THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLA DESH: ITS IMPACT ON INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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PREFACE

The cherished dream of golden Bangladesh aspired by late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was turned into reality on the 16th of December 1971 - the day the Pakistani army surrendered unconditionally to the joint command of Indian army and Muktibahini in Dacca. The emergence of Bangladesh indeed left a profound impact on Indo-American relations, for India wholeheartedly supported the liberation struggle of Bangladesh while the United States had favoured a 'tilt' towards Pakistan. The damage caused to Indo-American relations during the Bangladesh crisis is yet to be repaired and corrected.

This dissertation while dealing with the contradictions and constraints inherent in the politics of the united Pakistan which ultimately led to its break-up and the emergence of Bangladesh, attempts at analysing the impact of the Bangladesh crisis on the Indo-American relations.

The first chapter provides a backdrop to the genesis of the crisis and the subsequent birth of Bangladesh. The impact of Bangladesh on Indo-American relations has been analysed in the second chapter. The last chapter surveys the relations of the new state with its friends and foes. The conclusion sums up the account of the previous chapters and makes suggestions towards the normalization of the Indo-American relations.
Appendices contain various tables to show the extent of economic disparities between West Pakistan and the erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, the results of the Pakistani elections in 1970 and the text of memoranda of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).

This dissertation owes to the number of people for their help and guidance, of all, I am highly indebted to my supervisor Prof. S.A.H. Haqqi, Head of the Department of Political Science and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh for his expert guidance and for perpetual stimulation. I express my profound gratitude to Dr. Jafri for his timely guidance and suggestions. I am obliged to Mr. Naushad Ali, Mr. Ehsan, Mr. Mahendar Sharma and the staff of the Sapru House Library, New Delhi for providing me necessary guidance and materials for writing this dissertation. My foremost thanks are due to Shashi Prabha who corrected the manuscript and inspired me to expedite the work intime. The financial assistance given by the Government of Nagaland is gratefully acknowledged.
Men who are not free, he thought, always idealise their struggle.

Boris Pasternak
CHAPTER I

BACKDROP: THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

Often there had been conflict and confrontation between West Pakistan and East Pakistan ever since the emergence of Pakistan as a separate nation in 1947. The main issues involved were the division of financial resources, and the deprivation of Bengali culture. The Bengalis who have the distinct culture, language and race differed with the Pakistanis in many aspects. Geographical distinctions were such that East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was separated from West Pakistan by about 1,100 miles of Indian territory. Ethnic, and cultural distinctions were the most significant factors that struck the wide contrast between the two wings of confederacy.

Geographical separation between the two wings of Pakistan found expression in their every walk of life. The people of the western region including Punjabis, Pashtus, Sindhis and Baluchis were proud of their culture and always looked down upon the race and cultural heritage of Bengalis with contempt and malice. They had also been persistently insulted by the rulers of the West Pakistan.

Their language was also different. The West Pakistanis tried to imposed Urdu as the official language in the east wing but they did not achieve their object. An effort was made to undo the impact of the greatest figure of the Bengali culture, including Rabindra Nath Tagore - who is considered by the Bengali people equivalent of Shakespeare to the English or Pushkin to the Russian.²

The Rabindra sangeet (music) was disallowed on Radio Pakistan and Tagore’s works were banned. This was fiercely resented by the East Pakistanis and they considered that it was a great humiliation to their cultural pride. They made it clear to the West Pakistanis that it was improper and impracticable to totally eliminate Rabindra Nath Tagore and Nazrul Islam from their cultural scene. It could only be done at the cost of culture itself.³

The language question, in fact had been one of the several issues that had violently divided the two wings of Pakistan. On the negotiations of the various disputes between the two wings, the shadow of the struggle for the Bengali language was quite apparent. The Bengalis, were bitter because

One of Tagore’s songs has been adopted as the national Anthem of Bangladesh.²

2. Ibid; p. 45.

they had to fight desperately even to obtain what they thought was a matter of almost routine acceptability. This led them to become increasingly distrustful of West Pakistan. The struggle on the language issue acquired a greater vigour and speed when two students of Dacca University were shot dead by the police in 1952. This ultimately led to the demand of autonomy for East Pakistan. 4

They not only speak different languages (Urdu in West), Bengali in the East, (but eat different foods (fish and rice in the East) and had opposite culture; the Punjabis preferred soldiering and government, while the Bengalis love politics and literature. 5

The violent conflict which took place in the former East Pakistan between the West Pakistani forces and the Bengali freedom fighters had its roots deep in the history of Pakistan for the last two decades. In fact it could be traced even further to the neglect of Bengali Muslims in the pre-partition time by the central leadership of the All India Muslim League domination by the urdu speaking North Indian Zamindar elite and the professional middle classes of Bombay. For instance, in the tripartite discussions that took place on the various

4. Case for Bangladesh, Published by the Communist Party of India, (New Delhi), 1971, p. 28.
occasions among the Muslim League, the Congress and the British regarding the ratio of Muslim representation in the central legislature and various Provincial Assemblies, majority of Bengali Muslims was always sacrificed in order to gain weightage for the Muslim minority in the provinces of U.P. and Bombay.  

It was the cultural gap between the two wings of Pakistan that accelerated the growth of conflict which ultimately resulted in the birth of an independent nation from within Pakistan notwithstanding that they belong to the same religion. Pakistan as a state carried from the very beginning the seeds of dissolution, since the Bengalis had been perpetually exploited by Pakistanis and had only a meagre share in terms of economic gains.

The economy of erstwhile East Pakistan was dominated primarily by Jute cultivation and it was the biggest sources of foreign exchange to Pakistan. Economic disparity between the East and West Pakistan was so great that East Pakistan had only a negligible share even in its own economy.

According to the figures compiled by Stephen R. Lewis, the East Pakistani share of total commodity imports was as follows:

29.4 per cent, 29.1 percent and 30.5 percent, on the other hand, its shape of the commodities exports during the same periods were 50.3 per cent, 61.4 per cent and 59.5 per cent. In absolute rupee or dollar terms during these periods, East Pakistan had run a surplus with the rest of the world. On the other hand, West Pakistan had been in deficit with the rest of the world. The inter-regional trade figure, computed by Stephen R. Lewis indicate that East Pakistan was consistently kept in deficit as far as inter-regional trade was concerned than West Pakistan. 7

East Pakistan was the major foreign exchange earner because of its abundant jute cultivation. The foreign exchange earned was, however, to be surrendered to the state Bank in order to further allocate the resources to import the Technical Know-hows and it was determined by the West Pakistan bureaucrats who were holding the key position in the Central Government. Foreign aid, grants, loans etc: were centrally negotiated by the few bureaucrats. 8

Although during the last two decades East Pakistan had earned 50% to 70% of foreign exchange, the earnings were invested in West Pakistan on the ground that it had a greater

absorption capacity and the returns from capital investment were higher than in East. Higher investment indeed induced the growth of industries in the West. It was not very economical but could survive because of high import traffic. East Pakistan's exports were annually marketed to the East. On an average the East Pakistan annually incurred a deficit of 50% in its trade with the West.  

The per capita income in East Pakistan was considerably low and hardly sufficient to meet the subsistence level. Although per capita income of Pakistan increased substantially from $3.318.6 per year during the pre-plan period to $3.37.93 per year during the third plan period - it was accompanied by severe regional disparity between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The per capita income of the both the regions West and East Pakistan also increased. However, the per capita income in West Pakistan increased from $3.297.6 per year to $3.330.7 per year during the corresponding period. As a result, the disparity in per capita income of the two regions widened. While during the pre-plan period, per capita income of East Pakistan was behind that of West Pakistan by $3.46.0 per year, during the third plan period it further increased to $3.1020 per year. The disparity in per capita income between the two regions thus increased by 122 per cent.  

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The per capita development expenditure in Pakistan increased from Rs. 14.3 per year during the pre-plan period to Rs. 74.00 per year during the third plan period. The per capita developmental expenditure increased in both the regions but while in West Pakistan it increased from Rs. 21.5 per year to Rs. 107.9 per year, in East it increased from Rs. 8.5 per year to Rs. 45.6 per year only during the corresponding periods. While during the pre-plan period, per capita development expenditure in East Pakistan was Rs. 13.2 per year less than that in West Pakistan, during the third plan period, the lag increased between the two regions.

Even Pakistan's five year plan could not do adequate justice to the economic development of East Pakistan. Pakistan's third five year plan had indicated the meagre allocation of resources to East Pakistan. The total outlay was estimated at Rs. 4,950 crores of which Rs. 3,350 crores was for public sector and Rs. 1,600 crores for private sector. East Pakistan was allotted Rs. 1,600 crores and West Pakistan Rs. 1,350 crores for the public sector. For centre, the amount allocated was Rs. 400 crores.

The spending of the central resources could benefit either of the Provinces or both. But no specification in this regard was indicated. The actual beneficiary was the West Pakistan.

11. Ibid, p. 177.
For the private sector the outlay was Rs. 1600 crores of which Rs. 750 crores were for East Pakistan and Rs. 850 crores for West Pakistan. As projected in the plan, the total outlay for East Pakistan was therefore Rs. 2350 crores and for West Pakistan Rs. 2200 crores. 12

At the end of the third plan period 1965-66 to 1968-69, East Bengal received as development expenditure from the centre Rs. 351.3 crores against Rs. 1107.6 crores allocated to West Pakistan. During this period Pakistan received Rs. 1295 crores as foreign aid. Out of this, East Bengal received 30 per cent amounting to Rs. 388.5 crores. 13

The growing economic disparities between the two wings of Pakistan was deplored by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his broadcast on the 28th October 1970. He said:

"Today, barely two dozen families have acquired control over 60% of the nation's industrial assets; 80% of its banking assets and 75% of its insurance assets; 62% of the total bank advances are concentrated in only 3% of the total accounts in existence. The tax structure is the most regressive in the world. Only 2% of the GNP is being realised as direct taxes as against 6% in other developing countries, while oppressive indirect taxes are imposed on such essential commodities as salt. Protected markets, tax holidays, huge subsidies in the form of bonus vouchers, credits and grants of foreign exchange in the artificially low official rate have created specifically favourable condition for the growth of monopolies and cartels." 14

Further, he remarked on the 29th October 1970:

"To turn how to appalling record of economic disparity it is seen that during the last 20 years but of the total revenue expenditure of the government only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that is only one fifth of the total) was spent in Bengal, as against over Rs. 5,000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development expenditure during the same period, Rs. 3,000 crores (that is only one third of the total) was spent in West Pakistan over 20 years, West Pakistan has imported goods over more than Rs. 3,000 crores as against its own foreign exchange earning of barely Rs. 1,500 crores. Imports into West Pakistan have been three times the value of imports into the Bengal. It was made possible for West Pakistan to imports goods worth Rs. 2,000 crores in excess of its export earning by allocating to it Rs. 500 crores of foreign exchange earnings of Bengal and allowing it to utilise over 80% of all foreign aid.

