ABSTRACT

Two ideological blocs the Capitalist bloc led by United States and Communist bloc headed by Soviet Union emerged in the wake of World War II. Both started striving to expand their hegemony and the Cold War was the result of their mutual antagonism.

To have an upper hand in the global security system the Cold War strategy demanded that the US carried forward the containment policy outside Europe. Consequently, the US became actively engaged in the security affairs of South Asia. Initially, the US attempted to befriend both India and Pakistan. It was envisaged by US policy makers that if both countries were available it was fine. If not, at least one of them must be brought into the US global security system. When India turned down US proposal to become its satellite to serve its interest, the latter found in Pakistan a willing partner. The geographical location of Pakistan provided added strategic advantage to US to contain the expansionist policies and to encircle Soviet Union and China. Pakistan’s strategic location is such from where US could fulfill many objectives, it could contain Soviet Union and pursue oil interests in the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan’s perception about joining United States was absolutely different. The obsession of India always haunted the policy makers in Islamabad. Pakistan from its very birth perceives
India a threat for its very existence. It was in order to counter this threat and remove its sense of insecurity, that it moved towards the US. Moreover, Pakistan was desperate to establish a fair degree of parity in its military power vis a vis India. Thus, Pakistan in quest of military and economic assistance joined United States. It can be said both countries needed each other, though with divergent policy perspective and orientation.

To the United States strategic nexus with Pakistan was needed as it was supposed to facilitate a key element in the global chain of anti-communist alliance. However, Washington by making Pakistan a Cold War partner did not help in improving Indo-Pak strained relations. US defence pacts with Pakistan and its supply of sophisticated weapons to the latter unleashed arms race and in turn increased the probability of war in South Asia.

This work attempts to examine the factors which were responsible for changing US interests and priorities in Pakistan and latters dependence on the former, and causes which compelled Pakistan to acquire sophisticated arms and forge strategic relations with a Super Power far from Pakistan. The whole study is divided into five chapters. Each dealing with a specific period covering significant events of bilateral relations.

The First Chapter endeavours to present an overview of the evolution of US-Pakistan strategic relationship in historical
perspective, focusing how both countries came together, and how shrewdly Pakistan used the various opportunities intrinsic in the Cold War for becoming member of military blocs (CENTO, SEATO) which resulted in massive security assistance from the USA. It also gives a brief account of US military aid to Pakistan and implications of embargoes imposed in the wake of war with India in 1965 and 1971. This chapter ends with Symington-Glenn Amendment which terminated all US military aid to Pakistan in 1979 for its alleged attempt to acquire nuclear enrichment technology.

The Second Chapter attempts to analyse how the past deterioration in the strategic and security relationship between the United States and Pakistan over nuclear programmes came in for reappraisal. It also sees how fall of Shah of Iran and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan ultimately became 'turning point' in US-Pak strategic relations, when Carter administration discovered Pakistan's strategic significance as 'Front Line State'. Moreover, this chapter discusses the genesis of the Afghan Crisis and its implications on the relations of the superpowers, and perception of Washington and Islamabad regarding Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and how this become the question of survival for Pakistan and for United States to maintain its superpower status.

The Third Chapter deals with the evolution of close US-Pak strategic relations during two consecutive terms of President
Ronald Reagan. How Afghan Crisis increased the bargaining position of Zia vis a vis Reagan administration. And how Pakistan managed to acquire the two massive aid packages of ($3.2 billion and $4.02 billion) excluding other military and economic assistance along with sophisticated weapons including F-16 fighter aircrafts. This Chapter also discusses nuclear issues which become a major irritant between two countries.

The Fourth Chapter tries to examine the factors which radically altered the US-Pakistan strategic relations. The end of Cold War and disintegration of Soviet Union diminished Pakistan’s strategic significance for US. The imposition of Pressler Sanctions and its impact on Pakistan has been discussed in detail. This chapter also analyses the efforts of Pakistani policy makers to wriggle out of Pressler Sanctions and subsequent passage of Brown Amendment is also dealt with. Finally the issue of shipment of Ring Magnets and MTCR are also mentioned.

The Fifth Chapter examines the Post Brown development in the US-Pak strategic relations. An endeavour have been made to deal with the major factors of co-operation and irritation such as issue of F-16, India and Pakistan Nuclear Test and how Taliban became a factor in US-Pakistan relations. Fourth Military Coup in Pakistan and US attitude towards it, Clinton’s visit to South Asia and bilateral relations is discussed. This Chapter ends with September 11, 2001 attack on America and its grave implications.
on global security system and how ultimately Washington reinvented Pakistan's strategic significance.

The future course of US-Pakistan relations is hazardous to predict because of wide swing of the past half-century. What we can note are certain constant factors that will remain important. Geography will continue to give Pakistan strategic importance as the juncture of Western, Southern and Central Asia. There are three reasons why geo-strategic location of Pakistan will be important to the US. To tackle the growing influence of Russia-China-India in the region and preempt China, Iran, India axis. Pakistan's geo-political proximity to the Central Asian Republics and Middle East is also a plus for it. The US needs to garner support of a moderate Muslim country to fight International terrorism. As Pakistan is a leading Islamic state, the coming of an extremist Islamic regime in Islamabad would have profound negative impact not only on the sub-continent, but throughout the Islamic World. US interest lies in avoiding such a development.

Since India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states, how Islamabad and New Delhi manage their nuclear rivalry will have an implications far beyond the subcontinent. Averting a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent will be a key US policy goal. This will keep Pakistan and US engaged in the years to come. The future course of the US-Pakistan strategic relations would also
depend on whether the interest of the two countries are complementary or divergent. Further, American assistance to Pakistan would depend on the utility of Islamabad to promote US foreign policy objectives. What shape the Kashmir imbroglio takes would also have a bearing on the countries in future. It seems Afghanistan is going to loom large in near future on bilateral relationship as both countries have agreed to fight against the menace of terrorism.

It must be clearly understood by US-Pakistan policy makers that to establish reliable, creditable and durable relations both countries have to leave all real or imaginary apprehensions, fears, suspicions and mistrust. Irritants should be removed through diplomacy, co-operation, negotiation and attitude of give and take. US has greater responsibility to carry the burden of relations because of its power and influence. It is only then and then alone that lasting, durable, strategic relations beneficial for both can be ensured. Hence, a long term objective of conciliation and strategic friendship should not be lost sight of, which is essential for peaceful co-existence.
U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS SINCE 1979

THESIS
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By
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Under the Supervision of
DR. MIRZA ASMER BEG
(READER)

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ALIGARH (INDIA)
2002
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this study entitled "U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS SINCE 1979" carried out by Mr. Mosaib Ahmad in the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, is to the best of my knowledge an original work and is quite suitable for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

(Signature)

(Dr. Mirza Asmer Beg)  
Supervisor
DEDICATED
TO MY
PARENTS
AND
LATE GRAND MOTHER
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PREFACE

The end of the Second World War saw the division of world into two ideological blocs known as Capitalist bloc led by United States and Communist bloc headed by the former Soviet Union. Both started striving to expand their hegemony and their mutual antagonism led to the Cold War.

The Cold War strategy demanded the spread of the containment policy outside Europe in order to broaden the sphere of global security system. US became actively engaged in the security affairs of South Asia. Initially the US attempted to befriend both India and Pakistan. It was envisaged by US policy makers that if both countries were available it was fine. If not, at least one of them must be brought into US global security system. When India turned down US proposal to become its satellite to serve its interest, the latter found in Pakistan a willing partner. The geographical location of Pakistan provided added strategic advantage to US to contain the expansionist policies and to encircle Soviet Union and China. Pakistan's strategic location is such from where US could fulfill many objectives, it could contain Soviet Union and pursue oil interests in the Persian Gulf.

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threat and remove its sense of insecurity, that it moved towards the US. Moreover, Pakistan was desperate to establish a fair degree of parity in its military power vis a vis India. Thus, Pakistan in quest of military and economic assistance joined United States. It can be said both countries needed each other, though with divergent policy perspective and orientation.

To the United States, strategic nexus with Pakistan was needed as it was supposed to facilitate a key element in the global chain of anti-communist alliance. However, Washington by making Pakistan a Cold War partner did not help in improving Indo-Pak strained relations. US defence pacts with Pakistan and its supply of sophisticated weapons to the latter unleashed arms race and in turn increased the probability of war in South Asia.

This work attempts to examine the factors which were responsible for changing US interests and priorities in Pakistan and formers dependence on the latters, and causes which compelled Pakistan to acquire sophisticated arms and forge strategic relations with a Super Power far from Pakistan. The whole study is divided into five chapters. Each dealing with a specific period covering significant events of bilateral relations.

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grave implications on global security system and how ultimately Washington reinvented Pakistan's strategic significance.

The method of study has been historical, descriptive and analytical. Efforts have been made to collect all the relevant data and interpret it both in historical perspective and from the point of current relevance. Most of the research materials have been collected from different libraries in India especially American Centre Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Indian Council of World Affairs in Delhi and Centre for West Asian Studies, Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., Aligarh.
CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
EVOLUTION OF US-PAK STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Introduction

The most remarkable consequence of the Second World War for post War international relations was the emergence of the USA and Soviet Union as the two mutually antagonistic superpowers dominating the world scene. The post Second World War world was witness to many other things, in an accentuation of nationalism in Asia and Africa and the emergence of India and Pakistan as two sovereign independent states. The United States of America, now being easily the greatest world power, started involving itself not only in all affairs of Europe and Latin America but also in all significant developments all over the world. The era of American "Isolationism" was at an end. The United States was playing a new role as the leader of the advanced industrialized countries of the West. The supremacy of the United States was not; however, universally accepted. It was challenged by the socialist countries led by the Soviet Union. Confrontation between the USA and Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of Cold War era, and containment of communism became the chief objective of the US foreign policy.

The United States having checked the advance of communism in Europe through the Marshal plan and North
Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), was now turning its attention towards Asia. But the task was not so easy as the Soviet Union was also striving to expand its sphere of influence, or at least to deny the United States the friendship of as many countries in Asia as it could.

**United States Posture**

After the Second World War the thinking in the US government circles was that China should be united and made a democratic country to serve as a counter-weight to Japan and the Soviet Union in the Pacific. China did become united, but it did not become a friendly China. Infact the collapse of the Chiang regime and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 was a shattering blow to the diplomatic and military policy of the United States in East Asia. The 'loss' of China forcefully brought to the consciousness of American policy-makers the importance of strengthening relations with the two countries of Indian sub-continent, the only states whose combined population and resources could nearly match those of China.¹

The United States of America was thus desperately in need of friends to stem the advancing tide of communism in Asia.² In the early years of independence the United States undoubtedly tended to attach more importance to India than to Pakistan primarily because of its larger size, its industrial potential and the general
impression about India. However, India’s non-aligned posture was quite disappointing to the American Leaders. The last hope of the US was belied when Prime Minister Nehru, during his visit to the US in October 1949, made it clear, both in his public speeches and in his private talks, that India would definitely not align itself with one block against the other and remain non-aligned following an independent foreign policy.

Since India was not prepared to be satellite, or a client of the US to be used against communist countries by means of bilateral alliance and regional pacts, America moved towards Pakistan, the only alternative in the region. Moreover, the strategic location of Pakistan on the door steps of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China was considered important. For US Military strategists Pakistan represented a centrally positioned landing and launching site for aircraft and missile aimed at either Russia or China. The proximity of North-West Pakistan and ‘Azad Kashmir’ (Under Pakistan control) to Soviet Union, Central Asia, and that of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Tibet and Sino-Burma border had been important strategic reasons for American interest in having a military tie with Pakistan. Apart from strategic importance, many Americans thought that it could be also used as a link between South-East Asia and Middle Eastern defence system as the eastern wing of Pakistan formed the Western boundary of South-East Asia.
The North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 in the Western Europe as a part of anti-communist regional defence system of the United States world strategy. In the Eastern Sector the US signed defence treaties with Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea. But in the Southern Sector, comprising the Middle East and the South Asian countries which were strategically important from the American viewpoint were still undefended. Between Western Turkey and Eastern Thailand there was a wide gap which had to be filled so that the policy of the containment of communism might succeed. American saw that the leading Arab states were busy with their preoccupation with Israel, and therefore, were not inclined to listen to the Western reasoning of bringing these countries into its alliance system in defence of the 'free world'. They also knew that India was 'positively' neutral. In such circumstances importance of Pakistan certainly increased in the US strategic calculations.

**Pakistan's Posture**

Pakistan's thinking was quite different from that of the USA. It did not feel any threat either ideological or territorial from any of communist power. Whatsoever apprehensions Pakistani leadership had from Chinese and Soviet quarters, it was clear that they were not so much because of their being communist countries as they seemed to be, but because of their close relations with immediate
neighbours India and Afghanistan with whom Pakistan had long standing disputes.

The perceived threat of India, however, has been the main factor in Pakistan relations with United States. India has been the principal preoccupation of Pakistan's defence and foreign policies. Its overall weakness and strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis India, the continuance of several disputes in which it accused India of having changed the rules of the game according to its convenience, and lingering memories of partition disturbances and communal hysteria, have combined to present India as the most important threat to its existence and security. This has often loomed large over the political horizon of Pakistan and impelled it to seek allies and military aid.

Among the varied reasons for the Pakistan Government seeking US military aid, the decisively and most important was to strengthen itself militarily against India. Both official spokesman and unofficial sources have committed enough indiscretions publicly and privately in support of these reasons, foreign (especially American) observers and journalists have also testified to this.

Pakistan hoped that its strategic relationship with the United States would bring several benefits: (a) a guarantee against Indian aggression (b) military aid to establish parity with India, and (c)
pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute.\textsuperscript{15} it was this Pakistani outlook and posture which led Pakistan to appear pro-west and anti-communist, to give up its erstwhile policy of non-alignment\textsuperscript{16}, seek and accept US military aid and eventually to join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). This was done on the one hand to strengthen itself militarily against India, and on the other to ensure Western support to its stand on Kashmir. When the Pakistani Government, found that the sympathy and support of the Western powers (in particular of the USA and UK) would not go as far as backing publicly and fully the Pakistan stands on the Kashmir disputes (as the Soviet Union did in favour of India at the end of 1955). Pakistani leaders not only complained against and denounced the West but threatened to walk over to the communist camp.\textsuperscript{17}

It is evident that Pakistan was less moved by Ideological interests which were in any case subsidiary to its Indo-centric goals. Pakistan's Foreign Policy makers took advantages of the many opportunities inherent in the Cold War environment by using the right rhetoric in the right place at the right time.

One aspects of Pakistan's rhetorical tactics was to emphasize the strategic value of Pakistan and the danger of the Russian drive toward the Indian Ocean. Another was to assert that Pakistan was the most dependable friend, the staunchest ally of the United States in Asia. Moreover, Pakistan's Policy makers often stated that
future of Pak-US relations was very bright because as one of Pakistani finance minister commented, "we have the same way of looking at things and we are the two peoples who talk the same language"\textsuperscript{18}, that the same language was the language of communist threat.

This rhetorical tactic has an impact, American Official heard and appreciated them. For instance, Philip Talbott, then Assistant Secretary of State made the following comments during Congressional Hearings: "Pakistani Statesman have spoken strongly in defence of the free-world, both privately and at various world forums"\textsuperscript{19}. American officials were defending military aid to Pakistan on the basis of Pakistan's supposed anti-communist stand. For example, in discussing military aid to Pakistan, David Bell AID Administrator, stated that despite flirtation with China, Pakistan was strongly anti-communist and Pakistan's military forces should be improved through additional aid\textsuperscript{20}.

Thus the United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction for different reasons; the United States was guided by its global policy of containing international communism; and Pakistan was motivated by problem of national security and defence.

**Korean War**

Pakistan's outspoken support to the USA on its stand on Korean War and signing of peace treaty with Japan was a significant factor in promoting friendly relations between
Washington and Karachi. The out-break of Korean War in July 1950 and the developments that followed sharply intensified the interest of the American leaders in the reaction of the two States of the subcontinent. The involvement of the United States and the profound emotional impact of the conflict on American opinion provided an opportunity that was skillfully used by Pakistan to build and image of itself as a "trust worthy" friend in south Asia. However, in the beginning American did not pay much attention to the attitude of Pakistan, actually, it was busy in applauding India because of its acceptance that the aggression had been committed by North Korea.

American enthusiasm for India diminished when India abstained from the vote on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and even more, when Nehru urged a ceasefire and negotiations in Korea as well as seating of representative of the Peoples Republic of China in the United Nations. The proposal, however, reportedly aroused considerable misgivings among American policy makers and was turned down by the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.

In contrast to the Indian attitude, the American policies in Korea were vigorously supported by the Pakistani Government without any reservation. Pakistan was not slow to judge how much a movement of American public opinion could be turned to its own advantage. At the outbreak of war, Liaquat Ali Khan who was in
America itself, lost no time in declaring in a public statement that his government will back the US to the fullest, in any action it may take in Korean War. Pakistan also expressly supported the US on "Uniting for Peace Resolution" in the General Assembly in November in 1950. The United States needed the support of important Asian countries and now considered Pakistan's usefulness as a potential ally.

On August 29, 1950, Pakistan informed the Security Council that it could not spare any ground troops to help fight, the War in Korea because of grave danger that confronted it. It shrewdly sought to spread the impression in the United States that unlike India it was ready to send troops to fight alongside the UN soldiers in Korea, but that only its difficulties with India stood in the way.

**United States-Japan Peace Treaty**

Another important development which caused disenchantment between the USA and India and brought the former closer to Pakistan was the signing of peace treaty and a military pact between the United States and Japan. With the emergence of a potentially strong communist China and the outbreak of the Korea War, the United States felt impelled to take urgent steps to convert Japan into an ally against communist inroads in the Far-East. Since the days of Japanese surrender, the American policy in the Far-East had been to keep Japan in a
state of perpetual impotency, both militarily and industrially, but here after US sought to rehabilitate the Japanese industrial and military power and make use of that power to contain communist China. US called in a conference of 51 nations in San-Francisco to discuss how the status of war between Japan and Allied Power could be brought to an end. While Pakistan accepted the invitation. India refused to participate.

Pakistan not only signed the Japan Peace Treaty but also voiced powerful support for it from the floor of the conference. Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan claimed it was a “good treaty” offering justice and reconciliation. He held the American proposal as an “evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and West” and “harbinger of even happier consummations”.  

Contrary to Pakistani view, Nehru held that defensive alliance openly aiming some other country or countries defeat their own purpose of trying to maintain peace through strength. The authorities in New Delhi interpreted the treaty as an extension of “power politics” and expressed grave apprehensions that it would lead to an era of new tensions in Asia. India considered these measures of Washington as acts of provocations against communist China which in addition brought the Cold War into the Indian Subcontinent thereby threatening India’s Security. The outright opposition of India to the treaty and Pakistan’s
unequivocal support at a critical juncture and enthusiastic approbation for it, certainly left a deep impression on the mind of American policy makers. The diametrically opposite stands of India and Pakistan on the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty accelerated the process of US estrangement from India and friendship towards Pakistan.^^

**Military Alliance**

Pakistan moved for US help in its search for security, after being disappointed by Britain and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Pakistan wanted to gain support from these countries but they refused to do so. The Commonwealth refused to take side with Pakistan because the dispute between India and Pakistan had involved two of its members. The Middle East Countries, which had just achieved their independence after prolonged struggle under the banner of Arab Nationalism, did not like the concept of Pan-Islamism of Pakistan. They had several internal problems of their own to cope with. They were, therefore, not in a position to bear responsibilities abroad and give material help to Pakistan in case of an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan or between Pakistan and any other country.

Pakistan’s attempt to secure friends among the Islamic States to take its side against India did not achieved much success because they attached greater value to friendly relations with India which was bigger and took more active interest in their anti-
colonial struggle. Another reason which can explain the failure of Pakistan's efforts was its inability to give stout support to Egypt and Iran in their disputes with Britain concerning military bases at Suez and the nationalization of oil.

Thus, Pakistan left isolated and friendless, decided to enter into military alliance with the US in its desire to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India on the question of Kashmir for bargaining from a position of strength. The United States with its enormous military and economic resources and political influence was seen as the only Big Power with whom an alliance would enable Pakistan to meet its defence and economic requirements as well as boost up its international status.

It was the realization of its isolation and inadequacy of its own resources to guarantee its security in the context of its relation with India, which impelled Pakistan to seek the support of the USA. It had nothing to do with Soviet Union or threat of communism. One Pakistani scholar accepting this fact, had remarked that in Pakistan the danger of conquest by a communist power was very remote compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with India. Pakistan's alignment, thus was not based on genuine anti-communism. The occasional flurry of anti-communist statements and the pledge to defend freedom, democracy and individual liberty were more a nature of lip services to their allies.
On the other hand US strategists also saw Pakistan as a valuable asset in their global search for allies and bases around the USSR. In their view the communist success in China had already increased the threat of communist expansion in Asia. The events in Egypt, Iran and Jordan in 1951 and 1952, and the disturbing situation in South East Asia created by Korean War, emergence of China a regional power, called for a reconciliation and reinforcement of the Western position in Asia. India had refused to line up with the United States anti-communist front, and remained unshaken in its non-alignment attitude. Pakistan appeared the most suitable as an alternative, commendable more for its willingness to join military pact and its strategic advantages than for its resources or stability.

Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement:
Beginning of US Military Aid

Against this backdrop it was only natural that Pakistan and United States should proceed to forge a military tie up. Pakistan took the first step to secure US military assistance in September-October, 1953 during a visit by General Ayub Khan to Washington D.C. He held discussions, among others, with General Mathew Bunker Ridgway, the US Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Arthur Redfort, and John Foster Dulles.

The next major step was taken during Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's November visit to Washington accompanied
by Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan. He met President Eisenhower as well as Secretary Dulles. President Eisenhower appreciated Pakistan geostrategic location at the cross roads of Central, South, and South-West Asia. And an era of close US-Pakistan military security relationship was inaugurated. During all these visits by the head of the states and other officials, the establishment of Middle East defence and possible role of Pakistan in that was discussed. However, Middle East defence could not be realized. Meantime, Pakistan made some informal request for military aid from US, during autumn of 1953, US administration, considering Pakistan as part of "Northern Tier", began to discuss the idea of providing some military aid to Pakistan.

Americans no doubt had for long agreed that their global strategy against communism demanded of a militarily stronger Pakistan but they still hesitated to take the final plunge for fear of offending India. A State Department officials admitted that informal discussion had been going on for last year or two, but President Eisenhower said at the press conference that the US would be most cautious about-doing any thing that would cause hysteria in India.

It was the visit of Vice President Nixon in December, 1953 to Pakistan and India, tipped the seals in favour of Pakistan. Nixon told the Pakistanis that he was convinced that the people of
Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart communist ambitions, and that the USA would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial development and also in defence.\textsuperscript{39}

Nixon was successful in persuading President Eisenhower that Pakistan was the best available option in South Asia in containment of communism and a suitable reply to India’s policy of "neutralism" or non-alignment.\textsuperscript{40} It was finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{41}

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra announced at a Press conference in Karachi, on February, 22, 1954, that his country had formally requested the United States for military assistance within the scope of the Mutual Security Act, "for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter"\textsuperscript{42}. Three days later President Eisenhower announced in Washington that the United States had decided to respond favourably to Pakistan’s request.\textsuperscript{43}

In a statement before the Lok Sabha on March 1, 1954, Nehru vehemently criticized the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan. Commenting on Eisenhower assurance to him and his offer to similar military aid to India, he said "if we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we could be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves."\textsuperscript{44}
On May 19, 1954 after months of intense negotiations, Pakistan and the United States signed an agreement on US aid, called the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in Karachi: The agreement which consisted of seven Articles, came into force with immediate effect. It obliged United States to supply to Pakistan only "such equipments, materials, services or other assistance as the government of the US may authorized in accordance with such conditions and terms as may be agreed\textsuperscript{45}. It was stipulated that Pakistan should not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation and that it should use American Military aid exclusively for internal security and its legitimate self defence or to participate in the defence of area or in UN Collective Security arrangements and measures. Pakistan also agreed not to transfer American arms received under the agreement to any other country without the prior consent of the United States. In short the agreement bound Pakistan to the regional and global diplomatic and security objectives of the US\textsuperscript{46}. The US, thus found in the military alliances an opportunity to maintain its military and political presence on the territory of its allies.

