things, it will be deemed to separate from itself as well. If, on the other hand, we say only a part of the form is in each of its instances, we are commenting an absurdity suggesting that a universal can be broken into bits and scattered into space and time. Plato is clearly picturing “Forms” as a kind of ghostly particulars. It is precisely this picture which led him into difficulties. Thus, philosophical confusions are worse confound when a philosopher pictures:

(a) The mind as a spiritual thing which is somehow connected with a certain kind of physical organism.

(b) The subconscious as a special region of the spiritual thing known as the mind.

(c) The memory as another, perhaps partially overlapping, region, a kind of store-house of the mind.

(d) A proposition as a ghostly entity apprehended by the mind and expressible by sentences.
(e) The meaning of words as a kind of halo or atmosphere surrounding the word (Pitcher, 1964, p. 205).

In this way multiple pictures can hold us captive and inspire us to bring out puzzling and paradoxical positions. As Wittgenstein said:

A picture held us captive and we could not get outside it for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 115).

Our craving for unity, when directed towards language results in assimilations which produce misleading pictures. Take for example, two propositions "John cut an apple" and "John deduced a conclusion". We are inclined to assimilate the two statements and conclude that just as John while cutting an apple is performing an action, so John while deducing a conclusion must also be performing an action. However, whereas, there are bodily movements characteristic of cutting an apple, and there are no bodily movements which are characteristic of deducing a conclusion we tend to think that the former action is overt, publicly observable and physical; the later is very much like it, only it is hidden and not publicly observable. They are mental; deducing is a mental act, thinking is a mental process and being upset is a mental state. Now, we think as no physical action can exist without some body to do it; so no mental process can be carried out without something — a mind — in which it can take place, and no mental state, without something — a mind — to be in that state. In this way be indulging in our craving for unity, we are led by certain
grammatical similarities in our language to think of the mind on the model of body. We are led to have the picture of mind as a ghostly kind of body. Thus the famous mind-body problem may start dominating the philosophical agenda in modern times (Suter, 1989, p. 96-7). The famous formulation is found in the writings of the father of modern philosophy, Rene-Descartes. Descartes finds himself deeply puzzled by consideration of the relationship of mind and body. His solution is accepting both mind and body as two substances. He qualifies mind to be pure consciousness and body to be pure extension. While trying to explain the relationship between mind and body, Descartes postulates interaction of mind and body at the pineal gland. Subsequently, the problem is taken by Spinoza and Leibnitz as well; Spinoza offering a parallelistic explanation of the problem and Leibnitz forwarding his famous doctrine of pre-established harmony.

Gilbert Ryle, while commenting upon the mind-body dualism, points out that it is a category-mistake to raise the very question of mind-body relationship. Following Wittgenstein, Ryle argues that we confuse mind-statements with body-statements and thus generate a puzzle which is essentially irresolvable through forwarding of arguments. It is a category-confusion where the category of mind is assimilated to the category of body. Unless we rectify this basic category confusion through appropriate analyses, we can’t liberate ourselves from this dilemma. Mind is not something over and above the activities of behavior we indulge in day in and day out. If we don’t deem mind to be a collective noun for our multiple activities such as talking, walking,
calculating, gesticulating etc. we shall always place mind as a substantial category paralleling body. The dissolution of mind-body problem can be worked out only by understanding that grammatical similarities of mind-statements and body-statements do not warrant us to postulate their logical similarities as well. Ryle, following Wittgenstein, says that mind-body problem is a product of confusing grammatical similarities. Metaphysical problems are a function of grammatical confusion and it is through grammatical clarity with regard to multiple kinds of propositions that such problems can be dissolved. Language incorporates in a full-blood form, the very pictures that entrap us into doing philosophy (Russell, 1960, pp. 71-6).

The picture-embodying feature of our language, of certain forms of expression, is one of the main things Wittgenstein has in mind when he speaks as if language were the main culprit responsible for philosophical puzzlement:

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. [PI, Sec. 109]

Philosophy ... is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us [BB, p. 27]

When Wittgenstein accomplished his *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* around 1920, he was hundred percently sure that he had discovered a method or fashioned a technique of resolving the problems or dilemmas of philosophy. In principle, his atomistic analytical technique was capable of resolving all philosophical queries or pseudoproblems. The method was finally discovered.
It's concrete applications could be worked out, in course of time, by the upcoming competent practitioners of the method. He did not bother about actually carrying out the requisite analyses of the problems. He was rather satisfied in outlining a broad framework or paradigm of atomistic analysis. Hopefully, philosophical problems could be satisfactorily resolved within this framework.

However, intellectual integrity was the characterizing feature of Wittgenstein's philosophical engagements. In course of time, while doing miscellaneous jobs in Europe in between 1921 upto 1929 — he worked as a school teacher, gardener and architect during these years — Wittgenstein came to realize that there was something fundamentally flawed about his atomistic analysis. During these years he was in constant touch with F.P. Ramsey and his Vienna circle friends and admirers. In his philosophical and methodological conversations with these people, Wittgensteins' sense of inadequacy of his atomistic analysis was further aggravated. He was too honest not to return to the battlefront of philosophy. He returned to philosophy and to Cambridge in 1929. Convinced of the basic refutability of his Tractarian position Wittgenstein restarted his philosophical endeavours.

Thereafter, during 1930s and 1940s, Wittgenstein, through slow and steady intellectual struggle, assembled and brought out a powerful critique of his Tractatarian atomistic analysis or what is famously known as picture theory of Language or Meaning. Of course, everything outlined in Tractatus could not be repudiated lock, stock and barrel. Many of the Wittgenstein scholars discern subtle similarities between earlier and later Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, it can
be categorically asserted that later Wittgenstienian position is a thorough rejection of some substantial and fundamental doctrines advanced by early Wittgenstein (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 171-72).

The *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* is anchored on two fundamental theses. Firstly, it assumed that the world is divided into facts rather than things. In the final analysis, the world is divided into a uniquely determined set of atomic facts. Secondly, by recourse to analysis, each proposition can be ultimately resolved into one uniquely determined truth-function of elementary propositions. These two theses were anchored on an assumption that in the very nature of things the constituents of anything are fixed.

Later Wittgenstein realized the unwarranted nature of this assumption. There is no uniquely determined way as to how a thing divides itself up or what the parts or components of a thing are. So, there is no one necessarily right account of a thing or a phenomenon under consideration. Conversely, it is not the case that other accounts of the same thing or phenomenon are necessarily wrong. Early Wittgenstein was thoroughly mistaken in assuming that world divided itself into facts and not into things. We can develop several accounts of the world. It is how we look at the world. It is how we choose to formulate our account of the world. It is how we are inclined to work out an interpretation of the world. It is perfectly legitimate to say that the world divides itself into facts or objects or events or in some other possible ways. All these ways of describing the world are equally valid. They are alternative ways of describing the world. There is no one standard way of working out an exact, infallible, true or paradigmatic account of the world. There is no one and only one final
analysis of anything. Just as there are alternative ways of describing the world and all of them can be equally valid and legitimate, so is the case with propositions. The propositions too can be subjected to alternative ways of analysis. We can have radically different accounts of various types of propositions. The constituents of any propositional gestalt too can be specified, designated, qualified or analysed into different combinations and permutations. There is no exact analysis leading to exact final results which we can apply on philosophical propositions or propositions with regard to various aspects of the world (Pitcher, 1964, p. 173).

The author of the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus was convinced that all propositions must ultimately be reducible to or analyzable into atomic or elementary propositions. The atomic or elementary propositions, in their turn, have to be innocent of all ambiguities and free from all possibilities of misinterpretation and even misunderstanding. An atomic or elementary proposition was to early Wittgenstein, the ideal form of the proposition. A complex or compound proposition had an apparent logical form but its real logical form was represented by the atomic or elementary proposition. The apparent logical form was a misdirection of our understanding motivated by the misleading grammatical form of the proposition under consideration or analysis. The real logical form of a proposition was hidden or blurred in the proposition. The task of the analysis is to bring to light the hidden structure of the proposition.

The author of the Philosophical Investigations came to realize that in his earlier phase he had not looked at propositions objectively and found them to
contain this ideal logical structure. Rather it was the structure of the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, which had oriented him to expect the propositions to having that logical structure. He was preconceived about propositions in view of the requirements of his personal theories during his Tractarian phase. He was thoroughly mistaken in supposing that propositions must be logically in accord with his theoretical requirements. He needed to liberate himself from his earlier view of the logic of language. All propositions do not have and cannot have an exact, definite, true and perfectly determinate sense. Most of the propositions incorporated into any system of language, are, as a matter of fact, vague, ambiguous, inexact and indefinite “The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between “it and our requirement” (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 107).

The later Wittgenstein appropriated the realization that Tractarian demands on language where impossible. The earlier Wittgenstein had unfairly demanded that the proposition was not really a proposition at all unless it had an absolute determinate sense. A proposition must completely be innocent of any ambiguity. We must not entertain any possible doubt or uncertainty about a proposition. Whatever a proposition has to say, it must be able to say so with utmost precision and specification. Such as standpoint is fundamentally erroneous. It is not so erroneous to require an absolutely determinate sense; what is fundamentally erroneous is to entertain the possibility of a thought that such a sense is even intelligible (Hennery, 1962, p. 521).

Wittgenstein’s new insights about the logic of language disclosed a new perspective to him. The new perspective on language fizzled out the crucial
Tractarian assumptions and germinated an appreciation of the finest distinctions and most sophisticated nuances about the uses and functions of numberless words comprising any functional language operating across social, political, economic and cultural frames of reference. The words such as 'truth', 'exact', 'definite', 'standard', 'determinate' etc., are not absolutely unisemically employed in multifarious practical contexts. They are used with reference to the functional context or operational background. For instance, it is impertinent to say that a watch is useless unless it keeps an absolutely exact time. There is no ideal of the absolutely exact time. The use of the word 'time' is not completely divested of all operational or practical contexts. All words function in their given contexts. They operate with reference to human purposes and goals, aims and objectives, values and ideals and needs and requirements. Suppose my watch measures time well enough for ordinary purposes; I am not late for appointments, I do not miss my trains or airflights etc., then my watch is in perfect order. It would be fastidious of me to hanker after some supposedly absolute standard of keeping time and then to rue that in comparison to that standard my watch measures time in a way that is woefully mistaken. Similarly if what I say conveys my thought without any misunderstanding then my proposition, for all practical purposes, is in perfect order. It would be silly of me to posit some absolute standard of determinateness in comparison to which I can go on complaining about the lack of absolutely determinate sense in the propositions I keep on advancing. Propositions are formulated in response to the demand of the circumstances. A fisherman has to use a net with a mesh fitting the size of the fish in the water.
Propositions do not have an absolutely determinate sense in isolation from the contingencies of human discourse. The absolute determinateness of propositions is as mythical as a supposedly absolute standard of time:

No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention, at least any that satisfies you (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 88).

Later Wittgenstein launches a frontal attack on the very notion of analysis itself, which was so central to the Tractatarian project. The Tractatus assumed that a proposition can be analyzed into atomic propositions which can together express the original proposition. In Investigations, Wittgenstein mounted a severe critique on the very idea of analysis. He brings out that in order to appreciate or understand the meaning of any proposition under consideration; analysis is neither the only nor the most important way of doing so. Furthermore, the difference between a simple and complex proposition was not an absolute one as was advocated by the order of the Tractatus. It is true that the task of analysis was by definition reduction of complex propositions into the simplest propositions describing the simplest situations. However, there are no absolutely simple or absolutely complex propositions out there. Such an assumption is groundless. We just cannot bring out anything that is absolutely simple in itself. A simple thing in one context or for some purpose or from a
certain point of view may be complex from another point of view or context. Thus ‘simplicity and complexity’ are contextual and are not absolute qualities inherent in anything. Anything divested from all its contexts is neither simple nor complex. Any question, isolated from all contexts or in complete isolation, is unanswerable, for it lacks sense. According to later Wittgenstein, typical philosophical mistakes emerge when philosophers talk in ways that are shorn of all contexts. The author of Tractatus had blundered on similar grounds. He had deemed things to be simple in complete isolation. He realized the error of his unwarranted assumption. He realized that philosophers since the very inception of philosophy had fallen to the natural temptation to go in for absolute simplicity. Such an unwarranted assumption had cramped them into irresolvable dilemmas and paradoxes.

Reviewing or reconsidering Tractatarian account of meaning and language, later Wittgenstein brought out a paradigm-shift in our understanding and interpretation of meaning and language. Early Wittgenstein had thought that the meaning of any word which is a genuine proper name is the thing it denotes and the names of his absolutely simple objects are the only genuine proper names that there are. Hence, he said that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Later Wittgenstein in his perhaps deeper and profounder understanding of the relationship between language and the world, came to realize that names of the objects and meanings of the objects are too different descriptions and to deem them identical leads to unacceptable absurdities. The meaning of a name is not object-dependent. An object should not necessarily correspond to a name with a view to having meaning. The assumption of
correspondence between a name and its object leading to meaningfulness of names was an assumption appropriated by most of the classical, medieval and even modern philosophers. Later Wittgenstein realized that a name can have a meaning even though nothing may exist corresponding to it. Early Wittgenstein was wrong in assuming that there are absolutely simple objects. Earlier Wittgenstein was also wrong in assuming that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Early Wittgenstein's theory of meaning was accordingly impossible of sustenance (Ayer, 1982, p. 150).

Later Wittgenstein was also highly critical of his earlier view that meaning is a mental act. He now regards mental act view of meaning as absurd. It is absurd to assume that a speaker's mental act accompanying certain words constitutes the meaning of the words. The image of an intended thing does also not constitute an act of meaning. It can be readily conceded that something goes on in the mind of the speaker when he utter's certain words or phrases or propositions. The speaker while blurting out certain words or phrases or propositions can and often does mean some things from what he speaks. However, what is importantly to be underlined is that the speaker's act of intention does not constitute the act of meaning. Even when the speaker certainly means something by words, meaning should not be equated with the images of the speaker. According to later Wittgenstein, words do not get related with objects and facts in the world by the performance of mental acts of intending or meaning them to refer to those things.

