GILBERT RYLE'S TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy

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ALIGARH (INDIA)
1996
DEDICATED

TO THE SWEET MEMORY OF MY GRANDFATHER

HAJI ABDUL RAB
This is to certify that the work embodied in this dissertation entitled "GILBERT RYLE'S TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT" is the original research work carried out by Ms. Darakhshan Jabeen under my supervision. It is suitable for submission for the award of M.Phil. Degree in Philosophy.

(Sanaullah Mir)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It gives me immense pleasure to express my profound gratitude and thanks to my learned supervisor Dr. Sanaullah Mir, Deptt. of Philosophy, A.M.U. Aligarh, for his excellent, sympathetic and inspiring guidance and constant encouragement throughout the course of this dissertation. His wife Sara Begum has given me love and treated me with great care. I acknowledge my gratitude to her as well.

I owe profound gratitude to Professor M. Rafique (Chairman), Deptt. of Philosophy for constantly inspiring me during my stay at Aligarh. My sincere gratitude is also due to all my teachers, specially to Mr. Naushad Husain, Mr. M. Muquim and Dr. Tariq Islam whose encouragement was a tremendous moral support to me.

My grandparent and parents have blessed me throughout my years at Aligarh. My brothers and sisters have stood by me through thick and thin. I am beholden to them all.

My Uncle, Professor Mahmudul Haque and his wife have been very kind to me and treated me like their daughter. I am deeply thankful to them.

I am thankful to Mukhtar Apa who has been deeply loving and kind to me. Mr. Anwar Saleem has
been helpful and courteous. I also express my sincere thanks to him and other office members of the department.

My friends, especially, Shabnam, Rubby, Naseem, Parvez, Altaf, Aftab, Azad and Athar have been nice, and helpful in various ways. All of them deserve my thanks and compliments.

Kids at home especially Adil, Amil, Bilal, Faisal, Jamal, Yasir, Zaid and Ali are things of beauty and have given me numerous hours of joy. I feel privileged to record my love to them.

ALLAH alone is besought for help and on Him alone we depend.

Mr. H.K. Sharma deserves my thanks for quick and impeccable typing.

Date: May 06, 1996

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CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

(A) HUME AND KANT

The ancient and medieval philosophers conceived philosophy to be a superscientific enterprise. They deemed it to be the most fundamental of sciences, exploring deep and profound truths. The classical philosophers, despite their originality and depth of treatment were not specifically conscious of methodological questions pertaining to the validation of philosophical discourse. Consequently, their contributions in terms of numerous philosophical theories and systems sadly lacked in methodological clarity and, subsequently inspired great epistemological and methodological debates.

While advancing various theories and systems of philosophy, the underlying assumption of ancient and medieval philosophers was that they could explore the nature and structure of natural, human and divine orders by advancing arguments or reasons. Such questions as origin and destiny of the universe, the status of man in cosmic scheme of things and the nature of ultimate reality or God could be definitively answered by advancing rational arguments. Human reasoning was invested with extra-ordinary powers. In fact, they thought that reason could prove their doctrinal thesis and correspondingly disprove the
contentions launched by rival philosophers. For example, the medieval Christian philosophers could forward the so-called cosmological, ontological, and teleological proofs in order to conclusively demonstrate the existence of God. The veridicality and certainty of external world was also sought to be established by means of arguments. The proponents and followers of various religions put up strong theological defences of their respective beliefs and values.

These philosophers were deeply speculative by their training and temperament and could not appreciate that any factual information could be attained only by sustained observations and rigorous experimentations. They were largely oblivious of the fact that their self-professedly metaphysical contentions were impossible of resolution by means of speculative arguments. However, in accordance with their own assumptions, the philosophers forwarded various theoretical statements which violated our widely held beliefs. For example, philosophers brought out such formulations as; 'Time is unreal', 'The external world depends upon perception', 'The phenomenal world is an imitation of the metaphysical world', 'Matter does not exist', etc. The philosophers who formulated such statements assumed that they were forwarding true information with regard to such categories as 'time', 'world', 'Matter' etc.
Throughout the long historical career of philosophy, it seems that there has been widespread methodological confusion. Philosophers were so busy in formulating various systems of philosophy that they had little time or inclination to pause and critically evaluate their suppositions and assumptions. For example, the classical rationalists assumed reason to be the unfailing source as well as the criterion of knowledge. Rationalists deemed reason to be a consistent and competent authority to validate and justify all knowledge - claims whatsoever. The cosmos itself was a rationally ordered scheme and reason was capable of understanding the rationale of the cosmic order. In spite of a radical critique launched by classical skeptics and empiricists against the supposedly omnicompetent reason, rationalists continued to proliferate such theories as Idealism, Materialism, Monism, Pantheism, etc. for thousands of years. Pathagoras, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Acquins, Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wollf, Hegel, etc. continued to formulate their doctrines in accordance with rationalistic assumptions.

The rationalist assumptions were forcefully attacked by modern British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The Cartesian theory of innate powers of human reason was rejected by John Locke, who argued that our human mind is, to begin with, a 'tabularasa', i.e.
clean state on which subsequent experience inscribes countless ideas.\(^1\) However it was 18th century Scottish Philosopher, David Hume, who launched a radical empiricistic attack on rationalistic presuppositions. Following Locke and Berkeley, Hume refutes to accepts the tenteres of rationalistic philosophy.

For Hume countless daily sense-impressions were the only source of knowledge available to man. However, sense-impressions do give us only probable knowledge. They cannot disclose to us any knowledge pertaining to some material or spiritual substance. Hume did not accept the assumption that the so-called knowledge - claims supposedly arrived at through reason were necessary and universal, as ideas are, ultimately, traceable to sense-impressions and therefore devoid of any necessity. Hume's analysis of 'Causality' and 'Induction' struck at the roots of rationalist epistemology, for Hume contended that sense-experience gives us no warrant to accept the notion of a necessary causal connection or the validity of inductive generalizations. Experience presents us with particulars, that is, with separate and detached instances of sense-impressions. Experience does not provide us any universal and necessary relation between say A and B. It may furnish us with numerous separate instances of 'A' attended by 'B'. It may even go so far as to offer us "invariable sequences" in each of which 'A' is followeld by 'B'. But each experience 'B' following 'A' is always something separate
and distinct from the next. Sense-experience tells us "'A then B', 'A then B'"; and so on. Due to habit, says Hume, we insert between 'A' and 'B' fictitious necessary connection which we call "causal relation" - and conclude that "A causes B". But we do not find this necessary connection in experience. Experience gives us separate occurrence of "'This A is B', 'This A is B', 'This A is B'", etc. After a while we conclude that, "All 'A' is 'B'", and use this generalization to predict that future 'A's' will be 'B's'. But Hume tells us that although habit may often incline us to such general conclusions, yet we must admit that they are not given to us in our observation of natural bodies.

Thus by pushing Locke's and Berkeley's analysis of knowledge to extreme conclusions, Hume shows that we are incapable of arriving at universal causal connections or inductive generalisations by recourse to sense-experience which happens to be our source of knowledge. There are no good reasons to justify our beliefs in the existence of those universal and necessary connections to which we appeal to justify inductive and causal inferences. Inductive and causal beliefs have no rational justification. We hold them because inclinct, habit and custom strongly incline us to do so. Skepticism is unavoidable as all over epistemic beliefs are indefensible.
The skepticism, advanced by David Hume was seen by German philosopher Immanuel Kant as striking at the very foundations of philosophy and science. Kant was convinced that knowledge was impossible of attainment without presupposing the validity of universal or general judgements; the judgements that are arrived at by recourse to inductive generalizations or causal inferences. In order to overcome Humean Skepticism, Kant felt we will have to demonstrate how those universal and necessary connections are rationally justifiable which according to Hume have no basis in sense-experience. Kant felt it was crucially important that philosophers of science establish the validity of synthetic a 'priori judgements'. The validity of analytic a priori judgements was possible by definitional analysis of subject and predicate terms, whereas synthetic a 'posteriori' judgements could be verified by means of observation and experimentation. However that does not solve our problem. The analytic a 'priori' propositions are certain but not informative. The synthetic a 'posteriori' judgements are informative but not certain. We could refute Humean skepticism only if we can show some statements to be both certain as well as informative. Such statements have got to be synthetic a 'priori'. Only if there are judgements that are simultaneously synthetic as well as a 'priori', can it be shown, Kant felt, that even if knowledge starts with sense-experience, it does not originate totally from it. The
sense-experience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of knowledge.\textsuperscript{4}

Kant tried to respond to the above problem in the following manner: The universal and necessary quality of causal, inductive, and other judgements of a general nature is determined by the structure of mind itself. The mind is not a passive recipient of sense-impressions as held by British sensationalists. Our mind is dynamic and active and endowed with certain innate forms which organise and interpret our scattered sense-impressions.\textsuperscript{5}

The data presented to us by sense-experience are first oriented in space and time. Space and time are not objectively existing phenomena independent of our consciousness. Space and time are forms of human mind. These forms impress themselves on all human experience, thus co-ordinating the data of experience in space and time. Furthermore, these sense-experiential data as oriented and co-ordinated in space and time, are categorised or classified through categories of our understanding. Human understanding possesses twelve innate forms or categories. The universality and necessary connectedness of our judgements are derived from our understanding. The raw material supplied by experience when categorised by the operations of our categories of understanding results into universal and necessary judgements. For example, experience provides us with such
individual instances as "X then y", "x then y" etc. Henceafter, the category of causality interprets these data supplied by experience and consequently such universal judgements as 'x causes y' or 'Quinine cures malaria' are formulated. Other general or universal judgements too are, a function of other categories upon the data provided by experience. Now since percepts are ordered by concepts which owe their nature to the structure of the mind, all our knowledge is unavoidably conditioned by our faculties of understanding. We cannot know what the external world is as it exists in - itself i.e. independently of human understanding. Things-in-themselves or noumena are unknowable. We can only know the appearances or phenomena revealed to us through the operation of the categories of understanding upon this unknowable world. Concepts formed without any basis in sense-experience are bereft of any reality. However, percepts without the ordering and interpreting role of concepts will be of no avail in advancing knowledge.

Kantian account of human knowledge did not only clash with British phenomenalistic epistemology but had in store serious embarrassment for continental speculative rationalists as well. To the dismay of British empiricists Kant argued that categories of understanding are the presuppositions and preconditions of all empirical knowledge and thus the so-called logically consistent
skeptical conclusions have precisely crept up because of Hume's insufficient grasp of the logic and dynamics of human understanding and to the utter frustration of continental rationalists Kant pointed out that employment of the a priori and pure categories of understanding independent of the data supplied by sense-experience is illegitimate and results in antinomical formulations.  

The whole point of Kantian epistemology was to determine whether philosophers were justified in raising huge abstract and conceptual structures and whether it was in any way fruitful to undertake such assignments.

The philosophical enquiry of Kant quite clearly and unequivocally refuses to admit the validity of metaphysical claims pertaining to self, universe and God etc. The so-called metaphysical truths are what Kant terms as transcendental illusions. Such illusions have their roots in the essence of pure reason and so they crop up unavoidably.

However, it is one thing to recognise that reason, by virtue of its own logic, is unavoidably led to pose metaphysical questions and set forth their metaphysical answers, it is quite a different thing to investigate whether these questions are justified, i.e. whether there are assertions that are not only synthetic but also a priori, universally valid and necessarily true. The possibility of synthetic a priori propositions in
mathematics and physics; in the former due to space and time being the preconditions of all our cognition and in the latter because of the categories of understanding regulating our variable and contingent sense-experiences, misleads metaphysicians to profound synthetic a priori claims in metaphysics also. These claims being avowedly transphenomenal, are not susceptible to verification or falsification by any form of experience.

Thus, while Kant offers a way out to justify our belief in the existence of objective and scientific knowledge of the world; his theory of knowledge or critical philosophy rejects the grounds for any universally acceptable, methodologically informed and objectively standardised metaphysical scheme delineating the 'reality' of God, Soul and the Universe etc. 10

(B) THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SCENARIO:

The nineteenth century was a period of economic, political and scientific progress. However during this century, there was wide-spread reaction against metaphysical system-building, thanks to Humean and Kantian epistemological investigations, triggered off, in their turn, by the ever-growing body of empirical scientific conclusions within the framework of the mechanistic world-view outlined in the discovery of universal physical laws by Sir Issac Newton.
The post-Kantian critique of metaphysics in Europe was launched by different thinkers from diverse backgrounds and from various angles. August Comte (1797-1854) was the first advocate of the ideology of positivism. He postulated human cultural evolution to have passed through three main stages, viz; the theological, the metaphysical, and the positivistic. Regarding the theological stage as fictitious and metaphysical stage as abstract, Comte characterized the modern period as positive stage of human history. At this stage man outgrows his quest for ultimate causes and absolute explanation and instead confines himself to empirical research and experimental findings. Comte stood for scientific, methodological and empirical investigations. All metaphysical speculation regarding the nature of reality that radically goes beyond any possible events that could either support or refute such transcendent knowledge - claims, is to be avoided as fruitless and pointless quest for certainty. In this way, the positivistic, secular, antitheological and anti-metaphysical views of Comte led to methodological interrogation of philosophy in twentieth century.  

