THESIS
ABSTRACT

India’s friendly stance towards Russia (erstwhile Soviet Union) has greatly been exaggerated, misinterpreted and misapprehended in India and abroad, particularly after the Soviet Union’s disintegration. An evaluation and examination of the subject appeared necessary in order to explain the nature, extent, direction, implication and new trends in the relationship of India and Russia. Therefore an attempt has been made here to analyze Indo-Russian policies towards each other in the global world.

The study of India and USSR relations reveals that the despite some differences in outlook and policies great advancement towards mutual understanding and cooperation was made. In spite of earlier Soviet differences and basic differences in socio-political systems of the two countries, mutual bilateral relations improved markedly from 1953 onwards. Brussels Conference, which took place in February 10, 1927, gave a new thrust to nationalism in the world, particularly in Asia.

Jawaharlal Nehru had a vivid idea about future foreign policy of India. It must subscribe its interests, both economic and political. India realized the difficulties such as right to self government, opposition to colonialism. The opposition to colonialism in turn is directed to lend help and support to the dependent people in the achievement of their freedom. This policy was manifested in the Brussels Conference, Asian Relations Conference, and the Asian Conference on Indonesia and in the meetings of the Colombo powers which initiated the Bangdung Conference. Nevertheless, a closer examination of India’s foreign policy in this regard reveals that in every one of these cases whether in support to independence movements as in Indonesia or its hesitation to support them fully, as in the initial stages of Suez Crisis and Korean Crisis India’s policy has been first of all a policy of protecting its security and other vital interests. It was part of India’s strategy to safeguard India’s independence and security.
The Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin was under the impression that the whole Indian sub-continent was an offshoot of capitalism. Therefore it did not look over the region. Cold-War rivalry between the West and East gave a positive thrust for Soviet Union to support India over the Kashmir issue. But Stalin maintained equal distance from both the countries – India and Pakistan. Therefore, in pursuit of such policy, the Soviet representatives were absent during voting when the Kashmir question came up for discussion in the UNSC in 1948.

The US-Pakistan axis created grave concern for both India and Soviet Union which led to reorientation in their foreign policies, as a result both moved closer to each other. In September 1954, the Soviet Union unexpectedly and dramatically offered to build a giant steel plant in India to develop its iron and steel company. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India’s readiness to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would go a long way in the rapid industrialization of our country. On 2nd February 1955, the USSR and India signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet assistance for the construction of a giant steel mill at Bhillai. The agreement came at a time when a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was bogged down on technical grounds.

The USSR supported India in the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese colonialism. Hence The Indian Government and public were greatly appreciative of the profound sympathy and understanding of its aspirations by the USSR. It may be said that a community of interests between India and the USSR resulted in the steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. India-USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarity of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though for different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in Asia; checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and NATO, and later stage containing China. Almost throughout this decade i.e. from 1953-64, the USSR remained India’s principal source of strength in
international affairs, as well as in material and military requirements. Therefore, India under Nehru’s statesmanship always retained the freedom of action in its foreign policy.

During the Chinese aggression (1962) and Indo-Pak War (1964), the Soviet Union adopted a restrained attitude towards India, China and Pakistan. And Soviet Union decided to postpone the promised supply of 22 MiG aircrafts. Although Soviet Union did not support India directly, but it criticized to China and Pakistan. It was positive sign for India’s stand. Soviet Union played an important role in arranging the ceasefire through the Security Council, and later took initiative to sponsor on Indo-Pak summit at Tashkent in January 1968. And the declaration improved relations between India and Pakistan on the one hand and further strengthen India’s relationship with USSR on the other hand.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 proved land mark in strengthening their relationship. It sounded more as a military alliance to counter China and Pakistan in particular, and the USA in general. The main objective of Indo-Soviet Peace Treaty of 1971 was encirclement of China. The Treaty with the Soviet Union was an immediate source of strength, when the political crisis in Bangladesh was brought out. The Shimla Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on July 1972, it proved as an instrument for the relaxation of tension in Asia and for peaceful coexistence. It proved a cornerstone of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

Soviet Union first did not like this test but lately supported, when India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran in May 1974. Although, it was for the peaceful purpose, that is, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), but Pakistan and China bitterly criticized India for this test. And China accused India of nuclear blackmailing by posing as a “sub super power”. The international environment suddenly changed with the commencement of the ‘New Cold War’ as a direct result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979. U.S. supported to Afghan Mujahideen for fighting against USSR. India
being a non-aligned country opposed the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan because the intervention in internal affairs of any South Asian country is threat to the region. Though USSR needed India’s support or cooperation in this war same as India needed in Bangladesh crisis. Though initially India denounced the intervention, but it supported to USSR. The Rand Corporation study of the ‘security of Pakistan’s manifested that the Soviet intervention caused serious threat to South Asia, particularly to Pakistan.

As Indian Ocean is very paramount in India’s geostrategic relations and security perspectives. The decade of 70s witnessed the dawn of the Indian Ocean as another theater of big power rivalry. Although General Assembly passed various resolutions regarding the implementation of the “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” in 1974. But it was not impressive mainly because of the lack of interest shown by the Super Powers. India has geographical position, and resources could be balancing factors. Thus, the significance and strategic location of Indian sub-continent, and particularly land mass of India itself is crucial for the Soviet Union. India’s strategic location in the Ocean gives it a central position in the Asian politics.

Change of leadership in two countries did not affect geostrategic and economic bilateral relations between India and USSR. In the 1980, Mrs. Gandhi returned to power with a spectacular majority, and Brezhnev came to India in December of that year. There was much to discuss, the world peace had suffered setbacks with grievous blows dealt on détente by revanchists of the Western military circles. SALT II was in cold storage, the arms race was spiraling, tensions had mounted in the South Asia with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the aftermath of Sino-US-Pak plot to overthrow the Kabul Government as a direct interference in Afghanistan affairs and in South East Asia with the Chinese attack on Vietnam following the liberation of Kampuchea from Pol Pot’s inhuman yoke. There was tension in the Gulf region.
The visit of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Soviet Union from September 20 to 26, 1982 was yet another milestone in the further strengthening Indo-Soviet relations. But on account of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October, 1984, India’s leadership shifted to Rajiv Gandhi. Both India and Soviet Union signed the Delhi Declaration “on the principles of a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent world”, on 26 Nov 1986. They desired for not only peaceful world order but also the overall human development such as socio-economic, cultural and political. The balance of terror should be replaced by international peace and security. The Declaration was Perestroika’s first international document on “New thinking”. Another development of the 80s was the formation of regional organization of South Asian countries, that is, SAARC which strive to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region and to promote collective self-reliance among countries of South Asia.

The Perestroika and Glasnost policies were introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, which focused on the restructuring of system, openness and economic political liberalization. And the Cold War came to an end in December 1989, when Gorbachev and George Bush met at Malta Summit. Besides this other development such as signing of treaty on the reduction of Conventional Force in Europe (CEF) and Strategic and Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1990 and 1991 respectively. The stand taken on the Gulf crisis in 1991 confirmed the impression that Gorbachev’s “New thinking” presented a broad with that of the previous communist regions. And the Indo-Russian Treaty of Peace, Friendship Cooperation mentioned earlier, was renewed in 1991 for a further period of 20 years. This was a proof of sustained ties between the two countries. Thus, in this changing matrix of international political environment it was but natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge churning process. And it was considered that there was more ‘continuity’ than ‘change’ in Russia’s foreign relations. But the ‘collapse of Soviet Union’ left a vacuum in international political system. And the new world order came in to existence, that is, unipolar world which was dominated by US.
Thus, the ‘collapse of the Soviet Union’ left a vacuum in the international political system. The Soviet Union had played a significant role against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, which found themselves against the western bloc of countries. Even after the disintegration of USSR the relations between the Russian Federation and India remained diplomatically unchanged. For few years some problems came up. But Russia could not pay attention on Indian aspirations as earlier.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has affected India adversely in many sectors. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important implications are in defence and military areas. The matter assumed such a seriousness that the Defence Minister of India, Sharad Pawar, had to rush to Russia in September 1992 to bail out the armed forces of its immediate difficulties of Soviet armed supply. At the end of the visit while there was some hope in the improvement of the situation, it was evident that ultimately India would have to explore alternate sources. Moscow, it is argued, may not be in a position to meet the Indian demands as paucity of fund may force Russian to close down their units. Whatever, existing military weapons and hardware are in stock in the member states of CIS. They would like to sell them in the western markets in order to earn foreign exchange. Above all, one significant advantages which accrued to India in procuring armaments and equipment from the Soviet Union.

Some significant steps were taken to sort out these problems as early as January 1993 by the then President Boris Yeltsin when he visited India. In the early years, Cryogenic rocket deal manifested the vulnerability of Russia to succumb to the US pressure in the unipolar world. Thus the Cryogenic deal controversy manifested that Indo-Russia relationship was influenced by Russia's pro-Western foreign policy. Therefore the controversy related to the said deal brings to fore the emerging stark realities of unipolar world-the evident of US pressure and vulnerabilities of emerged Russia. Hence Russia
could not adopt an independent line in the initial years after the disintegration of USSR.

Russian policy towards India was of benign neglect. But he tried to recreate the spirit of the Indo-Soviet friendship. The earlier Treaty was replaced by new one: the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. During the visit he conveyed the impression that Russia put a high value on Indo-Russian relations. He described Russian and India as natural partners and that the interests of both countries were identical. Significantly, he reiterated Russian support for India’s position in Kashmir. As the same time India was turning against to Moscow with a long and expensive list for Modern weaponry and hence emerged as the largest arm purchaser from Russia.

But the "Moscow Declaration on the Protection Interests of Pluralist States" signed by India and Russia became the backbone of relations between both the countries, which focused on the challenges faced by the two countries, but also focused attention on the source from which this threat emanated for both the countries. It was the commonality of their geopolitical interests that paved the way for strengthening their relationship. Although Russia has put forward a proposal of military collaboration with India, but the harsh reality was that Moscow did not feel the strategic need of India in the post-cold war era.

As a matter of fact decline in the strategic significance of India to Moscow began with the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, when Gorbachev started giving priority to good relations with the west which was to provide loans and technologies, there was a drastic change in the geo-strategic perceptions of the Soviet Union. When Russia was strategically integrated with Europe and China has ceased to be socialist rival, need for a strategic consensus with India did not have the same relevance as in the previous two decades. In brief, diplomatically India cannot hope to depend on Russia to the same extent as it did on the Soviet Union.
Gradually the obstacles were overcome to an extent, and from 1997 onwards Russia was again on the way towards establishing a special position for the supply of defence related equipment. Both Russia and India decided in March 1997 to continue defence ties into 21st century. Significant agreement reached during Yergony Primakov’s visit in December (1999) when cross-century defence relationship was formalized. Described as “Cooperation 2010 Document” it envisaged partnership in research, development and joint production of sophisticated equipment besides incorporating other defence areas.

The most concrete expression of the new thinking was provided during the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia, China and India were able to form a regional bloc. The strategic triangle of India Russia China may restore peace and stability in the region. He also reiterated that Russia supports India’s claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Many developments were taking place to reveal the identity of viewpoints as well as long term convergence of interests between New Delhi and Moscow. The events involving Yugoslavia and Kosova, the bypassing of the United Nations, the devastation of Iraq(2003), the spread of religious fanaticism, Pokhran-II (1998), the Kargil War (1999) all these happenings continued to bring them together. Although aftermath of Pokhran-II (1998) Russia criticized India for conducting its nuclear test, Russia has been persistence in its statements that India should sign the NPT and CTBT (1996), which might suggest a subtle form of coercion. Initially, there was disquiet in Russia’s over the blast, but later, Russia did not publicly criticize to India. immensely, it did not impose any kind of sanction. During the Kargil crisis, Russia officially referred to Jammu and Kashmir as an ‘Indian state’ and denounced categorically Islamabad’s action as ‘invasion’. Russia explicitly referred to the Shimla Accord (1972) and the Lahore Declaration(1999) as the sole basis for resolving the problem.
A major change took place after the 9/11 and 13 Dec. 2001 terrorist attack on Pentagon, Washington and Indian Parliament respectively. It was the first time in world history when all countries came under one umbrella to condemn the menace of ghasty terrorism in all its sorts. To jointly tackle the menace of terrorism, during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2001, India and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration. They setup Joint Working Group (JWG) during the visit of President Putin in December 2002. Moscow strongly condemned the terrorist attacks that took place on 26 March 2003 in the Namdigarh village of Kashmir and Mumbai in Nov. 2008. Besides condemning the terrorist attacks, the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its support to the measures taken by India to stop the activity of terrorist forces. This convergence led to Russia and India support each other on their stands a Chechnya and Kashmir respectively.

The Indo-US nuclear deal has been the logical conclusion of a vision for US-India relations as framed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. It was an opportune moment for India to step out of the South Asian cocoon, onto the high table as a major power, and shape the emerging Asian Security architecture. India may also consider using this high chair to influence US actions vis-à-vis Russia. In fact, there are several commodities such as terrorism, W M D and stable Asian Security Oder among India, Russian and US along with china. Hence, the deal proved very fruitful to strengthen or cementing their strategic ties in Asia, particularly in South Asia.

The formation of three continental organization, that is BRICS, is very paramount step taken by the member countries in 21st century. The organization setup a platform for emerging powers to work together as a group of rising power that they are willing to play a collective role in international affairs. They pursue a new international political and economic order that is built on the principles of multi-polarity, justice, fairness and democracy. Russia views BRICS as a means of regaining its former reputable standing in setting
the agenda in global affairs. Although India has bilateral political or geographical problems with the China, but at the multi-lateral level it shares the same dais not only with China but with other members as well.

In the recent international crisis India and Russia support to each other, such as Syrian crisis and Ukraine crisis, both Russia and India played a great role in sorting out them in peaceful manner. The tension in both Syria and Ukraine has reviewed the Cold War diplomacy between West and East. They are politically differ in all discourse over the issue in West Asia. It was viewed in Moscow, it is a continuation of the western plan to encircle Russia militarily and torpedo its reintegration efforts in the former Soviet Union. The political upheaval in Syria and Ukrain as “the battle of the unipolar world of US hegemony against the emerged Russia. Geneva I summit was miserably failed, which calls for the transitional governing body. Further the Geneva II summit held in Jan. 2014 also could not fruitfully spelt out future role of Assad government. Thus, the crises have manifested power of emerged Russia in the region.

There has been annual bilateral summits between Russia and India to cope with changing stark realities. Medvedev’s visit to India in December, 2008 reflected the time tested and trustworthy friendship between the two countries. He signed MoU in the areas of nuclear energy, defence, trade and economic relationship. Therfore, the summit cleared the doubts that emerged in 2006, when India signed the nuclear deal with US. It once again demonstrated that there was continuity in Indo-Russian relations and the change of leadership in either country did not effect this binding, time-tested friendship. The visits proved to be very fruitful in their strategic cooperation. It enhanced close cooperation not only in military exercise but in many other areas of common interest and concern.

Russia and India have major international or regional mutual interest and concern to work together in 21st century. Although Russian in its formative years did not give the priority to India. Though India and Russia are the only
major powers in the world that do not have clash of interests or suffer from differences of opinion on any major issue and this affinity makes them perfect and genuine strategic partners in future. The major issue of common concern i.e. multi-polar world order, terrorism, democratic values and climate change come Russia and India at the single front.

The Soviet disintegration that took place in earlier 90s was a great blow for India. A mighty empire splitted in to many sovereign states and lost its paraphernalia. It was a red letter day for US as this event was foretold by G.F. Kenon. For others it was only a political process whereas for NAM states especially India it was severe shock. The new regime in Russian Federation led by Mr. Yeltsin got involved in difficult tasks to manage internal and external challenges and problems India expected the same trends from that side whereas it was quite subtle. The Security Advisor declared in press conference that Russia was busy in its own affairs it was necessary that states which were priority in part would remain as friendly ties. Their priority got changed as per changing international, regional and domestic circumstances.

After two and half years, when Russian Federation got somehow settled, attended India and vice-versa as well. A new era regime started on smooth grounds and since last one and half decades Russian leaders Mr. Putin and Medvedev have been cooperating on with India except slight differences. Finally it may be derived that those changing trends especially after 1991 make this relationship as buyer-seller relationship rather than a friendly allies. It was USSR/Russia which took lion’ share and advantages of the circumstances. India also got benefit with its support but several times received shocks and blows also.

India and Russia have close cooperation with each other. The scientific and technological cooperation between India and Russia has been deepening with the course of time. The cooperation is meant to impart a new dynamism in their mutual friendship. Trade and economic cooperation, cultural cooperation and nuclear cooperation have cemented their ties. These co operations between
India and Russia have led both the countries more closer to each other. Thus, their relations in all dimensions have been consolidated in the dawn of 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Thus both countries jointly may play a great role in regional security and world order simultaneously. This relationship is equally marked by the absence of any national irritants, no border disputes. This identity of their views on the political and economic order and on major international issues ensures that their strategic partnership would contribute to play a significant role in the years to come.
INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS:
TRENDS SINCE 1991

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
MUHAMMAD IMRAN

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
DR. FARHANA KAUSAR
(Associate Professor)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)
2014
Dedicated
To
My Mother
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled "Indo-Russian Relations: Trends Since 1991" submitted by Mr. Muhammad Imran for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, is his bonafide original work carried out under my supervision. In my opinion, the thesis may be placed before the examiners for the evaluation.

This thesis has not been submitted for the award of any degree of this University or any other university.

(Dr. Farhana Kausar)
Supervisor
Contents

Acknowledgement i - ii
Abbreviations iii
Preface iv - v

Chapter One: Indo-Soviet Relations: Historical Perspective 1 – 38
  • Indo-China War 1962: Soviet Response 17
  • Tashkent Agreement: 1966 19
  • Indo-Soviet Treaty 1971 23
  • Bangladesh Crisis and Indo-Soviet Cooperation 27
  • Shimla Agreement 1972 and Soviet Response 30

Chapter Two: New Cold War-1979: Indo-Soviet Relations 39 - 68
  • Beginning of New Cold War Era 39
  • Indian Ocean 48
  • SAARC: USSR Response 60
  • Perestroika and Glasnost: End of Cold War 62

Chapter Three: Soviet Union’s Disintegration: And Its Implications on India 69 - 111
  • Disintegration of Soviet Union 70
  • Cryogenic Rocket Deal and Irritant relations with Russia 80
  • India’s Nuclear Test and Russian Response: Pokhran-II 91
  • The Kargil War: Indo-Russian Relations 94
  • 9/11: Global War against Terrorism 102

Chapter Four: Indo-Russian Relations: 2001 Onwards 112 -165
  • Indo-US Nuclear Deal 126
  • BRICS: Delhi Accord: 2013 131
Chapter Five: Conclusion  

Bibliography
Acknowledgement

I bow in the reverence of Almighty Allah for His blessings that He bestowed on me to complete this work and holding me up during this entire journey and sometimes doing things nothing short of wonders.

I owe my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Farhana Kausar for her guidance inspiration throughout the study course. The numerous discussions with her on the subject gave me opportunities to widen my vision and develop deep understanding of the subject. The present work would have not seen the light of the day without her patronage. I always feel privileged to have worked under her guidance.

I am grateful to Prof. Arif Hameed, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh for providing me all possible help during the course of my work. I express my heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Murtaza Khan, Professor (retired) Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, who has instilled me fervor and self-credence so vital to pursue research.

Thanks are also due to Prof. Asmer Beg, Dr. Mohammad Naseem Khan, Dr. M. Nafees Ansari and Dr. Muhib-ul-Haque for their valuable suggestions and supports. And I also extend my gratitude to all my respected Teachers and non-teaching staff of the Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, for extending their helping hands whenever I needed them during my research.

A special thanks is due to my local guardians, Mr. Hasnain Qureshi, ADJ, Agra, Prof. M. Ishaq Qureshi, ex-Dean Faculty of Law, AMU, Aligarh and Mr. Wazir-uddin Qureshi, HoD-Al-Hasan Food Agro, Aligarh, who encouraged me to develop self-confidence and self-belief to face the world with intent, conviction and singularity of purpose. The support they provided me was highly stimulating and touching, both on personal and professional fronts.

I am thankful to the staff members of the Maulana Azad Library, and Seminar Library, Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Institute of Defence
and Strategic Analysis, New Delhi and Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi which facilitated me to avail the necessary material for finding new realm of intellect.

This acknowledgement will remain incomplete if I do not mention the kind of support I got from my seniors Dr. Mr. Masood, Mahboob Khan, Dr. Junaid Khan, Najmuddin, Khaleeque, Dr. Umama Moin, Dr. Rekha Yadav and all my friends or colleague Hasan, Kadir, Irfan, Haroon, Shakeel, Barkat-ul-lah, Nafees, Amir-ul-lah, Amir, Afzal, Irshad, Naureen, Rabab and Lubna.

I would like to express the most profound love, from the bottom of my heart, thanks to my loving parents, who faced extreme hardships but continued to shower their unflinching and purest of the pure love on me to achieve this milestone. A special gratitude is also due to my beloved sisters, Arfa, Ujma, Afshan, Najma, Sana, Arshi and Cousins Jamshed, Adil, and Nadir who have been constantly source of emotional vigor and a reservoir of support. My entire family has stood by me in making it possible to reach the pinnacle of my career.

Words are not enough to express my special thanks for my little cousin Khushi for bringing joyful moments in our lives.

Muhammad Imran
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CII</td>
<td>Confederation of Indian Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRDO</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOs</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICCI</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGCMTC</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights MOU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIGC</td>
<td>Indo-Russian Inter Government Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUs</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

India and Russia have a long history of close friendship and association in their efforts to assure prosperity and peace in the world. The end of Cold War, disintegration of the Soviet empire and sweeping transformation in the nature of international politics- set new challenges for India. Immediately after Soviet collapse, India had to face many problems and strains. It took few years to overcome all the difficult times. Even Russian Federation and CIS had changed their priorities. They were also facing many internal and global problems hence very categorically Russia showed its reluctance to start some new agreements, deals and other association with India. This was an alarming blow for Indian Government and decision makers.

Fortunately the visit of President Boris Yeltsin refurbished all positive dimensions between India and Russia as they were used to be ever. Further the heads of states and leaders of both the countries added a red feather in this direction, specially on new challenges and issues- as terrorism, energy security, climate change, multipolarity, strategic partnership, and commitment for strong Asian Order.

The central theme of this study” Indo-Russian Relations: Trends Since 1991.” This study is maiden effort to look into all those challenges, trends and future prospects between India and Russia.

The study consists of five chapters including conclusion-

The first chapter discovers the historical landscape of India and USSR relations and significance of both the states in the Cold-War order.

The second chapter explores the security problems in South Asia which emerged after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and led to a New Cold-War rivalry between East-West.

The third chapter sheds light upon the shift in Soviet policy and liquidation of Cold-War leading to Soviet disintegration. It also focuses upon
the problems and the challenges what India faced in that transitional period in terms of its old partner USSR (later on emerged Russia).

The fourth chapter touches the contours of post Cold-War Order, development in international scenario. It further covers the security challenges in the world after Terrorist attack in 2001 September on WTC. The chapter ends with the new, energetic, multidimensional relationship between India and Russia and the commitment to respond the challenges of multipolar world with strong and stable strategic partnership.

Finally, in fifth chapter study concludes the entire panorama of India-Russia association. It derives that despite of bearing some troubles India is again having very cordial relations with Russia.

Historical and analytical methods have been adopted on the basis of available primary and secondary sources to explore the facts in present study.
CHAPTER – ONE

Indo-Soviet Relations: Historical Perspective
Introduction

The state system is distinctive way of organizing political life on earth which has deep historical roots. They are independent of each other (legally), they have sovereignty but they are not isolated from each other. They have their social relations, and their behaviour greatly affect each other and lives of people. There are few basic core values that states usually uphold – security, freedom, order, justice and welfare\(^1\) and at the same time they have international responsibility. For this responsibility, they frame foreign policy for survival and sustenance in the world system.

Since all they are independent, they are ambitious for the protection of national interest. Consequently they opt persuasion, threat and ultimately war. The realist thinkers whether neo-realist or classical realist – E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau or Kenneth Waltz – all give this discourse -

- that world politics consists of an international anarchy of sovereign states.
- international conflicts are generally resolved by war
- for security, exhibition and use of power is necessary.\(^2\)

On the other hand it is also a fact that states cooperate with each other also, without much political drama for mutual advantage. They carry,
diplomatic relations, political culture, trade ties and exchange of science and technology. They commit for bilateral smooth running for international peace – this is perceived by liberal thinkers. In the contemporary world order both types of practices are seen and experienced specially in Post World War II period. There are sometimes compulsions, constraints, easy going atmosphere, difficult circumstances for every state whether big or small. In these circumstances they formulate their foreign policy and diplomacy. Foreign policy works as guide to action or actions of state intended to achieve its goal in international affairs. It affects the behaviour by virtue of being circumstantial. Indo-Soviet relations have also seen many ups and down. Though their maintained cooperation and friendship but major, dramatic upheavals disturbed them. Since foreign relation is matter of choice, Russia after Soviet disintegration had restrained its ties with India (due to some problems). The two states relations may be analysed with liberal approach because there has been much cooperation than hostility, but sometimes Russia, a big power also exhibited the real politik.

Historically, the British India and Russia had no significant relations. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 and the Russian Revolution of 1917 were the two most important events which dramatically moulded the sustenance and character of Indian National Movement. The Revolution in Soviet Union received more enthusiastic response from the Indian people than the defeat of Russia by Japan had received in 1905. The Russian Revolution was a milestone in the history of human race or civilization, which ushered in a new
era of hope, a new civilization and new relationship between man and man. Above all it marked the point of transition from the era of Capitalism to the era of Socialism on a world scale. The stand of the Russian Revolutionary leaders on imperialism, capitalism and the principles of national self-determination naturally produced a very favourable impression in India and other among subject’s peoples about the Russian Revolution, that is, October Revolution, 1917.

The impact of the October Revolution was phenomenal. It had three distinct dimensions – stimulating the consciousness of the Indian people, widening the basis of the national movement and above all, bestowing the revolutionary process of the Indian Leftist Movement, particularly the Communist Movement. The Great October Revolution and Lenin’s political thought considerably influenced the leaders of the Indian National Movement; particularly Jawaharlal Nehru. The practical achievements of Soviet Union were also tremendously impressive. But despite all these developments and possible distortions of the original passion for human betterment, I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a large leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new civilization towards which the world could advance.

Brussels Congress 1927

On February 10, 1927, the Congress on ‘Oppressed Nationalities’ met in Brussels, the capital of Belgium, at the Pakis Egmont and remained in session for five days. The first of the 40 resolutions passed by Congress, moved by
Nehru, extended the warm support of the Brussels Congress to the Indian National Movement for “complete freedom” for the “liberation of India from foreign domination”. Hence the League was very favourable towards the Communists”. The Brussels Congress proved to be milestone in the development of Nehru’s political thought, notably his espousal of Socialism and a broad international outlook. It was there that he first come into contact with orthodox communists, left-wing, socialists and radical nationalist from Asia and Africa. It was there the goals of national independence and social reform became clink inextricably in his conception of future political strategy.

He was inspired by many discussions and views from different states. He returned back India via Soviet Union and got influenced by socialist system. In a report submitted to All India Congress Committee, Jawaharlal Nehru termed the Brussels Congress “an event of first class importance” that was likely to have a far reaching impact. Nehru enthusiastically commented:

“It is study infant with great possibilities of growth..... it has the germs in it of developing into a real League of Nations of Peoples, a truer one than the League of Governments which sits at Geneva”.

It is clearly apparent that any association with the League does not limit anyway the freedom of activities of our Congress”.

Nehru recognized that the Brussels Congress was entirely in keeping with Russia’s present policy of encouraging and supporting every form of nationalism, and indeed, every other force which can help them to break
imperialism, especially British imperialism. Nehru felt that the Soviet Russia brought a message of hope to the downtrodden and the oppressed.¹³

While in Europe, he continued to give much thought to the soviet diplomats. In an article which he wrote on September 13, 1927 from Montan, Switzerland¹⁴, Nehru viewed the international situation. He outrightly rejected the British contention that Russia posed a danger to India. Analyzing Independent India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, he pointed out that Soviet aims were peaceful and that India had nothing to fear from Soviet Russia.

