THE RELATIONS OF SHAH ABBAS I

with

THE RULERS OF INDIA

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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>Anfa-ul-Akhbar</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE REIGN OF SHAH ABBAS I
(October 1588 to January 1629)

Shah Abbas, the second son of Shah Muhammad Khudabanda, ascended the throne of Persia at Qazvin on the 11th Ziqad 996 A.H. (2nd. October, 1588), at the age of eighteen years. His accession was preceded by more than a decade of court intrigues, political chaos and civil wars. On the death of Shah Tahmasp (May 1576), Shah Ismail II ascended the throne, but he soon fell foul of the princes and the nobility and executed many of them. He had even issued an order for the execution of Prince Abbas, who was then the Viceroy of Khurasan, at Hirat. A day before the order could be carried out, news reached Herat that Shah Ismail himself was assassinated (November 1577).  

1. *AAA* 1/133. Sykes gives 985 A.H. (995?) as the year of Abbas' accession (11/172), and Malcolm even earlier, in 1585. They have probably confused the date of his proclamation at Mashhad with that of his accession at Qazvin. The year which we have accepted is as given in *AAA* and is supported by the sequence events. The following verse, which gives the year 996 A.H. (Dec. 1587 to Nov. 1588) is quoted in *AAA* 250:

> بود جون ساپه خدانِ جهان سایه اندخاب بر عیادالله
> حال تاريخ ذل طلب مِ کرد هانگی زاد که ظل الله (١١۶)

Sultan Muhammad Khudabanda, the next monarch, was half blind. His wife Mahdi 'Umbia ruled in his name. The Shah and the Queen, having apprehensions on the part of the nobles in general and from the nobles of Khurasan in particular, recalled Prince Abbas to the court. But Ali Quli Khan, the Regent of the Prince at Herat and Murshid Quli Khan, Commander of Khwaf (- - -) resisted the order until the Queen was put to death by some nobles at the court (July 1579).1 After her, Prince Hamza Mirza, the heir-apparent, assumed de facto power. Sometime latter, Ali Quli Khan, proclaimed the Prince Abbas as the king of Khurasan in April 1581. Early in 1582, Shah Muhammad started for Khurasan to punish Ali Quli Khan and laid siege to Herat. But meanwhile the Ottomans attacked Azerbaigian and the Shah had to conclude peace with Ali Quli. Accordingly, Abbas was left as the Viceroy of Khurasan under Ali Quli and Shah Muhammad returned to Qazvin in June 1583.2

Shortly after, hostility arose between Ali Quli and Murshid Quli and in a skirmish, Abbas fell into the hands of Murshid Quli Khan in July 1586. Ali Quli sought to wreak vengeance by inviting Abdullah Khan Uzbak, who in the meanwhile had taken Balkh and Badakhshan.3 Murshid Quli, on the

1. AAA. 178 – 82; ZSA. i/43 – 46.
2. AAA. 201 – 12; ZA. 1/69 – 77.
3. AAA. 220-22, 286,375; ZSA 1/116-20; AN. 111/434. Abbas himself describes this rivalry in his letter to Akbar (1587), cf. JM. ff. 206b. For the contents of the letter see infra. p. 73
other hand, attempted to consolidate his position by proclaim- 
ing Abbas Mirza again as the King at Mashhad in 1586 and 
ruling in his name.¹

In the meantime Prince Hamza Mirza was assassinated 
on his way from Azarbaijan to Qazvin (December 1586). Shah 
Muhammad thereupon decided to rule himself, though it is 
doubtful whether he was physically in a fit condition to 
wield effective power. The Shah was, however, forced by his 
nobles to declare Abu Talib Mirza, his third son, as his 
heir-apparent. He then returned from Azarbaijan to Qazvin 
(1587). The turbulent governors of the various regions, such 
as Isfahan, Kashan and Fars, opposed the selection of the 
heir-apparent and declared themselves in favour of Abbas 
Mirza. The governors of Yazd, Kerman and Shiraz even invited Abbas 
Mirza to take over power. Shah Muhammad made attempts to 
suppress the revolts and laid seige to Kashan.²

While the Shah was facing the internal rebels in Iraq 
and the Ottomans were threatening Azarbaijan, Abdullah Khan 
Uzbek launched an invasion on Khurasan and laid seige to 
Herat (February 1588).³ Murshid Quli Khan, realizing that

¹. AAA. 222.
². AAA. 253-62; ZSA 1/110-17, 121 - 23.
³. AAA. 266; ZSA 1/125. Herat fell to Abdullah Khan in 
January 1589 (ZSA 1/126). Iskandar Munshi writes that, 
it fell after a seige of eleven months (AAA 375). There- 
fore, the seige would have been started in February 1588.
Khurasan was being threatened by Abdullah Khan, decided to go to Yazd to consolidate his position. He appointed his brother Ibrahim Khan as the Commander of Mashhad and himself started for Yazd via Tabas and Turshez, with the declared object of relieving Herat. At Turshez he learnt that the shah had laid seige to Kashan and was intending to occupy Isfahan and Yazd etc. Murshid Quli, therefore, gave up the idea of moving further and returned to Mashhad, which he began to fortify. Apparently he thought that Mashhad would have to be defended not only against Abdullah Khan but possibly also against the Shah.

When Shah Muhammad learnt that Murshid Quli had left for Yazd, he concluded peace with the commander of Kashan and rushed towards Isfahan. When Murshid Quli heard that the Shah had gone to Isfahan, he took advantage of the rebellions and invitations to Abbas, and decided to occupy the capital. He left Mashhad in September 1588, and by rapid marches reached Qazvin on 1st October 1588, and occupied it without opposition. On 2nd October, he raised the Prince to the throne of Qazvin and himself assumed the office of the Wazir and the charge of the province of Isfahan.

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1. AAA. 265; ZSA. 1/120.
2. AAA. 266-70; ZSA. 1/128-36.
3. AAA. 266-70; ZSA. 1/128-36.
Shah Muhammad learnt about Murshid Quli's marches towards the capital when he was at Isfahan. He at once started for Qazvin. But while he was at Qum, he was informed of the accession of Abbas on the throne. His nobles and army began to disperse. Shah Muhammad, however, came to Qazvin and abducted in favour of his son.¹

With the strong backing of the faction comprising the chiefs of his tribe, Murshid Quli became the de facto ruler of Persia and tried to reduce Abbas to the position of a figurehead. This position was unacceptable to the young, ambitious and energetic Shah, while the ascendancy of Murshid Quli was bitterly resented by the chiefs of the other Qizilbash tribes. His dilatoriness in sending help to Ali Quli, at Herat until it fell to Abdullah Khan in January-February 1689, also annoyed both the Shah and the Shamlu tribe to which Ali Quli belonged. There was great uneasiness at the court and even the throne of Abbas was in danger.²

In order to strengthen his position, the Shah instigated Murshid Quli to suppress ruthlessly the malcontents and to remove, one by one, their ringleaders many of whom were also involved in the murder of his (Shah's) mother and brother.

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1. AAA. 266-70; ZSA. i/128-36.

2. AAA. 266; ZSA i/136-40. In a letter to Akbar (1597), Shah Abbas subsequently blamed Murshid for this dilatoriness. cf. JM ff. 206b.
Then in May 1589, he set out for Khurasan to drive the Uzbeks out of Herat. At Bustam, he contrived to bring about the assassination of Murshid Quli himself (22nd July 1589), who, alarmed by the prompt actions of the Shah, was contemplating to place another prince on the throne. After forty day's halt at Isfahan, probably for provisions, the Shah came to Mashhad, where Ibrahim Quli, the brother of Murshid Quli was also replaced by Budaq Khan who was to rule as the Regent of Prince Hasan Mirza.

From Mashhad the Shah moved towards Herat. At Jam he learned that the Ottomans had launched a three-pronged attack on Persia and captured Ganja, Tabrez, Hamadan and Nehawand, where they also erected a fort and stationed a strong garrison. Shah Abbas postponing the recovery of Herat, rushed back from Jam to Qazvin (Feb., March, 1690) to check the Turkish advance and to save his capital.

But, not unexpectedly, matters in Khurasan took a turn for worse. Some disaffected nobles induced Budaq Khan to proclaim Hasan Mirza as the king. On the other hand, Abdul Mumin Khan, taking advantage of the situation, came to Mashhad

1. AAA. 250-70; ZSA. 1/134-46.
2. AAA. 268. In his letter to Akbar (1697), Abbas gives a detailed account of these events, JM, ff. 206b.
and besieged it (early summer, 1690). The Shah found himself between the devil and the deep sea. While in the west, the Ottomans were threatening his capital, the Uzbek menace was growing serious in the East. He, therefore, decided to come to terms with the Ottomans so as to be able to deal with the Uzbeks properly.

He accepted those terms which the Ottomans had presented before Prince Hamza Mirza in 1686, and before Abbas himself after his accession, through their ambassador Wali Aqa who was still present at the Persian court. By the terms of the treaty concluded in June 1590, he ceded to the Ottomans most of the territories conquered by them which comprised Azarbaijan, Urmnistan, Shirwan, Qarabagh and part of Luristan with the newly erected fort of Nehawand; and sent a Safavid prince, Haidar Mirza, as a hostage. As a result of subsequent diplomatic overtures by the Shah, the war prisoners were released and officers were appointed to settle the border (1592). The treaty proved to be stable until the Shah himself, free from the eastern problem, broke it in 1603 to recover his lost territories from the Turks.

1. AAA. 270, 71, 74.
2. AAA. 272, 300; Kier : Hist. of the Ottoman (Urdu) i/225; Sykes : Hist. of Persia ii/173.
After concluding peace with the Ottomans, the Shah started for the relief of Mashhad. On his way, he fell ill at Tehran, and Mashhad fell to the Uzbeks. Its fall was followed by the fall of Jam, Khwāf, Ghurian, Bustam, and Nishapur. Nur Muhammad, the ruler of Marv and ally of Abdul Mumin, also, invaded Khurasan and defeated the partisans of Prince Hasan Mirza, many of them thereupon joined the Shah. After these notable victories, the Uzbeks returned to Balkh. The Shah heard about these losses while he was still at Tehran.

Meanwhile, rebellions broke out in Fars, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kerman. The Shah realized that before he could face the external foes, he must set his own house in order. He, therefore, returned from Tehran to Qazvin and in early 1591, started for Isfahan to suppress the rebellions.

After suppressing the revolt at Isfahan (March 1691) and before involving himself in other prolonged military expeditions, the Shah despatched Yadgar Ali Sultan to the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1691), to dissuade him from entering

1. For the correspondence between the Ulama of Mashhad and Transoxiana, regarding the sanctity of Mashhad, and other religious questions, cf. AAA 268. A letter of Abbas to Abdullah Khan is given in JM in which the former condemns the latter for his tyranny over the people of Khurasan and reminds him of the fate which Ubaid Khan and Shaibain Khan had met there. JM. ff. 232a.

2. AAA. 275 - 78.

3. AAA. 281 - 87.
into an alliance with the Uzbeks and to seek his moral support against them. Then he sent an army under Farhad Khan to Kerman and himself came to Fars to suppress the revolts. When Fars was pacified, the Shah went to Yazd and thence returned to Qazvin, where he spent the winter (Nov. 1591 - March 1592).

As soon as winter was over, Abdul Mumin Khan launched another campaign in Khurasan lasting about six months (March-Sept. 1592), and captured Isfarain, Sabzwar, Mazinan, Jajran, and Tun. He returned to Balkh when winter was approaching. The Shah, however, remained busy in consolidating his authority. Hamadan and adjacent places were placed under Prince Muhammad Baqir with Aghorfo Sultan as his Wakan. A rebellion in Sultania was also suppressed, and the rebel, Daulatyar Khan was punished with death. Likewise, an expedition was sent against Amir Hamza Khan, the haughty ruler of Lankeron, who had failed to come to the court to pay homage to the Shah. The fort was captured and Amir Hamza was allowed to go to Mecca.

1. AAA. 280; AN i11/587; RZT xx. 1/474; AA ff.304; ZSA i/217.
2. AAA.296-97; Malcolm : Hist. of Persia i/525.
3. AAA. 302; Sykes 11/174.
4. AAA. 298 - 300.
The winter (Nov. 1392 - Feb. 1593) was spent by the shah at Isfahan, at the end of which he returned to Qazvin. In March 1593, he started for Ardabil, ostensibly to pay homage to the shrine of Shaikh Safi, his great ancestor, but, in fact, to punish Shah Virdi, the chief of Qaradagh who was suspected of being in league with the Ottomans. When the royal standards reached the city, Shah Virdi fled to the Ottoman frontier. The Shah also sent an army under Farhad Khan against the discontented ruler of Gilan, Khan Ahmad Gilani, and himself returned to Qazvin. But since the army could not achieve appreciable success, the Shah himself came to Gilan. On his arrival, the rebel fled to Shirwan. After organizing the affairs of Gilan, the Shah returned to Qazvin.

After these operations were over, Shah Abbas started for Khurasan in the spring of 1693, to cross sword with the Uzbeks. Abdul Munim Khan, who had just arrived at Nishapur, probably to further extend his dominion in western Khurasan, beat a hasty retreat to Balkh when heard of the approach of shah. Finding the field open, Abbas easily recovered from the Uzbeks Mazinan, Jajram, Isfarain, Sabzwar, Nishapur and Tun (summer 1593). At Isfarian he stayed for a month, probably

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1. From Shirwan Khan Ahmad, Gilan sent an envoy to Akbar in 1594 and in the letter sent through him showed his desire to come to the court. But Akbar does not seem to have take any interest in his affair, AN iii/666.

2. AAA. 303 - 306.
to settle the affairs of the region and to guard against the possibility of any fresh Uzbek attack. Mashhad was still to be recovered, but as the provisions were exhausted in the camp and winter was near, he left Isfarain for Qazvin. He spent the winter of 1693-94 again at Isfahan reorganising and equipping his army, returning to Qazvin in March 1694.

Early in 1694, disturbances again started in Gilan. The Shah, therefore, paid a visit of Gilan and Ardabil in the spring of 1694. But as soon as he returned to Qazvin, a rebellion broke out in Gilan. Farhad Khan was despatched to suppress it. About the same time, the Uzbeks also mobilized their armies. Abdullah Khan invaded and occupied Khwarezm and Abdul Munim captured Marv. Haji Muhammad Khan and Nur Muhammad Khan, the rulers of Khwarezm and Marv respectively, subsequently took shelter at the Persian court.

From Marv Abdul Munim came to Nishapur and besieged it. As soon as the Shah heard of the attack, he decided to start for Khurasan. But before he could set out, the chief of Luristan raised the standard of rebellion, invaded Borujerd and occupied it. The Shah gave up the idea of proceeding to Khurasan, directed Durwesh Muhammad to conclude peace with

1. AAA. 306 - 08.
2. Ibid. 312 - 16.
the Uzbeks, and himself rushed to Luristan. Durwesh Muhammad who had bravely held out for more than four months, started negotiations. After surrendering the fort of Nishapur, Durwesh Muhammad was allowed to go to Qazvin. Abdul Munim wanted to capture Sabzwar too, but as the winter was approaching, he returned to Balkh. Shah Abbas also, after suppressing the revolt in Luristan, came back to Qazvin on 26 September 1594.  

During the winter of 1594-95, Qandahar and zamindawar were handed over to the Mughals by the Persian governors while the Shah was at Isfahan.

In early 1595, rebellions were again brewing up in Gilan. As a precautionary step, the Shah himself visited the region in the spring of 1595. But when he returned, the molcontents raised their heads. Farhad Khan was again sent to suppress them. But before the rebellion in Gilan could be completely smashed, another revolt broke out in Khuzistan. Syed Mubarak, the rebel, captured Dezful and laid siege to Shustar. Hatim Beg, the Wazir, Farhad Khan and others were directed to pacify the whole region from Borujerd to Shustar.

1. AAA. 316 - 23.
2. Ibid. 331-33; AN 111/670; RZT ff. 1/577a; AA. ff.304; TD. ff. 572b.
3. The name given in Persian text of AAA. is Zeful (ژلف), AAA. 342.
The Shah himself came down and moved between Kashan and Isfahan. The rebellion was suppressed and after Syed Mubarak submitted to the Shah, he was confirmed in his possession of Koh-i-Kilwiyah.

By the beginning of 1696, the Shah had sufficiently consolidated his position and most of the western provinces had been brought under effective control. He, therefore, turned his attention towards the east. In April 1696, Farhad Khan, the able and experienced general, was transferred to the East.

About the month of June 1696, while Farhad Khan was at Firoz Koh, Abdul Munim came and laid siege to Isfarain. On hearing the news and after making necessary preparations for about a month, the Shah also started for Khurasan. From Bustan, he sent a letter to Abdul Munim inviting him to an open battle, and moved towards Jajram. Abdul Munim, however, withdrew the siege and retreated. The Shah after reorganizing the affairs of Isfarain left for Qazvin, postponing the recovery of Nishapur and Mashhad for the next year, as news of fresh disturbances in Gilan had reached him.

1. AAA. 342.

2. For an interesting correspondence between Abbas and Abdul Munim in which Abbas condemns Abdul Munim for the occupation of Khurasan and the latter asserts that Abbas should confine himself to Iraq. cf. JIB ff. 324-329; ZSA 11/129.
While Abbas was still at Astrabad, Abdul Munim returned, stormed sabzwar and massacred the population. The Shah hurried back to sabzwar to face the enemy. But Abdul Munim again evacuated the city and returned to Balkh before the arrival of the Shah. Abbas thereupon returned to Qazvin where he learnt of the suppression of the revolt in Gilan by Budaq Khan. (Circa September 1596).¹

Not long after, the Uzbeks brought pressure on Sistan, adjoining the Helmund Valley, and its chief, Malik Jalaluddin was forced to seek refuge at the Persian Court in 1006H/Aug. 1596 - Aug. 1597.²

Gilan had been a source of constant trouble in the preceding years, and had deterred the plans of Shah in the East. Mazandran also, which lay close to it, had not yet been brought under effective control. The Shah, therefore, decided to pacify the whole region. After the winter (Nov. 1596 - March 1597) was over, Farhad Khan was despatched for the purpose, and in a campaign lasting more than one year, he crushed the opposition and captured, among other places, Larijan, Rustandar and the fort of Aulad in Mazandran.³

¹ AAA. 346 - 50.
² Ibid. 362.
³ AAA. 354, 65, 66, 71; In his letter to Akbar (1597) Abbas describes the pacification of these places cf. JM 806B. For details of the letter, see infra p. 73
During the year 1597, the Persians were able to concentrate on the solution of their internal difficulties because the Uzbeks did not launch any serious invasion in that year, except for a local raid on Yazd which was easily repulsed. This seems to have been due mainly to the growing rift in the Uzbek camp. Late in 1596, Mir Qulbaba Kokaltash, the Uzbek Governor of Herat, afraid of Abdul Mumin's attitude towards him, and probably instigated by Abdullah Khan, had started negotiation with the Shah, and sent an envoy to him. Shah Abbas received the envoy favourably and sent Islam Beg with a friendly letter in return. Mir Qulbaba, while dismissing the Persian ambassador, Islam Beg, again sent envoys to the Shah, with letters and presents. The Shah on his part, again sent Muhammad Quli along with the returning envoy of Mir Qulbaba (1597).

During the same year, the Shah decided to transfer his capital from Qazvin to Isfahan which was geographically and strategically more suitable than the former. Situated in the heart of the empire and in a comparatively peaceful region, it was at a safer distance from the Ottomans and could serve

1. AAA. 359.
2. Ibid. 352; The letter of Abbas to Abdullah Khan is given in JM, ff. 232b.
3. AAA. 362.
4. Ibid. 372.
more properly as a base for operations in the east against the Uzbeks as well as in the south where in the Persian Gulf the Portuguese were creating trouble for the Persian travellers and the traders. During the winter of 1697-98, the Shah personally supervised the construction of the new capital. Magnificent buildings were erected, tanks and canal were constructed and beautiful gardens were laid there. Arrangements were also made to link it by roads with the various parts of the empire. Meanwhile, the ambassador of the Mughal Emperor, who had arrived in 1596, was dismissed and a Persian envoy was despatched with him to Akbar to 'seek his moral support for the campaign which the Shah was going to launch'.

The hostility between Abdullah Khan and Abdul Munim having become acute, an envoy from Abdullah Khan came to the Persian court early in 1698, bringing with him a letter of Mir Qulbaba from Herat. The Shah was eager to grasp the opportunity and decided to despatch an envoy to Abdullah Khan

1. AAA. 423. Since 1515 the Portuguese had established their predominance on the Persian Gulf and its trade, acquiring several bases in the region, notably Ormuz and Bahrain. The repeated attempts of the Ottomans to expel them had failed. For an account of Portuguese domination over the Persian Gulf and their conflict with the Ottoman Turks, cf. Danvers: *The Portuguese in India*, 1/309-25, 50, 54-55, 97, 514-15.

2. AAA. 372-73, Sykes 11/120.

3. AAA. 373; AN 111/745; RZT ff. 11/581; AA. ff. 406.

4. AAA. 374-79; AN 111/738.
and then to start for Khurasan. But before the Shah could
despatch his envoy or to start himself for Khurasan, he
heard the news of the death of Abdullah Khan (Feb. 1598). Thereupon he himself started moving towards Khurasan on 10th April 1598, via Kashan. From Bustam he sent a force along with Haji Muhammad Khan, to recover Khwaram from the Uzbeks for the latter. On the other hand, he sent Ruhullah Beg to Abdul Munim Khan with the message either to evacuate Khurasan or to face war. Before he had reached Mashhad, he was told of the assassination of Abdul Munim in July 1598.

The death of Abdullah Khan and that of Abdul Munim soonafter created confusion among the Uzbeks. Pir Muhammad, a relative of Abdullah Khan occupied Bukhara; Abdul Amin, a minor said to be the son of Ibadullah Khan, brother of Abdullah Khan, was raised to the throne at Balkh, while Din Muhammad, sister's son of Abdullah Khan, established himself at Herat. Abul Muhammad, the Uzbek commander of Mashhad, hard pressed by the Persians, surrendered the place without a fight.

1. AAA. 374; AN 111/738; RZT ff. 11/581b.
2. AAA. 387-90; In this letter the Shah threatened Abdul Mujjib that he was sending Haji Muhammad Khan to recover Khwaram and was proposing to come along with Nur Muhammad to capture Transoxiana. cf. JIB ff. 328a.
3. AAA. 390; AN. 111/739; RZT ff. 11/581b.
4. AAA. 381-87.
in July 1598. Its surrender was followed by the fall of Nishapur. From Mashhad the shah despatched Farhad Khan towards Herat; while a force was sent under Budaq Khan, the newly appointed commander of Mashhad, to assist Nur Muhammad to the former ruler of Marv, to recover his country. The Shah then himself started for Herat. Din Muhammad was defeated and killed and Herat was occupied by the Persian. They also occupied Tum; while Malik Jalaluddin was restored by the Persians to the principality of Spistan. An army sent under Baktash Sultan Ustajlu, captured Maruchang and Bala-Murshahab.

On the other hand, Haji Muhammad Khan and Nur Muhammad occupied their respective countries and sent letters full of gratitude to the Shah. In Marv, the Khutba was read and coins struck in the name of the Shah.

After these victories, the shah sent an embassy under Mirza Ali Beg to Akbar and another under Mahdi Quli to the Ottoman emperor, Sultan Muhammad III, informing them of his achievements.

Having organised the local administration, the Shah left Herat for Mashhad where he spent about a month. Thereafter he started for Astarabad where disturbances had occurred.

1. AAA. 390-98; AN. i11/803; Malcolm, i/528; Sykes ii/174.
2. AAA. 405; AN. i11/749.
From Astarabad he came to Mazandran and forced the disaffected chief Alwand Dev, to submit to him. From Mazandran the Shah came to Isfahan via Qazvin when the winter had already commenced.

In the spring of 1599 the Shah again started for Khurasan, having heard the news of further disensions among the Uzbeks. Tawkul Khan, the chief of Tashqand occupied Samarkand and attacked Pir Muhammad at Bukhara. The attack was repulsed and Samarkand was recovered from him and occupied by Baqi Khan, the brother of Din Muhammad (the deceased ruler of Herat). But conflict soon arose between Baqi Khan and Pir Muhammad. In a battle, the latter was killed and the former occupied Bukhara. The victory of Baqi Khan alarmed the nobles of Abdul Amin of Balkh and they started negotiation with the Shah who at that time was at Samnan.

The intrigues and mutual conflict among the Uzbeks gave the Shah the opportunity to play upon their jealousies. To take advantage of the opportunity, the Shah spent a whole year in Khurasan. Later in 1599, he sent a letter to Abdul Amin from Isfarain, addressed him as his "son" and assured him of his assistance. Then he came to Mashhad where he spent

1. AAA. 398 - 404.
2. Ibid. 406 - 411; AN. 111/403.
3. AAA. 411.
the winter of 1599-1600. After the Nauroz celebration he came to Herat and sent Ibrahim Khan, a prince of Abdullah Khan's family who had fallen into his hands at Herat, to overthrow Abdul Amin and occupy Balkh. A farman 'conferring' upon Ibrahim Khan the whole of Transoxiana, was given to him, and a Persian contingent under Bandaneq Khan was despatched to assist him (1600). Ibrahim Khan succeeded in occupying the throne of Balkh and sent a letter full of gratitude to the Shah (1600).¹

About the same time (1600-1601), Mirza Badiuzzaman, son of Shah Rukh Mirza, overthrew the Uzbek rule in Badakhshan and established himself in power there.²

Meanwhile, the Shah was becoming dissatisfied with the attitude of Nur Muhammad Khan. He, therefore, decided to punish the Khan and left Herat for Marv via Sarakhs. Afraid of the royal army, Nur Muhammad sought forgiveness. Baktash Sultan Ustajlu was appointed the commander and Nur Muhammad was sent to Shiraz with an assignment there. After organizing the administration of Marv and its dependencies, the Shah came back to Mashhad. After spending about a month at Qazvin, he returned to Isfahan, where he spent the winter (1600-1601).³

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1. AAA. 411-18. The above mentioned farman was drafted by Iskandar Munshi, the author of AAA.
2. AAA. 438; AN. 111/792. For details, see infra p. 56.
3. AAA. 411-18.
Soon after, Ibrahim Khan had occupied the throne of Balkh, conflict arose among his nobles. Meanwhile Ibrahim Khan died of fever sometime towards the end of 1600 or early in 1601. Baqi Khan, the ruler of Bukhara, seized the opportunity, came to Balkh and captured it along with its dependencies. Some of the Uzbek princes and nobles of Balkh again took shelter at the Persian court early in 1601. Probably alarmed at the growing power of Baqi Khan, the Shah set out on foot for Mashhad, ostensibly to pay homage to the holy shrine. He spent the winter (1601-1602) at Mashhad and began to intervene in the affairs of the Uzbeks. He asked Baqi Khan to hand over Balkh to the princes who had come to the Persian court. Baqi Khan, however, gave an evasive answer. Thereupon the Shah decided to punish him.

From Mashhad, he started for Herat. After spending a few days there, he moved on to Badghis where he stayed for two months to organise his forces. With the advent of the summer (1602), he slowly moved towards Balkh, occupying the fortresses on the way. On the outskirts of Balkh, however, he realized that his army was unable to carry on a prolonged military campaign in that far off region; the provisions were exhausted and illness had broke out in the camp. On 30th June 1602, therefore, he started retreating towards Herat where he

1. AAA. 418-23; 427-33; AN. 111/803.
stayed for about a fortnight and thence came Mashhad. Here he gave leave to his army and the generals, sent the Uzbek princes to Qazvin to their assignments, and himself started for Isfahan via Kashan. He reached Isfahan towards the end of 1602.1

When the Shah returned to Herat, Baqi Khan sent contingents to reoccupy the dependencies of Balkh captured by the Persians and himself came to recover Badakhshan for the Uzbeks (1603).2

While the Shah was on his way to Mashhad in the year 1607, Bahrain was captured by Allah Virdi Khan, the Persian Governor of Fars. Bahrain was a small island on the Persian Gulf, of considerable commercial significance and famous for its pearls, jewels and wealth. Though nominally under the ruler of the Ormuz, the Portuguese had acquired control over it. Bahrain, thenceforward, formed a part of royal dominions. Allah Virdi Khan followed up the victory of Bahrain with a successful attack on Lar, the ruler of which had adopted an arrogant attitude towards the central government and was harassing the merchants.

1. AAA. 433 - 37.

2. Ibid. 373; AN 111/817; There is a letter of Akbar to Baqi Khan (1602) in which the former warns the latter against his encroachments upon the territory of Badakhshan. cf. F2Q ff. 76.

3. AAA. 423; Malcolm, 1/529;
By 1602, the Shah Abbas had completely recovered Khurasan from the Uzbek, who no longer constituted a menace to the Persians. The rulers of Khwarazm, Marv and Sistan who owed their thrones to the moral and material support of the shah, sought his favour. There were also a few Uzbek princes of Balkh at his court whom he could use against the ruler of Transoxiana. His relations with the Mughal Emperor of Hindustan were also cordial established. Internally, the rebellions had been crushed and the control of the central government over the provinces established. The Shah was, therefore, now in a position to launch a campaign against the Ottomans to recover his dominions.