J.S. Mill (1806-1873) was deeply interested in logical and epistemological issues in philosophy. In his logic, Mill argued that the major premise of a syllogism is itself an inductive generalization and therefore a deductive conclusion therefrom is not a new piece of
information. A particular case is restored from a general proposition by means of a deductive inference. Induction is the only source of substantive general propositions. A deductive inference discovers only the implication of verbal statements. However, the inductive procedure is concerned not so much with statements as with facts and it moves from an observation of particular facts to an understanding of general truth. Thus J.S. Mill kept alive the empiricist epistemological tradition of Britain and outspokenly argued against the possibility of a purely rationalist account of knowledge. 12

Darwin (1809-1882) gave a naturalistic account of the origin and development of the human life. The fundamental contention of Darwin is that different species are involved in a stiff competition in their struggle for existence. In this struggle certain varieties of animals survive and multiply while some others perish. Darwin postulated that living species have to struggle against many disadvantageous conditions. In the course of the evolution, this struggle assumed a variety of forms. Species that are not capable of adopting to the circumstances in this way find themselves killed off, and those which succeed in adjusting themselves survive. The species of animals existent at present, have come to be what they are as a result of a long process of development in the course of their structures have been
profoundly modified. They owe their being to the fact that they proved to be the fittest to survive in their struggle for existence. Man too has passed through the painful course of biological evolution, competition and survival. The struggle for existence has eventually sharpened man's wits and conferred certain physical advantages upon him which enabled him successfully to modify environment to his own advantage.

This naturalistic explanation of life necessitated thorough revision of our metaphysical and moral beliefs sanctified by religious world-views and other numerous theological interpretation. The Darwinian account of biological evolution led to serious re-examination of our metaphysical and religions ideas and concepts. 13

For Karl Marx (1818-1883), history is a struggle between classes, and classes, are defined by the relationships of their members to the productive system. History is nothing but an account of the struggle between masters and slaves, feudal lords and serfs, capitalists and proletarians. Every class, develops its own ideology in keeping with its interests and economic standing in the society. At any given period, the ruling ideas are the ideas of the class that happens to rule. The ideas of the ruling class as interpreted by the supportive intellectuals, are defenses of its privileged position in
society. Conversely, the exploited class develops its own ideology. They want to ventilate their grievances through an alternative ideology which is always antithetical to the ruling philosophy. Subsequently, there is an all-out war between the ruling and ruled class in which ideas are weapons along with direct and violent action. Thus ideas can have both a conservative as well as a revolutionary function. However, the Marxian analysis of ideas as being class-based and motivated by economic interests and considerations, robbed metaphysics of much of its sheen as well as clan and Marxism become one of the foremost antimetaphysical movements in nineteenth century.14

Kierkegaard (1813-1855) developed a powerful critique of all system metaphysics, pointing out that the concrete richness of life cannot be comprehended within an abstract conceptual system. He declared that the Hegelian attempt to systematise the whole of existence in a neat conceptual formulation was selfdefeating as existence is not an inert state but a changing process. Hegel attempts a harmonious dialectical conciliation of all contradictions. He resorts to imposing universal resolutions upon the unavoidable antinomies which characterise an authentic individual existence.

The dilemma stem from the concrete situation of an individual's life. All abstract and conceptual models are as best possibilities. Only a willing, struggling and
striving individual can, by trying to realise any specific possibility, confer any reality or existence upon it. What we do, depends upon our willing and not upon our understanding.\textsuperscript{15}

The metaphysician's misplaced trust in the power of the rational argument drives him to establish an absolute and final system. All metaphysical systems are generalisations, reductions and conceptual illusions. Philosophical theories and theological doctrines are not scientifically verifiable or logically demonstrable propositions. So, instead of devising abstract metaphysical systems, Philosophy should address itself to the task of illuminating concrete individual existence. In so doing, philosophy cannot achieve any universally acceptable system of ideas, but it can help an individual in arriving at that passionate inner commitment to something that is objectively uncertain but is the highest truth at personal level.

In this way Kierkegaard questioned the very Locus standi and modus operandi of classical and medieval mode of doing philosophy. The revival of Kierkegaards' approach by 20th century German and French existentialists emerged as a strong protest against conventional metaphysics.\textsuperscript{16}

Ernest Mach (1838-1916) was a philosopher of Science. He was interested in the clarification of the
logic of scientific conclusions. He was influenced by David Hume's epistemological analysis. Accepting Humean impressions as the basic elements or what he called sensations, Mach developed his version of empiricism known as sensationism.

Mach maintains that our countless experiences of phenomena generate in us an urge to systematically understand them and to communicate them to others. In the process, we are led to looking for connections and relations between various kinds of elements and trying to understand them not in isolation but in their total contextual background. Thus emerges the unitary conception of the world, which serves as the basis of all scientific inquiry. All natural phenomena can be described, understood and communicated through observation. Sense-experience is the source of all scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be a priori. It need not be demonstrated or proved. Verification via observation is the surest method of establishing scientific conclusions.

It was a radical methodological departure worked out by Ernest Mach, inspiring twentieth century logical positivists to launch a very powerful antimetaphysical movement between two world wars.17

Besides these thinkers, there were other nineteenth century philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Feurbach, Herbert Spencer, Whilliam James, Nietzsche etc., who
powerfully and radically moulded our conception of philosophy from an all-pervading superscience to an open-ended methodological analysis of human situation, human existence and human language etc. The rise of human sciences such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, linguistics, etc., during nineteenth century also led to increasing delimitation of the jurisdiction of philosophy and instigated philosophers to undertake a fresh methodological assessment of their ontological, cosmological and axiological propositions. The phenomenon of perennial philosophical disagreement also induced philosophers to understand the nature of philosophical arguments in the light of contemporary methodological imperatives.

(C) THE ANALYTICAL TURN:

The irresolvability of philosophical disagreements unavoidably persuaded philosophers to take a fresh look at the logic and methodology of philosophical discourse. The ever-increasing standardisation of natural sciences mainly achieved by experimental method and the adoption of scientific methodology by social sciences with a view to study social, political, economic, psychological and historical questions in 19th century also inspired philosophers to re-examine the very project of philosophy, especially that of metaphysical philosophy. Therefore,
Instead of spinning new philosophical theories, they engaged themselves in bringing out the nature of philosophy by determining the origin, genesis and function of philosophical discourse.

The analytical approach to philosophy or the linguistic analysis of philosophical problems constitutes a very powerful critique of philosophy. It is a drastic revision of the superscientific pretensions of traditional philosophy. The pioneers of philosophical analysis were George Edward Moore and Bertrand Russell. They designed a trend of doing philosophy which, despite themselves, evolved into a radical thesis about philosophy and radically altered the very raison d'être, Locus standi and modus operandi of philosophy in twentieth century.¹⁸

The analytical approach to philosophy tries to analyse the statements, arguments, proofs, theories, and systems worked out by various philosophers. It stands for deeper and fuller understanding of the role of various uses of language in the origin, genesis, and development of philosophical theories. Linguistic analysts are suspicious that there is something wrong at the very bottom of philosophical language. They allege that philosophers divest ordinary words of their conventional use and superimpose upon them extraordinary philosophical uses and meanings. Therefore, the logic of philosophical language needs to be probed.
Analytical philosophers stress that the language of philosophical theories needs to be clarified with a view to resolve the perennial controversies going on in philosophy. The central contention of linguistic philosophers is that philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved either by reforming language or by understanding more about the language we use. The underlying assumption is that linguistic factors play crucial role in the formation and sustenance of philosophical disputes. In view of the same neither empirical research nor logical deduction help us in the resolution of philosophical problems. The only way to grasp the dynamics of philosophical disagreement is to carefully analyse the discourse employed by philosophers.

Philosophical analysis is not interested in defending or rejecting any philosophical system. Philosophers work out various theories or systems. Philosophical analysis as such tries to be neutral, treating all theories with equidistance and detachment. The job of philosophical analysis is to bring out the merits and demerits of various philosophical theories in the light of accepted or acceptable methodological criteria. Philosophical analysts do not formulate substantive philosophical theories themselves. Rather they try to examine the meaning and function of such statements as constitute various philosophical theories. For example, a philosophical analyst will not formulate or expound such
philosophical statements as: "God is the ultimate ground of the universe", "The external physical world is Maya", "Atman is Brahman", etc. A philosophical analyst tries to explore the uses or meanings of multiple philosophical utterances or terms. His concern is to find out the logical status of various philosophical claims or statements. The following statements by Ludwig Wittgenstein examplify as to what analytical statements are in contradistinction to substantive philosophical judgements:

A. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into statements about their constituents and into propositions that describe complexes completely". (TLP-2.0201).

B. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions". (TLP-5(1)).

C. "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". (TLP-5.6).

D. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness". (PI, SECT 225).

E. "Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical propositions, but rather in the clarifications of propositions". (TLB-4.112(4)).

F. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". (PI, SECT-109).
The above statements are not of philosophy but about philosophy. They do not side with any philosophical theory. Rather they project a 'theory of philosophy', they are not philosophical statements but statements on philosophy. They are not theories about such philosophical concepts as 'Time', 'Matter', 'Reality', 'Truth', and 'Beauty', etc; such as, "Time is unreal", "Matter does not exist", "Beauty is objective", etc., respectively are. They are remarks or observations on the nature of philosophical propositions or about philosophy itself. They constitute an analysis or evaluation of philosophical discourse. There aim is to bring out the nature of philosophical theories. They are not an addition to the philosophical theories advanced by classical, medieval and modern philosophers. In a word these statements are metaphilosophical rather than philosophical statements.

Accordingly, the philosophical analysts do not ask such questions as: "What is Reality?", "What is the nature of the universe?", "What is the knowledge?", "What is truth?", "What is Time?", "What is Freedom?", etc; rather they pose such fundamental methodological questions as: "What is the nature of Philosophy?", "Are philosophical statements cognitive or non-cognitive, analytic or synthetic?", "What is the meaning of a philosophical statement?", "How are philosophical words used?", "Can philosophy ever be as universal and objective
as Mathematics or Physics, or, if not, what is the nature of philosophical disagreements?", "What facture are responsible for the rise of philosophical disagreements and how can they be resolved", etc.

In response to such methodological questions twentieth century philosophical analysts broadly agree that philosophical propositions are devoid of any descriptive truth-value. No data can be collected in support of a philosophical thesis. A philosophical contention is neither confirmed nor dis-confirmed by any standardised or agreed upon method. A philosophical controversy continues even when the contending parties do not aspect any new piece of information. A philosophical conflict is not amenable to either experimental verification or logico-mathematical deduction. A philosophical dispute seems to be inherently undecidable. No 'philosophical research' can be expected to settle a typical philosophical dispute. Philosophical problems are not open to proof or disproof. As they cannot be solved, Wittgenstein contends that they can be dissolved by understanding the structure and function of philosophical discourse.¹⁹

(D) TWENTIETH CENTURY ANALYSIS:

Now we shall be summarising the crucial methodological and metaphilosophical insights of George Edward Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Logical
Positivists. It will provide a brief historical overview to the philosophical analysis as carried out by Gilbert Ryle whose 'treatment of philosophical disagreements' is to be critically evaluated in this dissertation.

(a) G.E. Moore:

The starting point of Moore's philosophical analysis is his sense of unease with certain philosophical propositions that violated commonsense. Moore felt there were certain metaphysical generalizations such as, "Matter does not exist", "Time is unreal", etc. which violated our common-sense beliefs and convictions. He felt called upon to defend such common-sense beliefs as "All of us were born at certain points of time" and "all of us did possess philosophical bodies" etc. Therefore, philosophical utterances about 'Time being Unreal' or 'Matter being non-existent' seemed to him to be very strange. Even philosophers in their non-philosophical moments could not agree with what they professed in their philosophical moods. Moore could never doubt the truth of the common-sense propositions. However he was not clear as to their proper and clear analysis.

For Moore analysis consisted in making clear the meaning of a complex proposition by translating it into a simple statement. In such an analysis, the 'Analysandum' and 'Analysiens' must be exactly equivalent in meaning. The
Analysis should be clearer and simpler than the statements to be analysed.