Both early and later Wittgenstein were profoundly committed to bringing out a methodologically informed account of or perspective on
Later Wittgenstein finds meaning rooted in the uses of the words. For later Wittgenstein, meaning is irredeemably, ineradicably and inextricably or radically contextual. Search for a transcontextual meaning is impossible of formulation and articulation. Words, phrases, descriptions, idioms, figures of speech, propositions, utterances etc. are operating across the context of numberless language-games and forms of life. The wider history and culture provide a backdrop against which numberless propositions can be said to be operating either meaningfully or meaninglessly. The structure of human society comprised of innumerable forms of life provides the context of meaning. The operations of life and language-games are the ultimate repository of meaning. For early Wittgenstein meaning could be appropriated with reference to objects of the world. For later Wittgenstein, the multicomplex situations of life or language-games provide a backdrop against which meanings could be appropriated.

The later Wittgenstein, thus, brings out a radical refutation of the fundamental assumptions of Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus. He lifts the debate of the nature of language and of philosophy unto a new plane. In the context of philosophical investigations, the language gets largely world independent. A radical account of language and of philosophical problems is outlined in Philosophical Investigations. The basic orientation or direction of Logical Atomism is most powerfully recast by the Later Wittgenstein. Our very understanding and conception of philosophy is radically redrafted by later Wittgenstein. For later Wittgenstein philosophical problems are inextricably embedded in linguistic confusion, the confusion between logic and grammar of
various types of statements. Philosophical problems suffer largely from their confusionary as well as illusionary character. The genesis of philosophical problems is in linguistic confusion and it is through working out of the appropriate linguistic analysis that philosophical problems can be resolved. As John Wisdom put it, philosophical problems arise out of the misleading structure of language. It is only through linguistic illumination that these problems can be appropriately resolved or dissolved. Later Wittgenstein, accordingly, proposed a radical programme of dissolution of philosophical problems by recourse to linguistic analysis. Only a radical surgery of philosophical propositions can restore us from confusion to clarity and lead to the dissolution of philosophical problems (Finch, 1997, pp. 93-7).

Thus, later Wittgenstien brings out an extraordinarily radical account of language. Philosophical problems are lingogenetic or lingocentric. Philosophical problems are not substantial to be ultimately susceptible to some consensual or methodical verification or falsification. Philosophical problems are not waiting an ultimate philosopher who is going to finally crack the DNA of Philosophy. No philosophical Newton will one fine morning discover a Universal Philosophical Law which can largely make a substantial contribution towards understanding of our philosophical horizons. Classically, philosophy was deemed to be mother of all sciences. Greeks defined philosophy etymologically to be 'love of wisdom'. Indians deemed philosophy to be a science which vouchsafes to us the vision or the beatitude of God. Here Wittgenstein comes with a dampener tracing the roots of philosophy in linguistic confusion and prescribing linguistic analysis as the surest therapy.
leading to the liberation of the philosopher from his linguistic puzzlement or bewitchment.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the Tractatus was that the ultimate elements of language are names that designate simple objects. Later Wittgenstein pointed out that such words as ‘simple’ or ‘complex’ have no absolute meaning. There is nothing absolutely simple or absolutely complex. ‘Simplicity’ and ‘complexity’ are necessarily relative to a language-game. It is the context within which names or propositions are to be qualified as simple or complex. There are no readymade cases that can be easily or ostensively pointed out to be either simple or complex. The Tractatarian Wittgenstein assumed that the existence of a simple object was correlated with the requirement of the definite sense of a sentence. The author of the Investigations brings out that such a requirement is itself a philosophical illusion. The definite sense might be the characterizing feature of an ideal language in an ideal world. We neither live in an ideal world nor have an ideal language at our disposal. The world we live in and the language we speak in are both imperfect. In our context precision and exactness are related to some particular purpose. We can never have an ideal of exactness laid down for all situations or there cannot be any transsituational or universal standard of exactness. Early Wittgenstein wrongly supposed that there is complete exactness underneath the surface of everyday speech and we can bring it to light by recourse to exact logical analysis. Such as analysis would reveal that a proposition would have one and only one complete analysis (Paul, 1967, p. 335).
The author of the Investigations came to realize that the ideal of perfect exactness is impossible of formulation in our day to day languages. However, we are so enamoured of the ideal of perfect exactness that we become deeply dissatisfied with ordinary words or sentences. We want a pure and clear structure in our actual languages and when we cannot find it, we think there is something fundamentally wrong with our actual languages. However, the more closely we examine actual languages, the sharper becomes the conflict between them and our philosophical ideal. To our dismay, we can not even understand as to how it could be realized in actual languages. We are overwhelmingly bewitched by the picture of idealness that we have subterraneously imagined and carried on in our minds. The problem is that we are like a blind-man in a dark room searching for a black cat which is not there. We cannot find what is not in our language, to begin with. We cannot dictate terms to language with a view to manufacturing the ultimately exact sense of propositions. Actual languages have been basically designed for communicative and commercial purposes. They were not designed to enshrine or embosom philosophical ideals of purity and exactness. Philosophers will have to have a deeper understanding of actual languages; they need to be more clear what is really there. They must give up their preconceived ideas of purity, exactness or incorruptibility. Rather they must take up a more modest endeavor of describing the manifold uses of language with a view to removing their philosophical perplexities (Paul, 1967, p. 337).

Early Wittgenstein thought that language is ultimately composed of names. The simple objects constitute the meaning of the names. A sentence
says something because it is composed of names that stand for things. Later Wittgenstein advanced the view that the meaning of a word is never the thing that corresponds the word. The meaning of all names is intralinguistically accomplished not translinguistically discovered. Understanding of language is prior to grasping the meaning of words. We must already have mastered the language-game featuring a name or several names with a view to appreciating their meaning. All names rather acquire meaning in their use, in understanding the situations in which they are employed. Meaning is use-dependent not object-independent. The early Wittgenstein was aiming at the construction of the perfect model of language. Such a language would have had a complete logical structure. Such a language would be a kind of the picture of the world. Later Wittgenstein completely abandoned his quest for a perfect or ideal language. He came to realize that such a quest is not motivated by any really pressing philosophical or methodological requirements. Rather such a quest is artificially and capriciously designed by philosophical pseudopuritans in their so-called quest for truth, for certainty, for reality etc. It is neither necessary nor feasible to arbitrarily impose an artificial language on natural or social world. The world can be multiversionally and multiformulationally shown or brought out or described. An account of the world in terms of so-called facts and so-called factual statements is only one of the several possible ways of responding to the world-situation in all its multicomplexity and multidimensionality. Philosophers cannot devise an ideal language or radically improvise our ordinary languages. Language can always be a functional medium and never transmute into a perfect transmissionary system for description and
communication. Most words and most importantly most philosophically significant words do not have a fixed meaning. Polyse micism is at the heart of all languages. Philosophers as the products of polysemic of languages cannot in a sudden turnaround, come up with an ideal, logically perfect and grammatically exceptionless language intimating to us the essence of truth, certainty or reality.

We cannot carry out a scientific investigation of language for words do not have meaning independent of us or independent of the uses within which they are operating. A universal, eternal, transcendental and essential definition of language is impossible of agreement and attainment. We cannot figure out any factor, common to all our uses of language. The words of any given language operate multicontextually, multiversionally, multiformualtionally, multifunctionally, multilaterally, multistructurally etc. The uses and functions of words are too numerous to be exhaustively and neatly catalogued or packaged in a detailed table. The games we actually play or can possibly play are inexhaustible. The polyse micity of words and creativity of human mind can eventuate into infinite combinations and permutations of language-games beyond the scope of the most fertile imaginations of semanticists, syntacticists and philosophers of language. There are logical, mathematical and scientific language-games. There are metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, theological and mystical language-games. There are metaphysical, allegorical, parabolical and symbolic language-games. There are descriptive, prescriptive, performative, evocative and invocative language-games. There are language-games in which we display our wits, blurt out jokes, engage in prayers, deliver commands, sing
songs, ask clarifications etc. Greeting, thanking, congratulating, condoling, apologizing etc. are distinctive language-games that we carry out and carry on day in and day out.

Language-games comprising any language do not share any common or essential element. Just as various games operating across the spectrum in keeping with their own rules, structure and format do not share any essence, so language-games also do not share any single core. Philosophers have been obsessed with fixed meanings and pictures of words. In view of this obsession philosophers have fallen under the spell of language. Philosophy, says Wittgenstein, is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (Pitcher, 1964, p.1).

A philosopher caught into a philosophical problem such as freedom of will and determinism or mind-body relationship etc. is not dealing with problems which are amenable to standardized methodical adjudication. They cannot be resolved through empirical verification or logical demonstration. An apparently or ostensibly time-honoured philosophical problem is actually a function of linguistic confusion or puzzlement; a confusion of grammar of various types of statements with the logic of various other types of statements. The central and crucial metaphysical problems are deeply abiding subterranean confusions of assimilating grammatical and logical similarities and dissimilarities to each other and getting up caught unto the horns of various dilemmas. A person caught into a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room who wants to get out, but does not know how. He tries a window, but it is
too high. He tries the chimney but it is too narrow. Only if he could turn around and see the door was always open to him.

Later Wittgenstein realized that language is not only multifunctional but multiformalational as well. Human beings can engage in innumerable language-games. They can choose to go in for numberless modes of projection. There is no standard of meaning or criterion of meaning which can stultify the creativity of man blossoming forth into limitless combinations and permutations of language-games. The metaphysical statements, the poetic expressions, the theological formulations, the mystical fulminations, the literary flashlights, the fictional stories, the artistic projections, the philosophical interpretations, the ideological manifestos, the ethical recommendations, the critical revisions, the interpretative reconstructions, the hermeneutical deconstructions and what not cannot be declared to be nonsense because we cannot discern or design their method of verification. Beyond the standard procedures of verification, there are limitless chartered and unchartered linguistic territories which in their limitless contexts have to offer important meanings and significant insights. We cannot brush off the limitless linguistic applications operating meaningfully in their respective contexts to be meaningless. They are not expressions of nonsense but significant language-games operating within their own contexts.

The propositions which are not amenable to verification or do not have a method of verification, cannot be lock, stock and barrel declared to be nonsense, meaningless and insignificant. The unverified and unverifiable propositions can be significant and meaningful in their respective contexts. We
have to understand the role and function of various types of propositions with a
view to appreciating their significance and meaningfulness in the economy of
life. The various types of propositions or language-games need to be clarified
and made more understandable by clarifying the rules of respective language-
games. Language is operating at various levels and in various ways. Learning
the names of objects is an important component of our struggle for mastering a
language. However, it is relatively, an elementary part of the complex exercise
which mastering a language is. The meaning of the term “Scissors” does not
consist simply in the object it names, but in the ways it is used in carrying out
various tasks by it. Wittgenstein’s maxim “Do not ask for the meaning, ask for
the use” (Pitcher, 1964, p. 253) signified a paradigm-shift in our understanding
of meaning as well as in our understanding of the multicomplexity and
multidimensionality of language.

The search for ‘meaning’ has been long drawn-out. The ancient,
medieval and modern philosophers across continents and cultures have been
engaged in figuring out the standards and criteria of meaning. However,
philosophers across continents and cultures have attempted to discover or
explore universal, eternal, essential, transcendental or transcultural standards or
criteria of meaning. As against the classical, medieval and modern
transcendental or transcultural criteria, contemporary European philosophers
led by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger have underlined on
exploring cultural and contextual criteria of meaning. The search for ‘reality’,
cannot be cross-cultural or trans-cultural. The theories of reality, of truth, of
knowledge, of value, of meaning and of interpretation cannot be objective, rational, universal, transcendental or transcultural. Whatever, we deem to be reality or truth or knowledge, or value or meaning or interpretation, is culturally conditioned and cannot have transcultural justification. Thus contemporary philosophical semantics and hermeneutics have registered a paradigm-shift, a turnaround, a reversal and Ludwig Wittgenstein's contribution in working out this paradigm-shift has been exceptionally outstanding. He recast the entire project of doing philosophy.

The atomistic analysis of early Wittgenstein was highly sophisticated and transparent piece of analysis with a view to working out a clear-cut criterion of meaning thereby demarcating significant and meaningful propositions from insignificant and meaningless ones. Early Wittgenstein was firmly convinced that the world as it is, is comprised of elementary, simple, irreducible or atomic facts. These atomic facts at the level of reality or world are corresponded by atomic statements at the plane of language. Only we need to subject compound or complex propositions in a given language to a process of minute or micro analysis till we reach irreducible or unanalysable propositions. Now these atomic propositions are the logical pictures of the atomic facts. These atomic facts are directly picturised by corresponding atomic propositions. This process of picturisation is the basis of meaningfulness of atomic propositions. In so far as atomic propositions directly picturise atomic facts, to that extent, the atomic propositions directly acquire the credentials of being meaningful. The entire world could be completely described by a logically immaculate language.
Later Wittgenstein as represented by Philosophical Investigations provides a new paradigm of understanding and interpretation. Wittgenstein brings out that linguistic expressions can have references or can be free of definite references. However meaning of statements or propositions is essentially independent of references. The entire choir and furniture of the universe is amenable to linguistic descriptions. However, the meaning of words and propositions is independent of the choir and furniture of the universe. Nevertheless, the independence or autonomy of language is not absolute or unqualified. Language is deeply rooted in human culture, tradition, history and customary modes of human behavior. Indeed, language is rooted in our “forms of life”. It is our “forms of life” that lend meaning and significance to our language. The complex logic of language cannot be judiciously appropriated either by the atomistic analysis of early Wittgenstein or by the verificationistic criterion of Logical Positivists. The meaning of statements or propositions is rooted or embedded in “forms of life” (Finch, 1977, p. 80).

The meaning of words in a statement is determined by their use. Human understanding does not mean mere acquaintance with some entity. It is not merely a cognitive state of mind either. Understanding is not entirely a matter of “know what”, but more importantly, a matter of “know how”. It signifies mastery of a technique akin to a craftsman’s understanding of tools. Words of a language are like tools. Both words and tools are understood by their use. Both words and tools have their meaning within shared practices. Tools become meaningful in their technical applications. Words too operate like tools or more like chess-pieces on a chessboard. Words are moves within language-games.
We do not understand words by recourse to theoretical definitions. Understanding words is a practical capacity to obey rules of their application in multiple contexts and situations of life. We learn to obey rules by practice. Obeying the rules of a language-game entails participation in customs and traditions alongside other people. We understand the meaning of words through participating in shared practices. Understanding and meaning are intimately linked to human participation in wider cultural practices, customs, traditions, ways of life and modes of operation – both vertical and horizontal across the spectrum.