The diplomatic official relations between India and USSR were started from 1947, Nehru sent his personal friend, Krishna Menon – the then Secretary of the Indian League in London – to meet the Soviet foreign Minister, Motov in Paris.¹⁵ According to Menon, his talks with Molotov were conducted in “a most friendly atmosphere’ and he “met with sympathy and understanding for India from everyone at the Russian Embassy”. Though, the preliminary steps of diplomatic ties were taken in March, 1947.¹⁶ And in April 1947, “desirous of maintaining and further strengthening the friendly relations”, the exchange of diplomatic relations between the two countries were announced.¹⁷

Initially the Soviet perception towards the Kashmir issue was non-committed. The Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin was under the impression that the whole Indian sub-continent was an offshoot of capitalism. Hence it had no role to play in the region. But at that time it was ‘Cold War’, moulded with ideological rivalry between the two power blocs –
USA and USSR. The Cold War situation influenced Soviet policy towards Kashmir issue. Stalin was of the view that India, like Pakistan, leaned towards Anglo-American bloc. The Soviet relations with Indian and Pakistan were based on the “Andrei Zhadnov’s thesis” of two camps. Hence, Stalin maintained equal distance from both the countries – India and Pakistan, ultimately with Kashmir issue. Therefore, in pursuit of such a policy, the Soviet representative remained absent during voting when the Kashmir question came up for discussion in the United nations security council in 1948.

The U.S.-Pakistan axis or proximity which led to reorientation in their foreign policy, created grave concern for India and Soviet Union. Therefore, on Jan 17, 1952 at the conclave of UNSC, the Soviet delegate, Jocok Malik, spoke at the length on the Kashmir issue. Referring to various plans put forward by London and Washington, as observed by Malik, that those plans instead of speaking a real settlement, were aimed at prolonging the dispute and at converting in a trust area of territory of U.S. and U.K. under the pretext of giving the assistance through the United Nations.

Soviet Union and India could not develop deep friendly relations with the Soviet Union as it would have desired initially. During the last phase of Stalin period, the Soviet Union tried to develop trade relations with India. It participated at the International Trade Fair held in Bombay in January 1952. M.V. Nesterov the then president of the USSR chamber of Commerce, who led the Soviet delegation to the fair, offered to supply of various machines, tools, generators, electric equipments, agricultural machineries and such other things
as fertilizers and food grains, but at that time, Indian government did not respond to the Soviet offer positively. Thus, the initial response of India to the Soviet offer of closer relationship was lukewarm. Nevertheless, later event altered scenario, besides the factor of growing US-Pak axis, and India’s spearheading of non-alignment movement attracted the Soviet leadership. India was against any sort of military alliance or any sort of hegemonic action of any state. According to T.N. Kaul, “the essence of non-alignment is independence of non-aligned countries to judge each issue on its merits without its previous commitment to one side or the other, at it affects the national interest of each non-aligned countries and the larger interest of peace, security and development throughout the world. Thus, this policy, to a large extent, brought the two countries closer. There were also many common factors in their foreign policy approaches such as disarmament, anti-colonialism, anti-racism and the concept of peaceful coexistence between different social and political systems.

It is most likely that changed Soviet attitude towards India was essentially inspired by reason of real-politick rather than by any doctrined considerations. By that time, at least on three important international issues of Cold War, Indian leadership had given positive evidence of willingness and ability to denounce the Western policy such as recognition of the People ’s Republic of China, on the Korean war and on the question of the United States – Japan Peace Treaty. Soviet Premier Malenkov appreciated India’s non-aligned foreign policy, in his August 1953 address to Supreme Soviet, “In the
efforts of peace loving countries directed towards ending the Korean war, India made a significant contribution. Our relations with India are becoming stronger and our cultural ties – are growing. We hope that in future, relations between India and USSR will grow stronger and develop in a spirit of friendly cooperation”. And it was believed in Moscow that the development of friendly ties with India would help the communist word’s efforts to come out its diplomatic isolation and obtain a foothold among the newly independent countries. The two countries cooperated each other, India raised the issue of apartheid, being practiced in South Africa, the Western countries put its off in the United Nations on the pretext that it was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. At that time, Soviet delegate Vyshinsky supported India and told the United Nations that the problem of racial discrimination was indeed an international issue, it did not pertain to domestic jurisdiction of South Africa.

Although India’s non-alignment policy is not only its refusal to join any military alliance, but also the deny of military and naval bases to any foreign power. It would like to keep superpowers and China out of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Besides, this policy was a major factor that brought the Soviet Union and India closer. This earned India support of USSR on Kashmir in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meetings. The Indian stand on the above mentioned international issues (China’s recognition, Korean war, policy of apartheid) led Stalin to praise and appreciate India’s position and he gave an interview to our Ambassador Dr. S. Radhakrishna. During the Jawaharlal
Nehru’s visit to the Soviet Union a joint communiqué was issued, which emphasized among other things International Peace and security of small states. Both felt that, “It is essential to dispel fear in all possible ways. Here again the best remedy is to adhere unflinchingly to the principles of coexistence”. Thus by 1953, improvement in Indo-Soviet relations was apparently visible.

Ahead to Nehru’s visit to Moscow in 1958, there had been a Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, which concerned with the Afro-Asian solidarity. The Conference promulgated the much heralded Panchsheel or five principles of International affairs, which served as a diplomatic bridge upon which close relations between communists and non-communist states could be constructed. The conference marked the beginning of a new era. For Nehru it was the realization of a long cherished dream. He said at the Bandung that “we are the future in Asia and Africa”. Bandung thus provided a new experience and belief, shared and cherished by all the participants irrespective of their different creed ideologies and alliances. Despite the criticism, the Soviet Union’s reaction to Bandung gave no indication of any offence. The Soviet reaction to Bandung was favourably mainly because the Soviet leaders apparently realized that the desire for Afro-Asian solidarity among the Bandung powers was basically an attempt to eliminate western influence from Asia and Africa. Bandung’s advocacy of the spirit of Panchsheel with its anti-colonialism and anti-imperialist stance were bound to be appreciated by the Soviets.
By this time, the Soviet leadership was busy preparing a psychological background at home, to launch a new policy of active relations with the newly independent Asian countries in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. The conference naturally came in handy for their new course and was praised by clouding Soviet academician, E.M. Thukov. The author, who had participated in the enforcement as an observer, referred to Lenin’s view on peaceful coexistence and drew strength from his conviction that close cooperation was quite possible and had become rather much more essential between the communist and the nationalist against their common enemy – World Imperialism.

Thus Bandung confirmed the credentials of India as a peace loving country, willing to cooperate with the Socialist community, befriend China and support the principles of peaceful coexistence impressed by India’s ever increasing international stature among the group of Nations, the Soviet Government invited Nehru to pay a state visit to the USSR in June 1958.  

Nehru’s Visit to Moscow

The Indo-Soviet relations were on mountain pitch in mid 50s, when Nehru was invited by the Soviet Government. He visited USSR in June 1958 (7-23 June). Referring to Nehru’s arrival at Moscow airport on June 7, K.P.S. Menon writes that, “the entire presidium, handed by Bulgarian, went to the airfield to receive him. As to the stately banquet organized in honour of the visiting Prime Minister (Nehru), he further notes that the Kremlin was never “used for such a function since the war, and rarely since the revolution”. “To be
dramatic, one might say about Nehru’s visit to the Soviet Union that he too came, saw and conquered”, Menon observed.32 “No one has ever received a more tumultuous welcome”, as Menon recorded in his autobiography.33 Pravda editorially welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in a manner, reserved exclusively for a leader of a communist countries.34 in his autobiography that when a foreign correspondent asked Nehru as to whether a crowd in Moscow was “organized”, Nehru gave the reply that “you can not organize man’s hearts”.35

Nehru used this visit to win the confidence of the Soviet leaders. And he observed:

“Even though we persuaded a different path in our freedom struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, we admired Lenin and were influenced by his stance. Inspite of this difference in our methods, there was at no time an unfriendly feeling among our people towards the people of Soviet union”.36

While paying tributes to the “great and novel experiment of the Soviet Union”, Nehru referred to attempts at creating “a socialist pattern of society” in India “through peaceful methods”. He spoke high of the ‘passion for peace’ in the Soviet Union. And at the end of the Nehru’s visit, it was resolved that relations between the two would continue to be guided by the Principles of Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations. The two Prime Minister also affirmed that in the observance of these principles by nations in the conduct of their mutual relations lies the main hope
of banishing fear and mistrust from their minds and thus lowering world tensions.\textsuperscript{37}

According to “The times”, there were “whole passages” of the joint statements which are apparently his (Nehru’s) and his alone.\textsuperscript{38} In his memoirs K.P.S. Menon wrote: “It must be said that at not time did they (Soviet leaders) try to use the slightest influence, let alone pressure to swing India to their side. They made it clear from the onset that they would leave it to us as guests to drift the joint statement. The joint statement was, thus, entirely Indian in style and in substance.\textsuperscript{39}

Nehru’s visit produced a powerful impact on the Soviet leaders, who made several references to its significance in their subsequent meeting with heads of other states. Thus, when big Four met at Geneva, Bulgarian referred Nehru’s visit as an event of great importance in June 1965, in his speech at the tenth anniversary session of the United Nations, Molotov referred to the visit of Nehru as “especially noteworthy” for lessening international tensions, promoting peace and security. On the other hand, the trip left the tremendous impact on Nehru, who expressed his gratitude to his hosts by saying, “I am leaving my heart behind”.\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, the visit was proved very fruitful in their relations. The visit enhanced the India’s stature in the comity of nations, particularly during the Cold War period.

**Khrushchev and Bulganin visit to India**

Indo-Soviet relations took a new turn after the death of Stalin in March 1953.\textsuperscript{41} In his Lok Sabha tribute, the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, described
Stalin’s death as “the ending of an era in history”. He referred Stalin as “a man of giant stature who moulded the destinies of his age and proved himself to be great in peace and war. I earnestly hope that his passing away will not mean that the influence which was exercised in favour of peace is no longer to be available. I may extend the hope that this event may loosen all our minds a little from their rigidity in all countries”.\textsuperscript{42}

After the Stalin’s death Nikita Khruschev became General Secretary of Soviet Communist Party, and initiated limited liberalization in the rigid policies of his predecessor, Stalin, in 1954.\textsuperscript{43} Bulgarin and Khruschev, in return, visited India in November 1955, and marked another watershed in Indo-Soviet relations as India was the first non-communist country, they visited. The visit demonstrated a matrix of change that was coming over in the relations between the USSR and Non-communist nations. It is worth pointing out that by the end of 1955 Pakistan had become the Western anchor of SEATO and the Eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact. By then Pakistan had also signed mutual defence agreement with the United States and had received substantially military and economic assistance from that country. On the very day of the Soviet leader’s arrival in India, the U.S.A. had announced an offer to construct 20 million dollar airfield in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{44} This mutual attitude of Pakistan and USA brought a radical change in South Asia.\textsuperscript{45}

When the Soviet leaders arrived in New Delhi in November 18, the Indian people fully reciprocated to the guests the same exuberantly popular and affectionate welcome that the Soviet people had given earlier to Nehru in the
Soviet Union. It laid the foundation of a new era in Indo-Soviet relations. Besides Delhi, the Soviet leader also visited Madras, Agra, Calcutta, Coimbatore and Srinagar. They were greeted with thunderous applause from the crowd. And they were greeted by slogans Hindi-Rusi Ek Hai and Hindi-Rusi Bhai bhai. Speaking at a Delhi civic reception to the visitors, Nehru spoke for all Indians when he said:

“This day will grow in history as a very important event. The two visitors represented more than the meetings of the leader of two great countries.... They signified something deeper and more far reaching, viz. the meeting of the two great people, and this had a great significance”.

The Soviet leaders referred to the identity of Soviet and Indian views on many world issues and paid high tributes to India’s contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security: citing the instances of the Korean war, the Indo-China conflict, the Farmosa straits crises, the demand for representation of people’s China in United Nations, the attitudes regarding weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, opposition to military pacts and alliances as well as emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes. Khruschev added that India is Great power and it must belong to one of the first plans among the great states of the world.

If 1954 marked the beginning of Sino-Indian brotherhood (i.e. trade agreement), 1958 inaugurated the era of Indo-Soviet brotherhood, and the latter in some measure came to diminish the farmer. The Indian gain from the Indo-Soviet rapport was Russian support for India on Kashmir issue, a support which was to be continuously displayed at the United Nations.
the issue of Kashmir came up in the Security Council, as the Graham Report was being discussed, the Soviet Union alleged that the Kashmir question was evading solution because of the interference by the Anglo-American bloc which was supporting the imperialist policy of Pakistan. The Soviet Union had also opposed the sending of foreign forces to Kashmir. By 1955, Soviet Union had apparently taken pro-India stand and declared unequivocally that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India.\textsuperscript{51} And he said that Kashmiris rejoice in their national liberation, regarding their territory as an integral part of India”.\textsuperscript{52} It fully accords with the interests of peace in this part of Asia.\textsuperscript{53} And Kashmir is as an inalienable part of the Republic of India.\textsuperscript{54}

Therefore USSR supported to demilitarization of Kashmir in the Security Council proceedings on Kashmir, in February in 1957, although the resolution was not accepted by India.\textsuperscript{55} In march 1959, A. Andrew visited Kashmir to demonstrate that they regarded Kashmir as an Indian state.\textsuperscript{56}

The events of 1956 (the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 31 October and the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in November) put the clock back. It was thus for Nehru a year of hopes and disappointments, and of conflict between high principles and national interests. Disappointment and hopes figured in Nehru’s attitude towards the Hungarian tragedy, which coincided with the Suez Crisis.\textsuperscript{57} The two countries adopted the identical position on the Suez Canal crises in 1956 and condemned the Anglo-French-Israel aggression against Egypt. However, later in 1956 itself, some misunderstanding developed between the two countries on the question of
Hungary. India's half-hearted demand that the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their future according to their own wishes and that the foreign forces (Soviet forces) should be withdrawn was greatly resented by USSR, though many critics in India opined that Nehru government should have been more forthcoming in its criticism of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. As a matter of fact, when the question of Soviet intervention was debated in United Nations General Assembly, and a resolution condemning Soviet armed intervention in Hungary was put to vote, India had abstained. This means that India did not unequivocally condemn the Soviet action. The India's unfortunate decision to vote in favour of the Soviet Union when a 5-power (vetoing countries of UN) resolution calling for free and fair elections in Hungary was put to vote, India, indirectly, supported Soviet Union.58

Thus, the Soviet support to Indian proposals on the Suez Canal issue revealed the common outlook of both the countries towards some problems created by some Western imperial powers. If the crises created by Soviet invasion of Hungary provided a rude shock to Nehru, the crisis created by the Anglo-French attack on Egypt brought to him the necessity of maintaining India's companionship with Soviet Union in world affairs and thus when both the crises moreover, the Indo-Soviet Relations remained on balance unimpaired. The continuity of friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union, was a salient feature of the Khrushechev period.59

Soon after the second general election in April 1957, Khrushechev said:
“The Soviet people greatly value the brotherly friendship with the Indian people, for the growth of which you did so much and which is already demonstrating its firmness as a factor in the world we are confident that the Soviet Indian friendship will in future grow and strengthen in the minds of peoples of both countries”.

However, relations between India and Soviet Union continued to grow despite the Hungarian episode. In 1961, when India used its armed forces for the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule, Soviet Union extended full support to India’s position. Trade relations gradually improved between the two countries.

**Indo-China War 1962: Soviet Response**

China launched a massive multi-prolonged attack all along the border from NEFA to Ladakh. India was caught unprepared for the sheer intensity of the attack and suffers heavy loss of man, material and territory. During the Chinese aggression in 1962, the Soviet Union adopted a restrained attitude towards India and China. The official Soviet publication pravada described the McMahon Line as an imperialist line which demarcated India and China. This was apparently clear support to the position taken by China. Not only this, the Soviet Union decided to postpone the promised supply of 22 MiG aircrafts. Though they did not pressurize India to succumb to Chinese demands because, as Nehru said:

“We have had their good will and their wishes all along… and this is the consolation to us and we certainly hope to have that in future”.
Later on, with the aggravation of Sino-Soviet dispute, Moscow even renounced its posture of neutrality and began to openly criticize China for its attitude towards India. At the Italian Communist Party Congress, held in December 1962, F. Kozlov, the Soviet leader, criticized the Chinese party of what he called ‘adventuristsic position’ on the Sino-Indian border conflict. Further, the cautioned the Chinese leadership “those who are certain of their historic position have no need to play with fire and endanger all the achievements of civilization”.

Suslov, a Soviet leader, in his report to the plenary session of central committee of the Soviet Communist Party on Feb. 1964, also criticized Chinese policy towards India and viewed it as having “rendered a great service to imperialism and done grave harm to the national liberation movement, the progressive forces of India and entire front of the anti-imperialist struggle”. He said that the Chinese actions might lead to strengthening of the imperialistic forces, thereby, further complicated the situation in the world. Although Soviet Union did not support India directly, but its stand over the event was positive sign for India’s stand. Therefore it strengthens Indo-Soviet relations. As Soviet Union had offered assistance for India’s Second Five year Plan (1954) and signed an agreement to build a giant steel mill at Bhilai, in 1955. The second Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement (1958) was further was increased three fold between 1960-65. At the same time the Soviet Union stepped up aid to India and concluded a numbers of agreements covering specific industrial projects. The most important economic agreement was the Soviet accord in
January 1965 to construct the Bokaro Steel Plant. Hence, this kind of attitude and support of Soviet Union towards India further strengthen the relations between two giants of world politics.

**Tashkent Declaration: 1966**

During 1965, Indo-Pak relations become so tense that a war appeared imminent in the summer on the question of the dispute regarding Rann of Kutch. The war was avoided as the dispute war referred to arbitration. The war that took place in September 1965, and proved decisively that India had superior might, provided the occasion for open American support to Pakistan and the Soviet support to India. Pakistan had even used some of the Chinese weapons. The Soviet Union played an important role in arranging the ceasefire through the Security Council, and later took initiative to sponsor an Indo-Pak summit in its own territory at Tashkent in Jan. 1966.

The Soviet Premier Kosygin, on 17 September, 1965, in an identical message to Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan reiterated the offer for a meeting in Tashkent to reach an agreement for the restoration of peace “if both parties so desire”. Though Soviet Union was not interested to mediate in the conflict between the two sides but to facilitate to cease hostility and restore peace. The Soviet offer was overwhelmingly accepted by both India and Pakistan.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, in a public meeting on 5 December 1965, reiterated his willingness to go to Tashkent and to accept the mediation of the Soviet Prime Minister to bring about understanding and good neighbourly relations
with Pakistan. But he made it clear that the question of Kashmir could not be discussed here. In return, the Soviet Union had expressed view earlier and advised both India and Pakistan to avoid discussing major issues at Tashkent and regard the meeting as the first among a series of bilateral discussions. Both leaders Shastri and Ayub agreed to meet at Tashkent on 4 January 1966. Kosygin attended the meeting at the request of both the parties. In his opening speech at the summit, Kosygin said, “in proposing this conclave, the government of Soviet Union was guided by feelings of friendship towards the Pakistan and India, by a desire to help them to find a way to peace and to prevent sacrifices and hardships brought by the disaster of war”. After a week (9-10 Jan.) long hectic parleys between the two sides, in which Kosygin took active part to break the deadlock in arriving at a mutual suitable agreement, Shastri and Ayub signed the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966.

The important points in the Declaration were: withdrawal of armed forces by both sides to former positions (held on 5 August 1965) and not later than 25 February 1966; observance of conditions of ceasefire in Kashmir; stoppage of hostile propaganda; resumption of diplomatic relations and renewal of normal diplomatic functions, etc. Kosygin hailed the Tashkent declaration as “an important political document and a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan”. Shastri, in a press meeting in 10 Jan. 1966, praised Kosygin for the ‘great and noval role he played in holding the talks”.

20
Critics described the agreement as an outcome of Soviet Union’s diplomatic convenience with Pakistan. Soon afterwards Soviet leadership tried to free Pakistan of American Bloc; and bring it under its own influence. Therefore, President Ayub Khan was invited to Soviet Union, and later USSR offered to sell Soviet armaments to Pakistan.\(^7^3\) thus it was the shift in Soviet foreign policy approach aimed at diminishing the U.S. and the Chinese influence in the South Asian region that shaped its policy towards the Kashmir issue. To achieve that objective it was necessary, the Soviet leadership might have thought, to give equal weight to Pakistan alongside India.\(^7^4\) The sources said that the Tashkent Declaration would improve relations between India and Pakistan on the one hand and further strengthen India’s relationship with USSR on the other hand.\(^7^5\)

Despite the assurances by the Soviet leadership that its policies would not negate India’s interests; there were overtures from its side that were likely to hamper India’s national interest. A high level Pakistani military mission went to Moscow in June 1966 to explore the possibility of Soviet arms supply to Pakistan. New Delhi warned that Soviet arms to Pakistan would weaken Indo-Soviet relations. To allay India’s fear, the Soviet Union assured India that their policy with regard to Kashmir has not changed and they regard Kashmir as an integral part of India. Further, to demonstrate Moscow’s sincerity, Soviet News Times published a map of India showing the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of Indian Union. Despite all these assurances, a group of
senior naval officers led by Vice Admiral Smirnov arrived in Pakistan in March 1968 to further explore the possibility of cooperation between the two navies.76

A Pakistani military mission led by General Yahya Khan arrived in Moscow on 6 June 1968 to negotiate first Soviet Pakistani arms agreement. The next day, it was announced that the Soviet Union has agreed to supply arms to Pakistan. Immediately, Moscow began deliveries of tanks, artillery and armed personnel carriers. Zakir Hussain, the then President of India, during his visit to Moscow from 8-10 July 1968, informed the Soviet leaders of India’s concern regarding the arm supply to Pakistan, but the Soviet Union did not pay attention to the Indian objection. Swaran Singh, in a statement to parliament on 9 April 1969, said, “we have... to admit that we have not been able to convince USSR of greater danger implicit in the supply of arms to Pakistan. The Soviet policy continues to be to supply arms to Pakistan”.77

India lodged a protest with the USSR against its decision in response to Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s protest. The Soviet leaders gave similar assurances to India as were once given by United States, that the armaments supplied by the Soviet Union would not be used against India. India was not satisfied by the assurance. But in view of the matrix of changing International environment, the Soviet Union dropped the proposal to supply armaments to Pakistan.78 therefore, it was the major step taken by Soviet leaders, which consolidated and strengthen close ties with India but also restored peace and security in South Asia.
The treaty between India and Soviet Union proved landmark in strengthening their relationship. It was only 1970 that the change i.e. reviving back of old policy of supporting Indian stand on Kashmir issue was perceived in Soviet policy. Pakistan’s refusal to endorse the Soviet proposals for the South Asian Regional Trade and Transit treaty and an Asian Collective Security system dissatisfied the Soviet leaders. The disillusionment led to a reappraisal of Moscow’s policy towards Pakistan and an abrupt end to the arm supplies. Swaran Singh, in a statement in Lok Sabha 9 November 1970, stated:

“We are glad that the Soviet government has given consideration to our representations and have informed us that they have not supplied and do not intend to supply any military hardware to Pakistan in addition to that already supplied in the past”.

Therefore, the re-establishment of amicable relations with India became the focal point of Soviet politics in the sub-continent. President Podgorny, in a letter to Pakistan president Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971, appealed for “the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan”, and to seek an amicable “peaceful political settlement”. Swaran Singh visited Moscow, appealed for “the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan”, and to seek a amicable “peaceful political settlement”. Swaran Singh visited Moscow in June 1971; the talks or parleys took places against the background of the Pakistan war threats, the growing discord between India and USA and the obvious Chinese bid to exploit East Pakistan crisis to its
advantages These factors provided the urgency for India and Soviet Union to enter into the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on 9 August 1971.81

The treaty mainly dealt with promotion of friendship, peace and security both a bilateral and international levels.82 There were twelve articles or proposals in the treat, as follow:

- The two countries solemnly declared that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between them and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the others internal affairs. They would continue “to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness, and comprehensive cooperation”.

- India and Soviet union declared “their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to half the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament including both nuclear and conventional...”.

- They condemned “colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination”.

- India affirmed that it respects the peace loving policy of the USSR, and the Soviet Union respects India’s policy of non-alignment.

- "Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security", the two countries pledged to “maintain regular contacts with each other on major
international problems... by means of meetings and exchange of views... and through the diplomatic channels”.

- The two countries would consolidate and expand economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as expand trade, transport and communications on the basis of principles of equality, mutual benefit and most favoured nation treatment”.

- They would “promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports”.

- Both countries solemnly declared that they would not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against other. Each of the parties “undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other party.

- Both the countries undertook not to provide any assistance to any third party that is engaged in an armed conflict with other country. In case of an attack or threat of an attack, on any of the two countries both “shall immediately enter into mutual consultations... and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries”.

- Both the countries promised not to enter into any understanding, secret or public, with any other state or states, that would be in conflict with the provisions of this treaty. Nothing would be done that might lays military damage to the other country.
• The duration of this treaty was to be twenty years. Therefore, it would be automatically extended for successions periods of five years. Either India or Soviet Union could terminate it after giving one years notice to the other party.

• It would provided that any difference of interpretation of the treaty provisions “will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in spirit of mutual respect and understanding”.

This was the peak point of Indo-Soviet relations. Although the treaty was stated to be political and military in nature. It sounded more as a military alliance to counter China and Pakistan in particular, and the USA in general. In consonance with this treaty, the Soviet Union began to strengthen India’s defence capabilities, and when called upon to live up to their treaty obligations, during the third Indo-Pak war, lent both material and diplomatic support to India. The mainstay of India-Russia Strategic Partnership and the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971, aimed at an encirclement of China.

The insidious nature of the treaty can further be gauged from the fact that at the time of ratification of the treaty by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the then USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyoke, stated that from then on, “no one can from his policy, whether towards Soviet Union or India without taking this treaty into consideration”. The treaty, according to critics, was a violation of traditional policy of non-alignment. But in international politics, there is no permanent friend or enemy, but national interest. Thus,
treaty was signed by India for national interest at a large. And it was only alternative to possible U.S. intervention in support of Pakistan.⁹⁰

At the time of its conclusion in 1971, the treaty was universally appreciated. Gromyoko, the then Foreign Minister of USSR, described it as a landmark for the two countries. Sardar Swaran Singh observed that the treaty represented an important milestone in the path of Indo-Soviet relations. The treaty was described by commentators as a document of great international importance contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and elsewhere.⁹¹

**Bangladesh Crisis and Indo-Soviet Cooperation**

The political crisis in South Asia, leading to creation of Bangladesh was caused by the short-sighted of policy of Pakistan president Yahya Khan and his administration.⁹² India’s relations with Pakistan became increasingly strained as the situation in East Pakistan worsened with millions of refugees pouring into India. There was insurgency the basis of Bangla language led by Sheik Mujeebur Rehman. Sheikh had also won the election but President Yahya Khan was not ready to accept him as Prime Minister. In west and other parts of Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) was dominating, hence Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took charge as Prime Minister. Finally, Sheikh Mujeeb demanded separate state and consequently Pakistani government and army tried to crush the insurgency. Many people took refugee in India from east side. The Indian government had a sympathy with them and got prepared Bangladeshi Muktiwahini force by those refugees and supported them. The crisis was discussed meticulously with Soviet government also. For India a harmless Bangladesh in Eastward was
better than hostile Pakistan. India got Soviet support wholeheartedly. The treaty with Soviet union was an immediate source of strength. While president Nixon of United States had told Mrs. Gandhi that if a war broke out between India and Pakistan, America might intervene on the side of Pakistan. A.A. Rodinov, the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad, in a message to Pakistani president Yahya Khan on 18 August 1971 warned on dangerous consequences of war with India.