The record in the field of Government services is just as deplorable. After 21 years Bengalis account for barely 15% in Central Government Services and less than 10% in the defence services. The price of the essential commodities has been 5% to 10% higher than in West Pakistan: the average price of coarse rice in Bengal is Rs. 45 to 50 per maund, in West Pakistan 25 to 20 and that of wheat is Rs. 30 to 35 maund, in East Bengal as against Rs. 15 to 20 per maund in West Pakistan. Mustard oil sells in the Bengal at Rs. 5 per seer and Rs. 2.50 per seer in West Pakistan. The gold price is Rs. 135 to 140 per tola in Karachi as against Rs. 160 to 165 per tola at Dacca. Even a custom barrier has been imposed against carrying gold from West Pakistan to Bengal.

This injustice is the product of the management of the economy for 22 years by the Central Government. The Central Government is incapable of redressing such injustices. This is borne out by the fourth five year plan. The fourth five year plan allocation are a confession of the failure of Central Government, however, powerful it might be to redress past injustice.
Federal Services

Our federal scheme envisages the abolition of all Pakistan services and its replacement by federal services in which persons shall be recruited on the basis of population for all parts of Pakistan. We also believe that the maintenance of a militia or a para military forces by the federating units will effectively contribute towards national security. This federal scheme by rendering the sources of doubt, distrust and discrimination will ensured a strong Pakistan.

Education

It is an alarming fact that the number of primary schools in Bengal has declined since 1947.

Health

In the field of health, even a minimum measure of medical relief is denied to over 90% of our population.

The Awami league has resolved to face this great challenge. We believe that with the support and confidence of the people, which our party enjoys, we shall Inshaallah, be able to successfully to meet the challenge. Pakistan Zindabad".

The Bengalis had a meagre share in most of the Governmental activities. They were not proportionately

represented in the Government services. Of the 83 Muslim I.C.S. Officers who opted for Pakistan at the time of partition, only 47 remained in active administrative service by 1965 and these 47 were Urdu-speaking non-Bengalis. Thus they were not only neglected in the governmental spheres but were also deprived of their cultural and legitimate rights.

The discriminating trend was apparent even in the agriculture sector. The policy decisions regarding agricultural inputs in terms of tractors, seeds, fertilizers, insecticide, tube wells etc. were taken and implemented by the West Pakistan authorities.

The Central Government absolutely ignored the basic educational needs of East Pakistan in continuation of the same policy. In the field of education West Pakistan had made considerable progress than East Pakistan. The following table is the testimony to the facts.

17. Mohamed Ayoob, n. 6, p. 21.
The curbs on culture and economy were the two vital ingredients which gave an immediate impetus to the Bengalis for the secession movements under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of Awami League Party. The autonomy movement had escalated further during President Ayub's regime, because he had failed to fulfill the promises made to the people of East Pakistan. Some of the social reforms and economic progress during Ayub's regime was largely confined to West Pakistan. The worst thing was that the economy of Pakistan was concentrated in the few hands who had a close connections with the Ayub regime. These were the reasons for the collapse

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18. Syamal Chakrabarty, The emergence of a Nation: from Patriotism to Bengali nationalism, a paper presented at Calcutta University, Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti in April, 1972, p. 114.
of the East Bengal's economy, where near famine conditions existed in most of the villages. 19

Ayub had promised to remove the existing disparities between the two wings of Pakistan but his promises remained mere palliative and the situation worsened day by day in East Bengal. The students particularly of Dacca, Bogra, Rajshahi and Chittagong rose against Ayub's regime and held demonstration for the restoration of parliamentary democracy. The demonstrating students were put behind the bars. Ayub brought certain constitutional changes in 1962 in order to pacify the Bengalis but the movement for the autonomy further aggravated as the constitutional changes brought in Pakistan were totally unacceptable to the Bengalis.

The demonstrators and agitators often clashed with the police and army. Ayub's military regime was determined to crush this democratic spirit. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had put forward his famous six point formula* for maximum regional

19. *The six points were:

(1) The constitution should provide for a federation of Pakistan in true sense on the basis of the Lahore resolution and for a parliamentary form of government based on the supremacy of newly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise, (2) The federal government shall deal with only two subjects—defence and foreign affairs with all residuary subjects vested in the federating states, (3) There should be either two separate freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency with two separate reserve banks to prevent inter-wing flights of capital. (4) The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in federating units. The federal

Continued on page 14 P.N.
autonomy for East Pakistan. This led to the arrest of many prominent leaders including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was later implicated in the Agartala conspiracy case. This only further aggravated the situation. Wide protest and strong resentment spreaded through out East Pakistan. The police had to resort to firing in Dacca on the 7th December, 1968 killing two persons and wounding several others. Complete strikes were observed in Dacca on the 14th December 1968 inspite of the army presence in the city. More than 1,000 persons were arrested on that day in Dacca. The army, however, failed to crush the democratic spirit of the Bengalis.

Eventually, Ayub released Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and with drew the Agartala conspiracy case. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

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1. The government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations (5) Economic disparities between the two wings shall disappear through a series of economic, fiscal and legal reforms. (6) A militia or para military force must be created in East Pakistan, which at present has no defence of its own.

++ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was treated as a conspirator by the military Junta of Pakistan and arrested on the ground that Mujib had collaborated with Indian Government for seeking military and material assistance to get East Pakistan liberated.


was invited for round table conference in March 1969. At this conference, he reiterated the demand for regional autonomy for both the wings of Pakistan. 22

No solution was found. Meanwhile Ayub could not face the onslaught of popular agitations and demonstrations and so on March 25, 1969, he had to withdraw in favour of General Mohammad Yahya Khan who reimposed Martial Law and dissolved National and Provincial Assemblies. 23 He declared that general elections would be held in December 1970. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman decided to contest the elections on the basis of his six point formula.

Pakistan's first general election under universal adult suffrage were held on the 7th December, 1970. Voters went to polls to elect their representatives to the National Assembly which was to provide a constitutional basis for a ultimate return to civilian rule. The Awami League won 167 of the 169 seats in East Bengal and thus got an absolute majority in the House of 313. Bhutto's People's Party secured 88 out of the 144 seats in West Pakistan. 24

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman insisted that the future constitution of Pakistan should be based on his six - point formula.

23. Ibid.
The West Pakistani politicians led by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto found it impossible to come to terms with Mujibur Rahman. Yahya Khan who had once declared Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to be the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, acted contrary to his assurances in the interest of military junta and Pakistan bureaucracy. He postponed the session of National Assembly on the plea that there were serious differences between Z.A. Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The postponement of the National Assembly accelerated the exasperation of the Bengalis and they felt that they were betrayed of their legitimate democratic rights. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave a call for non-cooperation and civil disobedience in order to paralyse the government in East Pakistan. The people participated in the movement and the army resorted to indiscriminate firing — killing more than 350 persons and injuring about 1,000 persons. 25

When Yahya Khan announced that the Assembly would meet on March 25, 1971, Mujibur Rahman put forward four conditions for participating in its deliberations. He demanded, first the immediate withdrawal of the Martial Law, secondly, the immediate withdrawal of all military personnel to their barracks, thirdly an enquiry into the loss of life, and eventually immediate transfer of the power to the elected representatives of the

25. *Bangladesh Documents*, n.22, p. 3.
people before the National Assembly was summoned on the 25th March, 1971. 26

President Yahya Khan and Z.A. Bhutto had discussions with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dacca in order to overcome the crisis and to find out an acceptable solution to the problem. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not shun his demand of regional autonomy for East Bengal. Meanwhile, the army had already received orders from the President to crush liberation movement in East Bengal. Hence the army let loose a reign of terror and repression when the talks were on in Dacca. They shot down 30 demonstrators in Joydarpur on the 19th March 1971, while the talks were on between Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman. It appeared that Yahya Khan had agreed to the demand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and there was a hope of the confrontation between the two wings of Pakistan coming to an end. But the talks failed. President Yahya Khan and Z.A. Bhutto left Dacca and the army received the orders to crack down the liberation struggle of Bengali guerrillas.

Since the fateful night of 25th March 1971, the army of Pakistan unleashed the reign of terror and oppression. Men, women and children were killed indiscriminately by the Pakistan army on the same night. The facts were revealed by the foreign citizens who could escape from the atrocities of Pakistan army.

that about 10,000 civilians had been killed in Dacca alone.  

The whole of East Pakistan was under the grip of Pakistan army, who committed untold atrocities and genocide in the human history till Bangladesh got liberated from their yoke fully on the 16th December 1971. The leading news papers from all parts of the world carried the news of unprecedented genocide committed by Pakistan army. Three million people were killed during the liberation war of Bangladesh.  

Dr. G. Davis of Australia who happened to be in Bangladesh for about six weeks, deplored the inhuman atrocities committed by Pakistani soldiers. He said: "An entire generation of women in Bangladesh, raped by the West Pakistani soldiers now face a life time infertility and chronic diseases".  

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already given the call for freedom struggle and thus the war of liberation between the Mukti fouj (the liberation army of Bangladesh) and Pakistan army began. The fight continued between the two wings of Pakistan. India had been watching the situation and did not interfere because she considered it to be an internal affair.


(400,000 women were known to have been raped during the nine month war, 200,000 women fell pregnant to the West Pakistani solders).
of Pakistan. The struggle between the two wings of Pakistan resulted in exodus of hundreds of refugees to India. India had to face the burden of feeding refugees whose number went to the extent of 10 million.

Indian economy had to undergo great strains and the refugees problem compelled India to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan as its unity, integrity and sovereignty were threatened. India requested Pakistan to take back its refugees. India also made known to the world the burden of refugees and appealed for the economic aid. Pakistan blamed that India was obstructing the return of refugees back to East Pakistan. In fact, such blames were baseless. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for refugees refuted the Pakistani allegations after having visited the refugees camps. He told a news conference in New Delhi that:

"There was absolutely no evidence that host governments, in this case or any other, had any interest in obstructing the refugees if they wanted to go back. The interest of the governments was in alleviating congestion by every available means".30

Swaran Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister while speaking in the General Assembly on 27th September 1971 gave a clear

account of the refugee problem to the international community.

He said:

"The first and foremost action which this Assembly and all other international organs within or without the United Nations system can take is to impress on the military regime of Islamabad the fact that force will not succeed and that, therefore, a settlement between the military regime and the already elected leaders is essential. We consider it wholly shortsighted to wait until worse crises have arisen. Bilaterally, all governments can do utmost to ensure by whatever means are available to them, that the military regime stops its repressions, enters into negotiations with the elected leaders to achieve a political settlement with their consent, and sends the army back to the barracks. Only by these measures will the flow of refugees to stop and the refugees already in India be able to return home." 31

Pakistan authorities did nothing to control this. The great powers like U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. could realise the growing impending danger in the subcontinent. U.S.A., an ally of Pakistan did not play a major role in solving the crisis. Secretary of State, Rogers made a statement in the General Assembly on 4th October 1971 which was more favourable to Pakistan than to India. He remarked:

"In South Asia, renewed and more widespread violence is an ever present possibility. The events in East Pakistan are internal events with which the Governments and people of Pakistan must deal. But then consequences -

the flight of refugees into India, the danger of famine, the threat to peace in South Asia are of grave concern to all nations."32

India's concern about the explosive situation in the subcontinent had least effect on international community as they took the neutral posture on the pretext that it was the internal problem of Pakistan. Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi and her cabinet colleagues took an extensive tour to the world capitals in order to explain India's position. India appealed to the Pakistani authorities to create favourable conditions so that the refugees would feel safe to go back their homes. All these appeals did not have any impact. The Pakistani leaders threatened a war, in case India did not stop interfering in East Pakistan. Marshall Cheng, visited Pakistan in July 1971. When asked about China's help to Pakistan in the event of a war with India, he said: "You can rest assured that the 700 million Chinese people would be behind Pakistan".33

India's integrity, sovereignty and unity faced danger from the exodus of refugees which did not cease nor was there any possibility of political settlement between the two wings of Pakistan.