**SEATO, CENTO, and Pakistan- US Strategic Relations**

The Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 was the basis on which Pakistan received military equipment from the United States. In the belief that membership in American sponsored multinational arrangements would bring fourth an expanded
programme or arms supplies and more vigorous US support for its own diplomatic and military objectives, Pakistan became a member of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO, Central Treaty Organization in 1955).

South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

The ceasefire in Korea in July, 1953 enabled the Chinese to concentrate on South East Asia and consequently China increased the scale of its assistance to North Vietnam, making the French position in Indo-China progressively worse. With a view to checking the perceived Chinese expansion, the Americans decided to extend the containment policy to South East Asia. The Americans thought that if any of the local state, battling communists, were allowed to fall then not only would the emerging communist regime in the region be eventually all linked ideologically, militarily, and politically with the USSR and Red China and deny the entire area to the USA, but there would also be a Chain reaction throughout the area. In responding to this perceived threat the Americans not only extended active support but also encouraged the States in the area to form a regional security alliance that would include the USA.

Thus, a conference at Manila resulted in the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty on September 8, 1954, creating an alliance consisting of Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, US, UK,
principles entitled the pacific charter\textsuperscript{48}.

Most interesting thing with SEATO was that almost all members of this pact joined it to attain their own objectives. Perhaps it would be true to say that SEATO had as many objectives as it had members. Admittedly, the American objectives was to foster collective efforts in the region to check the perceived expansion of communism but the objectives of the other members of SEATO were all different. Pakistan’s decision to join SEATO appears to have been influenced by a desire to please the Americans than a conviction of its utility to cater for Pakistan’s security needs.

Pakistan, however, was not too much happy with the SEATO because Pakistan was knowing well that it would receive no protection from SEATO against an Indian attack, which was its most immediate concern. No where in the entire document was there to be found even indirectly a hint of a suggestion that the treaty address itself to Pakistan’s proclaimed concern-Hindu expansionism, Indian imperialism, helping Pakistan to recover Indian occupied Kashmir or even defending in case of unprovoked Indian attack. Moreover, the United States wrote a reservation into the treaty that its obligation under Article IV(1) would extend only to cases of communist aggression.
Pakistan's justification to join SEATO was that East Pakistan geographically could be regarded as part of South East Asia. Further it signed for development of economic measures and basic defence structure promotion. Art 29 of this Collective Defence Treaty lays down that "In order to be more effective to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and active self help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent the counter subversive activities directed against their territorial integrity and political stability."

Three factors seem to have influenced the decision makers to opt for membership of SEATO. First, the desire to please the America, after the successful conclusion of the military aid agreement. Second, the purpose of signatories was to win more friends, as Pakistan was certainly looking for friends in order to at least strengthen its case on Kashmir Third, the development in East Pakistan which necessitated not only extra US aid but also strengthen fears regarding communist activities. A combination of the above mentioned factor could have influenced Pakistan decision makers to opt for membership in SEATO. That would at least please the USA, help procure much needed arms and to gain a kind of psychological defence against India.

The Baghdad Pact (CENTO)

Middle East has always been an area of great concern for US
due to presence of huge oil resources and its strategic location attracted more. After the Second World War both super-powers fully realized the strategic significance of oil for their own sake and as a means of denying vital oil supplies to the adversary. General Eisenhower, even commented that there was no area strategically more important than the Gulf.

In order to protect the interest of its own and its friends and allies, the USA, after the withdrawal of the UK, decided to establish military alliances with the countries of the region. First step in this direction was taken when it signed Mutual Defence Agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954, subsequently Turkey and Iraq signed a pact of Mutual co-operation at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, for the purpose of collective defence arrangements for the Middle East. The same was later joined by the Britain on April 5, 1955, Pakistan on June 30, 1955, and Iran on November 3, 1955 which popularly came to be known as Baghdad Pact. After Iraq formally relinquished its membership, head quarter was shifted to Ankara and name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959.

The Baghdad Pact provided that “the high contracting parties will cooperate for their security and defence, but that such measures as they agreed to take may form the subject of special agreements with each other (Art 1), also that this pact shall be
open for accession to any member state of the Arab league or any other state actively concerned with the securities and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both the high contracting parties.  

Although the USA had canvassed for Baghdad Pact and later fully participated in its work, but never officially signed the treaty. Then Ambassador Waldernar J. Gallman, United States observer at the council meeting in November 1955, gave two reasons why the US thought that it could contribute more by remaining out of the pact (i) It was perceived that formal US adherence to the Pact was likely to further estrange Egypt and other Arabs and (ii) It was thought that US participation might invoke an Israeli counter-demand for a Mutual Defence Treaty especially in view of the fact that the Baghdad Pact came into existence through the effort of an Arab country Iraq, and it could become an issue in the next presidential election. And a treaty with Israel would cause the Arabs, including Iraq, to reject alliances with the US and make them receptive to Soviet overtures.

Pakistan’s perception of Baghdad Pact was different from that of the United States. The fear of communist aggression on Pakistan was only a myth. The raison de’être of Pakistan’s entry into military pacts was explained by Mohammad Ayub Khan who himself had vouched his close association with Baghdad Pact (CENTO) According to him “the crux of the problem from the very
beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us: ‘we had to look for allies to secure our position’\textsuperscript{52}. Hence the primary motive of Pakistan’s participation in the SEATO and CENTO was the result of an extreme pathological “Indo-Phobia”. The other consideration seemed to have influenced the Pakistani decision makers to opt for formal membership of the pact were many. Pakistan has always stood for special ties with Muslim countries. Right from its birth, it had tried hard to forge stronger bonds with most Muslim countries in the Middle East and consequently it always demonstrated a keen interest in participating in all the schemes relating to the defence of the area. Moreover, having secured the most desired military assistance treaty with the USA, the Pakistan’s had been demonstrating overtly to undertake such ventures that would please the Americans.

By becoming member of Baghdad Pact, Pakistan became truly America’s “most allied ally in Asia” because Pakistan strategically located and only Asian country to be a member of SEATO and CENTO. Just like Turkey links the NATO and CENTO, Pakistan, however, never disguised the motivating compulsion that pushed it to join SEATO and the Baghdad Pact; what is more interesting to note that Americans were also fully aware of these when they decided to encourage Pakistan’s participation. As far as Pakistan was concerned the reason had little to do with the avowed objective of the pact which was to contain “international
communism* in the area. As usual, Pakistan's foreign minister Firoz Khan Noon, asserted that “enmity of a powerful neighbouring country had obliged Pakistan to enter into defence alliances to preserve its freedom* and that “Pakistan will not agree to commit suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact which is its defence against India.”

The reason, thus why Pakistan joined the military alliance was very different from the reason why the United States created the alliances. Why then alliance if the aims and objectives of the two parties were so doubly divergent? Infact, the United States recognized Pakistan's pre-occupation with India, but felt that it would be able to keep the Indo-Pakistan rivalry under control and that in any case, it would not allow that rivalry to interfere with its own global anti-communist strategy. In its anxiety to create the various military organization it ignored Pakistan's special motives.

It was against this background that the United States took steps to extend military assistance to Pakistan.

**Military Aid to Pakistan**

Pakistan’s bilateral treaty with the United States and former's membership of SEATO and CENTO made it eligible to receive massive military and economic assistance from Washington. According to a document of National Security Council
(USA) the total value of US military aid programmed for Pakistan during the period of 1950-58 was $411.6 million. Items valued at $276.4 million had been delivered during the period, leaving an undelivered balance as of 30 June, 1958 of item worth $135.2 million.\(^5\)

According to consolidated statistics published in December 1979 by the Comptroller of the Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defence, total deliveries and expenditure on the military assistance programmed for Pakistan (excluding “training”) amounted to $650.28 million during the period 1950-1969.\(^6\) Assuming that all the deliveries had been made by the time the embargo was enforced in 1965, in the wake of Indo-Pak War and deducting the figures of $276.4 million acknowledged to have been expanded during 1950-1958, we get $373.88 million as the outer limit of grant military assistance that Pakistan could have received the United States during the period July 1, 1958 to September 1965.

During the period 1954-1965, the United States provided military grants assistance valued at $650 million, defence support assistance valued at $619 million and some $55 million worth of equipment on cash or concessional basis between 1954 and 1965.

The USA also maintained a Military Assistance Advisory Group of about 100 personnel in Pakistan. The entire aid was
furnished under aide-memoirs signed in 1954, 1960, 1961 and 1962, in which the USA agreed to equip four specific units of Pakistan armed forces.57

The increase of US economic aid to Pakistan was also not without military implications. It seemed to have been subsidy to the main percentage of the huge War machinery which Pakistan had tried to set up during 1954-1964. American economic aid to Pakistan until the end of fiscal year 1965, was estimated worth $2.5 to 3 billion58.

The US interest in Pakistan as strategic partner in South Asia diminished gradually and steadily around 1959-1960. Pakistan which was termed as “most allied ally” of USA and pumped massive security, economic assistance by later fall of this trap owing to numerous development at international Scene. The thaw in the Cold War during that period changed the US perception towards Pakistan, resulted in the cut in military assistance programme.

The efforts of Kennedy administration to win over “non-aligned” India brought watershed in Pakistan US security and strategic relations. The Sino-India War of 1962, was perceived by US as a change in geo-political condition of South Asia power status. Moreover, Sino-Soviet rift and China’s adventure in Taiwan, Tibbet convinced US policy makers that principal antagonist and
threat to the United States strategic interest was assumed by Peoples Republic of China in Asia.

The role of China in Asia and War with Vietnam loomed large in the United States major foreign policy dilemma of the 1960s. Hence US policy in the 1960's was much more concerned with the future of Asia than it had been previously.

**Irritants and Efforts Towards Rapprochements**

US-Pakistan relations received a serious setback when the former announced an embargo on the supply of military equipment to both India and Pakistan, in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak War. The US embargo affected Pakistan more than India because of two reasons. Firstly, Soviet Union had not imposed any restriction on arms supply to India, and secondly, since Pakistan was almost dependent upon the US for military hardware, spare parts and other ammunitions. Thus, United States betrayed Pakistan. It closed the pipeline, with its arms supply dried and US threatening to release modern aircrafts and heavy armaments to India, Pakistan had to call off its counter offensive and go for ceasefire\(^59\). However, one thing is important to note that inspite of embargo, US continued supplying military hard wares to Pakistan through Iran, Turkey, West Germany and Italy.\(^60\)

When US imposed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan during 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan became conscious of inherent
dangers of too much reliance on single source of supply of weapons. With their traditional source of supply cut off, Pakistan looked for new sources of arms procurements, with China, France, Soviet Union (1968-69) and European markets. Henceforth China became very reliable and trusted friend of Pakistan.

After President Richard Nixon’s visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and conscious of Soviet, China inroads made into what had been an exclusive US sphere of influence, American tried to win back Pakistan by giving more armaments.61 Richard Nixon, who was known as a firm supporter of military aid and alliance with Pakistan.62 Efforts were soon made by Nixon administration to lift embargo on lethal weapons that had been imposed in 1965.63 In 1970, Pakistan was given military hardwares worth $15.40 million from the US at throwaway price as the market value of these arms was estimated to be $150 million, probably to save of opposition in the Senate.64

Bangladesh crisis was another test of US-Pakistan strategic relationship. US “tilt” towards Pakistan in 1971 War was not committed for its integrity. America took half hearted interest when Pakistan’s very survival as a nation state was being questioned. Although an embargo was imposed in 1971 by the USA but in March 1973, it returned to the 1967 policy. However, a section of policy makers in Islamabad saw US role in the 1971 crisis with suspicion. Pakistan thought that the US had covertly connived.
with the Indian government in its plan for the creation of Bangladesh. It deliberately fed disinformation about the move of its seventh fleet in support of Pakistan. This disinformation turned into embarrassment for Pakistan when it was dismembered.°

However, it is ironical that while the US was covertly conniving with and supporting India in the breakup of Pakistan, the latter, even while in the thick of battle of its survival, went out of its way to further US interests by laying the historical bridge for Sino-US relations by arranging Chou-enlai–Henry Kissinger Summit.66

Rather than beefing up Pakistan’s defence to enable it to maintain the minimal defensive deterrence. From now on US policy towards South Asia gradually shifted from a balance of power model in the fifties and sixties to a position of greater recognition of India’s pre-dominance since 1971. Kissinger refers to the Bangladesh crisis as the most difficult of Nixon’s first term, as far as US South Asia policy was concerned.67 Thus, the warming of relations between US Pakistan during Nixon period was lost with bitter experience of Pakistan in 1971 War with India. Similarly America also followed policy of disengagement in 70s in Asia because of frustrating experience in the Vietnam War.

The announcement of the lifting of the US arms embargo in 1975 stated that the US had no interest in upsetting the strategic
balance in the subcontinent or resuming America's pre 1965 role as the major arms supplier to the region. Now US was more interested to play role of a reconciliator between India and Pakistan.

In the War of 1971, Pakistan had lost a large part of its military equipments worth $200 million, with its military demoralized and India proving its ascendance. Once again Bhutto needed American military assistance. Since Pakistan had been striving hard to acquire arms from the USA and other sources. With the lifting of the embargo, Pakistan was free to get US lethal weapons short of nuclear ones. In 1975, just after lifting the embargo the US Defence Department approved sale of 110A-7 light bombers and it contracted with Pakistan worth $700 million for military aid.68

Ford administration faced a complex problem of Nuclear Development in South Asia. As India had already successfully conducted nuclear test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974, which completely changed the strategic balance in favour of India. On learning that Pakistan want to obtain nuclear device at any cost, Henry Kissinger, then US secretary of State, and US President Ford warned of making a horrible example out of Pakistan, if it persisted with its nuclear policy. This forced American foreign policy makers to deter Pakistan and India from acquisition of nuclear weapons, and US made non-proliferation a central issue in bilateral relations.
with Pakistan and India. Since 1974, successive US administration have pushed for restrain by both countries, utilizing a range of policy tools including diplomatic pressure, embargo on the export of nuclear technology, and the leverage of US assistance and arms sale. In fact, the United States had sought to oppose proliferation in South Asia through all available means at its disposal.

In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Symington Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act, which forbade US military and economic assistance to any country receiving, “nuclear enriched equipment” which was not subject to Atomic Energy Safeguards. Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with the result that all US assistance was terminated in April, 1979. There was however, a revival of US interest in security cooperation with Pakistan in the wake of downfall of the Shah regime in Iran and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the same year.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shot Pakistan to immediate prominence in the US perception once again. From a totally ignored and forgotten ally who till recently was being bullied and served warnings on nuclear issue and whose President had spurned disdainfully paltry economic assistance as “peanuts” suddenly became the champion of free world and declared to play most decisive role in furtherance of US interests in fighting its proxy War.
REFERENCE


5. Early Reports, of Pakistan-US negotiations indicated that the base facilities were an important consideration. The United States established a base near Peshawar in Northern Pakistan.

6. For details of Pakistan’s Strategic importance and value, see Lord Birdwood-“Reflections on Pakistan in international Relations” *Pakistan Quarterly*. Spring 1955, p. 6.

7. The Marshal Plan and the Truman Doctrine were the other measures implemented by the US along with NATO in this Process.
8. India's population is sixth times and its territory three times larger than Pakistan. Industrially also India is several times stronger. See Andrew Mellor, *India Since Partition*, London, 1951, pp.39-49.


31. Quoted in S.M. Burke, No. 28, p.135.


47. SEACDT being hard to pronounce, the organization became popularly known as SEATO, and in 1955 the latter term was officially adopted.

49. After the fall of Premier Mosaddique in 1953, the Shah of Iran had began to incline towards alignment with the West.

50. As Iraque did not recognized Isreal, the inclusion of latters in the Baghdad Pact was ruled out.


64. *The Time of India*, New Delhi, October 10, 1970.


CHAPTER – II

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN:
PAKISTAN GETS ‘FRONTLINE’ STATUS

Pakistan and the United States came even closer in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Eventually, Afghan crisis became a ‘turning point’ for United States-Pak strategic relations. The past deterioration in US-Pak relations on account of Pakistan’s nuclear programmes came in for reappraisal. The Soviet ‘adventure’ in Afghanistan brought a dramatic sea change in the geo-strategic situation and led the American policy makers to “rediscover” the strategic importance of Pakistan. The Carter Administration emphasized Pakistan’s new role as a “front line state” against the possible Soviet expansion. Pakistan, according to Thomas Perry Thorton, an American scholar, now became “an essential line of defence and an indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviet for their action”.¹

Before the Soviet intervention Pakistan-US relations were fraught with deep cleavages over the former’s covert acquisition of Uranium enrichment technology, when Carter Administration suspended American aid to Pakistan under the Symington-Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act. However, in its efforts to re-establish close military and economic ties with the Pakistan
government, Washington over rode its nuclear and human rights concerns which had inhibited their relations in the past so much.

Similarly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed both challenges and opportunities for Pakistan, an endemically unstable country situated uncomfortably at the juncture of South, West and Central Asia. The Soviet intervention underscored Pakistan's strategic importance as never before. Pakistan responded with a much more cautious and subtle policy. The Zia government immediately moved to repair its strained ties with Washington and other friendly countries to bolster its defence and form a 'broad' front against Soviet Union.²

The American response towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in general and towards Pakistan in particular has to be examined in the wider context of other developments in the region. The fall of Shah government in Iran, a strong and close American ally in West Asia and Persian Gulf, and coming into power of a revolutionary regime under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomayni, which was extremely critical of the USA. American's political and strategic interest in Gulf suffered a further set back when the US embassy personnel were taken hostage in Tehran by supporters of Ayatollah Khomayni in November 1979. The spiralling events were coupled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet action raised the spectre of renewed Soviet
expansionist strategy in the Middle East and had signaled a change in the strategic balance in the region.  

**Genesis of the Afghan Crisis**

Afghan crisis had its genesis in the pro-Soviet elements in the Afghan armed forces when they staged a successful coup on April 27, 1978, in collaboration with the Afghan communist party against President Mohammad Daud. Although, Pakistan recognized the new regime and expressed the desire to improve relations, still Pakistan was seriously perturbed over what it regarded as the Pro-Soviet leanings of the new government in Kabul. Islamabad was fearful of grave repercussions of the establishment of a leftist, a pro-Moscow regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. From Pakistan's point of view the coup in Kabul caused a historic readjustment in this part of the world as Afghanistan ceased to be the traditional 'buffer' between South Asia and Soviet Union. The Pakistani establishment apprehended that once the new Afghan government had consolidated its position it would create difficulties for Pakistan by fanning political grievances and ethno-national tension by reviving the 'Durand Line' issue between the two countries. As expected by Islamabad Afghanistan soon expressed support to the "Baluch and Pukhtoon brethren" from the very outset.
The change in the guard in Kabul did not go well with the tribal and religious conservative society of Afghanistan. They organized an armed resistance against the new regime which was denounced as communist and atheist. Soon the tribals posed great problems for Afghan government and it became quite difficult for it to strengthen its foothold due to the stiff resistance. The Kabul government alleged that Pakistan was sheltering and supporting mercenaries against Afghanistan. The allegations were not completely baseless as there were evidence that Pakistan organized Afghan resistance fighter from among the refugees, living in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, bordering Afghanistan with the cry of "Islam in danger". Islamabad also supplied other assistance through American's CIA and ISI of Pakistan, to strengthen the resistance and enabled it to survive the Afghan government’s effort to wipe it out. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan provided both opportunities and fear for Islamabad. Pakistan and Afghanistan had long standing border dispute along the North-Western part of Pakistan. To pre-empt future Afghan demand Zia administration organized and trained number of Pushtoons on the both side of the border under Pakistan control. Zia government used these fighters for its advantage to not only end Afghanistan claims across line but also create a formidable 'buffer' between it and the Soviet imperial domain to the North.⁶
Pakistan perceived the communist government in Afghanistan as a serious threat to its security. Pakistan tried to formulate international opinion against Soviet threat to its security and enforce Afghan resistance fighters. Zia wanted the United States to take a serious note of the grave situation arising from the installation of a communist government in Kabul and respond forcefully in collaboration with Islamabad. Pakistan officially sought to impress upon the US officials, the need to hold their country as it had virtually became “a front line state”.7

The Carter administration was comparatively slow to appreciate the implications of the Afghan coup and did not comprehend the grave threat inherent in that. Since at that time the ‘Cold War’ was as its lowest ebb and there was détente between the super powers. Due to reduction in conflict in other parts of the world the Afghan coup was viewed in Washington as an internal event without Soviet Union’s role. There was no immediate official reaction by the US to the communist coup in Kabul. The US economic, cultural, educational and peace programme in Afghanistan continued. This studied silence maintained by Washington showed that it was unconcerned that another country apparently had joined the Soviet bloc.

The Shah of Iran was the first to draw Carter’s attention towards Soviet intention in Kabul. But American officials did not
pay heed to Iranian version of the coup. Tehran considered it one more example of the Soviet grand design and a further proof of the Soviet drive to encircle Iran. To Iran’s surprise US urged Shah to co-operate with Afghan government.

There appeared to be no serious thinking in Washington to review the US South Asia policy, particularly relations with Iran and Pakistan in the rapidly changing strategic scenario in this region. The US was well convinced by the Soviet Afghan assurance that the “Saur revolution” was an internal development committed to promote democracy and security and to pursue a non aligned policy.

Assassination of US Ambassador in Kabul

However, the events that followed made it very evident to the US policy maker’s that their Afghan assessment was erroneous. It was the murder of Ambassador Dubbs in Kabul in February 1979, which made the Carter administration to realize the ground reality and grave implications of the coup. He was first kept as hostage in Kabul and subsequently assassinated by four Afghan’s in Kabul on February 14, 1979. Dubbs assassination cast a spell on the already deteriorating US-Afghan relations. As it posed many unresolved questions about the role of Afghan government in the affairs and its consequent uncooperative attitude. Dubbs was kept hostage in a hotel and kidnappers demanded release of the
arrested leftist member in exchange for Dubbs. The US embassy advised the Afghan government to prolong the negotiations while applying rescue operations. But the Afghan forces along with Soviet advisers stormed the hotel which resulted in the death of Dubbs. According to Richard P. Cornin, Soviet Security advisers appeared to be directing the operation and the Afghan government disregarded US suggestion that an attempt to rescue Dubbs by force be delayed. The United States was highly provoked by this act. The outraged Carter administration blamed Moscow's involvement in the murder of Dubbs. On July 23rd, 1978 Washington announced the withdrawal of most of its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan because of security reasons. Thus, US relations with Afghanistan reached at its nadir. Now Washington recognized effect of the coup on Afghanistan's neighbours.9

Given the anti-American orientation of the Iranian Revolution, and India's pro-Soviet stance, Pakistan was seen as the one country with which to work closely in order to protect US interest in the area. The development in Iran and Afghanistan forced the Carter administration to resume aid to Pakistan on October 24, 1978. This decision was taken to align closely with Pakistan.10 Carter administration took time to implement the decisions.
United States issued a warning to the Soviet Union of the adverse consequences of their expanding role in Afghanistan. In early September 1979, the United States consulted Egypt and Saudi Arabia regarding the resistance in Afghanistan. This consultation could be construed as the beginning of US aid programmes for the Afghan resistance forces against the communist government. The United States undertook this operation through other countries to deliberately avoid a direct dependence on Pakistan for its implementation. It implies that American concern for the Afghan situation did not meaningfully influence its relations with Pakistan.

Despite its growing concern with the Afghan issue, the Carter administration remained unmindful of the need, even after the fall of Iran, to discover the strategic importance of Pakistan and improve relations with it. The development in Afghanistan since the April 1978 coup, including the amassing of the Soviet troops along the Afghan border which was a clear indication of a large scale Soviet operation in late 1979, did not prove a catalyst towards an improvement in Pak-US security relations. A crisis of confidence persisted between Islamabad and Washington until the Afghan situation assumed a qualitatively new dimension after the Soviet intervention in December 1979.11

US Perception of Soviet Intervention
The American official viewpoint regarding Soviet intention behind the intervention in Afghanistan was nothing less than as "invasion". To the US, States Department the activities had increased to the extent of "political threat to the security of nations in the region and the world's access to vital resources and shipping routes". 12

Carter Administration interpreted the offensive 'invasion' as part of Soviet master plan to undermine and overwhelm the West by increasing control of the oil rich Persian-Gulf and warm water of the Arabian sea. Richard Nixon former American President, remarked that the incident marked the assertion of the Soviet Union global power which posed a challenge to America's status as a super power.

Thus, the United States drew the worst possible scenario of the Soviet arms intervention and objectives in the occupation of Afghanistan. To the US, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was an event full of repercussions and implications for the region. The crux of these implications was that the occupation of Afghanistan gave the Soviet Union an objective capability to threaten important US interest in the area which it did not have before.