According to diplomatic sources the message strongly objected to Yahya Khan’s repeated threat of war with India and categorically told Pakistan that it would embarking on a suicidal course if tension in the sub-continent escalated. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, visited Soviet Union in 1971, September to discuss the developments in East Pakistan and their impact on India. The Joint statement testified to the mutual understanding on many issues. There was a full accord in the assessment of East Pakistan situations, which demanded urgent measures to reach political solution, paying regard to the unbelievable rights and lawful interest of the people of East Pakistan.

The escalation of events led to the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan on 3 December 1971. Soviet Union apparently defended India. A ‘TASS’ statement issued on 5 December 1971 warned Pakistan, declaring that, “the Soviet Union can not remain indifferent to the developments, considering also the circumstances that they are taking place in direct proximity of the USSR’s borders and, therefore involve the interests of its security... the Soviet
government finds it necessary to state to the Pakistani leaders with all clarity about the grave responsibility that they assuming following the dangerous course. It warned other world powers to stay clear of the Indo-Pakistan conflict.98

The Soviet Union played a decisive role in the dismemberment of the East Pakistan, both at the Security Council and in the military assistance it rendered to India. It vetoed the Peking-supported US resolution in the Security Council on December 1971, which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of armed forces, and stationing of observers on the India-Pakistan border.99 Herein, the rivalry between Soviet Union and China came to the forefront. The Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua said that, ‘India’s aggression has been launched under the support of social imperialism”, an ‘ideological crime’ the Chinese attributed to the Soviet Communists. Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador at the UN, refuted it as "chatter, prattle and demagogy’ that defended imperialism and its policy of aggression, including the establishment of aggressive military blocs.100 And Soviet Union, contrary to China’s stand, demanded for a political settlement in East Pakistan, to be followed by a cessation of hostilities.101 On December 6, 1971, the Soviet Union vetoed another resolution supported by the US, in which the recommendations of Soviet Union did not contain any reference to a ‘political settlement’ of the East Pakistan crisis as a priority. Along with eight other socialist countries, the Soviet Union once more vetoed an Argentine-sponsored resolution asking for
the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces from each other’s territory.\textsuperscript{102}

The Soviet Union on December 13, 1971 used its veto for the third time to prevent the passage of a US resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. To the contrary, it supported the Polish resolution, which urged Pakistan to take steps for a peaceful transfer of power in the ‘eastern theatre of conflict’ to the lawfully elected representatives of the people, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, as the ‘correct approach’.\textsuperscript{103}

Tension was also heightened by the decision of the US to send a task force of its seventh fleet, headed by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier, USSR Enterprise, from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Bay of Bengal. A counter move made by the Soviet Fleet in the Indian Ocean area, however, acted as an effective deterrent the US designs. Pakistan Forces surrendered in Bangladesh on 16 December 1971 thereby ending the conflict.\textsuperscript{104} In nutshell, we may conclude that Soviet Union supported India during the Bangladesh crisis and fulfilled its promises made in the treaty signed by both, in 1971, The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.\textsuperscript{105}

Simla Agreement: 1972 and Soviet Response

At this time, the relations between India and Soviet Union reached at it zenith. The Soviet commentators welcomed the Simla Agreement, which was signed by India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 for peace and agreement. They considered it as “an important instrument for the relaxation of tension in Asia and for peaceful coexistence”. The agreement to resolve the Kashmir issue
through bilateral discussions without any outside interference, according to Soviet leaders, manifested ‘their sincere striving for normalization of relations and preservation of peace in the sub-continent. The Simla Agreement, the Soviet Union hailed, had been “approved by all those, who have at heart of peace and stability in area. It should become the cornerstone of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan.106

Soviet Union fully supported India, when India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran in Rajasthan in May 1974. Although it conducted test for the peaceful purpose, that is, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), but Pakistan and China bitterly criticized India for this test.107 And China accused India of nuclear blackmailing by posing as a ‘sub super power’.108 Indo-Soviet ‘Joint Commission’ was setup in August 1972. It began its first meeting in New Delhi on 9 February 1973 with leaders of the teams from both the sides agreeing on the immense possibilities of expanding economic cooperation and collaboration on a mutually beneficial basis. While India’s emphasis was on trade expansion, the leader of Soviet team, S.A Skachkov, underlined Soviet capability to assist India in developing key industries.109

The leader of Indian team, D.P. Dhar, in his opening remarks spoke of the great scope for cooperation in the field of production which he described as “a new and exciting field”. “We are prepared”, Mr. Dhar said “to enter into long term understanding with the Soviet Union”. He pointed out that the recent export level discussions between the two sides had opened up new vistas of cooperation.110
The leader of the Soviet team expressed satisfaction on the points that the trade between two countries has risen nearly six times in the last twelve years. He was also proud of the fact that there were 90 Soviet aided projects of which 50 were in cooperation.111

Brezhnev’s visit to India

Leonid Brezhnev visited New Delhi in November 1973. This visit was one of the most striking landmarks in the Indo-Soviet relations next only to the historical visits to the USSR by Nehru in June, 1958 and to India by Bulganin and Khruschev in November-December of that very year. Brezhnev used the visit to convey the intense Soviet feeling towards India – a feeling shorn of any trace of artificiality. “Friendship and cooperation with India”, he declared at the Red Fort ground on 27 Nov. 1973, “is part and parcel of the foreign policy of Soviet Union. We were with you when India’s new statehood was emerging. We were with you in difficult and trying periods for India. We were with you when various external forces were trying to bring pressure on your country when it was upholding its vital interests. We shall be with you in the days of joy and in the days of trial”.112

He explained the essence of détente and upheld the International significance of Indo-Soviet relations he said, “shows how close...many faceted friendly relations can unite states with different social systems when the policy of the state is inspired by the ideals of the struggle for peace and security of peoples, against aggression and all forms of colonialism”, and added: “This
good example experts and, we are confident, will continue to exert ever wider influence on the international life". 113

Within less than a year, there was a change of leadership in India following Mrs. Gandhi’s defeat by the Morarji Desai, who succeeded her as the country’s fourth Prime Minister, was reportedly averse to the Indo-soviet Treaty and initially sought to have it abrogated. This was, however, prevented by others running the government and Desai, too, realized the importance of maintaining the relationship between the two states in the spirit of the treaty. His visit to the USSR in October 1977 found the Soviet leaders including Brezhnev extending a warm welcome and generous hospitality to him as a mark of tribute to India. This visit helped to underscore the continuity of Indo-Soviet relations. Desai again went to Moscow in June, 1979. Just when Brezhnev was about to leave for Vienna to sign the SALT-II accord with Jimmy Carter, the then US President. While greeting this development, the two leaders expressed concern over the happenings in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The joint statement at the end of talks found both leaders agreed on the question of opposition any interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. 114 It is a relationship which need in no way be feared by any nation as it is anchored in the principle of peaceful coexistence which has universal applicability. 115
References


2. Ibid., p. 102.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Mitra, Register, 1927, p. 11, 158.


16. Ibid.


20. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 3.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
27. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 5.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
34. Pravada, 7 June, 1955.
35. Many Worlds, op.cit., p. 287.
36. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 57.
37. Ibid.
38. The Times of India, 24 June 1955.
40. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 58.
41. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 282.
42. K. Ray Aswini, op.cit., p. 37.
43. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 282.
44. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 59.
46. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 59.
47. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 5.
48. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 60.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
53. Ibid., p. 7.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Ibid.
57. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 62.
58. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 283.
59. Lubna Fatima Saeed, op.cit., p. 63.
60. Ibid.
61. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 283.
64. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 284.
66. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 14.
72. The Times of India, New Delhi, 11 January 1966.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., p. 15.
77. Ibid.
80. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 16.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
84. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 70.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. ‘Moscow Declaration between India and Russia on International Terrorism’, http://pib.nic.in/archive/irelong/1yr2001.html
89. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 289.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., p. 288.
92. Ibid., p. 286.
94. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 286.
95. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 17.
96. Ibid.
97. The Hindu (Madras) 6 December 1971.
98. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 17.
100. Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 18.
101. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 71.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 16.
106. Ibid., p. 18.
110. Izvestia, 5 July 1972.
111. The Times of India, New Delhi, 27 Dec. 1972.
113. Ibid., pp. 99-98.
114. Ibid., p. 99.
CHAPTER – TWO

New Cold War-1979: Indo-Soviet Relations
NEW COLD WAR-1979: INDO-SOVIEET RELATIONS

Indo-Russian relations have traditionally been marked by remarkable degree of continuity and stability, based on national consensus in countries, as well as mutual goodwill and trust and sensitivity to mutual interests and concerns. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who was otherwise generally averse to India claiming a leadership role, had stated that the country with its vast resources and population will always make a difference in the world. Fate has marked it for big things. The Pokhran-I nuclear test, signing the Treaty of Peace and Cooperation with Russia and liberation of Bangladesh gave recognition to India in the world politics.

Beginning of New Cold War Era

The most notable result in the power relations between states after the Second ‘World War’ was emergence of ‘Cold War’, the term given by Lippman, which bifurcated world into two blocs – Communist and Capitalist headed by USSR and USA respectively. The Cold War was the ideological differences and tensions of both superpowers in the world. But some changes occurred in the late 70s in the Afghanistan crises. The detente at the international level had reached a high watermark in the 1970s onwards. Albeit, the international environment suddenly changed with the commencement of the ‘New Cold War’ as a direct result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. By April 1979, notions of naval arms limitations in the
Indian Ocean had been scrapped, and a building had-recurred there in the forces of both super powers, including the dispatch by both of aircraft carriers in the area.\(^3\) Pakistan almost immediately, following the intervention, gained an elevated status in Washington's calculations as a frontline state and a potential block to further southern advance of Soviet power and influence. It was assured of Washington's commitment of support under the bilateral Reference Treaty of 1959.\(^4\)

Indian problem was that, on the one hand, the USSR was its most important and dependable major power ally in the world affairs. The Soviet action in 1978 had pushed back the possibility of a fanatic Islamic state in Afghanistan, as in Iran, to India's relief and had reduced the America's interfering in Afghanistan's internal situation to India's national interest. On the other hand, most of non-aligned states were opposed to the Soviet intervention. Furthermore, the deployment of the Soviet forces on the soil of Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, was a situation that was repugnant for India's consistent foreign policy principle, that is, non-alignment. The dilemma was between the choices of opposition to the Soviet move to maintain its stature and leading role in NAM as well as to be consistent with its foreign policy principle and avoidance of any resistant erosion in Indo-Soviet ties, while opposing the Soviet move. The main problem with India was how to fit itself in the texture – as a participant player or a non participant victim. After the Coup of 1978 in Afghanistan, India wanted return of stability in the state. India's reactions centered on two themes and thesis, with shifting grades of
relative stress, were persistently prevailing in Indian instance. First, India was opposed to outside interference in the internal affairs of one country by another. Second, a major fallout of the invasion was that arms race in the region was likely to be restored and accelerated.

Policy preferences for India were focused in a series of Mrs. Gandhi interviews with foreign press, she scoffed at suggestions that she was “pro-Russian”. Not a bit she said, “I am pro-Indian”. She insisted, “Our problem is not to take sides. We are only concerned with India. We are not in a one bloc or the other”. On the question that India would feel pushed towards USSR, with China as well as the US apparently helping Pakistan, she reported, “No, No, No. We do not have any need to support from whomsoever. We feel to be strong enough ourselves. The Russians will have to strengthen their presence in this region... all over South Asia. And that will be great danger”. And it would pose a danger to India and rest of the third world.

India’s position on the Afghan issue (given India’s stature within the NAM and third world) came to be viewed in Moscow’s perception as unquestionably crucial, since its isolation in General Assembly vote on Afghan issue, where 17 non-aligned nations sponsored a Resolution on Afghanistan, calling for an “immediate unconditional” and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Gromyko visited New Delhi in February 1980 to assess the new government’s policy preferences and to seek India’s support for Moscow’s military intervention to forestall interferences from Washington, Islamabad and Beijing. At the end of the visit, J.N. Dixit, the
spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry, stated that Moscow’s armed intervention could not be looked at out of context, as “many things are happening in the world which impinge on the situation in Afghanistan” like American use of Indian Ocean Persian Gulf military facilities, massive build up of US naval forces in the region, strengthening of Diego Garcia and reports that ‘certain countries are openly saying’ that they were training Afghan rebel fighters.⁹

Though Gromyko felt assured that India’s perceptions held the United States as much to blame as the USSR for the tension gripping the nation”, he was not successful in getting India’s unqualified support on Afghanistan, while India failed in its persuasion to get a time-table for Soviet withdrawal. A kind of a concerted efforts by visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, the Cuban Foreign Minister and the Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Yan Dong during April 1980 ostensibly to convert India’s view to their own perceptions on the Afghan issue, brought forward the fact that the USSR needed India’s cooperation and friendship in its trying time much in the same way as India needed the USSR in 1971.¹⁰

Later on, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated, on every single available occasion, India’s disapproval of interference by any country in the affairs of other, but was found quick to add that Moscow’s “interference” in Afghanistan was not a one sided affairs: what is notable of Indian stance on the occasion is the consistency of approach over a long period of three decades. India denounced intervention, but stopped short of public condemnations, in case of USSR. A
clue was provided by Mrs. Gandhi: “...we do not approve of foreign troops or any other type of intervention in any country... The other thing is to show to deal with it.

**Threat to South Asia Security**

South Asia is a sub-system of the global international system. Among the various sub-systems, South Asia is particularly endowed with the qualities that protect autonomy from intrusions of global system, at least in political and strategic terms. The region contains vast human and material resources. Several regional states possess impressive political skills and military establishments to back up them.\(^{11}\)

The location of South Asia is favorable – it is well defined, defensive and somewhat out of the line of fire of East-West hostilities. It also has, potentially at least, two of the most important structural elements stimulating autonomy – a significant by manageable external threat and a set of regional power dynamics that has been effectively clarified by the 1971 Indo-Pak war and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, most important, perhaps both India and Pakistan have developed considerable skill in dealing with the superpowers, and each has developed a healthy degree of skepticism about close relationship with a superpower patron.\(^{12}\)

South Asia, especially India, has occupied an important place in Soviet strategy. The interests of the USSR are perceived by the Moscow to be strongly affected by the developments in South Asia.\(^{13}\) There are three great powers, USSR, USA and China whose relevance for the security of South Asia is
unquestioned. All the states of south Asia suffer from a measure of domestic instability. All the South Asia peripheral states tend to fear the core nation – India. Political friction and regional disputes accentuated this trend. The super power interests in South Asia are basically converging. Occasionally they become competitive for tactical consideration and motivational military aid fans consider political controversy. Indian diversification of its military shipping to USSR, U.K., France, and USA after the F-16 announcement is significant. Indian government became much more dependent upon the goodwill of Soviets after defense purchases. The strings are implied and long term non-alignment being an elastic principle, which means for India, to decide international matter on the basis of its merit and national interest.

According to Geoffrey Wheeler, the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations with all countries in the region, considerable military and economic projects operating in most of them, a naval presence in the Indian Ocean with share facilities in India, South Yemen, East Africa, overt or clandestine communist activities, and the economic, social and cultural development of Soviet in Central Asia. On a scale so far unequalled in the countries to which it lies adjacent and most recently the Afghanistan.¹⁴

The outside power interests in South Asian Security have undergone a dramatic reappraisal in reaction to the Soviet expansion into Afghanistan and the fragmentation of the Northern Tier in 1979-80. In terms of Indian perceptions and reactions concern has been expressed less with respect to the direct consequence of the Afghan crisis – the projection of the Soviet power
into an area directly adjacent to the sub-continent – than to the adverse chain of events involving a broader set of factors which stem from it. The heightened strategic importance according to South Asia by the great powers in the wake of Afghanistan has stimulated renewed fears in India that the region may be transformed into an area of superpower competition.\(^{15}\)

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused serious threat to south Asia particularly Pakistan. The Rand Corporation study on the “security of Pakistan” mentions the following security threats\(^{16}:\)

1. Afghanistan Soviet support for separatist movements along the Baluch and Pathan population of Pakistan.
2. Soviet air and artillery strikes at refuge (arms across the border)
3. An attempt by Soviet or Afghan forces to seize a salient portion of Pakistani territory in the frontier.
4. A Soviet sponsored attack by India against Pakistan.
5. A coordinated Indian-Soviet-Afghan attack designed to fragment Pakistan along ethnic lines.

Despite Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s main preoccupation is still with India. Dangers from India continue to be the main pretext for Pak-USA military relationship and impart of huge military equipments from USA. Though U.S.A. has given $3.2 billion worth of aid to meet Soviet threat, yet the stationing of Pakistani troops clearly indicates its preoccupation with India. The Rand report says thus: of the Pakistani’s Army’s six corps headquarters,
only one is located along the Afghan border. The remaining five, which control all of the country’s armor, face India.\textsuperscript{17}

The main threat to India’s security comes from not only the overwhelming military machines and dynamic social concepts but also by the “lengthening shadow of the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon looming large on the country’s horizon”. India’s security is not threatened by Pakistan. India is worried about the U.S. supply arms to Pakistan and by other powers. Therefore, the Soviet Union has become a permanent factor in India’s strategic thinking and has much the same position which the USA occupies in Pakistan thinking.\textsuperscript{18}

The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan had an adverse impact on the security of the sub-continent, just as the moving of Chinese forces into Tibet and those of the United States’ bases at Diego Garcia have. But Pakistan has little credibility in talking about external threat to the sub-continent when it has been seeking Chinese help and constructed the Karakoram highway.\textsuperscript{19} Further there was news of signing of a protocol between China and Pakistan for the opening of the Khangerah pass in Karakoram highway “PoK”. India lodged protest against this, India is wary of Chinese designs in the region which consist of an attempt to weaken the central government to encourage centrifugal forces, and to look for eventual creation of number of separate states on the Indian sub-continent at least some of which would move into close alliances with peking”.\textsuperscript{20}
Thus, there is no way to ensuring security of the continent except to keep away the influence of all three powers-US, China, USSR – out of the subcontinent. It is necessary for all the South Asia countries – SAARC – to maintain their non-aligned status and independence of foreign policy. India’s objection to the USA proposal for the supply of $400 million worth of arms to Pakistan was not because it constituted a large induction of arms, but it would mean active U.S. involvement in the sub-continent. In the past Pakistan had been led into disastrous misadventures because of its over-confidence that the USA and China would have it out of dangerous situations in which it landed itself. K. Subramanayam says that the Pakistani leadership should not repeat that kind of mistake again: if the influence of distance U.S. is brought into the sub-continent, the neighboring Soviet Union, will have every justification to seek to intervention in the affairs of sub-continent, which locates on its southern borders, and therefore, has greater relevance to its security.21

The Utopian speculation about the future of South Asian security, says Thomas P. Thorton, can be discouraging because the range of this future seems to be between the desirable and unacceptable.22 The South Asian subsystem, according to Thomas Thornton, is highly vulnerable to outside intrusion or intervention because of the splits within it, indeed, in some regards its internal situation is about as bad as it can be since the two major members are in specially dangerous imbalance.23

The result of this combination of regional tensions has been remarkable manifestation of how the global (East-West) polarization can impose itself into
a regional polarization. The outcome, says Thornton, has been the classic interaction between the two systems and has presented opportunities to the superpowers to intervene in their own interests. There has been ups and down in this relationship that are familiar, but it is very essentially to focus on the fact that: (i) these vulnerabilities have led to very high levels of outside intervention in the past, and (ii) the potential for renewed high levels of intervention persists.

Thornton further added that the intrusion of global issues upon the South Asian system and its individual member state is not limited/confined to the traditional problems of security and political tensions associated with the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, but also mentions several new global issues such as non-proliferation, human rights, ecology, global warming, etc.

**Indian Ocean**

Indian Ocean is very paramount in India’s geostrategic relations and security perspectives. Herein, the superpower involvement has always seen, particularly after the World War II. Therefore, it is equally important to apprehend Soviet approach and Indian approach towards the Indian Ocean.

**The Soviet perspective**

British were the overriding external forces in the Indian Ocean, other than Dutch and French, till the 1970. In 1968, the British Government announced the phased withdrawal of its military presence east of Suez. The decision of withdrawal by British and concomitant appearance of a few Soviet naval vassals in the area shot the once neglected Indian ocean into prominence.
It has focused much more on the political, economic and military competition between the great powers (USA and USSR) rather than aspirations of the littoral states, particularly their cooperative endeavor. The vacuum created by British withdrawal was regarded by the superpowers as significant or paramount, too dangerous to be left to the littorals, since the naval powers of the nations bordering the Indian Ocean were regarded as weak to dominate the ocean.\textsuperscript{24}

Justifying their naval presence as the continuation of traditional policies of securing their vital interests, both United States and Soviet Union began to increase and continued to increase their naval presence or strength in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the decade of 70s witness the dawn of the Indian Ocean as another theatre of big power rivalry. The British reason to withdraw from the area alarmed the American and Chinese alike, both sharing that the resulting power vacuum would be exploited by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{25}

The appearance of a few navies of Soviet in the Ocean was immediately interpreted as Soviet efforts to step up its naval activities in order to fact the vacuum. Not much weight was accorded at the time to the argument that the Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean could have been the reaction of America’s introduction in the region of the Polaris-Poseidon nuclear submarine fleet. Neither was it considered that the appearance of the Soviet vassals merely coincide with Britain’s decision to withdraw. Available facts make it quite clear that the Soviet entry was strongly influenced by its determination to achieve seaborne nuclear parity with the United States on the one hand, and the
ongoing competition between the superpowers for political influence and economic gains on the others.²⁶

Although General Assembly passed various resolutions regarding the implementation of the “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone” of in 1974 and in 1975 progress towards the establishment of “Zone of Peace” was not impressive mainly because of the lack of interest shown by the superpowers.²⁷

In the past, superpower capabilities to respond militarily to crises situations in the swift and decisive manner were rather limited. Building such capability was considered in the mid 60s and the proposal was vetoed by a U.S. Congress suspicious of wars of intervention in the wake of Vietnam experience. But now both the superpowers have demonstrated their capabilities to intervene effectively in the Indian Ocean area and also sustain interventionary operations for long periods. The Taboz incident in which U.S. ships and aircraft operating from Diego Garcia and Egypt in a combined operation tried to rescue the American hostage in Iran in the summer of 1980, is a case in point. Though the mission failed, it did expose the vulnerabilities of littoral states to a combined assault by the U.S. forces.²⁸

The Soviet global strategy exhibits a degree of parallism though inhibited in a large measure by the limitations of its capabilities, and thus appears to be more reactive rather than initiative. From the global perspective, the entry of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean is the part of the determined efforts of the Soviet Union during the past decade to emerge as the dominant naval power of the world. The Soviet navy has entered into the ocean after
making its presence felt at important check points of sea communication like the Dardanelles, the Skagerrak Strait, and the Tushima Strait. To make its activities more effective the Soviet want to set up fully fledged navel basis in the region. Although they have no succeeded in setting up such basis so far, the treaties they have concluded in recent years with a number of countries in the region and the fleet port facilities they have acquired in places like Aden, Iraq, Mauritius, the Seychelles Islands, Somalia, the Socotra Island, Sri Lanka etc.29

Though India and Soviet Union have often voiced their opposition to the U.S. naval base in Diego Garcia in the ocean. Soviets have too expanded their naval presence in the Ocean since 1968. This explains why during Indore Gandhi’s visit to Moscow in Sep. 1971, the Soviet merely argued “to study” the question of making Indian Ocean “Zone of Peace” and “to solve” it together with other powers on an equal basis.30

The Soviet strategy in the Indian Ocean region is guided by a large measure, by parameters and objectives similar to that of United States; and may also be seen to operate in bi-polar dimensions. Perhaps the strongest incentives flow from function of securing a role for Soviet navy to support the status of Soviet Union as a global superpower. Although, since the Soviet Union is lagging behind the US in many spheres, especially strategic mobility, technology and naval air capabilities, its strategy is a reactive one and its policy options based more on responses to U.S. initiatives.31

The Indian Ocean and its littoral are of special interest to the Soviet Union because of their geographical proximity with each other. The Indian
Ocean and its littoral constitute the soft, vulnerable underbelly of the Soviet Union in strategic terms. Any move in this region, feels Jasjit Singh, must be seen by the Soviets as hostile and threatening to Soviet Security. The “coke points” of Suez Canal, Horn of Africa, and the Malacca straits region and the larger “get ways” to the Indian ocean dominated by pro-US, Australia and South Africa not only place several limitations on Soviet ability to project power of influence in the Ocean but impose even greater limitation (strategic) on its ability to reply and reinforce its naval capabilities in the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean.32

It is equally paramount that the Soviet union has applied economic and military hardware including missiles, naval ships, and aircraft to a number of Indian ocean nations including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia.33 In 1976, during Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Moscow there appeared to be some changes in the Indian ocean policy of USSR, for the Soviets stated that they were ready to participate with other countries concerned in any move to make the Indian ocean a zone of peace. They also supported the desires of the peoples of the ocean region to prevent this ocean from becoming an arena for (the) setting up of foreign military basis”.34

Evidently, the Soviet position on the issue of foreign military basis in the Indian Ocean is definitely quite close to that of India. It can be argued that in the age of the International Ballistic Missile, the Soviets do not need military basis in the Indian Ocean. By the same logic the USA and its allies too do not
India has, of course, desisted from criticizing U.S. arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia openly and strongly. It’s dependent on West Asian oil – the Gulf States supply almost two third of its requirements – and some other considerations prevent it doing so. Yet it is evident that China, Iran, Pakistan and United States are engaged in an effort to contain India in the Ocean region.

The geographical imperatives affecting the pacific – Indian ocean may also be affected by another dimension – the naval power of China. It is believed that China plans to create a force of at least 12 nuclear missiles armed submarines to provide it a nuclear second strikes capability. The limited range of its ‘SLMB’s may dictate a deployment in the north-west Arabian sea region to provide a serious and credible threat against important and critical targets in Soviet union. This in turn would generate the need for home-part facilities in the Indian Ocean. Thus, it may be reasonably to expect a revival of Chinese interests and activities in the Ocean region in the years ahead. China’s quit for attaining a major world power status would also point towards an expansion of its sea power, qualitatively, quantitatively and geographically against the Soviet Union, a country perceived as its major adversary.

**India’s Importance in the Indian Ocean**

The importance of India in the Indian Ocean is enhanced by its north western coast which is very close to the Persian Gulf area. Further, South, a future Indian navy might gains control over sea lanes leading in and out of the Gulf in the direction of pacific if the Maldives is also included in India’s
security perimeter. Towards South-East Asia, India possess the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, close to Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia, India’s north-Eastern coast forms part of the Gulf of Bengal. Thus, India has enormous significance for the world power on the one hand, and the rival communist systems on the other hand. In the power triangle – the USA, the USSR and China-India’s geographical position, and resources could be balancing factors. Thus, geographically; India is of greater significance to the USSR than the USA or to Europe.

Moreover, Indian Ocean is assuming greater importance for the Soviet Union not only in economic, political views but also strategic point of view. Though the Ocean flows a considerable part of Soviet East-West internal trade and it’s important for the Soviet domestic trade increased in the 80s. The Trans-Siberian Railways is the only link between the two parts, which may not be able to carry all the increased load of traffic. Besides, the eastern parts of the railways and specially the Soviet Pacific Fleet base at Vladivostok is insecure in the face of Chinese threat.