The simple statement was one that was further irreducible and whose meaning could be grasped only ostensively. However, despite his best efforts, Moore was never completely satisfied with his method of analysis, for in his effort to analyse complex statements he could not always find simple but equivalent statements.20

(b) Bertrand Russell :

Russell developed certain techniques of analysis, which revolutionised our way of doing philosophy. He did not question the traditional definition of philosophy as being the pursuit of truth. In fact, logical atomism as developed by him is itself being considered a metaphysical thesis. However, the very philosophy of logical atomism, eventually, developed into what may be called analytical approach to philosophy.

For Russell, the world is an aggregation of complex facts. Analysis consists in reducing complex or compound facts into simple or atomic facts. The consideration of analysis of facts leads Russell to the analysis of propositions as the facts are expressed in propositions which in turn are composed of words. Now on the plane of language we have simple atomic propositions and on the level of what language talks about, the atoms are the
simple atomic facts, those expressible by atomic propositions. When atomic propositions are generalised and conjoined by logical connectives, we get compound or complex propositions. Corresponding to complex propositions there are no complex facts. While an atomic proposition corresponds to an atomic fact, a complex proposition does not. The truth or falsity of a complex proposition is entirely determined by the truth or falsity of atomic propositions compounding it. So complex propositions are, what Russell calls, truth-functions of atomic propositions. Whether they are true or false will be revealed to us when we analyse them into atomic propositions from which they are deducible. So the fundamental thesis of logical atomism is that language must break down upon analysis, into ultimate elements that cannot be analysed into other propositions. The world must then be composed of facts that are ultimately simple. In this way, Russell thinks that the truth-functional character of ordinary discourse consisting of compound propositions can be made clear by recourse to analysis.21

(c) Ludwig Wittgenstein:

Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally described to have authored two revolutions in twentieth-century philosophy. The earlier Wittgenstein, following, Russell, was a through going logical atomist. His earlier work 'Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus' is a vigorous statement on logical atomism.
For Wittgenstein, the outside world is comprised of facts, and most of these facts about world are highly complex. These complex facts can be deduced from less complex facts which, in their turn, are deducible from still less complex facts and this process continues till we ultimately reach a point where the analysis of facts cannot be carried on, in view of the complete unanalysability of facts because of their simplicity. Such irreducible and unanalysable facts are, technically termed as 'atomic facts'. Corresponding to these atomic facts on the linguistic plane we have atomic statements or elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are themselves irreducible, photographically representing atomic facts. Thus, for earlier Wittgenstein, all complex propositions are the truth-functions of elementary propositions. The truth-claims of complex propositions can be uncovered if we reduce them to elementary constituent propositions. A list of all elementary propositions, both true and false, would furnish us with every piece of knowledge that we need to know, as all complex propositions depend on elementary propositions for the determination of their truth-value.  

The central contention of later Wittgenstein is that words of a natural language are multifunctional and are used in a variety of ways. The traditional philosophers did not pay requisite attention to the multifunctional
character of words. Words have descriptive, evaluative, performative, fictional, deductive, explanatory, exhortative, and interpretative uses. Philosophical problems are generated by confusing these diverse uses with one another.

The confusion of multiple uses or functions of words is the main source of philosophical problems. Therefore the clarification of the logic of language is the most important technique of resolving philosophical disagreements.

As a matter of fact, we play multiple language-games in our daily intercourse. We give orders, report and event, formulate a hypothesis, make up a story, make a joke, guess riddles, thank, curse, greet, pray, etc. All these uses of language are perfectly legitimate in our daily interpersonal communication. However, in most of traditional philosophical discourse, philosophers have confused different uses of various words. For example, most traditional philosophers have assimilated all declarative sentences to one paradigm use, namely, 'the descriptive one'. Thus a traditional philosopher will hardly differentiate between such sentences as: "The table is brown", "The garden is lovely", "Atman is Brahman", etc. although the first sentence is descriptive, the second one is evaluative and the third one is interpretative. As the mood of all the sentences is declarative, the traditional
philosophers will assume all the three sentences to be descriptive. The logic of the discourse is seldom differentiated from the grammar of the discourse in traditional philosophy.²³

(d) Logical Positivism:

Inspired by 18th century British Philosopher David Hume, 19th century German Philosopher Ernest Mach and early 20th century Austrian philosophical analyst and the author of 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', Ludwig Wittgenstein, a group of Viennaese philosophical analysts led by Schlick, Carnap, Hahn, Waismann, and Neurth developed a highly radical version of analytical approach to philosophy, widely known as 'logical positivism'. They were in complete agreement with earlier Wittgenstein that the job of philosophy is not to arrive at philosophical propositions but to clarify various propositions.

Logical positivists, ostensibly based their approach to philosophy on the logical analysis of the language. Such an analysis is important in order to determine the type of discourse to which philosophical statements belong. Logical positivists, to begin with, recognized two main functions of words; informative or cognitive and expressive or emotive. They deemed science to be made up of cognitive sentences which described states of affairs in the actual world, whereas, poetry was said to be
comprised of emotive statements whose function was to arouse similar emotions in us.

Logical positivists maintained that utterances expressing attitudes, feelings, and emotions, comprise emotive discourse; whereas cognitive statements alone are meaningful since meaning is the relation between a linguistic symbol and objects symbolized in the outside world. Utterances expressing emotions have no cognitive meaning at all. The cognitive statements are further divided into synthetic factual statements and analytic logico-mathematical statements. Synthetic statements are, in principle, observable and verifiable. Analytic statements are self-explanatory in so far as their predicate terms merely translate what the subject terms already contain. However, analytic statements are devoid of any factual content and are mere tautologies. As against them, the synthetic propositions are descriptive and informative. Most of scientific and commonsense statements are synthetic a posteriori statements and confirmable by recourse to observation or verification. In view of the same, logical positivists stressed that before a statement is declared to be true or false, it must be meaningful or intelligible, in the sense that its possible mode of verification must be understood. The meaningfulness of factual statements is deemed to be identical with their mode of verification. Hence the dictum". The meaning of a
proposition is the method of its verification.

"If a statement lacks a method of verification, it lacks cognitive meaning, and is only a pseudo statement. If it has no cognitive meaning, it can be neither true nor false. It is meaningless or non-sense in the strict sense, even though it may be correct grammatically".24

A.J. Ayer formulates the varifibility criterion of meaning in the following words:

"The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express, that is, he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false".25

In the light of above criterion of meaningfulness of statements, the logical positivists asked the traditional philosophers to pinpoint the possible mode of verification of philosophical statements which they consider to be cognitively meaningful. If philosophical statements can not be subjected to any actual or possible mode of verification, they are meaningless and cannot be accepted to be either true or false. As a matter of fact, philosophical statements have no possible mode of
verification, they are only pseudo-statements, although traditional philosophers might deem them to be not only meaningful but also true.

Logical positivists maintained that traditional philosophers have misunderstood the very role and function of philosophy. The job of philosophy is not to furnish us with a set of ontological, cosmological and axiological statements but to clarify the nature of different types of statements, especially that of the statements of science. Philosophy is not a search for truth but a pursuit of meaning and clarity. The genuine task of philosophy is to clarify the meanings of basic concepts. It should not attempt to answer unanswerable questions such as those regarding the nature 'Reality'.

Gilbert Ryle along with Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin was one of the founding fathers of Linguistic analysis, which by many accomplished practitioners of philosophy, is considered to be the foremost philosophical breakthrough of twentieth century, and which set the style of method of doing philosophy in the entire English speaking world in our times.
CHAPTER - II

HOW GILBERT RYLE SEES' PHILOSOPHY

Gilbert Ryle like Ludwig-Wittgenstein was a product of positivistic philosophical milieu inspired and sustained by the ongoing march of experimental sciences. In his earlier philosophical phase, Wittgenstein was deeply inspired by Australian and German positivism. This positivistic phase of Wittgenstein crystallised into one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy, viz "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus", although, in his second philosophical phase Wittgenstein repudiated some foundational thesis of his positivistic approach.

Gilbert Ryle, on the other hand, realised the positivistic challenge to philosophy in so far as it tried to get us rid of all philosophy and instead replace it with science. Although Ryle was in agreement with the central contention of the positivistic critique of philosophy, yet he tried to delineate what he still considered to be the unique task of philosophy.\(^1\)

Ryle is in agreement with the main thrust of contemporary philosophical analysis in rejecting the super-scientific conception of philosophy. Ryle did not view philosophy to be one of the sciences or "the systematic study of ultimate Reality". Philosophy like Mathematical
and logical sciences cannot arrive at its results by recourse to deductive method, nor can it, like natural sciences, discover laws by the technique of inductive generalization or experimental verification. The traditional argumentative way of doing philosophy could not arrive at any universally agreed upon or acceptable conclusions. Therefore, the traditional way of doing philosophy needs to be replaced by a new role for philosophy.

Accordingly, Ryle viewed philosophy as the activity of laying bare the logical categories which underlie and are often distorted by the surface grammar of our ordinary speech.²

For Ryle, like Wittgenstein, philosophy was analysis of ordinary language so as to rectify its mishandlings. Ryle views philosophy as a method of revising misuses of ordinary language and, thereby revising doctrines that were, to begin with, derived incorrectly from the surface structure or logic of language. He thinks that philosophy is born out of the surface meanings of ordinary language. What is important is that we get past the surface grammar or surface logical structure of ordinary language, and its apparent meaning. The job of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental grammar or true logical form of day to day language.
Thus it is clear that Ryle was deeply inspired and activated to conduct and carry on philosophical analysis by Russell's theory of Descriptions. The following extracts from Wittgenstein's 'Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus' too indicate Ryle's other sources of inspiration.

"In philosophy there are no deductions, it is purely descriptive. The word 'Philosophy' ought always to designate something over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences. Philosophy gives no pictures of reality, and can neither confirm nor confute scientific investigations... Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing. Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions (not primitive propositions only)." \(^3\)

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'Philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them). Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries." \(^4\)

Like Wittgenstein Ryle would argue that the job of philosophy was not to formulate theories of reality. Rather
it was an activity or a method through which we clarify the logic and grammar of ordinary language. The function of philosophy was not to discover new empirical truths. Its modest mission was to re-arrange our language or analyse it in order to uncover its correct logical form or real meaning. Only in such a way can philosophy display to us the pseudo-referring expressions, category-mistakes and the incorrect use of various words, phrases and sentences. The business of philosophy is not to provide us information of facts but undertake clarification of language.

"I have said that there is no philosophical information. Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were unknown before. The sense in which they throw light is that they make clear what was unclear before, or make obvious things which were previously in a muddle. And the dawning of this desiderated obviousness occurs in the finding of a logically rigorous philosophical argument".  

There are passages in Ryle's 'collected papers' which bring out the impact of logical positivism on his philosophical analysis'. "The philosopher may, perhaps, begin by wondering about the categories constituting the framework of single theory or discipline, but he cannot stop there. He must try to co-ordinate the categories of all theories and disciplines". 
This reminds us of logical positivist's programme for a unified Science; for here philosophy is not seen merely as clarifying ordinary language propositions but as questioning and clarifying and then co-ordinating the underlying conceptual assumptions.

Ryle stresses that philosophy is not a function of scientific induction and therefore it is not the business of philosophy to discover facts. He also underlines that philosophical arguments are not demonstration of the Euclidian types; namely, deduction of theorems from axioms or postulates. Philosophy is free-from any axioms and it never takes its start from postulates.  

After David Hume and Immanuel Kant who declared metaphysics to be impossible of formulation the question what is philosophy was again forcefully raised in twentieth century. After the appearance of Wittgenstein's classic "Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus", Logical positivists took up for re-evaluation the question of the nature and function of philosophy and brought out most forcefully the need for re-defining our conception of philosophy. The Central contention of logical positivists was that the empirical statements of natural sciences were standard forms of meaningful statements, as only their truth or falsity could be tested by observation or experimentation. Besides empirical statements, analytic statements such as "All triangles have three angles". "or 2+2 = 4", etc., could
be seen to be true or false merely by a consideration of the meanings of the words or symbols used in such statements.

Ryle agreed with logical positivists that philosophical statements were neither empirical nor analytic, and therefore their truth or falsity could neither be established by observation nor understood by a consideration of their subject and predicate terms.

Ryle was deeply interested in the question "What is philosophy?" He thought that philosophy could not be categorised as one of the many sciences. The questions of philosophy can not be settled in the way they do settle questions in natural and social-sciences. Metaphysics was not dealing with a set of problems with a clear-cut methodology of its own. Metaphysical statements were neither factual nor lexicographical. Nor could they be identified with mathematical or logical propositions. For Ryle it was one of the most fascinating questions to locate the clear-cut answers as to the nature and scope of philosophy. Ryle brings out the poignancy of his personal struggle in this regard, in the following words:

"There was in me, from quite early days, an ulterior concern. In the 1920's and the 1930's there was welling up the problem 'what, if anything, is philosophy?' No longer could we pretend that philosophy differed from Physics, Chemistry and biology by studying mental as
opposed to material phenomena. We could no longer boast or confess that we were unexperimen-
tmental psychologists. Hence we were beset by the temptation to look for non-mental non-material objects or objects which should be for philosophy what beetles and butterflies were for entomology. Platonic Forms, Propositions, Intentional objects, Logical objects, perhaps, sometimes, even sense-Data were recruited to appease our professional hankerings to have subject matter of our own.