The US perceived that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan presented dangerous prospects of further Soviet advancement in the South and East, threatening the security of
the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region and jeopardizing the supply of oil to the West. The Soviet move was seen to have altered the geo-political situation in the area in very ominous fashion, eliminating a "buffer state" Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and presented a new threat to Iran. It was argued that even if the Soviet's did not exercise military option arising out of the occupation of Afghanistan, the strategic map of the world would have been irrevocably changed for the worse.¹³

President Carter before the joint session of the Congress on January 23, 1980 stated that the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. The Soviet efforts to dominate Afghanistan has brought its forces within 300 miles of Indian ocean and close to the strait of Hormuz-a water way through which most of the world's oil flows. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position. That poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.¹⁴

Apart from maintaining geo-political implications the US administration also interpreted Soviet invasion in terms of a serious threat to world peace and violation of norms of international behavior. Carter observed that "the explosiveness of the region, its great natural wealth and Soviet willingness to use the forces which have been developed during the Kremlin's enormous military buildup during the last fifteen years are what
combine to make the invasion of Afghanistan so unsettling to the future of international peace\textsuperscript{15}.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also represented to Washington a new departure in Moscow's policy. The use of Soviet military force in Afghanistan was interpreted as a signal of Soviet policy entering a more aggressive and overtly expansionist phase. This was the first use of Soviet forces since the 1940s in an effort to extend the Soviet domination beyond the traditional socialist camp. In this context the Soviet move represented an extension of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" outside the Soviet dominated Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{16}.

Some US analysts also concluded that Soviet intervention could lead to superpower struggle resulting in war in South Asia. Therefore, the US formulated policy response cautiously so that Moscow could not succeed in its desired goal and threaten vital US interest in the West and South Asia. Washington soon realized that regional co-operation is essential to check further, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. Carter administration sent back diplomatic envoys to win support of strategically located countries. American policy makers took steps that no country is frightened or neutralized in the wake of steadily growing Soviet Military power and Soviet proximity of the region. Washington was of the view that if the regional countries were ever neutralized or threatened into
inaction because of the Soviet proximity it would facilitate consolidation of Soviet position in Afghanistan and enable it to wield greater influence at the cost of US position in South-West Asia. So all the policies were made keeping in view the role of the regional countries in general and Pakistan in particular.

Pakistan and Iran the two strategically located countries with a friendly disposition towards the US could be further target of Soviet expansionist policy through Afghanistan. The Carter administration did not want to loose its strategic allies at any cost, because their co-operation was essential to make the Afghan venture a bitter pill for the Soviet to swallow. As America was still to recover from the shock of losing its old friend Iran when a revolution brought Ayatollah Khomayni to power in Tehran.

Hence, in the period when Soviet armed forces were engaged in a protected effort to conquer Afghanistan, when a revolutionary Iran was openly hostile to the American presence in West Asia, and when the Middle East was highly flammable, the interest of the United States lay in strengthening it ties with Pakistan. The US assured large scale economic and military assistance for Pakistan to preserve its independence and integrity to bring about a withdrawl of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Thus eventual entry of Soviet army in Afghanistan brought sea change, resulted in close US-Pak strategic relationship.
Pakistan's Perception of the Soviet Move

Pakistan's perception of the Soviet intervention was different from the US. It was question of survival for the former and maintaining superpower status for the latter. President Ziaul Haque felt "the Soviet intervention had brought Soviet troops to the Pakistan frontier presenting Pakistan with a most critical situation." Feverish construction of infrastructure and steady process of sovietization of Afghanistan force shadowed a long term Soviet military presence in that country. As the Soviet would stay in Afghanistan, Pakistan was fearful of becoming the 'periphery' of a super power, with all the implications of super power rivalry.

Another worrisome prospects from Pakistan's stand point was the possibility of active Soviet support to Afghanistan on the Baluch and Pukhtoonistan issue.

In the mean time, a large number of Afghan refugees had begun to cross into Pakistan soon after the April 1978 coup it increased substantially, and after the Soviet intervention and the intensification of resistance in Afghanistan it reached alarming proportions. With the passage of time Pakistan became a safe and readily accessible sanctuary for the Afghan refugees and resistance fighters. Since the popular resistance against the Soviet troops would continue, Pakistan's abiding fear was that the conflict in Afghanistan might spill over into its territory. This fear became
more pronounced in view of Moscow–Kabul allegation of Pakistani involvement in the war and threat of grave consequences for its alleged involvement. The threat turned into reality when Moscow-Kabul forces engaged in air violations and cross border raids against resistant Mujahideen fighters in Pakistan's territory.

The Pakistani establishment perceived four possible threats which could materialize in any form.

(a) A direct full fledged attack to amputate and isolate Mujahideens in Baluchistan or North West Frontier Province.

(b) Cross border reprisal to intimidate Pakistan, or crossing into its territory into hot pursuit of the resistance forces and destruction of sanctuaries of fighters.

(c) Standard practice of subversion and integration of secessionist forces:

(d) Pakistan also foresaw the future where Pakistan could face two front attack.

Zia government envisaged a situation where Soviet Union and India could attack in collaboration at two fronts.

Although the risk of Soviet attacks incursions and subversions was high in Pakistan still its policy establishment down played the gravity of a direct Soviet attack in public. The underlining thinking was to keep people ignorant about anticipated Soviet attack because that could have created serious law and
order problems in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Provinces. Pakistan had vowed to fight back in case Soviet, attacks its interest any where.¹⁹

The Soviet Union threatened Pakistan repeatedly that upholding of “imperialist aggression” against Afghanistan from its territory was increasingly drawing it into a dangerous combination.²⁰ It was feared that the Soviet Union would not tolerate for long the resistance to its domination over Afghanistan.

Pakistan also perceived the possibility of Indo-Soviet collaboration against it. There was report that Soviet leaders were persuading the Indian leadership to help them dissipate opposition against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to put pressure on the eastern border of Pakistan to make things unbearable for Islamabad.²¹ Hence, Pakistan was faced with three front attack scenario viz. an Indian threat, threat from Afghanistan and internal threat on account of huge Afghan refugees sheltering there.

Pakistan which shares a 2400 km long border with Afghanistan felt directly exposed to Soviet military pressure. This affected greatly the security considerations of the military regime in Islamabad. The Zia regime perceived drastic shift in the regional balance of military power and the emergence of growing security situation far beyond its ability to manage on its own.
Pakistan realized that without adequate defence it was fumbling towards a position in which its security would rest on the good will of the Soviet Union and India. The state of Pakistan’s feeble defence could not remain unremedied because a weak Pakistan would increase the temptation for any power pursuing its strategic designs. It was argued that Pakistan capable of self defence could deter hegemonic and expansionist ambition in the region.\textsuperscript{22}

Besides it was clear to the Pakistan authorities that if Pakistan wanted to hold steadfast against the Soviet pressure and pursue its Afghan policy, it needed international diplomatic as well as material support. Among available options Islamabad found the US as an effective and willing partner which could shore up its defence and help it counter the mounting Soviet pressure on it by establishing a close security relationship. Thus, it was natural for Pakistan leaders to improve relations with their erstwhile ally and benefactor.

\textbf{A Revived Friendship}

Moscow’s adventure totally changed the situation for Pakistan and for the US-Pakistani military and strategic relationship. Over night Zia obtained internal political breathing room and an opportunity to refurbish his external ties. The United States moved quickly to revitalize the moribund US Pakistan
security relationship. Pakistan drew closer to its regional friends. Thus, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan became a watershed in US-Pakistan strategic relations. President Carter reversed his foreign policy priorities in the light of changing international scenario. There was convergence in US-Pakistan security perceptions. Once again Pakistan suddenly became a frontline and an essential anchor of the US in South West Asia. Pakistan was up-graded dramatically in the United States global strategic designs within few days of the Russian invasion. Carter categorically announced that the US was committed to the security of Pakistan and other aid to Pakistan to defend its territorial integrity. He also emphasized the US commitment to Pakistan under 1959 executive agreement.23 (which had remained operative only on paper in the past) and declared that the USA’s willingness to use force if necessary to protect Pakistan against Soviet attack.24

The first aid package of $ 400 million to Pakistan which was made on January 12, 1980, had three components. An American commitment to guarantee Pakistan’s security. Secondly, $ 200 million worth of America’s economic aid to Pakistan spread over two years. Thirdly, $ 200 million worth of military hard wares to be supplied to Islamabad by Washington.

Besides this, Carter urged the Congress to reconfirm the 1959 executive agreement with Pakistan on January 31, 1980, the
Carter administration informed key Congressional leaders that, it intended to enter into long term military support relationship with Pakistan. Congressional sources said that originally the US administration had thought of seeking only an emergency 'onetime exception' of the law barring Pakistan from America aid because of its nuclear weapons programmes but ultimately the administration planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to Pakistan without any time limit.

However, much to US surprise about revival of friendship with Pakistan through US aid programmes President Zia-ul-Haque, dismissed American aid offer of $400 million as "peanuts". He felt that the aid package was "terribly disappointing" and that it could not buy security for Pakistan. He added that it was too small to be effective but large enough to buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union which is more influential in the region than the United States. A few days later foreign minister Agha Shahi phrased the rejection more diplomatically telling the Washington post "the assistance must be commensurate with the size of the threat."

The obvious reason for his rejection were that Pakistan found the level of aid pledged by the USA insufficient and the USA was still resisting Pakistan's pressure for formalizing the 1959 security agreement into a treaty. President Zia, infact, thought
the leaders of the United States wanted to give a little aid, "let Pakistan burn its bridges forever with the Soviet Union and then leave it in the lurch". Zia held the view that Carter administration was in a state of panic after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and that it was the most opportune time for him to extract the maximum commitment from them. Washington was expected to "prove its credibility" as an ally before Pakistan accepted US aid\textsuperscript{31}.

Zia's dismissal of the aid offer as "a quibble" perturbed the Carter administration. However, Carter still sounded optimistic about the revival of friendship with Pakistan, in his State of the Union speech before US Congress on January 23, 1980. Jimmy Carter said that one of "highest legislative priorities"\textsuperscript{32} was a new military and economic assistance programmes/package for Pakistan. He also sent a military and diplomatic mission headed by his National Security advisor Zbignew Brzezinski to Pakistan in February, 1980 to reaffirm American commitment to the security of Pakistan under the 1959 agreement and to negotiate the proposed aid package. Although, Zia expressed satisfaction over the renewed US commitment to Pakistan, but did not accept the offer\textsuperscript{33}. Nevertheless, American authorities continued to negotiate with Pakistan to improve relations.
The rejection of U.S. aid offers by Pakistan, effectively, scuttled the revival of friendly relations. Pakistan had bitter past experience when Washington had let it down in 1965 and again in 1971. Pakistan was also irritated over the hypocrisy of the non-proliferation policy of the United States. It was also feared that President Carter would not be very forthcoming in extending strong political and military support to Pakistan in view of its keen desire to maintain its friendly relation with India. A number of explanations for Zia's rebuff of the aid package could be given:

1. Pakistan was wary of developing a close and formalized association with the United States at the very outset of Soviet intervention. The rejection suited the Pakistani rulers as they were interested in the formation of a broad international diplomatic front against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As of now when world opinion was building against Soviet Union, alignment with US would have hit badly the Afghan cause and Pakistan's stand on it. Thus, hurting Pakistan's efforts to muster support for a broad based front against Soviet Union.\(^{34}\)

According to another viewpoint Pakistan had sufficient reasons to reject the aid offer. In view of the magnitude of the problems posed by Soviet move, the consequent US assistance was not "commensurate with the size of the threat". Pakistan expected the Carter administration to put together a substantial aid
programmes but that fell well short of Pakistan's expectations and needs. The Pakistani officials termed the proposed aid programme as inadequate it would, unless substantially modified and increased, instead of reducing Pakistan's security problems enhance Pakistan’s insecurity.

Moreover, the aid package had been announced without prior consultation with Islamabad. To Pakistan's dismay US refused to supply Pakistan the F-16 aircraft which Pakistan considered extremely important to bolster the country’s defence capability.

Pakistan wanted to upgrade the status of 1959 defence agreement to a formal treaty endorsed by the Congress. In view of its expectations not coming true at the hands of the United States, Pakistan insisted for guarantees against Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis, which weighed high in its security calculations. Perhaps the most important reason for refusal of aid package was Zia government’s low confidence in the Carter administration. Pakistan's past disappointment made it to realize that the United States was fundamentally an ‘unreliable’ partner in international politics and should not be taken seriously.35

The officials of the Pakistan foreign office were less enthusiastic about the prospect of realignment with the United
States, believing there existed profound doubt in Washington about the wisdom of deeper involvement in South Asia.

Pakistan was reluctant to credit the pledges and assurance to an administration that swung almost overnight from a position of neglect to one of over reaction. It seemed inconceivable to policy makers in Islamabad that the same administration which had failed to acknowledge the transformation of Afghanistan into ‘Soviet satellite’ from 1978 to December to 1979 branded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the greatest challenge facing the free world since world war II.\(^{36}\)

In the light of this shaky faith of Pakistan in US, Brezezinski urged Carter to ensure that no ambiguity should be left in Pakistan’s mind regarding US position.\(^{37}\)

To assuage Pakistan’s suspicion about the seriousness of the US intentions, the President spelled out the “Carter Doctrine” the new policy under which a Soviet attack against the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an attack on US vital interest. He reaffirmed the security commitment to Pakistan, declaring “The United States will take action consistent with our laws to assist Pakistan to resist any outside aggression.”\(^{38}\)

Carter Doctrine was primarily regarding American’s own military power, the five specific parts of the doctrine’s architecture amply justified this\(^{39}\). These were, first, the Rapid deployment
force, to improve American's capability to deploy US military force rapidly to distant areas. Second, enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean and acquisition of base facility in the Gulf and the North East Africa. Third, it was recommended that the Congress should approve a strong defence budget for 1981 encompassing a 5 percent real growth in authorization without any reduction. Fourth, the creation of security framework in the region with the countries with different values and political belief under the US auspices and fifth, defence commitment to Pakistan in order to assist it in resisting any outside aggression and accordingly a reaffirmation of the USA 1959 executive agreement with the Pakistan. By using the label "a frame work of regional cooperation for his doctrine Carter seemed to imply what USA did not intend, to wage a global Cold War with the Soviet Union, rather than its intention was to contain Moscow in the Persian Gulf region. In essence, therefore "Carter Doctrine" conferred doctrinal justification on the USA to intervene in the Arab, Persian Gulf, South West Asian region to protect the interest of the West.

Consequent upon Pakistan's stubborn attitude Carter administration suspended Congressional approval of $400 million in order to hold further talks and reach an agreement with Pakistan. Islamabad was assured that $400 million package was only a beginning and more would be available in later years. Thornton, an American scholar said that the offer was not
munificent but was surely not "peanuts" as Zia described. Furthermore, Carter administration was prepared to form a group of donors to assist Pakistan.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Minor Disagreements and Misunderstandings}

The Pakistani establishment were not convinced by these assurances and initiatives taken by Washington. An impasse was created where by Zia noted that the invasion of Afghanistan has brought the Soviet Union to our doorstep.\textsuperscript{43} He stated that in the absence of "active participation" by the United States, Pakistan may have to adopt itself to the new reality. "If you live in the sea you have to learn to swim with the whales", became a part of his lexicon. He cited the fact that "history has taught us not to harbour any illusions",\textsuperscript{44} regarding US participation. Zia administration looked towards China and Islamic Nations for support.

Pakistan’s effort to forge a strategic alliance with the China as a bulwark against the Soviet threat created more gulf than friendship vis-a-vis the US. Apart from this, the issues of non-proliferation, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and India’s objection over military assistance to Pakistan continued to imperil Pak-US security relations. All this led to the fear that either the Carter administration failed to fully comprehend Pakistan’s enhanced strategic importance and security problem in the new
setting or was intentionally not doing enough for her. It appeared that the Afghan issue did not elevate Pakistan in the list of American priorities and it was still of 'peripheral' interest to the United States.

Thus no significant breakthrough in Pakistan-US strategic relations was achieved during the Carter administration. Despite, a mutual desire and a clear recognition in Islamabad and Washington to revive friendship in order to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet intervention. However, the Afghanistan issue appeared to be changing the US attitude towards Pakistan when the Carter administration supported the rescheduling of Pakistan's foreign debt and the $1.6 billion IMF credit for Pakistan.45

The Carter administration also strongly supported Pakistan's stance against recognizing the Soviet installed regime in Kabul. Pakistan and the US also co-operated in creating a broad international support for the Afghan cause and provide material assistance to the Afghan resistance fighters. Though, the co-operation remained confined to the Afghan issue only and could not make solid impact on Pakistan-US security relationship. It did create a land of dependence on each other for implementation of Afghan policy. This dependence in return facilitated the establishment of a close security relationship between Pakistan and the United States under Reagan administration.
REFERENCES


23. The US Pakistan bilateral agreement was signed on March 5, 1959, an executive agreement, which unlike a treaty did not require approval by the Senate. The operative language in Articles committed the United States, in the case of aggression against Pakistan, to “take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon”, In case of communist aggression. The 1959 agreement did not commit the United States to come to Pakistan’s aid against an attack by India, the commitment that Pakistan really wanted.


26. It was referred to as the Symington amendment which barred aid to countries indulging in suspect nuclear activities.

28. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 18, 1980.


42. Ibid.


44. Ibid.

The victory of Republican Party in the Presidential election reflected the change from liberalism to conservatism in American foreign policy. The assumption of power by Ronald Reagan as President brought sea change in US-Pak relationship. The process started by the Carter administration to forge a closes security and strategic relations with Pakistan was given a distinct momentum by the new administration. The United States under Reagan was firm for close relationship with Islamabad as a key partner in South Asia in opposing the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The new administration decided that American response would not be half hearted boycott of sporting events and ineffective trade embargoes but whole hearted efforts to roll back the Soviets from South Asia, and full-scale support for Pakistan.¹

The Reagan administration believed that Carter's efforts to construct a new world order had adversely affected American interests and image around the world. A fresh appraisal of the world strategic realities and challenges convinced Reagan that the Soviet Union still constituted a primary and formidable threat to vital US interests and that the promotion of these interest was becoming increasingly difficult. In such a scenario Reagan
administration decided that countries in strategic location needed to be supported with military and economic assistance to stem possible attack against them by the Soviet Union.

In a reappraisal of US policy towards Pakistan, Reagan administration neglected Carter's arms restriction on Pakistan, issue of non-proliferation and human rights, which loomed large on US Pakistan relations during past years. Thus, Pakistan because of new permissive policy frame-work, emerged as a strategically 'Front line' state in South and West Asia.²

Thus, change of guard in America brought cheers and optimism in Islamabad. The renewed interest of US in Pakistan enhanced Pakistan's bargaining position vis-à-vis USA. By recognizing its potential role in American foreign policy Pakistan was able to manoeuvre successfully on Reagan's strong anti communism, to continue on its nuclear programme, increase its security vis-a-vis India, military and economic aid to cope with the refugees crisis, consolidate the regime in Islamabad and most significantly, secure its Western flank against potential Soviet Afghan encroachment³.

For Zia regime, the implications of the Reagan Presidency were vast. With the Reagan administration, Islamabad found consistent partner with which to pursue goals in South Asia. For Reagan, an opportunity to confront the Soviet and force them out of South Asia represented a chance to re-establish containment as
a doctrine and America's prestige as a force capable of initiating change in far corners of the world.\textsuperscript{4}

With the overthrow of Shah regime in Iran, the most important pillar of US strategy in the Gulf region had collapsed long before. Thus, Afghan crisis posed a great threat to the region. However, the United States had evidently recuperated sufficiently from the experience of the Vietnam war so that it was ready to try its hand once again at a major foreign policy objectives. This time America was determined to ensure that same mistakes and misperception were not committed. Here the administration found willing and capable allies in the Afghan resistance in Islamabad. US thought that since Pakistan had earlier been assigned this role in the 1950s and 60s it could again assume that role. Further the United States could pursue its foreign policy objectives, attempt to reestablished a measure of international prestige and confront the Soviet Union, without committing troops with the help of Pakistan and the Afghan resistance fighters. Hence, Washington found it self in a comfortable situation; it could engage in a major foreign campaign but still satisfy domestic isolationists. The Afghan crisis was an opportunity for the US to re-established much of what it had lost in the decade since Vietnam.

The coming of US-Pakistan as close friends resulted in substantial increase in the US arms and economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980s and a considerable strengthening of its defence
capabilities. Pakistan accepted revised aid package which was earlier rejected by Ziaul Haque as "Peanuts".

Thus, the US establishment started to lay down the basic work that would facilitate the eventual extension of substantial military and economic assistance to Pakistan. In the large strategic interest of USA, the Secretary of the State Alexander Haig urged the Congress to soften the ban on aid to Pakistan imposed under Symington Amendments Act, which prohibited US assistance to countries which pursued nuclear enrichment technology and refused to give assurance that they were not developing nuclear weapons. Jane A. Coon Deputy Secretary and South Asia specialist, said that American now realizes that imposition of a ban on aid had not really accomplished the anti proliferation objective of the US policy. The sanctions had only led to a growing sense of isolation and insecurity in Pakistan.

The acceptable solution of nuclear problem was the foremost issue between two countries, which had bedeviled relations during the Carter years, with Pakistan making evident that it would not compromise on its nuclear programme. Washington, in great need of Pakistan replied that the issue would not become the centre-place of US-Pakistan relationship. Moreover, it said that if Islamabad did not develop nuclear weapons it would have made easier for Reagan administration to establish close relationship
with Pakistan. This was a radical change in the US policy towards Pakistan, in effect a tacit understanding that America could live with Pakistan’s nuclear programme as long as Islamabad did not take the extreme decision of exploding a bomb.  

Another irritant in bilateral relations was Pakistan’s record of human rights and democracy. The Carter Administration had been critical of Pakistan on both of these. So Zia wanted to be sure that Reagan administration did not continue this type of interference in internal matters of Pakistan. General Arif told Haig, “we would not like to hear from you the type of government—we should have” In response, the Secretary of State said, “General, your internal situation is your problem”   

There was convergence of interest between US and Pakistan on the issue of covert aid to Afghan resistance fighters. Americans agreed, on maintaining the modus operandi, established during Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Reagan administration also accepted the Pakistan’s insistence that Central Intelligence Agency would serve only as a quarter master, to supply arms, equipment and munitions for the Mujahideen, whereas supply would be funneled through Pakistan’s inter Services Intelligence Directorate. It was further decided that CIA would train Pakistan’s intelligence agency in the use of weapons and equipment and ISI in turn would instruct the Afghan fighters. This was a great tactical move of Zia regime, as Pakistan did not want to lose its new found strategic
significance by giving free hand to CIA in dealing with mujahideen.

The Reagan administration’s understandably flexible and conciliatory approach towards Pakistan dissipated all the previous fears and suspicions in the minds of foreign policy maker in Islamabad. Now there was no issue of US ‘credibility’ and ‘reliability’. With this Pakistan give up long standing demand of security assistance to Pakistan under 1959 bilateral agreement. This was result of altered atmosphere ‘as Pakistan had already become strategically inevitable for America. So no need was felt to seek a security guarantee beyond a pledge made by Reagan administration against a communist attack. America-Pak strategic friendship now moved forward on a durable basis.

**The Aid Package**

The US military and economic assistance to Pakistan started when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted on May 14, 1981 by 10 vote to 7 to lift restriction on aid to Pakistan and approved the administration’s request for $100 million in Economic Support Fund for 1982 and $600,000 for the International Military Training and Education Programmes (IMET) for Pakistan.

Thus, the rapprochement which had resulted from the Soviet intervention assumed the tangible form of aid based relationship.
Pakistan officially accepted the US economic and military assistance in September 15, 1981. Initially the Reagan administration offered a five year $2.5 million package to Pakistan which was later raised to $3.2 million beginning with Financial year 1983*. The new package included inter alia an additional $500 million worth of commodity assistance**.