The significance and strategic location of Indian sub-continent, and particularly land mass of India itself is crucial for the Soviet Union. India’s strategic location in the ocean gives it a central position in the Asian politics. Moreover, India is adjacent to the tier that borders on the southern flank of the Soviet Union and has enormous significance for the world power blocks. Furthermore, the Soviet disputes with china have at least two crucial factors for similarity with Indian disagreement with China. On one hand, the USSR and
India both have frontier wars over disputed territory with China, and on the other hand, both states share harbors with China, Russia in the north and India in the south. Thus, the overall geopolitical consideration on the whole advised Soviet Union (later Russia) to be close to India. Thus the Soviet policy towards India according to J. Bandopadhyaya, “is based on mutuality of national interests and convergence of political understanding of world politics and International relations. Therefore, India’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean gives it a central position in Asian politics and adds to it geopolitical significance in the world. As, all major sea and air routes of the world pass through India and Indian Ocean are an indispensable link in world trade and commercial significance”.41 From the geographical point of view as Nehru often used to say, India is a land of bridge between the East and West and become inevitably involved a major global issue.42

India being largest country in the region with long standing democratic traditions could well take the initiative in developing a benevolent, benign and tolerant leadership to enhance confidence in the smaller status of the region. The littoral states also need to promote economic interdependence with each other. And, in dealing with advanced countries (G-7) of the world, the littoral states should take a pragmatic view of the world politics. They must build an adequate defense against the threat they face. In this regard, India will have to shoulder the biggest burden in strengthening and expanding its naval and maritime forces and superstructure.
Thus, security and self-reliance for littoral states may only come about by internal strength and stability, economic development and a navel navel strategy to provide effective of credible sea power to defend and safeguard national interests. Therefore, the Soviet repeatedly expressed support for efforts of the littoral states to convert the region into a "Zone of Peace," where all foreign bases would be dismantled, removing threat to their security independence and sovereignty.43

(E) Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev Era

Change of leadership in two countries did affect geostrategic and economic bilateral relations between India and USSR. It was assured after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 that Indo-Soviet relations would continue to be cordial and friendly. Bilateral trade continued to grow. After Mrs. Gandhi's assassination in October, 1984, India's leadership shifted to Rajiv Gandhi. On the other side, it was Mikhail Gorbachev who became General Secretary of Communist Party in 1985 and also brought new policies. The Indo-Soviet relations were further consolidated during this period.44 Rajiv Gandhi adopted a "balanced approach" towards both the superpowers. He made it unambiguously clear that the geopolitical urgency demanded India to maintain defense and strategic relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Mr. Gandhi spelt out broad strategic options in conducting India's relations with major superpowers.45

India and Soviet had more or less identical views on most of international issues and questions. Rajiv Gandhi asserted a number of times
that the Soviet Union had stood by India in all difficult time. Therefore, Indo-
Soviet friendship would be maintained at high level. Rajiv Gandhi went on six
day visit to Soviet Union in May 1985. He was assured by Soviet leaders that
they were aware of India’s anxiety caused by Pakistan nuclear weapon
programme. Both the countries signed agreements for economic and technical
cooperation whereby Soviet assistance to India was considerably increased.
Soviet Union not only announced Rs. 1160 crores but also provided assistance
for a thermal power project of 840 mgw and certain other schemes.46

Acknowledging India’s prominent role in (South) Asia, the Soviet leader
said that, “we appreciate the contribution of India in strengthening international
peace and security and applaud India’s contribution in promoting the role of
Non-aligned Movement (1961) in this endeavor. Hence, Gorbachev proposed
to promote the idea of “collective security” for Asia originally initiated by Late
Brezhnev. Further, Gorbachev said that the USSR would not attempt to
improve relations even with China at the cost of Indo-Soviet friendship.47
While describing the relations as “model” between any two countries, Rajiv
Gandhi said, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru laid the foundation of Indo-Soviet friendship
on which Indira Gandhi built a fine edifice. The relations between our countries
have for long been a model of international cooperation between societies with
different traditions and political structures. Mutual regard has led to mutual
trust”. Therefore, this era was the period of bonhomie between two countries –
India and Russia.
An Indo-Soviet was held in Moscow in May 1985, where Gorbachev broached his Asia-Pacific strategy first with Rajiv Gandhi, and projected USSR as a leading power in Asia and beyond the Pacific region. Speaking on the occasion, Gorbachev said, “Years and decades have passed but Indo-Soviet relations have continued to grow”. That is so, he said, because these relations are based on equality and mutual respect, on the coincidence or similarity of positions of the two countries on basic problems of our time. It is free from any kind of strain. It wants to see India grow into powerful factor in global affairs.

The Delhi Declaration – “On the principles of a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World” – was held on 26 November 1986 by Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev. Both leaders emphasized both countries unique commonness of approach to the vision of a world, free from nuclear weapons and violence. The declaration contained the following expectations, namely:

1. Peaceful co-existence should be the universal basis of international relations;
2. Human life should be given highest priority;
3. Non-violence should be the basis of cooperative living;
4. Fear and mistrust should be replaced by milieu of mutual trust and cordial ties;
5. Political and economic rights of peoples of different countries should be recognized and respected;
6. The amount of money being spent on armaments should be usefully utilized for socio-economic development;
7. Proper atmosphere should be ensured for all round development of the individual;

8. The material and intellectual capacities of mankind should be utilized for finding the solution of the problems found by the community of nations;

9. The ‘balance of terror’ should be replaced by international peace and security; and finally

10. Effective steps should be taken for comprehensive disarmament so that the world can be free of nuclear weapons and may follow the path of non-violence.

The Declaration was Perestroika’s first international document on “New Thinking” carved out of the Indo-Soviet exchanges, as rooted by Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gorbachev referred to his address in New Delhi animatedly: “It is said in the Vedas: the path is won by he who is walking it... And I had thought that it was something novel pertaining to the new age, the pronouncing it to path, a new stage of coming closer”.

In addition to this forceful Delhi Declaration, an economic protocol was also signed by both countries. Accordingly, the USSR agreed to give a long term credit of Rs. 2883 crores on nominal interest for renewal of certain old projects and starting of some new projects. Cultural festivals were also organized in two countries since 1988 for better cultural exchanges. Several artists promoted the feeling of universality and equality.

Thus, the Soviet decision to start withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in May 1988 met India’s long expressed wishes. In November 1988, Gorbachev
visited New Delhi and had wide ranging of discussions on global as well as regional issue.\textsuperscript{55} Hence the Rajiv-Gorbachev era was very fruitful for both the countries. There was not only bonhomie but also economic and technological cooperation between both the countries – India and Soviet.

\textbf{(F) SAARC: USSR Response}

The Soviet Union had already intervened in Afghanistan in 1979. This act had opened a door for entries of superpowers to capture the South Asia. This was quite detrimental for South Asian Security. Hence, a solid cooperation was very essential at this junction. The idea of South Asia Regional Cooperation (SARC) was mooted by President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh in 1980. The President Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh discussed the possibility to organize regional cooperation for the common good of the people of South Asia during his visits to Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in late 70 and in 1980.\textsuperscript{56}

The Heads of the State or Government of seven South Asian countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – formally established the South Asia Association for Regional Organization (SAARC) in their first summit conclave at Dhaka on 7-8 December 1985.\textsuperscript{57} The basic objectives set forth in its charter were, inter-alia, to improve the welfare of people of South Asia to improve their quality of life, to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region, and to promote collective self-reliance among countries of South Asia.

The South Asian region has been strategically and politically significant to Russia (USSR) because of its geopolitical compulsions after the liquidation
of British colonialism. Thus as soon as Stalinist policy of Isolationism came to an end, the Soviet Union found in itself directly involved in the intra-regional affairs of South Asia in the mid fifties. It could not always afford to remain a silent observer in any intra-regional dispute in this area. This was in the context of its growing rivalry with the United States at the global level, and on ideological dispute with communist China. Naturally, such an interplay of global and regional factors brought the Soviet Union closer to India. The Soviets could not afford to ignore their basic interests in other nations of South Asia and sometimes provided them with sizeable economic and technical aid. However, the Soviet Union never fitted the balance against India and clearly recognized its potentialities as a natural leader of the emergent Third world countries and in the SAARC.\textsuperscript{58}

Another basic geostrategic interest of Soviet Union is that it being largely a land power, needs more and more outside channels not only for its national security but also meet the growing demands of its expanding economy. So, it urgently needs alternative channels and outlets to the Indian Ocean and through it to the other Oceans.\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, Soviet Union eulogized the effort of President of Bangladesh Zia-ur-Rehman along with India for a regional organization, that is, SAARC, because Soviet Union thought that it would integrate the South Asian region and would be a mechanism to contain Chinese and USA influence in the South Asian region.

Finally, the Soviet Union is in position to provide large scale economic assistance and technical know-how to a number of projects undertaken by most
of the South Asian countries. Even in terms of military hardware and strategic weapons, it is in position to provide substantial help. All these factors have increased the bargaining capacity of the Soviet Union in this part of the world.60

(G) Perestroika and Glasnost: End of Cold War

Perestroika and Glasnost were introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev. After that he assumed his office as President of USSR. Both Perestroika and Glasnost focused on the restructuring of system, openness and eco-political liberalization. Perestroika focused on broader issues like democracy and economic reforms. Gorbachev’s ‘New thinking’, the foreign policy counterpart of domestic perestroika prompted him to redefine the place and role of the Soviet Union in the world and to come out of ‘stagnation’ in the system that continued upto Brezhnev era.

Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister, criticized the old Soviet policy, said, “our direct or indirect entanglement in regional conflicts bring about enormous losses, exacerbating overall international tensions, justifying the arm race and hampering mutually beneficial economic ties with the West”. Gorbachev was interested in enhancing relations with the West, arms cut and opening the polity and economy to the forces of globalization, market and democratization. As a result, Indo-Soviet relations were looked in a wider perspectives.61

Although, ‘Glasnost’ and ‘Perestroika’ were one of the main causes of political earthquake in former Soviet Union. This led to fracture the Soviet Union in 15 independent states, that is, Common wealth of Independent States
(CIS). Russian Republic as recognized by the committee of nation, as the successor state of USSR. Both Gorbachev and George Bush, the then President of U.S. declared an end of Cold War at the Malta Summit in December, 1989. Gorbachev said that they did not consider them any enemy any more. The agreement on German reunification was a manifestation of this assertion. Other important developments included the signing of a treaty on the reduction of Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) in November 1990 and the signing of the Strategic and Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991. The stand taken by Soviet leadership on the Gulf crisis in 1991 confirmed the impression that Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” presented a break with that of the previous Communist regimes.

Though internal and external forces were prominent causes for the holocaust that disintegrated Soviet Union (that shall be discussed in next chapter). The impact of Soviet disintegration on Indo-Russian relations was enormous, encompassing every aspect of bilateral relations. In an overarching change in their foreign policy, Indo-Russian relations took unexpected turns in the 1990s. The initial two years (1991-93) were the most difficult years in bilateral relations since the holdup seemed difficult to be broken as both the traditional partners started drifting away from each other. The confusion and intense debate in Russian foreign policy establishment regarding the course of action to be undertaken i.e. whether to pursue a vigorous pro-west policy giving up the old relations or maintain a balance among new and old partners; further delayed the evolution of a concrete foreign policy.
Thus, in this changing matrix of international political environment, it was but natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge churning process. And it was considered that there was more ‘continuity’ than ‘change’ in Russian foreign relations.

Thus, the ‘collapse of Soviet Union’ left a vacuum in the international political system. The Soviet Union had played a paramount role against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, which found themselves against the western bloc of countries.
References


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid. p. 25.


13. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


33. Ibid.


39. Ibid.

40. Lodozhsky, A., *The USSR’s Efforts to Turn the Indian Ocean into a Zone of peace*, *International Affairs*, Moscow, No. 8, August 1981, p. 44.


43. Ibid.


47. Khanna, V.N., op.cit., p. 293.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


51. Ibid., p. 29.


54. Ibid.


61. Ibid, p. 18.


63. Ibid, pp. 28-29.

64. Ibid, p. 27.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.
CHAPTER – THREE

Soviet Union’s Disintegration: And Its Impact on India
Russia’s relations with India in the post-Cold-War era have been determined by remarkable degree of stability, continuity, restoration of peace and order in Asia, particularly South Asia.\(^1\) Despite their differing philosophies and political and social systems, the two countries co-operated closely throughout the cold war era.\(^2\) But the changing matrix of global environmental culminating in the political earthquake in former Soviet Union changed the world power structure, from bipolar to multipolar world. After the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as an independent state, Russia declared itself to be “state continuator”, of the former power giant, USSR.\(^3\) It is significant that India and Russia are the world’s largest democracies, India in terms of its size of the population, and Russia in terms of its size.\(^4\)

The impact of the Soviet disintegration on Indo-Russian relations was enormous, encompassing every aspect of bilateral relations. In an overarching change in their foreign policy, Indo-Russian relations took unexpected turns in the 1990s. The reasons of this change were found in the very systemic disintegration of the huge socialist pattern, further confounded by misgivings about each other’s policies. At the initial years (1991-93) the Russian economy was undergoing a difficult phase of transition from socialist society moving towards a market oriented pattern; the transition swept the whole society that

69
was unprepared for such a drastic change. In this complex scenario, it was but natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge churning process. Therefore, ahead to explore or discuss relations between two countries, there is essential to apprehend the disintegration and its causes that led to the political earthquake in former Soviet Union.

**Disintegration of Soviet Union**

The disintegration of Soviet Union is one of the most epoch making events in the history of mankind. It has transformed the whole nature of global politics and dramatically altered the basic parameters in which the various relationship between nations, states and classes have hitherto operated. If the collapse of Soviet Union meant that world would change what emerges from present influx will determine the direction of change. However the pace of change was so quick and fast that left the observers completely confused and bewildered, starting with Gorbachev’s “Perestroika” and ‘Glasnost’, followed by the ‘Union Treaty’ and unsuccessful ‘August coup’, and, on top of all, the disintegration of mighty Soviet Union, the events moved such a speed that even before the fallout of one was assessed, the other came with a bang.

A brief analysis of the reforms and the processes which emerged as their consequences would show that it was conjuncture of the objective and the subjective contradictions – the long term accumulation of weakness and short term methods of their resolution, which broke the Soviet Union in 15 Independent Republics. Controversies surround the method of Gorbachev’s reforms of ‘perestroika and glasnost’. But this does not detect from the
fundamental issues that reform was essential for the Soviet system. His reforms were not evolutionary or systematic, they attacked the system from all sides and a number of issues were raised simultaneously. The reform eventually brought the ethnic problems and subsequent demands for independence of Republics to the forefront, promising to put an early end to perestroika.

Initially, the Soviet people assumed that the absence of democracy and civil liberties was a temporary aberration caused by necessity of the socialist state to survive in the hostile international environment. But what seemed to be temporary adjustment to concrete historical circumstances soon became a system, a structure which resisted democratization own when circumstances favoured it.7

Causes of Soviet Disintegration

Mikhail Gorbachev during 1986-87 was known for his policy of Glasnost (openness) which provided a greater degree of freedom for mass media, free discussion on most contemporary politics. He also announced 4 programmes of economic reforms known as Perestroika the purpose of which was to liberalize the economic system by introducing market mechanism, competition and private initiatives. In his view, from formation of communist economy would be possible by freeing Soviet industry from the stratifying effects of centralization and bureaucratization so that they would survive.

Moreover, the Soviet economy has become lopsided with a very high defence account up to 40 percent of budget was linked to defence expenditure. Technological upgradation was concentrated in the defence sector. The
consumer sector was continually neglected. Rise of consumerism as a great influence on the minds of new generation of Soviet people. The slow economic growth domestically and all round the economic development in capitalist countries of Europe and USA led to the belief among the people of ex-USSR that capitalism is better economic system for them than socialism.\(^8\)

Despite his best efforts, when Gorbachev failed to achieve the objectives, that are, improvement in economy, settlement of ethnic differences and rehabilitation of the administrative machinery through his two pet concepts 'perestroika and Glasnost', he gave a chance to a new move. This he wanted to do through the signing of a Union Republic Treaty which he proposed to get signed on 21 August 1991. The treaty provided for a new decentralized setup in which republic would be given more autonomy in a loose federation.

The western interpretation is constrained to accept the absence of political pluralism as one of the few main causes. This element of the western interpretation highlighting the absence of political pluralism, democratic reforms of practices, disregarding human rights of freedom in the former USSR, making signal contribution to the collapse has to be conceded to a great extent.\(^9\)

Thus the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves a vacuum in the international political system. The Soviet Union played an important role against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation movements and assisted in the development of third world countries, which found themselves against the western power bloc of countries.
Disintegration of USSR and Impact on India

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dealt a body blow to India’s foreign policy framework, necessitating a thorough review of the assumptions on which this framework was based. Events happened with bewildering rapidity for which India had not prepared itself. The shock was more devasting as it was so expected and the collapse was so dramatic.

The Soviet Union was succeeded by the Russian Federation and the People in Russia went through the traumatic experience which has yet to end. Slowly and gradually the pieces are being picked and a saver policy is bringing established. It has certainly been a painful experience, the almost precipitations lowering of living standards, the fall of production, the amazing rise in unemployment and the equally amazing laws of corruption, the decline in control authority, the specter of ugly face of the mafia, the increasing disparities and so on.

The worst is perhaps not yet over, but at least now there is a semblance of order and some re-establishment of central authority. The wheels of production have started moving through own the previous laws have not been achieved. At least foreign policy assumed some recognizable shape and Russia has begun to assert itself in a somewhat more determined manner with better coherence and purposefulness. Both Moscow and New Delhi are discovering that the geopolitical realities do not vanish even in the minds of change.10
Impact on Defence & Strategic levels

In the defence or strategical areas also the collapse of Soviet Union had affected India adversely. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important implications are in defence and military areas. India, as we know, was buying very large number of military weapons, equipment and hardware from the Soviet Union. These included Mig fighter aircrafts, battle tanks, sub-marines etc. During 1986-90, according to one estimate, about 73 percent of the total value of arms imported by Indian defence forces originated in the Soviet Union.  

It is unlikely to expect USA to throw her military and political allies, like Pakistan, totally in lurch, if and when issues and problems like Kashmir come for discussion in the United Nations or elsewhere. All the same India cannot depend on the Russia support in the changed matrix situation. What is required is that strategic and diplomatic losses here and there should be compensated with new initiatives and modified responses to meet the exigencies of the new situation.

On the contrary, India may come under greater pressure in certain matters as signing of NPT. Horizontal proliferation, on which both superpowers agreed ever since signing of NPT, has now acquired to priority. Following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation was in the forefront of global strategic thinking. As Russia may not always come to the rescue of India or other countries the global constraints in this respect have increased. Ever since Sep-Oct 1991, Indian public opinion and political parties
have articulated deep concern over mounting pressure of USA on India to sign NPT which India denied. America’s arms twisting tactic culminating in rocket technology had increased the concern by India and Russia (Mutual Assured Destruction).

But the nuclear and traditional arms race between local powers has not ceased to exist. It is for these above reasons, it may be said that the above stated advantages flowing from the end of cold war need not accrue to the third world countries, particularly India, as a matter of course. The pro-western drive to protect of promote national interest was the major thrust of its foreign policy. Hence, it was not surprising to change its stand on Kashmir issue. Alexander Rutiskoi, Russia U.P. announced a very significant change his country’s stand in the issue by saying that the ‘right of self determination’ of the people of Kashmir should be decided under UN auspices of accordance with its resolutions. This was clear negation of the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue.

**Impact on Economic of Trade Relations**

The disintegration of erstwhile USSR led to a disruption for many sectors of Indian economy. Many of these problems that Russia have been facing in its economic spheres have affected India’s trade and economic relations with Russia. As per on the basis of DGCI and S data, total trade turnover between both countries declined sharply from over $ 2368 million in 1991-92 to $ 860 million in 1992-93. Although there was some improvement in trade turnover in subsequent years, during the period 1993-99; India’s exports
to Russia have been in the range of about $600 to 1,000 million per annum. Annual export data does not show any steadiness and in fact there have been wide fluctuations in exports over the years. Similarly, India’s yearly exports from Russia have been fluctuating in the range of $250 to $850 million. For India, the former Soviet Union was an important tradition partner of India, which is no more the case at present. Similarly, India has lost its position among Russia’s trade partners. Moreover, there is lack of growth and dynamism which should be a matter of concern for the policy makers and business community at a large.

It is essential to note that some large industrial houses which were operating for many years during the Soviet era wound their establishments in Moscow presumably due to uncertain and unfavourable socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country. Equally significant was the fact that several projects that were initiated in the early 1990’s by some respected Indian companies to set up processing units in Russia including that of Tata’s tea processing and packaging unit miserably failed. India’s Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha has, in his address in Mumbai during Putin’s meeting with Indian businessmen, opined that there were a few shortcomings with regard to trade with Russia. Moreover, 80-85 percent of this annual trade export is accounted for by debt repayment funds (DRF) and that too mainly concentrated on a few traditional items such as tea, coffee, tobacco, rice and leather etc. There were very few traditional items in India’s export basket with the exception of pharmaceutical products. Hence, one would legitimately question
about the prospects of India’s trade with Russia beyond say, 2005 when DRF are fully utilized.17

In initial years, problems were mounting in Indo-Soviet trade relations – the supply of Soviet imports was erratic; Soviet old deliveries felt short by $1.5 billion in that year; irregular supply of spares for Soviet weapons. Rupee-rouble controversy made the situation worse. Andrei Nechayev, Russia’s Economy Minister stated that India continues to go bilateral trade in the traditional form of Russian credit but he explained that the new credits would be at double the existing rate and with one-tenth of payment being made in advance Russia were not ready to adjust its devalued rouble with India’s rupee. Therefore, India closed trading accounts with Soviet Union in 28 December 1991, but after the disintegration new accounts were opened in the name of CIS.18

Notwithstanding the prevailing situation mentioned above, India and Russia, due to their large size, vast resources potentialities and skilled manpower etc. realized the close traded economic cooperation between both the countries. Both countries had good economic and trade accord during cold war era. Both countries have initiated economic policies of liberalization privatization and greater integration with the world economies which would enhance scope for closer economic ties.19

For instance, in their assessment, given skilled manpower from India and Russia’s R and D base coupled with hardware design capabilities, there is more scope for two countries to collaborate in areas such as IT, advance
computing, bio-technology, telecommunication, training personnel as so on. They, Ilya Klebanov, further include power engineering, new materials, and utilization of industrial wastes, environment control systems and instrumentation.\textsuperscript{20}

**Emerging Trends in Indo-Russian Relations**

Indo-Russian relations have begun to unfold new trends which stand as a complete contrast to the situation soon after political earthquake of erstwhile Soviet Union, which led to the end of bipolar world. The ruling elites in both the countries have begun to look at these relations with an open mind and without and ideological overtones, due to the insertion of 'perestroika and glasnost' policy in Russia's internal and external matters. This is reflected in the recent tendencies in the relation between the two countries, both in 'geo-economic' and 'geo-strategic' terms. These relations have been both continuity and change, though it would be incorrect to equate Indo-Russian relations with the former Soviet Union relations. The driving force behind Indo-Russian relations in the beginning of 21\textsuperscript{st} century is commonality of 'geo-political' and 'geo-economic' interests of both the countries in the new historical conditions. Notwithstanding that both the countries are witnessing changes in their internal economic and political structures. With India there come to be greater depth in the fast emerging relationship. Russia and India began to redevelop a multifaceted political, economic, security and defence relationship.\textsuperscript{21}
Cryogenic Rocket deal and Irritant relation with Russia

India had conducted an agreement with the former Soviet Union at the beginning of 1991 to gain cryogenic rocket motors. Eduardo Faleiro, India’s Minister of state for external affairs, had stated that his government intends to use Russian technology only for the peaceful and civilian purposes. Even experts pointed out that it takes approximately ninety days to prepare for launching the rocket, which makes it impossible to use it effectively for military purposes. Russian leaders assured India that Russia would execute the agreement signed by former Soviet leadership. Gennady Burbulis, Russia’s Secretary of State, during his visit to India in May 1992 assumed that they attached considerable importance to its relations with India and they would fulfill all their commitments, including the transfer of cryogenic rocket engines, despite the pressure from the US. But his statement, “let neutral, international exports once more evaluate this deal in accordance with all the standards of international law and then proof for their judgments which for our part, we will try to accept in the proper fashion”, surprised Indian leaders. The cryogenic rocket deal controversy manifested or indicated that Indo-Russian relationship was influenced by Russia’s pro-western policy.22

But in the changing global environment, the U.S. state department urged both Glavkosmos (Russian Space Agency) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to cancel the rocket deal. Such kind of US attitude towards the deal increased the tension between India and Russia. As India’s success in space technology prompted the U.S. to apply pressure on Russia to
cancel the agreement. James Baker, U.S. Secretary of state, during his visit to Moscow in February 1992 told Kozyrev that the deal with India 'created serious problems' in the US-Russian cooperation in space and warned that the US might impose trade sanctions against Russia if the contract was not scrapped. Further, Baker reiterated to Kozyrov, in a meeting in Brussels on 6 March 1992, that if Russia did not annuls the contract swiftly then the US might reconsider the idea of trade sanctions.23

But shortly before deciding to impose sanctions, George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, in a telephonic conversation on 9 May 1992, arrived at a understanding to show goodwill in matters of expanding sales market for cryogenic type technology on the basis of equal rights. Surprisingly, America imposed sanctions on 11 May 1992. The sanctions stopped issuing export licenses to both agencies – Glavkosmos and ISRO for two years. Also they banned imports from these organization to the US for the same period. Not only that, the U.S. state department urged other parties to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to impose sanctions against both the organizations. Interestingly, the US state department declared on 13 May 1992 that the sanctions against Glavkosmos would net stand on the way of the US imparting from Russia the advanced nuclear topaz rocket engine.

It is noteworthy that the Russian Foreign Ministry ‘explored’ this decision. Alexander Dunayev, head of Glavkosmos, vowed to continue its supplies to India despite the sanctions announced by US administration. Against such a background, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of US
adopted an anti-proliferation amendment sponsored by Joseph R. Bidon, making US to Russia conditional upon Russia’s agreeing to abandon the sole of rocket technology to India. Later, Russia succumbed to the US pressure and more other than Yeltsin himself declared Russia’s inability to fulfill the contractual obligations due to unforeseen developments: Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign Minister, known for his pro-Western approach, gave a moderate image to the U.S. sanctions and clarified that, “this (the sanctions) is not a matter of sanctions against industry... it will be viewed as an individual case regarding only Glavkosmos... not against the whole space industry and so one”.

During the transitional fears of Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow was keen to promote its interests even at the cost of cancelling its old agreements and commitments. Under the cloak of ‘enlightened pragmatism’, the Russian leadership was hoping that only the western cooperation could have tackle the crisis, both internal and external. In the cryogenic rocket motor case, a Russian diplomat stated that Russia assigns “top priority to national interests... he is convinced that it would be unwise to neglect opinions of exports, who say that the contract with India does not comply with the MTCR”. Therefore, this reliance on ‘foreign exports’ further slowed down the relations in the transitional years.

Although Ruslan Khasbulatov, Russian Supreme Soviet leader, on his state visit to India on 3 August 1992, accepted that the developments in Russia had a negative impact on India-Russia relations he assured that Russia ascribed highest priority to having good relations with New Delhi. He also assured that
Russian cryogenic engines would be supplied and the contracts with Glavkosmos would be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{25}

The intensive study of the international politics around the deal brings to the fore the emerging stark realities of the unipolar world – the evident of US pressure and vulnerabilities of Russia, consequent on its reduced stature in international arena.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, Russia could not adopt an independent line in the initial years.\textsuperscript{27} For the first time, in India-Russia relations later Russia, the Russian president had to cancel the deal in July 1993; he declared Russia’s unconditional compliance to the deal during his January 1993 Delhi visit.\textsuperscript{28} Questions were raised about Russia’s negligence of India. Baburin, People’s Deputy, participating in a discussion programme, “Does Russia have a foreign policy”, questioned ‘Russia’s double standards in foreign policy in dealing with the cryogenic agreement with India.’\textsuperscript{29}

Significantly, the scope for manoeuvre in the new dispensation was also indicated by the instance of the deal. It was indicated by the fact that Russia went the possible farthest point for compliance to accommodate India’s needs for its space programme and whatever its agreement with US, the gesture was important.\textsuperscript{30} It is also to be noted that both sides signed a new agreement in New Delhi March 1994, which dropped the technology transfer provision but increased the number of engines to be supplied to India.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, the most important traits of this early phase of Indo-Russian relations were the predominance of change factors and coexistence with an underlying continuity factors. The change factor was evident in ascribing lower
priority to India in Russia’s foreign policy; in the initial uncertainty over the
supply of arms and spares to India due to the near collapse of Russia’s
infrastructure; in the deletion of the word “peace” and article XI in the 1993
treaty; and cancelation of cryogenic deal. At the same time, the continuity
factor was evident in the process of re-prioritizing India’s worthiness in
Russia’s foreign policy perceptions; and in the acknowledgement of the 1971
Treaty in the Preamble of 1993. The highlights of this early phase was,
precisely, the realistic, down to earth (de-ideologized) assessment of the
relationship from both the sides, India and Russia. India wished to establish
new equations net on the basis of emotional or purely historical factors, but on
the ‘realistic’ basis, in the changing matrix of global environment due to the
political turmoil in former Soviet Union.

