NONALIGNMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

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— M.M. Rahman
The main aim of this study is to explain Nonalignment in theory and practice with particular reference to the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic, two of the three leading nonaligned countries.

This study developed out of a feeling of dissatisfaction with the general run of explanations and analyses of Nonalignment presented to the literate public both in India and abroad. On the one hand, these explanations seemed to be at variance with the foreign policy of India in practice. On the other hand, many of these explanations of India, foreign policy both by India's spokesmen on foreign policy and by scholars appeared to contradict the very bases of international politics and the objectives of foreign policy.

It was, therefore, found necessary to make a study of Nonalignment in depth, with a view to understanding it and making a realistic appraisal of its merits and demerits.

The study is divided into two major parts and a Conclusion.

In Part I, an effort has been made to analyse Non-alignment laying primary stress on the speeches of the architect of India's Nonalignment in particular, and Nonalignment in general, Jawaharlal Nehru, supplemented by the speeches of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the architect of Arab Nonalignment, and of a few other leaders of Nonalignment like Sukarno.
Since Nonalignment has been so much misinterpreted and misunderstood an effort has been made in the first two chapters to dispel these misunderstandings and misconceptions, leading to an analysis of Nonalignment and its meaning in chapter three.

In Part II, the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic have been examined from their beginnings. This section is divided into five chapters, each dealing with the foreign policy of the two countries in the major international crises since 1950, in which one or the other was directly involved or in which either or both have played major roles. An attempt is made to compare the foreign policies of the two countries so as to bring out their closeness and also their differences, if any.

An attempt has also been made to understand the bases of the closeness and also the stresses and strains in the relations between India and the United Arab Republic and to examine whether or not the two countries need each other's understanding and cooperation in future.

This is followed by a concluding section wherein some recent problems facing the two countries are touched upon with a view to suggesting a few guide lines for future policy.
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The United Arab Republic was formed in February 1958 by the Union of Egypt and Syria. The Union was dissolved by Syria's withdrawal from it in September 1961, Egypt retaining the little of the United Arab Republic. For the sake of uniformity this title alone is used throughout this study and it refers to Egypt alone.
CHAPTER I

COBWEBS AND ILLUSION

Introduction:

The Chinese aggression on India's borders in the last quarter of 1962 had "swept away many accumulated cobwebs and illusions" about Nonalignment from the Indian mind, said an editorial in The Indian Express of November 29, 1962. This might have been a confession. It cannot be taken as a generalisation for some important and somewhat paradoxical reasons.

Firstly, Nehru, the Foreign Minister of India, at the time, had no illusions of any kind about the fundamentals of his foreign policy, notwithstanding his confession, soon after the Chinese invasion that "we were getting out of touch with reality ..... and were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation." This confession had limited application, at the most, to only a few aspects of India's China policy as Nehru had later clarified. About Nonalignment as such he had no illusions. In his famous message to the nation, broadcast on October 22, 1962, he declared, "we have followed a policy


of nonalignment and sought friendship of all nations. I believe in that policy fully and we shall continue to follow it. We are not going to give up our principles because of the present difficulty. Even this difficulty will be more effectively met by our continuing that policy." Nehru was, I believe, perfectly right. He did not have to learn anything from the Himalayan tragedy. None of the major assumptions of Nonalignment was disproved by Chinese aggression. On the other hand, these were further strengthened during this crisis as shall be seen later.

Secondly, it is, however, not yet certain that all the accumulated cobwebs and illusions have completely been swept away from the minds of the Indians as well as the Westerners. For, while only a few of the illusions have disappeared, some new ones have since developed or are in the process of development.

It is, therefore, necessary to dispel and destroy, as far as possible, all these cobwebs and illusions, past, present and those that are in the process of development. Then only will it be possible to understand Nonalignment properly and to make a proper evaluation of its worth and validity or otherwise as a principle of foreign policy.

4. See below, p.^ Also see K.P.S. Menon, loc.cit.
Nonalignment and Nonviolence:

The most widely held misconception is the claim that India's foreign policy "has its foundations in India's culture and traditions, in her religiophilosophic ideology, in her immediate and remote past", all of which have "found best expression in recent times in Mahatma Gandhi's writings." Nonviolence or peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment of just means to achieve just ends, besides Nonalignment, are claimed to be the really noteworthy features of India's foreign policy.


7. Id., p.484. Also see M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs 1952-66 (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963), pp.31-48. Professor Rajan's views, as expressed in this book, are inconsistent and self-contradictory. For example, he says that "The rightness of a policy of action depended as much on the means by which a certain objective was sought to be achieved, as by the inherent rightness of the objective itself" (p.31). Therefore, "even while fully supporting the Egyptian act of nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July, 1956, Indian spokesmen did criticise the way it was done." Similarly, "India's sympathies for the Hungarian national aspiration of independence was tempered by the fact that it took the shape of violent uprising — and India believed violence was not a worthy means even to achieve worthy causes (pp. 31-32. Italics are mine - see below chapters V and VI respectively for an analysis of India's policy on the Suez and the Hungarian crises). At

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It is, however, admitted that "the ideal set by Gandhi is a very lofty one, even with the limitations of which he himself was conscious. It is but natural, therefore, that in our attempt to follow in the footsteps of the Mahatma we should fail sometimes, and fail grievously." It is also admitted that "How far in the implementation of

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the sametime he also asserts that "there was, and is never, any question in the minds of the Indian policy makers of consciously trying to operate on an idealistic or moral plane in world affairs" (p.38). There is here not merely a self-contradiction but also a strange double-standard. That is, while India did not adhere to these ideals, its spokesmen and scholars not only spoke of them, but also judged the actions of other nations on such ideals. Yet Professor Rajan writes that "when Indian foreign policy spokesmen sometimes talked in idealistic and moral generalities (as the spokesmen of any other country are wont to do), they were misunderstood to be following a wholly idealistic or ethical policy ... many a foreign critic not merely succumbed to this error, but also made the further error of criticising Indian policies and actions in the world from idealistic and ethical planes ...." (pp. 39-40). These views, claims Professor Rajan in the preface to the book, represent a 'typical Indian view'. In 'Chinese Aggression and The Future of India's Non-alignment', International Studies (Vol.V : July 1963-April 1964), Professor Rajan has succeeded in freeing himself of these inconsistencies but he has blamed our policy makers and the Congress leaders for having confused Nonalignment with nonviolence and for having treated Nonalignment as a 'fetish to worship', asserting at the same time that "the Government of India has never been a devotee of nonviolence" (p.128).


9. Appadorai, op.cit., p.489. Thus Professor Appadorai says that in the case of Goa, India simply decided to use force and against China too, Nehru was not "prepared to take the risks involved in the adoption of Nonviolence as a way of resolving international disputes" (p.614).
foreign policy India has kept up the ideal is a matter for investigation in each specific instance." "Yet", it is asserted,10 "there is no denying the fact that Gandhian ideology is a powerful force in our outlook and policy", and, that 11 "the nonviolent tradition is an integral part of the thinking of Indian leaders."

Therefore, it is concluded that "India's foreign policy is on the cross-roads, not in the sense in which some members of the Indian Parliament viewed it — substitution of alignment for nonalignment — but in the more fundamental sense of finding adequate sanctions for a policy based on Panch Sheel." At the same time, it is asserted 13 that "China's aggression on India's soil shows that it is very important for a nonaligned country especially, to have its defences in readiness, in case, the other party is not prepared to negotiate on just conditions."

10. Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 98.

11. Appadorai, op.cit., p.514. According to Professor Michael Brecher, Nonviolence is one of the 'pillars' of India's Foreign Policy — See India's Foreign Policy : An Interpretation, (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1967, Mimeographed) p.9.

12. Id., p.513.

13. Id., p. 419.
Neither of these conclusions is correct. It did not take 'China's aggression on India's soil' for Nehru to grasp the importance of having the country's defences in readiness. The fact that India suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Chinese forces does not mean that Nehru did not realise this earlier. The fact is that Nehru realised it very early and he said it a number of times. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on March 8, 1948, Nehru said that "nothing is more important in the opinion of this Government than to make India strong economically and militarily - not strong in the big power sense, because that is beyond our capacity, but as strong as we can to defend ourselves if anybody attacks us." Again, on March 22, 1949, Nehru said: "the first duty of every country is to protect itself. Protecting oneself unfortunately means relying on the armed forces and the like and so we build up, where necessity arises, our defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, although Mahatma Gandhi would have taken the risk no doubt.


16. Nehru had stated on other occasions that even Gandhiji was in favour of the use of force in certain cases like Kashmir (See below pp. 9-11). Professor Mahadevan wrote that Gandhiji "was advocating only a limited form of nonviolence, 'nonviolence restricted to the purpose of nonviolence'.
and I dare not say that he would have been wrong. Indeed, if a country is strong enough to take the risk it will not only survive, but it will become a great country.\(^{17}\) But we are small folk and dare not take that risk.\(^{18}\) If there is fear of future aggression we have to protect ourselves against that."

That was exactly why the Government of India sent forces into Kashmir in 1947. Therefore, the view that the foreign

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winning our freedom and therefore perhaps for preaching the regulation of international relations by nonviolent means.\(^{18}\) (op.cit., p.88). And Prof. Bimla Prasad has observed that "where the way for nonviolent resistance is not open, Gandhi was prepared to appreciate violent resistance, provided it did not involve the destruction of the entire society on whose behalf it was carried on." Prof. Prasad was, therefore, justified in holding that a thorough study of Gandhiji's views on world affairs is needed (see 'Survey of Recent Research Studies on India's Foreign Policy and Relations' International Studies Vol.V, July 1963-April 64), p.436. Prof. Prasad expressed these views in a comment on Paul F. Power, Gandhi on World Affairs (London, 1961).\(^{19}\) See Appadorai, op.cit., p.531 for a similar view.

17. See Appadorai, op.cit., p.531 for a similar view.

18. But Nehru was never tired of saying that India was a great country and that we would not be conquered by force. It would appear that Nehru was trying to point out that Gandhiji's ideals did not suit us, however great we might be. As Gandhiji identified himself with India's policy of Kashmir in October, 1947, it is possible to argue that perhaps he himself realised this towards the end of his career, as Plato did, though like Plato he might have insisted that it was all the more necessary that we should know the ideal.

policy of India is based on the philosophy of nonviolence preached by Gandhiji, Buddha and Asoka is not in accord with facts. As an Indian scholar has put it. A concept so patently absurd may not need a contradiction but for the fact that it is often repeated by many important people in India.

20. Buddhism was never totally accepted in India - See below note 53.

21. It is doubtful if Asoka's conversion to Buddhism made him believe in nonviolence totally. Though, with the defeat of Kalinga, he overcame the last significant obstacle to the control of India, Asoka did not seem to have reduced his army. Similarly he did not seem to have either relaxed the methods of punishment prescribed by earlier Mauryan kings, or abolished capital punishment (See Charles Drake's, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, (O.U.P., Bombay, 1962), p.173). Thus, Asoka's commitment to nonviolence seems to have been not more than Nehru's, for Nehru said that "If we are pledged to nonviolence, surely we would not keep any Army, Navy or Air Force" (See below). See also G.N.Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Nonalignment*, (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), chapter VI, pp. 118-141 for a similar discussion of Panch Sheel and pacts.


23. Nehru had himself done this quite often, especially after the conclusion of the Panch Sheel Agreement with China and the Bandung Conference. See Nehru, *op.cit.*, pp. 99-104. See below, note 48.
and abroad." For, "there is nothing in the political behaviour of the Indian people and the administrative and other measures of the Indian Government which substantiated this concept. In both Kashmir and Hyderabad the Indian government used its armed forces and acted more or less in the same way as other governments have acted in similar situations."

Nehru himself explained clearly the reasons for his decision to discard the Gandhian ethics in a speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949:

"We were bred in a high tradition under Mahatma Gandhi .......

"And with that idealism and ethical background we now face practical problems and it becomes an exceedingly difficult thing to apply that particular doctrine to the solution of these problems. That is a conflict which individuals and groups and nations have often had to face. We have not often thought enough of Gandhiji and his great doctrine, of his great message and while we praised it often enough we felt,

"Are we hypocrites, talking about it and being unable to live up to it ...." if we are hypocrites, then surely our future is dark. We may be hypocritical about the small things of life but it is a dangerous thing to be hypocritical about the great things of life. And it would have been the greatest tragedy if we exploited the name and prestige of our

24. See C.A.D., Part II, Vol. II, 8 March, 1949, pp.1229-1230. (Italics are mine). That such an important part of this speech had been omitted from the collection of Nehru's speeches (supra n.14) is rather unfortunate. Similarly Nehru's speech of 28 November, 1949 (See above n.19), does not find a place in this otherwise excellent collection of Nehru's speeches on Foreign Policy.
Great Leader, took shelter under it and denied in our hearts, in our activities, the message that he brought to this country and the world ..... we can not and I am quite positive that our great leader would not have had us behave as blind automatons just carrying out what he had said without reference to the changes in events......

"It was a curious thing that we who carried on the struggle for freedom in a non-violent and peaceful way ..... should have had to undertake a kind of war in a part of the country. The whole thing seemed to be a complete reversal of all that we stood for, and yet circumstances were such that I am quite convinced that we had no other way and that the way we took was the right one.

"May I mention to the House that towards the end of October 1947, when the question of Kashmir suddenly came upon us ..... I went as I often did — to Mahatma Gandhi, for his advice. It was not natural for him to give advice about military matters. What did he know about them? His struggles were struggles of the spirit. But listening to me, if I may with all respect say so, he did not say "no" to the course of action that I proposed. He saw that a Government as we were had to follow its duty even to military obligations when certain circumstances arose. And throughout those few months, before he was taken from us, I conferred with him on many occasions about Kashmir and it was a great happiness to me that I had his blessings in the step we took."

Nehru was more categorical and unequivocal, when during a debate on Goa, he told the Indian Parliament on July 26, 1966, in reply to a question from a member of the Parliament that:

"Acharya Kripalani put a straight question : whether our Government was pledged to non-violence. The answer to that is no, the Government is not. As far as I can conceive, under the existing circumstances,

no Government can be pledged to non-violence. If we are pledged to non-violence surely we would not keep any Army, Navy or Air Force ......

Acharya Kripalani reminded us of Mahatma Gandhi, saying that the Polish defence against the German armies might also be called satyagraha. Also Gandhiji defended — not only defended but in fact encouraged — the Indian Army going to Kashmir against the raiders. It is surprising that a man like Gandhiji, who was absolutely committed to non-violence should do that kind of thing. So that, even he, in certain circumstances, admitted the right of the state as it is constituted, to commit violence in defence. The Government of India cannot give up that right in the existing circumstances....."

These statements prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that India's foreign policy is or was not based on non-violence and that even Gandhiji had accepted the use of force whenever and wherever necessary.

**Nonalignment and Hinduism:**

But in the opinion of another Indian scholar who does not seem to take Nehru or anybody else seriously "we

26. R. Bhaskaran, 'The Philosophical Basis of Indian Foreign Policy', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1963, (Volume XII), p.448. Prof. Bhaskaran claims that India's foreign policy is based on the 'transcendental urge' which, according to him, moves Indian 'politicians as it does the illiterate peasant or the learned philosopher'. The learned professor attributes this 'urge' even to such down-to-earth acts of Indian politicians as "proposing to go into a sort of political 'retreat' to rejuvenate the party and clean the administration." This is a reference to what was at the time known as the Kamaraj plan as it was the brainchild of Kamaraj, the president of the Congress Party from 1964 to 1967. Under

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have let our philosophy actually guide our conduct as persons and group" and that:

"Our nonalignment like our noncooperation and nonviolence is a principle of conduct tested and proved viable in four millennia of civilised existence ... It is essentially an Indian principle demanding an open eyed indifference to the discipline of consequences. Its basis like that of everything else Indian is religious and is to be found in the permanent unshakeable faith in a divine ordering of the universe which permits endless variety and does not call for human exertion to extinguish difference and promote uniformity."

It is also claimed that "however distasteful it may be to the sophisticated architects and exponents of our foreign policy in its duirnal manifestations to consider its roots, it is the Hindu view of the ultimate truth that nourishes them."

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this scheme a few top ranking congress politicians including Lal Bahadur Shastri were made to resign office to work for the party. Not all these congressmen were 'clean' themselves, and had to face inquiries on charges of corruption subsequently. However, neither the party was rejuvenated nor the administration cleaned. The learned professor claims that such acts "show how utterly impossible it is to 'make sense' of our thoughts and actions without the key to understanding furnished by our philosophy." It does not seem so at all. It is a different matter if such acts would 'make sense' to some only when they were given a mystical or philosophical coating. If this were true, it is difficult to blame Nehru for having so often resorted to this method. After all, he had to justify his foreign policy to his people in the language they understood. This perhaps gives us a clue to an understanding of the Indian mind and Philosophy.

27. Ibid. Needless to say this is a reference to Nehru and other British oriented Indian leaders.
That this view of Nonalignment is not correct will become evident in chapter three. Here certain facts have to be noted which go against the claim that Nonalignment is an Indian and hence a religious principle. Firstly, Nehru was the chief architect of India's foreign policy. It is incorrect to say that he was nourished by 'the Hindu view of the ultimate truth'. Perhaps it would be easier to make such a claim about Gandhiji. But Gandhiji himself is reported to have said that 'Nehru is an Englishman'. For the same reason, Gandhiji and Nehru differed on almost all important political issues. The former did not favour parliamentary democracy. He did not like the Indian National Congress to function as a political party after independence. He was not a socialist. Finally, he was not in favour of the use of force at least in internal affairs. In every one of these matters Nehru's outlook was shaped by European currents of thought. Nonalignment was also a product of these influences. As a well informed Indian writer put it, "In fact it is the British and west European currents of thought which have for decades been determining Indian elite thinking on world affairs resulting on the


one hand in an overly enthusiastic participation in European affairs and in a broad socialistic fervour on the other......"

Secondly, it is a well recognised fact that Nonalignment is practised successfully by a large number of Afro-Asian nations, especially the United Arab Republic, not to speak of Yugoslavia. India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic evolved it independently though simultaneously, and drew inspiration from one another and in fact collaborated with each other, especially in the United Nations as will be seen in later chapters.

30. As K.P.Karunakaran has observed in the Introduction to Outside The Contest (op.cit., p.97), "the policy of nonalignment in the cold war is not that of India alone, but is also the policy of many Governments like those of U.A.R., Iraq, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and Ghana, and therefore, there must be something common to these countries which is at the source."


32. See Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester University Press, 1963), p.120, according to whom "India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic are the contemporary neutralist states par excellence. Each of these has pioneered policies which are not, in some respects at least, generally regarded as being typically neutralist."
Thirdly, there has been a demand from an important section of the Indian public for the abandonment of Non-alignment by India on the ground that India is not strong enough to face the Chinese threat or to take Kashmir from Pakistan. Among the advocates of this policy are leaders like Rajagopalachari and K.M. Munshi, who are known for their attachment to Hinduism and Gandhism. And the most vocal champion of dependence on the United States and the need for the manufacture of atom bombs by India, is the most militant of the Indian political parties, the Jan Sangh, which claims to be the champion of Hinduism in India, against what it calls the communalism of the Congress Party. Are all these gentlemen, then, not nourished by 'the Hindu view of the ultimate truth'? Or have they all lost their religious moorings to demand the abandonment of Nonalignment?

Finally, Nehru always spoke of Asia and Africa rather than of India alone. He said that Asia as a whole was

33. C.Rajagopalachari was almost the first leader to oppose publicly India's Nonalignment. When he founded the Swatantra Party, opposition to Nonalignment became its foreign policy plank.

34. For a study of Jan Sangh's Foreign Policy see M.A. Kishore, Jan Sangh's Approach to Problems of India's Foreign Policy (unpublished Ph.D. thesis presented to the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh).

different from Europe, and that Asia and Africa had common experiences and circumstances favouring Nonalignment.

Therefore, the argument that Nonalignment is either an Indian principle or a religious principle has to be rejected as ultra vires the facts.

The Basis of the Misconceptions:

In order to appreciate this better, it is necessary to examine the reasons for these wide-spread misconceptions.

Firstly, the close similarity of the word Nonalignment to words like nonviolence and noncooperation seems to have been a factor. For example a western Scholar has observed

36. Id., pp.248-252 and 280-281. In view of this fact, it would appear wrong to say that "Peoples and nations outside India do not have a similar history and all of them, national idiosyncracies notwithstanding, have opted for the western power-oriented attitude and for deliberate participation" (See R.Bhaskaran, op.cit., p.448). There is not a shred of evidence in the entire argument of Professor Bhaskaran to show that India's foreign policy itself is not power-oriented except an assertion to the contrary. Such attempts as this, to prove the greatness of India, appear to be, to say the least, entirely misplaced.

that "Nonalignment, by its very term is a negative conception. In this it resembles the idea of non-resistance, non-violence and nirvāṇa (non-illusion)....." This view conflicts with Nehru's own views. In fact Nehru rarely used the term Nonalignment in his early speeches on Foreign Policy. He is also reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with it for its supposedly negative connotation. For the same reason, Nasser and other Arabs prefer the term 'Positive Neutralism'.

38. See Nehru's speeches under the title 'An independent policy' in Nehru, op. cit., pp.24-85. In this section the word occurs only on pp.79 and 83. Nehru also used the term once in a speech in Parliament on 29 September, 1954, (Id., p.165). But see below for what appears to be the earliest recorded use of the term Nonalignment by Nehru himself. It has also to be borne in mind that it was only at the Belgrade Conference of the Nonaligned States in 1961, that the term Nonalignment was officially accepted by all states. Even then the Arabs seem to have disliked it (See below, note 40).


40. The Arabs' dislike of the term Nonalignment, was voiced by Fayez A. Sayegh, the distinguished Arab scholar in a comment on the Belgrade conference: "Nonalignment, selected in Belgrade..... is essentially and incapably negative; and yet it was chosen at the gathering at which the most militantly affirmative of meanings was assigned to the policy pursued by the participants. It was ironical that the supreme leaders of neutralism should have chosen its most affirmative moment as the occasion for broadcasting the purely negative element of their policy." (See Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1964), p.4.)
Nehru did not approve even this term. He had instead preferred such phrases as 'keeping aloof from blocs', 'independent policy', and 'friendly relations with all', etc. and he declared repeatedly that his foreign policy was neither negative nor passive. In 1947, for example, he said: "We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else." And in 1962 he said: "You may call it neutral or whatever you like it but I, for my part, fail to see how this approach is neutral ....." Again, in 1968, he declared: "When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, obviously we mean nonalignment with military blocs. It is not a negative policy. It is a positive one and, I hope, a dynamic one ....." This was not an empty claim as will be seen in chapter three.

Another factor which appears to have contributed to the misconceptions in question was a wrong understanding of the

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41. See Nehru, op.cit., p.86. Nehru said: "I do not even like ..... 'positive neutrality' as is done in some countries ....." He said further "we are unaligned we are uncommitted to military policies, but the important fact is that we are committed to various policies, various objectives and various principles, very much so." (Italics are mine).

42. Id., pp. 24-25.

43. Id., p.24.

44. Id., p. 24.

45. Id., p. 79.
Indian role in the Korean crisis and the nature of the Panch Sheel, as will be made clear in chapters three and four. A third factor was, of course, Nehru's own reference to the past in some of his speeches, especially after the Panch Sheel agreement. While Nehru had used such arguments for understandable reasons, Indian scholars took them at face value. Even when Nehru was clear and explicit, he was misinterpreted or by-passed as has been noted earlier. To give another example, here is a statement of Nehru which has often been quoted in support of the view that India's foreign policy is based on

46. See below, chapter IV for an analysis of India's policy in the Korean crisis.

47. See below, p. 32 for another factor of importance.

48. See Nehru's speeches under the title 'Panch Sheel and Coexistence' in Nehru op.cit., pp.98-105. On p.101 Nehru said: "Peaceful coexistence is not a new idea for us in India. It has been our way of life and is as old as our thought and culture. About 2,200 Years ago, a great son of India, Ashoka, proclaimed it and inscribed it on rock and stone". It has already been indicated that Asoka's commitment to non-violence or coexistence was not total (see above note 21). It may also be added that many of Asoka's edicts had no binding force and were only ideal statements (See Charles Drekmeier, op.cit., p.167). It is also important to note that these remarks were made by Nehru in a speech at a civic reception to Bulganin and Khrushchev at Calcutta on November, 30, 1955.

49. As indicated earlier, Prof. Rajan has written that "naturally ....... Indian foreign policy spokesmen sometimes talked in idealistic and moral generalities (as the spokesmen of any other country are wont to do)....."(See above note 6).

50. See above p. 11.

51. For example see A. Appadorai, op.cit., p. 487.
India’s culture and religion. Nehru said that “it is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today .... It represents every circumstances that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects.”

It is on the basis of this and similar other statements of Nehru and, particularly, of the phrase ‘mental outlook of India’, that the whole edifice of the philosophical or cultural basis of India's foreign policy has been raised by Indian scholars. "The essence of that mental outlook", says Professor Appadorai, "is a spirit of tolerance among the common people in India, who have inherited the traditions from their scriptures and from their history." And, according to Prof. Bhaskaran, "Few foreigners can acquire the patience and equipment

52. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 80 and 83 (Italics are mine).

53. A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.487. This is a questionable view. As has been noted earlier (see above p.12), Prof.Baskaran wrote that Nonalignment "is essentially an Indian principle demanding an open eyed indifference to the discipline of consequences." (Italics are mine). This indifference rather than tolerance appears to be the dominant trait of the Indian mind as the existence of such social evils as ‘Sati’ and ‘untouchability’, go to show. The evil of ‘Sati’ was abolished only with the help of the British might in India. And Gandhiji understood the ‘sin’ of untouchability in South Africa and not in India. It would have been hypocrisy on his part to tolerate ‘untouchability’ any more in India after his experiences in South Africa. He sacrificed his life for religious tolerance in India. Does this prove that religious tolerance has been a tradition of the

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for the proper study of our foreign policy while most Indians who are interested have no need to spell out and justify for themselves the drives which govern our policy for they are like the foundations of a building which the resident has no need to examine......" This is to ignore the fact that Nehru had himself taken the greatest pains, throughout his long career as India's Foreign Minister, to explain and to justify his foreign policy to his countrymen more than to foreigners.

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Indian mind? Prof. Appadorai himself admits that "The rise of communal outlook in the first half of this century ending in the partition of India, and the prevalence of untouchability as a custom ..... warn us that one can never be compacent of the strength of the tolerant attitude in all the people" (p.488). And Buddha's teaching of ahimsa would have been superfluous if ahimsa and tolerance were already part of the life of the common man. Dr. Radhakrishnan wrote: "Buddhism would justify Buddha's attitude by saying that every religion exaggerates the suffering of life, for the aim of religion is the redemption from sin and suffering. With a happy world there would have been no need for religion." (See Indian Philosophy (The MacMillian Company, New York, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1958), p.364. If "Buddha overemphasises the dark side of things", it is proof of the intensity of his feeling as well as of the complete or near complete absence of good around him. The fall of Buddhism in India is also proof of the absence of tolerance and the predominance of indifference in India, for as Dr. Radhakrishnan (op.cit.p.608) put it:"slow absorption and silent indifference ... are the causes of the fall of Buddhism". In politics also nonviolence does not seem to have been the predominant force in ancient India. See J. Duncan MacRett, 'The Maintenance of Peace In The Hindu World', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1958. One has only to name Kautilya's 'Arthasastra' in this regard See T.M.P. Mahadevan, op.cit., pp.99-104, for a contrary view. Nehru attributed Gandhiji's attachment to nonviolence to his early life in Gujarat and the Jain doctrine of nonviolence. He denied that India as a whole was influenced by this doctrine - See J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1967), p. 479.

Similarly, the fact that Nehru had laid the greatest stress on 'every circumstance that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects', is either forgotten or bypassed. As already indicated, Nehru also said that these circumstances were common to the whole of Asia as well as to Africa. Moreover, there is nothing in Nehru's statement to suggest that he was referring to the influence of Hindu philosophy and scriptures on India's foreign policy. As seen already he had clearly rejected Gandhiji's ideals as impracticable quite early in his career as India's Foreign Minister. Thus the words 'inherent in the whole mental outlook of India' do not refer to the influence of Indian philosophy and scriptures at all. All that Nehru meant was, in my opinion, that India's foreign policy, "was in line with the policy which we had broadly thought of even before we became independent." Even though the pre-independence thinking of the Indian leaders was idealistic and moralistic, mainly under the influence of Gandhiji.

55. See above, pp. 15-16

56. See above, pp. 9-11. Nehru also appears to have convinced Gandhiji in this regard - see above note 18.

Nehru made it clear, as early as 1947, that it did not suit an independent India, because, as he said, "Foreign affairs are utterly realistic today. A false step, a false phrase makes all the difference." This realism has been the most distinct feature of India's foreign policy as also of the United Arab Republic. It was the failure to understand this subtle change from the pre-independence days that had misled many to dub Nehru as an idealist and a dreamer.

Nonalignment and Islam:

Nasser has often said that "our policy emanates from our country, our land, and our conscience." Does this mean that the Nonalignment of the Arabs has its basis in Islam? Nasser has never claimed that it is so. As Fayez A. Sayegh

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58. Nehru, op. cit., p.27. See also Speech at pp.50-55. These two speeches of Nehru are extremely important for an understanding of Nehru's foreign policy and his approach to it which was throughly pragmatic and practical. In the latter speech Nehru even ridiculed the talk of blocs as outdated.