The policy of $3.2 billion was divided equally between economic assistance and foreign military sales credit guarantees of 1.6 billion. Each of the $1.6 billion economic aid component of the package, $1 billion was in the form of a grant the remaining $600 million had a 10 years grace period and 20 years repayment period at 2 percent interest respectively. The military sales component of $1.6 billion carried an interest rate of 14 percent with a repayment period of 30 years with 7-10 years grace period on the principal.10

The American aid package was designed in large measure to meet Pakistan's air defence need. A large proportion of the total military credit (some $1.1 billion) was to go for the acquisition of 40 F-16 aircraft. Pakistan made it clear that it regarded the F-16 transaction as a "test of American earnestness" and American political commitments. The high performance aircraft was considered by Pakistan as best suited to their defence requirement over the long haul.11
Since there was need to modernize ground and naval forces, America promised 100 M48A5 tanks, 35 m88 AI recovery vehicle, 20 M901. I-two vehicle (together with 1005 I-Two missiles) 64 M109 A2 self-propeled Howitzers, 75 M198 towed Howitzers and 10AH-15attack helicopters. Other items which were under discussion included tanks helicopters, A-10 close support aircraft, APC's surface to air missiles anti aircraft and new naval ordnance.

This agreement with Pakistan was logical and necessary response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Reagan urged the Congress to approve the five year economic and military aid package, in precaution. As in case of failure to respond to Pakistan's imminent need for external assistance at the critical time would "jeopardise important American Security interest".

Pakistan received massive military aid from USA during the Financial year-1984. In a fervent appeal to the Congress to keep the aid commitment to Pakistan at the agreed levels and not to make any cut the State Department officials said that the relation between the USA and Pakistan had been volatile and that it is crucial as we move to re-established our ties, that we do all we can to built trust and confidence in each other's reliability we need to alloy any lingering Pakistani doubt about the depth of our commitment to the revived relationship. He revealed that Pakistan has already made financial commitment to totaling $550 million in
1983 alone to be paid to American arms contractors for weapons purchase, and that any cuts in that would put them in difficulty.

Pakistan received $745 million from the Reagan administration during 1984 Financial year. Out of this aid $225 million was for economic assistance and remaining $520 million in military assistance. Besides, it was proposed to give $ 57.4 million by way of PL-480 assistance. In addition a budgetary provision of $800,000 had been made to train Pakistani military officers in USA.14

Pakistani establishment asked Reagan administration in December 1984 to be permitted to acquire the E-2C airbase early warning system, otherwise known as Hawkeye to guide its long range F16 attack bomber. By the middle of November 1984 25 F-16 aircrafts had been delivered to Pakistan. USA was apparently impressed with President Ziaul Haque’s plea for more sophisticated weapons systems and war system. But Islamabad received setback in 1985 when its endeavour of obtaining Hawkeye was turned down by Reagan administration on the recommendation made by a SP visiting Pentagon team to Islamabad. The team was of the view that the Hawkeye-E2 aircraft for early warning border surveillance was not suitable for Pakistan15.

Beside routine on going aid package Washington on various occasions provided substantive aid to Pakistan to keep it focused and prepared to fight against any misadventure of Soviet Union.
President Ronald Reagan in October 1985 had asked the Congress to approve a $106 million aid package to Pakistan which was supplementary to the ongoing $3.02 billion aid package and $50 million AIM 92 Side Vinder missile sale.16

In the meantime, when it became evident over the years that the Afghanistan issue would persist beyond the completion of the six-year aid programme in 1987, the two countries initiated negotiations to conclude a new aid package even before the expiry of the old one17. As result of these negotiations an aid deal of $4.02 billion was signed on March 24, 1986, a tremendous increase over the existing package, which further strengthened relations between Pakistan and United States. The package carried more relaxations on payment than the previous aid deal. It was more favourable to Pakistan because, it underlined Pakistan's penciled stand on the Afghan issue and steadfastness against pressure18.

The strategic and security relations between US-Pakistan entered new phase with purpose and resolve when Pakistani Prime Minister M.K. Junejo paid a visit to Washington in July 1986 to acknowledge the American aid package. President Reagan's message at that time reaffirmed the US *commitment to Pakistan's independence, security and territorial integrity. Washington and Islamabad expressed satisfaction over the successful conclusion of negotiation over six year period assistance package for 1987-1993.
President Reagan stressed that this unique multi-year programme provided tangible evidence of the durability and continuity of US commitment to strengthen Pakistan's defence capability in the face of Soviet pressure from Afghanistan. Reagan expressed his administration's admiration for Pakistan's courage in standing up to Soviet pressure through Afghanistan and for its selfless provision of humanitarian relief to the nearly three million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

During 1988 financial year Pakistan was proposed $670 million in economic aid and military sale package by Reagan administration, which was on increase of $12 million over its aid for financial year 1987. US administration proposed $666 million for financial year 1986 as aid for Pakistan but the Congress approved only $638 million, as in the house of Representative and Senate Committee, Democrats were in control. In the figure presented for the financial year 1988, Pakistan was to received $290-92 million in military assistance. The bulk of it was in the form of military sales credits and 386-95 million in economic aid. However, it was not made clear that how the military funds would be spent but an airborne early warning system, sophisticated tanks and additional F16 fighters were under consideration.

Nuclear Issue

The dilemmas the United States faced in its relations with Pakistan have been political and strategic, the nuclear issue was
by and large the most serious. The US-Pakistan strategic alliance suffered a serious set back on nuclear issue in August 1987. When on July 10 the US authorities arrested a Pakistani born Canadian citizen Arshad Parvaiz in Philadelphia on charge that he tried to export to Pakistan weapon grade uranium. Pakistan officials, however denied any link to the suspect in that case. Before this another Pakistani Mr Nazir Ahmad was arrested in Houston while trying to smuggle Krytone electronic switches, that can trigger a nuclear bomb.

The Reagan administration expressed serious concern over attempts at an illegal export of the goods which would have increased substantially Pakistan’s ability to manufacture a nuclear device, and said that Pakistan needed to take concrete steps to restore its credibility and further asked Islamabad to give assurance that it was not trying to develop a nuclear weapon.

In 1985 American Congress passed a law (Pressler Amendment) that prohibited US aid to nations that possessed nuclear device. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs sub Committee on Asia Stephan J. Solarz said that Pakistan appeared to have exhibited “a blatant disregard for American law if we do not enforce the law it will make mockery of our non-proliferation policy” Mr. Solarz Urged President Reagan to act and halt the aid to Pakistan.
In a surprise move US authorities took serious turn over Pakistan’s nuclear programme when it stalled all its aid to Pakistan till January 15, 1988 in the wake of latter’s attempts to smuggle out nuclear weapons oriented materials and its refusal to allow the inspection of its Kahuta nuclear plant. The two aid programmes which had been put off were the $540 million military and economic aid and the renewed $ 4.02 billion aid which was to commence from October 1, 1987, this was the first concrete action against Pakistan since 1979.

Thus, despite certain strong evidence available to Washington that Pakistan was involved in a clandestine weapon oriented nuclear programmes, the Reagan administration accepted Islamabad’s argument that it was not going nuclear. The US Congress on the desire of Reagan administration cleared the $ 4.02 billion military and economic aid package for Pakistan. With the approval of both Houses the aid to Pakistan resumed for the next six years.

The Reagan administration continued to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device in order to satisfy the Congressional requirement for release of aid. The most repeated and persuasive justification which the US government offered for aid to Pakistan was the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The aid programme was defended as a part of an overall American policy of
making available efficient and comparatively low cost aid programmes to friendly countries in order to help them make better use of their scarce resources and meet security threats within or on their borders.

Strengthening of Pakistan was viewed as the key to its ability to maintain its integrity and stand against potential external threats. The most immediate and potential external threat Pakistan then faced was the Soviet threat from Afghanistan. It was argued that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was in large part prompted by its sense of insecurity, further aggravated by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan US aid was expected to reduce the sense of insecurity, and consequently the chance of Pakistan going nuclear. The Reagan administration repeatedly cautioned Congress that any restriction on aid to Pakistan to curb its nuclear programme would be self defeating.

It was in US national interest to ensure sustained support to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan so that they could survive the Soviet might and put up a struggle against the Soviet forces. Consequently prompting Moscow to withdraw as a part of negotiated settlement. Termination of aid to Pakistan, the Reagan administration forcefully argued, would have seriously undermined the Afghan resistance forces and would have damaged US strategic interest in the area.
With the clearance of $ 4.02 billion US military and economic aid package in October 1988 for the next six years, Pakistan proceeded with its plan to buy 100 more F-16 aircraft. What was significant in this deal was that the new rates quoted for each F-16 at $ 10.5 million which was much lower than the $ 25 million a piece Pakistan paid for the 40 F-16 purchased under the first military economic aid package of $ 3.20 billion which ended in September 1987. Till January 1988 out of the 40 F-16 aircraft that were to be supplied to Pakistan during the first aid package period, so far 35 F-16 aircraft were reported to have arrived.

The United States Congress approved $ 445 million military and economic aid to Pakistan for the financial year 1989. A greater share of the aid of $ 230 million was allocated for military supplies which the balance of $ 215 million was in economic assistance. In the financial year 1988 Pakistan was given $ 480 million of which $ 260 million was in military supplies. The reduction in the aid for 1989 was the result of US budgetary constraint which had affected all the recipient countries.\(^23\)

Recognizing the Reagan administration's zeal to fight communism and desire to re-establish its prestige, Pakistan found an opportunity to maximize its own status and act as a broker in the Afghan crisis. It was successful enough in this effort that it was able to play a leading role in negotiating a settlement.\(^24\)
Geneva Peace Negotiations

Pakistan joined the Geneva negotiation held under the UN auspices to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict, despite certain reservations of the US administration and Congress. The US authorities were skeptical about the chances of achieving a settlement at Geneva for they believed that the Soviet side was not serious in negotiation. However, the American administration publicly extended full support to Pakistan's viewpoint. This support enabled Pakistan to negotiate a political solution to the crisis from strength and with confidence. This support also served a diplomatic purpose. Any opposition from Washington in this context could have propaganda advantage to Soviet Union. The Reagan administration affirmed US support to a political settlement which would lead to restoration of genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan with a government acceptable to the Afghan people. American officials of and on supported international efforts for a peaceful settlement as long as these efforts were consistent with the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

Pakistan and the United States maintained regular consultations with each other on Afghanistan issue including the UN sponsored negotiation. They proceeded in co-ordination with each other and the cooperation was so close that many Pakistanis
dubbed Islamabad’s Afghan policy as hostage to the American aspirations. It was argued that the negotiation, settlement to the Afghan conflict to the Geneva talks was not possible unless Pakistan removed its “American connection”\(^28\). This argument was seemingly predicted on the perception that the United States would not seek settlement of the Afghan issue in isolation from other global issues.

The extent of American influence on Pakistan’s Afghan policy, in general, and American role in influencing the Geneva negotiations, in particular, is difficult to determine for various reasons. However, one can safely say that Washington’s support to Pakistan was a significant factor which enabled it to resist Soviet-Afghan pressure and participate in the negotiation with confidence. The then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, acknowledged that US support to his country for its efforts to find a political settlement to the Afghan issue was a source of strength\(^29\).

The smooth course of Pakistan-US close cooperation and coordination on the Afghanistan issue came under serious strain on the question of formation of an interim government prior to the signing of the Geneva accords. During the last round of Geneva negotiations, Pakistan refused to sign the accords unless there was a prior agreement on interim arrangement in Kabul. This
standpoint evoked a very discouraging response from the US administration and several Congressmen. Both the countries looked at the question from such conflicting perspective that it tended to erode the mutual cooperation of the Afghan issue. The difference were so serious and importance of the issue of the interim government was so great for Pakistan that prior to putting signature on the Geneva agreement the Pakistani authorities publicly expressed frustration over American attitude and exhibited a sense of betrayal at the hands of the United States.

Pakistan complained that the United States was not fully endorsing its proposal of the interim government. President Zia was on record saying that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev delinked the issue of a coalition government from the withdrawal only a day after his meeting with President Reagan in December 1987 and that this was a result of a deal between superpowers which sullied the reputation of his country. It was widely speculated that the United States had struck a separate deal with the Soviet Union over the interest of Pakistan and the Afghan resistance.

Pakistan's insistence on the formation of an interim government emanated from its concern with the presence of three million Afghan refugees on its soil. It was apprehended that if the Afghan war continued even after the agreement and the
consequent Soviet withdrawal, the refugees would not go back to their homeland and Pakistan would continue to shoulder their burden. It was clear that the Geneva agreement would not bring an end to the war in Afghanistan. What Pakistan wanted was not only an appropriate but an effective solution which could ensure the return of the refugees to their motherland.

Not only the Zia government but certain hawkish elements in Washington were also opposed to signing of the Geneva agreement without installing an interim government in Kabul. However, the US authorities were opposed to linking the formation of the interim government to the Geneva agreement. At the time when the issue of the interim government was high on Pakistan's agenda, one senior US official stated that there "is no interest of Washington in trying to promote or construct an interim government in Kabul". Another American official opined that the United States did not support Pakistan in making the formation of the interim government in Afghanistan a pre-condition of the Soviet withdrawal. For the US, Soviet withdrawal was the issue. Washington feared that any effort to set an interim government was likely to cause further delay in the agreement and consequently in the withdrawal. The United States also opposed the idea because the popular view in Washington was that the Najib government would collapse once the Soviet forces left
Afghanistan. Pakistan's insistence on the formation of the interim
government, therefore, seemed unnecessary.

An understanding between the superpowers on the broad
countours of the settlement could also account for US opposition to
the Pakistani proposal. In private the US government reportedly
put pressure on Pakistan to delink the formation of the interim
government from the Geneva accords. This is not to suggest that
the United States was altogether indifferent to Pakistan's concerns.
At time, US officials publicly appreciated the proposal as a good
idea and sought to assure their Pakistani counterparts that the
United States was not averse to the idea of an interim government
as was proposed by Pakistan. The US administration discussed it
with the Soviet authorities. As a result, both the superpowers
agreed that Diego Cordovez would provide his good offices in his
personal capacity in promoting an agreement between mutually
antagonistic Afghan parties on a broad-based government. After
American assurance that negotiations would continue towards this
goal, Pakistan signed the Geneva accords on April 14, 1988. It was
pledged that the parties to the Geneva accords would support and
facilitate this process. These assurance provided Pakistan a way
out from an isolated position in the Geneva talks.

The above analysis suggests that apparently differing
perspective on the question of the interim government did not
cause a crack in Pakistan-US relationship. But differences forced the Pakistan government to modify the position on the question of interim government. Even during this period of serious differences, Pakistan and United States maintained a regular and close dialogue and officially expressed a unity of views regarding the Afghan issue. At one stage, when both the superpowers were locked over the symmetry issue, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to pull out its troops without US guarantees. This was interpreted in Islamabad and Washington as a Soviet ploy to induce Pakistan to sign the agreement, and oust the United States from the whole process. Pakistan declined the proposal, and suggested that both the superpowers should agree on the symmetry issue. This analysis is not meant to determine whose interests were protected at what cost, rather to suggest that through different stages Pakistan and the United States managed to amicably resolve their differences on the Afghan issue and successfully worked together towards the conclusion of the Geneva agreement and the consequent Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

**Post-Geneva Accords Phase**

The Geneva Accords in April 1988 and the subsequent Soviet pullout in February 1989 were the obvious result of the successful Pakistan-US collaboration against the Soviet Union on the Afghan
issue. According to one viewpoint, popular among Pakistani analysts, the Zia ul Haque regime's confrontational posture towards the Soviet intervention did not correspond to the national interests of the Pakistan, rather it was designated and pursued to suit American interests and requirements. Until shortly after the Benazir government assumed power in December 1988, there had been a hope that any democratic government succeeding the Zia regime through a genuine electoral process would question and change the basic premises, assumptions and the framework of Pakistan's Afghan policy. Hence, a genuine political process was likely to disturb Pakistan-US cooperation on the Afghan issue. A political process tending to complicate the process of Pakistan-US collaboration on the Afghan situation was certain to strain bilateral relations. It was widely believed that American interest in Pakistan would wane and its aid programme would not outlive the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Contrary to this pessimistic projection American as well as Pakistani officials sounded positive about Pakistan-US relations in the post-Afghanistan era. Before and after the conclusion of the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal, US officials continued to underscore that Pakistan would not become irrelevant to the United States in the post-Afghanistan era. They claimed that while the Afghan issue was an important factor the rapport between countries went beyond this issue. Pakistan was assured that it
would continue to receive a high level of aid even after the Soviet withdrawal. During his Presidential campaign, George Bush pledged that he would preserve and further strengthen Pakistan-US relations. He retained his commitment to Pakistan in these words: "Long after the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan, the US-Pakistan partnership will endure an important bilateral and regional association." The then Pakistan Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo expressed similar sentiments at the conclusion of the Geneva agreements. Pakistan and United States, he hoped, would remain steadfast in support of the Afghan nation's right to a government of their choice. He visualized that the effectiveness and success of co-operation between the two countries would strengthen the government and people of Pakistan in their resolve to further fortify their partnership with the United States for peace and stability in the region. Even after the dismissal of the Junejo government, Islamabad expressed hope for a continued aid relationship with the United States in the post-Afghan period.

Benazir government did not exhibit any immediate indication to reorient Pakistan's Afghan policy and disturb the existing relationship with the United States. If anything, there was a hint of further improvement in Pakistan-US relations. Reaffirming her election pledge to continue to assist Washington, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto urged the Americans to continue to support Pakistan. Despite the fact that she vehemently criticized the former military regime and its legacies and did not entirely agree with Pakistan's Afghan policy, she lauded Pakistan-US collaboration of the recent past, appreciated the goodwill nurtured in the two countries in their joint collaboration in support of the freedom of Afghanistan and did not upset or modify policy on the Afghan issue. Contrary to fear expressed by some, Ms. Bhutto assured the Bush administration of her determination to support the Afghans resistance and also urged Washington not to abandon the Afghans in the critical post Soviet withdrawal period.

Instead of falling apart as was speculated, Pakistan and the United States moved closer in their approaches towards the Afghan issue. Though Benazir pursued more or less the Afghan policy of the previous governments, including the emphasis on the military dimension, she gave the impression that her government was all out for a political solution of the Afghan issue. The political settlement which she envisaged contained the removal of the Najib
regime as an essential element.\textsuperscript{48} During her visit to Washington in June 1989, she exchanged views with the Bush administration on the prospects of a political solution. The Bush administration supported the idea of the political settlement that would lead to the establishment of a non-aligned representative government replacing the "illegitimate" Najib regime.\textsuperscript{49} The visit revealed the unanimity of views between the two governments on the question of resolving the Afghan settlement.\textsuperscript{51}

The Reagan administration in view of all these new developments in Pakistan and outside proposed a large amount of $626.7 million military, economic aid to Pakistan for 1990. This included $50 million of development assistance, $80 million of PL-480, $20 million of Economic Support Fund (ESF), $240 million of foreign military sales grant, $1 million IMET programmes as well as $5.7 million for antinarcotics. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on Asia and Pacific, Mr. Haward Schaffer, the US deputy Secretary for the Near East and South Asia said that "Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan remained vital for achieving our goals of a non-aligned, independent and stable Afghanistan and to our broad goals in South and South West Asia. For these reasons we must continue to honour our commitment to support Pakistan's security and economic needs."\textsuperscript{52}
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5. Ibid.


12. *Ibid*


22. Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of state for Near East and South Asian Affairs testimony to Joint committee of two House Sub-committee on July 22, 1987 in which he expressed the relationship between US aid to Pakistan, strategic considerations and the need to be forgiving regarding Pakistan's nuclear program.


33. Shahi, Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy, p.134.


38. Shahi, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, p. 91.


42. The Muslim, May 19, 1984: The Muslim, April 22, 1985.


50. Ibid.

CHAPTER – IV

ESTRANGED FRIENDS:
THE BUSH YEARS AND CLINTON’S FIRST TERM

The Bush administration did not bring any substantial change in US–Pakistan strategic partnership. Initially, like Reagan administration, the new administration continued in awarding precedence to Pakistan for its geo-strategic location and vital role it played in withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Bush administration also recognized the pressure that Pakistan was facing because of presence of millions of Afghan refugees on its territory. He declared that military support to the Afghan resistance would continue as would non military assistance for increasing urgent humanitarian needs.

In February 1989, barely a month after coming to office the Bush administration requested to Congress for $ 1.2 billion in foreign assistance for South Asia for 1990 Financial Year. Out of this amount $ 782 million was for economic assistance and remaining $ 242 million was for military assistance, with major portion going to Pakistan. Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs in February, 1989, noted that even after the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan remained vital to achieving American goals in Afghanistan and broad objectives in South Asia.\textsuperscript{1}

However, the international scenario was swiftly changing with far-reaching implications. The ‘Cold War’ was winding up, one after another the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe were shedding their communist rulers. The ‘Iron curtain’ was crumbling, US-Soviet conflict in ‘Third World’ in general and Afghanistan in particular was rapidly moving towards settlement favourable to United States. Further, unification of Germany brought a rapid succession of events that led to an era of unprecedented Soviet-American rapprochement. All these events were fundamentally altering the global balance of power.\textsuperscript{2}

In the changing world the United States not only abandoned its Cold War strategies but after the departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan its perspective towards Pakistan changed radically. The US and other Western Allies backed out of post war reconstruction of Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan no longer enjoyed the strategic exclusiveness that it had enjoyed during the last decade, since the disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of Central Asian states opened up new avenues for the US, Pakistan was left on its own to face and solve the post Afghan civil war problems. Thus, in less than a decade Pakistan’s dream of acquiring a ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan was to end in nightmare.
Consequently the relations with one time “most allied Ally” reached at lowest ebb.³

Meantime the development in the Persian Gulf, in the form of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 re-opened the US stakes and strategic interest in Middle East and South West Asia. For Islamabad this was an opportunity to develop close military and economic alliance with Washington in post Afghan crisis period, although Pakistan provided logistic support to US led allies in the Gulf War, the Pakistan ambition of playing a major role in the Gulf crisis as an American Ally as well as in capacity as an Islamic country was foiled when President George Bush sent an aid cut massage in 1990.⁴

Relations between two countries further deteriorated when Pakistan witnessed political upheal on August 6, 1990. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in one stroke dismissed the elected government of Benazir Bhutto and announced dates for holding national election on October 24, 1990. US Congress took keen interest in political turmoil of Pakistan when it sent a message to the caretaker government in Islamabad demanding among other things “a free and fair election” and warning that election would be test of US- Pakistan relations to continue smoothly in future. A somewhat similar stand was taken by the US State Department as well.⁵
As the Gulf War intensified along with it the pro-Saddam and anti-American sentiments were aroused in Pakistan. Moreover, the statement made by President Ishaq Khan did irreparable damage to the already shaky relations, when he remarked that the integrity and solidarity of all the Muslim countries is an article of faith with Pakistan and its heart bleeds at the spilling of Muslim blood anywhere. With this tough posture Pakistan lost all hopes of receiving American assistance. Once the Gulf War ended with the tremendous American victory the US which led the coalition war efforts against Iraq successfully emerged as the undisputed leader of the world in political and strategic matters. The tone of American foreign policy in the post Gulf War, in fact began to smack of Superpower arrogance in the absence of a countervailing power, a role that the Soviet Union used to play earlier.

Thus, through the Gulf War the US attempted to create a “New World order”. Now Washington assumed the role of world policeman to subordinate Europe to the US power and intimidate the Third World into submission. In a sense it was an attempt to regain the position of global supremacy held by the United States at the end of the Second World War. The Gulf War in its broadest contours was an attempt by the US to define a new military-centered global order.6
Infact, by this time US Pakistan strategic relations had already got into rough weather. President Bush did not issue the annual certification to the US Congress giving a clearance to Pakistan that it did not possess a nuclear device, nor requested the Congress for waiver of the Pressler Amendment. More over, the emerging pattern of relations between the India and the United States and increasing American pressure on Pakistan nuclear programme made it clear that the United States would re-orient its strategy in South Asia and signalled that the strategic significance of Pakistan had considerably declined in American calculations. With this US-Pakistan strategic relations completed a full circle, which had started with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.7

Pressler Amendment

The nuclear issue had placed unusual strain on relations between the United States and Pakistan, after years of growing ties following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan's nuclear programme had been an issue of contention throughout. In the past Pakistani officials had given assurance that they are not developing an atomic weapon, and the Reagan Administration had consistently waived the aid restriction. However, once again, in a surprise move the US Administration on October 1, 1990 decided to suspend all military and economic aid to Pakistan, worth between $ 564 million and $ 578 million in 1991, following
renewed fear that Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon. The decision was the result of the failure on the part of President Bush to certify that Pakistan's nuclear programme was designed exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Under the 1985 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistant Act, it was made clear that "no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of the Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance was to be furnished or military equipment or technology was to be sold or transferred that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device." On October 9, 1990 the US Secretary of State, James Baker informed Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan that future aid would be impossible unless convincing new evidence was provided that no "nuclear device" existed.