Giving out lame excuses, the Persian commander of Hamadan, captured the fort of Nehawand (in 1603) at the instance of the Shah. In the September of that year the Shah started for Azarbajian, though he gave out that he was going to Mazandran. He surprised the Ottoman commander of Tabrez, Ali Pasha, defeated him and captured Tabrez. He then captured the fort of Nakhchwan and proceeded to lay siege to Erivan. While the siege was still going on, Sultan Muhammad III died in 1604. The Ottoman army was disheartened and demoralised and the fort soon fell to the Persians. A Persians contingent stormed Qarabagh, plundered it and returned to Erivan.¹ Mean-

¹. AAA. 439-455. Kier ascribes the Persian attack on Azarbajian and the victories of Shah Abbas to internal revolts in the Ottoman Empire. Hist. of the Ottomans 1/232. However, the revolts followed the death of Sultan Muhammad III, while the Persian attack preceded it.
while, Azon Ahmad, the Ottoman Governor of Baghdad attacked Hamadan, but he was defeated and captured by the Persians.¹

Late in 1604, another Turkish army under Sinan Pasha came to attack Tabrez, but knowing that the Shah was still at Erivan, returned to Van. The Shah returned to Tabrez. The Ottomans then attacked Khoy and Marand in 1606. The attack was, however, again repulsed and the Persians captured Van. Meanwhile a rebellion of the Kurds was also suppressed.²

During the siege, after the conquest of Erivan, Abbas received Mir Masum Bhakkari, the envoy sent by Akbar. After few months Mir Masum was given leave to return.³

Notwithstanding the protestation of friendship with the Mughals, and even before Mir Masum had reached India, the Persian officers at Khurasan attacked and captured Bust, a small fortress to the west of Qandhar and a dependency of zamindawar, then in the possession of the Mughals (1605). The Mughal attempts to recover it failed.⁴

¹. AAA. 459.  
². Ibid. 464-68; 472-85; Kier : Hist. of the Ottoman (Urdu trans.) 1/232.  
³. AAA. 448; AN. 111/836; RZT ff.11/583. In the letter sent through Mir Masum (1604), Abbas described his victories against the Ottomans and occupation of Tabrez, Nackchihan, and Erivan. cf. JM. ff.209b, 211b. There are two other letters addressed to Prince Daniyal and Prince Salim (sent during the siege of Van 1604-05) in which the Shah referred to the above victories and siege of Van. cf. JM. ff.212b., 224b. For the contents of the letters see infra p. 82, 84  
⁴. AAA. 468; AN. 111/828.
The death of Baqi Khan in 1605, and the difficulty which Wali Muhammad, his brother, was finding in consolidating his position, provided Shah Abbas with further opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the Uzbek empire. Jahangir Khan, the grandson of Pir Muhammad, the former ruler of Balkh, and his nobles who were in attendance upon the shah after they had been driven out by Baqi Khan, took leave from Shah Abbas to retrieve their possessions. With the help of the Persian Governor of Herat, they acquired Ghorjistan. The tribal chiefs of the Hazarajat and sadjat, to whose allegiance the Mughals laid claim, also submitted to Jahangir Khan. When, however, Jahangir Khan advanced towards Balkh, he was defeated by Wali Muhammad and compelled to fall back upon Ghorjistan (1606).

Taking advantage of the disturbance following Prince Khusrau's revolt, the Persian officers of Khurasan attacked Gandahar in 1606. But the Mughal commander held out and the Persians had to withdraw. Uzbek attack on Ghorjistan in which Jahangir Khan was defeated and killed and Ghorjistan was occupied by the Uzbeks.

The death of Sultan Muhammad III (1604) and the occupation of the strategic places of Tabrez, Erivan and Van, provided the shah with an opportunity to push his plans further in the west. During the years 1605-06, he captured many places in the Shirwan and Gurjistan (Georgia) which included Genga, Tiflis, Ordubad, Shmaki, Balkoba and Derbent. 2

1. Ghorjistan was the country laying across the river Hari to the frontiers of Bamian, Ghazin and Kabul. It has also been called Ghoristan and Ghorsfilshtan of strange 'Land of the Eastern Caliphate' 416.

2. AAA. 494.

3. Ibid. 683; TJ.41; MJ. 22a; IJ.516; AA. ff. 213.

4. AAA. 496-517.
The Shah proceeded to Khurasan, ostensibly to pay homage to the shrine of Imam-i-Riza at Mashhad. The visit was presumably motivated by other considerations. Wali Muhammad, after repulsing Jahangir Khan from Balkh, had attacked Khurasan early in 1607, but the attack was repulsed. The Shah might also have been apprehensive of a Mughal counter attack after the failure of the Persian invasion of Qandahar. The arrival of the Shah at Khurasan, however, brought about the desired result. Wali Muhammad sent his envoy to apologize to the Shah for his attack. The Shah accepted the apology and sent in return an envoy to him. At the same time, Shah Abbas having already sent a letter of regret to Jahangir for the attack upon Qandahar, now felt assured that the Mughals did not contemplate any attack, and he left Khurasan for Isfahan (Nov. 1608).

When the Shah reached the capital, he heard that the chiefs of the Jalali tribe, having been driven out by the Ottomans from their homelands of Amosya and Tuqat, were coming down to Azarbaijan. In the spring of 1609, the Shah received these chiefs at his capital and after showing them favour ordered that they be settled in Kurdistan, probably to utilize them against the turbulent Kurds.

1. AAA. 523.
2. Ibid, 539.
After sending in 1610, Yadgar Ali Sultan Talish to the Mughal Emperor Jahangir to convey to the Emperor his condolence on the death of Akbar and congratulations on his accession, the Shah started for Sultaniah, to supervise personally the rehabilitation of the Jalalis and to crush the resistance of the Kurds. Meanwhile an Ottoman envoy, Khairuddin, waited upon the Shah to settle the boundaries of the two empires. But it appears that no settlement could be reached, since in the following year, the Ottomans attacked Tabrez. However, the Shah remained busy in Azarbaijan and its adjacent provinces. A disaffected chief of Ormia was defeated and killed (1611). Then he came to Maragha and heartlessly massacred the rebellious tribes. Meanwhile, Murad Pasha, the Ottoman Sadri-Azam himself came and attacked Tabrez. The attack was, however, repulsed and the Shah returned to Isfahan where he spent the winter (1611-12).

After establishing his power in Transoxiana, Wali Muhammad had appointed his nephews, Imam Quli and Nahr Muhammad, sons of Din Muhammad, as Viceroy of Samarkand and Balkh respectively. In 1612, the nephews rebelled, defeated him and drove him out of Bukhara. Wali Muhammad fled to the Shah.

1. AAA. 552; TJ 93; IJ 527; MJ. ff. 39; AA. ff. 218.
2. AAA. 556, 73, 580, 585; Malcolm. Hist. of Persia 1/546; Kier, Hist. of the Ottomans (Urdu trans.) 1/234.
This civil war again provided an opportunity to the Shah to interfere in the affairs of the Uzbeks. He received Wali Muhammad favourably, met him in his private apartment and sent a Persian contingent to help him recover his possession.\(^1\)

After despatching Wali Muhammad, the Shah again left the capital for Nehawand in June-July 1612, expecting a fresh attack by the Ottomans. After strengthening its defences, the Shah visited Sultaniah, Ardabil and Tabrez. At Tabrez he spent three months (Sept. - Nov.) in garrisoning the newly erected fort and demolishing the old one. Late in Nov. or early in Dec. 1612, the Shah returned to Mazandran where he spent the winter (1612-13).\(^2\)

In the spring of 1613, the Shah started for Mashhad via Firoz Koh,\(^3\) presumably because he wanted to watch the situation in Central Asia. Wali Muhammad had captured Bukhara. But as he advanced towards Samarqand he was defeated and killed by the combined forces of Imam Quli and Nazr (1613).\(^4\)

The Shah, after spending a short time at Mashhad, returned to Mazandran via Astarabad, in the autumn and spent the winter there (1613-14).

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1. AAA. 598 - 94.
2. AAA. 599 - 605.
3. AAA. 599 - 605.
4. AAA. 599 - 605.
After the Nauroz celebrations of 1614, he started from Mazandran for Isfahan. Here he heard the news of the occupation of the fort of Ibn-i-Fahl in Makran by the Persian Governor of Kerman.

At Isfahan, the Shah also received the envoys from the states of the Deccan: Mir Khalilullah from Adil Shah of Bijapur and others from Qutb Shah of Golconda and Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar. In view of the close friendship between the Shah and the Mughal Emperor, the above states had requested the Shah to recommend their case to the latter who had adopted a hostile attitude towards them. Accordingly, Shah Abbas sent a letter to the Emperor requesting him to adopt a benevolent attitude towards them. The envoys from the Deccan were also dismissed and in return ambassadors were despatched.

As the news of disturbances had reached the Shah, he set out for Gurjistan in Sept, 1614. About the same time the Uzbeks began to ravage his eastern dominions. Yalangtush Bahadur made plundering raids upon Marv and Mashhad. Next

1. AAA. 609.
2. AAA.612; AA.ff.218; ZSA iv/115. For the letter of the Shah to Jahangir in this context cf. JM ff.229b; also ZSA iv/302. For the contents of the letter see infra. p. 213.
3. Yalangtush Bahadur was the Ataliq (a post similar to that of the Wakil of the Mughals) of Nazr Muhammad, the ruler of Balkh. He was given the post sometime after the victory of Nazr Muhammad and Imam Quli over Wali Muhammad (1611-12) and the establishment of their independent rule at Balkh and Bukhara respectively. He continued in the post until 1641. AAA. 588-91,59, 96; Badshahnama (Lahore) i/220-21; Badshahnama (Qazvini) f. 259a.
year, Qaratghan Uzbek came with 5,000 Uzbeks and plundered Jam, Khwaf (Khur) and adjacent places. He was, however, beaten back when he attacked Herat. Again, a group of Arlat Chaghtais under Chalma Sultan, attacked Maruchaq and killed its commander, Quzaq Sultan, the son of Husain Khan, the Governor of Khurasan. After suppressing the revolt in Gurjistan, the Shah came to Mazandran to watch the situation in the eastern provinces.

Disturbances broke out again in the west. There was a rebellion in Qarabagh; and a Turkish army laid seige to Erivan (1615). The Shah, who was at this time at Mazandran, started for Azarbaijan, defeated the Georgians and punished them severly. He then rushed to Erivan for its relief. The besiegers had to withdraw. The Shah returned to Nakhehwan. But in the east, the Uzbeks again attacked the area between Sarakhd and Herat. A Persian detachment sent to repulse them was defeated by them.

Meanwhile Sultan Ahmad I of Turkey died in 1616 and was succeeded by his brother, Sultan Mustafa who was half-mad. He was soon deposed and Sultan Usman, son of Sultan Ahmad I, was raised to the throne in 1618. During this period again the Uzbeks came and attacked various places in Khurasan, going

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1. AAA. 624, 25, 31.
2. AAA. 626 - 41.
3. Ibid. 643.
4. Ibid. 652; Kier, 1/240-42.
as far as Nishapur, and then returned. In view of the growing Uzbek menace in the East, the Shah started negotiation for peace with the new Ottoman Sultan. But Khalil Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Diyarbakir, paying no heed to the negotiations, attacked Tabrez. He was, however, defeated by the Persians; now he sued for peace. Thereupon the Shah sent Yadgar Ali Talish to the Sultan to conclude peace.

In the same year (1618) when Abbas returned from Tabrez to Qazvin, he received Khan Alam whom the Mughal Emperor Jahangir had sent to him. The Shah showed special favour to the ambassador. Shaikh Muhammad Khatoon, an envoy from the Sultan of Golconda (Deccan), also came this year. Meanwhile, Husain Khan, the Persian Governor of Khurasan died in 1618. His son, Hasan Khan, was appointed on his post. The change induced the Uzbeks to invade Khurasan, and Yalangtush Bahadur made attacked Ghorian, but he was repulsed by local officers.

In 1619 Yadgar Ali Talish returned from Turkey. His mission proved successful and the terms were settled. Sultan Usman despatched Ibrahim Aqa with Yadgar Ali, along with a

1. AAA. 653.
2. AAA. 657 – 61; In his letter to Jahangir (1619), Abbas refers to his above mentioned victories. For the letter see JM ff. 219b.; ZSA iv/300. For the content of the letter see infra, p. 122
3. AAA. 661; TJ 121; ZSA iv/79.
4. AAA. 663.
5. AAA. 663.
letter and presents. In return Shah Abbas sent Takhta Beg Yuzbashi with presents and letter to the Sultan. Khan Alam was also dismissed in the same year and Zainul Beg was despatched with him to Jahangir. The envoys from the Deccan were also given leave and Persian envoys were despatched with them.

Early in 1620 the shah fell ill and spent almost the whole year in Mazandran. Here an envoy from Nizam Shah of the Deccan, Habsh Khan, waited upon him. When in the spring of 1621, the Shah left Mazandran for Isfahan, the envoy took leave for pilgrimage to Mashhad. After performing it, he returned to Isfahan. When the Shah arrived at Isfahan, Malik Mirza, the ruler of Kech and Makran, waited upon him. The Shah received him favourably and confirmed him in his possessions. During the same year, Takhta Beg returned from Turkey along with a Turkish envoy who brought presents and letter of friendship from Sultan Usman. Meanwhile, the Uzbeks attacked the fort of Bala Murghab, massacred the garrison and captured the fort. They then attacked Badghis but returned.

1. AAA. 668.
2. Ibid. 669. TJ. 321; MJ ff.64b. Rogers and Beveridge and Dr. Beni Prasad has given the name of Persian ambassador Zambil Beg (Raw B. ii/178 etc.; Beni Prasad, Jahangir 341. But the correct name is Zainul Beg.
3. AAA. 670.
4. AAA. 679.
5. AAA. 673; 76-77.
The Shah was naturally feeling concerned about the frequent Uzbek attacks on Khurasan, and was awaiting a favourable opportunity to punish them. Now free from the problems of the western-frontier, the Shah decided to start for Khurasan ordered that a large army be raised at Nishapur. The Shah was, however, detained at Isfahan by illness, but the news terrified the Uzbeks. Nazr Muhammad soon despatched Payinda Mirza to the Shah (Jan. Feb. 1622) with presents and a letter along with a recommendation of his mother who was the daughter of a notable Sayyid of Mashhad. The negotiation of Nazr Muhammad with Abbas alarmed his brother Imam Quli Khan who had just been defeated by the ruler of Tashqand. Therefore, he also tried to establish friendship with the Shah and employed for it the services of Khwaja Abdur Rahim, a great Sufi saint of Turan, who at that time was present at the Persian court on his way to Mecca. The Shah sent Muhammad Bag with letters showing his favour to the two rulers.

Nazr Muhammad, however, had not shown any inclination to return to the Shah the territory of Bala Murghab captured by Yalangtush in previous attack. The Shah thereupon resolved to come to Khurasan. It also seems that he thought it a favourable opportunity to try for the recovery of Qandahar.

1. AAA. 677-79.
The Persian occupation of Qandahar while on the one hand would have frightened the Uzbeks, it would on the other hand, provide the Persians another base to check the Uzbeks' activities. The subsequent events support the both inferences. The Shah, therefore, set out from Isfahan on 15th February, 1622. When he reached Farah, he was joined by the generals and the army gathered at Nishapur. Thence he started for Qandahar.

Shah Abbas reached Qandahar on 18th May 1622 and laid siege to it. A contingent under Khusrau Sultan was sent to capture the fort of Zamindawar. Due to the lack of adequate forces and provisions, Abdul Aziz, the Mughal commander of the fort, surrendered it on 21st June 1622. The fall of Qandahar was followed by the fall of Zamindawar, the commander of which had resisted longer. Abdul Aziz and his followers were allowed to go back to Hindustan.

After the Shah occupied the fort of Qandahar, he despatched with Abdul Aziz, Haidar Beg Yuzbashi to the Mughal Emperor to apologize for his occupation of Qandahar which, according to him, was not guided by ill-intentions towards his territories, but happened due to unpleasant and presum-

1. AAA. 679, 82-88; TJ 345; MJ. ff. 68; AA. ff. 220.
2. AAA. 679, 82-88; TJ 345; MJ. ff. 68; AA. ff. 220.
the Shah also received Zahid Beg, an envoy from Prince Shahjahan of Hindustan. The envoy was sent on a goodwill mission, had brought a letter of the Prince and was dismissed soon with favours and a letter to the Prince.

Meanwhile, the Shah was busy in organizing the affairs of Qandahar. Ganj Ali Khan, the experienced Governor of Kerman, was appointed as the commander of Qandahar. Another officer, Ahmad Sultan by name, was instructed to arrange for provisions and the repairs of the damaged fort. The Shah also transplanted some Kurdish tribes at Qandahar for its security. After these arrangements were made, he left Qandahar for Herat on 6th July 1622. On his way, he halted at Hasan Abdal where he received placating letter of Yalangtush. After a fortnight stay there, the Shah started for Herat and entered the city on 7th August 1622.

At Herat the Shah heard the news of victory of his army over the Portuguese of Ormuz. While he was still busy in the siege of Qandahar, Imam Quli Khan, his Governor of Fars, according to his instructions, entered into an alliance

1. AAA. 686; TJ.349; ZSA iv/103. The Letter sent through Haidar Beg is given in TJ 349; JM. ff.220a; JIB ff.272a; ZSA. iv/103. For the contents of the letter see infra. p. 158
2. AAA. 687; ZSA iv/109. The letter of Abbas to the Prince is quoted in JM ff. 226; JIB ff. 211a; FZQ ff. 80a. For the contents of the letter see infra p. 159
3. AAA. 688.
with the English and attackedOrmuz, a port of great economic, commercial as well as strategical significance in the Persian Gulf, held at that time by the Portuguese. The Portuguese were defeated and driven out and the port was given to the English on certain conditions. A Persian officer was appointed there as Royal Resident.

The Persian occupation of Gandahar frightened the Uzbeks. The stay of the Shah at Herat created further apprehension in their minds. Nazr Muhammad, therefore, dismissed the Persian envoy, Saleh Beg and despatched Ibrahim Khwaja with him to strengthen the bond of friendship between the two. The Uzbeks also hurried to surrender to the Persians the fort of Bala Murghab which they had captured the previous year. Their raids on Persian territory ceased to occur and Nazr Muhammad continued to send one envoy after another. From Herat, the Shah also despatched an envoy to Sultan Usman of Turkey to inform him about of his victory over

1. AAA. 669-92. Ormuz fell to the Persians on 22nd May 1622b. Danvers, Portuguese in India 11/2/12. The Shah was contemplating the capture of Ormuz as early as in 1613, when the Persians attacked Bandel. After two years of English settlement at Combroon (1620), the Persians carried out their plan against the Portuguese in 1622. For detail of the attempts of the English and the Persians to open trade with Persia, cf. Danvers 11/208-12; also Thomas Roe's letter to Abbas and the former discussions on the subject with Muhammad Riza, the Persian ambassador to India (1516-17), cf. Embassy of Roe. 114, 232-34.

2. Ibid. 692, 700.
Qandahar as well as over the Portuguese, a common enemy of the two.

While the Shah was still at Herat, an Ottoman envoy waited upon him and told the story of the assassination of Sultan Usman by some disaffected nobles and remonstration of Sultan Mustafa who was half-mad and who had been previously deposed (1618). These events led to the dissolution and chaos in the Ottoman empire. In the distant frontier-province of Iraq-i-Arabo, quarrels started among the local officers. Bakar Aqa, the general of Baghdad, even invited Shah Abbas. The Shah, realizing that this was an opportunity to extend his empire further in Iraq, decided to start for Isfahan. After two and a half months' stay at Herat, and knowing the intrigues in Mughal court, and not expecting any immediate Mughal attempt for the recovery of Qandahar, he left Herat in October 1622, for Mazandran, via Mashhad.

1. Ibid. 693. In the letter sent from Herat to Sultan Usman and his Wazir, the shah accounts for his attack on and capture of Qandahar, the placating attitude of the Uzbek after this victory and surrender of Bala-Murghab by them. He also describes his victory over the Portuguese at Ormuz and says that he engaged them at Ormuz so that they might not write in His Majesty. cf. JM. ff.174b, 200a.

2. AAA. 693-94; Kier, Hist.of the Ottomans (Urdu trans.) 1/249-50. Kier writes that the new Sultan was a puppet in the hands of the Jan Nisars and within a short period of 16 months, they changed six ministers after which they deposed the Sultan himself and raised to the throne Murad IV who was a minor (1624).

3. AAA. 695.
At Mazandran, both Zainul Beg and Haidar Beg, who were sent to the Mughal court before and after the fall of Qandahar respectively, waited upon the shah. After a brief halt at Mazandran, he came to Isfahan. Here, he dismissed the envoy of Nazr Muhammad Uzbek, despatched a strong army under Safi Quli, to Baghdad and himself followed it (1623). He captured Baghdad for himself and was now defending it against the Shah. When persuasion failed, the Shah laid siege to it. After a siege of twenty days, it fell to the Shah on 12th January 1624 and on 19th of the same month 'Khutba was read in the name of the twelve Imams' in the great mosque of Caliph Mustansir Billah, at Baghdad. A reinforcement under Hasan Pasha, the Ottoman commander of Musul, was also defeated and Musul and Kirkuk were also occupied by the Persians. The fort of Akhsaqa was captured by a Persian detachment.

The Shah then went to Karbala and Najaf, the two dependencies of Baghdad. After paying homage to and organizing

1. AAA. 699; Tj. 348.
2. AAA. 706; Kier, Hist. of the Ottoman (Urdu trans.) i/250. Kier writes that the Baghdad fell after a siege of three months, and even then by stratagem. But the duration of thirty days, given by AAA. is also supported by Abbas' above mentioned letter to Jahangir, cf. JM. ff.222a. For the contents of the letter see infra. p. 166.
3. AAA. 707 - 09.
the affairs of the shrines, he returned to Isfahan. When he reached Isfahan in July 1624, he sent Aqa Muhammad Mustanfi to the Mughal Emperor with presents and a letter describing his victories in Iraq. Meanwhile, an envoy from Nazr Muhammad arrived at the Persian court, along with a letter and present for the Shah. When the Shah started from Isfahan for Mazandran, Khwaja Haji waited upon him at Ashraf. He had been sent by Prince Khurram of Hindustan, with presents and a letter, in which he had described his quarrel with his father and asked for help. The envoy was dismissed soon along with a letter to the Prince in which the Shah promised to recommend his case to the Emperor.

In the beginning of 1625, the Ottomans made another bid for the recovery of Musal and attacked it. The invasion was, however, repulsed by the Persians. But soon afterwards, the Kurds, probably encouraged by the Turks, invested Najaf and Karbala. The Shah sent Zainul Beg was still on his way, the chief of Kartel, Mero by name, raised the standard of rebellion, invested various fortress and invited the Ottoman Governor of Diyarbakir to form a coalition against the Persians. As the news of these rebellions spread, disturbances broke out in the border area. Opportunity was seized by the

1. AAA. 712; TJ. 399; MJ ff. 11/3; The letter see infra p. 166
2. AAA. 715.
Ottomans. Hafiz Pasha, the new Ottoman minister, came with a huge army and laid siege to Baghdad (1626).

On hearing the bad news, Shah Abbas, who at that time had gone to Ardabil to suppress the Georgians, himself rushed to the relief of Baghdad. He halted at the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Bahraiz, established contact with the besieged, managed to supply them with provisions through the river, and harassed the besiegers from outside. After a long siege, the Turks had to withdraw with heavy losses (1626). The Shah, after their withdrawal, reorganized the affairs of Baghdad, appointed officers for the repair of the fort, stationed a strong garrison, and came to Sultaniah. Here he instructed the commanders of the various frontier regions to strengthen their respective forts, and himself came to Mazandaran where he spent the winter (1626-27).

After spring (1627), the Shah left Mazandaran for Qazvin and thence came to Sultaniah where an Ottoman attack was expected. From Sultaniah, he despatched generals to Tabrez, Gurjistan (Georgia) and Van to safeguard the frontiers.

1. AAA. 716 - 40; Sykes, Hist. of Persia ii/179. Kiers writes that the Ottomans had to withdraw mainly due to dissension in their camp. In retreat, one man out of ten was slaughtered by the Persians. Hist. of the Ottomans (Urdu trans.) i/251;
against the Ottomans as well as against internal disturbances. The Turks were, however, occupied with their internal dissensions and no invasion occurred. The Shah then returned to Mazandran, and spent the winter there (1627-28). Here he heard the news of the death of Prince Parwez in India and despatched Takhta Beg to Jahangir, to convey his condolence. At Isfahan the envoy learnt the death of Jahangir himself (October, 1627) and probably suspended his mission.

Early in 1628, the news of a fresh Ottoman attack reached the Shah and in the spring he came down to Qazvin and ordered that an army be raised at Sultaniah. As almost whole of Iraq-i-Arab was now in the possession of the Shah, he decided to capture the last Turkish stronghold in the region. He moved to Mazandran, and ordered Imam Quli, the governor of Fars, to capture Basra, which was a port of great strategic and commercial significance, and was regarded as a dependency of Baghdad.

1. AAA. 746-48. Soon after his return from his unsuccessful expedition of Baghdad, Hafiz Pasha was deposed and Khalil Pasha succeeded him as the Wazir, who remained busy against a disaffected noble Ayaz Pasha and launched a six-month's campaign in Erzurum. Kier, 1/252.

2. AAA. 749-50. It seems that the embassy of Takhta Beg was suspended. The letters which the Shah wrote to Jahangir and Nurjahan separately, are, however, recorded in JM. cf. ff. 218a.

3. AAA. 756.
The Shah then moved to Qazvin, but fell ill. Thereupon, he returned to Mazandran, where his health began to improve. But after sometime, as he was returning from a hunting expedition, he had an attack of dysentery. All attempts to stop it failed and the Shah breathed his last in Mazandran, on Thursday, 24th Jumadi I 1038 A.H. (18th January, 1629). Imam Quli heard the news while he was on his way to Basra. He, therefore, abandoned the expedition and returned.  

1. *AAA. 753 - 57.*
CHAPTER II

RELATION WITH AKBAR

Before 1588:

Shah Tahmasp's relations with the Mughals appear to have been determined primarily by his desire to occupy Qandahar. Before Humayun's expulsion from India, the Shah made several attempts to occupy Qandahar. But these attempts were beaten back by Mirza Kamran. Apparently the help given by the Shah to Humayun was motivated by the desire to acquire Qandahar. However, even before the Persian armies could enter Qandahar, the Mughal nobles started joining Humayun and the latter sent back the Persian contingent which had come to help him. Humayun was able to consolidate his position in Afghanistan without any further Persian assistance and, therefore, felt no compulsion to cede Qandahar to the Persians. There is no evidence to suggest that Shah Tahmasp maintained cordial relations with Humayun, after the latter's return to Afghanistan.

1. AN 1/230 - 39
Shortly after Humayun's death, while Akbar was still a minor and the Mughals were preoccupied with reestablishing their empire in India, Shah Tahmasp occupied Qandahar in 1558. The shah claimed that this action of his was in conformity with the promise which had been given him by Humayun and was not intended to be an act of hostility towards the Mughals. In 1563, Shah Tahmasp sent an embassy to Akbar with letters and presents, to convey his condolence on the death of Humayun and congratulations on Akbar's accession. The embassy was received with every mark of favour, though no envoy was sent in return.

The Mughals claimed that they were not forced to surrender Qandahar because of Persian military superiority, but it was done voluntarily, because Akbar valued traditional friendship of his house. This statement, however, does not conform to facts. If the Mughal empire had at that time been in a position to resist, a struggle would almost certainly have taken place. What is, however, significant that Akbar did not even show his displeasure at the action of the Shah and accepted the fait accompli and thus gave de jure recognition to the Persian annexation.

1. ANB ii/79; AAA. 326; AT ff.223; TD ff. 535; ZSA i/216.
2. AN. iii/170; TD ff. 542; ZSA i/216.
3. AN. ii/79; TD ff. 535.
With his hands still full in Hindustan, with Mirza Hakim being virtually in autonomous control of Kabul, with Mirza Sulaiman of Badakhshan, coveting Kabul for himself and with Sindh outside his empire, Akbar, it seems, felt no desire to worsen his relations with the shah. But for the very reasons, he felt there was no need to maintain cordial relations with Persia. Therefore, Akbar not only sent no envoy in 1563, but also did not care for to send an envoy on the death of Shah Tahmasp or of Shah Ismail II.¹

Shah Tahmasp, having being despised from the reception given to his ambassador in 1563 that the Mughals did not counter attack upon Qandahar, and having gained knowledge of the fact that the Mughal empire was not a force to reckoned with in Afghanistan, had no reason left to continue his relations with the Mughals.