Yeltsin’s visit to India: 1993

With the collapse of Soviet Union, the successor state, Russia assumed
the pro-western attitude. And India was reduced to periphery in its foreign
policy priority. But in the changing global environment, Russia suddenly
changed its attitude towards South Asia, particularly with India. Thus, the Boris
Yeltsin’s visit in 1993 was considered first step in that direction.

President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to India in January 1993 marked the
beginning of a new phase in the Indo-Russian relations. The visit ended all
speculations regarding the deteriorating relations between the two countries.
Both sides showed the visit as one of prime step in surviving the ‘special
realtionship’. Izbestia wrote, “the president of Russia is going to India to lay
the foundation of a new relationship”, Observer quoted Gennady Burbulis “indeed is a central plank of Russian Foreign Policy, it is also stated: Delhi is perhaps a vital shop to determine the broad contours of Yeltsin’s policy”.39

Yeltsin signaled that his trip to New Delhi was one significant move towards balancing Russia’s foreign policy between East and West. “Russia has had its own independent foreign policy for only a year”, the president recalled, and “at first we had to decide a significant nuclear weapons cuts with the US. That was the main issue, and it has been resolved, now our foreign policy equally balanced between West and East. Yeltsin appeared to cast off ‘pro-western romanticism’”.40

The 14-clause ‘Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’, signed by president Yeltsin and Prime Minister Race, was the first political document to guide Indo-Russian Future relations.41 The treaty basically was an extension of the previous treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation of 1971, the significant aspect was that the security and peace clauses present in the Treaty of 1971 were dropped.42 The 1993 Treaty provided the base for strengthening relations in the changed international circumstances. It committed both the countries to the security of each other’s territorial integrity and prohibited them from taking any action, which might adversely affect the interest of other.43

Over the deletion of words ‘peace and security’ from the treaty, President Yeltsin said, “the connotation of the new Treaty (1993) was not to form “blocs, axis, triangles or quadrangles”. He further elaborated that during the 1970s, Moscow used to play the card ‘against world imperialism and
Chinese hegemonism’ but now ‘we do not want to build our relations with India on that special basis ‘but rather’ on a solid basis of mutually advantageous partnership, not directed against any third country... The cold war context of the Article IX lost its relevance in the new milieu and the new treaty evidently recognized the post-cold war political and economic realities.44

Military and Technical Cooperation was signed on 28 January 1993, by Grachev and Sharad Pawar, during President Yeltsin’s visit to India.45 At a very outset it was made clear that the agreement was not directed against any third country. The thrust of the agreement was to “assist India in protecting its sovereignty, its independence, its integrity and unity.46 It was important in the context of Russia’s approach towards border issue. Basically the agreement envisages cooperation in defence, science and technology and joint research and development projects. Pawar expressed satisfaction that the agreement would “greatly relieve pressure on our armed forces”. And the report of Ministry of Defence commented that the agreement “provides a framework for a continuing defence supply relationship with Russia and paves the way for implementation of mutually beneficial programmes for cooperation in defence sector.47

Yeltsin realized, with his visit, that India could be Russia’s “largest international asset, nor US nor Western Europe’.48

Yeltsin supported India on three crucial issues without mincing words:

(1) He supported India on the Kashmir issue holding it to be an integral part of India;
He assured India of space cooperation and supply of cryogenic engines despite the western pressure; and

On the issue of nuclear proliferation, he understood the Indian position.\(^{49}\)

Russia’s policy towards the Kashmir issue favouring India appeared in a major way during the Yeltsin visit. The Russian president mixed no words in expressing Russia’s ‘unequivocal’ support to the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue. He cleared the doubt in the Indian mind that the newly emerging Russian state, in its drive to shed the old ideology, had made the dramatic turn from the old Soviet policy. He asserted the Indian stand on Kashmir while speaking at a meeting with Indian businessman on 28 January 1993 in Delhi, “we stand for integrity of India. We support the settlement in Kashmir in accordance to the Indian version so as to maintain integrity and unity in India. And, whatever International Organizations it may be UNSC or others we shall stand by this view”.\(^{50}\)

The Yeltsin visit removed the Indian anxiety about the Russian stand not only on issue like Kashmir but also other related issue like Pakistan sponsored terrorism and Pakistan’s move to spread religious fundamentalism in the region. He also clarified that “Russia will not seek to improve relations with Pakistan at India’s cost”.\(^{51}\)

The cryogenic deal controversy came into the scene in 1990, when Russia cancelled the deal with the mounting pressure of US. Initially, the deal proved that Russia could not adopt an independent line in the initial fears. Later Russia succumbed to the US pressure and none other than Yeltsin himself declared
Russia’s inability to fulfill the contractual obligations due to unforeseen developments". But the Yeltsin’s visit to India proved very fruitful in space cooperation and supply of cryogenic engines to India. As both India and Russia signed military cooperation on January 28, 1993, it was decided that deliveries would be resumed at previous level with guaranteed product support and comprehensive services for maintenance, repairing and modernization.53

Yeltsin supported India also on the nuclear proliferation. Although Moscow wanted India to sign CTBT and NPT to half nuclear proliferation in South Asia, there is an element of ‘pragmatism’ in its nuclear policy towards India.54 While India denounced to sign both CTBT & NPT, because, for India, these treaties are discriminatory in nature. So, India has not still signed them. Due to the policy of pragmaticism, Russia neither strongly condemned India’s nuclear weapons hosts in May 1998 nor imposed sanctions against it, as United States and Japan did. On the contrary, Moscow fully shares New Delhi’s stand that it would first need to build a national consensus before signing the CTBT.55

Thus, the position of Russian leadership on those said issues was a clear indication that Russia had shed its western orientation, which failed to prove to be ‘panacea for all the ills of Russia’s. Yeltsin could well gauge the emerging world order in which the interests of both the countries converged on many fronts. And he said, in Indian Parliament, “basic interests of our states coincide”56.
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visited Moscow from 29 June to 2 July 1994 to strengthen the bilateral relations between India and Russia. The visit was culminated as ‘Moscow Declaration’ on the protection of the interests of pluralistic, states and the Declaration on Further Development and Intensification of Cooperation between the republic of India and Russian Federation. The two countries were ready to adopt common positions on various issues. They took this opportunity not only to strengthen bilateral relations but also to infuse in them the warmth and sincerity of the erstwhile Indo-Soviet ties.

The Moscow Declaration categorically spelt out: ‘In particular, there is growing threat from the forces of aggressive nationalism, religious and political extremism, terrorism and separatism, which striked at the unity of pluralistic states’. The declaration also focused on the trans-border terrorism. In a crucial move, India and Russia, being among the largest multi ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious states, all the more “recognize their responsibility for opposing the threats to democracy and peace together with other members of the world community” on the basis of their “commitment” to “unity and diversity”.

The other Declaration, signed simultaneously, urged “further democratization’ of United Nations Organization and prescribed that the United Nations system “should reflect the changing realities of the contemporary world to the fullest extent”. Second, both Russia and India
agreed in particular “to make every effort to facilitate the early conclusion of multilaterally negotiated comprehensive treaties on the universal ban of nuclear tests and cessation of production of fissile materials for weapons purpose”. The second declaration point prompted The Statesman in its editorial to comment that it “shows Russia veering round to the Indian position on the NPT”.

The implications of Moscow declaration were far reaching. First, both countries were facing challenges of terrorism: India in Kashmir and Russia in Chechnya. The spurt of terrorism in the Central Asian Region had become a matter of great concern to both countries because the terrorists posed serious threats to pluralistic societies like India and Russia. Secondly, by expressing over these problems, Russia and India presented before the world community the true and grave picture of terrorism and religious fundamentalism. In certain cases, the declaration anticipated the formation of global front against terrorism aftermath of terrorist attack in the U.S. in September 2001. Third, this declaration further strengthened their ties to fight the menace of terrorism and separatism jointly. In this context, it could be mentioned that the declaration was moved in its nature because both the countries had never signed such a document on protecting the interests of pluralistic states.

Yeltsin noted that the signing of these declarations and other documents would facilitate the restoration of close political, cultural and scientific relations, which both the countries had enjoyed before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Following his one to one talk with the Indian Prime Minister, ITAR-TASS quoted Yeltsin as saying, “there are no differences at all” and “we
work very harmoniously and in a very coordinated manner and we understand each other well’. The said statement of Yeltsin was an indication that both India and Russia had come out from the brief period of uncertainty of the disintegration, and both the leaders all set to build relations afresh, keeping in mind the emerging realities.\textsuperscript{65}

Prime Minister Rao described the Moscow Declaration as “epoch making” since it was a recognition of the ‘stark reality we face in the world today”, namely the conflicts resulting religious exclusivism, political extremism and terrorism.\textsuperscript{66} In context of Moscow Declaration, Rao said: “In a new relationship the parties have to identify new areas of agreement. This was such an instance”. Although, the Kashmir issue was not discussed in the declaration, but both parties realized the sacredness of state boundaries and menace of terrorism.

The two aforesaid Declarations are the first documents that signified the convergence of each other national interests both regionally and globally.\textsuperscript{67} The Vista of 1993 and 1994, followed by the appointment of Yergeny Primakov as a Foreign Minister in January 1996, rekindled the desire on the part of two countries to work out a strategic partnership.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{India’s Nuclear Test and Russian Response: Pokhran-II}

India conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran, in Rajasthan. The rapid pace of relationship seemed to come to halt thereafter. This was the true test of friendship on the part of Russia.\textsuperscript{69} The Russian response, after the May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear blasts by India, was of particular significance.\textsuperscript{70}
But it was difficult for Russia to reconcile this Indian tests given its stated stand on nuclear non-proliferation. As, it had always an advocate of NPT and CTBT, and wanted India to sign (CTBT and NPT) both the treaties to halt nuclear proliferation in South Asia, to that India rejected, there is an element of pragmatism in its nuclear policy towards India. That is why Russia neither strongly condemned India’s nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, nor imposed sanctions against it, as United States and Japan did. On the contrary, Moscow fully shares New Delhi’s stance that it would first need to build a national consensus before signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Hence, Russia had actually never raised the issue to such a level to jeopardize the emerging relations between the two countries. Though, in the wake of the India’s nuclear tests Russian leaders were in dilemma regarding how to handle the situation quickly.

President Yeltsin told an assembly of Russian diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “India let us down with this blast but I believe that more diplomatic efforts or a visit will adjust its policy”. On the other hand, parliamentary leaders like Gennadi Zyuganov of the Communist Party, Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party and Gennadi Seleznyov, the speaker of Russian Duma, all welcomed the Indian action. Russian military leaders also hailed the Indian move. But Primakov, Foreign Minister, was worried, like President Yeltsin, and put forward a three point proposal, the “Helsinki Initiative”, to diffuse tensions in the sub-continent. The initiative proposed signing of the NPT and CTBT by both the India and Pakistan;
bilateral talks to resolve outstanding problems between India and Pakistan; and immediate interaction among P-5 members to work out a common strategy to curb the arms race in South Asia. The initiative, at best, was evidenced in a reinteraction of Russia’s earlier calls for signing the NDT and CTBT, as was the January 1994 joint statement by the US and Russia which called on India and Pakistan to sign the NPT.\textsuperscript{75}

Moreover, Promakov in an NTV interview emphatically stated: “we do not like it. Naturally we are against them because India is upsetting stability that has taken shape in the world now in preventing nuclear explosion in general, both underground and so on. We would like very much that India, being our friend and partner, stop and would not go any further”.\textsuperscript{76} However, he opposed any economic sanctions but stressed on the big powers stepping up “efforts for resolving the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir and sorting out all other differences between the two countries”.\textsuperscript{77} However, Moscow, as an act of defiance of economic sanctions, amended (through a supplement) the Indo-Soviet deal of November 1988, to actuate the $2.5 billion deal with New Delhi for the Koondankulam nuclear power station in June 1998 and signed in December 1998 to agreement on military Technical Co-operation up to 2010.\textsuperscript{78}

Russian went along with the multilateral consensus in condemning the nuclear tests at the G-8 summit, the P-5 conclave, the G-8 Foreign Ministers’ Meet and at the UN Security Council and agreed with other D-5 members that India and Pakistan could not be recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). But, significantly, did not lead the charge against India, so it opposed sanctions
against it.\textsuperscript{79} Even while voicing Russia’s concerns about nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent, the Russian Ambassador to India went ahead to state that his country was willing to recognize India as a nuclear weapons state if it signed the CTBT and NPT.\textsuperscript{80} If seen in this context, its quite significant that Putin refused to withdraw nuclear assistance to India even in the face of mounting American pressure. He reassured India that Russia would not retreat its promise of assisting India in developing its nuclear energy sector.\textsuperscript{81}

In a nutshell, the Pokhran tests (II) changed the geo-strategical and geopolitical background of South Asia, particularly India. It led to the relations of India and Russia in zenith, and to India’s recognition of nuclear weapon state. This was one of the developments which were responsible for the recognition of India as a “Big Brother” in South Asia. Although China and America condemned and afraid about it. Thus, the test proved very fruitful for enhancing India’s stature among the community of nation states.

The Kargil War: Indo-Russian Relations

The Kargil crisis of 1999 brought the two countries nearer and was a factor for cementing the closer ties.\textsuperscript{82} In May 1999 Indian army, supported by air force, launched “Operation Vijay” and finally defeated the enemy decisively.\textsuperscript{83} Voice of Russia denounced the Kargil infiltrators as “fundamentalists, extremists and separatists” receiving various kinds of support from Pakistan. Nezarismaya Gazola noted India’s concern over NATO airstrike on Yugoslavia, on the pretext of human rights, in the context of western attempts to seek internationalization of Kashmir problem and said, “In
Delhi’s view, it may mean for India a scenario quite resemble to the Kosovo one, and that is completely unacceptable to India, as so-called Kashmir problem is an excursive concern of the people of Indian sub-continent”.\textsuperscript{84} 

While Russia was not the only country to have supported India over Kargil, no western country officially referred to Jammu and Kashmir as an “Indian state”, denounced Islamabad’s action as “invasion”, consistently opposed internationalization of the Kashmir problem and explicitly referred to the Shimla Accord (1972) and Lahore Declaration (1999) as the sole basis for resolving the problem as Russia did.\textsuperscript{85} Corresponding to Moscow’s favourable state towards New Delhi’s nuclear policy, Russia’s response to the limited border war between India and Pakistan in Kargil mid-1999 want substantially in former’s favour. Pakistan send special envoy to Russia to mediate in the crisis. So responding to the Pakistan plea, an official of the Russian foreign Ministry expressed his country’s willingness to help both Delhi and Islamabad to tide over the problem, but this was balanced by Ministry’s categorical statement that Pakistan would have to first honour the line of control (LOC) and bring back status quo along it by withdrawing its armed forces and the Kashmiri Mujahedeen’s, sponsored by Pakistan itself, from the Indian soil.\textsuperscript{86} 

On the contrary to Islamabad stand, Moscow demonstrated its solidarity with Delhi by stepping up defence supplies to India during Kargil conflict. Russia shipped more SU-30 jets and Tanguska anti-aircraft systems to India, sent its newest T-90 Tanks for field trials and offered its unique artillery tracking radar “Zoopark-1”. General Andrey Nikolaev, Chairman of the
Committee on Defence of Russian Duma, commented: During the Kargil war, the Russian had been not only fully supportive of India’s position on diplomatic and political fronts, “but very eager to assist in supplying urgently needed spare parts even by stripping their own armed forces”.  

Professor Grigory Bonderwsky, a leading Russian expert on Asia, commented: “Russia’s strong and unequivocal support for India throughout its two month-old conflict with Pakistan in Kargil goes to show that this country is perfectly serious about its declared goal of building a strategic partnership with India”. On the other hand, this was the first time in five decades when United States gave to India political support on any major issue concerning national security, when U.S. President met Sharif on America’s national day, 4 July, 1999.

Thus, the outcome of Kargil war was very positive for India. It enhanced the strategic importance of India and got very positive gestures from the Russia and USA. The Kargil war totally changed the geopolitical relations in a steadily line with Russia and U.S.A. India had never received such universal support at any political level. It has proved very fruitful for building a strategic partnership with Russia and India. Furthermore, the ‘big-brother’ status of India among the South Asian states was also recognized.

**Putin’s Visit: A New Era of Strategic Cooperation**

The first state visit of Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Vladimirovleh Putin to India on October 2, 2000 marked a new and an important state in Indo-Russian strategic cooperation and relations. The summit is known as “Delhi
Declaration of Strategic Partnership" between Russia and India. It has consolidated the traditional friendship between both countries and led to the beginning of a new era of strategic and military relationship between them in the post-cold war world order. As a matter of fact, Putin's visit is really a milestone providing tremendous impetus to the development of the two countries' relationship at the beginning of the new millennium.

The two countries have signed a number of agreements reflecting convergence of national interests and starting close strategic cooperation, unprecedented since the end of Cold War, between New Delhi and Moscow. One of the key documents signed was the "Declaration of Russian-Indian strategic partnership essentially outlines the contours of the two countries relationship in the 21st century. Both sides have made it clear that the declaration is not a new alliance but a continuation of traditional friendship and close cooperation of the last 50 years. "Not directed at any third country: the said declaration binds the two sides to 'non-participation in any military – political or other alliance or associations of armed conflict directed against the other side, or in any treaties, agreements or understandings infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security interests of the other side.' The agreement identified new areas of economic cooperation beyond the traditional areas and stressed commitments to cooperate, "as strategic partners", bilaterally and at the multi-lateral level on strategic issues for the development of a multipolar world "on a new cooperative security order". 93
The highlight of Putin’s visit was signing of four defence agreements involving $3 billion, which essentially increased the strike capability of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. The defence deals included New Delhi’s purchase of more than 300 T-90 main battle tanks along with anti-tank guided missiles with an option to transfer technology and set up a manufacturing unit in the country. Another agreement related to the transfer of technology and licensed production of 140 Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft. In addition, Russia agreed to lease four Tu-22 Backfire bombers, a maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft fitted with 300 Km range air to ground missiles and capable of flying a three times the speed of sound.

Indo-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation was established at high ministerial levels, which would exercise coordination and control of bilateral military technical cooperation, and assist in accelerated and control of bilateral military technical cooperation and assist in accelerated decision making. Further India was provided with ample opportunity to establish effective bilateral trade and economic relations by expanding cooperation in such sectors as metallurgy, fuel and energy, information technology, banking and finance. Several agreements on these were accordingly signed within the framework of the Indo-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on trade economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

The visit has not simply led to arms transfer relationship, it has also focused on the joint production of Russian systems in India, including the
transfer of technology on missiles sub-marines, fighters and tanks. In the aftermath of the Putin’s visit, New Delhi has received Brahmos from Moscow, a new supersonic missile. Although Russia has provided the missile, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is ‘fine-tuning’ it to enhance its range and make it capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Putin’s visit has demonstrated the convergence of interests of both India and Russia on several issues:

First – Russia and India have found common justification in reviving their once close strategic and military relations. India will benefit immensely from this as it is largely dependent on Russia for bulk of its arms requirements. This is also essential for India as it is flanked by Pakistan and China – with whom the border issues are still lying unsolved. From the Russia perspective, the emergence of strong India on a multi-polar world is favourable to Russian interests. The bilateral arms cooperation will constitute a major source of hard currency. In addition, the new military strategic cooperation has cemented the interests of huge Russian defence industry and India’s information technology sector, with its potential in electronic system and software. The Statesman on 13 October 2000 has aptly editorialized: India and Russia are hugging each other because they have only each other to hug”.

Second – Russia and India have found common cause in fighting against terrorism in areas like Kashmir and Chechnya. India had been facing the menace of cross-border terrorism, religious extremism, drug-trafficking and separatism, to which Putin’s reconciled in his adverse to Indian Parliament on 4
October saying that “these dangers do not recognize any borders and affect all. Terrorism cannot be allowed to become an instrument of state policy”.

Third – Russia and India have shown the readiness to work together in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and signed a ‘MoU’ in this regard. Russia is only country among the P-5, which has committed itself to support India in its field of nuclear energy. Despite unrelenting pressure from Washington, Moscow has agreed to build two large 1000 MW nuclear power reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu costing $2-6 billion. Putin’s visit to India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre at Trombay was directly related to this project, reflecting Russia’s preparedness to provide further aid to India.

Fourth, Putin supported India’s position on Kashmir, the issue should be settled bilaterally on the basis of compromise and fully supporting the Indian leadership on the collective front to fight terrorism. The joint statement pointed out that the foreign interference in Kashmir should be stopped immediately so that dialogue could be resumed between the two nations within the framework of Lahore Declaration. He further said that Moscow’s relations with the other countries, Asia, or otherwise, were no ‘alternatives’ to its likes with New Delhi, nor would they ‘prejudice our relations with our long term partner and ally. India has reciprocated by expressing its support to the steps taken by Russia in Chechnya for protecting the country’s territorial integrity and constitutional order.

Despite complementarities of views and interests between India and Russia, Putin exhorted India to sign the ‘CTBT’, which India refused to sign
due to its discriminatory nature. He said that ‘we would like to see India participating in CTBT, although ‘Russia realizes India’s concerns over being a signatory to CTBT which are based on its (India’s) own strategic version: Russia’s stand on nuclear weapons is however apprehensible, as it is committed to bring about global nuclear disarmament in cooperation and coordination with United States.94

The strategic partnership Declaration signed by President Putin and Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee in New Delhi in October 2000 states that it is “based on the principles of sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefit”. Vajpayee reaffirmed India’s resolve to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia, and Delhi fully agreed to Moscow’s position on the question of restructuring the global order on the basis of equality, fairness and well recognized principles of International law.95 In this direction, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited India in February 2002 and met India’s foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. It was a big step towards consolidating strategic ties between the two countries. The main focus of the meeting was to combat terrorism. “Two sides noted that sustained and irreversible step on this direction create a conducive environment for the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration”. At the same time, they agreed that unless cross-border terrorism was fully stopped by Pakistan there was no rationale for resuming a dialogue with Islamabad.96
Thus, the Delhi Declaration was proved very fruitful in Indo-Russian relations. Such kind of document could not be signed by both earlier in its past 50 years’ golden time of friendship. It changed the geopolitical imperatives of India in the world, particularly in Asia and South Asia. On the other hand, it proved very beneficial for the Russia in post-cold war period, wherein Russia was staggering on its feets. Therefore, it was one another step in strengthening strategic partnership between India and Russia in 21st century.

9/11: Global War against Terrorism

Terrorism has been redefined since 11 September 2001 as “Global Terrorism” and from then onwards it has become the dominant area of concern in the world politics. It has been also regarded as the greatest challenge before human kind in the new millennium. 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new phase in the United States policy towards South Asia and West Asia. Therefore the 9/11 attacks on the world Trade Centre and Pentagon that had made terrorism transnational and more destructive, attracted the attention of the world community.

This was the first time in history of humankind, wherein all the major powers of the world politics come under the single umbrella to combat terrorism in its all sorts. The manner, audacity, targets and impact of the attack engineered by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 in the US got the attention of the premier power of the world to the impact and possibilities that terrorism could unleash, irrespective of geographical limits and sovereign boundaries.
Russian President Putin was quick to respond to the emerging scenario and termed the terrorist menace, ‘the plague of 21st century’. He was the first leader of the world to call President George W. Bush after the terrorist attack and after his support to fight against the menace: soon after the US and Russia reached an agreement to increase intelligence sharing about Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda. NATO, in May 2002, created a new NATO-Russia Council to include Moscow from the outset in NATO deliberations on issues including Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation. Taken together, these developments amounted to a notably supportive Russian response towards 9/11.

In the joint statement issued at the end of President Putin’s visit to India in October 2000, the two sides underlined the importance of joint efforts in “combating international terrorism”. Both believed that the Taliban ruled Afghanistan had become a ‘breeding ground’ for sponsoring and promoting extremism in Chechnya and Kashmir. Further they came closer against the menace when A.B. Vajpayee went to Moscow, and signed Moscow Declaration, in November 2001. The Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism, which gave emphasis on the collaborative efforts of the international community to fight the menace. In this declaration, both the countries reaffirmed the pivotal role of the UN in the international efforts against terrorism “on the basis of international law including the UN charter”. In this connection they stressed the importance of strict implementation of the ONSC resolutions on terrorism, 1373. Both India and Russia also stressed the need for the early finalization of the ‘convention for the suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism’ and ‘Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism’ in UNs.106

Besides Russia, at this juncture, India came very close to US, on November 9, 2001, in Washington (DC) Vajpayee spoke of the US and India as a “natural ally” and reiterated his support for Bush’s Global war on Terror. The terrorist attack on Indian parliament on 13 December 2001 led India to reorient its policy towards terrorists. It was eager to rule out it from all walks of life, wherever and whenever it takes place.107

The immediate aftermath of 9/11 makes it evident that the US is prepared to strike collectively as a part of a coalition or unilaterally and preemptively against a threat or perceived terror threat… “We will not to act alone, to exercise our right to self-defence, including the right to act preemptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to our people and our country”.108

The events of 9/11 also changed the way in which the U.S.A. interacted with the other major powers of the world overnight, from a stage where it saw strategic rivals in countries, like China, Russia, it suddenly perceived a strategic partner in the GWOT. Relations with all major countries reworked through the ‘prism’ of terrorism and differences were pulled aside – at least for the time being. It also resulted in the US neglecting a number of facets of its relationship with some of its allies and partners, which created a void for emerging and accommodative economies like China.109
Challenges to India and Russia

Indo-Russian ties (strategic) confront three significant challenges:

India and Russia recognized the importance of United States in the current international order and importance of maintaining cordial relations with the unipolar world. For both countries, these imperatives over-ride most other strategic requirements. These efforts of India and Russia reflected in several ways such as limitations on the extension of military ties and, particularly, research and development collaboration etc. India and Russia also maintained closer economic ties with US.

The second challenge that India and Russia face is dealing with China. There is general reluctance in the foreign/strategic policy establishment of major capitals around the world to talk in anything more than a whisper about how to deal with China. Both Russia and India recognize the long term threat that China possess, but are unsure of how exactly to deal with this threat. In the Russian case, this problem compounded by Russian arms sales to China, which though necessary to maintain a viable Russian defence industrial base, something which is in India’s interest also, nevertheless impact on the military balance in Asia and on India’s security. For India, China has always been a problem despite of good relations.

The third challenge that partnership faces is that both countries are relatively weak. Unlike the Soviet-Indian partnership during the cold war period, this was anchored by Soviet superpower capabilities to back the other on significant international and regional issues. For instance, it is unlikely that
Russia is today in a position to veto decisions of the UNSC unfavourable to India, as it did during the 1971 war.

Despite these challenges, the strength of the relationship lies in the continuing complementarities of interests. Neither India nor Russia can tolerate the dominance of any single power in the region and in the global community. American power and China's potential power in Asia are realities with which both India and Russia have already come to terms. Indeed both powers may have actually learned to use these powers to promote their own interests, is it can be seen in the war on terrorism and on the other issue such as nuclear weapons, anti-ballistic missile and global warming etc. But these are strategies of weaker powers, and both countries will be more comfortable balancing against these powers than bandwagon with them. As both India and Russia grow stronger their mutual interest in countering and containing any single powers in global and Asian politics, respectively, will bring them even closer.\textsuperscript{110}
References


2. Ibid., p. 68.

3. Ibid., p. 99.

4. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p. 3.