The questions pertaining to meaning, truth, understanding and interpretation of words, phrases and statements can go on endlessly. Even when we say that words, phrases, idioms and statements do not acquire meaning by their picturisability of facts, their verifiability or falsifiability etc., but by their usability in various contexts, it can still be asked as to why we use words and phrases in this and that context, this way and that way. We can never bring out final reasons in philosophy but we cannot go on perennially coining fresh reasons in response to insatiable philosophical introspections and interrogations. We will have to stop somewhere and say ‘enough is enough’. The search for rational justification has to stop somewhere. The reasons have to run out at some point of time. Our spade will have to turn when it reaches the bedrock. Nevertheless, the business of the use of words does go on incessantly even when all reasons and justifications are run out or exhausted. We have agreement on form of life. We just find it natural to go on in certain ways, have been “trained” or “oriented” to react on various occasions. If we did not, no
amount of rules or conventions would ensure that we will continue to understand one another (Perusen, 1969, pp. 82-5).

Thus metaphysical, theological, ideological, ethical, mystical and literary language-games are rooted or embedded in culture, history and tradition of a particular community, society or country. They are organically connected with the culture and ethos of an area evolved over millennia. These language-games are not delivered to us out of blue so to say. Now, these language-games, dissected from their cultural, historical or traditional roots cannot be deemed either to be true or meaningful for they derive their truth and meaningfulness from their cultural and historical traditions. These traditions are the "forms of life". The values we adopt, the norms we appropriate, the criteria we invoke, the standards we measure up with, the reasons we advance etc. stem from the culture we are conditioned with or trained in. We cannot advance reasons or criteria in justification of the culture we are born in. There are no transcultural, transcommunitarian or trans-societal criteria which can be cited in justification of a culture, a community or a society. Even the so-called scientific and rational criteria of experimental research are not privileged to evaluate a culture, a religion or a tradition. There are no transcendental grounds upon which a culture, a religion or a tradition can be grounded for culture, religion or tradition are themselves transcendental metanarratives claiming to justify subnarratives. A culture or religion can be intelligible on its' own traditional or scriptural standards. A culture as a "form of life" is, however, ultimate with reference to understanding of truth, knowledge, reality, value etc. Understanding and interpretation are carried out within a context of "form of
The form of life may be anchored on unwritten traditions or primordial patterns of behavior. Or, it can be grounded on certain scriptural injunctions, rules, values, criteria, practices, rituals, beliefs and assumptions.

Thus, we may conceive Hindu, Christian and Muslim societies as “forms of life” operating in keeping with the Vedic, Biblical and the Qur’anic standards, criteria, beliefs and values. Now to ask for standards, criteria, values, beliefs or reasons which can justify Vedic, Biblical or Qur’anic forms of life would be asking for the moon or asking for the impossible. There are no Trans-Vedic, trans-Biblical or Trans-Qur’anic standards, criteria or reasons which can justify Vedic, Biblical or Qur’anic world-views and value-systems. Philosophical prudence demands that we stop somewhere and accept some standards or criteria of a ‘form of life’ to be ultimate. So is the case with meaning of propositions or meaning of words. The words or propositions or a language itself, are ultimately rooted in a “form of life” or “forms of life”. A form of life provides the cultural soil to words or propositions. Seeking the meaning of words or propositions in isolation from their respective forms of life would be as unwise or imprudent as uprooting a tree from it’s soil or habitat and then wondering as to why its fruits, flowers, leaves, branches, trunk etc. are getting lifeless. A proposition isolated from a form of life is as meaningless as a tree uprooted from its soil is lifeless.

Wittgenstein advocates that when we imagine a language-game, we imagine a form of life. Our activities, our methods, our behavior, our modes of thinking, feeling and doing, our attitudes, emotions and responses, our orientations to happiness or sorrow, our articulations or gesticulations; our style
of functioning and body language, our angry outbursts and frustrations, our greetings and congratulations, our condolences and apologies, our thanksgivings and gratitudes, our irritations and cursings, our flirtations and tantrums etc., too contribute to the complex network of a form of life. We engage in various language-games as well while being engaged in such multidimensional activities constituting a form of life. Human beings agree in the use of words because they agree in a form of life. Their opinions differ but their agreement in the use of words stems from their agreement in a form of life. Forms of life are the original habitat of language-games. Words or statements become meaningful by being rooted in a form of life. Words or statements do not become meaningful by their potential picturisability of atomic facts or by their possible methodical verifiability. Words and propositions rather operate meaningfully by their contextual understandability and interpretability (Finch, 1997, pp. 84-90).

Later Wittgenstein, contrary to classical, medieval and even modern expectations from philosophy, underlines that a philosopher is not blessed with requisite methodological wherewithal to deliver accurate, exact and true substantial ontological, cosmological, theological, ideological or axiological statements, theories or systems. Rather, he is caught into an unenviable situation. He is deeply bewitched by the indecipherable beguilements of countless linguistic operations being carried out day in and day out by all the competent practitioners of speech and writing. Consequently, he is deeply confused and puzzled. People may be taking his bewitchment, puzzlement or
confusion for something of a profound omniscience or depth of commitment to divulgement of the mystery of the cosmos.

However, it is the operations of language that can inspire grandiloquent metaphysical doctrines or drive the philosopher to excessive or radical skepticism. For example, philosophers can read into language what is not there in language or driven by their wishful thinking what they want to impose on it. Philosophers are, more often than not, inclined to think that ordinary language is like an exact calculus. Thus, they may imagine that every word can be assigned one and only one precisely perfect meaning. Philosophers can also be driven by the idea that our ordinary language operates by following the exact rules. When they look for these exact rules in language, they to their dismay are rudely shocked into awareness that innumerable linguistic operations or transactions are carried out quite arbitrarily and language is not necessarily rule-bound or programmed in keeping with rules and regulations. One response of the philosopher can be that philosophically significant words have no meaning and should not be used at all. Thus, he might become a skeptic. Or, he can choose to invent artificial rules and come up with examples where the application of his so-called rules can generate paradoxes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter V

WITTGENSTEIN'S IMPACT ON EPISTEMOLOGY
(1) Epistemology

Epistemological issues and concerns have been dominating philosophical discourse since the very dawn of philosophical enquiry. Our innate and acquired quest for knowledge implies an analysis of the origin, sources, development and conditions of knowledge. It implies an exploration of the nature of knowledge and of the extent, possibility, scope and limits of human knowledgeability. Etymologically speaking the world ‘Epistemology’ is comprised of two, words ‘episteme’ and ‘logos’ or ‘knowledge’ and ‘theory’, thus meaning, theory of knowledge or logical investigation of the problems and issues pertaining to knowledge. There are knowledge-claims and counter-claims and then there are many types of knowledge-claims and then there are millions and millions of them. Which of these claims are verifiable, confirmable and justifiable and which are not, has been a challenge to every kind of philosophical enterprise. Consequently, epistemological skepticism, has been at the heart of all philosophical theories or systems. All philosophical theories or systems have faced the challenge of skeptics throughout history of philosophy. Infact, all major philosophical achievements have been grounded on radical critiques of previous philosophical accomplishments. Philosophers have often wallowed into radical critical evaluations of their rival philosophical
interpretations and more often then not advanced their philosophical positions in contradistinction to those of others.

The world we encounter seems, to all intents and purposes, devoid of any sense or significance. It is man who imparts to it some sense or significance by recourse to some ontocosmological interpretation. It is man who ascribes a world-view to the world, as well as, a corresponding value-system. Such an exercise is possibly fundamentally based on a vision or an intuition. However, no vision or intuition can be capriciously superimposed upon the world. No weltanschauung can sustain itself in flagrant violation of all cannons of logic, science, methodology and epistemology. Therefore, we need to be knowledgeable about the world in so far as it is humanly possible. Besides, we are both intrinsically and instrumentally inclined and obliged to cultivate a quest for knowledge. Infact this very quest is rooted in our primordial wonder and puzzlement about things, phenomena, objects, events, affairs and features that constitute both our natural and historical realms. We have this innate orientation to formulating or constructing of theories with a view to achieving a basic understanding of the world. As it happens, the complex world we are living in is not amenable to simple explanations. In view of its' overwhelming complexity, most of the human beings, engross themselves in non-philosophical engagements, finding it extraordinarily difficult to pursue a quest for coherent account of things to their utmost and logical limits. Most of us confine ourselves to a minimum or functional understanding of the world we live in. However, philosophers cannot reconcile
themselves to a bare or functional understanding; they go in far formulation of narratives or accounts of the world which can provide consistent, synoptic and true explanations of the phenomena and events across the spectrum. Epistemologists, especially carry out a relentless struggle with a view to arriving at indubitable and unassailable knowledge. Epistemologists can themselves start with assumptions with a view to achieving unqualified certainty of knowledge with regard to the world. However, additional reflection upon their awed knowledge-claims can disrupt their initial naivity about their claiming. Thus, they can themselves appreciate the uncertain character of their assumptions as well as claims. Their quest for certainty can be seriously jolted once they encounter the complexity of the anomalous features of the world (Paul, 1967, p. 466).

(2) Nature of Knowledge

The most fundamental problem of epistemology is the very nature of knowledge itself. Throughout history, epistemological philosophers have faced one of the perplexing problems, viz. delineating the concept of knowledge. Many epistemological philosophers have made various distinctions while outlining their accounts of knowledge. For instance, Russell has distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. For Russell, knowledge is either based or not based on direct experience. The knowledge that we gather by recourse to direct experience is categorized by him as knowledge by acquaintance. However, the knowledge that we gather from historical accounts or scholarly narratives is categorized by him as
knowledge by description. What empiricist epistemologists such as John Locke and David Hume stipulate as knowledge based on sensations or impressions is what Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. On the other hand, our knowledge of historical events or knowledge about makers and shakers of history, cannot be knowledge by acquaintance. For example, our knowledge of Alexander the Great is knowledge by description for whatever we know about Alexander has been culled from historical narratives advanced by various historians and scholars. Knowledge by acquaintance, for Russell, is our knowledge of objects. Such a knowledge, according to Russell, we gather through sense-data. Such sense-data Russell argues, are mental entities reflecting the characteristics of physical objects. Thus knowledge by acquaintance is identical with the perception of sense-data (Ibid., p. 467).

Similarly, Gilbert Ryle makes a distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. 'Knowing how' refers to some skill as for example, knowing how to dance. A person can have such knowledge without being able to explain such knowledge to someone else. As against, 'knowing how', 'knowing that' does not refer to some skill or aptitude. Such knowledge is rather both informative and communicative. One has some pieces of information with regard to some phenomena, events and objects and one can communicate or pass on such knowledge to someone else. Such knowledge is propositional knowledge and warrants abiding epistemological questions. Epistemologists have, historically speaking, negotiated deep and abiding debates with regard to such propositional knowledge. They have asked as to whether such
propositional knowledge is true or false, valid or invalid, verifiable or falsifiable, justifiable or unjustifiable (Hospers, 21005, p. 39).

Some philosophers have made a distinction between mental and non-mental conceptions of knowledge. Plato regarded knowledge as some kind of a mental state. However, such contemporary philosophers as Wittgenstein and Austin do not accept knowledge to be an appropriation of a mental state. For Wittgenstein, knowledge is not a state of consciousness, our or someone else's being knowledgeable entails satisfaction of certain complex behavioural conditions. Austin too does not admit knowledge to be a mental state. Any claim to knowledge indicates that the knower has the reasons and credentials to assert a proposition.

Epistemologists have also distinguished between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. A statement such as “All Bachelors are unmarried” is a standard example of a priori knowledge. The truth or falsity of such a statement is not dependent upon any empirical investigation. Such a statement can be known without undertaking any factual enquiry. We can know such a statement on the basis of pure reflection or understanding of the subject and predicate terms. As against such statements, there are propositions that are amenable to empirical investigation. For example, “Diamond is the hardest metal” is perfectly understandable. However, knowledge of such propositions entails empirical investigation. A chemist in order to ascertain the truth of such a proposition will have to compare diamond with all other metals and have a complete analysis of their physical and chemical properties. He will then have
to carry out a comparative analysis of the physical and chemical properties of the diamond with such properties of every other metal. Only such a detailed investigation will reveal diamond to be the hardest metal. Such propositions as "Lead is the heaviest metal", "carbon dioxide helps in extinguishing of fire", "Taj Mahal is made of marble stones", "the red book is on the brown table" etc., are examples of a posteriori knowledge. The attainment of such knowledge has got to be bucked up and certified by appropriate empirical research. A priori knowledge can be achieved just by mutual correlation between the subject and predicate terms.

Epistemologists have also worked out other distinctions with regard to the concept of knowledge. Some propositions are necessarily true and others are contingently true. So we can have knowledge that can be categorized as necessary and knowledge that can be qualified as contingent. Thus "all triangles have three angles" is a standard example of necessary knowledge. A triangle is necessarily three-angled geometrical figure. Under no circumstances, come what may, hell or high water, can we conceive a triangle which has either two angles or four angles. A triangle will remain a three-angled figure even when the entire universe can be snuffed out of existence. It has to remain three-angled figure in all possible worlds. On the other hand, a statement like "That rose is red" is a clear example of contingent knowledge. Given certain conditions, a rose can be red, and under other certain conditions it may not be red. It may even be blue or white or of any other colour. All mathematical propositions are examples of necessary knowledge and all empirical
propositions constitute the examples of contingent knowledge. Similarly, propositions can be analytic or synthetic. While a propositions priori are analytic, a posteriori propositions are synthetic. When we say all triangles have three angles, we know the proposition merely by the analysis of the triangle, for a triangle is by definition a figure having three angles. On the other hand, in a proposition, like "That rose is red", the term rose does not contain the property of redness for a rose can be of any standard colour. So, if it is red, then our knowledge is synthetic in the sense that we add the property of redness to the subject term of rose. All standard logico-mathematical propositions are analytic propositions whereas all standard empirical propositions are examples of synthetic knowledge.