After a gap of practically two decades another Persian ambassador, Murshid Tabrezl came to Akbar's court. He was sent by Prince Abbas who had been proclaimed Shah at Khurasan in 1681. The purpose of the embassy was to seek the help of Akbar against shah Muhammad Khudabanda who was attempting to suppress the rebellion of his son.² Although the date of

1. As complained by Shah Abbas in his letter to Akbar (1591) cf. JM. ff. 206; 23A l/228.
2. AN ii/587.
the departure of this embassy is not mentioned by the chronicles, it may be guessed that it must have been sent soon after the occupation of Kabul by Akbar's troops, following by invasion of Lahore by Mirza Hakim in 1581. The steps taken by Akbar to consolidate his hold over Kabul had alarmed even Abdullah Khan Uzbek. It is, therefore, quite possible that prince Abbas, realizing that Akbar's interests in Kabul might lead it to attempt the recovery of Qandahar, or the occupation of the other dependencies of Khurasan, wanted to forestall such an eventuality by seeking Akbar's friendship. Alternatively, he might even be hoping for an alliance with the Mughal empire against his father on the basis of the cession of Qandahar.

However, Akbar was not prepared to get himself involved in the internal strife of Persia at a time when he had begun to consider the attitude of the Uzbeks as menacing. He, therefore, sent back the message that he did not regard the prince as worthy of an answer because he had rebelled against his visible God, i.e. father. The renewed Ottoman attacks on Western Persia must have made it obvious to Akbar that the prince stood in no danger of being overthrown.

1. AN. 111/583.
2. AAA. 166, 70, 83, 213, 23; Kier, i/224; Sykes 11/177.
Hasrullah Falsafi, the author of 'Zindegan-i-Shah Abbas I', has expressed the view that Abbas had sent Murshid Tabrezi to Akbar to seek his help against Abdullah Khan Uzbek.

'As there was anarchy in Khurasan and the Khan was very powerful, Abar did not think it wise to help the prince.' 1 This observation is difficult to accept. The first attack of Abdullah Khan on Herat occurred in 1588. Considering that Murshid Quli himself showed dilatoriness in going to the help of his rival Ali Quli at Herat, it is very unlikely he would have sought the help of Akbar against Abdullah Khan. Moreover, the explicit statement of Abul Fazl that the prince had sought Akbar's help against his father after he was proclaimed the king of Khurasan, cannot be rejected in the absence of any other contemporary testimony.

In 1584 Shah Muhammad sent Sultan Quli Awaghli to Akbar's court. The purpose of this embassy is not clear. But from casual references, it appears that Shah Muhammad had sought Akbar's help against the Ottomans and against the internal rebels. 2 It is obvious that the Shah could not have seriously expected Akbar to give him any help against the Ottomans. It, therefore, appears that the purpose of this embassy was to ensure that Akbar did not give any help to

1. ZSA 1/217.
2. ZSA 1/216; also letter of Akbar to Abdullah Khan Uzbek (1586) AN 111/499; IAF 1/11; ZSA 1/216.
prince Abbas. There is no record of reply being sent by
Akbar to this letter. But from latter references it seems
Akbar conveyed to the envoy expressions of friendship and
sympathy for the Shah.

The friendliness shown by Akbar towards the Safavid
empire on the occasion of the visit of both the embassies, is
not without significance. Since his occupation of Kabul in
1681, Akbar had become conscious of the importance of defend-
ing it in the interest of the security of his Indian domi-

nions. The growing power of Abdullah Khan Uzbek, the internal
strife in Persia and the Ottoman attacks upon the Safavid
possessions, had upset the balance of power in West Asia. The
weakening of the Persian empire had virtually eliminated
the most powerful check upon the aggressive designs of Abdullah
Khan Uzbek. Akbar, therefore, was alarmed at the worsening
of the international situation. It is not surprising that he
desired that Persia should be strengthened. Already in 1577
Abdullah Khan had proposed to Akbar a joint attack upon Persia.

This proposal had been summarily rejected by Akbar on the
ground of the traditional friendship between the Mughals
and the Safavids. It is obvious that even in 1577 Akbar had
begun to realize that the growing power of Abdullah Uzbek had
posed a threat to the security of his empire and it had to
be counterpoised by friendship with Persia.

1. ZSA, 1/216; also letter of Akbar to Abdullah Khan Uzbek
(1586) AN 111/499; IAF 1/11; ZSA 1/216.
2. AN. 111/211.
The Uzbek occupation of Balkh and Badakhshan (1586-86)\(^1\) directly threatened the security of Kabul. Abdullah Khan sought to allay the apprehension of Akbar by protesting friendship and by proposing again a joint action against the Safavid empire. In his reply sent to Abdullah Khan Uzbek in 1686, with Hakim Human, Akbar expressed warmest sentiments of friendship for the Safavids, and referred to the assistance which latter had given to his ancestors. He condemned the rebels and the Ottoman invaders and even expressed the desire to send one of the princes with troops and to proceed in person to help the Shah. Finally, he told the Uzbek Khan that, "You also should proceed from your dominions towards that country (Khurasan) so that it may become a meeting place of the two seas of glory...............Now that the association of concord and agreement is patent to all, what is proper in the matter of assisting the ruler of Iraq and Khurasan, will come forth from inner ambush to the world of manifestation,"\(^3\)

Dr. Rahim has expressed the opinion, which is shared by many distinguished modern scholars, that Abdullah Khan and Akbar had concluded an alliance for the division of Persia.\(^4\)

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1. AN. i/1434, 79.
3. Letter of Akbar to Abdullah Khan, cf. AN i/1437; IAF 1/17; ZSA. 1/217.
4. He writes in "Mughal Relations with Persia and Central Asia", p. 78: There is no doubt that an agreement was concluded with the Khan (Abdullah Khan) on the division of Persia.
He says: "That the agreement was reached is proved by the following remarks in connection with Hakim Humam's return: "He conveyed the praise and supplication of the ruler of Turan, who represented that the conquests of Herat and Khurassan were due to the blessed influence of World's Lord." ¹

Dr. Rahim further argues: "Abdul Momin in his letter to Murad III also refers to this alliance in the following words: 'The Padshah of India has strengthened the bonds of friendship with this magnificent House by sending Hakim Humam, one of his chosen courtiers, with presents, gifts and loving letter and has formed an alliance."² He finally remarks," All doubt remove by the following passage from Imam Quli's letter to Jahangir: 'As between the noble kings — dwellers of Paradise — Abdullah Khan and Akbar Padshah, a treaty and alliance for the conquest of the road to holy places had occurred — due to this religious alliance and unity between the sovereigns, a great portion of Iraq and Persia and the whole of Khurassan was conquered'.³

A close examination of Akbar's letter sent with Hakim Humam suggests that Akbar, far from entering into an alliance for the division of Persia, was, in fact, trying to dissuade

¹. Rahim, 78 (cf. AN iii/566).
². Rahim, 79.
³. Rahim, 79.
Abdullah Khan from attacking the Safavid empire. Akbar condemns the Ottomans for launching an attack on the family of the Prophet which he regards as deviation from the Sunnah and, therefore, regards it his duty to assist the Shah against such attacks. Akbar considers himself under a moral obligation to help the Safavid Shah due to the traditional friendship between the two dynasties and because they had helped his father and grandfather. He expresses a desire to send one of the princes to help the Shah and even to proceed himself for the purpose. Obviously it indicates that Akbar was prepared to give the Persians his moral support against any attack, not merely an attack by the Ottomans. Secondly, Akbar categorically calls the Shah as the ruler of Iraq and Khurasan, which indicates that he regarded Khurasan as an integral part of the Persian empire. Finally, Akbar writes in the letter that if the Khan were contemplating to go to Khurasan, he would also go and meet him there so that the two might jointly devise ways and means of helping the Shah. This appears to be a veiled threat to Abdullah Khan that Akbar would not countenance any aggressive Uzbek action against Khurasan, especially at a time when the Shah was fighting the Ottomans and Khurasan was in virtual revolt against the central authority.

Dr. Rahim himself observes about the letter of Akbar: "In fact the threat of help to Persia was a direct challenge to Abdullah Khan, and the words attributed to the Sultan were
probably indirectly applicable to the Khan as well.\textsuperscript{1} This remark of Dr. Rahim can hardly be reconciled with the opinion of the learned scholar quoted earlier.

The reference to the alliance of Abdullah Khan and Akbar in the letter of Imam Quli to Jahangir, referred to by Dr. Rahim, is not of much value in the absence of any positive evidence, particularly because the envoy and the letter to Jahangir were sent by the former after the Persian occupation of Qandahar in 1622 A.D.\textsuperscript{2} It was mere opportunism on the part of Imam Quli who was trying to utilise Jahangir’s resentment for establishing friendship with the Mughals, although only a few years previously, he had apologised to the Shah through the same envoy for his unfriendly actions and tried to establish friendship with him.\textsuperscript{3}

The representation of Hakim Husam on behalf of Abdullah Khan to which Dr. Rahim has referred, seems to be hardly anything more than mere formality on the part of the Khan. The contents of the letter of Abdul Mumin to Sultan Murad III of Turkey, too, which Dr. Rahim has mentioned, do not bear any reference to an alliance for the division of Persia. The claim of close friendship between the Uzbeks and the Mughals is highly exaggerated and does not correspond to facts.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Rahim 78.
\item[2.] TJ 416; MJ. ff. 11.
\item[3.] AAA. 678.
\item[4.] See Infra p. 70
\end{itemize}
It may, therefore, be inferred that at the time of
Shah Abbas's accession at Qazvin in 1588, Akbar was enter-
taining sentiments of friendship towards Persia and was
apprehensive of the aggressive designs of Abdullah Khan Uzbek.

Accession and the Despatch of Embassy:

After ascending the throne at Qazvin, Shah Abbas was
expecting an embassy from Akbar offering congratulation on
the accession. Akbar, however, did not send any embassy.
presumably because the internal situation in Persia continued
to be uncertain and Shah Muhammad was still alive. However,
the Shah decided to send Yadgar Ali Sultan Rumâì on an
embassy to Akbar, after he had concluded a humiliating treaty
with the Ottomans and had decided to face the Uzbeks in
Khurasan.

In the letter sent with Yadgar Ali Sultan, Abbas
reminded Akbar of the old friendship between Shah Tahir Damasp
and Emperor Humayun; the latter's visit to Persia and the
help rendered to him by the former for the recovery of his

1. Expressed by Akbar himself in his letter to Abbas (1595)
cf. JM, ff. 205; RZT ff. i/583.
2. AAA, 290; AN 111/587; RZT ff. 1/474; AA ff. 304; ZSA i/218.
3. The letter of Abbas to Akbar (1591) cf. JM ff. 202b;
ZSA 1/218.
his throne. Abbas then complained that Akbar had not sent any ambassador to Persia on the death of Shah Tahmasp, in spite of the fact that the latter had sent an envoy with congratulations on his accession. Nor had he sent any one on the death of Prince Hamza Mirza. Next, Abbas described his own accession and the despatch of Yadgar Ali Sultan to carry to His Majesty this letter of friendship and inform him about the contents of it. In the end the Shah assured Akbar of his willingness to see of service to the latter; and expressed the hope that Akbar would adopt the same attitude towards him and would not permit any breach of friendship.

1. The Persian text of this portion is as follows:

According to Iskandar Munshi, the Shah had explicitly sought the support of Akbar against the Abdullah Khan Uzbek in these words:

جواب بر حسب اتفاقيہ قضا عبدالله خان و جنود او زیریکه بر خراسان ستوی کشته همک هم بدعاف سیاہ اور سیاہ و استخلاص مالکه حربت خراسان مصرف است - اگر از امداد ظاهری متذکری نشانه بشتی زنگ شادی باتی دریغ تداوید -

(290 م)
Yadgar Ali Sultan arrived at the Mughal court on the 26th May 1691 and was received with every mark of favour. The real purpose of the embassy was explained orally by the ambassador, which was to seek Mughal assistance against the Uzbeks who had occupied vast regions of Khurasan.

It is obvious that Shah Abbas considered the recovery of Khurasan far more important than the expulsion of the Ottomans from the eastern part of his dominions. He was, therefore, willing to conclude a humiliating treaty with the Ottomans rather than come to an understanding with the Uzbeks for the cession of Khurasan, even though the Ottomans posed less a threat to the security and integrity of the Persian empire than the Uzbeks.

Khurasan had not been an integral part of the Persian empire. Under the Timurids, who had ruled over it from Herat, its political, economic and cultural importance had grown. The Safavids had made special efforts to bring this province under their empire. The fact that mausoleum of

1. For a detailed account of the Splendour of the court at Herat and of its numerous mosques, colleges, almhouses, beautiful gardens and Trab-Khanas, see Mrs. Beveridge's 'Baburnama', 1/302-06. Iskandar Munshi's remarks about Herat, are also worthy to be quoted here. He writes (AAA, 266):

"ملكه هرات اعظم بلاد ایران و رشته رضوان رضوان است..."

2. AAA, 27, 30, 39, 43-48.
Imam Riza was situated in the mosque at Mashhad gave to it sanctity in the eyes of the Shiites and a sentimental attachment which was deeply engrained. The Safavids took particular care to make endowments for the shrine and fostered its development as a popular place of pilgrimage, a centre of learning and an asylum for religious divines. In their capacity as the protector and benefactor of the shrine, the Safavid rulers made special claims upon the allegiance and loyalty of their subjects. The Uzbeks, being bigotted Sunnis, massacred a large number of Ulama and the people after occupying Mashhad. The loss of Khurasan, and particularly of Mashhad, severely demaged the prestige of the Persian empire and of its Shah, and created a sense of uneasiness among the people who looked with great apprehension at the rising tide of the Uzbeks.

The province of Khurasan had also considerable economic and commercial importance. Almost the entire trade of Persia with central Asia and Hindustan was carried through Khurasan. In the north-east Khurasan linked Persia through Mashhad and Marv, with Khwarazm and central Asia and beyond. In south-east it linked Persia through Herat and Qandahar, with Hindustan. The volume of trade between India and Persia had been very large.

1. AAA. 274.
Politically and strategically, Khurasan was of even greater importance. It was vital for the security of the Persian empire in the east. If it were to be occupied by an enemy, he could easily penetrate into the heart of Persia. Shahbain Khan having taken Khurasan from the Timurid prince, Sultan Husain Baqara, came as far as Kerman and threatened Shah Ismail with the occupation of Iraq. This led to a war between the two in 1610 A.D., in which Shahbain Khan was defeated and killed at Marv and Khurasan thenceforward formed a part of Persian empire, though Ubaid Khan Uzbek made repeated attempts to recapture it.¹

Shah Tahmasp used to give a subsidy of three hundred Tuman annually to the ruler of Marv so as to prevent him from penetrating into Khurasan and sacking its crops, cattles and villages. When his successors failed in paying it, Jalal Khan Uzbek, son of Din Muhammad Khan, attacked Mashhad in 1578, though he was defeated and killed by its ruler.² These were the considerations which led Shah Abbas to take the first opportunity not only of recovering Mashhad, but also ensuring that Marv remained under a friendly ruler.³

¹ See above p. 20
² Rauzatus-Safaviyah quoted in ZSA 1/44; AAA. 163.
³ AAA. 27, 38-48. ZSA 1/156.
Shah Abbas was probably aware of the fact that Abdullah Khan Uzbek was attempting to form an alliance with the Mughals so that he could occupy Khurasan. After Abbas had ascended the throne, three embassies had been despatched by the Uzbeks to Akbar within a short period of three years. In 1589, when Hakim Humam returned, Ahmad Ataliq came from Abdullah Khan to Akbar. In 1590, another ambassador was despatched by Abdul Murid Khan, to Akbar, though the envoy was drowned in the Beas. Again, on 5th January 1591, another envoy, Maulana Husaini, waited upon Akbar. These frequent Uzbek embassies alarmed the Persian Shah, particularly in the existing political circumstances.

Abbas, therefore, sent Yadgar Ali Sultan to explore the possibilities of a joint Mughal Persian attack upon the Uzbeks. This is shown by the council held at Akbar's court to devise ways and means of assisting the Shah. Some of the courtiers suggested that an army be sent to Khurasan under a prince to assist the Shah. This suggestion was turned down on the ground that it would not be proper to send an army against Abdullah Khan in view of the latter's protestation of

1. AN III/566, 78, 83. Dr. Rahim writes that Ahmad Ali Ataliq reached the Mughal court after Yadgar Ali Sultan. (Rahim, 19). But AN gives 997 (1588-89) as the year of former's arrival at the court (AN iii/566). Even the third Uzbek envoy, Maulana Husain Khurasani, whom Dr. Rahim seems to have taken as Ahmad Ataliq, arrived at the Mughal court four months earlier than Yadgar Ali (AN iii/ 583, 88).
friendship. It would be better to attempt persuasion. It is obvious that Akbar felt that an armed conflict with the Uzbeks was not desirable at a time when Persia was prostrate. It is equally apparent, however, that in this struggle his sympathy lay with Persia.

Presumably Shah Abbas was not expecting military help from the Mughal Emperor. Yadgar Ali's main purpose, therefore, was to dissuade Akbar from entering into an alliance with the Khan and encouraging him against Persia. This inference is also supported by the statement in 'Alam Ara-i-Abbasi' that the Shah desired that 'in case material help could not be given (by Akbar), he should not desist from offering spiritual and moral support.'

Akbar's occupation of Qandahar—In 1595 Akbar occupied Qandahar. This action of the Mughal Emperor is capable of being interpreted in different ways. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the question at some length.

There is no doubt that Qandahar was of great significance to the Safavids as well as to the Mughals. It was an important

1. AN, i11/587.
2. The text of the statement is as follows (AAA, 230):—

"آکر از امداد ظاهراً منعَر بانی همک و توجیه باطنی دیش و
دارد".
commercial centre where, the merchants from Persia, India, Turkey and Central Asia gathered to strike bargain with one another. It was, therefore, a source of considerably income for the power which ruled over it. When Babur captured it in 1522, he described it in these words. "Such masses of white money had never been seen in these countries; no one indeed was to heard of who had seen so much." Later on, trade through the land-route of Qandahar had increased and "in early years of the seventeenth century, nearly fourteen thousand camels passed annually from India via Qandahar into Persia". We may reasonably assume that there was at least an equal volume of export from Persia to India. Besides, India imported through the Qandahar-route horses in large numbers and this trade was very lucrative.

The strategic importance of Qandahar was even greater. "Its master can surprise Kabul at a dash. It forms one of the two gates of India, one of the two natural bases of operation for a Persian or central Asian army against India."

4. Jauhar has recorded in his *Memoirs* that in one day, a caravan, containing 1300 horses, arrived at Kelmard, (Moinul Haq, Urdu trans. p. 142).
Due to its strategic situation, it was equally important for the
security of Khurasan.

Because of these factors Qandahar had become the bone
of contention between the Mughal and Safavid empires. Babur
made numerous attempts to conquer Qandahar and ultimately
occupied it in 1522. He consolidated his hold over it and
Shah Tahmasp made numerous attempts to wrest it from the
Mughals, but Kamran frustrated his efforts. Shah Tahmasp then
hoped to get Qandahar from Humayun as a price for his help.
But Humayun kept the place for himself. Soon after the death
in 1568 of Humayun, the Shah, captured it without resistance. Since
that time, it remained a part of the Safavid empire until
Akbar acquired it in 1595. Its annexation by Akbar was, accord-
ing to Dr. Rahim, and the outcome of Akbar's alliance with
Abdullah Khan for the division of Persia. But it seems that
the acquisition of Qandahar by Akbar was directed not so much
against the Persians as against the Uzbeks. In order to under-
stand the real significance of the Mughal occupation of
Qandahar we must examine the circumstances leading to its
occupation by Akbar.

1. Mrs. Beveridge: Baburnama, 1/337.
3. Rahim, 19-20, Dr.-Rahim.
By 1690, Qandahar was completely cut off from Persia. The Uzbek possession of Badakhshan, Balkh and Herat had encircled it from the north and west. Shortly after, we find that the Uzbeks were penetrating into Sistan also and Qandahar was encircled from south-west too. Moreover, the Uzbeks attacks on the dependencies of Qandahar itself had begun to occur. Munshi Iskandar Beg says that after the Uzbek occupation of Khurasan, Din Muhammad, the sister's son of Abdullah Khan, and other Uzbek chiefs were constantly attacking the dominions of Muzaffar Husain Mirza, in which a large number of able and experienced Qizilbash generals and nobles were lost. According to Abul Fazl the Uzbeks had even occupied the dependencies of Zamindawar and Garmsir from the Mirzas and evacuated them only after the Mughal occupation of Qandahar.

The situation was highly alarming for Akbar. In January 1590, Akbar directed the Khan-i-Khanan to go to Qandahar and "if they (the Mirzas of Qandahar), submitted, the fertile country was to be restored to them, and they were to be brought with the army, otherwise they were to be punished and were to be made over to just administrator!" In January 1592, Prince Daniyal was given the same order by Akbar. It seems that both the orders were ambiguous, otherwise they would

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1. AAA. 331.
2. AN. 111/669.
3. ANR. 111/584, 603, 16; TD ff. 669b.
certainly have been carried out. They were probably meant firstly to induce the Safavid princes to come over to India and secondly to warn the Uzbeks against movement in that direction. The Uzbeks were already facing the Persian pressure in Khurasan and presumably wanted to avoid any action which would lead to a conflict with the Mughals. Describing the motives of Akbar for the despatch of these expeditions, Abul Fazl writes: "If the Mirza should proceed to the court, they would be caressed, and other country would be given to them, and that cultivated territory would be put under the guardianship of (Pasbain) of a discreet and first officer of the Uzbeks would be restrained from thinking of seizing it. This assistance (to Persia) would have a taintly appearance."1

However, Akbar did not press his orders, probably because he, too, wanted to avoid an armed conflict, watch the developments and acquire Qandahar by means of diplomacy. Due to the growing Uzbek menace the Safavid princes themselves were probably contemplating to come to India, and were in communication with Akbar. In 1591, an envoy of Muzaffar Hussain Mirza, the ruler of Qandahar, came to Akbar. Describing the appoint-

1. AN. 411/ 886.
2. Shah Tahmasp had appointed his nephew, Sultan Hussain Mirza, the governor of Qandahar. Sometime after the latter's death in 1577, it was divided by Shah Muhammad Khudabanda, among his sons. Qandahar proper was given to Muzaffar Husain Mirza, while Zamindawar and Garmsir were granted to Rustam Hussain Mirza, and two other minor sons. Sometime in 1590-91 conflict arose between the brothers and Rustam Hussain Mirza, apprehensive of the attitude of Muzaffar Mirza and tired of Uzbek attacks on his dominions, went to Qalat and through the commander of Ghaznin, started negotiations with Akbar and ultimately went over to the court in October 1593. He was given as mansab of 5,000 and in Multan and Buluchistan yielding a revenue many times more than his territory
ment of Prince Daniyal for the expedition of Qandahar, Abul Fazl says, "As the safety of that country (Qandahar) was beyond the capacity of the Mirzas, that jewel of fortune was sent there. Jahangir also writes that "the Mirzas sent petition to the effect that in consequence of the nearness to Khurasan and the coming of Abdullah Khan Uzbek to that country, they could not leave the charge of looking after the country."  

Abdullah Khan, on the other hand, was also desirous of occupying Qandahar. The occupation of Qandahar would not only complete the chain of his dominions from Khwarazm downwards to Herat and Sistan, it would also give him a strategically situated first and a commercial centre: Qandahar could be used not only against Persia but also against Kabul. Had Persians not been facing him in Khurasan and had Akbar not stationed his forces in the north west and been himself nearly, Abdullah Khan might have attempted the occupation of Qandahar. However, not wanting an armed conflict with the Mughals, he also resorted to diplomacy. He sent an envoy and

(Continued from previous page)

in Qandahar. The treatment meted out to him by Akbar encouraged Muzaffar Husain Mirza to come over to Hindustan. (AAA. 352; AN iii/645; TD ff. 572a; AA. ff. 263).

1. AN. iii/616.
2. TJ. (R & B) 262.
a letter to Muzaffar Husain Mirza dissuading him from going to Hindustan and giving Qandahar to the Chaghtais. He also made protestations of sincere friendship towards the Mirza, assuring him of the safety of his life and possessions at Qandahar.

Muzaffar Husain Mirza, however, being aware of the unscrupulousness and aggressive designs of the Uzbek Khan, preferred to go over the Mughals. Handing over Qandahar to Shahi Beg Khan, the Mughal commander of Barqash, he left for India and on 21st March 1595 "glorified his forehead by performing the prostration." Thus without any actual show of force Qandahar came under the Mughal possessions. Shortly after, as a result of local resistance and Mughal pressure, the Uzbeks evacuated zamindawar and Garmsir, which were occupied by the Mughals.

In the light of above discussion it may safely be concluded that the acquisition of Qandahar by Akbar was neither motivated by any ill-will towards the Persian dominions, nor was it a part of any arrangement between Akbar and Abdullah.

1. AAA. 333.
2. AAA. 334; AN. i11/668; RZT ff. 1/577; AA. ff. 304; TD. ff. 572b.
3. AN. i11/669.
Khan. Rather, it was a check on the ambitious designs of Abdullah Khan which seriously menaced both the Mughal and the Safavid empires. Shah Abbas himself was aware of this fact and he neither considered it as an act of hostility nor did he protest against it in his subsequent letter to Akbar.

Yadgar Ali Sultan was dismissed by Akbar on 14th December, 1598, shortly after the occupation of Qandahar. Zia-ul-Mulk and Abu Nasir were despatched with him to the Persian court, the former as ambassador and the latter as custodian of presents. They were ordered to proceed along the Ravi to Bandar Lahtri and thence to Persia by way of

1. The Uzbek attacks on various parts of Qandahar, their occupation of Zainuddawar and Garmsir and Abdullah Khan's intrigues with Muzaffar Husain Mirza have escaped the attention of Dr. Rahim for, he says: "But in spite of these professions of sincerity and goodwill towards Persia, Akbar was all along intriguing with the Mirzas of Qandahar through Sharif Khan Ataka, the Governor of Ghazvin. The Mirzas, too, were probably aware of Akbar's arrangement with Abdullah and had no alternative except to bow to the inevitable. The very absence of an Uzbek attack after the conquest of Herat must have convinced them about this arrangement" (Rahim, p.19).

2. The author of Alam Ara-i-Abbas writes his name as Abu Nasr. Both the envoys were of Persian origin and had migrated to India some 20 years ago, probably during the reign of Shah Ismail. The father of Ziaul Mulk had also held the Qaziship of Kasham (AAA. 361).
Ormus

The motive in sending the envoys through the sea-route and not through Qandahar and Khurasan, which according to Akbar himself was the nearest route to Persia, seems to be to avoid the passage of the envoys through Khurasan which was then completely under the control of Abdullah Khan Uzbek.

The mission of Yadgar Ali Sultan was successful from the Persian point of view. True, Akbar did not send any material help to the Shah before or after the dismissal of Yadgar Ali. But as discussed above, it was neither Shah Abbas' object to secure any material help from Akbar, nor was it possible for Akbar to send it particularly when conditions were so unfavourable. Therefore, there is no question of 'Akbar dismissing Yadgar Ali Sultan with empty promises and false hopes'. The purpose of Shah Abbas in sending Yadgar Ali Sultan was the revival of old friendship of two dynasties and to dissuade the Mughal Emperor from entering into any alliance with the Uzbeks or provide them with any kind of moral support. These two objects were achieved by the mission of Yadgar Ali, whether due to actual sincerity of Akbar towards Persia or due to his own political needs. After all, there must be some

1. AN. iii/656; RZT ff. 1/573; AA. ff. 304; AAA. 361; ZSA. 1/221.

2. Akbar writes it in his letter to Abbas sent through Ziaul Mulk. cf. AN iii/656; JM ff. 205; RZT 1/574.

common interest in diplomatic relations.

The friendship of Akbar and the revival of old relations of two houses were in themselves highly valuable for Shah Abbas as a moral support against his enemies. Besides it, the presence of Akbar in the Panjab for fourteen years, his two visits to Kabul, the movements of his troops in the frontier area, and above all, his decision not to send any embassy to Abdullah Khan after Hakim Humam, until 1596 in spite of the numerous Uzbek embassies, were of appreciable advantage to Shah Abbas.

Yadgar Ali Sultan as well as Ziaul Mulk and Abu Nasir reached Persia in 1596 A.D. The arrival of the Mughal ambassadors was a matter of public rejoicings (due, perhaps, to the significance behind their arrival to which a reference has been made above). The Maidan-i-Saadat in Qazvin was illuminated and the Bazars were decorated on their arrival. Then, after a few days, they were graciously received by Abbas at his court where they presented to him the friendly letter of the Emperor and the valuable presents loaded on camels.

1. AN 111/704. After Hakim Humam's return from Turan, three Uzbek envoys came to Akbar's court in 1589, 590 and 1591. All three died in India but no envoy was sent by Akbar to Turan, (AN 111/566, 78, 83, 704).

2. AAA 361.

3. AAA 361.
The story that Abbas made the Shahinshah's slipper the diadem of good fortune, is, however, not given in Alam Ara-i-Abbasi.