13. Supra no. 12, p. 95.

14. The Times of India, New Delhi, 5 August, 1991

15. Supra No. 10, p. 91.


20. Ibid.
21. Supra no. 5, p. 15.
23. Ibid., p. 38.
24. Ibid., p. 39.
25. Ibid., p. 40.
31. Ibid., p. 125.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 49.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 50.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 51.
41. Smt. Ganguli, op.cit., p. 120.
42. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 101.
44. Smt. Ganguli, op.cit., p. 121.
45. Ibid., p. 119.
46. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 52.
49. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
50. Ibid., p. 53.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 37.
55. Ibid.
57. Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 60.
60. Smt. Ganguli, op.cit., p. 121.
63. Ibid.
64. Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 62.
65. Ibid., p. 61.
67. Ibid.
68. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 101.
69. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 68.
71. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 69.
73. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 69.
75. Ibid.
76. Debidatta Aurobindo Mahapatra, op.cit., p. 69.
77. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. B.M. Jain, op.cit., p. 122.
83. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 106.
85. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. V.N. Khanna, op.cit., p. 109.
92. Ibid., pp. 165-177.
94. Abhijit Gosh, op.cit., pp. 177, 178, 179.
95. B.M. Jain, op.cit., p. 119.
96. Ibid., p. 121.
98. Ibid., p. 156.
99. Ibid., p. 160.
102. Ibid.
103. Anil Kumar Halu, op.cit., p. 105.

105. Ibid.

106. Anil Kumar Halu, op.cit., p. 106.


109. Ibid., p. 94.

110. Supra no. 2, pp. 81-82.
CHAPTER – FOUR

Indo-Russian Relations: 2001 Onwards
Chapter-Four

INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 2001 ONWARDS

International political change leading to change of the regime and leadership did not subject to political vicissitudes. There is strong national consensus on the need for a healthy and stable relationship with the Russian Federation. A similar consensus exists in Russia on close and friendly ties with India. The 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the opening of the Russian Consulate General in Mumbai was commemorated on November 22, 2000.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, India has clarified that Russia would remain a “indispensable” partner for India’s defence needs. But at the same time, India stressed that the bilateral ties should adopt the changing times to address the challenges.\textsuperscript{2}

In the new Foreign policy concept released by Russian Federation on July 10, 2000, it had been stated that one of the crucial directions in the Russian foreign policy in Asia would be to develop friendly relations with the leading Asian states including India. It further states that Russia intends to strengthen its traditional partnership with India; including in International affairs.\textsuperscript{3} To furtherance their strategic ties both countries have continuously exchanged meetings of head of states and governments. They have been supporting each other not only in “continental organization”, like BRICS, but also in the ‘International Organizations’, ‘United Nations’. Russia supported India in UN Security Council and raised the hope for latter’s permanent membership in the forum.\textsuperscript{4}
India regards Russia as an “indispensable partner” in shaping inclusive, cooperative and role-based regional security architecture in the Asian pacific region, which is the focus of India’s “Look East Policy”. The following reasons may be ascribed in this search for deepening the relations of the two countries:

Firstly, Russia’s initial bonhomie with the West could not deliver the expected financial and political support, the former needed to resuscitate its morbid Soviet era economic and political institutions, and their subsequent conversion into thriving institutions of free market-economy and democracy. Levels of foreign aid and investment expected by Russia from U.S. and West were far below than Russian expectations, and were completely tied to the import of Western goods. Hence an observer commented, “while ideological proximity and alliance with the West was to be given emphasis, Russian foreign policy aims were to be realized in the CIS near abroad, and with old allies in West Asia and South Asia”.

Secondly, ever since the establishment of an independent Russia, its interests in Europe, West Asia and in Asia have clashed with those of the US. A number of positions taken by Russia showed the areas of divergence. Russia was opposed to the inclusion of the newly independent countries of its former East European Satellites in NATO. It opposed the US policy in Balkane, specially the NATO bombing of Kosovo without the implicit or explicit authorization of the UN. It continued to support the governments of Iran and then Saddam led Iraq. And finally, the West’s opposition to Russia’s policy in
strategic relations with its Soviet-Era allies, like India. India’s desire to maintain warm relations with Russia was driven by its military needs and political opportunism. As we know, there is no permanent friend and enemy in international relations, but national interests. Thus it is there, both India and Russia, common national interests or common concerns that have been cementing their ties from the former Soviet Union to present Russia in 21st century. In this direction, several summits, bilateral and multilateral, have been taken place, which set up the “strategical partnership” between the two countries, India and Russia.

**Delhi Declaration on Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership:**

**December 2002**

To strengthen its strategic ties with India in the new millennium, President of Russia Putin visited to India on 3-5 December 2002. The document signed by Putin and Vajpayee is known as “Delhi Declaration on further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership”. Putin gave priority to “elevate” their strategic partnership to a “qualitatively new level in both bilateral and international arenas”. The two most significant points, stressed by this declaration, were:

First, their commitment to work towards “a new cooperative security order that recognizes the legitimate security interests of all the countries”; and

Second, the recognition of the threat of terrorism, as it emanates in their “common neighborhood”, i.e., Afghanistan and Central Asia.
This was the first direction for cementing close strategic cooperation in 21st century, particular after 9/11. By this, both India and Russia stood together to fight against the menace of terrorism that had been engulfing not only India and Russia but also most of the countries of the world. For the security of the human being, both countries, economic, military, wants, desired to set up a new mechanism.

**Putin’s Visit to India: December 2004**

Putin visited India in December 2004 along with his high-powered delegation. It proved to be an opportunity for both Russia and India to re-assess their foreign policy options in the changing matrix of global environment after the 9/11. President Putin could be said to be seriously eager to re-build the strategic partnership that had existed between USSR and India during the cold war period. Russia had let this partnership glow in the post cold war period of the 1990s. This was evidence by this visit.

The summit meeting between President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh produced:

- Joint declaration emphasizing the strategic partnership between both India and Russia.
- Ten MoUs and agreements covering bilateral cooperation in the fields of outer space exploration, energy, navigation, visa services and banking.

The most important points that emerged on this count during the Russian President’s visit are:
Russia and India will move from a ‘buyer seller’ relationship to an expanded joint research and development and joint production of weapon systems.

Joint investment in the Brahmos Cruise Missile will be enhanced for greater production.

Both India and Russia will explore joint production of fifth generation strike combat aircraft.

Joint airborne troops’ exercise will be held.

Intellectual property rights agreement in relation to defence production would be finalized within five months.

Agreements on up gradation of existing Russian weapon systems in India were signed.

Supply of Russians spares for India’s future requirements more discussed and procedures streamlined.

The emphasis on joint research development and production of weapon systems is notable in many ways.9

Thus said visit of Russia President Putin proved to be very fruitful in their strategic cooperation. It enhanced close cooperation not only in military exercise but in many other areas of common interest and concern.

Manmohan Visit to Russia: December 2005

Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, visited Russia in December 2005 for the annual summit meeting with the Russian President for
the further consolidation of bilateral ties between both the countries. Along with Russian President Putin, he had also discussion with other Russian officials. His visit to Russia took place after four months of his historical summit with President Bush of the United States in mid-July 2005. The July 18, 2005 Indo-US Summit becomes therefore, a "contextual frame against the backdrop of which the Russian visit of the Indian Prime Minister may be comparatively reviewed.

Indo-Russian Agreements signed during Indian Prime Minister’s visit:

- India and Russia signed the following agreements during the Moscow visit in December 2005.\textsuperscript{10}
- Space Exploration Cooperation Agreement.
- Agreement on Corporation in the field of Solar Physics and Solar Terrestrial Relationships.
- No agreements seem to have been signed in the field of trade and economic cooperation. The India request for easy visa issuance to Indian business leaders was not addressed.

Though Indian expectations that Russia may be more forthcoming on India’s civil nuclear energy programme requirements did not materialize. There was a total absence of geo-political and economic content in the two leaders’
discussions, going by Media reports. And the agreements signed during the visit were confined to the defence and scientific cooperation. Albeit, no one may discard the importance of the summit for enhancing bilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{10}

**Putin’s Visit to India: January 2007**

President Putin’s visit to India is very significant to refer in this connection. There was noticeable lack of hype in the Indian media and analytical coverage by the strategic community. But it was only eve of President Putin’s visit that both media and analysts attention turned towards this significant event. It was as if this visit was going to be meaningless of any significant gains for India. As it turned out, the Russian President visit to India turned out to be strategically significant for India and Russia, in more ways than one. The January 2007 visit to India by President Putin helped Russia to reclaim a significant focus in India’s public strategic consciousness in multiple ways as follows:

- President Putin’s visit in January 2007 was his first visit to India after the Indo-US nuclear deal was signed.
- Russia’s strategic partnership with India became more visible in its broadest spectrum.
- India’s political leaders constant emphasis during this visit of the India-Russia strategic partnership as time-tested, reliable and marked by continuity would invariably throw up comparisons with the evolving strategic partnership with the US.
Comparison would also be inevitable of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal with India-Russia Nuclear Cooperation both existing now and in future.

The very selection of President Putin to be honoured as chief guest as Indian republic Day celebration in 2007 was a gesture to symbolize the importance India attaches to the India-Russia strategic partnership.

Medvedev Visit to India: December 2008

The Indo-Russia summit in many ways opened a “new chapter” in the bilateral relationship between the countries, which was held in Delhi in December 4-5, 2008. The summit reflected the time tested and trustworthy friendship between the two countries, and further growing strategic partnership between them in several areas such as nuclear energy, defence, trade and economic relationships, space etc. The Declaration on Indo-Russian strategic partnership was signed during President Putin’s first visit to India in the year 2000 and received adequate content in the course of the subsequent seven summit attended by him. But this was the first ever visit of Medvedev as a head of state. Therefore this had raised certain skepticism in some circle about the efficacy of the current summit. However, the Summit’s results proved that those doubts were misplaced and demonstrated once again that there was continuity in Indo-Russian relations and that change of leadership in either country did not affect this binding, time-tested friendship.

President Medvedev and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed agreements which are as follows:
• Signing Nuclear Cooperation was the one of the main achievements of the summit. Apart from signing an agreement for construction of four more reactors at the KundaKulam plant in Tamil Nadu, both sides expressed the desire to build additional reactors there as well. Russia would not only build these reactors. It would provide guarantee for life time supply of nuclear fuel to them. Both countries signed a deal worth $ 700 million for Russian nuclear fuel supply to India. India invested $ 2.5 billion in the Sakhalin-1 upstream project and engaged in oil exploration in Russia for $ 2.58 billion. India has been eyeing several out gas fields in Russia, including the Sakhalin-3 project.

• Defence cooperation was entered a qualitatively new phase beyond the ‘buyer-seller’ relationship. The new thrust in this sphere would be joint research, development and marketing, technology transfer etc. The supersonic Brahmos joint missile project, multi-role transport aircraft, fifth generation aircraft and many others were main projects. Both sides had augmented their defence ties under long term cooperation programme which expired in 2010 and agreed to extend its tenure by another 10 years upto 2020. Under the deal, Russia would supply 80 pieces of sophisticated M-17V-5 helicopters to India.

• Trade and economic relations was also major areas of concern to both countries. The Indo-Russian annual trade turnover, that honored around $ 2-3 billion for years, reached $ 5 billion in 2007, causing satisfaction in
both countries. And both countries hoped that it would be approximately $10 billion by the year 2010.

- Both countries discussed international and regional issues of common concern. Defying US unilateralism, the summit confirmed both sides' resolve to build on "Multipolar world based on the principles of supremacy of law, sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries". They re-emphasized the coordinating role of the UN for ensuring peace and security increasing its effectiveness and authority in world affairs. In this context, highlighting the necessity for reforming the UN system, Russia reiterated its support to India as a deserving and strong candidate for the post of a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

- Delhi and Moscow expressed satisfaction over the growing "strategic triangle" between India, Russia and China, which would create the foundation for further development of cooperation among the three large countries of Asia. This trilateral cooperation is not only emerging an important factor of multilateral diplomacy or multipolarity but also formation of collective leadership by the leading status of the world. It takes place through their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, various government departments, academic and business circles of the three countries.

- Cooperation among Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) appeared to be closer to the heart of Dmitry Medvedev. During the summit, both India
and Russia expressed satisfaction over the first independent conclave of Foreign Ministers of the four countries that took place in the Russian city of Ekaterinburg in May 2008. They desired that it would create multi-pronged mechanism for strengthening cooperation among them.

- India and Russia did discuss all major regional issues of mutual concern in the course of the summit. While discussing the situation in Afghanistan both battled for a “democratic and pluralistic Afghanistan” and welcomed the country’s admission into SAARC forum. Besides it India was the first state outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to support Moscow’s leading role in maintaining peace and security in Caucasus. Russia extended its support to a more active role by India as an observer country in the ‘SCO’. Besides this, both countries strained to a greater role in the Asia-Pacific Region through various organizations including ASEAN, ARF, Dialogue for Cooperation in Asia.

- Noteworthy point in the Joint Declaration was the joint call by India and Russia to resolve the issues in West Asia. They shared the view that Iran issue should have to be resolved through peaceful means, dialogues and negotiations. Both uphold Iran’s right to conduct research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the terms of the NPT and its other international obligations. They called for an all-comprehensive, long-lasting and fair resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict on the basis of the UNSC Resolutions no. 242, 338, 1397, 1515, through
peaceful negotiations that would lead to the creation of a sovereign, independent and United Palestine state.¹²

Thus, this suggests that both countries have major international or regional differences on mutual interest and concern. And this indeed underlines the strategic nature of the relationship. Perhaps India and Russia are the only major powers in the world that do not have clash of interests or suffer from differences of opinion on any major issue and that affinity makes them perfect and genuine strategic partners in the 21st century. This summit in Delhi once again unmistakably confirmed this truth.

**Manmohan Singh’s Moscow Visit: 2009**

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Russia from 5 to 7 December 2009 provided a fresh impetus to the strategic partnership between the two countries. This visit reinforced interests of both states in maintaining their traditionally close and friendly relationship and in strengthening a multipolar world order. Ahead to the visit, he had participated in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and SCO in June 2009 and May 2009 respectively. Since the Putin’s visit to India in 2000, Indo-Russian relationship has diversified enormously and today it is uniquely strong and also expanding the areas of defence, nuclear energy, hydrocarbons, space research, science and technology.

During this summit both Manmohan Singh and Medvedev signed six point agreements which are as follow:
• The two countries collaborated ‘Civil Nuclear Deal’ which guarantees an uninterrupted fuel supply for Indian nuclear plants such as four reactors at Kundankulam (Tamil Nadu).

• Issue of Afghanistan and Pakistan, both dismissed the theory of good Taliban and bad Taliban as proposed by Pakistan. Both countries reaffirmed their long term commitments to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

• Russia expressed support for India’s candidacy in the expanded UNSC and full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

• They focused on more trade and economic relations in the future. In the last few years, the Indian economy grew by more than 7 per cent per year and Russia at the same rate. And they desired for expansion of Inter-banking cooperation.

• Both countries signed a 10-year military agreement on technical cooperation. Other significant agreements signed were on the joint development and manufacturing of a fifth generation aircraft, multi-role transport aircraft, hypersonic missile and develop updated version of supersonic Brahmos.

• Both countries enhanced cooperation in the oil and gas field. Indo-Russian cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector received a boost after this summit. As India has already invested $ 2.7 billion in the Sakhalin oil and gas projects. They talked about enhancing cooperation in energy sector with
India getting access to Trebs and Titov oil fields in the Timan-Pehora region.

India and Russia are genuine and natural strategic partners. However, some misunderstanding hovered over India’s growing strategic relationship with US (signing of Indo-US Nuclear Deal). In this context the said visit was a significant, as it addressed Russia’s concerns and convinced Moscow that India’s improving ties with Washington is not going to hamper in any way, India’s time tested relationship with Moscow. The visit signified that both countries pay considerable value to this strategic partnership, which has reached a status where closeness with any other country would not make much of differences to the partnership.\(^{13}\)

**Indo-US Nuclear Deal**

The United States has been balancing two foreign policy objectives in India. First, it seeks to develop a strategic partnership with a large democratic counterweight to growing. Chinese and Russian power and a strong ally in counter-terrorism. Second, it aims to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the Bush administration concluded a bilateral agreement with India on civilian nuclear cooperation in October 2008 to achieve either objectives or maxims.\(^{14}\)

The law, now, titled, “United States – India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act”, was a product of the March 2006 agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 18\(^{th}\) July 2005. The agreement was a corollary of the US
recognition of India as a major pole of power in the coming century. And it is "an anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth". More significantly, the agreement was the result of India's strong non-proliferation record despite note being a party to the NPT. Additionally, the deal undoubtedly recognized India's "de facto" status as a nuclear weapons state. And, in July 2009, India designated two sites for US companies to build nuclear reactors in India.

But a nuclear liability law passed by Indian parliament in August 2010 is causing a rift with U.S. nuclear suppliers. Critics of the law contend India's proposal to seek legal redress against nuclear suppliers is sharp deviation from the International liability regime which holds nuclear operators solely responsible in case of an accident. India would also like the United States to relax some of its restrictions on technology after to India.

However, India "retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements".

Implications for India

It should be abundantly clear that the agreement was more than just about nuclear energy for India. The agreement has several strategic connotations, including with regard to Russia and China.
• The agreement was an outcome of the US recognition that India is major power in the 21st century. Therefore, it has a vital role to play in the emerging Asian strategic framework. If this century is going to be an Asian century, as has been widely predicted, the major powers would be the US, China, Russia, Japan and India. Hence, it is strategically important for the US to have strengthened and comprehensive relationship with India. It should also be noted that both the US and India have concerns regarding China’s rise and more specifically its military modernization which will have a bearing on the way China conducts business with the rest of the world.

• If the US wishes to take this relationship to a higher plane, the continuing technology controls placed on India will be a major stumbling block. It is trade in strategic goods and technology and not perceived common interests alone that will make this relationship an enduring one. This is the basis on which the agreement with the US must be analyzed. However, many Indian analysts have contested this, arguing instead that the agreement is a way of bringing India into non-proliferation order.

• Third, the Indo-US nuclear deal is in India’s interest. It marks the end of the nuclear apartheid India has been subject to in the last three decades. The deal recognizes India as a nuclear power, which has been of great concerns to the non-proliferation analysts of Washington.

• Fourth, the impact of nuclear disarmament on the Indo-US nuclear cooperation will be minimal. If the global community agrees to a
timeframe to rid the world of nuclear weapons, which however, remains highly unlikely. The nuclear deal and the civilian aspects of the nuclear programme will not be hampered by a universal disarmament plan.

- Fifthly, the deal has great concern for the Iran-India gas pipeline. The pipeline remained independent of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Given India’s increasing demand for energy, India must look at every available option for energy procurement, including nuclear energy, the US vis-à-vis Iran has become controversial due to Iran’s alleged pursuance of a nuclear weapons programme. India is also likely to be wary of a nuclear Iran in its neighbourhood.

On the issue of impact of the deal on India’s military programme, BJP, while criticizing the deal on the issue of nuclear testing, has raised concerns that the deal puts a cap on India’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The deal was perceived as curtailing India’s sovereign decision to decide on the size of its nuclear arsenal. The fact is that India has already sufficient indigenous uranium reserves (78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU)) to pursue its strategic weapons programmes hence the deal will not hamper its military programme in any manner.19

Lastly, the impact will be more in terms of the emerging Asian security framework. If India wishes to step out of the South Asia cocoon and take it rightful place on the world stage, it is the US that may help India to achieve that. Although Russia is also keen on seeing a stronger India with other major players at the high table, it has little capacity to help India in this regard. China,
on the other hand, has consistently played a less than supportive role, as was seen at ‘NSG’ meeting in 2006. China has little interest to adjust another power emerge in Asia, and does not want India to build closer ties with the United States or other Asian powers that could be detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role. Though Beijing has not categorized India as a challenge or threat even though it considers India as a “future strategic competitor” that may join any anti-China grouping.

China’s rise in the region has prompted the United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. The United States has been trying to cement its relationship with the world largest democracy in order to counter balance China. The Bush administration was “hoping that catching on to India as the rising star of Asia could have helped them handle China.

Fears were also raised about the possible loss of autonomy in determining the future course of India’s foreign policy. Is this a valid concern? The Left parties in India were of the view that India could not afford to be subservient to any nation. This fear, however, was unfounded, as India is not a puppet nation which can be dictated according to the whims and fancies of other countries. India’s vote on Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 triggered much of the controversy surrounding the issue of the autonomy of India’s future policy. But the opposition to the deal has been political.

Lastly, will the Indo-US nuclear deal lead to an arm race in Asia? The arguments have been that in light of the infusion of foreign fuel and technology into India for its civilian nuclear programme; materials and technology will
become available for its military programme, thereby, leading to expansion of India’s strategic weapons programme. China and Pakistan will look at this development with some concern. Both these countries in turn, might further expand their own weapons programmes. If China begins to expand its weapons programme; Russia and thereafter, the US could also expand their arsenals.\(^2\)

The Indo-US nuclear deal has been the logical conclusion of a vision for US-India relations as framed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. It was an opportune moment for India to step out of the South Asia cocoon, onto the high table as a major power, and shape the emerging Asian security architecture. India may also consider using this high chair to influence US actions/policies vis-à-vis Russia. In fact, India and US need to leverage the mutual suspicion between Russia and China. In fact, there are several commodities between India, Russia and US terrorism, WMD proliferation and a stable Asian Security Order. Hence the deal proved very fruitful to strengthen or cementing their strategic ties in Asia, particular South Asia.

**BRICS**

BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The grouping was originally known as “BRIC” before the inclusion of South Africa in 2010. The members of the organization are all developing and newly industrialized countries, but they are distinguished by their large, fast growing economies and major influence on regional and global affairs; all five are G-20 members.
The first formal summit of “BRIC” commenced on 16 June 2009 in Yekaterinburg in Russia. The focus of the summit was on means of improving the global economic situation and reforming financial institutions, and discussed how the four countries could better cooperate in future. South Africa officially became a member of the group on 24 December in 2010.24

With their increasing comprehensive power, BRICS countries will definitely have the capacity to contribute more to international public goods. This is not only the aspiration from the international community to deal with daunting global challenges, but also for BRICS’s own benefit to protect their own increasing global interests. Therefore, they work together through the international institutions such as UNs, IMF, which continue to be dominated by western powers’ interests and norms.25

The BRIC/BRICS summit was initiated to create a new platform for emerging powers to work together as a group of rising powers that are both willing and able to play a collective role in international affairs. They pursue or seek a new international political and economic order that is built on the principles of multi-polarity, justice, fairness and democracy, BRICS members wish to increase their voice in the global governance structure to reflect their perspectives and interests. They are working together to make global governance structures more representative and effective through peaceful and gradual reforms. In this context, the group is not aimed as a counterbalance to the established western powers but rather seeks to pursue a more effective or equal interaction with them to build a better world order.26
The BRICS members were actively involved in world affairs. Individually, these countries are prominent regional players in maintaining regional security and dealing with economic challenges. The political responses to crises such as nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran, peace keeping in Haiti, the coup de etat, in Honduras, political upheaval in Ukraine, and separation of the two Sudan have witnessed the assistances or even leading efforts from both relevant BRICS members particularly India Russia. Other that it, the ‘BASIC’ (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) and ‘IBSA’ (India, Brazil, South Africa) groups are working together on international negotiation on climatic change and Security Council reform respectively.  

To expand their global economic relationship further and protect their increasing overseas interests. India and Russia, along with other members, are starting to transform their economic power into international political influence. In this regard, the BRICS group has become a political unity with aim of both exploring internal economic opportunities among its members and of reforming the global governance system.

However, a more prospective role for BRICS in global governance is not easy considering their huge domestic development challenges and differences with western countries on values or means to deal with global issues. Declarations of BRICS summits are good at offering cooperative visions on regional and global affairs. Failures in forging an unified position on a BRICS candidate for heading IMF and for resolving political crises in Libya and Syria cast a shadow on the capacity to set a global agenda.
Russia views BRICS as a means of regaining its former reputable standing in setting the agenda in global affairs. It finds BRICS’ relevant for its international relations and cooperation. Therefore, a gradual and incremental approach with the mindset of cooperative stakeholders may serve BRICS’ objectives. It may also transform the current world order peacefully and constructively.

**Delhi Accord: 2013**

The third BRICS International Competition Commission (ICC) was hosted in New Delhi in November 2013. The theme of the 3rd BRICS ICC was “Competition Enforcement in BRICS Countries: Issues and Challenges”. The main objective of the conference was to discuss various issues and challenges in competition – enforcement among BRICS nations and take the agenda of Cooperation among the BRICS nations – The conference was concluded with the signing of a joint accord namely, “Delhi Accord”.

The ‘Delhi Accord’ was signed to ensure effective enforcement of competition rules among the BRICS nations and to strengthen the cooperation among their fair trade regulations by their exchanging views and boosting their communication. The BRICS competition authority, in sound and effective enforcement of competition laws, expressed their desire to resolve and commitment to exchange views on different aspects of competition policy. The agreement underlined establishing strong cooperation on competition laws and policies to further improving and strengthening the relationship between the five commissions. Hence, the accord may be proved very fruitful in
strengthening relationship between BRICS countries, particularly India and Russia. Because they have been natural partner in Soviet era and post Soviet era.

Global Crises: India-Russia Response

Syrian Crisis: 2013

After Afghanistan and Iraq it was now Syria’s turn to be devastated by incendiary and high explosive bombs, artillery spells and rockets by the American Army and Air Force. Afghanistan was accused of holding Osama Bin Laden, Iraq of having “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMDs); Syria was being accused of using chemical weapons in mid-August, 2013, in a Damascus suburb that killed about 300 people. The USA was trying to get its planned strike against Syria approved by the Security Council but the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the UK, US, France, Russia and China, have not able to reach a unanimous opinions: the US, UK and France are in favour of the military assault, but Russia and China were vehemently opposing it. One aspect of the Syrian crises is the total silence of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Countries.

While in St. Petersburg, Russia for the G-20 summit, Obama said chemical weapons attacks in Syria were not just a tragedy in that country, but pose a threat to regional and global peace and stability. Syrian regime’s chemical attack on its own people threatened to unravel the almost century old ban against using such weapons. He accused the Syrian government for the attack that killed civilians. The Syrian attack endangered Turkey, Jordan,
Lebanon, Iraq and Israel, and threatened to further destabilize the Middle East. In a joint statement released in the summit, the G-20 leaders joined the US in calling for a strong international response to this grave violation of the world’s rules and conscience that would send a clear message that this kind of atrocity can never be repeated. Those who perpetrated these crimes must be held accountable.”

Now, US claims Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, thereby justifying his planned military strikes in response. The UN General Assembly and Security Council have previously endorsed the Secretary General’s role in investigating allegations of chemical weapons attacks. This time, the question remains if Obama has the patience to wait for an UN endorsement or act on his own. In the latter possibility, International politics would get dirtier than before, tarnishing the US image as a result of the attack.

**Russian Response**

Russia’s stance remained impenetrable. From Russia’s response, one can surmise that Russia did not want a conflict breaking out in the Middle East and would act if the situation deteriorates. In response, Russia decided to send three warships to the East Mediterranean, though Moscow denied this meant it was beefing up its naval force there as Western powers prepare for military action against Syria.

One should keep in mind that Russia is Syria’s most powerful ally and would act to defend it if the need arises. Besides it, it is also one of Assad’s
biggest arms suppliers. Therefore, it opposes any military intervention in Syria and has shielded Damascus against further sanctions at the UN Security Council. According to the remarks made by Russia’s Chief of staff in June, 2013, the navy had stationed 16 worships and three ship based helicopters in the Mediterranean. Though Russia said its worships were means for Russian civilian to escape Syria in the event of US strikes. It was very unlikely the Russians would do anything to physically interfere with this process. But the presence if a Russian fleet might enable Moscow to give Syria’s Bushar al-Assad a few minutes warning of an attack.\(^{37}\)

The Syrian crisis has reviewed the Cold War diplomacy between West and East. And they are politically and pedagogically differ in all discourse over the issue in the West Asia. International community has done several efforts to sort out the crisis, but not fruitful outcome could be possible. As Geneva I summit was miserably failed, which calls for the transitional governing body, but it did not specifically spelt out Assad future role. In furtherance of this effort, in Jan. 2014, UNs, Russia and US came under one Umbrella in Geneva that is known as “Geneva-II” Peace Conference, wherein Syrian government and opposition party agreed, for the first face-to-face talks. The opposition demanded transition of Assad region and the former threatened to withdraw from the talk.\(^{38}\)

The crisis has not only reviewed Cold War rivalry between East and West but also given the lost status to Russia to contain the hegemony of US. India also indirectly supported to Assad government and Russia for supporting Syria.
As in International politics there is no permanent friend or foe, but only national interest. So, the final out shall be come by the course of time.