59. Ibid.

60. See Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1952), p.50.

61. See United Arab Republic Information Department, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1958, pp.88 and 100. (Hereafter cited as Nasser's Speeches). See also Nasser's Speeches, 1959, op.cit., p.11.


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has observed, "The marks of Islam upon the thought processes and expressions of Muslim leaders, in matters relating to internal affairs is pervasive and unmistakable; but in matters pertaining to international affairs in general and neutralism in particular, the reasoning of the contemporary generation of Muslim leaders is indistinguishable from that of non-Muslims. Nasir, Nehru, and Nkrumah ..... seem to speak the same language and to draw inspiration from the same public philosophy when they discourse on neutralism and the cold war ....." He has also observed that "leadership in establishing the doctrinaire

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of every contemporary Muslim statesman. But ... I have studied ..... a fairly representative cross-section of the voluminous literature in question.

"...I have found neither indications nor admissions of such influence, neither explicit references nor allusions! See also the contribution by P.J. Vatikiotis, 'Islamic and the Foreign Policy of Egypt', for a somewhat qualified acceptance of these views.

63. Id., p. 73.

64. Id., pp.82-83. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, Ed; op.cit. In the introduction to this book (p.10) the author makes a distinction between Doctrinaire neutralism and Pragmatic neutralism. In view of the dismissal above of the view that India's Foreign Policy had any doctrinaire basis, this classification of Fayez A. Sayegh loses significance. Nehru had been as much 'impervious' to the doctrinaire factors in foreign policy as any other nonaligned statesman had been, though he might have philosophied or theorised more often than others. It will be shown in the following chapters that India's foreign policy from 1947 onwards has been as practical as that of Nasser's from 1954.
grounds of neutralist policy has come from outside the ranks of Muslim statesmanship, particularly from Hindu and Buddhist statesman. When a few Muslim leaders, notably Sukarno, Nasir, and Sekou Toure began some what belatedly to inject some doctrinaire elements into their neutralist views, they did so, as the terminology and the conceptual context of their expressions clearly demonstrate, not by drawing inspiration from the spiritual heritage of Islam but by echoing the words and paraphrasing the thoughts of non-Muslim neutralists, especially Nehru. The majority of Muslim neutralist leaders, however, have remained impervious to the doctrinaire factor in neutralism. In short, as he has put it 65 "Islam is irrelevant to neutralism."

It was the absence of religiosity that, in fact, made it possible for Nehru and Nasser to collaborate on many international issues. Indeed, as Prof. Boutras Boutras-Ghali 66 has observed, Nasser had abandoned his idea of Islam as the 'Third Circle' 67 of which the United Arab Republic should form the centre, in favour of the more influential and powerful circle of the nonaligned states. It is not without significance that

65. Id., p. 86 (Author's Italics).
66. 'The Foreign Policy of Egypt' in J.E.Black and K.W. Thompson, ed; op.cit., p.331.
there are now signs of some strains in Indo-U.A.R. relations, partly as a result of the influence of religious propaganda on the foreign policy of India and some Arab countries, though not the United Arab Republic itself, as will be seen later.

In practice the foreign policy of the United Arab Republic has been highly pragmatic and down-to-earth. In the long-drawn-out dispute with Israel, Nasser's stand has been as unambiguous as possible. He has always declared that he would not—indeed, he could not—recognise Israel unless Israel accepted the Security Council Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab Refugees. He secured weapons from the Soviet Union to meet the Israeli threats of aggression, when the west

68. M.C. Chagla the Foreign Minister of India for a short while, gave public expression to these feelings against some Arab countries - See The Hindu, March 26, 1967.

69. See below Chapter V for an account of the evolution of the Nonalignment of the United Arab Republic.


71. Id., pp. 317-318.
refused such help to him. He has depended upon the United Nations for a just solution of the problem. Meanwhile he has declared that the United Arab Republic is at war with Israel. He has never claimed that he would solve the dispute through peaceful negotiations, as Nehru did in the case of Goa.

The Expendiency of Non-Violence:

But if Nehru wanted a peaceful settlement to the problem of Goa, it was not because he was either attached to non-violence or believed in a divine ordering of things, as already indicated. In October, 1961, he told a Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism, in New Delhi, that "At no time did we in our minds

72. Supra, N.69.

73. Nasser's stand has not changed so far, even after the June 1967 war with Israel. See below, Chapter V, for a brief analysis of this recent crisis.

74. See Nehru's speeches, 1957-1963, op.cit., pp.367-368. Speaking at a mass rally at chowpathy, Bombay, held under the auspices of the Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism, on October 23, Nehru repeated the warning - See The Hindu, October 24, 1961. See also R.P. Rao, Portuguese Rule in Goa : 1610-1961, (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963), p. 6. In view of this and other categorical statements of Nehru (See below note 82), the charge that "The non-aligned countries unless they manage to clarify their attitudes and the situations in which they regard the use of force as justified, are open to the charge that they do not differ fundamentally from the Great Powers ...." (See J.W.Burton, International Relations : A General Theory (Cambridge University Press, London, 1965), p.203 appears to be contrary to facts. A large part of his study of Nonalignment appears to be contrary to facts - See Robert L.Rothstein, 'Alignments, Nonalignment, and small Powers 1945-55; International Organization (Vol.20, No.4, 1966), pp. 397-418.
and in our actions renounce the possibility of military action..... we are not in any sense tied down absolutely to pursuing the policy which we have thus far pursued in the interest of removal of Colonialism. If we have to take some other action, we shall take it. We keep an open mind." That India did not renounced the use of force completely was also evident from the bitter opposition of India to the Western support to Portugal over Goa. Otherwise, as an Indian scholar put it, "it is inexplicable that the Government of India should express so much concern towards the Anglo-Portugal Alliance and the N.A.T.O., which would come into the picture only in case of an armed attack against the territories of the contracting parties." Nehru also said that "I do not say that it is impossible for India or some other country to have a limited war. It may yield results too."

But he did not like to use force against Goa because, he said: "we are fighting against these vague ghosts and phantoms which create the cold war..... If we ourselves move


78. Ibid. (Italics are mine).
away from that level and think in terms of some kind of police action or limited war, then we are injuring all the larger causes that we stand for, and possibly getting ourselves en-
tangled in great difficulties." For, as a British Scholar has observed: "if 'aggression' can be justified in Goa ..... it can be justified in cases in which there are remnants of colonialism, and in which there are boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colonial rulers". Though the Government of India defended their acceptance of the Chinese occupation of Tibet on the ground that the British Policy on Tibet was imperialist, they were not prepared to accept it either on Ladakh or N.E.F.A. But they did not have the strength to defend India against an invasion from China. Nehru was afraid that if India took military action in Goa, China might be tempted to do the same in Ladakh and N.E.F.A., as it did in Tibet. This was what he must have had in mind when he told the Rajya Sabha on March 20, 1962, while

79. This was precisely the line adopted by the delegate of the United States of America in the Security Council in his bitter attack against India on its military action in Goa. See Year Book of United Nations, 1961, p.130.

80. J.W.Burton, op.cit.,pp.202-203. The author also wrote that "if the nonaligned nations justify the use of force by themselves in the post-colonial situations, their position would seem absurd when they protest against the actions of major powers to which they take exception."

81. See Nehru, op.cit., pp.313 and 332. See also Nehru's Speeches, 1957-1963, op.cit., pp. 188.

82. See Parliamentary Debates: Rajya Sabha, Volume 32, No.7, 20 March, 1962, cols. 802-803. Nehru reminded the House that 'I declared I think in this House, about six months before the Goa operation that we did not rule out any stronger steps, military steps' (col. 802).
moving the Constitution Amendment Bill for the integration of Goa into the Indian Union, that: "It is true that when we decided to send armed forces to Goa I did so with a great deal of reluctance, not because it was not right in my opinion, not because it was not needed — that is why we sent it — but because we felt that this might be made an excuse by other countries and other people for military excursions even though they were not justified. People do not go into the long history, do not know all the facts, they only see a certain result."

It was, again, this fear that appears to have restrained Nehru from undertaking strong measures against China for a very long time. And the fact remains that as soon as India started military measures against China, it took advantage of the situation by mounting a large scale offensive on India's borders in October, 1962, just as Israel did against


84. Id., pp.246-247 for an account by Nehru of the measures India took and of their limitations. Thus, it is difficult to believe that Nehru would have taken these measures without being assured of positive results or that there was no fear of an attack from China on a massive scale, or both. Nehru himself confessed that "we expected that they would not attack in such large numbers and to bring about a regular invasion with several divisions, as they did" (Id., pp.237-238). See below pp. 100-105 for further discussion. An American Scholar has written that through these military measures India had provoked China to attack. See Harold C. Hinton, Communist China In World Politics, (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966), pp.299 and 307.

85. See below Chapter V for a case study of these two crises.
the United Arab Republic in 1966, and, again, in 1967.

It is clear now that India's policy of peaceful settlement of disputes has been a policy of expediency more than of principle. Thus, once Goa was freed, Nehru declared that there was no change in India's adherence to this policy. But, as indicated above, Nehru found it difficult to stick to this policy on China and had to resort to the use of force, with disastrous results. And when Pakistan sent infiltrators into Kashmir in 1965, Prime Minister Shastri ordered the occupation of the Haji Pir Pass on the Pakistani side of the international border which, in turn, precipitated the 22 days' war with Pakistan in September, 1965. At Tashkent, however, both Shastri and Ayub agreed to solve their disputes through negotiations, which appears unlikely in the near future.

86. See S.A.H. Haqqi, 'Some Reflections on India's Foreign Policy', The Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. XVII, No. 1, January-March, 1966), pp. 48-49. It is interesting to note that right up to the military action in Goa, Indian scholars have been citing India's policy on Goa as the most impressive illustration of India's adherence to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. See M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-66, op. cit., pp. 32 and 36, and also A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 614. As the occupation of Goa occurred after Prof. Appadorai sent his paper to the editor, he had to add a footnote saying "one week after this paper was sent to the editor, Goa was taken by India through what the Government has officially termed police action."


88. See Lok Sabha Debates (Hereafter cited as L.S.D.), Third Series, Twelfth Session, Vol. XLIV, Nos. 1-10, August 30, 1965, Col. 2631 for Chavan's (then Defence Minister) announcement.

89. See The Statesman, 11 November, 1965, for the text of the Tashkent Declaration.
It is also clear that there is no correlation between nonviolence as is generally understood in India, and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The latter is a principle of international law of long usage and is not at all of Indian origin. It is the failure to make this distinction that is at the root of the misconception that Nonalignment is based on nonviolence of the Gandhian type. India adhered to and advocated the peaceful settlement of disputes on occasions, while it has never been committed to the former.

Nonalignment and Non-Interference:

Another misconception about Nonalignment which needs to be dispelled is the view that it means noninterference or non-intervention in the affairs of others, which one may add, formed part of the Panch Sheel. Every independent nation which has the power to do so would resent and oppose unnecessary interference of others in its own affairs while it would itself accept

90. Prof. A. Appadorai wrote, for example, that nonviolence or peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment of just means to achieve just ends are the really noteworthy features of India's Foreign Policy. See above, p. 31.

91. See M. S. Rajan, 'Chinese Aggression And The Future of India's Nonalignment', op. cit., p. 128 (See above, note 71).

foreign help if circumstances demand it. Much depends upon the attitude of the Government concerned.

But a British scholar has written that "If a nonaligned Government were to enter into any agreements under which it could receive protection from another nation, its nonalignment would automatically be destroyed. Neither can a nonaligned nation support any intervention in the internal affairs of any other country, and revolt or political change in policy is a matter for the people concerned." This view would reduce Nonalignment to neutrality.

The author himself admits that "In many matters the nonaligned countries have a duty to be neutral, in the traditional sense ...." This is simply not true as Nehru and Nasser had rightly emphasised over and over again in their speeches and statements, as has been indicated earlier. They have not acted on this principle as shall be seen in the following chapters. Nonalignment has nothing to do with neutrality or impartiality.

93. See J.M. Burton, op.cit., p.120.
94. Id., p.224. This is a presumption rather than a statement of fact. But it will represent the claim in question.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. In a joint statement issued by Nehru and Tito on December 23, 1954 a specific reference was made to this aspect of Nonalignment -- See Texts of Documents, op.cit., p.145.
There are no such obligations. In its most elementary sense Nonalignment means freedom from all obligations and commitments. Nehru even declared that "we are free to join an alliance."

In practice the nonaligned states interfere and have interfered in the internal affairs of neighbouring states as the other big powers do or have done. India had continuously interfered in the domestic affairs of her neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. This aspect of India's foreign policy has been forcefully explained by an Indian scholar, who wrote that "we find that in dealing with these territories, India simply took up the mantle of the old British Diplomacy of direct or indirect control over these territories, if only for the security of India. Indian policy in Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh comes under this category. The agreements with Sikkim and Bhutan place them as vassal states of India. Though Nepal

97. J.W. Burton (op.cit., pp.218-227) has evolved an elaborate theory of rights and duties of Nonalignment which appear to be far removed from the facts. It is hoped that this study would bear out this point. See above, N.74.

98. Nehru, op.cit., p.61 See below pp. 69-81 for further discussion.

99. See below pp.151-53 for further discussion.

is still regarded as a sovereign state, interference by India in her domestic affairs is now too well known and is resented among the vocal sections of the Nepalese population. As in other territories, the question of India's security must have been the predominant thought behind this interference.

The aid given by India to Burma during the Civil War in 1949 has been criticised as interference in Burma's internal affairs, though Nehru denied it. Nehru's opposition to Pakistan's acceptance of arms from the United States could be called 'interference' in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. Nehru did not deny this, but, he said that the matter was too important for India to remain silent. He went further and said that it was not merely against the freedom of India but against the freedom of Asia as a whole. Nehru opposed the South East Asia Treaty Organisation on much the same lines. In fact, Nehru's 'Asia Policy' or the 'peace area' approach was a sort of Monroe Doctrine which declared that South Asia was India's primary concern as shall be seen later.

101. See below pp.146-48 for further discussion.
103. Ibid.
104. Id., p.89. How far Nehru was justified in these views shall be examined in the next chapter — see below pp. 69 - 76.
105. See below pp.142-163.
Finally, India is said to have violated the Panch Sheel when it gave asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1969. For example, Lord Linesey of Birker has observed: "The reasons for the revolt in 1959 belong to Chinese internal policies. The international repercussions came from Indian expressions of sympathy with the revolt."

Nasser also has his own sphere of influence in the Arab world, in which he does not want the interference of any foreign power. This is the basis of his Arab Nationalism. It seems wrong to say that Arab Nationalism is a myth. It is on the basis of Arab Nationalism that Nasser has been opposed to the Western Policies in the Arab World. And it was in the name

106. For an account of the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India see Frank Morese, The Revolt in Tibet, (Sterling Publishers Private Limited, Jullundur and Delhi, 1966), pp. 1-31.


108. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958 op.cit., pp.49-50,88,133-134, 236-237, 250. It is in this sense only that one can say that Nasser interferes in the affairs of his Arab neighbours. But the Arab League gives him the initiative. It is, therefore, difficult to call him an imperialist as many western scholars and writers depict him. Nasser's so-called imperialism springs from his opposition to the attempts of the big powers to dominate the Arab world."

109. Ibid.

110. Many people in India and abroad seem to believe in the myth of Arab Nationalism. Clovis Maksoud, the former Chief Representative of the Arab League in India, vehemently denied that it was a myth in a Seminar on Indo-Arab relations held at the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

111. See below Chapter V for further discussion.
of Arab Nationalism that he crossed swords with Khrushchev in 1959, when the latter accused him of anticommunism. Indeed, this policy was not Nasser's, it was inherent in his country's position in the Arab world. Nasser, however, translated it into reality by his bold policies. This is the secret of his success and popularity.

**CONCLUSION**

It is now possible to conclude safely that Nonalignment has not been a policy of either nonviolence or pacifism, it has no commitments, not even a commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes. Its basis is not religious, be it Hinduism, Buddhism or Islam. It does not mean non-interference or neutrality in any sense of the term.

These, one might say, are one category of misconceptions on Nonalignment. In the next chapter, another category of misconceptions will be discussed. To this we now turn.

112. In a classic sentence Nasser said: "If Khrushchev raises today to defend a small minority of the sons of our country saying that he is defending communism as a principle we tell him that we do not consider this as defence of the communist principle, but as intervention in our affairs". See Nasser's Speeches, 1959, op.cit., p.164.


114. This does not mean that Nasser has no opposition in the Arab world. But those who oppose him, like Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia are unpopular in the Arab World. See below Chapter V, for an analysis of the evolution of Nasser's Nonalignment.
CHAPTER II

GOALS OF NONALIGNMENT

In this chapter some of the professed objectives of Nonalignment will be examined so as to determine their validity or otherwise.

1 As Nehru put it in 1949: "The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subjected peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world's population."

From this and similar statements of Nehru have flowed the arguments that "the pursuit of peace", "the liberation of subjected peoples", "the elimination of racialism", and also according to some, the containment of communism, at least in Asia, through democracy and social reform, have been the major

objectives of the foreign policy of India. Some of these have also been variously described as the 'principles' or the 'pillars' of the foreign policy of India. And that Nonalignment is only "a means by which India seeks to achieve her policy objectives." By common consent, the first three have been accepted as the main objectives of all the nonaligned states, and indeed, of all Afro-Asian states, including those that have joined the Power Blocs.

It will be argued below that though Nonalignment is a means to an end, it has not been primarily concerned with any of the objectives mentioned above, including the 'pursuit of peace.' These also have been means to an end, namely, the 'security and progress' of the country, which in Nehru's own words, are the first objectives of the foreign policy of every country, including India.


5. See Chapter I, note 11.


9. Nehru, op.cit., p.79. See also Chapter 3 below, pp.83-85. See also A.Appadorai, op.cit., p.482.
Nonalignment and Anti-colonialism:

To begin then, the role of India and the United Arab Republic in the 'liberation of subjected peoples' will be examined first, in as brief a way as possible. At the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi, in 1947, under his patronage, Nehru said 10 that "the old imperialisms are fading away." In passing it may be noted that by old imperialisms Nehru meant western empires, implying thereby that he did not distinguish between Colonialism and Imperialism. He used the two words as synonyms more or less. However, it is well known that, Nehru acted with a crusader's zeal in the case of the freedom of Indonesia. As Werner Lein 12 has sarcastically, but apply put it, "such ambitious heights were never reached again, though opportunity has not been lacking." Again, in his speech at the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, in 1961, Nehru observed, 13 "the era of Classic Colonialism is gone and is dead, though, of course, it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet, but essentially it is over", and therefore, "the most important thing" was the...


11. See below pp. 145-46 for an analysis of India's part in the case of Indonesian freedom.

12. op.cit., p. 114.

reducing of tension between the Great Powers. For Nasser, as a publication of the Government of the United Arab Republic reiterated, "There was no question of priorities. World peace and Colonialism were both equally important, they were — as they still are — correlated and thus called for simultaneous and urgent action on the part of the conference." For, as a British Scholar has put it, Nehru's claim that the era of Classic Colonialism was over, "was at that time, far more true of Asia than of Africa." As Nasser pointed out in his speech, the Arabs and the Africans were fighting bitter battles against Colonialism in the Congo, in Algeria, in Angola and elsewhere. Even in Asia, and in India especially, Colonies existed. In less than three months after the Belgrade Conference India freed Goa from Portuguese Colonialism, by the use of force. As indicated earlier, the United States attacked this action of India as a set back for the cause of world peace and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. And an American scholar has written that "Indian motives for

15. Peter Lyon, op.cit., p.188 (Author's Italics).
17. Supra, Chapter I, n.79.
seizing Goa ..... surely included India's desire to reinforce its anti-colonialist bonafides among African governments", which "were beginning to view India as a supporter of great power interests in Africa, partly because of its role in the Congo ....." M.C.Chagla, appears to have been more accurate in his reported statement that "If we can send an army contingent to the Congo, to safeguard the integrity of that country, why cannot we send an army to Goa to safeguard the integrity of our own country." However, the united Arab Republic gave full support to India in this venture, whereas India followed a more cautious policy in the Congo, than the former had wanted, for well over a year, though ultimately, it had accepted a more militant role.

Similarly, whereas India had earlier supported the demands for freedom for Morocco and Tunisia from French Colonialism, it was hesitant in its attitude towards Algerian


21. See below Chapter VII for a study of the role of India and the United Arab Republic in this Crisis.

22. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit.,pp.37-46 for a critical study of India's anticolonialism upto 1955. See also Werner Levi, op.cit.,pp.50-60 and 113-123. Neither study appears to be complete in itself.

23. See M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit.,pp.572-576. See below, Chapter V, n.71, for a brief explanation of this attitude of India.
freedom. Again India and Nehru were indignant at the British and the United States' support to Portugal on Goa. It was in this context that Nehru went so far as to declare in Parliament on July 26, 1955, a sort of Monroe Doctrine for India: 25 "any attempt by a foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot tolerate and which subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the doctrine I lay down."

But, as Prof. Rajan has rightly observed, "there was probably little divergence in ..... fundamental objectives", between India and Britain in regard to British Colonial policies. This similarity between Indian and British objectives came into sharp relief in India's stand on the struggle between Britain and the United Arab Republic over the Suez military base and later over the Suez Canal itself, as will be seen later. 27 Suffice it to add here, that even at the height of the Anglo-French - Israeli aggression on the United Arab Republic, India's policy was only mildly anti-British, notwithstanding


25. Ibid. Nehru had made a specific reference to President Monroe's Declaration of 1823.


27. See below, Chapter V.
the indignation expressed by Nehru against the aggressors.

Two things clearly emerge from this brief factual account. The first is an apparent inconsistency in India's support to the liberation of subjected peoples everywhere, the second an apparent difference between the attitudes of India and the United Arab Republic, the latter appearing to be more vocal and militant in its anticolonialism. Neither is in fact true as a proper understanding of Nonalignment would reveal, i.e., as the Foreign Policy of a country and not as the pursuit of moral principles or human ideals. Faced with the apparent inconsistency in India's pursuit of anticolonialism, (in its narrower and anti-western sense), an Indian scholar\textsuperscript{28} has observed that: "such diversity of policy clearly indicates that India has to moderate her principles to suit the situation like any other state in defence of 'National Interest'". This does not appear to be the whole truth.

For, a closer examination of India's foreign policy would reveal that in everyone of these cases, whether in its support to the independence movements, as in Indonesia,\textsuperscript{29} or its hesitation to support them fully, as in the Suez crisis,\textsuperscript{30} India's

\textsuperscript{28} Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., p. 44.
\textsuperscript{29} Supra, n.11.
\textsuperscript{30} Supra, n.27.
policy has been, first of all, a policy of protecting its
security and other vital interests, as will be shown in part
of this study. Thus India's championship of the liberation of
subjected peoples before and after independence was part of
Nehru's strategy, along with Nonalignment, to protect India's
freedom and security. Besides, Nehru championed Afro-Asian
freedom movements, in one way or the other, because Nehru once
said that: "...in the long run it is to the advantage of
India to try to attract to itself the sympathy and hope of
millions of people in the world without offending others."

In this respect India's championship of freedom movements
was very much similar to that of the Soviet Union and might
well have been inspired by it, as their close collaboration in
the United Nation's organs during the late forties would suggest.
It was this collaboration, also reflected in the internal
support given by the Communist Party of India to the foreign
Policy of India, that appears to have misled the western Powers,
especially the United States, into believing that India was in
the Soviet bloc.

Even here, one might presume, that India was trying to
complete with the Soviet Union for the "sympathy and hope of

31. See above pp. 11 and also below pp. 82-85.
32. Nehru, op.cit., p.34. Nehru also said: "I do not think it
is purely idealistic; I think it is, if you like, opportu-

millions of people in the world", as Nehru had put it. However, soon Nehru had to use this instrument against the Communists themselves in South East Asia to meet the increased pressure that the latter were applying on some of these states, especially, Burma and Indonesia. It was perhaps the realisation of this fact that was responsible for the sudden increase in the Communist polemics against the nationalist leadership in India, Burma and Indonesia in early 1949. It was only when the Soviet Union and China realised that their pressure tactics against these leaders in India, Burma and Indonesia, and more importantly, in Yugoslavia, would only push the latter closer to the Western bloc, as was evident from Nehru's decision to remain in the Commonwealth and Tito's acceptance of Western Military support and protection, and that it would be far more advantageous to wean them away from the Western bloc, rather

34. The Economist, London, had been right when it said that the Conference on Indonesia had the effect of "taking the wind out of Russian anti-imperialist sails, by giving leadership to Asian opinion on the subject" (p. 43. See below, Chapter 4, pp. 145-146 for further discussion.

35. See below, Chapter IV, pp. 142-152

36. For details see J.C.Kundra, India's Foreign Policy: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc (J.B.Walters: Groningen, Netherlands - Vora & Co., Publishers Ltd., Bombay, 1955), p.120.

37. See below pp. 61-65 for an account of Nehru's visit to the United States in 1949, and pp. 142-146 for an analysis of India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth.

than force them into the Communist bloc, that the Soviet Union and China appear to have made a tactical shift in their policy towards these countries.

Nasser's support to the Revolutionary movements in Algeria and Yemen compares well with Nehru's support to Indonesian nationalists and the Burmese Government against the Communists, as his Arab Nationalism has been as much a struggle against the growth of Communism in these areas, as it has been against the colonial and other reactionary forces. And Nasser went to the rescue of Syria in 1958 by accepting its merger with his country, as it was the only way in which he could fight the communists in Syria. As has been indicated earlier, when Khrushchev tried to protect the communists in Iraq, in 1959, Nasser had made it clear that he would not tolerate it. Thus Nasser's support to the independence movements in Africa and in the Arab world, is not only to rid the areas of Western domination, but also to prevent the infiltration of Communism into these areas, as both are equally dangerous for the independence and integrity of the Arab States. As shall be seen later

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39. The Shift, however, became evident during the Korean crisis, See below, Chapter 4, pp. 177-179
40. See above, Chapter I, pp. 36 - 37
42. *Supra*, n. 40.
43. See Below, Chapter 7.
Nasser's policy in the Congo reflected, among other things, this dual purpose. And if he is still intensely anticolonial and anti-west, it is only because of the continuing presence of British protectorates, and American bases, etc., in the Arab world, not to speak of the consistent Western support to an aggressive Israel, which is a constant reminder of Western domination and injustices, as against the more cautious policy of the Soviet Union. Nasser had given enough proof of willingness to cooperate with the West on the basis of equality and non-interference in the domestic affairs. The United States has not so far shown an willingness, it would seem, to make any concession to the Arabs against Israel.

Nasser's continuing preoccupation with Western Colonialism and Israel, to an apparent neglect of problems of world peace, compares well with India's and other Asians' neglect of world problems in the early years of the United Nations. As

44. See Nasser's Speeches, 1956, op.cit., p.365 where Nasser had explained this basis of his policy. See also Peter Mansfield Nasser's Egypt, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1966), pp. 95-97 for a good analysis of the problem. See below, chapter 6 for further discussion.

45. This was particularly so, when he signed the 1954 treaty with Britain. See below Chapter 5.

46. This seems to be so in spite of the US pressure on Israel for its withdrawal from Arab territories in 1956-57, which, however, Israel did under certain guarantees. The US unwillingness to do anything against Israel became fully evident during the 1967-June Israeli aggression on Arab countries - See below, Chapter 5 for an analysis of the two Israeli aggressions.
Arthur Lal, the scholar-diplomat from India, has written, there was ".....a preoccupation with themselves to the exclusion of an interest in world problems except in so far as those problems concerned the questions of colonialism ....." And that "during the United Nations early years there was practically no contribution from Asia on such questions as disarmament, the peaceful use of atomic energy, the calling of international conferences by the ECOSOC, or even the enlargement of the ECOSOC. Their own affairs, colonial questions, and, as far as the Arabs were concerned, their relations with Israel practically constituted the whole domain of interest for the Asian nations in these years." And it is well to remember that India and the United Arab Republic were the chief spokesmen of Asia as China was represented by tiny Formosa.

And if Nasser's condemnation of Colonialism appears too hostile, one has only to look into the speeches of Nehru in support of Indonesian freedom, or the condemnation of military pacts as at the Bandung Conference, to realise that what

48. Arthur Lal writes that the absence of China 'the Natural helmsman' of Asia from the UN must be taken into account in assessing the part played by the Asian countries in the UN. (Ibid.).
Nasser still says or threatens to do is little different from what Nehru did on similar occasions. When Allen Dulles of the United States complained of Nasser’s bitter attack against the West during the Suez crisis, Nehru is reported to have said that it was a product of the former’s youth and inexperience. Nehru would have been more accurate, if he had said that it was natural. For, he himself condemned the tripartite aggression later in very severe language, which, according to Prof. Brecher, was ‘highly charged’.

It is now clear that neither Nehru nor Nasser had been ‘doctrinaire’ in their approach to the question of the liberation of subjected peoples. Nor did they approach it as a moral principle even though they had talked that way. It is also important to note that they were not unaware of the fact that Communism was also expansionist. All this has been well put by Nehru himself in explaining the Government of India’s attitude towards British Colonialism, in particular, and, imperialism in general. In reply to a debate on foreign affairs, in the Parliament of India, Nehru said on June 12, 1962:


63. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 57 and also pp. 151-152. (Italics are mine). These views of Nehru should prove that the charge that, “there was an a priori assumption that practically all western diplomacy was motivated by imperialism”, is not correct (Werner Levi, op. cit., p. 113).
"It is necessary for us to function as a mature nation. It is very easy to talk against imperialism as some hon. Members did. I do not deny that imperialism exists but ..... is hardly what it was in the past. Let Hon. Members understand what it is. Let them also understand that there are other imperialisms that are growing ..... British imperialism does flourish in Malaya, in Africa ..... but ..... today ..... is an exhausted thing. I hope this House has respect for the way England has tackled her problems since the war and the courage with which she has faced them.....

