POLITICAL SYSTEM OF ISLAM AND ITS RELEVANCE IN MODERN TIMES

ABSTRACT

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

SHIA THEOLOGY

By

ALI JANBOZORGI

Under the Supervision of

DR. SYED FARMAN HUSAIN

DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)

2005
Abstract
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In the present work an attempt has been made to assess the history, political philosophy and socio-political conditions and civilization trends right from the prophet period till now. The object of this work focuses on bringing into light major political systems of Muslims that emerged and operated at various periods of time and special emphasis has been given to modern Muslim experimentations and various methods techniques ad ways necessitated by the requirements of time and place. Many books and articles have been written on political systems of Islam and Muslims but no substantial and cohesive effort had been made to bring out the relevance and application of the that discussions 'political system of Islam to modern times' which has been done in this work.

This work is divided into seen chapters followed by a bibliography and glossary. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of the political system of the Prophet's period and the evolution of the Islamic state through a number of the Prophetic measures like the system of the 'mu’akhat (brotherhood) and the Kitab (document) and the making of the 'ummah' (Muslim community) etc: It also discusses the politico-juridical systems during the Caliphs’s period and explains the concepts of Khalifa and the Caliphate and Ideal Khalifat, encompassing the experimentations of the umavid and Abbasid dynasties with special reference to their state-building measure and thought making provisions and resolutions such the
rise of three tier system of governance which is generally classified as the central, provincial and local governments.

The second chapter deals with the discussion of the tradition philosophy and politics in Islam. This chapter is divided into three parts:

1. Early Islamic philosophers of the East, like Farabi, Avicena and Al-Ghazzal;

2. Islamic philosophers in the Western lands of Islam like Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Khaldun.

3. Later Islamic Philosophers like Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Nizamul-Mulk. This chapter explained the political thought of these philosophers and their salient features; for example: The principles of political philosophy of Farabi in Madina-e-Fadilah and Madinah-e-Jahilah that is partly followed from plato and Aristotle, while political philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) is also described against his historical backdrop because he was a great scholar who earned some experiences in the period of his administration working as a Wazir in Hamedan (Iran). Al- Ghazzali’s concepts of political philosophy is also discussed within the prescribed framework although he is generally considers a mystic and theologian.
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The last i.e. the Seventh Chapter deals with Conclusion and Suggestions to show some pattern of political systems and experiments that were made in the Muslim World.
In the end it can be said with some degree of satisfaction that varied political experimentations and statecraft developments have been analyzed in this work. Through them more suitable future political system could be discovered by the contemporary or future Muslim generation, or at least a glance in these experiments might give an idea to analytical researcher and greater scholar to find out a political system that might meet the requirements of the Muslim World.
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ALIGARH (INDIA)

2005
Dedicated to my wife

Fatima

Whose love was guiding force
Certificate

This is to certify that Mr. Ali Janbozorgi a Research Scholar in the Department of Shia Theology, Faculty of Theology has done his research work under my supervision. In my opinion his work has been completed and thesis titled "Political System of Islam and its Relevance in Modern Times" is ready for the submission.

Dr. Syed Farman Husain
Supervisor & Chairman

Forwarded

DEAN
Faculty of Theology
A.M.U., Aligarh

Dated 03-02-2005
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the name of Allah the Most gracious the Most merciful

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and peace and blessings of Allah be upon the noblest of the Prophets our prophet Muhammad and his family.

I bow in reverence to God whose gracious blessings gave me the required energy for the completion of this work.

I feel honored to submit this thesis under the supervision of Dr. Syed Farman Husain, Reader and Chairman, Department of Shi’a Theology, AMU, Aligarh, India without whose guidance and encouragement and helpful attitude every times, it was not possible for me to reach this stage.

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Finally, I would like to pray to Allah Almighty to shower his blessings on my Father who left this world last year during my research in a car accident.

Date: February, 2005

ALI JARBOZORGI
AMU, Aligarh-202 002
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<td>A.D.</td>
<td>Anno Domini</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.H.</td>
<td>After Hijrah</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Aligarh Muslim University</td>
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<td>B.C.</td>
<td>Before Christ</td>
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<td>Deptt.</td>
<td>Department</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf co-operation council</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof.</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBUH</td>
<td>Peace be upon him</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation organization</td>
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<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestine National Authority</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United States of Emirates</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States (America)</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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**CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS**

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The last part of chapter sixth gives as account about the Arab World and its definition, Syria and Arab World, Iraq and Arab World, Saddam’s Aggressive Arab Nationalism, the Israeli-Arab Wars, Saudi Arabia and its political system and its relations with USA. Finally in this chapter a discussion is devoted to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and its absolute monarchy and political development and ruling families of UAE. Moreover we have also thrown a glance on the efforts of Yasser Arafat as a Arab-Palestinian politician as well as two organizations in Arab World; League of Arab States and Gulf co-operation (GCC) and their political role in the Arab World.

The last i.e. the Seventh Chapter deals with Conclusion and Suggestions to show some pattern of political systems and experiments that were made in the Muslim World.
In the end it can be said with some degree of satisfaction that varied political experimentations and statecraft developments have been analyzed in this work. Through them more suitable future political system could be discovered by the contemporary or future Muslim generation, or at least a glance in these experiments might give an idea to analytical researcher and greater scholar to find out a political system that might meet the requirements of the Muslim World.
Chapter 1

Stages of the Development of Political System in Islam
CHAPTER 1

STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SYSTEM IN ISLAM

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CHAPTER I

1.1 THE PROPHETS' PERIOD:

With the revelation of the Quran, Islam came to the World and Mohammad became the prophet. The prophet had initially to convert the people of Makkah. Makkah was a busy and wealthy commercial town almost monopolizing the enterpot trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean trading centers. This was mainly due to its location on the international trade route from the South to the North, which included the route from Africa. The prophet Muhammad's great-grandfather, Hashim, who gave his name to the clan, died in Syria while on a trade expedition.

Makkah, where Muhammad was born in 571, was the proud heart of a fiercely interned Arab tribal society. Arab prided on their ancestry (nasab). For them the Arab was the noblest of nations (afkhar al-umam). Among the Arabs the Quraysh considered themselves the aristocrats. The Quraysh, was divided into numerous competing clans, dominated Makkah. Exclusive tribal codes, animistic practices, female infanticide, worship of some 360 competing idols, were the characteristics of society. This was the society The Prophet was set to change¹.
In the summer of 622 The Prophet left Makkah and arrived in Madinah, a journey that was to change the history of the World. It was called the hijrah or migration, and Marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar. His party of migrants was called muhajirs (refugees), the natives of Madinah ansars (helpers). It was an act that has been suggestive to Muslims throughout history, the transition from dar-al-harb, the land of war, to dar-al-Islam, land of Islam, or peace.

In Makkah the Prophet had propagated a new message, triumphant over a conversion one moment, concerned over a failure another, always under pressure. In Madinah he arrived as ruler, laying the foundations of a nascent state and religion. He now began to establish his community. One of the first tasks was to provide the charter of Madinah- a sort of Magna Carta – which announced the rights and obligations of all citizens, Jews and Muslims.

1.1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE:

(a) The system of the mu’akhat:

Mu’akhat was the first clear manifestation of the organization of Islam’ ummah (community) on the basis of a definite ideology and a distinct political philosophy. Till then, the Arabs recognised blood as the only bond that determined their social or community relationship. Sociologically, a people grown and brought up in a tribal system could not behave otherwise. But The Prophet brought about such a tremendous change in their outlook that affinity of faith replaced all other ties of blood, halif (confederation, association), Jiwar (protection) and wila (clientship) which had their roots in tribal traditions of the Arabs. The
Islamic ummah was organized on the basis of ideology throwing into shade all considerations of blood-relationship. This was absolutely new experiment having a revolutionary impact on the Arab Sociology and its success, thought in a rudimentary form, as demonstrated at Mecca\(^3\). According to Ibn-Ishaq and other early historians, when a substantial number of the Meccans accepted Islam, The Prophet established The System of the Mu’akhat, two Muslims were paired together and declared as brothers. Thus Talhah b. ‘Ubaydullah and al-Zubayr b. al-Awwam were declared as brothers while the prophet bracketed himself with ‘Ali b. Abi Talib as his religious brother\(^4\). This system replaced the family ties to such an extent that the two Islamic or religious brothers could inherit each other’s property, regardless of any blood relationship\(^5\). The mu’akhat was aimed at bringing about a change in the sociological consciousness of the early converts. It forged divergent social groups and warring individuals into a new community\(^6\).

After the migration of the Prophet to Mecca the Mu’akhat assumed a new dimension. It was then effected between the muhajirs and The ansar in the early days of Safar 1 A.H./ Aug. 623 A.D. As is well- known, the muhajirs had come empty handed from Mecca. The ansar provided their immigrant brothers with board and loading\(^7\).

(b) The Kitab (document) system:

The mu’akhat was followed by the Kitab (document) of the Prophet which bound the whole populace of Medina, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, into a political and social organisation\(^8\).
The *Kitab*[^9] or 'The constitution of Medina', was promulgated just after the migration of the Prophet to Medina. The constitution asserts that "This is a writing (Kitab) of Muhammad, The prophet, between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yasrib and these who follow them and are thus attached to them and who wage holy war with them[^10]. The people referred to in this document i.e. The Muhajir and the ansar, were declared a united 'ummah, distinct from the rest of the mankind[^11]. It was a community of Allah ('ummat Allah) in which the right to rule belonged to Allah and, in His name, to Muhammad, His Prophet.

(c) **The ‘ummah’:**

The ‘ummah is basically a Quranic term and it occurs fifty one times in the Quran and its plural ‘umam thirteen times[^12]. It is “The community formed by those who accept the messenger and his message[^13]. In the same connotation the term ‘ummah has been used at least in 303 traditions of the prophet[^14]. The view that the non-Muslims, The jews and the Pagans of Medinah were not excluded from the ‘ummah is not only against the spirit of the document but quite contrary to the very concept of the ‘ummah based on religion. Declares the immigrant and the ansar Muslims alone as the ‘ummah wahidah (one community), distinct from the rest of the mankind. All facts taken together, it becomes abundantly clear that the Muslims of the city-State of Medina alone were included in the ‘ummah. All the non-Muslims, pagans, Jews, or for that matter, Christians of Medina were given the status of the Zimmis(protected people), or at the most that of halifs.
though the idea is not given a theoretical expression, but it is implied in their relationship with the Muslims and Islamic state\textsuperscript{15}.

In 6 A.H./628 A.D. The famous treaty of al-Hudaybiyah, was negotiated. On the face of it, the treaty was a military and a political triumph for the Meccans but Soon it was apparent that they were struggling to hold their feet to the ground which was slipping under them. The treaty showed that the leadership was confused, and their rank and file were broken and frustrated. It was, in fact a diplomatic defeat for the Meccans who had unwittingly accorded an equal status to Medina. After al-Hudaybiyah, all factors seem to have combined to contribute to the downfall of Mecca, which eventually took place early in 630 A.D. when the Prophet entered the city as its conquer. Even a synoptic view of the political developments, particularly the armed encounters between Mecca and Medina, would show that while Mecca was losing ground day by day, Medina was gradually emerging as a centralized political authority\textsuperscript{16}.

The Islamic state was expanding, though slowly but steadily, in all directions of the city-state\textsuperscript{17}. The 9\textsuperscript{th} year after the hijrah (April-May 630 to April-May 631 A.D.) is generally called by the historians as the year of deputations from every nook and corner of the Arabian Peninsula visited the prophet. On the other hand that year was in fact the highest watermark in the formation of the Islamic ‘\textit{ummah} as well as the establishment of the Islamic state. Almost all tribes of Arabia, big or small, urban or Bedouin, hastened to join it\textsuperscript{18}. The whole of the Arabian Peninsula, from the Syrian borders in the north to the last corner of al-Yaman in the South and from the Shores of the Red Sea in the west to
the Persian Gulf and the Iranian confines in the east, not only had recognized the political sovereignty of the Islamic state, but also had been integrated with the Islamic ‘ummah based on Islam. The faith of the Prophet Muhammad’.

Our prophet Mohammad tolerated and stood against all opposed groups. He immigrated (Hijrah) to Medina and he founded the state due to the condition of that time. So he tried to lead the state wisely. The religion and the state were united and there was separation between them and it was an appropriate deed for prophet Mohammad to establish the state. He was realistic in his outlook about human beings that man has both spiritual as well as physical entity and man is considered as an individual and a social being.

1.2 **THE CALIPHS’ PERIOD:**

(a) **Theology and the Caliphate:**

Islamic theologians had to reconcile their irreligious views to the change circumstances of the time and the accept accomplished facts. The Hanafi School of Theology was evolved to recognize a khalifa on one of the following bases:

1. Khalifa by general consent and election
2. Khalifa by nomination
3. Khalifa by being in power

This school argued that without a leader, it would be impossible to defend Islam from external invasion or save it from internal anarchy.
The Shia rejected this theory, and asserted that since the Khalifa (or Imam) is appointed by Divine will and has nothing to do with the will of humanity, and as the last Imam has disappeared and is out of sight, in his absence any man can govern the country, though he would not be considered as the spiritual leader. The Mujtahids, or chief theologians, would act on behalf of the man as authorities on religion. Actually it is an internal religion and not so important for our discussion that we concentrate on it.

(b) Khalifa:

Khalifa means “representative”. Man according to Islam, is the representative of Allah on earth. His vice-gerent; that is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by Allah, and within the limits prescribed, he is required to exercise Divine authority.

To illustrate what this means, let us take the case of an estate of yours which someone else has been appointed to administer on your behalf. Four conditions invariably obtain: First, the real ownership of the estate remains vested in you and not in the administrator; secondly, he administers your property directly in accordance with your instructions; Thirdly, he exercises his authority within the limits prescribed by you; and fourthly, in the administration of the trust he executes your will and fulfils your intentions and not his own. Any representative who does not fulfil these four conditions will be abusing his authority and breaking the covenant which was implied in the concept of “representation”.

This is exactly what Islam means when it affirms that man is the representative (Khalifa) of Allah on earth. Hence, these four conditions
are also involved in the concept of Khalifa. The state that is established in accordance with this political theory will in fact be a Caliphate under the Sovereignty of Allah\textsuperscript{21}.

1.2.1 The Caliphate:

The early Caliphs could be described by either one of these three titles – Khalifah, Amir ul-Mu’minin, and Imam. Each was a title one of and the same personage, but Khalifah emphasized his relation to the Messenger of the faith, ‘The Apostle of God’ and put forward this apostolic succession as a claim for the obedience of the faithful the second title, “Amir ul-Mu’minin’, asserted more distinctively the authority of the ruler as supreme war lord and head of the civil administration; the third, ‘Imam’, emphasized rather the religious activity of the head of the state as performing a certain definite religious function. This last title Imam – is the favourite designation for the head of the church among the Shias’. They lay special emphasize on the sacrosanct character of the successors of the prophet, to whom they gradually attribute mysterious and almost supernatural powers, until, as at present, they came to believe in a hidden Imam who, unseen by men, guides and directs the faithful upon earth. Though the doctrine of the Imam was of no less importance in Sunni theology, and though Imam was an official description of the Sunni khalifa, it was not so favourite a designation with the Sunnis as with the shias, and it was probably under the influence of Shiah opinion that the Abbasid Caliph, al Ma’mun (813-833), was the first to put the title ‘Imam’ on his coins and inscriptions. The coins of his predecessors had generally borne the title ‘Amir ul-Mu’minin’. It was also no doubt owing to the hieratic character that the
institution of the caliphate assumed under the Abbasids, that this ecclesiastical title ‘Imam’ came to be inserted of the coins of al-Ma’mun, and in this practice he was followed by succeeding Abbasids.

Some differentiation between these various appellations may be recognized in cases where pretenders have arrogated to themselves one or other of the three, e.g. it was not until Abu’l-‘Abbas as-Saffah (afterwards the first caliph of the Abbasid dynasty) had broken out into open revolt that he assumed the title of Amir ul-Mu’minin; his brother, Ibrahim, who had been regarded as leader of the Abbasid Party before him, was known only as the Imam. Similarly, at a later period, in western Africa, when the Shiah movement had won a large number of adherents from among the Berbers, their leaders were styled Imam, and it was not until ‘Ubaydullah, the ancestor of the Fatimid Caliphs, was proclaimed Khalifah in Qayrawan in the year 909, that he assumed the title of Amir ul-Muminin. The later title emphasized the aspect of secular authority, whereas that of Imam indicates rather the status of the ruler in the religious order.

1.2.2 Ideal Caliphs (11/632-41/661):

We have here an exemplification of the ancient Arab custom, in accordance with which when the chief of a tribe died, his office passed to that member of the tribe who enjoyed the greatest influence, the leading members of the tribe selecting to fill the vacant place someone among themselves who was respected on account of age, or influence, or for his good services to the common weals there was no complicated or formal method of election, nor within such small social groups would any elaborate procedure be necessary, and when the
choice of a successor had been made, those present swore allegiance to
him, one after another, clasping him by the hand\textsuperscript{23}.

AbuBakr was sixty years of age when he was elected to succeed
the prophet, and he enjoyed the dignity for two years only (11/632-
13/634). According to the tradition recorded by Muslim historians,
AbuBakr nominated' Umar as his successor. But actually during the
caliphate of AbuBakr, ‘Umar had been the virtual ruler, and he assumed
the functions of head of the state immediately after Abu Bakr’s death
without any formality\textsuperscript{24}. This again was quite in accordance with
primitive Arab custom, when the prominent position of any particular
individual clearly marked him out as the ultimate successor of the head
of the tribes but though no formalities might be necessary, it was
virtually by election that such a man would take a place of the dead
chief, and the rest of the tribe would express their assent by swearing
allegiance to him\textsuperscript{25}.

In Umar’s time (13/634-23/644) Iraq, Persia and Egypt were
added to the Muslim domain. The battle of Qadsiya, fought in 635
against the Persians was of the most critical battles in history because it
would reverberate up to the present\textsuperscript{26}. Khalid wrote to the chiefs of
Persia:

“In the name of God, the Merciful and the compassionate from
Khalid ibn al-walid to the border – chiefs (marzuban) of Persia.

Become Muslim and be saved, if not accept protection from us
and pay the jizya. If not, I shall come against you with men who love
death as you love to drink wine\textsuperscript{27}.”
Uqbah ibn Nafi, sweeping victoriously westwards along the North African coast— the area Arabs would call the Maghreb, the west— stopped where the land ended. Galloping into the Atlantic brandished his sword.

But the Islamic World was changing rapidly. Wealth and numbers that were difficult to conceive in the early days now multiplied to boggle the imagination. At Ajnadayn Muslims faced an enemy of 100,000 and at Qadisiya 120,000. At Yarmuk the deed enemy alone numbered 140,000 and with conquest came vast booty. At Qadisiya, the Persian capital, the total booty was estimated at 9 billion dinars. Each soldier received 12000 dinars. Soon even privates owned one to ten servants each. After Qadisiya, within three years of the prophet’ death. The problems and scope of Islam had changed.

Al Tabari records: ‘Umar said to Salman: ‘Am I a king or a Caliph?’ and Salman answered” ‘If you have levied from the lands of the Muslims one dirham, or more, or less, and applied it unlawfully, you are a king, not a Caliph’. And’ Umar Wepst. In 23/644 a Christian Persian slave assassinated him in the Mosque.

Uthman, who succeeded Umar (23/644-35/656), was in a sense a victim of these. He was finding it difficult to cope with the changing world and its scale. In the summer of (35/656) he was killed by rebels from the garrison town of Fustat in Egypt and Kufa in Iraq. Caught between an unresponsive government and eager newcomers, veterans who had settled in Iraq and Egypt went to Medinah to complain to the third Caliph, and, finding him unresponsive, murdered him, unleashing the first civil war.
The death of Uthman showed that Medinah could not remain the capital of the Muslim lands. It was in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq that Arab manpower and fiscal revenues were now concentrated and the three contending parties in the civil war all represented centers outside Arabia. Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet was based in Kufa, one of the two garrison cities of Iraq\(^3\) (35/656 - 40/661).

Ali, says about his acceptance of the Caliphate: "Behold, by him who split the grain (to grow) and created living beings, if people had not come to me and supporters had not exhausted the argument and if there had been no pledge of Allah with the learned to the effect that they shold not acquiesce in the gluttony of the oppressor and the hunger of the oppressed I would have cast the rope of caliphate on its own shoulders\(^3\)."

The moral authority of Ali, as the rightful caliph, challenged and confronted the material power and wealth of his rival Muawiyah. The governor of Syria. Ali’s governor was turned back by Muawiah, at the borders of Syria and battle declared. At the battle of the Camel for the first time Muslims fought Muslims. Talha and al-Zubayr, two early converts supported by the prophet’s youngest Aisha, were based in Basra, the second garrison city of Iraq\(^3\). At the battle or the camel, it was over 10,000 Muslims lay dead on the battlefield. A year later, in (36/657), Ali’s army of 70,000 faced Muawiah’s of 90,000. The numbers were swollen by non-combatants\(^3\). 

Those who remembered the times of the Prophet were horrified. New wealth, new sects and old tribal rivalries were tearing society apart. Abdullah bin Sabah had declared that Ali was God, much to Ali’s embarrassment, while he himself was the prophet. A group calling
themselves the Kharijis decided to wipe the slate clean and make a fresh start. Not for the first time in Islamic history would an attempt be made to revive the time of the prophet, already seen as the Golden age.

The Kharijis planned to kill simultaneously the three most important men in Islam, Ali in Kufa, Muawiah in Jerusalem and Amar in Fustat, of these only Ali was killed, while praying in the mosque. Muawiah, now adopting the precaution of living in heavily guarded enclosures, became the caliph of Islam and first ruler of the Umayyad dynasty.

After the assassination of Ali, His son Hassan was elected to the office of the Khilafa by the people of Kufa (41/661). As the historical report suggests that when Ali was about to die, people came to him and asked shall we offer oath of allegiance (bay‘ah) to Hassan? He replied I do not ask or forbid you to do so. You can see for yourself. By this historical report it is evident that Ali did not forbid the people the election of his son. So the appointment of a son or the succession of a son to the office of the Khilafa was not against the practice of Sahabah. Had the nomination or the election of a son been prohibited for the succession to the office of the Khilafa, Ali would not have allowed his followers to follow their choice, in choosing his son as the Khalifa.

1.2.3 Political Freedom in Khalifate Rashidah period:

There was political freedom in Khalifate Rashidah period. But it was not used in its real meaning; it was the people and their critical ideas about the ruler. It depended on the ruler's justice and interest to pay heed to the critical ideas of people.
1.3 ARAB DYNASTIES

Umayyads and Abbasids:

The Arabs before Islam constituted a traditional, tribal community led by respected patriarchs and elders. People knew each other, their parentage and their social ways—it was what is called a face-to-face society. Both in Makkah and in the deserts beyond customs were tribal. Like tribal societies elsewhere they were a frank, warm, earthy people. They had a sense of humour, the hallmark of confidence whether in an individual or in a society. It was society with a defined social-and on the peninsula, geographical-arena. Islam’s success and emergence from the peninsula changed all that.

Arab society now converted into the established imperial patterns of the defeated Byzantines and sasanids. These two empires, the most powerful of the age, were characterized by an arrogant bureaucracy, powerful armies and the total power of the rulers. Within a century Arab rule would be identified by these very characteristics. The Islamic ideal and the actual position of the Muslims, inheritors of these complex systems, now fluctuated. Henceforth each generation would need to redefine itself anew in relations to the ideal.

1.3.1 UMAYYADS (Banu Umayyah) (41/661-132/750):

The dynasty of caliphs which, from its center in Syria, ruled the whole of the Arab Islamic territories from 41/661 to 132/750. All of the caliphs during this period are descendants of Umayya b. ‘Abd shams a pre-Islamic notable of the tribe of Kuraysh of Mecca, but they represent two distinct lines within the clan of Umayya: The first three caliphs,
descended from Abu Sufyan b. Harb, are referred to as sufyanids. The remaining eleven, descendents of Marwan b. al-Hakam b. Abil-‘As, as Marwanids. For convenience, a list of the Umayyad caliphs and the dates generally given for their caliphate is provided below;

1. 41-60/661-80 Mu‘awiya I b. Abi Sufyan
2. 60-64/680-3 Yazid I b. Muawiya I
3. 64-683 Mu‘awiya II b. yazid I
4. 64-5/684-5 Marwan I b. al- Hakam
5. 65-86/685-705 ‘Abd al. Malik b. Marwan I
7. 96-99/715-17 Sulayman b’Abd al-Malik
10. 105-125/724-43 Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Malik
11. 125-126/743 – 4 al – walid II b. yazid II
12. 126/744 yazid III b. al-walid I
13. 126/744 Ibrahim b. al-walid I
1.3.1 Muawiyah (41/661-60/689) The Founder of Umavids:

Muawiyah became the first Khalifah of the Umayyad family, after the assassination of Ali, in Kufah in Ramadan 40/660. In the preceding years, the Muslim ummah was politically divided into two groups: Supporters of Muawiyah elected him as their Khalifah in Balka in Palestine on 36/656, and the Shi'ah supporters elected Hasan to the office his father. The Islamic state was practically divided into two Khalifas for the first time in the history of Islam. The Western part that included Syria, Palestine, and Egypt owed allegiance to Muawiyah, while the eastern world remained faithful to Hassan under two independent rulers of Islam. In order to solve this statement, Hassan, after a period of six months, made a compromise with Muawiyah and abdicated Khalifah in his favor in Rabi I 41/661. With this, Muawiyah became the Khalifah of the whole Islamic world. It seems that there were two important events that happened during the Umayyads period: 1. Peace with Al-Hassan and 2. War with Husain.
1.3.3 Al-Hasan b. Ali’s surrender of power to Muawiyah: (May 7, 661-April 25, 662):

Among the events of the year 41 was al-Hassan b. ‘Ali’s surrender of Power to Muawiyah, the letters entry into al-Kufa, and the rendering of allegiance to Muawiyah as Caliph by the people of al-Kufah, when the people of Iraq acknowledged al-Hasan b. Ali as Caliph, he began to impose conditions on them, (saying), “you must be totally obedient, make peace with whom I make peace, and fight whom I fight.” The people of Iraq had misgivings about their situation when he imposed these conditions upon them, and they said, “This is no master for us since he does not want to fight”. So shortly after they acknowledged him, al-Hassan was stabbed (and wounded, but) not fatally. His dislike for them increased, and he grew more afraid of them. He corresponded with Muawiyah and sent conditions to him saying, “Grant me this and I shall be totally obedient, provided that you fulfill (this conditions) for me”. Al-Hassan’s scroll came into Muawiyah’s hand. Muawiyah, however, had previously sent al-Hassan a blank scroll sealed at the bottom and had written to him, “put whatever condition you wish (to make) on this scroll which I have sealed at the bottom and it will be yours. “When the scroll reached al-Hassan, he doubled the conditions which he had asked of Muawiyah previously and kept it with him. Muawiyah meanwhile kept the scroll of al-Hassan which contained the requests the latter had sent him.

When Mu’awiyah and al-Hassan met, al-Hassan asked him to grant him the conditions made by him in the document which Mu’awiyah had sealed at the bottom. But Mu’dwiyah refused and said. I
grant you the requests you made originally in your letter to me, for I had done so already when I received your letter. "Al-Hassan replied, " (But) I had conditions when I received your letter, and you agreed to fulfill them". Since they argued over them, none of al-Hassans conditions were met\textsuperscript{42}.