In the letter sent through Maul Mulk, Akbar regrets the interruption in the relations between two dynasties and attributes it to the unsettled condition of Persia after the death of Shah Tahmasp and his own preoccupation with the problems of Hindustan. He then describes his achievements in consolidating his authority and subjugating the Rajputs, the Afghans, the Baluchis, the other Muslim rulers, zamindars and hilly tribes. Then referring to the earlier days of Abbas' reign, Akbar writes: "The consolation which it occurred to us was to give any assistance that could be desired. But the affairs of Qandahar intervened, for the Mirzas there showed slackness in assisting the sublime family (Safavi dynasty)." In the subsequent lines, Akbar refers to the arrival of Rustam Mirza followed by Mozaffar Mirza and writes: "After his arrival (Mozaffar Mirza) the victorious army will proceed to Qandahar and will easily perform every kind of help."

1. AN. ili/745.

2. For the text of the letter cf. AN. ili/656; IAF 1/13; JM ff. 205; RMT ff. 1/574; ZSA 1/222.


Akbar proceeds to say: "At this time when Panjab was the seat of government, our firm intention had been to uprear the sublime standard towards Transoxiana which was the country of our ancestors, so that both might that country come into the possession of the imperial servants and also that the family of the Prophet (the Safavi family) might be assisted in a suitable manner. But was abstained from the project due to friendly pursuits of Abdullah Khan."¹

Akbar then describes his policies in respect of state and religion and advises the Shah to adopt a lenient attitude towards his nobles for 'upon them depends the strength of the empire'. Akbar also says that he wanted to dismiss Yadgar Ali Sultan earlier, with an envoy of his own, but could not do so due to the disturbances in Kashmir, Sewardan and Thatta. In the end Akbar shows his keen desire to know the condition of Persia 'which Ziaul Mulk will ascertain and report to him'. Akbar also mentions that that the envoy will convey some message personally. We do not know what the oral message was, but it may be assumed that Akbar offered an explanation for the occupation of Qandahar and assured him of his friendship against the Uzbeks.

¹ AN. iii/657 (trans. iii/1011).
There is also an incidental reference to this point in the letter of Shah Abbas to Abdul Munim sent in 1598. In this letter, Shah Abbas threatened the Khan with an attack by the troops of Iraq, Fars, Kerman, Khuzistan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad, Azerbaijan and Khurasan. These places have been enumerated probably to show the Khan the extent of the Persian empire and the actual strength of its ruler, whom Abdul Munim had contemptuously addressed as Abbas Mirza. Then Abbas writes to Khan that 'if you hope to seek refuge from my army with the ruler of Hindustan, I am writing him a letter to arrest you and to send you to this court with chain in your neck.'

The last portion of the letter is significant and worthy of consideration. In the above words Abbas reminds Abdul Munim Khan of the closer and stronger friendship of Akbar with himself (Abbas) than with the Uzbeks. The letter also shows that the Shah himself did not regard the acquisition of Qandahar by Akbar as an outcome of latter's arrangement with the Uzbeks for the division of Persia. Nor did he show any annoyance at it, at least apparently.

By 1698 Shah Abbas's position had improved considerably. With the death of Sultan Murad III of Turkey in 1594, he no

1. JIB. ff. 326; ZSA. iv/127.
longer feared any attack from the west. He had succeeded in crushing most of the rebellions in his kingdom and had started recovering his eastern territories from the Uzbeks. However, the Uzbeks still possessed a large portion of Khurasan which included the important and strategic places like Herat, Mashhad and Nishapur. The problem of the Uzbek was continued to be serious. For driving them out of Khurasan, the neutrality, rather the friendship, of the Mughal Emperor was still necessary.

Shah Abbas, therefore, dismissed the Mughal ambassadors early in 1598 A.D., with abundant rewards and magnificent Khalaqs. He also despatched Mawchahar Beg with them as his envoy to Akbar and sent a letter and presents to the Emperor. According to Abul Fazl the presents included, "101 choices Iraq horses, and among them was a horse which was five year old — had come; from the sea of Gilan (the Caspean). It has only two or three hairs on the mane and tail. It was very choice and its performance were unrivalled, but it died in the way. There were choice meres (qisraq), one of which was valued at 5,000 rupees. There were 300 pieces of brocade — all woven by the hands of noted weavers — and fifty masterpieces of Ghias Naqshband, and wonderful carpets (takyanamed), splendid paintings, also Turkish pavilions, embroidered mattresses, various

1. AAA. 372; AN. 111/745 (trans. 111/1113); RZT ff. 1/681; AA. ff. 402.
seeds, and 9 goats (Murgaz) whose fleeces yield wool (suf) and silk (Kharā), as well as other rarities, and 500 Turkaman in rich dresses. There were also numerous Iraqi horses in the caravan. This long list of precious and unique presents not only showed the keenness of the Shah to cultivate Akbar's friendship, but was also intended to impress upon Akbar the value which Persian friendship would have for the Mughals.

In the letter, Abbas expressed his unbounded joy on the warm response to his letter and the revival of the old friendship the 'seeds of which were sown by their predecessors'. Then he thanked Akbar for his valuable fatherly advice. He went on to describe the deplorable condition of Persian after the death of Shah Tahmasp and the steps taken by him to consolidate his position internally and the friendship he was able to establish with the Ottomans. He then referred to the Uzbek attacks on Khorasan and the depredations caused by them in occupied territory. Finally, he expressed his desire to expel the Uzbeks and recover his ancestral lands from them, and fortify his frontier in such a way that they would not again be able to enter the Persian territory. He again requested the Mughal Emperor for his moral support. In the concluding lines, Abbas intro-

1. AAA.372; AN.111/745 (trans.111/1113); RZT ff.1/561; AA. ff.403.
2. For the text of the letter cf. OM ff. 206; ZSA 1/228.
3. The passage is:

"توجه ظاهر میرآقا داریخ نگفته شده تا همان تماس باشد و به بلعکس

وزنامه گردب که هرچه که هم همت مران کند گردب"
duced Manuchir Beg as one of his personal attendants and most trustworthy nobles; requested Akbar not to detain him for long and continue the exchange of embassies and letters. It is interesting to note here that the letter does not contain any protest against or even a reference to Akbar's occupation of Qandahar. It also deserves attention that he also ordered his envoy to proceed through the route of Kutch and Makran and not through Khurasan and Qandahar.

Manuchir Beg reached the Mughal court in 1598 A.D. and "on the 23rd, Aban 1007 A.H. (14th Nov. 1598) he had the bliss of an audience (at Lahore) and was exalted by princely favours". Soon after the arrival of Manuchir Beg and while he was still at the court, another, Persian ambassador, Mirza Ali Beg Yuzbashi arrived at the Mughal court on 6th March 1599, with letter and presents. He had been despatched by the Shah to convey to the Mughal Emperor the news of the victory of the Shah over the Uzbeks and the recovery of Herat which, in fact, meant the recovery of Khurasan.

The death of Abdullah Khan and Abdul Mumin in 1598 and the resulting chaos in Turan, brought about a radical change in the international situation. While it provided Shah Abbas with the opportunity not only of expelling the Uzbeks from

1. AAA. 372.
2. AK Vol. iii/745.
3. AAA. 405; AN. 111/749.
4. AAA. 405; AN. 111/749. The text of the letters is not available.
Khurasan, but also of extending his influence in Turan, Akbar, who was still present in the Panjab, started thinking in terms of sending an expedition to Turan. Abul Fazl writes: "The intention of the Shahinshah was to send the victorious troops under the command of the Royal Prince to Turan and to include the ancestral territory within the empire." This conquest presumably meant the expulsion of the Uzbeks from Badakhshan. Though Abul Fazl says that the expedition was not sent due to the indolence of the prince, it is likely that principal factors were the continuing trouble in Bangash and Mughal involvement in the Deccan. In November 1598, Akbar himself had to leave Lahore for the Deccan via Agra.

In Badakhshan, however, Mirza Badiuzzaman, son of Mirza Shahrukh and a sister of Akbar, fought a battle with and defeated Mirza Humayun, who pretended himself to be the son of Mirza Sulaiman and had occupied Badakhshan after the death of the two Uzbek Khans. After occupying Badakhshan (1600-1601), Mirza Badiuzzaman 'adorned the pulpit and the gold and silver with the great name of Shahinshah (Akbar) and sent a petition apologising for the little service he had hitherto rendered'. Akbar received the messenger kindly and sent presents and war

1. AN. 111/745.
2. AN. 111/745.
3. AN. 111/745.
material. The successful revolt of Mirza Badiuzzaman in Badakhshan and the fact that he read the Khutba in Akbar's name, suggests that not only did the Badakhshanis want independence, but also they were expecting and given encouragement by the Mughals.

In such a situation it was natural that the urgency of an alliance between Persia and the Mughals no longer existed. Akbar, therefore, did not give leave to the Persian ambassadors to return to Persia until 1601. In 1601, while he was still at Asirgarh, he gave them permission to leave the court, but asked them to wait at Lahore for the Mughal ambassador to accompany them. Though Akbar did not at that time send any letter to Shah Abbas, Daniyal gave a letter for the Shah to Maunchhir.

1. AN. iii/792, 813; AAA. 437.

2. AAA. also records that there was a general resentment among the Badakhshanis against the Uzbeks, and leaving the city, they had retired to the hills. When there was confusion among the Uzbeks, the Badakhshanis themselves proclaimed Mirza Badiuzzaman as their chief (AAA. 437).

3. AN. iii/787. Mr. Beveridge had mistranslated the passage here. The text is...

"و خوشی از زوالا برجام با ارتش از تهدید رسمی هدایت جون بیوند"...،

Mr. Beveridge translates ........ An ambassador was to go afterwards from court together with presents, when arrangements had been made for their going to that country (AN. Beveridge, iii/1179).
Beg and sent presents in the custody of Bahadur Beg.\(^1\)

In the letter, the prince expressed his desire to establish correspondence with the Shah. He then described his appointment, after Akbar returned from Lahore to Agra, for the campaign of Deccan; and his victory over Ahmadnagar and that of the Emperor himself over Asirgarh. Daniyal also mentioned his appointment as the Viceroy of Khandesh, Gujrat, Malwa, Berar and the Deccan, 'each of which once had a separate ruler', and expressed his desire to establish link between the ports of the Deccan and the Gujrat, and Ormuz and Bahrain as a token of close relationship between the two countries.

It is not clear why Daniyal wrote to the Shah instead of Akbar. Perhaps the letter was written in the background of Salim's revolt. However, the main purpose of the letter was to foster trade between Indian ports on the one hand, and Bahrain, which had been occupied by the Shah, on the other.

The Persian ambassador waited for another couple of years, before Mir Musum Bhakkari was appointed as envoy to Iran and finally left in 1603. Apparently the further delay was due to the preoccupation of Akbar with the revolt of Prince

\(^{1}\) The letter of Daniyal to Abbas (1603) cf. JM ff. 223b.
Salim. However, the renewed Uzbek pressure on Badakhshan by Baqi Khan (1602), which ultimately led to the overthrow of Mirza Badiuzzaman (1603), perhaps, made Akbar feel the necessity of Persian friendship once again. An envoy from Mirza Badiuzzaman arrived at Akbar’s court asking for help against Baqi Khan. Akbar therefore, wrote to the latter warning him against occupying Badakhshan and molesting one who was a member of his family and associated with his kingdom. Next Akbar finally gave leave to Maunchihr Beg (1603), with valuable gifts for the Shah and a sum of four lakhs of dams to the ambassador himself. He sent some more presents for the Shah and a letter though Mir Masum. At the same time, it seems, that Prince Salim also sent a letter to the Shah, presumably to indicate that the misunderstanding between the father and the son had ended.

1. AN. i11/813; AAA. 437.
2. AN. i11/813.
3. Letter of Akbar to Baqi Khan (1603) cf. FZq ff.76. Akbar also sent ‘twenty camel loads of weapons of war etc. and an encouraging farman’ to Badiuzzaman (AN. i11/813). But probably before it could reach Badakhshan, Badiuzzaman was defeated and killed by Baqi Khan.
4. AN. i11/815, 25; RZT. ff.1/583; AAA. 448; ZSA. iv/80.
5. This assumption is based on the reply of the Shah to Prince Salim sent with Durwesh Beg (1605), cf. JM. ff. 212b. For the contents of the letter see infra. p. 83.
The letter of Akbar to the shah, sent through Mir Masum, is unfortunately not available to us. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the motive of Akbar in sending the embassy. However, from the reply to this letter sent by Shah Abbas, it appears that Akbar had congratulated the Shah on his victory over the Uzbek and had informed him of his own victory, probably over the Deccan states.

Dr. Rahim has suggested that this letter was presumably sent in the context of Akbar's desire to send an expedition to Turan. However, it is difficult to agree with this assumption, as Akbar had expressed the above mentioned desire in 1698. During the intervening five years the situation had materially changed.

Mir Muhammad Masum and Manuchihr Beg reached Persia in 1604 A.D., when Abbas was busy with the seige of Erivan. Both Manuchihr Beg and Mir Masum waited upon the Shah shortly after their arrival, when the seige was going on. Akbarama

1. Letter of Abbas to Akbar (1604-05) cf. JM. ff. 209b. For the content of the letter see infra p. 82
2. Rahim, 23. He says: the object of this mission (Mir Masum's mission) can be gathered from the following remarks of Abul Fazl, "The intention of the Shahinshah was to send the victorious troops under the command of the Royal Prince to Turan and to include the ancestral territory within the empire". (cf. AN. trans. iii/1114).
3. AAA. 448; ZSA. iv/80.
records the reception of Mir Masum by Shah Abbas in the following words, ".....The Shah had received him with great honour and had ordered a large sum of money to be given to him and had taken the letter of the Shahinshah in his two hands and placed it on his head. He had asked, 'How is His Majesty my Shah Baba? (royal father). In what condition is he'? Though the Shah received the Mughal ambassador apparently well and according to Akbarnama gave him a large sum of money, it seems that there was some coolness in his behaviour, for he accepted only one sword as a token of good Owen, out of the large number of gifts sent for him.

However, during the four months of his stay in the Persian army-camp, when the siege was going on, the witty Mughal ambassador succeeded in pleasing the Shah by his poetry, humour and eloquence. After Erivan fell to Abbas, Mir Masum was invited to the court where Sharif Pasha, and numerous other generals of the Ottoman troops and the chiefs of the Kurds were present. Here, to impress these Ottoman and other dignitaries, a show was made of the presents sent to the Shah by one of the most powerful rulers of the contemporary world. But this time again Abbas did not take any piece from

1. ANB. 111/1236.
2. AAA. 448; 23A. iv/80.
3. 23A. iv/81.
it. To further impress upon his enemies, he ordered the presents to be distributed among his nobles, generals, chiefs and notables of various sections, present at the camp.

Akbarnama narrates the story of the presents in this way. "The presents had been spread out and he (the Shah) had personally inspected all of them. He had for two or three days sent the ambassadors of Gurjistan (Georgia) and the Sirdars of Turkistan and other strangers to inspect them. He had marvelled at beholding these rarities which were objects of admiration 'to all.' The Mughal historian, however, avoids mentioning what ultimately happened to this marvellous collection of the presents.

The refusal of the Shah to accept Akbar's gifts appears to have been a calculated step to show that he did not particularly care for the Mughals. This open show of resentment was perhaps the result of undue delay in the return of Manuchihr Beg which would have been interpreted by the Shah as representing a lack of warm on Akbar's part. The Shah was at this time at the height of his power. He had not only consolidated his eastern frontier, but had also succeeded in extending his influence over Turan. He was now feeling secure enough to launch an attack upon the Ottoman empire. He had,

1. AAA. 448; ZSA. iv/81.
2. ANB. iii/1236.
therefore, no particular motive in desiring the friendship of the Mughals. He had even started thanking in terms of recovering Qandahar and his officers in Khurasan had already moved towards its dependencies.

After some months, Mir Masum was dismissed by the Shah and reached India some time in 1605. No envoy was despatched with him by the Shah. This was a further show of annoyance on the part of the Shah. A letter and some present were, however, sent through Mir Masum to Akbar. The presents included besides other precious things, some Iraq horses. Mir Masum also brought a letter from the shah's aunt to Mariam-i-Makani, who according to Dr. Rahim, 'used to send letters to her mother and sister in Persia through the agency of the ambassadors.

In the letter sent to Akbar, with Mir Masum, Abbas congratulated the Mughal Emperor on his victories and then described his own conquest of Kehawand, Tabrez, Nakhehwam and

1. See infra. p. 87
2. AAA. 461; AN. ii/836; RZT. ff. 1/583; ZSA iv/81; Rahim, 23.
3. AAA. 461; AN. ii/836; RZT. ff. 1/583; ZSA iv/81; Rahim, 23.
4. In J.M. there are two letters of Abbas to Akbar and each bears the RZT (1/583) of Mir Masum as its carrier (J.M. ff. 209b., 211b.). ZSA (iv/81) and reproduce still another which also bears the name of Mir Masum as its carrier. However, there is not any particular difference among them as far as the contents are concerned.
Erivan, which was the strong fort so never before taken by storm by any Persian ruler. No other matter had been discussed or referred to in the letter.

Dr. Rahim, however, says that the Shah promised his cooperation (in Akbar's scheme to conquer his ancestral territory of Turan). The different versions of the letter of Abbas given in the different collections do not contain any mention of promise for cooperation in Akbar's plan in Turan. Besides, it seems hardly possible that the shrewd Shah would welcome, much less would he promise cooperation for the Mughal plan of conquering Transoxiana. For, this would obviously affect his power and influence in the region.

Shortly after Mir Masum left the Persian court, and while the Persian armies were besieging Van (1604-05), the Shah sent letters of reply to princes Salim and Daniyal with Darwesh Beg Qazvini. Darwesh Beg came to India along with Bahadur Beg who had been sent by Daniyal, and Shali Beg who had presumably been sent by Salim.

In his letter to Salim, the Shah referred to the breach of treaty by the Ottoman and the occupation of Azarbaijan and Shirwan by them during the reign of Shah Muhammad. He then

1. Rahim, 22.
described the recovery of Tabrez and conquest of Erivan and other parts of Shirwan and Gurjistan. He hoped that he would soon conquer Van also. In the end the Shah requested the prince to continue the exchange of letter. The letter to Daniyal is also along the same lines as to Salim.

It seems strange that while he sent no embassy to Akbar, the Shah replied to the letters of the two princes not through their own messengers, but through a Persian envoy. Perhaps, the Shah, while administering the a mild diplomatic rebuff, was still desirous of continuing friendly relations with the Mughals.

By the time the Shah had written to Daniyal, the Prince was already dead. Soon after the return of Mir Masum, Akbar also died.
CHAPTER III

THE PERSIAN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE QANDAHAR
(1604 - 1607)

By 1604 Shah Abbas had not only expelled the Uzbeks and the Ottomans from his ancestral dominions but had also embarked upon a campaign of expansion. In the west he was leading his armies in Azarbaijan and Shirwan. In the east he had launched an attack upon Balkh which though unsuccessful, had succeeded in impressing the Uzbeks with the might of the Persian armies. The chiefs of Khwaramz, Mary, Sistan and the Maliks of Kech and Makran owed him allegiance. In such situation it is not surprising that the Persians started thinking of recovering Qandahar and its dependencies from the Mughals.

Presumably, Manuchihr Beg, after his return from India, had reported to Abbas that the health of Akbar was failing and that his empire was faced with serious difficulties. The fall of Mirza Badiuzzaman in Badakhshan, which, in fact, had become a part of the Mughal dominions, without any protest or military action on the part of Akbar or his Governor at Kabul, must have convinced the Persians of the Mughal military weakness in Afghanistan and encouraged them to attempt the recovery of Qandahar.
The Persians, it appears, had already started making encroachments upon the territories of Hazarajat. This territory had been occupied by the Uzbeks but when Akbar annexed Qandahar, he expelled the Uzbeks by force and compelled the chiefs of Hazara tribes to give him their allegiance. During the period in which Shah Abbas was extending his influence over Marv and Khwarazm and had led a campaign to Balkh, he seems to have extended his hold over some of the Hazara tribes also and had appointed Ali Quli Khan as the commander of Nikodar and Hazarajat.

About the same time Shah Abbas granted anyone to Mirza Hasan, a son of Shahrukh Mirza, who had escaped from the Mughal empire and whose whereabouts had been unknown to the Mughals for some time. The Shah, according to his usual policy, hoped to use Mirza Hasan to extend his influence. He sent the Mirza to Husain Khan, the Governor of Herat, when he himself moved towards Azerbaijan (1603). Shortly after, the Uzbeks ravaged the territories of Marashqa and Murghab and captured the brother of Yusuf Khan, the commander of the region. Thereupon Husain Khan, after securing permission from the Shah,

1. It has not been possible to identify Nikodar, but apparently it is a town in Hazarajat territory named after Nikodar Oghlan, cf. AIn (trans.) ii/406.
2. AN. i11/821, 828; IQJ. ii/495, 501.
3. Ibid.
sent Mirza Hasan to Badakhshan, so that the attention of the Uzbek might be diverted from the Persian frontier to Badakhshan. Mirza Hasan, however, did not find any support in Badakhshan and joined the tribes of Nikodar and Hazara, gathered around him a force of 20,000 from these tribes and began to create trouble in northern portion of zamindawar.\footnote{1}

Shah Beg Khan, the Mughal commander of Qandahar, led an expedition against him. Mirza Hasan was defeated and fled to Haqcharan.\footnote{2} Shah Beg Khan could not pursue the rebel because the Persians, taking advantage of Mirza Hasan's activities and Shah Beg Khan's pre-occupation with him, attacked Bust (1605)\footnote{3}. Bust was a fortress to the west of Qandahar, situated some two miles north from the confluence of Helmand and Arghandab rivers, and thus commanding a strategic position as an outpost of Qandahar. It was a part of Garmsir, a dependency of Qandahar, then in the possession of the Mughals. To its north-west, not far from it, lay Farah, an outpost of Khurasan held by the Persians.

Mir Zainul Abidin, a notable of Garmsir, harassed by the jagirdars of the place, had come to Herat leaving his

\footnote{1} AN. iii/821; 828; IQJ. 11/495, 501. 
\footnote{2} The place is not traceable. 
\footnote{3} AN. iii/828; AAA. 468.
property and family at Garmisir. At Herat, he met the Shah who had returned from his unsuccessful expedition of Balkh (1602). The Shah referred him to Husain Khan, the Governor of Herat, who sent the Mir to Farah. Shah Beg Khan, the Mughal commander of Qandahar, annoyed by the desertion of the Mir, confiscated his property, summoned his two sons to Qandahar and did not permit them to go to their father. Mir Zaimul Abidin, resented Shah Beg's treatment of his sons, and began to incite Khusrau Khan, an officer of Husain Khan at Farah, to attack Bust. The Persians were joined by the Zamindars of Garmisir. Khusrau Khan made a night attack on Bust. One of its two commanders was killed and the other escaped. The fort was occupied by the Persians.

When the news reached Shah Beg Khan, he started for Bust. But before he could reach Bust, Ali Khan, the Persian commander of Niksar and Hazarajat, along with Mirza Hasan and a force from Chor, attacked Zamindawar. Thereupon, Shah Beg himself rushed to Zamindawar to repulse the attack and

1. AAA. 488. AN. iii/828; IQJ. ii/501. Akbarnama and Iqbalnama attribute the fall of Bust to the disloyalty and intrigue of the zamindars of Garmisir with the 'qizibashes'; they neither refer to Mir Zaimul Abidin nor to any Persian attack on Bust.

2. AN. iiii/828; IQJ. ii/501. AAA. makes no reference to the attack of Ali Khan on Zamindawar or his alliance with Mirza Hasan.
sent an expedition under the commander of Qalat, and Aros Bahadur, that of Zamindawar to drive out the Persians from Bust. The attack upon Zamindawar was repulsed by Shah Beg Khan, but the detachment sent to Bust was defeated by a Persian reinforcement despatched by Husain Khan, under Ismail Khan, the Persian commander of Farah, and Malik Shah of Sistan. Aros Bahadur was killed, while the commander of Qalat was arrested and sent in chains to Shah Abbas, who at that time was busy in Azarbaijan against the Ottomans. The Mughal forces to reduce it failed. Ultimately Shah Beg gave up the attempt due to illness and returned to Qandahar (1604). The entire territory of Garmsir thus came in the possession of the Persians.

Shah Beg Khan now himself led an expedition to Bust and laid siege to the fort. But the Persians had properly garrisoned it and all efforts of the Mughal forces to reduce it failed. Ultimately Shah Beg gave up the attempt due to illness and returned to Qandahar (1604). The entire territory of Garmsir thus came in the possession of the Persians.

1. AAA gives the name of the commander of Qalat as apparently a misprint.
2. AAA 468-69. IQJ and AN do not record this battle.
3. The failure of Shah Beg, attempt to recover Bust is recorded in the 49th Regnal year, beginning March, 1604, before the mention of the return of Mir Masum and the death of Maryam Makani in Aug., 1604.
4. AAA 469; IQJ 11/501; AN 111/328.
Shortly after the death of Baqi Khan in 1605, while the Shah himself remained in the west to utilize the opportunity created by the death of Sultan Murad (1604), he despatched Jahangir Khan, the grandson of Pir Muhammad, the former ruler of Balkh, who had taken shelter at the Persian court, to recover his country. The Persian Governor of Khurasan was instructed by the Shah to render him all possible help. Jahangir Khan occupied Ghorjistan with Persian help (1606), and succeeded in securing the allegiance of some of the Hazara tribes.

About the same time, when after the death of Akbar, Jahangir was busy in suppressing the revolt of Khurasan, Husain Khan, the Persian Governor of Khurasan, along with the chief of Sistan, attacked Qandahar and laid siege to it (March-April 1606). This action was apparently taken at the instigation of Mirza Muhammad Zaman Shami, the new Persian commander of Bust, and some of the other disaffected former servants of the Mirzas of Qandahar. Shah Beg Khan,

1. AAA. 494.
2. Iskandar Beg avoids making a definite statement whether the Governor of Herat himself had come to Qandahar or not (AAA. 6837). Jahangir at one place writes that the Governor had personally led the expedition, but at another place, probably influenced by Shah's apology, he writes that the Governor had sent forces. IqJ. (iii/516) and MJ. (ff. 22a), however, explicitly say that Husain Khan, the Governor of Herat, led the expedition personally.
the Mughal commander of the fort, held out and wrote to Jahangir for reinforcement. The story of the defence of Qandahar is interesting. Jahangir writes: "Praise is due to the manliness and courage of Shah Beg Khan, who planted his foot firmly like a man, and strengthened the fort, and seated himself on the top of the third citadel of the aforesaid fort in such a manner that outsiders could see his entertainments. During the siege he girded not his loins but with bare head and feet arranged parties of pleasure, at not day passed that he did not send a force from the fort to meet the foe and did not make manly efforts."  

When these reports reached Jahangir "a large force was immediately appointed under the leadership of Mirza Ghazi" to proceed to the help of Shah Beg. When the Persians heard of the despatch of Mirza Ghazi by Jahangir, they withdrew the siege and retreated before the reinforcement could reach Qandahar (Feb. 1607).  

The Persian attacks on Bust and Qandahar against the Mughals with whom the Persian Shah protested friendship, were unprovoked and undoubtedly constituted aggression. Munshi  

1. AAA 663; TJ 33; IQJ 516; MJ ff. 22a; AA ff. 213.  
2. TJ 33 (trans. 1/71); IQJ 11/516; MJ ff. 22a; AA ff. 213.  
3. Ibid.
Iskandar Beg throws all responsibility of the Persian attack on Bust, upon Khusrau Beg, who according to Iskandar Beg, attacked the fortress at the instigation of Mir Zainul Abidin, without the permission of Husain Khan, the Persian Governor of Herat. He says that Husain Khan later on sent reinforcement under Ismail Khan and Malik Shah of Sistan, not because he wanted to encroach upon Mughal territory, but because he was annoyed by the attitude of Shah Beg, who instead of making complaints to Husain Khan against the local Persian officers, sent forces and himself led an expedition against the Persians. Iskandar Beg further writes that when the commander of Qalat was presented before the shah and he learnt of the attack by his officers on Bust, he got annoyed, condemned his officers for this unfriendly act towards the Mughals and decided to send back the prisoner with due honour after the campaign of Azarbaijan. 1 Surprisingly enough, neither Akbarnama nor Labalnama, do not say anything about the involvement of Husain Khan in the Persian attack on Bust and attribute its fall to the disloyalty of the zamindars of Garmisir, Akbarnama records "......the zamindars of Garmisir had in a shortsighted manner joined with the Qizibashes and seized the fort of Bust". 2

1. AAA. 468-69.
2. AN. 111/828; IJJ. 11/501.
Similarly, in the case of Qandahar, soon after the Persian armies flew from Qandahar, Husain Beg was sent by Shah Abbas to Emperor Jahangir with a letter. In this letter, according to Jahangir, the Shah denied knowledge of his officer's attack on Qandahar, condemned them for committing such an offence and apologized for it. He also issued a firman to his officers to return from Qandahar to their places.