"There are still colonies that belong to certain powers. I have no doubt that an end should be put to them all ..... Let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism in Asia, in Africa and wherever else it exists, but let us understand what the real conflict is about."

The 'real conflict' is a struggle for power. Colonialism or imperialism has always been the result of this struggle between powers. Thus every big power is imperialist to some extent, if only for the sake of its own security. This holds good in the case of India and even the United Arab Republic, in its behaviour towards its immediate neighbours, India is said to have followed or adopted the British policies of imperialism. China's occupation of Tibet was an act of imperialism. India would have followed and insisted on following the British policy on Tibet, if it had the strength to do it. That India,


55. See below, pp.179-95 for an analysis of India's Tibet Policy.
or rather, Nehru could and should have done so, is the charge that is levelled against Nehru by the critics of his China Policy. A few writers have, however, written that Nehru only did what the British in India themselves had done, in similar circumstances. It was, however, Jayaprakash Narayan, that posed the moral issue involved in India's acceptance of China's occupation of Tibet, in his reported statement that "It is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party to a wrong." The Government of India was not motivated by such morals. It accepted the Chinese imperialism in Tibet in the hope that the latter would recognise its interests in Tibet as well as in South Asia, as shall be seen later. But even then, Nehru as well as other spokesmen of India's foreign policy, defended its action in terms of a departure from


58. Cited in Frank Moraes, op.cit., p. 121.

59. Supra, n.56.

60. Ibid.
British imperialism. The temptation to use the bogey of anti-colonialism, obviously, appears to have been too strong, even for Nehru to resist it.

The same maturity is reflected in the attitudes of India and the United Arab Republic towards the Soviet Colonialism or imperialism in Eastern Europe, rather than what a majority of the Western scholars would have one believe, that this attitude of the Afro-Asians has been a product of lack of experience with the Soviet Union as against the experience with Western Colonialism and racialism, and also of the influence of Marxism and Leninism on Nehru, if not the other non-aligned leaders. This does not appear to be substantiated by facts, as for example, the attitudes and policies of India and the United Arab Republic in regard to the liberation of subjected peoples. On the other hand, the scholars themselves appear to be prejudiced against Nehru and Nasser and other

61. See below pp.115-17 for further analysis.


63. This appears to be particularly so with Prof. Brecher whose approach to Nonalignment is strongly influenced by these feelings as his criticism of the policies of India during the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956 reveals. (op.cit., pp.118-120) See below, Chapters 5 & 6 for a refutation of this criticism. Another important illustration is provided by his view that India's attitude towards Israel has been shaped by racial and anticolonial sentiments (op.cit., pp.121-138) See below p.280, n.29 for any comments.
nonaligned leaders. There are some people in India like the leader of the Praja Socialist Party and member of Parliament, S.N. Dwivedi, who seem to believe that Nehru's approach to the Soviet Union and China particularly was dogmatic. As Prof. S.A.H. Haqqi pointed out, Nehru's mind was particularly free from dogmatism. It will be shown in the next chapter that the policies of India and the United Arab Republic towards the Soviet Union, as, indeed, their entire foreign policy, has been based on a sound understanding of the world balance of power and a very realistic appraisal of the mutuality of their interests with the Soviet Union. While the struggle against the west and a western backed Israel have been the major factors in Nasser's relations with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, appears to have cultivated the Soviet friendship more as a counter against China's and Pakistan's threat to India's security, than from any fear of a western attack, which did not and does not exist.

64. Sri Dwivedi had made this observation during a speech at a Seminar on 'India And Her Neighbours', held at the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, on December 4, 1965.

65. Prof. Haqqi made this observation in his closing remarks at the Seminar. See also Loui Fischer, op.cit., pp. 125-127, for an analysis of Nehru's political and economic views.

66. See below, pp. 82-99

67. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op.cit., pp. 374-376 and pp. 153-186 for an exposition of the UAR-Soviet relations. Also see below Chapter V.

68. See below pp. 82-99
Nonalignment and Containment:

It does not, therefore, seem correct to argue that the Nonalignment of India has been a policy aimed at the establishment of the superiority of the democratic system in Asia, as some prominent writers in India and America seem to believe. 69 Prof. Morgenthau, for example, has written that "As India sees it, in Asia, at least, the issue between Communism and democracy has been joined and will be decided on the plane of social reform." This is not so much objectionable as what he says next." ..... such a policy which thinks of the struggle with communism in terms of competition between different social systems is not only unable to take interest in military measures, but must also regard western emphasis upon them as a pernicious interference with that competitive struggle." Echoing these arguments Sisir Gupta 70 has observed that" in the Indian conception of the Communist problem, the military aspects of the challenge were relatively unimportant, what is important .... is to establish the superiority of the democratic system even for Asian and other backward countries."


70. Id., p.14 See. also J.C.Kundra, op.cit., p.85. Till the Chinese aggression on India in late 1962, Indian scholars, some at least, seem to have believed in this view. See M.S.Rajan, India World Affairs, op.cit., p. 61.
This would mean that India did not realise the Chinese military threat to her security and that it was not interested in building its military strength. This is so obviously, and, completely contrary to facts, that Sisir Gupta hastens\(^\text{71}\) to add "that it would not be entirely correct to say that India did not take into account the military problem that China posed for her security. " Yet, he holds, \(^\text{72}\) it was secondary to "the more challenging task of competing with China in other spheres." This, to my mind, appears a complete reversal of India's China policy. \(^\text{73}\) For, if this were the truth, Nehru stands condemned before history as the New York Times angrily prophesied during the Korean crisis. But this is not the truth as Nehru was aware of the Chinese military threat from the beginning. Otherwise, one might ask, what the Panch Sheel \(^\text{76}\) was about, with its stress on 'nonaggression', 'territorial integrity', 'non-interference' and 'Peaceful co-existence', etc.?  

\(^{71}\) Ibid.  
\(^{72}\) Ibid.  
\(^{73}\) See below, Chapter 4 for an analysis of India's China Policy.  
\(^{75}\) See below, pp. 90-99 and Supra, n.73.  
\(^{76}\) Supra, Chapter I, n. 92.
This search for security against China was launched by India from the day China emerged independent under Communism as will be made clear later, for, the Panch Sheel was nothing but the consummation of this effort, as it appeared then.

Another defect in the Morgenthau-Gupta theory is that it appears to make a distinction between Soviet communism and Chinese Communism. So far as democracy is concerned there seems precious little between them to choose. For, if Khrushchev had started the process of de-Stalinisation, he had also crushed a 'spontaneous revolution' in Hungary, in as ruthless a manner as Stalin might have done with India remaining a passive on-looker most of the time. For Nehru, however, it was not the liberalisation of the Communist Party of either China or the Soviet Union that was important. It was the inherent or latent political struggle between the two Communist giants that was important for him and India.

But, then, did Nehru accept western democracy in toto? Did he not make it more socialistic than any western democracy, including England, ever conceived of? If Nehru was really

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77. Supra, n.75, see Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest For Security: Defence Policies 1945-1957, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967) for a very good study of India's defence policies. I could consult this book only after this study was completed.
78. For details Infra, Chapter 6, n.1.
79. See Chapter VI, for India's role in this crisis.
interested in establishing the superiority of democracy through economic and social progress, why did he begin to industrialise the country on the Soviet model, which was considered anathema to the development of a sound economy? The answers to these questions, would appear to suggest that India's policies in the economic sphere represented a success of socialist views against the democratic principles of free enterprise. And for the West, and especially, the United States, democracy means as much free enterprise as free elections. However, Nehru was perhaps as much influenced by the British Labour Party as by Soviet Socialism.

Above all, Nehru did not consider the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States as a struggle between democracy and communism. For him it was a power struggle, pure

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81. See Louis Fischer, op.cit., pp.119-122 for a highly unsympathetic criticism of this aspect of the Asians' economic policy. Among the many drastic comments, the one that stands out as particularly so is: "rapid industrialisation is the new Asian religion and steel is god" (p.120).

82. See David J.Dallin, op.cit., p.303.

83. It has already been indicated that Nehru's political and economic ideas were shaped by western European currents of thought - Supra, Chapter I, n.29. According to Krishna Menon's biographer, it was the influence of England in particular that was responsible for the affinity in the thoughts and outlook of Nehru and Menon on international affairs and economic problems. See T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1964), pp.102-117.

84. Nehru, op.cit., pp.53 and 69. See also the 'Appendix' entitled 'Talks with Nehru', in Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, op.cit., pp.203-204.
and simple. The doctrinal element only added to its intensity. That he was right was amply proved by the fact that the United States supported Tito with massive assistance when he defected from the Soviet bloc. The Sino-Soviet conflict which was clearly anticipated further confirmed it. Similarly, it is unthinkable that the Soviet Union would have given economic and military assistance to India and the United Arab Republic on such a large scale, if their policy was one of containment of Communism on the social plane. It is to keep these states out of the sphere of western influence permanently that the Soviet Union has been giving them aid.

Thus Dulles's view that "there is occurring", between India and China," a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police state methods can achieve better social progress", which Ambassador Bowles has quoted with approval, appears to be more an American wish than the fact of the situation. The real confrontation between India and China was a military one.


87. See X.Etinger and O.Melikyan, The Policy of Nonalignment, (Progress Publishers, Moscow),pp.19-21. Moscow has now to contain Peking also. This duality is best illustrated in its present relations with Pakistan and with the UAR since the 1967 war with Israel if not earlier. Indeed Soviet policies towards nonaligned nations appear to have had this underlying goal from 1964 - See Klaus Mehnert, op.cit pp.395-402.

87. Ambassador's Report, op.cit.,p. 161. It is interesting to note here that the US-oriented political parties in India...
However, neither Dulles nor Bowles appear to have been serious in their belief, in that both of them have acted on the contrary assumption. And Nehru refused to be drawn into Dulles's scheme of things precisely because he realised the military threat from China. That Nehru saw it and acted accordingly has been accepted by Bowles himself. It was again because of this that Nehru decided on the industrialisation of the country as rapidly as possible, under democratic methods, to the neglect of good and agricultural production, necessitating dependence upon foreign countries for good. But the choice had to be made, and was made deliberately, as Nehru made it clear.

Nasser is an enemy of Communism, but he has close relations with the Soviet Union and also China. And he is very much interested in social reform and the progress of his people. But

(Continued from previous page)

viz., the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, advocate a ban on the Communist Party of India. They do not seem to believe that this might affect India's democracy. See below, Chapter 3, pp. 103-106 for the other side of this argument.

88. Id., pp. 166, 178 and 180-185.
89. See below pp. 103-106.
90. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 374 where Nehru attributed India's failure to match China in military strength to its democracy. See also K.P. Karunakaran, 'Impact of the Sino-Indian Conflict on the Indian Political Scene', International Studies, Vol. 5: July 1963 - April 1964, p. 103.
91. Id., pp. 371-372, see below, p. 106.
92. See Nasser's Speech at the Bandung Conference for a brief summary of the aims of his revolution; Supra, n. 8, p. 63. Also see Vital Speeches of The Day, (New York, Volume 21, No. 16, June 1, 1965), p. 1102.
this does not make his struggle a struggle for democracy. He has equal aversion for it, as it is understood in the West. While Nehru did not have an aversion for democracy, he was certainly not a crusader in its service.

Nehru might have made statements occasionally which would support an argument like Prof. Morgenthau's. They might have, more often than not, been prompted by extraneous circumstances or factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of a country like India. The United States' insistence on giving aid only to those countries which professed to be anticommunist along with them, might have occasioned such statements to make it easy for the American policy makers to get aid legislation passed. Even Dulles's statement appears to have been motivated by this desire.

This is easy to see from the speeches and statements made by Nehru during his first trip to the United States in

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93. This is true in general of most Arabs - See Fayez A. Sayegh, *Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World*, op.cit., p.172.

94. See *Ambassador's Report*, op.cit., p.66, See also, Nehru, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69.

95. Pakistan's alliance with the US was of this nature.

96. See above, p. 59.
1949. In the early years of independence, when there was a bitter opposition from the West as well as the East to India's Nonalignment, there was the danger of India being left isolated and helpless, when it desperately needed aid of all kinds. Nehru was sure that once his foreign policy was properly understood, aid would be forthcoming from both sides. But, at that time, the Soviet Union was applying increased pressure on India through the Communist Party of India, and China had just emerged as a Communist Power. The United states, on the other hand, was anxious to rope India into an alliance against Communism, which Nehru did not want. But, Nehru appears to have calculated that the time was ripe to convince the United States that he was interested in social reform and the building of a strong economy which was considered necessary by the Western powers to combat Communism.

97. As will be seen later, it was this very real fear of isolation that led Nehru to remain in the Commonwealth, thus ensuring at least British cooperation, if not that of United States also - See below, pp. 143-149.

98. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 25, 27 and 35. The help given to Yugoslavia by the United States could not have gone unnoticed by Nehru.


internally. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan reflected this aspect of the Western policy.

It was with the above aim that Nehru visited the United States and Canada in 1949. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of India, on 28 November, 1949, Nehru explained the purpose and achievements of this visit in the following words:

"The objective which I had in going to America—both the United States and Canada—was achieved to my complete satisfaction. I did not go there for deals and for bargains and for intrigues. I did go there to create a friendly impression, if I may say so, a friendly interest in our problems, and generally to create an atmosphere of goodwill between the two countries. I believe we succeeded in doing that, and I believe that the responsible people in the United States thoroughly appreciated, if I may say so, the frank way in which I explained our position in world affairs."

101. See Documents 1947-48, op. cit., pp.2-7 for the text of the Truman Doctrine. See also pp. 7-10 for the Russian criticism of this in Izvestia of 13 March, 1947.

102. Id., pp. 23-26 for the text of the speech by Secretary of State Marshall, outlining his plan.

The timing of this visit was also significant. Nehru had already prepared the ground for this by deciding to remain in the Commonwealth, which proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that he was not in the Communist camp as the Americans had thought and believed. It was during this trip that Nehru drew elaborate parallels between the Indian and American Struggles for independence, between Indian democracy and the American democracy and, indeed, between his foreign policy and that of the United States' founding fathers. It was during this trip that Nehru told the United States Congress that "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral."

The extent to which Nehru succeeded in his objectives was evident from the fact that he felt it quite safe to recognise the Government of Communist China, soon after his return.

104. See J.C. Kundra, op. cit., pp. 116-120 for an account of this visit of Nehru to the United States. The author wrote (p.116), that it was difficult to understand the reasons for Nehru's acceptance of the invitation to visit the United States in May 1949, when he had rejected such an offer in March 1949.


106. Id., p. 591.

from the United States. As J.C.Kundra has pointed out this did not create "any serious and immediate differences with the United States of America", as "India was not alone in according recognition to the Peking Government but was joined in this by the U.S.A.'s principal partner in the Cold War, the United Kingdom. Secondly the United States' attitude had not yet fully hardened." The failure to do so would have undermined Nehru's position among the Communist inside and outside the country who had after his decision to remain in the Commonwealth, begun to accuse him of having aligned India with the Western bloc, and the visit to America made them still more angry. Thus the principal aim of Nehru in undertaking this visit to the United States was not only to demonstrate to the West his 'independence of the Soviet Union, but also to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that he was not afraid of moving closer to the West, if the situation so demanded it.

Nasser's policies towards the Great Powers and China during 1954-56 present a close parallel to those of Nehru during 1949-50, as will be seen later. Yet, here also, Dulles acted, as though Nasser was a Communist and unsuccessfully tried to bring his downfall.

109. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 59, for Nehru's defence of this criticism in the Parliament of India. See also J.C.Kundra, op. cit., pp. 120.
110. See below, pp. 211-227.
111. Ibid.
Anti-Racialism and Nonalignment:

It would, therefore, not unreasonable to hold, that neither anticommunism nor anticolonialism have been the major objectives of either India’s or the United Arab Republic’s Nonalignment. They only opposed Colonialism and Communism to the extent they posed a threat to their security. And they championed the cause of other Colonial peoples to the extent they furthered their security and other vital interests. These have, therefore, been means, rather than ends, of Nonalignment.

This is equally true of antiracialism and such other factors as the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, India’s interest in combating South Africa’s racial policies is too obvious to need elaborate explanation. As Author Lal 112 has observed, it was “a matter of direct interest to itself.” It still is. And as expected, India has been a major recipient of aid from the Big Powers directly, 113 more than through the United Nations agencies.

Alignment & Anticolonialism and Antiracialism:

That anticolonialism and antiracialism have not been the major objectives of Nonalignment, and that there is no intrinsic


relationship between them, is further evident from the alignment of Pakistan. For, Pakistan has remained as much anti-colonial and antiracial even after its alliance with the west, as it was prior to it, as its policies in the United Nations on these issues illustrate. As an Indian Scholar has explained, though Pakistan followed a pro-western policy on important world issues, "in respect of several other problems she acted like a nonaligned country. This latter fact was true particularly in respect of colonial questions, and apartheid, on which her delegates even attacked United States' policies bitterly." As a British scholar has written, "These are — features shared by all Afro-Asian countries, including those which are aligned."

It is, therefore, difficult to agree with the view that these "have been important in the development of non-alignment and...will continue to influence nations in that direction." For, according to the same scholar, "they are not an essential precondition" and "are not the distinctive influences which finally determine the foreign policies of a nation."


116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., p.207. See also K.P.Karunakaran, ed., op.cit., p.75.
Here again, the case of Pakistan is illustrative. A careful study of the alignment of Pakistan with the United States, reveals that the factors that influenced it were the same as those that influenced India's Nonalignment, namely, national security and economic development. Thus even the problems of economic development are not unique to Nonalignment. And the recent shift in the foreign policy of Pakistan towards closer relation with the Communist Powers, have also been influenced by the same factors. Neither anticolonialism nor antiracialism has been responsible for this shift.

It may, therefore, be concluded that the basic objectives are the same for both alignment and Nonalignment. As Burton has observed: "Nonalignment then is a condition which tends to occur whenever the pressures of circumstances are not sufficiently strong to justify alignments." And Nehru himself admitted: "we might have been compelled by circumstances, but we are not compelled by circumstances to give up,

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120. Supra, n.9.
because it does amount to giving up our independence in order to gain the goodwill of this country or that country."

**Nonalignment and Independence:**

Here is another misconception on Nonalignment and also alignment. As Nehru had put it: "What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party's view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour."

It would appear from these statements that Nonalignment is synonymous with independence. To be aligned is to lose one's independence altogether. This is an extreme view to which Nehru did not always subscribe. In reply to a demand from a member of Parliament that India should withdraw from the Commonwealth of Nations, Nehru said on June 12, 1962: "..... Nations must act with dignity and strength, adopt what they consider the right course and adhere. It is open to us to be associated in an alliance with any country. We have avoided alliances that might entangle us ....... so far we are concerned

124. Id., p. 36.

125. Id., pp. 60-61, and also p. 133 (Italics are mine). He said further: "we have associated ourselves with the UN. This association does not deprive us of our independence. Of course it limits our freedom in the sense in which it limits the freedom of every member country. That some limit should be placed on our freedom of action is the natural consequence of our joining on organisation of that nature." (p. 63).
we are prepared to enter into a treaty of friendship with every country in the world .... In an alliance, one invariably takes some thing and gives something in return. Each country binds itself down to a certain extent and relinquishes its freedom of action to the extent to which it commits itself in the alliance or agreement. An alliance, nevertheless, need not stand in the way of independence of the country.'

Paradoxically, however, when Pakistan accepted military aid from the United States in 1954, Nehru declared that it "goes to the root of the problem of peace as well as the freedom of many countries in Asia. These countries, including India have only recently attained independence. They will only retain it so long as they are worthy of it and are capable of defending it." He also said: "I can understand, although I would not approve, military alliances between great powers. But I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country....to attach small countries to themselves in alliances really means-and I say so with all respect to those countries - that they are becoming very much dependent on these countries."


127. Nehru, op.cit., p. 66.
This inconsistency in Nehru's views is more apparent than real. For, Nehru objected to the United States' military aid to Pakistan and the SEATO and Baghdad pacts not because he was really interested in the freedom of Pakistan, but because he was afraid that the United States' military aid to Pakistan would pose a problem for India's security. It is also difficult to believe that Nehru really thought that Pakistan would lose its independence or that Pakistan was not interested in its own independence. He was, on the other hand, afraid that Pakistan would become stronger militarily and that the United States might gain greater influence in Indo-Pakistan affairs. There was no question of Pakistan losing its freedom or independence of action in foreign affairs. Though this was not accepted earlier by many Indian scholars, there is now general acceptance of it as is evident from the following report:

128. *Id.*, p. 476 for a frank admission of this by Nehru.

129. As pointed out earlier, Nehru himself had said that an alliance need not stand in the way of the independence of a nation (See above, p.29). The only way in which we can explain this inconsistency in Nehru's views is that Nehru was making an all out effort to restrain Pakistan from taking the US aid. He might have been trying to mobilise opinion in other Asian countries and appealing to the Pakistani public, over the heads of the Pakistani leaders, as was his habit in India.

130. See below pp. 196 - 200.

"The discussion on the foreign policies of Pakistan and Japan led to sympathetic understanding of alignment. It was generally felt that recent trends and developments in the foreign policies of these countries show that alignment with power blocs does not always compromise freedom and initiative in foreign policy. For these aligned countries have been able to follow a reasonably independent policy and to establish friendly relations with Powers opposed to the leading members of the bloc to which they belong. On the other hand, several non-aligned states have felt compelled to seek military aid from the leading world Powers which are leaders of military alliances. In view of these developments, it was felt that the terms 'alignment' and 'non-alignment' have lost at least some of their original meaning and force."

This is a misconception which has gained currency since the Chinese aggression against India and the latter's acceptance of military aid from the Big Powers. It is a major contention of this study that neither 'alignment' nor 'nonalignment' has lost its original meaning. This misconception is obviously based on the fallacies that alignment meant loss of independence, and that Nonalignment meant a total rejection of not only alliances but also military aid from the Big powers.

Alignment and Independence:

It has already been indicated above, that alignment does not lead to a loss of independence of a country as admitted by
Nehru himself. It is, therefore, not correct to say that only "the recent trends and developments in the foreign policies of" Pakistan and Japan, "show that alignment with Power blocs does not always compromise freedom and initiative in foreign policy." The implication in the argument that Pakistan did not act independently in certain cases is that it did not act with the majority of the Afro-Asians, or the nonaligned states, though there is no reason why it should have done so, if it were really independent. For example, it is stated that "On the Hungarian question, Pakistan has voted constantly and consistently with the United States." But, it is forgotten that India had voted with the Soviet Union on the most crucial resolution on the Hungarian issue. And those who remember this explain, that India had to deviate from the theory of Non-alignment in defence of her vital interests.

Pakistan's stand on the Suez crisis should prove beyond doubt that it was as independent as any other state was. The


133. See below, Chapter 6 for an analysis of the voting record of India and the United Arab Republic on the Hungarian issue in the United Nations. It may also be added that a careful study of the voting behaviour of India on all cold war issues would reveal that on a good number of them India voted with this or that bloc. During the Korean crisis India had voted more often with the United States than voting 'independently' — See Chester Bowles Ambassador's Report, op. cit., p. 172.

arguments that "although she voted always with Afro-Asian
group in the United Nations, the tone of her delegates' speech
was milder than that of many others in the group", and that
"Even outside the UN, her government's reaction was not in
conformity with the popular feelings which rose to a high pitch
of sympathy for the Egyptians and of condemnation of the agg-
ressors", do not at all prove that Pakistan was not indepen-
dent, if all the facts of the case are kept in mind. It will
be similarly wrong as already indicated, to assume that India
had been blindly pro-United Arab-Republic during the Suez
crisis.

Perhaps, the most important reason for Pakistan's
refusal to vote with the majority of the Afro-Asians, was that
it amounted to voting with India. And it joined the Power bloc
only when it appeared to further its vital interests and causes
against India while India did the same, in reverse, as their
voting on the Hungarian issue, and much else of their foreign

135. See B.C.Rastogi, op.cit., p. 172.
136. There was no particular reason why Pakistan should have
gone all out in condemning England with which it shared
defence alliances and membership of the Commonwealth,
whereas, its relations with the United Arab Republic were
not very happy. In fact, Pakistan and Iraq took the
initiative in proposing to suspend Britain from the
Baghdad Pact. It is interesting to note that some Indian
spokesman and scholars have defended India's role in the
Hungarian crisis and also Nehru's criticism of Nasser's
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on the ground
that its policy was one of nonviolence in words as well
as deeds (See above, Chapter I, n.6).
137. See above, pp. 43 - 44.
policy reveals. Pakistan's alliance with the United States and India's opposition to it reveal the same fact. As already indicated, India opposed, tooth and nail, the United States' military aid to Pakistan, because, it was an attempt on the part of Pakistan to end its isolation, successfully caused by India and to boost its military strength vis-à-vis India. For, as long as Pakistan remained nonaligned, it could not pose a threat to India's security. In the then existing atmosphere of hatred and suspicion on both sides, the fear of an attack from the other, on either side, was natural, far more so on the side of Pakistan before 1954, because of its small size, absurd geographical position and comparative weakness, and according to Nirad C. Choudhuri, this fear on the part of Pakistan up to 1954, was not entirely unfounded.

138. See M.S. Rajan, 'India and Pakistan As factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy And Relations', *International Studies* (Vol. III, No. 4, April 1962), and Jayant Kumar Ray, 'India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policies', *International Studies* (Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2 July-October 1966), for a detailed study of the impact of the 'cold war' between India-Pakistan on their policies. The authors seek to prove that India's preoccupation with Pakistan is not as great as that of Pakistan with India, and, that even then, India's preoccupation with Pakistan is a sort of distortion from her general foreign policy. This argument, I feel, itself distorts India's foreign policy.


140. Nehru, op.cit., p. 82 Nehru singled out Pakistan as the only country with which India's relations were not clean. See also Sisir Gupta, 'India's Policy Towards Pakistan', *International Studies* (Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, July-October 1966), p. 38.

141. op.cit., p. 293.
Nonalignment and Alliances:

Coming to the other fallacy that Nonalignment meant a total rejection of all kinds of alliances and also military aid, it has to be pointed out that it is contrary to facts. For, it is a well established fact that India and the United Arab Republic as well as all other leading nonaligned nations have not always opposed all military alliances, either in principle or in practice. In a four-fold classification of pacts, Fayez A. Sayegh, has pointed out that pacts like the "Arab League do not arouse any opposition", and that the three kinds of pacts in the ascending order of objectionability are, "voluntary associations", "Cold War pacts par excellence", and finally SEATO and CENTO pacts against whom "the main opposition of neutralists has been directed."

Nehru's opposition and criticism of the NATO alliance was mainly in connection with the western support to Portugal

142. See J.C. Kundra, op.cit., pp. 87-98 for a more or less objective study of India's anti-pactism. See also N. Paramesharan Nayar, 'Nationalism As A Factor In India's Foreign Policy', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1962, p.4-46. The criteria for Nonalignment evolved at the preparatory meeting in Cairo for the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned States also made a distinction between Pacts.

143. Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World, op.cit., pp. 46-47.

144. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 89-90 and Supra, n.50.
on Goa, or his anger with the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. Nasser's opposition to NATO appears to have been a by-product of his opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the support given by the Western Powers to Israel. Besides, India's association with the Commonwealth, and the United Arab Republic's treaty of 1964, with Britain, showed that both the countries were willing to accept British help in the event of an attack by an outside Power. The Commonwealth, however, as Nehru rightly stressed, had no commitments on either side, especially of a military nature. In fact, however, India undertook certain obligations in Burma, in its own interests. And India had accepted British co-operation in building its defence forces. As Panikkar has written "If the Indian army was to be something more than a

146. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op.cit., pp.49-50, 133-134, 183. In fact one does not find a direct reference to NATO in these speeches.


148. Nehru, op.cit., p.144. "we cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other ...." said Nehru.

149. See below, Chapter IV, p. 146-148.

second class force meant only for internal security, then its
training and organisation had to be based on the latest know-
ledge. It was impossible without adequate co-operation from
one of the major powers to acquire this knowledge. Close
association with Britain was for India the only practical
alternative and India chose it unhesitatingly."

Nasser accepted the British stipulation to reactivate
the Suez base in the event of an attack on any of the powers
of the area not only because he realised the need for British
help in the event of an attack but also because he had to
depend upon Britain for the supply of defence equipment etc.

Nehru's early attitude to defence and defence prepara-
tions comes to light from the two Communiques issued by the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in 1948, to which Nehru
subscribed. The first one, issued on October 20, 1948, said,
interalia: "Defence and the maintenance of world peace were
the subjects of discussion at the Prime Ministers meeting this
morning and afternoon", and that "In the discussion there was
agreement that the danger of war must be met by building up
the armed forces in order to deter any would be aggressor, and

151. This stipulation was incorporated in Article 4 of the
treaty - Supra, n. 147. Also see below, p. 213-214.

152. Cited in K.P. Karunakaran, India In World Affairs,
that freedom must be safeguarded not only by military defensive measures but also by advancing social and economic welfare." The second Communiqué issued on October 22, 1948, had said, inter alia: "The Discussions have shown a substantial community of outlook among all Commonwealth Governments in their approach to present world problems."