Peace was concluded between al-Hassan and Muawiyah in Rabi’II 41 (August 4-September 1, 661) and Muawiyah entered al-Kufa at the beginning of Jumada I (September 2, 661). Yet another account claims that he entered it in the month of Rabi II. This is what al-waqidi says:

In this year ‘Ali’s sons, al-Hassan and al-Husayn, left al-Kufa for al-Madinah\textsuperscript{43}.

At Muawifa’s death, his son and successor, Yazid (60/680-64/683), fought against Meccan rivals led by ‘Abdullah b. al-zubayr. ‘Ali’s son Husayn attempted to move from Medinah to Kufa to take up the leadership of his followers, (according to Kufa’s invitations), but his small party was intercepted at Karbala (in Iraq) and destroyed. At the time the episode had few repercussions, but Husaya’s death gradually assumed. The significance of Martyrdom\textsuperscript{44}. Today Husayn’s Shrine Karbala is one of the great pilgrimage sites of the Muslim worlds. Along with the defeat of his father, Husayn’s death of the hands of the Umayyad divides Muslims more than any dispute over law or theology or any antipathy between tribes, races, and linguistic groups. Ali is the ancestor of Shi’ism Husayn is its martyr\textsuperscript{45}.  

26
In the meantime, the Kharijits who had repudiated ‘Ali after the battle of Siffin also rebelled. The Kharijits formed small bands, usually of between thirty and a hundred men. Each group was at once a terrorist band and a fanatical religious sect. They were held together by the conviction that they were the only true Muslims, and that their rebellions had profound religious justification. A group of Kharijits, called al Najdar, controlled a good part of Arabia including Bahrain, Oman, Hadhramaut, and Yemen before they were finally crushed. There Kharijits bands were most likely formed by uprooted individuals looking for communal affiliation through sectarian movements.\footnote{46}

The administrative and military dimensions of later Umayyad statism were backed by a new ideological policy, whereas the early caliphate had been a series of individual reigns deeply dependent upon the Personal religious or patriarchal qualities of the Caliphs, now the state as an institution was made the focus of ideological loyalty. In the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik, for the first time the caliphate began to mint its own coins in place of Byzantine and Sasanian money. The new system did away with Christian and Zoroastrian Symbolism, and introduced gold and silver coins with Arabic script to symbolize the sovereignty of the state-and its independence from, and superiority to-the previous empires. The state also symbolized its sovereignty by undertaking monumental constructions.\footnote{47}

The umayyads borrowed Greek motifs and even Greek builders and artists to decorate their mosques, and took Sasanian designs and decorations for their places. Yet in borrowing the ideas of the previous empires, the umayyads transformed the traditional motifs and provided
old forms with a new content. The state’s ideology derived from the previous empires, but its expression was characteristically Islamic.

1.3.4 The fall of Umayyads (127-32/744-50):

In 127/744, a group of Syrian Soldiers killed the Caliph al-walid II and enthroned their own candidate, Yazid III, thereby unleashing the third civil war. Refusing to acknowledge the new regime, Marwan, the Umayyad governor of Jazira-Armenia-Azarbayjan, marched on Syria with his own troops, defeated his rivals, and had himself proclaimed Caliph. He now had to conquer Iraq and to subdue the Kharijites, who were rebelling everywhere and whose Arabian adherents were about to spill into the Fertile Crescent when he crushed them in 130/748. An Abbasid- Shiite uprising in Khurasan was also launched in 131/747, led by one Abu Muslim. This revolt had long been planned and unlike the Kharijites, it could not be stopped: in 132/750 the Khurasanis inflicted adhesive defeat of a Marwan II in Iraq. They proceeded to enthrone a Hashemite, a member of the prophet’s family; but contrary to what many had expected, they did not choose a member of its Alid branch, but himself with the local rulers and aristocrats: These were to be a new elite.

1.3.5 Abbasids (Banulabbas) (132/750 – 656/1258):

The dynasty of the caliphs ruled from 132/750 to 656/1258. The dynasty takes its name from its ancestor, al-‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al- Muttalib b. Hashim, the uncle of the Prophet.
The story of the origin and nature of the movement that overthrew the Umayyad caliphate and established the ‘Abbasid dynasty in its place was for long known only in the much-revised version put about when the dynasty had already attained power, and with it, respectability."
### Genealogical Table of the 'Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliph</th>
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### Genealogical Table of the 'Abbasid Caliphs in Egypt

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According to others, the second Caliph, Al-Hâkim I, was descended directly from Al-Râ'îd in the following manner: Al-Hâkim b. 'Ali b. Abû Bakr b. Al-Husayn b. Al-Râ'îd.
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The foundation of the Abbasid dynasty- Abul Abbas al-Saffah (132/750-136/754) was proclaimed Caliph of the new dynasty at Kufa. There he ascended the pulpit and ended his attack on the Umayyad dynasty, exclaiming: “I am the Great Avenger and my name is Saffah”:

The first care of the new Caliph was to exterminate, under circumstances of almost incredible cruelty, the numerous members of The Umayyad dynasty. One prince of the family, born under a lucky star, escaped and, after wandering in North Africa, was invited to reign in Spain, where he founded a dynasty of considerable importance. Rising in central Asia. The Slaughter of the Umayyad party in Khurasan led to serious troubles at Bukhara, where, in (132/750), the Arab garrison mutinied and was joined by the people of Sughdiana and Samarkand. Ziad bin Salih, the governor, however, aided by the local chief, and termed the Bukhara-Khudah, put down this rebellion, inflicting heavy losses on the rebels.

The Persian ousted the Arabs. – Under the new dynasty the more civilized Persians seized the power and ousted the Arabs. Apart from the marked mistrust felt for them by the Abbasids Caliphs. The Arabs looked down on education as being unworthy of men who could boast a noble ancestry.

1.3.7 The Foundation of Baghdad (146/762):

The foundation of Baghdad, (146/762): Mansur who fully realized the wisdom of removing his army from kufa and Basra, which were centers of Arab intrigue and disloyalty, chose a site some twenty miles up-stream from the Sasanian capital of Madain and founded Baghdad on
the right bank of Tigris. On the opposite side of the river he built separate cantonments for the Khurasan troops and for the Yemen and Modhar Arabs⁵⁴.

The umayyads are celebrated only by their monuments; they did not survive long enough to leave their stamp upon either the historiographical or the literary traditions of Islam. The Abbasids, however, had the opportunity to design their own history. Their capital lies irretrievably buried beneath modern Baghdad and their Chief physical monument is the empty ruins of the grandiose and sour city of Samarra, to which they were forced to retreat in the ninth century with their Turkish guardsmen. We see all of early Islam as far back as the prophet himself through their eyes. Whatever the monuments say, it is to the Abbasids that the glory of the Islamic tradition belongs and nowhere more engagingly than in the celebrated thousand and One nights, in which the early Abbasids move through an Arthurian haze of benevolent wealth and easy but enlightened learning.

There is romance in the portrait, surely, and a great deal of accumulated nostalgia for a remote and vanished past, but there is truth there as well. Islam was at the height of its political power, and the reach of the Caliph would never extend further, there was wealth and luxury in the early Abbasid Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid and his immediate successors, but there was something more, and none of Islam’s provincial pretenders to the glory of Baghdad ever quite achieved it: The coming together of Muslim, Christian and Jew in a brief but glorious exploration of what they saw, then and there and never perhaps again, as their common intellectual heritage⁵⁵.
Early medieval Baghdad was not an utopian republic of letters, Surely, but despite the occasional charges of heresy or the frequent one of temerarious innovation, a number of Muslim Scholars joined with equally daring Jewish and Christian contemporaries in the catholic atmosphere of tenth and eleventh century Baghdad and followed where the Greeks had led and not merely as slavish imitators. In mathematics, astronomy, optics, medicine, and metaphysics, Muslim scholars were Masters and not merely disciples. Without benefit of endowment or even a great deal of encouragement, they constructed intellectual edifices as elegant and impressive as the scrolled domes and glittering tiled minarets that rise above the rooftops of Cairo or Isfahan. They are most impressive; perhaps, if we look upon them as important stops in a continuing intellectual guest and not, like their architectural counter parts, as mere monuments and mausoleums.

Notable a new capital, Baghdad, was started by Al-Mansur; it cost about 5 million dirhams, took four years to build and involved 100,000 architects, craftsmen and labourers. The Caliph became a mystical, semi-divine figure shrouded in court etiquette and lost in bureaucratic procedure.

The rule of Haroon-ur-Rashid (170/786 – 193/809). Caliph of the thousand and one nights is famous for its wealth and color:

A goodly place, a goodly time,
For it was in the golden prime
Of good Haroun Alrashid

Sang Tennyson in the Recollections of the Arabian nights. (It is Haroon’s rule which provides material to Karl Wittaogel)\textsuperscript{57}. 

34
1.3.8 **ABBASID ADMINISTRATION:**

(a) The Central Government

(b) Provincial Government

(c) Local Government

(a) **The Central Government:**

The creation of Baghdad was part of the 'Abbasid strategy to cope with the problems that had destroyed the Umayyad dynasty by building effective governing institutions, and mobilizing adequate political support from Arab Muslims, converts, and from the non-Muslim communities that paid the empire’s taxes. The new dynasty had to secure the loyalty and obedience of its subjects for a rebel regime and justify itself in Muslim terms.

To deal with these problems the new dynasty returned to the principles of 'Umar II. The Abbasids swept away Arab caste supremacy and accepted the universal equality of Muslims. They did away with the anachronism of the Arab “nation in arms”, and hackly embraced all Muslims as their supporters. Arab caste supremacy had lost its political meaning, and only a coalition regime, uniting Arab and non-Arab elements, could govern a Middle Eastern empire. The propagation of Arabic as a lingua Franca, the spread of Islam and the conversion of at least some proportion of the population, the tremendous expansion of commercial activities, and the economic and demographic upheavals that set people free from their old lives and launched them so new careers in new cities such as Baghdad made possible an empire-wide recruitment of Personal and of political support for the new regime.
Under the ‘Abbasids the empire no longer belonged to the Arabs, though they had conquered its territories, but to all these peoples who would share in Islam and in the emerging networks of political and cultural loyalties that defined a new cosmopolitan middle eastern society.

The new regime organized new armies and fresh administrative cadres. The openness of the ‘Abbasid regime was particularly evident in administration. Many of the Scribes in the expanding ‘Abbasid bureaucracy were Persian from Khurasan. Nestorian Christians were powerfully represented, probably because they made up a large proportion of the population of Iraq. Jews were active in tax and banking activities. Shi‘i families were also prominent, and Arabs did not altogether lose their important place. The ‘Abbasid dynasty was Arab; The ‘Abbasid armies were composed of Arabs, and the judicial and legal life of Baghdad and other important cities was in Arab hands. The prominence of Arabs, however, was no longer a prescriptive right, but was dependant upon loyalty to the dynasty. The office of the Wazir was developed to coordinate, supervise and check on the operations of the bureaucracy. Wazir was the title originally applied to the secretaries or administrators who were close assistant of the Caliphs and whose powers varied according to the wishes of their patrons. Not until the middle of the ninth century did the Wazir become the Chief of administration, with the combined duties of controlling the bureaucracy, nominating provincial officials, and sitting on the Mazalim court.

The elaborate central government was the nerve centre of the empire, and from Baghdad the Caliphs maintained communications with the provinces. But despite the propensities of the Central administration,
the provinces were not all governed in a bureaucratic manner. The degree of control ran from highly centralized administrations to loosely held suzerainty. The empire was tolerant and inclusive rather than monolithic.

(b) **Provincial Government:**

The directly controlled provinces were Iraq, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, Western Iran and Khuzistan- the provinces physically closest to the capital. Khurasan was sometimes, but not always, included in this group. These provinces were organized to maximize the obedience of officials to the will of the central government and to assure the remittance of tax revenues from the provinces to the center. Governors’ appointments were limited to a very short term so that their careers would be entirely at the mercy of the caliphs. They were rapidly rotated to prevent them from developing local support they might use against the central government. In addition, the powers of provincial government were often divided among several officials. The governor was usually the military commander, and a different man was appointed by the central treasury to be in charge of taxation and financial affairs; yet another official headed the judiciary. Those officials checked each other’s powers and all officials were subject to the supervision of the barid. In later period governorships were often awarded in payment of political debts to warlords, generals, and members of the royal family who had acquiesced in the accession of Caliph or in his succession plans, and Caliphs had to give these appointees wide latitude in the administration of their provinces. In such cases, frequent rotation and the separation of civil and military functions might be waived. For
example, until the middle of the ninth century, Armenia and Tabaristan had Arab governors who overawed the local rulers and collected tribute. These governors had no direct administrative contact with the subject people; the actual collection of taxes was in local hands. In other cases, the caliphate merely confirmed local dynasties as “governors of the caliphs”. Kurasan, was directly ruled by Caliphal appointees, came under the control of the Tahirid family.

(c) Local Government:

Local government was similarly varied. Iraq was divided into a hierarchy of districts, called Kura, tassuj, and rustaq. The rustaq was the bottom unit in the hierarchy and consisted of a market and administrative town surrounded by number villages. The same hierarchy and even the same names were used in parts of Khurasan and Western Iran. In Egypt the structure of administration was similar.

Local government was organized for taxation. Surveys were taken in the villages to determine the amount of land under cultivation. The crops grown and their expected yield and the information was passed up to the central administration. The taxes for whole regions would be estimated, the sums divided up for each district, and the demand notices sent out describing the responsibilities of each subdivision.

Any way for 500 years following the disintegration of the Abbasid empire, Islam as a religious and cultural system came to dominate a far larger share of the eastern hemisphere than any rival civilization.

1.3.9 Abbasid's Dictatorship:
Throughout the Islamic political history, it had been political dictatorship of Khalifat's systems and particularly Abbasid's Khalifate which was block for the long time in the formation of republication theories in the Islamic political history. In the Khalifate period and also after that, the domination of dictatorship in the Islamic world caused the existence of religion to be influenced by the political ideas.

Asharis insight which under the influence of political powers betrayed the Islamic ideas.

Socio-political activities in Khalifate and Umavids and Abbasids there has not been any special and main changes form the Khilafate Rashidah up to Umavids and Abbasids and also to other kingdoms and half-kingdoms. Human rights in that period was not the same as it is now. Nowadays human rights is considered as freedom, equality and cooperation. Forexample the Bei'ah in Khalifate Rashidah, Abbasids and Umavids was used concerning inthat period's meaning. It had never been used in the meaning, which it is used nowadays.
REFERENCES


2. Ibid, P. 20

3. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Yasin Mazhar Siddiqui, Organization of Government under the Prophet, India, 1987, P. 4


5. Ibid, 234-35

6. Prof. Dr. Muhammad M. Seddiqui, PP. 5-6.

7. Ibid, P.6

8. Ibid, P.7

9. Ibn Ishaq, 231, Says that the Prophet wrote a writing (Kitab)between the muhajirs and the ansar, in which he made a treaty and covenant of Peace with jews, confirmed them in their religion and property and stated the reciprocal obligations. Hence it is referred to in the text as the sahifah (The book, the writing the document).


11. Ibid.

13. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Mazhar Siddiqui, P. 10


15. Prof. Dr. Muhammad M. Siddiqui, PP. 10-11.

16. Ibid, P. 25

17. Ibid

18. Ibid, P. 41

19. Ibid, P. 49


23. Ibid, P.20

24. Ibid, P.21

25. Ibid

26. Akbar S. Ahmed, P.34
27. Ibid
28. Ibid
29. Ibid, P.35
31. Ibid
33. Francis Robinson, P.13
34. Akbar S. Ahmed, P.35
35. Ibid, P.36
38. A.S. Ahmed, P. 38
41. Ibid, PP. 164-165.
42. Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari (Tarikh at rasul Wa’l-muluk), V. XVIII, Translated by Michael G. Morony, State University of New York, USA 1987, PP. 7-8.

43. Ibid, P.11


45. Ibid.

46. Ibid

47. Ibid, P. 51

48. Ibid

49. Francis Robinson, PP. 24-25.


51. Ibid, PP. 22, 23


53. Ibid

54. Ibid, P. 46.

56. Ibid


58. Ira M. Lapidus, P.58.

59. Ibid, P.59

60. Ibid, PP. 59-60.

61. Ibid, P. 61.

62. Ibid

63. Rose E. Dunn, Edited by Majorie Kelly, P. 95.


Chapter 2

Traditional Philosophy and Politics in Islam
CHAPTER II

(I) TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN ISLAM

2.1 Alfarabi:
(a) Farabi’s political philosophy
(b) The types of regimes in farabi’s thought

2.1.1 IBN Sina (Avicenna)
2.1.2 Political Philosophy of Avicenna
2.1.3 Al-Ghazzali
2.1.4 Al-Ghazzali’s Political attitude

(II) ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHERS IN THE WESTERN LANDS OF ISLAM

2.2 IBN Bajjah
2.2.1 The Governance of the solitary of Ibn bajjah
2.2.2 IBN Tufayl
2.2.3 Political Philosophy of IBN Turayl
2.2.4 IBN Tufayl and IBN Bajjah
2.2.5 IBN Khaldun
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(III) LATER ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHERS:

2.3 Khwajah Nisir al-Din al Tusi
   (a) His politics
   (b) Philosopher/Vizier
2.3.1 Nizam al Mulk
2.3.2 Siasat Namah

1. References
2.0  THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHERS OF ISLAM MAY BE DIVIDED TO TWO GROUPS:

1. Early Islamic Philosophers in the East, who are super headed by Al-Kindi (185/801 – 252/866) the besides of several other are generally have been included in first Muslim generation of Philosophers such as Al-Farabi (257/870 – 339/950), Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya’ al-Razi (250/864 – 313/925 or 320/932), Al-Amiri (d 381/992), Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa’), Ibn Sina (370/980 – 428/1037), Ibn Miskawayh (d 421/1030) and Al-Ghazzali (450/1058 -505/1111). They in fact laid the foundation of Islamic philosophy in the East on which the great edifice was built by other philosophers.

2. Islamic Philosophers in the western lands of Islam are Ibn Masarrah who born in Cordova (Cordaba) in 269/883, and Ibn Bajjah (d. 533/1139) and Ibn Tufayal (d 581/1185-6) and Ibn Rushd (b. 520/1126) and Ibn Sab‘in (b.614/1217) and Ibn Khaldun who was born in Tunis in (732/1332) and died in Cairo in (808/1406).*

2.1  Alfarabi (257/870 – 339/950):

Abu Nasr Muhammad Ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlugh Farabi, who was known among later Islamic Philosophers as the Second Teacher (al-mu‘allim al-thani) and the philosopher of Muslims (Faylasuf al-Muslimin), not only is the founder of logic in Islamic Philosophy but also is considered by many to be the founder of Islamic Philosophy itself. Little is known of his life and even his ethnic background has been disputed among traditional authorities. Ibn Nadim in his al-Fihrist, which is the first work to mention Farabi, considers him to be of Persian
origin\(^1\). In contrast, Ibn Khallikan in his *Wafayat al-A‘yan* considers him to be of Turkish descent\(^2\). In any case, he was born in Farab in the Khurasan of that day around 257/870 in a climate of Persianate culture. As an already mature scholar, he came to Baghdad, where he studied logic with the Christian scholar Yuhanna ibn Haylan and with Ibn Bishr Matta, who was a translator of Aristotle into Arabic. Some time before 330/942, Farabi left Baghdad for Syria, where he traveled to Aleppo and possibly also went to Egypt, eventually settled in Damascus, where he died in 339/950 and buried there.

He was a truly encyclopedic figure, at once master of many languages, logic, political philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics, as well as music. Some hundred works have been mentioned in divers’ sources as having been composed by him. Many of these treatises are now lost, but a number of important ones have been discovered recently so that our view of his philosophy has been modified in recent years. His work includes several commentaries upon the logical works of Aristotle, as well as his own logical writings, which together from a major part of his intellectual output. They also include a number of foundational texts on political philosophy and ethics, chief among them *Mabadi‘ Ara-I Ahl al-Madinat al-Fadliha* (Principles of the Opinion of the People of the Virtuous city), perhaps his greatest work, and *al-Siyasat al-Madaniyyah* (Politics of the city) and *Tahsil al-Sa’adah*\(^3\).

The fact that Al-Farabi’s popular and political works have been accessible long before the present work should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is here that he gives an account of the Theoretical foundation on the basis of which those other works should be
understood, and of the philosophic principles that are applied in the other works. Although not wholly erroneous, the generally accepted view of Al-Farabi’s thought and of the philosophic tradition he founded must be seen in the new perspective provided by the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

(a) **Farabi’s Political Philosophy:**

We come now to Farabi’s practical philosophy. In his Ethics and politics we are brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and belief of the Muslims. One or two general points of view may be brought forward.

Just as logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge. So Ethics have to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although in the latter, somewhat more value is attached to practice and experience than in the theory of knowledge. In the treatment of this subject Farabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; but occasionally, in a mystic and ascetic fashion, he goes further than either of them. Even in the Ethics little regard is give to actual moral conditions; but in his politics Farabi withdraws still farther from real life. In his oriental way of looking at things, the ideal republic of plato merges into ‘The philosopher as ruler’. Men having been brought together by a natural want, submit themselves to the will of a single Person, in whom the state, be it good or bad, is so to speak, embodied. A state therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as regards the principles of the Good, either ignorant or in error, or quite depraved. On the other hand the good or excellent state has only one type, that namely, in which the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi endows
his ‘prince’ with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is plato in the mental of the Prophet Muhammad.

In the description of rulers’ representative of the ideal prince—for they may be more than one existing together and prince and minister may divide governing virtue and wisdom between them, we come nearer the Muslim political theory of that day. But the expressions are wrapped in obscurity: The lineage, for example, which is proper for a prince, and his duty of taking the lead in the holy war, are not clearly specifically signified. All indeed is left floating in philosophic mist. Morality reaches perfection only in a state which at the same time forms a religious community. Not only does the condition of the state determine the temporal lot of its citizens, but also their future destiny. The souls of citizens in an “ignorant” State are devoid of reason, and return to the elements as sensible forms, in order to be united anew with other beings, - men or lower animals. In states which are “in error”, and in those which are “depraved”, the leader alone is responsible, and punishment awaits him in the world beyond; but the souls which have been led into error share the fate of the ignorant. On the other hand, if the good and ‘knowing’ souls only maintain their ground, they enter the world of pure Spirit: and the higher the stage of knowledge to which they have attained in this life, the higher will their position be after death in the order of the all, and the more intense their blessed delight.

(b) The types of regimes in Farabi’s thought:

Farabi divides them into three broad types:
(1) The regimes whose citizens have had no occasion to acquire any knowledge at all about divine and natural beings or about perfection and happiness. These are the “ignorant” regimes at (Madina al-jahilah).

(2) The regimes whose citizens possess the knowledge of these things but do not act according to their requirements. These are the “wicked” or “immoral” regimes. Their citizens have the same views as these of the virtuous regimes, yet their desires do not serve the rational part in them but turn them away to pursue the lower ends pursued in ignorant regimes.

(3) The regimes whose citizens have acquired certain opinions about these things, but false or corrupt opinions, that is, opinions that claim to be about divine and natural brings and about true happiness, while in fact they are not. The similitudes presented to such citizens are consequently, false and corrupt, and so also are the activities prescribed for them. These are the regimes that have been led astray or the erring regimes. The citizens of such regimes do not possess true knowledge or correct similitudes and they, too, pursue the lower ends of the ignorant regimes. The regimes in error may have been founded as such. This is the case with the regimes “whose supreme rule was one who was under an illusion that he was receiving revelations without having done so, and with regard to which he had employed misrepresentation, deceptions, and delusions. But they may also have been originally virtuous regimes that had been changed. Through the introduction of false or corrupt views and practices.
All these types of regimes are opposed to the virtuous regimes because they lack its guiding principle, which is true knowledge and virtue or the formation or character leading to activities conducive to true happiness. Instead, the character of citizens is formed with a view to attaining one or more of the lower ends, these ends are given by Farabi as Six, and each of the general types mentioned above can be subdivided according to the end that dominates in it:

(1) The regime of necessity in which the aim of the citizens is confined to the bare necessities of life;

(2) The vile regime (oligarchy) in which the ultimate aim of the citizens is wealth and prosperity for their own sakes;

(3) The base regime is the purpose of whose citizens is the enjoyment of the sensory or imaginary pleasures;

(4) The regime of honor (timocracy) whose citizens aim at being honored, Praised, and glorified by others;

(5) The regime of domination (tyranny) whose citizens aim at overpowering and subjecting others;

(6) The regime of corporate association (democracy) the main purpose of whose citizens is being free to do what they wish.

The political thought of Farabi was not helpful and to the point for the religious beliefs. It was considered as a political idea and nothing else. It was neither useful to any Califs nor the base of any Khalifate.
2.1.1 IBN SINA (370/980 – 428/1037):

The most famous and influential of Persian philosophers and scientists, Abu 'Ali al-Husayn ibn 'Abdallah ibn sina (Avicenna), known by the later Islamic philosophers as al-Shaykh al-Ra'is and Hujjat al-Haqq, and in circles involved with his philosophy as simply Shaykh, was born in 370/980 in Afshanah, a village outside Bukhara. In 387/997, The Samanid ruler of Bukhara gave him access to the royal library, which enabled him to further his mastery of the various sciences, especially philosophy and medicine. In 391/1001, at the age of twenty-one, he composed the first book of which we have any knowledge. He began a life of wandering from one Persian court to another, usually acting as court physician to the various Buyahid rulers of the central regions of Persia. He journeyed from Jurjan (Gurgan) to Rayy and then to Hamedan, where he remained several years as court Physician and Wazir. Inevitably, Avicenna became also Sams-al-dawla's Wazir and acted in this capacity (with an occasional conflict with amir's troops) until the latter's death in 412/1021. The new amir, sama' al-dawla, asked Avicenna to stay on as wazir, but "Avicenna saw fit not to remain in the same state nor to resume the same duties, and trusted that the prudent thing to do, would be to hide in anticipation of an opportunity to leave that region". He secretly corresponded with the kakuyid 'Ala' al-dawla in Isfahan about this matter. The Buyid court in Hamadan, and especially Taj-al-Mulk, the Kurdish wazir, suspected Avicenna of treachery because of these moves, and they arrested and imprisoned him in a castle outside of Hamadan called Fardajan. Avicenna remained in prison for four months until 'Ala-al-dawlah
marched toward Hamadan and ended Sama-al-dawla's rule there. Released from Prison in the wake of these developments, Avicenna was again offered an administrative position in Hamadan, but he declined. Some time later he decided to move to Isfahan and he left Hamadan with his brother; Juzjani, and two slaves, dressed like Sufis. And finally settled in Isfahan. He accompanied his master in most of his campaigns and trips, and indeed it was during one such trip to Hamadan that he died, in 428/1037, and he was buried in Hamadan.\(^{10}\)

2.1.2 Political Philosophy of Avicenna:

The concept of divine providence relates Avicenna's metaphysics to his political philosophy. This Political philosophy, essentially farabian, rests on the theory of Prophet hood and revelation. The law, revealed through prophets, is not only necessary for the existence of human society, but for the very survival of man. It consists of the truth of theoretical and practical philosophy, conveyed, however, in language which the vast, non-philosopher, majority of humanity can understand. This is the language of the particular example, instead of the abstract universal concept, of the image and the symbol. Without prophets and the law they reveal the good order will not be realized in the terrestrial world of men. The existence of the law-revealing prophet is the necessary consequence of Good's knowledge of the good order, an expression of His providence.