It is surprising that Jahangir accepted not only the apology of Shah Abbas, but also refused to blame the Shah. He writes "............In the second place it became known (from the reports of Qandahar) that the Governor of Farah and a number of the officers of that neighbourhood had taken it into their heads, after the death of the late king (Akbar), that in this confusion Qandahar might easily fall into their hands and without waiting for an order from Shah Abbas had collected together and won over the chief of Siwistan (Sistan), sending some one to Husain Khan, the governor of Herat, they asked for support from him. He also sent a force. After that they turned to attack Qandahar." 2

Jahangir proceeds "Before the Mirza (Ghazi) reached Qandahar (with reinforcement), the news had been carried

1. TJ. 44; IQJ. 111/516; AAA. 682.
2. TJ. 41. (trans. 1/85).
to the Shah (of Persia) that the Governor of Farah, with some of the jagirdars of that neighbourhood, had proceeded towards the province of Qandahar. Considering this an improper proceeding, he (the Shah) sent Husain Beg, a well-known man and one of his own intimates, to make enquiries. He also sent a farman in their names that they should move away from the vicinity of Qandahar and go to their own places and abodes because the friendship and amity of his ancestors with the dignified family of Jahangir Padshah were of old standing.

It is possible that, when Akbar had just died, and Prince Khusrau had raised the standard of rebellion against Jahangir, the Persian officials of Khurasan, decided to launch immediately an attack on Qandahar, and thought it unwise to wait for permission from Shah and thus lose the opportunity. In the period under review no moral stigma was attached to aggression; expansion of empire and extension of territory were considered to be desirable; and governors or commanders often attacked a neighbouring principality or kingdom without even bringing the fact to the knowledge of their masters. We may refer to the case of Garha Katanga in the Mughal empire. It is, therefore, not impossible that the Persian officers of Khurasan attacked Qandahar without bringing the matter to the notice of Shah Abbas.

2. Dr. R.P. Tripathi: "Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire", 192.
But Dr. R.P. Tripathi, Dr. Beni Prasad and Dr. Rahim\(^1\) do not accept the view that Shah Abbas was as innocent as he pretended to be in his letter. It is, indeed, surprising how the Persian border officers could launch successive attacks within one or two years on the Mughal territories without the knowledge of the Shah. A close examination of the sequence, of the political changes in India, Turan and Turkey and of Persian activities on the respective borders suggests that the Persian attacks on Bust and Qandahar were not the results of the indiscretion of the local Persian officers, but they were part of a plan most probably conceived of by the shrewd Shah himself.

The Shah gave asylum to Mirza Hasan; his officers of Khurasan encouraged him; and gave him assistance to attack the northern territory of Zamindawar. With the help of Mirza Hasan, these officers themselves organized two-pronged attack on the Mughal frontier as a result of which they succeeded in occupying Garmisir. The Persians succeeded in securing two important base around Qandahar, one being the region of Hazarajat and the other that of Bust. Next year (1606), shortly after the death of Baqi Khan and Akbar, Jahangir Khan was despatched to recover his country. The attack of Jahangir Khan on Chorjistan on the one hand and the Persian attack on

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1. Tripathi, 'Rise and Fall of Mughal Empire', 360; Beni Prasad, 'Jahangir'. 161; Rahim, 25.
qandahar, on the other, seem to be parts of a coordinated plan. It seems that Jahangir Khan who met the Persian Governor of Herat before starting on his own campaign with Persian assistance, was sent by the Shah with certain instructions to the Governor. There was probably an organized plan that while Jahangir Khan would wrest Ghorjistan the Uzbeks, the Persians would invade Qandahar which they would be expecting to fall soon due to the disturbances on the Mughal frontier on the one hand and the rebellion of Khusrau on the other.\(^1\)

Even if it is accepted that neither the attack upon Bust nor upon Qandahar had been undertaken with the consent of the Shah, it is significant that he agreed to keep Garmsir even though he is reputed to have disapproved of the action of his officers. It is also significant that while expressing his disapproval, the Shah remarked, "If friendship (towards the Mughals) was not to be kept in view, why was the same effort not shown in the capture of Qandahar rather than in the involvement with Bust?"\(^2\) (The Persian officers did not disappoint the Shah; they attacked Qandahar at the earliest opportunity).

It may be observed that Iskandar Munshi, the court historian of Shah Abbas, who had given the full details of

\(^1\) AAA. 470.
\(^2\) AAA. 470.
Persian attack on Bust and latter on of Jahangir Khan's attack on Ghorjistan etc., does not make any reference to the Persian attack on Qandahar in the sequence of the year 1606. This event of 1606, he incidently mentions in the account of the year 1622, when he describes the Persian attack on Qandahar of 1622.1

It would, therefore, be a legitimate inference that the attacks upon Bust and Qandahar were in accordance with the broad policies of the Shah, even though the Shah may not have issued specific instructions to his officers to launch the attacks. Furthermore, the Shah would certainly have accepted the annexation of Qandahar if the attack had succeeded, just as he had accept the occupation of Bust and Garmsir.

Abbas did not apologise for the indiscretion of his officials in regard to Bust because it fell to them. If his armies had succeeded in occupying Qandahar, too, the shrewd Shah would not have offered the explanation which he did.

However, when the attack on Qandahar failed, the Shah thought its unwise to strain his relations with a powerful neighbour. He, therefore, threw the responsibility for this unsuccessful attack and unfriendly action on his officers. He thus absolved his army of the blame for failure and simul-

1. AAA. 683.
taneously sought to restore friendship with the Mughal Emperor. He was busy at this time in the west, against the Ottomans. He perhaps wanted to avoid Mughal bid for the recovery of Garmisir and Mughal expansion in Hazarajat. Moreover, the Uzbeks empire under Wali Muhammad had again started showing signs of recovering its military strength.

It is extremely doubtful if Jahangir was as simple as to fail to see the Persian attacks on Bost and Qandahar in their true perspective. It seems that there were significant political considerations which induced him to accept the apology of Abbas and connive at his involvement in the matter. Since Qandahar had not been lost, there was no necessity to accuse Abbas of his responsibility, and strain his relations with a powerful neighbour, in the very beginning of his reign when he was faced with internal difficulties. Moreover, the fact that soon after the Persian attack on Qandahar was repulsed, Jahangir decided to go to Kabul in spite of the opposition of his nobles due to expected disturbances in Bengal, Gujarat and the Deccan, shows that Jahangir was not quite satisfied with the defence of Kabul and his north-western frontiers. It is extremely doubtful if Jahangir's visit to Kabul was simply a hunting expedition. His concilia-

1. TJ. 33.
2. Cf. TJ. (p.33).
tory policy at Kabul, the remission of custom dues and tamgha, the lavish distribution of money among the people, the interest in the affairs of Badkhshan, the orders for the construction of roads between Qandahar, Ghazni and Kabul and finally, the despatch of expedition against the Bangash tribes, show the real significance of Jahangir's visit to Kabul and the apprehension which he had about his frontiers. For the peace of this region, to keep a check on the activities of the Uzbeks, and for successful operations against the Bangash Afghans, the friendship of Persia was valuable. Moreover, the question of Qandahar itself was important and continuity of friendship with Persians might prevent them from making a fresh attack on it.

Perhaps, for these reasons, Jahangir readily accepted the explanation of Shah Abbas and thought it unwise to strain his relation with a powerful neighbour. Therefore, some time after his return from Kabul, he dismissed Husain Beg, along with Darwesh Beg who had come and brought a letter to him before his accession. A letter was given to Husain Beg, for the Shah and presumably some presents were also sent (1608).  

1. TJ.50,52-53,57; Tripathi, 'Rise and Fall' 361; Beni Prasad, Jahangir 162-63. From Kabul an amount of 1.70 lakh was also sent for the provisions of Qandahar (TJ.52).

2. Letters of Jahangir to Abbas (1608) cf. JIB ff.231a,267a; FZQ ff.93a,115b. In both, the collections there are two letters of Jahangir to Abbas and while the first bears the names of only Darwesh Beg and Sharif as the carriers of the letter, the second also bears the name of Husain Beg. In regards to the contents, though there is not any particular difference, first seems to be more concerned with the event of Qandahar (1606). The reference in the letter to the delay in sending Husain Beg back suggests that he was permitted to return in 1608.
In this letter, Jahangir expressed his sincere friendship towards the Shah and stressed that he would always remain in future, as in the past, a well-wisher of that 'exalted brother'. Jahangir then referred to the delay which had occurred on the side of the Shah in starting an exchange of letters (probably in sending a formal letter of congratulation on his accession). The events of Qandahar, had confused those who could not understand the hidden truth until Husain Beg arrived; presented what His Majesty had written in a hurry; and removed the suspicious of such people. Next, Jahangir then stated that what belonged to one monarch, in reality belonged to the other as well (thus implying that there was no need for the Shah to covet Qandahar) and the friendship of the two houses transcended sordid temporal questions. The cordiality would keep on increasing and would not be affected by the endeavours of enemies. Accounting for the delay in the dismissal of the envoy, Jahangir wrote that he was waiting for the next envoy whom the Shah had promised to send. Apparently, due to his preoccupation the Shah was unable to send the said envoy. He was, therefore, dismissing the ambassadors. The letter closes with the usual good wishes.
CHAPTER IV

THE PERIOD OF FRIENDSHIP, 1611-1622

The set-back in the relation of Abbas with Jahangir, resulting from the Persian attack on Qandahar, had not lasted long. During the second decade of the 17th century, an exchange of formal and informal envoys, letters and presents took place on an unprecedented scale which resulted in the establishment of extremely intimate relationship between the two rulers, until it was broken again by the Shah when he attacked Qandahar in 1622. Before we discuss the reasons and motives behind the frequent exchange of embassies and the intimate friendship, it may be useful to study first the sequence of events.

During this phase of their relationship, initiative was again taken by Shah Abbas. Sometime towards the close of 1610, he despatched Yadgar Ali Sultan Talish to Jahangir, to convey his condolence on the death of Akbar and congratulations on Jahangir's accession. Yadgar Ali's was a magnificent embassy. He was accompanied by fifty person and brought innumerable presents for Jahangir, collected from Persia and
other countries, including fifty select horses and 1500 pieces of warities.¹

In the letter sent through Yadgar Ali Talish, the Shah regretted the delay in sending the ambassador for the said purpose. He ascribed this delay to his preoccupation with the affairs of Azerbaijan and Shirwan. After the campaigns were successfully concluded and he had returned to the capital, he was sending Yadgar Ali, who was one of his devoted servants. In the end Abbas requested Jahangir to continue the exchange of letters and embassies.² (The Shah returned to his capital in the spring of 1609 and the embassy was despatched after about an year and a half).

Yadgar Ali Sultan reached the Mughal court on 7th April 1611. Jahangir seems to have been very much pleased by Yadgar's mission. He remarks about the letter that the Shah "expressed the greatest friendship and omitted no point of regard and concord." Many favours were showered on the

¹. AAA. 552; TJ. 93; IqJ. iii/527; MJ. ff. 381.; AA. ff. 218; ZSA. iv/85. Yadgar Ali Sultan Talish was one of the most distinguished noble of the court. His grand-father had been the Governor of Baghdad during the reign of Shah Ismail I (1499-1524). After he returned from India in 1618, Yadgar Ali Talish was also sent to Turkey (1618) to conclude peace with the Ottoman Sultan. His mission proved successful and the treaty was concluded in 1620. He died some time in 1627. (AAA. 552, 660-61, 68, 753).

². The letter of Abbas to Jahangir (1611) cf. TJ. 93; IqJ. iii/527; MJ. ff. 39b; JM. ff. 214b.
ambassador on various occasions. On the day on which he presented the royal gifts to the Emperor, he was awarded a superb robe of honour and thirty thousand rupees. Rs. 15,000 were given to him on the Nauroz of the year 1021 A.H. (March 1612). On next Nauroz, the Emperor bestowed on him a gold muhar of 1,000 tolas.

While Yadgar Ali was still at the Mughal court, Jahangir sent some time in 1612, Muhammad Husain Chelebi to 'Iraq and Turkey on a commercial mission, to purchase jewels and to collect certain rarities. He was particularly directed to 'pay his respects to the ruler of Iran' and a letter was given him for the Shah. Chelebi waited upon the Shah at Mashhad in the summer of 1613. The account of their meeting is given by Jahangir in these words: "He (Chelebi) met my brother, Shah Abbas, in Mashhad and the king enquired from him what kind of things should be brought for his master's Sarkar. As he was urgent, Chelebi showed the list he had brought with him. In that list there were entered good turquoise and mumiya (bitumen) from the mines of Isfahan. He told him that these two articles were not to be bought, but he would send them.

1. TJ. 93, 100, 116.

2. TJ. 117. It is difficult to ascertain the date of despatch of Muhammad Husain Chelebi. Jahangir records in April 1613 the arrival of certain commodities sent by Chelebi.

3. Ibid.
for me. He authorized Uwais Tupchi (gunner) who was one of his private servants, to hand over to him six bags (ambancha) of turquoise earth holding about 30 seers, with 14 tolas of mumiya and four Iraq horses, one of which was a piebald, and he wrote a letter containing many expressions of friendship in which he had apologised for the inferior quality of the turquoise dust and scarcity of mumiya.  

Chelebe's mission appears to have had a political purpose as well, for he played a part in bringing the two rulers closer to each other. Various reference to him and to his mission and activities are found in the subsequent correspondence of the two rulers which we will refer to at their proper places. The total period which Chelebi spent in Persia is difficult to ascertain. However, it is quite certain that he stayed in Persia until April 1617.

Some time during the year 1613, a letter was sent by the Shah to Jahangir recommending the case of Salamullah Arab. Jahangir immediately increased his mansab and jagir.

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1. TJ. 117 (trans. i/237. Jahangir does not mention the name of the carrier of these things from Persia. It was certainly not Chelebi. It might have been some merchant.

2. See infra, p. 111

3. TJ. 117. Salamullah was the brother's son of Mubarak Arab, who had been the chief of Huwaiza and Dezful. Due to a misunderstanding with Shah Abbas, he left Persia and took up service under Jahangir. His mansab on this occasion was apparently raised to 1500/800. In 1616 he was given the title of Shujaat Khan. He held jagir in Gujarat for a long time. cf. TJ. 76, 78, 140, 157; Z.Kh.f. 115b; T.U.f. 87b-88a; Ma. Um. ii/862.
After two and a half years' stay at the Mughal court, Yadgar Ali Talish was dismissed by Jahangir on 11th September 1613. At the time of his dismissal, Jahangir bestowed upon Yadgar Ali, "a horse with a jewelled saddle, a jewelled sword, a vest without sleeves with gold embroidery, an airgretke with feathers and a jigha (Turban ornament) and 30,000 rupees in cash, altogether 40,000 rupees." Khan Alam, who was sent for from the Deccan for the purpose, was despatched with Yadgar Ali, as envoy to the shah.

The embassy of Khan Alam was, in the words of Dr. Rahim, "the most important in the history of Mughal diplomacy, for never before or after was a more splendidly equipped mission sent out." Iskandar Munshi describes the large retinue of Khan Alam in these words: "From the day Khan Alam set foot on Persian soil, he had with him 1,000 royal servants, his own private servants, and 200 falconers and hunters. He also had with him mighty elephants with golden ornaments and turrets.

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1. The author of ZSA. writes that Jahangir dismissed Yadgar Ali after seven years, in 1026 A.H. (1617), ZSA. iv/85, 89. But Jahangir explicitly says that he was dismissed on 20 Shahriyur 1022 A.H. (11,9,1613). The former has been probably misled by the arrival of Yadgar Ali and Khan Alam at the Persian court in 1618. This we presently discuss.

2. TJ. 121 (trans. 1/248). Khan Alam, whose name was Mirza Barkhurdar, was the son of Abdur Rahman Muid Beg. The title was conferred on him by Jahangir in 1609. He served in the Deccan campaigns of 1610, 1612. After he returned from Persia (1620), he was appointed the Governor of Allahabad. In 1623, he was sent with Prince Parvez against Khurram and in 1624 a robe of honour was sent to him at Burhanpur (TJ.74, 338, 58, 60, 77).

3. Rahim. 27.
of innumerable kinds of Indian animals such as lions, tigers, leopards, monkeys, deer, cows etc.; there were also many singing birds and beautiful palkis. The other presents which Khan Alam had brought for the Shah, were unique and innumerable.

The letter which Jahangir sent to the Shah, through Khan Alam, begins with the usual compliments and good wishes. Next, Jahangir expresses his pleasure on the arrival of Yadgar Ali and describes his embassy as the symbol of the friendship of the two houses; and expresses his desire that the Shah would continue to send letters informing him about his affairs. Jahangir then introduces Khan Alam to the Shah as one of the most intimate and loyal associates of his court and requests the Shah to dismiss him soon.

Some time in 1613, envoys came to the Persian court from the three states of the Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golcunda, with them valuable presents. Except for the name of Mir Khalilullah who came from Adil Shah of Bijapur, the names of the other envoys are not mentioned. Apparently they were sent when the Mughals started their offensive in the Deccan. In view of the close friendship of Shah Abbas with Jahangir, these

1. AAA. 661. Tr. taken from Rahim 27. Among those sent with Khan-i-Alam was the famous painter Hishan Das, cf. infra. p. 155.

2. The letter of Jahangir to the Abbas (1613) cf. JM. ff. 215a; ZSA. iv/297.
envoys had come to complain against the one encroachment of the Mughal army upon their dominions, and to secure the intercession of the Shah.\(^1\)

The envoys were received favourably. The Shah gave them a patient hearing and sent a letter to Jahangir recommending the case of the rulers of the Deccan. This letter is not available and it is difficult to determine its contents and the name of the person who brought it. Nasrullah Falsafi, however, gives an extract of a letter in which the Shah, referring to the friendship between the two rulers, requested Jahangir to be benevolent towards the states of the Deccan and particularly towards the state of Colconda.\(^3\)

Shortly after the despatch of this recommendation, the Deccan envoys were also dismissed, and in return Persian envoys were appointed to accompany them, along with letters and presents for the sultans of the Deccan. Husain Beg Tabrezi was sent to Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah; ef Darwesh Beg to

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1. Mir Khalilullah was a native of Khurasan. He was unrivalled in the art of calligraphy and was called 'Khush Nawis'. During the Uzbek raids on Khurasan, he came to the Deccan and took up service under Ibrahim Adil Shah II (AAA.612).

2. ZSA. iv/114. Possibly another recommendation was sent through Muhammad Riza Beg who reached the Mughal court in Oct. 1616. Roś's remark that Muhammad Riza's mission had some connection with the affairs of the Deccan states supports this assumption. (Foster: 'Embassy of Roś', 259).
Murtaza Nizam Shah II and Malik Ambar; and Shah Quli Beg to
Ibrahim Adil Shah II. Shah Quli was, however, detained until
the winter of 1613-14 and he finally postponed his mission.
Mir Khalilullah, the ambassador of Adil Shah, also, returned
from Shiraz to Isfahan. Darwesh Beg died at Shiraz and his son
Muhammad Beg was appointed to carry on his mission. Muhammad
Beg and Husain Beg ultimately went to Deccan. It seems that
Muhammad Beg was also instructed to go to Adil Shah, for,
there is a letter of Shah Abbas to Adil Shah which bears the
name of Aga Malik Muhammad as its carrier, probably a misprint
for Muhammad Beg.  

The letter sent to Qutb Shah with Husain Beg is not
available to us. It appears from Alam Ara-i-Abbası that the
main purpose of this embassy was to convey to Sultan Muhammad
Qutb Shah the condolence of Shah Abbas on the death of Sultan
Quli Qutb Shah (died 1612) and congratulations on the accession
of Muhammad Qutb Shah. 

In the letter sent to Adil Shah, Shah Abbas, after the
usual compliments, congratulated Adil Shah on his victory over
the infidels (probably the Portuguese). He then requested the
Sultan to send to Persia a certain Mustafa Khan. The Shah
wrote that Mustafa Khan was an old well-wisher of his dynasty

1. AAA. 612; the letter of Abbas to Adil Shah cf. JMff.230a.
2. AAA. 612.
(Safavid dynasty) and since he had gone from Persia to that court (court of Adil Shah), he had continued to send letters to him (the Shah) and on his invitation had consented to come to his court. The Shah blamed the Sultan for delaying his despatch for two years, which he thought was due to Adil Shah's preoccupation with the war against the Portuguese. In the end the Shah requested Adil Shah to despatch Mustafa Khan soon.

After Yadgar Ali and Khan-i- Alam had left the Mughal court for Asia, the Shah despatched another envoy, Mustafa Beg, who reached the Mughal Capital on 3rd. April 1615. Jahangir describes the embassy of Mustafa Beg in these words: "After completing the matters of Gurjistan (Georgia) my exalted brother sent him (Mustafa Beg) with a letter consisting of expressions of friendship and assurances of sincerity, with several horses and camels, and some stuff from Aleppo, which had come for that fortunate brother from direction of Rum. Nine large European hunting dogs, for which a request had gone, were also sent by him."  

The letter which the envoy brought is a brief one, containing a reference to Pacification of Gurjistan (1615), leaving the details to be communicated verbally by the ambassador who was an eye-witness of the campaign.

1. TJ.138; MJ. ff. 57a. Surprisingly enough, no reference has been made in AAA to the despatch or return of the embassy of Mustafa Beg.
2. TJ. 138 (trans. i/282).
Within a week of his arrival, Mustafa Beg was awarded ten thousand rupees, a jewelled belt and dagger. On 30th August he was given a Nurjahani Muhar valued at Rs. 6,400. Mustafa Beg was dismissed on 17th Sept. 1615, with a reward of twenty thousand rupees and a robe of honour, and was given a letter for Shah Abbas "written in the perfection of friendship." Unfortunately we could not find the letter which Jahangir mentions above.

About an year after the dismissal of Mustafa Beg, and while Khan Alam had not yet met the Persian Shah, another Persian envoy, Muhammad Riza Beg, arrived at the Mughal court on 28th October 1616. Jahangir describes his embassy in the following words: "After performing the due of prostration and salutation, he laid before me the letter he had brought. It was decided that he should produce before me the horses and other presents he had brought with him. The written and verbal messages sent were full of friendship, brotherhood, and sincerity. I gave the ambassador on that same day a jewelled tiara and a dress of honour." The presents which Muhammad Riza had brought are described by Sir Thomas Roe in full detail:

1. TJ. 138, 39, 46, 48; MJ. ff. 48b.
2. TJ. 165; MJ. ff. 59b; IQJ 541; Foster: Embassy of Roe 258. The embassy of Muhammad Riza also has not been described in AAA.
"Hee (Muhammad Riza) brought for presents three tymes nine horses of Persia and Arabia, nine mules very fayr and lardg, seven camells laden with velvett two sutes of Europe arras (which I suppose was Venetian hangings of velvett with gould, and not arras), two chests of Persian hangings, one cabinett rich, 40 musketts, five clocks, one camell laden with Persian cloth of gould, eight carpetts of silke, two rubyes ballast, 21 camells of wyne of the grape, 14 camells of distilled sweet waters, seven of rose waters, seven daggers sett with stones, five swords sett with stones, seven Venetian looking glasses, but these so faire, so rich, that I was ashamed of the relation."

The letter which Muhammad Riza brought, begins with the usual compliments. The Shah then expresses his joy at the continuance of the hereditary friendship between the two houses and expresses the desire that one of his courtiers should always represent him at his (Jahangir’s) court. Next, the Shah refers to the mission of Chelebi, praises his manners, behaviour and wit, credits him with strengthening the relations of the two rulers, expresses his desire to detain him, and writes that he was instructed to collect from the Persian empire every thing desired by Jahangir. The Shah gives the details of some of the presents which he has or dered to be prepared for him

1. Foster: "Embassy of Thomas Roe" 258.
(Jahangir). In the end the Shah refers to few recommendations which the envoys has been instructed to convey verbally. According to Roe, the ambassador conveyed the recommendations of the Shah in behalf of the ruler of the Deccan.

Muhammad Riza was dismissed at Mandu, on 10th April 1617, with a reward of 30,000 rupees and a robe of honour, along with some presents and a letter to the Shah. Among the gifts were "certain presents of jewelled things which the rulers of the Deccan had sent, with cloth, rare things of every kind, fit for presentation, of the value of 100,000 rupees." These presents included a crystal cup which Chelebi had sent from Iraq. The significance of this present is given by Jahangir in these words: "The Shah had seen this cup and said to the ambassador (Muhammad Riza) that if his brother would drink wine out of it and send it to him, it would be a great mark of affection. When the ambassador presented this, having drunk wine several times out of the cup in his presence, I ordered them to make a lid and a server for it and sent it along with the presents." In the letter sent with Muhammad Riza, Jahangir

1. The letter of Abbas to Jahangir (1616) cf. TJ. 165; M. ff. 215b.
2. Foster, op. cit., 259.
4. TJ. 197; MJ. ff. 60b.
expressed his joy at the sincere friendship between the two rulers. He described his victory over the Rana and the successful campaign of Khurram against Malik Ambar, who soon after his (Jahangir's) accession, had 'usurped' some territory of Berar. Ambar, being afraid of the Imperial might, had sought forgiveness through Adil Khan, who from old was connected with this court, and had surrendered to the prince, the keys of the fort of Ahmadnagar and the fortresses of Berar, which was a territory of 40 or 50 thousands sawars. The other rulers of the Deccan also, who had assumed airs (probably Golconda) followed the example of Ahmadnagar and showed their submission and sent peshkash. In regard to Chelebi, Jahangir thanked the Shah for his favours shown to Chelebi, praised Chelebi whose manners were liked by the Shah, requested him to dismiss him and promised to send him back again.

While on his way, Muhammad Riza died at Agra some time in the month of October 1617. According to the desire of the deceased ambassador, Jahangir appointed Muhammad Qasim a member of his retinue to continue the mission and to take his belongings to the Shah for being given to his heirs.

On 25th March 1618, another person, Haji Rafiq by name, came from Persia and waited upon the Emperor. He was a merchant and by his frequent visits to Persia, he became

1. TJ. 197; 223.
intimate with Shah Abbas. He had brought a letter from the Shah and presumably some presents also.

To turn to the Persian court, Khan Alam reached Qazvin in July 1618, when the Shah had gone to Tabrez for its relief against the Ottomans. When he returned to the capital, Khan Alam was received by the Shah on 11th November 1618.

It is surprising that Khan Alam, who was despatched by Jahangir in September 1613, reached Qazvin in July 1618. However, Peitro della Valle, an Italian traveller, who was present at the Persian court, both on the occasion of the arrival as well as of the reception of Khan Alam, has given indefinite dates for both the occasions. It is difficult to ascertain where did Khan Alam spend about five years? A casual reference is to be found in the accounts of the same traveller who writes: “that ambassador had long before started (for Persia). The Shah and his court are impatiently waiting for him, but he moves very slowly and his messenger (who waited upon the Shah on 17th July 1618 at Qazvin) informed the Shah that he (Khan Alam) has reached Tehran, which is on a two-day distance from Qazvin, and thence will come to here. But this distance he will travel in ten or twelve days.”

1. TJ. 223; ZSA. iv/86.
The reason for this slow movement seems to be his large train and probably his halt at important places in the way to make a display of his magnificent retinue. His train was a moving museum of Indian arts, crafts, and curiosities and his mission might well have been intended to promote cultural and commercial relations between the two countries. This inference is also supported by the fact that this unusual delay was resented neither by the Shah nor by Jahangir (as is evident from the favours shown to him) and that Yadgar Ali remained with him until they reached Qum. Munshi Iskandar Beg writes of their arrival in these words: "He (Khan Alam) stayed for a time at Herat and came to the court this year (1027 A.H., 1618 A.D.). When His Majesty set out for Azerbaijan, he appointed Kalb-i-Ali Beg Yasawal to receive him and bring him to Qum where he was to stay till his return. He (Khan Alam) came to Qazvin and then went to Qum. Here Yadgar Ali Sultan separated from him and proceeded to the court." 1

This delay has escaped the attention of Dr. Abdur Rahim and he seems to be under the impression that Khan Alam spent this long period at Persian court, while actually he stayed there only for about an year.

Khan Alam was given a magnificent reception by the Shah who showed him extraordinary favour by embracing him and calling

1. AAA. 662.
him "brother". But in spite of the warmth of the reception, the Shah could to see only some three hundred pieces out of the many presents sent, roughly two to three specimen from each kind. Perhaps the Shah wanted to score a point over Jahangir by publicly demonstrating that he did not particularly care for the presents sent by Mughal Emperor.

The Persian ambassador to Golconda, Husain Beg Tabrez had been dismissed some time, early in 1617. Shaikh Muhammad Khatoon was despatched with him by Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah with a letter some presents for the Shah. They waited upon Jahangir at Mandu, on their way from the Deccan to Persia. Husain Beg presented a peshkash to the Emperor. They reached Persia some time in 1618 and were received by the Shah after the reception of Khan Alam. Unfortunately the letter of Qutb Shah to Shah Abbas is not available. But from the reply which the Shah sent to Qutb Shah, it appears that the latter had again increased his apprehension of the menacing Mughal attitude on his frontiers (not of an encroachment upon his territory).