Undoubtedly the US has stringent laws to bar aid to countries suspected to be engaged in a nuclear weapons programme, but they have always been subordinated to its strategic interest. The US administration had been aware since the autumn of 1986 that Pakistan was producing weapons grade uranium at Kahuta. The Washington Post, reported that Pakistan had detonated a high explosive device between September 18 and
Moreover, Mr. Reagan in 1988 and Mr. Bush in 1989 personally declared that evidence about Islamabad continuing pursuit of weapon was making it difficult to give the certificate that the President is required to provide annually that Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive device". During 1989, voices were being raised in the Congress, notably by Mr. Stephen Solarz and Mr. John Glenn, that Pakistan must make fresh promises of good behaviour to qualify for a certificate. The Washington Post had meanwhile, editorially called for a termination of aid "clearly and without regret". But there were many who had been lobbying Congress for continuance of aid under a temporary waiver to give time to the regime that took office in Islamabad after the October 24, election to respond to US concern.

The certificate was given in 1988 on November 18, two days after the conclusion of Pakistan's general election of that year. Possibly by doing so, President Bush wanted to claim to be champion of Pakistani democracy, that he was using the leverage of the certificate for a good purpose. In fact the US administration in the past had used several excuses to get over the US Laws which specifically prohibit aid to countries which possess or are trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Till the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan it was argued successfully that continued aid to Pakistan was necessary to buy its support for Afghan rebels. However, that excuse no longer existed after the Soviet withdrawal.
And when Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister, US officials gave another excuse that it was necessary to continue the aid to support democracy in Pakistan. The sale of F-16s at Mrs. Benazir Bhutto’s request was said to be as much for helping her to consolidate a democratic order as for meeting the country’s “legitimate” security needs.

Mrs. Benazir Bhutto after becoming the Prime Minister assured the Congress and the White House that we do not possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. But in the subsequent months the CIA had gathered sufficient evidence indicating that Pakistan was still working on the bomb. There had been reports that Pakistan had been modifying its (US) supplied F-16 Jet so that they could carry nuclear weapons. In September 1990 some fresh evidence of Pakistan’s suspected procurement efforts came into light. It was reported that in early 1990 Pakistan made several clandestine efforts to buy high-temperature furnaces from Consarc Crop. of New Jersey. The furnaces were capable of producing metals for nuclear weapons system. Consequently US military and other aid to Pakistan was suspended in October 1990.

Thus, for more than a decade, the US officials found reasons to look the other way while Pakistan moved steadily closer to becoming a nuclear power. That was particularly true during the war in Afghanistan, when Pakistan served as a key staging area for supplying anti-Soviet guerillas with American made weapons. But
now that the Cold War apparently was over, Washington was no longer willing to turn a blind eye. Washington may now have felt that it no longer needed to worry so much about staying on good relations with Pakistan. The end of Cold War, in fact, had made it more difficult for Third World countries to play Moscow and Washington against each other. Moreover, the Gulf crisis of 1991 had taught Washington the danger of looking the other way while countries such as Iraq developed chemical warfare programmes or nuclear capabilities.

The imposition of Pressler Sanction since October 1990, was a heavy blow on the Pakistan’s defence establishment. The US stopped with immediate effect the delivery of 28, F-16 fighter aircrafts and other military equipments for which Pakistan had already paid $ 1.4 billion. Further with October 1, 1990 the $ 564 million economic and military aid programmes approved for fiscal year 1991 was frozen. Nonetheless, in view of the delay over the implementation of the Pressler Amendment Pakistan received an estimated $ 3.3 billion American aid during 1985-1990 of which over $ 2 billion was in the form of military aid.12

Pressler Sanction had less immediate impact on economic development since the amendment stopped only new assistance commitments. Aid was able to continue to implement programmes that were already under way and to disburse funds from roughly $ 1 billion still in the pipeline. Nevertheless, the sanction had
considerable negative effect on projects run by the US assistance. These projects were related to agricultural and rural development, engineering, health, population, nutrition, human resource development.\textsuperscript{13}

The adoption of the Pressler Amendment was considered by Pakistan as another betrayal and its old fear revisited that as long as Pakistan served America's strategic interest the latter deliberately ignored every things but as soon as its objectives were accomplished it deserted Pakistan in oblivion. That is what happened after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and consequently disintegration of Soviet Union changed the US perception towards Pakistan.

The reaction in Islamabad to the imposition of sanction was one of disbelief, shock and anger because of its discriminatory nature. The sanction was country specific leaving-India untouched who had conducted nuclear test way back in 1974. Moreover, Pressler Sanction was too severe and unlike earlier sanctions\textsuperscript{14} or embargoes it was longer one. Although the Bush administration said that apparent reason why the amendment covered only Pakistan and none else was that Islamabad was the recipient of billions of dollars in name of military and economic assistance. The press in Pakistan also critically denounced the US action as unfair, anti-Islamic and discriminatory. They charged that the United States had once more proved to be a "fickle friend". A Pakistani
observer commented acidly, "with the Afghan war over, the United States no longer needs Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex". General Aslam Beg expressed a view that most Pakistani agreed that with the Afghan war over the United States no longer needed to look the other way on the nuclear issue and it let the Pressler axe fall.15

**Pakistan's Efforts Against Pressler Sanction**

As the Pressler Sanction began to bite, Pakistan tried desperately to wriggle out of its implications and repercussions on its economy. First such move was made in June 1991 when the Chairman of Pakistan Senate, Wassem Sajjad visited Washington with Nawaz Sahrif's ambitious diplomatic initiative, calling for a five power conference to consider a ban on nuclear weapons in South Asia. The proposed countries were the United States, Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan. Washington showed interest in the idea, however, due to India's reluctance, the proposal remained moot. Thus, he utilized his visit to impress upon the American policy makers about Pakistan's interest in non-proliferation and the Indian intransigent attitude.

Although Sajjad could not convince the US Congressmen regarding resumption of the US aid, nonetheless he did not return empty hands. As a result of his intensive discussion and persistent lobbying with the US officials, the Bush administration finally
agreed to supply some military spare parts and equipments to Pakistan on commercial basis by providing a self serving interpretation of the Pressler Amendment. Moreover, on October 6, 1992 the US Congress approved an amendment providing a "minor break" for Pakistan in terms of renewed US assistance through waivers on two items for the Pressler Sanctions. The Congressional waivers, as part of the 1993 Foreign Aid Bill, were applicable to "assistance to non governmental organization and under Public Law – 480".

The strategic significance of the Congress move gets reflected in the fact that the amendment containing the waiver also stipulated a provision that requires an annual report from the US President on the State of the nuclear and the ballistic programmes of Pakistan India and China. This provision pleased the policy makers in Islamabad. It was regarded as an achievement of the Pakistan lobby which was apparently making efforts to reduce the excessive focus of the US policy making on Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

This waiver was a clear indication that Washington would take gradual step in time to come to normalize the relations with Pakistan which had been strained since October, 1990 in the wake of suspension of the US military and economic aid to Pakistan. There seemed to be growing realization in the United States that
Pakistan had already suffered for quite sometime and that normalcy in the relations between the two countries had to be restored before they were seriously ruptured. In September 1992, the then US Ambassador to Pakistan John C. Manjo had made it already clear that “while we hope new economic and security assistance to Pakistan suspended under Pressler Amendment can be resumed. We will not compromise our non-proliferation principles to do so.”¹⁸ This statement was significant in context of US Pakistan relations. The first part of Manjo’s statement is perhaps more important and carries the real message than the second part which was often repeated. It was also known that rules, regulations and amendments are suitably changed or appropriately interpreted when any compromise over principles or national interest becomes necessary. The same was done during the prolonged Afghan crisis.

The non-proliferation issue was not the only serious impediment in the US-Pak strategic relations. Problem of terrorism in Kashmir was at the top of Bush administration’s priorities. US expressed serious concern over the covert help by Pakistan for Kashmir insurgency which was destabilizing the peace and security of the region. Under Secretary of State for political affairs Arnold Kanter warned that if Pakistan continued its help for the Kashmir insurgents “it ran the risk of being declared a country officially supporting terrorism”¹⁹ His comments were based on
credible intelligence reports that the ISI was continuing to provide direct assistance to the anti India insurgents through training and infiltrating them across the line of control.

In the mean time, the war in Afghanistan was dragging on with no near end in sight and due to infighting among Mujahideens along ethnic lines, Najibullah government could not be ousted. In September 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed that they would both stop the supply of military equipments to Afghanistan. With this the US-Soviet Cold War confrontation came to an end. Now Afghanistan became a second or third tier foreign policy issue. As one top State Department official told then Pakistan country Director John Holzman “Afghanistan is no longer on our radar screen”.

The subsequent events of disintegration of the Soviet Union had great repercussions in store. On one side it radically reshaped the regions geo-political landscape. On the other hand Afghanistan gained importance as a potentially important corridor for trade and other links with newly independent Central Asian countries.

However, the sudden demise of the Soviet Union undermined the Najibullah regime. The government collapsed in April 1992, after the infighting within the government. Najibullah’s fall did not usher in era of peace instead it began a new phase of what would
become an Afghan civil war in which rival factions battled each other.

Thus withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and subsequent change in the US-Pak relations did not mean that Afghan factor will not influence future course of US-policy towards Pakistan rather it loomed large in the wake of continued civil war for Kabul among ethnic groups.

Bush administration thus could not cement US-Pakistan strategic relations which was created against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bilateral differences were all too apparent during Bush administration. Pakistan had not only lost strategic importance but had become a nuclear trouble maker and a source of regional instability for US policy makers. Islamabad perceived the imposition of sanction as the change in US perspective and more a evidence that the United States was 'fickle', 'unreliable' and not a friend in need of Pakistan.

In the mean while, there was change in administration in Washington. The incoming Bill Clinton administration brought no substantial change in US policy towards Pakistan. The new President's re-emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, democracy and cross border terrorism did not helped in improving relations with Pakistan. Thus, the Clinton administration tookup from where George Bush had left.
Pakistan in its quest of improved relations with Clinton administration sent foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan to Washington in August 1993, to wriggle out of the US pressure and to strive for resumption of the US aid. He succeeded in convincing National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's for further dialogue to tackle the problems created by the implementation of the Pressler Amendment. The Foreign Secretary, Warren Christopher underscored the "Vital role" that the United States could play in resolving the Kashmir question. These statements were regarded in Pakistan as an important development towards normalizing hitherto strained relations between the two countries. While assessing his visit Shahryar Khan himself claimed that he sensed a "breath of fresh air" from the Clinton administration in addressing both bilateral and regional issue. The Pakistan's Foreign Office was reportedly pleased over the outcome of the wide ranging bilateral talks between the US and Pakistan, which in its understanding, would develop a "new more mature and durable relationship" between the two countries.

Less than a month after Khan's visit to Washington, The US Senate sent to President Bill Clinton for signature a bill that would exempt Islamabad from the operation of the Pressler Amendment for some specific purposes. The Bill authorized the sale of wheat and soyabeen worth $ 40 million to Pakistan. Other items that were exempted from the Pressler Law were funds for non-
governmental organizations working for population planning, child welfare and adult literacy programmes. In fact, these exemptions were already working in the outgoing fiscal year as well. It was in August 1992, when Washington sent a friendly feeler to Islamabad administration over the US aid cut issue by conveying the US Department of Agriculture’s decision to increase by $50 million credit guarantee available to US exporters for the sale of wheat to Pakistan.22

The US policy makers had found other ways to redress Pakistan’s grievances. While refraining from giving any official military and economic assistance to Islamabad, the US State Department had authorized the commercial sales of military spare parts to Pakistan and had not discouraged US private businessmen from other countries as well as multilateral funding institutions from dealing with the country.

Shahryar Khan’s visit to Washington was coincided with the new US sanctions (August 1993)23 against a few Chinese companies and Pakistan on the issue of transfer of M-II missile technology to Pakistan. It was only an addition to the existing irritants between the two countries. However, it was common knowledge that the later sanction under Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would not affect Pakistan. Nation, a leading Pakistani daily had rightly commented that the US
sanctions will hardly make any material difference to Pakistan, the real rub will be on the political level where despite the best efforts by Islamabad, relations between Pakistan and its erstwhile patron will further deteriorate. Responding to the sanction, the then Pakistan Prime Minister, Moeen Qureshi, in a statement in Islamabad on August 26, 1993 said, “The Missiles that Pakistan received over a year ago are well within the parameter of MTCR. China, which agreed to supply a small number of Missiles to meet our legitimate self-defence requirement, told the US that the short range tactical missile it supplied to Pakistan did not exceed the MTCR criteria. We ourselves have given the same assurance to the USA”.24

Generally, the Pakistani reaction to imposition of the US sanction over the M-11 missile issue was at very low-key. First, because it had no practical effect on Pakistan and secondly, it was imposed only after the real transfer of the missile technology took place.

The whole issue of missile transfer to Pakistan from China brought the USA in the unenviable position of being subjected to pressures by three nations. Pakistan by deploying its M-11 missile could jeopardize the US-China relations. India by deploying the Prithvi could trigger off such a reaction on the part of Pakistan.25 China which was already annoyed with the US on the issue of the
Taiwanese President, Lee Teng Hui's visit to the US and the lifting of certain curbs on high technology transfer to Taiwan, could well supply more missiles to Pakistan. In other words, the MTCR which was touted as a great US initiative in curbing missile proliferation was now causing it headaches.  

Discussion Draft

Only a few months after Shahryar Khan's visit to Washington, the State Department sent a 130-page bill labeled "discussion draft" of a new foreign Assistance Act to key members of the US Congress. This draft adopted new approaches to foreign aid with a view to best utilizing the US money to serve the nation's interests. Interestingly, this new approach included removal of the country specific language of the Pressler Amendment. In the past, Presidents of both Republican and the Democratic parties had complained that the Congress had attached rather too many conditions to foreign aid. The rationale behind the "discussion draft" was that the President needed to have greater flexibility in the matter of providing assistance to foreign countries and since the Pressler Amendment, unlike other similar legal measure, did not have any similar provision of waiver, it needed to be done away with.  

While there was widespread agreement that the time for restructuring the US aid programmes had come and the six
objectives of the aid programmes outlined in the "discussion draft" such as "promoting sustainable development", "promoting democracy", "promoting peace", "providing humanitarian assistance", "promoting growth through trade and investment" and "advancing diplomacy" were acceptable. The efforts to do get away with the Pressler Amendment met with severe opposition in the Congress. The Clinton administration, in the face of Congressional opposition and the adverse reaction in the Indian Subcontinent, decided to drop the idea at least for the time being, removing the Pressler Amendment from the Foreign Assistance Act. Nonetheless, these development in the USA provided a sense of relief to the Pakistanis as their case was being advocated by some Americans themselves.

It is interesting to note that the Pakistani leadership felt that they would not prevail over their patron on resumption of economic and military aid, they tactfully tried to link up the issue of nuclear-non-proliferation and the problem of Kashmir together. Pakistani officials reportedly conveyed their American counterparts that both regional peace and the future of nuclear proliferation depend on a settlement of the Kashmir issue between Indian and Pakistan. Pak Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi during his private visit to Washington had stated that: “There was a linkage between Kashmir and non-proliferation and that the lasting solution of the proliferation issue rested in the resolution of the Kashmir
problem." Muslim, a leading Pakistani news paper argued that "as long as contentious issue between India and Pakistan-notably Kashmir issue remains unaddressed and continues to spite fire there will always be incentive for arms built-up, including proliferation of nuclear weapons... If the political cause of proliferation, notably the Kashmir problem are removed in accordance with UN resolutions, there will be no nuclear weapons".30

We are still left with the question, why did Pakistan unveil its nuclear capability in connection with the Kashmir issue, and why the Pakistani politicians link the bomb and Kashmir? While answering these questions Prof. Stephen P. Cohen quoted some Pakistanis as saying their nuclear capability would provide the umbrella under which Pakistan could re-open the Kashmir issue.31 Another reason behind this Pak ploy could be diversionary tactics to withstand the tremendous US pressure on the proliferation issue.

The US administration made unsuccessful attempt in 1994 to seek a one – time exception to the Pressler Amendment to deliver F-16 aircrafts and to resume suspended military and economic assistance aid to Pakistan. Thanks to Larry Pressler and his colleague Senators, who succeeded in aborting the administrations effort to scarp the Pressler Amendment through a new Foreign Assistance Act. There was in fact a growing sense in
Washington that the Pressler Amendment had outlived its utility as a diplomatic lever. There were many in the American foreign policy establishment who had accepted the Pakistani argument that the Pressler Amendment punishes Pakistan unfairly without including India to change its behaviour on nuclear non-proliferation. In the last five years Pakistan attempted, though without success, to coax the US Congress on to either extending the Pressler Amendment to India or to dropping it altogether.

Over the years there has been sustained interaction between the USA and Pakistan to end the nuclear dispute. Two factors might have worked to facilitate a nuclear modus Vivendi between the USA and Pakistan. One was the new positive attitude in Washington to put its relationship with Islamabad back on track. The other was the formerly declared position of Pakistan since February 1992 that it had ultimately frozen its nuclear programmes. Given these position it was not impossible for the US and Pakistan to find common ground, that would allow them to return to the nuclear status quo ante and renewal of the US military and economic assistance to Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the Clinton administration in 1994 had insisted on three conditions for lifting the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan firstly, to end the production of weapons grade Uranium; secondly, to stop the manufacture of additional nuclear weapons cores; and finally, to melt the existing nuclear cores. Michael Mc
Curry, the US administration spokesman said on October 6, 1994 that: "we have offered Pakistan the opportunity to work with us to achieve our non-proliferation goals, which could lead to a waiver of the sanction that we have imposed on the Pakistani entity".32

Perhaps the most questionable aspect of this new US proposal was that, notwithstanding the failure that necessitated the 1990 application of the Pressler Amendment in the first place, it was once again projected as means of curbing Pakistan's nuclear ambition. The apparent assumption was that by resuming conventional military aid to Pakistan the US would gain "new flexibility" in persuading Islamabad to place certain constraints on its nuclear weapons programme, something which Washington had lost through applying Pressler's blanket ban. According to this rationale, the Pressler law was a structural impediment to progress on non-proliferation in South Asia.33 But the flaw in this approach was that it did not take into account the fact that Pakistan did not shy away from its nuclear programme when the US, through its massive military aid during the Reagan years sought to bring about military parity with India.34

One Time Waiver

President Clinton's South Asia Report (1994) on US non-proliferation objectives referring to this region named capping, reducing and finally eliminating the nuclear weapon capability of
India and Pakistan as its prime concerns. Lynn Davis under Secretary for International Security stated in April 1994, that "we are looking at the possibility of a one time waiver of the Pressler Amendment which would have as its goal to cap the production of missile material by the Pakistanis and to do so in a verifiable way" so that Pakistan could receive the F-16 aircrafts. But much to the US surprise Pakistan had refused to accept verifiable cap on its nuclear programme. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto instantly declared that Pakistan would not roll back its nuclear programme.

The proposal of Clinton administration was perplexing because supply of F-16 capable of delivering nuclear weapons could not promote non-proliferation. Lynn Davis said that, "the aircraft would be sold without the capacity of delivering such weapons, "she was obviously referring to the Pentagon assurance that the plane transferred to Pakistan would not have the racks to carry bombs. But as Senator Pressler pointed out "racks do not require any sophisticated technology and can be built by any corner garage mechanic".

While the US administration was defending the proposal to sale F-16s to Pakistan, Senator Larry Pressler expressed his determination to go to any length to prevent this proposed sales of F-16 and other military materials to Islamabad. Reacting to the proposal Pressler remarked it is bad enough that the
administration wants to sale a warfare, capable of delivering a nuclear weapons, to a volatile region. Now, it is seeking to rebuild the entire Pakistani Airforce. Instead of pursuing a responsible nuclear non-proliferation policy in South Asia, it seems the Clinton administration is conducting a Pentagon garage sale of military hardware and spare parts.39

By linking up the issue of sale of F-16s to capping of the production of fissile material, the State Department sought to project an impression that this step would be in the economic national security and nonproliferation interests of the United States. In one stroke, the Clinton Administration attempted to please the Look head Company, the Pakistanis and Senator Pressler and his colleagues in the Congress.

Although, the Clinton administration did not succeed in resuming military aid to Pakistan, it had, however, gradually succeeded in restoring token economic assistance and some other non-military aid to Pakistan, despite the operation of Pressler Sanction with minimum or no opposition from other branches of the American government. Even commercial sales of the certain military spare parts to Pakistan also continued. It was, however, bound to face Congressional opposition to any of its plans to sell military hardware to Pakistan. Pakistanis, on the other hand, were
trying their best to acquire the approval of the US Congress; the ball was clearly still in the American court.

**Benazir Visits USA**

The unfinished business of negotiations between the USA and Pakistan over the resumption of the US military aid to Pakistan once again acquired new life when Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the USA in April 1995. But just before her visit on March 9, 1995, two employees of the American Consulate General in Karachi were shot dead which jolted the relations. This increased the growing insecurity in the ruling Pakistan establishment about its ties with the USA.

Meanwhile, the condition in Karachi and Sindh had already deteriorated to worse. The Clinton administration took serious note of this and at one stage had threatened to put Pakistan on the list of terrorist States and stop aid.\(^{41}\) Nine Democratic and Republican member of the Congress had urged the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher to put Pakistan on terrorism watch list. In a letter to Christopher they had said “while Pakistan says it condemns terrorism in all forms and manifestation reports contradicts these assertion. The killing of the American diplomats and Pakistan’s continued grooming of terrorist warrants a serious re-evaluation of the US-Pakistan relationship.\(^{42}\)
Prime Minister Bhutto's visit was to seek visible reiteration of US support to Pakistan's ruling establishment and also push for lifting the Pressler Sanctions which had become an impediment in the US-Pakistan strategic collaboration. A seasoned Pakistani commentator termed the Bhutto's visit a "Make or Break Yatra" for the politically embattled Benazir. Well before her visit Pakistani government tried its best to soften US attitude towards it. Firstly came the "discovery" that the man alleged to be the mastermind in the 1993 bombing of the New York, World Trade Centre, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf was a Pakistani. He was quickly extradited to the United States, that was followed by the "discovery" and rapid extradition of Haji Mirza Mohammad Iqbal Baig and Mohammad Anwar Khan Khattak both indicated in the United States in 1992 for drug smuggling. To improve its image and gain favour in Washington, Islamabad presented itself as being in the vanguard of "moderate" Islam, opposed to fundamentalism else-where especially in Iran, an emerging nuclear threat. Ms. Bhutto had said that Pakistan needs American support not sanctions to battle extremists.

In fact, Benazir Bhutto was clamouring for a new basis for the US-Pakistan relationship, American recognition and presumably aid were asked for as a frontline State in the fight against religious fanaticism, sectarianism and all extremist
movements as well as the various manifestations of narcotic trade.

During her sojourn in Washington Ms. Bhutto utilized a bulk of her time lobbying with Congress against the Pressler Amendment. Pakistani Prime Minister also highlighted the Kashmir issue and linked it with the nuclear issue to globalize the Kashmir issue, Ms. Bhutto stated that I urged an early resolution of the core issue of Kashmir which poses a great threat to peace and security in our region, it had retarded progress on all issue including nuclear and missile proliferation. This was unambiguously endorsed by Clinton when he said that obviously if the issue of Kashmir were resolved a lot of these issue we have been discussing here to day would be resolve themselves. At least I believe that to be the case reiterating the familiar US position that Washington would play a role in Kashmir only if both parties are willing to US play a leading role. Further, Bill Clinton said that he wanted a review of the Pressler Amendment that it is time we should seriously review the policy. He described Pakistan as a nation that aims to combine the best of the tradition of Islam with modern democratic ideals. President Clinton stated, America is proud to claim Pakistan among her closest friends and has been a good partner and more importantly has stood for democracy and opportunity and modernization. The indulgent description of Pakistan as a mature, moderate nation State was indicative of the
tremendous sympathy bordering on blind affection that permeated the Clinton administration. US was of the view that a strong Pakistan is the need of hour for peace and reconciliation and ultimately for dismantling weapons of mass destruction in the region.

