RELATION OF JĪVA AND BRAHMAN
IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBĀＲKA

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अम्बानन्दाप्रे : पदमलिङ्गांतःप्रेक्षकरं
पदार्पणोऽहं हृदयंरामशैलिपुर्
कदा वीराधावा: स्वज्ञहृदयरामसमये-
रामराहोड किशोरान्ततिमिरवां मम हरेत्

--- रामाराजप शाखरी
Relation of Jīva and Brahman is an important philosophical problem. Almost all the great Ācāryas have expressed on this problem. But the contribution of Nimbārka on this problem is unique, and deserves investigation. Of course a number of modern scholars have touched or discussed this problem in their different works. Dr. Koma Bose in the third volume of her thesis "Vedānta-parījāta-saurabha"; Dr. Umesh Misra in his "Nimbārka-School of Vedānta"; and Prof. P.N. Srinivasachari in his "The Philosophy of Bhedābheda", have tried to give a lucid and comprehensive exposition of the complete philosophy as well as the historical problems of the Nimbārka. But their main aim seems to be, to give the historical back-ground of Nimbārka Philosophy. They did not try to write, in detail, the relation of Jīva and Brahman. There are quite a number of papers, articles, periodicals and booklets written
in Hindi and English which represent attempts at an exposition of the teachings of Nimbarka, but these, being devotional or religious in character, are prompted by unquestioning faith more than based on an analytical, rational approach.

The present work undertakes to present the relation of Jīva and Brahman of the philosophy of Nimbarka, in scientific and unbiased manner. The work consists of five chapters. In Chapter-I, (The Concept of Relation), the nature of relation and types of relation are discussed. The types of relation of difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda) are mainly discussed in this chapter. In Chapter-II, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Difference and Non-difference (bhedābheda) is discussed. In Chapter-III, it is sought to establish that the relation of Jīva and Brahman is the natural relation of difference and non-difference (Svabhāvika - bhedābheda) in the philosophy of Nimbarka. In Chapter - IV, the nature of Jīva and Brahman is discussed as concerned with their relation of difference and non-difference. These two chapters supply the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of Nimbarka. In Chapter-V, a comparative study of the relation of Jīva and Brahman is discussed on the basis of various-school of Vedānta.
This is my humble attempt, this problem had been a difficult one, and it is not impossible to misunderstand the text of great ācāryas.

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CHAPTER I

The Concept of Relation

(1) Definition of relation:

Everything is decided to be true or false on the basis of direct experiences alone. Philosophy primarily explains different kinds of experiences. Every experience involves some kind of relation. Relation determines cognition which is of experiences. Determinate experiences are made possible by relation. An abstract entity, has no relation to anything. Relation denotes facts. Hence, relation plays a very important role in our knowledge.

Every relation implies two terms viz. Pratiyogin (counter-correlative) and Anuyogin (correlated-substratum). Pratiyogin is that which rests on a substratum and Anuyogin is substratum.
According to Naiyāykas a relation is perceived. Vātsyāyana says that, a relation is seen i.e., perceived. Similarly, Visvanātha says that the conjunction is an object of the eye and the perception of inherence is due to the relation of attributiveness.

Kesāvamīśra defines the relation as follows: "Sambandho hi 1. sambandhibhyām bhinnah, 2. ubhayāśri-tah, 3. ekaśca, viz. the relation (sambandha) should be different from the relations (sambandhibhyām), dependent on both, and one. As for example, the conjunction of a kettle-drum and the stick. The conjunction (samyoga-sambandha) is different from the kettle-drum and the stick because the kettle-drum and the stick are substances (dravya) and the conjunction is a quality (guna), dependent on both, and is one.

In the Buddhist-philosophy, relations are contingent reality, that is to say no ultimate reality

1 Vātsyāyana-Bhāsya on Nyāya-Sūtra 1.1.5, pp.16, Poona, 1939.
2 Karikāvali of Visvanāth, Māsarma Srichandrahari Singh, verse 54, pp. 97, Darabhanga, 1939.
3 (a) Ibid. V. 61, pp. 108.
(b) Bhattacarya, Tara Sankara "Relation according to the New-school of India Logic (Nyāya-Nyāya)", Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. II, pts. 4, 1945, pp. 392.
(b) Sambandhibhinnatve sati sambandhyāśritah-Nyāya-kosa of Jhalkikar Bhimacarya, pp. 920. Poona, 1928.
Ultimate reality is unrelated, it is non-relative, it is the absolute. Relations are constructions of our imagination, they are nothing actual. The Indian realists, however, kept to the principle that relations are as real as the things and that they are perceived through the senses. Uddyotakara says "the perception of the connection of an object with its mark is the first act of sense-perception from which inference proceeds". According to him, connection is perceived by the senses as well as the connected facts.

Dharmakīrti in the first stanza of his work "Sambandha - Parikṣā" states that conjunction or relation necessarily means dependence. Therefore "all relations in the sense of ultimate (or independent) reality do not really exist". Viniṭadeva in another sub-comment, states that the expressions "related to another", "dependent on another", "supported by another", "subject to another's will" are convertible. Causality, contact, Inherence and opposition are not realities by themselves. There are no "possessors" of these relations otherwise than in imagination. A reality is always one reality,

1 This work is with the commentaries of the author and two sub-commentaries of Viniṭadeva and Śankarāṃśa.
it cannot be single and double at the same time. Vācaspatimisra quotes a Buddhist who remarks that these relations considered as objective realities are, as it were, unfair dealers who buy goods without ever paying any equivalent. They indeed pretend to acquire perceptiveness, but possess no shape of their own which they could deliver to consciousness as a price for the acquisition of that perceptiveness. If a thing is a separate unity it must have a separate shape which it imparts to consciousness in the way of producing a representation. But relation has no shape apart from the things related. Therefore, says Vinītadeva, a relation in the sense of dependence cannot be something objectively real. Neither, can a relation be partially real, because to be partially real means nothing but to be real and non-real at the same time," because reality has no parts what has parts can be real empirically, (but not ultimately).

Like Naiyāyikas, Mimāṃsakas maintain that relation is perceived. Kumārila Bhāṣṭa in his "Slokavartika" in the interpretation of the words "Jñāta-sambandhasya", says that once a permanent

2 Śābara-Bhāṣya 1.1.5
relation whether it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of krittīka with Rohini, where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the letter may be inferred), or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of cases is perceived. Sucaritamiśra in his commentary on Ālokavārtaṇa namely, "Kāśika" says that for this purpose that relation is perceived, it is to be said in Ālokavārtaṇa "yadavastu lokah pratipadyatesmin dvidhāpi tat sakyat eva vaktumiti.

In śamkrite Advaita philosophy, all relations are purely conceptual and superimposed. Because Sankara admits that the real-existence (paramārthikasattā) is one. That is merely real. But the phenomenon world is vyavahārika, which is illusory. In this sense, all relations do not possess any reality from the transcendental standpoint. So,

1 (a) Ālokavārtaṇa on anumāna.
2 Mināmsā-ālokavārtaṇa of Kumārilabhātta with the commentary 'Kāśika' of Sucaritamiśra, Part III, pp. 100, Trivandrum, 1943.
relations as the cause and the effect etc. are known as vivartata (illusory).

According to the Saivas, the entire manifestation, whether subjective or objective is due to the will of the universal self. Relation is nothing but a special category based on the general category-unity in multiplicity - involving two external Realities. Because both the material and the subject that works on it are the manifestations of the ultimate, the relation, therefore, naturally does not end with the individual self, but ultimately depends upon the universal self.

Some Vedantic-schools such as of Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka etc., to establish the truth of the proposition that relations are real, recognize that each existence has a twofold aspect: one its causal state and the other its effected state. As

\( (a) \) Na kevalam ca sambandhamayaikatasa sparśitarmitat

\( \text{Mayāpramātraparyavasāyī vastuprakāśānāvyāparah} \)

\( \text{yāvadamanntcinmyāśīvatāvabhasaviśrantaiva} \)

\( \text{prakṣāsanam vastusamvιtkriyā/Na ca samvidah} \)

\( \text{kramostī ekaivaikatraiva kṣanerthapraκāśanāt/} \)

\( \text{Saiva sambandhāśiṣvatāmayameva svarupamāviskarot} \)

\( \text{titātuccatā/ -Sambandhasiddhi of Utpaladeva,} \)

\( \text{pp.9, Srinagar, 1921.} \)


\( (c) \) Iyer & Pandey, "Saiva Theory of Relation", Allahabad, 1938, pp. 17.
for example, " 'the pot' and 'the dish' etc. and the clay. The 'pot' is different from dish in nature and shape, but there is also non-difference so far as, the clay is concerned. They are thus both different and non-different from each other." In this manner, the reality of non-difference is not the least lower than the reality of difference. Thus all relations are real.

(ii) Types of relation:

There is an indefinite number of relations in Indian philosophy. According to Naiyāyikas, principal relations are conjunction and inherence (samyoga and samavāya). Samyoga is defined as the contact of two things that were first separate; and therefore there can be no samyoga between two all-pervading things which are never apart from each other; for example, the tree is perceived through conjunction with the eye. Samavāya means an intimate

1 aprāptavastu yā prāptih saiva samyoga īritah/ -

or inseparable relation. The blue colour cannot be separated from the blue lotus. Anambhatta defines the Samavāya as an intimate relation between two things which are technically called 'ayuta-siddha'. 'Ayuta-siddha' means: those things which have never existed in a separate condition without themselves being destroyed, are 'ayuta-siddha'. These 'ayuta-siddha' things are limited in number; such as:

1. The component parts and composite wholes (avayava and avayavin); 2. The quality and the qualified (guna and guñin); 3. The motion and the moving (kriyā and kriyāvāna); 4. The individual and the common characteristic (jāti and vyakti); the lastly 5. particularity and eternal substance (Višeṣa and nityadravya).

Although in all these cases here it is a question of different aspects of the problem of the

1 Nitya-sambandhah samavāyah, ayutasyadhavrattih/yayordvayormadhye ekamavīnasyadaparasritamevavatihatethate tavayutasiddhan/avayavāvāvavinau, guṇagūnīnau, kriyākriyāvanta, jātivyakti, Višeṣanityadravyaceti/

Tarka-Saṅgṛaha of Anambhatta, Kasi, pp. 130-131, 1939.
one and multiple, these five types of Samavāya do not seem to the Madhava to correspond the question on the same order. Some of them aim at the relationship between substance and attribute of the dharmin to the multiple dharma, the others want to give account of the plurality of the substances, separated one from the others, and yet in relation one with the other. These two orders of the problem are considered in a distinct way by Madhva: One is contented in the notion of the Viśista, all concrete and specified, the others implicate the imagination of the notion of bheda, difference which separates these realities and divides them one from the others.


"Bien qu'il s'agisse dans tous ces cas d'aspects différents du problème de l'un et du multiple, ces cinq types de samavāya ne semblent pas aux madhva correspondre à des questions de même ordre. Les unes visent le rapport de la substance à ses attributs, du dharmin unique à ses dharma multiples, les autres entendent rendre compte de la pluralité des substances, séparées les unes des autres, et cependant en relation les unes avec les autres. Ces deux ordres de problèmes sont envisagés de façon distincte par les Madhva: l'un..."
In the place of Samavāya, the Bhāttas, Mimāṃsakas and Advaitins recognize the relation of difference - cum - identity (tādātmaya). The relation of tādātmaya, according to Bhāttas, is not absolute identity, as the Naiyāyikas take it to be; but it is identity in a relative sense i.e. identity (abheda) compatible with difference (bheda-sahisnu). Though difference and identity are ordinary opposed to each other, yet they are taken by the Bhāttas to be compatible with each other, on the ground that it is experience, after all, that determines the compatibility or incompatibility of two things and that experience warrants the recognition of difference, associated with identity, as forming the relation between Ādi jāti and vyakti. In the proposition - 'This is a horse' (ayam āsvah), for instance, 'this' refers to a particular vyakti and 'horse', according to the Bhāttas, primarily refers to horseness (āsvatva), which is a jāti. According to this view in a judgement embodied in this proposition, a jāti is equated with

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est contenu dans la notion de viśiṣṭa, tout concret et spécifié, l'autre implique l'examen de la notion de bheda, différence qui sépare ces réalités et les divise les unes des autres."
a vyakti; But this equation cannot be absolute as, in that case, the two words 'this' and 'horse' would turn out to be synonyms. Therefore, the Bhattas argue that, on the strength of what is presented in cognition, a particular relation consisting in difference-cum-identity (bhedābheda), should be recognised in the case of Jāti and vyakti.

In the philosophy of Himbārka, the relation always presupposes difference and non-difference (bhedābheda). When we say that the universe is non-different from Brahman, we do not mean thereby that non-difference means absolute identity; but simply that the universe is absolutely dependent on Brahman, which can have no existence and activity independently of him, "Just as the thousand-rayed sun, having independent existence and activity in contrast to its own rays, is their soul and the rays are non-different from it." Thus, non-difference

1 Shastri, S. Kuppuswami, 'A primer of Indian Logic, pp. 30-31, Madras, 1951.
here means essential dependence and not absolute identity. The relation of identity is possible between two things when they are non-different in some way or other. No identity is possible between a cow and a horse. Again, identity is not possible in the case of a single horse also. But there is a relation of identity between the effect and its cause, the attribute and its substratum, the power and its possessor, i.e., only between two things which are both different and non-different, otherwise, in accordance with the text: — "All this, verily, is Brahman", the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient must be non-different from Brahman in nature, which is impossible. Thus, non-difference is of this kind which is not in conflict with difference, but is compatible with difference. And, difference means difference of nature. Thus,

1 "Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha and vedānta-kaustubha" English Translation, by Roma Bose, Vol.II. pp.785, 4.1.3 Calcutta, 1943.
2 Vedānta-Kaustubha 4.1.3
3 (a) Vedānta-ratna-manjūsa. pp.91, Benares, 1907.
   (b) Tattavaprakāśika of Keśava Kaśmīri, commentary on Bītā, hindi translation, Kalika Singh, pp.102, Bardhawan, 1935.
difference and non-difference (bhedabheda) relation is equally real and compatible with each other.
There is no contradiction between difference and non-difference.

In the words of Dr. Roma Bose, "Brahman is different from the universe as transcendental, non-different from it as immanent. If we understand difference and non-difference in this sense of transcendency and immanency, no contradiction will be involved in taking difference and non-difference to be equally real and compatible. Non-difference does not mean here "absolute identity", like that between one pea and another, but it simply means "essential dependence of the universe on Brahman and the immanence of Brahman in the universe", while difference means "difference of nature between the universe and Brahman and the transcendency of Brahman over the universe". Hence everything is reconciled.

An objection may be raised here that there is contradiction of co-existence (samānādhikaranyavya-ghatah) between the difference and non-difference

(Bhedābheda). The Naiyāyikas maintain that, non-difference amounts to a negation of difference, and difference invariably involves total exclusion of identity. It is clear that there is contradiction of co-existence between difference and non-difference like the case of a jar and the negation of a jar (ghata and ghatahāva), because in the absolute negation (atyantābhāva), there is contrast with its pratiyogin (correlative). And again, they say that non-difference (abheda) is merely identity and identity is in a relative sense, compatible with difference (bheda). Thus, to explain the difference and non-difference (bheda), the non-difference (abheda) is tenable but the difference (bheda) is futile.

To remove this objection Nimbārka school hold that, in the difference and non-difference (bheda), difference as the total exclusion of

1 tādāntyasambandhāvachhinnapratīyogitākonyonyābhāvah/
   Tarkasangrah of Annamān, pp. 133, Kasi, 1939.

2 traikālikasamārāvachhinnapratīyogitakotyantābhāvah/
   Tarkasangrah of Annamān, pp. 133, Kasi, 1939.
identity is not tenable on account of the all things having Brahman for their souls (brahmātmakatvāt) 1. So, the difference (bheda) is that, which is non-contradictory of having Brahman for their souls (brahmātmakatvāt), is completion of different knowledge of different things and different caused to be done (tattadavastugatavailakṣanyapratitah - vilakṣana kāryakāritayāśca nirvāhakah), and is merely position (bhāva) or negation (abhāva). Again they say about the Non-difference (abheda) that non-difference is untenable, as defined that Non-difference (abheda) is merely absolute negation of that difference, which invariably involves total exclusion of identity, because non-difference (abheda) is the relation of identity to Brahman only and, which is not contradictory of the difference (bheda) but compatible with difference, as it has been shown. Thus, non-difference (abheda) is the relation of identity of Brahman, but it is compatible with difference also. As for example, it is true that the ear-ring is non-different from the bracelet as the gold, but there is also difference

1 Vedānta-kāmadhanu of Śrīnimbārkaśārya, verse 7.
so far as, in name and shape simply on account of kundalattva and katakattva. It is true that there is non-difference between the sun and its rays so far as, brightness is concerned, but actually there is also difference between the sun and its rays. Thus, there is no contradiction of co-existence in the relation of difference and non-difference (Bhedābhedaśambandha), both are equally real and compatible.

The concept of relation of Bhedābheda may be illustrated by the wellknown example of "the serpent and its coil". The serpent is the material cause (upādānakarana) of the coil. The serpent is independent while the coil is dependent. On one side, this shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent, it proves the non-difference of the two.

It may be asked whether the difference is tenable as the total exclusion of identity or in other sense in the above example.

1 Vedānta - pārijāta - saurabha and Kaustubha 3.2.27.
The answer is as follows: Nimbarka's school hold that difference is merely tenable in the different sense from the Naiyayika's difference, or, it cannot be said that serpentness (sarpattva) is not present in coil, but straightness (ṛjugottva) is present in coil, in above example. Because straightness (ṛjugottva) is present in the state of coil (Kudalavastha) and coilness (Kudalattva) is present in the state of straight (ṛjawastha), otherwise, there will not be any change in its state. Hence, both are, indeed, present in both the states as subtle and gross. But, serpentness (sarpattva) is, also, present in the state of coil as well as in the state of straight. Thus, the difference is not tenable as the total exclusion of identity, but it is non-contradictory of the non-difference.

In this manner there is no contradiction of difference (theda) with the negative aruti of

\[ \text{anyathā tasya tatrabhave punaravirbhāvo na syāt/} \]

Kaustubhaprabhāvrtti of Kesavakāsmirībhaṭṭa, the commentary on Vedānt - Sutra, pp. 210, Delhi, 1938.
difference (bhedanisedhakāsruti) as well as there is no contradiction of co-existence (samanādhikaranya) of difference with non-difference (abheda). Because, there is purpose of the negative śruti of difference (bheda) is the establishment of having Brahman for their souls (brahmatmakatvasiddhi) of the thing only. Thus, Naiyāyikas difference is to be finished from negation only. It is pointed out in the Parāpakṣagiribājra of Madhavamukunda also that there is no contradiction of difference with the negative śruti of difference. In fact, on account of the inseparable union (prathakasiddhi-itvāt), there is no negation of thing but the negation of difference which is defined as the total exclusion of independent reality. There is no contradiction of difference with non-difference (abheda) also. Because it is desireless with the knowledge of the relation of identity to Brahman in things. There is no doubt of impossibility of co-existence (samanā dhikaranya) in the mutually contradictory relation of difference and non-difference (bheda-abheda) and they are not contradictory with each other also, on account of the different subject. It has been said that difference is desireless with the knowledge of nature etc., of
different things. It is merely the subject of difference. Non-difference is satisfied with the knowledge of the relation of identity to Brahman. The relation of identity is merely the subject of non-difference. And thus, there is no opportunity of above-mentioned blame in the mutually contradictory relation of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) and they are not contradicted as well as contradicting with each other.

1 (a) Na ca bhedaṁiśedhavākyasyaiva tadabādhakatvā- 
ditivācyam, tasya svatantrasattvāvachhinna- 
bhedaniśedhāparatven vastusvarūpiṁiśedhāparat- 
vābhata/ aprathakasidhātyāścestvāt/ Nāpya- 
bhedāvakyānām tadabādhakatvam, teṣām brahma- 
tātmyasambandhavidhāyakatvena nairakṣkyātā/ 
Nāpyamayoritaret arabirodhitvena sāmaṇādhikar- 
anyasambhasāmkanīyo, bhinnavisayatvāt/ 
tathā-bhedaṁvākyānām padarthasvarupāvidhā- 
nāparatvena nairākṣkyātā eva teṣām visayah/ 
abhedaṁvākyānām tu padarthakadambasya brahma- 
tātmyasambandhavidhāyakatvena kṛtaṁkṛtaṁ sambandha 
eva teṣām visayah/ evamca netaret arabadhyabādha- 
bhavast asamānnotkādosesvākaśāh/

Parapakṣīrīra Ḍaṭiṃ of Madhavamukunda.

pp. 37, Mathura, Samvat 1993.

In western philosophical literature those relations are said to be external which bring the relata together without unifying them, and internal relation are said to be rooted in the very nature of things and serve to transform and to unify though in varying degrees. In Indian philosophy, the relation of difference-cum-identity (tādātmya) is essentially an internal relation, according to the Samkhya, Bhātta and Advaita systems. In these systems, where difference is not wholly incompatible with identity where causation is not new creation, but transformation to some extent and where all relations may be said to involve difference and identity in some sense and no relation can be recognised in cases of absolute difference, it can be easily seen that no relation is strictly external and nothing which does not unify, in some sense can be considered a relation. In the Nyāya-vaśasika systems, difference is uncompromising and amounts to a total negation of tādātmya is the sense of complete identity, it is an external reality and not a mere conceptual product, it is presupposed by every relation is thus external. At this stage, we may

say that the relation of difference and non-difference is essentially an internal relation in the philosophy of Nimbarka. Because in this system, difference is compatible with non-difference, the causation is not new creation, but transformation to some extent like the Sāṃkhya-view, and all relations may be said to involve difference and non-difference in some sense.

Above-discussed relation of difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda) may however exist between several types of things, as indicated by some illustrations, such as "the serpent and its coil", "the sun and its lustre", and "An ocean consists the water, waves, bubble etc. etc." Four types of relation of difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda) are mentioned by 'Sureswaracārya in his Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisadabhāṣyavārtika. These are following:

1 Brahma - Sūtra 3.2.27
2 Ibid. 3.2.28
3 Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisadabhāṣyavārtikam of Sureswaracārya, pp. 623-624, St. 948-50, Ananda Āram Sanskrit Series, Bombay, 1893.
(i) Sāmānya and viśeṣa.

(ii) Avasthāvat and avasthā.

(iii) Kārya and kāreṇa.

(iv) Bhāga and bhāgin.