The appearance of prophets on the historical scene, however, is very infrequent. This has practical implications regarding the setting down of institutions and traditions to ensure the continuance of the good order once the prophet is gone. But the infrequency of the appearance of
prophets has a metaphysical side, a metaphysical explanation involving Avicenna’s doctrine of the human soul. This soul, individual and immaterial emanates from the celestial intelligences. It is created with the body, but not imprinted in it. Its association with the body is conditioned by the material compositions that receive it. These compositions vary and their variance determines the quality of the souls that are created with them. The bodily composition that induces. The reception of a prophetic soul, which is the highest quality of human souls, occurs very infrequently, Avicenna tells us. This soul is endowed with exceptional cognitive powers. Some prophetic souls receive symbolic knowledge directly from the celestial souls. Other (of a still higher rank) receives from the Active Intellect all or most of the intelligible instantaneously. These intelligible are then conveyed in the language of imagery, example, and symbol understood by all.

In the hierarchy of existents, the prophet stands highest in the world of generation and corruption. In Avicenna’s cosmology he is, in effect, link between the celestial and terrestrial worlds. It is perhaps no accident that Avicenna concludes the Metaphysics, which is the last part of the encyclopedic Sefa (Shefa)- with the following words: “If one combines with justice speculative wisdom, he is the happy man. Whoever, in addition to this wins the prophetic qualities becomes almost a human god”.

2.1.3 **Al-Ghazzali (450/1058 – 505/1111):**

Abu Hamid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali was born at Tus, a city in Khurasan in Persia.
If we wish to place al-Ghazzali within a history of Islamic Philosophy we must make some preliminary remarks. The most obvious starting point is that al-Ghazzali did not consider himself a philosopher, nor liked to be considered as such —yet it is interesting that the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages, reading his book *Magasid al- Falasifah* (“The Aims of Philosophers”), a reasoned and objective exposition of the main philosophical topics of his time looked on him as a Faylasuf like Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd. It not only means that al-Ghazzali studied and assimilated philosophy deeply, being aware of its theoretical glamour and its structural strength, but also it leads us to believe that philosophy must have had at least an indirect influence on even on his mystical thought. Although, al-Ghazzali, who was essentially a theologian, a mystic and a jurist, sharply criticized philosophy, trying to demonstrate its contradictions, it would be misleading not to recognize that his mysticism and theology are not simply practical and religious doctrines but have a noticeable theoretical depth.

2.1.4 **Al-Ghazzali’s Political Attitude:**

In 478/1085 al-Ghazzali joined the court of Nizam al-Mulk, all powerful vazier of the Seljuq Sultan Malikshah, and became a close friend of the vazier. After a few years, al-Ghazzali was an intellectual of the court, if not a courtier. Occupying this position, he learnt about the corruption and immorality of power, the compromises of orthodox Fuqha’ and ‘ulama’ with depraved kings and amirs, and his political ideas matured.

Al-Ghazzali professed a sincere loyalty to the Caliphate, recognizing the legitimacy of ‘Abbasid rule. Anyway, he argued that
caliphs and sultans had to co-operate to bring peace and safety to the Muslim empire. The caliphs, who were given complete religious authority, had to receive the oath of allegiance from the Sultans, on whom Supreme political authority rested. The Sultan had not only the duty to defend the Caliphate but also to repress any possible revolutionary tendency. Above all, al Ghazzali’s political attitude was inspired by a sort of quietism, because he stigmatized any revolt, even against an oppressive and evil monarch. This attitude is induced by a particular meaning of the relation between the outward and inner world. In fact political quietism is functional to the renaissance of religious sciences. Nobody and surely not a scholar or a mystic can look after his or her conscience if the outside world is troubled by wars and injustice. The reform of the heart needs social peace and harmony, even though this silence has to be paid for with an autocratic power. The wise person may, however, close the windows of the world to open the door of soul.

Obviously, it can be argued that this quietism was justified by fear and dislike of ‘Isma‘ili Shi‘ism which, at the end of the fifth/eleventh century, seemed still very strong in Fatimid Cairo and indeed was vigorously spreading throughout the Middle East after Hassan Sabbah founded at Alamut a Batini state of warrior monks improperly known as “Assassins”. The great Nizam al-Mulk was finally killed by an assassin in 485/1092. It is true that al-Ghazzali viewed Isma‘ilism as a real danger for orthodox Islam, both politically and dogmatically. So he devoted many works to the confections of Isma‘ilism and dedicated to the new Caliph al-Mustazhir.
2.2 Islamic Philosophers in the Western Lands of Islam:

Ibn Bajjah (500/1099 – 533/1139):

Abu-Bakr Muhammad ibn yahya Ibn al-Sayigh, an Islamic Philosopher, known to the medieval scholastics as Avempas. During his brief life he endured the tribulations occasioned by the Christian “reconquest” of Andalusia. It is known that he wrote several commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises and that he was very learned in Medicine, mathematics, and astronomy. Ibn Bajjah opposed his own hypotheses to Ptolemy’s system.

Ibn Bajjah’s philosophical works have remained incomplete, notably the treatise that gained him his reputation, Tadbir al-mutawahhid (“The rule of the solitary”). For a considerable length or time this treatise was known only through a detailed analysis of it in Hebrew by Moses of Narbonne in this commentary on the Hayy ibn yaqzan of Ibn Tufayl, the pupil of Ibn Bajjah.17

Ibn Bajjah exercised upon Islamic philosophy in Spain a completely different orientation than did Ghazzali.18

2.2.1 The Governance of the Solitary of Ibn Bajjah:

Ibn Bajjah was a close reader of Plato’s Republic, of Aristotle’s Nicoachaean Ethics and of al-Farabi’s Syntheses of the metaphysics of Neo-Platonism with an Islamicized version of Platonic Politics and Aristotelian ethics. He knows that the human being is a social, indeed a civil being by nature and that happiness is the life in accordance with the virtues. He also knows that the virtues are socially and civilly instilled,
and that the mediation of imagination is crucial in the implementation of social policies by which moral virtues are inculcated and intellectual virtues rostered. Yet, like Plato and Aristotle, Ibn Bajjah is rather alienated from the society in which he lives. He is hardly prepared to be its apologist. Like al-Farabi, Ibn Bajjah knows that a state might not always be fortunate enough to find and adequately empower its true philosophical ruler. There is an irony here, of course, like that of the stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who also felt powerless. For Ibn Bajjah was a vazier, as Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander and closest friend of Antipater, Alexander’s regent; and Plato was born into the highest ruling circles of Athens. Yet it is characteristic of Politics, in Machiavelli’s and not in Plato’s ideal Sense, that even those who are placed structurally in the seats of authority may lack authority to alter the structures in which they sit. Clearly Ibn Bajjah was in no position to implement the rule of philosophy, which he, like Plato, saw as the ideal. And while al-Farabi could rationalize the myths and rituals, laws and institutions of the prophet and his followers as symbols mediating the way to realities best known by the philosophers, it would take a special gift of insensitivity for a philosopher at the seat of power to identify a regime like that of the Almoravids, or their Almohad successors, among whom Ibn Tuṣayfī served as a faithful expression of the platonic ideal rather than an unhappy recurrence of all that was ugliest in, say, Plato’s Syracusan disaster. Ibn Bajja pours his doubts into a reflective meditation, the regime of the solitary.⁰¹

We can say the political philosophy of Ibn Bajjah in brief, as following:
(i) He accepted al-Farabi’s division of the state into perfect and imperfect.

(ii) He agreed with al-Farabi that different individuals of a nation possessed different dispositions. Some of them will rule and some others will be ruled.

(iii) The penetrative philosopher should keep aloof from the people in certain circumstances even though avoidance of People is undesirable.

(iv) The penetrative philosopher should migrate to those countries where he finds knowledge.

(v) There are two alternative functions of the state:

(a) It should estimate the deeds of the subjects in order to guide them to reach their intended goals and not any other ends. It is for a sovereign ruler in the ideal state.

(b) It should devise means for the achievement of particular ends just as a rider as a preliminary exercise acquires control over the bridle in order to become expert in riding. It is for the administrator of the state which is not ideal.

2.2.2 Ibn Tufayl (d.580/1185):

Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, is another Islamic Philosopher, known to medieval scholastic as Abubacer. Born in the first decade of the sixth/twelfth century at Wadi Ash (Cadiz), north-east of Granada. He moved in court circles and became secretary to the governor of Granada and then to the governor of Ceuta and Tangier, a
son of ‘Abd al-Mu’min, the military lieutenant and successor of the charismatic Ibn Tumart, who founded the Almohad dynasty in Spain and north Africa. Ibn Tufayl served as Court physician to the Almohad Caliph Abu Ya’qub Yusuf (ruled 558/1163 – 580/1184) and possibly as a qadi in his regime. He is even named in one source, improbably, as a vazier. The ruler genuinely enjoyed his company, spending hours, sometimes days, in conversation with him.

Ibn Tufayl acted as a kind of culture minister, seeking out and bringing to court many men of erudition and science, including the young Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

2.2.3 Political Philosophy of Ibn Tufayl:

Of the four Muslim Philosophers, along with Aristotle, al-Farabi receives the most deprecating polemic and harshest criticism from Ibn Tufayl. Ibn Tufal’s criticism of al-Farabi’s notion of happiness does not seem to be warranted. Al-Farabi did not contend that human happiness is only attainable in this world. From the virtuous city and other works one can clearly infer that the second Master irrevocably considered genuine and lasting happiness as of the afterlife. Hence, happiness in this life is partial and temporary, and leads necessarily to happiness in the next. Realization of complete and permanent happiness is only possible in the life after this. Likewise, those who are not ignorant but lead a corrupt life are unhappy not only in this world, but also in the other. Ibn Tufayl is equally unjustified in attacking al-Farabi’s view of prophecy, we are not even sure whether Ibn Tufal himself would have wanted to construe prophecy as a miracle incomprehensible by human categories. For one thing, with his Aristotelian background al-Farabi
would not and could not accept miracles; always tried to seek causal factors behind appearances\textsuperscript{23}.

The key to the task of reconciliation was philosophical fable Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. The story of a self-taught philosopher of perfect intelligence, growing up on an equatorial island without parents, language or culture, who discovers for himself all phases of knowledge, from the technical and physical to the spiritual truths underlying scriptural religions\textsuperscript{24}.

Hayy ibn Yaqzan, like any fiction, is a thought experiment. It builds on the famous floating man thought experiment of Avicenna.

The social critique, which complements Ibn Tufayl’s irenic message, is not left implicit. It is spelled out in passages describing the encounters between the perfect Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and the members of a society governed under a prophetically revealed religion that is (in Ibn Tufayl’s Phrase) a “Thinline veiled” generic counterpart of Islam\textsuperscript{25}.

2.2.4 Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Bajjah:

No doubt, in several of his ideas Ibn Tufal shows clear debt to Ibn Bajjah. But it would be wrong to suppose that Hayy ibn Yaqzan is nothing but an enlarged edition of Ibn Bajjah’s work. They have points of agreement as well as points of difference, as we shall presently see:

Hayy ibn Yaqzan is in the form of a story, while Tadbir al motawahid (Hermit’s Guide) is an ordinary philosophical treatise.

The object of Ibn Bajjah is collective rather than individualistic. He wants to realize an ideal state or society within the society, and tells
us how the solitary individual or individuals, as citizens of that Ideal state should behave. Ibn Tufayl’s point of view is individualistic. He is concerned with the mystic Ideal- The programme for the Salvation of each individual.

But inspite of these fundamental differences Ibn Tufayl shows agreement with Ibn Sajjah in several points:

Both believe that the highest truths should be concealed from the masses. According to Ibn Bajjah, gnosis should be pursued as if it is something to be ashamed of.

Both of them recommend a kind of seclusion from the society and favour association with kindred soul’s only\(^{26}\).

2.2.5 Ibn Khalidun (732/1332 – 808/1406):

Abu Zayd ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami was born in Tunis in 732/1332 and died in Cairo in 808/1406 after having, five years earlier, met Timur (Tomerlane) outside the walls of Damascus. A contemporary of the Merinids in Morocco, the Banu ‘Abd al-Wadid in the central Maghreb (Algeria), the Hafsids in Ifriqiya (Tunisia), The Nasirids in Grandda and the Mamluks in Egypt, he was acquainted with all these regimes and lived in their respective courts. His different jobs within the sphere of these political powers gave him a valuable asset: They allowed him to experience the political game in the Muslim West and have direct contact with the tribal world in north-western Africa. From these two sets of experiences he drew theoretical consequences of tremendous importance broadly outline in his Muqaddimah (“Prolegomena”). Two predominant events affected his life during the
first period: The Black Death (748-9/1348-9) which had taken most of his teachers and particularly his own parents; and the assassination of his friend and competitor Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib in 774/1347.

He began his political and public activities in Tunis before he even reached the age of twenty with his appointment to the office of seal-bearer and secretary by the Hafsid Sultan, Abu Ishaq of Tunis.

(a) Political philosophy of Ibn Khaldun:

While Ibn Khaldun bases his analysis of human nature and human society on natural laws and on purely socio-economic and political factors, from time to time he has to revert to orthodox religious doctrines and dogmas and have recourse to rationalizations.

A very obvious example of such complexities is clearly discernible in the dilemma that emerges in the contradiction between his socio-political theory based upon the concepts of al-‘asabiyah (group feeling) and al-mulk (royal authority), and the idea of al-mustabid (despot), the autocrat capable of utilizing the former force for the later purpose, on the one hand, and on the other hand, his admission that “The lawgiver (Muhammad) censured group feeling and urged (us) to reject it and to leave it alone”. And that “God said: “Most noble among you in God’s (eyes) is he who fears God most”.

Here we are confronted by the same age-old problem that all social thinkers have had to face throughout the history of human civilization. The civilizing religious or social reformation of human society resisted by the individuals or group’s desire to dominate other individuals and groups; The moral and spiritual imperative of an
altruistic conscience opposed by the driving force of egocentric impulses; the natural realization of the socio-biological need of the trend toward homonymy in direct conflict with realization retarding, self-centered trend toward increased autonomy, democracy denied by despotism; piety rejected by autocracy; human community fragmented by partisanship; society sundered by dissensions and discord of rival group feelings in short, a soul-searching issue; a soul-searching quest for an answer to the question of the stakes involved in the human situation of morality being in the balance against expediency. Are the former illusory and only the latter real? And, how much justification is there for expecting the former to effectively counter the latter?

Both by very definition and by nature, demonstrated and confirmed by historical experience, group feelings and royal authority, each one of these tends to make the group and the autocrat, respectively, a law unto oneself. Such tendencies, obviously, always run athwart every attempt at some form of comprehensive, universal legislation-moral, religious and divine or social, secular and human-That is based upon some comprehensive and universally applicable principles of equity, justice and good conscience, principles that direct both individuals and groups towards what present-day psychologists may describe as “Super-ordinate goals” and determine appropriate legislation.30

He says also: “The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes comes from their shaykhs or leaders – their defense and protection are successful only if they are a closely-knit group of common descent;
compassion and affection for one’s blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as something God put into the hearts of men\textsuperscript{31}.

The closing remarks of this section are significant in the sense that al-‘asabiyah’ (group feeling) is proposed as the pivot of all forms of human activity and authority not only of al-mulk (royal authority) or autocracy, but of prophecy and apostleship as well:

“If this is true with regard to the place where one lives, which is in constant need of defence and military protection, it is equally true with regard to every other human activity, such as prophecy, the establishment of royal authority, or propaganda (for a cause). Nothing can be achieved in these matters without fighting for it. And for fighting one cannot do without group feeling. This should be taken as the guiding principle of our later exposition. “God gives success”\textsuperscript{32}.

Once united under the leadership of a group having an ‘asabiyah with a religious message (da‘wah), they are able to assault the central government. Thus the death of the state is imminent and a new dynasty takes over\textsuperscript{33}.

Ibn Khaldun dismisses the Ideal City of al-farabi a a simple hypothesis not worth discussing. The rational government (Siyasah ‘aqliyyah) is based on a law consisting of a mixture of the divinely revealed prophetic law and the ordinances of the ruler\textsuperscript{34}.

To be sure, this firm opposition to the political philosophy of the Falasifah can be expected from such an empiricist who is more interested in political reality as it was and as it is than in what it ought to ideally or in the future, theoretically however, the religious government
(Siyasah Shariyyah) is far more comprehensive than both rational politics and political utopianism (Siyasah madaniyyah) “because the lawgiver knows the ultimate interest of the people and is concerned with the salvation of man in the other world”. The fact that such regimes based on principles derived from the divinely revealed law were supposed to have gone with the prophet and his guided Caliphs means they were the last ideals which were as non-existent for him as the Virtuous city of the Philosophers. Thus Ibn Khaldun’s political philosophy is more concerned with what he calls the second type of rational politics (since the first type had gone with the pre-Islamic Persians) where public interest is secondary to the ruler’s concern and is practiced by both Muslims and non-Muslims, except that the Muslim regimes mix it with religious laws “as mush as they are able to”.

(b) The transformation of the Caliphate into royal authority:

He says in his Muqaddimah: “It should be known that royal authority is the natural goal of group feeling. It results from group feeling, not by choice but through necessity and the order of existence. All religious laws and practices and everything that the masses are expected to do requires group feeling. Only with help of group feeling can a claim be successfully pressed. Group feeling is necessary to the Muslim community. It existence enables (The community) to fulfil what God expects of it. It is said in the Sahih (al-Bukhari), “God sent no prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his people”. Still, we find that the lawgiver (Muhammad) censured group feeling and urged (us) to reject it and to leave it alone. We also find that (The Lawgiver Muhammad) censured royal authority and its representatives. He blamed
them because of their enjoyment of good fortune, their senseless waste, and their deviations from the path of God. He recommended friendship among all Muslims and warned against discord and dissension.\footnote{36}

The contradictions that begin to unfold and emerge in these opening paragraphs of Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of “The transformation of the Caliphate into royal authority”, constitute, in the context of the moral and religious values that he mentions, a crucial stage in his thesis relating to the concepts of al-‘asabiyyah (group feeling) and al-mulk (royal authority).\footnote{37}

Anyway if the social group feeling will be on cause of God it will be very good, and that group feeling with a religious message (da’wah), they are able to assault the central government. And the royal authority whom that goes on the God’s path also would be recognized.\footnote{38}

Then Ibn Khaldun mentions about the historical trend of transformation of the Caliphate into royal authority and says: “when ‘Umar b. al-Khattab went to Syria and was met by Mu’awiyah in full royal splendor as exhibited both in the number (of Mu’awiyah’s retinue) and his equipment, he disapproved of it and said: “Are these royal Persian manners (Kisrawiyah), O, Muawiyah?” Mu’awiyah replied: “O commander of the faithful, I am in a border region facing the enemy. It is necessary for us to vie with (The enemy) in military equipment”. Umar was silent and did not consider Mu’awiyah to be wrong.\footnote{39} Then came the later Umayyads. As far as their worldly purposes and intentions were concerned, they acted as the nature of royal authority required. They forgot the deliberate planning and the reliance upon the truth that had guided the activities of their predecessors. This caused the
people to censure their actions and to accept the Abbasid propaganda in the place of (The Umayyads'). Thus, the Abbasids took over the government. The probity of the Abbasids was outstanding. They used their royal authority to further, as far as possible, the different aspects and ways of the truth; they remained Caliphs in name, because the Arab group feeling continued to exist. In these two stages Caliphate and royal authority existed side by side. Then, with the disappearance of Arab group feeling and the annihilation of the (Arab) race and complete destruction of (Arabism), The Caliphate lost its identity. The form of government remained royal authority, pure and simple. This was the case, for instance, with non-Arab rulers in the East. They showed obedience to the Caliph in order to enjoy the blessings (involved in that), but the royal authority belong to them with all its titles and attributes. The Caliph had no share in it. The same was done by the Zanatah rulers in the Maghrib. The Sinhahah, for instance, had such a relationship with the ‘Ubaydid (-Fatimids), and the Maghrawah and also the Banu Yafran (Ifren) with Umayyad Caliphs in Spain and the ‘Ubaydid(-Fatimids) in al-Qayrawan.40

It is thus clear that the Caliphate at first existed without royal authority. Then, the characteristic traits of the Caliphate became mixed up and confused. Finally, when its group feeling had separated from the group feeling of the Caliphate, royal authority came to exist alone41.

Ibn Khaldun also gives more explanation about the Wazirate, Hijabah (The office of doorkeeper as political concepts and many other executive branches of the Administration42.
This photo is attached on the first of translation of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah by Franz Rosental, Routledg, London and USA 1938, V.2.

The Saying on Political Wisdom from the Secretum Secretorium

From MS. Husa el-kattup (Ayr I), 1002, Cf. 1381 C (n. 29 end), above
2.3 Later Islamic Philosophers:

2.3.1 Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (597/1201 – 672/1274):

Nasir al-Din Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Hasan al-Tusi, the renowned Persian astronomer, Philosopher and Theologian, often referred to in general Shi'i literature as Muhaqqiq-I Tusi (The great scholar Tusi) and in the Ismaili circles of his time as Sultan al-du'at (King of the Preachers), was born in Tus, which is now a small town in the suburbs of Mashhad, Khurasan, on 11 Jamada I 597/17 February 1201, and died in Baghdad on 18 Dhu’l Hijja 672/25 June 1274. He is often considered at far with Avicenna and al-Farabi.

Central to Khwajah Nasir’s ethics is his discussion of politics. He divides his section on “politics” in Akhlaq-i-Nasiri into two parts: The first segment addresses domestic issues, or a communal order on a small scale, dar tadbir-I manazil (“on how to run a Household”) and the second segment covers “national” issues, or a communal order on a larger scale, dar siasat-i- mudun (“on the politics of cities”).

Akhlaq-i-Nasiri which was written at the request of Nasir al-Din Muhtashim. Tusi composed and translated a number of books. Tusi’s most important works on ethics, the Akhlaq-i-Nasiri and Akhlaq-i-Muhtashami, are dedicated to Nasir al-Din.
(a) **His Politics:**

The section on “the politics of Cities” of Akhlaq-I Nasiri is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter, Khawjah Nasir provides an argument as to why human society is in need of civilization (tamaddun). Human beings need mutual cooperation in order to safeguard their individual and collective survival. In the second chapter, he discusses the centrality of mahabbat, or “group Sentiments”, as the crucial factor in bringing a human collectivity together. The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the two kinds of human society; Utopia (madinah-I fadilah and the anti-utopia (Madina-i ghyr-e-fadilah). The fourth chapter of this section has full discussion of the question of political power which is properly titled as “The administration of kingdom and the royal manners”. There are two dimensions to supreme political authority: a “Politics of virtue” (Siasat-i fadilah) and a “politico of imperfection” (Siasat-i naqisah). The politics of virtue is necessary to guide the followers to bliss and salvation; The politics of imperfection is required to Punish and curtail human fallacies and short comings. The fifth chapter enumerates the principles and guidelines to be observed by those who are associated with kings. The sixth chapter is devoted to friendship. His purpose here is to emphasize the social and political significance of having a limited but closely knit circle of friends and acquaintances. The seventh chapter is a full treatise on the principles that should govern one’s relations with members of various social classes and groups. The eight and last chapter, which is also the conclusion of the book, consists of a series of short aphorisms that khwajah Nasir attributes to plato “Do not test the learned in the
abundance of their learning, but judge them by how they avoid evil and corruption".46.

(b) **Philosopher/Vizier:**

Perhaps the most compelling image of Khwajah Nasir that shines through all his writings and activities is that of a philosopher/vizier, a distinctly Persian phenomenon that combined avid theoretical learning with a relentless penchant for practical politics47.

As a philosopher vizier, Khwajah Nasir is prototypical of a breed apart, the closest approximation to the platonic (and pre-Islamic Persian) ideal of the Philosopher/King. In (full) control of the center of political power, he was also the most erudite philosopher of his time. The combination of these two forces – power and knowledge – results in a unique “political philosophy” which is both a politically based philosophy and a philosophically anchored politics. The implications of this discourse go beyond the immediate confinement of both political establishment and philosophical engagement. The philosophical discourse of the Philosopher/vizier assumes a unique ethical grounding that exacts obedience from both the political and the religious figures of authority. The philosopher/vizier speaks from the commanding position of a Muslim (interpreter of the sacred) Philosopher (The possessor of reason, an astronomer, a physician). The philosopher/vizier, with khwajah Nasir as its archetypal example, thus occupies a central position of command and obedience in the Islamic and Persian political culture, instrumental in creating the material conditions for the growth and development of philosophy. The instrumentality of reason in pre-modern intellectual history48.
2.3.2 **Nizam al-Mulk (408/1018 – 485/1092):**

Nizam Al-Mulk, Abu ‘Ali Al-Hassan B. ‘Ali B. Ishaq Al-Tusi, the celebrated minister of the Saldjuqid Sultans Alp Arsalan and Malik Shah. According to most authorities, he was born on Friday 21 Dhu’l-qa’dah 408/10 April 1018, though the 6th/12th Century, and was assassinated on 10. Ramadan 485/14 October 1092.

He wrote a book *Siasat Namah* (Treatise on the Art of Government) in his old age which won high appreciation from his royal master. Nizam al-Mulk, in his boyhood was at a School at Nishapur with Omar Khayyam and Hassan bin Sabbah. The three boys swore eternal friendship, agreeing that whoever of them succeeded in life should help the other two. Nizam al-Mulk fulfilled his obligation in the case of Omar Khayyam who refused the governorship of Nishapur but asked for a Pension which was granted. He also managed a suitable post for Hassan bin Sabbah, but the latter intrigued to supplant his benefactor, failing which he became a bitter enemy of Nizam al-Mulk.

2.3.3 **Syasat Namah:**

We have already mentioned Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, as a stateman and administrator. It was also stated that he was the author of the book ‘Siyasat Namah or ‘Treatise in the art of politics: This great work comprises fifty chapters, concerning royal duties, royal prerogatives and administration. It is written in simple language and embodies the views of the great administrators.

The *Siyasat Nameh*, which is the exposition of his theory of kingship, was originally written to serve as a “Monarch’s Premier”. It is
said that in 484/1091 Sultan Maiikshah instructed some of his dignitaries to think over the state of affairs in his realm and write down the principles of conduct that were followed by monarchs in the past, and were required to be observed by himself. The treatise of Nizam al-Mulk among the works presented to the Sultan was the only one which he approved of and adopted as a guide (Imam). But it must not be treated as a mere handbook of day-to-day administration. Nor must it be regarded as containing simply practical suggestions for the improvement of an administrative system. It is more than that, it is, in fact, the expression of realistic political theory which emerges out of an actual political situation, and therefore, helps us to understand the stage in the development of Muslim polity reached in the fifth/eleventh century.