Soon after Mujib's arrest, representatives of the Awami League party had formed a provisional government of Bangladesh on March 28, 1971 and found the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, on April 17, 1971, with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as President, Syed Nazrul Islam as acting President and Tajuddin Ahmed as Prime Minister.  

Since this provisional government of Bangladesh had been formed by the duly elected representatives of Awami League and there was also a constant threat of war from Pakistan, the members of Indian Parliament were compelled to request the government of India to extend the recognition to Bangladesh and to face any eventualities. The Government, however, felt that the recognition of Bangladesh in the prevailing emotional climate could provoke Pakistan to declare a war on India. President Yahya Khan had warned that if India would help the Bengali guerrilla base in East Pakistan, his government would treat that as an attack on Pakistan.  

Since India had close cultural and historical links with East Bengal, it was practically impossible for India to ignore the grave situation in East Pakistan either in its own interest or in the interest of peace in the subcontinent. Thus the situation in East Bengal posed a threat to India's stability and unity.

34. J.P. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangladesh, (New Delhi), 1974, p. 6.
In such a war-like situation, India entered into a Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union on 9th August 1971 which envisaged immediate consultations to counter any threat to the security of either country and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace. The treaty was signed for over a period of 20 years and could be extended further if either of the parties showed their willingness.

It was for the first time that India had entered into such a treaty with a major military power. It was a timely warning to Gen. Yahya Khan’s threat to unleash “total war” against India as the article IX of treaty envisaged:

"Each High Contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third country that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries".35

Signing of treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation had been bitterly criticised by the Western countries, particularly, the United States on the ground that India had deviated from her foreign policy of non-alignment and it had aligned with a military bloc. Indian leaders on several

occasions unequivocally stated that India's policy had remained unchanged. Yet, Pakistan accelerated its propaganda machinery to impress upon the world opinion that India's foreign policy has changed.

Even Senator Edward Kennedy appreciated the treaty during his visit to India and Bangladesh in August 1971 as it is revealed from his following address to the crowded conference in New Delhi, he felt that the recent Indo-Soviet Treaty should help to strengthen the considerable restraint exercised by India in this region. 36

President Yahya Khan failed to find a solution to the problem of the eastern wing. Mukti Bahini supported by the Indian army were on the offence. The guerrilla warfare was intensified. Yahya Khan declared that: "In ten days I might not be here in Rawalpindi, I will be off fighting a war". 37

The administrative setup had gone completely out of Yahya's control, India's insistence for the transfer of power to the duly elected representatives of Bangladesh and also optimism with regard to military help from U.S.A. and China in case of a war with India, created feeling of both over confidence and desperation in the mind of Yahya Khan, who

ultimately declared war on India on the 3rd December, 1971.  

The Pakistani army, air force and navy went into operation and the Pakistani air force launched a pre-mediated, pre-emptive air strike at 5.45 P.M. on the 3rd December, 1971 on a number of India airfields - Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttarai, Jodhpur, Ambarla and Agra. Simultaneously, it also launched ground attacks at a number of places in the western sector.

The Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister returned to Delhi from their respective tours on hearing of Pakistani attack. An emergency meeting of the cabinet was held. President V.V. Giri, proclaimed a state of emergency at 11.50 P.M. on the 3rd December 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made the following statement in the Lok Sabha:

"This morning, according to the news, the government of West Pakistan have declared war upon us. Last evening the Pakistan Air Force violated our air space and attacked a large number of our airfields. Simultaneously their ground forces shelled our positions along the western borders. Their propaganda media has made a totally baseless allegations that India had launched an attack and assault.

The news reached me just as I was leaving Calcutta. Immediately on my returned I took counsel with my colleagues and with the leaders

39. Ibid.
of the opposition parties. We were all of one mind, united in our resolve that the nations' freedom should be defended and unanimous that the aggressor should be beaten back. I am sure the same sense of solidarity will mark our work in the difficult days ahead. A state of emergency has proclaimed.

I lay on the table a copy of notification No. G.S.R. 1789 published in the Gazette of India dated the 3rd December 1971 under sub-clause (5) of Clause (2) of Article 352 of the Constitution, publishing the proclamation of emergency issued by the President on the 3rd December 1971, under clause (1) of the said article."

Thus a war between India and Pakistan broke out. There had been demands for the recognition of Bangladesh from all sections of the people in the country, and so India accorded recognition to Bangladesh on the 6th December, 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made the following statement in the Lok Sabha:

"I am glad to inform the House that in the light of the existing situation and in response to the repeated requests of the government of Bangladesh, the Government of India have after the most careful consideration, decided to grant recognition to the GANA PRAJA TANTRI BANGLADESH.

It is our hope that with the passage of time more nations will grant recognition and that this GANA PRAJA TANTRI BANGLADESH will soon form part of the family of nations."41


Prime Minister also placed the copies of communication received from the Government of Bangladesh in the House, wherein the basic policy of Bangladesh were proclaimed to be based on democracy, socialism, secularism and the establishment of an egalitarian society.

All the members including the opposition congratulated the Prime Minister for having granted recognition to Bangladesh. Dillon the then Speaker in the conclusion spoke "on behalf of those persons who do not belong to any party who are non-controversial and who belong to both the Treasury Benches and opposition on behalf of the whole House, I congratulate the Prime Minister."

The war continued and Indian troops met with success in both the wings of Pakistan with the active assistance of Mukti Bahini and the local people. The Pakistani forces were isolated completely in Bangladesh. Neither any foreign intervention nor reinforcement could come to their rescue. Such a state of helplessness compelled Lt. General A.A.K. Niazi to surrender to the joint command of Indian army and Mukti fouz on the 16th December 1971 in Dacca. India declared unilateral cease fire which Pakistan accepted.

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a historic statement in the Lok Sabha on the same day. She said:

"Mr. Speaker, Sir, I have an announcement to make, which I think the House has been waiting for, for sometime. The West Pakistan forces have unconditionally surrendered in Bangladesh. The instrument of surrender was signed in Dacca at 16.31 hours I.S.T. today by Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi on behalf of the Pakistan eastern command. Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Arora, GOC-in-C of the Indian and Bangladesh forces in the eastern theatre accepted the surrender. Dacca is now the free capital of a free country". 44

All the members of the House not only congratulated the Prime Minister but also shouted "Indira Gandhi Zindabad". Mr. Samar Guha said, "The name of Prime Minister will go down in the history as the golden sword of liberation of Bangladesh". 45

Bangladesh's struggle for liberation thus was a triumph of righteousness. The dream of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to see his Sonar Bangla (Golden Bangladesh) on the world map had been realised.

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45. Ibid, Col. 147.
It was wonderful to find America but it would have been more wonderful to miss it.

Mark Twain
CHAPTER II

BANGLADESH IMPACT ON INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Immediately after India's independence, there was some misunderstanding in the US about India's policy of non-alignment. Slowly however, this attitude changed and Indo-American relations were further strengthened on the basis of common understanding of each other's problems. The Americans had supported India's struggle for freedom and the Indian leaders had shown appreciation and regard for the democratic setup and the process of law in the US. Recently, however, again there has been a drift and for more than a decade Indo-American relations have remained far from satisfactory.

The sharp difference of opinion between India and U.S.A. was highlighted during the recent liberation struggle of Bangladesh, while India stood firmly behind the Bangladesh cause, America being an ally of Pakistan supported the latter. America's direct support, both materially and morally to Pakistan during 1971 war further escalated the tension in the sub-continent. At the same time it led to the further deterioration in Indo-American relations.
During the last few months preceding the actual crisis, India had been drawing the attention of the U.S. Government towards the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army in Bangladesh and also the enormous pressure from refugees which was being felt in India. She had also been emphasizing upon the US the need to use its good offices in order to persuade Pakistan authorities for ceasing the military repression, and negotiate a political solution with the duly elected representatives of Bangladesh. Nixon administration was also aware of the concentration of the Pakistani troops all along Indian border and threat to peace in the subcontinent.

The crisis in the sub-continent occupied the attention of both the congress and the public alike in America. Church, while speaking in the Senate about America's attitude towards Bangladesh war once remarked: "We say in Vietnam that we are fighting for self determination so that the people there can have the opportunity to choose their own government. Yet in Pakistan we continue to give support to an authoritarian clique that conducts business by martial law and forcibly deprives its own citizens of the right of self determination even after a free and fair election". 1

Over the public criticism, President Nixon had shown sympathy in the initial stages of the crisis and had requested

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the Congress for an additional sum of money to meet the growing demands of influx of refugees in India. He had justified his demand on the humanitarian grounds and taking the plea of possible repercussion on the sub-continent. He said in the Congress:

"I therefore urge, that in addition to completing action on the House initiative the Congress authorise and appropriate an additional sum of $150 million for the relief and rehabilitations of refugees from East Pakistan and for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan under the foreign Assistance Act. Together with food supplied under public law 480, these funds will enable us to do our share in mitigating the effects of this human crises and thus help avert the deeper tragedies that all too easily could follow."

So, it could be safely concluded that President Nixon had complete knowledge of the situation in the sub-continent when he decided to favour Pakistan on this occasion.

During her visit to the United States in November 1971, Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi highlighted the basic understanding of each other when in her reply to President Nixon's welcome speech she said:

"We share a commonity of ideals and there is no real conflict of interest between us. Our people value your friendship. They have great admiration for the

spirit of quest of the American people for their desire to reach beyond the immediate. I bring the greetings of India to you and to the warm hearted people of the United States. And, I fully and sincerely reciprocate the desire which you expressed that the sun may always shine on our friendship and that we may always work for those ideals which our people and country have cherished through these years.3

Mrs. Gandhi came back with the impression that Nixon sincerely believed in solving the crisis in South Asia. She, however, firmly rejected any move to withdraw Indian troops from the Pakistan border on the plea of India's security.4

Suddenly, on 1st December 1971, American Government suspended arms supplies to India with immediate effect and also cancelled other commitments made earlier. This question was raised by Piloo Mody in the Lok Sabha and he sought clarification from the Foreign Minister. Mr. Swaran Singh confirmed:

"Government have been informed by the U.S.A. government that in view of what they regard as "the deteriorating situation in South Asia and continued military engagements between Indian and Pakistani armed forces", they have as of December 1, 1971 decided: (1) to suspend the issuance of all further ammunitions list licences for India (ii) not to issue any new licences or new existing ones and (iii) to cancel several licences, the total value of which according to their estimate is approximately $2 million".5

4. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), November 6, 1971.
These steps of United States were strongly resented by the Indians and condemned by all the sections. This attitudes of America caused further deterioration in Indo-American relations.