(3) Conditions of Knowledge

The classical, medieval and even modern epistemologists have defined knowledge to be justified true belief. Such a definition entails that a proposition or knowledge-claim must be independently true or true-in-itself in order to count as knowledge. Secondly, any claimant of knowledge must be believing the proposition to be true. Thirdly, the claimant must have adequate reasons or grounds constituting the justification of a knowledge-claim under consideration. Knowledge is not merely true belief, it is adequately or appropriately justified true belief.

Philosophers have been wallowing into countless philosophical disagreements since times immemorial. They have been debating numberless
metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, axiological, teleological and epistemological questions. They have hardly agreed upon anything. However, surprisingly enough, right from Plato up to A.J. Ayer, they have been unanimous in agreeing upon three conditions of knowledge: the Truth condition, the Belief condition and the justification condition. The fundamental or the foremost condition of knowledge is that a propositional knowledge-claim must be true. Any knower must believe the proposition under consideration to be true. Furthermore, the person claiming to have knowledge of a proposition or a set of propositions must advance adequate grounds justifying the truth of a proposition or propositions with reference to a given context. If a justified true proposition is believed by a person, then that person can be said to be having the knowledge of that proposition. Such an analysis of knowledge is known as traditional or standard analysis of knowledge (Hospers, 2005, pp. 41-3).

In traditional or standard analysis of knowledge, truth is the defining or characterizing condition of knowledge. It is the essential condition of knowledge. The truth is almost interchangeable with knowledge, or we can say truth is equivalent to knowledge, the traditional or standard analysis of knowledge is largely indicative of the propositional character of truth. Just as we characterize human actions to be either good or bad or objects of the world, to be either attractive or repulsive, so are propositions characterized either to be true or false. However, only descriptive propositions can be categorized as true or false. Various other types of statements such as metaphorical, symbolic,
exclamatory, imperative, interrogative and interpretative statements cannot be subsumed under true or false category. Similarly metaphysical or theological statements and various other types of statements are not amenable to true/false categorization. The time-honoured methods of induction and deduction or rational inferences and arguments cannot settle the truth of such statements. The truth or falsity of such statements is beyond the ken of verification, demonstration or proof. Anyways, in order to be part and parcel of our knowledge, a proposition has go to be true. In this sense, even metaphysical or theological statements can be deemed to be conceivably true and to that extent we may concede them to be a possible part of our knowledge-stock.

Knowledge is unavoidably and inextricably dependent on Truth. If a statement is true, it can be a component of our knowledge. If a statement is false, it just cannot be deemed to be so. However, truth is independent of knowledge. Such statements “Lead is the heaviest metal”, “Oxygen helps in the burning of fire” and “Akbar was a sixteenth century king of India” etc., are normally deemed to be true statements and therefore also deemed to be integral to our stock of knowledge (Encyclopedia Americana, 1991, pp. 185-86).

For a proposition to be a part of our stock of knowledge, it has to be believed in by someone or the other. While countless statements believed in by countless knowers are true, there can be countless true statements which are not a part of our knowledge as such. True statements can be a part of our knowledge only when they are discovered by someone, verified by someone, appropriated by someone, or believed in by someone. The law of universal
gravitation was eternally and universally operating all along. However, when it was discovered by Newton in seventeenth century did it become a part of our knowledge. The same can be said about “Earth is moving round the Sun”. However, we came to know about it only through the investigations of Copernicus and Galileo. It signifies that true propositions become a part of our knowledge only when we understand them to be true and believe them to be true. Thus, belief may also be said to be integrally connected to our knowledge (Hamlyn, 1970, pp. 87-95).

Apart from truth-condition and belief-condition, justification-condition is the real test of human knowledge-claims. Propositions can be true independent of human understanding and any knower can believe in a proposition or set of propositions without knowing the truth of the propositions. The real test is whether a knower has a sufficient set of reasons establishing the truth of propositions under consideration. In order to claim the knowledge of a proposition we must have the capacity to carry out necessary and sufficient research with regard to any proposition. We must be able to mathematically demonstrate a proposition or scientifically a proposition or historically establish the truth of the proposition with the support of authentic evidence. Or, we must be able to establish the truth of a proposition under consideration by recourse to field-survey, data-collection or any other appropriate methodological strategy. Or, we must be able to establish average responses through statistical treatment. What is important is to be aware of the relevant processes of justification of various propositions or truth-claims. Any real
knower must be having adequate grounds with a view to establishing a truth-claim such as heliocentric hypothesis or law of universal gravitation or theory of biological evolution etc. Thus, in the light of traditional or standard analysis of knowledge, a person can be said to be having knowledge of a proposition, if the proposition under consideration is true, he believes it to be true and he has adequate or requisite grounds with a view to justifying the truth of a proposition.

(4) Sources of Knowledge

Historically speaking, epistemologists have advanced three theories of knowledge; empiricism, rationalism and intuitionism. According to empiricists, sense-experience or perception is the primary or fundamental source of knowledge. According to rationalists, human reason is the primary or basic source of knowledge. According to intuitionism it is intuition - an immediate flashlight - that intimates to us the real or authentic knowledge. All these three theories of knowledge, claim that they can furnish us justified true beliefs or true knowledge grounded on solid indefeasible or unassailable arguments or proofs.

(i) Empiricism

According to empiricism, experience through which we acquire knowledge is sense-experience or what is interchangeably called perception. We may perceive an object, experience a flash of light or feel some hard or warm object etc. Such a perception or experience is the fundamental source of
knowledge or the most reliable source of knowledge. As an epistemological theory, empiricism believes in the reliability of sense-experience as a way of knowing. Conversely empiricists have abiding distrust in the validity of conceptual knowledge. Empiricism is radically critical of the claims of rationalists advocating independent powers of reason which can disclose to us knowledge regarding objects, relations, events, processes etc. Empiricism is also highly suspicious of the claims of intuitionism or authoritarianism with regard to knowledge (Stroll, 1961, pp. 94-6).

The father of modern European empiricism was John Locke. He was an eloquent advocate of empiricism and profoundly influenced European philosophy of science. For Locke, the most important source of human knowledge is our sense-experience. He is highly critical of Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas -- the doctrine that human mind is naturally endowed with certain innate powers, to furnish us knowledge independent of human sense-experience. Locke is famous for comparing human mind with a clean state which is devoid of all ideas whatsoever. All our knowledge is finally traceable to human sense-experience. The British Empiricists such as Berkeley and Hume followed Locke’s basic epistemological framework. They accepted Locke’s contention that all knowledge is from experience. However, they further interpreted his basic doctrine to the effect that all knowledge is from sense-data. This was a rigorous interpretation of Locke’s basic empiricist contention. From this sensationalistic interpretation of sense-experience, David Hume derived the conclusion that all material objects in minds were clusters of
Chapter V

Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology

sensations. In this way, Hume turned empiricism into skepticism. Hume's empiricism was also instrumental in the rise and development of twentieth century logical positivism. They advanced the view that propositions which are cognitively significant must be either formal statements of logic and mathematics or empirical statements derived either from observation or verification. Other statements such as ethical, theological, metaphysical or mystical statements must be cognitively insignificant and neither true nor false but meaningless and nonsense (Hamlyn, 1970, pp. 33-41).

(ii) Rationalism

According to Rationalists the most important and the most fundamental source of knowledge is reason. Greeks were the first who advanced the doctrine of unqualified rationalism both in the epistemological and ontological senses. The pre-Greek civilizations were mostly oriented to mystical, religious and intuitive approaches and reason was deemed to be of secondary importance in the validation of both religious and epistemic beliefs. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were the foremost rationalist trio who laid unqualified emphasis on the capacity of reason to arrive at true ontological, cosmological and epistemological beliefs. Socrates advanced the view that reason is fully competent to discover objective truth and arrive at objective values. Plato defined his Ideas or Universals to be rational and understandable only by a rational intuition. Aristotle defined man to be a rational animal. In modern Europe, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were defined to be Age of Reason or the period of Enlightenment. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were thorough-
Chapter V  
Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology

going rationalists and deemed reason to be the most important source of knowledge. According to these modern European philosophers human mind was blessed with certain innate capacities or a priori truths, which can serve as a basis or foundation upon which a complex edifice of knowledge can be built up. It is through reason that we can discover scientific, mathematical and logical truths. Reason was also fully competent to discover objective moral principles and values with a view to guiding us in the multiple situational contexts of life. It is through reason that we can control our impulses, drives and desires. Christian theologians during Medieval Ages employed reason in defence of theological doctrines and values. As against sense-experience reason can provide us conceptual knowledge. It can go beyond perceptual particulars to form general or universal laws. Whereas, sense-experience can furnish us particular instances of knowledge, reason can furnish us general patterns of experience.

Some of the most important philosophers of west such as Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel were advocates of rationalist epistemology. They were convinced that reason was the only source of true and certain knowledge. As against reason, sense-experience can gives us only pieces of perceptual knowledge and intuition or mystical experience can land us into the vortex of obscurantism.

(iii) Intuitionism

Most religious and cultural conditions have anchored themselves on intuitive understanding of their basic beliefs and values. Intuition is deemed to
be furnishing us direct, immediate and certain knowledge. Mystical philosophers especially have underlined the supra-logical, supra-rational and supra-empirical sources of knowledge. Intuition signifies an immediate feeling of certain knowledge even when there is no apparent evidence for any knowledge-claim one is convinced about. Historically speaking, various religious and mystical traditions have claimed that highly advanced men of intuition have experienced immediate and direct visions, illuminations, inner voices etc. Such an intuitive knowledge leads to a sudden resolution of metaphysical, moral or religious conflicts within a seeker or inquirer. More often than not a sudden intuitive flashlight has the potential to completely reorient us and overhaul our very mode of being and doing. Mystical philosophers of all ancient traditions have confirmed that we can know the hidden reality behind the veil of the apparent universe by recourse to an intuitive flashlight. Plato underlined that we can understand the real world of ideas through rational intuition. Many Sufis have claimed to have had the experience of One Divine Reality beyond this illusory world. Great artists, philosophers and scientists have achieved excellence in their respective domains through their deep, profound and abiding intuitions. It is through intuition that scientists arrive at revolutionary hypotheses. Great artistic and philosophical accomplishments have been made possible by recourse to intuitive experiences. Great scientific laws are a function of powerful intuitive flashlights rather than a result of perceptual observations, rational
demonstrations or scientific inductions and deductions (Cooper, 2003, pp. 191-92).

There are many who have been critical of intuitive knowledge-claims. For example, psychologists have interpreted the so-called intuitive knowledge in terms of complex forms of latent sensory and emotional build-ups. They have not accepted the mysterious faculty called intuition. Many critics of intuitionism have argued that intuitive knowledge is not amenable to public verification. It is essentially a private flashlight.

Besides, perception, season and intuition, there are other sources of knowledge as well. For example, most of our beliefs we acquire through authority. When we study books, we acquire the knowledge of many things through authority of the author. Our parents, teachers, friends, preachers, leaders, media personalities etc., impart us innumerable beliefs. Each item of our knowledge need not be acquired by each one of us through personal research. Scholars, historians, scientists and teachers transmit to us numberless propositions of unimpeachable validity and authority.

(5) Picture Theory of Language

According to early Wittgenstein, there are three types of meaningful statements: Tautologies, contradictions and empirical statements. The tautologies such as 'All triangles have three angles', 'All bodies are extended', 'All Bachelors are unmarried' etc. are meaningful and true under all conditions. They are true by definition. They are analytic apriori because their predicate
terms are already contained in their subject terms. They are tautologous because they are true under all conditions. On the other hand, such propositions as 'The teacher drew a round square on a black-board', 'He is the son of a barren woman', 'That triangle has four angles' etc. are contradictions. Now, tautologies and contradictions are not part of human knowledge for tautologies are self-confirmatory, whereas contradictions are self-contradictory. We have not to go in for any methodical, technical, data-based or empirical research with a view to certifying tautologies or contradictions. It is the countless empirical propositions which are neither self-certifying nor self-contradictory and are or can be true or false under given conditions, which comprise or constitute human stock of knowledge.

According to early Wittgenstein's account of knowledge, propositions or utterances which are neither tautologies nor contradictions nor empirical statements, are at the very outset outside the pale of meaningfulness and therefore of knowledge. The non-tautologous, non-contradictory and non-empirical propositions can be of diverse types. Such propositions can be metaphysical, mystical, theological, ethical, ideological, religious or axiological — such propositions cannot be categorized either as true or false. In point of fact, they cannot even be deemed to be meaningful or significant propositions. They are neither true nor false nor meaningful but simply meaningless and non-sensical propositions. The true or false propositions have got to be empirical propositions. Only empirical propositions can be confirmed to be either true or false. Only statements of science qualify as empirical
propositions. And only such propositions can have significance, of course, by
recourse to observation, experimentation or other necessary and relevant
procedural strategies. The metaphysical philosophical and axiological
propositions, according to early Wittgenstein are condemned to be cognitively
insignificant and meaningless propositions. The question of the truth or falsity
of such propositions does not arise at all. For, in order to count to be either true
or false, a proposition has got to be meaningful. Meaningfulness is a necessary
condition of the truth of a proposition. A meaningless proposition can not be
even false not to speak of its being true.

Wittgenstein in his Tractarian phase worked out what is famously
known as picture theory of language. Early Wittgenstein is deeply impacted by
Russell’s logical atomism. He advances an all the more sophisticated version of
Russell’s atomistic doctrine. Early Wittgenstein accepts Russell’s distinction
between compound and simple propositions. The simple or the simplest
propositions are derived from complex or compound propositions. The simplest
propositions are ultimate propositions or unanalyzable propositions or
irreducible propositions. They are atomic propositions which just refuse to be
further reduced or simplified. Such atomic propositions are logical pictures of
atomic facts which comprise the world outside language. The atomic
propositions picturise or mirrorise atomic facts. Or, we can say atomic facts are
photographically represented by atomic propositions. This picturisibility of
atomic facts by atomic propositions is the basic condition imparting meaning to
atomic propositions. Every atomic proposition is meaningful in so far as it
works out a logical picture of a corresponding atomic fact. In this way, the atomic propositions become directly meaningful. The compound or complex propositions out of which atomic propositions are derived, to begin with, cannot be directly testified to be meaningful. They can be said to be indirectly meaningful in so far as a given set of atomic propositions derivable from a given compound proposition are directly certified to be meaningful propositions.