It may be noted here that at this time Khan Alam was present

1. AAA. 669.
2. AAA. 663. Shaikh Muhammad Khatoon was a native of Mashhad and one of those Ulama who were entrusted with the service of the shrine. During the Uzbek occupation of Khurasan, he went over to Golconda and was considered to be one of the dignitaries at the court. (AAA. 663).
at the Persian court.

In 1618, a merchant, Khwaja Abdul Karim Gilani came from Persia and brought a letter and some presents from the Shah. Jahangir rewarded him with a dress of honour and an elephant and gave him leave to return. Jahangir also sent with him a reply to the Shah's letter and a farman and special dress of honour for Khan Alam.¹

On 3rd July 1619 arrived Saiyid Hasan, the next formal ambassador of Shah Abbas to the Mughal court.² He have been despatched shortly before or after the reception of Khan Alam at Persian court. He presented before the Emperor a letter together with a crystal drinking cup, on the cover of which was a ruby.¹ Jahangir remarks about it. "As it was given from excessive friendship and sincerity, it was the cause of the increase of amity and good fellowship."³

In the next week, Hafiz Hasan, a servant of Khan Alam, came from Persia with a letter from the Shah and another from Khan Alam. Khan Alam had also sent a dagger, the hilt of which

¹ TJ. 238.
² Dr. Rahim has given the date of his arrival March 1618. But in Turuk the date of his arrival is given 13th Tir 1028 A.H. (3rd July 1619). TJ. 273. The embassy of Saiyid Hasan also has not been mentioned in AAA.
³ TJ. 273 (trans. 11/102).
was made of a white fish-tooth with black spots, which the shah had given to Khan Alam. 'As it was a great rarity, Khan Alam sent it to the Emperor which pleased him much. It seems that Khan Alam had sent with Hafiz Hasan the report of his reception at the Persian court held in Nov. 1618. Next day, Saiyid Hasan, the Persian ambassador was rewarded with 4,000 darbs.

On 26th October Saiyid Hasan was dismissed with a reward of twenty thousand rupees, a dress of honour of gold brocade, with a jewelled jigha (turban ornament) and an elephant. For the Shah, Jahangir sent a present of a jewelled jug made in the shape of a cock.

The letters brought by or sent with the above three persons are not available to us, and it is not possible to find out what they contained. However, it appears that Jahangir had expressed a desire in the letter sent through Haji Rafiq, that he wanted the historic astrolobe of Mirza Ulugh Beg which was in the possession of the safavids. In his reply, sent through one of envoys, the Shah showed his happiness that Jahangir had expressed to him the wish to acquire the astrolobe. In fact, it was Jahangir's by inheritance. The Shah had ordered the scientists to prepare to exact replica so that the original

1. TJ. 274.
2. Ibid. 278.
could soon be sent to Jahangir. It is probable that this letter was brought to the Emperor by Haji Rafiq himself, while one of his successors brought the astrolabe.

A fortnight after the dismissal of Saiyid Hasan, Pari Beg came from Persia and waited upon the Emperor on 9th November 1619. He was the chief hunter (Mir-i-Shikar) of the Shah and the latter had sent through him a falcon (shungar) to the Emperor. Though the bird was mauled on the way by a cat and died after a week of its arrival at the court, and Jahangir was delighted with the present and broke : "What can I write of the beauty and colour of this falcon? There were many beautiful black markings on each wings, and back and sides. As it was something out of the common, I ordered Ustad Mansur who has the title of Nadir-ul-Asr (wonder of the age), to paint and preserve its likeness. I gave Mir-i-Shikar Rs. 2,000 and dismissed him."

After a stay of about one year at the Persian court, Khan Alam was dismissed by the Shah some times late in 1619, with numerous rewards, dresses of honours, present of various kinds and Iraqi horses. The total cash given to him on various occasions amounted to 15,000 Tumans, excluding the other gifts which the Persian nobles presented to him. The Shah

2. TJ. 280.
despatched Zainul Beg with Khan Alam, as his envoy to the Mughal Emperor.

Some where on the way, the two envoys separated and Khan Alam proceeded towards India. When Jahangir heard of the approach of Khan Alam, he sent every day one of his courtiers to receive him, and on 22nd January 1620, he waited upon him at Kalansur.

Among the rarities which Khan Alam brought and which were particularly liked by Jahangir, was a historical painting of Mir Khalil, probably the teacher of Behzad, showing the fight of Timur with Tuqtamish Khan and the likeness of him, his children and the great Amirs who were with him in that fight; each portrait bearing the name of the person concerned. In this painting there were 240 figures. It had belonged to the library of Shah Abbas, but had been stolen and sold, and some how, it fell into the hands of Khan Alam. The Shah learnt of the fact and saw the picture but returned to Khan Alam for being taken to Jahangir.

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1. AAA. 669. Zainul Beg was one of the prominent nobles of Shah Abbas. His services in India were liked by the Shah. He was given the title of Khan and appointed Wakil. In 1625 he was sent for the relief of Musal against the Ottomans and in 1626 to Najaf and Hilla which were attacked by the Ottomans. He continued on the post of Wakil until he was killed by Shah Safi (1629-1642) in 1631.(AAA. 669, 700, 17,30; 23A. iv/117).

2. TJ. 284; I QJ 111/558.

3. TJ. 284.
When Jahangir was at Khanpur (October 1620) he learnt that Zainul Beg had reached near Lahore. Mir Hisamuddin was dispatched, along with a robe of honour and thirty thousand rupees, to receive him, and to bear the expenses of the envoy until his arrival.¹

After Jahangir returned to Lahore, Zainul Beg waited upon him on 9th Dec. 1620. According to Jahangir, he presented the gracious letter of that brother of high degree, containing expressions of sincerity and perfect friendship. Zainul Beg brought as peshkash '12 Abbasis, 14 Gilani horses with gilded trapperings, three white falcons, five Persian mules, five camels, nine bows and scimitars.² He was awarded by the Emperor a superb robe of honour with a plumb and a jewelled turban fringe and a jewelled dagger. Wisal Beg and Haji Niamat, who had come with him, probably as custodians of the presents, were also honoured.³

The presents which the Shah had sent for Jahangir, included; Iraqi horses, jewelled articles, and rarities from Rum, Europe, Russia and Persia itself. Within a fortnight these presents were put before the emperor.⁴

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¹. TJ. 315; MJ. ff.64b.; IqJ. ii/571.
². This peshkash, which the ambassador presented as 'naazr' on his own behalf, has been taken by Dr. Rahim as the royal gifts to the Emperor (Rahim 35). They were presented before Jahangir, on a subsequent date, in a court ceremony.
³. TJ. 320.
⁴. Ibid. 321.
In the letter which Zainul Beg brought, Abbas referred to his victories against the Ottomans and attributed them to the divine grace and favour of 'that brother'. He introduced Zainul Beg as one of his most loyal and distinguished courtiers, who was being sent to strengthen the bond of friendship and to convey personally to the Emperor 'those secrets of friendship which could not be disclosed to pen and paper'. In the end, the Shah requested the Emperor to dismiss the envoy soon and to ask for anything that he wanted from Persia.

The Shah also sent a letter to Jahangir regarding the ruler of the Deccan. This letter fortunately has been preserved and is very important as, it throws considerable light on the policy of the Shah towards the Deccan states as well as towards the Mughals. The letter does not bear the name of the ambassador who brought it, but as it was sent after the arrival of Shaikh Khatoon in Persia and before his departure for the Deccan (in 1619), may safely be assumed that it was brought by Khan Alam, or by Zainul Beg.

In this letter the Shah wrote to Jahangir that the Sultans of the Deccan who had been tributaries of 'that exalted dynasty' (the Mughals), had also maintained relations with

1. The letter of Abbas to Jahangir (1620), cf. JM. ff. 219b; ZSA. iv/300.
2. The letter of Abbas to Jahangir cf. JM. ff. 229b.
3. The text is like this:

"مجمع وظام دکن کا ایاں جد برسلکے مطبعان وواج
گزاران آن والامود کان انتظام داڑہ ......."
this dynasty (the Safavids) and were sending letters of friendship to him. Due to his relation with them and in view of his friendship with Jahangir, he had once before requested His Majesty to forgive them and His Majesty had acceded to the request. Shah Abbas proceeded: 'It has come to my knowledge that the above-Sultans have again offended His Majesty who had sent someone to conquer their countries. But as they have always been submissive to His Majesty; do not have strength to defy his authority; and are still ready to comply with the royal orders, in view of my own friendship with His Majesty, I request you to please forgive them so that our friendship became evident to the world. In fact it does not matter for His Majesty whether they held these countries as tributaries or His Majesty were to assign them to others. If they were allowed to retain their possession; they and myself would be grateful to him. The position of His Majesty is so high that he would hardly desire such inferior countries; however, if some expansion of the royal dominions were desired, this well-wisher would be happy to give up an equivalent or even a larger territory from his own dominions.

Some time after the despatch of Zaimul Beg, the Deccani envoys were also dismissed from the Persian court and in return

1. The text of the portion as follows:
"في الواقع خواه سلطانين دکن یاچ گردار مطع باشند و خواه دیگری را بابین خدمت مامول گردانند جه نقص بارکان سلطنت ویدادمای خواهد رسید..."
Persian ambassadors were sent with them. Qasim Beg, the commander of Mazandran was despatched with Shaikh Khatoon to Muhammad Qutb Shah; Talib Beg Awaghi was sent with Mir Khalilullah to Ibrahim Adil Shah II; and Muhammadi Beg to Murtaza Nizam Shah II. Presumably each of these envoys, were given letters to the three Sultans, but only one letter has been preserved, the one sent to Muhammad Qutb Shah.

In this letter, the Shah, after the usual compliments, praised the Sultan for his generous attitude towards Shaikh Khatoon; and enumerated the favours shown by himself to the Shaikh. Next, the Shah consoled the Sultan on the death of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah and expressed his good wishes for the present Sultan. The Shah then, wrote that having earlier heard of the encroachment of the Mughals on the Deccan states, he had recommended their case to the Emperor, particularly the case of Qutb Shah's family through a letter which Jahangir would have not received by then. However, he was again sending a letter to him for the same purpose and the Emperor would

1. AAA, 670. It seems that Mir Khalilullah, the envoy of Sultan Adil Shah who was dismissed in 1613 and had returned to Isfahan from Shiraz, either he did not go to Bijapur after that time or went and came again to Persia. Neither his departure after 1613 is described nor his second arrival in Persia. As he was a native of Khurasan, it is probable that he spent these five years in Persia. Muhammadi Beg also, who had been sent to Nizam Shah once in 1613, was probably despatched again at this time.

surely pay attention to his request and would be generous towards that family (qutb Shah's family). The Shah then advised qutb Shah that it was in his own interest and in the interest of his people to be submissive to the Emperor, avoid hostility and seek his favour. In the end the Shah referred to his own conflict with the Ottomans and his victory over them.

The Shah also sent a letter to Jahangir with qasim Beg. In this letter, the Shah after referring to their mutual friendship, wrote that as His Majesty had adopted a generous attitude towards the Deccan states, he had dismissed their envoys and was sending qasim Beg to inform His Majesty about the developments in Persia and then to proceed to the Deccan states to persuade them to seek the favour of His Majesty. In the closing lines, the Shah expressed his hopes that the Emperor would always be benevolent towards these states and would soon dismiss qasim Beg to proceed to the Deccan. qasim Beg waited upon Jahangir on 29th May 1621, on his way to the Deccan.

1. This portion of the text of the letter is worth quoting here:

"وانه جاحر انور ورد آبست که امامکی و مقدور است آن
سلطنت بناء (سلطان محمد قطب شاه) بادی نزاع و جدال نبوده بجهت
حفظ احوال زبرستان در استرضا حاجر شیف باد شاه ولا جا، خورشید
کلر بدلالات حرد حرده، بین کوهیده از جنگ و جدال برکنار باشد."

2. There is no reference in AAA that qasim Beg who was sent to Sultan qutb Shah, was given a letter to Jahangir also. But the author of ZSA has quoted this letter without mentioning his authority. ZSA. IV/302.

3. Jahangir records the arrival of qasim Beg, but makes no reference to the Deccan. TJ. 332.
In the autumn of 1620, when the Shah was ill at Mazandaran, an envoy Murtaza Nizam Shah II of the Deccan, Habsh Khan by name, waited upon him. When the Shah left Mazandaran for Qazvin and Isfahan early in 1621, the envoy took leave for pilgrimage to Mashhad and then returned again to Isfahan. When the Shah started for Khurasan in Feb. 1622, the ambassador accompanied him and was present when the Persians attacked Qandahar.

Though the letter itself does not bear any reference to the question of Qandahar, the embassy of Zainul Beg was undoubtedly meant to raise the question and probably it was that point which was to be conveyed verbally to Jahangir.

Many favours were showered upon Zainul Beg throughout his stay in India. Besides the rewards bestowed on him on the first day of his arrival, he was given fifty thousand rupees when he presented the royal gifts. In March 1621, he was awarded a Nurjahani Muhar of the weight of 100 tolas. In April 1621, he was given a muhar equal to 200 tolas in weight. Again, within a fortnight, a special dagger was bestowed upon him. On 23rd August 1621, a jewelled sword was given and a village under the Jurisdiction of Agra, yield-

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2. AAA. 689.

2. For a discussion on the subject see infra. p. 146
ing a revenue of Rs. 16,000, was assigned to him. And on the Nauroz of the year 1031 A.H. (21 March 1622), eighty thousand darb were given to him.\(^1\)

Shortly before or after the arrival of Zainul Beg, Haji Rafiq the merchant, came from Persia and brought a letter from Abbas to Prince Khurram\(^2\). No detail of this embassy or the letter sent with it is available. However, from the reply sent by the Prince to Shah Abbas, it seems that it was a friendly letter like his letters to Prince Salim and Prince Daniyal.

In return Prince Khurram sent Zahid Beg with a letter and some presents to the Shah. Zahid Beg must have been despatched by Khurram some time in 1621, for he reached Mashhad late in 1621 or early in 1622 where he heard that the Shah was on his way from Isfahan to Khurasan. He, therefore, stayed at Mashhad and waited upon the Shah in 1622, after the Shah occupied Qandahar.

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1. TJ. 321; 26, 28, 33, 43; MJ. ff. 64b.; I.Q. 111/573.

2. This information has gathered from the letter of Khurram to Shah Abbas (1621), cf. MJ. ff. 226b; JE. ff. 212b.; FZQ. ff. 81a.

3. See above p. 76.

4. Shah writes in his subsequent letter to Shahjahan (1622) that when he (Abbas) was coming to Khurasan through indirect route, Zahid Beg was going to Isfahan through the direct route of Mazandran and the latter returned to Mashhad when learnt the fact (see infra, p. 159).
In his letter to Abbas, Khurram wrote that for a long time he had wanted to establish relations with His Majesty but could not do so without the permission of the Emperor and was waiting for an opportunity to seek permission. The opportunity was provided when Haji Rafiq came and brought a letter of His Majesty. Thereupon he took permission from the emperor and despatched Zahir Beg along with some presents of Hindustan, to His Majesty. Khurram requested the Shah to write to him about those presents which he liked among the presents sent so that he (Khurram) might send them again. In the end Khurram wrote that he regarded the Shah as his uncle and expected that he would continue the exchange of letters.

A few months after Zainul Beg's arrival, two other Persian envoys, Aqa Beg and Muhib-i-Ali Beg arrived at the Mughal court and on 19th February 1621, and presented a loving letter from that noble brother, together with a black and white plume (Kalgi-i-Ablaq) valued by the jewellers at Rs. 50,000; and a ruby weighing 12 tolas. The real significance of this ruby was that it had once belonged to the treasury of Mirza Ulugh Beg and on it was engraved in Naskh character, "Ulugh Beg bin Mirza Shahrukh Beg bin Mir Timur Gurgani." Some how it had reached the treasury of the Safavids. Shah

1. TJ. (R. and B.) ii/196; AAA. 669; ZSA. iv/96; IQJ. iii/574.
Abbas ordered that "Banda-i-Shah-i-Milayat, Abbas" be engraved on it. It was put in a jigha and sent to the Emperor as a souvenir.

Jahangir highly appreciated this invaluable present and recorded in the Tuzuk: "As the ruby bore the names of my ancestors, I took it as a blessing for myself and bade saïda, the superintendent of the goldsmith department, engrave in another corner the words "Jahangir Shah bin Akbar Shah" and the current date." Few days after, some other presents of the Shah were put before the Emperor which consisted of four horses, some silver ornaments and cloths.

Besides these, royal gift, the envoys also presented during the Nauroz-celebrations, a peshkash of seven Iraqi horses with trappings, 24 horses, two mules, three camels, seven grey hounds (saq-i-Tazi), twenty seven pieces (taq) of brocades, a shamama of ambergris, two pairs of carpets and two woolen coverlets.

Neither the letter, sent through Agh Aqa Beg etc., nor any clue to its contents is available. Perhaps they were informal ambassadors.

1. TJ. (R. and B.) 11/195; AAA. 669; ZSA. iv/96; IQJ. iii/674.
2. TJ. 324, 26, 27.
3. Ibid. 669.
Aqa Beg and Muhib-i-Ali Beg along with Haji Beg and Fazil Beg were dismissed on 10th June 1621. Aqa Beg was awarded a dress of honour, a jewelled dagger and forty thousand rupees in cash; Muhib-i-Ali Beg a dress of honour and Rs. 30,000; and to the others gifts were given according to their positions. A suitable souvenir was also sent to the Shah.

In the light of above detailed account of the embassies, it is evident that the relationship of Shah Abbas with Jahangir was extremely cordial and intimate. There is no other example of such frequent exchange of embassies between two medieval rulers. Apart from informal messengers, most every year one or the other Persian envoy waited upon the Mughal Emperor and returned with letters and presents for the Shah. On the other hand, Muhammad Husain Chelebi remained at the Persian court for a long period.

These magnificent and highly equipped embassies were unusual for both the countries and starting for the foreigners.

1. Dr. Rahim regards Haji Beg and Fazil Beg as a separate embassy, arrived from Persia sometimes after Zainul Beg's arrival (Rahim, 36). Arrival of these ambassadors is not recorded in the chronicles. It is their dismissal which Jahangir has recorded. It seems that they were these two persons who had come with Zainul Beg. Their names Wisal Beg and Haji Nimat have been probably changed in transcription due to similarity in their form:

2. TJ. 332.
Sir Thomas Roe gives the detail of Muhammad Riza’s train and in spite of his jealousy towards him, which itself indicates the position of Persian ambassador at the Mughal court, he writes about the presents: "...But these so faire, so rich, that I was ashamed of the relation." On the other hand, Iskandar Munshi remarks about Khan Alam’s retinue: "...... From the beginning of this divine dynasty no ambassador ever came from India or Rum with such splendid and lavish equipment; and it is doubtful whether, even in the days of the great kings of the past such an embassy ever came from any foreign land."^2

The presents which Abbas and Jahangir sent for each other and which we have discussed at length, were also unprecedented regarding their quality and quantity. Each envoy from either side brought and in return carried back a large number of presents which included some of those gifts which no monarch would ordinarily like to part with. But here, each of the two expressed the desire that the other should ask for a special favour.

On Jahangir’s indication, Abbas sent the historic astrolabe of Ulugh Mirza, the painting of the Light of Timur and the ruby which bore the names of Ulugh Mirza and his father

1. Foster: 'Embassy of Thomas Roe' 258.
2. AAA. 661.
and grandfather. Besides its importance and value, the ruby was among the trust properties of the shrine of Mashhad and Abbas must have taken particular trouble to get its possession. Jahangir on his part, reciprocated the gesture by sending to the Shah that jewelled cup which Chelebi had sent for him, and the Shah had shown a liking for it. Besides the specialties of their own countries, the presents also included the spoils of war and the gifts sent from other countries. Even birds and animals were included in the list of presents and special carriers were despatched for the purpose.

The favours shown to the ambassadors at each other's court were also highly generous and greater than they shown to the envoys of other countries. At each court, the ambassadors of other countries were also present at one time or the other. But neither Abbas' court historian, nor Jahangir himself, attached to them the same importance which they did in regard to the Indian and Persian envoys respectively. We have quoted Thomas Roe above. Foster also remarks: 'Jahangir not only describes the embassy (of Muhammad Riza) in his Memoirs, but gives the Shah's letter in full; whereas Roe's mission was not thought worthy of mention.'

Shah Abbas showed great favour to the Mughal ambassador and even to the informal envoys. The treatment which he meted

1. AAA. TJ. 105, 324.
2. Foster, 'Embassy of Thomas Roe', 259.
out to Khan Alam was significant. He received him warmly, embraced him at the time of Komish, entertained him by feast, hunts, banquets and other courtly functions and paid informal visits to his residence. He also exempted Khan Alam from the court etiquette and ambassadorial formalities and from the general prohibition against smoking. Finally, when Khan Alam took leave, the Shah came out of the city to see him off. Jahangir writes about these favours. "Of the favours and kindness offered by my brother on Khan Alam, if I were to write of them in detail, I should be accused of exaggeration."

The number of letters sent by the two rulers to each other is very high considering the short period of correspondence. They are more than formal and unique in nature. They contain more references to the friendship of the two dynasties and particularly that of the two rulers than to political or diplomatic questions. The remarks of Jahangir that in the letter (of the Shah) much friendship and affection were displayed, apply to almost every letter, sent by the Shah to him. And he himself always sent letter.

The display of friendship was not confined to the exchange of embassies, present and letters and favours to the ambassadors. Jahangir also sent Bishandas, the unrivalled

1. AAA. 661-63; TJ. 183; 284; I.Q.J. 111/558.
2. TJ. 284; I.Q.J. 111/558.
3. TJ. 284.
painter of his age, along with Khan Alam, to make the portrait of the Shah and his chief nobles and bring it back with him. It is significant that the paintings consisted, besides the individual portraits of the Shah and his nobles, a portrait in which the Shah and Jahangir are shown sitting together. In another picture, they have been shown embracing each other. In a third one, Khan Alam has been depicted as sitting close to the Shah who is presenting him with a cup of wine.

There are other examples of the cordial relationship of the two rulers. There are cases when Shah Abbas recommended the case of one or another person to Jahangir and the letter gave due attention to his request. At one place Jahangir writes: "In a separate letter (1613), the Shah had written a recommendation of Salamullah the Arab. I immediately increased his mansabs and his jagirs." There is also the case of the states of the Deccan for whom Abbas made repeated requests to Jahangir to be benevolent towards them. The policy of the Shah in regard of the Deccan has been discussed elsewhere. It may be mentioned here that, though it was too much to expect that Jahangir would have decided one of his most important political questions according to the wishes of the Shah, the fact remains that the Shah recommended to Jahangir the case of the Deccan States and both the Shah and his courtiers had the impression

1. TV. 117.
that Jahangir had accepted his recommendation.

It may therefore be categorically stated that the friendship of the two rulers was unprecedent. The question naturally arises as to what were those factors that led to such frequent exchange of embassies and such close friendship. It has been observed that "their apparent object was to 'lull the suspicions and win the confidence of Jahangir'. It is also said that 'their apparent object was to expedite the negotiation for the return of Qandahar began by Zain-ul-Beg and to obtain a final reply from Jahangir'. The arrival of the Deccan envoys at the Persian court has led some scholar to the conclusion that the Shah was intriguing with them, as he was interested in the preservation of the independence of his allies in the Deccan. Let us now examine the facts.

Shortly after the repulse of the Persians from Qandahar in 1606, the Uzbeks, had once again gathered strength under Wali Muhammad and had increased their military power. They defeated and killed Jahangir Khan and occupied Ghorjistan (1606-07). The occupation of Ghorjistan was followed by an Uzbek attack on Badghis and Maruchaq, though it was repulsed by the combined armies of Maruchaq and Marv. Meanwhile, after

1. See infra. p. 123
2. Bani Prasad: 'Jahangir', 338; Tripathi: 'Rise & Fall' 388; Rahim 37.
3. Rahim 37.
4. Ibid. 33 cf. 'Roe's Embassy' 259.
the Persian attack on Qandahar was repulsed by the Mughals, the Mughal Emperor Jahangir set out from Lahore for Kabul. Alarmed by these developments in the east, the Shah came to Khurasan, leaving the affairs of his newly conquered places unsettled. Though Wali Muhammad established friendship with the Shah, probably on the latter's consenting to the former's occupation of Ghorjistan, the affairs in the west took an unfa
dible turn. Taking advantage of the death of Sultan Muhammad III of Turkey and other internal problems of the Ottoman, the Shah had recovered within a comparatively short period of four years, Azerbaijan and had further advanced in Shirwan and Gurjistan (Georgia). To consolidate his power in these regions of turbulent tribes, required time. Before he could consolidate his power in these provinces, his armies suffered a reverse in the east and the Jalali tribes came in the west. The arrival of the Jalalis in Kurdistan Azerbaijan created many problems for the Shah. Their settlement in Kurdistan was resented the Kurds and by their revolts and disturbances the Kurds soon became a menace for the peace of his newly conquered provinces of Azerbaijan and Shirwan. The Ottomans most probably encouraged these turbulent tribes, and taking advantage of these disturbance, they started attempts to recover from the Persian Azerbaijan and Shirwan. Though their attempts failed, yet the Shah was kept very busy in the west and he had to spend most of his time (1609-13) in his western provinces in fortifying his border and crushing the turbulent tribal chiefs.
Meanwhile a change came in Uzbek politics. Wali Muhammad whom the Shah had assisted against Imam Quli and Nazr Muhammad Uzbek, was defeated and killed (1613). The Shah, having apprehension lest Imam Quli and Nazr Muhammad advance towards Khurasan, made a surprise visit to the province. However, finding no indication of any immediate Uzbek attack on Khurasan and not quite satisfied with his western frontier, he returned from Mashhad to Mazandaran within a fortnight. But the assistance which the Shah had rendered to Wali Muhammad (1613), was bound to be resented by the Uzbek brothers and the fears of the Shah proved completely true. Khurasan again became a prey to successive Uzbek incursions from 1614 to 1620.

In 1614 Yalangtush Bahadur invaded Marv and Mashhad. Next year, some of the Uzbek chiefs plundered Jam, Khwaf (Khaf) and the surroundings, as far as Herat. It was followed by another attack on Maruchaq in which its commander, Qazag Sultan was killed. In 1616, the Uzbek again attacked the area between Sarakhs and Herat. In the following year (1617) they attacked Nishapur and its surroundings. Meanwhile, the governor of Khurasan died in 1618. The event provided the Uzbeks with a further opportunity and Yalangtush Bahadur captured Bala Murghab. His attack on Gharian was, however, repulsed.
In view of these serious difficulties, the only expedient step which Shah Abbas could take was to enter into a close friendship with the Mughal Emperor. While his friendship with Jahangir would prevent the latter from making any attempt for the recovery of Bust and move beyond, it would also stop him from entering into an understanding with the Uzbeks. Some parts of both the Mughal and the Uzbek dominions (such as Bust and Bala Murghab etc., respectively) had been occupied by the Persians and when the Shah was confronted with serious internal disturbances and Ottoman threat, a possible coalition of the Mughals and the Uzbeks in the east, would not only expose his eastern provinces to a joint attack, it would also endanger the newly conquered places in Azerbaijan, Shirvan and Gurjistan.

Compelled by these considerations the Shah despatched Yadgar Ali Sultan Talish to Jahangir on a friendly mission. Similarly, if we examine the circumstances when the other important embassies were despatched to India, we find that they were sent when the Shah was confronted with serious difficulties. The letters sent to Jahangir with these ambassadors no longer bore the news of his victory either over the Uzbeks or over the Ottomans, as his letters sent before 1606 and after 1623. In fact, after 1607, no offensive was launched by the Shah either in the east or in the west. He was mainly busy in the west, in suppressing the tribal chiefs, and the disaffected nobles and in repulsing the Ottoman attacks on Azerbaijan.
The second Persian ambassador, Mustafa Beg, was despatched to India in 1614, a period when Wali Muhammad had been defeated by the Uzbeks, their attacks had started on various places in Khurasan, disturbances had spread in Gurjistan and the Ottoman had attacked Qarabagh. There is a reference to these facts in both the letters of Abbas to Jahangir and Jahangir’s description of the embassy. When Muhammad Riza was sent to the Mughal court in 1616 the attacks of the Uzbeks on Khurasan and that of the Ottomans had become frequent.

The next Persian ambassador to the Mughal court was Sayyid Hasan who arrived in August 1619, when the Uzbeks had penetrated as far as Nishapur and the Ottomans, regardless of Shah’s proposal of peace, had once more attacked Tabrez in 1618. So great was the Ottoman threat and the fear of the turbulent tribes in the west that in spite of successive Uzbek attacks on Khurasan from 1614 onward, the Shah could neither move beyond Mazandran, nor even send a strong reinforcements to Khurasan. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful if the Shah would have thought during this period of the recovery of Qandahar.