It will be shown in the next chapter that Non-alignment has always meant a readiness to accept military assistance in the event of foreign aggression. In its simplest meaning viz., freedom of action in foreign relations, it could not have meant the contrary, notwithstanding Nehru's own statements to this effect.

It is, therefore, possible to conclude that Nehru's opposition to the cold war pacts on ideological and moral grounds was in itself a cold war tactic. As Devdutt has explained, "The Government of India committed more or less the same error as the big Powers. The cold war mentality in a sense implies the introduction of nonpolitical, particularly

153. Ibid.
154. See below, pp. 95-99.
155. Ibid.
156. See K.P. Karunakaran, ed., op.cit., p.73.
the moral or ideological considerations, into the evolving of foreign policies ...." In fact, however, self-interest rather than ideological or logical consistency has been her main objective. Moral ends entered the foreign policy only as means or attitude-building factors." Seen from this point of view, the so-called divergence in the Government of India's precepts and practice nearer home where her national interest is involved, disappears.

Similarly, it will be shown in Part II of this study that India's role in crises like Korea, Suez, Hungary, and, the Congo, was consistent throughout with her actions and policies on issues like Kashmir, Tibet, and Goa etc. The so-called inconsistancies that are pointed out by various writers arise out of the fact that Nonalignment has not been properly understood by a majority of the people every-where.

A few examples would serve to illustrate the point better. According to one group of writers, "The reaction of many of the nonaligned nations towards events in Hungary in 1956", was divergent from the theory of Nonalignment. Another scholar has said that the Indian action in Goa was "an aberration from India's foreign policy style", forgetting India's action in

167. Id., p.88.
168. Ibid.
169. Supra, n.131, p.112.
160. Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia, op.cit., p.27, Note. 63.
Kashmir in 1947 and its support to the United Nations' military action in the Congo. Kashmir again, is an exception to the rule for many. The Communists and other leftist leaders in India have called the acceptance of military aid from the United States during and since the Chinese aggression, not a mere aberration, but a major departure, from Nonalignment.

All this divergence reveals that each has his own view of Nonalignment and refuses to see it as a whole. As Norman D. Palmer has aptly put it, "In India ...... the major stronghold of neutralism most people who have any views at all on such matters seem to approve of the foreign policies of their Government, but their concepts of the nature of neutralism differ greatly. Some brands of Indian neutralism are vague and naive, with a strong 'out of this world' flavour; others are well thought out and politically realistic. Some Indians lean as far towards Communism and the Soviet Union as their so-called neutralism permits, whereas others seem to be definitely neutral on the side of democracy and have a strong pro-western orientation."

As against all this, Nehru simply said: "I am on my country's side and on no body else's".

161. See below Chapter VII for an analysis of India's role in the Congo crisis.
163. Krishna Menon said: "......our acceptance of aid and advice were at once basic and a catastrophic changes...." See The Hindu, February 6, 1967.
CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF NONALIGNMENT

Aspects of Nonalignment:

Nonalignment is a policy based on the balance of power principle and its main objective is the protection of the security of the nation. It is not a simple policy but a complex whole having different aspects, all of which aim at the same main objective, viz., the security of the nation. Its various aspects were very well explained, as follows, by Nehru in the debates on Foreign Affairs in the Indian Parliament on December 9, 1958:

"When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, obviously we mean nonalignment with military blocs .... This in itself is not a policy; it is only part of a policy.....

"The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgement, and furthering the principal objectives and ideals that we have. Every country's foreign policy first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress. Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else.

"Apart from this, from the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our ability for world peace.....

"Our foreign policy has this positive aspect of peace. The other positive aspects are an enlargement of freedom in the world, replacement of colonialism by free and independent countries and a large degree of cooperation among nations...."

In the previous chapter the policies of anti-colonialism and antiracialism have been examined. Only the major aspects now remain to be explained.

To begin, then, what did Nehru mean by 'acting according to our best judgement' and 'an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue'? Did it mean objectivity or impartiality as has been often claimed by many persons in India and abroad? The answer is no. For, Nehru said in 1948 that "Our instructions to our delegates have always been firstly, to consider each question in terms of India's interest Secondly on its merits — I mean to say if it did not affect India, naturally on its merits and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this Power or that Power, though, of course, it is perfectly natural that in our desire to have friendship with other Powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate them."


India's interests are paramount because, as Nehru said:

"The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

"Therefore, whether a country is imperialist or Socialist or Communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country. But .... of course some people may think of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences or take a short distance view. Others may think that in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important because if war comes every one suffers so that in the long distance view, self-interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as, indeed, it does demand."

Thus neither peace nor goodwill for other nations have been ends in themselves. Peace is necessary to the extent it secures India's security and development. "Therefore", said Nehru, "We propose to look after India's interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as world

4. LD., p. 28 (Italics are mine).
5. Ibid.
peace can be preserved." But warfare, said Nehru, "can not be avoided if another party starts it, or if there is aggression one has to meet that. That is why originally we had to go to Kashmir, that is why we have stayed on — that is, our armed forces have stayed on — and ..... we will not withdraw our forces from there so long as there is any danger left to aggre-

sion from outside....."

Similarly, Nehru said that "we cannot perhaps be friendly always with every country..... Naturally you are more friendly with those countries with whom you have closer relations..... Naturally, again, we are likely to be more friendly to some countries than to others because this may be to be our mutual advantage..... but even so, our friendship with other coun-
tries should not bring us inevitably into conflict with some other country."

Nonalignment Is Balance of Power Policy:

Very few people seem to realise that this policy of Nonalignment with military blocs and friendship with all countries to protect the security of the nation is in reality

a policy based on the balance of power principle. The difficulty arises out of misconceptions about Nonalignment such as those examined earlier, also of the balance of power principle itself. As Prof. Penrose has aptly observed: "The idea of a balance of power is often a stumbling block to the general reader, and sometimes a source of confusion to the student of international relations ...." Therefore, a suitable definition of the idea of the balance of power seems necessary to dispel the confusion. In the words of Prof. Penrose:

"A preliminary explanation ... may best start by considering the position of the statesmen entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs in any independent state. Obviously, their first concern must be the survival of the state and the preservation of its independence....

"In meeting these responsibilities statesmen are obliged to take account of the distribution of power in mind. They must strive to establish such relations with other countries as will ensure that no preponderance of power among the latter, singly or collectively, will threaten their independence or encompass their downfall. In the pursuit of this defensive aim they may decide, from time to time, to enter into or form alliances with other powers, particularly when those countries whose designs they fear are linked by treaty engagements. In other circumstances they may eschew all alliances fearing that by entering into one they would provoke a hostility of a rival group and be drawn into conflicts which they might avoid by remaining dissociated.


9. Ibid. (Italics are mine). The identity of the aim of survival between alignment and nonalignment stressed here has already been indicated in the previous chapter See above, pp.76 - 79."
from either group. Much depende upon the geographical position and natural resources of the state in question; each state is unique in size, however defined in resources and in geographical position in relation to other states. Consequently the precise measure appropriate to the maintenance of a defensive balance-of-power differ in different countries. What is common is the aim of survival."

This, then, is the first aspect of Nonalignment, that is, not joining power blocs or entangling alliances, or, as Prof. Penrose has described it, the 'maintenance of a defensive balance-of-power'.

There were many circumstances, upon which Prof. Penrose and Nehru himself, have laid stress, that were favourable for the Nonalignment of so many Afro-Asian states.

Among the most important of these was the emergence of a more or less stable balance-of-power among the Big Powers, by 1945 or so, which not only ruled out the possibility of another World War, even before the advent of nuclear parity, but also created an atmosphere congenial for Nonalignment. Nehru was quick to grasp this fact, for it was in 1946 that


he first came out with his declaration of Nonalignment as the basis of India's foreign policy. And in 1949 he declared categorically that "there has been a great deal of talk about the possibility of war — world war I mean. So far as I can judge, such possibilities as there were have receded. I don't think there is any great chance of any war on a big scale, on a world scale in the near future...."

Again in a debate in the Parliament of India in 1955, Nehru said:

"As things are today, we have reached a certain kind of balance — it may be a very unstable balance, but it is still some kind of balance — when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor. Whether aggression takes place in a small country or a big one, it tends to upset the unstable balance in the world and is, therefore, likely to lead to war. It is because of this that in the Geneva Conference there was so much argument about the Indo-China states. Either of the major parties was afraid that if any of these states lined up with or coerced into joining one group, it would be to the disadvantage of the other.... So at Geneva they wisely decided, more or less, though not in clear language, that the Indo-China states should keep out of military pacts or alliances on either side, or in other words, remain neutralized.

"If you extend the argument, you will see that the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt, many

things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by war .... Further by enlarging the area of peace, that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that, but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance of war."

This statement of Nehru accurately explains the basis of Nonalignment as a balance-of-power policy. And if the big Powers were suspicious of each other and were keen to have as many of the small states of Asia and Africa aligned on their side, as was the case in the late 1940's, the small states were more suspicious of the big Powers because of their strength and power. Thus the desire not to antagonise them was reinforced by a desire to keep as aloof from them as possible, or in other words, not to have exclusive dependence on either, which was bound to antagonise the other. From the very beginning Nehru was determined to make India, as far as possible, self-reliant. Nonalignment would serve both these aims.

14. It is, therefore, not correct to hold, as is done in some quarters, that there is no basis in Nehru’s Speeches for such a view of Nonalignment. Nor is it necessary to say that the Foreign Minister does not always make everything clear. See A.P. Rana, 'The Nature of India’s Foreign Policy (An Examination of the Relation of Indian Nonalignment to the Concept of the Balance of Power in the Nuclear Age)', India Quarterly, (XXII, No.2, April-June, 1966), pp. 101-139; Giri Lal Jain, 'Indian Nonalignment And Balance of Power', Id., pp. 177-179 and A.P. Rana, Indian Nonalignment And Balance of Power - A Rejoinder', Id., (No.3, July-September, 1966), pp. 279-285.

Defence Through Friendship:

The desire not to antagonise the Soviet Union, at any cost, has been due to the fact that it was the most powerful state on India's borders, capable of threatening its security, when India became independent, as Nehru had pointed out, as early as 1931, in a masterly analysis of India's strategic-military position, though it was not likely to attempt it, as it would then lay itself open to attack from the European Powers. The emergence of the Cold War almost ruled out even this remote possibility. The surest way to antagonise the Soviet Union would have been an alliance with the West which Nehru, any way, did not want for other reasons as well. In 1960, for example, Nehru said: "So far as India was concerned, placed as she was historically and geographically it would have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into this business of the cold war, either on grounds of principle or on grounds of expediency." And K.P.S. Menon, has written that "Nehru wrote to Asaf Ali and myself as the first Ambassadors of independent India, on the eve of our departure for Washington and Nanking respectively ..... 'The Soviet Union being

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16. See Bimla Prasad, The Origins of India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., Appendix II, pp.280-283. China, Nehru wrote, would not be such a great threat for a very long time. 
18. India and the Cold War, op.cit., p.29 (Italics are mine).
our neighbour, we shall inevitably develop closer relations with it. We cannot afford to antagonise Russia merely because we think that this may irritate some one else. Nor indeed can we antagonise the U.S.A."

Friendship with the United States was essential because, it was not only the one power capable of providing substantial economic help for India's economic prosperity, but, of course, also the only power which could effectively check the Russian ambitions of territorial expansion, if any. From the point of view of India's security, friendship with the Soviet Union appears to have been more important for geographical reasons. After all, the United States' interest in India became real only after the rise of Communist China, heralding the failure of the United States' policies in China. Though it is very difficult to substantiate, Nehru appears to have calculated that Russia would look upon India as a possible ally against an expansionist China, either under Mao or under Chiang Kai-Shek.

19. It is for this reason that perhaps Nehru stated once or twice that foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy. See Nehru, op.cit., p. 24. Also see below, p. 106-107.

20. The geographical closeness of India and the Soviet Union appears to have been one of the reasons for Nehru's opposition to the creation of Pakistan as an independent nation — See J.Nehru, The Discovery of India, op.cit., pp. 566-567. If this were so, the fact that a hostile Pakistan came into being with an independent India might have increased the need for closer relations with the Soviet Union and for not antagonising it lest the former might exploit the situation. Indeed K.M. Panikkar (op.cit., pp. 33-40) wrote that the creation of Pakistan had created a defence problem of great magnitude for India.
For, Nehru had written in the early 1940's itself, that though the Russian leaders were far too busy with their own problems to think of India's independence, "yet they were not likely to ignore India which touched their frontiers in Asia..." It is more likely that Nehru had from the beginning looked upon Russia as a possible ally against an expansionist China. It is unlikely that Nehru could have neglected the emergence of a powerful China and its impact on India. For, even in 1927 Nehru declared that "The Chinese Revolution is not an event of local interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of the greatest historic importance..... the country which will be most affected by the issue will be India."

Whether or not all these considerations were taken fully into consideration, it is clear that some thought was given to the emerging Chinese problem. Nehru told the Indian Parliament in 1959: "Even before the Chinese Revolution we tried to develop friendly relations with the Chiang-Kai-Shek Government" Once it was evident that China had gone Communist and was not prepared to accept India's friendship and partnership in Asia, for that was what India wanted from it, India could not but give full thought to the problem. To quote Nehru again:

21. Id., p. 523.
24. See below pp. 142-144.
"Ever since the Chinese Revolution, we naturally had to think of what the new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution was going to be a very big factor in Asia, in the world, and in regard to us. We realised — we knew that amount of history — that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history that has been the case. And we felt that the great push towards industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase, would together create a most dangerous situation. Taken also with the fact of China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive when she is strong, we realised the danger to India. We have discussed it here, and it has been discussed in other countries. As the years have gone by, this fact has become more and more apparent and obvious. If any person imagines that we have followed our China policy without realizing the consequences, he is mistaken. If he thinks that we followed it because of fear of China, he is doubly mistaken."

Perhaps Nehru was right in his claim that his China policy was not based on fear of China. For, while he realised that Communist China was a danger to India, he appears to have calculated that it was not an immediate danger, as he told the Indian Parliament in 1959: "Right from 1950 or, at any rate from 1951, when the Chinese forces came into Tibet we have had this problem before us. It has not suddenly come up before us this year or last year. We have had this problem before us and this developing picture ..... of two power states merging, two power states coming face to face with each other on a tremendous border. Ever since 1950, this was the picture

before us. We may have differed as to the timing in our minds, as to when this will happen, whether in five years, ten years, thirty years, fifteen years, it was difficult to say. But we had the picture....."

Therefore, while he took all necessary steps to meet any possible threat from China, he rightly proceeded to cultivate China's friendship on the basis of mutual interests as will be seen in the next chapter. England also appears to have proceeded on the same assumption. Their aim appears to have been to give the Chinese government the necessary international recognition, so that it need not have to depend upon the Soviet Union exclusively for diplomatic support. Even after this effort failed, through what might have been a deliberate effort on the part of the Soviet Union, and China signed the treaty of friendship with its big neighbour, India hoped that it might still be possible to make friends with the Communist giants, by remaining nonaligned. India's alignment with the United States at this stage would have definitely antagonised the Soviet Union and China, and possibly made them permanent enemies, thus increasing the threat to its security.

27. See below, pp. 142 - 150
Defence Through Nonalignment:

As has been indicated earlier, leaders in India and many other Asian countries were hopeful that sooner or later, China and the Soviet Union were bound to fall apart. It was all the more necessary, therefore, for India to remain non-aligned. Thus the Sino-Soviet split, when it finally came about, only confirmed the basis of Nonalignment. It was not so much against the West as against China that Nehru declared that the Soviet Union was India's second front and vice versa. Indeed, he is reported to have told the United States that the Soviet Union considers India as its second line of defence against China.

In 1950 these developments were only anticipated. Nehru, therefore, wanted to make it clear to the Soviet Union and China what he meant by Nonalignment. For, they appeared to have taken it for granted that Nonalignment meant permanent hostility to the West, especially the United States of America, for it was the United States that was bitterly opposed to India's Nonalignment. Thus Nehru made it clear to the Communist

30. See above, pp. 53-57.


32. See Sisir Gupte, India and Regional Integration in Asia, op. cit., p. 16.

33. See above, Chapter II, p. 65 Also see below pp. 142-151.
Powers that he would not hesitate to accept Western aid, if not an alliance, if India's security was threatened, by his decision to remain in the Commonwealth, by his support to the Burmese Government against the Communists, and by putting the Communists in India in jail, in their thousands. Stalin might have already learnt his lesson from Tito's successful defection from his control and the prompt support given by the United States to the latter. This must have been a heartening development for India.

If Stalin had learnt his lesson well, it was reasonable to conclude, that the Soviet Union would not like to drive India into the Western camp, by supporting any big Chinese move against India. If, however, this happened India was sure of Western help, alliance or no alliance, as Nehru wrote in 1931: "No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to prevent this to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India." But the West might be checkmated by the Soviet Union if India entered into an alliance with the United States or

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34. Supra, n. 16.
even Britain, even against China, for the primary concern of the
Soviet Union has always been to prevent the growth of Western
influence in these countries, if it could not increase its
own. But this is possible, in so far as India is concerned,
only when it is prepared to do more than remain neutral, in
the event of a massive Chinese thrust against India, for, India
does not possess the strength to withstand it, nor would it be
able to do it for a long time to come, without outside assis-
tance, which could come only from the West if it did not come
from the Soviet Union. Obviously, the Soviet Union appears to
have fulfilled this requirement in 1962, at least, in a partial
way.

This explains the major plank of India's defence policy,
and indeed, of all the nonaligned nations. There has always
been a tacit dependence upon the world balance-of-power and
great power support in times of crisis. Panikkar has written
that India's Nonalignment "does not mean that in case she is
actually attacked she would not accept assistance from others.

35. See above, chapter, II, n.86.
1965 Soviet Union moved away from its traditional policy
of support to India on Kashmir and thus appears to have
fulfilled this requirement between India and Pakistan.
37. See Cecil V.Crabb Jr., The Elephants And The Grass : A
Study of Nonalignment, (Frederick A.Praeger, N.Y.,1966),
pp.30-33 for a good discussion of this aspect of Nonalign-
ment.
38. K.M.Panikkar, op.cit., pp. 128-129.
No country has ever held such a view. Faced with Nazi aggression, Britain and France bid for Soviet support. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Moscow welcomed the help of America and the Western allies. That is different from basing one's defence policy on support from stronger powers, or taking shelter behind the strength of others."

This is what Nehru seems to have had in mind when he told the Indian Parliament on November 27, 1959, that: "The policy of non-alignment and of having friendly relations is, I believe, basically a right policy under all circumstances. But if two countries fall out and, in the extreme instance, go to war, obviously that policy does not apply to them. If peace is broken, we deal with the situation in so far as we can. The policy remains good all the same and it applies to the rest of the world, and later, to that part of the world too, because war is not a permanent phenomenon."

Paradoxical as it might appear, this is what Non-alignment means, both in theory and in practice. Explaining his reasons for rejecting the Baghdad Pact and the British protection, Nasser said in 1958: "On February 20, 1955, I met Mr. Eden, the British Premier in Cairo. At that time the British Foreign

40. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op. cit., p. 236.
Secretary was prompting the cause of the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East ..... I said we could defend ourselves, that in the case of Soviet aggression we would have recourse to the Western Powers, and that we would ask for the help of the Soviet Union if we are attacked by the Western Powers ....."

It has already been indicated \(^{41}\) that India's association with the Commonwealth and the United Arab Republic's treaty with Britain, both meant the tacit acceptance of British help in the event of an attack. Thus, if Nehru had refused to commit himself in advance for the acceptance of aid from the West, it does not seem correct to think that either he, or the Government of India, treated Nonalignment as a 'fetish' \(^{42}\) or a moral principle, for the simple reason that the moment it was evident that the Chinese attack was a massive aggression, he appealed to all powers for help which came immediately from the west and also belatedly from the Soviet Union. What is important is not that the Soviet Union was slow to respond, but that it did respond in a positive way. Hence Nehru was quite justified in holding that the abandonment of Nonalignment would be a "moral failure", not so much because it was a moral principle, but because it proved valid and stood justified, in its major assumptions regarding India's defence and security. Even today India can not be conquered by China and it knows this well.

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41. See above, chapter II, p. 161.

42. See M.S.Rajan, 'Chinese Aggression And The Future of Nonalignment', op.cit., p. 128.
India's Failure:

This does not mean that China's advance into Indian territory in 1962 was not a loss for India. It is very much so. But it would not be easy for China to make similar gains in future, unless the Government of India and its defence forces commit the same mistake again, that of not anticipating the Chinese attack which Nehru himself admitted.

It is, however, difficult to understand how the Government of India failed to anticipate the Chinese attack. Even if the military intelligence was primitive, as the NEFA inquiry revealed, and failed to perform the most elementary function of ascertaining the military preparations of China for a massive attack on a border spreading over some 2,000 miles, it should not have been difficult to anticipate the attack. It appears to me, that any one with a little knowledge of the Chinese behaviour could have foreseen that China was likely to exploit the extremely delicate international situation existing in October 1962, as it did in 1960, when it occupied Tibet.

See Lt.Gen.B.M.Kaul, The United Story, (Allied Publishers Bombay 1967), pp.175-349, for interesting facts relating to the Himalayan tragedy. Kaul claims that he had predicted the Chinese attack, early in 1962 and had told Ambassador Bowles about it who promised to do his best to persuade Kennedy to help India (pp.341-342).

44. See L.S.D., Third Series, Fifth Session, Vol.XX, 2 September 1963, cols. 3849-51 for Defence Minister Chavan's statement placing a summary statement of the inquiry which has not been published. For the text see A.G.Noorani, Our Credulity and Negligence, (Ramdas G.Bhatkal, Bombay, 1963), Appendix 3, p.158.

45. See below, p. 183.
It is difficult to say, for want of any information, if the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry had taken proper steps to understand Chinese behaviour and tactics.

But was this the real reason for the debacle? It does not appear to be so. The then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, has recently said that the acceptance of military aid from the United States after the Chinese attack was a catastrophic change from Nonalignment. It is, therefore, possible to conclude that he was opposed to such a move and might have advised Nehru accordingly. It is difficult to believe that Nehru himself believed that the acceptance of military aid would compromise Nonalignment, for there was hardly a nonaligned state which had not done it at one time or the other. If he really believed in it he was wrong. It is true that Nehru himself was always reluctant to accept foreign military aid. But he would hardly have failed to see the need for it had he realised the magnitude of the Chinese preparations. It is difficult to say whether Menon also believed that it was the sine qua non for averting the Chinese attack. Or was he afraid that the acceptance of the Chinese threat would bring pressure on the Government of India to seek military aid from the United States which he was not prepared to accept? Did he, by any chance,

46. See above, Chapter II, n.163.
forgea a demand for his own resignation and an end to his political career? After all, he is an intelligent and shrewd person.

It would appear, from hindsight at least, that it would not have been difficult to prevent the attack, if the Chinese intentions were revealed to the world promptly. Even if the attack came neither the army nor the world at large would have been taken by surprise. At least the nonaligned nations could perhaps have been taken into confidence. As the whole diplomatic practice is shrouded in secrecy, it is difficult to say anything definite whether or not any of these steps were taken and with what results.

But the entire approach of the Government of India to China, in so far as it can be understood from Nehru's speeches appears to have been one of reluctance to take up the Chinese challenge, because of their weakness, and perhaps because of their approach to the defence of India. In a typical statement Nehru told the Parliament of India on December 9, 1959: "In the early years of the Chinese Republic, Mr. Panikkar was our Ambassador there. I read through his notes on the subject and our notes to him and our decisions. From the very first day

47. Nehru, op.cit., p.377. According to V.K.Krishna Menon's Biographer, Nehru and Menon were prepared to lease the Aksai Chin salient to China — See T.J.S.George, op.cit., pp. 255-256. It was also reported that Chou En-Lai was prepared to recognise the McMahon Line in return for the Aksai Chin Road — See A.G.Noorani, op.cit., pp.139-140.
this problem about our frontier was before us. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage. We decided not to do ...... we felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time the challenge came we would be in a much stronger position to face it....." Till such time Nehru wanted to keep China at bay through the Panch Sheel as shall be explained later. One would have, therefore, expected the Government of India to be more vigilant and not less, for it was natural to expect, that China would like to settle the issue before India was "in a much stronger position to face it." It was also natural that China did not allow the issue to lapse into insignificance. It did not fall into the trap which the Government of India laid for it.

**Meaning of Nonalignment:**

In fairness to Nehru and Menon, it has to be mentioned that there might have been another reason for their reluctance to face the Chinese challenge which they could have done, by a more judicious and intelligent use of Nonalignment. **And this is fundamental to Nonalignment.** For, the Nonalignment of a newly independent nation, means, more than anything else, a desire on its part, to stand on its own legs, as far as possible, and to build its future in its own way with the assistance and under the protection of friendly powers, especially the big
Powers. Naturally it opposes and sometimes even rejects this assistance and protection, if conditions were attached to it.\textsuperscript{48} It did not want the cold war pacts because these involved firm commitments to one side or the other which were not always in its interests. Alliances were not considered safe because they would subordinate the interests of a country to those of the big partners in the alliance, as England and France learnt in 1966, and, Pakistan in 1966. China's split with the Soviet Union reflects this fact, no less than France's with the United States. Thus Nehru said in Parliament in 1959: "There is one fact which might be remembered when people think sometimes of obtaining outside aid. They probably imagine that in my conceit I say that I will not take outside aid. I certainly have a little conceit about India's standing on its own legs. I cannot, however, say what we may do in an eventuality. But I do not want this idea to get into our people that others will help us and preserve our freedom. I do not want India to go on crutches. .......

\textsuperscript{48} See Nehru,\textit{ op.cit.}, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{49} See Nehru,\textit{ op.cit.}, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{50} See Richard Lowenthal,\textit{ op.cit.}, Preface, P.VIII and Klaus Mehnert,\textit{ op.cit.}, pp. 398-402.

\textsuperscript{51} See to 'Suez Seen from Paris',\textit{ Eastern Economist} (August 17, 1956), pp. 241-242 for a remarkably accurate forecast of the things to come.

\textsuperscript{52} Nehru,\textit{ op.cit.}, p. 379.
In the same way, Nasser said in 1958 that, "we wanted the defence of the area to emanate from the will of the Arab people and from their land and not from the will of any foreign colonialist power." And further that "when we asked Britain for arms to be able to resist aggression, to resist Israel which was getting arms from France and other western powers, Britain imposed conditions on us. She made it a condition that we should not attack the Baghdad Pact, nor oppose the pact, and asked as a price for those arms that we join or condone these pacts that surround us and threaten our safety, our very existence." That Nasser was not far from the truth became evident during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Perhaps it was some such consideration that stood in the way of Nehru in committing the Government to accept Western help in the event of a major Chinese aggression. The United States' insistence on a solution of the Kashmir problem in the wake of the Chinese aggression might have been quite an expected move. Both Nehru and Menon might not have liked it at all. However, in the true spirit of Nonalignment Nehru had long ago proceeded to lay the foundations of a self sufficient defence force for India in all spheres. As he told the Indian Parliament on December 8, 1959:

54. Nehru, op.cit., pp.371-372. See K.M.Panikkar, op.cit., for an account of the defence preparations of India in all spheres. Panikkar admits that India's preparations were not meant for the defence of India single handed in case of a Contd.....
"If any hon. Member thinks that we had ignored the question of defence in our enthusiasm for the Panch Sheel, then I would submit that he is mistaken ...... The basic factor in defence is the industrial growth of the country, and all the armies in the world without an industrial background cannot function adequately. Our Five Years Plans built up this industrial background. As the House well knows, in the last few years, more especially since the Second Five Year Plan came into being, great stress has been laid on the foundations of basic industries and heavy industries in the country. It is on them that defence can ultimately rest ...... they ...... not only provide the wherewithall for defence ...... (but) are supposed to raise the economy of a country to higher levels, thereby putting the people in a stronger position to meet any emergencies that they might have to face.

"A country does not normally go about talking of the steps it takes for defence. Our stress, in particular, has been on peace and will continue to be on peace, but that does not mean any kind of forgetfulness of the country's basic requirements in regard to defence ...... Both for guns and butter we have to lay, as rapidly and as firmly as we can, the foundations of heavy industry......"

Nonalignment and Economic Aid:

Besides this accent on the development of heavy industry, Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Tito have all been Socialists. They all favoured some form of State Socialism. They were apprehensive of getting aid from the Western countries, especially, the United States, in full measure, unless they accepted some form of capitalism, if not other commitments. The (Continued from previous page)

major war (p.108). Also see Supra, Chapter 2,n.77. Many responsible US officials and scholars consider this self-reliance in defence as the greatest asset of India. See Cecil V. Crabb Jr., American Foreign Policy In The Nuclear Age, Second Edition (Harper & Row, New York, 1965), pp. 323-324.
only other country that could give them economic aid in a big way was the Soviet Union. Even if aid was forthcoming from one side only, Nehru said it was not "a wise policy to put all your eggs in one basket. Nor should one get help at the cost of one's self-respect." And Nonalignment would give this freedom of choice to take aid from wherever one liked while alignment might restrict it. And as Nehru put it, "we are going to have it and going to get it too in large measure," inspite of Nonalignment. It was left to Nasser to demonstrate the wisdom of Nehru's words in some highly dramatic moves in 1955-56.