Metaphysical, theological, axiological and other such propositions are beyond the pale of atomistic analysis. It is so because, we just cannot have atomic propositions derivable from compound metaphysical, theological and axiological statements. In view of the fact that theological, metaphysical and axiological propositions cannot operate within the paradigm of atomistic analysis, Wittgenstein deems such propositions squarely to be neither true nor false but simply meaningless and nonsense.

Wittgenstein's theory of propositions in the Tractatus has far reaching and important consequences. All propositions, according to that view, are truth-functions of elementary propositions. It follows that there are only three kinds of propositions: (1) tautologies, those whose truth-tables assign them truth-values of truth only, (2) descriptive propositions, those whose truth-tables assign them truth-values of both truth and falsity, and (3) contradictions, those whose truth-tables assign them truth-values of falsity only. Since tautologies and contradictions "say nothing", the only kind of propositions that say anything are descriptive propositions. And all that a descriptive proposition can
say, in the end, is that certain states of affairs exist or do not exist, or that certain “truth-functional” combinations of them exist or do not exist. This, then, is all that can be said. All intelligible discourse is thus limited to assertions about states of affairs (Pitcher, 1964, p. 139).

According to early Wittgenstein, any thought can, in principle, be put into words. There cannot be a thought which cannot possibly be put into words or we cannot have a thought which it is impossible in principle to put into words. Thus Wittgenstein limits significant discourse to statements of natural science. It is empirical or descriptive propositions which assert the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Descriptive or empirical propositions can be physical object statements as well. However, it is the propositions of natural science which can be said to be constituting the hard-core of true propositions. The following propositions from the Tractatus bring out the same:

Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

(T.4.1)

The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences). (T.4.11)

Descriptive propositions, as a matter of fact, constitute the entire body of what can be significantly said. The tautologies and contradictions can say nothing. It is the propositions of natural sciences which assert all that can be said:
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science – i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this method would be the only strictly correct one (T.6.53)

The early Wittgenstein as represented by *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, is not carrying out any epistemological investigations. He is not forwarding any epistemological theory. He is not defending rationalism, empiricism or intuitionism like Descartes, Locke or Bergson. He is not finding truth, belief and justification conditions of knowledge to be insufficient to the purpose and recommending indefeasibility condition like Gettier, with a view to arriving at indubitable knowledge claims. He was not an advocate of skepticism like Hume and advancing a critique of causality, induction or law of uniformity of nature. He is not defending religious beliefs and values by recourse to mystical, intuitive or revelatory experience.

He is rather carrying out logical and methodological investigations of philosophy. He is evaluating the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of propositions or statements under consideration with a view to demarcating the
sphere of sayability from the sphere of unsayability. He is trying to figure out what can be meaningfully asserted and what can be meaninglessly blurted out.

Now, the quest for such methodological clarification or logical investigation can be multidimensionally impactful. It can horizontally impact multiple spheres of human discourse. It entails a comparative and cross-ventilative clarification of the propositions of mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences, religious sciences, humanities etc. Within philosophy, it can have deeply disturbing implications. It can provide a devastating critique of the entire philosophical discourse. The most time-honored and entrenched metaphysical, cosmological, axiological, ideological and epistemological claims can be shaken to their foundations. By surveying the logical geography of philosophical discourse, it can question the truth-value of metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, theological and ideological statements. Most importantly, it can interrogate the truth of theories of knowledge and knowledge-claims of various disciplines.

(6) Game Theory of Language

Later Wittgenstein was a semantic non-objectivist, and pluralist. He opened up a radically new paradigm of understanding and interpretation within which he encountered an altogether new set of expectations, ambitions as well as conceptions with regard to both language and philosophy. Later Wittgenstein is a thoroughgoing semantic pluralist. Whereas for early Wittgenstein, scientific propositions were privilegedly serving as paradigm
cases of both meaningfulness and truth, for later Wittgenstein no proposition from whatsoever field of investigation or interpretation can have any privileged status or special significance. All propositions are sailing in the same methodological boat and no proposition can have any privileged significance with reference to epistemic truth or validity. From mythology to metaphysics to natural sciences etc., all of us are playing language games of varying hues and colours. The meaning as well as truth of propositions operate intralinguistically. We just cannot have a translinguistic realm serving as a standard bearer or criterion of meaning or truth, we do not know what is beyond language. Any realm transcending language is beyond the ken of our understanding and interpretation. We are, so to say, condemned to intralinguistic realm and there is no universal, eternal and transcendental criterion which cuts across all the so-called incommensurable language-games.

In fact, truth is not the central concern of later Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis. Later Wittgenstein is centrally concerned with numerous uses of words and numberless functions of propositions as earlier Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with examining the meaning or sense of propositions against the backdrop of the world comprising of objects, phenomena or states of affairs. Later Wittgenstein is centrally concerned with examining the meaning or sense of language against the backdrop of forms of life. The earlier Wittgenstein was partly referential, the later Wittgenstein undercuts radically the role of reference in grasping the meaning or sense of language. For later Wittgenstein, language is essentially self-referential. The meaning of the
propositions is not to be determined by recourse to references comprising the non-linguistic world, but by recourse to examining the uses of words in their concrete forms of life. The earlier Wittgenstein was fundamentally carrying out logical analysis of the types of language. The later Wittgenstein was basically carrying out a phenomenological analysis of numberless functions of words and propositions in their concrete situational contexts.

Accordingly, later Wittgenstein submitted himself to the patient and painstaking phenomenological analysis of the entire linguistic terrain. His fundamental contention was that any quest for meaning is itself a metaphysical exercise, and the question, "what is meaning", is as metaphysical as the question, "what is reality". Rather we must abandon the grand metaphysical quest for meaning and engage ourselves in the modest task of understanding the uses of words and functions of language. Later Wittgenstein has tabulated various types of language-games we engage in while speaking out or using language in various contexts.

The view of philosophy which Wittgenstein takes or believes that he takes, in his later writings, is clearly set out in one of the paragraphs of ‘Philosophical Investigations’. We may not, he there says, ‘advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything hypothetical in our consideration. We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take place. This description gets its power of illumination i.e. its purpose from the philosophical problem. There are, of course, empirical problems, they are solved, rather by looking into the workings of our language; and that in such a way as to make us
recognize those workings in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we
have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language [PI, Sec. 109].

A philosopher is also deeply puzzled by certain kind of mental or
intellectual pictures. He tends to have a picture of such philosophical words as
‘time’, ‘space’, ‘mind’ etc. Thus a philosopher may picture the mind as a
spiritual thing, the memory as a kind of storehouse and the meaning of the
word a kind of halo etc. This picturing also does lead philosopher to
assimilating philosophical words such as mind to common words such as some
kind of a place. Thus when we say “Keep this book in the box”. The
philosopher may model his philosophical statements such as “keep these ideas
in mind” on such statements as “keep these ideas in mind” or “Register this
result in mind” etc. Thus we may assume mind to be like body and ask
questions like, “How is mind related to body”? Thus, Descartes may be caught
in the paradox of mind-body dualism. Similar other philosophical paradoxes
can be traced to linguistic confusion through appropriate analysis of various
type of statements (Pitcher, 1964, p. 205).

Wittgenstein’s rejection of his own earlier conception of language has
had consequences of fundamental significance. The later Wittgenstein rejected
the view that language has one basic use, the statement of facts. He rejected the
notion that sentences are logical pictures of the facts with which they purport
to deal. Language, he now argues, is not essentially a pictorial art, language is
rather more like a tool for getting various jobs done. The meaning of words and sentences is to be analyzed in terms of their uses within the linguistic and extralinguistic contexts in which we employ them.

The notion of a logically perfect language is itself unclear and confused. It is a fundamental mistake to attempt to analyse or to reconstruct the meanings of expressions in ordinary language. By doing so, we ignore their familiar linguistic functions. There is no ideal structure or syntax to which words in any proper use must conform. We can discover illuminating likenesses between various language-games. What we call simplicity and clarity are not the characteristics of certain unique concepts. Nor is there any one absolute direction which philosophical analysis of statements ought to take. The ideal of atomic facts, like that of Descarte's distinct ideas, is based upon a myth. A useful and clarificatory analysis can only describe how a term is used in the contexts in which it is normally applied.

While early Wittgenstein was certifying scientific propositions as paradigmatic instances of knowledge, for later Wittgenstein physics was as much comprised of Language-games as was metaphysics. We are condemned to be operating within the numberless networks of language-games. We just cannot jump out of our linguistic skin, so to say. We can never command a translinguistic with a view to omnicompetently sift true propositions from false ones. We can, at best, attempt a comparative analysis of all possible or available types of propositions with a view to liberating ourselves from confusions and puzzlements.
Wittgenstein's greatest contribution to epistemology is his depth-linguistic analysis of philosophical discourse in a comparative methodological frame of reference. There were many who carried out analysis of philosophical discourse before Wittgenstein. Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, James and many more employed analytical method with a view to clarifying the logic of philosophical discourse. Wittgenstein's immediate predecessors, Mach, Frege, Russell and Moore carried out intensive and extensive methodological investigations of philosophy with a to accomplishing clarification of philosophical issues and problems. However, Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical issues and problems by recourse to linguistic analysis was a turning point in the onward march of philosophy to self-authentication. Wittgenstein advanced as well as inspired others to advance an analysis of philosophical problems by bringing out the logical cash-value of various types of prepositions and statements.

Wittgenstein came to realize that the assumption that all language starts with facts and contains a logical skeleton was derived not by observation but by thought. Just as various games have similarities, relationships and other common features in between them, so various language-games can also share similarities, relationships and common features. His earlier doctrine, namely, Logical Atomism was not the product of careful observation of the way language actually operates. Wittgenstein therefore, shifted the programme of analysis from a preoccupation with logic and the construction of a perfect language to the study of ordinary usages of languages. The early Wittgenstein
was in accord with Russell and Carnap. The later Wittgenstein directed his attention upon the analysis of ordinary language as emphasized by Moore. The later Wittgenstein rejected the assumption of a single pattern in language. Now, he found language as complex as life itself. Now, he recommended that analysis should consist not in the quest for meaning. Rather, a philosopher must engage in a careful description of its uses. There is no scope for explanation is philosophy. A philosopher must engage in description of multiple uses of language. Most importantly, he must be methodologically sophisticated and nuanced enough to appreciate the multidimensional and multicomplexional character of words and sentences in all their multicontextual frames of reference, meaning, interpretation and understanding. At least, he must categorically distinguish between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of language. If he is devoid of this distinction, his confusions can get worse confounded.

We can cite various philosophical problems as having fundamentally arisen in view of philosophers confusing descriptive language-games with non-descriptive language-games. Take, for example, the so-called philosophical problem of ‘Other Minds’.

Philosophical trouble regarding other minds arises due to the impossibility of a direct and independent check-up about them. There seems to be no sufficient proof which could conclusively convince one person of the actual occurrence of mental states on the part of other person. The analogical argument regarding other minds is basically different from ordinary type of
analogical inferences. Ordinarily, we can gather direct evidence and verify our claims. If we argue for instance, from various similarities between two human bodies and presence of brain in one of them, to the presence of brain in the other, the conclusion itself is clearly open to direct surgical examination. But if a person A, on the basis of the regular concomitance of his own mental states with certain aspects of his behavior, infers similar mental states as concomitant with the other person B's behavior then he cannot by any known or even conceivable procedure convince himself of the truth of his conclusion.

Although the problem of other minds can be traced back to Platonic Dialogues, yet it figured prominently in philosophical discussions after Descartes made a strong plea for mind-body dualism. The dualist interpretation of mind and body introduced the familiar tone of talking about mind as a separate entity which cannot be verified by observation. Nevertheless, the problem was subjected to searching analyses in the hands of analytic philosophers. Russell felt the problem to be an intractable one and concluded that no amount of logical or empirical investigation can justify the probability of the existence of other minds, although he advised that admission of other minds is both necessary and desirable if we are to save ourselves from falling into the trap of solipsism.

The problem has received a novel treatment in the hands of therapeutic analysts such as Wittgenstein and Wisdom. They have attacked the very traditional metaphysical view of the problem of other minds. Instead of offering a philosophically satisfactory answer to the problem or replacing the
old view by a new one, they have rather tried to dissolve it through linguistic analysis.

Wittgenstein puts forward the thesis that problem about other people’s minds is mainly due to the misunderstanding about the language. It crops up because of confusing mind-statements with ordinary descriptive statements. We think just as ordinary statements like, “I eat food”, “I wash my clothes”, describe certain physical states of affairs about me, similarly the mind-statements or sensation-statements such as, “I am in pain”, or “I am angry” also describe some of my mental states of affairs. Because we are confused about the logic of the sensation-statements, we think, “I am in pain” or “I am angry” and the like first-person present-tense utterances give a privileged position to the speaker of such utterances and he becomes aware of his mental states in his own private language and none of us therefore can have access to the sanctum sanctorum of his mind.

Wittgenstein thinks that the whole rub about other minds lies in ascribing any descriptive content to mind-statements or sensation-language-games. If it can be convincingly shown that language-games relating to so-called mental phenomena are shorn of any descriptive content, the problem of mind and with it the problem of other minds will crumble down like a house of cards. Wittgenstein points out that words and sentences in themselves are dead. They become alive in actual language-games which are rooted in our forms of life. What creates philosophical tangles is that the philosopher due to his inordinate craving for unity or his quest for abstract essences, does not want to
contemplate the untidy range of diversified language-games and outline the complex logical geography of philosophical discourse.

Let us take, for example, a sensation-statement such as, “I am in pain”. In the ordinary or trivial sense the word ‘pain’ in the above utterance does name a sensation. In this sense ‘pain’ is a sensation-word, just as ‘five’ is a number-word. However, the point of contention is that how the word ‘pain’ denotes a sensation. It is quite natural to suppose that the relation between ‘pain’ and a certain familiar kind of private sensation are very similar indeed to those between, say, ‘red’ and a certain familiar kind of publicly observable property. It seems that, ‘I am in pain’ attributes a sensation to me just as, “His book is red”, attributes red colour to his book. We talk about pain, very much as we talk about colour or sound. It is just this view that Wittgenstein most forcefully tries to repudiate (Pitcher, 1964, p. 293).