When Pakistan declared war on the 3rd December 1971, President Nixon expressed his approval of Pakistani efforts to solve the Bangladesh crisis by peaceful means and blamed India for frustrating all efforts to settle the problem. Clandestinely, the US had supplied substantial quantities of arms on urgent Pakistani request by C-141 Cargo plane which was found unloading arms in Karachi at 10.30 P.M. on November 29, three days, before the actual war broke out between India and Pakistan.

India had lodged a strong protest against the delivery of military embargo to Pakistan with the American attache in New Delhi. The Government also raised this issue with the then Ambassador of America to India Mr. Kenneth B. Keating, who sent the classified telegram to State Department in U.S.A. The telegram runs as follows: "I consider General Manekshaw one of the most honest and straight forward Indians I have ever met. I have no doubt that Manekshaw honestly believes what he reported.

If true, this information is indirect violation of publicly announced policy.  

This, however, did not influence the policy makers in Washington and later on, America admitted the landing of the planes but denied having unloaded the arms.

The American Government claimed that they had made full efforts to bring about a political settlement and accused India as "unreasonable and recalcitrant nation" and absolved Pakistan of the responsibility for the war.

The State Department in Washington held India as "an aggressor" and the economic aid programme for India was put under review. The United States called for an urgent U.N. Security Council meeting in an effort to quell the India-Pakistani hostilities.

It further cut off $87.6 million in development loans to India and the State Department spokesman defending the action said: "The United States is not making a short term contribution to the Indian economy to make it easier for the Indian Government to maintain its military efforts."

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The United States expressed the hope that the Security Council could take prompt action to bring about a cease fire between India and Pakistan. The Security Council did consider a resolution incorporating the views of the United States but without being able to put this into practice because of Russian veto.

India's permanent representative, Sen totally rejected the five-power draft-resolution of Security Council on the ground that it was contrary to the realities of the subcontinent. He pointed out:

"We think it is wrong, illogical, undesirable, disastrous even to have to come to a decision without taking into account the point of view of the Bangladesh representatives, the representatives of the main party involved in these tragic circumstances. However, it is not the first time that the Security Council or the United Nations has taken an unrealistic decision simply to show that it is up and alive and can act. We are not letting the Council down fair enough. We are all faithful members of the United Nations and we should uphold the dignity and prestige of all its organs. But let us not say that by adopting a purely unrealistic resolution we have done anything except console ourselves. That by itself would not be so bad, but if in the process we give a false hope to the world at large that, I think, will be a disaster". 12

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Mr. San also quoted in the Security Council Senator Church who had criticised America's bias towards Pakistan and justified India's action in Bangladesh.*

Ambassador Vinci, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the five power draft resolution, defended the Soviet Union's position in the Security Council. He said:

"We have been insisting, we insist and shall continue to insist that reality should be taken into consideration. We were guided by precisely that consideration in introducing our amendments to the five power draft resolution. We became firmly convinced, after examining that draft, that it was necessary to make it realistic, to give it a basis of reality. Without the Soviet amendments, the five power draft was truly unrealistic. Our amendments to that draft provided the close, inseparable and organic link between a cease fire and cessation hostilities on the Indian subcontinent and

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* Senator Church had remarked that: "I find it odd to understand why there is such a pro-Pakistani bias in American policies. India's position in the war which has now broken out is not only consistent with her professed ideals but it also the position which is most likely to prevail. By showing such favouritism towards West Pakistan we side with probable loser and we forfeit the good will of the freedom fighters in East Pakistan as well as the people of India.

"Unless one believes that West Pakistan represents the wave of the future on the subcontinent it is impossible to reconcile this government bias towards Yahya Khan's government with the role in regard to the interest of the United States". 13

the elimination of the main cause of the conflict in that region, which led to a very serious crisis in East Pakistan, whose consequences have acquired an international dimension and significance”. 14

American policy towards Indian subcontinent was bitterly criticised by the people and Senators alike in America. In fact, Mr. Edward Kennedy justified India’s role in the Bangladesh crises and held Nixon administration responsible for the deterioration of Indo-American relations. He pointed out in the Senate that:

"Perhaps in the mind of many Americans is that thought that India has created this crisis. But the fact, Mr. President, show that this war began not last week with renewed military border crossings, nor last month with the escalating crossfire of artillery between India and Pakistan, this war began on the bloody night of March 25 with the brutal suppression by Pakistan army of the free election it held in East Bengal. A review of the events since March 25 - a quick jostling of our memory - reminds us that the problem in South Asia is today and has been from the very beginning a political problem between the ruling military elite in West Pakistan and the Bengali opposition elected in the East Bengal”. 15.


George Bush, America's Ambassador to the United Nations, explaining the five power draft resolution of the Security Council said in the General Assembly:

"We have said before, and we repeat, that the beginning of the crisis goes back to the use of force by Pakistan in March of this year, but since the beginning of the crisis it should also be clear that India bears the major responsibility for broadening the crisis by spurning the efforts of the United Nations to become involved, even in a humanitarian way, in relation to the refugees, spurning the proposals such as the Secretary-General's offer of good offices, which could have helped in defusing the crisis, spurning proposals that could have began the process of dialogue leading towards a political accommodation." 16

Mrs. Gandhi expressed strong resentment over the United States hypocritical attitude towards the realities of situation in the subcontinent and refuted the charges of United States that the crisis had been precipitated by India. Nixon failed to act prudently at a time when India was in need of America's assistance. This sort of attitude brought further deterioration in Indo-American relations.

The five power draft resolution of Security Council for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops was favour

by the General Assembly, by 104 votes in favour, and 11
opposed with 10 abstentions. 17

This mandate of the General Assembly is not binding. The United States had firmly supported the resolution, with
the Soviet Union just as firmly opposing it. The position
of the United States in affirming that "India bears the
major responsibility for the broader hostilities" was deeply
resented, in India while the position of the Soviet Union
was warmly appreciated and admired. 18

The series of Washington Special Action Group meetings
(WSAG) were held secretly in White House during Indo-Pak war
as to assess the war situation and to provide military and
moral support to Pakistan. The most of WSAG meeting were
chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger. 19

In a WSAG meeting on the December 3, 1971 Dr. Henry
Kissinger said: "I am getting hell every half hour from the
President that we are not being tough enough on India. He

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17. Security Council Official Records. Twenty-sixth year,
1611th meeting, December 12, 1971, para. 16, p. 2.


19. See the appendixes XXIV-XXVII for WSAG Secret meetings
which reveal America's "tilt" towards Pakistan and
Nixon's assistance during the Indo-Pak war.
has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise". 20

The American leaders hurt Indians more and more by their open support to Pakistan. Even the traditional friends of America in India started having a second thought about their views on Indo-American relations.

On the contrary the Russians stood with them throughout this crisis. Lenin Breshnev, while speaking at the sixth Congress of the Polish communist party at Warsaw on the 7th December 1971 called for a peaceful settlement of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The Soviet Union firmly spoke in favour of ceasing the blood shed and for a peaceful settlement of the existing problems with respect to just rights of the nations without any intervention of external forces.

Mr. Breshnev, said: "The war was a result of the 'bloody' suppression of the basic rights and clearly expressed will of the population of East Pakistan and the tragedy of millions of refugees". 21


Both America and China supported Pakistan in war and in fact, they were co-belligerents. America supplied arms to Pakistan through third country. The secret message was flashed to L. Dean Brown, the American Ambassador in Jordan to authorize King Hussein to send several U.S. supplied F-104 fighter planes to Pakistan even though it was contrary to the legalities of U.S. Government.  

The Indian troops and the Mukti Bahini were successful in driving away Pakistani forces in Bangladesh and town after town fell to the victorious armies. Both America and China felt irritated and once again asked India to impose immediate cease fire on the 10th December 1971. Secretly, the Turkish pilots were instructed by the Nixon administration to fly American jets to Pakistan.

The Indo-Pakistani war was reviewed almost every day by the WSGG team in White House and simultaneously, George Bush pleaded again and again in favour of Pakistan in the Security Council. During the course of debate in the Security Council, George Bush accepted the realities in the sub-continents, but contradicted India’s action in Bangladesh. He remarked in the Security Council:

22. The Anderson papers, n. 20, p. 32.  
23. T.V. Kunhi Krishna, n.6, p. 110.
"As I said before, the United States has never supported this action in any way. We have always recognized that the events of 25th March had a very important impact on India and we have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India broadened the danger of communal strife. We fully appreciated both the social and the economic strain the influx of refugees imposed on India. The fact that use of forces in East Pakistan in March can be characterized as a tragic mistake does not, however, justify the action of India in interfering militarily and placing in jeopardy the territorial integrity and political independence of its neighbour Pakistan". 24

America's role during Indo-Pak war was inconsistent, inadequate and contrary to the realities of sub-continent. The confabulation between President Nixon and NSAGE ultimately favoured 'tilt' towards Pakistan. Assurance of all support to Pakistan in war were the reasons that caused rupture in the present Indo-U.S. relations.

The Indians further provoked by Nixon administration's decision to send the U.S. 7th fleet into Indian Ocean at a time when India was at the verge of victory and Pakistan troops were preparing to surrender in Bangladesh. This action of the United States was strongly condemned and resented by all the members of the parliament including the rightists. Jyotirmoy Bose, the leader of the CPI said, in the Lok Sabha:

"Sir, this a mischievous and designing move adopted by President Nixon of U.S.A. in that he has ordered the nuclear powered air-craft carrier Enterprise to sail to the strait of Malacca off Singapore to wait final instructions to proceed to Bay of Bengal under the pretext of rescuing of U.S. citizens in Dacca. It is not only the nuclear powered air-craft carrier enterprise but it also includes a task force of several amphibious ships and destroyers which actually left Saigon waters on Friday and which are heading full stream towards its destination. Enterprise is a 99000-tonnes vessel excluding its escorts and is the largest air-craft in U.S.A. and the only nuclear powered one. She carries 100 fighter-bombers, reconnaissance air-craft fighters and helicopters. It is a part of the U.S.A. 7th fleet. It is a very serious matter and positive threat to India's security."25

This provocative naval deployment was intended (1) to compel India divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force (2) to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan (3) possibly to divert the Indian air-craft carrier Vikrant from its military mission and (4) to force India to keep planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.26

The Indian Government expressed its concern over the U.S. decision to send air-crafts carrier in the Indian Ocean.

Britain, Soviet Union and France also equally shared India's feelings.

This attitude of America further intensified the indignation of Indians and they had no other alternative than to seek assistance from Soviet Union, who on the other hand was equally concerned and had assured India to meet all the eventualities created by the United States. 27

The task force stayed in the Bay of Bengal from December 12 to 20 and the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, informed the opposition members in Parliament on the 16th December 71, that it was 1,500 miles from Chittagong. The spokesmen in Washington, while accepted the presence of 'Task-force' in the Indian Ocean pleaded that it had entered to evacuate forty seven Americans. 28

It was obvious that America had a intention to intimidate the Indian army and thereby prevent the liberation of Bangladesh. Vice-Admiral John Mo Cain, Commander of the 7th fleet had the instruction of actual involvement. But these intentions were frustrated by the presence of Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. 29

27. As per the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between India and Soviet Union (signed on the 9th of August 1971), both immediately should consult each other in case of either of the countries sovereignty is threatened as to remove such threat in accordance with article IX of the Treaty.