Nonalignment and Domestic Politics:

And acceptance of aid from only one bloc, as India had to do, till the Soviet Union came forward with help, could be dubbed as dependence on, or alliance with, that bloc, by its opponents and their sympathisers within the nonaligned country itself. Many of the nonaligned countries possess extremely divergent sections of population creating an acute sense of

55. Ibid., p. 35.
56. Ibid.,
57. See below, Chapter V.
58. See Nehru, op.cit., pp.47 & 59. Accepting that India was depending upon the Anglo-American bloc for economic aid, Nehru throw a challenge to the Soviet Union to enter the field (p.59).
disunity. In the words of an American scholar, "More than any other conceivable approach to foreign relations, nonalignment serves to hold these disruptive political forces in check and to make possible that degree of political unity which is the minimal price for internal stability and national survival. For a policy of nonalignment is generally acceptable to (or is, at any rate not actively opposed by) the principal groups jockeying for power and affords some basis for compromise among them."

Does this mean that Nonalignment can not be practised by destroying anyone of these groups, say, the Communist Party? An Indian scholar has written that "In the domestic sphere it ... means allowing all parties including the Communists, to function normally ....." And that "Participation in the present cold war and military alliances under western auspices is based on a philosophy opposed to coexistence --- coexistence both in the international and in domestic fields. A government of a country, which has a large Communist Party, can successfully oppose coexistence only by destroying the Communist Party at home......"
It may be easy to argue in this way by restricting the field of inquiry to only a few Asian states like India, Indonesia, Burma, etc. But Nonalignment is a world phenomenon and the United Arab Republic follows Nonalignment quite successfully even after crushing the Communists in the country. And a Communist country also follows Nonalignment and is considered one of the leaders of the group.

On the other hand, the fall of Sukarno from Power in Indonesia, proves that too much freedom for the Communist Party is not always in the interests of Nonalignment. Thus, if the Communist Party enjoys freedom in India, it is only because it has not yet so far posed a serious threat to the security of the nation and has not so far come in the way of the normal functioning of the government of India. Whenever it exceeded its constitutional limits, Nehru came down with a very heavy hand on it. And Nasser, has crushed it for more or less the same reasons. The unpopularity of the Communists in India and the United Arab Republic is in no small measure due to the acceptance of their Nonalignment by the Soviet Union, depriving the Communists of their most potent weapon against the ruling elite, namely, the charge of their being in the imperialist camp. This was by far the greatest domestic gain for the ruling elite from

61. See K.P.S. Menon, India And The Cold War, op. cit., p. 51.
62. Ibid., See also Nehru, op. cit., p. 52.
their Nonalignment, for it deprived the Soviet Union and China of an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of these nonaligned states, as Khrushchev realised to his chagrin when he attempted to shield the Communists in Iraq in 1959.

This is how the nonaligned states strive to protect their security by maintaining a defensive balance of power, that is, by keeping aloof from the major powers and maintaining correct and friendly relations with them. But the pursuit of this defensive balance of power is not enough, as its success depends upon the world balance of power. Therefore, the maintenance of the world balance of power, as far as possible, becomes the second important aspect of Nonalignment. In this sense it is more or less the same as the traditional British policy of balance of power, though it has also a new and perhaps more important element in it, as will be explained below.

Nonalignment is not Neutrality:

To understand this aspect properly, it is necessary to dismiss, one or two popular but mistaken notions about Nonalignment. The first is that Nonalignment is not 'neutrality'. Though this is no more disputed by any one seriously

63. See above, Chapter I, p. 36–37.
64. See below, pp. 126–133.
it still seems to hold the field in a different form. According to Prof. Brecher, whose views may be taken as typical of this school of writers, among whom is also Fayez A. Sayegh, Nonalignment" is, rather the passive, first stage of neutralism. Neutralism has in common with nonalignment an expressed desire to remain aloof from bloc conflict. But neutralism goes much further, for it involves a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts .... In other words nonalignment is the policy guide of the neutralist state, but neutralism represents an attitude and a policy which are much more activist than nonalignment as such. India is the outstanding example of the neutralist state ..... In short, neutralism is a contemporary expression of the time honoured theme of neutrality."

To substantiate this analysis, Prof. Brecher writes that "From 1947 to 1950 Delhi's posture was strikingly similar to classical neutrality, with the frequent expression of hope that India could remain outside a war, should it occur. After the Korean war, however, there was a realisation that non-belligerency or neutrality were not sufficient. And so India moved to the second stage—an open rejection of the leadership of both blocs but still passive in its orientation; that is :

66. See Dynamics of Neutralism in The Arab World, op.cit., p. 4.
67. Supra, n.65, p. 113.
Nonalignment. In the early fifties India moved to the third stage—a positive role in world politics and attempts to alleviate tensions with the ultimate purpose of avoiding a global conflict, in the belief that this was the *sin qua non* of India remaining free from war. Mr. Nehru most recently has gone beyond neutralism because of its verbal associations and called this a 'Positive Policy for Peace'."  

It is submitted that this analysis of Nonalignment in theory as well as practice by Prof. Brecher, is not in accord with facts, as will be shown below, if not also faulty in its logic which, however, is not examined here.

Firstly, as indicated earlier, Nehru, and for that matter, all nonaligned leaders, have always denied that their policy is neutrality or neutralism. Nehru also did not accept 'Positive neutralism', while the Arabs seem to dislike 'Nonalignment'. The least objectionable word for Nehru appears to have been Nonalignment, though by no means satisfactory. Nasser uses both the words, viz., Positive Neutralism and Nonalignment simultaneously, thus indicating no particular preference for either.

68. See above, Chapter I, pp. 33-34.

69. This is the impression one gathers from a study of Nasser's Speeches published in English annually by the UAR Government.
Secondly, as Nehru himself pointed out, "Neutrality as a policy has little meaning except in times of war. If you think there is a cold war to-day, we are certainly neutral." The cold war is no war in any sense of the word. It is not even an ideological war. It is a struggle for power, more than anything else.

Thirdly, there was no desire, at least in India, to stay aloof from war. Nehru told the Constituent Assembly of India in December 1947 itself: "We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless it is a little difficult now a days in world wars to be neutral ..... we are not going to join a war if we can help it. We are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends."

No doubt, Nehru had not ruled out, in theory at least, the possibility of India opting for neutrality in the event of war. But that does not seem to make Nonalignment the passive first stage of neutralism, whatever that may mean. On

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70. Nehru, op.cit., p. 58.
71. Id., p. 24 (Italics are mine).
the other hand, what it seems to prove, is that the question of neutrality does not arise till there is a war, that is, till Nonalignment itself fails. For, the first concern of Nonalignment is the avoiding of war, which can be no stretch of imagination be called a desire to keep aloof from war.

In fact, however, Nehru had ruled out the possibility of India remaining neutral in the event of war, because, it is difficult to do so. That was the lesson which the Americans learnt, to their disappointment, in the I and II World Wars. Further, it is not easy to remain neutral unless both the sides recognise it. India did not simply possess the strength to safeguard its neutrality, say against an advance by China, in the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the first Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, G.S. Bajpai has written, "moral strength is not enough, either to prevent a collision between them or even to protect a neutral's neutrality." And "the greater the strategic importance of a country because of its geography and resources, the greater the threat to its neutrality in a world conflict." The two thrusts that China had made towards India, the first in 1960,

72. 'India and The Balance of Power', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1962, pp. 5-6.
73. Ibid.
and, the second in 1962, are of significance here.

**Nonalignment as Balancing Process:**

Thus the first concern of India has been to avoid a major conflict between the Great Powers, for its own security as much as for world peace. As Nehru put it: "The supreme question that one has to face today in the world is, how can we avoid a world war?"

As indicated earlier in this chapter, Nehru said that "the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt many things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by war ...... Further by enlarging the area of peace, that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance of war."

What did Nehru mean by the acceptance of "things more or less as they are?" It meant the acceptance of the balance of power in the world, especially between the Big powers. At the Belgrade Conference he said: "The whole framework of the UN, ever since it was formed fifteen years ago, was recognition of the balance of power in the world ...." This has to be

75. See above p. 88.
clearly understood for a proper understanding of Nonalignment. The acceptance of things as they are meant the acceptance of the power position of the two major antagonists in the cold war, both in Asia and Europe. This position should not be changed by war for it would mean a world conflict and hence any such attempt should be nipped in the bud, as far as possible, if necessary by force. This is possible only when a state or group of states, is in a position to act as a balancer in a conflict between two sides and is free from commitments to either side, so that it can shift its weight from one side to the other, as the occasion demanded. This, it will be seen in the next chapter, was what India attempted in the Korean crisis. This is the real meaning of the policy of "pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major group of power but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue...."

The fact that the Korean crisis was the first occasion for India to play the role of a balancer does not seem to prove that this was a sudden shift in its foreign policy. Nehru had formulated his foreign policy as a complete whole and this aspect has been an integral part of it, as already indicated.

77. See below, Chapter IV pp.163-164 for the Government of India's statement and Nehru's statement on North Korean aggression on South Korea, in June 1950.

78. See above, p. 82.
his policy and its assumptions. Even before the Korean crisis Nehru had said: "I feel that India can play a big part, and may be an effective part, in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of Powers which for various reasons are full of fear of war and preparing for war. That is the main approach of our policy."

Again, in the same speech he had said: "We have stated repeatedly that our foreign policy is one of keeping aloof from the big blocs of nations-rival blocs—and being friendly to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliances military or other that might drag us into any possible conflict. If by chance we align ourselves definitely with one group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the shadow of a doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess (and that influence is going to grow year to year) in the cause of world peace....."

**An Analogy:**

This policy of Nonalignment, it is submitted, is essentially the same as the British policy of 'freehand', both in

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79. Supra, n.74.

80. Id., p. 1232.
its language and terminology and its application. As a British Scholar has written in a recent study of British foreign policy, "The policy of isolation was not one of holding aloof but to 'avoid needless entangling engagements'. The phrase might be Jefferson's; it is actually Gladstone's. It meant a free hand—

with the implication that the hand could be applied as required by the cardinal principles of British policy." And according to Lord Salisbury, the British policy was to keep absolutely clear of entanglements and to leave the country free to take any action which it might think fit in the event of war." There should be no doubt about the similarity of this policy with Nehru's independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue.

The similarity, however, does not end there. The very first formulation of foreign policy by Nehru appears to be British inspired in all its aspects. In what is supposed to be a classic formulation of the cardinal principles of British foreign policy, an English authority had stated that "the policy of Britain had to be directed so as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind ......

81. Saul Rose, 'The Foreign Policy of Britain', Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson, ed., op. cit., p. 30 (Italics are mine).

82. cited, Id., p. 27.

England more than any other noninsular Power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others and the natural protector of the weaker communities." This "analysis", says Saul Rose, "not only represented a typical view of the time, but by its general acceptance helped to maintain a stereotyped approach to foreign policy ....." This applies with equal force to the approach to foreign policy in India. For, in expressing a typical Indian view, as he has himself claimed, an Indian scholar has written that, "It so happened that many of the policies and actions of the Indian people (e.g., opposition to colonialism and racialism) were in harmony with the needs of world society and the general moral values prevailing in the world at large." This is of course, the same British way of saying "that what is good for the world is good for Britain", while in reality it meant "that what is good for Britain is good for the world." This is how India and the other nonaligned states have been championing the freedom of peoples, etc., as already indicated above.

84. Id., p. 32.
85. See M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 38. Also see above, Chapter I, n°6.
86. See Saul Rose, op.cit., p. 31.
**Balance of Power is not Obsolete:**

This analysis of Nonalignment would not be complete until one or two objections raised against it are examined. Prof. Brecher, for example, does not accept this view: "Is neutralism merely a twentieth-century variation of the balancing process? I think not. The basic difference is that the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century had sufficient power to prevent the outbreak of war, or, if war broke out, to throw its weight into the scales in such a way as to ensure victory for one or another of the participants. Today no state can be a balancer in the nineteenth century sense simply because the gap between the power of the two super-powers and all others is such that the addition of the power of India or anybody else would not make any difference."

This, in effect, is an argument advanced by all those who claim that the balance of power has become obsolete in the post-Second World War era. This objection, to my mind, appears to spring from a wrong understanding of the balance of power as it emerged after the Second World War, as also of the type of role that the nonaligned states can play as balancers.

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It may be true that no balancing is possible in the nineteenth century sense of the term. But is it not possible to say that the type of balancing necessary in mid twentieth century is different from it? Has not the balance of power between the two super powers itself ruled out the possibility of a World War? If such a war broke out there may be precious little for the survivors, if any, to enjoy the fruits of victory. Therefore, the type of balancing that is required is to prevent any local war to become a general war. Is it not possible for a nonaligned state, or, a group of them, to play this role in the event of a local war, as in Korea or Suez? Are not the Big Powers themselves bent upon ending all such local wars, as far possible, by throwing their weight into the scales behind the nonaligned states?

It would appear to me that the nonaligned states have been able to play this kind of balancing, precisely because the balance of power was so even, that no great power was necessary to tilt it. Moreover, the nonaligned states belonging to three continents and representing large populations cannot be said to be insignificant, when the Big Powers want their support against each other. Nehru clearly stated that "when

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there is a substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia, with our limitations, will not be able to influence the issue. But when the two opposing forces are evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance."

It is this kind of role that Nehru selected for himself and India, as it was the only way in which he could play a part in world affairs and carve out a role for India and other small states, which would otherwise have to join this side or that, dividing the world into two opposing blocs with no one to control them. Thus the very fact that certain states chose to remain aloof from the blocs meant a check to this dangerous trend towards bipolarity. Thus Nehru said" I am not conceited enough to imagine that we can control the fortunes of the world or prevent something happening that otherwise would happen. But there can be little doubt that we can occasionally at least make a difference. Well, I hope that this country will make that difference whenever it has the chance and that difference will be in favour of peace."

Whenever the super-powers are ranged against one another, as they were in the Cuban-missile Crisis of 1962, there is

91. See Susan Strange, 'Cuba And After', Year Book of World Affairs, 1963, for one of the earliest studies of the Cuban Crisis.
nothing that the nonaligned states can do. Similarly, whenever they are together against the nonaligned states, they can not do much. This, as shall be seen in the concluding chapter, is the present challenge which the nonaligned states face, though it was against this trend that Nonalignment was first evolved.

There is yet another argument which claims that "There are in the twentieth century features which make a balance of power system quite inoperative. Under balance of power, each state must, as a matter of policy, be prepared to declare in advance of changed political circumstances its willingness to switch its support from one state or group of states to another regardless of all other reasons. Such a condition would be possible only in a world of independent sovereign states having no cultural, political or other links with other states, and being completely indifferent on grounds other than strategic grounds with whom they had alliances; for equilibrium to be meaningful, no state could place a value on ideology, or any other interest, or even developing close relationship with any other state, which might prejudice its easy transfer of strategic support as required to maintain equilibrium."

92. See below, p. 137-138.

There are two aspects to this argument. One is that ideology makes the balance of power inoperative and the other is that it is so in the twentieth century. These views appear to be quite contrary to facts, both of the present day world and that of the past. Ideology does not seem to have been the major determinant of foreign policy at any time. Yugoslavia, a communist state has not remained in the Communist bloc. China and the Soviet Union are now as far apart as any two states could be. The Soviet Union is perhaps much nearer to the United States, at least in certain respects, than to China. They might still come closer and it would not be a surprise. After all, they were allies during the Second World War. As Prof. Penrose has written, "It is easy to find much continuity between the foreign policy of Czarist Russia and that of Soviet Russian," adding that "it does not follow that doctrinal influences are thus rendered negligible....This was a secondary influence, only sustained sporadically over the long period of conflict, but it was important where it occurred."

England did not give all out support to the United States in the Korean Crisis and in Indo-China. England was perhaps nearer to India in these two crises. The United States

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94. See E.F. Penrose, op. cit., pp. 9-16 for an exhaustive study.
95. Id., pp. 11-12.
in turn did not support England and France in the Suez war in 1956. France has all but gone out of Nato alliance. The democratic world could not go to the support of the Hungarian people against the Soviet Union for balance of power reasons, nor could nonaligned India do so. Nepal, supposed to be a Hindu state, is nonaligned between India and China. The Soviet Union did not support China against India. In the Arab World, all are not united even against Israel, if not against others.

Is this not enough to prove that ideology has not played the part it is supposed to have played since the Second World War? The very fact that the nonaligned states refused to take sides in the cold war was an indication that it was of no major concern to them and that they would side with anyone side in accordance with their interests. In this sense, they may be said to have reactivated the balance of power which was supposed to have become inoperative.

From the point of view of ideology also, India and other nonaligned states, appear to be capable of playing the role of the balancer in the East-West struggle as has been recognised.

97. See below, Chapter 5, p. 5.

98. See below, Chapter 6.

99. This was Nepal's policy on the Sino-Indian dispute.

100. Tunisia and its President, Habib Bourguiba, are obvious examples — See Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 79.
by some Western scholars. According to Coral Bell, "this appears to confer upon the neutralists a role analogous to that of the balancer in the classical balance of power theory, not because of their military strength (which was slight) but because they represented a body of opinion whose endorsement might ultimately prove decisive (psychologically and in various other ways) in a struggle that was as much between two theories of society as between two power systems." According to Charles H. Heimsath: "Within the frame of reference suggested by the ideological competition between the Western and Soviet systems India's position was analogous to that of a classic holder of the balance of power. The possibility of committing its people to one system or the other gained for India the capability of influencing the policies of other states."

Nonalignment as Containment of Big Powers:

Thus Nonalignment does not seem to provide so much 'an alternative game' to the balance of power as it strengthens it and prevents it from reaching the breaking point. It is

101. Supra, n. 89.
Indeed a response to the inadequacies of the bipolar balance of power, rather than of balance of power as such. For, there is nothing like a model or fixed balance of power. It is something which is dynamic and every changing and its success seems to depend upon its flexibility. As Palmer and Perkins have written "Once bipolarity exists, it tends to become rigid as well as unstable, and a peaceful transition to a complex balance — one involving many states — becomes difficult." Nonalignment was an attempt to replace this balance by a complex balance of power in which as many of the major states or groups of states as possible could take part.

This was possible only when the further polarisation of the world into the blocs was first stopped, especially when most areas of Asia and Africa seemed to create what are called power vacuums due to the rapid decolonisation set into motion after the Second World War, with the Great Powers intent to fill the vacuums. This is what Nehru called the creation

104. Id., p. 27.


106. For a most authoritative discussion of this question from the point of view of the peace-keeping role of the UN, see Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld's 'Introduction to the Annual Report on the work of the UNO' (31 August 1960), General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/4390/Add). (Hereafter cited as G.A.O.R.).
of a 'peace area' in Asia and Africa. India's championship of the independence of subjected peoples and their Nonalignment has to be understood from this point of view to see it in the proper perspective. Nehru's championship of Indonesia's freedom was the first manifestation of this aspect of his approach to world affairs, which has been described as 'messianic neutralism' by Fayez A. Sayegh, in his characteristic style. 

As Fayez A. Sayegh has correctly pointed out this is the most imaginative and also the most militant aspect of Nonalignment. Its greatest significance lay in the fact that it is in line with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, as the late Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld, boldly and squarely acknowledged in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis. This crisis, as will be seen in chapter seven, was a great challenge to Nonalignment and to the United Nations, as it threatened to wreck both.

Once the bipolarisation of the world is stopped it will be easier to achieve a multiple balance, in as much as it would be then easier for the smaller powers, not all of which were

107. See below, Chapter 4, pp. 145-146.
108. See Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World, op.cit., p. 70. Sayegh's discussion of this aspect of Nonalignment is the most interesting and useful part of the book.
109. Ibid.
110. Supra, n. 106.
small anyway, to play their part in world affairs. As Prof. Penrose has observed: "The structure of all balances of power before 1914 gave dominating position to the Great Powers and enroached widely and deeply on the independence of the smaller countries, not only through Colonialism but also through all forms of imperialism." Even the Security Council had overlooked the role which the small powers play in the international balance of power," though the Charter itself had not, as Hammarskjöld had interpreted it, in his capacity of the Secretary-General of the U.N. whether or not this was actually so, that was how Nehru looked at the problem from the beginning with his fine vision and he set about his task with conviction, strengthened by similar forces at work in other parts of Asia and Africa.

Thus he told the Constituent Assembly of India on March 8, 1949: "I should like to deal with the general aspects of foreign affairs and foreign policy as they affect India and as we look at them rather than say much about the smaller aspects of the main problem.

"One of the major questions of today is the readjustment of the relations between Asia and Europe. When we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition but because of circumstances, because of geography, because of history

112. Supra, n.74, p. 1227.
and because of so many other things inevitably, has to play a very important part in Asia.....

".....India now in this last year or more, emerges again into the main trend of human affairs.....

".....Asia in the long millenia of her history has played a very important part, so has India, of course; but during the last two hundred years or so, certain developments of science and technology in Europe, and in America a little later, led to the domination of Asia by Europe and to a restriction of her activities in the world at large. She became confined and restricted. Various changes took place. I believe (there is) a considerable recognition of these changes now, but it is not enough yet. Even in the Councils of the United Nations, the problem of Asia, the outlook of Asia, the approach of Asia have failed to evoke the enthusiasm that they should....."

Nehru was much more explicit in 1966 in a speech in the Lok Sabha:

"The fact of the matter is that in the 19th century, a certain not very happy equilibrium was established in the world by the dominance of certain European powers practically all over the world. That continued till the beginning of the First World War. The First World War upset that equilibrium in many ways - political, economic. Some empires vanished. The period between the two World Wars intervened, a troubled period, a difficult one. Always an attempt has been made to find some equilibrium and it has been a failure. The Second World War came and upset the old 19th century balances still more. Ever since then, the world has been groping about to find some equilibrium. Meanwhile, apart from the emergence of these great giants, America and the Soviet Union, in terms of material power, this atomic energy comes in another upsetting factor.

"Now, the countries which enjoyed the privileged position in that 19th century setup, many of them have lost their position. It is not easy for them to adjust themselves to the new thinking, the new balances in the world, the new balances - apart from the giants coming up - and the new renaissance in Asia and Asian countries becoming independent in their different ways, whether it is India or China, or Indonesia or Burma or other countries. The old balances go on being changed and Governments, very wise Governments can not easily keep pace with those practical developments. Of course the most remarkable fact about this lack of awareness, proper awareness, is that a great country like China is there of course they know it. Nevertheless they seem to lack something, or otherwise, their policy would be different.

"But it is not merely a question of China. It is really a question of the outlook on all Asian problems or African problems and the idea that, as previously they have to be settled by the great powers whom we all respect, hardly taking consideration what the countries of Asia might feel about it....

"So this kind of difficulty is there and facts and events have gone on, bringing about enormous changes and yet, the mind of man can not keep pace, and it keeps in the old ruts...."

No wonder Nehru had become such a tireless champion of China's place in the United Nations. That was the first step for him towards the recognition of Asian resurgence and also towards the evolution of a multiple balance of power, for China is a power in its own right and one which could complete with the two superpowers.

The greatest significance of Nonalignment perhaps lies in the fact that it announced the desire of the Asian and
African states to enter the "balance of power struggle in their own right." Not all the Afro-Asian states had the geographical and other advantages to realise this aim. It was therefore, fitting that those who had the advantage took the lead. It was not till the rise of Nasser into power that the Arabs could join this struggle in their own right, as shall be seen in the fifth chapter.

Thus, in the words of the once famous Sukarno of Indonesia, Nonalignment does not mean becoming a buffer state between two giant blocs. Nonalignment is active association in the cause of independence abiding peace, social justice and freedom to be free .... (We) are striving for the speedy establishment of a new equilibrium. What do we mean by a new stable equilibrium? It means all nations must become independent. All nations must have freedom to be free, freedom to live their national lives in accordance with their own wishes, freedom to build their own national foundations, political, economic and cultural. We mean that all nations must be free to arrange international relations as they see fit, based upon principles of equality, justice and mutual benefit. We mean that no power shall interfere in the struggle of another nation. No power

shall attempt to force any other nation to change its ideology."

Stripped of its universalism this description of Non-alignment is quite accurate in all essentials. Ironically, Sukarno seems to have forgotten his own words, thus paving the way for his own downfall.

In conclusion, it seems necessary to mention that since each state, whether nonaligned or aligned is first of all concerned with its own security and other vital interests, there are bound to be differences and sometimes even disagreements in the pursuit of Nonalignment between one state and another, as has been noted in earlier pages. The case studies of the Nonalignment of India and the United Arab Republic that follow, emphasise the similarities as well as differences and disagreements in the practice of Nonalignment by two of its three acknowledged leaders. One fact that emerges from these studies is that the differences and disagreements have been over details rather than over the fundamentals of Nonalignment, on which there appears to have been complete agreement and understanding between India and the United Arab Republic, thus forging close links of friendship and cooperation between them.
PART II

NONALIGNMENT IN PRACTICE
CHAPTER IV

INDIA: THE BEGINNINGS

Primacy of Security: Kashmir:

The primary concern of India's foreign policy has been as shown above the security of the country and Nehru did not hesitate to use force as and when it suited the purpose. Nothing illustrates this better than the very first major action taken by the Government of India in the field of foreign relations, to save Kashmir from falling into the hands of Pakistan in October 1947. The popularity of the Government of India and its foreign policy in the early days of independence appears to have been based on this popular action of the Government of India. 1

The importance of Kashmir for the security of India was explained by Nehru in a speech to the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1947: "Kashmir because of its geographical position, with its frontiers with three countries namely the Soviet Union, China, and Afghanistan is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. The Caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through

the Kashmir State." V.P. Menon, who played an important part in obtaining the accession from the Maharaja of Kashmir has written:

"Personally, when I recommended to the Government of India the acceptance of the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir, I had in mind one consideration and one consideration alone, viz; that the invasion of Kashmir by the raiders was a great threat to the integrity of India. Ever since the time of Mahmud Ghaznavi, that is to say for nearly eight centuries, with but a brief interval during the Moghul Epoch, India had been subjected to periodical invasions from the northwest. Mahmud Ghaznavi had led no less than 100,000 of these incursions in person. And within less than ten weeks of the establishment of the new State of Pakistan, its very first act was to let loose a tribal invasion through the northwest. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow. A nation that forgets its history or its geography does so at its peril."

That was why the government of India decided to send forces into Kashmir and then insisted on the accession of Kashmir to India before aid could be sent to it. Nehru, however, claimed later that:

"The Government of India had been a continuing body through the changes in India's Constitutional status. When India became a republic sometime after power had been transferred to Indian hands, the new Government inherited not only the liabilities and duties


4. See above pp. 7 & 85.

of the old Government but also its assets and its rights. After all, we continued to be a member of the United Nations without a fresh election. Similarly it was as much our right as it was our responsibility to protect not only the States which had acceded to India but also those which had not acceded to Pakistan. Thus, even if Kashmir had not acceded to India, we should have still been obliged to protect the people of Kashmir against aggression. Kashmir had at no time been recognised as a sovereign State under international law. It has always been considered part of India. Partition made no difference to our responsibilities in Kashmir as long as it had not acceded to Pakistan."

One would have, therefore, expected the Government of India to act immediately and to go to the help of the people of Kashmir. But the fact that they had accepted, instead, Mountbatten's advice that forces should be sent only after obtaining the accession from the Maharaja, which Mountbatten himself was not prepared to accept as final, suggests that their first concern was to obtain the accession of the state. Perhaps a great deal of loss of life and property could have been prevented if the Government of India had sent forces much earlier into Kashmir. The Maharaja's letter addressed to the Government of India at the time of the accession makes it clear that he had signed the Instrument of Accession since aid could come only after the accession of the State. Sheikh Abdullah had also made a similar statement at the time.

6. See V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 381.
8. Infra, n.21, p. 124.
This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the Government of India had not thought it proper, during those three days from October 24, 1947, when the Tribal invasion of Kashmir was launched, to October 27, 1947, when the Indian army was flown into Kashmir, to refer the matter to the United Nations, as might have been expected of a Government and a leader, who claimed to have faith in the world body. The fact was, however, that the Government of India as well as Nehru, had a genuine suspicion of the great power unanimity in the Security Council and of a Western majority in the General Assembly. It would not have been very difficult to visualise that in a matter like Kashmir the Great Powers might act together and try to impose a solution. As Arthur Lal has written: "If the arrangements envisaged in Chapters VI, and VII, of the Charter had worked smoothly, it is possible that the fiats handed down by the Great Powers acting in concert might on occasion have been not only onerous, but, in terms of Asian situations arbitrary." Indeed this was India's complaint against the Security Council's failure to

11. See Ross, N.Berkes and Mohinder S.Bedi, op.cit., pp. 2-3. Also see below, n.13.
12. This became most pronounced during the debates on the 'Uniting For Peace Resolution'- See below, pp. 188-191.
call Pakistan an aggressor in Kashmir and its decision to call for a cease-fire and to hold a plebiscite. 

It was this fear of Great Power fiat that appears to have been the reason for the reference of the case to the Security Council under Chapter 6, instead of Chapter 7 of the Charter, which calls for enforcement action. The Government of India had always been opposed to the admission of any foreign forces on India's soil for obvious reasons. This is quite clear from the correspondence Nehru had with Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan. In his telegram on December 12, 1947, Nehru said: "We have given thought to the question of inviting the UN to advise us in the matter. While we are prepared to invite UN Observers to come here and advise us as to the proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in what other capacity UN help can be sought ...... I find myself unable to suggest any thing beyond what I have offered already." In other words, the Government of India did not want to give any independent role to the UN in Kashmir, as proposed by Pakistan's Premier.