As it was inconsistent with his political ends to recognize the Caliph as the Supreme authority, so an explicit refutation of his claims in this respect would have made Nizam al-Mulk unnecessarily provoke a controversy about the powers of the two offices. To this dilemma he finds a solution in what may be called in modern language the theory of divine right – the theory that the king enjoys the right to rule over his subjects by virtue of divine appointment. This becomes obvious from the study of the first chapters in the Siyasat Nameh, which mainly explain the divine nature of this institution, and its functions ordained by God. He puts, in every clear words when he says: "In every age God selects one from amongst mankind and adorns him with princely skills, and entrusts him with the affairs of the world and the comfort of the subjects. This is the remarkably simplified hypothesis of his theory of Kingship he does not argue to prove it, but simply states it as a self-evident truth. This proposition, as advanced by Nizam al-Mulk, suffers
the logical weakness common to all the expositions of the divine-right-
theory which set out this hypothesis as a fait accompli, to be simply
accepted rather than to be argued. It is indeed a dogmatic belief rather
than a rational proposition. It is, however, important for our purpose,
because it serves to explain how Nizam al-Mulk comes (in Siyasat
Nameh) to expound a political theory which is out and out a vindication
of autocracy, and how he is led from the outset to reject the democratic
principles enunciated by the advocates of the Caliphate. He also
discusses in the Siyasat Nameh about the purposes of kingship in a
political community and says:” The essential function which the king
has to fulfill in human society is to bring order out of chaos, and to
maintain peace and justice. Thus those noted above are the main
structures of the Siyasat Nameh.
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Chapter 3
The Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires
CHAPTER III

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References
3.1 **THE OTTOMAN, SAFAVID, AND MUGHAL EMPIRES:**

In 857/1453 a clan of Turkish warriors or ghazis conquered Constantinople, ended eleven centuries of Byzantine rule, and completed the job. The Arabs had left unfinished in the Seventh Century. The conquest of Constantinople (henceforth Istanbul) opened the door for the expansion of Islamic rule into Southern Europe. It also brought enormous prestige to the conquerors, the clan of Osman (Arabic: ʿuthman), who achieved what other Muslims had tried and failed at for eight centuries. Their leader, Muhammad, earned the title “Conqueror”, and the power of the Osmanli family rapidly grew. Muhammad’s successors consolidated Osmanli rule in Anatolia and extended it into the Balkans. In 923/1517 Selim “The Inexorable” (or “the Grim” depending on which side you were on) defeated the Egyptian Mamluks in Syria. Suddenly, the Ottomans, as Europeans called the family of Osman, had obtained for themselves an empire that was astonishingly similar in size and extent to the Pre-Islamic Byzantine empire. At the height of Ottoman power under Sulayman “The Lawgiver”, who reigned for forty-six years from 927/1520 to 974/1566, the empire encircled the Black and red seas, and encompassed three quarters of the Mediterranean coast. The Ottomans ruled over vast numbers of non-Muslim subjects, and the Turkish armies were the terror of Europe. In 936/1529 Sulayman’s forces laid siege to Vienna and would certainly have taken it had their troops not been so eager to get home before winter.

While the Ottomans were expanding into Europe, a rival Muslim empire was growing in Persia. In 907/1501 the leader of a radical shi’i
Sufi order conquered Tabriz, set himself up as ruler, and pronounced Twelver Shi’ism the creed of the state. Isma’il thus became the founder of the Safavid empire and the most successful and intolerant Shi’i ruler since the fall of the Fatimids. Isma’il seems to have aimed at no less than the complete destruction of Sunni Islam, and in the territory that came fully under his control he was astonishingly successful. He enforced the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman, as usurpers, disbanded Sunni tariqas and seized their assets, faced Sunni ‘ulama’ with the choice of conversion, death, or exile, and imported Shi’i scholars to replace them. The almost complete predominance of Twelver Shi’ism in modern Iran is largely Shah Isma’il’s doing.

Twelver Shi’ism might have come to dominate much more of the Islamic world in the newly emerging Ottoman state had not stood in Isma’il’s way. The Safavi Sufis had a significant following among the Turks of Anatolia, the so-called Qizilbash (“Red Heads”) who had a penchant for red turbans. In 917/1511 The Qizilbash rose in rebellion against the Ottomans, but three years later, in 920/1514, the Ottoman Sultan Salim decisively defeated the Safavids, ending Shi’i expansion. The Ottomans’ response to the Safavid threat was to massacre the Qizilbash and to persecute Shi’i Muslims more generally. The result was, for the first time, a sharp divide between Shi’i and Sunni Islam along geographical lines. The split deeply affected the ‘ulama; who were ghettoized. Consequently, Shi’i and Sunni intellectual culture moved in different directions. The division also had a profound effect on the development of popular piety. In Safavid lands the dominant religious form of Sunni Islam, tariqa Sufism, was replaced with popular Shi’i
piety, centered on the rememberance of the passion of Husayn at Karbala, and encouraging hatred of Sunnis.

To the east the final piece in the puzzle was put in place by Babur, an ambitious and resourceful descendant of Timur. Forced out of central Asia by Uzbek expansion, Babur based himself in Kabul and turned his attention to India. In 933/1526 he decisively defeated the Muslim rulers of Delhi at the battle of Panipat and the Mughal empire was born. During the long reign of Babur’s grandson Akbar (964-1014/1556-1605) Mughal power expanded to include most of the Indian subcontinent. Under Akbar the Mughals came close to a policy of religious neutrality, making Akbar the Poster child of later advocates of religious tolerance and a favorite of Indian historians. Akbar abolished the jizyah (head tax) on non-Muslims, prohibited Hindu girls from converting to Islam for marriage, set aside the death penalty for apostasy, and patronized the building of temples. He also engaged in religious experimentation, establishing a sort of private court tariqah of his own and giving a hearing to spokesmen of every tradition, including Christians. Akbar’s experiment with universalism did not last. His great grandson Aurangzeb, faced with a Hindu in Surrection in the South, restored the jizyah and generally adopted a hard line toward his Hindu subjects. Aurangzeb was the last of the great Mughal emperors. Soon after his reign Mughal power was on decline and very fast disintegrated.

3.1.1 THE OTTOMANS:

The word ‘Ottoman’ is the Europeanized form of Osman, the founder of the Turkish dynasty, so the Turkish tribesmen of Osman were
called ‘Osmanly’. They belong to the Kaayi clan of the Oghus Turks who had fled before the Mongol armies, and the name of Ottoman Turks is not entirely unfamiliar to the reader by now. In either ninth or tenth century, the Turks of central Asia were converted to Islam and in the eleventh century they began to push their way into south-Eastern Russia and Persia. In the almost continuous struggle, Turkish soldiers proved to be effective advanced gurds for Islam. The Turks who came into contact with Islam, accepted the Sunni faith and were fanatically loyal to its tenets and institutions. It is also said the Ottoman from-their ancestor Uthman (a namesake of the third ideal caliph).

The Ottoman state has emerged as the result of an Islamic movement under the leadership of Ghazi Osman (699-727/1299-1326) the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, towards the end of the 13th century at Eskisehir, located in north Western Anatolia. Early Ottoman rulers were fiefs of the Seljuqi monarchs whose capital was Konya. They derived their title of Sultan from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo.
(I) **The Ottoman Sultanate:**

Osman I  (699-727 / 1299-1326)
Orhan       (727-762/1326-1360)
Murad I     (762-702/1360-1389)
Bayezid Yilderim (702-805/1389-1402)

(II) **The Ottoman Empire:**

1. Mehmed I (815-824/1412-1421)
2. Murad II (824-855/1421-1451)
3. Mehmed II (855-886/1451-1481)
4. Bayezid II (886-918/1481-1512)
5. Selim I (918-927/1512-1520)
6. Suleiman (927-974/1520-1566)
7. Selim II (974-982/1566-1574)
8. Murad III (982-1004/1574-1595)
9. Ahmad I  (1004-1012/1595-1603)

The Ottoman was one of the largest and longest-lived dynasties the world has ever seen. Starting with uthman in direct male line, 36 Sultans ruled from 1300 to 1922. The Empire probably reached its zenith with Sulayman, the Magnificent, in the Sixteenth century. This was the greatest time of expansion. The North African conquests date from this period – all of North Africa, save Moraco, formed part of the empire. It
stretched from Budapest to Yemen, from Baghdad to Algeria. In 936/1529 Sulayman came close to taking Vienna.

The heart of the Ottoman Empire was the Topkapi place in Istanbul. The Topkapi was for hundred years the Seat of Ottoman power and is now advertised as ‘the largest and richest Museum in the world’.

3.1.2 Political development of the Ottoman:

The Ottoman state first appeared on the map of world history as a small Emirate which straddled the uneasy border between the seljukid and the Byzantine Empires in North Western Anatolia. It expanded rapidly and during the Period (702-805/1389-1402) achieved the status of a major imperial power, reaching as far as the Danube in the North and the Euphrates in the east. The first imperial experiment was brought to a sudden halt when the Ottomans, failing to use the strategic advantage gained by their defeat of a crusader army led by the Hungarian King Sigismund in 799/1396 at the battle of Nigbolu (Nicopolis), turned their military energies instead to the ill-timed annexation of Muslim emirates in Anatolia. In the ensuing melee, which was concluded by a major Ottoman defeat at the hands of Timur in 805/1402 at the battle or Ankara, the Ottomans’ Empire in Europe and Asia lost its cohesion. In the Subsequent period between 805/1402 and 816/1413, the empire was wrecked by inveterate civil war as rival claimants to the throne sought to rebuild the patrimonial hegemony. During the period of the civil war the scope of Ottoman sovereignty in Anatolia was severely restricted, and the centre of political power in the state shifted to the European province. It was during this period that
Edirne came into its own as the empire’s chief political capital. While the era of the civil war usually considered to be confined to the period of 805-16/1402-13, unstable political conditions persisted until 809/1425 – Threatening at times to restart the process of imperial disintegration. After 834/1430 when the Ottomans succeeded in capturing Salonica from the Venetians, the state entered into a renewed period of imperial expansion in Europe and they defeated a succession of crusader armies mobilized from the west. The Ottoman, by their victor, over the Polish-Hungarian King Ladislas at the battle of varna in 848/1444, firmly restored the empire’s dominance over the Balkan lands and brought the final fall of the Byzantine empire within the realm of possibility.

The Ottoman sovereign derived his imperial authority from three separate sources of legitimacy: from his adoption of the Islamic title Sultan, from the Turco-Mongol designation Khakan, and from the rank of Kaysar inherited from the rulers of the Eastern Roman Empire. Within the short span of sixty-four years after the fall of Constantinople the Ottoman had added the Arab Capitals of Damascus, Cairo, Mecca and Medinah to their imperial Patrimony and were catapulted into a position as the premier Islamic Power in the world.

3.1.3 Ottoman Knigs and their ranks:

The Ottoman Empire was primarily an army encampment. Fighting was a most important business. The Sultan accompanied the army and he took his pay as a Janissary, his name being first on the roll. The Ottomans were Sunni Muslims, and as such, their government was limited and restricted by Islamic law; it was not a theocracy, but could be termed as an autocracy in which the Sultan enjoyed very vast powers.
However, theocratic restrictions naturally limited the power of the Sultan. He had to share it with Shakykh ul-Islam, the highest religious dignitary in the land. The Ottoman Sultan tried to use their prerogatives as much as they could without doing away with the Shari'ah. They certainly used titles: “Vicar of God on earth,” “Successor of the prophet”, “Pontiff of the Muslims”, “Refuge of the world”, “Shadow of God”, and, in unbecoming modesty, “Servant of the two sanctuaries”, (i.e. Mecca and Medina). Later, the Ottoman Turkish Sultan adopted the title of the Khalifah and declared their rule as Khilafat, successor to the Abbasid Khalifat which continued till 1343/1924.

3.1.4 The ‘Ulama’ and Ottoman rulers:

The Ottoman rulers succeeded in absorbing ‘Ulama’ (Scholars) into the structure of the state to an unprecedented degree. The Ottoman system was built upon the simple Mongol distinction between the rulers and the ruled. In this system the ‘Ulama’ formed their own hierarchy within the ruling class and were, in formal terms, part of the Ottoman army. Thus the title of two chief judges of the empire was Qadi-asker, Judge of the army. Above the Qadi-askers, the Shaykh al-Islam supervised a vast religious bureaucracy and shared equal status with the Grand Wazir. At the highest level, along with the Shaykh al-Islam and the Qadi-Askers, the household of the Sultan had two official prayer leaders, an official religious preceptor, a head strolologer, and a head physician. Forty-three Qadi divided into three levels served under the Qadi-Askers. A variety of grades of Muftis, prayer leaders, and preachers filled up the secondary ranks of the ‘ulama’. The system was formally a meritocracy, and the ‘ulama’, were divided into twelve consecutive grades, with a formal system of certification marking the
passage from one grade to the next. The Ottomans, had successfully transformed the ‘ulama’ into a religious bureaucracy, tried, inextricably to the interests of the ruling class.\(^\text{12}\)

What the Ottoman ‘Ulama’ lost by way of independence was more than compensated for in wealth, power and prestige. Like the other members of the ‘askeri class the ‘ulama’ paid no taxes, but they also enjoyed an additional unique privilege: they could pass on wealth to their descendants. Every other members of the army was, in formal terms, a slave of the ruling household and his property was subject to confiscation upon his death. Not so was the case of the religious scholars. Consequently, leading families worked hard to ensure that their sons entered the system. The ‘ulama’ also supervised and benefited from the income of vast religious endowments (awqaf, sing. Waqf). The Ottoman ‘ulama’ made good use of these privileges, amassing enormous wealth and power. At the higher echelons of the hierarchy those in power also contrived to keep the wealth and power in the family, so to speak and the most powerful ‘Ulama’ became, in effect a hereditary aristocracy.\(^\text{13}\)

3.2 THE SAFAVID:

The safivd dynasty originated in the sufi order founded by safi al din (650-735/1252-1334) Shiaism was its faith and charter. The Turks, with Uzbegs on the eastern front, would be the constant enemies of the Safavid soldiers, the Qizilbash or red-heads. The Safavids wore red turbans with twelve folds commemorating the twelve Shiite Imams.\(^\text{14}\)

In 907/1501 Shah Ismail I, was proclaimed ruler after defeating a Turkish army. The most important decision of the shah was to declare
that the official religion of the state would be Twelver-ithna ashari – Shiaism. The Saffavid state was to be a Theocracy, Shah Ismail Personified the Twelfth Imam in the flash. Shah Ismail conducted a vigorous campaign to convert the predominantly Sunni population to Shiaism. Then Shah Ismail’s Son, Shah Tahmasp, was an ascetic, and Tahmasp’s grandson, Shah Abbas the great (997-1039/1588-1629), coming to the throne when he was seventeen, brought saffavid fortunes to their peak. By 1015/1606, he had decisively defeated the Uzbegs and the Ottomans.

By the eighteenth century the Shia Ulama were beginning to challenge the theory of the divine right of kings, the concept that the Shah was the Imam incarnate, the Shadow of God, Zilallah, on earth. Mullah Ahmed Ardabili confronted Shah Abbas with the thesis that he did not rule by divine right but as a trust on behalf of the Imam. The ulama, he warned, would decide whether that trust was being honoured or not. Soon the Ulama were vigorously arguing that the Imam must be a genuine mujtahid, a man of learning and impeccable character. The ulama were bidding to take control of the Shia state which the safavid had created.

Henceforth, politics would oscillate between two points, secular rulers jealously guiding their authority while discovering their roots in imperial pre-Islamic Persian history and aggressive religious scholars clamming a share of it. Where the rulers emphasized Persian language and custom especially drawing on the Pahlavis – Firdausi’s Shah Nama was a rich source- The ulama spoke of a universal Islam. I am an important sense the base for contemporary politics in Iran was being laid in the Safavid period itself.
A major development during the safavid reign was the end of the mutual toleration between Sunnis and Shias that existed from the time of the Mongols.

The developments in saffavid Persia would reverberate in society and politics up to the present times. Persia-Iran-became the largest, most powerful shia state in the world, the source and inspiration of shia dogma, the Champion of its destiny. The saffavid period thus determined, as it accurately reflected, the shape of things to be in what is now Iran\textsuperscript{18}.

What is very interesting about Safavids. It has been said, that Shah Abbas built a beautiful mausoleum over the tomb of the eight Imam Ali al-Rida in Mashhad and made a vow to walk from Isfahan on a pilgrimage at the completion of the edifice. He fulfilled his vow, and pilgrimage to Mashhad became about as important as the Pilgrimages to Mecca and to the tomb of Husayn at Karbala\textsuperscript{19}.

When Shah Abbas died in 1039/1629, there was no worthy successor left, for he had killed them all\textsuperscript{20}.
3.2.1 **The Safavids of IRAN:**

1. Esmail I (906-931/1500-1524)
2. Tahmasb I (931-984/1524-1576)
3. Esmail II (984-986/1576-1578)
4. Khodabandeh (986-996/1578-1587)
5. Abbas I (996-1039/1587-1629)
6. Safi (1039-1052/1629-1642)
7. Abbas II (1052-1078/1642-1667)
8. Soleiman (1078-1106/1667-1694)
9. Hossein (1106-1135/1694-1722)
10. Tahmasb II (1135-1144/1722-1731)
11. Abbas III (1144-1149/1731-1736)

3.2.2 **‘Ulama and the safavid empire:**

Ismail, Founder of the safavid empire, had to recruit ‘ulama’ from outside of Iran in order to build his Shi’i state. This should have proven a golden opportunity to exert state control over religious scholarship, but shi’i scholars were doctrinally well equipped to resist threats to their independence. To begin with they were disposed to reject the ultimate legitimacy of any state not led by the twelfth imam. In addition, an internal squabble among Shi’i ‘ulama’ ended up reinforcing the independence of scholars. Shi’i scholars were divided into two camps over whether religious authority was primarily textual (the Akhbari position which paralleled the Sunnis) or whether it was vested in living scholars called mujtahids (the Usuli position). Under the safavids the Usulis won out, and thought that each individual believer should submit to the authority of a particular living mujtahid. Twelver shi’i religious
authority thus reached directly to ordinary believers and bypassed the state. This independence was further encouraged by the rapid breakdown of state authority in Iran during the eighteenth century.

The most famous scholars of Safavid’s period Muhammad Majlisi became Sheikh al-Islam of Isfahan in 1099/1687 and Mullabashi-Head Mullah- in 1106/1694, the same year that Shah Sultan-Hosein started his reign. Although he would end his days as a drunken debauch Sultan-Hosein was initially pious, holding the Sheik in great respect. Majlisi was acknowledged as the foremost shi’i scholar of his time. He wrote more than sixty books. He initiated a campaign against Sunnis and Sufis which opened with an effort at their expulsion from Isfahan. Although missings the lessons of tolerance and gentleness, Majlisi’s ideal was none the less the prophet: Bahar al-Anwar, accepted as his magnum opus, is an encyclopedic collection of hadith. Shi’i fevour brought to and maintained at a pich by the safavids left little room for compromise or compassion; by the end its intensity had drained away the vitality of the state.

It seems that the safavids’ support and recognized the ‘Ulama’, and they gave them the title of Sheik al-Islam and also ‘ulama’, recognized the safavids as a “Shadow of God”. So they had not any challenge together and there were not any commandment each to other.
3.3 **Mughal Emperors of Hindustan**:

1. Babar, Zahir-ad-din (932 AH / 1525 AD)
2. Humayun, Nasir-ad-din (937 / 1530)
3. Akbar, Jalal-ad-din (963 / 1556)
4. Jahangir, Nur-ad-din (1014 / 1605)
5. Shah-Jahan, Shihab-ad-din (1037 / 1628)
6. Aurangzeb, Muhyyi-ad-din (1069 / 1659)
7. Bahadur Shah, Kutb-ad-din (1119 / 1707)
8. Jahandar Shah, Mu’izz-ad-din (1124 / 1712)
9. Farrukh-Siyar (1124 / 1713)
10. Rafi-ad-darajat, Shams ad-din (1131 / 1719)
11. Rafi-ad-daulah Shah Jahann II (1131/1719)
12. Muhammad Nasir ad-din (1131/1719)
13. Ahmad (1161/1748)
14. Alamgir II, Aziz ad-din (1167 / 1754)
15. Shah-Alam, Jalal ad-din (1173 / 1759)
16. Muhammad Akbar II (1221 / 1808)
17. Bahadur Shah II (1253 / 1837)

Those are the most famous of Mughal emperors and almost near non-famous of them are estimated to nine. And also this emperor, deposed by the British Government on 1275 AH / 1857 AD\(^3\).
3.3.1 The Mughal:

The history of the Mughal Empire of Hindustan, which nominally extends from 932 / 1525 to 1276 / 1857, is rarely contained in much narrower limits. The assured domination of the Mughal Emperors begins with the building-up of the Empire by Akbar (963/1556–1014/1605) and practically ends with the death of Aurangzeb, the last autocrat of their line, in 1119/1707. Before Akbar there was no Mughal Empire, but only the attempt to create one.

In histories that focus on Akbar’s Ostentatious tolerance and pragmatic politics it is often forgotten that he stabilized the Mughal state only after decades of fighting. His most important conquests were those of the Rajput states in the Rajasthan desert west of Agra, for these Hindu warrior clans commanded the best armies in northern India. Mughal generals erected towers of skulls-Timurid terror tactics-from thousands of slain Rajput troops who resisted Akbar’s early campaigns.

Akbar’s Rajput relations astutely recognized political reality in an empire in which 80 to 90 per cent of the population was non-Muslim-predominantly Hindu but also Jain, animist, Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian. The Mughals were a Turco-Mongol garrison state that controlled the urban centres and reform and revival.

Akbar, the Great Mughal, creating a new creed, the Din-i-ilahi; Ali transformed into an avatar with four arms; Duldul, the prophet’s mule, equated to Hanuman, the monkey god.
3.3.2 The Mughal Connection in Pakistan:

Drawing genealogical lines – so to speak from Aurangzeb and Dara Shikoh to the leaders of Pakistan illuminates the problem further for us. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, a Prime Minister of Pakistan, in a significant and historical manner-and despite Berkely and oxford-reflects the conceptual position of Dara Shikoh. Both were eclectic and syncretist. While Dara Shikoh wished to include Hinduism in Islam, Bhutto attempted a similar exercise with the dominant rival ideology of his time, socialism, evolving the concept of ‘Islamic socialism’.

3.3.3 Mughal Kings and their powers:

To whatever extent the Mughals dabbled in religious adventurism they saw themselves, and were largely seen, at least formally, as Champions of Islam Akbar the greatest Mughal Emperor, adopted the title of Jalaluddin, while Jahangir’s title was Nur al-din, light of religion, Shah Jahan’s Shihab al-din, bright star of religion, and Aurangzeb’s Muhyi al-din, life giver of religion. Akbar’s friend and publicist, Abul Fazal, went one step further. The Emperor Akbar was the Summation of the major spiritual and religious tendencies of the Islamic world. He was perfect man. For contemporary historians and scholars. The Mughals are ideal Muslim rulers. A blind eye is turned discreetly to imperial excesses. In fact they were autocrats and despotic ruler like their Ottomans and Safavid rulers. In certain respects, they may be different from each other but in their political philosophy and practice they all were autocrate Emperor.
3.3.4 The Mughal Rulers and ‘Ulama’:

The Mughal rulers also did their best to corral the ‘ulama’ into serving state interests, but with only partial success. Akbar tried to overrule the ‘ulama’ in the articulation and application of law, belatedly applying Ibn-al-Muqaffa’s advice by putting himself in the place of the final arbiter in the interpretation of Shari‘a. Awrangzeb compiled his own collection of judicial rulings, the Fatawa-Yi’Alamgiri, in a similar attempt to make an end run around ‘ulama’ monopoly on interpretation of the law. It is clear that ‘ulama’ were closely involved with the state, but some of that involvement was by way of independent critique of state policy, as in the case of Ahmad Sirhindi, who ended up in prison for his pains. As with the Safavids, the rapid decline of Mughal power in the eighteenth century left the ‘ulama’ to fend for themselves, and they thus entered the modern period with their own institutions and accustomed to independence. It was an independence that would go in two different directions, however. Two quite different kinds of religious institutions emerged. The first represented by Lucknow’s Farangi Mahall, concentrated itself with the preservation of traditional learning in the midst of a tumultuous environment. A second line of ‘ulama’, represent by Shah Wali Allah and his descendants, actively worked for the reform of Islam and the restoration of Muslim Power.

It is no accident that the early eighteenth century produced one of the greatest Muslim scholars and reformers in India, Shah Wali Allah Dehlavi, who sounded the orthodox alarm as a result of a social condition of the Muslims. Contemporaneous to the Wahhabis in Arabia. He emphasized a reversion to pristine Islam. Rejection of Hindu
accretions, such as tomb worship, consulting Brahmans for omens and celebrating Hindu festival, was advocated by him. Pointedly, he wrote his major contribution to theological dialectics, Hujjat Allah al-baligha, in Arabic not Persian. In spite of bitter polemics by the traditional ‘ulama’ he translated the Holy Quran into Persian in order that it should reach a wider readership; his sons translated it into Urdu. Shah Wali Allah’s ideas were to shape the Islamic college at Deoband and influence Muslim of all opinions. Significantly, and logically, one of his heroes was the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb.
REFERENCES


2. Ibid, P. 192.


4. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. P. 70.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid. P. 72.


20. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


28. Ibid. P. 82


30. Akbar S. Ahmed, P. 78
Chapter 4
Egypt, Turkeys, Malaysia and Tajikistan's Political Systems in Modern Times
CHAPTER IV

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REFERENCES
4.1 EGYPT

**Official Name:** Arab Republic of Egypt. Arabic Jumhuriyah Misr Al-Arabiya

**Local Name:** Misr

**Population:** 76,117,421 (July 2004 est.)

**Independence:** 28 February 1922 (From UK)

**Status:** Republic

**Chief of State:** President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak (Since 14 October 1981)

**Prime Minister:** Ahmed Nazif (Since July 2004)

**Capital:** Cairo

**Language:** Arabic (Official)

**Religions:** Sunni Muslim (C.90%), minority largely Coptic Christian (C.10%)³
4.1.1 **EGYPTIAN HISTORY, ANCIENT:**

The history of ancient Egypt stretches roughly from 3100 BC, when a unified kingdom embracing lower and Upper Egypt was first created, to 332 BC, when Alexander the Great brought the rule of the pharaohs to an end. In the intervening millennia, Egypt experienced alternate phases of strong, centralized government and periods of near anarchy, when competing dynasties and warlords fought for power. The periods marked by strong government at home and expansionist policies abroad are called the Old, Middle and New Kingdoms. The chaotic phases go by the name of Intermediate Periods (I-III). In the so-called Late Period, the centuries immediately before Alexander’s conquest, Egypt lacked central authority, and the country was easy prey for the great expansionist powers of the Middle East-Assyria conquered her in 671 BC and Persia in 525 BC.
### 4.1.2 Dynasties of Rulers: Ancient Egypt

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4.1.3 HISTORY:

Neolithic cultures on river of Nile from C.6000 BC; Pharaoh dynasties from c3100 BC; Egyptian power greatest during the New Empire period, 1576-1085 BC; became Persian Province. 6th-c BC; conquered by Alexander the Great, 4th-c BC; Ptolemaic Pharaohs ruled Egypt until 30 BC; conquered by Arabs, AD 672; Suez Canal constructed in 1869, revolt in 1879 put down by British in 1882; British protectorate from 1914; declared independence, 1922; King Farouk deposed by Nasser 1952; Egypt declared a republic; 1953; attack on Israel followed by Israeli invasion, 1967; Suez Canal remained blocked, 1967-75; changed name to Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971; Yom Kippur War against Israel, 1973; Camp David peace conference with Israel, 1978; Israel returned disputed Taba Strip, 1989; participated in Gulf War with US-led coalition, 1991; governed by a people’s National Assembly, President, Prime Minister, and Council of Ministers.