(i) Sāmānya and Viśeṣa:

The universal and the corresponding particulars; as for example, 'horseness' and the several individuals 'horses'. It refers to horseness (aśvatva), which is the universal (sāmānya), and to individuals 'horses', which are particulars. According to this view parabrahman would be the basic or in most principal revealing itself in all existent things the particulars and the aparabrahman these existent things themselves.

(ii) Avasthāvat and avasthā:

Substance and its modes; as for instance, the waveless ocean manifests itself as waves, and bubbles and yet maintains its self-identity.  

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same way, the parabrahman involves itself into the aparabrahman and yet is identical with itself.

(iii) Kārya and Kāreṇa:

The cause and the effect; as for instance, 'threads' and 'cloth' (pata and tantu), threads are cause of cloth and cloth is the effect. Similarly, Brahman is the material cause of the universe, and the universe is the effect. The universe arises from the Brahman and returns to the Brahman, so that two are neither altogether different nor the absolute non-different but both are different and non-different. Thus, it is established that there is the relation of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect.

(iv) Bhāga and Bhāgin:

The whole and the part; as for example, a 'chariot-wheel' and 'the nave of the chariot-wheel', 'the circumference of a wheel' etc. The chariot-wheel is bhāgin (the whole) and its nave, the circumference etc., are the bhāgas (the parts). In the same way, the Brahman is the bhāgin (the whole) of the Jīva, and the Jīva is bhāga (part) of the Brahman.
Prakāśātman maintains five types of relation of difference and non-difference (bhedabheda) in his "pañcapadikavivarana", instead of these above discussed four types. These are followings:

i. Jāti and vyakti.

ii. Guna and Gujin.

iii. Kārya and Kāreṇa.

iv. Viśistāsvarūpa.

v. Amśa and Amśin.

(i) Jāti and vyakti:

The general and particular: as for example, blue and yellow etc. things are naturally different in colour, but are non-different so far as substance is concerned. The same is between jīva and Brahman.

(ii) Guna and Gujin:

The attribute and its substratum: as for instance, "the table and the shape, colour etc, of the table". Similarly, Brahman is substratum of the Universe and the sentient and non-sentient universe is attribute of the Lord. There is
relation of difference and non-difference between the Lord and his attributes.

(iii)  Kashmir and Kārma:

The cause and the effect: as for example "the clay and the pot". Similarly, Jīva is effect of the Brahman and Brahman is the cause of the Jīva. So, Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman, as the cause and the effect.

(iv) Viśīṣṭasvārūpa:

The special form: as for, example, 'the clay and the pot dishes etc.' The clay takes a special-form (viśīṣṭasvārūpa) such as the pot, dishes etc., in this sense the clay is different from the pot, dishes etc. But on the otherhand, the clay is non-different from the pot, dishes etc., because these forms are after all nothing but the clay. The same is between Jīva and Brahman. Brahman takes a special form (viśīṣṭasvārūpa), when He becomes many, as Jīvas, in this sense Brahman is different from Jīvas. But on the other hand, the Brahman is non-different from Jīvas, because Jīvas are after all nothing but the Brahman.
(v) **Amśa and Amśina**

The whole and the part; as for example, 'the tree and the branches, leaves etc.' The same, Brahman is whole and Jīva is His part. There is relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, as the whole and the part.

Having thus discussed the concept of relation, in 3rd chapter, we will see that which type of relation of difference and non-difference (bheda-bheda) is to be adopted by Śrīnimbarkacārya to establish his doctrine of Natural difference and non-difference (Śvābhāvika - Bheda-bheda).
CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF

DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE

The doctrine of difference and non-difference is not quite new. So far known Āśmarathya and Āudulomin were old exponents of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. Th this Dr. K.C. Pandey says that the tradition of dualism-cum-Monism goes back to the vedic time. The pre-Bādarāyana thinkers like Āśmarathya and Āudulomin offered the dualistic-cum-monistic interpretation of the upanisadic passages and are referred to as such.
in the Brahma-Sutra. Kāśikā, who is interpreted by Śankara as an exponent of non-dualism. But Śrīnivāsa, an immediate disciple of Nimārka, and Śripati panditācārya think that Kāśikā was, an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. It shows that Kāśikā was also an old exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. Even in later age Lākulīśa, Bhāratīpyās, Rājaś, and Yādavaprakāśa were the supporters of this doctrine. And after that the doctrine of difference and non-difference is elaborated in the philosophy of Nimārka, Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya and Śripati. Though, the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Āśmarathya, Āudulomin and Kāśikā is known from references only; and the same doctrine of the philosophers from


(ii) "Vedabheda-svāda to vaidikapramaparāyamapuyapalabhīśate/ Vaidikabheda-svādavādino 'Āśmarathya', 'Āudulomin' matayorbhādarāyannena saviyabrahmasūtre krata evopanyāsah/" - "Śaivaśāyavindu" of Pandey, Dr. K. C., pp. 54, Benares, Samvat 2021.
Lakulīśa to yādavaprakāsha has been almost lost; yet the doctrine of difference and non-difference of the Nimbārka, Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya and Śripati is living to this day. Thus, the development of the doctrine of difference and non-difference may be discussed in three stages for convenience. First is that, which is known from references only, as the doctrine of Āsurathya, Ādulomin and Kāśikātāna, second is that which has been almost lost as the doctrine of the philosophers from the Lakulīśa to Yādavaprakāsha and, third is that which is living to this day as the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Nimbārka, Śrī-Kṛṣṇacaitanya and Śripati.

First Stage:

(1) The Doctrine of Āsurathya:

As the sparks being the effects of the fire, are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire, and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be

1 Brahma-Sūtra 1.4.20.
distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other. So, Jīvas are neither different from Brahman for that would mean they are not of the nature of intelligence, nor absolutely non-different from it, since then, they would not be different from each other. Hence the Jīvas are different and non-different from Brahman. And again, just as in the case of the pot and the clay, being the effect and cause, there is undoubtedly primary difference between them and on the other hand, there is non-difference between them, because the word 'pot' refers to the clay as well. So, according to Āsmarathya, the Jīva is also the effect of Brahman, who is the cause of all, as the śrutī says, "Yatovāṁśāṃśi bhūtāni jāyante" from whom, all these elements arise. Thus, these two are related as cause and effect. Being the effect and the cause there is undoubtedly primary difference between them. Being born from it and so on, there

2 Vedānta-Kaustubha pp. 141, 1.4.20, Benares, 1932.
3 Taittiriya-Upanisad III.1
is non-difference between them. There is natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, according to Āsamarathya.

(2) The Doctrine of Āndulomin:

Āndulomin looks upon difference and non-difference of the Jīva from Brahman as due to different conditions. The Jīva, bound by the limiting adjuncts of body, senses, and mind, is different from Brahman, through knowledge and meditation, it passes out of the body and becomes one with the Highest self. Āndulomin admits the absolute difference between Jīva and Brahman but asserts their unity when the Jīva attains mukti, in accordance with two texts from the Upanisads. The first of these is: "esa samprasadāsmāchhārītāsamuthāya param jyotirūpasāṃpadāya svenrūpenāthinisāṃpadaye" this Jīva after going out of this body, realises its own nature, attains higher light that is Brahman. The second is: "As the flowing

1 Brahma-Sūtra 1.4.21
2 Śāṅkara-bhāṣya 1.4.20
3 Chāndogyopanisad VIII.12.3
rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and form thus, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine person, higher than high." This shows that as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the Jīva also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the Highest Person. On this view, there is relation of difference between Jīva and Brahman during the state of bondage (buddhāvasthā) of Jīva, and non-difference during its state of salvation (muktāvasthā).

Thus, there is relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman. Vācaspatimiśra in his 'Bhāmati' on Śankara - bhasya and Bhāskara in his 'Bhāmati' on Sūtraśāsya quote to compare the saying of Pāncarātrikas:

"a mukter bheda eva syajīvasyacarasyaca /
muktasya ca na bhedosti bhedetor abhāvatah/"

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1 "Yathā nedyah syandamānāh samudre astām gachhati nāmarūpa vihāya tathāvidvān punyapāpād vimuktah parātparam purusam upaiti divyam."
   - Mund. Up. III.II.8

2 Vedānta - Kaustubha pp. 140, 1.4.21
(up to the moment of liberation being reached
the Jīva and Brahman are different: But liberated
Jīva is no longer different from Brahman since
there is no further cause of difference).

The technical name of the doctrine
advocated by Ācārya is Satyabheda-vāda.

(3) The doctrine of Kaśkṛtāma.

Here is a controversy over this question
that whether Kaśkṛtāma was an exponent of the
difference and non-difference or non-dualism. He
is interpreted by Śāṅkara as an exponent of non-
dualistic, is interpreted by Bhā-skara Bhatt as an
upholder of "identity in difference" (Bhedābheda) view
in this regard. In fact he has been interpreted by
almost all commentators as supporting their different
views and regarding him as Monistic, Dualistic,
dualistic-cum-monistic or qualified monistic as is

1 Vedānta - Sūtra (George Thibaut) Vol. I, English
Translation of Śāṅkara - bhāṣya pp. 278, 1.4.20 Deekh
2 Brahma Sūtra 1.4.22
clear from the commentaries of Śankara, Madhva, Bhāskara, Śrīkantha, Rāmānuja etc. But it appears that Kāśyapa was an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as is clearly from the commentary of Śrīnivāsa namely - "Vedāntakaustubha" Kāśyapa, is of opinion that as the Parmātman dwells in the Jīvatman, who is his niyamya (that is, controlled by him). Thus, there is a relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahmaṇa, as the object controlled as well as the controller. As declared by śruti: "He who dwelling in the soul is other than the soul whom the soul does not know, whose body is the Ātman. He who rules into the soul, He is your soul, the inner controller of men, the soul of all" etc. etc. The controller


2 "tadevam munitrayamataadvāra prasangat 
Hedābheda-prakāro )bhagavata darisatān - 
Vedānta-kaustubha, 1.4.22, pp. 141

viz. Lord is denoted by a knower of the object controlled by Him viz. Jīva. And again, Śrīpati interpretes that, Kāśkrtāna abides by the doctrine of bhedabheda which is declared by the śruti texts which, without contradictory each other, enunciate in 'dvāsūparnā' etc. and other texts the bheda doctrine and the abheda doctrine in 'tattvamasi' etc. and other texts. In order to point out clearly the existence of bheda and abheda between the Jīva and Brahman, Kāśkrtāna here declares that all śruti texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine of bhedabheda. Therefore, the third doctrine of bhedabheda is the highest essential truth declared by all the śruti texts; and so it must be understood. Hundreds of śruti texts declare that during the samsaravastha Jīva and Brahman are quite distinct from each other and separate; and that during the Mokṣadāsa abheda is declared to be the established

1 Vedānta - Kaustubha, pp. 141, 1.4.22.
truth, śruti texts like the following:

"Esā samprasādārtha ātma śarīrāt samuthāya paramjoti
rūpam sampādaṁ svēna rupanabhinisapādyate" etc. etc.

Second Stage:

(1) The doctrine of Lakulīśa:

The lakulīśapāṣupata a well known
dualistic-cum-monistic system, propounded by
Lakulīśa in the first half of the second century
A.D., according to the inscriptive evidence of
Mathura pillar and of stone slab of somanatha, is
based upon the five vedic Mantras "Sadyojātām" etc.,
Lakulīśa wrote a "pāṣupata-Sūtra". Pāṣupata-Sūtra
with the commentary of kaundinya namely "pāncārthībh-
āsya" is available at present. Pāṣupata-Sūtra
is divided into five chapters, which is based on the

1 Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Dualistic - cum - Monistic
(Rađabhedaśaṁda)" Journal of Ganganātha Jha,
Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XX - XXI,
Pts. 1-4, Nov., 1963 - August 1965, pp. 245
five Vedic Mantras of Taittiriyāranyaka. Five Vedic Mantras are following:

"Sadyojātām prapadyāmi"
"Vāmadevāya namah"
"Agnorebhyoth ghorebhya"
"Tatpurāṣṭaya vidmahe"
"Īśānah sarvavidyānām."

It means, these five Anuvākas of the Taittiriyāranyaka are the basis of the Lakulīśa pāśupata system. Sayana in his interpretation of this text agrees that they refer to śaivism in general, both as a religion and as a philosophy.

Before discussing the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Lakulīśa, it may, therefore, be useful to discuss the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Taittiriyāranyaka, which is similar to the Lakulīśa pāśupata system.

(1) The difference and non-difference of Taittiriyāranyaka is based on the following grounds which are similar to the Lakulīśa pāśupata system:

(a) Brahman is the cause of the material world. He is material cause through his māyāśakti. So, He
is called "Māyin and Māyaviśīṭa." 

(b) Just as He is the very nature of the Nirguṇa-Brahman to be the oneness of Saccidānanda, so He is that of sagūṇa Brahmān to be creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world.

(c) Iśwara is not affected by the fruits of the deeds but He is giver of the fruits of the deeds.

(d) Brahmān is all-pervading and Endless because the effect is not out of the cause.

(e) Brahmān is Real: He creates the world and then enters into him. The Brahmān becomes everything perceptible and imperceptible, determinate and indeterminate, sentient and insentient, truth and untruth.

(f) Brahmān is virtuous, because He creates everything independently.

1 Taittiriyārānyaka, 564, 566
2 Taittiriyārānyaka, 571
3 Ibid. 571
4 Taittiriyārānyaka, 622.
5 Taittiriyārānyaka, 641
6 Taittiriyārānyaka, 642
(g) The salvation consists in the Jiva's having pratisthā in the Brahman who is imperceptible.

(h) The person who knows the identity of the Ānanda that is the individual with that which is the Brahman, slowly gets union with the Brahman, the Ānanda (upasankramati). The word "Sakramana" implies strong union, similar to that which a leech has with a living organism from which the passes into it.

(i) The final emancipation is attained through various stages and that in the final stage the liberated attains the greatness (mahima) of the 3 Brahman.

(j) Thus there is no fundamental contradiction between difference and non-difference. The non-difference refers to the essence, the Brahman, and the difference to the form (Ākāra) (Brahmakārena advaitam, Bhoktrobhogyakārenordwaitam).

1 Taittiriyāraṇyaka, 644
2 Taittiriyāraṇyaka, 652
3 Taittiriyāraṇyaka, 734-735
4 Taittiriyāraṇyaka, 576
Thus, the taittiriyāranyaka presents the difference and non-difference (ḥedāḥhedāvāda).

(II) Ḫedāḥhedā of Lakulīśa:

According to the Lakulīśa pāṣupata there are the five primary categories viz.,
(i) Kāraṇa or pati (ii) Kārya or pāṣu (iii) yoga
(iv) Vidyā (v) Dukkhaṇa.

Here, it may, therefore, be useful to discuss briefly the concept of the Kāraṇa or pati and the concept of the kārya or pāṣu, to understand the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as propounded by Lakulīśa.

(a) The word pati, Kāraṇa and Brahman are synonymous. Pati is the cause of all effect (kārya) viz. Vidyā, kāla and pāṣu. He is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe. The universe springs up (bhavodhavah) from the Brahman, as does a sprout from a seed. He is the cause of both the creation and dissolution of the world. He bestows grace. He transcends all. He is playful.

1 Pasupatasūtra, 55
2 Pasupatasūtra, 56
He is higher than the liberated. He has perfect powers of knowledge and action. They constitute his essential nature exactly as heat does that of fire. He inspires fear of the immortal deeds in the bound Jīvas and unites them with the merit and demerit of the deeds.

(b) The kārya or paśu is controlled by the lord or pati (paśamāt paśun). The kārya is that which is dependent on something ulterior, it is threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the the sentient.

(c) Relation between the cause (pati or kāraṇa) and the effect (kārya):

There has been a great controversy over the question of the doctrine of causality, in Indian Philosophy. According to Nyāya-vaiśesika philosophy, the effect, is non-eternal (asat) but the effect

1 Pasupatasūtra, 57
2 Ibid. 57
3 Pasupatasūtra, 5
according to Lakulīśa pāṣupata is eternal (sat).

Nor is the effect mere illusion, as the vedāntin asserts. For, the Lakulīśa pāṣupata is not Monism, but Dualism-cum-non-dualism. It admits that the reality is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity and, therefore the multiplicity according to it, exists in unity just as do the stars in heaven. The creation is nothing more than the arrangement of what exists in a creation form (vṛtti-labhā). The traid abides in His power, which constitutes His very being, the most essential nature, the principal attribute the chief characteristic, Dharma. There is no confused existence (Vṛttisankara) between the cause and the effect like water in milk. On the other hand, there is different existence between the cause and the effect, like the light of the eyes and that of the sun or of lamp, which illuminates the object at the time of perception. He is all-pervading. But the pervadingness of the different dependent categories of the "effect" is of limited nature. Each higher

1 Pāṣupata-Sūtra, 60
2 Pāṣupata-Sūtra, 58
3 Pāṣupata-Sūtra, 59
category pervades the lower. So, in the Lakulīśa pāsupata system, different effects do not have their existence in isolation from each other, like cells in a honeycomb. The pervaded and the pervading are to be seemed, differently as water is grasped differently from the colour that colours it.

Thus, the cause and the effect exist together, but maintain their respective entities because of different nature, though both of them are pervasive. The effect is as eternal as the cause. For, the cause cannot be logically represented to be the cause without the effect, nor can pati be spoken of as pati without something to Lord over. The effect has its existence in the cause as does a seed in the earth. The cause is free (svatantra) and the effect is "not free" (asvatantra). The former is the pati and the latter is paśu. The one stands for the cit and the other for both cit and acit.

Thus, Lakulīśa pāsupata system is dependent on "Satakāryavāda". In creation the Lord is free. It has already been observed according to Lakulīśa that there is essential difference between the individual self and the highest self, the cause
and the effect and the sentient and non-sentient. Though, the cause (pati) and the effect (paśu) are mutually different, the effect (paśu) viz. vidyā, kāla, rūpa, has neither free being out of pati, nor equal superiority with the pati, yet the effect is dependent and "not-free" (asvatāntara), because of to be carried on, to be created and to be effected. So, Lakulīśa pāsupata is the follower of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. Because, it thinks that there is essentially difference between the cause and the effect but there is non-different also, the effect merely exists in the cause. And again, the cause and the effect are non-different because the unmanifest state of the effect is known as kāraṇa and the manifest state of the cause is known as kārya. Thus, there is relation of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect.

Thus, it is established that similar to the doctrine of difference and non-difference of the

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Taittiriyāranyaka, Lakulīśa pāsupata presents his doctrine of difference and non-difference.

(2) The Doctrine of Bhartrārpanača:

Bhartrārpanača is known from references only. His any work is not, at present, available. He wrote a commentary on the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad. As Śankara did, and that B's commentary was even more voluminous than Śankara's. And that he was an old Vedāntin anterior even to Śankara.

To understand his doctrine of Brahmābheda, it may, therefore, be useful to discuss the concept of Brahmā, Jīva and the world.

Bhartrārpanača recognized like Śankara that Brahmā is para (higher) and anāra (lower). Brahmā is both one and many. Just as a cow is one as a substance, but its features, the dewlap etc., are many. Thus, Brahmā is different and non-different.

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1 Hiriyana, Prof. M., "Bhartrārpanača - An old Vedāntin" - proceedings and transactions of All India Oriental Conference, Session III, Madras, 1924, and Indian Antiquary, Vol. LI, 1924.

2 Brhadāranyakopanisad, Śankara-Bhāṣya, 4.3.30.
He does not explain like Śankara that Jīva or lower Brahman is vivāpta of the higher Brahman. And he does not explain like Bhāskara that diversity of Brahman is adventitious. But he says that para (higher) and apara (lower) or unity and diversity of Brahman, both are real. Just as an ocean has unity as cause of waves, foam and bubbles etc., and has diversity as effects viz. waves, foam and bubbles etc. And therefore, both are real.

Bhattarapāpanca admits the Brahmaparinaṁvāda, but he does not admit the vivartavāda of Śankara. According to him Brahman transforms itself by its own creative urge into light form of world and Jīva. Which are thus: 1. Antaryāmin 2. Sākṣin 3. Avyākṛta 4. Sūtra 5. Virāj 6. Devatā 7. Jāti and 8. Pinda. Prof. Hiriyana refers to that these eight forms together with Brahman according to Bhattarapāpanca, may be divided into three rāsis, in which we have the three fold subject matter of all religion and philosophy viz. God, soul and matter.

1 Śankara-Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.14, pp. 456 Bombay, 1933
2 Bhadāranyakopaniśadabhāṣyavārtikām 2.3
1. Paramātmarāsi.
2. Murtāmurtarāsi.

1. Brahman is antarayāmi or inner-ruler of all. So this rāsi is absolute Brahman.

2. This is known as six material forms of the world. Which are thus: Avyākṛta-An elementary substance from which all things were created, Sutra - the adjunct of the logos, Virāj - the visible universe, Devatā - an organ of sense, Jāti - a class, and Pinda - the body.

3. In this rāsi, Jīvas or the Śaksin are real transformation of Brahman. Bhaṭṭapragṛśa already counts it as a third rāsi.

Bhaṭṭapragṛśa explains Brahman, Jīva and the world relation thus, there is not absolutely difference between these three and there is not absolutely non-difference like Śāṅkara. But the relation of difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda) between these three is obvious. To make it clear,

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1 Brahadāraṇyakopanisadavārtikā p.576, St.46, ASS, 1815, 1893.
in his Bhāṣya, at Brhadāraṇyakopanisad 5.1.1., Śankara tells us that the one Brahman has got a dualistic as well as a non-dualistic aspect (dvaitādvaitatamakam). For example, the ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles etc. As the water is real and waves appear and disappear, but are a part of the ocean itself, are absolutely real, in the same way dualistic world is absolutely real, it corresponds to the waves etc., on the water while the supreme Brahman stands for the ocean water is absolutely real. 2

Prof. Hiriyana says that, It is difficult to determine which of these view was in the mind of Bhartrahrapaṇa. Otto Strauss 3 says that the types bhāga-bhāgin and avasthāvat-avasthā appear to be the most usual. Kārya-Kāraṇa has to be taken in the sense of parināma, and saṃānya-viśeṣa cannot be employed directly on account of Brahman not being a Saṃānya in the

1 Brhadāraṇyakopanisad with the commentary of Śankara and the glossary of Anandgiri. Ed. by Dr. E. Roer., pp. 951-952.


logical sense of the world. On the other hand, prof. P.N. Srinivasachari says that according to Bhartrihari the Sūtras bring out this truth by means of the classical analogy of the snake and its coil and the sun and its radiance. The cause is, logically speaking, immanent in the effect. The whole pervades the part and the universal is realised in and through the particulars. But the most adequate Category of Reality is the relation of substance and modes (avasthāvat and avasthā) in which there is a pervading identity that transfigures the parts.