15. Supra, n.7, p.77.
17. Supra n.7, pp. 55-73.
18. Id., p. 73.
Professor Appadorai, therefore, does not sound convincing when, in defence of this action of the Government of India, he says "that clear proof of Pakistani aggression was available only some four months after India referred the matter to the Security Council and after Pakistan committed the act of aggression." On the other hand, the Government of India appear to have been full of confidence about the strength of their case, legally and otherwise, for Pakistan had sent its military forces into Kashmir in the wake of India's military action. The military position also had turned in favour of India. Therefore, it was with reluctance that the case appears to have been taken to the United Nations, and perhaps on the insistence of Gandhiji. As Sisir Gupta writes: "On both sides attitudes had hardened enough and it was almost chimerical to believe that direct negotiations could succeed. And if they would not there could be only two ways; in India's view, of solving the problem of Kashmir: to wage a war against the country which aided the invaders or to ask the world to bring its pressure to bear on the aggressors. Of this limited choice, Gandhiji's preference could never be in doubt."


20. This is admitted by every one. And Nehru's critics base their attacks on him on this point. See in this connection T.N. Kaul, "Idealism And Self Interest in Foreign Policy", Indian And Foreign Review, (Vol.4, No.16, June 11,1967, New Delhi), p. 9.

Not much is known about the actual role of Gandhiji in this crisis, except Nehru's own statements to the effect that he had accepted the sending of forces into Kashmir. It was upon his insistence that the Government of India appear to have agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. But Gandhiji appears to have been opposed to the idea of a war with Pakistan to liberate Kashmir. He had begun, on January 13, 1948, a fast to persuade the Government of India to pay to Pakistan the amount (Rs. 550 m.) due to it under the partition arrangements, which the Government of India had withheld lest it might be used against India in Kashmir. It would appear that the advocacy of friendly relations with Pakistan along-with this crusade against communalism in the Indian society that was responsible for his assassination, within one month of the reference of the Kashmir issue to the Security Council by India. This was terrible, and must have scared the Government of India terribly. Thus, Nehru's later unwillingness to agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir is quite understandable. It was from this stage onwards that the Kashmir issue got entangled with India's secularism.

22. See above chapter I, pp. 9-11.
It is however incorrect to claim that "It was essentially, if not entirely, Mr. Nehru's faith in the United Nations and the pacific settlement of disputes which actuated him to refer the case to the United Nations." Similarly, it was not again this faith, or according to T.N. Paul, "anxiety to establish peace and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan", that made the Government of India accept the cease-fire agreement in the United Nations. Among other things, there was a very important development which appears to have forced this necessity on India. It was China, Nehru told Parliament in 1962 that "Just about the time when we were busy fighting the Pakistanis, the Chinese came into Tibet. A great power was next to us. We saw that the situation has changed."

To avoid these twin dangers, one internal and the other external, Nehru expressed willingness to partition Kashmir between India and Pakistan and rejected the plebiscite as impracticable, as Joseph Korbel has recorded.

27. Supra n.20.
29. op.cit., p. 89.
Kashmir could no more be the only concern of the Government of India and India was in a fairly strong position vis-a-vis Pakistan. The Chinese threat had to be met adequately, while not giving in on Kashmir. Much of the Indian foreign policy during 1949 appears to have been aimed at this objective.

The India-China Rivalry:

The Chinese challenge was not unexpected. In a speech broadcast from New Delhi, six days after the formation of the Interim Government, Nehru said: "China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon and a united and democratic China will emerge, playing a great part in the furtherance of world peace and progress."

But very soon Nehru came to realise that the new China was in no mood to cooperate with India. It was not even prepared to accept India as an equal. This became evident, naturally, one might say, at the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi during March-April 1947, under Nehru's patronage. This was the first major attempt by Nehru to assume a sort of leadership of Asia at least against the

30. See Nehru, op.cit., p. 3.
European Powers. In his inaugural address to the Conference, Nehru stated: "For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and Chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our legs and cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the play-things of others.

"In this crisis in World history, Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs....."

While this was meant for the Western powers, there was also an assertion of India's own place in Asia. Nehru said: "In this conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia....."

32. Id., p. 23.
This statement was at once an assertion of India's interest in the regions specified and a reminder to the Chinese that India did not want to be led by anybody in Asia, least of all China. The reaction of China was one of indignation, the small nations of South and South-East Asia were alarmed. As pointed out by Werner Levis: "The conference marked the apex of Asian solidarity and the beginning of its decline. The reasons for this were many and varied, the two major sources of discord were the intense rivalry between India and China in the conference and the common distrust of the two Asian giants among the smaller countries of the region....."

Nehru appeared, however, unprepared yet to take up the challenge posed by China, for, when the Chinese delegate protested against a map displayed at the conference dias which showed Tibet as a separate State, Nehru got it removed promptly, giving the first evidence of his future conciliatory approach towards China.

33. A delegation from Burma is reported to have said that "European Capitalism and exploitation may be replaced by 'brown exploitation'." And a Ceylon delegate "referred to the fear of small countries like Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia etc., that they might be faced with aggression not necessarily political but economic and demographic, by their big brothers like China and India." Id., pp.73-74.

34. Op.cit.,p.21; see also Sisir Gupta, India And Regional Integration, op.cit., pp. 36-37 and C.H.Jansen,op.cit., pp. 51 & 52

35. Ibid.,

But when China came into Tibet while the Government of India were busy fighting in Kashmir, the Chinese threat was realised. China had not yet occupied Tibet and the Himalayas still presented a good barrier. But the fall of either Indonesia or Burma into China's hands might have meant a threat of the greatest magnitude. India, therefore, became involved deeply in the freedom of South East Asia from Colonialism as well as Communism. The conference on Indonesia convened by India in January 1949, was the first major manifestation of India's involvement in South-East Asia. The importance of Indonesia's freedom for India was pointed out by Nehru when he said: "If some kind of colonial domination continues in Indonesia, if it is permitted to continue, it will be a danger to the whole of Asia, it will be a danger to us in India." This statement of Nehru has been compared to the Monroe Doctrine by an Indian scholar. What is important to note, however, is the fact that the continuance of colonialism in Indonesia might have led to a Communist victory in Indonesia over the nationalists. Such a development would have been a great danger for India. This appears to have been

37. It was the period when the Communists were trying to takeover Burma, Malaysia and the Phillipines -

38. Nehru, op.cit., p. 262.

a very important consideration with the Government of India, though it was not made public. But in a speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, on March 22, 1949, Nehru appears to have drawn attention to this aspect when he said:

"I have no doubt that the countries of Europe and America are themselves very much disturbed and distressed by what is taking place in Indonesia ..... I think they realise that Indonesian freedom is not only desirable in itself, but is also desirable in the larger scheme of things which they have before them, and if by any chance any kind of imperialistic domination succeeds in Indonesia it will affect the larger plan they have for the future. And I realize that the Asian nations as a whole will be very much affected....."

It was about this time that the Government of India began to take interest in the civil war in Burma between the Burmese Government and the Communists. The importance attached to the success of the Burmese Government is evident from the fact that......."apart from financial assistance, India had

40. Nehru, op.cit., p. 263.


42. See Sisir Gupta, India And Regional Integration In Asia, op.cit., p.76. See also V.K.Sinha, 'India And Southeast Asia', in A.B.Shah, ed., India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Manaktala's, Bombay 1966), p. 111.
also rendered military assistance to Burma. There has, however been no public statement regarding the nature and extent of this aid."

And in a speech in the Parliament of India on March 17, 1950, Nehru made a cautious statement on the aid given to Burma: "There is Burma, which has seen a great deal of internal trouble in the last two or three years and has faced enormous difficulties. Naturally our Government and our people are interested in the present and future of Burma. It is not our purpose—and it is not right for us to interfere in any way with other countries, but wherever possible, we give such help as we can to our friends. We have ventured to do so in regard to Burma without any element of interference."

Nehru was also reported to have told newsmen that "...fear on the part of the British and other Governments was that if the present conditions continued, other elements in Burma may begin to play a more important role that either the Karens or the Burmese Government, which they did not want them to play." The other elements referred to by Nehru were only Communists. As Sisir Gupta has explained: "It was well-

45. India And Regional Integration In Asia,op.cit., p.76.
known that the aid was largely needed to tide over the
Communist revolt a situation which all the newly-freed coun-
tries were facing at this stage."

As Nehru pointed out, this aid to Burma was given with
the consent of the British and other Commonwealth Governments
of the area. In fact the decision to fight Communism through
economic development as well as by strengthening military
forces, was taken at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Con-
ference at London in October 1948. It was from this meeting
that India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth flowed.
This decision was taken because Nehru said: "If we disassoci-
ate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the
moment we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely
isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we
have to incline in some direction or other." India was not
only isolated economically and politically, but it was weak
militarily and it was being encircled by enemies or hostile
nations. This encirclement appeared to be complete, with the
first signs of the success of Communists in China and their

46. See J.C.Kundra, op.cit., pp.186-194 for a detailed dis-
cussion of this aspect of India's foreign policy. Also
see above chapter 2, p. 78 - 79.

47. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 144. See also pp. 132-146 and 158-159
for Nehru's views on the Commonwealth Association. Also
see J.C.Kundra, op.cit., pp. 37-42; Karunakar Gupta, op.
cit., pp.22-36. Also see Balram Singh Pavadya, Mr.Nehru,
The Indian National Congress And India's Membership in
the Commonwealth : International Studies (Vol.6, No.3,
January 1963).
presence in Tibet. As already indicated, the Commonwealth not only assured British economic and military help for India's own progress, but it also opened channels for help from the United States. Above all, British assistance was assured in the case of an eventuality like a major clash with China.

The Commonwealth also ended the search for the much needed regional association or a regional organisation by India which had begun with the first Asian Relations Conference. At the conference on Indonesia, Nehru had pleaded for such an organisation:

"We see creative and cooperative impulses seeking a new integration and new unity. New problems arise from day-to-day which, in their implications, concern all of us or many of us. The Americans have already recognised a certain community of interest and have created machinery for the protection and promotion of common interests. A similar movement is in progress in Europe. Is it not natural that the free countries of Asia should begin to think of some more permanent arrangement than this conference for effective consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims—not in a spirit of selfishness or hostility to any other nation or group of nations, but in order to strengthen and bring nearer fulfilment the aims and ideals of the Charter of the UN."

48. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 77 - 78.
49. Ibid., See in particular M.S.Rajan, 'The Future of The Commonwealth', Supra, Chapter 2 n.143.
51. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 410-411. Also see G.H.Jansen, op. cit., p. 89 for a comparison between Nehru's views at the Asian Relations Conference and the Indonesian Conference and also p.227 for a comparison with Bandung Conference.
This enthusiasm was shortlived, for it was evident that such an organisation with purely Asian membership would be neither feasible nor would be of any benefit to India. Thus Nehru told the constituent Assembly of India, on March 8, 1949:

"We have not yet decided what the region of cooperation might be, because .... India is interested in several regions of Asia. Whether all should be grouped together or separately we do not know. That is for us to consider together and decide what is more feasible .... Whatever structure we may build up will be entirely within the scope of the Charter of the UN .... there will be no binding covenants in it, and this will be largely an organisation for the consultation and cooperation that naturally flow from common interests."

As Sisir Gupta has written "The change of Indian opinion illustrated by these developments within the span of a year reflected a vast change that had in the meantime taken place in the Asian political scene. Even as the Asian delegates at the Indonesian Conference were deliberating, news from China indicated that Chiang Kai-Shek had virtually abdicated and his successor was seeking peace with the communists; by the end of the year communist revolution in China was complete. It was now futile to expect any regional movement.

53. India And Regional Integration In Asia, op.cit.,pp.43-44.
in the Asian region which could be made to grow in isolation from this development. It was impossible to think of accepting China in any regional arrangement for Asia without making it a hot bed for communist intrigues; likewise any association formed to counter the Chinese situation would mean a definite lining up of Asia with the West and behind some of the regimes of the continent which felt threatened by China due to their internal weakness...."

What this argument, however, fails to mention is that India itself felt threatened by China and that South East Asia and India had been for sometime hotbeds of communist intrigues. India, therefore, needed closer links with a friendly power or powers. The Commonwealth was chosen because it was free from commitments while providing the necessary protection in case of an eventuality. In this way alone could India rectify the imbalance created by the rise of a powerful communist state right across its borders. This decision might well be considered as the first major manifestation of India's Nonalignment.

This does not mean that India was depending upon Britain for its defence. India itself took certain steps. In a significant move it took over the administration of Sikkim.

54. See Hindustan Times, 8 June, 1949.
in June 1949. And, in August 1949, India concluded a treaty
with Bhutan placing the latter's foreign relations under its
control. India also signed a treaty of friendship with
Nepal, on July 31, 1950. All this was done, it must be men-
tioned, in anticipation of the Chinese occupation of Tibet.
After this, on December 5, 1950, India concluded a fresh treaty
with Sikkim, placing the latter under India's protection.
On December 6, 1950, Nehru declared in the Parliament unequi-
vocally that:

"Frankly we do not like and shall not brook any
foreign interference in Nepal. We recognise
Nepal as an independent country and wish her
well .... From time immemorial, the Himalayas
have provided us with a magnificent frontier.
Of course, they are no longer as impassable as
they used to be but they are still fairly eff-
ective. We cannot allow that barrier to be
penetrated, for it is also the principal barr-
er to India. Much as we stand for the indep-
endence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to
go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be
crossed or weakened, because that would be a
risk to our own security."

And Nehru made a similar statement in the Parliament
about the McMahon Line, on the advice of Pannikkar, who was

the text.

56. Id., pp.31-33. This treaty gave India an important right
to treat Nepal as of special significance in India's
defence - See Nehru, op.cit., pp. 373-374.

57. Id., pp.39-40. The King of Sikkim in a recent visit to
India has pleaded for more autonomy See above, Chapter 2,
n.100.

Contd.....
then ambassador to China. Pannikar, therefore, appears to have been perfectly justified when he claimed that like every Big Power India had her own area of primary and strategic importance around her; intrusion into which by a foreign power would be considered by India as a threat to her own safety, and this area included Nepal, Burma and in a way Ceylon and that India had made it clear to foreign (big) Powers that she would not tolerate any interference in the affairs of the three countries.

It is submitted here that it was to obtain the recognition of China for this area of primary and strategic importance to India that the diplomacy of India towards. China was devoted from 1950 to 1954, for, unless China accepted this, India's position would not be safe, as the most important threat to India came from China. The Korean Crisis appeared to provide

60. Ibid.
61. See The Hindu, August 27, 1954. It is strange that an Indian Scholar has questioned the right and authority of Pannikar to speak in this way as he had by then left the diplomatic service. His argument against the existence of a sphere of interest is not very convincing — See M.S. Rajan, India In World Affairs, op.cit., p.57, n.2 and J. C Kundra (op.cit., p. 71 n.2), characterised this statement of Pannikar as a 'confusing note'.

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an opportunity to win this favour and India exploited it with
more or less success, as will be seen below.

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE KOREAN CRISIS

Introduction:

The role of India in the Korean Crisis embraced the
whole range of India's foreign policy objectives; from the
preservation of world peace, to the protection and further-
ance of India's vital interests in Kashmir, and the not yet
successful aim of establishing friendly relations with the
Sino-Soviet bloc. It was the interplay of these objectives,
that produced a policy so rich in diversity that many people
appear to have been baffled by it. It was essentially a
simple policy, dictated by a single minded devotion to the
pursuit of India's policy objectives as seen by Nehru and his
close associates.

India and the UNTCK:

The pattern for this policy was set quite early by
India as a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission
On Korea (UNTCOK). It is, therefore, necessary to examine
it briefly.
The Korean dispute was brought to the United Nations General Assembly by the United States on September 17, 1947. On September 23, 1947, "The General Assembly decided by a vote of 41 to 6 with 6 abstentions to include the item concerning Korea in its agenda and referred it to the First Committee for consideration." When "The First Committee began consideration of the Korean question in its 87th meeting on October 28, 1947," The United States and the Soviet Union submitted two separate draft proposals. The United States' draft proposal provided for elections to be held by the occupying powers in the northern and southern zones of Korea and the constitution of national security forces before the withdrawal of the occupation troops." It also provided that the "application of that resolution should be supervised by a United Nations Temporary Commission instructed to report to the General Assembly." The proposal of the Soviet Union was "that the General Assembly recommended to the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from southern and northern Korea, respectively — thereby leaving to the Korean people itself the establishment of a National Government of Korea."

62. For a brief account of the genesis of the Korean dispute see Year Book of The United Nations : 1947-48. The account of the United Nations action in the dispute and the quotations that follow are taken from the same source. See pp. 81-86 (Hereafter cited as Y.B.U.N.).
At the 91st meeting of the First Committee on October 30, 1947, "India stated that the U.S.S.R. proposal for the immediate withdrawal of occupation forces could lead only to confusion, since there was no Korean Government which could take over the administration of the country. On the other hand, the U.S. proposal that the National Government when constituted should form its own national security forces and then arrange for the simultaneous withdrawal of the occupation troops seemed to be unduly vague." The Indian representative, therefore, proposed that "A general election should be held, not on a zonal basis but on a national basis under the control of the UNTRO, so as to remove the political and moral barrier which had been created by the division of the country." India also proposed that elections should be by secret ballot and on adult suffrage; that the National Assembly should meet immediately after it had been elected and form a National Government which should form its national security forces and dissolve all foreign bases and forces and that a definite time limit should be fixed for withdrawal of occupation forces.

In the 92nd meeting of the First Committee the United States introduced a revised draft resolution incorporating many of the suggestions made by India and others, providing again for elections to be conducted by the occupying Powers. Then India "submitted an amendment (AC/237) to the United States' proposal to omit reference to the 'occupying powers.'"
This amendment "was adopted at the 94th meeting of the First Committee on November 5, 1947, by a vote of 34 to 0, with 4 abstentions."

Why, then, did India reject the Soviet proposal and oppose the holding of elections on a zonal basis by the occupying powers? India no doubt, was motivated by the desire to establish an unified Korea as that had been her stand right from 1942. But another equally, if not more important, motive appears to have been at work. That was the desire to avoid the creation of precedents in the United Nations which might affect India's interests in Kashmir. The fact that both the issues arose almost simultaneously must have definitely influenced Indian thinking on the Korean dispute.

Though India had not thought of taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations before October 27, 1947, it was evident that by the end of the month, it was under the active consideration of the Government of India. Panikkar has recorded that amidst rumours in the United Nation's circles

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64. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 54 where Nehru said that every question had to be viewed from a hundred different viewpoints. Any study of India's policy in the Korean crisis would be incomplete, if not also incomprehensible, if it does not take into account its implications for India's stand on the Kashmir issue.

that India was likely to charge Pakistan with aggression, Mrs. Pandit, the head of India's delegation to the United Nations, was asked by Nehru, through a personal message, to get into touch with the United States' Secretary of State, General Marshall, and to explain India's point of view to him. Mountbatten raised the issue for the first time, in his talks with Jinnah at Lahore, on November 1, 1947. On the next day, Nehru himself made the offer in a broadcast from Delhi, and, in telegrams to Liaqat Ali Khan, on November 3 and 8. The latter accepted it on November 16, and, suggested, inter alia, that the United Nations be requested to stop fighting, to arrange the withdrawal of outside forces, and to undertake a plebiscite under its direction and control. As already indicated, none of these proposals was acceptable to Nehru. The similarity between Liaqat Ali's proposals on Kashmir and the Soviet proposals and parts of the United States' proposals over Korea, was too close for India to accept them without creating a precedent that could be exploited by Pakistan to its advantage.

66. See Joseph Korbel, op.cit., p. 89. See also V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 386.
67. Supra, n. 7, p. 55.
68. Id., pp. 55 & 62.
69. Id., p. 65.
70. See above, p. 138.
This, rather than any principled opposition to measures which might entail the partition of a country, appears to have been the important consideration with the Government of India. For, India's policies do not suggest an adherence to such principles in the matter of recognition of states. For besides accepting the partition of India itself, India had in 1949 established diplomatic relations with West Germany. And, as already indicated, by the end of 1948, Nehru was prepared to partition Kashmir itself, between India and Pakistan, rather than hold a plebiscite under United Nations' auspices. Therefore when the Interim Committee of the General Assembly recommended the holding of elections in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission, India accepted it. So the argument that this "was completely

71. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., p. ix

72. As in other matters in this matter also the Government of India is guided by interests rather than principles. Id., p.45. And according to an Indian scholar, the Government of India's recognition policy with regard to the two halves of Germany is inconsistent with the principles of international law on the one hand and its own policy of not recognising territorially dismembered countries on the other. See K.P. Misra, 'Recognition of the G.D.R. - An Appraisal of India's Policy, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs (Vol.2,1963), p.131. It has not recognised East Germany. It has recognised Israel and yet has no diplomatic relations.

73. See K.P. Misra, op.cit.k p.119.

74. See above, p. 141.

75. This committee was appointed by the General Assembly to attend to its work during its absence. The UNTOK failed to secure the cooperation of the Soviet authorities in North Korea in the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of November 14, 1947. It then reported the matter for the Interim Committee. See Y.B.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 282-33 and 302.

76. Ibid.

77. Supra, n.71.
inconsistent with her policy in the immediate past", cannot be correct. For, "The world", said Nehru, "marches rapidly and changes, new situations develop and we have to deal with each situation as it comes ....... In matters of foreign policy especially, one has to decide almost every hour what has to be done." Thus India's position in Kashmir had improved very much. India might have also been disenchanted with the Communists. India might have also been cooperating with the United States in the hope of winning its support on the Kashmir issue.

The most important factor in India's decision, however, would seem to be the recognition of the reality of the situation in Korea. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, was prepared to accept a single Korea except on its own terms. The only alternative to war was, therefore, two Koreas. Thus the holding of separate elections in South Korea did not

78. Nehru, op.cit., p. 51.
79. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., pp. ix-x.
80. See K.P.S.Menon, India And The Cold War, op.cit., pp. 32-33 and 35. Also see Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Vol.V, No.6, 4 August, 1950, where a few members drew attention to this fact.
produce the division of Korea. It was already there. As pointed out by Professor Goodrich: "It would be unfair to say that the condition was the result of UN action, as it might well have happened in any case ..." as, one might may add, in Germany.

The policy of the Government of India became further clear when it refused to vote for the recognition of the Government of South Korea as the National Government of Korea, because it was "too grave a step" as the Indian representative on the Temporary Commission put it. It should be evident that the Government of India accepted the division of Korea as the only practical solution under the circumstances, though they were prepared to try all peaceful methods for the unification of Korea. India, therefore, supported the United States' proposal for the creation of a new UN Commission to work for the unification of Korea. India was also apprehensive that the withdrawal of forces of occupation before peaceful negotiations are instituted might lead to a war between the two Governments.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
Thus when the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, it was clear to India that it was a challenge to the UN and a threat to world peace and the Government of India decided immediately to work for the restoration of the Status quo ante in Korea.

Therefore, both India and the United Arab Republic, who were then members of the Security Council, voted in favour of the Resolution adopted on June 25, 1950, the operative part of which contained, inter alia, the following clauses:

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel;

2. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

As the North Korean authorities did not comply with this Security Council resolution, the latter adopted another Resolution on June 27, 1950, recommending "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic...

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86. See Survey, 1949-50, pp. 473-477 for an account of the commitments of support by Russia and the United States to the North and South Korean Governments, respectively.
89. For the text of the resolution - Supra, n. 87, p.222.
90. Id., p. 244.
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." India and the United Arab Republic could not participate in the voting on this resolution as their delegations had not received instructions from their respective Governments.

The Government of India accepted this resolution on June 29, 1950. On the same day they issued a statement to the press which said, inter alia:

"The Government of India have given the most careful consideration to this resolution of the Security Council in the context of the events in Korea and also of their general foreign policy. They are opposed to any attempts to settle international disputes by

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91. S.C.O.R., 5th Year, No. 16, 474th Meeting 27 June 1950, pp. 14-16. Both B.N. Rau and Fawzi, the Indian and the UAR delegates, respectively, were very much anxious to take part in the voting. The former even delayed the proceedings of the meeting in the capacity of the President of the Security Council for the month, in the hope of receiving instructions. In the end they regretted inability to take part in the voting - See below, Chapter 5 for an analysis of the UAR's stand on Korea.

resort to aggression. For this reason Sir Benegal Rau, on behalf of the Government of India voted in favour of the first resolution of the Security Council. The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. The Government of India therefore also accept the Second resolution of the Security Council. This decision of the Government of India does not, however, involve any modification of their foreign policy. This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries; it remains an independent policy which will continue to be determined solely by India's ideals and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope that even at this stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the disputes by mediation."

And on July 7, 1950, Nehru further explained India's policy to a press conference in the following words:

"When North Korea launched an invasion against South Korea, it became evident from all the information available that this was a large scale and well-planned invasion. Border conflicts between the two countries as well as internal conflicts, had a bearing on the situation. But they were dominated by this major fact of a well-planned invasion and aggression on South Korea. In the delicate and precarious balance existing in the world, any such invasion was fraught with the most dangerous possibility. If aggression was allowed to succeed, the entire structure of the UN would have inevitably collapsed and a large-scale war resulted."

"The whole basis of the UN is to bring about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. If aggression takes place and the aggressor ignores completely the UN, then only two choices are left: either the UN should condemn that aggression and try to put an end to it, or

93. See The Hindu, July 8, 1950.
it should come to the conclusion that it has ceased to be an effective instrument of peace and leave the decision of any dispute to war.

"In the context of events the Security Council had no alternative but to declare North Korea the aggressor, and subsequently call upon the members of the UN to meet this armed attack and restore international peace. Whatever justification might be advanced for this aggression and whatever might have preceded it may have some importance, but it does not take away from the fact of a well-planned aggression. India supported the resolutions of the Security Council because they logically followed the context of events and the UN Charter, and because that seemed the only course to avoid the extension of conflict and large-scale warfare. In doing so, India's primary consideration was to serve the cause of peace. This did not involve any change in the basic foreign policy of India, which is one of *nonalignment* with any group of nations against another group. In accepting the resolutions of the Security Council, India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. They refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation....

"The Government of India are of opinion that the admission of the People's Government of China in the Security Council and the return of the U.S.S.R. are necessary conditions to enable the security council to discharge its functions adequately and to bring the Korean conflict to a peaceful conclusion. The best assistance that India can give is to help to limit the area of conflict and try to end it. Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's defence forces have been organised for the defence of the country, and not for service in distant threats of War."

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93. This appears to be one of the rare occasions on which Nehru used the word Nonalignment in the late forties and early fifties.
These statements have been reproduced here, in full, because they explain quite satisfactorily, the whole basis of India's policy during the Korean crisis. Still, India's Korean policy, as it evolved fully, was widely misunderstood, and, criticised. It is, therefore, necessary to explain again the essentials of India's policy.

Firstly, Nehru had made it perfectly clear that there was a well planned and large scale aggression on South Korea. Speaking in Parliament on August 3, 1950, he dismissed the Soviet-backed North Korean claim "that before they invaded, South Korea had apparently gone across the border with troops", as a "very feeble plea". He also said that "There might have been border incidents, but to make that an excuse for the well-planned big scale invasion patently does not carry much

94. The extent to which India's policy was or was not properly understood could be seen from the speeches of members of Parliament and Nehru's replies to them. See Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volume V, Nos. 1-5, July-August 1950. See J.C. Kundra op.cit., pp.126-140 for an account of the American reaction to India's policy. See also F.S.C. Northrop, The Taming of Nations; for an interesting but, in my opinion, inaccurate interpretation of India's policy. See also G.F. Hudson, 'Korea And Asia', International Affairs (Vol.XXII, No.1, January 1951). p.22.

95. See Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volume 5, No.4,3 August, 1950, Cols. 223-224. See also in this connection Survey 1942-50, p. 477. Karunakar Gupta (op.cit.,p.xi, n.8) feels that the decision of India was based on inaccurate accounts furnished by the Indian members of the UNTOOK and also suggests (p.xiii), that the decision might have been influenced by Loy Henderson, the then United States' Ambassador in India. As Shiv Dayal (op.cit.,p.82) has observed this appears 'highly improbable.'
force." And he declared that "It may be described as a 'Civil Conflict'; it may be described as an attempted unification and all that, but I rather doubt if any of these excuses can be taken to be a sufficient justification for this kind of thing. It was aggression ...... that is the attitude ...... that is described in that statement of June 29......"

Secondly, Nehru made clear that this aggression was an attempt to solve disputes by force which was dangerous from the point of view of world peace, because it was an attempt to upset the delicate balance of power. Therefore, it had to be prevented by the United Nations by the use of force much as India had done in Kashmir, since a call for the withdrawal of forces by the United Nations had gone unheeded. But the use of force had to be restricted to restore the status quo ante and not for the settlement of the problem which could be done only through peaceful means. Therefore, Nehru stated categorically that "In accepting the Security Council resolutions India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. They refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation." This was clearly a reference to 96 Truman's declaration on Formosa. This move of the United States appears to have raised suspicions in the minds of the

96. See Documents for 1949-50, p. 632 for the text of the declaration.
Government of India about the United States' intentions in Korea, and they appear to have foreseen that it might be willing to extend the area of conflict, if possible, at least to unify Korea under the auspices of the United Nations, which might escalate the conflict into a bigger war. This appears to have been an important, if not the main reason, as Nehru later clarified, for India's refusal to contribute forces to the UN Command, though the reason given in the statement of July 7, was quite satisfactory.