Thus, America's bias and open support to Pakistan damage its prestige as a champion of liberty and democracy in the South Asia.

The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh announced in the Security Council, that India had ordered her armed forces in the Western Sector to cease fire from the 17th December 1971 at about 2000 hrs and quoted the Prime Minister's statement showing that India had no territorial ambitions. Even after the cease fire, the 7th fleet was present in the Indian Ocean for sometime.

Jyotirmoy Basu again drew the attention of the Government in the Lok Sabha. He said:

"Navy ships would stay in the Bay of Bengal under the pretext of arranging security for American citizen in Pakistan. With object of complicating the issue further, the United States Government Pentagon spokesman has stated that it too easily to draw any conclusion from the unilateral cease fire ordered by India and has added that U.S. Naval task force is continuing its course towards East Pakistan even after the Pakistani surrender to Indian forces".31

The U.S. did not give up the hostile attitude towards India even after the cease fire. Both China and America had the intention of waging war against India in order to appease Pakistan. Their intentions of waging war on India did not materialize because Russia foiled their belligerency and ultimately Bangladesh was liberated. The damage it caused to Indo-American relations was undoubtedly to out last this crisis.
Your enemy's enemy is your friend.

Mao-Tse Tung
CHAPTER III

BANGLADESH : ITS FRIENDS AND FOES

Ever since the birth of Bangladesh, many nations have come forward to extend their hand of friendship to her either for the economic reasons or for the strategic manoeuvre. Bangladesh is now one of the members of the United Nations as a sovereign nation and is recognized by most of the countries in the world.

Among the friends India and USSR who had supported the liberation struggle, always believe in stable, viable and strong Bangladesh. At the same time there are many foes who have brought Bangladesh into the whirl-pool of politics in the present era. From the very beginning China and U.S.A. were opposed to its independence. They considered the struggle for Bangladesh as an internal affair of Pakistan and were opposed to any outside assistance. China repeatedly pledged its "firm support" to Pakistani peoples" in their struggle against "foreign aggression" and Chinese delegates bitterly attacked Indo-Soviet Treaty in the United Nations.¹

¹ Financial Express, (Bombay), November 8, 1971.
Mr. Malik, Soviet Ambassador to U.N., while speaking in the Security Council pointed out that China was indifferent to East Pakistan during her freedom struggle. He said:

"The whole world has been horrified by the tragedy and sufferings in East Pakistan, the death of hundreds of thousand of people and the unprecedented flight from their own country to 10 million people. All the members of the Security Council, except one, have commented on this tragedy. Even the current President of Pakistan, speaking at Security Council (1611th meeting) acknowledged that a mistake had been made in East Pakistan, and afterwards he added that it had been a tragic mistake only one permanent member of the Security Council China and its leaders have remained blind and deaf to this tragedy and the suffering of millions of people. They have followed the course of giving unreserved support to tyranny, terror and violence in East Pakistan. Neither condemnation of those who have done this nor pity for the victims has been expressed by Peking or by the representative of China in the Security Council ". 2

In the initial stages at least, China thus became one of the most staunch critics as its leaders openly supported Pakistan during the crisis and objected to the emergence of sovereign and independent Bangladesh in the subcontinent. Acting Foreign Minister of China, Chi Peng - Fei, while visiting Pakistan in November 1971, pledged China's support in the

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event of "war with India" and he further emphasized that: "our Pakistan friends may rest assure that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government and people will as always resolutely support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence." He was further of the opinion that it was an internal question of Pakistan and interference by another country would be dealt with strongly.

For Pakistan, Chinese friendship and support became necessary during Bangladesh war in its dealing with India. On the other hand, China wanted to please Pakistan by not justifying Bangladesh crisis as she was interested to find out a short cut to middle east, Arabian Sea, African countries and Indian Ocean for its trade and strategic importance. Thereby, China collaborated with Pakistan to delay Bangladesh independence.

Similar was the case with United States of America, a self styled champion of liberty, freedom, and democracy, was opposed to the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and continued to supply arms assistance to Pakistan to suppress the genuine democratic rights of people. Mr. Rogers, then Secretary of

State told in a luncheon meeting in Washington that America
was doing everything it could to prevent a war, "obviously
if war breaks out, we will do everything we can to stay out,
we have no intention of getting into any other war".4

During the war between India and Pakistan in December
1971, U.S. 7th fleet was sent into Indian Ocean to restrain
the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. In fact, the decision
to send the task force was taken by President Nixon himself
on December 9, 1971 in a secret meeting of Washington Special
Action Group (WSAG) at the basement of White House and the
7th fleet remained in the Bay of Bengal from 12th to 20th
December, 1971.5

Senator Harris, while speaking in the Senate criticised
American foreign policy in South Asia and remarked that:

"For months both the friends and critics of
this administration have pointed out that
the new crisis centre of danger to world
peace was now in South Asia. They warned
that America's whole political future in
Asia now hangs in the balance for by our
totally indefencwible policy we have
managed to offend both parties to the
conflict. We offended Pakistan by not
doing enough to and in its hours of need

5. Vinod Gupta, Anderson papers, A study of Nixon's Black Mail
 of India, (New Delhi), 1972, p. 112.
for we could not without out ranging our own people. Yet we also insulted India by our total disregard for its appeals that we at least halt military shipments to Pakistani army slaughtering innocent victims in East Pakistan. 6

Most of the Americans were sensitive to Bangladesh crisis and they made repeated appeals to the Nixon administration to accord recognition to Bangladesh and put an end to the tragic problem. Their appeals fell to the deaf ears of Nixon administration. Helstoski, in the House of Representative said:

"I am convinced that the time and a sense of belated concern for the masses in East Pakistan will require eventual recognition of Bangladesh. Why not initiate such a policy now before the people of that new nation are totally alienated from the United States as well as from their former government in Islamabad? We must recover our sense of justice and morality in the field of foreign affairs. A start can be made by undertaking this long over due revision of our policy towards the peoples of South Asia."

The American government was insensitive to the public criticism over Bangladesh crisis and continued to act in the best interest of Pakistan. This annoyed both India and


Bangladesh. India's involvement in the crisis, invariable criticism for America's arms supply to Pakistan and friendly relations with the Soviet Union annoyed America and the relations between the two countries drifted from bad to worse.

On the other hand India and Russia were all along with Bangladesh during its liberation struggle. The USSR was quick enough to oppose military atrocities committed by Pakistan in East Bengal. Podgornay's letter of 2nd April, 1971 to President Yahya Khan was first to denounce Pakistan's action in Bangladesh and its tone and content left no doubt of Soviet support to Bangladesh. 8 Yahya Khan had sent Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister and at one time Ambassador in Moscow to discuss the situation and justify the military action in East Bengal, but the mission failed as Moscow asserted its firm support to the independence struggle of Bangladesh. 9

To meet the challenge of the U.S. 7th fleet, Russia despatched her naval ships in the Indian Ocean with the aim to deter U.S. bellicosity and to help in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. 10 The Soviet Peace Committee appealed for


cessation of "reprisals" against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other popular leaders of East Pakistan and the USSR Association for the UN condemned the ruthless suppression of the principle of the universal declaration on Human Rights in Bangladesh. Further, protest meetings were held in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Riga and other cities against Pakistan's repression in East Bengal. 11

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited Soviet Union from 1-4 March 1972 and had talks with President Podgorny, Prime Minister, Kosygin and the Party President Brezhnev and signed two agreements on Soviet economic aid to Bangladesh. The Soviet Union agreed to provide 38,000,000 roubles loan to Bangladesh for the construction of a thermal power station, broadcasting station and an electrical equipment plant. The second agreement of the Soviet Union undertook to provide three 1,000 ton merchant ships, 10 trawlers, 50 locomotives, a railway workshop, 30,000 tons of rice and 5,000 tons of edible oil and to train personnel for industry and agriculture. 12

A joint declaration signed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Prime Minister, Kosygin on 3rd of March 1971 said that:

"an early political settlement, which took into account the


legitimate interests of the peoples of the subcontinent, would considerably facilitate the advancement of the countries of the area along the path of economic and social progress", and continued: "The Soviet Union and Bangladesh state that a genuine political settlement in the subcontinent can only be achieved through negotiation between the states directly concerned, without outside interference and having regard to the actual situation, on the basis of legitimate rights and interest of its peoples. They are convinced that the achievements of a genuine political settlement will contribute to the normalization of the situation in the subcontinent and will be an important contribution to ensuring international peace and security".  

Moscow exercised considerable influence in Bangladesh even before its independence with a hope that it would emerge as a new nation in the sub-continent under its auspices. It was within keeping with this line of thinking that the Soviet leaders condemned the extreme measures adopted by Pakistan in Bangladesh and eventually favoured autonomy for it.

The friendship between India and Bangladesh is deep rooted in their culture and tradition. India was, therefore,
bound even culturally to assist Bangladesh in her liberation and Mrs. Gandhi visited Bangladesh on March 17-19, 1972 and signed a joint declaration and a treaty of friendship, cooperation and peace between India and Bangladesh.*

Thus India had helped Bangladesh to win its freedom, provided necessary help to stand on its own feet and sent millions of tons of rice and wheat to feed its teeming millions of people. Yet, some of its leaders particularly Maulana Bhashani charged India as a conspirator, and alleged that the victorious Indian army had destroyed bridges, factories and the communication system. He further alleged that important machinery and plants on a large scale were carried away by the Indian army and Indian Marwaris have infiltrated in Bangladesh. 14

* See Appendix XXIX for the detail information of Indo-Bangladesh Treaty.

On the contrary, Prof. Muzaffar Ahmed, Leader of Pro-Moscow, National Awami Party believed in friendship with India. He said:

"For us, here in Bangladesh, to believe in friendship with India is not merely an emotional necessity; in fact, our very existence and all other progressive policies depend on it. In plain words, without India - Bangladesh friendship, none of the four principles of our state policy can have a leg to stand upon. Especially for parties like mine, it is a question of life and death, without India's friendship, you see, my politics, would not just work here". 15

The former enemies of Bangladesh, China and U.S.A. now have become its friends as they have extended their recognition and accepted the sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh in the subcontinent.

Dr. Kissinger visited Dacca from 30 - 31st October, 1974 for talks with the then Bangladesh Prime Minister Late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the then Foreign Minister

Dr. Kamal Hossain. Dr. Kissinger told a press conference that the United States would assist Bangladesh to meet her food crisis and development needs to solve the problems of flood control, and would do everything possible to help her achieve long term economic goals. The U.S. AID mission in Dacca announced on the same day a grant of 100,000 tons of food, to be delivered before the end of the year. Both Bangladesh and America have already established diplomatic relations.

China who vetoed Bangladesh's application for admission in the UN, favoured a unanimous resolution to be adopted without vote, by the Security Council on Dacca's entry into the world organization on 10th June 1974 and the Chinese representatives expressed his government's desire to develop neighbouring relations

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with the countries of the subcontinent. They have now established the diplomatic relations as well.