I had learned, chiefly from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that no specifications of a proprietary subject matter could yield the right answer, or even the right sort of answer to the original question 'What is Philosophy'.

In order to arrive at a conclusion, philosophers can, at best, employ the reductio-ad-absurdum argument. This argument is what Ryle calls the paradigm case of philosophical analysis. It consists in drawing out of conclusions or entailments from some statement of a theory to show that these conclusions are absurd. In such an argument, the philosopher might demonstrate that these conclusions are incomplete disagreement with those fundamental and established beliefs which are conclusively established and, consequently, held by all of us to be indisputable. It may also be shown that conclusions under consideration involve practical impossibilities like negotiation of an infinite series of steps. In this way the
absurdity of such conclusions may be demonstrated in order to repudiate the initial theory.9

Philosophical statements or theories cannot be tested by observation or experimentation. They cannot be tested against the facts. Rather philosophy shows how statements or theories contain latent contradictions or entail infinite regresses in order to demonstrate their incompatibility with established beliefs. It is the central task of philosophy to take workaday propositions and even theoretical statements of various disciplines with a view to examine as to whether their real meaning or logical form is correctly understood. In this way, Philosophy can attempt to minimise paradoxes or absurdities arising out of our mishandlings or misunderstandings of the propositions of various types.

Thus Ryle maintains that there is no specific subject matter which is studied by philosophers, just as entomologists study beetles and butterflies. Philosophers ask unusual questions about various ordinary things. These ordinary things can be either day to day speeches of common people or fundamental theoretical statements of various specialists. The unusual philosophical questions about such statements can be of such form as "what is the true logical form of the propositions they expressed ?" or "what are the logical powers of the concepts they make use of ?".10
In view of the above stand taken by Ryle, his view of philosophy came to be recognised as mapping of the logical geography of concepts. The philosopher must scrutinise a theory or concept and examine whether it leads to logically incompatible results or not. If the logical incompatibility is detected, the philosopher's task is to restore the true logical forms or propositions in question. Such a restoration or rehabilitation work can be undertaken only in comparison to theories and concepts already accepted and understood.

The job of philosopher is to bring out the sources of paradoxes or absurdities by analysing various concepts. The concept may turn out to be internally contradictory or we may presume it to be having a logical form which it has not. It is a philosopher's responsibility to rehabilitate the concept and fit it in with other concepts which constitute its logical environment.

The philosopher must take great caution not to be misled by grammar or the surface look of the words and the manner of their arrangement in sentences or utterances. The concepts and propositions, according to Ryle, carry with them no signal to indicate the logical types to which they belong. Expressions of the same grammatical pattern are used to express multifarious thought. For example, the word 'exists' does not have the same logical function in such statements as "There exists a cathedral in oxford"
and "There exists a square number between 9 and 25 i.e. 16", for a number does not exist in the way a building does.

Ryle thinks that the job of philosophy is to provide an account of the grammatical and logical features of various types of statements. However, a philosopher cannot give new information about concepts employed in human discourse. Philosophical argument cannot increase our knowledge about various concepts. The philosopher can only rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess. The non-philosophical people are not necessarily bothered to be instructed by philosophers as to how to apply various concepts in concrete situations. They already know that perfectly well. However, they are not able to correlate these concepts with one another and with concepts of other sorts. As Ryle puts it:

"Many people can talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them; they know by practice how to operate with concepts, any how inside familiar fields, but they cannot state the logical regulations governing their use. They are like people their way about their own parish, but cannot construct or read a map, of it, much less a map of the region or continent in which their parish lies".

The job of philosophy is to determine the logical geography of concepts. By so doing a philosopher reveals
the logic of the propositions. They show with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what propositions they follow. Thus they bring out the logical type or category to which a concept belongs and also point out the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with it.

"Thus, we can say that philosophical statements are not the first order statements about specific entities constituting the furniture of the universe. They are rather second order statements about certain aspects of language. Philosophical statements, "are condemned to be un-informative about the world and yet able, in some important ways, to be clarificatory of those propositions that are informative about the world, reporting no matters of fact, yet correcting our mishandlings of reported matters of facts".  

In this way Ryle thinks he has correctly and meaningfully responded to the Logical Positivists' loaded metaphilosophical question as to what is philosophy or what is the nature of philosophy. Ryle agrees with the central contention of positivists that philosophy is not one of the natural or social sciences. The apparently 'empirical', 'a posteriori' and 'synthetic' tone, tenor, idiom and flavour of philosophical statements are misleading or misdirecting and the statements of philosophy do not fall into the category of verified or verifiable meaningful statements.
However, for Ryle philosophical statements are not lexicographical or analytic statements either. Philosophical statements admittedly, do not stem from observable data-base and are not derivable by valid rules of inference from axioms. Their origin can, however be traced, by reference to the logical properties or logical implications of concepts and the propositions expressed in sentences. For instance, for Ryle a paradigm philosophical statement would be of the form 'The sentence 'S' is misleading in that its grammar suggests that the phrase x which is in S, is an expression of logical type LT when it is not'. An example, illustrating this form might be the sentence "Jones' hates the thought of going to hospital". This sentence has the great misleading potential if it is not restored to its real logical form. The grammatical structure of the sentence under consideration suggests that the phrase "The thought of going to Hospital" is a referring expression as the proper noun "Smith" is a referring expression in the sentence "Jones hates Smith", when, in point of fact, it is not. Ryle suggests that the sentence "Jones hates the thought of going to Hospital" should be made to reveal its correct logical form by reformulating its real import in the sentence "Whenever Jones thinks of going to hospital he is distressed". The paradigm philosophical statements have the job of restoring the correct grammatical form of the sentences with a view
to disclose their real logical form. Philosophical statements restore the correct logical categories or types of expressions used in the sentences. Philosophical statements do not pertain to the world but to the discourse being conducted about the world from various standpoints or angles.

W. Lyons summarises this position in the following words:

"Thus paradigm philosophical statements are ones which restate the grammatical form of sentences so as to reveal their true logical form (that is, the correct logical categories or types of the expressions used in the sentences), and ones which display the ensuing arguments used to show that the grammatical form of a sentence is misleading. That is, paradigm philosophical statements are comments about the logical form of sentences and a priori arguments in support of them. Paradigm philosophical statements are not statements about the world, but statements about statements about the world; or philosophy is talk about talk about the world, that is, a second-order enterprise". ¹³

Nevertheless, paradigm philosophical statements have also the task of describing the logic of concepts brought out in reformulated statements which give the correct logical form of original statements. Thus paradigm philosophical statements are not merely revelatory of misunderstanding about the logical form of propositions. Philosophy has a positive task to perform as well. One of
its crucial functions is to map the logical geography of concepts, bring out their connection with other concepts, especially those concepts which are verified and indisputable.

Thus Ryle may argue that just as an atomic physicist might say that his area of investigation was the micro-world of atomic particles and their relations which underlie the surface of the macro-physical world; similarly, a philosopher can argue that what he was dealing with were the concepts and propositions and the relations between them which underlie the surface grammar of our sentences and utterances. Sentences, meaning components, propositions and concepts were to philosophy what beetles and butterflies were to entomologists. Thus philosophers have a distinct area or subject matter for carrying out their philosophical investigations and explorations. The distinctive role of philosophy is to correct the mishandling of ordinary language which can be traced to misunderstandings of their logical features. Mishandlings of ordinary language led people to populate the world with entities which did not exist. The specific and special task of philosophy is to rectify misunderstandings leading to mishandlings of ordinary language culminating into incorrect ontological, cosmological and axiological beliefs.
This Rylean view of philosophy coincides with Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy. For Wittgenstein, philosophy arises out of the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language and, accordingly, the job of philosophical analysis is to untie the knots in our thinking by recourse to the technique of linguistic analysis. Thus Ryle along with Wittgenstein determined the agenda for philosophy in twentieth-century English speaking world. Ryle and Wittgenstein, exhorted us not to take ordinary language at its surface value. It is better to negotiate it carefully, or otherwise the logical and ontological howlers inherent in ordinary language will engage or entice us into pointless philosophical problems and disagreements.

Gilbert Ryle is not generally deemed to be contributing to the therapeutic view of philosophy supposedly espoused by later Wittgenstein. However the following words from Ryle, seem to indicate that philosophical analysis has a therapeutetic function as well:

"Philosophy is the replacement of category-habits by category-disciplines, and if persuasions of conciliatory kinds ease the pains of relinquishing inveterate intellectual habits, they do not indeed reinforce the rigorous arguments, but they do weaken resistances to them.

Some readers may think that my tone of voice in this book is excessively polemical."
It may comfort them to know that the assumptions against which I exhibit most heat are assumptions of which I myself have been a victim. Primarily I am trying to get some disorders out of my own system. Only secondarily do I hope to help other theorists to recognise our malady and to benefit from my medicine".14
CHAPTER - III

GILBERT RYLE'S TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT

I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

The increasing methodological sophistication in twentieth-century has brought out the logic of various types of disagreements; scientific, mathematical, historical, legal etc. Philosophical problems and disagreements too have received deep and wide methodological treatment. The logic of philosophical disagreements is complex and like Wittgenstein, Wisdom, and Lazerowits, Gilbert Ryle has also tried to bring out the nature of philosophical disagreements. Ryle thinks that philosophical problems are more like dilemmas than the normal disputes that arise in day to day life. That is why philosophical disagreements can neither be proved nor disproved, confirmed nor disconfirmed. The two sides of philosophical disputes are equally justifiable or defensible. Anyone who considers a particular philosophical disagreement is caught on the horn's of a dilemma. Opting for any side of a philosophical disagreement entails the rejection of the other side and yet a person caught on the horn's of a philosophical dilemma is convinced that both sides of the dispute are equally cognent and coherent and equally debatable and justifiable.

"In disputes of this kind, we often find one and the same thinker-very likely oneself-
strongly inclined to champion both sides and yet, at the very sametime, strongly inclined entirely to repudiate one of them just because he is strongly inclined to support the other. He is both well satisfied with the logical credentials of each of the two points of view, and sure that one of them must be totally wrong if the other is even largely right. The internal administration of each seems to be impeccable but their diplomatic relations with one another seem to be internecine".\(^1\)

In any philosophical disagreement we are caught on the horns of a dilemma. We seem to have compelling reasons for both sides of a philosophical dispute. Thus we come to realise that philosophical disagreements are inherently undecidable. Ryle brings out this feature of undecidability of philosophical disagreements or puzzles in these characteristic lines:

"On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays he is sure that the will is free; On Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays he is sure that causal explanations of actions can be found or are actually already known. Even if he does his best to forswears one view in favour of the other, his professions of conviction give forth a loud because of hollow sound. In his heart he would prefer saying that he knows that both views are true to saying that he knows that action have no causal explanations or that he knows that people are never to blame for what they do".\(^2\)
A philosophical dilemma can arise in our day to day life. For example all of us know that a child needs to be properly educated with a view to display normal behaviour when he grows up. If the child is adequately groomed, he is most likely to observe proper manners during his adulthood. When a person displays bad-conduct, we think that he is badly brought-up. Then it seems to follow that his parents and not the person should be blamed for his various acts of omission and commission. From this follows that his grand-parents and great grand-parents should be really blamed, till we reach a point where none can be blamed at all. When we consider the duties of the parents we think that if they do not properly educate their son, they must be deemed to be blame-worthy. On the other hand, while considering the behaviour of their son, we feel sure that he rather than his parents deserve to be blamed. One position seems to rule out our answer to the other and vice-versa.

"We feel quite sure both that a person can be made moral and that he cannot be made moral, and yet that both cannot be true".  

In a philosophical dilemma no new reasons are awaited to be discovered or arguments to be designed. The disputants may have all reasons and arguments wanted for. Ryle considers that philosophical disputes cannot be settled by any additional evidence to be supplied by
further scientific researches. Such disputes can be settled by carrying out an intensive analysis of philosophical discourse. Two sides of a philosophical dispute are not rival theoretical positions but plaintiff and defendant claims needing arbitration by appropriate analysis. Philosophical disputes may be likened more to litigations rather than to any substantial theoretical competitions.