Wittgenstein points out that the word ‘pain’ does not denote anything in pain-language-games in the way words ‘red’ or ‘blue’ denote something in various colour-language-games. It is so because the words ‘red’ or ‘blue’ as against the word ‘pain’ have a descriptive use. The word ‘pain’ acquires its use in the concrete ‘pain behaviour’ of human beings and does not describe any private sensation as such; if there were no express manifestations or expressions of pain, i.e., if people just inwardly had pains, but did not cry or grown or grimace or plead for help then there is no conceivable way that anyone could learn the use of the word ‘pain’. The ‘pain behaviour’ plays an indispensable part in the teaching and learning of the word ‘pain’. The pain-
language-games owe their very existence to the pain behavior; for example, to crying, groaning, administering of sedatives and applying of bandages by the physicians etc. The private sensations, whatsoever they might be, play no part at all when we come upon a man who just has been run over by a car and who is bleeding, moaning, crying out for help and we rush him to the doctor and do everything we can to make him comfortable. It is the linguistic as well as non-linguistic behavior on his and on our part that enters into this kind of pain-language-games. His private sensations do not enter into them, they are completely unknown to us. We have no idea what he might be feeling and it is not in the least needed also. We proceed in exactly the same way no matter what his sensations may be like.

Wittgenstein is not denying the fact of pain as such. As a matter of fact, there are acute and terrible pains and it would be extremely absurd to deny what is obvious. He is only denying a particular thesis about language, namely that the word 'pain' or for that matter such sensation-words as 'anger', 'sorrow', 'joy' and 'repentance' etc., designate something which is even remotely identical to how descriptive words designate their objects of reference (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 282-83).

Thus Wittgenstein thinks that confusion about other minds arises from the failure to appreciate the way in which language of sensations functions. Once we appreciate that sensation-language-games are not designative of private language in which people specially communicate to themselves, the
problem of other minds is automatically and simultaneously dissolved into oblivion.

There is no royal road to philosophy. There is no single supreme method of doing philosophy or working out philosophical analysis, although according to Wittgenstein, there are various methods like various therapeutics, which can relieve us of our philosophical puzzlement. Because philosophical problems grow out of language, it is necessary to acquire a basic familiarity with the usage of the language out of which each problem arises. As there are many kinds of games, there are many sets of the rules of the games. Similarly, as there are many forms of ordinary language of work, play, worship, science, metaphysics, poetry, theology etc., so there are many usages or corresponding language-games with corresponding rules we engage ourselves different confronting situational matrices or negotiating various contexts or frames of reference. Under these circumstances, the work of the philosopher consists in assembling minders of the way language is used with a view to clarifying the origin, genesis and development of philosophical problems.

Now, if the philosopher cannot make the simple distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive statements, he can be quagmired into irresolvable philosophical paradoxes or dilemmas masquerading as time-honoured and respectable philosophical problems. As if these dilemmas or paradoxes are amenable to solution, only if the philosopher produs enough to recognize their truth.
Chapter V  
Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology

The issues pertaining to knowledge or justified true beliefs etc., can have their own complex logic. There can be various criteria of knowledge or various conditions of knowledge. There can be various theories of knowledge as well as various theories of truth. Philosophers can engage in numberless disagreements with regard to knowledge, truth and justification. They can negotiate various conditions of knowledge, truth and justification and even stipulate various conditions thereof. However, they cannot afford to be oblivious to the basic methodological distinctions or sophistications with regard to the logical terrain of language. They cannot afford to be ignorant with regard to the logical topography of language. For if they cannot command a clear view of the logical terrain of language, they can perennially get circumlocuted in the labyrinthine tangles of language and may never be negotiating the orbit of propositional truth or untruth in view of their blissful ignorance of basic methodological distinctions within the multicomplex terrain of language. Being aware of the logic of language may not be the sufficient condition of knowledge but it is a necessary condition of knowledge. The philosopher must know how language is actually operating across the spectrum. He musts be aware of the descriptive and non-descriptive operations carried out by a given language. He must grasp the multifunctional, multidirectional and multicontextual character of language.

Only then can a philosopher grasp that all that glitters at the propositional plane need not be golden at the epistemic plane. Language carries out an infinite number of operations. In this onward march of linguistic
infinitum, there are propositions that are referentially true and contextually meaningful. However, the primary business of language is not to go on engaging in truth-operations or knowledge-operations. Propositions can be descriptively true, viz; “The cat is on the mat” and “That rose is red” or experimentally verifiable, viz; “Oxygen helps in the burning of fire” or “H₂O = water” or logically or demonstrably necessary, viz; “If A = B, and B = C, then A = C” or “Any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third” etc. However, language as such is not addressed to exploring truth or arriving at sure and certain knowledge. Scientific researchers can aspire to discovering correspondent truth or mathematicians and historians can aspire to exploring coherent truth and thereby expand the frontiers of knowledge. However, the fundamental mood or direction of any given language is pragmatic. Any given language operates pragmatically. Wittgenstein’s radical emphasis on functions or operations of language smacks of perfect congruence with the basic direction or orientation of pragmatism. We employ language with a view to doing something. We carry out myriad operations through language and in all such operations, words and sentences are perfectly meaningfully employed. We never question the doing character of language, the functional or operational mode of language. The questions with regard to meaning of words or propositions arise when, as Wittgenstein said, language goes on holiday. However, the questions pertaining to truth and knowledge, are, broadly speaking, irrelevant to the fundamentally doing character of language. As it happens, language is, primarily oriented to pragmatic operations or commercial
transactions and only figuratively or metaphorically extrapolated to questions pertaining to truth and knowledge.

We have this irresistible quest for truth, for understanding, for realization. However, as Wittgenstein underlined, there is no pure or unalloyed truth, understanding or realization. Human understanding is co-extensive with language. There is no non-linguistic understanding. Our understanding can have pictorial components. Besides early Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language or meaning even later Wittgenstein talked of our being trapped into mental or conceptual pictures. However, for later Wittgenstein, our understanding is primarily interpretative or hermeneutical and, more importantly, there is no translinguistic understanding which can yield absolutely clear truth or unqualified knowledge.

Besides giving us an overall framework of linguistic analysis within which to tackle the larger questions of truth, justification and knowledge, Wittgenstein has also tried to tackle the ancient epistemological issue known as skepticism. Sceptics, throughout the history of western philosophy, have questioned the veracity, reliability and authenticity of knowledge-claims. As a philosophical attitude, scepticism is the doubting of knowledge-claims set forth in various areas of research, investigation and interpretation. Sceptics have challenged the adequacy or reliability of these claims by asking what they are based upon or what they actually establish. They have raised the question whether such claims about the world are either indubitable or necessarily true.
and they have challenged the alleged grounds or accepted assumptions of knowledge-claims.

From ancient times onward sceptics have developed arguments to undermine the contentions of dogmatic philosophers, scientists and theologians. The sceptical arguments and their employment against various forms of dogmatism have played an important role in shaping both the problems and the solutions offered in the course of western philosophy. In ancient times sceptics challenged the claims of Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism and Hegelianism too have been challenged by modern European sceptics. Various religions and theologies have also come under sceptical attack in our times.

David Hume was one of the most celebrated skeptical philosophers in modern philosophy. He started with empiricist epistemological assumptions and ultimately arrived at a powerful sceptical standpoint. Accepting sensations or impressions to be the basic source of all knowledge, Hume argued that it is impossible to guarantee the validity or veridicality of inductive generalizations, causal connections, soul or afterlife by recourse to sense-impressions. Accepting relations of ideas or analytic statements and matters of fact or synthetic statements to be meaningful, Hume recommended to consign all metaphysical and theological discourse to flames for it could contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
In western philosophy, scepticism has raised basic epistemological issues. For example, human beings have various experiences. Skeptics question as to which experiences are veridical and which are not. Human beings have different perceptions of what is presumed to be one object. Skeptics question as to which is the correct view. Human beings have illusory experiences, skeptics question as to whether it is really possible to distinguish illusions and dreams from reality. Whenever any criteria of knowledge or of value or of beauty are formulated or advanced, skeptics question the basis of the criteria or demand an indubitable justification of the criteria. On what basis does one tell whether one has the right criteria? By other criteria? Then, are these correct? On what standards? The attempt to justify criteria seems either to lead to infinite regress or to just stop arbitrarily. If an attempt is made to justify knowledge-claims by starting with first principles, the skeptics ask as to what are they based upon? Can it be established that these principles cannot possibly be false? If so, the proof itself must be such that it cannot be questioned. If it is claimed that the principles are self-evident, it is asked as to whether one can be sure about it, sure that one is not deceived? And can one be sure that one can recognize and apply the principles correctly? Through such questions skeptics have tried to question the very possibility of knowledge?

Skeptics have been critical with the entire epistemological project. They have denied the very possibility of knowledge. Rationalist epistemologists such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz have struggled to find indubitable or self-evident principles which could serve as axioms from which to derive
subsequent knowledge-claims. However, all such attempts have been debunked by sceptics. The sceptics have argued that unless knowledge is indubitable and infallible, it cannot be deemed to be knowledge.

While the principles of Logic, analytic statements and statements about one’s personal pain have generally been deemed to be outside the purview of sceptical interrogations or questions, the inductive statements, laws and generalizations have been most prone to sceptical attacks. The skeptic may ask, “How do you know the sun will rise tomorrow?” , “How do you know that the law of gravitation will continue to hold true?” , “Do we really have the evidence that the laws of nature will continue to operate as they have thus far?” etc. We can respond by saying that we do know. Does not the fact that a law has operated all these many years without a single exception constitute very good evidence that it will continue to operate tomorrow? The skeptic can retort by saying that the fact that a law of nature has continuously and consistently operated in the past does not provide either the evidence or guarantee that it will continue to operate in the future as well. How are we convinced that the operations of the universe in the past give us any clue with regard to its future operations? Not only do we not know that the Law of Gravitation, for example, will continue to operate tomorrow, but we have no evidence that it will. The so-called evidence from the past cannot be granted to be the evidence, as past is not a reliable guide to the future.

The foremost condition of knowledge is the availability of evidence. However, the question arises as to how much evidence is needed with a view to
be assured that we know a particular proposition under consideration. The skeptic will retort that “some evidence” would not suffice as an answer. There may be some evidence that tomorrow will be sunny, but you do not yet know it. How about “all the evidence that is available?” But this would not do either; all the evidence that is now available may not be enough. All the evidence that is now available is far from sufficient to enable us to know whether there are conscious beings on other planets. We just do not know, even after we have examined all the evidence at our disposal.

Critics of scepticism have claimed that anyone who tried to be a complete skeptic, denying or suspending all judgements, would soon be driven insane. Even Hume thought that the complete skeptic would have to starve to death and would walk into walls or out of windows. Hume, therefore, separated the doubting activity from natural practical activities in the world. Skeptical philosophizing can be carried on only in theory. Practical activities do unavoidably lead to beliefs.

Some recent thinkers like A. J. Ayer and John Austin have contended that scepticism is unnecessary. If knowledge is defined in terms of satisfying meaningful criteria, then knowledge is open to all. The sceptics have raised false problems. As a matter of fact, it is possible to tell that some experiences are illusory since we have criteria for distinguishing them from actual events. We do resolve doubts and reach a state of knowledge through various verification procedures, after which doubt is meaningless.
However, scepticism throughout history has played a dynamic role in forcing dogmatic philosophers to find better or stronger bases for their theories. It has forced a continued re-examination of previous knowledge - claims and has stimulated creative thinkers to work out new theories to meet the sceptical challenge (Cornman, Lehrer & Pappas, 1982, pp. 39-45).

Wittgenstein, in his last book “On Certainty” takes up the question of knowledge and the perennial possibility of scepticism. This book is in response to Moore’s so-called proof of the external world, holding up his hands and saying, ‘Here is one hand’ and ‘Here is another’, and concluding therefrom that the external world does really exist. Wittgenstein is sure about the relevance of Moore’s examples. He also coins several examples of his own. However, he argues that when Moore speaks of ‘knowledge’, he is not using the word in accordance with normal conditions. When one says “I know”, one is ready to give compelling reasons. But it is not clear how such conditions could be met with reference to Moore’s examples, such as ‘Here is a hand’. While responding to Moore’s examples and his own coinages such as “The earth already existed sometime before my birth” etc, Wittgenstein is really puzzled as to what to make of this peculiar situation. Knowledge is what we can justify by advancing relevant, cogent and coherent reasons. Now when I say “Here is my hand’, we do not have relevant, cogent and coherent reasons to justify it. Can we say that Moore’s example does constitute a case of knowledge? Wittgenstein would like to reserve the expression “I know”, for the cases it is
used in normal linguistic exchange. If I say "I know" that I am now sitting in a chair", here the word "know" is not used in its appropriate context:

Moore was advancing certain propositions which he, "knew, with Certainty, to be true". Like Descartes he was trying to defeat scepticism and rehabilitate knowledge by advancing certain unassailable and indubitable propositions. Wittgenstein is not in full agreement with this foundationalist programme advanced by rationalists, empiricists or G. E. Moore. He questioned as to whether Moore's propositions were cases of knowledge at all. However, for Wittgenstein propositions such as 'I know this is my left hand', 'The earth has existed for a long time before I was born', 'the mountains are older than trees', 'I know I am sitting in the chair now' etc, do play a logical role in our system. According to Wittgenstein, such propositions must be taken for granted if there is to be any doubting or questioning at all. Our questions and doubts make sense only if certain propositions are exempt from doubt (On Certainty, 1969, p. 341). Such propositions are, according to Wittgenstein, part of one's 'world-picture', 'the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false' (OC, 1969, p. 94). Such propositions cannot be doubted without giving up all judgement. Somebody who doubts such propositions cannot be communicated with for he undercuts the very scope for arguments and counterarguments. If somebody says he doubts whether he has a body, we simply do not know what it means to try to convince him that he has one (OC, 1969, p. 257). We can engage with someone only if he deems such propositions to be beyond doubt. However, it does not mean that such propositions are
strong cases or examples of knowledge for they do not confirm very well to the normal conditions for knowledge (Oswald Hanfling, 1989, p.160).