However, the Clinton administration could not succeed in giving any concession to Pakistan because a powerful lobby in Congress, led by Republican Senator Larry Pressler, was dead set against change, fearing that such a step would make mockery of the US non-proliferation concerns. During Ms. Bhutto’s stay in Washington a group of fifteen US Congressmen wrote to American Defence Secretary, William J. Perry voicing their staunch opposition to any change in the Pressler Amendment. “we do not believe events warrants a repeal of the Pressler Amendment and we will resist all efforts to bypass or weaken this provision”, they said in a joint letter to Perry.46

US Pakistan relations further received a setback when the Washington Post, revealed that Pakistan was furtively constructing a new nuclear reactor giving Islamabad access to substantial quantities of plutonium for more powerful and compact nuclear weapons that it now possesses. To compound matters the Washington Post, reported that after initially denying knowledge of any such facility, the Pakistani Prime Minister back tracked and
conceded that such a project was in existence. The Washington Post decided to pull this issue out of obscurity and timed it with the Benazir visit to Washington thereby, leaving the Clinton administration with little manoeuvering in assuaging the Pakistani sentiment over the Pressler Amendment. The Clinton administration, thus was faced with a great dilemma in harmonizing its global nuclear non-proliferation policy with Pakistan's furtive nuclear weapons quest.

Although reports certainly created a new headache for Pakistan but it could not prevent Prime Minister Bhutto from getting Clinton's assurance for a revision of Pressler Amendment. For Islamabad the removal of the Pressler Amendment from the statute book arguably had more political and strategic importance than its military value *perse*.

Benazir Bhutto's visit proved more productive for Pakistan than what was perceived at that time. Three significant gains for Pakistan emerged from this visit, first, the commitment by Clinton administration that US would not abandon Pakistan and confer a strategic dimension to the US-Pak relationship in the Post Cold War period. Second, acceptance by the US President of the Pakistani interpretation that Kashmir's is at the core of the acrimonious Indo-Pak relations, finally endorsement of the Pakistan position that the Pressler Amendment discriminates
against Islamabad and a US resolve to work towards a regional nuclear solution that perceives India's nuclear dynamics only in an Indo-Pak context.48

Thus, Bhutto effectively articulated her case both to President Bill Clinton and the American public that Pakistan a formerly time tested friend of the US had now been abandoned. She harped on the theme of a new 'geo-strategic' contact with America, her visit yielded results just after few months of her return from Washington when US Congress finally passed the Hank Brown Amendment.

The Hank Brown Amendment

After several attempts by Pakistan government over the years to get repealed the Pressler Amendment, the US Congress passed the Brown Amendment in November 1995. Named after American Senator, Hank Brown, the Amendment provided the transfer to Pakistan of all the previously embargoed lethal arms and equipment other than 28, F-16 combat aircrafts. Although, the Amendment, backed by the Clinton administration was introduced in the Senate with the Defence Authorization Bill in August 1995, but it was stalled successfully for months by the anti-proliferation lobby opposed to it.

However, the determined Clinton administration, introduced the Amendment again in the Senate in September 1995, as part of
the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, this time it was adopted. The House Senate Conference Committee which met in October 1995, also accepted the Brown Amendment by decisive 10-4 votes. These developments were followed by the adoption of the Brown Amendment as part of the Foreign Appropriations Bill of the US House of Representatives on November 1, 1995. The package permitted Pakistan to take possession of military equipment frozen in the US including 3PC orion air crafts, Harpoon missiles, C Nite multifunction Kits, M-198 Howitzer, Cobra Helicopter, TIQ-36 radars, Tow launchers besides spares for F-16s. It also gave the green signal for the renewed economic assistance loan guarantees by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Export-Import Bank Lending.

United States objectives behind the Hank Brown initiatives, which was written in the United States Defence Planning Guide for the Post Cold War era, published in 1992 were as follows "...with regard to Pakistan a constructive US-Pakistan military relationship, will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South-West Asia and Central Asia. We should endeavour to rebuild our military relationship, given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concern."

Initially, Islamabad hailed passage of the Brown Amendment as a major victory. However, soon Pakistan realized that the
Amendment provided largely symbolic relief. As the Brown Amendment left intact the heart of Pressler Sanction, the ban on the US military assistance and government to government arms transfer. Pakistani establishment, nonetheless, was satisfied because the Clinton administration had finally acknowledged the inherent unfairness of the Pressler Sanction and tried to amend that. In effect, Pakistanis agreed with Brown Amendment which boosted Pakistan's defence and economy.

The renewed US interest in Pakistan made strategic theorist Spykman, and his rimland concept more valid. According to him Pakistan as a viable rimland State could serve a dual US purpose, though on occasions Islamabad had become the tail that wagged the dog. The primary US aim is to secure the Gulf Oil and “contain” the aspirations of Iran immediately and possibly Russia and China at a later date. The second strategic significance of Pakistan is its access to Central Asia which encompasses the oil, potentially crucial mineral, natural gas and the dependence of Russia, China and India on it made crucial to US establishment to control Central Asia.

This is how US harmonized its regional strategy with an abiding national interest. Pakistan as a geographical entity and more specifically Pakistani army acquired a special niche warranting US indulgence. This is where the contradictions fall
into place. The Hank Brown Amendment not only being anti-India or pro-proliferation acquires a different context to the extent where Islamabad's nuclear transgressions are condoned to keep Pakistan plain and committed to furthering US interest. Under the circumstances the US had obviously reverted to its Cold War policy of using Pakistan as an ally to safeguard American interests in South and West Asia. Since an ally or a client State has to be kept politically happy or stable, it has to be piped with economic and military largesse.54

An American expert on South Asian affairs Harold A Gould had given a three fold answer to the question why the United States adopted the Brown Amendment. First, it reveals that the Cold War culture has survived Cold War. Two generations of American politicians and scholars were so conditioned to think in 'containment' and confrontational terms about international security that they continue to do so long after the need to do so is irrelevant. Second, and related to first, a vast American defence industry and the politicians whose constituencies continue to derive economic benefits from its production lines, has a vested interest in perpetuating in Cold War Style of doing international business. Third, the Clinton administration is in some ways more naïve about South Asia than were most of its predecessors, partially because Mr. Clinton himself seems to be so unattuned to the international dimensions of politics, and partly because, as far
as India is concerned, the advice he got came heavily from an Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel, who was (a) pro-Pakistani and (b) out of her depth.55

However, no one was certain why President Clinton took the path which President Bush feared to tread in 1990s Pakistan's nuclear ambitions had been as clear as day light and yet the US officials and legislature for a ignored their dazzle and offered military package to their old client on a silver platter. According to an Indian analyst56 such a military package to Pakistan would appear to serve three purposes of the US: First, it would help the Americans in their efforts to win back loyalties of a former crony Pakistan. With Washington remaining wedded to its idea of projecting it as a “moderate Islamic State”, and Pakistan threatening in the post-Pressler Amendment phase, to firmly align itself to either the Islamic bloc or Communist China the prime obsession of the Clinton Administration, it caused alarm in Washington.

Secondly, an increasingly confident India would in the long term be a threat to the American hegemony in the region. The United States considered the democratic, India to be an unmanageable factor in its regional strategic planning. Compared to this, the US had not just the experience, but also continuing assurances from Pakistan that it will remain a reliable ally and co-
operative partner in the US plans in the region. Hence, this attempt to strengthen Pakistan by maintaining a balance of power in South Asia.

Finally, the vast American military, industrial complex was keen to revive arms sales in South Asia, as the region was a major arms-import in the eighties. So, the Hank Brown initiative and its approval by the Clinton administration, was also designed to please the American industry as well as the electorate. Such a policy had echoes of the past, when the Neo-Realist school of political thought as enunciated by Henry Kissinger, had stated that "morality" ends at one's national borders- beyond which nothing is immoral if it helps in the furtherance of one's national interests.

The US policy makers believed that revival of a kind of quasi-alliance with Pakistan will give the US leverage in that country which was lost during the years of suspension of military supplies and other forms of aid due to Pressler Amendment. They claim that this influence can be used to contain Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and freeze the development and deployment of Ballistic Missiles. The US logic that the arms sales will give America greater leverage vis-à-vis Pakistan was a simplistic fallacy. During Afghan War, the US floated the same theory that the supply of arms will keep Pakistan away from perusing the nuclear path. But what happened? Having received billions of dollars worth of arms,
General Zia went ahead with his nuclear programme. The US conveniently closed its eyes. Similarly the Reagan administration provided arms by the tonnes to the Afghan rebels in their fight against the communists.

India’s renowned defence expert K. Subrahmanyam has rightly observed: "This is not the first occasion for the US administration and legislature to commit a folly of this type. They gave arms to Chiang Kai Shek and they ended up with the Chinese Communists. They supported the South Vietnamese generals and the results are now part of history. They sold enormous quantities of the arms to Shah of Iran and that benefited the Ayatollah. They supported Saddam Hussein and he turned against them. They armed Siad Barre of Somalia and General Aideed inherited those weapons. They armed Pakistan; ISI and Afghan Mujahideens. Those arms were later used in sustaining the civil war in Afghanistan, ultimately becoming sanctuary of International terrorism.

The US President’s arguments that this policy of releasing military equipment to Pakistan would not effect the military balance in South Asia and that it would instead actually help strengthen peace, stability and democratic forces in Pakistan also proved facetious. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations sub Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on
September 14, 1995, Bruce Reidel Deputy Assistant Secretary took
great pains to establish the point that India already had a 2 to 1
superiority over Pakistan in conventional weapons and therefore
the release of $368 million military equipment to Pakistan would
not make a difference to the military balance in the region. While
advancing an argument of this kind he deliberately ignored the fact
that India is four times bigger than Pakistan and its security
responsibilities are qualitatively different and quantitatively larger
than those of Pakistan. It also reveals a psychology that the US
cannot resist the temptation to neutralize Indian strength
whenever an opportunity permits it.

**Ring Magnet, M-11 Missile Issue**

Meanwhile, US-Pak strategic relations received a hiccup when shipment of a US military equipment to Pakistan under the
Brown Amendment was put off in early 1996 because of Pakistan’s
suspected acquisition of sensitive nuclear equipment from China
in 1995 and subsequent controversy over M-11 missile supplied by
China to Pakistan, in violation of MTCR guideline, put the
implementation of Brown Amendment in peril. Since the Brown
Amendment did not entirely lift sanctions against countries that
received help for an unsafe guarded Uranium enrichment facility
thus, a major problem arose, complicating the implementation of
the Brown Amendment and exacerbating bilateral trouble with
China in face of the CIA reported discovery that the China’s
Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had sold some five thousand Ring Magnets, which aid uranium enrichment to Pakistan. Although, Pakistan reacted that it was not a violation of Brown Amendment but still Clinton administration thought that this was an attempt by Pakistan to smuggle laser equipment to measure precisely machined nuclear weapons components.

However, instead of taking strict action and imposing sanctions against China and Pakistan, firing from a pea shooter into the air was the best response President Clinton found to the sale of nuclear related Ring Magnets. US merely freezed export credit to China for a month and delayed arms deliveries to Pakistan to deliver mildest of warning against nuclear proliferation. These were inadequate measures well short of not sanctions. Earlier Clinton administration could not ignored the CIA report because the CIA director had confirmed the validity of the Ring Magnets transfer in an open Public Hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee. This put the Clinton administration in an embarrassing position and in a spot over the issue of concealing crucial informations from the Congress during the debate and vote on the Brown Amendment.

The US 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act stipulates harsh sanction, and sale of Ring Magnets should have resulted in the suspension of all export-import Banking if the US government concluded that the Beijing authorities had willfully approved the
Ring Magnet transfer. But the feeble and adhoc sanction was the Clinton administration's way of avoiding a direct showdown with Beijing. Except holding for a while arms package to Pakistan, no action was taken against Islamabad by way of sanction. Instead, Clinton administration further moved ahead to implement a major element of the Brown Amendment when $ 368 million equipment frozen by the Pressler Sanction and refund of $ 120 million for other items were released. It seemed that Clinton administration was protecting a burgeoning commercial relationship and mollifying a frazzled ally. It was nothing but a detestation for following the practices of his predecessors to give priority to non-proliferation over trade and economic interests.

Similarly Clinton administration did not take any action when US intelligence confirmed that Islamabad had resumed production of weapon grade uranium. Pakistan was exonerated by a mere warning. When the Deputy National Security Advisor Samual Berger went to Islamabad to emphasized US concern that if Pakistan continued with its nuclear programmes Clinton administration would have trouble in implementing the Brown Amendment.64

More fissures arose in bilateral relations in Summer 1996. When intelligence agencies reported that Pakistan decided to deploy nuclear capable Chinese supplied M-11 missile. Further, CIA concluded that China was assisting Pakistan in setting up a factory near Islamabad. This created sensation in the United
States and South Asia. Thus, the intelligence information put the Clinton administration in an awkward position, since it suggested that the Chinese were dangerously violating MTCR guidelines by exporting missiles to Pakistan.

Although MTCR guidelines imposes drastic sanction for its violation, which could have costed American companies billions of dollars in sales to China. But the Clinton administration turned a blind eye to this and took no action on the ground that the intelligence was insufficiently conclusive to justify the imposition of severe sanction.

Clinton administration issued certificate to Pakistan on narcotics contrary to frictions it created. US policy makers also ignored human rights violations and Islamabad’s role in the spread of global terrorism and its clandestine nuclear weapons programme. This proved the hollowness of US advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation through international regimes and conventions like MTCR, NPT and CTBT. The timid and “pea-shooter” approach of the Clinton administration also showed that US is no longer the sole superpower which could prevail its wish in the post Cold War world.

What ever the reasons given or arguments advanced by the US administration in support of the Brown Amendment and not applying sanctions on the serious issue of shipment of Ring Magnet, M-11 missiles by China to Pakistan and US blind eye on
this contradicted the declared US policy objective of working for non-proliferation, MTCR and CTBT. The US restoring of military supplies to Pakistan and subsequent blind eye on Pakistan's other effort to achieve nuclear arsenal not only negated earlier US legislation aimed at penalizing Pakistan for its nuclear weapons programme, but was a clear political signal that it tacitly accepted Pakistan's nuclear weaponisation as a part of its strategic plan to secure its interests in South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. Thus "all the pious concern of the US for nuclear proliferation has been shown to be an eye wash in relations to an old and trusty ally".

Hence, the thesis that with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan's importance in serving US interests had diminished was not correct. Rather Clinton administration considered Pakistan an important partner in safeguarding its interest in the Gulf, on the eastern flank of the region. US also considered Pakistan a useful base for influencing political process in Central Asia. Further, it thought that a strong Pakistan is essential to counter its threat perception regarding Iran and Iraq. The US believed at that time that Pakistan was one country which if strengthened militarily and technologically can counter India's emergence as an effective regional power. US perception since the emergence of Pan-Islamic trends in World politics are that being supportive of Pakistan will contribute to
encouraging moderate Islamic forces and countering Islamic extremism. By the end of 1996 when Clinton completed his first term US was obsessed with all these factors and it was willing to pay a high price for collaboration with Pakistan, pretending that Pakistan is a secular State. Their obsession blinded them to the reality and Pakistanis exploited that obsession to serve their own interests.
REFERENCES


15. Quoted in Dennis Kux, No. 13, p. 311.


23. During last two decades the US imposed Sanctions on Pakistan on four occasions: 1977, 1979, 1990 and 1993, While the first three sanctions were limited with the nuclear question, the Latest one was on suspected acquisition of M-11 technology from China.


28. Ibid.


33. The same thesis was recently advocated by the US Defence Secretary, William Perry, For his view see *The Times of India*, February 2, 1995.


35. In addition to the 38 F-16, Washington wanted to arm Pakistan with three Orion anti-Submarine War Planes and 15 T37 trainer air Craft, see *Indian Express*, April 8, 1994.


46. The Times of India, April 6, 1995.

47. The Times of India, April 15, 1995.


50. Vinay Kumar Malhotra, "The Clinton administration and South Asia 1993-97". South Asia Publisher, New Delhi 1997, p. 75.


52. On February 16, 1995, The White House Released the US Department of Commerce Section 232 investigation which found that the Nations growing reliance on imports of Crude Oil and refined petroleum Products threatened the nations security and increased US vulnerability to oil supply a interruptions. The US strategic thinkers are therefore, looking fenetically at a diversification of source of supply mid nervousness about increasing dependence on the Gulf Region.
53. Pakistan was carefully pursuing the possibility of piped natural gas supply from Turkmenistan which had abandoned reserves, through Afghanistan to a port in Pakistan. This would not only permit Pakistan to meet its own growing demand for natural gas but also too possibly liquefy the balance for export to other parts of the world. Conceivably, piping oil along the same route could also supply to the US, reducing its dependence on Gulf Oil.


59. Between 1981 and 1991 the US government gave to Pakistan aid worth more than $ 6 billion. And yet there were precisely
the years during which Pakistan made maximum progress in the development of its nuclear weapons.


64. Vinay Kumar Malhotra, “The Clinton Administration and South Asia, 1993-97, South Asia Publisher, New Delhi, 1997, p. 80, p. 80.


CHAPTER – V

PAKISTAN'S UNREQUITED FONDNESS:
THE CLINTON'S SECOND TERM

US-Pakistan relations seemed to be coming out of the post-
Cold War downturn during the Clinton’s second consecutive term. Unlike past policies, US under Clinton’s leadership made attempts to broaden security and strategic relations with Pakistan, the one time “Most Allied Ally”. The issue of non-proliferation was shelved for the time being. The changing US perception can be gauged from the statement of then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering when he said “we want to show that we do not consider South Asia the backside of the diplomatic globe”.¹

Not withstanding the fact that bilateral relations were seriously ruptured over the issue of non-proliferation, shipment of Ring Magnets and M-11 missile supply from China, issue of narcotics, Islamabad’s alleged support for the cross border terrorism during the Clinton’s first term. US-Pakistan strategic relations shown sign of improvement, when Islamabad desperate to forge close relations, co-operated with US law enforcement officials in arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national charged with the fatal 1993 shooting of two CIA employees outside the agency’s headquarter in Virginia. Further, Islamabad allowed the America to fly back Kansi to United States to face trial without having gone...
through the normal extradition process. This action of Sharif government was widely criticized in Pakistan because United States had refused to bypass its extradition procedures in the case of a Pakistani air force officer being held in a US jail on drug charges. As a writer for the Nation asserted, Washington “rarely acts to circumvent its own laws. But expects others to waive and ignore theirs.”

Despite, the renewed interest of Clinton administration in Pakistan after the arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi the Pakistani policy establishment was still under impression that Washington had only marginal interest in giving momentum to already derailed relations. Instead US was more interested in ties with India. Since the issue of F-16 remained unresolved even after the passage of Brown amendment in 1995. More-over, the US was doing little to assist Pakistani’s faltering economy. Thus, half hearted US interest in Pakistan’s problems strengthened the perception of policy makers in Islamabad that the US is a fickle friend.

In the post Cold War period, Pakistan had become more hawkish in dealing with its two most pressing national security issue India and Afghanistan. The US-Soviet Cold War had ended but South Asia’s Cold War continued unabated. Infact, India Pakistan tension had intensified during the 1990’s because of Islamabad’s backing for Kashmiri insurgents
The obsession of Pakistan with India and Islamabad's Afghan policy had become issue of friction in the US-Pakistan relations. Clinton administration expressed keen interest that two major powers of the South Asia should improve relations. The then US President while meeting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during U.N. General Assembly Session in New York, urged Pakistan to resume dialogue with India. Nawaz Sharif responded positively for improved bilateral relations and urged a more active US role in Kashmir issue. However, the tension intensified over Islamabad's continued backing for Kashmiri insurgents. Irrespective of US advice the relations between India and Pakistan remained at lowest ebb. India's efforts to broaden relations with Pakistan through trade were frustrated. The mantra pushed by hard liners in Islamabad was that nothing could be done to improve relations with India until Kashmir problem was solved. This hard line attitude of Islamabad had its bearing on US-Pak relations.

Similarly, Pakistan's Afghan policy become another irritants in the relations with United States. It was ironical that the place which brought US-Pak strategically so close in 1979 after the Soviet intervention was now drifting two countries apart. Islamabad had always been deeply involved with Afghanistan. The assumption of power in Kabul by Taliban with overt and covert support of Pakistan brought the issue of Afghanistan once again at fore front. Pakistan's Afghanistan policy was driven by its desire to
see a friendly regime in power—thereby supposedly ensuring “strategic depth vis-a-vis India. Initially Pakistan supported Tajik dominated Rabbani government but soon realized that it is not serving Pakistan’s interest. So it reverted to Pushtuns the tribal sibling of Pakistan’s Pathans called Taliban. But due to strange and adventurous policy of Taliban towards women and foreigners Islamabad came under International criticism because Pakistan was held responsible for the rise of Taliban.

By the end of 1997, US started to take more interest in Indian Sub-continent. To reinforce US interest in India and Pakistan, President Clinton sent Secretary of State, Madeline Albright to the region to show that “after along absence, the United States at the highest level is getting back in South Asia game”. Her visit reflected the souring of bilateral relations during the post Afghan crisis or post Cold War crisis. Secretary of State discussed host of issues with the policy makers in Islamabad. Madeline Albright utilized most of her time deliberating about Nuclear weapons, issue of Afghanistan, Kashmir conflict etc. The visit was not only very fruitful for Pakistan because the US did not propose any military or economic assistance to Pakistan. Nevertheless, she asserted that Pakistan “will be able to count on continuing friendship of the United States.”

The high point of Albright’s visit was meeting with Afghan refugees in Peshawar, like that of George Shultz then Secretary of State who visited to Pakistan at the climax of Afghan crisis in
1983. Although, Shultz at that time had offered full US economic, military support for the Mujahideen because they were fighting for American cause against the Soviets. Contrary to the Shultz visit, as the geo-political situation had undergone tremendous change, the US was in no need of Mujahideen or Taliban so Albright voiced US opposition to Pakistan’s Taliban policy and stated “we are opposed to their approach on human rights, we are opposed to their despicable treatment of women, children and their lack of respect for human dignity”.

More irritants surfaced in bilateral relations over anti-narcotic measures. In 1998, for the third running year Clinton had to issue a waiver to avoid the imposition of sanction for lack of cooperation in the anti-narcotics efforts. Meanwhile, a bitter dispute had arisen over the arrest of Pakistani national Ayyaz Baluch, an employee of the US Drug Enforcement Agency’s Islamabad office, Baluch had been involved in an effort to entrap a Pakistani air force officer suspected of drug smuggling. Not informed beforehand, the Pakistani authorities were indignant and embarrassed when the air force officer was arrested in the United States. They retaliated by jailing Baluch for “Seducing” the air force officer to commit a crime. Intense “and some time angry” diplomatic pressure was needed before Baluch was pardoned and permitted to emigrate with his family to the United States.
US-Pakistan strategic relations received more set back when Pakistan imported missiles from North Korea. CIA reported that Pakistan had obtained North Korean Technology to develop a medium range missile, which was successfully fired over a range of nine hundred Kilometers on April 6, 1998. The Pakistan's claimed that the missile gave them an edge over their neighbour India. But Islamabad denied the US assertion that the missile was modified version of North Korean Nodong-itself a variant of the Soviet Scud and declared that Pakistani scientists had developed the 'Ghauri' on their own. Rejecting the Pakistani position, the Clinton administration proceeded to impose sanctions against North Korea, and Khan Research Laboratories, where the missile was produced. This sanction had only symbolic effect because earlier sanctions already in operation barred dealing with the US in defence field.®

INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR TEST AND NON-PROLIFERATION

US South Asia policy received a severe setback in May, 1998, when Bhartiya Janta Party led Indian government successfully conducted three underground nuclear-test on May 11, 1998 in Pokharan range of Rajasthan. Further, to the more surprise to the world community unfazed India conducted two more Nuclear-tests on May 13, 1998 to complete its series of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes.
Although, Sharif government had warned Clinton about Indian intention in April 1998, as Vajpayee government had been very clear about induction of nuclear weapons, soon after assuming power. But lulled by soothing comments in New Delhi, US officials thought that Pakistan was crying wolf regarding India and were satisfied that the India would not do anything which could trigger nuclear proliferation in the region.\(^{11}\)

However, Clinton administration was taken aback, that immediately after entering office, Vajpayee had given a green signal for nuclear tests.\(^{12}\) India's preparations at Pokhran was kept so clandestine by Indian Scientists, that they were successful in avoiding detection by the US Satellites. Thus, the nuclear test by India caught Clinton administration embarrassingly off-guard. India’s five nuclear tests were jarringly out of step with the world community's substantial progress in recent years on the non-proliferation front. Further, it did irreparable damage to the unconditional renewal of non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was picking overwhelming backing from the international community.