4.1.4 MONARCH:

1922-36 Fouad I
1936-7 Farouk Trusteeship
1937-52 Farouk 1

Head of state:

1952-4 Mohammad Najib
1954-70 Gamal Abdel Nasser
1970-81 Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat
1981- Mohammed Hosni Mubarak till now (February 2005)
4.1.5 **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:**

Egypt is a country which inherited the legacy of five thousand years old civilization; it may not be the oldest civilization of the ancient world, but is certainly of great antiquity. The Egyptians had built massive structures like the Pyramids- a major feature of ancient Egyptian architecture, and had developed a unique system of preserving mummies. Egypt also has to its credit the invention of the first solar calendar in the history of mankind. Ancient Egyptians laid the foundation for the study of arithmetic and geometry. They perfected the achievement of irrigation, engineering and making of pottery, glass and paper. They were the first ones to have formulated a clear concept of the aesthetic aspect of art, besides its utilitarian purposes. More significant, still, were the Egyptians’ contributions in the fields of religion, and individual and social ethics. From the land of Pharaohs, thus came the germ and the stimulus for numerous intellectual achievements of later countries.

The Arab conquest of Egypt in the seventh century brought Egypt in the fold of Arab and thereby Islam, and Egypt became heir to another civilization, namely, Islamic Civilization of the middle ages. The Arab conquest gave Egypt a new religion, i.e. Islam, and a new language, Arabic. Arab conquest, however, did not cut off Egypt completely from its pharaoh traditional culture.

The modern history of Egypt could be traced back to the founding of Mohammad Ali dynasty in the earlier years of nineteenth century. Mohammad Ali, and Albanian soldier, was sent by port to drive out Napoleon who had invaded Egypt in 1213/1798. In the confusion that
followed the French invasion, Mohammad Ali established himself as the ruler of Egypt.

It was with the French invasion of Egypt that the process of Egypt’s modernization began. Mohammad Ali, an ambitious soldier, set Egypt, which was still a province of Ottoman Empire, on the road of modernization by introducing several reforms, particularly in the fields of education and industrialization.

Mohammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha, sought to accelerate the pace of Modernization. Unfortunately, he conceived the process in terms of grand Palaces and European style buildings and spent a colossal amount of money in implementing his plans to raise Egypt’s international status. The advanced nations of Europe were his ideal. His zeal for Europeanization was so great that at the time of the opening of the Suez Canal, he proudly declared that he had detached Egypt from Africa and attached it to Europe. Egypt thus was the first Arab state fully exposed to Western civilization.

During the next few years the country became an arena of Franco-British rivalry became an arena of Franco-British rivalry and, as a consequence of nationalist revolt of 1299-1300/1881-1882, Britain occupied Egypt. Henceforth, the power remained mainly in the hands of British Civilian agents, even though technically Egypt still remained part of the Ottoman Empire. It was only in 1333/1914, during the First World War, when Britain found Turkey in the opposite camp, that Britain declared Egypt a protectorate in order to make its position more firm and secure legally and administratively.
After the war, under pressure from the nationalist Wafd party, the British government declared on 1341/28 February 1922 that “the British protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is declared an independent sovereign state”. However there were certain matters which, His Majesty’s government reserved for its discretion.

Meanwhile attempts were being made to reach a settlement on the “reserve subjects” which were a part of the 1341/1922 declaration. These attempts led to the signing of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1355/1936. The Treaty replaced the unilateral British declaration of 1341/1922, but it also put some limitations on Egyptian sovereignty.

The “indignities” that Egypt had suffered at the hands of the British, together with the inefficient, corrupt and feudalistic government that tolerated all these indignities, aroused some young army officers against both Britain and the ruling class at home. These young officers decided to put an end to the prevalent state of affairs. Egypt's defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1368/1948, which these young officers attributed to corruption and mismanagement at home, hardened their resolve and they decided to rescue the colony from the morass of corruption. They staged a coup d'état in 1372/July 1, 1952 and captured power.

4.1.6 THE AIMS OF REVOLUTION BY JAMAL ABDU AL-NASSER:

The aims were:

1. extermination of imperialism,
2. eradication of feudalism;
3. termination of monopoly and domination of capital over government;

4. promotion of social justice;

5. establishment of strong national army;

6. bringing about democratic life\textsuperscript{10}.

Though the revolutionary leadership succeeded in achieving some of these objectives, it did not make much progress in bringing about democratic life to any large extent. Nasser Government basically remained a dictatorial government; the leadership did not encourage democratic life and thus getting people’s participation and building of modern civil society\textsuperscript{11}.

4.1.7 ANWAR SADAT ACHIEVEMENTS:

Anwar Sadat who came to power in 1390/1970, after the Sudden demise of president Nasser, had three achievements to his credit from the point of view of Egyptian state and society. First, by launching an offensive against Israel in 1393/October 1973, he redeemed Egypt honor and prestige that was badly damaged in 1388/June 1967 War with Israel. As he put it: “we regained our self-confidence and world’s confidence in US”. Second, Sadat decision to visit Israel to remove” psychological barrier” set the peace process in motion, which ultimately resulted in signing the camp David accord in 1399/September 1978. Third, this in turn cleared the way for opening the Suez Canal- one of the main sources of Egypt’s National income. Sadat thus, redeemed Egypt’s lost prestige, regained its lost territory- Sinai desert, and got the Suez Canal opened\textsuperscript{12}.
Sadat took two other major decisions – one on economic front and another on political front – which any other leader would have found it difficult to take. Sadat moved away from Arab Socialism and Liberalized the political arena in order to get rid of the leftist Nasserist wing. On economic front sadat moved away from the policy of nationalization and opted for ‘Infitah’ (Open door policy) – a policy which signaled a switch to market economy. He introduced the most comprehensive legislation on foreign investment in 1394/1974. This liberalization, apart from stabilizing monetary level, had a good effect on the economy, which was growing at the rate of 9 per cent per annum—of course, this growth was also partly due to world oil boom

4.1.8 **HOSNI MUBARAK’S COMING TO POWER:**

When Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1402/ October 1981, after the assassination of Sadat by Khalid Istambuli, the country experienced perhaps for the first time since its independence in 1342/1923, a feeling of relative freedom—both physical and psychological. Since Mubarak, as a former Air Force, commander, had played important part in 1393/October 1973 war, and also, since he had already been appointed by Sadat as Vice-President of the country, his credibility and legitimacy were never in doubt when he came to power. Mubarak followed all the major policy initiatives of Sadat-Peace with Israel, economic liberalization and democratization. Thus, in his first policy statement Mubarak, while reiterating his support for the Camp David Accord, also stressed the need for peace and justice in the Middle East, including justice for the “oppressed and dispossessed Palestine”. He further said that Egypt would uphold Palestinian’s cause “… in all political circles anywhere in the world”. Thus, while on the one hand
consolidating the gains from Sadat’s policies, on the other hand, Mubarak, wanted to dissociate himself from the unpopular aspect of the latter’s policies. On domestic front, he opened a dialogue with all opposition groups and achieved a measure of consensus on broad national goals. He also released political detainees and even permitted the still out-lawed Muslim Brotherhood to resume its political activities. Opposition groups publicly expressed their willingness to cooperate with the government.

For the time being, things seem to go well, with Mubarak firmly in the saddle. But gradually, there developed a gap between the state and society. The state agenda became different from society’s agenda, and the respective priorities of the state and the society appeared heading for a clash.

4.1.9 MUBARAK’S LEGITIMACY:

The first item on Mubarak’s agenda was to gain legitimacy. Though, as pointed out earlier, his succession was legitimate, but mere legitimate succession was not enough. Naturally, the best way to get it was to conduct democratic election. Mubarak must have thought that a little dose of political liberalization would not seriously threaten the stability of his government, but rather would ease tensions caused by his predecessor’s harsh method of dealing with opposition. There were also expectations of diplomatic and economic benefits that the regime could achieve through the maintenance of liberal façade. It was hoped that this would induce Western governments and investors to be more sympathetic towards the country. It was also hoped that democratic elections would isolate more radical oppositions groups.
In this sense the real Mubarak era started only in 1405/1984. The first parliamentary election held under the new regime took place in May of that year. In this election conducted under the system of proportional representation the ruling national Democratic Party achieved 72.9 per cent of votes and 87 per cent of seats. The right wing wafd party received 15 per cent of votes and 13 per cent of seats. The socialist labour party got 7.73 per cent of votes but no seat. The left wing progressive Rally Tajaramu’s party got 4.1 per cent of votes and no seats, and Liberal’s party 0.65 per cent of votes and no seats. The election made it clear that the ruling party, headed by Mubarak himself, was well in control and he had established himself well in power\textsuperscript{17}.

According to human rights groups, human rights are violated and jails are packed with more than 16000 prisoners. There had never been so many detainees\textsuperscript{18}.

There is, therefore, growing demand and mounting tensions for an expansion of democratic process by amending of the civil society groups in Egypt is to limit the number of times a head of the state can run for office. Thus in spite of his electoral victories, Mubarak did not get the expected legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians\textsuperscript{19}.
(II) **TURKEYS:**

Turkish (Turkiye),

**Capital:** Ankara

**Official Name:** Republic of Turkey,

**Population:** 68,109,469 (July 2003 est.)

**Independence:** 29 October 1923 (Successor State to the Ottoman Empire).

**Status:** Republican Parliamentary Democracy

**Chief of State:** President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Since 16 May 2000).

**Prime Minister:** Recep Tayyip Endogan (14 March 2003)

**Languages:** Turkish (Turkey) (Official), Kurdish and Arabic; Greek, Armenian and Yiddish Minorities

**Religion:** Sunni Muslim (98%), Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish minorities.\(^2\)
4.2.1 HISTORY:

Seljuk sultanate replaced by the Ottoman in NW Asia Minor in 13\textsuperscript{th}-c; Turkish invasion of Europe, first in Balkans, 1375; fall of Constantinople, 1453; empire at its peak under Sulaiman the Magnificent, 16\textsuperscript{th}-c; Young Turks seized power, 1908; Balkan War, 1912-13; allied with Germany during World War I; Republic followed Young Turk revolution, led by Kemal Ataturk, 1923; policy of westernization and economic development; neutral throughout most of World War 2, then sided with Allies, military coups in 1960 and 1980; strained relations with Greece, and invasion of Cyprus, 1974; aided the allied forces during the Gulf War, 1991; constitution provides for a single-chamber National Assembly; a President appoints a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers.

4.2.2 HEAD OF STATE:

1982 – 9 Kenan Evren
1989-93 Turgut Ozal
1993-2000 Suleyman Demirel
2000 – Ahmet Necdet Sezer\textsuperscript{21}

4.2.3 TURKEY FROM THE CALIPHATE TO NATION STATE:

The Ottoman state had begun to create a secular framework during the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{22}. In 1343/1924 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, urged on by the triumphant Ataturk, abolished the caliphate. The action should hardly have been necessary. As a real focus of political power, the caliphate had ceased to exist by the end of the tenth century. The ideal of the caliphate continued to live on however,
and the later Ottoman sultans. Particularly ‘Abd al-Hamid II (1293-1327/1876-1909), had not been shy about claiming the title of universal leader of the Muslims. This was a tricky proposition since the family of Osman was patently not Arab, let alone descended from the Quraysh. The Ottoman hand was forced however, by rivalry with European powers. In 1188/1774, when the Empress of Russia claimed to be the protector of all Orthodox Christians everywhere the Ottomans naturally could not let the claim go unmatched, and they began calling the Sultan “Sovereign Caliph of the Mahometan religion”.

The post World-War I Ottoman Society was qualitatively as well as quantitatively, different from the earlier one mainly because of the Arab revolt against the Turks and British occupation of Turkey. The Ottoman totality’ was now non-existent functionally. To the Turk in the Street, the Treaty of Severs seemed a death Warrant, individually and nationally. In this background, a new Turkish nationalism took shape under the clashing push and pull of imperialism. The Erzurum-Sivas Congresses (1338/1919) and the National pact (1339/1920), which envisaged a Turkish government on the basis of national will, territorial integrity and complete independence, showed the consolidation of the ideas of Turkish nationalist consciousness. This national solidarity made the war of liberation a great success in 1342/1923. The Turkish National Liberation movement represented the collective will of the Turks under the leadership of new ‘revolutionary elite’ which was a substitute for the Ottoman ruling elite. During the liberation movement, nationalism was the main ideology of the Turks and it prepared them for future changes in the Turkish Republic. However, the nature of the movement gave rise to covert, ideological conflict.
4.2.4 LEADERSHIP OF MUSTAFA KEMAL:

The conservatives representing extreme religiosity and negation of westernization and the moderates representing systemization of tradition and modernity were systematically and completely dominated by the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal. After the successful war of liberation against Western imperialism, the Turks emerged as a new national entity which represented a logical culmination of the nationalist ideas of the young Turks²⁷.

The development of Turkish awakening, which had started in the Tanzimat, went through the successive steps of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanianism. It was left for Mustafa Kemal, The soldier-reformer, to reject them all and succeed with the simple Turkism of the Turks of Asia Minor²⁸.

Mustafa Kemal had joined the Committee of Union and Progress. He did not have an active part in the coup d'état of 1326/1908 and at no time was he identified with the policies or practices of the young Turks who had full control over the government. He had his disagreements with the triumvirate but he was too good an officer to be pushed aside. His defense of Gallipoli won him national acclaim. Perhaps the most important ally of Mustafa Kemal was the Soviet Union. Even though the doctrinaire Marxists among the Bolsheviks looked to Europe for the predicted proletarian revolution, there were enough “Asia Firsters” among them to pay some attention to Iran and Turkey. In 1338/1919, the Bolsheviks were very friendly to Mustafa Kemal and his revolution. On 1340/ March 16, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Signed a treaty of friendship and collaboration with Russia against the western powers²⁹.
4.2.5 THE TURKISH REFORMS OPPORTUNITY:

For Mustafa Kemal, independence from foreign interference was not an end but only a means to give the Turks the opportunity to build a new Turkey. This could be done by far-reaching reforms in practically every aspect of life. Most of the reform programs launched by the nationalists under Mustafa Kemal had been proposed and discussed by scores of Turkish intellectuals and reformers from Tanzimat on. Some of these ideas had been systematized by the famous sociologist Ziya Gokalp. All reforms, however, before the proclamation of the six principles and after, were based on them. These principles were:

(I) Republicanism, which asserted the idea that sovereignty was rested in the people.

(II) Nationalism, which claimed Turkey for the Turks and rejected jurisdiction over territories with non-Turkish population.

(III) Populism, which did away with the millet system and proclaimed the equality of all classes of all people before the law.

(IV) Statism, which accepted the necessity of the constructive intervention of the state in the national economy.

(V) Secularism, which established the principle of the separation of religion and state.

(VI) Reforms, which emphasized the determination to change and bypass tradition and precedent if they do not serve national purpose.
It is important to note that notwithstanding violent vicissitudes, the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1357/1938 and world war II, the above principles have remained operative without much modification. Furthermore, these and all the reforms carried out under them have been directed toward one major objective, namely, the replacement of an eastern civilization with that of a Western one.

4.2.6 KEMAL ATATURKS’ ABOLITIONS:

In addition to the abolition of the ‘Sultanate’ of Mohammad V and the Caliphate which offended all Sunni Muslims everywhere, Mustafa Kemal also abolished Islamic law and replaced them with Swiss civil and Italian Penal codes, and also changed Islamic Calendar to Christian Calendar, and Arabic Alphabet by English Alphabet. Many other abolitions included abolition of Friday as the weekly holiday, abolition of old titles like Pasha and abolition of Bey and closing down of mosque-schools. Several other abolitions were also carried out by this regime.

4.2.7 THE SECOND TURKISH REPUBLIC AND ITS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

While the trials were in progress and the constitution was being written, new political parties were being formed and they were preparing for the promised elections. Some 11 parties registered and carried on a lively campaign. In the election held on 1381/October 12, 1961, only four parties were able to win seats in the assembly. The Republican people’s party won 173 seats, the Justice party 158 seats, the New Turkey Party 65 Seats, and the Republican Peasants’ National Party 54 seats. Inasmuch as the Republican People’s party did not have
a majority, it arranged a coalition with the Justice party. The Assembly elected General Gursel as President and Ismet Inonu as Prime Minister. A year later internal disagreement in the coalition caused the People’s Party to seek coalition with the other two parties and leave the Justice party out of the government.

No one was surprised that the Republican People’s Party got more votes than any other. Beside from being Ataturk’s party, it spearheaded opposition to the excesses of the Democratic Party. What surprised the observers, however, was the strength shown by the Justice Party. Generally it was composed of conservatives who believed in lower rates of taxes and transfer of state monopolies to private industry; the Party was also for the abolition of governmental controls and against all state planning. On the whole, the Justice Party captured the votes of the followers of the Democratic Party.

The New Turkey Party was made up of economic, liberal, and political progressives which someday might pose throat as the chief opponent to the Republican People’s Party. They were strong secularists and advocated the rights of labor to strick. The Republican Peasants’ National party advocated social conservatism and had anti-secularist tendencies. It and the Justice Party generally appealed to the rural areas while the Republican and the New Turkey Parties had their followers among the Urban dwellers.

The secularists wanted to follow Ataturk, which means no religious education in school and no use of the Arabic language in religious observances. The clericalists, on the other hand, wanted religious education in school, demanded the use of Arabic in worship
and wanted all the religious endowment funds turned over to the ‘ulama’. Between these two were the moderates who believed in the “Partial” restoration of Islam. But when it came to translating this restoration into action, most of the moderates were afraid that freedom of religious instruction will reinstate the use of Arabic letters, veil, polygamy, caliphate etc. So the final decision will be made, not by fiat, but by the process of education and the rapidity with which the rural areas westernize\textsuperscript{33}. 
(III) **MALAYSIA:**

**Local Name:** Malaysia

**Population:** 25,092,940 (July 2004 est.)

**Status:** Constitutional monarchy

**Independence:** 31 August 1957 (from UK)

**Capital:** Kuala Lumpur

**Chief of State:** Paramount Ruler Fuanku Syed Sirajuddin ibni Almarhum Tuanku Syed Putra Jamalullail, the Raja of Perlis (Since 12 December 2001).

**Head of Government:** Prime Minister Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi (Since 31 October 2003).

**Languages:** Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) (official), also Chinese, English, and Tamil widely spoken

**Ethnic groups:** Malay (59%), Chinese (32%), Indian (9%)

**Religions:** Muslim (53%), Buddhist (17%), Chinese folk-religionist (12%). Hindu (7%), Christian (6%).
4.3.1 HISTORY:

Part of Srivijaya Empire, 9th–13th-c; Hindu and Muslim influences, 14th–15th-c; Portugal the Netherlands, and Britain vied for control from the 16th-c; Singapore, Malacca, and Penang formally incorporated into the British Colony of the straits settlements, 1826; British protection extended over Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, Constituted into the Federated Malay States, 1895; protection treaties with several other states (Unfederated Malay States), 1885-1930; occupied by Japanese in World War 2; Federation of Malaya, 1948, independence, 1957; constitutional monarchy of Malaysia 1963; Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965; government by a bicameral Federal Parliament; Head of State is Monarch elected for five years by his fellow sultans; advised by a Prime Minister and a Cabinet.

4.3.2 HEAD OF GOVERNMENT:

1963-70 Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj
1970-6 Abdul Razak bin Hussein
1976-9 Haji Hussein bin Onn
1979-97 Mahathir bin Mohammad
1997 Anwar Ibrahim Acting
1997- Mahathir bin Mohamad

4.3.3 POLITICAL SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY:

In the traditional Islamic state, it is expected that the ruler be an exemplary Muslim, observant of the full “Shariah” law. The favourite
Malaysian example of the ideal ruler is embodied in the Four Religious Caliphs, especially Omar. Independent Malaysia combines its parliamentary democracy with a legacy of nine sultanates, of which one is elected every five years as King of Malaysia. Beyond their role as head of religion in their respective states, the Sultans’ real strength remains in their symbolic representation of Malay identity and power as the original and dominant people of the country. The constitutional monarchy, however, retains certain arbitrary powers is seen as residues of the ‘feudal’ age. Loyalty to the Person of the King and the elaborate trappings of pre-Islamic rituals and titles, lead others to say that ‘we fear the King more than Allah’ which means that rulers are in fact above the law. A number of incidents over the past decade involving anti-social, corrupt and even criminal behaviour by some of the rulers finally reached crisis point in late 1413/1992, culminating in a parliamentary constitutional amendment to remove the Sultans’ legal immunity. The Prime Minister, the first in Malaysia not to come from an aristocratic or royal background, was personally strongly committed to this move, although critics claim that the measure also strengthens his own powers. Despite their formal roles as head of religion, the sultans’ newly publicized lifestyle and character were quickly targeted as ‘Feudal’ and ‘un-Islamic’, hence unfit for office and for the title Baginda, one also used for the Prophet.

The ‘mufties’ and ‘fatwa’ councils of several states have issued statements to the effect that stripping Sultans of their legal immunity is in line with Islamic law and justice, and even the PAS Council of Ulama asserted that royals are not above the law; all are equal before Allah.
When the final parliamentary vote was taken, however, PAS voted against the constitutional amendments to abolish royal immunity, once again for political reasons. For the federal government, however, the issue is clearer: The legitimacy of the Malaysian state is thoroughly secular even though many of its policies and characteristics are presented in Islamic clothing. In its latest stand-off with royalty, the rights of the people are re-defined in a civil, constitutional sense, with Islam as a social and political leveling mechanism.

4.3.4 THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MALAYSIA:

Unceasingly since Independence in 1377/1957, Malaya/Malaysia has been engaged in a process of state building and consolidation. To the extent that the country aspires to be a ‘nation-state’, the national focus has always been on Malay, and the constitution clearly establishes the primacy of Malay status in a number of provisions and policies, while the constitutionally defined characteristics of Malayness-by languages custom and (the Muslim) religion-are essentially cultural, thus theoretically permitting assimilation of immigrants and minorities (to Malay status) according to the classic ideal, in practice, informal social mechanism prevent full acceptance of culturally qualified non-Malays. From another perspective, the constitution also requires that Malays be Muslims, as a condition of ethnic recognition, and a non-Muslim Malay is thus a legal anomaly. Malays, therefore, are the only Malaysian to enjoy no freedom of religious choice or practice, a price paid for political re-requisite and ethnic protection. Malaysia thus remains a plural state, whose principle political parties are also ethnic based. The ruling coalition (Barisan Nasional) which has ruled in substantially the same format since independence consists of a core of
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO): The Malasian Chinese Association (MCA); and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), to which are added from time to time other parties. Among the permanent opposition parties are the largely Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP): a Splinter party from UMNO, Known as Semangat 46, led by a Malay Prince; and an attenuated multiethnic Peoples’ party (Party Rakyat). The other principle opposition player is the Pan-Malayan Islamic party or PAS, which keeps the UMNO constantly on its moral and religious toes, and which at present, in alliance with Semangat 46, is the ruling party of the heavily Malay north eastern state of Kelantan. In its early years, beginning in 1371/1951 as Hisbul Muslimin, PAS was more concerned with the promotion of Malay interests, an ethnic party legitimated by the moral force of Islam. Now that PAS has been in power in Kelantan since 1411/1990.

4.3.5 MALAYSIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE ‘WEST’:

Malaysia’s relations with the ‘west’ are highly ambivalent and sometimes defensive. Beneath the co-operation, it perceives a lurking ‘orinetalist’ bias, which may be partly a projection of Malaysia’s own uncertain identity. Western countries are portrayed alternately as role models to be emulated or rejected, as indeed are Muslim ones. In the positive mode, the Prime Minister rhetorically asks his countrymen (especially the Malays) why the Muslim People of today are less developed and enterprising, unable to co-operate among themselves or to gain respect for their achievements, ‘like fruits floating haphazardly in the sea’? The Malaysian leader ponders how Muslim countries can modernize without destroying the faith. The defenders of economic development are usually scrupulous in separating the west’s technical
and scientific contributions from its accompanying social and cultural shortcomings. Further compensation is sought from history, and the glories of the Islamic civilization in times past.

4.3.6 MALAYSIA’S RELATIONS WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES:

As for the present, Malaysia’s relations with Muslim countries and peoples are selective. Although formally a member of the organization of Islamic conference (OIC), Malaysia has a rather low opinion of that grouping, for it perceived indecisiveness and lack of coordination amid the compelling events of Bosnia, Somalia and the Gulf War. The Malaysian government generally tries to distance itself from the immediacy of local Middle Eastern politics, and some of its publications are critical of the disposition of Arab Wealth, which does not necessarily appear to benefit the world’s poorer Muslims. It is apparent; too that Iran is not a role model for Malaysia ever since some of the ‘dakwah’ movements openly declared their inspiration from the Iranian revolution. The latest exercise in religious politics for Malaysia has been in the new Central Asia republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikestan and especially Uzbekistan, where it perceives a tempting vacuum. Political and trading overtures, followed by a Prime Ministerial visit to Uzbekistan mark this new alignment for the region’s Muslim population and re-incorporation as members of the wider ‘Ummah’. Also in the name of the Ummah, but outside the purview of the state.

4.3.7 THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIA IN THE POST-MAHATIR MUHAMMAD ERA:

Mahatir has contributed positively to the economic development of his country, and succeeded in building self-confidence and a “can do”
attitude among his people. But in his zeal to instill self-discipline and accelerate progress, he managed to eradicate the political power of his rivals and critics, often resorting to questionable means. In the process he has not only weekend the constitutional and legal foundation of Malaysia’s Political Institutions, but has even succeeded in subordinating the judiciary to his office. He forced, for instance, the resignation of Malaya Chief Justice Yahya Saleh because the later refused to dance to the political tone of Mahatir’s government. The latest sacking of his deputy was intended to guarantee that no one should dare to oppose his decisions and policies. Few People with authentic values and independent minds remain in the government today. Undoubtedly, this has dire consequences for the post-Mahatir era.

As for the Islamist, they are likely to continue to be an important force to be reckoned with. One important development that came as a result of the political crisis in Malaysia was the founding of the National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional). The party is currently led by Wan Azizah Ismail, Anwar’s wife who serves as the party’s president, and by Chandra Muzaffar and Tian Chua as Vice Presidents. The National Justice Party represents a drastic shift from the communal polities that dominated Malaysia’s political life since its independence, bringing the three major ethnic communities- The Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians- into political unison. While the party has a little chance to muster political power in the next elections, it reflects a deep political transformation currently underway, particularly when one realizes that the party is founded by individuals counted among the Islamically oriented forces.41
(IV) **TAJIKISTAN:**

**Official Name:** Republic of Tajikistan,

**Capital:** Dushanbe

**Population:** 6,863,752 (July 2003 est.)

**Independence:** 9 September 1991 (from Soviet Union)

**Chief of State:** President Emomali Rahmonov (Since 6 November 1994)

**Head of Government:** Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov (Since 20 January 1999)

**Date of Independence:** 1991

**Languages:** Tajik (official), Russian

**Ethnic groups:** Tajik (59%), Uzbek (23%), Russian (13%)

**Religion:** Sunni Muslim 85%, Shi'a Muslim 5% & Others 10%
4.4.1 HISTORY;

Conquered by Persia, and Alexander the Great; invaded by Arabs in 8th –c; Turkish invasion, 10th –c; until mid 18th –c part of the emirate of Bukhara, which in effect became a protectorate of Russia, 1868; following the Russian Revolution (1917), became part of Turkestan Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, 1918; scene of the Basmachi revolt 1922-3; Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic created as part of the Uzbek SSR, 1924; became a Soviet socialist Republic, 1929; declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, 1991; joined Commonwealth of independent states, 1991; Republican communist party remained in power until civil war, 1992; governed by a president, Prime Minister, and Supreme Assembly.