In the recent past, the political situation in Bangladesh has changed. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of secular democratic Republic of Bangladesh, who fought for freedom of Bangladesh from Pakistani oppression was shot dead along with his entire family in the coup led by Major Dhalim on the 15th August, 1975.

Khondekar Mushtaque Ahmed, Minister for Trade and Commerce in Mujib's cabinet, was sworn in as a President of Bangladesh on the same day.

The World Peace Council in Helsinki held the CIA responsible for the coup in Bangladesh and its contention was that this represented a bid to eliminate yet another government opposed to "U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression."

17. J.R. Jain, n.11, p. 211.

18. The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), March 1, 1976.


20. Ibid.
America refuted these charges and established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. President Ford spoke after new Bangladesh Ambassador M.R. Siddiqi presented his credentials in Washington that: "The people of his country had "great sympathy" for the people of Bangladesh because of the trials that Bangladesh suffered" in the first years of independence". 22

The Soviet Communist Party Organ Pravda warned at the time of coup that unbridled activities of right and left extremists could gravely menace the democratic gains of Bangladesh. The Budapest daily, Magyar Nemzet had pointed out in connection with the coup that "the U.S. may be looking for some compensation in Asia after its failure in Indo-China... with China not minding in the least continued U.S. presence in Asia." 23

India also expressed its concern at the brutal killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman more so because she was afraid of political instability in Bangladesh which certainly affects India's political and economic stability.

The army which led the coup in August 1975 did not spare the close associates of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman including

22. Ibid; November 24, 1975.
23. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), August 18, 1975.
Tajuddin Ahmad, Nazrul Islam, A.K.M. Kamaruzzaman and Mansoor Ali who were reported to have been assassinated on the 3rd of November 1975.  

Again there was some trouble and a new regime came into power from the 7th November 1975 with the swearing of Mr. Justice Abu Sadaat Mohammed Sayem as the President of Bangladesh. Khondaker Mohttaque Ahmad submitted his resignation after having learnt that his four former colleagues were assassinated in Dacca Jail. The President Sayem declared that his country would strengthen friendly relations with "our close neighbours", friendship with all and malice towards none will be the cardinal principle of our foreign policy" he further expressed the hope that relations between the people of Bangladesh and the Soviet Union would be maintained and further strengthened. He also extended the heartiest greetings and felicitations to Mr. Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorney Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the occasion of the fiftyeighth anniversary of the great October socialist Revolution.  

24. The Indian Nation, (Patna), November 6, 1975.  
26. Ibid.
With the change in the political situation in the subcontinent it appears America is getting involved in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. India cannot just shun the events in Bangladesh as they are bound to affect her. India's close association with Bangladesh, and its friendly ties with Soviet Union are the two immediate reasons for the present tension in Indo-American relations.
CONCLUSION

In the late 1971, the Indo-American relations received a big jolt due to the Bangladesh war and since then, neither country tries to cast off the misunderstanding precipitated by the crisis. It is high time for both India and United States to put an end to this estrangement begotten by the circumstances over which neither country had any control. Forgetfulness, magnanimity and accommodation should be the guiding principles in the conduct of the bilateral relations of the two countries in the interest of greater prosperity and strength of the two great democracies. The Bangladesh issue is now a thing of the past and it is no longer stands in the way of normalisation of Indo-American relations as the U.S.A. and Bangladesh have themselves established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

However, it has often been alleged that the recent coup in Bangladesh was master-minded by the CIA. India has to be vigilant in dealing with Bangladesh keeping these

1. The Budapest daily, Magyar Napolt commented that, "the US may be looking for some compensation in Asia after its failure in Indo-China.....with China not minding in the least continued US presence in Asia". Quoted in The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), November 24, 1975.
allegations in view. Also important is the question: Will America's recent policy towards the subcontinent and her strategic presence in the Indian Ocean affect the rapprochement between India and America? The answer is obviously 'no'. Dr. Kissinger admitted during his visit to India in October 1975 that the United States does not believe in the concept of balance of power in the subcontinent. He further categorically affirmed that the United States was not interested in promoting an arms-race in South Asia. "Our relations with the non-aligned countries", Dr. Kissinger affirmed:

"Are another pillar of our foreign policy. No accommodation among countries, however powerful, can be durable if negotiated over the heads of others or if an attempt is made to impose it on others. Our attitude toward the non-aligned will be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and shared endeavors and on the premise that all countries have a stake in a peaceful world. Condominium, hegemony, sphere of influence are historically obsolete and morally and politically untenable".2

Now there seem to be no major direct conflicts of interest between India and America, neither strategic, ideological, commercial nor territorial. Most of our serious differences have turned on third party relationship i.e.

2. Dr. Kissinger's address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, (New Delhi), October 28, 1974.
Veitnam, Pakistan, China, USSR etc.; these seem likely to lose intensity and force in the coming few years. America's withdrawal from Vietnam, reality of Bangladesh, hope for Indo-Pakistan accommodation, Sino-American rapprochement, Soviet-American detente are a few to name that would pave the way for positive and constructive rapprochement between India and America.

There have been regular meetings of the Indo-American joint commission and its sub-commissions and the recently concluded agreements are meant to promote cultural understanding and cooperation in the fields of commerce, technology, education etc., between the two countries. Such periodical exchanges enhance mutual understanding and strengthen friendly ties of the two countries.

The main irritants are confined to the arms supply to Pakistan and the American base in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which may at any time adversely affect the relations. However, India has accepted America's assurances that White House sincerely believes that Indo-Pakistan problems should be solved in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Simla agreement and that there should be normalization of relations between the countries of the subcontinent without the intervention of the outside powers. Dr. Kissinger acknowledged at the time of his last visit India's leadership
in South Asia and the world. He pointed out:

"The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asia and in world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. The United States recognizes both these realities. They are wholly compatible with the close friendships and special bonds that we have with all the nations of the region. As we wish South Asia well, we wish India well."

It is hoped Diego Garcia issue would be solved through multilateral negotiations as many littoral states are involved and this should not stand in the way of normalization of Indo-American relations.

Dr. Kissinger accepted that the values and aspirations of India are similar to those of the United States, the national purposes of both countries are similar and the disputes between the two fall in the category of 'family quarrels'. He further asserted:

"We have no conflict of interest, no basic animosity or disagreement that keeps us apart. And we face a world in crisis and transition that compels us to work together. We are both democracies, with all that implies for the kinds of decisions we are able to make. The

3. Ibid.
leaders of a democracy can only sustain policies which their electorate will support. If there are no general rules as to what such policies are likely to be, there are specific limitations as to what they can not be. It is clear that our relationship cannot be based in either country - on the dependence of one on the other. Nor can our relationship survive constant criticism of one by the other in all international forums. There must be a sense of common purpose in at least some endeavors. To Indian - American relations, equality and mutual respect are more than doctrines of international law. They are political necessities.4

The public opinion in both the countries about the similarities, and proximities in various spheres of the life should be given wide publicity for the promotion of harmonious relations between India and America.

Mr. Anthony Mayer, who proposed to make a film on Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi remarked:

"There is still surprising ignorance about India - her size, her cultural diversity, etc; It is impossible to understand current events in India unless one can understand the nature of the country."5

In order to play a vital role in international politics it is imperative for India to strengthen her ties with the

4. Ibid.
5. The States Man, (Calcutta), December 4, 1975.
United States on the basis of equality, mutual understanding and cooperation for which America has also expressed her desire. India and America are to work together to preserve liberty, freedom, democracy and peace in the world.
Party position in National Assembly 1970-71

Baluchistan
N.W.F.P.
Punjab
Sind

West Pakistan (candidates)
East Pakistan (candidates) 1

Pakistan total
-(candidates) 1
-(seats won) 1

* None *
## APPENDIX - II

Table 1. Regional distribution of Gross National Product - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre Plan</td>
<td>1352.4</td>
<td>297.6</td>
<td>1305.1</td>
<td>343.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>1414.0</td>
<td>275.7</td>
<td>1561.3</td>
<td>363.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>1753.3</td>
<td>301.5</td>
<td>1912.3</td>
<td>393.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>2131.1</td>
<td>330.7</td>
<td>2333.1</td>
<td>432.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
2. 1964-65: Third Five Year Plan, Government of Pakistan.

## APPENDIX - III

Table 2. Regional distribution of Industrial product - Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>156.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>233.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>173.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>335.6</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As on the Table 1.
APPENDIX - IV

Table 3. Regional distribution of manufacturing product - Pakistan (Annual average)

| Plan Period | East Pakistan | | West Pakistan | | Pakistan | | Disparity |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|              | Total (crores) | Per capita Rs. | Total (crores) | Per capita Rs. | Total (crores) | Per capita Rs. | Index |
| Pre-Plan     | 56.6          | 12.4          | 123.7         | 32.6          | 100.3         | 21.6          | 20.2  | 100.0 |
| First Plan   | 80.7          | 15.7          | 188.4         | 43.9          | 269.1         | 28.6          | 28.2  | 139.6 |
| Second Plan  | 124.9         | 21.5          | 251.1         | 51.1          | 376.7         | 35.3          | 30.3  | 150.0 |
| Third Plan   | -             | -             | -             | -             | -             | -             | -     | -     |

Source: Same as Table 1.
APPENDIX - V

Table 4. Regional distribution of large scale manufacturing product - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total (crores)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>138.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>163.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>229.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>183.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As in Table 1.
### APPENDIX - VII

Table 6. Regional distribution of plan developmental expenditure - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>373.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>818.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>678.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1592.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>1844.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>4212.6a</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>2941.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>2817.2a</td>
<td>107.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:— (i) For pre-plan period (1950-65) and first plan period (1955-60): Maqbul Haq, *The strategy of Economic planning - A case study of Pakistan.*


Note:— "a" includes Indus Basin Development Expenditure.
### APPENDIX - VIII

Table 7. Regional distribution of public sector developmental expenditure - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>D Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>188.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>410.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>394.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>926.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>1231.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2089.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:— Same as in Table 6.
### APPENDIX - IX

Table 8. Regional distribution of Provincial expenditure - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan Total (Rs. millions)</th>
<th>Per capita (Rs.)</th>
<th>West Pakistan Total (Rs. millions)</th>
<th>Per capita (Rs.)</th>
<th>Pakistan Total (Rs. millions)</th>
<th>Per capita (Rs.)</th>
<th>Per capita index percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>256.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>354.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>216.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>418.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>634.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>1003.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1138.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>2141.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>1788.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>1522.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>3310.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as in Table 6.
APPENDIX - X

Table 9. Regional distribution of central expenditure - Pakistan (Annual Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (£ millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (£)</td>
<td>Total (£ millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (£)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>154.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>508.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>228.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>951.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>316.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1337.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as in Table 6.
APPENDIX - XI

Table 10. Regional distribution of central developmental assistance - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>272.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>401.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>887.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>874.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>1381.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>884.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: - The Budget in brief, 1969-70; Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance.
APPENDIX - XII

Table 11. Regional distribution of loans sanctioned by Central Government - Sponsored Financial institutions - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>272.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>245.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>375.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: - Central Financial Institutions comprising agricultural development bank industrial development bank of Pakistan.
### APPENDIX - XIII