3. The Doctrine of Bhāskara:

Bhāskara wrote a commentary on the Brhma-Sūtra, in regard of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. His commentary on Brhma Sūtra is available, at present, who belonged to the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th Century A.D.


2 (a) Bhāskara-Bhāsya, p. 7

(b) Pandey, Dr. K.C., "Dualism-cum-non-dualism (Bhedābhedā)" Journal of Gangānath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, Vol. XX-XXI, Nov. 1963, August 1965, pp. 246
To make clear his doctrine of difference and non-difference, Bhāskara accepts the three ultimate realities viz., Brahman or Iswara, Jīva, and the world.

(i) Bhāskara hold the Brahman to be the cause of the world, its creator, supporter, and destroyer. Brahman is the both material cause and the efficient cause of the world. He is known only by the Scriptural authority.

In fact for Bhāskara, the world is a transformation (parināma) of Brahman, but he does not accept the tradition of Sānkhya-yoga which is thus, the world is transformation or parināma of the prakṛti, just as curd is the transformation of milk. The Brahman possesses infinite power or energy (sakti) and makes this power undergo transformation, so that he can remain what he is.
Parināma is for Bhāskara the throwing out of energy (Saktivikṣepa). According to Bhāskara, Brahman has power of two kinds viz., subjective and objective.

Brahman is both one and many. As cause he is one and as effects he is many. Just as gold is one as material cause and many as bracelets, ear-rings etc. Thus, Brahman is different - non-different. Non-different state is natural and different state is adventitious.

Brahman is true being, sentient endless, blissful, omnipotent and omniscient.

(ii) The finite self or Jīva is not a vikāra of the Brahman, for vikāra is an actual transformation, just as the world is a vikāra of prakṛti according to the Sānkhya. It is essentially identical with the Brahman such as sparks are with fire.

1 (a) Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp. 85

2 Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp. 18

3 "Sa Cūkhīnābhinnasvarūpobhinnaṛūpa svābhāvikamopādhikam tu bhinnarūpa," Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp.141, 2.3.33.

4 Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp.24.

5 (a) Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp. 134,
The Jīva is atomic in size and is innumerable. Jīva, is the part (aṁśa) of Brahman. The term aṁśa is employed by Bhāskara in three senses. It may connote (i) the relation of the cause to its effect as when thread is explained as an aṁśa or component of cloth, (ii) a share in property to be divided, or, as in this context, (iii) The principal of self-differentiation through upāsiha. The Jīva as a part is adventitious. It is not absolutely different from Brahman, and is not absolutely non-different from Brahman, but is related to Brahman both as different and non-different, just as the sparks are to the fire, as the five-fold prāṇās to air and as the aesthetic (kāma) to the mind.

It is agent of all deeds, but only so long as it is conditioned. It is enjoyer of all fruits of deeds, pleasure and pain.

(iii) The world is the effect of the Brahman. It is admitted by Bhāskara, Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world.

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1 (a) Bhāskara-bhāsya 2.3.43
   (b) Srinivasachari P.N., Bombay "The Philosophy of Bhedābheda", pp. 73-74.
2 Bhāskara-bhāsya 2.3.43, pp. 140-141.
Like Śaṅkara, Bhāskara does not accept the world as illusion. According to him, it is real and eternal. As the cause and the effect, the world is different and non-different from Brahman during the effected state, and is non-different from Brahman during the causal state.

(iv) Aupādhika-Bhedābheda
dvedānta

Bhāskara adopts the doctrine of difference and non-difference (Bhedābheda), as the central truth of vedānta and this is the fundamental note of his doctrine. It cannot be objected that difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory. Nor cannot be said that two cannot do co-exist. To avoid this objection Bhāskara says that everything is depend on direct experience, what is true and what is wrong in the world, so everything must be decided on the basis of direct experience. Because, nothing is seen absolutely different or absolutely non-different in the world of experience. Everything is different and non-different. For example, a cow is different from another cow as individual cow, but non-different from it as belonging

1 Bhāskara-bhāsyā, pp. 18, 1.1.4.
to the same genus 'cow'. Again, a cow is different from a horse as a cow, but not-different from it being an existent substance like it and so on. Similarly a gold ear-ring is different from a gold bracelet but not-different from it as gold.

So, direct experience is only source, which guarantees in regarding that difference and non-difference are not mutually contradictory and do co-exist.

Bhāskara says that there is no contradiction between unity and diversity of Brahman as cold and hot, because the relation of cold and hot is not that of cause and effect. But the relation between unity-Brahman and diversity - the world is that of cause and effect, so Brahman is both different and non-different from the world.

It has already been observed that Jīva is the transformation (parināma) of Brahman through his power. It is natural that which is the effect of Brahman, that will be non-different from the Brahman because one effect arises from a cause and abides in a cause. Thus, Jīva is non-different from Brahman. Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman during the effected state of Brahman (kāryavasthā).

1 (a) Bhāskara-bhāsyap.16-17,1.1.4

(b) Jijñāsā "Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha" Vol. III pp. 193, Calcutta, 1943.

2 Bhāskara-bhāsyap.17.
Thus, it is established that Jīva-Jagat is non-different from Brahman during the destruction and salvation. It is natural, Brahman being the cause, and the Jīva-Jagat must be Brahman in nature and essence. It means that non-difference (abheda) of Brahman and Jīva-Jagat is natural (svābhāvika). But, Jīva-Jagat is different and non-different from Brahman during the state of creation and sansāra (buddhavasthā). Here, difference is adventitious (aapādhika), because at the beginning of the Creation the Jīva becomes associated with the upādhis.

To conclude this aapādhika-bhedabheda of Bhāskara Dr. Roma Chauduri refers to that Bhāskara explains Brahman-Jīva-Jagat relation thus -

(1) During the Karṇaṇavasthā of Brahman, i.e., when Brahman is a pure, undifferentiated unity, prior to creation or arṣti, Jīva-Jagat, too, remain absolutely merged in him, without any distinction from Him at all.

(ii) Then, during the kāryāvasthā of Brahman, when Brahman creates so to speak, Jīva-Jagat out of Himself, Jīva-Jagat become different from Him. So, then, they are bhinnābhinnam from Him. This is the stage of arṣṭisthiti.

(iii) Then during the stage of pralaya, too, Jīva-Jagat, again become identical with Brahman.

(iv) During Mokṣa also Jīva becomes identical with Brahman.

In this way, according to Bhāskara the abheda between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat is Svābhāvika, i.e., satya and nitya, while the bheda between Brahman and Jīva-Jagat is aupādhika, i.e., āguntuka due to upādhis, and so anitya, yet satya.

4. The doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa

Yādavaprakāśa is known from references only. Nothing much is known about the Yādavaprakāśa and his philosophy. According to tradition, Yādavaprakāśa was the supporter of the doctrine of

1 "Jivaparayaśca svābhāvikotheda aupādhikastu bhedaḥ"- Bhāskara-bhāṣya pp.243, 4.4.4.
difference and non-difference. To establish his doctrine of Bhedābheda, there is no clear evidence, because, though, he wrote his commentary on Brahma-Sūra, yet his commentary is not, at present, available. His doctrine has generally been established on the basis of some critical references of works of Rāmānuja and Vedānta-Deśika. Rāmānuja criticizes the doctrine of Yadavaprakāśa in his Vedārthasangrah. Vedānta-Deśika devoted a brief chapter in his paramatathāṅga to the critical examination of the tenant of Bhāskara and Yadava.

According to "Sruti-prakāśikā" the glossary on the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja, which is written by Sudārsanabhatta, there is relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahmā as the cause and the effect, as explained by Āsmatarthya, so such is the view of Yadavaprakāśa, which is called as "svabhāvika-Bhedabheda"

2 Srinivasachārī, Prof. P.N., "The philosophy of Bhedābheda", pp. 144.
1. The doctrine of Śrīnimbārka-cārāya

In Nimbārka's view, there are three ultimate realities viz. Brahmaṇa, Jīva and acit(Jagat),

1 Ayam Yaḍavaprakāśa-pakṣoṣmin sūtra upanyastah/
tatra hi kāryatmanā kāranaatmanā ca Jivabrhaumobhe-
dābhedau svabhāvikam matau/


2 Srinivasachari, Prof.P.N., "The philosophy of Bhedabheda", pp. 144.
and the relation between these three realities is difference and non-difference.

To understand his doctrine of difference and non-difference, it may, therefore, be useful to say a few words about the concept of Jīva—the enjoyer (bhokta), the Brahman (niyanta) and the acit (bhogya), as propounded by Śrīnimbārka-cārya.

(i) Jīva is knowledge by nature, dependent on Hari, as in a condition to be conjugated with, or substracted from, a body is atomic, different in different bodies, and is a knower and infinite.

(ii) Jīva is knowledge by nature. It is a peculiar quality of Jīva, which delights the entire body, just as the odour of the flower. It proves that Jīva is different from non-sentient.

The Jīva, being a knowledge, is knower as well as. Here is no contradiction between knowledge and knower, and is not identity with each other. In many cases, we see, the substratum

1 Vedānta-kāndaḥanu verse. 1
2 Vedānta-pārijata-Saurabha. 2.3.26
3 Vedānta-pārijata-Saurabha 1.2.12, 1.3.6, 2.3.18.
4 Vedānta-ratna-manjūgas, pp.4
and the attribute are very resembling, but that
does not mean that they are identical. Just as
a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet there
is no identity, is difference and they stand in
the relation of substratum (dharma) and attribute
(dharma).

The Jīva, being a knower, is an ego or,
'I' (aham). A knower always feels 'I know',
'I want', 'I do' etc.

The Jīva, being an ego, is a doer, enjoyer,
under the control of Brahman and a part of the
Brahman, all these being true of in bondage as
well as in liberation.

Jīva is atomic in size. According to
the Svetāsvatara Upanisad, the individual soul
(Jīva) is as subtle as a hairpoint divided and
sub-divided hundreds of times, Jīva is atomic in
size, in bondage as well as in liberation.

Jīva is infinite in number. In this
evidence, Brahma-Sūtra states that Jīva is many,
Brahman is one, it proves the difference between
Jīva and Brahman.

1 Vedānta-Ratna-Manjūsa pp. 4
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.18
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.32 – 40, 1.3.7., 2.3.43.
4 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.19.
5 Bhedavya-padesāscanyah/ Brahma-Sūtra 1.1.22
The Jīva is of two kinds:


(Sri-Nimbāraka Cārya has given the following characteristics of the Brahman in his Vedānta-kāmadhanu. "We meditate on the supreme Brahman viz. Kṛṣṇa, Hari, who has eyes like the lotus, who naturally has destroyed all the defects, is the store of all auspicious attributes, his body is represented by the vyūha and who is attended by all"

Thus, according to Nimbārka, the absolute ultimate reality is Śrīkṛṣṇa Himself. He is denoted by the term "Brahman" who is greatest of all because of his infinite, incomprehensible, inherent nature, attributes, powers and so on. He is the cause of the Universe. Brahman alone is the cause of the creation and destruction of the universe. All names and forms arise from him and return to Him. Brahman is the both the material cause and the efficient

1 Vedānta-kāmadhanu. Verse 4.
2 Vedānta-parījāta-Saurabhī 1.1.1
3 Vedānta-parījāta-Saurabhī 1.1.10-12.
4 Vedānt-Pārijāta-Saurabhī 1.3.42
cause of the universe. He is lord of all causes, he is controller of all, He is lord of all.

(iii) The acit or Jagat is of three kinds viz.

1. apanakṛta- not derived from prakṛti.
2. Prakṛta - derived from prakṛti.
3. Kāla - the time.

In the things of prakṛta we have the ordinary material objects, it consists of the three guṇas viz. sattva, rajas, and tamas.

The process of creation and destruction is as follows. In creation first the ether originates from the lord, from the earth air, from air fire, from fire water, and from water earth. But, in every case, Lord is real creator. In destruction the process is just reverse of the process of creation viz. first the earth merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in ether and the ether in the Lord. Just like salt merged in water.

In process that the acit or Jagat is the effect of Brahman. It arises from Brahman and abides in Brahman.

1 Vedānta-parijātā-Saurabha 1.4.23
2 Bhadāranyaka-panisad 3.4.22.
3 Vedānta-parijātā-Saurabha 2.3.1 -14.
(iv) **Svabhāvika - Bhedābheda**

To explain the relation between above discussed three ultimate realities, Śrīnimbārkācārya adopt his doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (svabhāvika-bhedābheda).

The mutual difference in the nature and concept of Brahman, Jīva and the world is obvious. It has already been observed that Brahman is the cause and Jīva his effect and there is a obviously difference between the cause and its effect, just as the ocean and its waves, the sun and its lustre.

There is difference between Jīva and Brahman as the part and the whole. Jīva is the part of Brahman. Brahman is the whole.

Brahman is as the object to be obtained, while the Jīva is as the obtainer. Brahman is the object to be known and the object to be worshipped, while Jīva is knower and worshipper. The mutual difference is obvious between them.

1. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 2.1.13
2. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 1.1.18
3. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 1.2.12
4. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 1.2.12
5. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 1.2.12
6. Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha 1.2.12
7. 
There is difference between Jīva and Brahman, that Brahman is ever-free from all sins, while Jīva is an enjoyer of the fruits of all deeds done by himself.

Again, Brahman is inner-controller, while Jīva is not inner-controller because both the kāṇvas as well as the Madhyandinas depict Jīva as different from the innercontroller viz. Brahman.

Thus, the mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is natural and eternal.

On the other hand, the mutual difference between Jagat and Brahman is also obvious. Brahman is the cause, the Jagat is the effect. Both cannot be identical. Brahman is omniscient and unlimited by time, space, and unit, while Jagat is inanimate, and gross. Thus, the mutual difference of the three is distinctly established, which is natural and eternal.

In reality, there is non-difference between these three which is established by the scriptural authority. And, it has already been observed that Brahma is cause, and Jīva and Jagat are effects.

1 Vedānta-parījātā-Saurabha 1.2.8
2 Vedānta-parījātā-Saurabha 1.2.21
On the one hand, there is difference between cause and effect, on the other, there is non-difference between two. Because, the effect is dependent on the cause for its activities and existence, just like, the ear-ring is different from the bracelet in name and shape simply on account of kundalattva and kattakattva, but is non-different so far as, the gold is concerned. The ear-ring and bracelet are dependent on the gold for their existence and activities, in the absence of gold the ear-ring and bracelet are impossible for their activities and existence. In the same way, Jīva and Jagat are non-different from the Brahman as cause and the effect.

There is difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage state of Jīva, on the other hand, there is difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in the liberated state of Jīva also, liberated Jīva (mukta-Jīva) is non-different from Brahman being existence, consciousness, bliss in essence, but it, too, is different from Brahman, because Jīva is atomic in size in bondage as well as in liberation and even a liberated Jīva lacks the powers of Brahman.  

1 Vedānta-Kaustubha 1.4.21, 140-141.
In the very same manner, Jagat is different and non-different from the Brahman during creation as well as during destruction.

In fact there is neither absolutely difference and nor absolutely non-difference between these three viz., Brahman, Jīva and Jagat. But the relation between these three is both difference and non-difference. Just like the sun and its lustre. It is true that there is difference between the sun and its lustre, but there is non-difference so far as the brightness is concerned.

To make clear the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference, as propounded by Nimbarkacārya, this evidence is final. Which is as follows: "But on account of the designation of both, like the case of serpent and its coil." In this example, "like the case of serpent and its coil", the serpent is the material cause of the coil. On the one hand, this shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other, the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. It shows the non-difference between the serpent and its coil. Likewise, Jīva and Jagat are the effects of the Brahman. The

1 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabh 3.2.28
2 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabh and Kaustubha 3.2.27.
relation of the Jīva and Jagat the effects, with Brahman the cause, is natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvikabheda-abheda). Thus, it is established that there is relation of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvikabheda-abheda) between these three viz., Jīva - Jagat and Brahman, as propounded by Nimbārka-cārya, there is no any contradiction.

Having thus briefly observed the doctrine of Nimbārka, we will see in detail in further chapters, on the basis of relation of Jīva and Brahman.

2. The doctrine of Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya:

Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya was born in 1486 A.D., in Nava-dvipa in Bengal. To explain his philosophy, he adopts the doctrine of "Acintyabheda-abheda", but did not write any commentary on Brahma-sūtra. He accepted the Śrimad-bhāgavat and the commentary on

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1 "The religious condition, of Bengal was far from satisfactory at the time (A.D. 1485) when Śrīkṛṣṇa (Śrīgauranga) was born" - Radhagovindnath, "A survey of the Caitanya movement". The cultural heritage of India, Vol. IV, Calcutta, 1956.
Brahmasūtra. His any work is not available. His philosophical views were elaborated only by his disciples in their works. One of them, Jivagośāmī was his follower, who has done a famous work namely "Śatasandharbha". In spite of these sources, one commentary on Brahmasūtra was necessary to prove the doctrine of "Acintya-bhedabheda" of Śrīkṛṣṇa-caitanya. In the nineteenth century, Baldevavidyābhūṣāṇa wrote a commentary on Brahmasūtra namely "Govindabhāṣya" in support of the doctrine of "Acintya bhedabheda". Here, the doctrine of Śrīkṛṣṇa-caitanya is elaborated mainly on the basis of Govindabhāṣya.

Baladeva admits of five tattvas, namely 4
Īśwara, Jīva, prakṛti, Kāla, Karma. It may, therefore, be useful to discuss briefly the concept of the Jīva, Īśwara, and the prakṛti, to understand the doctrine of "Acintya-bhedabheda", as propounded by Śrīkṛṣṇa-caitanya.

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1 "Brahmasūtrānmarthasatesamakrtrimbhaṣyabhūta ityarthā" Tattva-Sandharbha, ll anuchheda.
2 Śatasandharbha-Tattvasandharva, p.4, śloka 3-5.
3 Vidyārūpaṁ bhūsaṁ me pradāya khyātim nityen yo Śrīgovindaḥ Svapnānirddistabhāṣyo radhabandhur-badhuragah sa Jiyat/- Govindabhāṣya - avatārmikā, pp. 5., Mathura, Śaṁvt-2011.
(i) "The nature of Jīva is that it is an eternal servant of kṛṣṇa. Jīva is the marginal potency of kṛṣṇa, and is a manifestation of a distinct-non-distinct relation with kṛṣṇa." This quotation in short gives the conception of the Jīva. But it require to explain further.

Jīva is by nature eternal. Material objects are only destroyed and are created, these are only transitory, while Jīva is never created nor can it have any destruction. Refers also in Kathopanisad 1/2/18., "The soul has neither any birth, nor any death; it does not spring from any other thing, none spring from it." Again, Svetāsvatara "Two unborn ones, the knower and non-knower, the lord and non-lord. Further; Eternal among eternal, conscious among conscious etc.

Jīva is by nature knowledge as well as knower. "Who is dwelling in knowledge", and 'I slept happily, but I could know nothing". These two kinds of bruti prove that Jīva is knowledge as well as knower.

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2 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.16.

3 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.17.
Jīva is an active agent. Being an active agent Jīva is enjoyer. Jīva is the part and the potency of the lord. In this connection Jīva is both different and non-different from Brahman. Jīva is atomic in size.

Jīva is plural in number. "pādosyasarvābhūtānī" in this sentence of śruti, "Sarvabhūtānī" shows the plurality of Jīva. Again, though all Jīvas are same in nature, yet there is difference owing to their deeds.

Jīva is of two kinds:

1. The bound (Baddha Jīva)
2. The liberated (mukta-Jīva)

(ii) Śrīkṛṣṇa is himself ultimate reality. He is nirguṇa, free from the three guṇas of prakṛti viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and is saguna Brahman, being a store house of all auspicious attributes. He has an infinity of auspicious attributes and inconceivable powers.

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1 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.31
2 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.31-38
3 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.41
4 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.18-30
5 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.42
6 Govinda-bhāṣya, 2.3.49
7 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.1.11
8 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.1.2
Brahman has three powers viz., para-sakti, aparā-sakti, and avidyā-sakti. The para-sakti is called Vishnu-sakti or svarūpa-sakti, the aparā-kṣetrajna and avidyā-karma or mayā-sakti. Through the aparā and mayā-sakti, he constitutes the universe of cit and acit and through his para-sakti which is three fold viz. samvit or jñāna-sakti, saṃdhini or bala-sakti and hilādini or kriya-sakti, he has knowledge, existence and bliss. The power and attribute of Brahman are identical with Brahman owing to the identity of substance and attributes. Just as the serpent and its coil, and the sun and its lustre.

Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe. He is efficient cause through his para-sakti, and he is material cause through his aparā-sakti. As the efficient cause, the Brahman is unchangeable or kutastha, as the material cause he is subject to modification or parināmin. It means Brahman is cause as well as the effect with his powers. Brahman is the subtle powerful in causal state; and he is the gross-powerful in the effected state. Thus, there is relation of difference and

1 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.4.26
2 "Vishnu saktipara proktā kṣetrajnabhaya tathāpara/ Avidyā-karma-samjñayatritiya saktīrīsyate."
3 Govinda-bhāṣya, 3.2.28
4 Govinda-bhāṣya, 3.2.29
5 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.4.26
6 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.4.26
non-difference between the cause and the effect as the power and the powerful.

(iii) The world is an effect and power of the Brahman. Brahman constitutes the world through his avidyā or māyā-śakti. His māya-śakti is also called tamās. It means the world is a combination of three guṇās viz. sattva, rajas, and tamās.

(iv) Agintya-bhedabheda-vāda:

Here is a question what is relation between above discussed these three ultimate realities?

The mutual difference in the nature and concept of Brahman, Jīva and world is obvious. It has already been observed that Brahman is all-knowing, all-powerful and omniscient, while the Jīva is knowing little and has limited power. Brahman is absolute, while Jīva is atomic. Brahman is creator, supporter, destroyer, while Jīva is created, supported and controlled by Brahman. The world is inanimate and gross. Thus, the mutual difference of the three is distinctly established.

1 Govinda-bhāṣya, 1.4.26
In reality, there is mutual non-difference, in the three aspects of knowledge, existence, and bliss viz. sat, cit, and ananda of Brahma, these three Brahma, Jiva and world are identical.