Due to the same reasons it is difficult to accept the view that the object of these missions was to expedite the negotiation for the return of Qandahar. Though the Shah

2. Rahim 37.
himself says in his letter to Jahangir sent after the fall of Qandahar that the question of Qandahar had been raised in his letter and often discussed by his ambassadors; and Persian chronicles also state that the Persian ambassadors put forward this point. Jahangir altogether denies the allegation in his letter sent to Abbas; and states that only Zainul Beg (who arrived at the Mughal court in Oct. 1620) had raised the question of Qandahar. The statement of the shah and his court chronicler Iskandar Beg, is hardly anything more than a ready excuse and a justification for the unfriendly act. Apart from his own straightforwardness, the statement of Jahangir is supported by other facts.

Almost all the letters of Abbas sent to Jahangir are none of them available to us and contain a reference to Qandahar as stated by the shah that he had referred to this matter in his letters. It seems unlikely that the shah would ask Jahangir to surrender Qandahar to him when he had once apologized for the attack on Qandahar by his officers; when he was extremely, busy in the west; and when due to political difficulties, he was eager for the friendship of the Mughal Emperor. By the time Zainul Beg was despatched to India, the Ottomans, being repeatedly defeat-

1. cf. letter of Abbas to Jahangir (1622), TJ.348; JM.ff. 220a; JIB 272a; ZSA iv/103; AAA. 676, 83.
2. cf. letter of Jahangir to Abbas (1622) TJ. 350; JM. ff. 220b; JIB ff. 274b; ZSA iv/104.
ted by the Persians and confronted with their own problems, had sought peace and the negotiation were in an advanced stage. Yadgar Ali Talish who had been sent to Turkey, had returned along with an Ottoman ambassador. The Shah, therefore, from his anxiety regarding his western frontier, instructed Zainul Beg to put forward the question of Qandahar before Jahangir. It is surprising that Dr. Rahim, though he accepts the fact the negotiation for Qandahar were began by Zainul Beg, nevertheless states that all the embassies were sent in connection with Qandahar. Only one embassy of Aqa Ali and Muhib-i-Ali came after the arrival of Zainul Beg in India and before the Persian attack on Qandahar. The purpose of the mission of Aqa Ali and Muhib-i-Ali will be discussed in the next chapter.

As a Persian attack on Qandahar during 1609-1620 was hardly possible, it is difficult to accept the view that Abbas, while protesting friendship with Jahangir, was in reality attempting to utilize the Deccan states against the Mughals so that he could find an opportunity to attack Qandahar. It was not without reason that no Persian attack occurred during the period 1608-1611 when the Mughals were busy in the Deccan and in Mewar. In the Deccan they had even suffered reverses.

1. Rahim 37.
2. Rahim 37.
3. TJ. 75, 77, 86, 107; Tripathi: Rise and Fall of Mughal Empire 374-75; Hem Prasad: Jahangir 262-64.
Nor did it happen during 1615-17 when the main Mughal army was busy in the Deccan, and the Emperor himself was at Mandu. During the same time trouble with the Bangash tribes had increased and Mehabat Khan was sent to suppress them. It was, therefore, a suitable period for an attack on Qandahar if the Shah had been waiting for it.

These suspicions are further removed by the fact that while the Deccan envoys were present at the court, Khan Alam was also present there. If there was anything like such an intrigue, must have been aware of it and informed Jahangir. Moreover, Jahangir himself was well aware of the exchange of embassies between the Shah and the Deccan states and some of these ambassadors waited upon him, and presented their peshkash. It should also be noticed that Mir Muhammad Amin, commonly known as Mir Junla who went from Persia to Golconda and thence to the Mughal court in March 1618, would have informed Jahangir.

1. TJ. 166,179.
2. TJ. 152,199; Bern Prasad: Jahangir 215-17; Tripathi Rise and Fall. 387.
3. TJ. 184, 332.
4. TJ. 224. Mir Muhammad Amin was a Saiyid of Isfahan. A few years ago he came to Golconda and entered into the service of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah and by his ability attained the post of Mir Junla. After the death of Quli Shah (1612), his relations became strained with the new Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah and he returned to Persia. The Shah offered him various posts but he accepted none except the Mazarat. Disappointed, he again left Persia and came to the Mughal court. Jahangir, however, writes that he came on his invitation. At Mughal court he got quick promotions. In June 1618, he was given a mansab of 1500/200. In 1619 he was appointed on the post of Arz-Mukarrar. In April 1620, his mansab was raised to 2000/300. During the same year he made 'Khansamah' and finally he was promoted (1623) to a mansab of 3000/300. TJ. (trans.) 11/3,15,37,154,75, 276.
of any intrigue between the Persians and the Deccanis, had there been one in fact. In view of all these facts it seems difficult that such an intrigue would remain hidden from the Mughal court. And the fact that the relations of Jahangir and Abbas remain cordial until the latter’s attack on Qandahar, suggests that Jahangir himself did not entertain any suspicion.

The suggestion that the Shah was interested in the preservation of the independence of the Deccan states and looked with jealousy on the increase of this empire (Mughal empire) in that direction, is also not supported by facts. No doubt the Shah recommended their case to Jahangir more than once and requested Jahangir to avoid armed action against them. But the Shah was more anxious to secure the friendship of Jahangir than to ensure the independence of the Deccan states. Moreover, in his letter to Jahangir and to the Sultan of Golconda, which we have quoted above, there is evidence that the Shah regarded them as tributary states of the Mughal empire. In his letter written in 1619 he even advised the Sultan of Golconda to avoid hostility with the Emperor and seek his favour which was in his own interest/in the interest of his people. This evidence suggests that the policy of Shah Abbas in regard to the Deccan states was pro-Mughal and not anti-Mughal. The Shah wanted that these states be left in peace.

1. Rahim 33.
provided they continued to owe allegiance to the Mughals. The remarks of Sir Thomas Roe, which are probably the basis of the above suggestion, nearly suggest that the shah desired "to treat a peace for the Deccans."

These embassies were, therefore, sent with the purpose of securing Jahangir's friendship which was highly valuable for the shah under the circumstances which we have discussed. This fact was probably known to Jahangir, for only this would explain his carelessness in the defence of Qandahar. The suggestion that the garrison of Qandahar dwindled because Jahangir was deceived by the Persian embassies which were sent to negotiate for Qandahar, is contradictory in itself. For if the question of Qandahar had been raised between the two rulers or Jahangir had found any inkling of this fact, though he might have continued his friendship with Abbas to dissuade him from attacking it, he would not altogether neglect the defence of Qandahar. Rather, he would be more careful to ensure its protection. It has been observed that in the 15th year of his reign (1620), Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Qandahar was suddenly promoted to a mansab of 5,000/4000 and a total amount of 2,60,000 was sent to increase the provision in the fort of Qandahar, and this shows that Jahangir was aware of the intrigues and the intentions of the shah. But this appears

1. Foster: 'Embassy of Roe' 259.
2. Rahim 38.
to have been due to Jahangir's usual generosity and not a precautionary step. Jahangir himself and his statement is collaborated by Iqbalnema and Maktir-i-Jahangiri, that there were only three or four hundred soldiers in the fort when it was attacked by the Persians. Besides, the fact that a fort like that of Qandahar fell to the Persians within a month, proves that it was not properly garrisoned.

Jahangir on his part, seems to be equally anxious for Persian friendship. An attack on Qandahar had already been made and possibility of fresh attacks could not be ruled out. Jahangir would have thought that close friendship with the shah would dissuade the latter from making any fresh attack on Qandahar. Besides, this was the period when the frontier tribes were creating serious difficulties for the Mughals and there was a traditional suspicion that the Uzbeks were interested in encouraging the tribal strife. Ahmad Afghan had even attacked Kabul. While Jahangir was busy against Mewar and the Deccan, the disturbances on his north-western frontiers would have upset his whole plan. The Persian friendship would prove a check upon these tribes and the Uzbeks. It may be noted here that immediately after the loss of Qandahar to the Persians

1. TJ. 343; IQJ. 111/579; MJ. ff. 68.
2. AAA. 685.
3. TJ. 96, 114, 52, 57-59, 263-69, 77, 89, 91; IQJ. 111 558; Beni Prasad, 'Jahangir', 216-17; Tripathi, 'Rise & Fall' 387.
Ghazni and Kabul proper were attacked by the Uzbeks who seem to have established their control not only over Ghorjistan, but also parts of Hazarajat.

Besides these political considerations, both Jahangir and Abbas were particularly interested in promoting trade and commerce between their respective countries. We find that special commercial missions were sent to Persia. Muhammad Husain Chelebi was sent for the specific purpose of trade. Haji Rafiq made frequent visit of Persia and India and was in touch with both the courts. To encourage the trade between the two countries, special favour was shown to merchants by both the Emperors. Even the diplomatic missions were, as we mentioned above, like moving exhibitions of the arts and crafts of their respective countries. The best specimens of the arts and crafts of the country were included in the royal presents. This was a useful way of popularizing the products of the country.

Overland trade became more important in this period due to the European domination of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The most simultaneous attempts of Adil Shah, the Mughal Governor of Gujrat and the Persian commander of Lar, to drive
out the Portuguese from their respective territories had failed (1613). From a casual reference in *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, it seems that even the Indian and Persian travellers could not safely travel by the sea-route. Both Jahangir and Shah Abbas wanted to secure the alliance of the English against the Portuguese. Until they succeeded in their plan against the Portuguese, overland route was the only safe one for the merchants of the two countries, and the promotion of overland trade the friendship between the two rulers was vital.

1. Danvers: 'Portuguese in India' 11/162-63; *English Factories in India* L.R. 11/96.
2. TJ, 184.
3. AAA, 689; ZSA iv/214-28; *English Factories in India*, L.R. iii/19-20; Danvers: 'Portuguese in India' 11/207.

Danvers write: 'The Shah concluded an agreement for this (silk) trade with James, King of England, with whom he also entered into a league for the capture of Island (of Omuz).
CHAPTER V

THE RECOVERY OF QANDAHAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
1622 - 1629

When Yadgar Ali Talish returned from his embassy to the Ottoman empire in 1619, the Shah felt that a stable peace on the west was insight. He, therefore, felt relief and decided to turn his attention to the eastern provinces where the Uzbeks had been creating trouble. At this time he also started making moves for the recovery of Qandahar.

According to the author of Alam Ara-i-Abbasi, the Shah explicitly raised the question of restoration of Qandahar. He told Khan Alam that a demonstration of the unity of the safavid and the Mughal empires was in their best interest. This unity should be made specially clear to the Uzbeks who were the enemies of both. He told him that the restoration of Qandahar, which had belonged to his dynasty and was an integral part of the province of Khurasan, and which was far off from Hindustan, would become the corner stone of their mutual friendship and would prevent their mutual enemies from continuing to taunt the Mughal Emperor for having (perfidiously) taken the territory of a friend. The Shah realized that the evacuation of Qandahar might prove embracing to

(1) AAA. 684.
Jahangir. He, therefore, proposed that he should go towards
Qandahar ostensibly for pleasure and Shikar and the Mughal
officers might offer him hospitality at Qandahar. After that
the Mughal officers would return and it would be demonstrated
that the giving up of the Qandahar was the result of close
friendship between the two rulers and was not due to any ill-
feeling among them.

It may be safely assumed that the Shah had raised the
question of rendition of Qandahar with Khan-i-Alam and had
stressed that it would strengthen the bonds between the two
houses against their common enemy, the Uzbeks. This argument
appears to have been an implied threat that if the Mughals
failed to surrender Qandahar peacefully, the Shah might enter
into an arrangement with the Uzbeks to the detriment of the
Mughals. However, it does not appear to be probable that the
shah had, in fact, suggested the *modus operandi* mentioned by
Iskandar Munshi.

As has been stated earlier, Zainul Beg had also been
entrusted with the same mission and was specifically asked to
bring a definite reply from Jahangir. Although Zainul Beg
arrived at Lahore in October 1620, he was unable to meet the
Emperor until December. As there was a delay in the receipt
of favourable reply from Jahangir, Shah Abbas sent the embassy
of Aga Beg and Muhibb-1-Ali Beg who arrived at the Mughal court

1. AAA. 684.
in February 1621. Perhaps the Shah felt that since his message sent through Khan Alam had reached Jahangir in January 1620, he could legitimately expect an early reply.

Zainul Beg had wanted to return before March 1621 but was unable to do so. When Aga Beg and Muhibb-ı-Ali ultimately returned in June 1621, they did not bring any definite reply either. According to Iskandar Munshi, the Persian envoys reported that when Khan-i-Alam placed the Persian proposal before Jahangir, there was a difference of opinion. Some suggested that every effort should be made to strengthen the friendship with Persia, while others, who were really trouble-makers and shortsighted, but claimed to be loyal well-wishers of the Mughal empire, in their sycophancy urged the emperor to reject the proposal. There is no reference in Indian sources to this difference of opinion. It is extremely doubtful whether any group at the imperial court would have advocated the voluntary surrender of Qandahar.

In 1621 the Uzbeks again invaded the Persian territory and occupied Bala-Murghab. The Shah, therefore, decided late

1. AAA. 699. Iskandar Munshi writes that due to avasive answers of Jahangir on the question of Qandahar, Zainul Beg wanted to return from Lahore. But as he was instructed by the Shah to present some new presents for Jahangir, he had to proceed to the capital.

2. AAA. 684.
in 1621, to raise a massive and well-equipped army for being sent to Khurasan. It is clear from a perusal of Alam Ara-i-Abbasi that the purpose of raising this army was the conquest of Qandahar, though incidentally it was intended to impress the Uzbek with show of force. It has been argued that the shah decided upon an expedition to Qandahar when he was told that the Mughals had sent a large army to the Deccan under Prince Shahjahan, and that there was a coordinated plan of the Persians and the Deccan states. The presence of Babsh Khan, the Ahmadnagar envoy, at the Persian court during the siege of Qandahar has strengthened this view. However, the fact that a treaty between the Mughals and the Deccan states had been concluded in April 1621, even before Aga Beg and Muhibb-i-Ali left India, suggests that there was no connection between the Persian attack on Qandahar and the wars in the Deccan. Actually during the period of the attack upon Qandahar, the relation of the Mughal with Adil Shah were cordial.

The military preparations in Khurasan and the news that the Shah intended moving against Qandahar had a military effect upon the Uzbeks. As stated earlier, both Nazr Muhammad

1. AAA. 676.
4. See above 33.
and Imam Quli opened negotiation with the Shah and an understanding was reached between the Persians and the Uzbeks. The Shah decided not to attempt the recovery of Bala—Murghab for the time being so that he could concentrate upon the conquest of Qandahar.

On 16th February 1622, the Shah personally started for Khurasan. When he reached Farah, his large army which had assembled at Nishapur joined and he set out for Qandahar. From Farah he sent a message to Abdul Aziz Khan the Governor of Qandahar stating that he intended to visit Qandahar for pleasure, he should offer the Shah hospitality and receive him in Qandahar as a friend of his master so that the unity of the two amirates might become apparent to their common enemies, specially to the Uzbeks. Iskandar Munshi states that this proposal had been sent to Abdul Aziz in accordance with the promise which the Shah had given to Khan-i-Alem. However, it seems likely that this particular excuse was thought of at this very moment so that the Persians might continue to enjoy the friendship of the Mughals against the Uzbeks, in spite of their taking Qandahar. The fact that there was only a small contingent of three to four hundred swars under Abdul

1. AAA. 684.
2. Ibid.
Aziz at this time, might convey the impression that Khan-i-
Aalam had actually been conveyed this proposal and Jahangir
tacitly agreed to it. However, in that event the Shah would
not have brought with him such a large army which it had taken
him months to raise. Moreover, if such had been the case,
Jahangir would not have displayed so much bitterness at the
loss of Qandahar. Furthermore, Jahangir would not have shown
the anxiety for the recovery of Qandahar which ultimately led
to the rebellion of Shahjahan that rocked the Mughal empire
severely.

Abdul Aziz Khan sent a firm but polite reply to the
Shah through Mirza Baqi Kabuli. He urged the Shah to turn
back and warned that in the case of refusal to do so, he
would be compelled to defend the fort.

The Shah thereupon sent a contingent under Khusru
Sultan to capture the fort of Zamindawar which was being
defended by Shah Kalan and himself marched to Qandahar arriving
there on 18th May 1622. Abdul Aziz Khan defended the fort but
ultimately, due to the lack of provisions and inadequate forces,
he was compelled to surrender the fort on 21st June 1622.

Among the Mughal officers who surrendered along with Abdul Aziz

1. TJ. 343; MJ. ff. 68b.
2. AAA. 684.
Khan, were Shamsheer Khan, Ali Quli Darman, Mirza Fazil Makhdom zad and Shah Muhammad Khan, son of Shah Beg Khan entitled Khan-i-Dauran. According to Iskandar Munshi the number of troops who surrendered was between four to five thousand, though the Mughal sources put down their number at three to four hundred. Shah Abbas treated the Mughal officers courteously and permitted them to returned to India. On 24th June Khutba was read at Qandahar in the name of twelve Imams.

In zamindawar, Shah Kalan held out for a longer time. But the news of the fall of Qandahar and the paucity of the resources demoralized the defenders. Khurasan Sultan invited shah Kalan to meet him. The latter accepted the invitation of the former but went there armed with his retainers. Perhaps he had hoped to kill Khurasan Sultan and thus throw the besiegers into confusion. Taking advantage of a break between the soldiers of the two sides, Khwaja Mughal of zamindawar, who bore on enmity towards Shah Kalan, attacked and assassinated him. Zamindawar thus passed into the hands of the Persians.

When the news of the movement of Abbas to Qandahar reached Jahangir, who was then at Rawlpindi, he sent orders to Shahjahan to come to the court with all his army so that

1. AAA. 685.
2. Ibid.; TJ. 343; MJ. ff. 68b.
3. AAA. 686.
4. Ibid. 686-87.
he could be sent against the Persians. Shahjahan demanded certain concessions and the permission to delay the expedition until the rainy season had passed. In the meanwhile, Qandahar, fell and Abdul Aziz returned to India.

The presence of Shahjahan's envoy, Zahid Beg, at the Persian court when the Shah attacked Qandahar and letter on Shahjahan's demand of concessions when he was asked to go to Qandahar, has created a suspicion in the mind of some distinguished modern scholars that he was in league with the shah of Persia and the latter was encouraging the Prince against the Emperor. Dr. R.P. Tripathi has written: "It appears that he was planning a coup, and wanted to avail himself of the situation created by the invasion of Qandahar by the shah of Persia. His treacherous intentions find support from the fact that he stood so low as to send Zahid Beg with presents to the shah of Persia and wished him good luck in his Qandahar enterprise. Indeed in his undeserved hatred for the queen and his anxiety to humiliate the Emperor, he had sent Zahid Beg to the shah." Dr. Rahim has put forward a similar view and writes: "certain entries in Alem Aref Abbasi also show how deep was the Shah's interest in the intrigues of Nurjahan against Shahjahan."
This suspicion has arisen mainly because the arrival of Zahir Beg in Persia has been confused with his reception at Qandahar. In fact, Zahir Beg had reached Persia, in 1621. He had been sent at a time when the relations of Shah Jahan with Jahangir had not become strained, and the latter had presented the former with a ruby as a special mark of favour. Dr. Rahim himself says: "while the Shah was still at Qandahar, Shahjahan's ambassador Zahir Beg appeared with a letter and presents, an act which cannot be explained in any way, for so far Jahangir had taken no action against Shahjahan. Zahir Beg was sent on a goodwill mission, like the missions of Prince Salim and Prince Danyal to Shah Abbas. Zahir Beg and the letter sent with him to the Shah, were despatched with the permission of Jahangir and the letter does not bear any reference either to his conflict with the court or to his intrigues with the Shah. In this letter which has been fortunately preserved to us and is quoted in three original collections of the letters, there is no reference to Qandahar, much less to Shahjahan's good wishes on Shah's enterprise of Qandahar.

1. Dr. Banarsi Prasad Sagania also seems to be under the impression that Zahir Beg reached Qandahar, when the Shah was busy in its siege, (Banarsi Prasad Sagania : 'shahjahan' 54).
2. AAA 687.
3. This ruby was presented to Shahjahan on his success against the Deccan, in April 1621. (TJ. 332).
4. Rahim 41.
5. See above p. 123.
The references in Alam Ara Abbasi to differences at the Mughal court have already been discussed at some length, and it is difficult to accept Dr. Rahim's interpretation that the shah was taking a keen interest in the conflict between Nurjahan and Shahjahan. It seems to be reasonably clear that neither Shahjahan instigated the shah to conquer Qandahar nor did the shah encourage Shahjahan to defy his father. The conditions put forward by Shahjahan and the dilatoriness shown by him in moving against Qandahar were really due to internal factors which have been so clear brought out by Dr. Tripathi himself as well as by Dr. Beni Prasad.

After occupying Qandahar, the shah sent Wali Beg to Jahangir with letter explaining away his attack on Qandahar. Wali Beg was followed by Haidar Beg with another letter to Jahangir and two golden keys of the fort showing that it was still in the possession of Jahangir. The two envoys reached the Mughal court simultaneously on 17th Nov. 1622. Both the letter are on the same times.

2. AAA. 686; ZSA. iv/102-3.
3. Letter of Abbas to Jahangir (1622) cf. TJ. 348; JM. ff. 220a; IJB ff. 272a; ZSA. iv/102-3. The author of ZSA has quoted both the letters, but the letter sent through Wali Beg is not given in any of the sources. Jahangir mentions their simultaneous arrival (TJ. 348), while the AAA. records that they returned together (669). AAA. mentions only the despatch of Haidar Beg after the fall of Qandahar (AAA. 686).
In the letter sent with Haidar Beg the Shah wrote that many of his ancestral dominions had been lost to the others, but he recovered them from the enemies. However, as there was friendship between him and Jahangir, he was expecting that Jahangir himself would return Qandahar to him. He had referred to this matter in many letters and through various embassies. As he could not get any answer from Jahangir and was subjected to taunting by the enemies, he started towards Qandahar only on a hunting expedition so that the hospitality of the commander of Qandahar, the friendship of the two rulers would become evident to all. But Abdul Aziz Khan adopted an un損害 attitude towards him and ignored the warning conveyed to him. The Shah, therefore, attacked and captured Qandahar in spite of the fact that he had not brought with him the necessary weapons of war and siege. However, in view of the friendship of the two rulers, he forgave the commander, allowed him to return. Then the Shah referred to their old friendship, regretted that the attack had occurred under unpleasant circumstances and suggested that Jahangir should regard Qandahar as still being in his own possession. He invited Jahangir to appoint a commander of his own choice and the Shah would be happy to give the charge of the fort to such a commander.

It is significant that in this letter the Shah did not refer to any proposal sent through Khan-i-Alam as claimed by Iskandar Munshi. Nor is there any reference to the unity of
the Safavid and the Mughal empires against their common enemy, the Uzbeks, as has been stated by the Persian chronicler.

Shortly after despatching Haidar Beg, the Shah also dismissed Zahir Beg with rewards to the envoy and a letter to the Prince. In this letter the Shah wrote, after the usual compliments, that the bond of friendship between him and Jahangir was hereditary and so strong that it could not be broken by any unhappy incident (a reference to Qandahar). The Shah then explained that delay had occurred in the dismissal of Zahir Beg as he had gone from Mashhad to Isfahan by the direct route, while the Shah was coming from Isfahan to Qandahar through an indirect route. After he came to Qandahar, he called the envoy there and was then dismissing him. In the end, the Shah explained his relation with Shahjahan as that between father and son, appreciated the manners of the envoy and requested the Prince to continue the relations and send back the same envoy. "As the envoy had conveyed to the Shah the desire of the Prince that he should be addressed by the title of 'Shahjahan' given to him by Shah Salim, the Shah addressed the Prince with that title and also quoted a verse in this respect."3

1. AAA. 687; ZSA. 4/110. The letter of Abbas to Prince Shahjahan cf. JN. ff. 226b; JN. ff. 212b; FZQ. ff. 81a.
2. It appears that the Shah had deliberately avoided meeting Zahir Beg until he had occupied Qandahar. It is not without significance that the interview of the Shah with the envoy by Shahjahan took place after the occupation of Qandahar. If there had been any intrigue between the monarch and the Prince, the interview would probably have taken place earlier.
3. AAA. 687.
On 6th March 1622, while Jahangir was at Rawalpindi, he received a definite report that Shah Abbas was proceeding to attack Qandahar. He was not inclined to believe that the shah would stoop to such perfidy and, in fact, gave a present of 80,000 darbs to Zainul Beg. However, as a precautionary measure he sent Mir Zainul Abidin to the Deccan to ask Shahjahan to come to the court immediately with his troops so that should the report prove to be true, he could proceed with his large army and vast resources to teach the shah a lesson for his faithlessness. Although Jahangir had been receiving disturbing reports from Qandahar, Khan Jahan, the Governor of Multan sent a definite report that the shah had invested the fort of Qandahar. In June-July 1622 sent Tahawwar Khan to call Prince Parvez to the court. He also decided to proceed to Lahore from Kashmir. He despatched Khwaja Abul Hasan, The imperial Diwan, and Sadiq Khan, the imperial Bakhshi to Lahore so that until the arrival of the princes with the armies of Deccan, Gujrat, Bengal and Bihar, they should make arrangements for sending the amirat at the court and the others who had been reached from their jagirs, to Khan Jahan at Multan, for the Qandahar expedition. They were also ordered to despatch to Multan the artillery the elephants, armour and treasures to Khan Jahan. Since it was difficult to obtain supplies between Multan and Qandahar, Banjaras were advanced money to ensure the supply of provisions for the large army. An idea of the
temper of Jahangir may be gathered from the fact that he expressed the hope that the army would not only recover Qandahar, but would humiliate faithless Shah in his own capital, Isfahan.

While these preparations were going on, Mir Zainul Abedin, who had been sent to Prince Khurram returned and conveyed the unpleasant reply that the prince wanted to move after the rainy season was over. The dilatoriness of Shahjahan could not shake the Emperor from his determination. All the seyids of Baraha, the Rajputs, and the Afghans, posted in the Deccan were recalled to the court to be despatched with the expedition. Mirza Rustam Safavi, once the chief of Zamin-dawar, was sent along with I'tiqad Khan, to Lahore with one lakh rupees to make the necessary preparations. On 15th August Jahangir himself left Kashmir for Lahore. A faman was sent to Kabul recalling Mahabat Khan to the court. Khan Jahan was also recalled from Multan, for instructions.

Before the army could make a move, Wali Beg and Haidar Beg, the Persian ambassadors reached the Mughal court on 17th November 1622. So great was Jahangir's resentment against the Persians that the Emperor, who had already become cool towards Zainul Beg, received these envoys coldly and dismissed them along with Zainul Beg after a week. Zainul Beg refused even

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1. TJ. 343-45; MJ. ff. 68; IQJ. iii/689.
2. TJ. 345, 47-48; IQJ. iii 581.
to perform Kornish when he was finally dismissed from the court. Jahangir also showed his resentment and his refusal to accept the lame excuses furnished by the shah for his attack on Qandahar and in the reply he sent to the shah.

In this letter Jahangir blamed the shah for breaking the strong and old friendship between the two houses without any reasonable ground and expressed surprise that the shah had undertaken such a hunting expedition. Jahangir then wrote that the question of Qandahar was raised for the first time by Zainul Beg and had not been referred to in any previous letter nor by any previous ambassador, nor even in the letter sent with Zainul Beg. When the states of the Deccan had raised the standard of rebellion, Khurram had been despatched there to suppress them and he himself was moving (from Kashmir) to Agra. Zainul Beg arrived, waited upon him and put forward the question of Qandahar. He told him to wait for a while at Lahore and said that he would give him a proper reply after the conclusion of the campaign in the Deccan. When, after its conclusion, he (Jahangir) started for Kashmir again during the summer (1622), he took Zainul Beg with him on that trip. Meanwhile news arrived that the shah had started for an attack on

1. AAA. 670.
2. TJ. 348; I.QJ. 111/581; ZSA. iv/105.
qandahar. But as it was incomprehensible that such an exalted personality would undertake an expedition against a petty village, he refused to believe it. When the news was verified, he sent orders to Abdul Aziz Khan to obey the orders of that 'brother' for he (Jahangir) valued the friendship of the shah above everything else. In the end Jahangir again complained that the shah, taking into account their cordial relations, had not waited for the return of Zainul Beg and Jahangir's reply. Perhaps, he (Jahangir) would have himself consented to the proposal. The action of the Shah was definitely contrary to the best traditions of manliness, sincerity and truthfulness.

In spite of its bitterness, it is significant that the latter complains of the refusal of the shah to wait for a reply and even hints at the possibility of Jahangir agreeing to give up qandahar. This was, perhaps, due to the fact that the attitude of Shahjahan had made Jahangir doubtful whether he would be able to recover qandahar, and he, therefore, wanted to avoid the possibility of losing face. It is also possible that Jahangir was reciprocating the diplomatic courtesy extended by the Shah and wanted to retain the friendship with Persia in spite of his efforts to recover qandahar.