**Ukraine Crisis: 2013**

Ukraine has been in turmoil since Nov. 21, 2013, when President Yanukovych refused to sign a trade deal for closer economic integration with the European Union and instead accepted a $15 billion loan package from Russia with a 33 percent price reduction in Russian gas exports that are critical for the Ukrainian Economy. Basically the actual problem is in Ukraine as “the Cold War between the unipolar world of US hegemony against emerged Russia”. Hence it has one again revived the past memory for ‘cold war’ rivalry between East and West.

**Ukraine: Response of Russia and West**

The political crisis in the former soviet ally, Ukran, has been the forefront in international politics in recent time. It has given the place to both Russian and America to wage war against each other. The Ukran crisis is viewed in Moscow as a continuation of the Western plan to encircle Russia militarily and torpedo its reintegration efforts in the former Soviet Union. The leaders in Kiev installed with the West’s support were the same people who staged the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine and set Ukraine on the path of NATO membership. The revolution was a protests and political events that took place from nov.2004 to jan.2005, in the aftermath of the run of vote of the Ukrainian presidential election.
The political upheaval in Ukraine as “the battle of the unipolar world of US hegemony against the emerged Russia. As US has intervened in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and forced them to survive in accordance with the term and condition setup by it. It has created tension in the region in the name of democracy and humanitarianism, but on the other hand the Russia along with its natural ally has denounced it.

In Ukraine, President Putin made the same point he has been driving home in Syria: regime change by force is illegal. When Western nations halted the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Ukraine as “a democratic free choice of the Ukrainian people”, Mr. Putin replied that Crimea also has the right to make its own choice. Therefore, it was an ideological conflict between the two powers of the world, US and Russia.

The West pushed President Putin too far in the Ukraine, which is more than just a former Soviet state. It is where the Russian nation was born in medieval “Kievan Rus and it is still part of the “Russian World”. The West’s efforts to bring Ukraine into its orbit viewed in Moscow as an encroachment on Russia itself. The procedure from Russia was due to various factors such as geographical contiguity; close economic linkages, long historical legacy and so on. Thus, Russia has legitimate concern and interest in the current development in the Ukraine. Because Ukraine is most important country in influencing geo-politics in the region. Therefore it may not tolerate to any power to intervene in it.
Ukraine, the second most powerful economy in the former Soviet Union, is a link pin to President Putin’s plan to build the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC), as Moscow-led version of the European Union. The US denounced the plans as a disguised attempt to re-create the Soviet Union and vowed to disrupt it. There was a more re-sovietize the region, as Hillary Clinton said in 2012, it is not going to be called that. It is going to be called a Customs Union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that but an ‘effective way” to wreck President Putin’s project was found when the European Union offered Ukraine on “either or” choice between closer ties with Europe or membership in Mr. Putin’s EEU. Brzezinski wrote years ago, “without Ukraine, Russia lease to be an empire in Eurasia”.

Mr. Yanukovych used the EU talks for a free trade association pact in order to play Europe against Russia in an attempt to get the best deals from both sides. When he settled E.U. pact in November 2013 in favour of multi-billion Russian aid packages Ukrainians felt robbed of their hopes for prosperous life in different Europe. It was an illusion assiduously nurtured by Western politicians and the media, but Mr. Yanukouyeh’s turnaround triggered mass protests that eventually brought down his Kleptocratic and inept regime.

Apart from geopolitical compulsions, Moscow’s support for Crimea’s breakaway bid was driven by important domestic compulsions. The protests in Ukraine, manipulated as they were by the West, reflected the rise of grass root civic activities against corruption and authoritarianism – the same problems that devil Russia and that brought thousands of anti-government protesters on
to the stress of Moscow in 2011. By intervening in Ukraine, Mr. Putin sought to stop the surging pro-democracy wave from spill over to Russia. And it has brought Russia strategic gains but is fraught with serious risks.\textsuperscript{44}

**Crimea Declaration**

On March 6, the parliament of Crimea voted to join Russia. And on March 17, the Crimean parliament declared independence and applied to join Russia. According to the declaration approved by the Crimean parliament, the region becomes an independent state and formally joins Russia, with some autonomy; will adopt the Russia rouble as its currency within a month; will move to Moscow GMT-4 and two hours ahead of Kier time); will offer Crimean soldiers the chance to join Russian military.\textsuperscript{45}

President Putin annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014 and described the move as correcting past injustice and a necessary response to western encroachment upon Russia’s vital interests. Putin extended thanks to China and India for remaining restrained and objective in dealing with the crises. It has manifested its power in the region while West and European Union passed sanctions against Russia. And Russia was suspended from the G-8, the group of industrialized countres.\textsuperscript{46} But Russia never look bit and followed the path of political realism.

**Areas or Issues of Common concerns**

India has clarified that Russia will remain “indispensable” partner. And it stressed that the bilateral ties should espouse to changing times to address
challenges. The emerging realities in the 21st century provide opportunities for India and Russia to forge common stand on various issues. These factors have brought both closer, thus providing common ground to adopt similar approaches on various issues like terrorism, climate change, multi polarity etc. The commonality of approaches of both the countries on these issues has been highlighted by Alexander Kadakin, Russian Ambassador to India, who in his speech delivered at United Services Institution of India on 26 Sept. 2001 focused on factors like terrorism, multi-polarity, democracy etc. as areas on which interests of both countries converge.

India-Russia relations can be seen in a wider framework of convergence. For this purpose, these issues of common concern need detail analysis so that their importance in reinforcing the element of continuity in Russia’s policy towards India can be assessed.

**Multi-polar World Order:**

The disintegration of the Soviet Union altered the power structure and world order in international politics. Though Russia remained a military power it lost its erstwhile dominance in matters of economy and politics. It was no longer a superpower. The US was only superpower, reigning over the instrument of world economy and politics. Even in some cases, the American led Western bloc simply ignored proposals of Russia. For instance, the Russian proposal during the Yogoslav crisis was unanimously rejected by the West, mainly the US.
In international politics in 1993, Russia asserted independence in its foreign policy. The 1993 foreign policy concept advocated for sacrificing ‘Atlanticism’ in favour of ‘pragmatism’, later called multi-polarism. West was not interested in the development of a new international order based on a multipolar cooperative security order, Russia took the lead in propagating the idea of a multipolar structure in the world.

Yevgeny Primakov, well known for his balanced policy approach, took a number of steps for the evolution of a multipolar world structure. During his visit to new Delhi in December 1998, as a Prime Minister of Russia, he talked about “strategic triangle” – India, Russia-China, for peace and stability in the world, and to check unipolarism. India and Russia committed to the dispersal of power and influence across the globe and both envisage a powerful role for a reformed United Nations (UNs) in the international system.

The Russian drive to promote multipolarism in international politics had its strong support in India. During the visit of Prime Minister, Vajpayee to Moscow in December 2001, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate bilaterally and at the multilateral level on strategic issues for the development of a multipolar world based on a new cooperative security order. And later on Putin visited to India in 2002, both sides reaffirmed their determination to contribute to the establishment of a just multipolar world.

On other international issues, like tensions in the Middle East and Gulf, both countries hold common position. Regarding the US military strike on Iraq
in 2003, withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, Georgia, Syria etc. they opposed any unilateral action against Iraq by passing the UN.

Prime Minister Vajpayee further reiterated this common position for the evolution of a multipolar world structure during his visit to Moscow in 2003. He said: we are both opposed to unilateralism in international matters".\(^55\) And during Medvedev visit to India in December, 2008, both countries defied US unilateralism, and the summit once again confirmed both sides resolve to build a “multipolar world based on the principle of supremacy of law, sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries”\(^56\).

Russia, along with India, has emphasized that the future world order must be based on collective mechanisms for addressing global problems. The system may have various mechanisms to address various issues at various forums such, EU, UNs, BRICs, ASEAN, G-8 etc.

**Terrorism**

President Putin called terrorism, ‘the plague of the 21\(^{st}\) century’. The menace of terrorism has not only affected South Asian countries but also other countries of the continents. However, the surge of terrorism as suffered by India in Kashmir and Russia in Chechnya is strikingly similar. Both countries, being multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious states, the problems related to heterogeneously are similar. Whether it is Chechnya or Kashmir, destabilization threats with immense debilitative potential are common elements of anxiety.\(^57\) The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in New
York and Washington captivated the attention of International leaders regarding the menace of terrorism and possible mechanisms for its control.\textsuperscript{58} This was the first time in history of humankind, wherein all the major powers of the world politics came under single umbrella to combat terrorism in its all sorts.\textsuperscript{59}

In a joint statement issued at the end of President Putin’s visit to India in October 2000, the two sides underlined the importance of joint efforts in combating “international terrorism”.\textsuperscript{60} Terrorism has been discussed in last chapter. Although both countries have manifested common desire against the menace at the bilateral and multi-lateral summits. And in November 2013, both India and Russia decided to give a new thrust to strategic cooperation. The Armies of two countries had recently held Exercise Indira in Rajasthan and the focus was on anti-terrorism exercises. And they viewed further cooperation to face global challenges to fight terrorism jointly.\textsuperscript{61}

Thus, from the above discussion, it can be gauged that the 9/11 incident provided opportunity to both India and Russia to countries to realize the changing realities and accommodate each other’s interests accordingly.

\textbf{Concern for Democratic Values}

For the development of Russian society and polity, Russia adopted the path of democracy after the disintegration of Soviet Union. The initial years of Russian democracy were fragile; the elementary apparatus of democracy found it difficult to find roots.\textsuperscript{62} But later, it has set up democratic principles and norms in its internal as well as external relations.
Boris Yeltsin adopted the principles of democracy in his own characteristic fashion. He said the supremacy of democracy, human rights and liberty, legality and morality are the guiding principle of our democracy. Both India and Russia, have the same goal of establishing democratic order. Both are resolved to further reinforce the fundamentals of democracy, to impart maximum transparency to their respective social, economic and political system.63

In order to strengthen the democratic process in Russia they signed an agreement in 1998 on establishing an Indo-Russian Inter Parliamentary Commission. The first session was held in New Delhi in March 2000 where they discussed the democratic conditions in their countries and focused on the exchange of democratic ideas. Vladimir Putin firmly believed that given the conditions in Russia, it could become a great power by combining the principles of market economy and democracy.

During his visit to India in October 2000, he complimented the democratic system in India saying that this “positive experience is very valuable” for Russia because “Russia, like India, is a huge pluralistic state”. The democratic bases of both the countries provided the ground to come closer to take common positions against non-democratic countries like Pakistan.

One finds convergence of interests of India and Russia in the wide spectrum of democracy towards which the world is moving a large. President Putin said that the emerging world order in the 21st century must be based on the Principles of ‘Unity through diversity’ because pluralism is an integral part
of democracy’. The democratic countries have much that unites them. We must prevent the situation where difference in tactical approaches would undermine the unity of nations on International Organizations participating in the solution of the world problems.64

Both, India and Russia, have shown their spirit towards democracy in the bilateral as well as multilateral force. They favored the restoration of democracy in Afghanistan, Syria and other region, where the security of human being is at stake. This affirms that both, India and Russia have common stakes in the preservation and smooth functioning of democracy not only in their own countries but around the world.

Climate Change

Climate change is one of the greatest global challenges of the 21st century, there is an increasing realization within the international community that achieving the consensus and commitment needed to take stronger action on climatic change, with all major emitting countries participating in the solution, requires positioning climate change in a broader policy context. The climate change negotiations do not take place in isolation from other developments on the global agenda, and actions in other areas of foreign policy will have impacts on climate change and influence negotiations in the climate change sphere.65

As the oceans warm and the glaciers melt, one of the definitive impacts of climate change will be a rise in sea levels. Scientists expect sea level rise (SLR) to the extent of one to several meters by the end of this century. The
SLR results in an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyclones and hurricanes, storm surges, coastal inundation, salt water intrusion and damage to coastal ecosystems, all of which will make life along low-lying coasts and small islands difficult or impossible. Thus, it will forced to tons to thousands millions of people in move out their home, thus becoming climate migrant or exiles. Therefore, it is the developing world that will bear the worst impacts of climate change and house the largest number of climate exiles.\textsuperscript{66}

A number of processes at the multilateral level offer opportunities to implement strategies to allow developed and developing countries to engage in dialogue and take action on climate change.

The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are the most advanced elements of the response to climate change. The development of more effective and inclusive approach to addressing climate change in post-2012 was given a considerable boost with the launch of a two-track process initiated under the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP-11/MOP-1) held in Montreal in November 2005.\textsuperscript{67} The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its main implementing agencies such as the UNDP, UNEP, and World Bank have played a great role in the achievement of climate change objectives. The climate change has also addressed by such agencies as the WTO, UNIDO and UN Institute for Training and Research. The CSD has taken a more substantive role in addressing climate by reviewing progress toward the outcome of Agenda 21 and Johannesburg Plan of Action with respect to energy for sustainable development and climate change.\textsuperscript{67}
In 2005, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and the United States announced the Asia Pacific Partnership on clean Development and Climate (AP-6). Although, United States is not a signatory of Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of the partnership is to develop and deploy low emissions technologies not to set emissions reduction targets. The AP-6, described as a model for public-private collaboration, is intended to complement the Kyoto Protocol and to maintain the key principles of the UNFCCC.68

The G-8 summit, held at L'Aquila, Italy, was took place in 2009, jointly statement of the parties was issued. They said that the global average temperature above pre-industrialization levels should not exceed 2° Celsius. And Copenhagen summit of 2012 on climate agreement set up agenda for emission of ‘GHG’, G-8 agreed to reduce emissions by 80 per cent by 2050. Infact G-5 declaration had demanded a 40 per cent cut by 2020 from the 1990 levels.69

Although so much efforts have been taken place in emission of green house gas (GHGs) at the bilateral or multilateral levels, but the no final satisfactory objective could be achieved. It was due to the negative will of the industrialized countries, particularly USA, that hamper to achieve the desired objectives. The developing countries have continuously commitments in climate change. Thus, it is also one of the most common concerns to India and Russia to come together at bilateral as well as multilateral level such as BRICS, WTO, UNs etc. it will provide peace and stability in the region.
In Russian Cooperation

Scientific and Technical Cooperation

At present, India and Russia have a scientific and technological cooperation under the Integrated Long Term Programme (ILTP) of Cooperation in Science and Technology which is a continuation of the earlier ‘ILTP’ cooperation in science and technology signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Mikhail Gorvachev in July 1987, lasted till the 2000. The Declaration on strategic partnership signed in October 2000 laid clear emphasis on strengthening close cooperation within the framework of the India-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC) for Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural cooperation. This programme is a reflection of the close Russia-India ties in science and technology that has developed between the countries over the last 13 year.

Twelve Working Groups were established under the ‘IRIGC’, covering various spheres i.e. Trade and Economic Cooperation, (2) Petroleum, (3) Power and Non-conventional Sources of Energy, (4) Ferrous and Non-ferrous Metallurgy; (5) Science and Technology; (6) Cultural; (7) Coal; (8) Information Technology; (9) Environment and Natural Resources; (10) Pharmaceuticals; (11) Cooperation between Regions; and Cooperation in Civil Aviation. Moreover, both countries have entered into an agreement to expand their cooperation in Nuclear physics. A MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) has been signed between the Department of Science and Technology of India
and Russia's leading Research Institute, the Kurchalov Centre. The three year agreement will be automatically renewed unless one side decided otherwise.73

During President Putin's visit to India in December 2002, both countries signed a Joint Declaration of Strengthening and Enhancing Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The Cooperation was meant to impart a new dynamism to this aspect by getting the two sides together at the highest level to agree to certain Principles, or a framework, and the contents of the framework and principles that should govern the efforts of both sides to enhance economic trade.70

The scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries has been deepening with the course of time. Russia has also expressed its desire to modernize and upgrade several sectors, like thermal power projects, steel mills, and the construction of new power grids. In coal mining, Russia is effectively assisting India in its modernization of coal mining enterprises by using modern technology. The two countries are also working on joint ventures in the oil and gas industry which will be implemented in India, Russia and other countries, like Indian investment in Russia's East Siberian Outfields in Sakhlin Electronics, information technology, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and civil aviation and some the areas where Russia wants to be very active and seeks joint ventures with India. In biotechnology, Russia has expressed its readiness to cooperate in the production of pharmaceuticals and supply of poly-vaccines and immune-biological substances.74
The inter-Session Review Meeting of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Cooperation that took place on November 22, 2002 reported that 156 joint research projects in different areas of science and technology have been completed, and 2,500 exchanges have taken place. In the month of November 2003, 87 new projects were identified for cooperation between the two countries. An Indo-Russian Science Centre has been set up in order to enter into joint ventures of Russian scientific institutions for commercialization of high technology.

There is an Indo-Russian centre for Advanced Computing Research at the Institute for Computer-Aided Design (ICAD) of the Russian Academy of Science in Moscow. The centre has acquired C-DAC’s lattes PABAM 10,000 super computer, which will be used for the development of various software applications of mutual interests by India and Russia. Also both countries have setup an Indo-Russian Centre for Oceanography, as well as an Indo-Russian Centre for Biotechnology. Also, an International Advanced Research Centre for powder Metallurgy and new materials in Hyderabad and the Bharat Immunological and Biological Corporation Ltd. In Bulandshahr has also been established.

During the state visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Russia in November 2003, both countries inked an MoU between the ‘ISRO’ and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) in Exploration and use of Outer Space for Peaceful purposes, that include Russian assistance in an Indian lunar mission as well.
The State visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Moscow on 21st October 2013, both countries were likely to sign five deals. Both countries signed a MoU in technology transfer and cooperation including on IT, Nano-Technology. They inked cooperation in biotechnology and technical cooperation in the field of standardization.  

AnMoU on Intellectual Property Rights signed between India and Russia has removed a major stumbling block in Scientific and Technological Collaboration.

**Military and Technical Cooperation**

The military ties between India and Russia have a very long history which is full of mutual understanding and based on the concept of strategic partnership. There is increasing awareness on both sides on willingness to incorporate latest achievements of other countries such as France and Israel etc. Su-30 MK is an instance of such cooperation, wherein Sukhoy Designing office worked closely with France’s SNECMA and Russia’s NPO Saturn over working or SaM146 engines.

Both countries are actively engaged in enhancing and developing inherent capabilities and potential of Su30Mk1, Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCH). Indian research and development agencies like Electronic R & D Establishment (LRDE) and Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) have joined hands with Rosoboron Export and V.V. Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of instrument Building along with India-Russia Venture Brahmos Aerospace. The Brahmos is a shining example of a joint venture in
Defence Technology. The agreement to design, develop, produce and market a multi-role supersonic cruise missile was signed in 1998 between Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise (NPCM) and India’s State owned ‘DRDO’. The production of the cruise Missile does not violate obligations under MTCR.

The modernization of Admiral Gorshkov renamed the Vikramaditya is another example of successful International collaboration. It could be development of T-72 M1M main battle tank, the revamped version of T-72 with the MSTA-5 self propelled gun and enhancement of range and better accuracy of smirch multiple-launch rocket systems are the features of this upgradation. This project has competition from Ukrain where similar upgradation is also possible.\textsuperscript{80}

The creation of Rosoboron Service (India) Ltd. is a first ever unique joint venture consequent to a degree by the Russian President. It involves eight Russian defence manufacturers/vendors who have joined hands with an Indian company in private sector. The mandated activities of the company, registered in India, range from repairs and maintenance of systems to spare parts supply and training of personnel. Initially, to meet needs of the Indian Navy this company will take later on take on the service/maintenance of Russian supplied assets of Indian Force.\textsuperscript{81}

Hence, military and defence cooperation constitutes a strong component of Indo-Russian strategic partnership. Madvedev repeatedly emphasized that our defence cooperation is stated to enter a qualitatively new phase beyond the presently predominant buyer-seller relationship. The new thrust in this sphere
would be joint research, development and marketing, technology transfer etc., which will provide an unique character to our defence cooperation in the days ahead. The defence cooperation which was expired in 2010 has been extended by another 10 years upto 2020.

The joint Army and Navy exercises between the two armed forces are held under the title INDRA. The last joint exercise INDRA-2012 between the two armies was held in Russia in August 2012. Indian and Russian Navy ships conducted a advanced passage exercise called INDRA-2012 off the coast of Mumbai in December 2012. The two countries also decided to hold Joint Air Forces and Navy exercises in 2014 for the first time. Bilateral projects correctly underway include indigenous production of T-90 tanks and Su-30 MKI aircraft, supply of MiG-20-K aircraft and Kamov-31 and Mi-17 helicopters, upgrade of MiG-29 aircraft repair and refit of the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya etc. Thus over the years cooperation in military technical sphere has evolved from a purely buyer-seller relationship to joint research design development and production.

**Trade and Economic Cooperation**

Non-military trade between Russia and India stands at roughly US $ 1.7 billion annually. Major Indian exports to Russia are drugs and pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee, rice, leader products, food products, processed minerals, cotton yarn fabric etc. Indian imports from Russia comprises fertilisers, newsprint and paper products, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, organic chemicals etc. while international investment needed to boost the economy of the countries, Russia
and India are encouraging their private entrepreneurs to invest in sectors that are mutually beneficial. An Indian firm, ONGC Videsh Limited has recently concluded an agreement to invest US $ 1.7 billion in the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project. The signing of Inter-governmental Agreement on Civil Aviation has also opened up broad prospects for the development of bilateral ties in civil Aviation.\(^86\)

In the “Joint Declaration on Strengthening and Enhancing Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation” signed between the two countries in New Delhi on 4 December 2002. Both countries noted that in the last decade, “with the stimulus of reforms and liberalization, the economies of the two countries have acquired a new dynamism and significant new capabilities and requirements have emerged”. The joint Declaration identified the following areas among others, to “provide for a positive environment for the conduct of business interaction and investment”: strengthening transportation through the operationalize North-South Transport Corridor; streamlining customs administration; sustain business sector dialogue; developing trade and joint ventures; developing regional trade and economic cooperation with other countries etc. and they indicated their common desire to intensify long term cooperation in energy security, which could be extended to other areas including the Caspian Sea as well as to other aspects of the energy sectors.\(^87\)

Also both countries along with Iran have signed an agreement on opening a North-South Corridor which connects Mumbai with St. Petersburg
via Bomdar Abbas. It is expected to handle 15-20 million tons of freight annually, with the trade turnover pegged at US $ 10 billion.\(^8^8\)

In December 2008, Medvedev visited India and both countries have been expressing serious concern over the sluggish growth of their trade and economic relations over the years. The Indo-Russian annual trade turnover, that hovered around $ 2-3 billion for years, reached $ 5 billion in 2007, causing satisfaction in both countries.\(^8^9\) India and Russia are the only two major powers in the world that do not have a clash of interest or suffer from differences of opinions and that makes them perfect and genuine strategic partners in the 21\(^{st}\) century. The latest bilateral summit has confirmed this truth.

**Cultural Cooperation**

Both India and Russia have historical cultural ties. But the Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed in October 2000, laid great emphasis on promoting cultural cooperation and people to people contract. India’s most extensive cultural, academic, scientific, educational, sports and other exchanges are carried under the Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP). Under this arrangement, both countries organized the ‘Days of Russian Cultural; the ‘Days of Indian Culture’, ‘Days of Moscow’ and the ‘Days of New Delhi’ in their respective countries on the alternate basis.

Exchanges have also been taking place on a regular basis between academics and scholars of the two countries in the shape of seminar, round-tables, conferences etc. A Mahatma Gandhi Chair of Indian Philosophy was formally inaugurated in February 1999, at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian
Academy of Sciences. And in each bilateral summit, both Russia and India have expressed their desire in enhancing cultural cooperation from 2000 to 2013. But in February 2014 Indo-Russian Music festival was cancelled due to some rift between local taxi driver and foreign in Goa. But, they have strong cultural ties. As both countries signed four agreement in 2001, on promoting educational and research at four leading Russian institutes: Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre and the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Science; the St. Petersburg State University; the Kazan State University; and the Far Eastern National University in Vladivostok.

Thus, the cultural ties between Russia and India have strengthened their strategic cooperation. It has bound the two countries to work in intendum.

**Nuclear Cooperation**

An Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) on construction of a 200 MW Koondankulam Nuclear Power Station worth US $ 2.6 billion in India was signed between both countries in November 1988. The supplement to the 1988 IGA was signed in New Delhi in June 1998, and further augmented by a MoU for the construction of the plant signed during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Russia in November 2001. A MoU in the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy was also signed during President Putin’s visit to India in October 2000. The 2000 Declaration envisaged cooperation “in the peaceful use of nuclear energy”.

Russian nuclear cooperation with India are prompted with an eye on seizing a large share in an expanding Indian market for nuclear energy, since it
is poised to increase its nuclear energy output to 20,000 MW by 2020. Russian compulsions to exploit the potential for nuclear exports to revive its own nuclear industry were revealed when the Director General of Russian Electric Power Company, that operates 24 nuclear plants, admitted on April 12, 1999 that his enterprise "lacks money to pay workers, perform maintenance and repairs, inspect crucial pipes and even buy fuel.

Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation is also inversely related to the state of US-Russian relations. In fact, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines were drafted primarily on the American initiative. In a similar context, the Russian interest in reprocessing spent fuel for other countries in face of US opposition, was evidenced in the US offer to release $ 75 million, contingent on Russia's halting the reprocessing of spent fuel, out of the total of $ 100 million US aid for joint research in civilian reactors and fuel.\textsuperscript{94}

During Medvedev's president of Russia, visit both countries signed a deal worth $ 700 million for Russian nuclear fuel supply to India. These deals, coming as they do the aftermath of the much-hyped Indo-US nuclear agreement, signify that Delhi and Moscow are poised for some sort of strategic partnership in the sphere of nuclear cooperation. Nuclear energy forms only part of the broader Indo-Russian energy cooperation, a traditional sector of our productive cooperation ever since India's independence. India, which has invested $ 2.5 billion in the Sakhalin-1 upstream project, our largest investment abroad till date, is on the verge of purchasing the imperial Energy company, engaged in oil exploration in Russia, for $ 2.58 billion India has been eyeing
several oil and gas fields in Russia, including the huge Sakhalin-3 project. All these suggests that Russia is destined to play a significant role in ensuring our energy security in the coming years.\textsuperscript{95}

Thus on the basis of above discussion one may say that the Indo-Russian relations has been deep rooted. The initial years of 21\textsuperscript{st} century have cemented their ties. The head of states or governments of both the countries has continuously been meeting by holding years summits. They have not only supporting each other bilaterally but also at the multilateral forum as well. Russia has supported India’s candidacy in expanded UNs Security Council along within the IMF, BRICS, and WTO etc. They have condemned the menace of terrorism, throughout the world. And Russia has proposed the strategic triangle of Russia-India and China which would further cement their ties and regional stability. They have not only common concern for democracy, terrorism, multi-polar world but also to climate change. Therefore, their relations in all dimensions have been consolidated in the dawn of 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Thus, both the countries jointly may play great role in the regional security and world order simultaneously.
References


4. Civil Services Times, op.cit., p. 34.

5. Ibid.

6. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., pp. 102, 103.


9. Ibid.


11. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 126.


13. Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi, 2009.


17. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


23. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, op.cit.

24. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 1.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 6.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 8.