Thus, there is relation of both difference and non-difference between them. There is no contradiction. There is a hidden harmony behind the apparent contradiction of difference and non-difference. When Srícaitanya establishes the relation between Brahma and Jiva as Bhedabheda-prakāsha, he means to say that it is true that there cannot be both difference and non-difference in the same aspect. But there can be identity in certain aspects and difference in certain other aspects of the same objects. Such difference and non-difference are not necessarily self-contradictory. Regarding this theory, and being a follower of the school of "Acintāya - bhedabheda" Jivagocārī says that, there is no finality about


2 "apare tu" tarkapratishthānāt" (Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.11) bhedēpyabhedaipī nirmyādadasantidarsñena bhinnatāyā cintayitumasakyaḥ vadhābhedaṁ sādhyaṁ tād avadabhinnatayapicintayitumasakyaḥ vadhābhedaṁ ṛṣi sādhyaṁ to cintayah bhedābhedaḥ vadhāṁ svikurvanti"/ "Sarva-Samvādīni of Jivagocārī, pp.145-146 Radhakunda (Mathura), Samvt. 2022.
reasoning, so there is impossible the absolute difference in Jīva and Brahman, seeing unlimited defects in difference like the non-difference. Therefore, as difference is impossible, in the same manner non-difference is, too, impossible. We accept "the inconceivable difference and non-difference" (Acintyabheda-bhedavāda). Again says, there is relation of difference and non-difference as the power and powerful. There is non-difference in essence between the power and powerful, and yet difference as manifestation as a aspect of the same substance. As for example, "the musk and its odour" and, "the fire and its burning power". The musk is identical with its odour. The fire is identical with its burning power. We cannot remove the odour and the burning-power from the musk and the fire. It means, there is identity between the power and powerful, yet there is difference also, because the odour and the burning power are manifestations of the musk and the fire. Thus, there is neither absolute difference nor the absolute non-difference, between the power and

1 "tasmāt svarūpābhinnatvena cintyitumasaḥyaḥ- vādībheda-bhinnatvena cintyitumasaḥyaḥvādīabheda-sa pratiyate eti. Śakti-śaktimātorbheda-bheṣṭha-vādī-āveśāṅgikratau ca acintyau eti/. Sarva-Samvādinī of Jivagośwāmi, pp. 33, Radhakunda (Mathura), Samvat, 2022."
powerful; We accept the both difference and non-difference; the entire system of relation is a great inconceivable mystery.

The concept of "acintya" is not similar to Śankara's 'anirvācāniya.' Because, if it is accepted that the māyā is the power of Brahman, there will not be establishment of non-dualism; and again if the māyā of Śankara, is not accepted, that is also impossible. So, the term of "anirvācāniya" of Śankara is not similar to the term of 'acintya' of Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya.

Śrīdharasvāmi explains the 'acintya' as follows: "He has inconceivable nature on account of unlimited magnanimity." Again Jivagoswāmi says in Bhāgavatāndarbhaj: "which makes the impossible possible that is called "inconceivable" (acintya)."

Thus, it is established, that, according to Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya, there is relation of difference and non-difference between these three ultimate realities, which is inconceivable.

1 Sundram Sāvidyāvinoda, "Śrīcāintyādeva" (in Hindi), pp. 395, Calcutta, 1953.
3 "sparimatamahimatvadacintyaratram"/
4 "durghataghatakatvamḥacyintyatvam"./ Bhāgavata - Sandartha anusūkhēda-16.
3. The doctrine of Śripati:

Śripati wrote a commentary on the vedānta-sūtra- namely "Śrikara-bhāṣya", in the 12th Century A.D. His doctrine is referred to by various names, such as, 'Rhedābheda, Dvaitādvaita, and viśeṣādvaita' and again, (i) Dvaitādvaita, (ii) Viśeṣādvaita, (iii) Sesvarādvaita, (iv) Śivādvaita, (v) Sarvaśrutisa- 

rmata and (vi) Rhedābheda.

It may, therefore, be necessary to say, a few words about the concept of Brahmā or Śiva and the concept of Jīva or pāru, to make clear his doctrine of difference and non-difference, as propounded by Śripati.

The words, Brahmā para, Śiva and pāru, are used by Śripati as synonyms. Brahmā is 'Saviśeṣa' but not 'Nirviśeṣa'. Brahmā is both the material cause and the efficient cause. The universe is the transformation of the Brahmā. When He himself remains only its efficient cause and He transforms into world his energy or mayāśakti its material cause.

4 Śrikara-bhāṣya, pp. 179-180.
Jīva is not born but eternal. Jīva is different from the form of the creation of the physical world. Jīva is a part of Brahman. Jīva is of two kinds viz. Baddha and mukta. In liberation, the Jīva becomes identical with Brahman, but it cannot possess the power of creation and remains secondary to Brahman. Jīva is atomic in size, and not all pervasive.

It has already been observed that Brahman is different Category from the Jīva. Brahman is the object of worship, all-pervasive and omniscient, while Jīva is worshipper, has spatial limitation and possesses limited knowledge. But at the liberation there is union of the two. He admits that the aforesaid limitation of the Jīva are beginningless and natural. But he asserts that Jīva gets freedom from these natural differences and becomes identical with the Brahman. As Śruti says "The rivers flowing when go to the ocean disappear into the ocean leaving name and forms, so a wiseman losing his name and form attains the divine person, higher than high" (chāndogyopanisad 8.3.4). In arguing for the difference

1 Śrīkara-bhāṣya pp. 29.
2 Śrīkara-bhāṣya pp. 261
3 Śrīkara-bhāṣya pp. 48
4 Śrīkara-bhāṣya IV.V.17
5 Śrīkara-bhāṣya pp. 263.
and non-difference, Śrīpati seeks invariably the help of nyāyas, like "bharamarākitaśūktisalā-disu". It means that we find a fly of natural birth changes its inborn nature and becomes a bee, and rain water, getting into a mother-of-pearl becomes pearl. Thus, Śrīpati concludes that there is beginningless difference between Jīva and Brahman, but at literated state of Jīva, there is non difference, of the two. This identity is natural as well as of form. He emphasizes this point again and again.

If it is asked how can both identity and difference hold if identity as of form also, Śrīpati's possible answer is that difference hold only in bondage and identity in mukti so that identity and difference are not to be found simultaneously but at different times.

His doctrine of difference and non-difference is natural like the case of the serpent and its coil.

2 (a) Śrīkara-bhāṣya, Vol. II, pp.338.
'Sripati follows the kāśkrta, because he is an exponent of the bheda-bheda, takes all the śrutis into account and represented in central view of the vedānta. But his doctrine is clearly similar to the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as propounded by Āñdulomin.

1 Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Bhāskari" Vol. III, pp. XLVIII.
2 Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Saivadarśanasānindu"
CHAPTER III

The Doctrine of Natural Difference and Non-Difference
(Svābhāvika-bhedabhedāvāda).

(i) Difference in Jīva and Brahman:

(A) In the philosophy of Nimbārka, the mutual difference in the nature and concept of Jīva and Brahman is obvious. Brahman is the cause and Jīva his effect or transformation. There is a difference between the cause and its effect, as between the clay and the pots, dishes etc.; between the gold and the bracelets, ear-rings etc.; between the tree and the leaves, fruits etc.; between the sea and the foams, waves etc.; and between the sun and its rays. Similarly, there is a difference between the Jīva (the enjoyer) and the Brahman (controller).

1 Vedānta-parījata-saurabhā and Vedānta-kaustubha 2.1.13
And again, Nimbarka points out that there is difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the cause and the effect: He says that the creator of the world viz. Brahman is something more than the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, "on account of the indication of difference". As in passage:

"O the soul, indeed, should be seen', 'the knower of Brahman attains the highest,' 'who controls the soul within'.

Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the diamond the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest, which are modification of the earth, are different from the earth, and the leaf and so on, which are modification of the tree, are different from tree; the ray of diamond is different from the diamond. So, the Jīva which is modification of the Brahman, is different from Brahman.

1 Adhikām tu bhedaṁ nirdeṣāḥ/ Brahma-sūtra, 2.1.21
2 Vedānta-parijātā-saurabhā and vedānta-kaustubhā 2.1.21
3 Vedānta-parijātā-saurabhā and vedānta-kaustubhā 2.1.22
There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the part and the whole. Jīva is the part of Brahman. Brahman is the whole. As declared by śruti: "For it is a part of the highest." A 'part' means a 'power', it is clear from śruti: "This Jīva, a power of highest, is small in power and not independent."

The vedic mantra also confirms the part idea comes from the Puruṣasukta, quoted in Chandogya Upanisad (3.12.6) "pādo'sya viśvabhūtāni tripād asyāmrtam divi" (all the being are His foot, immortal in the heaven is His three feet). A 'feet' means a 'part'.

The śruti also corroborates the concept of part, thus "in this world of life the Jīva is my own part, in the form of eternal part," (Gitā 15.7).

The relation of part and whole declares that there is a difference between Jīva and Brahman,

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1 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.3.42.
2 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.3.43
3 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.3.44
"On account of the designation of variety"
i.e., on account of the designation of difference.
The Jīva is, by nature, a part, and the subject
to bondage and salvation, while Brahman is, by
nature, whole and the ocean of a mass of attributes
like omniscience and the rest. The following
are designations of difference: "Who rules
the soul within; having entered within, the ruler
of men; the soul indeed is supreme, self-dependent,
possessing superior qualities, the Jīva is less
powerful, dependent, lowest, the two unborn selves,
the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the
non-lord.

The statement of difference (bheda)
is expressed by Nimbārka-cārya in Brahma-sūtra
1.1.18, the Jīva is different from Brahman, 'on
account of the designation of difference.' Just
as the vedic mantra: "He is indeed, the essence;
for indeed on attaining the essence, he becomes
blissful." It designates a difference between
Brahman as the object to be obtained and the Jīva

1 Vedānta-pārijātasaūrabha and Vedānta-kaustubha
2.3.42
2 bhedavāyapadesacca/ Brahma-sūtra 1.1.18
as the obtainer, the obtainer cannot be the object to be obtained. Thus, there is a difference of nature between Jīva and Brahman, otherwise, an intermixture of attributes will result. To prove this statement of difference, Nimbarkacārya says that the Jīva is not blissful but only Brahman, because Brahman is the cause of the bliss of Jīva; and the bliss of the Jīva is momentary, while the bliss of Brahman is endless.

Here a doubt arises that when Jīva and Brahman, both are conscious, both must be blissful. As Sruti says "may my consisting of food, consisting of the vital breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of understanding and consisting of bliss, be purified." It proves that what consists of blissful is something to be purified; and as it is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be purified, so that which consists of blissful is the Jīva.

1 Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha and Vedānta-kaustubha 1.1.18
2 Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha 1.1.15
3 Mahānār. 20.21, English Translation of Vedānta-Kaustubha, Roma Bose, l.1.13.
To this answer is as follows: that blissful is Brahman alone, on account of repetition viz., the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times in scripture in reference to Brahman alone. So, it is established that Jīva is different from Brahman, because on attaining whom the Jīva comes to be united with bliss.

Who is within the sun, within the eye, and is to be worshipped by desirous of salvation. He is Brahman alone, not Jīva. To prove this Nimbarkācārya explains "antastadhamopadesāt" viz., there is difference of Brahman with Jīva, because Brahman has special qualities such as: free from all sins, the soul of all and so on.

The statement of difference (bheda) is further expressed by Nimbarka in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.22 "bhedavyapadesācānyah". It means, by nature, brahman is different from the individual souls of the sun and the rest, within which He dwells, "on account of the designation of difference." Again, it means that Brahman in Jīva,

1 Vedāntā-kaustubha 1.1.13
2 Vedānta-parijāta-sauratha 1.1.20
3 Vedānta-parijāta-sauratha 1.1.21
who is āsarinībhimānin, is different by nature.
It is also mentioned in the āsruti: "who dwelling into the sun, is other than the sun, the sun does not know him, of whom the sun is the body, who controls the sun from within, He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal. "Thus, it is established that there is difference of Brahman with Jīva, within which He dwells.

"Sarvam khalvidam brahma tajjālāntiti 'sant-uṣṭāt" viz. "All this, indeed, is Brahman, rising from him, disappearing into him and breathing in him; - calm, one should meditate on him." For the purpose of meditation it is to be said that 'manomaya prāṇa āsāra' means Brahman has spiritual body and vital-breath body. Here, it is to be understood, that for the purpose of meditation as the spiritual body is Brahman alone, not Jīva. Because Brahman alone, celebrated in all the vedāntas, is taught in these above words," 
"sarvam khalvidam brahma." It means that there is difference of Brahman with Jīva.

1 Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha and vedānta-kaustubha 1.1.22
2 Chāndogypaṇiṣada, 3.14.1
3 Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha, 1.2.1
To make clear this Nimbarka gives the evidences of āruti and smṛti. First of all He gives the evidences of Brahman-sūtra "Vivakṣit gamopapateśca" and "anupattestu naśārīrah". Both sūtras declare that Brahman is different from Jīva, "because of the appropriateness of the attributes intended to be stated", and "on account of inappropriateness, not the embodied (soul)".

It means Brahman has the spiritual (manomaya) and vital-breath body, the form of light; He has true volition, has the ether as the soul, has all desires, has all odours, has all testes etc., while Jīva has no spiritual body, and has not the above mentioned attributes such as; having all desires, having all odours etc. "Karmakarṇayava-
padeśca" and "Śabdāviseṣat" both sūtras of Brahman-sūtra, too, declare, that Brahman is different from Jīva" because of the designation of object and agent " and "on account of the difference of words". It means Brahman is object and the Jīva is agent. For instance; "Having departed from here, I shall attain him," in this sentence

1 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabha, 1.2.2.
2 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabha, 1.2.3.
3 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabha, 1.2.4.
4 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabha, 1.2.5.
5 Chandogyparāised 3.12.4.
Brahman is object, while Jīva is an agent. And on account of difference words, it proves also that Jīva and Brahman are denoted by different words viz. the genitive and the nominative respectively. As in śruti: "This my soul is into my heart." In this sentence the mutual difference in Jīva and Brahman is obvious.

To conclude this statement of difference (bheda) Nimbārka further gives the evidences of smṛti: 'O Arjuna the lord dwells in the heart of all beings.' ¹ 'He who sees me everywhere and sees everything in me, of him I will never lose hold, and he shall never lose hold of me;' ² 'He, who established in unity worships me abiding within all beings,' 'that yogin rests in me whatever be his mode of living'. 'There is nothing higher than I, O Dhananjaya.' ³ 'all this is threaded in me as rows of gems in a string.' ⁴ 'Since I excel the perishable, and am more good than the imperishable, I am renowned in the world,' ⁵

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1 Chandogyan 3.14.3.
2 Gitā, 18.61
3 Gitā, 6.30
4 Gitā, 6.31
5 Gitā, 7.7
and in the veda as the supreme person (purusottam)'.
All these above evidences establish the mutual
difference in Jīva and Brahman.

There is difference between Jīva and
Brahman, that, Brahman is ever-free from all sins,
while Jīva is an enjoyer of the fruits of the
deeds done by itself. Scripture is the sole
proof. Such as: "Of these, He who is the supreme
self is called to be eternal and devoid of all
properties of matter." "He is not smeared even
by the fruit, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by
water, the active self, on the other hand, is another,
who is liable to release and bondage. "Thus, it
is established Jīva is an enjoyer of the fruits of
the deeds, while Brahman is ever-free from all
sins.

Brahman is an eater who is destroyer of
world, while the movable and the immovable are food
which has death for their condiment. It declares
that Brahman is different from Jīva. As āruti:
"He to whom both Brāhmaṇa and ksatriya are the food
and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?"

1 Gitā, 15.18
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 1.2.8
3 Mahā 12.13754-13755, Eng. Translation of Vedānta-
pārijāta-saurabha, Roma Bose, 1.2.8.
4 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha 1.2.9, English Translation
by Roma Bose.
"ratam pibentau sukratasya loke guha previstau". Here it is to be understood that there is two sentient being viz., Jīva and Supreme-self into the cave, where the mutual difference is obvious, between Jīva and Brahman. Brahman is difficult to see, who is hidden by yoga-māyā, who is all-pervasive, who is entered into the cave; while Jīva, who arises with the vital-breath, who is aditi who is made of the deities, who was manifested through the elements, who is internal into the cave. To prove this Nimbārka points out that Brahman is the object to be worshipped and the object to be known; while Jīva is worshipper and knower. The mutual difference is obvious between them.

Brahman is inner-controller, while Jīva is not inner-controller because both the kānas as well as Madhyandinas depict Jīva as different from the inner-controller viz. Brahman. As śruti:

"He who is dwelling in intelligence", and "He who is dwelling in the soul.

1 Kathopanisad, 3.1.3, 2.1.7, 1.2.12.
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 1.2.11
3,4,5,6 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 1.2.12
7 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 1.2.21
Brahman is imperishable and the source of beings, while Jīva is not denoted by the words 'imperishable and the source of beings.' So, there is difference between Jīva and Brahman, on account of attributes and difference. As āruti says, the designation of attributes is "All-pervading" and the designation of difference is "Higher than high imperishable." ¹

The statement of difference (bheda) is expressed by Nimbārka in Brahma-sūtra 1.3.5, "bheda-vyāpadeśacca". It means, Jīva cannot be the heaven, the earth and the rest, on account of the designation of difference viz., 'there is difference between the Jīva, which has little knowledge, and is subject to bondage and salvation through the lord's Māyā consisting of the three guṇas, and the Brahman, who is omniscient lord. It establishes that there is difference between Jīva and Brahman as the knower and the object to be known. ²

Regarding the relation of difference between Jīva and Brahman, it is to be explained

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1 Vedānta-pārijātasa-rāhṛtha, 1.2.23.
2 Vedānta-pārijātasa-rāhṛtha and Vedānta-kaustubha 1.3.5.
that, Brahman is non-eater, while Jīva is an 1 eater. As declared by śruti: "Of these two, one testes the sweet berry, the other looks on 2 with-out eating."

Jīva and Brahman are different from each other, Brahman is the omniscient, while Jīva is non-knower in deep sleep. As in śruti; "Embraced by the intelligent soul, he does not know anything eternal, nor anything internal."

There is indeed difference between, Jīva and Brahman, on account of words like 'lord' and 3 the rest. On account of śruti like; "He is lord of all', 'the controller of all', 'The ruler of all'; 'He rules all this; 'The lord of all' " etc.

Jīva is alone that is subject to deeds and participates in imperfections, but Brahman who is not subject to deeds. It is to be said in śruti; "The two birds of handsome plumage, close friends, cling to the same tree; One of them eats the sweet berry, while the other, without eating looks on".

1 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabhā, 1.3.7.
2 Mundakopanisad, 1.1.3
3 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabhā and vedānta-kaustubha
4 Brhadāranyakopanisad, 4.3.21
5 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabhā and vedānta-kaustubha,
It means, Jīva is an enjoyer on account of its imperfections, while Brahman is not touched even by an odour of imperfections, and He is not the enjoyer of the names and the forms to be created by Himself.

Thus, Baddha Jīva is entirely different from Brahman, being imperfect, sinful, impure and so on.

(B) There is difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation. Mukta Jīva is different from Brahman in two respects. In the first place, the freed-soul is atomic in size, while Brahman is all-pervading. Atomic Jīva cannot become all-pervasive in salvation. But it can take place in several bodies through its attributes of knowledge, as the case of a lamp, though placed in one place, pervades me places through its rays. As scripture shows: "The individual soul is as subtle as a hair point divided and subdivided hundreds of times. He is potentially infinite. He has to be known."

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 3.2.13-14
2 Vedānta-kaustubha 4.4.15.
3 Svetāsvatara upanisad 5.9.
In the second place, the freed soul, however, though similar to the Highest Brahman, yet cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their controller, their supporter, all-pervasive and so on; and hence its lordship is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

Thus, it is established that Jīva is not absolutely different from Brahman like the Mahāvīra-philosophy, but the mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is equally eternal, natural, and undeniable, in bondage as well as in salvation.

(C) "The objections levelled by Śankarites against the admission of "duality" or "difference" as a category are, firstly, that the category of difference (bheda) being by nature a relation involves two poles and hence it cannot be identical in nature with its locus in which it is supposed to subsist (bhedaśya na adhikarana-svārūpaṇam). Secondly, that if "difference" is different in nature from its locus, then a second grade of "difference" has to be introduced and this would imply another grade of difference and so on ad

1 Vedānta-kaustubha, 4.4.20. English Translation by Roma Bose.
infinitum. Thus, we have a vicious infinite. To the first objection, the reply is that "difference" is not relational in nature with this or that individual locus but with the concept of the locus as such (bhūtalatvadina nirapeksatve' pi adhikaramātmakatvena sāpeksatve Kaste abhāvat). The charge of vicious infinite by the introduction of difference of differences is invalid, for all differences are identical in nature with their locus. So in the case of a series of differences the nature of each difference becomes well defined and the viciousness of the infinite series vanishes. In the instance "there is a jug on the ground", the nature of the difference of the jug is jugness, whereas in the case of the difference of the difference, the second order of difference has a separate specification as a special order of differences. Moreover, since difference reveals only the particular modes of the objects, these difficulties cannot arise. In perceiving difference we do not perceive difference as entity different from the two objects between

1 Parapakṣa - giribāgra of Madhava-mukunda pp. 17.
which it is supposed to subsist. One might equally well find such a fault of mutual dependence on the identification of Brahman with Jīva, since it depends upon the identification of the Jīva with the Brahman.

A further discussion of the subject shows that there cannot be any objections against "differences" on the score of their being produced, for they merely subsist and are not produced; or on the possibility of their being known, for if differences were never perceived the Śāṅkārya would not have been so anxious to remove the so-called illusions or mis-perception of differences, or to mis-spend their energies in trying to demonstrate that Brahman was different from all that was false, material and the like; and the saint also would not be able to distinguish between what was eternal and transitory. Again, it is held that there is a knowledge which contradicts the notion of difference. But if this knowledge

\[1 \text{ nā'pū anyonyā-srayah bheda pratyakse pratiyogita-} \]
\[\text{vacchedakastambhatvadi-prakāraka - jnānasyai'va} \]
\[\text{hetutvat na tāvad bheda-pratyakse bhedā-srayād} \]
\[\text{bhinnatvena pratiyogijnamam hetuh.} \]

Para-paksa-giri-bajra of Mādhavamukunda pp.17.
itself involves difference it cannot contradict it. Whatever may signify anything must do so by restricting its signification to it, and all such restriction involves difference. Even the comprehension that demonstrates the illusoriness of "difference" (e.g., this is not difference, or there is no difference here etc.) proves the existence of "difference". Moreover, a question may be raised as to whether the notion that contradicts difference is itself comprehended as different from difference or not. In the former case the validity of the notion leaves "difference" unmolested and in the second case; i.e., if it is not comprehended as different from "difference", it becomes identical with it and cannot contradict it."