"Sometimes thinkers are at loggerheads with one another, not because their propositions do conflict, but because their authors fancy that they conflict. They suppose themselves to be giving, at least by indirect implication, rival answers to the same questions, when this is not really the case. They are then talking at cross-purposes with one another. It can be convenient to characterize these cross-purposes by saying that the two sides are, at certain points, hinging their arguments upon concepts of different categories, though they suppose themselves to be hinging them upon different concepts of the same category, or vice-versa. But it is not more than convenient. It still remains to be shown that the discrepancies are discrepancies of this general kind, and this can be done only by showing in detail how the metiers in ratiocination of the concepts under pressure are more dissimilar from one another or less dissimilar from one another than the contestants had unwittingly supposed". 

Gilbert Ryle maintains that there arise several types of disagreements in theoretical research. Often there
arise competing solutions in the face of problems. In fact multiple theoretical choices are offered in response to a given difficulty. Normally, it so happens that one of the competing solutions is true and others are declared to be false. However, if the question under consideration is fairly complex, we cannot easily choose among a variety of proffered solutions. In such cases, various theoretical responses may be partly right, partly wrong and partly incomplete. However such disagreements do not or should not bother us. We do not get disturbed in view of the fact that all the competing responses have contributed in finally arriving at a conclusively clinched solution of the problem.

According to Ryle the disagreements that arise in philosophy are not settled in the above manner. The pattern of philosophical disagreements is a different one. Philosophical disagreements may be said to be dilemmas which seem to be irreconcilable with one another. A philosopher who advocates one of the proffered philosophical responses seems to be logically committed to rejecting the other. Such disagreements or dilemmas cannot be definitively clinched this way or that way. We feel there are strong reasons for advocating both sides of a philosophical dispute. Sometimes we would like to reject one and accept the other side of the dispute and vice-versa. Both sides seem to be having equal logical justification.
"In disputes of this kind, we often find one and the same thinker, very likely oneself, strongly inclined to champion both sides and yet, at the very same time, strongly inclined entirely to repudiate one of them just because he is strongly inclined to support the other. He is both well satisfied with the logical credentials of each of the two point of view, and sure that one of them must be totally wrong if the other is even largely right".  

Philosophical disputes are mostly carried on in the minds of philosophers. It is not necessary to discuss or debate a philosophical issue with another philosopher or a group of philosophers. We need not convene a Seminar or a Conference on a particular philosophical dilemma. The philosopher is mostly engaged in a philosophical dispute arguing for and against both sides of the dilemma. We may say that he is simultaneously the counsel for the prosecution, counsel for the defense and he has himself to deliver the judgement. The entire burden of proof on both sides lies on his own person, only he does not come up with a proof, this way or that way. The philosopher feels equally strong ties of allegiance to both of the seemingly discrepant positions.

Rival solutions of philosophical problems are continuously in need of new arguments and fresh reasons, for all arguments or reasons cannot be completely submitted at any particular point of time. Besides, if the reasons
for one rival solution have same persuading power, it seems that all the reasons for the rival solutions have not been completely catalogued. Philosophers are psychologically attuned to finding additional reasons and arguments for or against the various solutions under consideration. Ryle says that it may so happen that we have all the reasons that can be cited in supporting or opposing a particular solution and yet we may not be able to decide as to which solution to finally adopt. It may be because philosophical disagreement cannot be settled by recourse to finding additional arguments and reasons for or against various positions. We may need to re-understand the logic of the settlement of philosophical disagreements. In fact a new view of philosophy and a new way of doing philosophy is needed.

II. MIND BODY PROBLEM:

Ryle tries to resolve philosophical disagreements by the method of linguistic analysis. His method is specifically to figure out the logical geography of the concepts and expressions used by philosophers. Such a linguistic and conceptual analysis will reveal that philosophical disagreements are born out of committing category-mistakes.

Take, for example, the question of Mind-Body relationship or what is commonly called Mind-Body problem.
We may start with Rene Descartes, for he is famous for dealing with this so-called problem and making it one of the central debates of modern philosophy.

According to Descartes there are two kinds of substances in the universe - Mental things and physical things - they are radically different from each other. Mind is pure consciousness while body is pure extension. But as it happens, human beings seem to be both mind and body. Descartes argues that I am a conscious, thinking being and my immediate experience tells me that I am a mind. As a conscious substance I just cannot afford to doubt my existence. However, as I perceive, I have a body which belongs to the physical realm. This sets the problem for Descartes as to how these two fundamentally and totally different kinds of being can co-exist to form the unity which is myself? As a matter of fact, my mind and body do interact. But how can one kind of being affect the other which seems completely different. Descartes answer to this question was too simplistic to be acceptable to subsequent philosophers. He thought that Mind and Body affected each other through the medium of what he called animal spirits. He also believed that the pineal gland in the brain served as a locus of exchange of influence between mental and physical events. The subsequent philosophers took sides in this highly seminal philosophical disagreement. Those who underscored the role of mind and played down the physical
side of human personality were led to adopt modern idealism. Other's who stressed the significance of matter or physical things and tried to explain life, consciousness, and mind, as functions of physical events were led to adopt modern materialism. After Descartes, such eminent philosophers as Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant etc., gave their own versions of the mind-body problem.

One of the most significant and influential books applying the method of 'Linguistic Analysis', while taking up the age-long Mind-Body philosophical disagreement, is Gilbert Ryle's 'Concept of Mind'. The book appeared in Mid 20th century i.e. 1949. The doctrine of Mind-Body dualism is outrightly denied and forcefully repudiated by Ryle. However, he does not, thereby accept, the contention of the materialists that mental events can be reduced to or explained into physical events.

The questions pertaining to the Mind-Body relationship started in view of the Cartesian dualistic account of Mind-Body problem. The Cartesian thesis assumes two totally different existences, viz. mental and physical. The underlying supposition is that every human being is made in two parts; firstly, he has a publicly observable, and spatially located material body and secondly he has an immaterial, spatially unlocated and publicly unobservable mind since it is utterly private to each person. It is
assumed that every physical self must necessarily be conjoined to a mental self in order to provide a coherent or acceptable account of human personality. Each one of us is deemed to be carrying about with us a second self that is invisible, nonpublic or mental besides or alongside our physical persons. The following quotation from Ryle summarises the Cartesian thesis.

"The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his mind are ordinarily harnessed together but after the death of the body his mind may continue to exist and function. Human bodies are in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily processes and states can be inspected by external observers. So a man's bodily life is as much a public affair as are the lives of animals and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, crystals and planets".

But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. Only I can take direct cognisance of the states and processes of my own mind.
"A person therefore lives through two: Collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world".  

In fact, besides Descartes, the majority of classical, medieval and modern philosophers have shared one common assumption, namely, the bifurcation of man into two worlds, the physical and the mental, the body belonging to external physical world and mind belonging to internal world. To begin with the intention of bifurcation might have been purely metaphorical. However, the question as to how mind and body influence one another, has generated inseparable difficulties in philosophical circles. Philosophers have asked such questions as to how physical sources of stimuli can generate responses inside one's mind or how 'decisions framed inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities'.

"what the mind wills, the legs, arms and the tongue execute; what affects the ear and the eye has something to do with what mind perceives; grimaces and smiles betray the mind's moods and bodily castigations lead, it is hoped, to moral improvement. But the actual transactions between the episodes of the private history and those of the public history remain mysterious, since by definition they can belong to neither series."
They could not be reported among the happenings described in a person's autobiography of his inner life, but nor could they be reported among those described in some one else's biography of that person's overt career. They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist".8

Underlying the bifurcation of a person's two lives is a philosophical assumption. Existence itself is assumed to be of two types; physical and mental. Physical existence is necessarily spatial and temporal, whereas mental existence is necessarily temporal and non-spatial. Similarly whereas physical existence is composed of matter or is a function of matter, mental existence is a function of consciousness.

Thus mind and matter are deemed to be diametrically opposite to each other or it is supposed that mind and matter are in a polar opposition. Thus material objects are out in space and mechanically connected with one another. On the other hand, it is supposed that mental occurrences happen in isolated fields, known as minds. It is further supposed that there is no connection between the happenings in various minds. Everyone of us lives the life of a Ghostly Robinson Crusoe.
While the minds of others cannot be known, we are specially privileged, via introspection, to understand the functioning of our own minds. We are so clear about knowledge of our own minds that there can be no doubt about it. Such knowledge can never be confused or we can never entertain doubts about it. One has a privileged access to one's own stream of consciousness. This stream of consciousness is made up of occurrences which are labelled as 'knowing' or 'believing' or 'hoping' or 'dreading' or 'intending' etc. Ryle describes this whole dualist account or the mind plus body view of human persons as 'The dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'.

"Mental states and processes (or are normally) conscious states and processes, and the consciousness which irradiates them can engender no illusions and leaves the door open for no doubts. A person's present thinking, feelings and willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings are intrinsically phosphorescent'; their existence and their nature are inevitably betrayed to their owner. The inner life is a stream of consciousness of such a sort that it would be absurd to suggest that the mind whose life is that stream might be unaware of what is passing down it". 9

Ryle contends that this official doctrine of Mind-Body dualism is absurd and entirely false. It is not false in detail but in principle.
"It is not merely an asemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher's myth". 10

This myth has to be destroyed; the 'official', or Cartesian myth that mental-conduct expressions refer to a queer sort of entity, 'mind' and 'soul', distinguishable from the body in virtue of being private, non-spatial, knowable only by introspection.

The dogma of the Ghost in the machine is a mistake of a special kind. It is a category-mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another.

The Cartesian dualist dogma needs to be demolished by showing that it is one large category-mistake. A category-mistake is committed when, in seeking to give an account of some concept, one says that it is of one logical type or category when in fact it is of another. The logical type or category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with it'.

For example one commits the category-mistake if one says, "My Consciousness is purple", for consciousness is not the sort of thing which can be pruple. Only physically
visible objects can be classified as coloured. How we commit a category mistake can be shown by reference to the celebrated examples given by Gilbert Ryle as follows:

Suppose I were to be taken to visit a university. I am shown the buildings, meet some Professors, see the students in the lecture rooms, inspect the offices and residence halls etc. Now suppose I were to say, "yes, I've seen the students, the teachers, the buildings, and all that, but when are you going to show me the university"? My question would be deemed to be silly, because it makes out that I think a university is a thing similar to but separate from a group of students, faculty, buildings and so on. The truth is that a university does not belong to the same type or order of things as buildings, teachers, or students. Nor is it something over and in addition to them. So too the belief that corresponding to my physical self there is a related, but private and invisible mind which I alone can know, involves a category-mistake.

Similarly when a child witnesses the march-past of a division and asks after observing battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc., as to when the division would appear, he commits a category-mistake. In such a case the child would be assuming that a division is something over and above the units already seen. His mistake would be rectified by pointing out to him that in watching the battalions, batteries and squadrons marching past he had been watching
the division marching past "The march-part was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries, squadrons of a division".  

The same category-mistake would be committed by a foreigner, who for the first time, while watching a game of cricket going on, learns the functions of bowling, batting, catching and fielding carried on by bowlers, batsmen and fielders suddenly asks as to who carries on the operation of 'Team-spirit'. It will have to be pointed out to him that 'Team-spirit' is not an operation carried out by any specific player. It is not a separate task, over and above the bowling, batting and fielding operations. It is the keenness with which all the players perform their specially assigned tasks. The logic of the 'Team-spirit' is diametrically opposite to the logic of bowling, batting and fielding.

In 'The Concept of Mind' Gilbert Ryle tries to analyse the logical powers of 'Mental Concepts'. These concepts, Ryle points out, do not create any trouble in our day-to-day discourse while we engage in various forms of communication or transaction. Our puzzlement starts once we try to discover the category to which particular expression belongs. We are puzzled when we try to explore the logical powers of the propositions into which such expressions enter. Ryle suggests that such puzzlement can be overcome
only by mapping out the logical geography of mental concepts and understanding the limits of their application.\textsuperscript{13}

Ryle says that philosophers usually assume that 'acting intelligently' is synonymous with 'theorising' or discovering the truth. However, Ryle contends that theorising is one of the many functions of intelligent behaviour consists in 'knowing how' as against 'knowing that'. We 'know how' to play chess or to speak French or to build a house etc. which is very different from theorising about games or about language-speaking or about house-building. The contention that any practice, in order to be meaningful, must be preceded by intelligent thinking is untenable for it can involve us in infinite regress. It can be pointed out that if there were any reason for supposing that intelligent chess-playing must be preceded by intelligent theorising about chess, there would be exactly as much reason for supposing that intelligent theorising must in its turn be preceded by intelligent theorising about theorising and so on ad infinitum. Besides reassigning the logical type or category to a concept to which it belongs, Ryle tries to figure out a positive account of mental-conduct concepts as well. In the process, he provides a dispositional account of mental behaviour. The category mistake of dogma of the ghost in the machine arises because mental behaviour is mostly explained in terms of occurrences or episodes or processes, when it
ought to have been explained in dispositional terms. Ryle hopes that such an account would go a long way in abolishing mind as a shadowy entity which initiates ghostly actions.