Table 12. Regional distribution of expenditure on physical infra-structure in Public Section - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Index percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. (millions)</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>Rs. (millions)</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>128.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>375.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>504.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>586.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1477.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>2064.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>329.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>991.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2138.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>3129.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>393.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For First Plan Period: "The role of the Public Sector in Economic Development in Pakistan" by M.A. Rahman, A paper contributed to "Conference on Economic Development on South Asia" Ceylon; for the Second Plan and Third Plan Periods, same as Table 6.
APPENDIX - xiv

Table 13. Regional Distribution of power production - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (000KWH)</td>
<td>Per capita KWH</td>
<td>Total (000KWH)</td>
<td>Per capita KWH</td>
<td>Total (000KWH)</td>
<td>Per capita KWH</td>
<td>Per capita KWH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>22,125</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>299,519</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>321,644</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>118,044</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>868,169</td>
<td>20.24</td>
<td>986,214</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>17.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>346,385</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2,032,002</td>
<td>41.78</td>
<td>2,378,327</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>35.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>688,478</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>3,596,855</td>
<td>65.05</td>
<td>4,285,333</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>54.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:-(1) Monthly statistical bulletin, December 1965, Government of Pakistan, C.S.O.
(2) Statistical Digest, Government of East Pakistan, 1966
**APPENDIX - XV**

Table 14. Regional distribution of net freight ton miles - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million ton miles</td>
<td>ton miles</td>
<td>million ton miles</td>
<td>ton miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>510.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2703.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>755.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3405.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>905.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>4412.4</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>815.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>4958.6</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as in Table 11.
### APPENDIX - XVII

Table 16. Regional distribution of foreign exchange assistance in Government Sector - Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>3.2a</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3.6b</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>6.8c</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>102.7</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>122.1</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>160.9</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>283.0</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>217.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>304.4</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>593.6</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>207.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 10.

\[ a = 1954-55 \quad b = 1952-53 \text{ to } 1954-55 \quad c = 1965-66 \text{ to } 1967-68 \]
### APPENDIX - XVIII

Table 17. Regional distribution of Imports - Pakistan (Annual average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Index percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>439.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1053.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1492.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>624.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1325.0</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>1949.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>103.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>1211.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>2772.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>3983.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>201.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>1393.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>3244.9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>4638.2</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>206.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: - As Table 11.
APPENDIX - XIX

Table 18. Regional distribution of Imports of Capital Goods and materials for Capital Good - Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total (millions)</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>166.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>367.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>533.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>268.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>636.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>904.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>683.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1687.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>2371.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
APPENDIX - XX

Table 19. Regional net inflow/outflow of resources - Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>-280.6</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>+56.9</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>-82.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>+436.1</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>+347.5</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
<td>+1517.0</td>
<td>+31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>+399.8</td>
<td>+6.2</td>
<td>+1275.4</td>
<td>+23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 11.

a: Regional Net Inflow (Outflow) of Resources = (Foreign Imports - Foreign Exports) + Regional Imports - Regional Exports;

+ = inflow, - = outflow.
### Appendix - XXI

#### Table 20. Distribution of inter-regional exports - Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
<td>Total (Rs. millions)</td>
<td>Per capita (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>242.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td>271.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>544.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>452.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>848.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>784.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1314.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 11.

Also quoted from Table 1 to 20 in P.C. Verma, *Economic Development in Pakistan, regional disparity*, *Journal of South Asian Studies* (Jaipur), vol. 7, No. 1, January 1972, pp. 53-64.
### APPENDIX - XXII

Table V. Actual Imports (Public and Private) by area 1957-58 to 1964-65 (in million rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Also quoted in Bhanwar Singh, Industrial Growth in Pakistan a fiction or a reality?, *Journal of South Asian Studies*, (Jaipur), vol. 7, January 1972, p. 76.
### APPENDIX - XXIII

**Table IV. Distribution of Public Development Expenditure in Selected Sectors (in crores of Rupees)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FIRST PLAN</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>SECOND PLAN</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>THIRD PLAN</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td>Rs. %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>3.3  2.9</td>
<td>74.7  18.6</td>
<td>32.4  14.6</td>
<td>69.4  9.1</td>
<td>98.8  15.5</td>
<td>43.5  7.4</td>
<td>194.5 14.1</td>
<td>187.6 10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral and Power</td>
<td>40.0  35.3</td>
<td>35.0  23.7</td>
<td>156.0 24.7</td>
<td>278.1 36.5</td>
<td>182.7  28.6</td>
<td>198.1 33.7</td>
<td>378.7 27.4</td>
<td>571.2 32.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>24.4  21.5</td>
<td>92.6  23.1</td>
<td>133.8 21.2</td>
<td>173.4 22.7</td>
<td>117.6 18.4</td>
<td>171.8 29.2</td>
<td>275.8 19.9</td>
<td>433.8 25.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


APPENDIX - XXIV

SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE
WASHINGTON DC 20301

Refer to: 1-296
43/71

DOWN GRADED AT 12
YEARS INTERVALS
(ILLEGIBLE)

Not Automatically declassified

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT:- Affairs Memorandum for WSAG Meeting on India / Pakistan

Participants: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State - John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defence - David Packard
Director, Central Intelligence - Richard M Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)

Maurice J William II
Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in the west wing. CIA agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit. Involving £ 99 million and a hold on further action implementing the £ 72 million PL 480 credit. Convening of Security Council Meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situations in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959 bilateral US agreement with Pakistan.

Kissinger: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He
has called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels every thing we do comes out otherwise.

Helms: Concerning the reported action in the west wing, there are conflicting reports from both side and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar Air-Ports. The Pak say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian Officials say this a lie. In the East wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there now seven separate friends involved.

Kissinger: Are the Indians seizing territory?

Helms: Yes; small bits of territory definitely.

Sisco: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is hapening in the west - is a full scale attack likely?

Moorer: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant number of Indian combat aircraft.

Helms: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1.30 may well announced recognition of Bangladesh.
Moorer: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during the late afternoon, which does not make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet.

Kissinger: Is it possible that the India attacked first under Pak's simply did what they could before dark in response?

Moorer: This is certainly possible.

Kissinger: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the B 99 millions credit. He wants the £ 72 million PL 480 credit also held.

Williams: World will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

Kissinger: This is his order, but I will check with the President again if asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic programme and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the subcontinent. The next issue is the UN.

Irwin: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the secretary learns towards making a US move in the UN soon.

Kissinger: The President is in favour of this as soon as we have some confirmation on this large scale new action. If the
UN cannot operate in this kind of situation effectively. Its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of UN guarantees in the Middle East.

Sisco: We will have recommendation for you this afternoon, after meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the secret council tomorrow.

Kissinger: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

Sisco: That is ideal.

Kissinger: The earlier draft statement for Bush is too even handed.

Sisco: To recapitulate, after me have seen the Pak Ambassador, The Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

Kissinger: We can say we favour political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

Sisco: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.
Williams: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

Kissinger: Wait I talk with the President. He has not addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

Sisco: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation under review.

Kissinger: It is hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

Packard: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action in as much as we are so near the weekend.

Kissinger: We need a WSAF in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO contest. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/S/initials
James H. Noyes

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs.
Approved:

Illegible signature

For G. Warren Nutter

Assistant Secretary of Defence

for International Security Affairs.
APPENDIX - XXV

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON DC 20301, CM-1360-7

SECRET/SENSITIVE
T/SECRET-SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief of Staff U.S. Army
Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subject: - Washington Special Action Group

Meeting on Indo/Pakistan Hostilities, 4 December 1971.

1. Attached for your information is a memorandum for second concerning subject meeting.

2. In view of the sensitivity of information in the NSC system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know-basis.

For the Chairman,
Jcs:

AK Kroizan
Captain, US Navy

Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified enclosures
APPENDIX - XXVI

KEATING CABLE TO ROGERS

Washington, January 5 - Following is slightly paraphrased form is the text of a secret cablegram from Kenneth B. Keating, United States Ambassador to India, to William P Rogers, the Secretary of State, on December 8, 1971, made available to the New York Times by the Columnist Jack Anderson.

Mr. Keating said he was very interested to read an article by the International Press Service (USIA) correspondent in the Mornings Wireless file reporting White House Official’s explanation of development of present conflict and United States role in seeking to avert it while he appreciated the tactical necessity of justifying the administration’s position publicly, he felt constrained to state that elements of this particular story do not coincide with his knowledge of the events of the past eight months.

Specifically the IPS account states that the United States Government’s dollars 155 million relief programme in East Pakistan was initiated at the specific request of the Indian Government. His recollection, and he referred the state department to his conversation with foreign minister Swaran Singh in New Delhi on May 25, is that the Government of India was reluctant to see the relief programme started in
East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on grounds that such an effort might serve to "bail out Yahya" (General Mohammed Agha Yahya Khan was the President of Pakistan at this time).

In noting offer of amnesty for all refugees story fails to mention qualifications in Yahya's September 5 proclamation that amnesty applies to those not already changed with specific criminal act(s), which is more than a minor bureaucratic coveate in East Pakistan circumstances.

'Story indicates that both the secretary (Mr. Rogers) and Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Jha (Lakshmi Kant Jha, Indian Ambassador to the United States) that Washington favoured autonomy for East Pakistan.' Mr. Keating said, he was aware of our repeated statements that we had no formula for a solution, and our relief that the outcome of negotiations would probably be autonomy if not independence but he regretted that he was uninformed of any specific statement favouring autonomy.

'Also according to story, Jha was informed by Department on November 19 that 'Washington and Islamabad (Capitol of Pakistan) were prepared to discuss a precise time tab'.

Keating said he did not understand the statement that Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent. See (for) example
DIAIB, 219-71 of November 12 (Defence Intelligence Agency intelligence Bulletin No. 219-71 of November 12) stating specifically that war is 'imminent'.

Statement that Pakistan had authorised USA to contact Mujib through his attorney seems an overstatement, since according to Islamabad 11760 (message from American Embassy in Pakistan) Yahya on November 29 told Ambassador Farland (Joseph Farland, United States Ambassador to Pakistan) nothing more than that a Farland Broli meeting would be a good idea since Ambassador Farland would be able to obtain from Broli at least his general impressions as to the staff of the trial and is conduct' Keating said, he was unaware of any specific authorisation from Yahya to contact Mujib' through Broli (Mr. Broli was apparently the defence attorney for Sheikh Mujib, leader of the East Pakistani autonomy movement, then imprisoned and on trial in West Pakistan). In any case, as we are all only too unhappily aware, Yahya told Ambassador Farland on December 2 (Islamabad 11555) that Broli allegedly was not intervened in seeing him'.

The statement on GOP (Government of Pakistan) agreement on distributing on by UN RELIEF SUPPLIES in East Pakistan obscures the fact that the UN never had nor intended to harm sufficient personnel in East Pakistan to handle actual distribution which was always in Pakistani Government hands.
Mr. Keating said he made the foregoing comments in the full knowledge that they may not have been privy to all important facts of the tragedy. He did not believe these elements of the story (reporting the back grounder) either add to our position or, perhaps more importantly to American credibility.
Following is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Council Committee on Indian / Pakistan hostilities made public on January 14, 1972.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, DC 20201 8 December, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Washington special action group met the situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday 8 Dec to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. ATTENDEES:

A. Principals. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Richard Helms, CIA General John Ryan, JC's, Mr. Donald Mac Donald, AID Mr. David Packard, Defence, Ambassador U Alex. Johnson, State.