(ii) Non-difference in Jīva and Brahman:

In reality, there is mutual non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the cause and the effect. Because, Brahman is the cause of the Jīva and Jīva is the effect or transformation of the Brahman. Nimbārka-cārya points out that there is

non-difference between the cause and the effect, and not absolute difference; on account of the texts of the śrutis, the smṛtis and the sūtras. In texts: "The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay", 'the existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning one, without a second', 'He thought, may I be many; may I procreate', 'He created the light; 'All that has this for its soul', 'that is true', 'that is soul', 'thou art that', 'All this, varily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into him and breathing in him', 'that was unmanifest then', 'it became manifest by name and form' and so on".

For this reason also, says Nimbārka, there is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent.

Again He says, the effect—which belongs to a posterior time; is present in the cause. So

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.14
2 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.1.14, English Translation by Boma Bose.
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.15.
the effect is non-different from the cause. As declared by śruti: "Brahman, indeed, was this in beginning".

Further, he makes it clear, that it cannot be said that the effect does not exist prior to creation, on account of the designation of what is non-existent, as in text "The non-existent, indeed, was this in the beginning". Because, the pre-existence of the effect is to be known from the complementary passage, viz. "That was existent". And again says, the pre-existence of the effect is to be known from reasoning. He admits that the names, forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, all are real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz. a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay, that is existent. Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. Here, it cannot be said that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the

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1 Vedānta-parījātasaurasbha, 2.1.16
2 Vedānta-parījātasaurasbha, 2.1.17
activity of the agent has no meaning. Because, the pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest; hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before. Thus, according to Nimbarka, the conventional usage of names and forms is not unprecedented. On the other hand, Nimbarka says that the origin of a non-existent effect does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks—for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight, a different weight is never found. Likewise the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all, there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence, the doctrine of a non-existent effect (Asatkarya-veda) is unreasonable. Nimbarka states once more another reason

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1 Vedant-kaustubha 2.1.17, English Translation by Roma Bose.
for the existence of the effect, thus: 'Satkāryā-vāda'. The other text is the text aptly teaching
the pre-existence of the effect: Viz. "The
existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning",
which is other than the quoted text, viz., "The
non-existent, verily, was the beginning." Because
of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect
alone that originates, - this is the sense.

The above-mentioned doctrine of existent
effect (satkārya-vāda) is explained by the
following illustrations. Such as: just as a
piece of rolled up cloth, although not known to be
a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason,
become non-existent, but is indeed existent,
existing in a different form, and when spread
out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth; just
as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not
perceived, even though existent, but do not become
non-existent there by and are known when stretched
out again; And just as the banyan tree, existent
in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form,
is manifested in a gross form. And just as the vital-breath, having the prāna, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercise etc., remains in its real form; and when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective forms. So indeed the prior to creation the universe remains existent indeed, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation, having its name and forms manifest. Thus, the cause and the effect are non-different. Because, the effect - which belongs to posterior time, is present in the cause.

Thus, it is established that the effect is non-different from the cause. Similarly, the Jīva - the effect or transformation of Brahman, is non-different from Brahman - the cause.

1 Vedānta - kaustubha, 2.1.18, English translation by Roma Bose.
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.19.
3 Vedānta - kaustubha, 2.1.18, English translation by Roma Bose.
There is non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the whole and the part. Jīva is the part of Brahman; Brahman is the whole. The relation of a part and the whole declares: That there is difference between Jīva and Brahman, as well as non-difference. Jīva is non-different from Brahman, on account of the designation of non-difference. And its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. The following are designation of non-difference:

"Thou art that" 'This soul is Brahman', 'I am Brahman', and so on.

The non-difference between Jīva and Brahman is further supported and expressed by Nimbarkācārya in the verse of vedānta-kāmadhanu that all these three primary principles are 'Brahmātmaka'. This statement (brahmātmaka)

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha and vendānta-kaustubha

2.3.42

2 Sarvam hi vijnānamato yathārthkam
śrutismṛtiḥbhyo nikhilasya vastunah/
brahmātmaktyāditi vedaśīrśatam
trirūpaḥpi śrutisūtrasādhitā//
Vedānta-kāmadhanu - Verse 7.
indicates the non-difference of the three. Three means there are three realities viz. Brahman, Jīva and the world. So having Brahman for its essence (brahmātmaka), Jīva is non-different from Brahman, as the ear-ring is different from the bracelet in name and shape simply on account of kundalattva and katakattva, but is also non-different, so far as, the gold is concerned.

Nevertheless, the authorities of śrutī prove that Jīva is non-different from Brahman. 

"Existence alone my dear, was this in the beginning one only; without a second', 'This one only was soul in the beginning', 'Thou art that', 'This soul is Brahman', 'That I am Brahman', 'All this is, indeed, soul', 'All this is Brahman', 'I am you indeed, O revered deity,' 'All this is verily Brahman for three form does it proceed, there in does it merge, and there by it is maintained.'"

To prove this statement of non-difference another ground is as follows. There is non-difference between Jīva and Brahman because the existence and activity of Jīva are depend on Brahman (tadvayattas-thiti-pravrtik-tat). As cleared from śrutī.

1 Vedānta-ratna-manjūśā, pp. 89.
"The lord abides, O Arjuna: in the heart - region of all, causing all being to revolve by his mysterious power, as if mounted on a machine". Moreover, whatever is depend on something else for its existence and activity, there is non-different from it. It is to be said in the dialogue between the Vital-breath and the sense-organs in the chāndogya: "verily, they are not called speech, eyes, or mind, but called the vital-breath alone."

To make clear this statement of non-difference final ground is as follows: Jīva is non-different from Brahman because it is pervaded by Brahman (tadvyāpya). Whatever is to be seen or to be heared in this world, internal or eternal, that all is pervaded be Nārāyana.

Baddha Jīva is non-different from Brahman in essence, being His effect or transformation, on the otherhand Mukta Jīva is entirely non-different from Brahman, being existence-cognition-Bliss in

1 Gītā, 18.61
2 Chāndogypansad, 5.1.15.
3 Vedānta-ratna-manjūsa, pp. 89
essence (saccidanandavartapa). The freed Jiva attains
the nature and qualities of the Brahman viz. the
freedom from sins and so on. The freed Jiva
attains its-fathers and so on, through a mere will.
It comes to have, in fact, the attributes of true
desires and so on, and becomes a self-ruler,
in accordance with the scriptural text "He becomes
a self-ruler". Thus, freed Jiva is entirely non-
different from Brahman.

(iii) The doctrine of Natural difference and
non-difference (Svabhavika-bhedabhedaavada):

Thus, according to Nimbarka, the relation
of Jiva and Brahman is just like that between a
cause and its effect, a whole and its parts, a
substance and its attributes, a substratum of power
and its powers. There is a relation of difference
and non-difference between the cause and its effects
as in ordinary life. In ordinary life, the pots,
dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their causes but there is still a mutual difference amongst the particular effects themselves. Thus, there is neither pure non-difference (abeda) nor pure difference (bheda), between the cause and its effect, but natural difference and non-difference. Again, just as pots, dishes and the rest are by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, but they are by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. And just as the bracelets, ear-rings and the rest are by nature non-different from the gold, as having no existence and activity apart from the gold, but they are by nature different, too, from the gold possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the gold lacks. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda) between Jīva and Brahman.

1 Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha and Vedānta-kaustubha 2.1.13.
Again, it may be said in the support of above, that just as in the passage when it is said: "Sarvam khalvidam brahma" (All this, indeed, is Brahman), though it declares that the non-sentient is non-different from Brahman, is yet different from Brahman as its difference from Brahman is admitted by the phrase 'emanating from Him.' So, in the case of Jīva also, when it is said: "tattvanamī" (Thou art that), though it declares that the Jīva is non-different from Brahman only as having no existence and activity independently of Brahman, but not by nature, is yet different from Him, on account of the stated scriptural text designating difference. Thus, there is difference between Jīva and Brahman, in spite of there being a non-difference between two. For example, stones like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modification of the earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth, are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do their peculiar nature. And, just as the leaf,

1 Vedānta-Kaustubha, 2.1.21
though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree; Just as the ray, though non-different from its substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the Jīva is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul.

Thus, it is established that the Jīva is neither absolutely different from Brahman, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the cause and its effects. Again, the Jīva is entirely different from Brahman as it has already been observed. But it, too, is non-different from Brahman in essence, being His effect or transformation.

The natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman is to be further explained by Nimbarkācārya in such a sūtra of Brahmāsūtra as "aśo nāṇayapadeśādanyathā cāpi dāśakitavādītvamadhiyata eka."  The Jīva

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2. Brahma-sūtra, 2.3.42.
is neither absolutely different from the Brahman, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but it is a part of Brahman, and the Brahman is the whole of the Jīva. Here, a 'part' means a 'power'. It should not be understood here as a portion, like a portion of wealth and the rest, because if it be like a portion of wealth there will result an absolute difference between Jīva and Brahman and hence the texts like: "Thou art that" will be set aside. So, the true doctrine is that there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman. Thus, the Jīva is by nature different from Brahman predicated to be the whole, and the store of attributes like omniscience and the rest—while it is predicated to be a part—as is subject to bondage and salvation. But it is yet non-different from Brahman, as its existence and activity are under control of the whole. "On account of the designation of variety and otherwise" viz. on account of the designation of difference and non-difference. The following are designations of difference: "'who controls the individual self within', 'Having entered within, the ruler of the people', 'The soul, indeed is
independent and possessed of more qualities, Jīva is less powerful, is dependent and is lowly', 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' and so on. The following are designations of non-difference: "'Thou art that', 'this ātman is Brahman'; 'I am Brahman'" and so on.

The fact is that the cause and its effects, the part and the whole are neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different, but the relation of difference and non-difference. Thus, the relation of Jīva and Brahman is a relation of natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedābheda).

To conclude the present doctrine the final evidence of the Brahma-sūtra is present, such as "unbhayavyapadesātivahikundalavat" viz.

1 Vedānta-kaustubha 2.3.42
2 Brahma-sūtra, 3.2.27.
"But on account of the designation of both, like the case of serpent and its coil." In the present illustration 'ahikundalvat', the serpent is material cause of the coil. The serpent is independent while coil is dependent. On one hand, this shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other, the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. It proves the non-difference between the serpent and its coil. Thus, there is natural relation of difference and non-difference between the serpent and its coil as between the cause and its effects. Likewise, this universe of matter and souls is the effect or transformation of the Brahman. The relation of Jīva - the effect or transformation, with Brahman - the cause, is natural difference and non-difference on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference. The other analogy through which the Nimbraka tries to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which means that it is true that there is difference between sun and its

1 Brahma-sūtra 3.2.28
rays but there is also non-difference so far as the light is concerned.

Thus, there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage.

On the other hand, there is natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, in salvation, too. Thus, the freed Jīva is entirely non-different from the Brahman, being existence - cognition - bliss in essence (saccidānandavijnāna). But the freed Jīva, too, is different from the Brahman in two respects. In the first place, the freed Jīva is atomic in size, while Brahman is all-pervasive. And in the second place, the freed Jīva, however, though similar to the Brahman, yet cannot be possible be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their creator, their supporter, their destroyer, all-pervasive and so on, which Brahman possesses fully and eternally, as it has already been observed above.

The relation between the freed Jīva and the Brahman is to be further remarked by Nimbārka-cārya, as follows: - 'bhāgavirodhi bhāgena Jīva
"atmanamanubhavati". "The freed Jiva experiences itself as non-division, which is not opposed to division, or as being both different and non-different at the same time, from the Brahman. Here again, it is to be explained by Srinivasaacarya, as follows, the freed Jiva, freed from all fetters, realizes itself as non-divided or non-distinct from the Highest self, the Highest person. "On account of being seen" that is, because at the time (viz. during salvation) the Highest self, the soul of all, is intuited by the freed Jiva. Through the influence of nescience, the individual soul comes to have a perverse notion about itself. But, when through the influence of the repeated practice of hearing, thinking, and meditating, the Highest lord is intuited, all the obstacles to the real knowledge regarding the real nature of itself as well as of the highest self are immediately destroyed in accordance with the scriptural text, "The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off, and all his works perish when he who is high and low is seen. Hence, there can be no doubt what-so-ever.

1 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, 4.4.4.
that the freed Jīva a part of the Lord, having intuited the soul of all, the whole, realizes itself, all the more clearly, as non-distinct from Him. The individual soul, having Him for its essence, has no distinction from Him, and hence in spite of a distinction of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, there is still a non-distinction between them, a non-distinction which is compatible with distinction—just as there is between an attribute and its substratum. Again, Śrīnivaśacārya says that we do not mean to say that there is any non-distinction of nature between the soul and the Lord, otherwise in accordance with scriptural and smṛti texts like: "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only and without a second," "All this, verily, is Brahman", "Vāsudeva is everything", "Know everything krṣṇa, the movable and the immovable, all souls and the universe is krṣṇa", there must be a non-distinction of nature between the non-sentient and the Lord too, or—because scripture is found to refer to distinction and non-distinction. Hence, it is
established that the freed Jīva realizes itself as non-distinct from the Brahman which non-distinction is compatible with distinction.

Thus, it is established that there is natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in salvation.

According to Nimbārka, therefore, there is natural relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation. It is further supported by Śrīnīvāsaśācārya, the fact is that even during the bondage (bhaddhav-asthā) the Jīva, which is atomic in size and possesses little knowledge, though different from the Brahman, who is all-pervading, non-straying in nature and omniscient, yet like the leaf is non-different from the tree, the ray from the lamp, quality from the qualified, sense organs from the vital-air, its existence and activities being dependent upon the Brahman, it is non-different

1 (a) Vedaṇta-kaustubha, 4.4.4, English Translation by Romā Bose.

from the Brahman. Likewise, though in salvation (muktāvastha) the Jīva is non-different from Brahman, it having no separate independent existence and activity, at the same time, it is undoubtedly different from Brahman, in accordance with the śruti "Svena rūpena sampadyate" — "It realizes its own nature." Otherwise, the nature of both, the Jīva and the Brahman becomes loose.

But according to Bhāskara, there is relation of difference and non-difference due to adjuncts (aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda) between Jīva and Brahman. And again, Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman in the state of bondage (baddhavastha). Jīva is non-different from Brahman in salvation (muktāvastha). The difference (bheda) is due to beginningless adjuncts (aupādhika) and non-difference is natural (svābhāvika).

Devacarya criticises this doctrine of Bhāskara with regard to the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvika - bhedābheda-vāda) and says that this doctrine is

1 Vedānta-kaustubha, 1.4.22
2 Siddhānta-Jāmnavi, 1.1.1, pp. 30-31.
untenable and is exactly differ from the Bheda-bheda-vāda of Nimbārka, for each of the following five possible alternatives leads to absurdities. Thus:

1. It cannot be said that the Jīva is a portion of Brahman actually cut off from Him by the limiting adjunct, since first, Brahman can not be cut off thus, and secondly the Jīva becomes non-eternal on this view.

2. It cannot be said that the soul is a part of Brahman (not actually cut off from Him but) connected with the atomic upādhi, since first, in that case all the faults of the upādhi will pertain to Brahman, and secondly, motion of Brahman being not possible the motion of the upādhi, there will arise sudden bondage and salvation on the part of the Jīva.

3. It cannot be said that the Jīva is Brahman himself, connected with the

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1 "anurupopādhi-samyukta-brahma-pradesa-viśeṣah" - Sidhānt-Jāhanvi, 1.1.1, p. 31.
limiting adjunct, for if Brahman becomes the soul in His own nature, there will remain no transcendent Brahman, unconnected with upādhis.

4. It cannot be said that the Jīva, a conscious being and connected with upādhis, is different from and other than Brahman (who is a conscious being, but not connected with upādhis), if a second reality besides Brahman be admitted, the view that all difference is due to upādhis only (and is not real) falls to the ground.

5. Finally, it cannot be said that the limiting adjunct itself is the Jīva, for that will lead to the ārvāka view which identifies the Jīva with the body."

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1 "Upādhi-samyuktam brahma-svarūpam eva Jivah" - Sidhānta-Jāhanvi, pp. 31, 1.1.1.
Thus, the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference is real, and eternal. And again, it establishes that in the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedāvatā) of Nimbarkacārya, there is no such contradiction as we find in some other’s doctrines such as: the follower of the doctrine of only difference (bhedavāda), has to accept many texts like "All this indeed is Brahman", as subordinate ones, and the followers of the doctrine of only non-difference (abhedavāda) have to accept many texts, which determine difference, as subordinate ones.
CHAPTER IV

NATURE OF Jīva AND BRAHMAN AS CONCERNED WITH THEIR RELATION

There are three ultimate realities of two kinds, in the philosophy of Nimbarka: Independent and Dependent. Brahman is the independent reality. The dependent is of two kinds: Sentient and non-sentient.

(a) Sentient being (cetana) is that where there is intelligence (caitanya), knowledge, desire and action. It is the spirit, considered as the essence of all the being and sources of all sensation.

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(b) Non-sentient (Jāda) is that where there is no knowledge, desire and action. It is a pathetic or devoid of appreciation.

1. Nature of the Jīva

Jīva is the only sentient reality. Śrīnimbārkaçārya has given the following characteristics of the Jīva in his Vedānta-kāmādhana:

"jñānasvarūpam ca hareradhinam,
śarīrasamyojagavayogyam/
Añum hi jīvam pratidehabhinām,
jñātratvavantam yadamantamāḥuh// (verse 1)

(The Jīva is knowledge by nature, dependent on Hari and capable to be associated with and dissociated from a body; atomic, different in different bodies; and a knower and infinite).

1 (A) The Jīva is knowledge by nature. It is a special quality of the Jīva, which delights the entire body, just as the odour of the flower. As


2 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.26 and Vedānta-kāmādhana verse 1.
proved from the śrutis: "He has entered here up to the body-hair and finger-nails." On account of this special quality of the Jīva, it is different from the non-sentient viz., the body, the sense-organs (eleven in number), the vitalbreath (with its five modes), the mind and buddhi.

Being the essence of the Jīva, knowledge is present in every state viz. the states of walking, dream, deep-sleep, swoon and death. It is present even in the state of deep-sleep and the rest.

An objection may be raised here: where is it present during the state of deep sleep, as it is present during the state of walking? The answer to this question is as follows: It is manifested during the walking state and is in its own possession (self-possessed) during the state of deep sleep. Just as the youthness is present even in child-age, though it is not manifested in child-age, yet is manifested in young-age.

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.26.
2 Vedānta-ratna-manjūṣā pp.4.
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 2.3.30.
The Jīva being a knowledge, is knower as well.

An objection may be raised here: the Jīva cannot be both knowledge and knower. Just as one drop of the water is identical with water, so knowledge is identical with knower. Here, the Jīva is not a knower, but pure knowledge.

To this the answer is as follows: there is no contradiction between knowledge and knower, and is not identity with each other. In many cases, we find that the substratum (dharma) and the attribute (dharma) are very similar, but that does not mean that they are identical. Just as a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet they are different and they stand in the relation of substratum (dharma) and attribute (dharma). Similarly, though the Jīva and its quality of knowledge are equally knowledge, yet they stand in

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha 1.2.12, 1.3.5, 2.3.18
2 Vedānta-ratna-majuśa, pp. 4.
3 Ibid. pp. 4
4 Ibid. pp. 5
relation of substratum and attribute, so there is distinction from each other, but is no identity, as clear from scripture: "Seated on the body by knowledge." Thus, there is difference between one drop of water and water, for that drop of water, having a distinct form, must be different from other drop of the water.

The Ātma being a knower, is an Ego or 'I' (aham). A knower always feels 'I know', 'I want', 'I do' etc. 'Aham-artha' is not contemporary of the two factors, one intelligence and other non-intelligence. It is not unreal but the essence of the Ātma.

It is objected here, that if an Ego or 'I' is real or the essence of the Ātma, it must always exist along with it. But the 'I' no longer exists in the state of deep sleep, salvation etc. So, the 'I' is an effect of Prakrti.

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1 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.27.
2 Vedānta-ratna-manjūsā, pp. 5
3 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.18.
4 Vedānta-ratna-manjūsā, pp. 7
5 "dvayānāsatāpi na ca bhāti cetanāhampratitivisayeh-amarthake/"
   Sarvīśeṣa-Nirviśeṣa-krṣṇastvaraja, Verse 21.
6 Vedānta-ratna-manjūsā, pp. 7
The answer to this question is as follows: the 'I' is present even in deep sleep, as is proved from such memory as "For such a long time I slept happily and did not know anything". It shows, the 'I' is present even in deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge and the feeling of happiness. Even the memory "For such a long time I have not even known myself", does not show the absence of 'I' during the state of deep sleep. But it means that it is present even in deep sleep, what is absent, is the 'I' as it is during the waking state. Hence, the 'I' must persist even during the states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest.

The Jīva, being an Ego, is a doer. It is proved from all spiritual injunctions; for example: "one who desires to go to svarg should perform sacrifices", or "one who desires salvation should worship the - Brahman." On account of the statement of its moving, it is a

1 Vedānta-ratna-manjūśā, pp.8
2 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 2.3.32-40
3 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 2.3.32
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The Jīva, being an Ego, is a doer. It is proved from all spiritual injunctions: for example: "one who desires to go to svarg should perform sacrifices"; or "one who desires salvation should worship the - Brahman." On account of the statement of its moving, it is a

1 Vedānta-ratna-manjūsa, pp.8
2 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabhā, 2.3.32-40
3 Vedānta-parījāta-saurabhā, 2.3.32
doer as declared by āruti: "The Jīva moves, within the body at will", or "Thus, moves taking the vital breath. "This also proves that the Jīva is a doer. It means that the Jīva is a material cause, being a knower and enjoyer as far as possible, of the vital breath, the sense organs and the buddhi etc. In this sentence that, "Vijnāna performs sacrifice". This also proves that the Jīva is doer. Here is a doubt that, 'Vijnāna' means 'buddhi'. To this we reply: It is wrong, because buddhi is not doer itself but is an impelling. The fact is that the Jīva is only a doer.

An objection may be raised here, if the Jīva is only a doer, it must always do only pure actions, from which it could get only pleasure, but why does it do impure actions? The answer to this question is as follows: There is no any rule for obtaining the fruits of the past deeds, The Jīva does its actions, being to be ruled by past deeds, at that time it does not know about the pure or impure deeds. So even

1 Vedānta-paraśaraḥ, 2.3.33.
2 Vedānta-paraśaraḥ, 2.3.34.
3 Vedānta-paraśaraḥ, 2.3.35.
being a doer, the Jīva is to be ruled by the deeds. If we accept it, that buddhi is doer, what will be impelling power; which is necessary for doer. So, the Jīva is only doer.

The Jīva does its actions as its desired, just as a carpenter does his works or does not do his work, as his desired. This agreement is possible in the Jīva, but is not possible in the buddhi. So buddhi is not doer, the Jīva is only doer.