Ryle tells us that a disposition is an ability, liability, tendency or proneness to act or react, or fail to act or react, in a certain way in certain circumstances. To say, for example, that an animal is a ruminant is to attribute a disposition to it, for it is to make a claim that the animal in question will chew its cud if and when it has any to chew. When we say that a person or thing has a disposition to act or react in a certain way if certain circumstances occurred, sentences embodying dispositional claims are, strictly speaking, always hypothetical in form. If circumstances C occur then X will do y.14

However, Ryle again warns us that a disposition should not be construed to be a special sort of entity. For example, if we say that glass has a disposition to break, such a proposition is a shorthand for a range of hypothetical propositions such as: "If you drop glass, or hit it with a stone, or try to bend it, it will break". To look for some entity described by disposition is to look for the impossible. Ryle opines that when we say that our behaviour is dispositional, it means that our conduct is 'Law-like' or that it follows a regular pattern.15
The dispositional attribution should not be taken to be a reference to an occurrence or state of affairs. A disposition is rather a proneness. We cannot have dispositions in the way we do have arms or legs. A disposition is a behaviour pattern. A pattern of behaviour is not possessed, it is displayed through numerous pieces of behaviour. To attribute dispositions to a person or a thing is to make some law-like generalisations or hypotheses about that person or thing. Attributing dispositions is making inferences about the likely behaviour patterns and reactions of people or animals or things in a certain set of circumstances obtaining in future. These inferences or projections are based on our observations as to in what circumstances and with what constancy such behaviour - patterns or reactions have been noticed in the past.16

Similarly, Ryle argues that so-called 'acts of volition' are not 'mental processes'. It is pointless to investigate as to whether volitions are continuous or interrupted. When volitions begin and when they end and whether they can be speeded up or slowed down are questions that do not mean anything and have therefore no answers. It is not the case that voluntary behaviour is preceded and involuntary behaviour is not preceded by an act of volition.
In the same way, seeing and recalling are not 'mental processes'. There are no 'mental processes' properly describable as 'acts of seeing' or 'acts of recalling'. Ryle recommends that 'seeing' and 'recalling' are not 'process' words they are what he designates as 'achievement' words:

"To 'see' is to succeed in a task - it is parallel to winning a race, as distinct from running in one. If Moore was puzzled by the elusiveness of 'mental acts', this is for the very good reason that he was looking for what is not there to be found".17

Mind-Body dualism is categorically rejected by Ryle, for such a dualism makes the mind the private and unobservable and the body a mindless object. Ryle contends that human beings are unities. There is no impassable gulf between our bodily behaviours and mental intentions. By watching people's behaviours, we can successfully make out as to whether they are tired, interested, hopeful or loving. Therefore, the myth of essentially private, impenetrable mental worlds is impossible of being sustained if we can accept the dispositional analysis of human behaviour.18

It is only through language that we can and often do manage to distinguish between the so-called mental or physical events. The distinction is made or achieved purely through logical, syntactical and grammatical mechanisms or
manipulations. Such purely artificial mechanisms should not blind us to the essential unity of a human personality. "But the fact that we do so distinguish between the two sorts of events does not mean that humans are packaged in two water-tight compartments, the first bodily, material, and publically observable; the second interior, mental, and forever private. Once we appreciate the fact of the essential unity of human beings and the artificiality of the physical public/mental-private distinction, says Ryle, we shall appreciate as well the origin and refutation of the materialist dualist dispute". 19

III. THE FATALIST DILEMMA :

Furthermore, Ryle argues that philosophical dilemmas also arise from misinterpreting some unproblematic and compatible proposition in such a way that it becomes a rival to the ordinary man's views on this matter. For example, such a dilemma is what, Ryle calls "Fatalist Dilemma".

The fatalist argument is generated or incubated in this way:

Last Sunday night, I coughed at 10 P.M., and went to bed by 10.30 P.M. It was, one does or may argue, true on Saturday, morning that in the coming night I will cough at one moment and go to bed at another. In point of fact, it was true thousands of years ago. Indeed, it was true from all eternity that I would cough and go to bed at two
particular points of time. Accordingly, it must have been impossible for me not to have coughed by 10 P.M. last Sunday night and gone to bed by 10.30 P.M. 20

From this follows the generalisation that whatever anyone does; anywhere, anyhow, any time in any way had got to be done and could not have been averted in whatsoever circumstances despite all-out efforts on our part. For, it was true from eternity that it was going to happen and therefore it just could not have happened. Therefore, anything that we do or undertake is bound to be done or undertaken as per the inexorable wisdom and inscrutable mystery of the cosmic situation.

Ryle argues that the Fatalist Dilemma is a product of misinterpretation of the dictum 'whatever is, was to be'. For example, no philosophical dilemma arises if we interpret this dictum viz. "that for everything that happen's, if anyone had at any previous time made the guess that it would happen, his guess would have turned out correct". 21

Such an interpretation is not against the common man's belief that he sometimes or often does exercise some control over his actions. The philosophical problem arises when the dictum is interpreted in such a way that it seems to run parallel to common-man's belief. Such a parallel interpretation of the dictum is worked out in such a way as
if those propositions describing what takes place had been written down in some book of destiny, before the events described actually did take place. Thus we think that 'a things' actually taking place is, so to speak, merely the turning up of a passage that has for all time been written".

The philosophical trouble is further complicated if it is assumed that somebody such as God has actually written the Book of Destiny. Such a suggestion is the basis for theological version of Fatalism known as the doctrine of predestination. The theological version of Fatalism does not bother Ryle, for he thinks it to be devoid of any evidence and most likely just false.22

However he is concerned in bringing out the origin of the fatalist-misinterpretation. Ryle thinks that it originates from a widely prevalent category-mistake. Ryle points out that when the dictum 'whatever is, was to be', is interpreted in such terms as "that for everything that happen's, if anyone had at any previous time made the guess that it would happen, his guess would have turned out correct', we are mistaking the nature of the term correct. Traditionally philosophers thought that the use of the term 'correct' here indicates some property, just as adjectives like 'white' and 'sweet' do in any set of respective propositions. Now if the adjective 'correct' is prefixed or suffixed to a proposition, it is thought that it labels or
qualifies a proposition which is a logical entity that exists or subsists eternally and can be thought of or expressed in sentences at a particular period of time. From this supposition, it has not been very difficult for philosophers to positing the existence of propositions correctly describing the states of affairs even before the events taking place.  

Ryle confines himself to an analysis of the fatalists' use of the term 'correct'. The term 'correct' is not a label of some property. It is merely an obituary and valedictory epithet. It does not describe anything. It is more like a conferment of an award to a 'sentence'. The proposition "oxygen helps in the burning of fire" does not function like the proposition, 'Sugar is white and sweet'. The first proposition is a guess or a hypothesis whereas the second proposition is a description of a certain property. A proposition about the future turns out to be correct or incorrect only after the event described in the proposition has taken place, just as a guess is fulfilled or unfulfilled only after the event guessed has taken place. Propositions about the future are not correct or incorrect in anticipation of events taking place, just as promises, wishes, dreams, and guesses etc., are not fulfilled or unfulfilled without the necessary efforts undertaken. If we realise that the dictum "whatever is, was to be", pertains to propositions about the future which may
or may not turn out to be correct in course of time, its fatalist nuances will be immediately dissolved into nothingness.

Ryle points out that the fatalist dilemma may also arise from assuming 'correct' and 'incorrect' as synonymous with 'true' and 'false'. For example, usually speaking the titles 'true' and 'false' are used as verdicts pronounced upon carefully formulated propositions about past or present events. On the other hand, 'correct' and 'incorrect' are verdicts applied to guesses or predictions when they are finally declared as fulfilled or unfulfilled. Now if we assimilate 'correct' and 'incorrect' to 'true' and 'false', we will be according guesses or predictions the status of established statements about past events. Such an assimilation might lead us to interpreting "what is, was to be ", not as a conditional prediction which finally turned out to be correct, but as a proposition about the future which was accurate from the moment of its formulation.24

The fatalist does not realise that it is events which make propositions true and not propositions which make events come true. Such a failure is a vital source of his misinterpretation. The fatalist does not make this mistake while analysing the propositions about past events. He misinterprets while analysing propositions pertaining to future events.
"A large part of the reason is that in thinking of a predecessor making its successor necessary we unwittingly assimilate the necessitation to causal necessitation. Gunfire makes windows rattle a few seconds later, but rattling windows do not make gunfire happen a few seconds earlier, even though they may be perfect evidence that gunfire did happen a few second earlier".25

Ryle says that since we can and do argue from a proposition to an event, when, for example, we argue from "there is foot-print on the sand", to the fact that a foot must have trod on the piece of sand, we can be led into thinking that propositions can cause events. However, this piece of argument is merely drawing out entailment of one truth by another, of one true proposition by another. We are making use of logical necessity not causal necessity. The entailment of a proposition is not an event but another proposition. The fatalist is assimilating logical necessity to causal necessity. A fatalist is not merely claiming that events are practically inevitable but that they have the same inevitability as the conclusion of a valid syllogism which has true premises.26

"What happens is inevitable or doomed, and what makes it sound even worse, logically inevitable or logically doomed-somewhat as it is logically inevitable that the immediate successor of any even number is an odd number. So what does 'inevitable' mean? An avalanche may be, for all practical purposes,
unavoidable. A mountaineer in the direct path of an avalanche can himself do nothing to stop the avalanche or get himself out of its way, though a providential earthquake might conceivably divert the avalanche or a helicopter might conceivably lift him out of danger. His position is much worse, but only much worse, than that of a cyclist half a mile ahead of a lumbering steam-roller. It is extremely unlikely that the steam-roller will catch up with him at all, and even if it does so it is extremely likely that its driver will halt or that the cyclist himself will move off in good time. But these differences between the plights of the mountaineer and the cyclist are differences of degree only. The avalanche is practically unavoidable, but it is not logically inevitable. Only conclusions can be logically inevitable, given the premises, and an avalanche is not a conclusion. The fatalist doctrine, by contrast, is that everything is absolutely and logically inevitable in a way in which the avalanche is not absolutely or logically inevitable; that we are all absolutely and logically powerless where even the hapless mountaineer is only in a desperate plight and the cyclist is in no real danger at all; that everything is fettered by the Law of Contradiction to taking the course it does take, as odd numbers are bound to succeed even numbers. What sort of fetters are these purely logical fetters".  

Logical truths do necessarily imply the truth of other propositions. Today is Monday implies that tomorrow is Tuesday. It cannot be other way round. However one truth
can be made necessary by another truth but events themselves cannot be made necessary by truths. An avalanche can be inescapable for all practical purposes and the conclusion of an argument can be logically inescapable. However an avalanche cannot have and need not have the inescapability of the conclusion of an argument. The fatalist tries to invest events and happenings with the inescapability of the conclusion of a valid argument. Our familiarity with the practical inescapability of some things, like some avalanches, helps us to yield to the view that really everything that happens is inescapable, only not now in the way in which some avalanches are inescapable and others not, but in the way in which logical consequences are inescapable, given their premises. The fatalist has tried to characterize happenings by predicates which are proper only to conclusions of arguments.  

There is a logical trickiness about the fatalist doctrine. For example, by appropriate traffic-planning and engineering, considerable number of accidents can be prevented. However, a list of particular accidents averted can never be prepared. It can be argued that accidents of such and such kinds which used to be frequent are now rare. However, it cannot be said that yesterday's collision between this loaded truck and that passenger bus at this corner was, fortunately, averted. We can never point to or name a particular happening and say of it 'this happening
was averted'. Ryle says that this is a logical truism. However, this logical truism seems to commit us to saying "No happening can be everted" and therefore it is no good trying to ensure or prevent anything happening. So when we try to say that somethings that happened could have been prevented, we seem to be in a queer logical fix. Ryle points out that averted fatalities are not fatalities at all. We cannot, in logic, say of any designated fatality that it was averted and this sounds like saying that it is logically impossible to avert any fatalities.29

So, though we are right to say that some sorts of accidents can be prevented, yet we cannot put this by saying that this designated accident might have been prevented from occurring not because it was of an unpreventable sort, but because neither 'preventable' nor 'unpreventable' can be epithets of designated occurrences, any more than 'exists' or 'does not exist' can be predicated of designated things or persons.

Thus Ryle thinks that the fatalist dilemma is born out of category-mistake as well as from confusing logical necessity with causal necessity, which confusion may again be said to be a 'category-mistake'.

Thus Ryle's treatment of philosophical disagreement is diametrically opposite to the conventional approach.
The conventional philosopher or metaphysician would take sides in a philosophical controversy. He would offer reasons for and against in any philosophical deadlock. Ryle like other linguistic analysts does not accept this method of doing philosophy or treating a specific philosophical disagreement.