The Indian test once more put the nuclear issue on the centre stage of US South Asia policy. Terming them “a terrible mistake” apparently angry Clinton stated. “I want to make it very
clear that I am deeply disturbed." US promptly imposed wide-reaching sanctions against India mandated by the 1994 non-proliferation act: United States cut off all aid, prohibited export of certain defence and technology materials, voted against loans by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and urged other states to follow suit. Major industrialized nations joined in strongly criticizing the tests. But only Japan imposed sanctions as drastic as those of the United States, when it freezed aid to India.

Indian nuclear tests alarmed Pakistan and Islamabad termed India’s nuclear adventure as "reckless and highly provocative". Clinton administration’s attention soon shifted to Pakistan. In the hope of persuading Sharif government not to follow India’s suit. For this purpose President dispatched, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott to Islamabad. The envoy tried to bargain with Pakistan when they offered F-16, which had been stalled since October 1990 when the Pressler Sanction was imposed, more over the resumption of economic and military aid was offered to Pakistan to shelve its nuclear proliferation programme. Pakistan would gain the moral high ground internationally by not testing thereby global disapproval on India.

President Clinton spoke himself with Sharif on the phone to underline US concern that Pakistan should not go nuclear. The the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif responded that he had not taken a
decision but was under great domestic political pressure to show that Pakistan could match India. Publicly, he declared, “it is up to the international community” to address Pakistan’s legitimate security concern in the wake of India’s nuclear tests. Thus, implicitly Pakistan rejected US request to restrain in the wake of Indian nuclear test but assured Washington that it would not act in haste. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad said “there is no question of any renunciation of our option”, we cannot ignore the aspirations of our people to meet the nuclear challenge imposed by India.

Pakistani establishment wanted from world community in general and from US in particular the harshest possible punishment for India. Foreign Minister Gohar Ayyub Khan declared that invoking mandatory sanctions under US laws against India hardly constitute an effective response. Although, (G-8) the group of world’s eight leading economic powers criticized India and agreed to oppose multilateral lending. Islamabad considered it inadequate when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister said. “It is a matter of when, not if, Pakistani will test”. The statement by Indian Home Minister L.K. Advani put more pressure on Sharif administration and surcharged the atmosphere in Pakistan in favour of nuclear test. Advani called on Pakistan to accept the new realities imposed by the Indian tests. Inspite of this, President Clinton remained publicly hopeful “that the Prime Minister and Pakistani
government would not go through a nuclear test. And I believe we can... work with them in a way which meets their security needs without the test"18.

Thus, Pakistan was confronted with great dilemma either to pursue nuclear test or forego test. At one side, if Pakistan conducted test, the economic cost would be high because Islamabad's action would invite severe sanctions as imposed on India. The sanctions could nearly bankrupt Pakistani economy and it would not be able to withstand its implications. On the other hand, if Pakistan did forego nuclear test, it has the opportunity to bring major shift in Clinton administrations policy towards Pakistan. One that Islamabad had been seeking ever since the Pressler Sanctions were imposed in 1990. However, half hearted interest taken by Clinton administration during last six years and other difficulties over Pressler, missile etc, left Pakistani officials with little faith in Clinton's assurance and were skeptical whether Congress would agree to lift sanctions and approve F-16 aircraft, substantial economic and conventional arms assistance package.

Pakistan did not only face international pressure but also there was mounting domestic pressure on the government that if Sharif did forego test he would have to pay a heavy political price. This put the survival of the government in peril. Not only the opposition Pakistan Peoples Party and Pro-Islamic Parties, but
many in his own Pakistan Muslim League were vociferously clamouring for Pakistan to match India. In a meeting with newspapers editors, the Prime Minister was reportedly told by Arif Nizami, editor of the widely read and influential Urdu daily Nawai-I Waqt "there is going to be an explosion soon it will either be a Pakistani nuclear test or you being blown out of office".

Pakistan made a formal request to Clinton administration that Islamabad needed a US security guarantee against India to hold off from testing. The President Clinton said that he could not give this assurance but reiterated his intention to cut through the knot of laws blocking aid and give Pakistan the tools needed to defend the country. This assurance, however, was not good enough for Pakistan to fulfill its security demand. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan exploded five underground nuclear devices in Chagai region of Baluchistan.

The Pakistanis across the political spectrum or loyalties celebrated on the successful test. A proud Sharif declared, "today we have settled a score... our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership's reckless action" and further said that International sanction over nuclear tests against Pakistan would be unjustified.

Thus, Pakistan had two basic compulsions which forced it to conduct nuclear test. Firstly, it had to prove to India in particular
and the world at large that its nuclear capability is not a fib but very real. Secondly, which was more vital to the survival of the Nawaz Sharif government was the dire need to reply to Indian tests with identical display of nuclear prowess.

For US the nuclear test by Pakistan was a big disappointment as Islamabad ignored President Clinton’s repeated pleadings not to conduct test. The US-Pakistan strategic and security relations which promised rise, because of New Delhi’s action, reached at the lowest ebb with Pakistan’s matching reply to India. Thus, Pakistan lost an opportunity to strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis, the United States.

President Clinton commented sadly, “By failing to exercise restrain in responding to the Indian test. Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its political standing in the eyes of the world”. But simultaneously the statement by Presidential press Secretary Michal Mecurry, gave great respite to Islamabad when he said that Clinton remained angrier at India because, “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was honest and straight forward in the description of the decision he was wrestling with, and India manifestly was not.21

Pakistan came in for a lot of flake from world community for its tests. UN Security Council “deplored” Pakistan’s test and urged both countries to show restrain. Nevertheless, on May 31, 1998,
Pakistan tested the sixth nuclear device, one more than India had tested. This signaled the ensuing arms race in South Asia. The foreign Ministers of the five declared Nuclear Weapons States and the permanent members of the UN security council urged in Geneva Declaration to India and Pakistan to take steps to reduce the danger of nuclear war; sign the CTBT, ban fissile material production and to show restrain in missile testing and deployment.\textsuperscript{22}

The Clinton administration announced wide ranging sanctions against Pakistan under the 1994 non-proliferation act. The US cut off all aid and any material which could be used for defence purpose, voted against loans by the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank.\textsuperscript{23}

As was feared earlier that sanctions might sink Pakistan's shaky economy proved right. Emergency was declared in the country almost immediately after the announcement of the nuclear test and austerity measures proposed by Nawaz Sharif was indication of high price that Pakistan will have to pay for taking its bomb out of basement. Moreover, Pakistan faced debt payment problem and unless it received fresh financial help from the IMF. The government in panic froze foreign –currency bank accounts which created havoc for foreign companies working in Pakistan. This damaged country's international credit.
However, some efforts were made in Washington to ease sanctions when Senate and House of Representatives voted to exempt agricultural credits from the sanctions. In other words US wanted to protect her commercial interest in Pakistan. Because sanctions barred agricultural export credit which was injuring farmers in US. Recognizing that the rigidity of the 1994 legislation deprived the President of any flexibility in trying to deal diplomatically with Pakistan, Congress voted in a separate action to give the chief executive authority to waive all sanctions, including those imposed by the Pressler Amendment.24

The entire nuclear issue which began in Indian subcontinent witnessed US tilt in favour of Pakistan. It was ironic that severe sanctions were imposed on India but strangely enough even after Islamabad ignored President Clinton’s repeated pleadings not to conduct ‘tit for tat tests’, the US attitude towards Pakistan remained soft. Clinton administration continued to find excuse for Pakistan.

President Clinton’s efforts to dissuade Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from testing included such blandishments as the repeal of the Pressler Amendment – a piece of legislation that the Pakistan hated with visceral intensity as well as offers of fresh military and economic aid as Clinton even climbed down from his Presidential heights and telephoned Nawaz Sharif several times, ultimately of no avail.
Referring to the President’s persistent bid to battle for “sanity on the subcontinent” White House Spokesman Mike McCurry said on May 28, 1998, “I think it would be accurate to say that the Prime Minister clearly struggled with what was apparently, for him, a very difficult decision. He knew the costs, he understood exactly the President’s argument... but I think he clearly felt the pressure and burden of both domestic political opinion and also the reality of the pressure he faced in the region because of the decision by the government of India. He sounded in short, like some one who is very pained by a very difficult decision”.25 It seemed that US was defending Pakistan’s decision to conduct nuclear test.25

The White House spokesman also sounded quite sad that the sanctions mandated by Glenn amendment26 would apply with equal severity to India and Pakistan. Although, both countries had conducted nuclear tests, McCurry felt there was a qualitative difference in the way the two countries had handled their nuclear compulsions. “The tonal quality of the way we have addressed this decision by Pakistan. I would suggest to you is a different, and we would acknowledge that there is a difference in the way these two government have dealt with the United States with respect to this test,”27.

It seemed that the spokesmen had forgotten Pakistan’s past record. When it had been less than “straight forward” over the several years when it clandestinely acquired nuclear material,
missile and other relevant technology form China and North Korea; Moreover, the transfer of these technologies was banned by the US law and global treaties.

State Department Spokesman James Rubin also turned out to be a pro-Pakistani. He displayed a tilt not only in favour of Pakistan, but also its benefactor China which for long had been the 'Holy Cow' of American foreign policy. Asked about the China angle complicating the Indo-Pak Nuclear matrix, Rubin admitted that there had been serious concern in the past about Beijing's cooperation with Pakistan, “But we all have to bear in mind the evolution that has occurred in China's policies, including a commitment that we believe they are honouring not to assist unsafe-guarded nuclear facilities especially those in Pakistan and other countries of concern”\(^\text{28}\) In other words James Rubin was saying that India can not justify its test on ground of Beijing-Islamabad alleged collaboration. Rather it was India's explosion which forced Pakistan to respond.

Another significant sign of the tilt was Washington's reaction to the “aggressive rhetoric” emanating from New Delhi and Islamabad. When Home Minister L.K. Advani warned Pakistan to halt intervening in Kashmir the State Department went ballistic and called in Indian Ambassador, Naresh Chandra to express unhappiness. But there was not much reaction when Pakistan Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayyub Khan went around making
incendiary statements, including a pointed threat that since Indian cities were bigger, their casualties in missile attack would be larger.

However, Pakistan's sixth test, to even the score with India, left little room for those who were sympathetic to its position in the US. Many senior US officials who attempted to justify the Pak tests as an inevitable to India's tests felt betrayed. Thus, the tilt for all practical purposes wilted.  

That was evident in the even handed statement from Clinton, when condemning the sixth test US President said, that Pakistan and India are contributing to self defeating cycle of escalation. State Department Spokesman Rubin also deplored and said that, we are very disappointed that Pakistan continues to ignore the calls to exercise restrain that were made by the International community after its first tests.

As the US policy makers were reconciling with new realities in South Asia where two antagonistic nuclear power had emerged. Clinton administration was trying to calm down excessive jingoism in India and Pakistan to avoid any further escalation of arm race in the region. In the, meanwhile the development in Afghanistan drew Washington's attention towards Afghanistan, where Taliban had been achieving phenomenal success, in capturing and controlling most of the Afghanistan. They appeared to be close to total victory over their arch rival ethnic groups of Uzbek-Hazara and Tajik
called the Northern Alliance. The rapid stride by Taliban created concern in Washington about the future of Afghanistan. Recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and by no other country. Thus, Taliban by their treatment of women, their tolerance, drug trade and most significantly their willingness to provide a heaven to International terrorist contributed to acquire near-pariah status in United States.  

Further, the active ISI support for the Taliban became an important source of friction, in already troubled relations with the United States. There was growing concern in Washington that the Taliban like movement presumably supported by Pro-Islamic political parties and fundamentalist element in ISI and Pakistan military is ominous sign in general for the region and in particular for Pakistan with far reaching implications.

The terrorist attack on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Daressalam, Tanzania, that took more than two hundreds lives, shook and enraged the Clinton administration. The administration overnight started operation to nab culprits responsible for this act of terror. When intelligence agencies concluded that the attacks were organized by Osma Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian living in exile under Taliban protection, Afghanistan and Taliban occupied centre stage in US policy. The Clinton administration also envisaged the possible Pakistani role in its operation against terrorism.
The Clinton administration did waste little time when on August 21, 1998, it struck back to take revenge. US Navy warship launched cruise missile against Osama Bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and also targeted a factory in Sudan supposedly linked to the Saudi fugitive.

However, missiles attack drew sharp criticism from Pakistan. As the strike killed 11 Pakistan, because Washington did not inform Pakistan before hand of the attack this was considered by Pakistan as the infringement of its sovereignty because US used air space without informing Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even telephoned Clinton to complain about the US action. There was growing misperception in Islamabad. To end this misperception Gen Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Visited Islamabad to make clear to General Karamat that the missile flying through Pakistani air space were American, not Indian and were aimed at Afghanistan.

As the air strike could not target Osama, US turned towards Pakistan to press the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. Islamabad responded positively but also warned that fiercely held Afghan customs regarding hospitality would render its efforts fruitless. Although, this was an opportunity for Islamabad to gain favour in Washington by arranging for the capture of Osama. However, the action could have costed Sharif dearly both in Pakistan, where
Laden had become an anti US cult hero, and in Afghanistan, friendly Taliban would have been annoyed.

**F-16 ISSUE SOLVED**

The US-Pakistan strategic relations witnessed a thaw in 1998 when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington on December 2, 1998 for his first visit to US as Prime Minister. The visit was arranged in the background when Talbott talks did raise hopes that India and Pakistan are willing to sign the CTBT; this was path breaking news, as both countries had previously ‘spurned’ this. They had agreed to join in multilateral negotiations looking forward a ban on the production fissile material, and more importantly they had expressed willingness in principle to strengthen their control over export of nuclear items.

Pakistanis had great hopes from the Sharif’s visit. It was expected that Clinton administration would ease sanctions, press the IMF to relax its lending terms, clear up the still unresolved F-16 problem and apply greater pressure on India to negotiate over Kashmir.\(^3^3\)

The US-Pak relations dramatically swung up side when President Clinton while greeting Sharif at White House had a pleasant surprise for him, a concrete proposal to solve the F-16 issue. But, this US action was not as simple as it was made out by Clinton administration. Washington become serious only after the
Pakistan formerly moved to initiate legal action against the US government as a last resort to recover their money which they had paid well before the imposition of Pressler Sanction in October 1990. Thus, when justice department hinted that Islamabad was likely to win in legal battle. The Clinton administration decided to solve the issue of F-16 at the earliest to avoid an embarrassment. Moreover, US also accepted a Pakistan suggestion to cover the remaining amount by providing $140 million of wheat and other commodities on grant basis over the coming two years.34

The trip of Sharif marked a significant triumph for Pakistan. The issue of F-16 was resolved after a long eight years when Pressler Amendment was invoked for the first time, in a manner that was satisfactory to Pakistan.

The relations between India and Pakistan reached at its zenith in post Cold War years when Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertook a historic visit in mid February 1999 to mark the resumption of bus service between India and Pakistan. The Clinton administration was obviously delighted over the highly successful visit by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when two countries signed ‘Lahore Declaration’. Since, US always attempted to engage two arch rivals in dialogue in order to improve relations. Lahore Summit raised hopes that tension will reduce between the two countries because finally India-Pakistan understood the dangerous implications of nuclear weapons.35
The US Role in Kargil Conflict

However, Lahore expectations proved short lived Lahore spirit received devastating blow when India realized in May 1999 that a large number of insurgents with Pakistan backing had crossed the line of control in the far north of Kashmir to occupy 15,000 foot positions near Kargil. Given the high altitude and strategic positions held by intruders, it became quite tough to evacuate them. This action of Pakistan to internationalize Kashmir dispute brought the already volatile region on the brink of War.

But the move by Pakistan to draw leverage by Internationalizing Kashmir issue boomeranged and resulted in a major political set back for the Sharif government. Similarly, the government of India was doubly embarrassed because at the one hand, this was a great betrayal by Pakistan of ‘Lahore Declaration’. On the other hand Kargil misadventure was done at the time when India was serious to improve relations with Pakistan. Moreover, the Indian intelligence was caught napping, since Kargil infiltration started taking place well before Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Lahore.36

India reacted forcefully employing massive air power for the first time in Kashmir to evacuate intruders. With little success to India initially, it raised the fears that India would
broaden the conflict by striking across the line of control. This intensified worries in Washington. Clinton administration could not ignore Kargil operation as fighting could widen and spin out control raising the nightmare scenario of war between the two states armed with nuclear weapons.

With the situation in Kargil having all ingredient of war, the US government responded vigorously. President Clinton telephoned Sharif to urge him to have the forces withdrawn. To underline Clinton’s message General Anthony Zini visited Islamabad, brushing aside Pakistan’s claim that it was not directly involved in the Kargil operation and lacked control over the Mujahideen, the US urged Islamabad to ensure that the intruders pulled back across the line of control very soon. This pro-Indian stand of Clinton administration and when even the Chinese were not willing to support the Pakistani position, left Pakistan internationally isolated and Sharif government realized that its gamble had failed.

Now Islamabad was desperate to find a way out of Kargil imbroglio. Sharif expressed of desire to meet Clinton. He visited Washington on July 4, 1999. According to a participant in the talk Nawaz Sharif seemed like a drowning man looking for a miracle, hoping that some how the United States would bail him out. After the long discussion Pakistan accepted Draft Statement which indicated that he would “urge” the Mujahideen to withdraw across the line of control and restart the stalled Lahore process with
India. Pakistan in exchange gained Clinton's promise that he would take an active interest in efforts to address the Kashmir problem.\textsuperscript{39}

The US role in Kargil crisis evoked considerable public attention. According to many commentators it was a paradigm shift in the US policy towards South Asia it was viewed that 'Washington Declaration' signed between Nawaz Sharif and Clinton opened up new vistas for future co-operation between India and the United States.

There was no denying the fact that Washington exerted diplomatic pressure on Pakistan right from the start of the Kargil crisis both at the bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure the withdrawal of intruders from line of control.

However, it would be wrong to perceive that US has acted out of love for India or endorsed India's Kashmir policy. The US is hardly driven by altruism in the matters of international relations. Thus, a paradigm shift in US South Asia policy had not occurred.\textsuperscript{40}

The US had its own reasons to take tough posture against its traditional ally Pakistan. In the first place, the phenomenon of the crumbling of the Pakistan State and its coming under the domination of various extremist groups and a rogue army might have led the US to take a realistic view on Kargil based on its own national security interests, secondly, as President Clinton was in
last year of his term he wanted to ensure a future role for him as ‘trouble shooter’. The joint statement issued by Nawaz Sharif and President Clinton in Washington on July 5 was manifestation of the increasingly significant role that the Clinton administration envisaged to play in what it regard to be “a nuclear flash point”.

The real significance of the joint statement was that the President Clinton would take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption of bilateral efforts between India and Pakistan to resolve all the dispute including outstanding Kashmir dispute. Thus, Pakistan practically succeeded in dragging the US into the Kashmir conflict as an international mediator. This was Islamabad’s strategic ploy to enhance its position in the conflict vis a vis India.

To sum up, the conflagration in Kargil provided the perfect opening for Washington. As the US efforts brought the end of Kargil conflict, the US assumed a de-facto role to play in future Kashmir though not as a mediator. According to Stephan P. Cohen a South Asia expert, the US has a specific role between the two sides as a facilitator. One may not call it mediator, but facilitation is also a form of mediation. Thus, Clinton-Sharif agreement put an extra burden on India to accept US facilitation.

PAKISTAN'S FOURTH MILITARY COUP AND US ATTITUDE

The fallout of the Kargil fiasco appeared very soon on Pakistan political map when on October 12, 1999 Sharif’s
democratically elected government was toppled in blood less Coup d'etat by General Pervez Musharraf. This was reassertion of the military’s dominant role in the Pakistan’s polity after an interval of 11 years. The military this time, however, was able to wrest political power not because the top brass conspired to over throw the civilian government. Rather, the inability of the political elite to manage the political crisis and the gradual erosion of civilian institutions encouraged the military once again to over through the civilian government which stood discredited by the people because of its autocratic style of functioning.  

The United States was presumably well aware of army take over in Pakistan much before it actually took place and the circumstances leading to its occurrence. In fact, Washington was buzzing with a rumour of a possible military tussle between the government of Nawaz Sharif and coup leaders for about a month as Sharif government tried to pin the responsibility on the military for ill-fated Kargil plan. Sharif also anticipated a coup, to avert the threat of coup Prime Minister dispatched his high-profile brother Shahbaz Sharif to Washington, to press for US warning against a military take over. Thus, three weeks before the change over in Pakistan, Clinton administration warned the Pakistan army against taking any extra-constitutional measures and strongly pleaded for the continuance of democratic government. Nawaz Sharif himself attempted a pre-emptive strike against the Army.
Chief General Pervez Musharraf. As the army chief was returning to Karachi from Sri Lanka, the Government announced his dismissal. Moreover, the Karachi airport control tower was instructed not to allow the plane carrying Musharraf to land, even though it was dangerously low on fuel. The episode backfired for Sharif, after the military became aware of the events, reacting swiftly, the army arrested Sharif and his colleague. By the time PIA flight finally landed in Karachi, Musharraf had become Pakistan's chief executive.43

There was scant regret in Pakistan about the departure of Sharif government, rather people hoped that military would bring back the country on right track. There was no resistance, not even any demonstration or murmur from the civilians against the coup. Even National Assembly members belonging to Nawaz Sharif's own party the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) preferred to remain silent.

The reaction in abroad to the coup was of sever criticism. Although, the Clinton administration was well aware of Sharif's falling reputation however, military take over was un-acceptable to Washington as it was against the US support for democracies. The Clinton administration responded strongly, Washington imposed additional sanctions that were legally required in the case of the overthrow of a democratically elected government.44
The seeds of the military takeover were sown during the battle of Kargil when under the pressure of the Clinton administration, Nawaz Sharif agreed to pull out troops much to the opposition of the Army General, concealing a political victory to India. The Pakistan army genuinely felt 'let down' when blame of the Kargil fiasco was imposed on them. The army also took advantage of Nawaz Sharif's alienation from the power base and unpopularity with the masses due to largely autocratic rule, his successive ousting of the President of the Republic, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Former Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat his crack down on the voice of dissent political as well as press, economic doldrums and widespread corruption. In such situation the Army could well understand the mood of the nation and repercussion of their taking over. The army proved right when over two third of the Pakistan's people supported the army takeover.45

The Clinton administration was eager to see the return of democracy in Pakistan but its hope was dashed because General Pervez Musharraf did not give any time frame for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The chief executive made amply clear that he would have to set the county's economy right and deal with the rampant corruption. He further declared that 'real' democracy would be established in Pakistan with provision for accountability of the politicians and devolution of power to Pakistan's four
provinces and that the army would stay 'in power as long as it was absolutely necessary' for putting the country on the right track.

The US-Pakistan relations improved little when Clinton administration somewhat softened its stand towards the military rulers in Pakistan after its initial outpourings against them. The United States officially welcomed General Pervez Musharraf's unilateral military de-escalation and troops withdrawal from its international border with India as well his offer of dialogue to diffuse tension between the two countries. President Clinton himself admitted that he was pleased by what he described as 'conciliatory tone' Pakistan's new military ruler took towards India.

The US Ambassador in Islamabad said that the Washington was heartened by the military ruler's pledge to 'Usher in real democracy' in Pakistan. The World Bank South Asia regional Chief's statement was another evidence that US attitude towards army take over has under gone change. As he said it was not the Bank's look out what type of government a particular country has, but how efficiently and in which sector it uses the loans it receives. The statement was significant because the World Bank is largely controlled by the United States.

As Pakistan has strong connection in the Muslim countries particularly among the oil rich Arab nation. Clinton administration rightly realized the ineffectiveness of sanctions.
Clinton administration also drew the conclusion that isolation of Pakistan for longer period could backfire. As Pakistan could draw the sympathy of the Middle Eastern countries and in turn trigger a clash of interest between the US and the Muslim countries. It was also feared in Washington that Pakistan the lone Muslim country to possess nuclear capability might take a more hard line attitude by assuming the leadership of the Islamic world and pose a threat to the US strategic and economic interest in the Persian Gulf. To avoid such a possibility the Clinton administration opted for what is called in diplomatic jargon “construction engagement”.

THE CLINTON VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA

The US President Bill Clinton visited Islamabad on March 25, 2000, this was the first time a President had been to Pakistan in more than thirty years, after Richard Nixon toured Lahore in August 1959. The expectations from visit in Pakistan was not high because before going to Pakistan US President Bill Clinton had a vary successful visit to India. Meanwhile the murder of the thirty five Sikhs in Kashmir by terrorist to draw the Presidential party’s attention towards Kashmir made matter worse for Pakistan. The Clinton administration reacted strongly to the terrorist activity and stressed that violence was not the way to solve the dispute. Further, he called two countries to respect the line of control. The US even went to the extent of alleging that some elements in the
Pakistani Government were supporting terrorism. This strong rebuke spoiled the party before it was staged and was not the desired way to create friendly environment on the eve of high profile visit by the US President to a disenchanted ally.