The Jīva is a doer not only during the state of mundane existence, but also in its state of salvation. As clear from this, that, performing the Samādhi, It is a doer.

The Jīva is an enjoyer or bhokta. It is proved from such memory of deep sleep: "For such a long time I slept happily," and it enjoys supreme bliss produced from its direct vision of Brahman during the salvation-state. Thus it continues to be so during deep sleep and salvation.

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1 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.3.36
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 2.3.37
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabhā, 2.3.39
4 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabhā, 2.3.38
5 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 1.3.7., 3.2.13.
6 Vedānta-ratna-manjūṣā, pp. 12
The Jīva, being, the knower, a doer, an enjoyer, it may be asked, must be an independent like the Brahman. To this question, siddhānti replies that, it is not independent, but is dependent on Hari, and its activity, existence, knowledge, enjoyment everything is dependent on Brahman. For example: the earthen Jar is of the nature of clay, hence the existence and the activity of the Jar is dependent on clay. It is proved from śruti: "Entered within, the controller of men," which works are to be done by the Jīva, Lord himself makes it do good deeds or bad deeds on account of futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited. Even when it attains similarity to Brahman during the state of salvation, it remains under his control.

The Jīva is without birth and death - eternal. But, according to prima facia view that "Devadutta is born and dead" so the Jīva is born and dies. It is only figurative, there is

1 Vedānta-kāmadhanu Verse 1.
2 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 2.3.40
3 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, Eng. Trans. by Roma Bose, 2.3.41, Calcutta, 1943.
4 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.16-17.
no birth and death of the Jīva, and imply only that the material body is born or dies. In the presence of an existence of body, it is (its birth and death) natural. So the Jīva does not born or die, it is eternal (ajāta). As declared by scripture itself: "A wise man is neither born nor dies, Eternal among eternal, An unborn one, indeed, lies by enjoying." It is also proved from smṛti. "Unborn, eternal, constant and ancient he is not killed when the body is killed."

The Jīva is a part of Brahman. Here, the 'part' means 'power', it means Jīva is power of Brahman. "All the beings are a foot of Lord" it also proves that the Jīva is a part of Brahman. Also proved from smṛti. Just my part, the Jīva came in the world of mortals as the eternal."

Here, it may be asked: the Jīva is a part of Brahman, Brahman must experience pleasure and pain like the Jīva. To this objection, the Jīva

1 Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.42
2 Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.42
3 Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.43
4 Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.44
experiences pleasure and pain under the influence of its past deeds, but Brahman does not experience any such feeling, just as the defects of light, which is the part, do not effect the sun, who is the whole.

Thus, in nature the Jīva is knowledge, a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer, under the control of Brahman and a part of the Brahman—all these being true of the Jīva in bondage as well as in salvation.

(B)

The size of the Jīva is very minute (atomic or anuparimāṇa). If we accept the medium size, the Jīva will also be perishable like the jar. The followers of this siddhānt accept the size of the Jīva according to the size of the body. Thus the size of the soul of an elephant will be as huge as the body of the elephant. The size of the intelligence of an ant will be as small as the body of an ant. This will create

1 Vedānta-Parijātā-Saurabha, 2.3.45.
2 Vedānta-Parijātā-Saurabha, 2.3.19, and Vedānta-Kamadhanu Verse 1.
the following difficulty, when the intelligence of an elephant will obtain the body of an ant or, when the intelligence of an ant will obtain the body of an elephant, it will be rather impossible for both of them to enter into the body of one another. Hence the outlook of the Maddhyamparimāṇavadin cannot be accepted.

The all-pervading size of the Īśvara is also defective. If we accept the all-pervading size, then the Utkranti (going of the soul out of the body), gati (going of the soul to the higher worlds, like moon etc.) and agati, return of the soul from other worlds in this world), of the Īśvara should not occur, because the all-pervading entity cannot move. Only supreme Brahman is of the nature of all-pervasiveness. Hence the outlook of vibhuparimāṇavadin cannot be accepted.

Consequently, we have to accept the size of the Īśvara as the most minute one (anu). This is

1 Vedānta-Kaustubha, 2.3.19
2 Vedānta-Kaustubha, 2.3.19, 2.3.21
from the text: "This soul goes out through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body." "Whoever, go forth from this world all go to the moon alone." "Returning from other world in this world for action", and so on. This is clearly declared by scripture as well which designates "The Jīva is as subtle as a hairpoint divided and subdivided hundreds of times."

Here it may be asked: the Jīva being an atomic how can it experience the feelings of pleasure and pain of the entire body? To this, we reply: Just as a drop of sandel wood-paste in one part of the body can smooth and enlightens the entire body, so, the Jīva occupies only a point in the body, enlightens the entire body and experience the feelings of pleasure and pain of the entire body.

Further, it may be objected: The example of sandel wood-paste is not suitable, on account of speciality of residence. To this objection,

1 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.19
2 (a) Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.22
   (b) Joshi,Rasika Vihari, 'A Note on the doctrine of Non-difference in difference of Nimbarka" "East and West", Vol.15, NOSI-2,January 1964, March 1965, ISMEO, Rome.
3 Vedānta-parijāta-Saurabha & Vedānta-Kaustubha, 2.3.23.
we reply: The Jīva, too, dwells into heart viz. in one part of the body; does not dwell anywhere as a consciousness, just as the sandel woodpaste.

Thus, the Jīva is atomic in size in bondage as well as in salvation.

The Jīva is innumerable in number. The Ekaji-vādān admits only one Jīva in the universe. None has, so far, attained final liberation. Whenever that one Jīva will be liberated, the whole world will disappear.

To refute this doctrine, Nimbarkācārya propounded that in each body the Jīva is separate being limited by that body. It proves that in all the beings Brahman is one but Jīva is separate and infinite. Both Brahman and Jīva are

1 Vedānta-Pārījāta-Saurabha, 2.3.24
2 (a) Vedānta-Kaustubha, 4.4.15, pp. 431.
   (b) Tattva-prakāśika of Keśava-Kāśmirī, Commentary on Gītā, (Hindi Translation of Kalikā Singh) Bardhavana, 1935, pp. 314-315.
3 Pratidehabhinnam/ Vedānta-Kamadhanu Verse 1.
possessed of mutual distinguishing marks. In case, we do not accept a separate Jīva in each body, then all the individual souls should sleep after the sleeping of one, and all should be unconscious when one becomes unconscious. Similarly when one feels happy or unhappy all should feel alike. This never happens. Hence the outlook of Ekjīvavādin cannot be accepted.

Nevertheless the scriptural injunctions prove that the Jīva is not one (endless). It is many while Brahman is one there is great difference by nature between the Jīva and Brahman. In passage: "He who staying in the self, internally self, eternal of all the eternals, animate of all animates, and being one without a second makes many desires. In evidence, all the three, epithets i.e., nityānām, cetanānām, bahumām, prove that the self is endless. The Brahmasūtra states that the Brahman in Jīva, who is sarirabhimān, is different by nature. It also establishes that

1 Vedānta-ratna-manjuśā, pp.19
2 Ya atmani tisthan atmanamantaro yamayati/
esa te atmanantaryasamartah/
nityo nityānām cetanaścetanānām/
Eko bahumām yo vidadhāti kāmān// kathaka
Upānīṣad, II.13
3 Bhedavyapadeśaśacaśyāh/ Brahmaśūtra.
Brahman is different from Jīva. The omniscient and omnipotent ultimate reality is definitely superior to the Jīva. The Bhagvatgītā also remarks: "O Arjuna, It is not true that I was present before, I, you, and all these doings are never present in present, past and future." In this way the natural difference between Brahman and Jīva is strongly established.

When we accept infinite individual souls, the question is that by propitiation one by one each individual soul will attain the final liberation and a stage will come when all the individual souls will attain mukti, and the creation will come to an end. The answer of this question is explicitly given by Nimbārkaśārya in course of the definition of the Jīva under the words 'yadānamatamānuḥ' the Jīva is innumerable and endless, will never come to an end. The whole of the universe is full of the beings who have gross, subtle, and minute bodies.

1 Adhikam tu bhedaṁirdēśat/ Brahmaśūtra.
2 na tvevāham ātatu nāsam na tvam nema janādhipah/
na caiva na bhavisyamah sarve vayamatah param//
   Gītā 14.2
3 (a) Vedānta-ratna-manjūṣa, pp.19
There are broadly two kinds of the Jīva, viz. Baddha and Mukta.

(i) Baddha:

That is one who is pointed out by the term 'unborn one' (aja), eternal by nature, carried away by the current of beginningless deeds, and destitute of a true knowledge of the real nature of itself or of the supreme being. One who has identified itself through nescience with the body of a god, or of a man, or of any other being, who is the evolution of prakṛti, and is taking pleasure in sounds and the rest, the parts of prakṛti, and is destitute of the supreme bliss, it is to be said baddha or bound. Baddhas are of two kinds viz., Mumuksus and bhubuksus. Mumuksus, again, are of two kinds: viz. bhagavatabhāvapatti and

1 Muktam ca baddham kila baddhamuktam/
   Prabhedavahulyamathaıśu bodhyam//
   Vedanta-kamadhana, Verse 2
2 Anādimayāpariyaktarupam/
   tvenemvidurvasi bhagavat-prasadat//
   Vedanta-kamadhana, Verse 2
3 Vedanta-Kaustubha, 1.4.10
nijasvarūpapatti; bubhuksus are of two kinds; viz. bhaviṣreyaskah and nityasamsāri.

(ii) Mukta:

That is, one who has attained fortunately the grace of the Lord through his poor and pitiable condition, and has attained the supreme Bliss through the practice of hearing, thinking and meditating of the vedānta by attending upon the feet of his guru and who refuses prakṛti, it is to be said mukta or liberated.

Muktas are of two kinds viz. nityamuktas and muktas. Nityamuktas, again, are of two kinds, viz. Ānantaryya and pārśada; muktas are of two kinds viz. bhagavatabhabhāpatti and nijasvarūpapatti.

Their characteristics are very much the same. That is, like the Baddha-Jiva, the mukta-Jiva also is knowledge by nature and a knower, a doer, an enjoyer, atomic and infinite. Hence, although the characteristics of a Baddha and a

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1 Vedānta-ratna-manjūśā, pp. 22
2 Vedānta-maustubha 1.4.10
3 Vedānta-ratna-manjūśā, pp. 22-23
mukta Jīva are apparently the same, really these are not so. It is, undoubtedly true, that a mukta-Jīva, too, is knowledge by nature, a knower, a doer, an enjoyer, atomic and infinite; yet it is entirely different from a Baddha-Jīva, because it is all the above in an entirely different sense.

2. Nature of Brahman:

In the philosophy of Nimbārka, the absolute ultimate reality is Śrīkṛṣṇa himself. He is denoted by the term "Brahman", who is inherent nature, attributes, powers and so on. He is Lord of sens-organs, He is controller of all, He is Lord of all. He is variously known as: Kṛṣṇa, Hari, Ramākanta, Puruṣottam, Keśava, Madhava, Bhagwan etc., and on his left side, the daughter of Vṛśabhanu (Radhika) shines with a corresponding beauty, who is attended on by thousands of female friends and who is giver of

2. Vedānta-परिजात-सूरभा, l.1.1., Vedānta-Kāmadhanu 4
3. Brhadāraṇyaka-Upanisada, 4.4.22.
This concept of Brahman has been clearly explained by Śrīnimārkacārya in the following verse of the Vedānta-kāmādhanu (Daśāloki):

Śvabhāvatopaśastasamastadosamaśeskalāyanagmaikarāśim/
vyuhāṅginam brahma param vareṇyam āhyāyam kṛṣṇam
kamalekṣanam harim//

-Vedānta-kāmadhanu Verse 4.

(I meditate on the Supreme Brahman viz. Kṛṣṇa, Hari, who has eyes like the lotus, who naturally has destroyed all the defects, is the store of all auspicious attributes, His body is represented by the vyūha and who is attended by all)

(A):

By nature, Brahman has destroyed the all defects viz. the five kinds of klesās such as (avidyā (nescience), asmitā (egoism), rāga (passion), dveṣa (aversion) abhiniveṣa (the will-to-like), These klesās are denoted by the

1 Vedānta-kāmadhanu, Verse 5.
the words, tama, moha, mahāmoda, tāmisra and
hatāmisra, tama (nescience) which covers the real
nature of things, moha is the confounding the
body to be the soul mahāmoha is that which hankers
after enjoyment, tāmisra viz. malice, andhatāmisra
viz. death. He is absolutely free from the six
kinds of modifications (vikāras) such as: birth,
existence, growth, transformation, decay and
death, is free from three gunas viz. sattva, rajas,
tamas. Nevertheless, the authorities of the
śrutī prove that He is free from all sins, without
old age, without death, without grief, without
hunger, without thirst, having true desires,
having true volitions. "He is not effected
with the deeds, klesā (hindrances), fruitions
of karma (vipāka) and so on."

On the other hand, He is endowed with
all the auspicious attributes and qualities like
knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, Energy,
valour, saushilya, vātsalya, mārdava, ārjava,
sauhārda etc. knowledge\(^1\) - the direct perception
of all space, time and objects, power, - the

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\(^1\) Vedānta-ratna-manjusā, pp. 43 - 44, Vedānta-
pārijāta-Saurabha, 3.2.11, 30.
capacity of making the impossible possible, strength the power of supporting the entire universe, sovereignty - the power of controlling the everything, Energy - tirelessness in spite of continued and unlimited labour, valour - the capacity of defeating all without being ever defeated by them. These six qualities of Brahman help him for creating the universe. Saushilya - to be connected with all without considering the lowliest and the most unworthy, in spite of His own greatness, vatsalya - never looking at the faults of His devotees, mardavam - non-endurance of the miseries of those who are dependent on Him, arjava - the perfection of mind and speech; sauharda - the diligence to protect others; Sarvasharnya or somya - being the place of refuge of all; karmya - the nature of destroying the faults of others; sthiratya - remaining steady in wars; dhaitya - maintaining promises; daya - feeling grieved at the grief of others without any cause, and being desirous of removing their griefs; madhurya - having sweetness like the nectar etc. All these qualities of Brahman help Him for protection of those who are dependent on Him.

1 Vedanta-ratna-manjusa pp. 45-45, Vedanta-Parijata-Saurabha 1.2.2.
The lord is all blissful and is the source of bliss to all Jivas. His bliss is unlimited. Through his bliss, He desires to be many and creates the universe, as declared by śruti, "He desired: may I be many and procreates, He created all this."

The lord has a physical body upon which desirous of salvation meditate. Meditation, too, is possible only if the lord has a body. Śruti speaks also that the Lord has physical body, "The person who is seen within the sun, having a golden board, having golden hair etc." The person who is seen in the eyes" and so on.

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1 Vedānta - parijāta - Saurabha, 1.1.13,15
2 Vedānta - parijāta - Saurabha, 1.3.9
3 Vedānta - parijāta - saurabha with Vedānta-Kaustubha, 1.1.17
4 Taittiriyopanisada, 2.61
5 Vedānta- Kaustubha, 1.1.21
6 Chandogyopanisada, 1.6.6
7 Chandogyopanisada, 1.7.5
Brahman is denoted by the words such as,

1. Ether, vital-breath, light, Gayatrimetre etc.
2. He has spiritual body, the sruti speaks, also, "Spiritual, having the vital-breath for the body, of the form of light, having true volitions etc."
3. He is eater of the movable and the immovable.
4. He is great and all-pervasive. He is the object to be worshipped and the object to be known.

5. This lord is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. He is all happiness. He is controller of all, is seer of all, is inner controller. He is invisible and omniscient.
6. He is imperishable, is all-pervading. His nature is everpresent and is the cause of the appearance of the nature of Jīva. Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent, it is known by all creation viz. movable and immovable. He is whole of Jīva. He is the maker of all, which are seen

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1. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.1.23-31
2. Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 1.2.2
3. Vedānta - Changyopanisada 3.14.2
4. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.9
5. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.10
6. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.12
7. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.13
8. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.15
9. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.19-20
10. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.22
11. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.2.23, 1.3.10.
12. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.3.19-20
13. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 1.4.14
14. Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabha, 2.3.42.
in dream and are indicative of pure and impure
grounds. Through his desire the Jīva's
bondage and salvation arise, as declared by
Śrutī: "The cause of the world, bondage,
abiding and salvation." Brahman is not enjoyer.
Though He is abiding within all-sentient and non-
sentient, yet He is not touched by their defects,
is endowed with his all auspicious attributes,
Just as: the sun, reflected on different water-
houses, does not touch by the defects of their
increase and decrease. As Śrutī speaks: "He is
not smeared with the misery of the world." Brahman
is unmanifest, "He is not perceivable through the
eyes nor by speech, and so on." but He becomes
manifest through the loving devotion and medita-
tion, just as there is manifestation of the sun,
fire and like through the repetition of the means
resorted to by those who long for them, as declared
by Śrutī and Smṛtī. He, with his nature purified
through the clarification of the knowledge of
Brahman, perceives, meditating him who is without

1 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 3.2.4,7
2 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 3.2.5.
3 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 3.2.13
4 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 3.2.11,20,30.
5 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 3.2.23.
parts"; and "O Arjuna, I may be known through exclusive devotion, and, O paramatapa, perceived in truth, and entered through exclusive devotion."  
Brahman is unlimited, but He becomes limited for those devotees who meditate Him, just as the lustre of the sun through a window.  

Brahman alone is the giver of fruits of all deeds in accordance with particular duties to which they are entitled.

Thus, by nature Brahmān has destroyed the all defects and is endowed with the all attributes and qualities.

(B)

Brahman is the cause of the universe.  
Brahman alone is the cause of the creation and destruction of the universe. All names and forms arise from Him and return to Him.

Brahman is the both material cause and efficient cause (upādāna and nīmitta kāraṇa) of

1 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 3.2.24-25.  
2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 3.2.32,34.  
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 3.2.38  
4 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā, 1.1.10-12,19,2.1.35, 2.3.8, 13.  
5 Vedānta-pārijāta-Saurabhā 1.3.42
the universe. As declared by śruti: "Brahman was the forest, Brahman, the tree from which they cut off the heaven, and the earth, O learned man, ask their mind whereon is stood possessing the worlds." It is the material cause in the sense that it enables its natural saktis (capacities), viz. cit and the acit in their subtle forms, to be manifested in gross forms; and it is the efficient cause in the sense that it unites the individual souls with their respective fruits of actions and means of enjoyments. Thus, the creation of the universe is nothing but a manifestation in a gross form of what was subtle before and is thus a sort of modification or parināma.

Parināma means modification or transformation or actual change, resulting in an effect having equal reality with the material cause, or, production of an effect that has the same kind of (either real or unreal) existence as that of its

1 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 1.4.23-27
2 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 1.4.25
3 Vedānta-Kaustubha 1.1.2, and Vedānta-ratna- manjūṣā, pp.63
material cause. The example of the transformation of milk into curds is often quoted. In this school of thought, there is entire modification of the substance, name, and form of the cause. The change of the cause is real. The relation between the cause and the effect is that of difference and non-difference. The cause itself assumes the shape of the effect. In reality, both are real. The milk itself changes into curds, the effect in the cause in the form of the cause or the śakti is accepted. It established the relation of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect.

Pariṇāma has been divided into two kinds:

(i) Svarūpa-pariṇāma as of the sankhya system
(ii) Saktipvkepa-laksana-pariṇāma. Nimbarkācārya admits the Brahmakarṇaṇavāda or the Brahmasaktikarṇaṇavāda. According to Him the universe exists in the Brahmān in unmanifest form or identical form or in the form of potency (śakti) because it becomes manifested as before. In this view the

2 Vedānta-kaustubba, 2.1.26, pp.169
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 1.4.26
relation between the universe and Brahman is that of difference non-difference such as the cause of gold and ornaments.

Several objections may be raised against the causality of Brahman. The most important and very natural one is: why should Brahman create this universe? Because, who is eternally fulfilled with all desires, can not, be an agent and the activity of an agent have a need.

To this question, Nimbārka replies: The creation of Brahman is the mere sport, just like, the mere sport of kings. In ordinary life, the play of an emperor, who has attained sovereignty, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls etc., is a mere sport without any desire indeed for fruit, So Brahman creates the world in mere sport without any His need.

The second objection, which leads to above, no less natural. If the lord creates this universe in mere sport, which has inequality, as one is rich

2 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.31
3 Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, and Kaustubha 2.1.32
and other is poor, one is happy and other is unhappy etc., why is it so? It means the lord is not all merciful, but is a cruel.

Hence Nimbarka replies: Unequality and cruelty of unequal creation and destruction etc. are depend on the deeds of the Jīva. Just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots, depends on their respective seeds. So the śruti: "One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds." Thus, Brahman is not responsible for the miseries and various lots of Jīva, Jīva is itself responsible through their own deeds.

It may be objected; Brahman gives the fruits of deeds in accordance with the deeds of Jīva, it is not suitable. Because, there was no difference between Jīva and Brahman prior to creation. As declared by śruti, "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning". So, inequality and cruelty of unequal creation are depend on the Lord.

It is not so because the creation is beginningless. He creates the universe in accordance

1 Vedānta-parijata-saurabha, 2.1.33
2 Vedānta-parijata-saurabha, 2.1.34
with the deeds of Jīva, which has been done by the individuals souls in previous creation. A subsequent creation cannot arise all of a sudden, so it is depend on a prior creation. It is clear from śruti: "The creator formed the sun and the moon as he did before", and so on.

One or two objections will be considered against this doctrine that Brahman is the creator of the world. It is to be objected; Brahman is not material cause of the universe, because, there is difference between Brahman and the world, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, while the world possesses just the opposite attributes of non-sentience and it is the rule, whatever is different from something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is different from the eather has not the creator as its material cause.

But Nimbārka points out, there is no rule that there will be a similarity between a material cause and its effect in every respect. So it cannot be said that the world, being

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1 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 2.1.34
2 Vedānta-kaustubha, 2.1.4
different from Brahman, cannot arise from Him. 
As śruti: There is the origin of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are different, and of scorpions from the cowdung from which they are different."

An objection is raised. Brahman is not material cause of the world in dissolution, because, Brahman, the cause, like the effect viz. the world, will be non-sentient.

The answer to this question is as follows: Just as the evolutes like the pot, when dissolved, donot defile the lump of clay with their own attributes, so this world, consisting of non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not defile Brahman, possessing the non-sentient as His powers.

It may be objected: Brahman is material cause of the universe, then He himself will experience the pleasures and pains in the form of Jīva,

1 Vedaṇa-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.6
2 Vedaṇa-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.8
3 Vedaṇa-pārijāta-saurabha, 2.1.9
so that there will be no difference between the enjoyer (viz. the Jīva) and the Controller.