B. Others. Mr. Maurice Williams, AID, Mr. John Waller, CIA, Col. Richard Kennedy, NSC, Mr. Samuel Hokranson, NSC, Mr. Harold, Saunders, NSC, Mr. Armistead Selden, Defence, Mr. James Noyes, Defence, Mr. Christopher van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel Depalma, State, Mr. Bruce Laingen, State Mr. David
Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Admiral Robert Welander, OJCS, Capt. Howard Kay, OJCS, Group 4 down graded at 3 year intervals, declassified after 12 years.

3. Summary: Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting through calculated destruction of Pak armoured and air force, to render Pakistani impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kashmir be assessed.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan all major Pak Loc's in the East are now vulnerable. In the west the Paks are now claiming Punjab, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a UN call for cease fire, she intends to straighten out the Southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistani armour air force capabilities. Thus for only India and Bhutan have
recognized Bangladesh. It is believed that the Soviet have held off recognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition however, may be forthcoming in the near future.

5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings.

6. Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indian pushing to hard at this time, rather they seen content with a holding action.

7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West; General Ryan said it might take a reasonable long time to move all the forces but that the air borne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days.

8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After discussions with Mr. Williams it was determined that only a very small number of US dollars earmarked for refugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting the Indians have actually last foreign exchange in the process of earning for refugees. In any event, the entire relief effort is currently suspended in both India and Pakistan.
9. Dr. Kissinger then emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL 480 commodities, or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything aiding through.

10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the secret might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other possible action was taking a position concerning aid material currently under contract. This however would be a very messy problem in as much as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by US contractor and thus would be compelled to pay US suppliers, resulting in claims against the USG.

11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborated that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of action had been taken against some middle east countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims.

12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan programme, to which Mr. Williams responded
that nothing was under negotiation at the present time.

13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year (AID) budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for aid to India. It was not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget for India only to have the “wicked” white House take it out.

14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indian smash the Pak air force and the armoured forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the distintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armoured and air forces would make the Pak’s defenceless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a US ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade. Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if US supplies are needed they will not be provided?

15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Henry Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that foreign minister Swaran
Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really a disputed territory.

16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madam Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Loddakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counter action if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build up at this time but nevertheless, even with out a build up they could 'make motions' and rattle the sword.

17. Turning then to the question of military support of Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hussein relative to the provisions of F-104Is to Pakistan and asked how we could get Jordan into a holding patterns to allow the President time to consider the issue. Dr. Kissinger also asked whether we should attempt to convey to the Indians and the press that a major attack on West Pakistan would be considered in a very serious light by this country.

18. Mr Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanian to do any thing that the USG could not do. If the USG could not give the 104's to Pakistan, we could not allow
Jordan to do so. If a third country had material that the
USG did not have, that was one thing; but we could not allow
Jordan to transfer the 104's unless we make a finding that
the Paks themselves, were eligible to purchase them from
us directly.

19. Dr. Kissinger suggested that if we had not cut the sail
of arms to Pakistan, the current problem would not exist.
Mr. Packard agreed.

20. Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really
analysed that the real danger was when we were turning at the
arms to Pakistan.

21. Mr. Packard suggested that another consideration in the
Jordan issue is that if Jordan delivers the equipment we would
be expected to replace it. Ambassador Johnson stated we do
not have any more MAP left.

22. Dr. Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is
a situation where in a country (India) equipped and supported
by the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an
important state and the other half into a vessel. We must
consider what other countries may be thinking of our action.

23. Mr. Helms asked about our CENTO relationships with
Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated we had no legal obliga-
tions towards Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr. Kissinger
agreed but added that neither did we have legal obligations towards India in 1962 when we formulated the air defence agreements. We must consider what would be the impact of the current situation in the larger context of world affairs.

24. Dr. Kissinger said that we must look at the problems in the terms of Security Council guarantees in the middle east and the impact on other areas. We must look the military supply situation one could make a case he argued that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation.

25. Mr. Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast with expectation that the West Paks could hold their own.

26. Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possible effect that the additional supplies for Pakistan might have it could be that eight F 104's might not make any difference once the real war in the west starts. They could be considered only as a token. If, in fact we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ballgame.

27. Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our reply to Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indians pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may themselves be trying to take Kashmir.
28. After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you do not win, do not get involved if we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let us not get in if we know we are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.

29. Mr. Williams suggested that we might now focus efforts for a cease fire in West Pakistan. Ambassador Johnson stated this might however, stop the Pak from moving into Kashmir.

30. Dr. Kissinger asked for an assessment of the Pak capabilities and prospects in Kashmir. He asked CIA to prepare an assessment of the international implication of Mrs. Gandhi’s current moves. He indicated that we should develop an initial stand on the military supply question. He reiterated that he desired to keep Hussein in a 'holding pattern' relating to the latter’s expression of support for Pakistan and that he should not be turned off. The USG should indicate to Hussein that we do not consider trivial his feelings in this matter.

31. Turning to the question of the blockade, Ambassador Johnson said that both India and Pakistan have taken blockade action, even though the Pak blockade is essentially a paper blockade. Dr. Kissinger said that we should also protest to
the Paks. Ambassador Johnson indicated we do not have legal case to protest the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right to blockade when a state of war exists. We may think it unwise and we may question and how it is carried out. We have in fact, normally expressed our concern. On the other hand, we have no problem in protesting the incidence of the SS Buckeye state.

32. Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States. Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The lady' is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet Satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited any one who objected to this approach to take his case to the president. Ambassador Keating, he suggested, is offering enough reassurance on his own.

33. Addressing briefly the question of communal strife in East Pakistan Dr. Kissinger asked whether any one would be in a position to know that massacres were occurring at the time when they took place. Mr. Helms indicated that we might
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred the relations and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relationship and establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both the countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

In order to achieve this objective, the government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

1. The Government of India and Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontations that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relations and establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.
In order to achieve this objective, the government of India and the Government have agreed as follows:

1. That the principles and purposes of the charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

2. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.

3. That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourhood and durable peace between them is a commitment by both countries to peaceful coexistence, respect of each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

4. That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have been devilled the relations between the two countries for the past twenty-five years shall be resolved by peaceful means.
5. That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

6. That in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

(ii) Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

(iii) In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

1. Steps shall be taken to resume communications—postal, telegraphic, sea land, including border posts and air links including overflights.

2. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other countries.

3. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

4. Exchanges in the field of science and culture will be promoted in this connection, delegations from the two countries
will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

5. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both governments agreed that:
   (i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their sides of the international border. (ii) In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side; neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line.
   (iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon the entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereafter.

6. This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instrument of ratification are exchanged.

Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in future and that in the meanwhile, the representatives of two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repartition of prisoners of war and
civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute and the resumptions of diplomatic relations.

(Mrs. Indira Gandhi) (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
Prime Minister President
Republic of India. Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Source: J.P. Jain, Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi), 1974, pp. 231-233.
APPENDIX - XXIX

THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND PEACE SIGNED
BETWEEN INDIA AND BANGLADESH

Dacca, March 19, 1972

Inspired by common ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and nationalism,

Having struggled together for the realization of those ideals and commenced ties of friendship through blood and sacrifices which led to the triumphant emergence of free, sovereign and independent Bangladesh,

Determined to maintain fraternal and good neighbourly relations and transform their border into a border of eternal peace and friendship,

Adhering firmly to the basic tenets of non-alignement, peaceful co-existence, mutual cooperation, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,

Determined to safeguard peace, stability and security and to come out progress of the respective countries through all possible avenues of mutual cooperation,

Determined further to expand and strengthened the existing relations of friendship between them, convinced that
the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the national interest of both states as well as interest of lasting peace in Asia and world.

Resolved to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to make efforts to bring about a relaxation of international tension and the final elimination of vestiges of colonialism, racialism and imperialism.

Convinced that in the present day world, international problems can be solved only through cooperation and not through conflict or confrontation.

Reaffirming their determination to follow the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter the Republic of India on the one hand, and the peoples Republic of Bangladesh on the other, have decided to conclude the present treaty.

ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties inspired by the ideals for which their respective peoples struggled and made sacrifices together, solemnly declare that their shall be lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their peoples, each side shall respect their independence sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side.
ARTICLE 2

Being guided by their devotion of (sic) the principles of equality of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, the high contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations and are determined to strive for their final and complete eliminations.

The high contracting parties shall cooperate with other states in achieving these aims and support the just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination and for their national liberation.

ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties reaffirm their faith in the policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence as important factors for easing tension in the world, maintaining international peace and security and strengthening national sovereignty and independence.

ARTICLE 4

The high contracting parties shall maintain regular contract with each other on major international problems affecting the interest of both states, through meetings and exchange of views at all levels.
ARTICLE 5

The high contracting parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutual advantageous and all round cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. The two countries shall develop mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most favoured nation principle.

ARTICLE 6

The high contracting parties further agreed to make joint studies and joint action in the field of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydroelectric power and irrigation.

ARTICLE 7

The high contracting parties shall promote relations in the field of art, literature, education, culture, sports and health.

ARTICLE 8

In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries, each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or
participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each of the high contracting parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other parties, and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or constitute a threat to the security of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 9

Each of the high contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third parties taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In each case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take appropriate effective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries.

ARTICLE 10

Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment secret or open, towards one or more state which may be incompatible with the present treaty.
ARTICLE 11

The present treaty is signed for a term of 25 years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the high contracting parties.

The Treaty shall come into force with immediate effect from the date of its signature.

ARTICLE 12

The differences in interpreting any article or articles of the present treaty that may arise between the high contracting parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

DONE IN DACCA ON THE NINETEEN DAY OF MARCH NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY TWO.

Sd/- (Smt.) Indira Gandhi  
Prime Minister  
for the Republic of India  

Sd/- Sheikh Mujibur Rahman  
Prime Minister  
For the People's Republic of Bangladesh

1. Source: Arun Bhattacharjee, Date Line Mujibnagar, (New Delhi), 1973, pp. 242-244.
EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN USSR AND BANGLADESH


7. Syed Nazrul Islam, Minister for Industries, visits USSR to participate in the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR - Dec. 1972.


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XVIII. Radiance (New Delhi).
XIX. Seminar (New Delhi).
XX. The Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay).

D. NEWS PAPERS

I. Assam Tribune (Gauhati).
II. Bangladesh Observer (Dacca).
| III. Financial Times       | (London).                        |
| IV. Financial Express     | (Bombay).                        |
| V. Manila Times           | (Philippines).                   |
| VI. Patriot               | (New Delhi).                     |
| VII. The Dawn             | (Karachi).                       |
| VIII. The Hindustan Times | (New Delhi).                     |
| IX. The Hindu             | (Madras)                         |
| X. The Indian Nation      | (Patna).                         |
| XI. The International     | (Paris).                         |
| Herald Tribune            |                                |
| XII. The Indian Express   | (New Delhi).                     |
| XIII. The Times of India  | (New Delhi).                     |
| XIV. The Observer         | (London).                        |