It seems, however, incorrect to conclude from this that India was not prepared to support the UN action in Korea. India had not only contributed medical units, but both Nehru and Rand paid handsome tributes to the men fighting under the UN flag in Korea. But Nehru was opposed to a military solution to the Korean problem. He, therefore, made it clear that

97. Supra, n.85, cols.224-225. See also Shiv Dayal, op.cit., p. 95.
99. See above pp. 164 - 165.
100. See K.Gupta., op.cit., pp. xii-xiii.
101. See Nehru's letter to the Secretary General of the UN cited in B.Shiva Rao & S.Kondapi, 'India And The Korean Crisis', India Quarterly, (Volume VII. No.4, October-December 1951), pp. 303-304.
a permanent settlement of the Korean problem was possible only with the cooperation of the Soviet Union and China. This was possible only when the former returned to the Security Council and the latter was admitted into it.

Nehru Mediates?

It was apparently in pursuance of this belief that the Government of India initiated the move to admit China to the Security Council. As Panikkar has written, the proposal was put forward by him secretly, in a meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister of China, Chang Han-Fu, on July 1, 1950, Nehru having already moved Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, in the matter. It is not known what the reaction of Britain was. However, the Chinese approval came on July 10, and, as an American authority has opined, "Undoubtedly after consultations with its Soviet Partner."

Then Nehru made a formal proposal in identical letters addressed to Stalin, and Acheson, the United States' Secretary of State, on July 13, 1950. Nehru wrote: "India's purpose is to localise the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful

104. In Two Chinas, op.cit., pp. 103-104.
105. Ibid.
107. Supra, n. 96, p.705 for the text of Nehru's letter.
settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council. The U.S.S.R. can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean conflict."

Not surprisingly, while Stalin accepted the proposals on July 15, Acheson rejected them on July 18, 1950. An Indian Scholar has observed that "If this peace initiative had evoked as favourable a response in the Western capitals as it did in Moscow, the Korean war would have ended honourably long before or at least, it would have put to test Soviet sincerity about peace in Korea." Nehru did not appear to have been so optimistic as he said later that "I made the appeal in the vague hope that perhaps it might result in something positive." And Panikkar has recorded that "I realised that the proposal of seating Peking in the Security Council, however

108. Id., p. 706.
109. Ibid., for Acheson's reply and Nehru's second letter to him.
112. In Two Chinas, op.cit., p. 104.
legitimate, reasonable and logical, would be resisted by the Americans since it would involve an immense loss of face to them. It was also obvious that in the face of definite American opposition Bevin would not be able to act. Still, there was a chance...." Panikkar added significantly: "That the Russians did not expect anything to come out of this was clear from the fact that TASS published the correspondence before Acheson had a chance to reply....."

Thus it would appear that the Government of India were not unaware that the proposal might be rejected by the United States. Only a little reflection was needed to realise it. What then did they expect from the move? In a lengthy statement in Parliament, on August 3, 1950, Nehru explained part of it: "Now with New China and the U.S.S.R. and some other countries going out of the United Nations, it has assumed a new shape. It has ceased to be what it was meant to be, for the time being at least.....There is no forum left for any attempt at peaceful settlement.....the United Nations instead of being an organ for peace would inevitably drift towards being an organ for war or preparation for war." Nehru also

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113. In Two Chinas, op. cit., p. 104.
114. Supra, n.95, cols. 227-229.
pointed out that "the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie communicated repeatedly with the various member nations including us, earlier this year, pointing out these great developments and saying that if something was not done soon the United Nations would simply disintegrate ..... That was what Mr. Trygve Lie felt, and that is how we felt....."

"Therefore", continued Nehru, "when this Korean invasion took place and we tried to think what we could do in the matter. .....we felt again, as we felt previously that ..... one initial approach would surely help in creating an atmosphere which would facilitate the solution of that question....."

Thus it would appear that the Government of India did not like to have an United Nations, increasingly dominated by the United States. If they had calculated that their move might induce the Soviet delegate to resume his seat in the Security Council, that was achieved, and the Soviet delegate, Malik returned to the Security Council on August 1, 1950, as its president for the month. Prof. Whiting, has suggested that the acceptance by Stalin of Nehru's 'mediation' might have been an indication of the Soviet desire for compromise and that Malik's behaviour did not preclude a Soviet attempt

115. See Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., p. 62 see also Supra, n. 96, 4 August, 1950, col. 378. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Id., p. 73.
to explore the prospects for negotiated settlement in Korea.\(^{118}\)

He admits, however, that "nothing in Malik's position committed the Soviet Union to specific settlement of the war and by extending the Indian proposal to include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as the People's Republic of China at the talks he was merely amplifying a position already taken by a respected non-communist power. Should the Soviet Union fail little would be risked, while the potential gains were large."\(^ {119}\)

B.N.Rau was quick to foil this Soviet attempt to subvert India's proposal. Voting against the Soviet draft resolution of August 4, which proposed to invite the representatives of North Korea besides those of Communist China, and, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the Indian delegate said on September 1: "......What we are discussing at present with respect to Korea is not a dispute ..... Briefly what we are engaged in at the moment is not the discussion of the Korean dispute, but rather of the Korean campaign. In the view of my Government, the question of hearing the representative of the North Korean authorities

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118. Id., p. 76.
120. See S.C.O.R. 5th year, No.36, 494th Meeting, 7 September 1950, pp. 15-16.
can not arise until the campaign is over, that is to say, until at least hostilities have ceased and withdrawal of the North Korean forces had been agreed upon. I shall therefore have to vote against the proposal that their representative should be invited to the council table at this stage and I emphasize the words 'at this stage'.

Thus any hopes that India might have had of a change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union appeared frustrated by the Soviet behaviour in the Security Council. Intervening in a debate, the Indian Delegate said on August 14, inter alia: "I was hoping that with the President's return to this council, a new effort ..... would become possible and would be made inside the council, with such assistance as the other countries represented here could give. That hope has somewhat receded now. The course of the debates in the Council has served to increase rather than reduce the tension between the two great Powers....." There was, however, the fact that the United States had rejected the Indian proposal. But the North Korean armies were still advancing into South Korea. It was on the ground that any cease-fire at that stage would give the United Nations forces time to strengthen. Their position to launch an offensive, that the Soviet Union

and China rejected the Indian co-sponsored draft resolution (A/C1/641) of December 12, 1960 in the First Committee of the General Assembly. Therefore, even if the United States had accepted the proposals, still there might have been no change in the Soviet position. Having achieved their immediate objective, both the Communist Powers might have become more uncompromising. China would have perhaps demanded the surrender of Formosa, among other things, as a price for stopping the war, as it in fact did later, after its entry into the war. And India could not have opposed this move, especially with Pannikar as its Ambassador in China. He had frankly confessed that from the beginning he attached greater importance to Formosa, than to the United Nations' action in Korea. The President of India, however, said in his speech to the Parliament on July 31, 1960 that "Had it (Nehru's proposal) been acceptable to all concerned, my Government would have actively cooperated in bringing about a settlement through the agency


124. In Two China, op.cit., p. 103.

125. Supra, n. 95, 31 July 1950, Col. 10. Nehru also said, "At no time has India suggested that she would resign from her support of the UN Resolution about North Korea's aggression." See Nehru's statement at a Press Conference on 16 October 1960-Documents for 1949-50, p. 712. This statement also contains a good summary of India's Korea policy.
of the United Nations and on the basis of the two resolutions of the Security Council."

But Nehru's proposals to Stalin and Acheson did not contain any reference to the Security Council Resolutions and to the need for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces from South Korea. Had this been done, perhaps the proposals would not have been accepted by the Soviet Union, and China. Therefore, this omission by Nehru, appears to have been a tactical move, calculated to secure the approval of the Communist Powers, without insisting on their prior acceptance of the Security Council Resolutions, which they had condemned as illegal. The Government of India, however, could have assured the Government of the United States diplomatically that they were not deviating from their earlier position. They did not seem to have taken this step, though Nehru was in close contact with the British Prime Minister, who seemed to have accepted India's policy on China as the right policy. It is difficult to say whether the Government of India also wanted to leave enough room for a tactical shift, either way, as the occasion demanded.


Whatever might be the truth, it seems clear that Nehru had taken extraordinary care to see that his proposals were acceptable to the Sino-Soviet bloc. This, to my mind, appears to be the crux of the issue. For, what India needed to stress most at the time was not its adherence to the Security Council Resolutions, but its adherence to its policy of Nonalignment and friendly relations with both the blocs. And this, for very important reasons. Firstly, India had not yet succeeded in establishing its bonafides as a Nonaligned country with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Secondly, the West and its supporters in India, had begun to believe that India had at last thrown off its mask of neutrality and joined the Western block, in contrast to the United Arab Republic, which did not accept the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council. Finally—and this was, by far, the most important reason—there was the threat of an imminent invasion of Tibet by China. It was, therefore, imperative for India to establish good relations with China, as quickly as possible.


130. See Sardar Hukam Singh's speech in Parliament - Supra n.95, cols. 247-260. The member said that India should have followed the U.A.R.'s example to uphold its neutrality.
It was to achieve these objectives that Nehru appears to have initiated the move to seat China in the Security Council. As seen earlier, the Government of India, and Nehru, in their statements of June 29, and July 7, respectively, took particular care to emphasise that their acceptance of the Security Council resolutions did not mean a change in their policy of friendly relations with all nations. India had also dissociated itself from Truman's declaration of neutralising Formosa. But something more effective was needed to demonstrate India's independence of the Western bloc. Nehru could not have, obviously, chosen a better move at this juncture to please China, than to press for its legitimate place on the Security Council. As Prof. Whiting has observed "the Indian proposal challenged the Communist image of a world neatly divided into warring camps with no 'neutral' nations occupying a third position. Full appreciation of this may not have come immediately in Moscow or Peking. Nevertheless, Jen Min Jih Pao's gradual shift from criticism to praise of Nehru suggested at least a tactical modification of the 'two camps' approach .... the Sino-Soviet reaction to the Indian proposals of early July stands as an important bench-mark in the development of Chinese Communist policy, not only in Korea, but on the

131. op.cit., pp. 61-62.
132. Id., p. 60.
broader problems of relations with Asia and the World in general." The first favourable sign came one day prior to the Chinese acceptance of Panikkar's secret proposal, for, "on July 9 Jang Min Jih Pao reviewed Indian policy without attacking Nehru..."

It was for such a breakthrough that India had been trying ever since China became independent. As Nehru said on August 4, 1960: "What we have suggested first diplomatically and later in the personal appeal, was not mediation. We have suggested a step for which we had been asking for months and months. We have suggested that because we thought that it would ease the situation..... our proposal was something which is entirely apart from the Korean question. We have been trying for that for the last eight months. So it stood by itself and we propose it on its own merits....."

India, China And Tibet:

To understand, therefore, why the question of China's representation in the United Nations was raised by India at a time when it was most likely to be rejected by the United States, one has to examine the basis of India's China policy. The

132. *Id.*, p. 60.

Second Protest Note sent to Peking by the Government of India on October 31, 1950, against the Chinese invasion of Tibet, said, inter alia: "It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests..." These, one might add, are three of the five principles, later to be known as Panch Sheel. And "our policy towards China," observed Panikkar, "has been of a two-fold character: to cooperate on the basis of respect of each other's rights in every sphere where such cooperation is possible, and secondly to use such influence, as we have to bring about an understanding between China and other nations."

It was in pursuance of this policy that, on August 13, 1950, that is, just one month after the Nehru proposal, "the Government of India represented to the Government of China that they were concerned at the possibility of unsettled conditions across their border. They, therefore, strongly urged that

134. See Leading Events In India-China Relations, op.cit., p.1. See also Documents for 1949-50, pp. 552-553 for the full text.
135. See Purushottam L.Mehra, op.cit., p. 16.
137. Supra, n. 134.
Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations." This move was explained by Nehru to the Parliament on December 6, 1950, as follows:

"Ever since the People's Government of China talked about the liberation of Tibet, our Ambassador told them on behalf of the Government of India, how we felt about it. We expressed our earnest hope that the matter would be settled peacefully by China and Tibet. We also made it clear that we had no territorial ambitions in regard to Tibet and that our relations were cultural and commercial. We said that we would naturally like to preserve these relations and continue to trade with Tibet because it did not come in the way of either China or Tibet. We further said that we were anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has had for at least the last forty years. We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet... They gave us to understand that a peaceful solution would be found though I must say that they gave us no assurance or guarantee to the effect. On the one hand, they said they were prepared for a peaceful solution; on the other, they talked persistently of liberation."

Thus Nehru and Panikkar appear to have hoped that China might postpone the invasion of Tibet at least till the end of the Korean war, if not indefinitely, in view of India's support to China's claims. When actually the Tibetan occupation was undertaken in October 1950, India wrote to the Peking Government on October 21, 1950 "that a military action at


139. Cited in Whiting, op.cit., p. 145, See also Mark C. Freer, op.cit., p. 376.
the present time against Tibet will give those countries in
the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-
chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in inter-
national affairs .... opinion in the United Nations has been
steadily veering around to the admission of China into that
organization before the close of the present session. Military
action on the eve of a decision by the Assembly will have
serious consequences and will give powerful support to those
who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government of
China ..... to misrepresent China's peaceful aims."

This was in effect the American argument against the
admission of China into the United Nations. China, therefore,
wrote ironically that "The problem of Tibet and the problem
of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the
United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those
countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the
fact that China is exercising its sovereign rights in its
territory Tibet, and threaten to obstruct the participation of
the People's Republic of China in the United Nations Organisa-
tion, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly
and hostile attitude of such countries towards China."

140. See Acheson's reply to Nehru's proposal of July 13, 1950,
Supra, n. 109.

141. Supra, n.139, pp. 145-146. See also China's Note of 30
October 1950 in reply to India's Note of 26 October 1950
Documents for 1949-50, p. 551.
One cannot but conclude, therefore, that Peking had exhibited greater sense of reality than New Delhi. Yet India's move was not entirely illconsidered. In the words of Prof. Whiting, "Just as the People's Republic of China had found it possible to postpone the Taiwan operation so too it could have delayed indefinitely the occupation of Tibet." Talks had actually begun between the Chinese ambassador in India and the Tibetan delegation which was held up in India on its way to China from early 1950, for want of visas for Hongkong which the British Government had refused to grant in the month of June 1950, after some delay in the matter. It was true that these talks were only a tactical move on the part of China. But they were terminated only when China decided in favour of a military solution in the wake of the United Nations' decision to cross the 38th parallel. This decision was taken by the United Nations' General Assembly on October 7, 1960, and Chinese troops began their invasion of Tibet simultaneously, though China announced the fact on October 14 only. To quote

142. Supra, n. 139.
143. In its Note of 30 October, China accused India of delaying intentionally the departure of this delegation to China. India of course denied it in its Note of October 31, 1950. See Documents for 1949-50, pp. 551-553.
144. See Mark C. Freer, op. cit., p. 373.
146. Supra, n. 134, p. 2.
147. Ibid.
"It would appear that China considered the die was cast when the United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel and that she then abandoned diplomacy pending a decision on the battle front...."

If, on the other hand, the United Nations had called for a diplomatic solution, India's support would have been sought by the Sino-Soviet block. This would have given India an opportunity to bargain with China on all problems, including Tibet, as was done later.

Balancing At The 38th Parallel:

This explains, to a large extent, though not in full, India's impassioned appeal for a halt to the United Nations' military action at the 38th parallel. The Chinese threat of intervention, delivered to India's Ambassador Panikkar, at midnight, only served to confirm India in its desire not to antagonise China. Unlike the earlier proposal of India, this appeal was precise and reasonable. Prof. Goodrich has opined

149. See below, pp. 200-201.
151. See In Two Chinas, op. cit., p. 110.
that "It is impossible to say whether a cease-fire could have been achieved at this stage on the basis of the restoration of the status quo ante, with suitable guarantees that armed forces would not again be used. In any case no serious effort was made ...." But the United Nations' forces were in a strong position. South Korea and Formosa were secure. It would have been, perhaps, possible for the United Nations to enter into discussions with the North Korean authorities. The Government of India appeared certain that there was such a possibility, as its delegate pointed out in the General Assembly. After expressing the fear that the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations' forces might "prolong North Korean resistance, and even .... extend the area of conflict," B.N.Rau suggested that "before the United Nations' forces advance further, we should call upon the North Korean forces to cease hostilities by a certain specified date .... the North Korean forces would in their present military situation, have every inducement to comply with the call....."

It would appear that such a categorical statement would not have been made by B.N.Rau, unless the Government of India had some indication that North Korea would cease hostilities if the United Nations' forces stopped at the parallel.

B.N. Rau said that each Government has to judge the situation upon the best information at its disposal and to act accordingly. Thus the rumours of North Korean approaches for Indian mediation appear to contain some truth, though they were not taken seriously at the time. Whether or not this was so, the Government of India would not have become prejudiced against the United States and the United Nations, in the way it did, from the moment the United Nations' forces crossed the 38th parallel, if its warning was heeded by the latter.

For, besides spoiling India's chances of seeking a peaceful solution to the Tibetan problem, this move of the United Nations went against other basic considerations of India's foreign policy. India opposed the North Korean aggression on South Korea, because it was an attempt to upset the delicate balance of power in Asia by the use of force. India did not want the United Nations either, to attempt to change this balance of power by force. This has been India's policy right from the beginning as has already been indicated. Thus India would have opposed this move irrespective of all other considerations. It is significant in this connection, to note that India later appealed to the Chinese and the North Korean

154. Supra, n. 146, pp. 230-231.
156. See Documents for 1949-50, p. 713 for the text.
authorities, along with 12 other Arab-Asian states to declare their intention not to cross the 38th parallel. This, it has to be admitted, was a perfect piece of balancing in the classical sense of the term. It is also significant to note that Britain had supported both these moves of India on the same basis.

Clearly, the attempt made by the United States to alter the balance of power in its favour was a dangerous move from the point of view of world peace. It was also dangerous from the point of view of the freedom of Asian nations, for the United States was unwilling to give proper weight to the views and fears of the Asian nations of which China and India are the biggest. Its behaviour was high-handed. Thus China's entry into the Korean war appears to have come as a relief to many Asian nations. Hence India's refusal to condemn China for its entry into the war. On the other hand, Nehru had

157 See John W. Spanier, The Truman-Mac-Arthur Controversy And The Korean War (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959), pp.38-39. According to G.H. Jansen (op. cit., pp.105-111), the 13-nation appeal was issued on the initiative of B.N. Rau without prior consultations with the governments concerned and that Nehru did not like it. He has further written that this move was taken upon the repeated urgings of the British and United States delegates to the UN.

158. See Nehru's statement to a Press Conference on 16th October, 1950. Supra, n.128, pp.710-712. See also Gladwyn Jebb's speech to the First Committee of the UN GA. Supra, n. 128.

to the conclusion that the military mind had taken over in Korea. He was not entirely wrong. The United States' President had to put up a brave struggle against Mac Arthur, to maintain the supremacy of civilian authority in the United States.

There were other dangers involved in the United Nations' move to unify Korea by force. It directly threatened India's position in Kashmir, as will be shown below.

**The 'Uniting For Peace Resolution':**

These fears appeared to become a reality when the United States introduced the 'Uniting For Peace Resolution' or the 'Acheson Plan' which sought to give the General Assembly powers to recommend measures against an aggressor if the Security Council failed to take a decision. Nehru was indignant and he came out strongly against it. In his statement of October 16, 1950 he said "It seems like converting the UN into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact making it a war

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160. Infra, n. 181, col. 5294
162. See below, pp. 190-191.
organisation more than one devoted to peace." On another occasion, he said: "Instead of being a great organisation for peace slowly one of its members had begun to think of it as an organisation for waging war. Indeed, that was not the plan behind the UN and though its Charter remains some facts begin to belie it, more and more."

While Vishinsky of the Soviet Union questioned the legality of the Resolution, B.N. Rau told the General Assembly that "My Government considers that this is not the time for stressing the military aspect of the UN, important though that aspect may be......", and declared India's decision to "abstain from voting on the resolution." As one Indian scholar has written: "The most obvious danger stemmed from the composition and voting practices of the Assembly in the early fifties. One-third of the entire membership of the General Assembly belonged to one of the blocs in the Cold War, i.e., the western camp ..... In that situation if the Assembly had established a force, the contingents contributed by the Member states would

166. Supra, n. 87, pp. 185-186 and 191, 192.
not probably have been at the disposal of the UN but at the disposal of the dominant bloc." And for India there was the grave threat of such a force being created for the purpose of settling the Kashmir dispute. At that time the Kashmir issue was under the active consideration of the UN. The Indian stand on the Korean issue had already antagonised the United States. The United States and Britain did not appear to appreciate India's stand on the Kashmir dispute. Particularly, India's refusal to accept Dixon's recommendations and Dixon's views on India had generated a great deal of misunderstanding between India and the United States and England. Though the question of introducing foreign troops into Kashmir had not been raised till then, it did not take long for such a proposal to be advanced. This was done during the efforts at mediation undertaken by the Commonwealth mainly on Pakistan's insistence. This proposal was acceptable to Pakistan while India rejected it.


170. Supra, n.87, pp. 243-244.


172. Id., p.470. Also see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir... op.cit., pp. 215-223 for a detailed account of this phase of the dispute.


174. Ibid.
Soon after the failure of this Commonwealth effort, the dispute was discussed in the Security Council, in February 1961. It was here that further and final confirmation of India's fears was provided, for the United States and United Kingdom sponsored a resolution proposing, interalia, that the United Nations' representatives be authorised to consider the possibility of raising a force, from among the United Nations members or locally. The British delegates explained that a neutral force was essential for a successful plebiscite.

Not surprisingly, India's reaction was quick and sharp: "It is surprising that any one should think of suggesting to us that we should admit foreign troops whose withdrawal was an essential feature of our independence. It does not matter in what guise they are sought to be introduced or by whom; we shall not permit this to happen."

Tibetan : A Surrender:

It is easy to see now why Nehru did not take a firm stand against China on Tibet. The only way in which Nehru could do that was by seeking the support of Britain and the United States. But the policies of the United States, especially, towards Asian nations were highly provocative. It was

176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
not at all prepared to accept India's Nonalignment and other policies. Nehru, on the other hand, was convinced that his foreign policy was sound. He was also convinced that the United States' policies towards China were wrong. He had pressed for a peaceful solution of the Korean as well as the Tibetan problems. He had disowned all political and territorial claims in Tibet. It would have been difficult for him and the Government of India to seek military or even political support from the West in the defence of India's vital interests when they were determined to eliminate all foreign influences from Asia.

If India had sought such help, there was no assurance that the United States and Britain would stand by India without a price. Their stand on the Kashmir issue was unfavourable to India.

Even if the United States and Britain extended diplomatic recognition to Tibet it would have been of no help to India. Tibet would have become another Formosa or Korea, for China had already occupied it and it could not have been forced out of it, even by the use of force. And finally, if India had sought Western support on Tibet China would surely have championed the Cause of Pakistan in Kashmir and if the western Powers did

179. See P.C. Chakravarty, op. cit., p. 36 for the contrary view. In 1943 the United States was reported to have told a Tibetan delegation, that Tibet was a part of China. See P. 'Middle Ground Between America And Russia' Foreign Affairs (Vol. 32, No. 2, January 1954), p. 263. They had refused to receive a Tibetan delegation in 1949. See Mark C. Freer, op. cit., p. 373.
not support it, Pakistan might have joined hands with China and also the Soviet Union, thus increasing the danger to India's security.

Nehru's policy, on the other hand, was to solve India's disputes with neighbours without outside interference. He was, therefore, determined to secure the friendship of China which was determined to secure its rights everywhere, by force, if necessary. Nehru, therefore, decided to pay the price demanded by China for friendship with India by allowing China to occupy Tibet and ending its autonomy. The then Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Keskar, said that the "Government is not unmindful of protection of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I may go further and say that the best way of protecting that frontier is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China. It is obvious that such a complicated and big frontier cannot be well protected if we have a border country which becomes hostile to us....." Thus the Government of India appears to have attached greater importance to the MacMohan Line and NEFA and to the Himalayan states and Burma, than to Tibet.

180. B.N.Rau told the General Assembly that "For us.....the friendship of China is desirable and natural. We wish to do everything possible to promote the friendly relations that now prevail between us, because we feel that a free and independent China marching with India will be the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia." Supra, n.133, p.10.


182. See above pp.144-45. See also Taya Zinkin 'Indian Foreign Policy : An Interpretation of Attitudes', World Politics (Vol.VII, No.2 January 1955), pp. 204-205. See also Purushottam L.Mehta, op.cit., p. 19.

183. See C.H.Alexandrowicz, 'India And The Tibetan Tragedy', Foreign Affairs (Vol.31 No.3,April,1953),for a good analysis of the importance of Tibet for India's security.
for India's defence and security. It was for this reason that India did not support the Tibetan issue in the United Nations, after advising the Tibetan authorities to take the issue to the World body. For, by this time the Korean War had reached a stalemate and there were signs that the parties might start negotiations. India felt that it might still profit if it did not antagonise China further. Towards this end India opposed the move to brand China as aggressor in the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 20, 1951, and voted against the resolution in the General Assembly on February 1, 1951. And, as pointed out by Harold C. Hinton, "China also seemed anxious to retain as much official Indian goodwill as possible because of its involvement in the Korean war, in which friendly neutrality on the part of India was a great help to Communist side."

Towards this end Mao Tse-Tung visited the Indian Embassy in Peking on January 26, 1951, the first anniversary of the Indian Republic and spoke of the Indian people as a fine people, their thousands of years friendship with China and also spoke warmly about Nehru and looked forward to see him in China soon.

185. Supra, n. 159.
187. See In Two Chinas, op. cit., p. 125. It perhaps significant that Mao's gesture came after India's refusal to call China 'Aggressor'.

Therefore, when the Sino-Soviet block finally decided, in July 1961, to accept a stalemate truce along the 38th parallel in Korea, India's major objective of restoring the status quo prior to June 25, 1950, was achieved. India's stand was vindicated. Naturally, India was called upon to shoulder the responsibility of conducting the armistice negotiations which began in July 1951. The Indian policy throughout the armistice talks continued to be governed by the desire to pacify China as far as possible. The Government of India kept in close contact with the Government of China through their Ambassador Panikkar who had played a major role in shaping India's foreign policy towards China. India was not willing to waste this opportunity of establishing permanent rapprochement with China and through China with the Soviet Union.

Aftermath:

This policy of India and the support given to it by the other nonaligned states in the United Nations led to a reassessment of attitude on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc towards these states. They realised that these states could be kept away from the western bloc. On the other hand, the west began

190. Stalin himself appears to have initiated this move when he granted an interview to the Indian Ambassador. See K.P. H. Menon, They Flying Troika (O.U.P. London, 1963), pp. 26-29.
a new drive to recruit allies in Asia to contain the Sino-Soviet threat of expansion. This was diametrically opposed to the policies of Nehru and Nasser, the latter having come into power just then in the United Arab Republic, at the head of a military Government. It was this struggle between the nonaligned states and the power blocs that culminated in the Suez Crisis of 1956 as will be seen in the next chapter.

An early indication of the things to come was given, when, in August 1963, the composition of the Korean Political Conference, came up before the General Assembly of the United Nations, while a majority of states including Britain favoured India's participation, the United States and the Latin American States opposed it. India's displeasure with the United States was forcefully expressed by Nehru in a speech in Parliament on September 17, 1963. He said, inter alia, that:

"Certain interesting consequences flow from this vote. If the voting is analysed, you will see that of the twenty-one countries who voted against India, eighteen were from the Americas, seventeen from what is called Latin America. Now I have the greatest respect for the countries of Latin America. But the facts stand out that nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this Political conference, while a number of countries all from the Americas, did not want it. They have as much right not to want it as others have to want. But the

191. Nehru, op. cit., p. 429 (Italics are mine).
question that we have been considering is an Asian question. And is the will of Asia and of Europe to be flouted because some people who really are not intimately concerned with this question feel that way? that is an extraordinary position.

"It is interesting because in spite of the major developments that have taken place in the world during the last few years, somehow it is not realized by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, by-passed and sat upon."

This was the crux of the differences between India and the United States, not only in the Korean dispute but in the whole range of problems between India and the West. A careful study of India's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan, would reveal the same basic conflict of interests. Also, as one Indian scholar has observed the debate on the Korean political conference...concided with another incident...namely the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir on August 8, with which rumours had connected US intrigue." More significant than this, was, perhaps the fact that Pakistan voted against India's participation in the Korean Political Conference, in spite of a request from Nehru to Zafrullah Khan. This was mentioned by Nehru in his letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister on August 28, 1953. Just a week earlier the two

192. See Documents for 1951, pp. 606-611 for Correspondence between India and United States on the issue. See also J.C. Kundra op. cit., pp. 140-147 for an account of India's stand on the issue.
194. Supra, n. 21, p. 273.
Prime Ministers had come to an agreement at Delhi on Kashmir and had issued a joint Communique on August 20, 1953 which said, inter alia, that:

"The Kashmir dispute was especially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that state, with a view to promoting their well being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the state. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agree that these preliminary issues would be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. In order to fix some kind of a provisional timetable it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken."