The answer to this is as follows:

Just as, in ordinary life, though foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual difference amongst the particular effects themselves. In the same manner there may be a mutual difference between the enjoyer and the controller, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause. The fact, however is, according to Nimbārka, that there is difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman.

Thus, according to Nimbārka Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe and its soul. And, Nimbārka, like that of the Sāṅkhya, is the upholder of Satkāryavāda. In this view, the relation between the universe and the Brahman is that of difference-non-difference such as the cause of clay and pots. This Vedābheda doctrine is called the Svabhāvīka-bhedābheda-vāda.

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1 Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha, 2.1.13
But, like Naiyāyikas, to establish the doctrine of difference, in the pure dualistic interpretation of the Vedānta the Brahma is not to be regarded as the material cause of the universe, but He is to be regarded only as efficient cause of the universe. They hold, "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second, 'He thought, May I be many, may I procreate', 'It became manifest by name and form', 'All this, verily, is Brahma, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and Breathing in Him', 'This soul is Brahma', 'All that has this for its soul', and so on"; "(Brahma is) the material cause, and (the efficient cause), on account of the absence of conflict with regard to the initial proposition and the illustration", "on account of creating Himself, on account of transformation", "(There is) non-difference (of the effect) from that (viz. the cause), on account of (the texts) beginning with the word 'beginning' and the rest", and so on"; And, "'I am creator of all and all are moved by me', 'All this is threaded in me like the rows of pearls in a string', 'In the last birth of
many births, a wise-man meditates upon me, having such feeling as 'All is Vasudeva', He, the supreme spirit is very difficult to be attained? and so on'; above-mentioned all texts of Śrutī, Sūtras, and Smṛti; and the exponents of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with the Brahman are, merely, rejected.

Moreover, in the pure dualistic interpretation of Vedānta the Brahman is to be regarded only as the efficient cause and as such claims of all texts that speak of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with Brahman are to be disregarded. Because in the Nimbarka's philosophy Brahman is material cause as well as efficient cause on account of the absence of conflict with regard to the initial proposition and illustration. The initial proposition to begin with, is as follows: "Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheared becomes heared, the unthought thought, the unknown known?" It is known from the initial proposition that Brahman is the material cause. The illustration given as

\[\text{1 Vedānta- pariṣṭī- saurabha, 1.4.23.}\]
as follows: "Just as my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known, just as through a iron-ball, all objects made of iron may be known". It is known from these illustrations the Brahman in material cause. Hence, it cannot be said that produced effects are to be known through only the efficient cause or knowledge. A potter has not been cited in the illustration; and through a potter being known, a pot cannot be known. But a lump of clay being known, all objects made of clay, like pots and the rest, may, indeed, be known. So, according to Nimbarka the Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause. And again, just as the pots, dishes etc., having the lump of clay as their material cause, bracelets, ear-rings etc., having gold as their material cause, are all non-different from their causes; So, the universe, having the Brahman as its material cause, is non-different from the Brahman. Hence, the identity of the universe with the Brahman is, too, not to be avoided.

Thus, it is established, according to Nimbarka, the Brahman is material cause as well as

1. Vedanta-tattva-bodha of Anantaram Sastri, pp. 3-5, Benares, 1908.
efficient cause of the universe. In this view the relation between the universe and the Brahman is that of difference and non-difference (Pбедгш bdsm). This पदभेद doctrine is called the सधभविका - पदभेद newa.
CHAPTER V

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RELATION OF JīVA AND BRAHMAN ON THE BASIS OF VARIOUS SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA.

(1) Śankara and Nimbārka

The doctrine of Śankara is called "Kevalādvaita" or 'absolute monism'. According to Śankara, there is no natural difference between Jīva and Brahman. Brahman is the only reality, and pervades all beings which have only apparent existence. The plurality of individuals is false. He emphasizes this point again and again. He accepts, therefore, Jīva and Brahman are absolutely identical, that is repeated taught in the upanisads. The saying, "Tat tvam asi", means that Jīva is non-different from Brahman, or Jīva and Brahman
are absolutely identical. This is the establishing sentence of identity of Jīva and Brahman, but this meaning is not reasonable, because there are many contradictory attributes in Jīva and Brahman. Jīva is atomic, has little knowledge, while Brahman is omniscient and all-pervading and so on. In this sense, there cannot be an identity between the Jīva and Brahman. What is the exact meaning of this Mahāvākyā? In Śamkarite philosophy, this mahāvākaya is to be interpreted by "Bhāgavti-lakṣaṇā." An identity judgment like "This is that Devadatta" makes clear the above point. "This is that Devadatta" refers to identity of the individual in spite of differences in respect of time, place and circumstance. An individual who was seen previously at a certain place is seen today at a different place under different circumstance. When we say that he is the same man we overlook the unessential differences and emphasize the essential identity. Similar is the case with the identity taught between the Jīva and Brahman. Jīva and Brahman, in spite of the difference in their adjuncts, are identical in so far as their real self is concerned. Thus, Jīva, is absolutely identical with Brahman.
Here, Śankara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka. According to Nimbārka philosophy, in the interpretation of the Mahāvākyā "Tat tvam asi", Jīva is non-difference from Brahman, which non-difference is compatible with a difference between them.

Thus, Nimbārka's doctrine is completely different from Śankara's doctrine. In Śankarite philosophy, non-difference means "absolute identity", while in the philosophy of Nimbārka, non-difference is compatible with difference. And again, Śankara's doctrine has no place for difference, which is only 'vyavahārika', but, for Nimbārka, both difference and non-difference are on the same level, real and compatible.

(ii) Rāmānuja and Nimbārka

Rāmānuja explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman on the analogy of the substance - attribute (Viseṣyaviśeṣa), or soul-body relation (Śarīra-Śarīra sambandha).

1 Vedānta - ratna - manjūsa, pp. 91
In the first place Ramanuja has described the relation of Jīva and Brahman as similar to the relation between a substance and its attribute. Brahman is only independent reality. Jīva is dependent on it. Jīva and Brahman do not exist separately, but, like substance (viśeṣya), and the Jīva to attribute (viśesāna) - as colour, dimension, etc., are attributes of paper, for instance. As attribute, Jīva is really different from Brahman - the substance: but as it always remain united with Brahman, the doctrine of 'Advaita' is established and the Jīva - attribute, can in this sense of inseparable union be regarded as non - different from Brahman. Here it can be said that from the practical point of view, the relation of Jīva and Brahman is difference and non - difference (bhedabheda).

In the second place Ramanuja has also interpreted the relation of Jīva and Brahman as similar to the relation of soul - body. Jīva is

1 Śrībhāṣya, 1.1.1
2 Śrībhāṣya, 3.2.28
3 Śrībhāṣya, 1.1.1
declared to be the body (śarīra) of Brahman, which is śarīrī. The śarīra does not exist without śarīrī, nor śarīrī without śarīra. Jīva is not non-different from Brahman on any account as similar to the relation of soul-body (śarīrī-śarīra-sambandha). Jīva is really different from Brahman. Jīva is entirely full of troubles or griefs. At this stage, how can be possible "non-difference" of Jīva with Brahman? Jīva is different from Brahman as śruti says: "He who dwells in the soul and within the soul, whom the soul does not know, of whom the soul is the body, who rules the soul within, he is thy soul, the ruler within, immortal; 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs'; 'there are two, knower-non-knower, born - unborn, ruler-non-ruler'."

1 'Ya ātmani tisthannātmanontarō yamatma na veda yasyātma śarīram, ya ātmanamantrō yamayati sa ta atmantaryamratah'. - Bri. upa, III.7.22

2 'sa karaṇam karaṇādhipādhipah' - Svet, up VI.9

3 'jnājnau dvāvajavisanissau' - Svet, up. 1.9
When Brahman is uninterrupted, at this stage, how can you say that the Jīva is the part of the Brahman? Rāmānuja says that Jīva is the part of Brahman or body is the part of the soul, like the case of sparks are the parts of fire. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the supreme person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and absolutely subordinate to him. In this manner, there is relation of non-difference between Jīva and Brahman. Here it can be said that from the practical point of view the relation of Jīva and Brahman is difference and non-difference (bhedābheda). But the feeling of non-difference is always due to inseparable union between Jīva and Brahman. Thus, there is relation between Jīva and Brahman as between the soul-body.

Here, the term body (Sarīra) is not used to denote bodies, such as human bodies, but to

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1 Sārīha, 2.3.45
2 Sārīha, 2.1.9., Eng. translation of George Thibaut.
denote attributes, the substance being soul (śarīrī). Body (śarīra) means Aprithaksidha, i.e., inseparable union, or connection which has for ever existed, which is not brought about at any intermediate period, and which can never cease. Thus, there is an indissoluble union between Jīva and Brahman.

Hence, Rāmānuja calls his "viśisṭadvaitavāda" or the doctrine that the non-duality, or non-reality - Brahman - which is united with Jīva and acit as its attributes.

Thus, Rāmānuja explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman on the analogy of the substance-attribute (viṣēṣya-viṣeṣaṇa), or soul-body relation (śarīrī-śarīra sambandha). But NimbārkaCārya explains his doctrine, as it has already been observed, on the analogy of the cause-effect relation. And again, "The doctrine of Nimbārka has very much is common with that of Rāmānuja; both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But for Nimbārka,

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1 Bhashyacārya, N., F.T.S.,

"A catechism of the viśisṭadvaita philosophy"

Madras, 1887, Q.No. 69
difference and non-difference are on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance; while for Ramanuja, non-difference is the principal; it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it."

Another technical distinction between the two doctrines is that according to Ramanuja, the Jīva is the attribute of Brahman, and Brahman thus, qualified by the Jīva, is a unity, omniscient, omnipotent. But though Jīva is attribute of Brahman, yet is different from Him, otherwise the defect of the latter will pertain to the former. But the school of Nimbārka refuses to admit this view for the following reason. The very task of an attribute or an adjective is to differentiate the particular object which possesses that particular attribute from other objects which do not possess it e.g., the red colour of a red ball differentiates it from a blue ball and the rest. Now, in the very same

2 Siddhānta- Kusumānjali of Harivyāsdeva, pp.27
3 Siddhānta-Jahnavi of Devācārya, pp. 43, 1.1.3.
manner, if Jīva be attribute of Brahman, the question at once arises: from whom or from what object do it differentiate Brahman? It cannot be said that it differentiate Brahman? It cannot be said that it differentiate Brahman from itself (i.e., the Jīva), for that which differentiates can never be itself the object from which the original object (i.e., the object of which it is an attribute) is differentiated, e.g., it is absurd to say that the red colour of a red ball differentiates the ball from red colour. But nor can it be said that the Jīva differentiates Brahman from any other object. Hence the Jīva cannot be attribute of Brahman. Moreover, the viśistādvaīta view also — admits of a svābhāviKA bheda between Brahman on the one hand and the Jīva on the other. Hence instead of admitting difference and non-difference in this round — about fashion, it is far better and reasonable to admit svābhāvika — bhedābheda all at once.

1 Bose, Dr. Romā, "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha" Vol. III, pp. 112-113, also, Vedānta-tattvabodha of Anantarama, pp. 27-32.
Bhāskara explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman on the basis of upādhyāvāda, his theory may rightly be called "Aupādhika - Bhedābhedāvāda" as distinguished from the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (Svabhāvikabhedābhedāvāda) of Nimbārka.

As it has already been observed that Brahman is the cause and Jīva is its effect. Brahman being the cause, Jīva must be Brahman in nature and essence. During salvation Jīva is completely identical with Brahman. Also, during effected state of Brahman, during Baddhāvasthā, as just shown Brahman - the cause, Jīva - the effect are identical in nature and essence. Hence non-difference of Jīva and Brahman is natural, eternal, real. But the difference of Jīva and Brahman is neither natural nor eternal; yet it is real. It is not natural because prior to creation, as shown above, Brahman and Jīva are absolutely identical, again as well as during salvation, Brahman and Jīva are absolutely identical. Jīva is different
from Brahman only during the effected state of Brahman and Buddhāvasthā of Jīva. So this difference (bheda) is neither natural nor eternal but it is upādhi, because, at the beginning of creation the Jīva comes to be associated with its upādhis, so it is different from Brahman.

Thus, according to Bhāskara, the non-difference (abheda) is natural, eternal and real, but difference (bheda) is only real, it is neither natural nor eternal.

Thus, according to Bhāskara Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman in bondage, and in salvation Jīva is absolutely identical with Brahman. But, for Nimbārka, Jīva is different and non-different from Brahman in bondage, as well as in salvation. And again, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Bhāskara; both regard the difference as well as non-difference as real. But, for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are on the same level, they have same importance and both are equally natural, while for Bhāskara, difference is due to upādhis or limiting adjuncts,
non-difference is natural. In this manner, Bhāskara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

(iv) Madhyācārya and Nimbāraka

Madhva explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman in the symbolism of "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" (the object-image concept).

"The term "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" is derived by Madhva from the significant passage in the Āgveda:

'rūpam rūpam prathirūpo babhūva/
tadasya rūpam pratīcaksanāya//
(vi. 47, 13)

The underlying idea in all these expressions is the same, viz., that Brahman is the one independent source of all reality, consciousness and activity found in the individual selves and which cannot therefore be explained without reference to their dependence on Brahman for their being. As no creation of Jīvas is admitted the figure of pratibimba should be literally constructed in the sense of the Jīvas, being the
actual reflections projected by Brahman like that of a concrete substance on a mirror. Madhava warns his readers against taking the scriptural descriptions of the Jīva as a pratibimbā of the Brahman in its gross physical sense of an actual reflection. That is why he is so careful and particular to insist that there is no medium of reflection (upādhi) in this case. This would at once bring out the difference Madhava's and Śankara's conception of the Jīva as a pratibimba of Brahman. According to the latter, the Jīva is false appearance or projection of the Brahman on the screen of Avidyā. This relation can be transcended. "Jivatvam ca mrasā jneyam rajvām sarpagraho yathā/"

(Aparoksānubhūti, 43)

But, to Madhva, the relation of Bimbaprati-bimbabhāva between God and the souls is a sacred and inviolable relation, which is true for all time and goes to the very core of the Jīva and constitutes his very essence and could never be annulled. Its full significance, missed in Samsāra, is realized in Moksa. Moksa, in fact, is the complete realization of this intrinsic relation of metaphysical dependence and similarity
(in some respects) with the supreme. Pratibimbatva, according to Madhava, is not a false relation, of which the Jīvas are to be ashamed and should try to shake off, as in Advaita. It is the truest and most beautiful permanent bond with the Supreme being and the purpose of philosophy is its progressing realization, by the Jīva two doctrine are thus diametrically opposed! 

Madhva in his Bhāsya on Brāhmaṇastra

"Abhastha eva ca" discusses the theory of "Bimbapratibimbabhāva", Jīva is the reflection (pratibimba) of the Brahman. According to him a pratibimba is of two kinds:

"Sopādhiranupādhiśca pratibimbo dvicheyate/
Jīvaisasyānupādhirindracāpoya thāravertiṃipengisruteh//"

One is sopādhika, i.e., which is dependent on external media, and the other is Nirupādhika, i.e., the one which is not so dependent. Madhvaśārya

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1 Sharma, Dr. B.N.K. "Philosophy of Śrī-Madhvacārya" pp. 218-219, Bombay, 1962.
2 Madhva-Brahmasūtrabhasya, 2.3.50, pp.93
3 Madhva-Brahmasūtrabhasya, pp. 93.
cites a illustration of the rainbow as an instance of a Nirupādhika reflection of the sun’s rays, to elucidate his conception of the Īśva as a Nirupādhika reflection of Īśwara.

"The illustration of rainbow as the nirupādhika reflection of sun may at the first sight appear incongruous because it is incompatible with the scientific truth, that the phenomenon of rainbow in the sky is due to the reflection of sun’s rays in the cloud or the atmospheric and anupādhika or nirupādhika reflections would bring out the sense in which Madhva asserts the anupādhika character of rainbow and would specify the distinction between these two forms of pratibimba (reflection)." Again, Madhva quotes an analogy of a man and his shadow from the śruti, to make clear the relation of metaphysical dependence between Īśva and Brahma. As śruti says: "Yathaisā puruse chāya etasminnetadātātām" (Prasno upa. III.3).

1 Narain, Dr. K. "An outline of Madhva Philosophy" Allahabad, 1962, pp. 143-144.
2 Madhva - Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, pp. 93.
(in some respects) with the supreme. Pratibimbatva, according to Madhava, is not a false relation, of which the Jīvas are to be ashamed and should try to shake off, as in Advaita. It is the truest and most beautiful permanent bond with the Supreme being and the purpose of philosophy is its progressing realization, by the Jīva two doctrine are thus diametrically opposed! "

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One is sopādhika, i.e., which is dependent on external media, and the other is Nirupādhika, i.e., the one which is not so dependent. Madhvācārya

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2 Madhva-Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, 2.3.50, pp.93
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1 Narain, Dr. K. "An outline of Mādhva Philosophy" Allahabad, 1962, pp. 143-144.
2 Madhva - Brahmastraubhāṣya, pp. 93.
"The analogy of "Chāyapurusa" conveys the idea that God is immeasurably more than and superior to the souls, as the substance is greater than its shadow. The shadow is there because of the substance; it is bound to the substance; but not vice-versa. The dependence is thus unilateral and not reciprocal. The shadow is outwardly similar to the substance, in form. The souls have the same form of reality. Consciousness and bliss, resembling Brahman's. It should always be remembered that analogies should not be stretched indefinitely. The point of the analogy is strictly confined to the ideas of dependence and similarity and nothing more."

The relation of part and whole (amśāṃśibhāva), also conveys the same truth of dependence and similarity: "Jivasya parameswarāmsatvam tu, tatādārasyaṃ tadadhinasattadimattvāṃ cetyarthah/" (Nyāya-Sudhā II, pp. 453b) Jīva is part (amśa) of the Brahman, it is clearly apparent that Madhva

1 Sharma, Dr. B.N.K., "Philosophy of Śrī-Madhvācārya", Bombay, 1962, pp. 219-220.
always tried to establish the nature and existence of Jīva as separate from that of Brahman. Brahman is the cause of the nature and existence of Jīva just as father is cause, of the existence of his son. Madhva does not accept the relation of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) between Jīva and Brahman, but he accepts fundamental difference and substitutes amātva for "Non-difference". Madhva distinguishes two kinds of Asams: Savrupāmsa and bhinnāmsa. Matsya and Kurma are svarūpāmsa of the Brahman. Jīvas are bhinnāmsa of Brahman.

Thus, in the words of Jayatirth the difference (bheda) is not absolute but eternal.

1 "mām raksatu vibhurnityam putroham paramātmanah/ Madhva-Brahmasūtra-bhāsya, pp. 90.
2 "atascāmsatvamuddhistam bhedābhedauma mukhyatah"/ Madhva-Brahmasūtra-bhāsya, pp. 91
3 "svāmāscatho vibhinnāmsā iti dvedhānisa isyate/ Madhva-Brahmasūtra-bhāsya, pp. 92, 2.3.47.
4 "Jivatmanah paramātmanā atyantikabhedah samarthyate (Nyāya-sudhāpp pp. 435), parantu, na jivo brahmano ghata iva patātatyaantabhnīnah/ (Nyāya-sudhā, 453 b)".
Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka is completely different from the doctrine of Madhvacārya, because according to Nimbārka both difference and non-difference are equally real, while in the doctrine of Madhvacārya the difference (bheda) alone that is real, and non-difference has no any place in his doctrine. It is the main difference between the doctrines of Nimbārka and Madhvacārya.

And again, it establishes that in the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (svābhāvikabhedabhedavāda) of Nimbārka there is no such contradiction as in the Mādhva doctrine viz. Mādhva doctrine of only difference (bhedavāda), has to accept many texts like "All this indeed is Brahman", as subordinate ones.

(v) Vallabha and Nimbārka.

The doctrine of Vallabha is called "Śuddhādvaita", i.e., "pure non-duality". The compound 'Śuddhādvaita' can be dissolved in two ways: 'Śuddham ca tadadvaitam', or, the non-duality of Brahman that is pure, without any
connection with māyā; and, 'Suddhayoh advaitam',
or, the non-duality of the universe and the
Brahman that is pure, without any connection with

According to vallabha, the Jīva and
the unanimate world are essentially the same as
Brahman, so there is non-duality between Jīva,
Jagat and the Brahman.

In this manner, according to vallabha, the
relation of Jīva and Brahman is "pure non-duality".
Jīva is the part of Brahman. As the sparks of the
fire are not different from their original the
fire, the Jīva also is not different from Brahman,
 viz., Jīva is identical with Brahman. Vallabha-
cārya admits the 'Parināmavāda' (transformation).
In his doctrine the Jīva is transformation of
the Brahman, but he admits "immutable transform-
ation" (avikṛtaparinaṁavāda), i.e., that which

1 Suddhādvaitapade jneyah samāsah karmadhārayayah/
    advaitam suddhayayoh prāhuh saśthitapuruṣam buddhah//
  (127)
Māyā-sambandha-rāhitam 'Suddhamityacyate budhaih/
kārya-kāreṇa-rūpam hi sūddham Brahmana māyikam//
    -- Suddhādvaitamārtanda.

2 Anubhāṣya, 2.3.43.
does not undergo change. Just as gold, even when moulded into ornaments of different shapes and sizes and comes to be known as 'bracelets', 'rings' etc., remains unaffected by these changes pertaining to those ornaments and does not lose its essence, in the same way, the Lord manifests His qualities of sat, cit and ānanda in the Jīva, the Jagat and the Antar-yāmin forms of His, without himself undergoing any change whatever. This is also supported by Sūtras like "Ātmakṛtah parināmat" and so on. The relation between Jīva and Brahman is thus that of identity (advaita), which is pure (Śuddhādvaita).

Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka is completely different from the doctrine of vallabhācārya, because, according to Nimbārka both difference and non-difference are equally real, while in the doctrine of vallabhācārya the non-difference (abheda) alone that is real, and difference has no any place in his doctrine. It is the main

(a) Yatha suvarnam sukratam pursastāt pascāscaś/ sarvasya hirānmayasya/ tadeva madhye vyavahārya- mānam nānapadesairahamasya tadvat//

(b) Mrudula I., Mariatia, "The philosophy of Vallabhacarya", pp. 55-56, Delhi, 1967
difference between the doctrines of Nimbārka and Vallabhaśārya. Dr. V.S. Ghate, says, "For vallabha, it is non-difference (abheda) alone that is real (vastavika), which all difference is simply for the sake of sport, in opposition to both Ramanuja and Nimbārka. According to these latter, though both difference and non-difference are theoretically equally real (vastavika), it is difference only that is real, while the non-difference is accounted for by the similarity of nature between Brahman and Jīva or by the relation of dependence between the two (niyama-niyantuva).