4.4.2 Head of state:

1992 – Imamoli Rakhmanov

4.4.3 Head of government:

1996 – 9 Yahya Azimov
1999- Oqil Oqilov

4.4.4 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF TAJIKISTAN:

The extended internal armed conflict precluded the development of the Tajikistan political system, which is currently both weak and prone to violence. The country is headed by the president, Emomali Rahmonov, who will be serving his second term until 1427/2006. In 1420/1999 the president’s term of was extended through referendum from 5 years to 7 years.
The Tajikistan Parliament comprises two chambers—a 63-seat lower house, the council of Representatives, and a 34-seat upper house, the National council. This parliament, elected in 1421/March 2000, replaced the Former unicameral Supreme Assembly. The MPs (Member of Parliament) are elected for 5 year term.

Tajikistan has experienced a devastating five years civil war that ended in 1418/1997 with the conclusion of an agreement between the Tajik Government and major opposition group, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). As a result of the agreement the opposition is now integrated in the political process, following constitutional amendment on the legalization of political parties based on religion. Nevertheless, the political situation is complicated by the exclusion of “Third force” opposition powers, which include representatives of the northern region of Leninabad, the most developed and productive region in the country. The government’s ban on independent political organizations in Leninabad could weaken the stability of the country and marginalize a reign—with a large ethnic Uzbek population—already susceptible to calls for secession.

4.4.5 STATE POWER IN TAJIKISTAN:

According to the Constitution of Tajikistan, adopted in 1415/1994, state power is based on the principle of Separation of power to legislative, executive and judicial ones. These functions are reformed by the majlisi oli (Parliament), Government and Court, respectively.

However, the constitution separates functions among branches of power inaccurately. There are some cases of duplication of functions of one branch of power by another one. For example, according to the
constitution, the constitutional court is authorized to supervise the coordination of the country. At the same time, the president of the country is authorized “to abolish or suspend the resolutions of the organs of state government in the case of their contradictions to the laws and the constitution of the country”.

The parliament also has the right to interpret the constitution and laws.

According to the Constitution, the president has the right to introduce to the parliament the candidatures of Chairmen, their deputies and judges of the constitutional, Supreme and supreme economic courts for both election and recall the judges of the martial courts as well as judges of regional, city and district courts are appointed and dismissed by the president of the country on presentation of the Minister of justice. Such procedures make the judicial power to be dependent on the president of the executive power.

The state power unofficially, is formed on a regional basis. For example, now all key positions are divided between the representatives of Kulyab, Leninabad and Gissar regions, who came to power in 1413/1992 after the victory over the Islamo-democratic coalition. Previously the Islamo-democratic coalition, in its turn, represented the coalition of Qarategin and Badakhshan Tajks.

### 4.4.6 A SERIES OF CHANGES TO THE ELECTION CODE BY THE TAJIK PARLIAMENT:

The Taj parliament has approved a series of changes to the Election code that should improve the election process. The
amendments, among other things, call for independent members to be appointed to local election commissions and outlaw the presence of armed men at polling stations.

On the negative side, the amendments for the first time impose a registration fee on candidates, but a compromise allowed for this fee to be lowered to $500 per candidate from an original proposal of $3000. Still, some say parties may not be able to afford registering many candidates.

A spokesman for the Islamic Renaissance party of Tajikistan, Nasriddin Saidov, said his party generally welcomed the amendments, but added there were two issues the party wished had been included. “Two amendments that would have had a huge influence on elections were not accepted”, “he said. “We proposed a change to article 15 of this law, to include representatives of political parties at polling stations on voting day. They should be there because experience has shown that all violations occur in these places. Also, we proposed changes to Article 46, so that all parties should be provided with the tabulation of vote results right after counting. All the parties indicated the amendments give them a better chance to complete in a vote they hope will be more transparent than previous efforts.

4.4.7 DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:

We may declare that its political structures, political culture and subsystems autonomy have a limited character. According to the classification of the political system types. The political systems with limited political structures are called pre-mobilized modern political systems. They are called modern as they have attributes typical for
modern societies—a constitution, and political infrastructure, though in the limited size. Judging by the ruling regime, pre-mobilized authoritative and democratic political systems are differentiated. Unlimited power and lack of control of the state by citizens, use of force, monopolization of power and politics, prohibition of political opposition, non-interference or limited interference of non-political spheres is typical for authoritarian regimes.

The characteristics of authoritative power have been described in detail because they are all present in the ruling regime of Tajikistan. In addition, the heads of executive power of cities and towns are not elected but appointed and relieved by the president of the country. This also is a criterion of an authoritative ruling regime.

According to the level of its development problems which face the country’s political system are typical for this type of the political system. Challenges which cause the development of a political system come from outside, and inside the society, or from the political elite of the society.

A threat coming from a neighboring state forces a political system to strengthen its extractive function, and to mobilize resources to repulse a possible attack. The political system adopts its structures and creates new structures to fulfill this task.

Development results when the exiting structure and culture of a political system is unable to cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization. Almond differentiates four types of challenge which may lead to the development of the political system:
1) The integration of the society and control of the society-state building.

2) The increase of national self-consciousness national building.

3) The participation of the citizens in decision-making-process participation.

4) The distribution of weals\textsuperscript{48}.

The peculiarities of the historical and current development of the Tajik Society have developed in such a way that these four problems simultaneously face the country’s political system\textsuperscript{49}. 

\textsuperscript{48}\textsuperscript{49}
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Chapter 5
Iranian Political System in Modern Times
CHAPTER V

IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN MODERN TIMES

5.1 The political background of Iran
5.2 Government
5.3 The meaning of political leadership in Shi’s system
5.4 The rank of ‘Ulama’ in the political arena in Iran from the 1298/1880s to 1400/1979
5.5 A political biography of Ayatollah Khomeini

(a) Imam Khameini and Wilayat I-Faqih
(b) The Principle of Wilayat I-Faqih

5.6 Religious Intellectual Movement in Iran:

REFERENCES
IRAN:

Official Name: Islamic Republic of Iran (Theocratic Republic)

Capital: Tehran

Population: 68,278,826 (July 2003 est.)

Independence: 1 April 1979

Chief of State: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini – Khamenei (Since 4 June, 1989)

Head of Government: President (Ali) Mohamad Khatami Ardakani (Since 3 August, 1997)

Languages: Persian 58%, Turkic 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1% and others 2%.

Religions: Shi'a Muslim 89%, Sunni Muslim 10%, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian and Baha'i 1%.
5.1 THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF IRAN:

Iran, called Persia until 1354/1935, was formerly a monarchy, ruled by a Shah (King/Emperor). In 1346/1927 Reza Khan, a Cossak Officer, Seized Power in a military coup, and was subsequently elected Shah, adopting the title Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1360/1941 British and Soviet forces occupied Iran, and the Shah (who favoured Nazi Germany) was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. British and USA forces left Iran in 1365/1945, but soviet forces remained in the north-west of the Country (Azerbaijan province) until 1366/1946. The United Kingdom retained considerable influence through the Anglo-Iranian oil Company, which controlled much of Iran’s extensive petroleum reserves. In 1371/ March 1951, however the Majlis (National consultative Assembly) approved the nationalization of the Petroleum industry, despite British and other Western opposition. The leading advocate of nationalization, Dr. Muhammad Mussadeq, who became Prime Miniser in 1371/May 1951, was deposed in 1373/1953 in a military Coup d’etat, engineered by the USA and British intelligence services.

The Shah gradually increased his personal control of government following the coup, assuming dictatorial powers in 1383/1963 with the so-called ‘white revolution’. By the end of 1408/1987 anti-government protests were widespread, involving both left wing and liberal opponents of the Shah, as well as Islamist activists. The most effective opposition came from supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. The growing unrest forced the Shah to leave Iran in 1400/January 1979. Imam Khomeini
arrived in Tehran and effectively took power 10 days later and on 1400/1 April, 1979 Iran was declared on Islamic Republic.3

The first president of Iran, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was elected in 1401/1980 and then his Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Rajaei became President and Muhammad Javad Bahonar became his Prime Minister and both of them were assassinated by a group of Mujahdin-e-Khalq.

For most of the 1401/1980s Iran’s domestic and Foreign policy was dominated by the war with Iraq. In September 1980, Iraqi forces invaded Iran along a 500-Km front, apparently anticipating a rapid military victory. The Iranian military offered strong resistance, and began a counter-offensive in early 1403/1982; by June Iraq had been forced to withdraw from Iranian territory, and Iranian troops subsequently entered Iraq. At last after 8 years conflict between two Islamic countries come to an end and on 1409/18 July 1988 Iran unexpectedly announced its unconditional acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution no. 598, adopted one year earlier. In those times Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei was president and Mir Husein Mousavi was Prime Minister and after Imam Khomeini’s death on 1410/3 June 1989, in an emergency session on 4th June the council of Experts elected president Khamenei to succeed Imam Khomeini as Iran’s spiritual leader (Wali Faqih), and Hashemi Rafsanjani became president for two period (8 years). In 1418/ March 1997 Rafsanjani was appointed Chairman of the Council to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic order (which arbitrates in disputes between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians). Sayed Mohammad Khatami (a presidential adviser and former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance) was elected as the
President as he was a strong contender, just prior to the election, dated 1418/1997.

Taking office in August 1997, President Khatami emphasized his commitment to fostering sustained and balanced growth in the political, economic, cultural and educational spheres, as well as freedom of and respect for. The individual and rights of the nation, in the context of the rule of law. Khatami has been reelected for second term of presidency till 1426/2005.

5.2 GOVERNMENT:

Legislative power is vested in the Islamic consultative Assembly (Majlis), with 290 members, the Chief executive of the administration is the President. The Majlis and the president are both elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of four years. A 12-member council of Guardians Supervises elections and ensures that legislation is in accordance with the constitution and with Islamic Precepts. The council to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic order, created in 1409/February 1988 and formally incorporated into the Constitution in 1410/July 1989, rules on legal and theological disputes, between the Majlis and council of Guardians. The executive, legislative and judicial wings of state power are subjected to the authority of the Wali Faqih (Supreme religious leader).

Iran is divided into 28 provinces, each with an appointed Governor. Population (official estimate at mid-year) 2003 was 66,479,838 and population of province capital, Tehran 11,912,221, estimated.
5.3 THE MEANING OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SHIA SYSTEM:

There is a very deliberate endeavor to rejuvenate shi’ism in politics. In this regard they underscore the importance of ‘Marja’yyat’ (source of emulation) and Wilayat (deputyship). There are two essays on the issue of the legitimacy of clerical involvement in politics that are particularly noteworthy. Morteza Motashari makes a polemical critique of the Akhbari School, using a very reformist and non-traditionalist language. He contends that Akhbarism was a movement against reason and that a very peculiar fanaticism and dogmatism dominated this school of thought. He even goes so far as to draw a parallel between the rise of Akhbaris in Iran and the sensationalist philosophy of the west. Motahhari here is setting the stage for a more unconventional interpretation of shi’ism and the concept of religious leadership.

Tabataba’i’s discussion of “Walayat va Za’amat” (Deputyship and leadership”), however, is a far more articulate philosophical argument on the nature of Political theory and the rule of clerical leadership in Shi’ism. In this regard, Tabataba’i was the most prominent contemporary shi’i cleric to introduced the concept of Islamic government and the leadership of the faqih (jurisconsult). Therefore, in contrast to the view that he was opposed to the concept of the Wilayat-i-Faqih and the Islamic state is not correct, in fact, he is one of the earlier proponents of clerical rule. Tabataba’i’s discussion on “Walayat va Za’amat” is based on his belief in the natural and intrinsic need of every human being for guidance and supervision.
Each society, in order to endure, relies on a person or an official whose intelligence and will-power is superior to those who are ruled and who can control the will and mind of others and will safeguard and preserve the system that exists in the society... in a manner that a guardian is responsible for an orphan and the head of the family is responsible for the minor children of that family and the ministry of endowment administers the public endowment and the king or the president is presumed to rule among the people ... this position according to which a person is appointed to take care of the affairs of others, as a real person administers his life, we call Wilayat.\(^8\)

The intervention of the Shi‘i cleri’s in politics is rationalized on the basis of the belief that Islamic teaching is a comprehensive system of beliefs covering all aspects of life, promoting the spiritual and material well-being of the individual and society. Hence, there can not be a separation of religion from other aspects of life in Islam.\(^9\)

5.4 THE RANK OF ‘ULAMA’ IN THE POLITICAL ARENA IN IRAN FROM THE 1298/1880S TO 1400/1979:

The ‘ulama’ played a prominent part in the political arena in Iran from the 1880s, with renewed concern over their status and power in relation to the mounting intrusion into the Iranian economy and politics of the European powers and their banks and merchants. The first major episode in which the ulama realized their power was that of the Tobacco Regie in 1299/1881. The agitation which followed culminated in a ‘fatwa’ from the most senior ‘mujtahid’, Mirza Hassan Shirazi, resident in Najaf (Iraq), forbidding the consumption of tobacco on pain of eternal damnation. The successful boycott which followed ensured the
cancellation of the monopoly. Worries over the corrosion of the ulama’s influence and control over law and education by the incursion of modern forms associated with the European penetration may also have been a background factor at that point. Few in these constituencies understood what the constitution was about, except as a limitation on royal power and the transfer of powers to some kind of assembly in which, they assumed correctly, they would have representation. This instrumental attitude did not, however, apply to all the ulama: some understood the issues and were moved to find religious justifications and arguments to theorize and sustain the constitution. Prominent among those was Mirza Mohammad Husayn Na’ini, who wrote a book, Tanbih al-umma wa Tanzih al-Milla, published in 1327/1909. Theorizing the constitution. In the absence of Imam-ul-zaman, the Hidden Imam, he argued, it was incumbent on the community and its leaders to devise the means of just government. Government in accordance with law and by the representatives of the peoples was far superior, and more favourable to the rule of Islamic law than arbitrary tyranny. The main opponent of the constitution among the Ulama was Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri who argued that there is no room for legislation or legislatures in Islam, for whom divine law is the only law, with the ulama as its privileged guardians and interpreters. Although initially sympathetic to the Majlis and to legal limits on the powers of the monarch, he soon turned against the constitution and eventually became its principal clerical opponent and supporter of the shah’s attempt to restore absolutism, Nouri expressed strong doubts about the liberties and equalities specified in the constitution, such as freedom of expression which would include anti-religious expressions, compulsory education for girls and equality of non-Muslims with Muslims, all judged to be contrary to the Shari’a.
In 1347/1928 the Queen of Reza Shah, on a visit to the Shrine in Qom, unveiled her face during the proceedings, to general consternation. Ayatollah Bafqi, present at the shrine, sent a message to the Queen: ‘If you are not Muslim why did you come to the Shrine? If you are then why are you not veiled? When his message was ignored, Bafqi delivered a sermon denouncing the shah and inciting the crowd. In response, Reza shah personally went to Qom, entered the Shrine in his boots, horse whipped Bafqi and had him arrested.

Then Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1360/1941, when British and Russian forces occupied Iran and put an end to Reza’s attempted neutrality. He was succeeded by his young son, Mohammad Reza.

Any resistance or opposition from the clerics was forcibly repressed, with arrests and exile for recalcitrant clerks and the majority of the religious classes retired to passivity, watching developments with mounting alarm, but helpless to resist. In the end, it was Ayotollah Borujerdi who emerged in 1365/1946 after Reza Shah’s abdication as undisputed Chief Marja of Shi’i world, who worked out a Modus Vivendi with the state, based on the clergy keeping out of politics and opposition, but being assigned their niche in the religious institutions and general respect and dignity. In effect, the clergy under Ayatollah Borujerdi accepted the modern and secularized state and its culture, and the confinement of the religious sphere. Some, however, and certainly the then junior [Imam] Khomeini, were seething with resentment against secularization and the subordination of religion and the clergy, but biding their time and keeping within the confines of the Ayatollah Borujerdi regime.
The shrine cities in Iran and their ‘madrasa’ and religious culture continued to provide centers of autonomy for the ‘ulama’ and a means of perpetuating their institutions and discourses. The ‘ulama’ also found ready allies in the bazars (Markets), continued to pose challenges to the Pahlvis throughout their reign, despite repeated efforts to control and subordinate them. They were to be the major forces in the Revolution that ended that reign in 1400/1979.<sup>14</sup>

5.5 A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI:

Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born on 20 Jumada al-Thaniyah 1320/24 September 1902 in Khomein near Qom. He obtained religious education at Khamein. In early 1340/1921 he went to Arak for higher studies, and the following year the latter was invited to Qom to take charge of Madrasa-e-Fayziya. He completed his education by 1346/1927 and started teaching in the same madrasa.

Imam Khameini’s life can broadly be divided into two distinct phases:

(I) The first phase starts with his stay at Qom upto the early 1380/1960s,

(II) the second dates from early 1960s until his death in 1410/1989.

In the first phase of his life he looks like a scholarly person whereas in the second phase he emerged as a political leader. His stay at Qom coincided with the rise of Reza Shah to the power which was not liked by the clergy. Reza Shah was viewed by the clergy as an enemy who wanted to curb the power and prestige of the clergy. Imam Khomeini’s family belonged to that section of the clergy who did not like the
modernization of policies by Reza Shah. The anti-clergy measures of Reza Shah further increased grievances of the clerical class. However, Imam Khomeini followed politically a quietist line and associated himself with Shaykh Abdol Karim Ha’eri-Yazdi who disapproved ulama’s active participation in political affairs and emphasized the need of clerical involvement in educational and religious reforms. It is said that Imam Khomeini campaigned for the candidacy of Ayatollah Borujerdi for the post of 'marja’e taqlid'. Around this period, Imam Khomeini wrote Kashf al-Asrar which first appeared in 1360/1941. This book gives a clear picture of his thought of his period. In this book he attacked both the monarch and the modernist in strong terms.

Imam Khomeini was arrested on 1383/5 June 1963\(^{15}\). This led to the most violent confrontation between the regime and the people. This is regarded as the turning point and the foundations tone of the revolution of 1400/1979. He was again arrested in 1384/1964 and exiled in Turkey and after one year came to Najaf (Iraq) where he stayed upto 1399/1978. He continued his opposition to the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi from Najaf. During this period he came to be known as a leading marja-e taqlid. His most important work published under the title of Hokumat-e-Islami or Wilayat-i-Faqih. Then the Iraqi regime forced him to leave the country, so he went to Paris in 1399/October 1978 where he stayed till his triumphant return to Iran on 1 February 1979 to establish the first “Government of god on Earth”.

(a) **IMAM KHOMENEI AND WILAYAT I-FAQIH:**

The concept of Wilayat i-faqih (guardianship of jurisconsult) as conceived by Imam Khomeini constitutes an important aspect of
contemporary shi’i religio-political thought. It served as a major ideological justification for the legitimacy of the attempt of clergy to overthrow the Pahlavi regime and capture power and thus establish a theoretic state. In his theory of Wilayat i-faqih Imam Khomeini discusses the sources of the fuqaha’s authority, their right and duties and their status and role in the society. The basic points of Imam Khomeini’s interpretation in this regard is as follows: The ‘faqaha’ of Islam are the rightful successors of the Hidden Imam; they are designated as the deputies and successors of the prophet and Imams; they are the proofs (hujja) of Islam: Therefore they are responsible for those acts and duties for which the Prophet and Imams were sent. As the Prophet and Imams were appointed by God’s will and to execute it on earth, the fuqaha are also entrusted with the same two-fold task. The fuqaha inherit everything from the Imams except, of course, the supernatural qualities. The government of a faqih-e-‘adel (“just faqih”) is the only legitimate government on earth and the ulama should strive to establish such a government by overthrowing all other tyrant and unjust governments.

The doctrine of Wilayat i-faqih is only plausible and thinkable in the nation-state when the community of believers can be conceptualized as the ‘nation’. The concept of the nation is tied to the concept of citizenship which, unlike the passive ‘subject’ of dynastic Kingdom, is active in deciding and shaping the destiny of the nation, through political action of reform and even revolution. Imam Khomeini believed that ‘The People’ were the natural allies of the clergy in the defence of Islam and the establishment of the law. If only they could be awakened by the clergy and their agents and alerted to the dangers posed to Islam by imperialists and tyrants, they would rise to its defence. Islamic
'revolution' would inaugurate an Islamic 'republic', all these concepts are clearly borrowed from modern political vocabularies\textsuperscript{16}. 

(b) **THE PRINCIPLE OF WILAYAT I-FAQIH:** 

The principle of Wilayat i-faqih and its application in government has important implications for the relationship of the 'ulama' to government. It gives almost absolute power to the ruling 'faqih' and clerical associates. Indeed, in the case of Islamic Republic, clerics have assumed power positions in all the institutions of the state and the society. What are the implications, however, for the autonomy of the Senior 'Mujtahid' or marja's? We have seen that in the traditional system, each 'mujtahid' enjoyed undisputed authority over his followers who were free to choose which 'marja' to follow. The assumption of one senior cleric of state power, including that of legislation and ultimate ruling on any issue, puts the autonomy of what should be his peers in question. This was clearly perceived by the 'ulama', and many of them rejected the principle of Wilayat i-faqih. Some, such as Ayatollah shari’atmadari, openly in the political arena, others quietly in their writing and teaching. Ayatollah Golpaygani (d.1414/1993) apparently wrote to Imam Khomeini to say that what had happened between him and Shari’atmadari was up to God and history to Judge, but that, that was no way to treat a renewable cleric and was a threat to the sanctity of religion. This is clearly the view of many senior clerics in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, most of whom keep their traditional authority over their followers, collect the religious dues from them, and run their own schools and institutions, but mostly keep quiet about the polities of the Islamic Republic\textsuperscript{17}. 

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5.6 RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN IRAN:

The newly emerging trend of religious intellectualism led by Mohammad Mojtabah Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush, the pen-name for Hossein Dabbagh.

Between 1988-1990, Soroush published a series of articles on his Theory of "Contraction and expansion of Religious Knowledge" (Qabd va Bast-e-Te'urik-e Shari'at).

Arguing in this theory that any understanding of religious is human and thus time-bound, Soroush's theory successfully launched the thesis that no understanding of religion is ever sacred, absolute or final. Shabestari also has like this opinion. It laid the foundation of an epistemological pluralism that is the basis of any democratic pluralism. This theory and many related ideas written about and elaborated upon, became the turning point in the current religious discourse and nourished the mind and the language of the generation that was to bring about the political reform movement in the late 1990s. Religious intellectualism offers a non-ideological understanding of Islam that when translated into political discourse will only supported democracy and political pluralism.

The ideological discourse has a maximalist understanding of religion. It insists that the Shariah offers the comprehensive plan for felicity both in this life and the other including providing economic and political plans. The new discourse, however, has a minimalist understanding of religious laws pertaining to social life and questions the efficacy of the Shariah for governing the society. The new religious
discourse emphasizes the role of reason and rationality versus revolutionary emotionalism and blind imitation.

In the politically and ideologically charged atmosphere of the Islamic Republic of Iran, no one could put forward these during questions in a better and more effective manner than Soroush and Shabestari did.

The boost the religious reform movement received after Khatami's election was much expected. Khatami himself is among very few contemporary clerics who have shown an active interest in reconstructing religious though, and have contributed to the new religious intellectual movement.

Soroush argues that while Islam is based upon unchangeable principles, our interpretations of those principles can and must change from time to time. Therefore, no one can claim a monopoly over the "true" Islam. Thus, he has explicitly challenged the claim by the 'ulama' that they are in fact the guardians of the faith. Soroush advocates opening up the political process, maintaining that a true religious state is based on democracy. He insists that Islam can not and should not become an ideology serving the interest of a governing elite. Again, his proposition implicitly rejects the very notion of the Wilayat i-faqih, which is the foundation of the political system in Iran. Mohammad Mojtabih Shabestari as a reformist is a cleric with a theological training background from the seminaries who gradually separated himself from the traditionalists and joined the religious modernists camp in the second half of the 1990s. Engaging in rational theological debates. He also published articles in "Kiyan" and "Aftab" on topics such as reason and
revelation. His hermeneutical ideas also supported the possibility of multiple understandings of Islam. Advocating rationalization of the political order as a necessary step towards modernity, he questioned the jurisprudential reading of Islam and making it the base of government. Although Shabestari has more or less followed the same line of arguments as Soroush and has become a popular figure of the religious intellectual movement the hard liners have not harassed him.

He has criticize "Wilayat-e-Faqih" theory really considerable. He believes that Faqih's can govern people like others due to the needs of society. But it is not appropriate for them to think that they can do whatever they believe or like and consider themselves Godlike. His opinion is based on the fact that it is people rights to make decisions. He believes that "Wilayat-e-Faqih" theory is debatable religious judgment (Fatva) that is formed its political validity with people's opinions. While the advocates of Wilayat-e-Faqih consider it as a religious theory which is not interpretative. They consider political Fiqh as a legislative and management beliefs without considering its in completeness in this age. They try to interpret Islamic constitutions on the base of Fiqh. They have set aside people's political, social rights. They have also abandoned the votes of the people.
REFERENCES


2. On Iranian date 22 Bahman 1357 and also these 10 days were called Dahe-ye-Fajr (decades of Victory).


5. Ibid, p. 2164.


8. Ibid, P. 41

9. Ali Mirsepassi, P. 86


11. Hazrat-e Masumeh


15. 15 Khordad 1341 A.H. Sh. (an Iranian date)


17. Ibid, pp. 196-197.


19. Ibid,


Chapter 6
Development of Modern Political System in Pakistan, Indonesia and the Arab World
CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

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References.
PAKISTAN:

Official Name: Federal Republic

Capital: Islamabad

Population: 150,694,740 (July 2003 est.)

Independence: 14 August 1947 (from UK)

Chief of State: President Pervez Musharraf (since 20 June 2001)

Head of Government: Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz (since 2004)

Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindi 12%, Siraik 10%, Pashto 8%, Urdu (official 8%), Baluchi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1% Burushaki and others 8%

Religions: Sunni Muslim (77%), Shi'a Muslim 20%, Christian, Hindu and others 3%.

* India Yearbook 2005, p. 383
6.1 **PAKISTAN:**

This Muslim Country has 149,030,000 population according to official estimates at mid-year of 1424/2003\(^1\). Its president is the head of state and acts on the advice of the Prime Minister in Council of Ministers. He is elected by an electoral college, comprising the two chambers of the Federal Legislature and the four Provincial Assemblies, to serve for a term of five years. He must be a Muslim. The president may be impeached for violating the constitution or gross misconduct\(^2\). The Federal Legislature consists of the president, a lower and an upper house. The lower house, called the National Assembly, has 207 members elected directly for a term of five years, on the basis of universal suffrage (for adults over the age of 21 years), plus 10 members representing minorities. The upper house, called the Senate, has 87 members who serve for six years, with one-third retiring every two years. Each provincial assembly is to elect 19 Senators. The tribal areas are to return eight members and the remaining three are to be elected from the Federal Capital Territory by members of the Provincial Assemblies.

Two sessions of the National Assembly and the Senate are prescribed for each year with not more than 120 days between the last sitting of a session and first sitting of the next session.

The role of the Senate in an overwhelming majority of the subjects shall be merely advisory. Disagreeing with any legislation of the National Assembly, it shall have the right to send it back only once for reconsideration. In case of disagreement in other subjects, the Senate
and National Assembly shall sit in a joint session to decide the matter by a simple majority. Pakistan comprises the four provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, plus the federal capital and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Right now (February 2005) the Head of state is General Pervez Musharraf who was sworn in 20 June 2001 and his Prime Minister is Mr. Shaukat Aziz (since 2004).