From the above observations of Wittgenstein with regard to skepticism, we can assume that he has attempted to deal with one of the most crucial and recurring problems of epistemology. As already pointed out, skepticism as an attitude or standpoint has been, for better or worse, an extra-ordinarily impactful as well as insightful response of philosophers to working out an overall estimate of philosophical enterprise. The upshot of Wittgenstein’s critique of skepticism is that a wholesale skepticism is impossible of formulation as well as understanding. In launching the wholesale or fully-fledged skepticism, the philosophers literally throw the baby with the bathwater. Such a skepticism is self-refuting. It cannot be that we run with the rabbits and hunt with the hounds. Skeptics will have to admit some propositions whether logico-mathematical or observational to be true in order to impart some sense or significance to their skeptical posers.

Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’, is a radical interpretation of language. In this work of seminal significance, Wittgenstein brought out the limitations of his understanding of language upon which his earlier book *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* rested. His understanding of language was inadequate because he deemed language to be monofunctional rather than multifunctional. He had assumed that description of facts was the only or most fundamental function of language. He had also assumed that statements derived their meanings from stating facts. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein
brought out that language has many functions besides picturing of facts. A language is multifunctional because it is multi-contextual. It is impossible to count numberless ways in which language can be used. Some illustrative uses of language are metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, scientific, symbolic, invocative, informative, descriptive, prescriptive, evocative, exhortative, parabolical, allegorical, metaphorical, affirmative, negative etc. Wittgenstein points out that promising, asking, commending, praying, joking, swearing, cursing, greeting, thinking. Play-acting and story-telling etc. are some other uses of language. All these are multiple language-games bringing out multiple roles and purposes for which linguistic expressions can be used. By highlighting multiple language games, Wittgenstein tries to undermine the assumption that words have only the descriptive role to play. The different language-games bring out the different roles that language can play. Words derive their meanings from their use and each word has a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context (Pitcher, 1964, p. 224).

The later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the diversity of the functions of language fructified into an alternative conception of philosophy. The task or function of philosophy now was to liberate the philosopher from confusion, puzzlement and bewitchment. Philosophy had now to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. The words had to be brought back from their metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, philosophy will not be adding to our knowledge or providing us new information, it will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful description.
of language. Such a linguistic analysis of multiple expressions will show the fly
the way out of the fly-bottle. The role of linguistic analysis will not be
informative or communicative but therapeutic.

According to later Wittgenstein there is no royal method of doing
philosophy. There are various methods like various therapies, which can relieve
philosopher of puzzlement. The genesis of philosophical puzzlement is in
language. Philosophical problems grow out of language. In view of the same, it
is necessary to be familiar with the usages of the language out of which such
problems arise. Work, play, worship, science, metaphysics, poetry, theology
etc. require corresponding usage of language. The job of the philosopher is to
assemble reminders of the way language is used as a way of clarifying the
origin, genesis and development of philosophical problems.

Later Wittgenstein like early Wittgenstein is categorically opposed to
providing any overall metaphysical picture of the world. For later Wittgenstein,
we operate in countless language-games. It is these language-games which
provide us our understanding of the world. The metaphysical picture of the
relationship between language and reality lies outside language. Therefore, it
is impossible to arrive at truth defined as correspondence with or picturing of
reality. The meaning and truth operate intra-linguistically. They are not to be
understood with reference to some external reality. They are to be understood
within the context of multiple uses of language. Our ideas are not lurking
within words. Such a perspective needs to be replaced by a radical paradigm-
shift. Early Wittgenstein, maintains that ideas and language are wholly
independent. For later Wittgenstein, ideas are always symbolically embodied and essentially inseparable. Words do not serve as a medium of exchange for ideas. Words are the very stuff of which ideas are made. It is as impossible to separate thought from language as it is to separate mind from its organic embodiment.

In view of the above considerations, the metaphysical quest for objective reality is impossible of realization, says later Wittgenstein. The quest for finding a single meaning of words and especially of philosophical terms, is also a hopeless struggle. The meanings of words are dependent upon their context. Therefore, it is pointless to try to jump out of our linguistic skin. Philosophers who are itching for a final, objective, transcendental, universal and eternal philosophical account or perspective upon the universe, are to be treated as suffering from conceptual illusions and linguistic confusions. They are to be treated as patients and relieved of their confusions and misconceptions though requisite and appropriate methodological field-illumination. Analysis of the multiple functions, purposes and usages of language is the most appropriate method of liberating the philosopher from his puzzlement. Appropriate linguistic analysis can lead to dissolution of philosophical problems by revealing the hidden motivations of philosophical questions, thus leading to the withering away of questions themselves. Such an analysis can lead to dissolution of philosophical conflicts and disagreements (Khwaja, 1965, p.105).
Later Wittgenstein asserted that philosophy is a purely descriptive enterprise. The task of philosophy is neither to reform language nor to try to place the various uses of language on a secure foundation. Through the analysis of the uses of language, Wittgenstein attempted to undermine the idea that philosophy is a foundational enterprise. Rather, philosophical problems are removed by having a correct understanding of how language actually functions. The key notion in later Wittgenstein's conception of language is the notion of a language-game. We should think of the words in language as being like the pieces in a game. They are not to be understood by looking for some associated ideas in the mind by following some procedure of verification or even by looking at the objects for which they stand. Rather, we should think of words in terms of their use. Referring to objects in the world is only one of many uses that words have. The meaning of a word is given by its use and the family of uses that a group of words has constitutes a language-game. For example, the language-game we play in describing our own sensations, or the language-game we play in identifying the causes of events. This conception of language leads Wittgenstein to the rejection of the conception that the task of philosophical analysis is reductionist or foundationalist. That is, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that language-games either have or need a foundation in something else. He also rejects the idea that certain language-games can be reduced to certain other kinds of language-games. Wittgenstein says, philosophical analysis does not alter our existing linguistic practices nor does it challenge their validity.
For Wittgenstein, knowledge is not the mental representation of what is outside the mind. It is this notion of knowledge as accurate representation that Wittgenstein struggles to set aside. There is no all-encompassing discipline which legitimizes or grounds the other disciplines. Epistemological foundationalism is itself devoid of foundation or justification. For Wittgenstein, there is no way to stop the infinite regress in the knowing process by an appeal to some point or source that is self-evident and self-authenticating and serves as a bedrock validating the claims that are subsequently built upon it. For Wittgenstein there is no such ultimate source of evidence. There is simply no way to move outside of the humanly created languages, cultures, institutions and practices within which human beings reside, participate, know and undertake their multiple projects. For Wittgenstein, every justification or evidence is rooted in forms of life. For later Wittgenstein language is a form of activity rather than a form of representation of world. Language is a social practice and it has no mechanism to tell what the structure of world is. Language is not like a map but is like a set of game played by the users of the language.

In a sense, Wittgenstein's critique of traditional epistemology was in continuation with the Kantian critique of epistemology. Hume's skepticism seemed to Kant to be a great challenge to the project of knowledge. It struck at the very foundations of philosophy and science. If there is no rational justification of our beliefs, then the foundations of both philosophy and science rest on thin air. If skepticism is to be avoided, says Kant, we must show, how
universal and necessary connections are rationally justifiable. Kant says that
the necessary quality of causal and inductive judgements is determined by the
structure of mind itself. The mind is not like an inert block of wax passively
receiving and recording the impressions of sense, as Locke and other British
sensationalists held. The mind is a creative, active and dynamic process. It is
equipped with certain innate forms which order and interpret sense-experience.
The understanding, according to Kant, possesses twelve innate forms or
categories. It is from these categories that our experience derives its' quality of
universality and necessity. Those general and necessary judgements which
Hume declared impossible to justify are the products of the categories of the
mind upon the stuff of experience.

According to Kant, the conceptual knowledge is subjective in the sense
that concepts come to us as products of the categories of our minds rather than
from external world. Percepts are derived from an objective source external to
us. But, since percepts are organized by concepts which owe their nature to the
structure of the mind, everything that we know is coloured by our knowing
faculty. We can never know the real nature of the external world, if by external
world is meant, the world as it exists independently of human knowledge.
Things-in-themselves, as Kant calls them, are unknowable or forever hidden
from us. What we do know are the appearances (phenomena) produced by the
operations of the forms of mind upon this unknowable x-world.

Now, if Kant's theory is correct, we are born with mind like ordering
glasses. Through these mental lenses there filters the flux of the external world
in such a way that we say this world is an ordered, connected, rational whole. By finding the source of natural order as a whole within man rather than the external world, Kant believed that he had accomplished a Copernican revolution in philosophy.

Wittgenstein, in his own way, accomplished another Copernican revolution in twentieth century. Just as for Kant all our knowledge—claims are ultimately traceable to the structure of our mind, so for later Wittgenstein all our knowledge-claims are ultimately traceable to the structure of our language. Language imposes its categories upon our thought and we just cannot jump out of our linguistic skin.

In his later work Wittgenstein denies any attempt to provide an overall metaphysical picture at all. We find ourselves caught in a language-game, a game that provides us with what we understand as the world. The overall metaphysical picture of the relationship between language and reality lies outside our grasp, for it lies outside language. As a consequence, Wittgenstein abandoned any notion of truth as correspondence with or picturing of reality, and instead understood meaning and truth as an internal function of language. The meaning of a word or sentence was not to be found in some external reality but simply in terms of its use within language.

Previously, thought or ideas were deemed to be lurking somehow behind or within “words”. It has come to seem progressively more inadequate and in need of replacement by a radically improved perspective. If the root idea
of the older view is that thought and language are, in principle, wholly independent, correspondingly the basic insight of the newer position is that there can be no fully articulated thought without symbolic embodiment.

Language is no longer perceived to be a medium of exchange between ideas, but as the very "stuff" of which "ideas" are made. To separate thought from language is like separating mind from its embodiment in a human organism.

For later Wittgenstein, therefore, not only is there no objective reality but there is no single meaning. Any sentence or proportion has as many meanings as there are contexts. Furthermore, anyone who desires to provide a final account is to be treated as if suffering from a philosophical disease. There are no answers in any ultimate sense, there are only responses within language.

This radical shift of perspective tends to make the study of language nearly co-extensive with the study of all human behavior. Thus study of language has intimate relations with psychology, sociology, anthropology, logic, literary criticism and aesthetics.

From the language-game account of philosophy as advanced by Wittgenstein, it can be safely assumed that he is not forwarding any metaphysical, ontocosmological or epistemological theories in philosophy but only employing a therapeutic method. He is helping us to break free of confusions that we are caught in when we try to philosophize. At the same time Wittgenstein is disabusing us of the notion that we can stand outside language.
and command an external view and that such an external view is necessary and possible for grasping essence of thought in language. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein advances an ontology characterised by features of realism. In his later phase, Wittgenstein embraces a theory of meaning which has the characteristic features of anti-realism.

The language-game account of philosophy advanced by Wittgenstein anticipates certain postmodern themes. Thus Wittgenstein can be said to be presaging anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism, anti-realism, post epistemological stand-point, anti-representationalism, rejection of metanarratives. Thus, Wittgenstein may be said to be presaging the postmodern turnaround of philosophy in the second half of twentieth century.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter VI

Critical Evaluation
CHAPTER VI

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The early Wittgenstein (1889-1951), following Bertrand Russell, gave a clear and categorical version of logical atomism in his book *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. His picture theory of propositions or of language is apparently a direct outcome of his atomistic analysis. Propositions, according to early Wittgenstein, are logical pictures of the situation. Language mirrors the logical forms of the universe. The function of analysis is to resolve all complex propositions into their ultimate units of unanalyzable names and their combination which represent the ultimate symbols of the world. The task of analysis is to make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it describes. There is an essential correspondence between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. The world or reality is mirrored in the basic patterns of rational discourse. Given the syntax of a scientifically correct language, one can determine the ontological structure of objective reality (William and Hennery, 1962, p. 487).

Thus for early Wittgenstein, in analyzing the meaning of any proposition, we must ultimately arrive at nothing but elementary propositions. The sense of any propositions can thus be stated completely by means of elementary propositions, so that if one had a set of all possible elementary propositions, one could say anything that is sayable. Non-elementary propositions are just combinations of elementary propositions, they are
molecular propositions. The molecular propositions are truth-functional compounds of elementary propositions. The whole truth about the world is determined by the truth-value of the elementary propositions. If all true elementary propositions are listed, the world is completely described (Backar, G.P., Hacker, P.M.S.: Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Vasil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, pp. 451-57).

According to Tractatus there are only three kinds of propositions: (i) Tautologous, (ii) Contradictory, and (iii) Descriptive. The tautologus propositions are true under all circumstances, contradictory propositions are false under all circumstances and only descriptive propositions can be either true or false. The limits of language impose corresponding limits on the reality that can be described. The limits of language are the limits of the reality. All that can be said are the propositions of the natural sciences. Philosophy is not one of those sciences and therefore its propositions are non-sensical. Whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, the job of the philosopher is to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Philosophical propositions are not false but non-sensical. Most philosophical propositions arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. Philosophy is not a body of true philosophical propositions but rather concerned with the clarification of various types of propositions (Baker and Hacker, 1980, pp. 466-67).

The later Wittgenstein advanced a radical critique of his earlier standpoint outlined in *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. In his posthumously
published book 'Philosophical Investigations', Wittgenstein brought out that his earlier understanding of language was inadequate because he deemed language to be monofunctional rather than multifunctional. He had assumed that description of facts was only the most fundamental function of language, he had also assumed that statements derive their meanings from stating facts. In 'Philosophical Investigations', Wittgenstein brought out that besides the picturising of the facts, language has countless other functions. It is impossible to count numberless ways in which language can be used. For example, language can be used ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, invocatively, informatively, descriptively, prescriptively, evocatively, exhortatively, parabolically, allegorically, axiologically, metaphorically, affirmatively, negatively etc. Wittgenstein points out that promising, asking, commanding, thinking, playacting and storytelling etc. are some of the other important functions of language (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 50-73).