(VI) Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya and Nimbārka

Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman exactly like Nimbārka. According to him, the mutual difference in nature and concept of Brahman and Jīva is obvious, as already observed, that Brahman is all knowing, all - powerful and omniscient, while the Jīva is knowing little and has limited power. Brahman is absolute, while Jīva is atomic. Brahman is

1 Ghate, V.S. "The Vedanta", Poona, 1960, pp.35.
creator, supporter, destroyer, while Jīva is created, supported and controlled by Brahman.

In reality, there is mutual non-difference. In the three aspects of knowledge, existence and bliss viz., sat, cit and ānanda of Brahman, these two Brahman and Jīva are identical.

Thus, like Nimbārka, there is relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman.

On the other hand, like Nimbārka, this relation of difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman is in bondage as well as in salvation. The mukta Jīva appears to be entirely identical with Brahman, being knowledge, existence and bliss viz. sat, cit and ānanda of Brahman; but, the mukta Jīva, too, is different from the Brahman in two respects. Thus, first, even a mukta Jīva is atomic while Brahman is all-pervading; and even the Mukta Jīva no doubt

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1 Govinda-bhāṣya, English Translation, Ed. by Basu B.D., Allahabad, 1912, 4.4.20.
creates the Pitriloka and Matriloka, etc., as we learn from the cha. upa., but his creation has this limitation, that it is a local creation only, different from the creation of the Supreme Brahman, who creates the whole universe, consisting of spirit and matter, sustains it and dissolves it back into Himself. This power belongs to Brahman alone and to no Mukta Jīva. In this sense Mukta Jīva is different from Brahman. The Mukta Jīva is equal to God in matters of enjoyment only; not essentially and absolutely equal to the lord.

Thus, like Nimbārka in the philosophy of Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya both difference and non-difference are true. He accepts both difference and non-difference as incompatible and inconceiveable, theory true. Nimbārka accepts both difference and non-difference to be equally true and compatible as well as. The doctrine of Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya may, therefore, be called “acintya-bhedābheda-vāda”, which may be translated as “inconceiveable relation

1 Govinda-bhāṣya, English Translation, Ed. by Basu B.D., Allahabad, 1912, 4.4.17, pp. 765.
2 Govinda-bhāṣya, 4.4.21.
of simultaneous difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman", as which is distinguished from the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (Svabhāvikabheda-bhedavāda) of Nimbārka.

(vii) Śrīkantha and Nimbārka

In the first place, according to Śrīkantha, like Nimbārka there is an essential difference between Jīva and Brahman. Brahman is by nature a store of all auspicious qualities, independent and ever-free from all defects, does not become subject to the faults of the Jīva, while the Jīva is dependent, becomes deluded and grieves\(^1\), i.e., remains merged in the ocean of sorrows, brought about by the great delusion. There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman in respect of their qualities, viz., knowledge and ignorance, independent and dependent and so on. Again, Brahman is the object to be

1 Śrīkantha-bhāsyā, Eng. Translation by Dr. (Mrs.) Roma Chaudhri, Calcutta, 1959, 1.2.11, pp. 96
2 Śrīkantha-bhāsyā, 1.2.11, pp. 96
worshipped, while Jīva is the worshipper. Jīva and Brahman are related as the 'directed' and the 'director', as the body and the soul. Hence the mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is obvious. Brahman is the director, while Jīva is the directed. Brahman is the Lord of the world and never the Jīva. Hence, Jīva is different from Brahman. Thus, Jīva is different in nature from Brahman.

But, if, on the one hand, Jīva is different from Brahman, on the other, Jīva is also non-different from Brahman. Jīva as effect and part of Brahman, is different from Brahman, the cause and the whole, but as effect and part, again, Jīva is also non-different from Brahman. There is non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, as they stand in a relation of the pervaded and the pervader. Here also Śrīkantha perfectly agrees with Nimbārka.

1 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 1.2.2, pp. 84
2 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 1.2.12, pp. 96
3 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 1.3.44, pp. 142
4 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.3.45, pp. 241
5 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.3.42, pp. 240
Thus, according to Śrīkantha, it is established that there is both difference and non-difference (Hedābheda) between Jīva and Brahman. But Śrīkantha says difference and non-difference (Hedābhedavadā) is not tenable. He replies that no such difference and non-difference is to be apprehended here, for we only establish the doctrine of Non-difference as qualified by difference (Viśiṣṭādvaita). We do not maintain that there is an absolute difference between Brahman and the universe, as between a pot and a piece of cloth. For, that would be opposed to the scriptural texts maintaining the non-difference between the two. Again we do not maintain that there is an absolute difference (between the two) as between the nacre and the silver. For, if one of these two be false, then that would contradict the scriptural texts maintaining the difference between them in respect of natural qualities. Further, we do not also maintain that there is both difference and non-difference (between the two), for that would

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1 "Hedābheda-kalpanam viśiṣṭādvaitam sādhayāmah" — Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.1.22
be self contradictory. But we maintain that
(the relation between Brahman and the world
is that non-difference (or Brahman) is qualified
by difference (or the world), as the embodied
being is by its body, as the substance is by
its attribute.

Thus, Śrīkantha explains the relation of
Jīva and Brahman on the analogy of the soul - body
(śarīrī-śarīra), substance-attribute (viśeṣya-
viśeṣana), and the cause-effect relation (kārya-
kārana sambandha).

The non-difference between the Jīva and
Brahman simply means that the Jīva - the effect
and the Brahman its cause, the Jīva - the attribute
and the Brahman its substance, the Jīva - the body
and the Brahman its soul, none can exist in the
absence of the other, as in the case of a pot and
clay. A pot is never found without blueness. In

1 (i) "na ca bhedābhedavādīnaḥ, vastuvirodhāt/
kintu śarīrāśarīrīnoraiva ca viśeṣāvaita-
vādīnaḥ/" Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.1.22.
(ii) Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, Eng. translation by
Dr. (Mrs.) Roma Chaudhuri, 2.1.22, pp. 181.
the same manner the power (śakti) viz. the Jīva can never exist without Brahman, while, Brahman, too, is never known to be without His power viz., the Jīva, just as fire is never without heat. If a thing cannot be known without another thing then the first is qualified be the second. The second thing (the attribute) is the first thing (the substance) in essence. Hence, it is said that Brahman is non-separable from and necessarily connected with the Jīva. On the other hand the difference (between the two), too, is natural. Hence, the Brahman is, indeed, superior to the Jīva. Just as the soul is non-different from the body in nature and superior to it, just as the substance is non-different from attribute in nature and superior to it; just as the cause is non-different from the effect in nature and superior to it.

Hence, Śrīkantha calls his doctrine "viśīṣṭa-Śivādvaita", viz., the doctrine that Śiva possessing the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, as his body, is one without a second, and he is both the cause and the effect.

1 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.1.22, pp. 181-182
2 Śrīkantha-bhāṣya, 2.1.14, 2.1.22, pp. 174-181
Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīkantha (as with Rāmānuja); both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real, in the same sense. But for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference (Bhedabheda) are on the same level, they co-exist, and have the same importance; while for Śrīkantha (as for Rāmānuja) non-difference is the principle; it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it.

Another technical distinction may be possible between the doctrines of Śrīkantha and Nimbārka, like the another technical distinction between the doctrines of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, as it has already, been observed above.

Thus, the main difference between Śrīkantha and Nimbārka consists in their doctrines with regard to the relation between difference and non-difference, Brahman on the one hand, Jīva on the other.

(viii) Śripati and Nimbārka

As it has already been observed that, like Nimbārka, Śripati calls his doctrine Bhedabheda
and dvaitadvaita. There is difference between jīva and Brahman in bondage. Brahman is the object of worship, all-pervasive and omniscient, while jīva is worshipper, has spatial limitation and possesses limited knowledge. But at the salvation jīva is identical with Brahman. This identity is natural as well as of form. And again, like Nimbārka, Śrīpati tells us that both difference and non-difference are natural.

Thus, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīpati, both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as natural. But for Nimbārka, identity is not of form unlike difference where as for Śrīpati identity is not only natural but also of form like difference. And again according to Śrīpati, difference holds only in bondage and identity in mukti; So that identity and difference are not to be found simultaneously but at different times. But for Nimbārka, there is the relation of both difference and non-difference between the jīva and the Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation; so that difference and non-difference are to be found simultaneously.
CONCLUSION

The above views of different philosophers shows that the problem of the relation of Jīva and Brahman cannot be easily brought under any well known logical category, such as identity, difference and difference and non-difference.

On one hand there are absolute non-dualistic doctrines, such as the Advaitavāda of Śankara, and the "Śuddhādvaita of vallabha", in which Jīva is completely identical with Brahman; and on the other hand, there are absolute dualistic doctrines, such as Dvaita-vāda of Madhva, in which Jīva is completely different from the Brahman.

And again, there are the doctrines of Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkṛṣṇaçaitanya, Śrīkentha and Śrīpati. All of them accept the relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, to be equally real;
but all of them try to reconcile them in different ways. Nimbārka accepts the relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman, which is to be equally natural (svabhāvika) and completely compatible. Rāmanuja and Śrīkantha explains the relation of Jīva and Brahman on the analogy of soul and body (Sarīri-Sarīra), in which non-difference is the principal, it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it. Bhāskara regards the difference and non-difference to be equally real but he takes difference to be aupādhyāka and non-difference to be natural and real. Śrīkṛṣṇa Caitamaya regards the difference and non-difference as inconceivable (acintya). Śrīpati regards the difference and non-difference to be equally natural, but he takes that identity is not only natural but also of form.

But considering the above doctrines, Nimbārka's main contribution seems to be very reasonable, both from the philosophical and theological points of view. Nimbārka elucidates his point about the relation of Jīva and Brahman,
by the analogy of the cause and the effect (or the part and the whole relation), as it has been observed. The effect (or the part) is different from its cause (or the whole) in attributes and powers, forms and functions. A clay - jar, for example, is different from a lump of clay, in this sense that the lump has a round shape; the jar an oblong one; the lump is black; the jar, brown, the lump is soft; the jar hard; we can besmear the floor with the lump, but cannot fetch water by it, and so on. But on the other hand, the effect is non-different from the cause, in essence, being but its transformation; for example, a clay jar, an effect, is non-different from the lump of clay - the cause, in essence, both being equally clay.

Hence, the relation between the cause and its effects (or the part and the whole) to neither one of pure non-difference (abheda) nor one of pure difference (bheda) but one of natural difference and non-difference (Svabhāvika-Bhedābheda), both of which are equally real.

The very same is the case with Jīva and Brahman. The Jīva is the effect (or the part)
of the Brahman, and the Brahman is the cause (or the whole) of the Jīva. The mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is obvious. As it has already been observed that Brahman is of the nature of all - pervasive, omniscient and independent, while Jīva is knowing little and dependent on Brahman, and so on. But on the other hand, Jīva is non-different from the Brahman, because it is after all nothing but Brahman. To conclude this present note, it may be illustrated by well known example of Brahma-Sūtra, which is "Ahikundalavat". In this present illustration 'ahikundalvat' the serpent is the cause of the coil and the coil is the effect of the serpent. The serpent is independent, while the coil is dependent. On the one hand, it shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other hand, the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. It shows the non-difference of the serpent and its coil. Likewise, the relation of Jīva - the effect (or the part, transformation), with the Brahman - the cause (or the whole), is
natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedābheda). This relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman is in bondage as well as in salvation. Mukta Jīva is non-different from Brahman, being knowledge, existence and bliss in essence (Saccidānandāsvarūpa); but, it too, is different from Brahman in two respects. In the first place, Mukta Jīva is atomic while Brahman is all-pervading; and in the second place a Mukta Jīva lacks the power of creation on which Brahman possesses fully and eternally.

Thus, there is relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation, which is to be equally real and compatible. The testimony of various scriptures proves the natural difference and non-difference of Jīva with Brahman. There is no such contradiction, in the doctrine of Natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda) of Śrīnimbārkācārya, as we find in some vedāntic systems, such as; the follower of ‘dvaitavāda’, has to accept many
texts like 'Sarvām Khalvidam Brahma', as subordinate ones, and the followers of 'Advaitavāda'; have to accept many texts, which determine difference, as subordinate ones.

However, Nimbārka's very special contribution seems, as regards the relation of Jīva and Brahman, to be very reasonable. So even-now Nimbārka-school has a best place and a great importance in Indian devotees. In the words of Dr. (Mrs.) Roma Chauduri, "In fact, 'Abheda' and 'Abheda' have both been admitted by all the Monitheistic School of Vedānta (except, of course, that of Madhva); But none has been able to put the two, exactly on the same level, same status, like Nimbārka. What a great and glorious conglomeration! An infinite number of Gods in essence, eternally worshipping the one, universal God, from within, like the rays in the sun, like the ripples, in a river, like the flowers in a tree, manifesting His light, singing His praise, spreading His Fragrance. What a superb, sublime, sweet conception."

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In words of Pt. Anantaram Shastri,
"Tasmādakūmārapi cidācidīśvaramī svāthāvīkabheda-
bhedameva sambandham angīkratyā punarviśistatvāngī-
kāro gauravāvahopyanupapannapi svasampradāyasya
svātantryasiddhyartha iti siddham/

- Vedānta-tattva-bodha, pp.32
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RELATION OF JĪVA AND BRAHMAN
IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBĂRKA

(ABSTRACT)

Thesis submitted for the
DEGREE OF
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by
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The present work consists of five chapters, which undertakes to present the natural relation of difference and non-difference (Svākhāvika-bhedābheda-sambandha) between Jīva and Brahman, according to Nimbārka - philosophy.

Naiyāyikas maintain that relation is perceived. In the Buddhist - philosophy, relations are contingent reality, that is to say no ultimate reality at all. Like Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkṣepa maintain that relation is perceived. In Śāntakara Advaita Philosophy, all relations are purely conceptual and superimposed. According to the Śāivas, relation is nothing but a special category based on the general category - unity in multiplicity - involving two external realities. According to Rādkara, Viśnudvīpa, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, etc., all relations are real. There is an indefinite number of relation in Indian - philosophy. According to Naiyāyikas, principal relations are conjunction and coexistence (Sāmyoga and Samavāya). In the place of samavāya, the Viśisṭha Viśeṣika and Advaitins
recognize the relation of difference - cum - identity (तद्वयत्य). In the philosophy of Nimbarka, the relation always presupposes difference and non-difference (स्वेदाभ्य द). Non-difference here means essential dependence and not absolute identity, which is not in conflict with difference, but is compatible with difference. And, difference means difference of nature. Thus, difference and non-difference (स्वेदाभ्य द) relation is equally real and compatible with each other. Four types of relation of difference and non-difference (स्वेदाभ्य द) are mentioned by Sureśvaracārya in his Pradārśanakopāṇisad-bhasyavārttikā. These are following:

(i) Śamāya and Viśeṣa.
(ii) Avasaṭhāvata and avasaṭhā.
(iii) Kārṭya and Kāraṇa.
(iv) Ṛṣya and Ṛśagāna.

Prakāśātanam maintain five types of relation of difference and non-difference (स्वेदाभ्य द) in his Paṇḍapadikavivaranaṇam instead of these above four types. These are following:

(i) Jāti and Vyakti.
(ii) Guna and guṇāna.
(iii) Kārtya and Karana.
(iv) Viśistavartipa.
(v) Aṣmā and aṣman.
The doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) has had a long history. It goes back to the Vedic time. The pre-Śāṅkarāyana thinkers like Āmaraśākayā, Audulomin, Kaśyapāna offered the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda), who are referred to as such in Brahma-sūtra. Even in later age Lokulīśa, Brahma-prapūtra, Bhāskara, and Yādavaprakāśa were the supporters of this doctrine. And after that the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) is elaborated in the philosophy of Nimbārka, Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya and Śrīpati.

In the philosophy of Nimbārka, the relation of Jīva and Brahman is just like that between a cause and its effect, a whole and its parts, a substance and its attributes, a substratum of power and its powers.

The mutual difference in the nature and concept of Jīva and Brahman is obvious. Brahman is the cause and Jīva his effect or transformation. So, there is essentially difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the clay and the pots, dishes etc., between the gold and the bracelets, ear-rings etc., between the tree and the leaves, fruits etc.; between the sea and the foams, waves etc.; and
between the sun and its rays. There is a difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the part and the whole. Jīva is the part of Brahman. Brahman is the whole. The relation of part and whole declares that there is difference between Jīva and Brahman on account of the designation of difference. The Jīva is, by nature, a part, and the subject to bondage and salvation, while Brahman is, by nature whole and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest. Again, Brahman is the object to be obtained and the Jīva is the obtainor, the obtainer cannot be the object to be obtained. There is difference between the Jīva, which has little knowledge, and is subject to bondage and salvation through the lord's Māyā consisting of the three gunās and the Brahman - who is omniscient lord. It establishes that there is difference between Jīva and Brahman as the knower and the object to be known. Brahman is the object to be worshipped, while Jīva is worshipper. The mutual difference is obvious between them.

Further, Brahman is different from the individual souls of the sun and the rest, within which He dwells on account of the designation of difference. Again it means that Brahman in Jīva,
who is sarirabhimanin, is different by nature.

Other essential differences between Jīva and Brahman are that Brahman is inner-controller while Jīva is not inner-controller. Jīva is alone that is subjects to deeds and participates in imperfections, but Brahman who is not subject to deeds. Jīva is an enjoyer on account of its imperfections; while Brahman is not touched even by an odour of imperfections, and is not the enjoyer of the names and the forms to be created by Himself. Thus, Dādha Jīva is entirely different from Brahman, being imperfect, sinful, impure, and so on.

Even Uktta Jīva is different from Brahman in two respects. In the first place, the freed-Jīva is atomic in size, while Brahman is all-pervading. Atomic Jīva cannot become all-pervasive in salvation. In the second place, the freed-Jīva, however, though similar to the Highest Brahman, yet cannot possible be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their controller, their supporter, all-pervasive and so on; and hence, its lordship is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

The mutual difference between Jīva and Brahman is equally eternal, natural, and undeniable, in
bondage as well as in salvation.

In reality, there is mutual non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the cause and the effect. The effect, which belongs to a posterior time, is present in the cause. So the effect is non-different from the cause. It is explained by the illustration of the ornaments. The ear-ring is different from the bracelet in name and shade simply on account of Kundalattva and Katakattva, but is non-different so far as the gold is concerned. There is non-difference between Jīva and Brahman as between the whole and the part. Jīva is the part of Brahman, Brahman is the whole. The relation of a part and the whole declares that Jīva is non-different from Brahman on account of the designation of non-difference. And its existence and activity are under the control of the whole.

Dādha Jīva is non-different from Brahman in essence, being His effect or transformation. On the other hand Mukta Jīva is entirely non-different from Brahman, being existence - cognition-bliss in essence (Saccidānandāsvarūpa).

On the one hand, difference is true, on the other, non-difference is no less true. The Jīva - as
the effect and part of Brahman is different from Brahman - the cause and the whole but as effect and part, again, Jīva is also non-different from Brahman. The fact is that the effect and the cause, the part and the whole are neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different but the relation of them is a relation of both difference and non-difference. Thus, the relation of Jīva and Brahman is a relation of natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedābhedā), just like that between the serpent and its coil or between the sun and its rays. Just as serpent is the cause of the coil and the coil is the effect of the serpent. The serpent is independent while the coil is dependent. On the one hand, it shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other hand, the existence and activity of coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. It shows the non-difference of the serpent and its coil. Likewise, the relation of Jīva - the effect, with the Brahman - the cause is natural difference and non-difference (Svābhāvika-bhedābhedā). It is true that there is difference between sun and its rays but there is also non-difference so far as the light is concerned.

According to Nimbārka, therefore, there is natural relation of difference and non-difference
between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation. It is further supported by Śrīnivāsa-gaṇārya, the fact is that even during the bondage (baddhāvasthā) the Jīva, which is atomic in size and possesses little knowledge, though different from the Brahman, who is all-pervading, non-staying in nature and omniscient, yet like the leaf is non-different from the tree, the ray from the lamp, quality from the qualified, sense organs from the vital air, in its existence and activities being dependent upon the Brahman, it is non-different from Brahman. Likewise, though in salvation (Muktāvasthā) the Jīva is non-different from Brahman, it having no separate independent existence and activity, at the same time, it is undoubtedly different from Brahman, in accordance with the Śruti "Svēna rūpena sampadyate" -- it realizes its own nature. Otherwise, the nature of both, the Jīva and the Brahman becomes loose.

Thus, there is relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation, which is to be equally real and compatible. The testimony of various scriptures proves di-natural difference and non-difference of Jīva with Brahman. There is no such contradiction in the doctrine of Natural difference and non-difference (Śvabhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda) as we find in some
vedāntic systems, such as, the follower of 'Dvaitavāda', has to accept many texts like 'Servam Khalvidem Brahma' as subordinate ones, and the followers of 'Advaïtavāda', have to accept many texts, which determine difference, as subordinate ones.

The problem of relation of Jīva and Brahman cannot be easily brought under any well known logical category, such as identity, difference, and, difference and non-difference.

On one hand, there are absolute non-dualistic doctrines, such as the Advaitavāda, of Śankara, in which Jīva is completely identical with Brahman; and on the other hand there are absolute dualistic doctrines such as Dvaitavāda of Madhva, in which Jīva is completely different from Brahman.

And again, there are the doctrines of Nimbārka, Ramanuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya, Śrīkantha and Śrīpati. All of them accept the relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman to be equally real but all of them try to reconcile them in different ways. Nimbārka accepts the relation of both difference and non-difference between Jīva and Brahman by the analogy of the cause and the effect (or the part and the whole), which is to be equally natural (Svābhāvika) and perfectly
compatible. Ramanuja and Srikanttha explain the relation of Jīva and Brahman on the analogy of soul and body (Śarīrī-Śarīra), in which non-difference is the principal, it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it. Bhāskara regards the difference and non-difference to be equally real but he takes difference to be aupādhika and non-difference to be natural and real. Srikramacaitanya regards the difference and non-difference as inconceivable (acintya). Śripati regards the difference and non-difference to be equally natural, but he takes that identity is not only natural but also of form.

However, Nimbārka's very special contribution seems, as regards the natural relation of difference and non-difference (Śvābhavika - bhedābheda) between Jīva and Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation, to be very reasonable both from the philosophical and theological points of view. So, even now Nimbārka-School has a best place and a great importance in Indian - devotees.