Ryle's method of treating a philosophical disagreement is to bring out the logic of key philosophical discourse in any philosophical dispute. By bringing out the logic or area of use of a philosophical term, we clarify the category-confusion because of which a philosophical problem or disagreement does arise, to begin with. Thus, when we understand the origin or rise of a philosophical disagreement, our quest for thrashing out a solution dies down and thus a philosophical disagreement is dissolved, so to say.

There is no solution of a philosophical disagreement as such. It cannot happen that one day metaphysical philosophers will finally succeed in proving the truth of either idealism or materialism. It cannot happen that one fine morning theologians will finally succeed in proving the existence of God or disbelievers will conclusively demonstrate the absence of God from the cosmic scheme of things. Ryle would say that instead of searching for so-called final solutions of philosophical disagreements,
we must concentrate on the identification of the logical jurisdiction of key philosophical terms in a particular dispute.

For example, when we discuss the question of the existence of God, we are treating 'God' on the same logical, linguistic, syntactical and grammatical planes as we do treat other words such as 'pen', 'book', 'chair', 'table' etc. We do not realise that the word 'God' belongs to a different logical area or jurisdiction. Therefore, all God-statements pertaining to or arguing for such theories as monotheism or pantheism etc., are products of the confusion of the logical status of the word 'God'. Similarly, while arguing for idealism or Materialism, we must realise that the logic of 'Mind' and 'Matter' cannot be confused with such words as 'Knowing', 'understanding', 'Imagining' or 'diamond', 'steel', 'copper' etc. 'Mind' and 'Matter' may at best be deemed to be logical constructions. After all, 'Matter' is not logically at par with 'diamond' or 'Steel' or 'Copper' etc. Nevertheless, when a materialist says that Matter is the ultimate stuff of reality, the statement is logically at par with such a statement as "Diamond is the hardest of all metals". Thus, Ryle might say that two sides of a typical philosophical disagreement are functions of two category confusions at one and the same time.

To conclude, Ryle's analysis of the Mind-Body problem and Fatalist Dilemma shows that he regards
philosophical problems and disagreements as born out of category-confusions or category-mistakes. Such problems as the existence of God, freedom of the will, nature of time etc. and many more could, according to Rylean analysis, be shown to be born out of category-mistakes. Therefore, philosophical disagreement, in general, may be said to be born out of conjoining logically incompatible propositions or proposition-factors.

Therefore, we need not develop philosophical theories based on category-mistakes. Such theories as try to explain the mind-body relationship viz. interactionism, psycho-physical parallelism, 'pre-established harmony', etc., may be said to be category-confusions worse confounded. We should not try to develop these pseudo-theories in response to pseudo-problems. Theories pertaining to God such as pantheism, monotheism, Deism, polytheism etc., too should not be taken as serious points of departure in response to the so-called 'God-problem'. Such theories can be shown to be products of category-confusions. God-talk too can be shown to be of a different logical category or plane in comparison to other types of discourse.

What is important is to grasp the 'category-logic' of concepts such as Mind, God, Time, Space, Matter etc., and thus avoid conjoining logically incompatible proposition-factors. Otherwise, we shall go on, pointlessly, taking sides in philosophy.
CHAPTER - IV

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Gilbert Ryle has played a key role in creatively applying the method of linguistic analysis to a host of philosophical problems. He worked out detailed analysis of concepts and expressions that seemed to him to be misleading and confusing. His life-long interest was in mapping the logical geography of concepts. He shared with Wittgenstein the view that philosophy has the function of liberating us from confusions and puzzlements. In his numerous writings Ryle has repeatedly underscored that conceptual confusions arise out of our confusing of Grammar with logic. While doing philosophy, grammatical similarities and differences are confused with logical similarities and differences. Philosophical problems are born out of similar grammatical treatment of logically different categories. The job of philosophy is to remove conceptual roadblocks or liberate us from conceptual traffic-jams, so to say.

One of the most significant contributions made by Ryle in contemporary philosophy was his masterly critique of Cartesian dualism. Although the doctrine of Mind-Body dualism formulated by Descartes in 17th century had variously been attacked by subsequent philosophers, yet till Mid 20th century it had retained its central thesis. Ryle's book 'Concept of Mind' plausibly made a strong case
against Cartesian thesis and contemporaneously there are few philosophers who can afford to argue for the validity of Cartesian thesis.

Ryle's 'Concept of Mind' is a sustained effort to map the logical geography of the words we employ in our language to describe mental activity. Ryle contends that "Descartes Myth" has been the source of confusion in philosophy for centuries. Such confusion can be eliminated by carefully examining the ways in which we actually use mentalistic terms in our language. The day-to-day use of mentalistic terms does not necessarily indicate any kind of dualism between mind and body. The so-called two substances of Cartesian ontology of mind and body are not diametrically opposite to each other, as argued by Descartes. It is the logic of mentalistic terms that is quite different from the logic of physicalistic terms. The so-called Mind-Body problem is born out of an assimilation of the logic of mentalistic terms to the logic of physicalistic terms.

Ryle tries to bring out this confusion by giving various examples. His contention is that there is a special kind of confusion which can be illustrated by that of taking team spirit as an element in a game as being on equal footing with serving or receiving, of taking a division as a military formation as being on equal footing with its component regiments, of taking oxford university
as an institution as being on equal footing with its component colleges. Ryle then goes on to claim that traditional Cartesian dualism treats the mind as an entity on equal footing with the body and mental activities as being on equal footing with bodily activities; and that this is a confusion of the same kind as those in the three illustrative cases.

Such a misconception Ryle calls the dogma of the ghost in the machine. He attempts to show its falsity in a series of chapters on the main aspects of mental life, in which the arguments fall into two main classes. On the one hand he tries to show that the dogma of the ghost in the machine fails in its explanatory task and is logically incoherent, leading to such logical evils as vicious infinite regresses. On the other hand, he tries to show that a satisfactory positive account of mental phenomena can be given, without invoking the ghost, in terms of such things as style of performance, dispositions to certain characteristic performances, and acquired skills. Thus, if a person does a physical action while thinking about what he is doing, we must take it not that ghost discursively thinks and the bodily machine moves but that the person performs bodily in an appropriate way, while being disposed to perform other actions if the occasion arises.

In his Tarner Lectures, subsequently published as 'Dilemmas', it is claimed that many philosophical problems,
if not all, immediately present themselves in the form of dilemmas: we find ourselves holding, without the possibility of sincere repudiation, two or more opinions which seem to be incompatible. For example, we think, we often choose responsibly what to do and simultaneously think that we are what we are through our natural endowment as modified by environment. This is the famous problem of free-will vs. determinism and presents a typical philosophical dilemma. Such dilemmas must be overcome by showing that the apparent conflict is a consequence of conceptual confusions rather than making a choice, this way or that way.

However, Ryle's treatment of the Mind-Body problem or Fatalist Dilemma suffers from several limitations. A brief overview of the same may be presented as follows:

With regard to Mind-Body problem Ryle's argument is not merely that previous philosophers have made a number of particular mistakes in the characterization of particular points of ordinary usages and ways of thought; they have been wrong in detail because they have been wrong in principle. Ryle's polemic is launched against Cartesianism or what he calls the official doctrine and the para-mechanical hypothesis. However, the precise historical identification and even more the historical order of responsibility for the doctrine cannot be fixed.
The first cardinal mistake pervading the Rylean analysis is just this assumption that the origin of the conception of the mind as a ghost within a machine is of purely historical and of no philosophical interest. An inquiry into the origins of the conception reveals that for from being imposed on the plain man by philosophical theorists of 17th century, the myth of the mind as a ghost within the body is one of the most primitive and natural of all the innumerable myths which are deeply imbedded in the vocabulary and structure of our languages. The two substance conception of persons is the natural vernacular mode of description and it has developed independently of the attempts of Plato and of Christian theorists or 17th century rationalists who tried to systematise it as a self-conscious doctrine. Ryle throughout represents philosophers as corrupting the literal innocence of common sense speech with alien metaphors. In this he not only greatly exaggerates the influence of philosophers on the forms of common speech, but neglects the facts, or rather the necessity, that the forms of common speech and its modes of description should be permeated with such metaphors, most of which can ultimately be traced back to underlying myths and imaginative pictures. Descartes was himself suspicious of metaphors and of graphic representations in language. It is characteristically a philosophers complaint that we normally describe mental processes and conditions in terms
which have been transferred from an original use of application to physical objects. As transferred terms are by definition metaphors, most psychological descriptions may therefore be said to be ultimately metaphorical. How otherwise can language be developed.

Thus Ryle is attacking not a philosophical theory of mind, but a universal feature of ordinary language itself—namely, that most of its forms of description have been and are being evolved by the constant transfer of terms from application in one kind of context to application in another, and in particular by the transfer of what were originally physical descriptions. Thus Rylean's treatment of Mind-Body conflict confuses a general feature of common language with a particular metaphysical theory.

However, there is another important consideration to be taken note of while examining Ryle's notion of category-mistake. Ryle emphasizes that one cannot tell by the grammar of a sentence whether a category mistake has been committed, since such a mistake may be committed even though the language in which it is expressed is grammatically correct. By what criterion, then, can one tell? The test, in Ryle's view, seems to be whether the proposition in question (assuming that it is grammatically correct, employs conventional vocabulary, and so on) is absurd. For a category-mistake is said to have been
committed when one conjoins proposition-factors of incompatible types; and we have seen that "to say that a given proposition-factor is of a certain category or type, is to say that its expression could complete certain sentence frames without absurdity". If so, then one cannot first claim that a category-mistake has been committed and then conclude that a certain proposition is absurd; rather, one must first show that the proposition in question is absurd.

In the example of the visitor to the university, who surveys the buildings and grounds and then asks where the university is, the absurdity is clear. But is it equally clear that the statement that the mind is an immaterial substance in which private events take place is absurd? Obviously, to many people it is not. Indeed, if Ryle is correct that this doctrine is prevalent among many theorists and laymen and that "most philosophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe, with minor reservations, to its main articles", then it may even be that it is not absurd to most people. If so, then the accusation that this view commits a category-mistake looks dubious.

It might be replied - unlike in the example of the university - that the requirement here is only that the doctrine appear absurd to a certain group of persons, say, linguistic philosophers. But then we must ask why their
opinion should be privileged over the opinions of many others - including other philosophers who may be followers of Descartes, theologians who believe that the immaterial-substance theory is dictated by the tenets of their theology, and many ordinary people for whom the belief is an integral part of their religious convictions. It is possible, of course, that after reading Ryle these people would agree that their beliefs are absurd and promptly relinquish them. But even granting that not all absurdities are readily apparent and that they often require painstaking argument for their disclosure, it would be incautious to expect large scale conversions to result from reflection upon Ryle's arguments. Not even all philosophers who are equally familiar with the issues are prepared to endorse his assessment; it seems even less likely that those ordinary people for whom the belief is interwoven with their most cherished convictions would do so either.

This points up a serious difficulty for Ryle's line of attack. For if an appeal to absurdity is to be the criterion for identifying category mistakes, and thereby for determining what is meaningful, then careful specification of the persons to whom something must seem absurd in order to qualify as a category mistake must be made and defended. If this is not the criterion then we must ask what is. Once we exclude purely formal features of sentences and range beyond simple cases like that of the
visitor to the university, we are at a loss for guidelines. And it is at just those times that we encounter the philosophically interesting and controversial problems.

Thirdly, Ryle does not discuss the most common form of fatalism called causal fatalism. The claim of causal fatalism is not that there exist in some timeless logical realm true propositions about future events which somehow necessitate those events. The thesis of causal fatalism is that there exists in our ordinary world prior to any and every future event the fully determining cause of those events. A causal fatalist may believe that his sitting down to launch tomorrow will be the result of a causal chain already in motion now. In that case his sitting down to launch tomorrow is fully determinate. It is the inevitable result of the antecedent links in the causal chain leading up to this event. Ryle does not treat causal fatalism. He has just tried to analyse the logical version of the fatalist dilemma. Thus Ryle's treatment of the Fatalist Dilemma does not take all its versions and formulations into consideration.

Ryle's view of philosophy as mapping the logical geography of concepts is also questionable for it is excessively narrow and exclusivistic. One could question this view of the fundamental nature of philosophy by arguing, for example, that one of the enduring glories of philosophy is that it has been the source of so many new
areas of enquiry; such as natural science, theology, economics, political science, psychology and sociology etc. It is only because philosophers have engaged in tasks other than just pure analysis of existing usages, and have formed theories of their own from basic empirical data that is available to everyone or from more sophisticated data gained as a result of a more than amateur acquaintance with some area of knowledge, that they have formed the theories which became the basis of these new areas of enquiry. That is, one fairly persistent view of philosophy has seen its basic task as asking fundamental questions about areas where such fundamental questions have not been asked before.