By highlighting such multiple games, Wittgenstein tries to undermine his earlier assumption that words have only descriptive role to play. Wittgenstein now underlined that words derive their meanings from their use and each word has a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context. The later Wittgenstein rejected the assumption of a single pattern in language. Now, he found language as complex as life itself. Now he recommended that instead of engaging in atomistic analysis, a philosopher should engage in a careful description of the countless uses of language.
Later Wittgenstein underlined that while using language we cannot help operating in and through countless language-games. It is these language-games which provide us our understanding of the world. The metaphysical picture of the relationship between language and reality lies outside language. Therefore, it is impossible to arrive at truth defined as correspondence with or picturising of reality. The meaning and truth operate intra-linguistically. They are not to be understood with reference to some external reality. They are to be understood within the context of multiple uses of language. Our ideas are not lurking within words. Such a perspective needs to be replaced by a radical paradigm-shift. Early Wittgenstein assumes that ideas and language are wholly independent. For later Wittgenstein, ideas are always symbolically embodied and essentially inseparable. Words do not serve as a medium of exchange for ideas. Words are the very stuff of which ideas are made. It is as impossible to separate thought from language as it is to separate mind from its organic embodiment (Suter, 1989, pp. 14-6).

The epistemological quest for objective knowledge, in view of the above considerations, is impossible of realization. A philosopher who is itching for a final, objective, transcendental, universal, and eternal metaphysical account of reality or final account of true knowledge is to be treated as suffering from conceptual illusions and linguistic confusions. He is to be treated as a patient and relieved of his confusions and misconceptions, through requisite and appropriate methodological field-illumination. Bringing out the multiple functions, purposes and uses of language is the most appropriate method of
liberating the philosopher from his puzzlement. This conception of philosophy advanced by Wittgenstein can have its own merits and demerits. However, we need to bring out the limitations of Wittgenstein’s approach as well.

There is something fundamentally wrong with Wittgenstein’s methodological approach to philosophy. The method of ‘linguistic analysis’ fashioned and applied by Wittgenstein with a view to resolving the vast body of philosophical problems, has been hailed to be one of the most original achievements in twentieth century philosophy. It brings most powerfully that philosophical problems originate out of grammatical similarity and logical polarity of various types of statements. Philosophy is a product of bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. It is through linguistic analysis that we can pinpoint the sources of confusion as well as bewitchment and thereby accomplish the dissolution of philosophical problems, for they have no solution and mostly trap us in interminable disagreements. Such a Wittgensteinian approach can lead to illumination of many a philosophical perplexity by revealing to us the genesis of various philosophical problems. Various philosophical problems can be cited to be pre-eminently amenable to Wittgensteinian method analysis, clarification and subsequent dissolution.

However, to attribute the entire philosophical discourse across religious, cultural, historical and civilizational spectra to linguistic confusion and bewitchment seems to be a methodological or analytical overkill. Philosophical problems may become complicated or philosophical disagreements may get interminable in view of linguistic fixation, rigidity, confusion or bewitchment.
However, all philosophical problems are not suggested by linguistic confusion or bewitchment. Philosophical problems arise out of man’s reflection over his ontic and situational conditions. The questions pertaining to origin, meaning, purpose and destiny of man are not suggested by language. The questions with regard to human freedom and determinism or good and evil too are not lingogenetic. The questions related to truth, knowledge, justification, reality, God etc. too can be shower to be originating beyond or apart from the pulls and pushes of linguistic confusion and bewitchment. Such questions, it can be readily admitted, can be linguistically mismanaged or misdirected. Language can be the director of philosophical problems but it is not be the producer of philosophical problems.

Wittgenstein while bringing out the linguistic genesis of philosophical problems fails to appreciate their sociological or situational context. Philosophical problems do not originate merely from linguistic sources, they are sociologically or situationally inspired as well. The emergence and development of human behavior of various dimensions and orientations is a function of various crises that we encounter in our societies. The situationalists or contextualists assume that philosophical world-views and value-systems emerge in response to human need for attunement with the cosmos by integrating the multiple dimensions of our experience into a meaningful whole. Philosophical theories such as naturalism, idealism, theism etc., are fundamentally philosophical interpretations seeking some coherence across the spectrum of multiple phenomenal, historical and social features. These
philosophical responses are the function of social, historical and cultural settings in which they originate, develop and articulate. Philosophical problems or socially conditioned and situationally determined. Philosophy as a concrete cultural response is integrally related to religion, science, ethics, art and literature and cannot be understood in isolation. Philosophical problems are culturally rooted and oriented. For example, our philosophical beliefs and values leading to multidimensional disagreements, are, historically speaking, rooted in our prephilosophical rather primodial religious, mystical, theological, literary and artistic responses. Problems pertaining to the existence of God and soul, the problem of good and evil, the problem of freedom and determinism etc., were in vogue in religious, theological and mystical discourse, for thousands of years before they were taken up for philosophical consideration by rational and critical thinkers. Such problems emerged specifically in the Semetic religious milieu espousing belief in complete providential determination of the cosmos by an All Powerful and All-Good God. Indian philosophers did not debate such philosophical problems as Freedom of Will and Determinism, Good and Evil etc. because of Indian belief in universal law of karma entailing ‘as you sow so shall you reap’ and belief in numerous and even endless rebirths till the moral account of any person is squared out by dissolution of all sins leading to liberation from cycle of birth and rebirth. This only reinforces the contention of culturalists or contextualists that philosophical problems are culturally conditioned and situationally determined.
Chapter VI

Critical Evaluation

Even the modern approaches to philosophy whether Linguistic, Existentialist, Cultural, Marxist, Pragmatic etc. are directly and clearly traceable to the emergence of scientific research and consequent technological developments across the globe. While medieval or premodern philosophical problems were directly fostered and reinforced by theological imperatives, modern epistemological theories and contemporary approaches to Philosophy can be unambiguously traced to scientific and technological culture. Contemporary approaches to philosophy including that of Wittgenstein, have inaugurated a methodological turnaround instead of appropriating or debating substantive problems of philosophy.

Wittgenstein is almost completely indifferent to the cultural determination of philosophical theories. He doesn't seem to be aware of the imperceptible determination of philosophical problems by our respective cultural and societal imperatives. He is not bothered about tracing philosophical problems to their social and cultural context.

Wittgenstein does work out a functional analysis of language. However, such an analysis is not sufficient to appreciate metaphysical theories. Wittgenstein correctly points out that metaphysical statements have no descriptive or cognitive function. However, he does not appreciate the existential character of metaphysical statements. Metaphysical judgements do not merely embody linguistic 'confusions, they also give expression to man's existential problems. Metaphysical statements are not conspired into articulation or formulation merely by linguistic bewitchment, they are also
inspired by our ineliminable perplexity with regard to origin and destiny of the universe and our status in such a universe. We cannot be satisfied by a purely phenomenological analysis of the world. Neither can a tabulation of confirmable hypotheses and formal deductions relieve us of our existential crisis. Man does not merely care for a descriptive analysis of the features of the cosmos, he craves for some metaphysical explanation of the universe, as well. Definitions and interpretations do not console him; he wants to explore the purpose of his existence, the ideals and values he has to live by and die for and the nature of his eschatological destiny. Man does not live by scientific explanations and causes. He does not live by inductive generalisations and deductive conclusions. He does not live by empirical or rational knowledge. He lives by aspirations and missions. These existential concerns of man are at the heart of philosophy. Therefore, philosophical discourse cannot be explained away by recourse to linguistic analysis. Philosophical propositions or theories arise out of our existential questions and concerns. Philosophical theories are motivated by our existential yearning to figure out our place and role in the cosmos.

Wittgenstein cannot capture the existential genesis of philosophical propositions and theories. Philosophical propositions are essentially evaluative of human conditions and therefore existential and thus beyond the logic of truth and falsity. Philosophy arises out of our existential antinomies. It wells up from the depths of the antinomical structure of human existence. Philosophical
problems are rooted in the mystery of being. Wittgenstein fails to grasp the existential genesis of philosophy.

Wittgenstein also fails to grasp the crucial function of philosophical theories. Such philosophical theories as idealism, pantheism, materialism, monism, pluralism, dualism etc. are not superficial truth-claims but conceptual unifications or world-views. They operate as integrating guidelines or principles in our ongoing crises or predicaments.

Metaphysical statements cannot be assimilated to scientific and descriptive statements. Such an assimilation is a confusion born out of linguistic and grammatical similarities between various types of propositions, making us oblivious to the irresolvable logical dissimilarities thereof. However, Wittgenstein does not capture the value or significance of philosophical positions operating as world-views, thus interpreting features of the cosmos into a coherent whole. Philosophical theories operating as world-views are innocent of superficial pretensions. Philosophical theories as world-views do not claim to be descriptively or cognitively true. As world-views, they have directive, orientative and ontogenetic function. Wittgenstein had a rare genius of understanding what philosophy is not but he falters in appreciating what philosophy positively is.

Bringing out the linguistic bewitchment of philosophers does not tell us the full story. We will have to understand philosophy to be an organization of our experiential data into a meaningful whole. For example, the proposition
“God is the creator of the universe” can be said to be an assimilation of “A potter is the creator of the pots”. However, ‘God’ can operate multifunctionally or multi-contextually. The word ‘God’ symbolizes a fully-fledged world-view and value-system. Any given theological perspective can have an abiding existential function. We can locate our existential manifold of beauty and order, evil and suffering, hope and fear, purpose and value, despair and helplessness etc., into ‘God frame of reference’. Theology as a superscience can be subjected to Wittgensteinian critique but theology as an existential interpretation of the cosmos or as a world-view is not amenable to the critique advanced by Wittgenstein. Wittgensteinian critique of philosophy is not applicable to philosophy as a consistent, comprehensive and fruitful conceptual unification. Philosophy as conceptual unification or as a world-view is beyond true/false logical dichotomy.

Wittgenstein, yet again, ignores the value-geneticity or axiogeneticity of philosophical discourse. Any philosophical system or metaphysical theory presages a value-system. Metaphysics or ethics are dialectically correlated. They are interdependent and, so to say, rise and fall together. Both have a cross-justificatory or cross-legitimatory function. An ethical theory can not operate in a vacuum and a metaphysical theory can not sustain its pristine glory in some transcendental realm. An ethical theory has to justify itself with reference to a conceptual unification or a metaphysical world-view. Conversely, we need a metaphysical world-view with a nuclear ethical core in order to operate meaningfully within any space-time civilizational continuum.
or societal frame of reference. Thus, both metaphysics and ethics operate in a mutual causal relationship.

Every metaphysical theory, conceptual unification, theological world-view or ideological system can have a corresponding set of values. If the metaphysical theory or world-view is, in the face of historical change or evolution, replaced by another metaphysical theory or world-view, there is a corresponding replacement of a value-system as well. Similarly, an emergence of a new value-system, again due to historical vicissitudes or societal transformations, correspondingly necessitates an alternative metaphysical weltanschauung. Such values as love, kindness, mercy, sympathy, compassion, mutuality, commitment, detachment, responsibility, goodwill, authenticity etc. tend to stabilize and reinforce a theistic rather monotheistic world-view. On the other hand, such values as hard work, discipline, tolerance, free-enquiry, social egalitarianism, political independence, economic well-fare, democracy, liberalism, secularism etc. inspire or reinforce a naturalistic world-view. Monotheism and naturalism, correspondingly, promote or reinforce the respective values that drive us in the first place, to formulate such conceptual frames or schemes.

Thus metaphysical systems or world-views, are profoundly and subterraneously axiogenetic or value-genetic, although their sociogenetic, psychogenetic and lignogenetic dimensions can hardly be overemphasized. A set of values can play a crucial or fundamental role in the origin and destiny and rise and fall of a philosophical theory. Once we are awakened to the value-
geneticity or value-centricity of metaphysical theories, we are illuminated as to the nature of a philosophical disagreement and its irresolvability. The value-dimensionality of metaphysics spotlights one of its' basic sources. Such an awareness intimates to us as to what orientates a metaphysician to opt for a particular metaphysical theory. Such an awareness may also help us in transcending the very quest for resolution of metaphysical disagreements. Thus we may be liberated from our craze for debating the merits and demerits of a given metaphysical system. We may simply stop taking sides in philosophy. We may come to the conclusion that in view of the ineliminable competing value-choices, metaphysical disagreement is a perennial feature of a philosopher's intellectual struggle and should possibly be accepted in the spirit of 'what can not be cured must be endured'.

An exploration of the correlation between philosophy and values can enrich our understanding of philosophy. Philosophy against the backdrop of values can definitely yield its locus standi, raison deter and modus operandi. Philosophical theories and values are reciprocally reinforcing. By missing this reciprocation, Wittgenstein has missed the interrelationship between philosophy and life.

The Wittgensteinian chastisement of philosophy to be bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language, can be greatly misleading. Such an evaluation can, at best, dismantle the superscientific pretentions of philosophy but hardly reveal its real import. Philosophy is not merely a product of linguistic bewitchment. Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis fails to probe the
deeper locus standi of philosophy. The existentialist and culturalist evaluations of philosophy see more profoundly the modus operandi of philosophy.

A profounder analysis can reveal that philosophy can not be reduced to any monodimensional formula. Even a multidimensional analysis of philosophy can not exhaust it's range, richness and complexity. However, we need to understand the linguistic bewitchment and confusion which generate philosophical paradoxes. We will have to appreciate the basic cultural intuitions and orientations wherefrom a philosophical world-view springs up. We will have to understand the existential dilemmas and predicaments which powerfully induce a philosopher to underline certain philosophical responses. We will have to grasp the axiological motivations which inspire us to expound or appropriate this or that philosophical interpretation. We will have to uncover the political, economic and psychological roots of philosophical worldviews. Such a comprehensive methodological investigation of philosophy can hopefully pinpoint the causes and reasons of philosophical disagreement.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Selected Bibliography
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN


(B) WORKS ON WITTGENSTEIN

1. A. Maslone, A study of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, University of California press 1961


15. Pandit, Balkrishna. S: Western Philosophy (Metaphysics); SBD Publisher' Distributers, Delhi, 1999.


(C) General Books and Articles

(a) General Books


Bibliography


80. Pollock, John I., (1986).*Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, Totowa, NJ.


95. Specht, Ernst Konrad, (1969). *The Foundation* and Barnes and Noble,


(B) General Articles


Bibliography


20. Geach, P.T., Review of Tractatus as Translated into Italian by G.C.M. Columbo, PR, LXVI, No. 4 (1957).


34. Sellars, W., "Truth and Correspondence", JP, LIX, No. 2 (1962).