However, after dismissing the Persian ambassadors, Jahangir continued the preparations for the expedition to qandahar. Khan Jahan who had been recalled from Multan, was
sent back to command the vanguard and was instructed to wait at Multan for Prince Parvez. Asaf Khan was sent to Agra for bringing to the court the treasures; successive famans, written in the Emperor's own hand, and messengers were sent to Prince Parvez, urging him to come with all possible haste.

But all these preparations and the hopes of the recovery of Qandahar, fell to the ground when Shahjahan began to show the sign of rebellion and started towards Agra. Jahangir himself had to start for Agra in Feb. 1623 and the preparations made for fighting the external enemy were diverted against the internal rebel. These developments shocked Jahangir and in his utter disappointment he writes: "But that which weighs heavily on my heart and places my eager temperament in sorrow is this, that at such a time when my prosperous sons and loyal officers should be vying with each other in the service against Qandahar and Khurasan....this inauspicious one (Shahjahan) has struck with an axe the foot of his own dominion, and became a stumbling block in the path of the enterprise. The momentous affairs of Qandahar must now be postponed."

Zainul Beg, Haidar Beg and Wall Beg reached Persia in the spring of 1623. They must have reported to the Shah the

1. TJ. 362-63; I.Q. iii/581; Beni Prasad : Jahangir 346-47; Banarsi Prasad Sahana, Shahjahan 37.
2. TJ. 354 (Tr. ii/248).
3. AAA. 669.
plans for the recovery of Qandahar as well as the developments at the Mughal court. Though an immediate attempt for the recovery of Qandahar was not expected due to the rebellion and shahjahan, its possibility could not be ruled out. The restless Uzbeks would have certainly grasped such an opportunity and taking advantage of the hostility between the safavids and the Mughals, might have renewed their attacks upon Khurasan. The shah was contemplating an attack upon the Ottomans for the conquest of Iraq, and was therefore keen to avoid further complications in the east. The shah therefore, thought it expedient to soothe the ruffled feelings of Jahangir. Even if friendship with the Mughals could not be fully restored, the despatch of embassies would have the advantage of keeping the shah informed of the situation in the Mughal empire. They would also provide him with information regarding the relations of the Uzbeks with the Mughals and attempt to prevent any understanding between the two. The current hostility between the Mughals and the Uzbeks was an important factor in the defence of Khurasan. The fact that a letter from Imam Quli's mother had arrived at the Mughal court in 1621, and that the envoy who had taken the reply of Nurjahan was still with Imam Quli, must have caused a certain amendment of misgiving in the minds of the shah.

1. TJ. 343;416; IqJ. iii/612; MJ. f.11.
In 1624 Yalangtush Bahadur attacked Hazarajat. The tribal chiefs of the region sought the help of the Governor of Kabul showing that they had always owed their allegiance to Ghazvin. Khawzad Khan, the Mughal Governor of Kabul led an expedition against them and drove the Uzbeks out from that territory. Then Yalangtush Bahadur came to attack Ghazvin. This attack was also repulsed by Khanžad Khan and the Uzbeks were compelled to retreat with heavy losses in May-June, 1624.

Apparently, taking advantage of Yalangtush's attacks upon Ghazvin, the Shah sent in June 1624, Aga Muhammad Mustaufi to Jahangir with the excuse of informing him about his capture of Baghdad.

Aga Muhammad Mustaufi was given a unique white robe and a letter to Jahangir. In this letter, the shah, after the usual compliments, reminded Jahangir of the old friendship between the two dynasties and expressed the hope that Jahangir would not abandon the friendship at the instigation of the enemies. The Shah then wrote that as he wanted to continue the friendship and cordiality, he thought it necessary to inform Jahangir about his victory at Baghdad against the Ottomans, which he could capture with divine grace and the goodwill of Jahangir, within twenty days. In the end the Shah

1. TJ. 338; IQJ. 111/592; MJ. f. 82b.
requested Jahangir to continue the previous cordial relations between them.

Some time after the despatch of Aga Muhammad Mustaufi to the Mughal court, Khwaja Haji came from India to the Persian court. He had been despatched by Prince Khurram who was then in open rebellion and had suffered reverses at the hands of the royal forces and was being chased from place to place. In his disappointment, he turned towards the Persian shah probably hoping that in view of the latter's hostility towards Jahangir, the shah would help the prince.

In the letter sent through Khwaja Haji, the prince acknowledged the receipt of the letter of the shah sent through Zahid Beg which he had received while on his way from the Deccan to Agra. The ambassador had also conveyed to him the verbal message of the shah. Describing his conflict with Jahangir, the prince stated that some selfish persons had poisoned the ears of his father against him to such an extent that he (the prince) had to take military actions to save his life. In this struggle he succeeded by the grace of God and the blessings of the shah. Alarmed by these victories, his enemies induced the Emperor to conclude to which ShahJahan agreed. But these enemies turned back on the province and

1. AAA. 715; ZSA. iv/109.
again sent armies against him. The shah had graciously told zahid Beg that should the Prince stand in any need of his help, he would be glad to render it. Accordingly he was now despatching Khwaja Haji, who had accompanied zahid Beg, to explain to the shah his predicament and seek his instructions. The princes’ ancestors had sought help from that family of the prophet and ‘Ali in the past and had attained their objectives with this help. Shahjahan was, therefore, acting in accordance with the traditions of his forefathers and was confident that the shah would show him favours.

A reply was sent to the prince with Khwaja Haji who was dismissed early in 1625. In this letter the Shah advised the Prince to try to obey the orders of his benevolent father and seek his favour which would bring merit both in this world and in the next. He suggested to the Prince that he should adopt such an attitude towards his father the selfish people would not succeed in poisoning his father’s ear against him, and his obedience to his father would become evident to all. The shah promised that he would recommend his case to the Emperor and would request him not to lend his ear to those who

1. Shahjahan uses the words Khandan-i-Nubuwat wa Hilayat. The Shiite regarding Ali as the only true successor of the Prophet, consider him to be the Ilah without any intermediary. The reference to Hilayat by a person of Shahjahan’s religious views is significant.

2. AAA. 715; ZSA. iv/110; Letter of Abbas to Shahjahan cf. J. M. ff. 227a; JI. ff. 216a; FZq. ff. 83a; ZSA. iv/110.
spoke against his son. He hoped that the Emperor would pay due attention to his recommendation.

It is significant that in his letter the shah attempted to please Jahangir by advising shahjahan to seek the favour of his father. It may also be noted that notwithstanding the promise contained in the letter, the shah did not send any recommendation to Jahangir regarding shahjahan, even though he had interceded with Jahangir on many occasion including the case of the Deccan states.

The defeat of Yalangtush and the arrival of another Persian envoy at the Mughal court brought about a change in the attitude of the Uzbeks. Nazr Muhammad now tried to start negotiations with Jahangir. Some time in 1625 an envoy came from Nazr Muhammad. The Khan apologised for Yalangtush’s attack on Ghaznin. He also requested that as relation between his men his men and the Governor of Kabul had become strained, it would be better to transfer the commander. Jahangir accepted his request and Khanazad Khan was replaced by Khwaja Abul Hasan.

1. Dr. Rahim is of the opinion that the mission of Aqa Beg (Aqa Muhammad Mustaфи?) was also meant to recommend the case of Shahjahan to Jahangir (Rahim 43). But it seems certain that Khwaja Haji reached the Persian court when Aqa Muhammad Mustaфи had already been despatched for the Mughal court (AAA 712, 715).

2. TJ. 393; MJ. f. 83b.
Aqa Muhammad Mustaufi reached the Mughal court in October 1625 and was received favourably. The reason for this change in the attitude of Jahangir might be explained partly by the attitude of the Uzbeks, who inspite offering an apology for Yalangtush's attack had demanded the transfer of the Mughal commander, and partly due to internal problems. Shahjahan was not only in open rebellion but had also started negotiations with the shah. Though the shah had not encouraged the Prince, the fact that negotiation were taking place would have certainly created an anxiety in the mind of Jahangir. He therefore welcomed the friendly attitude of Persia. The Persian envoy was detained at the court for about five months and then was dismissed in March 1626. A robe of honour, a jewelled dagger and thirty thousand rupees were bestowed upon him at the time of dismissal and a letter was sent to the shah.

In this letter, Jahangir described the reception of the envoy, and congratulated the shah on his victory over Baghdad. In reply to the suggestion for the exchange of letters and maintenance of friendship, Jahangir wrote that he also was desrions of continuing the old friendship and expressed his hope that the shah would likewise inform him about his affairs in future.

1. TJ. 399; I.QJ. 111/599; MJ. ff. 83.
Shortly after the dismissal of Aqa Muhammad Mustaufi from the Mughal court, reconciliation took place between Jahangir and Shahjahan (March 1626). To wash the blot of rebellion from himself and probably to secure the sympathies of the Shah in a possible civil war, Shahjahan sent Ishaq Beg Yazdi to the Shah with a letter in which he informed the latter that according to his instructions he had submitted to Jahangir.

In June 1626, Shahjahan himself started for Thatta with a view to go Persia. It is difficult to explain this act of Shahjahan, for, reconciliation had taken place between father and son and the Shah had so far shown no encouragement to him. However, his defeat at Thatta, his illness, the fall of Mahabat Khan and finally the death of Prince Parvez in October 1626, induced Shahjahan to return to the Deccan in Nov. 1626.

Sometime in 1626 or 1627, Ishaq Beg Yazdi returned from Persia with the reply of the Shah to Shahjahan. In this letter the Shah appreciated the action of the Prince in acting upon his advice and submitting to his father. The Shah again suggested to the Prince to seek the favour of his father, who was his visible God.

1. This letter is not available to us. The information is based on the reply which the Shah sent to Shahjahan cf. JM. 228b.
2. TJ. 413 I II. iii/610; Beni Prasad; Jahangir 416-19; Banarsi Prasad; Shahjahan 53-54.
Sometime between March and August 1626, another ambassador of Nazr Muhammad, Shah Khwaja by name, waited upon Jahangir who was then dominated by Mahabat Khan. The envoy brought a letter and some presents which included Turkish slaves. In November 1626, Shah Khwaja was dismissed by Jahangir with Rs. 40,000 for the envoy some presents for his master.

After these preliminary steps, the main objective of the embassies was put forward by the embassy of Khwaja Abdur Rahim who was a popular Sufi saint of Transoxiana, and therefore was expected to carry on the mission more successfully. He was sent by Imam Quli, the ruler of Bukhara with a letter to Jahangir. He was received some time before March 1627, with great favour. The letter which he brought from Imam Quli, contained a proposal for the renewal of the so called alliance of Abdullah Khan and Akbar for the division of Persia. In view of the recent hostility between Persia and India on the question of Qandahar, Imam Quli had tried to induce Jahangir to cooperate with him in his campaign against Persia to open the route to Mecca. Imam Quli also pleaded with Jahangir the case of Shahjahan. It seems that Shahjahan had approached not only Shah Abbas but also Imam Quli. Whereas the Shah did not send any recommendation, Imam Quli did.

1. TJ. 41.
2. TJ. 416; IJQ. 111/612; MJ. ff. 111.
It seems probable that the shah heard about the diplomatic overtures of the Uzbeks at the Mughal court. This news must have disturbed him. But perhaps he was not fully aware of the nature of the Uzbek proposal. He had probably anticipated that as a result of Yalangtush's attacks, there was no likelihood of an anti-Persian coalition between the Mughals and the Uzbeks. Moreover, after the death of Parvez he must have assumed that Shahjahan was the likely successor to the throne, and his relations with Shahjahan were cordial. Presumably he did not know that Imam Quli had also ingrained himself in Shahjahan's favour. Consequently, he decided, some time in 1627, to send Takhta Beg Yar bashi on an embassy to Jahangir to offer condolence on the death of Parvez. The shah wrote two very brief letters for being despatched with Takhta Beg, one was addressed to Jahangir and the other to Nur Jahan Begum. Both these letters are very brief and formal. However, the shah did not consider that the situation demanded any urgency and there was a delay in the despatch of the embassy. Even before Takhta Beg had left Isfahan news arrived that Jahangir had died on 8th November 1627.

After the death of Jahangir the shah apparently decided to watch the situation at the Mughal court. He must have felt that in view of political disturbances, Shahjahan

1. AAA. 750; The letters cf. JM.ff.218
would not be able to apply his mind either to the proposal of the Uzbeks or to the problem of qandahar. Consequently he was in no hurry to send an embassy to shahjahan with a message of condolence. He wrote a letter to shahjahan offering his condolence on the death of Jahangir, and expressing his hope that the new monarch would forget the bitterness (caused by his rebellion), would devote himself to the task of all his subjects, and would continue the best traditions of his predecessors.

The letter has been preserved, but there is no record in the chronicles of either Persia or India that it was, in fact, sent. It seems probable that it was written late in 1628, but before an embassy could be actually despatched, Shah Abbas died in January 1629.

1. Letter of Abbas to shahjahan (1628) cf. JMff. 229a.
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(a) Persian Chronicles :-

Tarikh-i-Alem-Ara-i-Abbasi (Teheran, 1314 A.H.)

This is one of the two contemporary works on Shah Abbas' reign, written by the court historian, Munshi Iskandar Beg, who joined the court of shah Abbas in 1025 A.H. (1616-17) and thereafter was an eye-witness of the events until the death of the shah. To the other work, Abbasnama or the diary of court-astronomer Jalal Munajjim, the writer could not find access.

Though the Alem Ara-i-Abbasi contains a good account of the reigns of shah Ismail I, shah Tahmasp, shah Ismail II and shah Muhammad Khudabanda, it is mainly the history of the reign of shah Abbas I. It is political history in the strict sense of the term, describing only the battles and the military activity of the shah on different points. It contains considerable information about the political developments in Turan, their affects on the frontier provinces of Persia and Abbas' conflict with them. It also gives a detailed account of shah Abbas' relations with the Ottomans.
As regard the subject of dissertation, it contains a detailed account of embassy between India and Persia until 1604. Thereafter it has recorded only four or five Persian embassies to India. It even does not furnish any information about the embassies of Mustafa Beg, Muhammad Riza, Sayyid Hasan etc. It is from Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri that we know about them.

No mention has been made by Iskandar of the informal embassies nor of the commercial missions between Jahangir and Abbas or between Persia and India generally. The information regarding the relations with the Deccan states is also inadequate.

Its chronology is defective, and its pro-Persian bias pronounced. The account of the invasions of Gandahar in 1606 and 1622, appear to have been written from 'hindsight'.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, it remains the principal and the most detailed source for the study of shah Abbas's reign. It provides information on many points on which others are silent. For example, the intrigue of Abdullah Khan with Muzaffar Husain Mirza——AAA of Gandahar is mentioned only by Iskandar, and not even by Abul Fazl. Similarly, Jahangir's attitude towards Zainul Beg after the occupation of Gandahar by the provincs, is given in AAA, but not in the Tuzuk.
(b) Mughal Chronicles:

_Akbarnama_ of Abul Fazl Allami (Bib. Ind., 3 vols.)

_Akbarnama_ furnishes detailed information about the relation of Akbar with shah Abbas on the one hand and with the Uzbeks on the other. Abul Fazl has also quoted some of the letters sent by Akbar to shah Abbas and to Abdullah Khan.

Through incidental references, sufficient light is thrown on Akbar's attitude towards Persia and Turan and his policy towards Gandahar which was burning problem for the Safavid and the Mughals.

Abul Fazl's bias in favour of Akbar is well-known and counterbalances the prejudice of Iskandar Munshi. However, in spite of the bias in interpretation, Abul Fazl mentions most of the facts, though some of these are merely hinted at in the garb of similies and metaphors.

The continuation of _Akbarnama_ after the death of Abul Fazl was apparently written early in the reign of Shahjahan. This continuation is based on _Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri_, whose second volume was written about the year 1619. However, in paraphrasing and summarising the version of _Iqbalnama_, the continuation had clarified some of the ambiguous points of the former.
Compiled by Tahir Muhammad B. Imad-ud-Din Hasan Sabzwari, completed in 1014 A.H. (1605). It is a general history, from the time of the Prophet to the year 1014 (1605). Its chapter VI deals with the Mughals of India and chapter VII contains an account of the Safavids. The author held some office under Akbar. He was the brother of Khwajagi Sultan Ahmad, a poet of Akbar's court. Being a Persian by origine, the author seems to be considerably interested in Indian relations with Persia. He has given the account of almost all the embassies and many of the letters sent with or brought by these embassies. Though no new information is furnished by the author, it stands almost equal to Akbarnama in describing the relation of the Safavids and the Mughals during the reign of Akbar. It helps to collate the information of Akbarnama. The book also describes the relation of Akbar with Abdullah Khan Uzbek.
Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri (Syed Ahmad, Edition, 1864) :-

The famous autobiography of the Emperor Jahangir was written by himself from his accession till the end of the year 1622, and then written on his behalf until about June 1624, by Mutamad Khan. During the 18th century Mirza Hadi wrote a continuation down to the accession of Shahjahan. This continuation is based upon Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri and the other chronicles of the 17th century.

The value of the Tuzuk lies not only in the authentic reflection of the Emperor's views and understanding but also in the detailed nature of the account left by the Emperor. It gives a very detailed account of the exchange of embassies between Persia and India, and quotes the text of many letters. It is mainly on the basis of the Tuzuk that we learn about the informal envoys and the commercial missions such as those of Muhammad Husain Chelebi, Raja Rafiq and Abdul Karim Gilani.

In spite of the intimate nature of the narrative, Jahangir wrote his autobiography with a view to publication and his statements are, therefore, not always frank and candid. For example, describing the news of the death of Khusrau, he records the event baldly. But in a secret letter which he sent to Mirza Raja Jain Singh after shahjahan's rebellion, he has explicitly blamed the latter for bringing about Khusrau's death. One should, therefore, be on guard in accepting
Jahangir’s comments regarding the fall of Qandahar at their face value. Perhaps, the Emperor has not been entirely frank in recording his reactions.

Iqbalnema-i-Jahangiri of Mutamad Khan (Nawal Kishore Press 1870):

Muhammad Sharif B. Dost Muhammad, a native of Persia, was given the title of Mutamad Khan by Jahangir in 1608. He was for a time the Bakhshi of Ahadis and subsequently sent to the Deccan as the Bakhshi of Khurram’s army. On rejoining the court, he continued to serve as one of the Bakhshis. He remained at the court until Jahangir’s death and rose to be the Mir Bakhshi in 1637 in which position he was holding till the time of his death in 1639. Because of his close association with the court he had excellent sources of information and an access to court secrets.

In the summer 1620, while he was with the Emperor in Kashmir, he completed, at the latter’s instance, his Iqbalnema-i-Jahangiri in two volumes: the first dealing with Babur and Humayun and the second with Akbar. The account of Akbar is given year vise.

1. Regarding these comments on the Tuguk, I have accepted the views of my revered teacher, Professor S. Nurul Hasan.
It appears that some time during the reign of Shah Jahan, Mutamad Khan decided to add a third volume dealing with the reign of Jahangir. 

As has been mentioned earlier, Mutamad Khan wrote the portion of the *Tuzuk* on Jahangir's behalf, dealing with the account of January 1623 to June 1624. He also wrote the little known work *Ahwal-i-shahzad-i-shahzahan Badshah*. The latter work hardly provides any additional information regarding his relation with Persia.

For his account of Akbar, Mutamad Khan relies heavily on the *Akbarnamea*, though, occasionally he provides additional information. But for the account of Akbar's reign after the assassination of Abul Fazl, it is an extremely valuable and rich source of information. It is the only source for incidents like the intrigues of the Persians with Mirza Hasan of Badakhshan and their attack upon *Zamindara*.

For Jahangir's reign, the account is meagre and largely based upon the *Tuzuk*. Even here, additional information is

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1. This opinion is again based on the observations of Professor S. Nurul Hasan. In the earliest known copy of the work, transcribed in 1635, i.e. during the life time of the author, the third volume is missing and in the author's preface only two volumes have been referred to (cf. Bankipur vii/560-61).
occasionally given such as the presence of Husain Khan, the Governor of Herat at Qandahar during the Persian attack of 1606. However, from the middle of 1624 until the death of Jahangir, Mutasim Khan gives an independent account. Even though he was strongly biased in favour of Shahjahan, his accounts of relation with Persia are objective, though not very detailed.

MaaSIR-I-JAHANGIRI (A.M.U. MS. till the 20th R.Y. and Bankipur vii/663 for the rest):-

A History of the early life and reign of Jahangir by Khwaja Kamgar Husaini written in 1630. The author was the nephew of the famous Jahangiri noble, Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang. He was closely associated with Jahangir's court during the second half of his reign and served under him in various capacities. In 1631, he was given the title of Ghairat Khan by Shahjahan. In 1639 he was appointed the Governor of Delhi, but was soon transferred to the Governorship of Thatta where he died in 1641.

MaaSIR-I-JAHANGIRI's account is based largely on the Tuzuk though it is very brief. From the period June 1624 to the end of Jahangir's reign he has given his narrative independently. Although many of the facts recorded by Kamgar and
Mutsamad Khan are common, there is considerable divergence on a number of points such as question of the removal of Khanazad Khan from the Governorship of Kabul. Since both Mutsamad Khan and Kamgar Husain were present at the court when the incident took place, it is difficult to judge which version corresponds to fact. Kamgar Husaini is the only author who has quoted the text of the letter sent by Imam Quli to Jahangir through Khwaja Abdur Rahim in 1627.

Since Kamgar Husaini shares with Mutsamad Khan a pro-shahjahan bias, there is hardly any difference between the outlook of the two.

Anfa-ul-Akhbar: (A.M.U. Rotograph of CRO Hyderabad Ms.)

Compiled by Muhammad B. Daulat Husain-i-Balaki. The manuscript has been transcribed by the author himself. The date of its compilation as given by the compiler is Muharram 1037' (September, October 1627).

It is a brief general history beginning from the reign of Tirmur to the year of its conclusion, the reign of Jahangir. The author joined the Mughal court in 41 reginal year of Akbar and was probably given an office.
Though it furnishes little new or detailed information either for Akbar's reign or that of Jahangir, being a contemporary source, it serves to corroborate the information given by the other authors.

**Tarikh-i-Dilkush**: (Cambridge University, King's College MS. No. 71);

Compiled by Inayat Ullah Kanbuh, some time between 1658-1671, during the reign of Aurangzeb.

It is a general history of the Mongols including that of the Mughal Emperors of India, who was down to the reign of Shahjahan, which was the main purpose of the compilation of the work.

Though it does not furnish much new information and is generally based on Akbarnama, it provides occasionally new facts and helps to corroborate the information supplied by the other authors.

(c) The Deccan Chronicles :-

In spite of the fact that a number of histories were written in the Deccan during the 16th and the 17th centuries, including the celebrated work of Ferishta and the
Basatius salatin, it is surprising not one of them pays any attention to relations of the Deccan kingdoms with Shah Abbas. Whatever information we have on this question is either from the text of letters which have been preserved in the different collection or the Persian and Mughal chronicles.

(d) Collections of Letters

For the study of the relations of the rulers of two countries the importance of the text of letters is evident. A full picture of the relations of India and Persia could not emerge only after the study of the chronicles. These letters bear references to some important matters of common interest and thus help us in understanding the political problems and their effects on international relations. Much information could be gathered only from these letters. These letters also serve to corroborate facts in chronicles. Fortunately a large number of these letters has been preserved in various collections. Many of these letters have been quoted in the chronicles themselves such as in Akbarname, Tuzuk-i-Jahangir, M'ahir-i-Jahangiri and Rauzat-ut-Tahirin.

The collections of the letters to which we could find access, are as follows:
Muskh-i-Jam-i-Murasilat :-

B.M. MS. No. Add. 7688; Rieu 1/388a.

Compiled by Abul Qasim Ivaghli Haidar, in about 1052 A.H. (1642-43 A.D.).

It is a collection of letters written by or addressed to the sovereigns of Persia and the neighbouring countries and their wazir, including also royal diplomas, from the time of Alp Arslan Saljuki to the reign of Shah Abbas II.

The collection is comprehensive and has proved to be the principle source for the study of the subject. Being a near contemporary collection, compiled during the reign of Shah Safi, by a person who was attached to the court, its authenticity cannot be doubted. It contains almost all the letters exchanged between Shah Abbas and Indian rulers or princes. Many of these available only in this collection. It also contains a few letters concerning the Deccan which are of great importance for they throw light on the policy of Shah Abbas in regard to the Deccan and to the Mughal Emperors.

It also contains other letters which, though not directly concerned with India, refer to some important problems concerning India.
Jami-ul-Insha :- (B.M. Ms. No. 1702; Rieu 111/984).

It was compiled by Munshi Bhagchand, some time in 1850.

It is a collection of the letters of the rulers of India and Persia and of some Amirs and the officials of the court of Delhi.

It is among the basic sources for the contemporary documents. Though many of the letters in this collection are found in other collections also, it includes a few which are not given in other collection, for example the letter of Jahangir to Abbas (1608) and the letter of Abdul Momin to Abbas and vice versa. These two letters are of considerable significance for they throw light on the relations of Akbar with Abbas and Abdul Mumin.

Feiz-ul-Gawamin :- (A.M.U. Ms. Abdul Salam Collection No. as 324/94).

The collection contains many letters which are found in the other collection mentioned above. However, it contains a letter of Akbar to Baqi Khan, the ruler of Bukhara, written in 1602-03 which is not found in above collections. This letter throws light on the last phase of Abbas relations with Akbar.
Insha-i-Abul Fazl (N.K. Press edition) :-

This invaluable collection of Abul Fazl's letters includes most of the letters of Akbar to shah Abbas and to Abdullah Khan Uzbeks. Many of them are also found in Akbarnama itself and in the other collections.

(e) **Contemporary European Sources** :-

A number of European travellers and merchants whose accounts are available to us have thrown interesting side-light on the relations of shah Abbas I with rulers of India. Among these special mention may be made of Pietro della Valle who is the only author to give the date of the arrival of Khan Alan at the Persian court; and, sir Thomas Roe whose gives an interesting account of the reception given at the Mughal court to Muhammad Riza Beg and his own reaction to this reception. Foster's L.R. and English Factories in India contain occasional references. Danvers recension of contemporary Portuguese sources given in his valuable work, The Rise of the Portuguese Power in India, is invaluable for the study of the relations of the Portuguese with Persia as well as India.

(f) **Persian Biographical Works** :-

The biographical works prepared in India during the 17th and 18th centuries are useful for the study of occasional facts and invaluable for the study of a connected account of the
principal Mughal officers. Among those whose biographies have been found specially useful are Khan-i-Alam, Mirza Ghazi, Mirza Rustam Safavi, Khan-i-Dauran, Khanazad Khan and Abdul Aziz Khan.


The work was compiled during the reign of Shahjahan in 1650 with additions upto 1653. The first volume deals with the nobles of Akbar, the second with that of Jahangir and the third with Shahjahan.

*Ma'asir-ul-Umara* (Rib.Ind. 3 volumes):

This monumental biographical dictionary of the Mughal nobles compiled by Shah Navaz Khan in the 18th century, is invaluable for all students of Mughal history. Though the author borrows heavily from *zakhirat-ul-Khwanin*, and the other well-known chronicles, he occasionally supplies fresh information.

*Tazkirat-ul-Umara* (A.M.U. Ms.) :

Written by Kewal Ram, it contains concise notices of Indian nobles and zamindars who served the Mughals from the time of Akbar to that of Aurangzeb. Completed in 1727, it is specially useful for the biographies of the Hindu nobles and chiefs.
II - SECONDARY WORKS

(a) Modern Works (Persian):

Zindagani-i-shah Abbas I (Tehran, 4 volumes)

It is a monograph based on the study of original Persian sources, written by modern Persian scholar, Nasrullah Falsafi, a professor in Tehran University. It is principally a biography of Shah Abbas and not a political history of his reign. A whole volume deals with the personal qualities of the monarch.

The IV volume deals with the 'attitude of the monarch towards the foreigners and foreign ambassadors' and contains the text or summary of many of the letters of Shah Abbas to Indian rulers, some of which could not be traced in the collections mentioned above. It is obvious that the author had access to some contemporary sources which are not available to us.

(b) Modern Works (English):

Beni Prasad  ... A History of Jahangir, Allahabad 1930.
Browne, E. G.  ... A Literary History of Persia.
Kier, D. L.  ... A History of the Ottomans (2 Volumes).
Malcolm  ... A History of Persia (2 volumes).
Rahim, A.  ... Mughal Relations with Persia and Central Asia, A.M.U. Aligarh Memorial.
Saksena, B. P.  ... History of Shahjahan of Delhi, Allahabad 1932.
Smith, V. A.  ... Akbar the Great Mogul, Oxford 1919.
Sykes, P.  ... A History of Persia.
Tripathi, R. P.  ... Rise & Fall of the Mughal Empire, Allahabad 1966.

Note: Books which contain only incidental references but have no direct bearing on the subject have not been listed above, even though they may have been cited in the text.