Philosophy may show itself not so much in the discovery of new answers as in the discovery of new questions. It may influence its age not by solving its problems but by opening its eyes to previously unconsidered problems. So the new ideas released by philosophy may be those which give a new direction to enquiry, often amounting to a new method of thinking.

Furthermore, Ryle's treatment of philosophical disagreement may be deemed acceptable within the over-all linguistic explanation of philosophy. However, the phenomenon of philosophical disagreement cannot be treated or explained only by recourse of Linguistic Analysis. There are other perspectives on philosophy which give entirely
different explanations of the phenomenon of philosophical disagreement. For example, the existentialist and the sociological approaches to philosophy do provide their own explanations of philosophical disagreement.

The problems of philosophy, according to existentialists, are diametrically opposite to scientific or mathematical, or logical questions. Science, for example, is concerned with the manipulation of physical objects and data confirming or arriving at its results through experimental verification. Philosophical questions have no definite answers. Our engagement with philosophical problems results into profound perplexity and bafflement. Scientific questions demand total concentration in case we want to resolve them. However, philosophical questions pertaining to Free-will, Evil and God etc., engage us to our foundations and our whole mode of life is at stake while trying to resolve them, this way or that way. Our deepest drives, desires, attitudes, hopes, fears, aspirations; in fact, the very mode of existence is drastically altered while deciding a philosophical issue. Our commitment entails radical corresponding change in our life-style. As philosophical questions cannot be resolved through mathematical demonstration or experimental verification, their resolution unavoidably entails faith, commitment, decision and finally an inescapable ring of doubt.
Various philosophical alternatives offer choices and we have to choose any one of the alternatives in keeping with our own inner lights. Whether to believe in God or not, become a Muslim or a buddhist, deem man free or determined, choose between a supposed good and supposed evil etc., are matters to be decided in consultation with the depths of our subjectivity or conscience. Even the perennial philosophical positions viz. Monism, Dualism, Rationalism, Hedonism, Materialism, Idealism, etc, are, at bottom, rationally laboured responses to the eternal questions pertaining to the origin, status and destiny of man in the cosmic scheme of things.

Thus the existentialist approach views philosophy as originating from the mystery of human existence and not arising out of category-mistakes or conceptual-confusions as held by Gilbert Ryle. As against Rylean explanation of philosophical disagreement, existentialist approach to philosophy coureously accepts philosophical disagreement or plurality of philosophical responses. The job of philosophy is not to explain philosophical disagreement but to illuminate the nature of multiple choices and alternatives that confront man in his practical life. The interactable controversies of philosophy cannot be explained through Linguistic analysis but by recourse to arriving at a decision amongst unavoidable multiple choices. There cannot be a universality applicable formula
or technique of resolving a philosophical disagreement. Every person will have to resolve a philosophical dilemma according to his own inner lights.

Similarly, the superscientific conception of philosophy is outrightly rejected by the sociological approach to philosophy. It refuses to accept philosophy as an exploration of transcendental ontological facts. To that extent, it is in agreement with the analytical approach championed by Wittgenstein and Ryle. However, the sociological approach to philosophy advances an altogether different explanation of philosophical disagreement. It does not treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned or detached explorer of 'Truth-in-Itself' but a culturally conditioned and ethnocentrically oriented person. Philosophy is a function of the socio-cultural setting in which it originates and operates. Metaphysical speculation or philosophical argumentation is not inspired by a disinterested search for truth but by political ideology, religious world-view and technological situation of a particular society at a particular point of historical evolution.

Therefore, philosophical disagreement is a product of differing cultural and historical field situations. A philosophical theory emerges from the pre-philosophical group conceptual field. Philosophical contentions and arguments are pre-philosophically directed, if not
determined. The philosophical disagreement within a particular cultural group can be traced to differing psychological specificities or individual differences amongst a group of philosophers representing a particular 'world-view-cum-value-system'.

The Marxian view of philosophy is one of the significant versions of the sociological approach to philosophy. For Marx, philosophy is a part of the ideological justification of a particular social system based on an economic structure or arrangement. Human history is a struggle between classes. It is a perennial struggle between ruling and ruled classes. The governing ideas or controlling values of any age are the ideas and values of the ruling class. The governing class justifies the existing economic structure or the status quo by offering an ideological justification for the same. On the other hand, the exploited people challenge the existing economic arrangement by working out an alternative set of ideas. This is not a controversy to be settled by logical argumentation. It is a battle for the appropriation of the means and modes of production and can be settled only by recourse to violent action.

Thus we find that philosophical disputes or disagreements are culturally, politically and economically inspired controversies and not necessarily motivated by a disinterested search for truth. Gilbert Ryle's treatment of
philosophical disagreement as arising out of conceptual confusions does not tell the whole story. It is, at best, a partial explanation of the phenomenon of philosophical disagreement.
CONCLUSION

The history of philosophy reveals that there has been continuous disagreement on various philosophical theses. In fact, the phenomenon of philosophical disagreement has deeply puzzled the proponents as well as the opponents of philosophy. Each civilization has generated its own peculiar philosophical controversies. Philosophy has bristled with interminable disagreements throughout the ages. It has never been possible for all philosophers to agree on a set of philosophical conclusions. Furthermore, the disagreements have been perennially figuring in ancient, medieval and modern ages. The problems are still under discussion and will continue to be debated during centuries to come.

The ontological, cosmological and axiological standpoints of philosophers have offered bewildering variety and complexity, apart from being diametrically opposite to one another. For example, while Heraclitus speculated that everything is in a constant flux, motion and change; Parmenides argued that from being only being can become something else and whatever is always has been and always will be and that everything remains what it is. Sophists argued for ethical subjectivism and relativism whereas Plato advocated forms to be objective and absolute. Aristotle criticised Plato for maintaining that universal
forms transcend their particular instances in the physical universe. In 17th century Descartes tried to break completely with Christian Scholasticism. Locke refuted the doctrine of innate ideas advanced by Descartes. Berkeley rejected the Lockean contention that primary qualities are independent of mind. Hume repudiated Berkeley's notion of soul-substance. Kant criticised Hume for drawing radical skeptical conclusions. Hegel differed with Kant for his epistemological approach to philosophy and instead advocated his dialectical method of doing philosophy. In 19th century Schopenhaur, Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Nietzsche, rejected the entire metaphysical, axiological epistemological package of ancient, medieval and modern philosophers.

Thus, as a matter of fact, we have various ontological, cosmological and epistemological doctrines. In fact, every philosophical position has a counter-position. We have materialists contesting the standpoint of idealists, pluralists opposing monists, atheists criticising theists, Teleologists, rejecting mechanists, Pragmatists differing with existentialists, intuitionists repudiating empiricists and humanists contradicting fundamentalists etc. In addition, we have Pythogoreans, Buddhists, Platonists, Aristotolelians, Thomists, Vedantins, Cartesians etc. celebrating and standing for philosophical outlooks or religious world-views of the founders of these schools.
The phenomenon of philosophical disagreement was highlighted owing to the increasing standardization of scientific results during the last five hundred years. While natural sciences have registered solid progress in their fields of enquiry, metaphysical philosophers have been proliferating disagreements and controversies. Whenever great metaphysicians have tried to solve philosophical problems, they have ended up generating additional contradictions, antinomies and paradoxes. Right from ancient Greeks up to twentieth-century Neo-Hegelians, no philosophical agreement has ever been worked-out and it does not seem that further philosophical enquiry will arrive at any major consensus.

Philosophical disagreements are not like scientific or mathematical disagreements. Rival scientific hypotheses can be subjected to well-known methods of observation, induction, deduction and verification and thus disputes can be resolved. New factual findings can confirm or disconfirm particular scientific hypothesis. Often a new hypothesis emerges in the light of relevant experiments carried out. A mathematical dispute can also be resolved by recourse to logical deduction. However, a philosophical dispute is not amenable to scientific verification or logical deduction. Philosophical contentions are neither proved nor disproved; neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. No philosophical dispute is settled once for all. Every philosophical thesis or
statement is perennially debatable. Philosophical statements sound more like enigmas and riddles rather than theories. In view of the same, not a single metaphysical contention has been finally resolved so far, despite the fact that men of exceptional genius have struggled very hard at their resolution.

In view of the above methodological field-situation, linguistic analysts such as Gilbert Ryle, offer us a way out. They suggest that philosophical problems are rooted in logic, language, grammar and syntax etc. Therefore, it is essential that we carry out a logical, linguistic, grammatical and syntactical analysis of philosophical discourse. We shall discover, they maintain, that philosophical problems will be dissolved by recourse to such an analysis. For Gilbert Ryle, philosophy is a function of our constantly committing category-mistakes. We confuse the logical status or role of various categories in vogue in our day-to-day language. Then we give them similar treatment in our writings, speeches and arguments. Thus philosophical problems crop up. These philosophical problems will disappear if we can grasp or appreciate the category-confusions or category-mistakes that originate and sustain them, to begin with. In this way, all philosophical disagreements will be dissolved or philosophical controversies will stop bothering us any further.
Thus, for Ryle the job of philosophy is to undertake analysis leading to what may be called category clarification or category-rectification as against the category-confusion or category-mistake which lead to philosophical problems and consequent philosophical disagreements.

There is an element of truth in this Rylean account of philosophy. Philosophical problems are intimately linked to language. However, whether they originate from language or category confusions and mistakes is a moot point. Language cannot be deemed to be enjoying an absolute and unqualified licence in legislating all kinds of philosophies, world-views and ideologies for us. Language, after all, is a human enterprise or institution. Philosophy is a human enterprise as well. Language can qualify philosophy as much as philosophy can qualify language. However, it does not mean that language originates or generates philosophy or philosophy originates or generates language. Philosophy is a highly controversial area of human endeavour. However, it is highly inadequate and unhelpful to trace all philosophical problems and disagreements to category-confusions. Philosophical problems and disagreements originate from man. Language can illuminate or mislead us. However, that does not mean that workings or mishandlings of language are responsible for the rise and fall of philosophy.
However, the central question pertaining to Linguistic Analysis in general and in this dissertation specifically with regard to Gilbert Ryle's view of philosophy as an activity or method of correcting the misunderstandings and consequent mishandlings of ordinary language leading to false or untenable metaphysical beliefs; is its own status. Obviously, it is not a descriptive thesis giving an overview as to how the actual historical development of philosophy has taken place or how philosophy has been carried out by such philosophers as Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel etc. Ryle's view of or assignment to philosophy would not be even recognisable to such distinguished 17th century philosophers as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz who thought that the most important business of philosophy was to work out some definite first principles from which one could deduce a whole system of theorems or conclusions pertaining to many areas of knowledge. Even empiricists would have defined philosophy as an examination of the faculties of mind, especially its powers of knowing and perceiving; with a view to determining the scope and limits of our own understanding.

Therefore, it is safe to presume that the method of Linguistic Analysis views the role of philosophy in an altogether different light. It is not entirely a method of doing philosophy. It is a new framework for philosophy
as well as a new perspective on philosophical problems. Thus Rylean view of the role of philosophy is also recommendatory. It is a normative thesis. This thesis does not describe as to how philosophy has historically been done for centuries across continents and civilisations. It suggests that no matter what philosophers have been doing for centuries, now they ought to carry out their pursuits in this way.

Philosophy is an all-inclusive intellectual endeavour. It has accomodated this highly normative thesis regarding itself. However, linguistic analysis leading to category-clarification and dissolution of philosophical disagreements cannot be deemed to be the sole task or purpose of philosophy. A critical examination of world-views and ideologies, an illumination of the possibilities and limitations of human existence and an exploration of new intellectual vistas etc, can be some of the more significant and relevant projects to be undertaken by philosophy.

Every age has its own fanaticisms and fundamentalisms. Every age is psychologically attuned to the suggestion to be the wisest of all ages and to have been vouchsafed by destiny with final verities. Atomistic Analysis practised by Russell, Moore and early Wittgenstein, Positivistic attack launched by Schilick,
Carnap, Wasimann and Ayer, Linguistic Analysis carried out by later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Wisdom, Austin and others, etc. are surely new perspectives on philosophical problems. But it cannot be said that these perspectives are final or for that matter sacrosanct. These perspectives have emerged in response to the great methodological sophistication and standardisation achieved by western man in our century. The empiricistic perspective championed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume culminating in Kantian Critical Philosophy was an equally powerful outlook on philosophical questions. There were finalistic overtones in Humean and Kantian accounts of philosophy. However, a reassessment of philosophy by twentieth century philosophical analysts opened up fresh avenues of looking at philosophical questions and responses. Similarly, new developments in decades to come will necessitate a fresh look at Philosophy and we might become richer by new methodological insights and metaphilosophical perspectives.
CHAPTER - I

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