However, in contrast to the warning to Pakistani establishment Clinton administration showed perceptible change in US policy towards India during his five days in India. His well crafted address to the Indian parliament was enthusiastically received by the members of Indian Parliament. During his course of visit to New Delhi, Agra, Hydrabad, and Mumbai President kept the Indian policy makers and masses in good humour. The US was now more interested in India because of its huge markets for American Investors. This was a shift in US policy towards New Delhi, as President Clinton did not press India to sign CTBT. Clinton administration completed a successful visit to India "in order to start a new chapter" in Indo-US relations. And he did achieved success in that.

Clinton’s short stop in Islamabad was far from being warm. Since this trip was made at the moment when Islamabad had a military General as head of the State. There was not much expectation from Clinton’s visit in Pakistan because of changing perception of the US towards Pakistan.

Moreover, the President made this trip when there was differing view of policy makers in Washington whether the
President should go to Pakistan or not in prevailing circumstances. There was serious security concerns posed by anti-American terrorist groups, as three months before his trip to Islamabad the terrorist fired rocket at the American Cultural Centre in Islamabad. Further, the presence of dreaded Al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden aggravated the security condition in Pakistan.

Washington was also wary that the visit might put the Presidential stamp of approval on the Musharraf regime and the continued deadlock over the issue of CTBT was another hurdle in his visit to Pakistan. However, finally Clinton visited Pakistan keeping all doubts at bay. The Clinton administration thought keeping Musharraf engaged is must in order to exert any influence on his policies.  

President Clinton had five hour of official visit to Islamabad on March 25, 2000. He had a talks with chief Executive Musharraf on host of issues of bilateral as well as multilateral concern. American President exuded much empathy towards Pakistan and its problems. Although, the substance of his massage was blunt, but he did not criticize Musharraf while stressing that he had come to help a friend in difficulty. Simultaneously, he expressed concern about the direction which Pakistan was going. The US President argued that Pakistan could improve relations with India through bilateral talks. Clinton made it clear that the United
States is prepared to help Pakistan on Kashmir issue but could not mediate in this dispute and that Islamabad had to deal directly with India. Although, Clinton accepted and declared Kashmir is most 'dangerous nuclear flash point' on the world yet could not use his weight because of India's stand of no third party mediation. According to National Security Advisor Berger Pakistan, Chief Executive responded with his own hard line construct on Kashmir “Musharraf obviously has a strong and passionate view” on this issue. Although, the general indicated willingness to deescalate on Kashmir, he still stressed that Pakistan would not act unilaterally.

The next important agenda which Clinton had with Musharraf was Taliban issue. The export of terrorism from Afghanistan and refuge and support given by ruling Taliban regime to Al-Qaida become issue of friction in US-Pakistan foreign relations. Thus, Pakistan's Afghan policy had always been of great importance for US-Pak relations. The US wanted Pakistan to restrain Taliban and urged Taliban to be more forthcoming. Musharraf's response to the Clinton was that Pakistan is ready to help US but stressed how difficult it was to deal with the “people who believe that God is on their side.

The irritants between two countries remained unsolved as earlier. The issue of non-proliferation and conflict over Kashmir could not make progress during the President's visit. As Pakistan
was preoccupied with India and expected Clinton to criticize India’s Kashmir policy. Instead US President categorically stated to the General Pervez Musharraf that there is no military solution to Kashmir. This was rebuke of Kargil misadventure.56

The high point of Clinton’s visit was when he addressed the people of Pakistan and stated that I am here as a friend- a grateful friend who values our long partnership; a concerned friend who cares deeply about the future course of your country; a committed friend who will stand with the people of Pakistan as long as you seek the stable, prosperous, democratic nations of your founders dreams.

He also counted Pakistan’s contribution in rapprochement between China and United States, and Islamabad’s role in withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and co-operation in fight against terrorism.

The US President also expressed concern for democratic government; relations with India. He advised for respect of the line of control and endorsed ‘Lahore Declaration’. Moreover, he was also worried with nuclear proliferation in the region. He said “I ask Pakistan to be leader for nonproliferation. Are you really more secure today than you were before you tested nuclear weapons”? Thus he tried to remind the devastating impact of nuclear war and its negative effect on economic development.57
In the end it can be concluded that by not skipping Pakistan altogether President Clinton shown US interest in Pakistan. People in Pakistan were pleased that President did not ignore their country out rightly. However, as one Pakistan said “this is a very painful thing for us only five hours in Pakistan and five days in India.”\(^5^8\) This was the realization of Pakistan that United States has chosen India and was once more dumping Pakistan.

The US-Pakistan strategic relations did not see any sign of improvement even after the visit of the President Clinton to Pakistan. The Washington’s perception about Islamabad did not change as there was no interlude in the US campaign for restoration of democracy in Pakistan and the US demand for ban on the so called Islamic militants.

Thus, if President Clinton’s visit dealt a serious blow to the expectations that many Pakistani entertained that Washington still had some regard for its former ally in South Asia. The events that followed, such as the exile of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s decision to unilaterally withdraw troops along LOC in Kashmir raised suspicion that Islamabad was caving in under Washington’s pressure.\(^5^9\) The decreasing strategic significance strengthened the perception in Islamabad that India-US relationship is assuming a strategic and military dimension which could pose new challenges to Pakistan.
The September 11 Attacks and the Rediscovery of Pakistan as Frontline State

The fateful events of September 11, 2001 shook the United States to the core. With two hijacked planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, another into the US Military Headquarter at Pentagon. This was the biggest single attack on the US mainland for over two centuries causing massive loss of life and property. The attack on US, the sole super power on the earth had great implications for the regional matrix in South and South West Asia in a most unexpected manner. It appeared that the destiny of nation State in the region had undergone tremendous change. Apart from Afghanistan no other State felt the impact of the crisis more than Pakistan. The policy makers in Islamabad faced over night an act of balancing domestic policy with foreign policy as it posed threat to the very State structure of Pakistan from possible disaster.60

Till the September 11 attack Pakistan was engaged in evolving a strategy for breaking its increasing isolation in 'comity of nation' as a 'failed State'. General Pervez Musharraf led military government was considered an international pariah by many countries including United States of America. But the terrorist attack on WTC brought the sea change in the geo-strategic position of Pakistan. All of sudden Pakistan was 'rediscovered as a frontline State' for the vital role it had to play in the fight against
terrorism. Its own geographical location once brought Pakistan too close to US. It seemed that year 1979 has revisited when after Soviet intervention US discovered Pakistan as ‘front line State’.

President Bush immediately declared “America was now at war against terrorist” and vowed to find and punish those responsible for the attack. Soon Bush administration sought international co-operation in its fight against terrorism. President Bush made it clear that there can be no neutral ground in the new war, the nations were either with the US or with the terrorist.  

The US intelligence agencies as well as media almost immediately pinned the blame on dreaded Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network for the September 11 attack. Since Osama Bin Laden a guest of Taliban government in Afghanistan had long before become nemesis of US, Thus, the focus of the new war swiftly shifted on Afghanistan and in almost equal measures on Pakistan. Initially Washington urged Taliban and put pressure on Pakistan to use its proximity with Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden to US in order to avoid war. But as Taliban rejected US demand to handover its ‘guest’ the attack on Afghanistan became a matter of time.

To access the land locked Afghanistan the US government put immense pressure on General Pervez Musharraf government to support US in its efforts against terrorism. Soon, Pakistan under
great international pressure succumbed and decided to give its ‘unstinted’ co-operation to the United States. With its successful exploitation of the moral outrage and assisted by an extremely vigorous campaign by the government and media. The US succeeded in obtaining widespread support around the world. The UN Security Council unanimously condemned the terrorist attack and supported some kind of retaliation. For the first time in its history North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to invoke article 5 of the treaty. Which declares attack on one member as an attack on all members. The US Congress sanctioned $40 billion at the disposal of the President for the operation ‘enduring Freedom’.

The attack on Afghanistan did not last long. The Taliban left Kabul without much resistance paving the way for formation of broad based government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. The ‘Bonn Accord’ was signed by the representative of all the ethnic factions organized by United States.

Pakistan support to the Taliban in the past if studied deeply reveals that it was the result of logical thinking that there should be a friendly government in Kabul to minimize the threat to Pakistan’s security. To this, however, another dimension was added during the post Soviet struggle for power in Afghanistan when the concept of ‘strategic depth’ was born in the minds of
some ISI planners to overcome the lack of geographical depth against India in case of an armed confrontation, the idea arose that a strategic alliance of some sort with Afghanistan could provide the necessary depth to Pakistan. Thus, this was a pragmatic approach that stemmed from security and strategic considerations.  

For Pakistan Afghan crisis posed both challenges and opportunities. General Musharraf calculated that if Pakistan joins ‘anti terror coalition cobbled together by the United States of America, Pakistan would suddenly find itself in good books of US and other Western Countries. On the other hand if Pakistan did not joins US led coalition it faced risk of being declared a ‘terrorist State’ or supporter of terrorism. Moreover, Musharraf thought that aligning with US in war against terrorism would put massive pressure on India to accommodate Pakistan on Kashmir. It was the best available option to go with US to avoid India’s attempt to isolate Pakistan. Thus, this single decision by military administration unlocked all doors which had till that time been barred to Pakistan. With the reemergence of Pakistan as ‘Front line State’ it received massive economic aid and grants as Bush administration lifted sanctions against Pakistan under section 508 of the foreign aid bill. Thus, issue of democracy, nuclear proliferation and CTBT were relegated to the background.

The Pakistani decision to align with US was not popular with the religious parties and some other politicians, who considered it
sell out of national interest and betrayal of the Taliban whom Pakistan had been nurturing for the last one decade. Anti American and Anti Musharraf demonstrations were organized by extremist elements. Nevertheless, Pakistan permitted the use of its soil, air space by US forces, reluctantly, in the face of US demand, pressure and possible bulling. This decision of government came under much criticism, mainly on account of the government’s capitulation. Thus, Pakistan faced two pronged pressure when religious parties declared that an attack on Taliban is an attack on Islam. There was threat that Pakistan might succumb to an Islamic revolution, dissolve into chaos. But all this proved empty rhetoric and army was able to contain protests against the US campaign within bounds.

The defeat of the Taliban strengthened Musharraf’s domestic as well as international position. In Post September 11, United States treated Pakistan as key working partner, eventually recognizing military regime in Islamabad. Now General Musharraf turned democrat. Further in post Afghan crisis Musharraf wielded more power. He declared himself President in order to increase his legitimacy.

General Pervez Musharraf tried to counter the losses to the economy with appeal to the international community. Almost two decades ago, when confronted with a similar situation, General Zia-ul Haq had openly demanded more aid from Washington in
return for Pakistan's co-operation against Soviet's intervention in Afghanistan. Once again Afghanistan increased the bargaining position of Islamabad. He pointed out that the economic fall out of the war against terrorism fell disproportionately on Pakistan. Musharraf appealed to the international community to help alleviate the situation by arguing that 'we are helping you with your problem, but you need to help us with ours'. The response to Pakistan's plea was positive when Washington announced a $ 1 billion aid package for Pakistan which included $600 million in direct aid and $300 million line of credit through OPEC for its firm investing in Pakistan.

Moreover, Pakistan received aid from other countries too. The European Union cut tariffs and raised the quotas for Pakistani textile exports. Canada converted Pakistan's debt into a social development programme. Japan signed debt rescheduling agreement for $550 million as well as provided smaller amount of direct aid. The international community contributed separately, and very generously, for the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan as US provided $600 million to help them.68

US-Pakistan strategic collaboration in aftermath of September 11, could not fulfill Pakistan's expectation. Pakistan soon after the end of military action, realized the US interest in Pakistan was fading as America achieved its goal. Within a year
Pakistan was put under pressure to change the country's policy against its will. With President Bush urging Pakistan to stop infiltration and export of terror it made clear that Pakistan has not acquired any leverage vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan mistook American support in post 9/11 as a blanket endorsement for its policies vis-à-vis India as if the new nexus with Washington had a strategic dimension as well. Further, Pakistan failed to appreciate Indian ability to link its goals regarding Kashmir with the US led "War on Terrorism." Pakistan also failed to secure debt write off and greater market access particularly from the US.

An assessment of the political, economic gain received by Pakistan in the wake of Afghan crisis reveals an imbalance. The losses far outweigh the benefits because the expected US support is not forthcoming.

The most significant impact of the Afghan campaign on the United States has been that the US has gained military presence in the most strategically volatile region. Not only has US gained military foot hold in Afghanistan but, it also provided US presence in Afghanistan. Which bolstered US strategic position in South and South West Asia. The geo-political location of Afghanistan makes US stakes more high in the area. Now US can supervise the activities of "Rogue states" Iran, Iraq, China and Central Asia from
a place, which borders these countries. Thus, the follies of the Taliban threw the whole region into turmoil and provided United States opportunities to entrench in the region. With US firmly entrenched in Afghanistan both militarily and economically, Pakistan's strategic 'depth theory' became irrelevant.\textsuperscript{70}

The Afghan crisis and the dramatic change in US policy towards the military regime in Pakistan reveals bluntly how national interest is the most potent driving force behind the United States policies in international relations. The US rhetoric about human rights and democracy proved to be a hoax.
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63. Ibid. p. 48.


CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have delved into the dynamics of complex US-Pakistan strategic relations. On the basis of this discussion one can now attempt to draw some broad conclusions about the factors responsible for shaping the nature of this strategic relationship and the possibilities of cordiality and causes of friction and tension in the foreseeable future.

The US-Pakistan strategic relations over the years have had the rollercoaster character, marked by so many ups and downs. The relations have seen number of stages, initial hesitation, alignment, detachment, tilt, disenchantment, re-alignment and re-detachment and lately the rediscovery of a frontline state.

United States had emerged from World War II as the world’s strongest and most prosperous country and soon become the leader of the Anti-Communist bloc in the Cold War. Henceforth its policy revolved around the dominant objective of containment of international communism all over the world. This demanded strategic nexus and military pacts to accomplish the global security system against communism.

The United States having taken measures to contain the advancement of communism in Europe, now turned its attention towards Asia. Initially, Washington showed only modest interest in the Pakistan, and it attempted to have closer ties with larger and
more important India. But as India chose a non-alignment policy, Pakistan became an attractive potential partner in security arrangement for containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Pakistan's geo-political location played significant role in concluding strategic relations with United States. Pakistani perception of aligning with US was totally different. Since Pakistan was in frantic quest for an ally who could remove its sense of insecurity visavis India. It thought that friendship with US would bolster their defence. Thus, both countries needed each other, though with divergent policy perceptions and orientations. The United States was guided by its global policy of containment and Pakistan was motivated by its perceived threat from India.

Pakistan's foreign policy makers took advantage of the many opportunities inherent in the Cold War environment by using the right rhetoric in the right direction and at the opportune time. Pakistan extended unstinted support to the US stand during the Korean War and subsequently when the latter signed peace treaty with Japan. The outright opposition of India and Pakistan's unequivocal support at critical juncture when US prestige was at stake, certainly left deep impression on the mind of Americans. All these development led to the US estrangement from India and intimacy towards Pakistan.
Pakistan’s pre-occupation with India kept it running for support all over the world to strengthened its defence. Pakistan entered into military pacts (CENTO, SEATO) and concluded mutual defence pacts with US which resulted into Pakistan obtaining massive military aid. The supply of arms to Pakistan become issue of friction when it used US arms against India in the 1965 war, US placed an embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan because these arms were primarily meant for use against the communist countries. Thus, Pakistan became conscious of inherent dangers of over reliance on single source of supply of weapons. Pakistan established a new military relationship with communist China; which ultimately become ‘trusted ally’ of Pakistan in late 60’s and 70’s. Similarly, when Pakistan did not get enough support from US and China during 1971 War with India, Pakistan joined non-alignment. Pakistan too frequently shifted its allies because of its fickle friendship with US.

Infact, Pakistan and US had their own preoccupation and priorities. The former was too obsessed with India from which emanated its threat perception that India could destroy it. Unfortunately this conviction grew stronger when India become instrumental in the loss of East Pakistan in December 1971. Similarly, United States was always preoccupied with Cold War rivalry. It saw every move of Soviet Union with skepticism. Pakistan was never on the top of its priority. The US was a global
power and economically most advanced. Pakistan although an important Muslim state was economically poor regional power whose security interest did not extend much beyond its neighbours India, Afghanistan, Iran and China. Thus, it was “a union of unequals”.

US Pakistan relations had been bedeviled even in the seventies. US imposed Symington-Glenn Amendment to security Assistant Act which forbade US military and economic aid to any country engaged in acquisition or production of nuclear weapons. Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with the result that all military aid to Pakistan was frozen.

However, the fall of the Shah regime in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the same year produced new glue to bind the two countries together. The Soviet adventure in Afghanistan become ‘turning point’ for Pakistan-US strategic relations. Pakistan geo-strategic landscape led the American policy makers to ‘rediscover’ the strategic importance of Pakistan. The Carter administration emphasized Pakistan’s new role as ‘Front Line State’ against the possible Soviet expansion. The past deterioration in bilateral relations came in for reappraisal. The change in US policy underlined that whenever and whereever US national interest lies it would not hesitate to take U-turn in order to achieve its objective but once its goal was accomplished it would leave Pakistan in the lurch.
The Afghan crisis strengthened Zia’s bargaining position which was reflected when he rejected $ 400 million aid offer as mere ‘peanuts’. President Zia infact thought the leaders of the United States were in a state of panic after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that was an opportune time for him to extract the maximum commitment from them for more reliable and durable relations in future.

The strategic and security relations received great boost during Reagan years. United States provided massive military and economic aid to Pakistan in order to check Soviet expansion. $ 3.2 billion aid package was extended and it was to be spread over 1981-87. Moreover, US Congress cleared another $ 4.2 billion military and economic aid package for Pakistan for second spell of six years (1987-92). Beside this Pakistan received many sophisticated and extremely lethal weapons including F-16 fighter aircraft from USA.

US- Pakistan co-operated in Geneva negotiation held under the UN auspices to find a solution to the Afghan conflict. However, soon smooth course of Pakistan US close co-operation came under serious strain on the question of formation of an interim government in Kabul, prior to the signing of the Geneva Accord. Pakistan refused to sign the accord unless there was prior agreement on interim government in Kabul. The differences were so serious that Islamabad expressed frustration over American
attitude and exhibited a sense of betrayal at the hands of United States. Nevertheless, the Geneva Accord in April 1988 and the subsequent Soviet pullout in Feb 1989 were the obvious results of successful Pakistan-US collaboration over a decade on Afghan issue. It could be concluded that collaboration on Afghan issue was more designated and pursued to suit American interests than Pakistan.

Pakistan-US strategic relations radically altered in the Post Afghan conflict or in Post Cold War period. The disintegration of Soviet Union and subsequent end of Cold War brought rapid change in international scenario. In ‘new world order’ the unrivalled super power abandoned its Cold War global security strategies and with it Pakistan’s strategic significance diminished in US military thinking. Now Pakistan left to face the post Afghan civil war on its own. It shattered Pakistan’s dream of acquiring ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s attempted rapprochement with USA fell apart during Gulf War even though it has provided all possible support to US. The bilateral relations received further set back when in a surprise move the US administration on October 1, 1990 suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan under the 1985 Pressler sanctions following renewed fears that Pakistan had developed nuclear weapons. Although, for more than a decade, the US officials found reasons to look the other way while Pakistan
moved steadily closer to becoming a nuclear power, which was particularly true only during the War in Afghanistan, when Pakistan served a key US purpose against Soviet Union. But after the end of Cold War Washington was not to turn a blind eye on Pakistan.

Pakistan strived hard to wriggle out of stringent Pressler Law. A number of official visits were undertaken by Pakistan to pursue and convince that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons but all those efforts fell on deaf ears. When Pakistani policy makers felt that they would not prevail over their patrons on resumption of economic and military aid, they tactfully tried to link up the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and Kashmir dispute together.

Benazir visit in 1995 to United States proved fruitful for Pakistan as she got commitment by Clinton administration that US would not abandon Pakistan. This conferred a strategic dimension to US-Pak relationship. She also succeeded in convincing US that Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan.

The passage of Brown Amendment in October 1995 brought great respite for Pakistan. It cleared the way for resumption of American arms supply to Pakistan and provided an aid package worth of $ 370 million under provision of the Hank Brown Amendment.
The passage of the Hank Brown Amendment renewed US interest in Pakistan because Clinton administration considered Pakistan an important partner in safeguarding its interest in the Gulf on the Eastern Flank of the region. Washington also perceived that strong Pakistan is essential to counter its threat perception regarding Iran-Iraq.

The US Pakistan relations during the Clinton’s second term were marred by Pak’s obsession with India. Taliban factor and nuclear issue caused friction between the two countries. But efforts were put in to improve relations. Secretary of state Madeline Albright came to Pakistan but this visit was in contrast to the Shultz’s visit at the climax of Afghan crisis in 1983.

One of the major irritants between US–Pakistan has been nuclear weapons. In bilateral relations US as a boss always tried to dictate Pakistan’s nuclear policy. However, Pakistan nuclear policy makers ignored all the allurement and threat of US when in May 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. US imposed sanctions against Pakistan under 1994 non-proliferation act. Thus, Pakistan lost an opportunity to take advantage of India’s misadventure.

The Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan raised the specter in the United States that conflict over Kashmir could trigger the first use of nuclear weapons. Finally, American intervened to save the situation in South Asia from going out of hand.
The President Clinton's visit to Pakistan in year 2000 did not bring any perceptible change in relations as both countries differed on major issues such as Kashmir dispute, Pakistan's Taliban policy and question of terrorism and democracy. The fateful events of September 11, 2001 did recast the regional matrix in South and South West Asia in a most unexpected manner. The destiny of nation states in the region have undergone a change unlikely to be reversed in near future. Apart from Afghanistan no other state has felt the impact of the events more than Pakistan where ruling elite has had to carry out acrobatic maneuvers in its policy to prevent the very state structure of Pakistan from possible disaster. All of sudden Pakistan's geo-strategic significance was rediscovered by United States as a 'front line state' in fight against international terrorism. Thus, Pakistan's geographical location once again brought it closer to its erstwhile benefactor. It seemed that year 1979 has revisited. To access land locked Afghanistan the United States came to realize Pakistan's inevitability. All past deterioration in the relations came in for reappraisal. Pakistan joined anti terror coalition to end its isolation and avoid being declared terrorist state. More importantly to deny India any opportunity to group with America against Pakistan.

The future course of US-Pakistan relations is hazardous to predict because of wide swing of the past half-century. What we can note are certain constant factors that will remain important.
Geography will continue to give Pakistan strategic importance as the juncture of Western, Southern and Central Asia. There are three reasons why geo-strategic location of Pakistan will be important to the US. To tackle the growing influence of Russia-China-India in the region and preempt China, Iran, India axis. Pakistan’s geo-political proximity to the Central Asian Republics and Middle East is also a plus for it. The US needs to garner support of a moderate Muslim country to fight Islamic terrorism. As Pakistan is a leading Islamic state, the coming of an extremist Islamic regime in Islamabad would have profound negative impact not only on the sub-continent, but throughout the Islamic World. US interest lies in avoiding such a development.

Since India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states. How Islamabad and New Delhi manage their nuclear rivalry will have an implication far beyond the subcontinent. Averting a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent will be a key US policy goal. This will keep Pakistan and US engaged in the years to come. The future course of the US-Pakistan strategic relations would also depend on whether the interest of the two countries are complementary or divergent. Further, American assistance to Pakistan would depend on the utility of Islamabad to promote US foreign policy objectives. It seems Afghanistan is going to loom large in near future on bilateral relation as both countries have agreed to fight against the menace of terrorism.
It must be clearly understood by US-Pakistan policy makers that to establish reliable, creditable and durable relations both countries have to leave all real or imaginary apprehensions, fears suspicions and mistrust. Irritants should be removed through diplomacy, cooperation, negotiation and attitude of give and take. US has greater responsibility to carry burden of relations because of its power and influence. It is only then and then alone that a lasting, durable, strategic relations beneficial for both can be ensured. Hence, a long term objective of conciliation and strategic friendship should not be lost sight of which is essential for peaceful co-existence.
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