6.1.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND:

The oldest history of Pakistan is traced back to Indus Valley civilization which existed 4000 years ago, while Muslim rule began with the arrival of Mohammad Qasim Thaqafi in the year 712AD, followed by Umayyad and Abbasid Rule which gave in to the petty dynasties and ultimately Delhi Sultanate (1206 – 1526 AD). It come under the Mughal Empire and remained a part of it till the end. Then the British ruled over most areas from 1256/1840s; it was separated from India to form a state for the Muslim majority in, 1367/1947; consisted of west Pakistan (Baluchistan, North-West frontier, west Punjab, Sindh) and East Pakistan (East Bengal), physically separated by 1610 Kms and it occupied Jammu and Kashmir, 1369/1949 and proclaimed an Islamic republic in 1376/1956; the differences arose between the East and the West, and Pakistan was engulfed into a civil war in 1391/1971; East Pakistan became an independent state (Bangladesh); the West Pakistan was ruled by – Z.A. Bhutto who dethroned by military coup by General Zia ul- Haq in 1398/1977, with execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto in 1400/1979; New Constitution (1378/1985) strengthened Zia’s powers; Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime Minister in 1409/1988 but
deposed in 1410/1990; Ethnic (Muslim/Sindh) violence, especially in Karachi took place in 1414/1994 and still going on once again a military coup occurred in 1999 and the coup leader, General Pervez Musharraf, was declared president in 1422/2001; Sensitive border area with Afghanistan, following the US-led anti-Taliban campaign, 2001, focusing on Afghan refugees. Pakistan pro-Taliban fighters, and Taliban escapees; ongoing tension with India over Kashmir, with some fighting, 2001, escalating into a major crisis, mid 1423/2002; governed by an elected president and a bicameral Federal Parliament.

6.1.2 MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH, (QUAID-I-AZAM), FATHER OF PAKISTAN:

The British ruled over the Indian subcontinent for nearly 200 years from 1170/1756 to 1367/1947. After the Indian Mutiny of 1247/1857, the British government abolished the powers of British East India Company, which had ruled the subcontinent on behalf of the British Crown, and took on direct powers of governance. Political reforms were initiated, allowing the formation of political parties. The Indian National Congress, representing the overwhelming majority of the people, was created in 1303/1885. The Muslim League was formed in 1324/1906 to represent and protect the position of the Muslim Minority in India when the British introduced constitutional reforms in 1327/1909, the Muslims demanded and required separate electoral rolls. This granted Muslims representation in the provincial as well as national legislatures until the down of independence in 1367/1947.

The idea of a separate Muslim state in South Asia was put forward in 1349/1930 by the poet and philosopher Sir Mohammad Iqbal.
He suggested that the North-Western provinces of British India and the native state of Jammu and Kashmir should be joined into such a state. The name “Pakistan, coined by the Rahmat Ali a great leader of Muslim League which came to be used to describe this grouping, is thought to have originated as a compound abbreviation made up of letters of the names of the provinces involved, as follow: Punjab, Afghania (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Indus-Sindh, and Baluchistan. An alternative explanation says the name means “Land of the pure”. By the end of the 1349/1930s, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Leader of the Muslim League and considered the founding father of Pakistan had also decided that the only way to preserve Indian Muslims from Hindu domination was to establish a separate Muslim state. In 1359/1940 the Muslim League formally endorsed the partitioning of British India and the creation of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. The British decided on 1367/August 15, 1947, transferred power dividedly to India and Pakistan.

6.1.3 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR:

This power has given higher degree of Militarian powerful to Pakistan and it has became as a more powerful Muslim country. With Bhutto in office, relations between India and Pakistan became more tense. Bhutto openly supported the Muslim rebels in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, who were involved in sporadic fighting against the Indian army. He also announced that Pakistan would continue with its nuclear weapons development programme, raising concerns that a nuclear arms race could start between Pakistan and India, which is believed to have had nuclear weapons since the 1390/1970s. In 1417/1996 the united
state of America returned to a policy of delaying delivery of military equipment to Pakistan owing to China having supplied nuclear-weapons-related materials in 1416/1995. In 1419/April 1998 Pakistan openly tested a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1500 Km (930 mi). Following five underground nuclear tests by India in 1419/May 1998, Pakistan responded within days with six nuclear tests. The events further heightened tensions between the two countries.

6.1.4 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERS OF PAKISTAN:

General Pervez Musharraf dissolved the Parliament following the military take over of 1420/12 October 1999, however, political parties have been allowed to operate; list of main political parties of Pakistan is given below:

1. Awami National Party (ANP) [Wali Khan]
2. Balochistan National Movement (BNM) [Dr. Hayee Baluch]
3. Baluch National Party (BNP) [Sardar Akhtar Mengal]
4. Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) [Akbar Khan]
5. Jamiat-al-Hadith (JAH) [Sajid Mir]
6. Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, Fazlur Rehman Faction (JUI)
7. Jamaiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) [Niazi Faction]
8. Millat party [Farooq Leghari]
9. Milli Yakjheti Council (MYC) is an organization which includes Jamaat-i-Islam or (JI) [Qazi Hussain Ahmed]
10. Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) [Sami ul-Haq]
11. Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP), [Allama Sajid Naqvi]
12. Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) [Noorani Faction]
13. Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), [Altaf Faction]
14. National People’s Party (NPP) [Ghulam Mustapha]
15. Pakhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) [Mohammad Khan Achakzal].
16. Pakistan Quami Party (PQP) [Mohammad Afzal Khan]
17. Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) [Tahir ul Qadri]
18. Pakistan Muslim Leage’ Junejo, Function group (PML/J) [Hamid Nasir]
19. Pakistan Muslim League (PML/N) [Nawaz Sharif Faction]
20. Pakistan National Party (PNP), [Hasil Bizenjo]
21. Pakistan people’s Party (PPP) [Benazir Bhutto], The PPP’s
collection to politicization of the country’s politics will
always be regarded as a notable achievement—Particularly in
the Punjab.8
22. Pakistan People’s Party/Shaheed Bhutto (PPP/SB) [Ghinva
Bhutto]
23. Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) [Imran Khan]

Political alliances in Pakistan can shift frequently.

However, the political parties in Pakistan may profess to believe
in democratic politics or in democracy as form of government, their
leadership has offered no proof of the truth of their claim9.
General Musharraf has had to withdraw his proposed amendments to the blasphemy law and modify the provisional constitutional order of 1420/1999, deleting Islamic provisions, due to sever opposition from such groups. His instructions to Madrassas to file detailed information about themselves are being observed in the breach and are as good as not being there. There is also an effort to control exhibition of weapons at meetings organized by extremist groups but it is also not making much headway. In the eyes of some such groups, Pakistan is not even an Islamic State since it does not conform to the government at Medina that existed under Prophet Muhammad and, therefore, it has no right to regulate activities dear to Islam such as Jihad (holy-war). The JL Chief, Qazi Hussain scaled new heights of opposition and bravado when he recently asked the corps commanders to overthrow Musharraf for having permitted Nawaz Sharif to go into exile.

There is pressure from western countries including USA, Russia and China upon Pakistan to control the Jehadi outfits in the country, as operatives trained at these institutions have been active against the interests of those countries. Evidence is yet to be available that the Pakistani establishment feels confident about responding to these approaches effectively. However, many Islamic groups are against the increasing pressures of foreign countries, especially USA.

Without the agreement of Islamic groups in Pakistan it will be difficult for any government there to work for an accommodation with India. The call for bilateral talks for the purpose under Tashkent and Simla agreements had failed to yield any results when the Islamic lobby
was not as powerful as today. In today’s environment shall be even more difficult.

6.1.6 FUTURE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN:

A Lahore newspaper published a brief report from Washington in January 2001 saying that a United State of America commission on National Security had made certain predictions about South Asia for the next quarter century, which saw Pakistan split as a result of war in Afghanistan. The commission saw India fighting a war with Afghanistan over the Taliban Policies, over Afghanistan’s Shia-Hazara population, drugs, the Wahabi interpretation of Islam, and over ‘sheer geo-strategic rivalry’. This Indo Afghan War is supposed to include Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, each seeking to absorb the Uzbek and Tajik minorities of Afghanistan.

According to the Commission, the collapse of nuclear Pakistan will start a competition between Iran and India over the territories of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan. There is a possibility of a ‘major’ Indo-Pakistan war after a military ‘miscalculation’. But India is seen as the new world power by the end of 25 years by reason of economic recovery and growth. Pakhtun is seen as dwindling economically till its various nationalities, the Pakistan, the Baluch, and the Muhajirs, being to seek their own separate states. Then the commission delivers the caveat that the conflicts predicted by it may not happen at all.

Iran’s economic and human indicators are also projected into the future. It is double the territorial size of Pakistan with only half as much population, which has been ‘capped’ effectively by official ‘Islamic’
contraception. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability in the years to come it will emerge as a regional power friendly to the Western World after its Islamic intensity, already on the wane in 1421/2000 is replaced by a reversion to its great ‘civilization’.

The next 25 years may see a ‘globalised’ South Asia with ‘provinces’ competing with one another economically in conditions of peace. The politics of Assam in India and Baluchistan in Pakistan are propelled by an awareness of resources, which can be ‘sold’ to the ‘federation’. As a reaction to these tendencies, both India and Pakistan are moving towards the view that provinces must be paid a fair price for resources used by the other provinces.

But developments dreaded by many may not come to pass. ‘Nuclear powers’ who collapsed economically in the past (USSR, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, North Korea, etc.) all accepted ‘reform’ of behaviour instead of ‘imploding’ and unleashing proliferation on scared world. After economic collapse, most nations concentrated their energies on the national economy and many emerged as powerful states ‘without’ nuclear weapons. The Japanese-German model of supremacy without arms seems to take hold in the beginning of 2000. But internal wars is also a pattern to emerge in Asia and Africa at the same time. The world is on the threshold of change. It is to be seem what direction it takes.

6.1.7 THE PUBLIC OPINION AND STATUS OF PRESS IN PAKISTAN:

the most influential. The daily newspaper with the largest circulation is ‘Daily Jang’. Although the English-language press reaches only a small percentage of the population, it is influential in political academic and professional circles. The four main press groups in Pakistan are ‘Jang Publications’ (The daily Jang, The News, The Daily News and the Weekly Akhbar-e-Jehan) the Dawn or Herald Group, the Nawa-i-Waqt group and the National Press Trust (Mashriq). The establishment of an independent press council was under consideration in 1425/200415.

In is important to note that despite military regimes the newspapers of Pakistan have been largely free and outspoken. Of course sometimes they have to obey orders of the rulers, but they succeeded in forming or at least influencing the public opinion. The ruling classes also realized the power and prestige of big newspaper and tried to appear than of their leaders in various ways. A free press is, of course, a weaker of public opinion.
INDONESIA:

Official Name: Republic

Capital: Jakarta

Population: 234,893,453 (July 2003 est.)

Independence: 17 August 1945

Chief of State: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Since October 2004)

Head of Government: The president in both the chief of State and head of government.

Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official), English, Dutch

Religions: Muslim 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist 1%, others 1%.

* Yearbook 2005, p. 317
6.2 INDONESIA:

6.2.1 INDONESIA; RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY:

The Republic of Indonesia consists of group of about 18,108 islands and its population according UN estimates at mid year of 1423/2002, was 217,131,000^16.

Indonesia was formerly the Netherlands East Indies. Dutch occupation began in the 17th century and gradually extended over the whole archipelago. Nationalist opposition to colonial rule began in the early 20th century. During the second World War the territory was occupied by Japanese forces (3 years). In 1365/1945 a group of nationalists proclaimed independence of Indonesia. The first president of the self-proclaimed republic was Dr. Sukarno (1901-1970), a leader of the nationalist movement since 1339/1920. The declaration of independence was not recognized by the Netherlands, which attempted to restore its per-war control of the Islands. After four years of intermittent warfare and negotiations between the Dutch authorities and the nationalists, agreement was reached on a formal transfer of power. On 27th December 1949 the United States of Indonesia became legally independent, with Sukarno continuing as president. Initially, the country had a federal Constitution, which gave limited self-government to the 16 constituent regions. In 1370/August 1950, however, the federation was dissolved, and the country became a unitary Republic of Indonesia. The 1369/1949 independence agreement excluded West New Guinea (Subsequently Irian Java and known as Papua from 1 January 2002), which remained under Dutch control until 1382/ October 1962^17.
6.2.2 POLITICAL VIEWS OF SUKARNO AND HIS SUCCESSOR SUHARTO:

The State's first president, Sukarno (1949-70), who called himself 'a convinced nationalist, a convinced Muslim, a staunch Marxist', urged, like Ataturk, that Islam should remain a private religion. Both Sukarno and his successor Suharto regarded Islam with considerable apprehension and caution, and tried to maintain Indonesia as a secular state in which the political activities of religious groups were strictly regulated. As a result the state managed to check Muslim political ambitions while rural Ulama, reformers, and modernists continued to present a variety of Islamic opinion and practice to Indonesia's Muslims.

Sukarno followed a policy of extreme nationalism, and his regime became increasingly dictatorial. His foreign policy was sympathetic to the people's Republic of China but under his rule, Indonesia also played a leading role in the Non-aligned Movement.

In 1387/February 1967 Sukarno transferred full power to Suharto, and he became Prime Minister in October 1967 and in 1968 he became president and re-elected to the presidency in 1393/ March 1973.

During 1405/1984 suharto's attempt to introduce legislation requiring all political, social and religious organizations to adopt 'Pancasila', the five-points state Philosophy (belief in a Supreme humanitarianism; national unity; democracy by consensus and social justice) as their only ideology encountered opposition.
6.2.3 POLITICAL TRANSITION IN POST-SUHARTO PERIOD:

The downfall of Suharto in 1419/ May 1998 was celebrated as heralding the birth of a ‘new Indonesia’, and a ‘second independence’ from the oppressive rule of their own ruler and its worst manifestation in the form of “Cronyism, corruption and collusion” (KKN). The change brought a rising expectation and a hope that it would usher in a new era of democracy in Indonesia, as well as good governance, transparency and accountability of its new leaders21.

Mark Malloch Brown, head of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) considers Indonesia’s current problems as a ‘democratic birth-pains problem’ when he says that one can not expect” … this government to solve all the problems. A first government elected under these circumstances has a double crisis. It lacks the legitimacy and the consensus within its own rank to take certain bold decisions, yet, on the other hand, because it is the first democratic government there is a huge crisis of expectations … it is caught between those weak capacities and those huge aspirations for it22.

The government that took over in 1420/October 1999 under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri as president and Vice-president respectively, was a legitimate one, the result of a fair election and Parliamentary process and was committed to an inclusive style of policy-making, economic recovery and national unity. Under their leadership, Indonesia was becoming more liberal and humane in many ways as the harsh policies of the Suharto’s 32 years of rule were overturned23.
Until 1421/August 2000, Wahid's government was based on compromises and included a hodge-podge (Indonesian gado-gado) of reformers, holdovers from Suharto's ruling Golkar, and representatives of the military. After sideling the military and consolidating democracy, Wahid's government was under increasing pressure to speed up economic reforms or risk losing the fragile gains in stability it had achieved. Political parties that have been formed in the post-Suharto era have not been able to overcome the shortcomings of the old party system characterized by narrow sectarian interest and lack of organizational capacity. They still rely for the societal support on their leaders rather than on collective action based on party-building, elite recruitment and constructive programme and action at the grassroots level. All three new major political parties - Partai Demokracy Indonesia (PDI) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) are known not by their disciplined organizational party machinery which is able to mediate the interests of their supporters, but their charismatic leaders- Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, respectively. The process of 'reinvention' and democratization, therefore, was going to be long and difficult- until the time when the political parties of Indonesia will be able to transform themselves from 'Partai takoh' (Parties of Prominent individuals) to parties with disciplined cadres and committed members based on organized collective behaviour.24

In the broader picture of Indonesia politics, they might not have made a major imprint as yet because of the miniscule size of such groups. Seen from a longer perspective, however, the emergence of such citizens watch groups will go a long way not only in the creation of
healthy civil society, but also in laying the foundations for grass root democracy in Indonesia.

6.2.4 STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

Indonesia has a considerable geo-strategic importance and a significant economic potential. Its stability and prosperity are in Germany and Europe’s interest. With a population more than 210 million people it is the fourth most populous country and after Suharto’s downfall—also the third-largest democracy in the world after India and United state of America. As more than 80% of Indonesian are Muslims, that makes it the biggest Muslim country worldwide. Undoubtedly, Indonesia’s democratization has made progress after Suharto’s departure. There were free elections, Parliament has become more active then before, decentralization legislation was passed, and freedom of the press exists. However, Indonesia is still being considered to be in a lengthy period of high instability and prone to crisis. Conflicts are caused on ethnic, Social, religious, and political grounds. They are often instrumentalized by political interest and justified on a religious basis.

6.2.5 THE PRESS AND ITS ROLE:

In 1411/August 1990 the government announced that censorship of both the local and foreign press was to be relaxed and that the authorities would refrain from revoking the licences of newspapers that violated legislation governing the press. In practice, however, there was little change in the Government’s policy towards the press. Following
the resignation of president Suharto in 1419/May 1998, the new Government undertook to allow freedom of expression.27

6.2.6 THE ROLE OF TELEVISION:

In 1410/March 1989 Indonesia’s first private commercial television station began broadcasting to the Jakarta area. In 1417/1996 there were five privately-owned television stations in operation.28

6.2.7 PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND REFORM NEEDS:

It became obvious through the Asian economic crisis that it is the political, legal and economic order, which, in the long term, decides on the prosperity of nations.

After 32 years of authoritarian regime, however, Indonesia lacks almost entirely functioning, stable institutions. It is a potentially rich country, but without institutions that generate prosperity. Its natural wealth disappears through inefficiencies and other problems. Therefore, the country needs at the same time stabilization and the determined building up of a political system characterized by freedom, democracy and rule of law. Conflict prevention and internal peace, continuation of the democratization efforts especially on the local level (provinces, regions), legal reform, economic recovery within a social market economy based on competition which makes prosperity for all possible—these are core elements of the reform needs, in Indonesia. For this reason the country needs a competent, democratically minded political leadership.
The development of a workable political system is an institutional, collective and individual learning process that needs time. Additionally, an ethical and moral transformation process is necessary in Indonesia in order to come to terms with the burdens of the past and to prevent possible future conflicts.

6.2.8 Head of State Government of Indonesia:

1. 1949 – 56 (Ahmed) Sukarno
2. 1966 – 98 Suharto
3. 1998 – 99 Habibie
4. 1999 – 2001 Abdurrahman Wahid
5. 2001 –2004 Miss Megawati Sakarnoputri
6. 2004-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

6.2.9 Versatile 'S-B-Y' Inaugurated as Country's First Directly Elected President

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – known to his countrymen simply as S-B-Y took office on 4 October 2004. He is a man of contrasts. A general and his country's one-time security chief, Yudhoyono is respected for his intellectual bent and cautious decision-making style. He made a name for himself with his antiterrorism efforts and then established himself as a popular leader in a country whose 238 million (2004 est.). People make it the world's largest Islamic-majority state. Yudhoyono has singled out. The economy, corruption and terrorism as his first priorities.
Yudhoyono can be expected to be as friendly toward the united state as political prudence permits in a country where tens of thousands have demonstrated against the U.S.-led war in Iraq. He studied in American Universities and received training from the U.S. Military\textsuperscript{30}.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a new President of Indonesia and his stance regarding political reformation.

We will reinforce our security services, police and immigration in recognition of terrorist activity. We should demolish corruption fully in both structural and cultural ways. I have mentioned the police and public prosecutor to scrutinize all the corrupted files as quickly as possible. We have forbidden to use the army for our political or other purposes, because it disturbs the trend of the improvement of democracy. Nowadays, in Indonesia, the violence of human rights has been decreased by the army. If it is seen in some parts like "Acheh" or "West Popna, at attempt will be made to held military courts. We have the opportunity to make the new policy to end the struggle in "Acheh".

He remarks in response to the question of: Do you enjoy being a President?

Yes, why not, it is a responsibility for me, not an entertainment, it is a mission, a challenge and also a learning. There is a lot of problems that I should face them\textsuperscript{31}. 

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6.3 **THE ARAB WORLD:**

What is the exact commutation of ‘The Arab World’?

The Arabic-speaking peoples are searching for identity. Even since World War II, they have talked of unity while remaining as separated as ever; they have spoken of one “Arab Nation”, while acting as a dozen different nations. The only things which they have in common are language, religion and culture.

One of the factors which separate; the Arabic-speaking countries is the form of government. There are monarchies, republics, dictatorships, Para-democracies, and small sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf, which defy classification. Other, the degree of education and general attitude toward the modern world. Countries like Lebanon and Egypt, which have numerous universities and attitudes within comparative to Yaman and Iraq and also in the area of economic the United Arab of Emarates to compare with Bahrain and Iraq.

After World War II, two factors kept the possibility of unity alive among the Arab countries:

1. Israel, that its establishment enraged all of the Arabic Speaking people and countries.

2. The appearance of a popular and charismatic leader in the person of Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Photographs of Nasser could be seen in practically in every Arab Market place, home, and tent from Yaman to Moracco.
6.3.1 Syria and Arab World:

The history of Arabic-speaking countries of the Fertile crescent during the quarters of a century after war II is in part the story of the reaction of each country to Israel and to the leadership of Nasser, carried on in a context of an inter-Arab cold war. Syria is one of the best examples of the Arabs’ desire for unity and their difficulties in achieving it. Syria can rightly claim to be the home of modern Arab nationalism. The division of Ottoman “Syria” into four independent countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine), with the latter of them an alien implant, has never been accepted by ardent Syrian nationalists.

In the relatively free elections which took place after the coup of 1374/1954, the Ba’th (Resurrection) party gained 15 Seats. This was not very impressive, but in the light of the role the party played in Syria it was quite significant. The Ba’th party was created (by Michel Aflaq) in 1373/1953 from a fusion of two parties which had been Pan-Arab and socialist in their orientation; the party was led by Michel Aflaq, a Christian and Salah al-Bitar, a Muslim. Ba’histis became influential and organized branches in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. The main rival of the Ba’th in Syria, in organization, ideology, and influence, was the communist Party.

Right now the policy of Syria in the inside country, is like the period of Hafiz Asad, the father of Bashar Asad, present president, both being elected as a single candidate for life. On other hand their foreign policy had not undergone any change, as it opposed Israel and has good
relationship with USA and very good relationship with Iran and other Muslim Countries. But during the war between Iran and Iraq, the relationship between Syria and Iraq became strained because the Syrians took the side of Iran.

6.3.2 Iraq and Arab World:

Arab nationalist rhetoric certainly formed part of their official credo and was adhered to as an ideal by a considerable number of Ba’thists and others in Iraq. However, the men in command showed themselves to be as jealous of Iraqi sovereignty and thus preoccupied with the organization of power within the territorial state, as had any of their predecessors. With the great increase in the government’s revenues after the oil price rises of the 1390/1970’s the trend of placing Iraq first was ever move marked. The Arab world came to be seen by the regime as a stage on which Iraq could assert its own primacy and thereby the supremacy of the leader of Iraq, adding to the stature of the dominant figure of Saddam Husain.

The emergence of Saddam Husain and his construction of a dictatorship demanding obedience and using violence on a scale unmatched in Iraq’s history are the dominant themes of the politics of this period. The factors, which made it possible, as well as its consequences for Iraqi’s political life, do not suggest a radical break with the past. On the contrary, the methods Saddam Husain has used, some of the values he espouses and the political logic of the system that he has established in Iraq have all been prefigured in previous regimes to varying degrees.\textsuperscript{34}
The dictatorship of the more than past thirty years has been in part the result of just such competitive and ruthless struggles, conducted with a view to excluding and suppressing alternatives in the shaping of the history of Iraq\textsuperscript{35}.

In 1401/1980, Saddam had countered the potential threat of an expansionist revolutionary Islam by invading Iran. With the support of moderate Arab States, the United States, and Europe, and heavily financed by the Gulf States, Saddam Husain became the defender of Gulf Arabs against Iran. Thus, Iraq received economic and military support from its allies, who conveniently overlooked Saddam’s use of chemical warfare against the Kurds and the Iranians and Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

6.3.3 SADDAM’S AGGRESSIVE ARAB NATIONALISM:

Two years after the Iran–Iraq truce of 1409/1988, The politics of the Gulf and of the Middle East had been reversed. Saddam Hussain did what his Gulf patrons had earlier paid him to prevent. Having turned back the threat to the Gulf from Iran, he overran Kuwait and confronted his Gulf\textsuperscript{26} neighbors in the name of Arab nationalism and Islam. Ironically, he accomplished this with a military machine paid for in large part by the tens of billions of dollars Kuwait and the Gulf States had poured into Iraq and the weapons and Technology provided by the Soviet Union, Germany, and France. Even more ironically, Saddam attempted to legitimate his “naked aggression” not only in the name of Iraqi nationalism, but also in the name of Arab nationalism and Islam. Saddam simultaneously sought to appropriate or claim the historic roles of ‘Nebuchadnezzar’, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and Salahuddin Ayyubi\textsuperscript{37}. 
While Saddam Husain failed to win the support of the leadership in the Arab world, he enjoyed a degree of popular support often not fully appreciated in the west, where the tendency was to focus on those governments that supported the USA initiative and to equate the position of these Arab rulers with that of their people. As a result, little distinction was made between the differing perspectives of Western nations supported by their Arab allies and the views of a significant portion of the populace whose deep-seated grievances and frustrations were given a new voice and champion in Saddam Husain.

At last the wrong policy of Saddam opened the political space and military opportune for the west especial America and England that attacked Iraq and occupied it and so became dangerous to Islamic countries especially Iran that has border with Iraq.

6.3.4 The Israeli – Arab wars:

Wars between Arabs and Israelis have taken place from the day the state of Israel was implanted by the West on the land of Palestine in 1368/May 1948, dominating the headlines and featuring prominently in books about Israel. The balance sheet, after more than fifty years of Israeli-Arab conflict, indicates that on the battlefield there has been no clear victor-neither Arab nor Israel.

For the Middle East in general, and for the people of Palestine in particular, 1368/1948 was clearly a turning point. It was the year in which the British Mandate for Palestine terminated, a Jewish state called Israel was established. Thousands of Arab Palestinians became refugees in their own home, and regular armed forces of Transjordan, Egypt,
Syria and other Arab countries entered Palestine-Israel and clashed with Israel forces. Thus began the first all-out Arab-Israel war which-like the civil war which preceded it-revolved around land\textsuperscript{39}. In that war Israel held ground and even defeated Egypt and Lebanon. But the Jordanians and Syrians did well and in the War 1377/1967 defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In the 1393/October 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egypt and Syria managed to win an important battle in the initial phase of the conflict but were later forced to yield their gains to the victorious Israelis. Then, during the years of the “Intifada”, Israel failed to contain the disturbances, and the Palestinians uprising which began in 1408/1987 was ended temporarily after the singing of Oslo agreement in 1414/1993, only to start again with much more ferocity in 1421/2000. Wars, however, are a clash not only of arms but of words, and if, as we have just stated, there was no victor on the battlefield. There was indeed a clear victor in the war of words-Israel\textsuperscript{40}.

During the first decades of the state, Israel was the gathering place of Jewish immigrants from the four corners of the earth, and rather than a homogeneous society it was an assembly of communities and diverse people, some of whom were still ‘adding up the grocery bill in Arabic; others dreaming in Yiddish and singing to their children lullabies in English or Russian\textsuperscript{41}.