36. Ibid., p. 9.
37. Ibid.
40. The Hindu, March 17, 2014
41. Ibid.
43. The Hindu, 17 March, 2014.
44. Ibid.
45. The Indian Express, 19 March 2014.
46. Ibid.
47. Civil Services Times, December 2013, XIX year issue No. 12, p. 34.
49. Ibid., p. 153.
50. Ibid., p. 154.
51. Ibid., p. 155.
52. Ibid., p. 156.
53. Ibid., p. 157.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
60. Anil Kumar Halu, op.cit., p. 105.
63. Ibid., pp. 161, 162.
64. Ibid.
66. The Hindu, 15 July, 2009
68. Ibid. 43
69. Ibid., p. 44.
70. The Hindu, August 13, 2009.
73. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 112.
74. The National Herald, New Delhi, 4 November, 2002.
75. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., pp. 112-113.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 114.
79. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 118.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
86. Civil Services Chronicle, op.cit.
89. Halu B. Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 115.
91. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 117.
93. B. Halu Anil Kumar, op.cit., p. 117.
94. Ibid.
CHAPTER – FIVE

Conclusion
Chapter-Five

CONCLUSION

In the changing patterns of international politics by the end of Cold War and subsequently disintegration of USSR in 1991, there were paradigm shifts in the nature of relations among the countries. The bipolar world turned into unipolar world-dominated by the US. There was a dilemma in the mind of Indian and Russian statement to adjust in the changing world scenario. Initially, Russia, the successor state of erstwhile Soviet Union, adopted a pro-Western foreign policy and it somehow sidelined its former natural partners, like India. On the other hand India was also facing the same situation dealing with the changing world scenario. But for few years it seemed as if both were strangers to each other. The Russian Federation was busy in its own affairs and had no time to give preference to its older ally India. Habitual to Soviet partnership, India felt these realities as shock. However after getting settled it was the President Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, who visited to India and paved the way for further consolidation of their mutual bilateral relations with India.

The study of India and USSR relations reveals that despite the wide differences in outlook and policies great advancement towards mutual understanding and cooperation was made. In spite of earlier Soviet indifference and basic differences in socio-political systems of the two countries, mutual bilateral relations improved markedly from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which demanded India to move closer to the USSR.
India's attitude towards the USSR has been derived from its overall foreign policy objectives. In understanding and evaluating this attitude, it is therefore indispensable to keep in view two main considerations: first, the assumptions, motivations, style, basic goals and principles of India's foreign policy which governed its relations with other states in general; second, the particular goals which India sought to achieve in its relations with the USSR. It is the inter-relationship between the general and particular objectives and the degree of their combination and contradiction that give an idea of various phases of India's relations with the USSR. Such an analysis, however, may not be restricted more to the conceptual level. The interaction of such other factors and the failure or success of Indian diplomacy at the international level may also constitute a part of the analysis.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, had a vivid idea of future foreign policy. It must subscribe its interests, both economic and political. India realized the difficulties such as right to self government, opposition to colonialism. The opposition to colonialism in turn is directed to lend help and support to the dependent people in the achievement of their freedom. This policy was manifested in the Brussels Conference, Asian Relations Conference, and the Asian Conference on Indonesia and in the meetings of the Colombo powers which initiated the Bangdung Conference. Nevertheless, a closer examination of India's foreign policy in this regard reveals that in every one of these cases whether in support to independence movements as in Indonesia or its hesitation to support them fully, as in the
initial stages of Suez Crisis and Korean Crisis India’s policy has been first of all a policy of protecting its security and other vital interests. It was part of India’s strategy to safeguard India’s independence and security.

Initially the Soviet perception towards the Kashmir issue was non-committed. Thus, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin was under the impression that the whole Indian sub-continent was an offshoot of capitalism. Therefore it did not look over the region. But Cold-War rivalry between the West and East gave a positive thrust for Soviet Union to support India over the Kashmir issue. The Soviet relations with India and Pakistan were based on the “Andrei Zhdanov’s thesis” of two camps, which believed in maintaining equidistance to all. Hence Stalin maintained equal distance from both the countries – India and Pakistan. Therefore, in pursuit of such policy, the Soviet representatives were absent during voting when the Kashmir question came up for discussion in the UNSC in 1948.

The US-Pakistan axis or proximity created grave concern for both India and Soviet Union which led to reorientation in their foreign policies, as a result both moved closer to each other. In September 1954, the Soviet Union unexpectedly and dramatically offered to build a giant steel plant in India to develop its iron and steel company. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India’s readiness to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would go a long way in the rapid industrialization of our country. He also regarded the Soviet offer as a welcome alternative source for the supply of capital and machinery and also a bargaining counter to the West. On 2nd February 1955,
the USSR and India signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet assistance for the construction of a giant steel mill at Bhilai. The agreement came at a time when a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was bogged down on technical grounds.

The USSR supported India in the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese colonialism. When West brought forward a resolution in the Security Council against India, USSR blocked it with a prompt veto. Hence The Indian Government and public were greatly appreciative of the profound sympathy and understanding of its aspirations by the USSR. The stand taken by USSR on Goa certainly helped in drawing India closer to it and helped in consolidating and strengthening their friendly ties.

It may be said that a community of interests between India and the USSR resulted in the steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. India-USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarity of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though for different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in Asia; checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and NATO, and later stage, are containing China. Almost throughout this decade i.e. from 1953-64. India had a sense of common purpose with USSR. During the decade, the USSR remained India's principal source of strength in international affairs, as well as in material and military requirements. It gave to the credit of shrewed diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru that without entering into any formal treaty or alliance or giving the impression of being subservient to
the USSR he secured all from the USSR to suit the national interest of India. India under Nehru’s statesmanship always retained the freedom of action in its foreign policy.

Although during the Chinese aggression in 1962, the Soviet Union adopted a restrained attitude towards India and China. And Soviet Union decided to postpone the promised supply of 22 MiG aircrafts. Although Soviet Union did not support India directly, but it criticized to China for its expansionist policy. It was positive sign for India’s stand. The same attitude or response from the Soviet side was perceived during the India and Pakistan war. The Soviet Union played an important role in arranging the ceasefire through the Security Council, and later took initiative to sponsor on Indo-Pak summit at Tashkent in January 1966. The Tashkent declaration was an important political document and a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan. And the declaration improved relations between India and Pakistan on the one hand and further strengthened India’s relationship with USSR on the other hand.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 proved landmark in strengthening their relationship. The treaty mainly dealt with the promotion of friendship, peace and security both at regional and international levels. It sounded more as a military alliance to counter China and Pakistan in particular, and the USA in general. The mainstay Indo-Soviet Peace Treaty in 1971 was encirclement of China. The treaty was described by commentators as a document of great
international importance contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and elsewhere.

The Treaty with the Soviet Union was an immediate source of strength, when the political crisis in Bangladesh was brought out. The Soviet Union played a decisive role in the dismemberment of the East Pakistan, both of Security Council and in military assistance it rendered to India. In nutshell it can be perceived that Soviet Union supported India during the Bangladesh crisis and fulfilled its promises made us the treaty signed by both India and USSR in 1971. The Shimla Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan in July 1972. It proved as an instrument for the relaxation of tension in Asia and for peaceful coexistence. It proved a cornerstone of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan.

Soviet Union fully supported India, when India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran in May 1974. Although, it was for the peaceful purpose, that is, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), but Pakistan and China bitterly criticized India for this test. China accused India of nuclear blackmailing by posing as a “sub super power”.

The international environment suddenly changed with the commencement of the ‘New Cold War’ as a direct result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979. U.S. supported to Afghan Mujahideen for fighting against USSR. India being a non-aligned country opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan because the intervention in internal affairs of any South Asian country is threat to the region. Though
USSR needed India’s support or cooperation in this war same as India needed in Bangladesh crisis. Though initially India denounced the intervention, but it supported to USSR. The Rand Corporation study of the ‘security of Pakistan’s manifested; the Soviet intervention caused serious threat to South Asia, particularly Pakistan.

Indian Ocean is very paramount in India’s geostrategic relations and security perspectives. The decade of 70s witnessed the dawn of the Indian Ocean as another theater of big power rivalry. Although General Assembly passed various resolutions regarding the implementation of the “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” in 1974. But it was not impressive mainly because of the lack of interest shown by the superpowers. In the power triangle – USA- USSR- China, India has geographical position, and resources could be balancing factors. Thus, geographically, India is of greater significance to the USSR than the USA or to Europe. The significance and strategic location of Indian sub-continent, and particularly land mass of India itself is crucial for the Soviet Union. India’s strategic location in the Ocean gives it a central position in the Asian politics.

Change of leadership in two countries did not affect geostrategic and economic bilateral relations between India and USSR. It was assured after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 that Indo-Soviet relations would continue to be cordial and friendly. After Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination in October, 1984, India’s leadership shifted to Rajiv Gandhi. Both signed the Delhi Declaration “on the principles of a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent world”, on 26
November 1986. They emphasized over the both countries. Unique commonness of approach to the vision of a world, free from nuclear weapons and violence. And they desired for the overall human development such as socio-economic, cultural and political. The balance of terror should be replaced by international peace and security. The Declaration was Perestroika’s first international document on “New thinking”.

The Perestroika and Glasnost policies were introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev. These focused on the restructuring of system as openness and economic political liberalization. The Soviet leader on his part tried his best to reform the ‘tight’ system through freedom of expression and restructuring economy and polity, but unfortunately some of the aspects and misuse of these policies led to suffer the entire state’s system (breakup of empire). The Cold War came to an end in December 1989, when Gorbachev and George Bush met at Malta Summit. The stand taken on the Gulf crisis in 1991 confirmed the impression that Gorbachev’s “New thinking” presented a broad with that of the previous communist regions. Thus, in this changing matrix of international political environment it was natural that Indo-Russian relations underwent a huge churning process. And it was considered that there was more ‘continuity’ than ‘change’ in Russia’s foreign relations. But the ‘collapse of Soviet Union’ left a vacuum in international political system. And the new world order came into existence, that is, unipolar world which was dominated by US.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dealt a blow to India's foreign policy framework. Events happened with such rapidity for
which India had not prepared itself. The shock was the more devastating as it was so unexpected and the collapse was so dramatic. India could not remain untouched of the consequences of the events taking place in international scenario. For India, the events in Soviet Union had been a major blow because changes in Soviet Union occurred at a time when India itself was going through a severe economic crisis and internal turmoil of such a magnitude which changed the nature of the political completion of India. It compelled India to recast or reframe its external relations.

Even after the disintegration of USSR the relations between the Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and there is a great scope for deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. Indo-Russian relations is based on mutuality of common interests, good neighbourly ties, liberal political ideology, convergence of national interests, geo-political settings, economic opportunities and international interdependence. But India did not get due recognition from the Russia. The economic, political and strategical relations were also affected in the 90s. The pro-Western policy of Russia was not accepted by the Indian government. The Cryogenic deal controversy and rupee-ruble tensions led to further rift between India and Russia.

Some significant steps were taken to sort out these problems as early as January 1993 by the then President Boris Yeltsin when he visited India. In the early years, Russian policy towards India was of benign neglect. But he tried to recreate the spirit of the Indo-Soviet friendship. The earlier Treaty was replaced by new one: the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. During the visit he
conveyed the impression that Russia put a high value on Indo-Russian relations. He described Russian and India as natural partners and that the interests of both countries were identical. Significantly, he reiterated Russian support for India’s position in Kashmir. As the same time India was turning against to Moscow with a long and expensive list for Modern weaponry and hence emerged as the largest arm purchaser from Russia.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has affected India adversely in many sectors. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important implications are in defence and military areas. India was buying a very large number of military weapons, equipment and hardware from the Soviet Union. These included Mig fighter aircrafts, battle tanks submarines etc. During 1986-90, according to one estimate, about 73 percent of the total values of arms imported by the Indian defence forces originated in the Soviet Union. Practical difficulties which confront Indian armed forces since 1991 include, replacement of the spare parts as well as replenishment of the existing stock.

The matter assumed such a seriousness that the Defence Minister of India, Sharad Pawar, had to rush to Russia in September 1992 to bail out the armed forces of its immediate difficulties of Soviet armed supply. At the end of the visit while there was some hope in the improvement of the situation, it was evident that ultimately India would have to explore alternate sources. Moscow, it is argued, may not be in a position to meet the Indian demands as paucity of fund may force Russian to close down their units. Besides, many of the Russian scientists and technocrats are reported to have left the country and got jobs in
the western countries where they are promised better salaries and employment opportunities. Whatever, existing military weapons and hardware are in stock in the member states of CIS. They would like to sell them in the western markets in order to earn foreign exchange. Above all, one significant advantage which accrued to India in procuring armaments and equipment from the Soviet Union.

Cryogenic rocket deal manifested the vulnerability of Russia to succumb to the US pressure in the unipolar world. The deal was signed by India and Russia in 1991 under which India was to gain cryogenic motors from Russia. But the US urged to both Glavkosmos (Russian Space Agency) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to cancel the rocket deal. Surprisingly, US, along with the MTCR Parties, imposed sanctions on 11 May 1992 on both the agencies- Glavkosmos and ISRO. Thus the Cryogenic deal controversy manifested that Indo-Russia relationship was influenced by Russia's pro-Western foreign policy. Therefore the controversy related to the said deal brings to fore the emerging stark realities of unipolar world-the evident of US pressure and vulnerabilities of emerged Russia. Hence Russia could not adopt an independent line in the initial years after the disintegration of USSR.

But the "Moscow Declaration on the Protection Interests of Pluralist States" signed by India and Russia became the backbone of relations between both the countries. The said declaration drew attention not only the nature of the challenges faced by the two countries, but also focused attention on the source from which this threat emanated for both the countries. It was the
commonality of their geopolitical interests that paved the way for strengthening their relationship.

Although Russia has put forward a proposal of military collaboration with India, but the harsh reality was that Moscow did not feel the strategic need of India in the post Cold-War era. As a matter of fact decline in the strategic significance of India to Moscow began with the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, when Gorbachev started giving priority to good relations with the west which was to provide loans and technologies, there was a drastic change in the geo-strategic perceptions of the Soviet Union. When Russia was strategically integrated with Europe and China has ceased to be socialist rival, need for a strategic consensus with India did not have the same relevance as in the previous two decades. In brief, diplomatically India cannot hope to depend on Russia to the same extent as it did on the Soviet Union.

Thus, the ‘collapse of the Soviet Union’ leaves a vacuum in the international political system. The Soviet Union played a significant role against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, which found themselves against the western bloc of countries. Gradually the obstacles were overcome to an extent, and from 1997 onwards Russia was again on the way towards establishing a special position for the supply of defence related equipment. Both Russia and India decided in March 1997 to continue defence ties into 21st century. Russian afford a new air defence system
and a 10 billion military deal. Significant agreement reached during Yergony Primakov’s visit in December (1999) when cross-century defence relationship was formalized. Described as “Cooperation 2010 Document” it envisaged partnership in research, development and joint production of sophisticated equipment besides incorporating other defence areas.

The point does not need to be surprised that India had multifaceted and deep going relationship with the Soviet Union which ranged from the political to economic and technological, and to strategic and security ties. It was a special and unique relationship. It was valuable to both India and Russia for meeting hostile external challenges; certainly for India. The Soviet Union constituted irreplaceable counter balancing force in facing up to its regional and international concerns and an added source of strength in pushing economic and scientific development. India had received valuable assistance in establishing a basic industrial infrastructure.

The most concrete expression of the new thinking was provided during the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia, China and India were able to form a regional bloc. The strategic triangle of Russia, China and India may restore peace and stability in the region. A lot depends in the region on the policies of these countries that India is a great power and our relationship is based on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two countries for stability in the world. He also reiterated that Russia supports India’s claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.
Many developments were taking place to reveal the identity of viewpoints as well as long term convergence of interests between New Delhi and Moscow. The events involving Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the bypassing of the United Nations, the devastation of Iraq (2003), the spread of religious fanaticism, Pokhran-II (1998), the Kargil war (1999) all these happenings continued to bring them together. Although aftermath of Pokhran-II (1998) Russia criticized India for conducting its nuclear test, Russia has been persistence in its statements that India should sign the NPT and CTBT(1996),which might suggest a subtle form of coercion. Initially, there was disquiet in Russia’s over the blast, but later, Russia did not publicly criticize to India. Immensly, it did not impose any kind of sanctions during the Kargil crisis, Russia officially referred to Jammu and Kashmir as an ‘Indian state’ and denounced categorically Islamabad’s action as ‘invasion’. Russia explicitly referred to the Shima Accord (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999) as the sole basis for resolving the problem.

A major change took place after the 9/11 and 13 December, 2001 terrorist attack on Pentagon, Washington and Indian Parliament respectively. It was the first time in world history when all countries came under one umbrella to condemn the menace of ghasty terrorism in all its sorts. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in strict terms, to stop cross-border terrorism and create conducive atmosphere for bilateral dialogue and consultation. To jointly tackle the menace of terrorism, during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2001, India and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration. They setup
Joint Working Group during the visit of President Putin in December 2002. Moscow strongly condemned the terrorist attacks that took place on 26 March 2003 in the Namdigarh village of Kashmir and Mumbai in November, 2008. Besides condemning the terrorist attacks, the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its support to the measures taken by India to stop the activity of terrorist forces.

Due to these positive efforts of developments, it would be logical to emphasize the point that terrorism is one of the important contributory factors for perceptual convergence between the two countries. This convergence led to Russia and India support each other on their stands a Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. The Ministry of External Affair in India pressed the information of March 2003 in Chechnya, under the guidance of the Russian government as important for the restoration, normalization, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Russian Federations Check Republic within the democratic framework.

President Putin and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s summit produced a strong statement called upon Pakistan to fulfill its obligations by preventing infiltration of terrorists across the line of control and eliminating the infrastructure of terrorism as a pre-requisite for the renewal of peaceful dialogue. Russia unambiguously endorsed India’s stand that the Shimla Agreement and Lahore Declaration provide the sole framework within which the dialogue between India and Russia should eventually take place.
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been the logical conclusion of a vision for US-India relations as framed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It was an opportune moment for India to step out of the South Asian cocoon, onto the high table as a major power, and shape the emerging Asian Security architecture. India may also consider using this high chair to influence US actions vis-à-vis Russia. In fact, there are several commodities such as terrorism, WMD and stable Asian Security Order among India, Russian and US along with China. Hence, the deal proved very fruitful to strengthen or commenting their strategic ties in Asia, particularly in South Asia.

The formation of three continental organizations, that is BRICS, is very paramount step taken by the member countries in 21st century. The organization setup a platform for emerging powers to work together as a group of rising power that they are willing to play a collective role in international affairs. They pursue a new international political and economic order that is built on the principles of multi-polarity, justice, fairness and democracy. In this regard, the group is not only a counterbalance to the established western powers but rather seeks to pursue a more effective or equal interaction with them to build a better world order. Russia views BRICS as a means of regaining its former reputable standing in setting the agenda in global affairs. Although, India has bilateral political or geographical problems with the China, but at the multi-lateral level it shares the same day not only with China but with other members as well.
In the Syrian crisis and Ukraine crisis, both Russia and India played a
great role in sorting out them in peaceful manner. The tension in both Syria and
Ukraine has reviewed the Cold War diplomacy between West and East. They
are politically differing in all discourse over the issue in West Asia. It was
viewed in Moscow, it is a continuation of the western plan to encircle Russia
militarily and torpedo its reintegration efforts in the former Soviet Union. The
political upheaval in Syria and Ukraine as “the battle of the unipolar world of
US hegemony against the emerged Russia.

The political change leading to change of regime and leadership did not
subject to political vicissitudes. And both countries, India and Russia, ran
parallel to each other. And there have been annual bilateral summits between
Russia and India to cope with changing stark realities. Medvedev's visit to
India in December, 2008 reflected the time tested and trustworthy friendship
between the two countries. He signed MoU in the areas of nuclear energy,
defence, trade and economic relationship. Therefore the summit cleared the
doubts that emerged in 2006, when India signed the nuclear deal with US. It
once again demonstrated that there was continuity in Indo-Russian relations
and the change of leadership in either country did not affect this binding, time-
tested friendship. The visits proved to be very fruitful in their strategic
cooporation. It enhanced close cooperation not only in military exercise but in
many other areas of common interest and concern.

President Putin extended thanks to China and India for remaining
restrained and objective in dealing with the tensions in both countries. Russia
has manifested its power in the region while West and European Union passed sanctions against Russia. As Geneva I summit was miserably failed, which calls for the transitional governing body. And the Geneva II summit held in January, 2014 also could not fruitfully spelt out future role of Assad government. Thus, the crises have manifested power of emerged Russia in the region.

Russia and India have major international or regional mutual interest and concern to work together in 21st century. Perhaps India and Russia are the only major powers in the world that do not have clash of interests or suffer from differences of opinion on any major issue and this affinity makes them perfect and genuine strategic partners in future. The major issue of common concern i.e. multi-polar world order, terrorism, democratic values and climate change come Russia and India at the single front.

Findings:

- Though it started late but it was a strongly cemented relationship between Soviet Union and India since mid fifties.
- Soviet leaders especially Stalin remained reluctant to establish close contacts with India as it perceived it might be British agent.
- Since mid fifties both the states came closer and Indian leader (Prime Minister Nehru) was very happy. Positive cooperation in various dimensions started as economy, defence, international crisis, disarmament and developing friendly relations with developing countries etc. assurances to be there where ever the other partner needed.
During Communist aggression, USSR very cautiously refrained from saying any word in favour or against. It remained neutral and deliberately delayed the military assistance.

After Tashkent Accord 1966, relations completely restored by USSR. This mediation was to assuage India.

USSR supported India during 1971 War leading to 1971 friendship treaty. The general military and economic support continued to India.

The 1979 Afghanistan intervention, the act was not criticized by India because of many compulsions.

In 1980, it was new cold war- the theater of rivalry shifted from political and economic divergence to the developing countries. Arms proliferation and arms race was enhanced.

In 1980 SAARC was formed. There was change of government in USSR, Gorbachev and his new policies leading to reduction of tension between the super powers in 1989-90. In 1991 the disintegration took place and there was a drastic change in the relations between India and emerged Russia. Russia was facing so many problems internally as well as externally.

President Yeltsin's visit to India re-started the lost flow of friendship between the two states. The next incumbents-Mr. Putin, Medvedev, and again Putin- cemented and further strengthened the ties.

The new issues for mutual cooperation came up such as environment, terrorism, climate change, Asian order and multipolar pragmatism etc.
The entire study shows that there have been less vicissitudes in India-Russia relations except slight differences of opinions. During Sino-Indian crisis in 1962 Soviet Union restrained for its own interests and image at international level (among communist states). Had it supported India, the entire communist world would have gone against it. Had it supported wholeheartedly, the West world and non-aligned bloc would have criticized severely. Therefore, it took a stand which was quite uneasy to explain, whether it was to hidden support to China or a lesson to India. Aftermath of Chinese crisis Soviet Union tried to assuage India’s irritation. Immediately USSR mediated between India and Pakistan during Tashkent Pact 1966. In 1971 USSR supported India in preparing Bangladesh Muktiwahni force. In 1974 USSR did not like India’s Pokhran-1 nuclear test.

Soviet Union despite of being very close to India showed its resentment whenever India slightly inclined towards US or Western states or did any nuclear test. India’s leadership specially Congress regime many of the time convinced Soviet Union intransigent activities. During Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, entire international community criticized it but India did not. A new cold war had started, rivalry intensified and affected different areas especially South Asia from where the new Cold War had started because of Soviet Afghan debacle. US President Ronald Reagan was very critical of and also with India. These years passed precautious in every corner of the world except Soviet Union. This was the time when India was like emerging power but did not maintain very cordial relations with neighbours.
There were many positive roles of India at various patterns but sometimes it failed in its foreign policy rather diplomacy in handling some states and regional organizations-ASEAN, SAARC, West Europe, US etc. India had strong faith in USSR, even in all leadership from Nehruvian legacy, secretaries and bureaucracy even media and public mood- all were in the Soviet colour with full administration. After the death of Brezhnev in Soviet Union, assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and incumbent Rajeev Gandhi and Gorbacheve all maintained the same legacy. Mr. Rajeev’s period remained better than Mrs. Gandhi in terms of negotiations, foreign visits and good relations with neighbours. However during the Rajeev-Gorbachev period ties were further strengthen. On international fronts, the world community was taking asigh of relief as two super powers had shed down their ferocity, rivalry and antagonism. The Cold War by and large came to an end.

The Soviet leader had to take strenuous tasks from outside and inside both. The internal problems in economy, army and specially insurgency by Republics had started. The radicals were not in favour of Mr. Gorbachev. During this crisis the Soviet government even could take any strong stand in the Gulf crisis, and its natural partner India was also sometimes ignored. It was not deliberately and eventually, Gorbachev was not in a position to take any stance but at that time India took this gesture very carefully apprehending the problems of its fried country. Despite of these circumstances which took place in Soviet Union the psycho-emotional attachment, dependency and faith in
Soviet empire was not lessened down. The Indian government could not prepare itself for forth coming realities.

The Soviet disintegration that took place in earlier 90s was a great blow for India. A mighty empire splitted in to many sovereign states and lost its paraphernalia. It was a red letter day for US as this event was foretold by G.F. Kenon. For others it was only a political process whereas for NAM states especially India it was severe shock. The new regime in Russian Federation led by Mr. Yeltsin got involved in difficult tasks to manage internal and external challenges and problems India expected the same trends from that side whereas it was quite subtle. The Security Advisor declared in press conference that Russia was busy in its own affairs it was necessary that states which were priority in part would remain as friend allies. Their priority got changed as per changing international, regional and domestic circumstances.

After two and half years, when Russian Federation got somehow settled, attended Indian government and India respond well. A new era regime started on smooth grounds and since last one and half decades Russian leaders Mr. Putin and Medvedev have been cooperating on with India except slight differences. Finally it may be derived that those changing trends especially after 1991 make this relationship as buyer-seller relationship rather than a friendly allies. It was USSR/Russia which took lion’ share and advantages of the circumstances. India also got benefit with its support but several times received shocks and blows also.
However this relationship is equally marked by the absence of any national irritants, no border disputes. This identity of their views on the political and economic order and on major international issues ensures that their strategic partnership would contribute to play a significant role in future as well.
Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Documentary Collections


Document of Strategic Partnership, signed between India and Russia on 4 October 2000, in The Hindu (New Delhi), 6 October 2000.

Document of Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee’s Visit to Moscow, 4-7 November 2001, Strategic Digest (New Delhi), pp. 1467-1478.


Document of Putin’s Visit to India in December 2002, in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), vol. 32, no. 12, December 2002.


Document of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Visit to India, Strategic Digest (New Delhi), April 1993.


Indian Prime Minister NarasimhaRao's interview on board the PM's special aircraft from Moscow to Delhi on 2 July 1994, *The Hindu* (Madras). 3 July 1994.

Ministry of External Affairs Foreign Affairs Record, 1955.


Secondary Sources

Books


Dutt, N.P., India’s Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1988.

Dutt, V.P., China: The Post Mao View, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1981.

Ganguli, Sumit, India’s foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2010.


Mann, Poonam, *India’s Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era*, Harman Books, Delhi, 2000.


**Articles**


Avyupsky, Vyachslav, “Confessional Geopolitics in the South of Russia and the North Caucasus”, *Russia and the Moslem World* (Moscow), No. 3 (141), 2004.

Bakshi, Jyotsna, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking”, *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), Vol. 21, No. 10, January 1998.


**Periodicals/Journal, Newspapers**

- American Political Science Review (New York)
- Asia Quarterly (Brussels)
- Asian Recorder (New Delhi)
- Asian Survey (Berkley)
- Current History (Philadelphia)
- Daily Excelsior (Jammu)
• Eastern Economist (New Delhi)
• Foreign Affairs Report (New Delhi)
• India Quarterly (New Delhi)
• Indian and Foreign Review (New Delhi)
• Indian Express (New Delhi)
• Indian Journals of Politics (Aligarh)
• International Affairs (London)
• International Affairs (Moscow)
• International Relations (London)
• International Studies (New Delhi)
• Journal of Peace and Studies (New Delhi)
• Kashmir Times (Jammu)
• Moscow News (Moscow)
• Moscow Times (Moscow)
• New Times (Hyderabad)
• Pacific Affairs (Vancouver)
• Patriot (New Delhi)
• Political Quarterly (London)
• Post-Soviet Affairs (Florida)
• Regional Studies (Islamabad)
• Russia and the Muslim World (Moscow)
• Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)
• Survival (London)
• The Hindu (New Delhi)
• The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)
• The Statesman (New Delhi)
• The Times of India (New Delhi)
• The Tribune (Chandigarh)
• The Washington Quarterly (Washington)
• Young India (New Delhi)
Websites

• http://www.currenthistory.com
• http://www.indian.mid.ru
• http://www.memafin.com
• http://www.chechenpress.com
• http://www.cnn.com