In 1408/1987, two thirds of Israelis stated that they would not support social services cuts in order to increase the defence budget, and in 1413/1992 only 24 per cent of Israelis said they would be willing to finance increased defense spending. These changes in the environment and within Israeli society were significant in that they had a strong effect
on the attitudes and behaviour of Israelis and their willingness to fight in wars and pay for them. Indeed, the perception of a decreasing external threat, the disappearance of the Holocaust generation and a shift from collective ideals and priorities to individual ones, meant that a more confident Israeli nation, less fearful for its very existence and less traumatized and haunted by its past, was also showing itself to be less single-minded and more reluctant to take up arms and sacrifice, as was clearly demonstrated in Lebanon in 1403/1982 and during the years of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories between 1408/1987 and 1414/1993; and as of 2000,\(^42\) and now (2004).

Unfortunately Israel's government essentially lives with fight and does not know any right for Muslim society and continues to its criminals with supporting from the western countries especially America and united European also fear of her in her policy.

6.3.5 SAUDI ARABIA:

In 1420/ January 1999, Saudi Arabia celebrated a hundred years of 'unification, stability and renaissance' under the leadership of the Al-Sa’ud. Having successfully weathered a major attack in the early 1411/1990s, this leadership invited the population and the outside world to celebrate its success. The religious foundation of the state was seriously undermined by the propagation of and emphasis on state narratives that glorified the role of Ibn Sa’ud in creating Saudi Arabia. The centennial celebrations emphasized discontinuity with the past, as the foundation of Saudi Arabia was given the continuous date of 1320/1902.
According to official narratives, Saudi Arabia was born with the capture of Riyadh. In reality, the formation of the Sa’udi state cannot be attributed to any single event or date. Rather, it has been the function of social and political developments throughout the last century. It is tempting to view the formation of this state as a continuous and progressive process. The state has been an evolving structure, something that is destined to continue in the future.

6.3.6 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND RELATION WITH THE USA:

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with no legislature or political parties. Constitutionally, the King rules in accordance with the ‘Shari’a’, the sacred law of Islam. He appoints and leads a council of Ministers, which serves as the instrument of royal authority in both legislative and executive matters. Therefore, the foreign policy and relationship with countries belong to this authority. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the USA were placed under renewed strain in 1423/August 2002 after a group representing 900 relatives of victims of the September 2001 attacks filed a civil suit in Washington, DC, against Senior Saudi Ministers and institutions seeking compensation amounting to US$ 1,000,000 m. for their alleged funding of al-Qa’ida activities. Saudi investors reacted angrily to the suit, Threatening in response to withdraw from the USA some $750,000m, in Saudi investments. In late 2002 Saudi Arabia was criticized by the USA for ignoring the funding of alleged terrorist organizations by Saudi nationals, and in November USA media reports claimed that a charitable
donation from the Saudi royal family had assisted two ‘hijachers’ responsible for the Suicide attacks on the USA.

Despite the tensions between Saudi Arabia and the USA, in September 2002, following intense pressure from the USA and the United Kingdom, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated that Saudi Arabia might be prepared to approve the use of military bases in Saudi Arabia for a future US-led attack on Arab and Muslims Countries. In 1424/January 2003 Saudia Arabia attempted to secure support for a plan to persuade Saddam Hussain to relinquish power and go into exile in order to avert a US-led war to oust his regime. On 1425/21 April 2004 a car bomb exploded near one of the headquarters of Riadh’s security services, killing four people and wounding up to 150. A militant Islamist group called the ‘al-Haramain Brigades’ (and alleged to have links to al-Qa’ida) claimed responsibility for the attack. Earlier in the month all non-essential US diplomatic personnel, had been ordered to leave the Kingdom after another spate of terrorist attacks and several foiled suicide-bombing attempts. In these days USA shifted her military base from Saudi Arabia to Qatar as a Muslim country in Persian Gulf.

6.3.7 THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE):

In 1382/1962, in an address given before the Royal Central Asian Society in London, J.E.H. Boustead remarked that life in Abu-Dhabi had changed very little during the past two centuries. While this observation might have applied in 1382/1962, it would never hold ground today. The radical transformation of Abu Dhabi can only be
classified as one of the Phenomena of the modern era, so rapid and fundamental has it been.

This alternation would not, of course, have been possible without the discovery of vast oil reserves, underground and offshore, which are currently bringing thousands of millions of dollars a year into the Sheykdom. Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial states remained in the background of international affairs, still under the aegis of Britain. Since the end of World War II, their internal development had come under greater scrutiny from the British Government, as oil exploration began to be taken seriously again.

With this new policy of participation in local affairs came a reorganization of British administration. In keeping with the pre-War decision, the political residency for the Gulf was moved from Bushire to Bahrain, in 1366/1946. The office of Residency agent in Sharjah was abolished in 1369/1949, and from 1348/1929 to 1373/1953, when a political agency for the Trucial Coast was set up, a permanently resident political Officer was appointed from the Foreign Office in London. The Political Agent, with headquarters in the burgeoning town of Dubai, assumed much greater responsibility and authority than any former British representative on coast had done, and acceptance of his role became a precondition for British recognition of the rulers.

In 1388/ January 1968 the United Kingdom announced its intention to withdraw British military forces from the area by 1391/1971. In 1388/ March 1968 the Trucial states joined nearby Bahrain and Qatar (which were also under British protection) in what was named the Federation of Arab Emirates. It was intended that the
Federation should become fully independent, but the interests of Bahrain and Qatar proved to be incompatible with those of the smaller Sheykhdoms, and both seceded from the Federation in 1391/August 1971 to become Separate independent states. In July six of the Trucial states (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ummal-Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah) had agreed on a federal constitution for achieving independence as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ras al-Khaymah joined the union in 1392/February 1972. The provisional constitution was extended for five-years periods in 1397/1976, 1402/1981, 1407/1986, and 1412/1991.

6.3.8 GOVERNMENT OF UAE:

The highest Federal authority is the Supreme Council of Rulers, comprising the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates, each of whom is virtually an absolute monarch in his own domain. Decision of the Supreme Council require the approval of at least five members, including the rulers of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. From its seven members, the Supreme Council elects a president and a Vice-President. The president appoints the Prime Minister and The Federal Council of Ministers, responsible to the Supreme Council, to hold executive authority; the legislature is the Federal National Council, a consultative assembly (comprising 40 members appointed for two years by the emirates) which considers laws proposed by the council of Ministers. There are no political parties. Once, the Head of state was president Sheykh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (ruler of Abu Dhabi) had taken office as president of the UAE on 2 December 1971; re-elected 1976; 1981, 1991, 1996 and 2 December 2001 up to 2004 and he died on 3
November 2004 and his successor is Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan.

6.3.9 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND RULING FAMILIES OF UAE:

In 1414/1993 the most important political figures in the UAE were the senior members of the ruling families of the individual amirates. The Al-Nuyayyan family of Abu Dhabi, the Al-Nuaimi of Ajman, the Al-Sharqi of Al-Fujayrah, the Al-Maktum of Dubai, the Al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al-Mualla of umm al-Qaywayn. The most powerful amir is Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the president of the UAE. He has ruled Abu Dhabi since 1386/1966, when his elder brother, Shaykh Shakhbut was deposed by the British. Shaykh Zayid designated his son, Shaykh Khalifa as crown prince, one son was a colonel in the Union defence force air force, and several of his cousins were prominent in government, especially the sons of his cousin Mohammad ibn Khalifa.

The relative political and financial of each emirate is reflected in the allocation of positions in the federal government. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, whose emirate is the UAE’s major oil producer, is president of the UAE. The ruler of Dubai, which is the UAE’s commercial center and a significant oil producer, is Vice-President and Prime Minister.

Since achieving independence in 1391/1971, the UAE has worked to strengthen its federal institutions. Nonetheless, each emirates still retains substantial autonomy, and progress toward greater federal integration has slowed in recent years. A basic concept in the UAE Government’s development as a federal system is that a significant percentage of each
emirate’s revenues should be devoted to the UAE Central budget. The UAE has no political parties, there is talk of steps toward democratic government, but nothing concrete has emerged. The rulers hold power on the basis of their dynastic position and their legitimacy in a system of tribal consensus. Rapid modernization, enormous strides in education, and the influx of a large foreign population have changed the face of the society but have not fundamentally altered this traditional political system. As of 2004, UAE have been accused by several human rights organizations of acting in contravention of the Universal Development of Human Rights in the country’s failure to allow freedom of expression.

The Barnabas Fund organization cites that the Dubai emirate removed the right of appeal against deportation by expatriates accused of ‘religious crimes’; such as trying to convert a Muslim to another religion. Amnesty International lists further problems relating to human rights on its website, such as the mass detainment of 250 persons related to the United States – led war on Terror, the ill-treatment of prisoners in prison, and the continued use of flogging and the death penalty.

6.3.10 YASSER ARAFAT AS A ARAB PALESTINIAN POLITICIAN:

He was born in 1348/1929 in Jerusalem, and helped to form the al-Fath movement, emerging as its leader in 1388/1968. The Chairman of the ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in 1389/1969 and Commander –in-Chief of the Palestine Revolutionary Forces in 1391/1971. He attended all-Arab Sammit Conferences, and in 1394/1974 was invited to address the United Nation General Assembly. When he rejected military
violence, recognized the existence of the state of Israel, and called for a political solution to the Palestine problem. Although excluded from the ‘peace-process’ initiated by the USA in 1413/1992, he remained a key-figure behind the negotiations between Israel, Syria, and Palestinians. In 1414/1993 he signed a peace accord with Israel, in which Israel agreed to withdraw its troops from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to give up terrorism. He, along with Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1415/1994. He was elected President of the newly formed Palestinian National authority in 1417/1996 and still he hold the office. He died on 11 November, 2004 and succeeded him Mahmood Abbass (Abu Mazen) in recent election.

6.3.11 LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (ARAB LEAGUE):

It is an organization of Arab states, founded in Cairo, Egypt in 1365/1945 and its members in 1412/1991 were: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djiboti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. An annexe to the League’s Charter stipulates that Palestine is considered as an independent state and as a full member of the Arab League. The principal aims of the League are to protect the independence and sovereignty of its members, and to strengthen the ties between them by encouraging co-operation in different fields. In 1411/1990 the league narrowly approved a proposal to dispatch Arab forces to support the US-led coalition against Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, but the conflict exposed serious divisions among members. The League supported the
peace accord between Israel and the PLO in 1414/1993 but decided to uphold the boycott of Israel until it withdraws from all the occupied territories\textsuperscript{58}.

6.3.12 GULF CO-OPERATION CONCIL (GCC) AND ITS RANKS:

It is an organization of Arab Gulf States, established in 1402/1981 to promote regional co-operation. The GCC has six members: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudia Arabia with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. Initially seeking to encourage collaboration in economic, social, and cultural affairs, the GCC later extended its scope to cover common security problems, and in 1405/1984 set up a joint defence force. It supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). The organization’s failure to offer any decisive response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1411/1990 led to suggestions that it be strengthened and expanded. After the Gulf-War ceasefire in February 1991, the GCC countries joined with Egypt and Syria in agreeing to set up an Arab peace force as part of a broader plan to strengthen regional security\textsuperscript{59}. 

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57. Ibid.


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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Suggestions
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The teaching of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) abolished the inequalities of races and classes and brought to human beings a modern teachings specially political system and moreover, the Prophet himself exercised all powers, spiritual as well as temporal and others, in the community which he had organized into a state and endowed with all its organisms. Thus cumulation of powers was passed in heritage, after his death, to his successors in the state, with this difference that these successors were not Prophets, and so did not receive the Divine revelations. The Prophet Muhammad had always insisted on the necessity of community life, and he went so far as to declare that, “Whoever died without knowing his imam (Caliph) dies in Paganism”. 

In the time of prophet, there were individuals and even groups of Muslims, who lived voluntarily or under constraint, outside the frontiers of the Islamic state, for example in Abyssinia, and in Mecca (before its conquest by the prophet). Some of the non-Muslim regions did not know religious tolerance, and prosecuted the Muslims (as in the City-State of Mecca and the Byzantine empire). Others, like in Christian Abyssinia, practiced a liberal policy in matters of conscience. The Caliph inherited from the Prophet the exercise of the double power, spiritual-temporal, and he presided over the celebration of the service of worship in the mosque, and he was the head of the state in temporal affairs (chapter one).

The Quran speaks of kings, both good and bad, and never refers to other forms of government, such as a republic. The form of government thus established was intermediary between hereditary
monarchy and a republic - the Caliph was elected for life. If the fact of election makes it resemble a republic, the duration of the power was like that of monarchy. From the very beginning, there have been dissidents to the elected caliphs; later there have been even rival claimants and these caused bloodshed in the community from time to time.

Later, power was held by some dynasty, thus came the Umayyads, who in their turn were replaced by the ‘Abbasids’; these latter did not succeed in obtaining the homage of the far-off province of Spain, where independent dynasties of Muslim rulers exercised sovereign powers, without, however, daring to assume the title of “Caliph” and by name of Islam (Chapter one).

Political experimentation and practices of the Prophet and his successor paved the way of theorization and the scholars of later countries developed on their basis a whole political system of Islam. Most prominent of the theoretical traditions of Philosophy and politics by Al- Farabi and Avicenna and later by Ibn Khaldun and Khawja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and soon with their challenges on the political theory that borrowed from Philosopher king of plato and Republic from Aristotle and then established their political theory of “Madina Fadilah” and did good researches on political system of Islam. Specially the details of Ibn-Khaldun of “group feeling” and many other things were also very useful. Moreover some of them like Avicenna and Nizamul Mulk Tusi: entered in polity and they did practical experimentations and wrote their experiences of political activities.

Farabi in his political philosophy looking at the ideal republic of Plato merges into ‘The Philosopher as ruler’, and he endows his ‘prince’
with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is plato in the metal of the Prophet. Farabi divides the regimes into three broad types, the "ignorant" regimes (Medina al-jahilah), "Wicked" or "immoral" regimes and the regimes whose citizens have acquired certain opinions about these things but false or corrupt opinions. Then he concentrated on virtuous city (Medinah al-Fadilah). The political Philosophy of Aviccenna also and essentially Farabian and rests on the theory of Prophet hood and revelation. Al-Ghazzali proposed a sincere loyalty to the caliphate, recognizing the legitimacy of Abbasid rule. He argued that caliphs and Sultans had to co-operate to bring peace and safety to the Muslim empire. Ibn Bajjah accepted al-Farabi's division of the state into perfect and imperfect and Ibn Tufail's point of view is individualistic.

Ibn Khaldun's socio-political theory based upon the concepts of al-'asabiyah (group-feeling) and al-mulk (royal authority) and the idea of al-mustabid (despot); and he says the group feeling is necessary and good if to be used in the case of Allah. He also says; that royal authority is the natural goal of group feeling. Of the later Islamic philosophers, Khwajah Nasir details his political Philosophy in his book (Akhlaq-i-Nasiri) which belong the politics of cities. He also discusses the institution of philosopher/ Vazir. At last Nizam al-Mulk Tusi shows his political philosophy in his book (Siasat Nameh). (Chapter two).

The Turks, when converted to Islam, brought a new element. First they furnished soldiers and commanders who became the real governing power in the state. Side by side with the caliphs, there appeared a "commander of the commanders", and later a "sultan", and the state authority became divided and administration went into the hands of the Sultan who governed in the name of the Caliph. This period was at
medieval experiment of the Ottoman dynasty in the name of Islam, the same Ottoman dynasty had also two medieval counterparts, namely, the Safavids of Iran as a Shia state and the Mughals of India. Anyway, these three daynasties were most powerful and took their powers from Islam and ruled in the name of Islam by different methods in their areas (Chapter three). The Fatimid Caliphate of Cairo disappeared first, and this Kingdom was acquired by a dynasty of Turkish-Kurdish governors, who recognized the caliphate of Baghdad. When the later was devastated by the Pagan Tartars, the Seat of the caliphate was moved to Cairo. Later the Ottoman Turks conquered Egypt, and abolished the neo-‘Abasid dynasty of Caliphs there. The Turkish Istanbul (The city of Islam) and the Mughal Delhi (India) also pretended to be champions of the caliphate and the Safavids of the Imamat: but, however big their empires might have been, their claims were recognized only inside their respective jurisdictions. The Mughals were removed from their Indian power by the British; the Turkish Ottoman also by the British and Safavids by Qajar (with the support of the British).

The modern experiments in Muslim World are available in more than 55 countries like Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and Arab World that we have explained about their perspective in chapters four, five and six give us a clear understanding of political authority and leadership, therefore we can say; Islam attaches no importance to the external form of government. It is Satisfied if the well-being of man in both the worlds is aimed for, and the Divine law applied. Thus the constitutional questions take a secondary place. Thus, a republic, like Egypt and Turkish and Tajikistan and Iran, a monarchy like Malaysia, Saudia Arabia, Qatar, a joint-rule,
among other forms, are all valid in the Muslim community. But what is important, that is the duties of the state. The duties and functions of a Muslim state seem to be four:

1. Executive (for the civil and military administration)
2. Legislative
3. Judicial
4. Cultural

The sum up, Islam seeks to establish a world community, with complete equality among people and without distinction of race, class, or country. It seeks to convert by persuasion, allowing no compulsion in religious beliefs, every individual being personally responsible to God. To Islam, government signifies a trust, a service, in which the functionaries are the servants of the people. According to Islam, it is the duty of every individual to make a constant effort to spread good and prevent evil.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, much of the Muslim world, having attained independence as nation-states, now faces a second revolution or transformation: That of national identity and religious/intellectual reform. Issues of authority, legitimacy, identity, authenticity, political participation, and human rights are prominent. This occurs within a context in which secular forms of liberal nationalism.

Political Islam has proved a formidable force even though Islamic movements or organizations often constitute a minority of the community. It has proved attractive and effective in response to the political and socio-economic failures of governments and elites: sectarian, tribal, and class grievances: Second-class citizenship in terms
of access to education and employment; mal-distribution of wealth, and official corruption. In societies when opposition is absent, repressed, or muted by governments. Islamists have often proved effective both in mobilizing their own following and, as the only viable outlet or “game in town”, in attracting those who wish to register their frustration or opposition to the prevailing order. Islam has increasingly reemerged in Muslim political discourse and politics and has been effective in providing or reinforcing national identity and political legitimacy; it has also been a source of mass mobilization. Governments and opposition movements have appealed to Islamic symbols and slogans. Islamic movements and organization have proliferated across the Muslim world. However, the appeal to religion is a two-edged Sword, as demonstrated by the experience of some Muslim countries.

Some Muslim countries like Malaysia is powerful in economy and industrial technology despite monarchical political system and could be a pattern and Indonesia in democracy and Pakistan as a nuclear energy and military, and Iran as an independent country also could be a pattern. But if possible they gather all those patterns together or not? This is another thing.

Egyptians from the ancient up to present time have experiences in political activities (about 5000 years) and two times in modern times the president of United Nation (UN) was Egyptian (Petross Ghali). For the time being, in 20 years later, things seem to go well, but gradually, there developed a gap between the state and society. The state agenda became different from society’s agenda, and the respective priorities of the state and the society appeared heading for a clash.
Turkey Ottomans became Nation-State after world-war I and in the hand of Kemal Ataturk became a secular state, then he abolished many symbols (Sha'air) of Islam in modern Turkey, like abolishing of ‘Adhan’ and changing weak end holiday Friday and also the alphabets and legislative law to European law. The Malaysian also developed in many areas of polity and in the Shadow of polity, economy, especially in the period of Mahatir Mohammad its Prime Minister. This country had a good relationship with the west and also with Muslim countries in foreign policy. Despite it has monarchical system of governance but it is constitutional in nature and real power is vested in the parliamentary system based on election in that country that has good status, and the king is elected for 5 years and the political parties have total freedom. Thus welfare of the people is the hollwork of the political system.

Finally in the chapter four we have discussed about a new Muslim country. Tajikistan, that it obtained independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union. Parties in this republic have also been grated freedom although it experienced civil war for five years. Many challenges which cause the development of political system come from outside of Tajikistan, and inside the society, or from the political elite of the society.

The case of modern Iran, considered in Chapter five illustrates the difficulties encountered by a modern government in a complex society. After revolution (in 1979), the theory of the Wilayat-i-Faqih became the theory of government, and after sometimes Imam Khameini turned from Wilayat-i-ifiqih to Wilayat-i-Motlaqeh-i-faqih (The absolute guardianship of the jurist) for the solution of the problems of country. Imam Khameini’s doctrine was in operation in the 1970s, hence
constitution was also changed. The position of the ‘ulama’ in Iran is very strong. Nowadays Iran has challenged the USA about nuclear energy therefore the foreign policy of Iran was oriented or inclined in favour of European Union. Elections in Iran were held frequently and in the 25 years after revolution almost 25 elections took place for Assembly and consultation and president.

Pakistan which was dominated by military dictatorship for a long time after independence and also as a nuclear armor country is the most powerful Muslim country in the military matters its relationship with USA after September 11, 2001, got a high rank in her foreign policy with USA, because it allowed the USA entrance to Pakistan and through Pakistan fighting Taliban. The logistic base of US army in Jacobabad in Pakistan in the state of Baluchistan supported American’s in fighting the Taliban. Status of Parties and Press and private channels of Television otherwise is good.

Indonesia’s status of parties and press and private televisions also good and it is said that the third best democracy obtained in Indonesia in the world after USA and India. Finally we have discussed Arab political experimentations and systems especially of Syria, Iraq, UAE and their challenges to the Israel and the west. Part of the Arab World is dominated by absolute monarchy and another part by republic systems. Monarchical states prohibited the establishment of political parties but private television and press have been allowed to work in some countries like Qatar and UAE. There are some republics like Egypt, Syria and Iraq where political parties are allowed to operate but in all these countries one party system dominates there is free party-system like India, Pakistan or even Indonesia and Malaysia where multiple
party system strengthens the polity of the countries. In fact, freedom and liberty are two touchstones of the political health of a country, which are not found, generally speaking in west of the Muslim World. But it may be admitted that their political experimentations have quite enriched the Muslim legacy, and it is hoped that one day a truly Muslim, if not Islamic, polity would be brought into being which may be based on human dignity, love and affection, or at least on peaceful coexistence.

Being a Muslim in the contemporary world needs the fact that all Muslims try to base their social systems on the human rights ideals. It is accepted that human rights doctrines are not included in the Kitab (Qur'an) and the tradition but it is accepted belief that the modern societies which have established their base on human rights are successful in providing justice, togetherness and kindness. And it is the best way in facilitating faithfulness and morality to the morals of the society.

The avoid of establishing the totalitarian regimes and accepting seriously the human rights and democracy which is the reality of our age is one of the basic needs of being a Muslim in this period. In modern Muslim societies like other modern societies taking into the consideration of human rights is the only correct and acceptable way for improving human relationships on the base of justice and morality. In this modern age, establishing the systems on the base of human rights is the only way that Muslims can be faithful to Islam, faith, justice morality, togetherness and kindness.
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Glossary
**GLOSSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adhan</td>
<td>The call to salat (prayer) pronounced loudly to indicate that the time of praying is due.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adl</td>
<td>justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-asabiyah</td>
<td>group feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-mulk</td>
<td>royal authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ataturk</td>
<td>The Father of Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ansar</td>
<td>helpers; Those men of Medina who supported the prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bay’a</td>
<td>declaration of allegiance to a ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliph/Khalifa</td>
<td>deputy, used for the ruler as ‘Deputy of the prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daral-Islam</td>
<td>land of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dawla</td>
<td>‘dynasty’ in historical usage; ‘state’ in modern usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derbey</td>
<td>local chief/landlord, in Ottoman usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faqih</td>
<td>jurist, legal theorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatwa</td>
<td>Ruling on matter of law or worship, usually issued in response to a question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiqh</td>
<td>jurisprudence, legal theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazi</td>
<td>warrior for the faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>Sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad, prefaced by a pain of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ijma</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijtihad</td>
<td>The exercise of reason in the derivation of legal judgments from the canonical sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>Generic usage as religious leader; Shi’ite special usage to designate charismatic descendants in the line of the prophet through Ali and Fatima (A.S.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam-ul-Zaman</td>
<td>‘The imam of all time’, referring to the Hidden Imam in Shi’ite belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahiliya</td>
<td>Ignorance or barbarism, designating the time preceding the coming of Islam, but used to denigrate disapproved groups and societies, deemed irreligious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Holy war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiwar</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jizya</td>
<td>Poll-tax levied on protected non-Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharadj</td>
<td>Tax, more specifically, land tax in medieval Persian usage and in the Ottoman empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khawarij</td>
<td>The people who dissented from the religion and disagreed with the rest of the Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitab</td>
<td>Documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorities through whom the tradition is said to have been transmitted.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Marja’al – taqlid</strong></th>
<th>The ‘source of emulation’ a title applied to the highest authority among the shi’ite clergy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Madinat al-Fadilah</strong></td>
<td>Principles of the Opinion of the people of the virtuous city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Madinat al-jahilah</strong></td>
<td>Madinah-I-ghyr-I-fadilah, anti-utopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mamluke</strong></td>
<td>literally ‘slave’, designates the slave dynasties which ruled in different parts of the Middle East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marzuban</strong></td>
<td>border-chiefs of early Persia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mecelle/Majalla</strong></td>
<td>Ottoman legal statutes codifying the civil law elements of the Shari’a in modern forms, published in 1293/1876.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mu’akhat</strong></td>
<td>First clear manifestation of the organization of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mufti</strong></td>
<td>a man trained in the shari’a, or Muslim divine law, and who can give a legal opinion (Fatwa) on questions concerning Islamic practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujtahid</strong></td>
<td>a high ranking member of the clergy qualified to practice ijtihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muhadgir</strong></td>
<td>in early Islam, Those Meccan Muslims who emigrated from mecca to Medina either just before the prophet himself or in the period up to the conquest of Mecca in 8/630.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qadiaskar</strong></td>
<td>Two high religious dignitaries in the Ottoman court; literally, military judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qizil-bash</strong></td>
<td>Red heads, who had penchant for turbans in the Safavids period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rashidun</strong></td>
<td>Rightly guided applied to the first four caliphs succeeding the Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shari’a</strong></td>
<td>The sacred law of Islam, law based on the Quran and Sunna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shykhulislam</strong></td>
<td>The highest ranking cleric in the Ottoman court, Mufti of Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shi’i/shi’a</strong></td>
<td>‘Shi’i’ is a singular noun as well as an adjectives ‘Shi’a is the generic plural, as in the Shi’a they refer to a section of Islam that championed Ali, the fourth caliph and his descendants as the rightful rulers of Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shura</strong></td>
<td>Consultation, usually applied to the ruler consulting the ruled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Siasa</strong></td>
<td>Administration, applied to tribunals, judgments and punishments effected by the ruler and his deputies, as distinct from Shari’a, in modern usage, politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Siasah madaniyyah</strong></td>
<td>Political utopianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunni</strong></td>
<td>Adjective, referring to the mainstream congregation of Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaddun</td>
<td>civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taqlid</td>
<td>simulation; lay believers are said to emulate learned scholars, and later generations of Scholars to emulate learned illustrations predecessors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadbir al-motawahid</td>
<td>Hermit’s guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulema/ulama</td>
<td>Scholars of Islam, cleric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ummah</td>
<td>The community formed by those who accept the messenger and his message Islamic community, brother hood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah wahidah</td>
<td>One Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilayat-I-faqih</td>
<td>The guardianship of the jurist, Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of Government, assigning authority to a ruling faqih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali-e-amr</td>
<td>guardian, a term applied to one in authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wila</td>
<td>client ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilayat-I-motlaqa-e-faqih</td>
<td>absolute guardianship of faqih as a latest doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini in modern Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmis</td>
<td>Protected people like Christians, jews and Zoroastrians in Islamic society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>