What Nehru achieved through this Communique was the elimination of the United Nations from the picture, at any rate, for the time being, without giving any concessions to Pakistan. The elimination of the United Nations meant the elimination of the Western pressure upon India. The importance

195. Cited in Id., p.270.
attached to this aspect by Nehru became evident when he wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on September 3, 1953 that "If Kashmir becomes also an arena of conflict between the great powers, then not only India and Pakistan but also the people of Kashmir play a secondary part."

The acceptance of military aid from the United States by Pakistan appeared to undo this achievement of Nehru. This appears to have been one of the important reasons for his bitter opposition to the United States' military aid to Pakistan. He told Parliament on March 1, 1964, that:

"This grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. It is vitally necessary for India and Pakistan to solve their problems and develop friendly and co-operative relations.... These problems can only be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others. It is, indeed, this intervention of other countries in the past that has come in the way of their solution. Recently a new and more friendly atmosphere had been created between India and Pakistan and by direct consultations between the two Prime Ministers progress was being made towards the solution of these problems. That progress has now been checked and fresh difficulties have arisen.

196. Supra, n. 194.

"The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far-reaching results than the previous types of intervention."

Earlier, in a speech on February 22, 1954, Nehru said that he had no "ill feeling against Pakistan and certainly not against America." But in his statement of March 1, 1954, he demanded the withdrawal of American personnel from the UN observers group in Kashmir, on the ground that the United States was no more impartial in India-Pakistan disputes.

All this seems to have confirmed the Chinese in the belief that India was not in the Western camp. As Harold Hinton has written China then appears to have decided to use India to put "pressure on Britain and through Britain on the United States for a favourable settlement in Indo-China. This was one of the most important aspects of the complex Sino-Indian bargaining that seems to have begun at the end of 1953, when an Indian delegation arrived in the CPR for the ostensible purpose of negotiating an agreement on Tibet."

India, on the otherhand, not only "...wanted to put trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet on a more regular and satisfactory footing....." but also to secure concessions

200. Id., p. 283.
from China on South East Asia. The result was the agreement on Tibet signed in April, 1954. To quote Hinton, "Nehru evidently hoped that, by getting the CPR to subscribe to the 'Five Principles' of Peaceful Co-existence', taking an active part in the Geneva conference on Indo-China, and assuming the chairmanship of the International Control Commissions for the three Indo-Chinese states, India could shield Burma, and if possible the rest of South East Asia except for Vietnam from the Chinese and the North Vietnamese."

Thus Nehru thought that he had at last arrived at an understanding with China. Therefore he declared that India had not done anything better than this in Foreign Policy since independence. It would be unfair to say that Nehru believed that China would uphold the agreement. He wrote to the Congress Party's state units that "It is said, how can you put faith in such declarations? In international affairs, one can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion and not give any other approach a chance? Surely, it is better, with nations as with individuals, to hope for

201. Id., p. 446.


203. Cited in P.C. Chakravarty, op.cit., p.54, n.21. Also see G.M. Kahin, op.cit., p.7. See also Tuya Zinkin, op.cit., p. 204.
and expect the best but at the same time to be prepared for any eventuality." Nehru was asking for time to be able to stand up to the Chinese challenge. It would have been folly to challenge China at this stage as China had demonstrated its willingness to defend its interests by its intervention in the Korean war. After all, China had been accorded great power status by the Big Four at Geneva. For Nehru China was the third great power. It was for this reason that he did not insist, even at this stage, on Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line. He said that if this were done, then trouble would have started immediately, instead of years later. Perhaps the Government of India believed that it would take some time for China to renew its claims in this area, because of the Panch Sheel. And if it violated these principles, India could profit, as it in fact did. It was for this reason that China appears to have resorted to small scale operations on the borders and to strengthen its position before making its intentions plain.

The Panch Sheel was, therefore, a tactical device by which Nehru wanted to contain China as he explained in 1954

205. See Nehru, op.cit., p. 305.
itself. That he was not satisfied with the Panch Sheel, was also evident from the fact that he took the lead in arranging the Bandung Conference of 1955, with a view to counteracting the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and to seeking further confirmation of China's acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

While India was preoccupied with these problems, important changes had taken place in the United Arab Republic since 1962, which were destined to bring the two countries very close to each other and to have a far-reaching affect on the outside world. We shall now turn to these developments.

208. See Kahin, op.cit., pp. 4-7.
CHAPTER V

INDIA AND THE SUEZ AND WEST ASIAN CRISIS

India and the Suez Crisis:

Before examining the role of India in the Suez Crisis, it is necessary to trace briefly the evolution of the Nonalignment of the United Arab Republic. For, the Suez Crisis, as shall be seen in this chapter, was important from the point of view of the emergence of Nonalignment as a force in international politics.

Roots of Arab Nonalignment:

The Nonalignment of the United Arab Republic is not essentially a product of the deep anti-westernism of the Arabs (which was the popular form of Arab Nationalism), as is generally believed. Even Arab Nationalism was not based on mere hatred of the West. It was an expression of profound indignation at what Fayez A. Sayegh has called "the callous indifference to past and continuing western injustices in the Arab world" and a demand for justice. The history of Western policies in the Arab world is a chronology of mounting injustices, which

1. **Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World**, op.cit., p.173.
culminated in the 'supreme injustice' of the creation of Israel, depriving over a million Arab Palestinians of basic and fundamental Human Rights.

The Arabs had equal aversion for Communism and the Soviet Union also joined the Western Powers in supporting the Zionist cause. As Prof. Boutras Boutras-Ghali has put it, thus created "a crisis of confidence between the Arabs and the rest of the world which had deliberately espoused the Zionist cause." The predicament in which the Arabs found themselves then the East-West struggle began in the mid 1940's has been well described by Fayez A. Sayegh: "with no love for communism, no faith in Western democracy, and no respect for the caricature of 'democracy' bequeathed by Europe to the Arab world, Arabs lacked all the elementary pre-requisites of interest in

2. Id., p.172. There are many books and articles by Western as well as Arab scholars depicting this history of Western imperialism in the Arab world. Among those of special interest are the following. Arnold Toynbee \textit{'Britain And The Arabs : The Need For A New Start'}, \textit{International Affairs} (Vol.40,No.4, October, 1964); Albert Hourani, \textit{'The Decline of the west in the Middle East - I and II}, Id., (Vol.19, Nos.19 Nos. 1 and 2, January 1953 and April 1953); Brig. Stephen Longrig, \textit{The Decline of the west in the Middle East An Alternative View}, Id., (Vol.19,No.3 July, 1963); Edward Atiyat, \textit{The Arabs} (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middle Sex, Revised,1965); John Campbell, \textit{Defence of The Middle East} (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1968); and Erskine B. Childers, \textit{Common Sense About The Arab World}, (Victor Gollanez Ltd., London, 1960).


4. Supra, n.1, p. 172.
that ideological 'Great Debate' which the Cold war purported to be. If they lent deaf ears to Soviet professions of 'peaceful intent', Arabs also greeted with scorn the righteous claim that they represented 'Freedom' and 'justice' which was put forward by the very powers whose forces had divided and ruled the Arab world and suppressed Arab liberation struggles, and whose policies had so recently perpetrated supreme injustice in Palestine. The title 'Free world' preempted for itself by the western bloc, rang hollow in Arab ears."

The Arabs were, therefore, justified in opposing all western moves to bring the Arab states into western alliances against Communism. The resignation of Salih Jabi's Cabinet in Iraq on January 27, 1948, following popular resentment against the Portsmouth treaty between Iraq and Britain signed on January 16, 1948, was one of the earliest manifestations of this aspect of Arab Nationalism in the post-Second World War period. In the United Arab Republic proper, there were technical discussions in 1949 between it and Britain for working out an air defence scheme which failed because the Government of the day lacked sufficient support to commit themselves to such an agreement.

6. Id., p. 146-147.
The UAR and the Korean Crisis:

 looked at from this angle, the United Arab Republic's response to the June 27, 1950, resolution of the Security Council authorising the use of force against North Korea, is perfectly understandable. Explaining his country's stand on June 30, 1960, Fawzi, in an oft quoted statement said: "I am now in a position to state, on behalf of my Government, that Egypt would have abstained from voting on the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 27 June, had the representative of Egypt been able to participate in the voting.

"This attitude is dictated by the following two reasons: first, the conflict under consideration is in fact but a new phase in the series of divergences between the western and eastern blocs, divergences which threaten world peace and security; secondly, there have been several cases of aggression against peoples and violations of the sovereignty and unity of the territories of States Members of the UN. Such aggressions have been submitted to the UN, which did not take any action to put an end to them as it has done now in the case of Korea."

This, says Prof. Ghali, was the "first official manifestation of Egyptian neutralism towards the Cold War". And

7. See S.C.O.R., V, Year, No.17, 475th Meeting, June 30, 1950, p.2
Fayez A. Syegh has written that this was an excellent illustration of the Arab "indifference to the difficulties experienced by the western Powers." Neither of these views appears to explain accurately the United Arab Republic's policy in the Korean Crisis, for these views lay stress on only one aspect of the explanation offered by Fawze, to the neglect of the other, which appears to have been the more important consideration. As Georgiani-G. Stevens has observed correctly: "Two strands of logic underlay the Arab position in the Korean case. One was their argument that the same yardstick applied to Korea should also be applied to Palestine, where in their view, Israel has trespassed on Arab territory. But more important from the long range viewpoint, was their almost instinctive more toward a neutral and mediating role in company with India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Burma and Afghanistan."

It has already been indicated that while accepting the United Nations action against North Korea, India itself expressed the desire to end the conflict by peaceful negotiations, and made attempts in this regard. And the United Arab Republic had voted in favour of the June 25, 1950, resolution of the

9. Supra, n.1.
Security Council which called for the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea. Speaking on this occasion in the 473rd meeting of the Security Council on June 26, 1950, Fauzi 11 said: "I welcome all action aiming at the cessation of the conflict in Korea. Indeed it is exhilarating to note the energetic attitude which the Security Council appears to be taking and which is in contrast to several earlier cases...."

And in the 288th meeting of the General Assembly on 12 September 28, 1960, Salah El-Din Bey, explained the United Arab Republic's abstention from voting on the June 27 resolution of the Security Council, in the following words: "I know that we alone have taken this stand. Nevertheless, we do not feel isolated. On the contrary, we feel indeed that we have voiced the sentiments of small and medium states and that the great Powers themselves, when they have over attitude properly weighed up, can not but approve it and welcome its objectives.....

"First is our concern for peace and our fear that it would be disturbed by the long standing conflict between the two blocs, a conflict which has of late become so fierce that anxiety and fear prevail everywhere.....


"Secondly, there is the often observed practice of differentiating in treatment between states and peoples.....

"It has been alleged that Egypt did not condemn aggression as others have done. No, indeed ... Egypt would undoubtedly be among those who abhor and condemn it the most, since it still continues to suffer from the violation of its rights. Egypt justly calls upon the United Nations to use one and the same measure in all cases of aggression and resolutely to repel aggression with the same alacrity wherever it may occur."

"The two reasons which led Egypt to abstain from voting on the Security Council resolution of 27 June last, are traceable, in fact, to one single reason: the love of peace and concern for its protection."

For the rest one finds Fauzi cooperating with B.N.Rau, in every proposal put forward by India in the United Nations to bring a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Thus the United Arab Republic's stand on the Korean Crisis had been less

negative than has generally been realised. But the United Arab
Republic had not yet become a nonaligned state in the real
sense. This was achieved by Nasser.

**UAR's Nonalignment: Evolution:**

Arab Nonalignment as evolved by Nasser was first of all,
a demand for the liquidation of British and other foreign bases
and armies from the Arab countries. It was thus inherent in
Arab Nationalism and was one of the main aims of Nasser's revo-
lution of 1952. But it differed from the popular form of Arab
Nationalism in the sense that it was a rational policy based
on the realities of the distribution of Power in the world,
where as the basis of Arab Nationalism was purely emotional.
This was where, one has to say, Nasser differed from the Muslim
Brotherhood, for example. It is one of the great achievements
of Nasser that he had given a rational content to Arab Natio-
malism by evolving Arab Nonalignment and identifying it with
Arab Nationalism.  

This difference between Nasser's Nonalignment and Arab
Nationalism was well reflected in the denunciation of the Anglo-
UAR treaty of 1954 on the evacuation of the Suez base, by the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists. It is the failure to

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And G.A. Nasser, The Philosophy of The Revolution, op.cit.,
pp. 61-63.

of Modern Islamic Movements, (Khayat's College Book Coopera-
tive, Beirut, Lebanon, 1966), pp. 130-147 for an account
of the conflict between Nasser and the Brotherhood.
see the difference that appears to be responsible for Prof. Ghali's observation that the treaty "was incompatible with Egyptian neutrality" and that "The circulation of leaflets denouncing the Suez agreement by Leftist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood was another confirmation of the strength of neutrality in Egypt."

As indicated earlier Nasser agreed to allow the British to come back within a period of seven years, in case of an attack on the Arab League States or on Turkey (Article 4), because firstly, the United Arab Republic was not strong enough to defend itself in case of an attack, secondly there was not much of a chance of an attack from the Soviet Union which had not yet shown much interest in the Arab lands. He had grasped the meaning of the cold war very soon after coming into power, though he could not formulate suitable policies immediately.17

As Leonard Binder has put it, he had begun to criticise the United States towards the end of 1953 for its "failure to grant Egypt any development loans in the fourteen months since the revolution." Nasser could see that the cold war was being waged on the economic front. Again, as the same writer has

16. Op.cit., p. 344. He also does not seem to distinguish between neutralism and neutrality as his account of the origins of Nonalignment suggests (p. 341).

observed: "On April 19, 1954, he made a thinly veiled threat that he might seek arms from the Eastern bloc if the West did not comply with his request. On the second anniversary of the revolution he made one of his most revealing statements about Egyptian foreign policy and his grasp of the cold war situation, he said that this was no longer the age of power politics, but an age in which the great powers were vying for the friendship of the lesser powers. Egypt, he announced, would withhold its friendship from those who did not co-operate with her."

Thus there does not appear to have been any 'ambivalence' in Nasser's stand on the evacuation treaty. He had to grant the concession to Britain because there was no other way in which he could secure a quick withdrawal of the British forces from the Suez base. And he must have felt that there was no harm in giving this concession, when there was no danger of an actual Soviet attack in the near future. In this sense he was far more realistic than either the British statesmen or their friend Nuri of Iraq. Further, this concession was offered to Britain in an Egyptian note of December 1954 demanding the revision of the 1936 treaty, which Britain had rejected at the

18. Id., p. 239.
19. Ibid.
time. Above all, Nasser was in need of economic and military aid which was expected to follow from the United States and Britain after the evacuation treaty.

The belief, therefore, that Nasser was pro-west at this stage was without any basis. His signature of the evacuation treaty or his desire to secure aid from Western sources, was no more or less a sign of pro-westernism, than Nehru's decision to keep India in Commonwealth and similar policies were! The treaty with Britain was for Nasser the 'final liberation from imperialism'. Though the British and American statesmen did not understand this at the time, there is now general agreement among western writers that they were wrong in their belief and calculations. In an able analysis one writer has pointed out that "This assumption was an unhappy illustration of one of the commonest failures of communication and understanding between Asian nationalists and the West." This is an under-observed statement. As the same writer has a more penetrating observation was made by Albert Hourani. When he pointed out that such

an assumption was derived from the "complacency of force", characteristic of Western powers in Asia for imperialism, is "self-confident force imposing itself upon resentful weakness".

As a British scholar has written "while Neguib and his colleagues were not outwardly anti-western, it soon became clear that they were no more willing than Farouk's Ministers to be hurried into a defence fact centred upon some new arrangement for the canal base...... secret circulars distributed by the Free officers' Organisation soon after their seizure of power showed distinct neutralist leanings and the Minister of State for Propaganda (afterwards National Guidance) in the new Government, Fathi Ridwan, had been an advocate of a nonaggression pact with Russia. By the end of the year these tendencies were sufficiently in evidence for the western idea of the MEDO to look distinctly a nonstarter. In a dinner at the Officers' Club in Cairo given to the Syrian dictator Shishakli, on December 14th, Negiub foreshadowed, The basic principles of the foreign-policy of his own successor, Nasser, when he said that 'in these difficult times, when the two great blocs are waging one of the greatest struggles that history has ever known, we wish to prove to the world that this part of the world belongs to its citizens

and no longer accepts tutelage of any one". This is as succinct and clear an explanation of Nonalignment as one could find in the speeches of Nehru and Nasser.

Moreover, when India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and Indonesia could remain outside power blocs, there was no reason why the Arab States could not do so. After all, all these nations had taken the UN rather seriously and they had been active members of the UN from the start. The experience they had gained in the UN made them feel secure without alliances as already indicated.

For the Arabs, except for a few like Muri of Iraq, the defence of the Arab States had to be their primary responsibility and only secondarily of the outsiders and the UN. They had after all concluded the Arab defence treaty in the Arab League, prior to the Revolution of 1952 to counter the British moves to form a Middle East Defence Organisation.

One of the requirements for the success of this policy was the Nonalignment of all Arab States. Another was close


* Pakistan became aligned in 1954.
links with other nonaligned states. Nasser got the opportunity of making Nonalignment an all Arab issue when Iraq decided to join the Baghdad Pact sponsored by Dulles. Nasser quickly asserted his leadership of Arab Nonalignment. The Israeli military attack on the United Arab Republic's military frontier post at Gaza on February 28, 1955, stressed the need for Arab unity against Israel. Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact of which Britain became a member on April 4, 1955, against Nasser's wish was not only a direct challenge to the concept of Arab nonalignment, but it also weakened the defence of Arab States against the Israeli threat of aggression. For in the British House of Commons, Eden assumed Israel's friends on March 30, 1955, that when the Baghdad Pact "comes to be studied, it will be seen that from the point of view of Israel it is likely to be a desirable development because this is the first time an Arab State is looking in other directions than simply


30. See below, pp.282-90 for further discussion.

31. Supra, n.29, pp. 293-298.

32. Id., p. 292.
towards Israel. Notwithstanding the contradictory view expressed by Nuri in the Iraqi Parliament, in justification of the Turco-Iraqi pact that he always placed first the Zionist danger and the need to secure the support of the world in order to eliminate that danger," Eden's view seemed to represent the basic motive and purpose of the new defence pact.

For, one of the important reasons for which the United States and Britain refused to give military aid to Nasser was that it might boost the United Arab Republic's strength vis-a-vis Israel. They were trying to keep a balance between Israel and the Arabs which was favourable to the latter. This was the purpose with which Britain, the United States and France issued the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, on the Middle East. It was this Western position, which was opposed by the Arab League Council in its resolution of June 21, 1950, that ultimately forced Nasser to conclude the arms deal with the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia in September 1955.  

33. See Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p. 182 and Supra, n.29 p. 285.
34. See Charles D. Cremeans, op.cit., p.146.
35. Supra, n.28, pp. 308-309.
36. Id., pp. 310-311.
after the failure of all attempts to secure arms from the west under conditions compatible with the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic.

Just as the western leaders had earlier assumed that Nasser was pro-west, soon after the arms deal with the Soviet Union, they concluded that Nasser had turned pro-Communist and that the United Arab Republic was becoming a Soviet satellite. In fact, Nasser was neither pro-East nor pro-west at any time, as already indicated. If the reason for the earlier assumption was the 'complacency of force,' the reason for the latter was blind anti-communism of which Dulles was the chief exponent at the time. Dulles was blind to the fact that Nasser had not granted a single concession to the Communists in the United Arab Republic, even after the arms deal with the Soviet Union. In fact, as one scholar has pointed out "....."effective co-operation between the Arab and Soviet concussing groups at the UN had to wait the mid 1950's because the Soviet Union had endorsed the Palestine partition proposed in 1947. Only after

the Soviet Union had given its unequivocal blessings in 1963 to the Arabs position in the dispute with Israel did a practical basis appear for mutual support at the UN ..... Arab-Soviet Co-operation it should be stressed did not suggest that Egypt or any other state was subordinating itself to the Soviet Union; much less was any of them going Communist. Those Arab countries that followed Egypt's lead in becoming Soviet clients, such as Syria, Iraq, and, most recently Algeria, were thoroughly nationalist, as attested to by their suppression of the local Communist parties, at times even in the face of Soviet protests.

Nasser's clash with Khrushchev in 1959, as already indicated, was gave ample proof of his determination to oppose all outside interference in Arab affairs. Even prior to this clash with Khrushchev, Nasser told a group of American Journalists on January 27, 1968: "If in future we face any pressure from the Soviet Union, we will definitely protest against it. If the Soviet Union attempts to bring pressure to bear upon us in order to force us to accept their policies, we will criticise the Soviet Union, but nothing of the sort has happened."

Nor was Nasser's recognition of Communist China in May 1956 an indication of the United Arab Republic becoming a Communist satellite. This decision was in conformity with

the Bandung principles of coexistence. Having accepted them, it would have been unfair, if not impolitic, on the part of Nasser, not to recognise Communist China. Nasser might have also been advised by both Tito and Nehru to take this step. However, Nasser had other sound reasons for recognising Communist China in May 1956. At that time the United States and Britain were trying to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union for an embargo on arms supply to the Middle East.  

In the words of Al Gumhouriya, the semi-official Arab daily "Gamal Abdel Nasser has recognised China and dealt a death blow to the projected western blockade of the Arab states.... People's China is the biggest producer of armament at present and can supply the Arabs all the war material they need. Thus Gamal Abdel Nasser put Eden's noose around Eden's own neck."

It was, therefore, as much an anti-Soviet move as it was anti-western and was in the true spirit of Nonalignment. As an American scholar has put it "the fact, that the Soviet Union without previous agreement with Egypt, had discussed Arab affairs with Britain was not viewed with satisfaction by Cairo. Most threatening, in the Egyptian view, was the possibility of an arms embargo, which had been conditionally

42. Cited in David J. Dallin, op. cit., p. 404.
43. Ibid.
accepted by Khrushchev and Bulganin, and which would endanger Egypt's status as the emerging leader of Arab countries.

"These were considerations that lay behind the official recognition of Communist China by Nasser a few weeks after the visit of the two leaders to London. When Nasser's spokesmen announced (May 27) that Egypt 'could get all the arms..... needed from Communist China even if the UN imposed an embargo on weapons to the Middle East', this appeared as a rebuff to Moscow."

The opportunity to forge close links with other Afro-Asian states presented itself when Nasser was invited to the Bandung Conference. The most important achievement for Nasser at this Conference was the friendship established with Chou en-lai. Nasser is reported to have told an Indian journalist that "Here I learned and realised that the only wise policy for us would be positive neutrality and nonalignment." Further, "It was also a source of inspiration about new trading patterns, for in the course of conversations with Chou en-lai Nasser arranged to sell China some of Egypt's cotton surplus. He also confided Egypt's main perplexity — his difficulty in acquiring the modern arms that he needed chiefly in order to please, his

44. See Elizabeth Monroe, op. cit., p. 155.
army supporters, though also of course to fortify his frontier with Israel. Chou en-lai inquired why he did not buy arms from Eastern bloc countries."

These were the origins of Nasser's arms deal with the Soviet Union, the recognition of Communist China and perhaps also of the Suez Crisis of 1956, inasmuch as the former policies were responsible for the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam Aid offer by the United States and the United Kingdom, which led to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company by Nasser and its aftermath. However, the true origins of the Suez Crisis lay in the Western refusal to accept Nasser's Nonalignment, which did not differ from India's Nonalignment in any significant sense. But an American scholar has claimed that: "If America seemed inhospitable to the idea of neutralism, this was largely because Abdel Nasser's 'positive' variety had little in common with that of Jawaharlal Nehru. It was based on no doctrine, no devotion to peaceful settlement of international disputes, but merely on speculating on the antagonisms of Great Powers." This argument does not stand scrutiny. In the first instance, it wrongly presumes that Nehru's foreign policy was acceptable to the United States, at any

46. Ibid., See also Charles D. Cremeans, op. cit., p. 146.

time. The United States, even to-day, lacks the vision to appreciate this policy fully. And the charge that Nasser's foreign policy was based on speculating on the antagonisms of Great Powers is meaningless as the cold war was not Nasser's creation but of the United States. Further, the United States does not hold a record in being devoted to peaceful settlement of disputes, to be indignant at Nasser. And the United States has called Nehru's policy 'immoral' because he refused to join their military alliances against Communism and had instead called for peaceful coexistence.

Similarly, if Nasser had taken 'massive supplies of arms from the Soviet bloc', it was to escape "mortgaging the economic future" of his country to the United States and not to mortgage it to the Soviet bloc. Again, Nasser's attempts, if any, at undermining established governments elsewhere in the Arab world and even beyond it were against those governments which were being maintained by the western Powers. And the United States has a record of its own in the field of overthrowing governments in many parts of the world. Nasser himself had been a target of the United States and its allies more than once.

48. Ibid.
So far as Nasser's so-called "abusive propaganda against the West" is concerned, it has to be admitted that it has more truth in it than the propaganda made by the Western Powers and Israel against Nasser.

Contrary to the above claim another writer has observed that at Bandung Nehru hoped to convert Nasser from his evidently pro-western position to doctrinaire neutralism in the East-West struggle." Neither Nehru nor Nasser was pro-East or pro-west at any time. Nehru was more pro-Britain than Nasser as already indicated. It is important to note this difference for a proper understanding of India's role in the Suez Crisis. In his anti-westernism, however, Nasser needed no lessons from Nehru. The Bandung Conference only served to bring Nehru and Nasser closer. Indeed this was achieved well before the Bandung Conference, through Nehru's careful diplomacy. Nehru had mounted a vigorous attack on the Baghdad Pact because of Pakistan's adherence to it. Nasser could not have been happy with Pakistan over this, and, this


51. See Georgiana G.Stevens, op.cit., p.146.

52. Ibid.
gave Nehru an opportunity to wean Nasser away from his concept of the unity of Muslim states. As already indicated, it was Nasser's realisation of the greater opportunities which the nonaligned circle offered that was responsible for his loss of interest in the Islamic circle of which he was an exponent earlier.

Then in February 1965, Nehru had spent two days in Cairo with Nasser, and the two leaders issued a joint communique on February 16, condemning military alliances. On April 6, a few days before Nasser's arrival in India on April 12, a treaty of friendship between the United Arab Republic and India was signed in Cairo.

Inspite of this, Nehru and Nasser were reported to have differed at Bandung on the discussion of the Palestine issue. Nehru was reported to have hoped initially to avoid the discussion of the issue in the conference. However, he consented to it, as he had earlier agreed to the exclusion of Israel from the invitees to the Conference, mainly on the insistence of Pakistan. Obviously Nehru did not like to

54. Id., pp. 165-166.
55. See Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration, op. cit., p. 67.
56. See G.M. Kahin, op. cit., p. 3.
agonise Nasser on such a sensitive issue, not because he was thoroughly convinced of the Arab case, but because he was afraid that his refusal might give Pakistan an opportunity to exploit the situation and to defeat his attempt to forge close links with the Arab states. The support of India, however, unwilling as it might have been, appears to have been of great gain for Nasser, both internally and internationally.

There remained only one formal step to be taken for Nonalignment to become a world phenomenon. This was achieved when Nasser, Nehru and Tito met at Brioni in Yugoslavia, on July 18–19, 1956, who from then onwards came to be called the Big Three of the nonaligned world. Nonalignment was no more confined to Asia and Africa, but it an European power also became interested in it. The major significance of the Brioni meeting was, as the joint statement issued by the three leaders said, was that "The similarity in their approach in international questions has led to close cooperation among them." This has since become a feature of Nonalignment as practised by these three states, as shall be seen in subsequent pages, especially in respect of India and the United Republic.

57. Supra, n.54, p. 243.
The Suez Crisis:

It has been observed earlier that the origins of the Suez crisis lie very deep. More than the origins, the nature of the crisis is of importance for this study. It was a manifestation of the struggle for power between two forces. Resurgent Arab Nationalism and waning British and French imperialism. A third force viz., Israel's attempt to exploit this struggle in its own interests added a second dimension to its intensity.

None did perhaps express the significance of the first aspect of the struggle better and more forcefully than Gaitskell, the leader of the Opposition in the British House of Commons during a debate on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company by Nasser on July 26, 1956. Gaitskell drew a parallel between Nasser's policies and those of Hitler and Mussolini and then declared: "This episode must be recognised as part of the struggle for the mastery of the Middle East. That is something which I do not feel we can ignore... because of the prestige issues which are involved. If Colonel Nasser's prestige is put up sufficiently and ours..."


put down sufficiently, the effect in that part of the world will be that our friends will desert us because they think we are lost, and go over to Egypt. I have no doubt myself that the reason why Col. Nasser did this in the way he did - aggressively, brusquely, suddenly - was precisely because he wanted to raise his prestige in the rest of the Middle East...."

Nasser himself came very close to this when he told an Indian correspondent on September 16, 1966 that "The West was worried not so much about the Suez Canal as about Western prestige in the Arab world. The West believed that if it lost the battle in the Suez Canal it might be ousted from the Arab World."

The resurgence of Arab Nationalism and the waning of Colonialism were well reflected in the complete confidence with which Nasser acted throughout the crisis as against the blundering and bungling of the western, especially the British and French statesmen.

60. See Mideast Mirror, (Vol. 8, No. 38, September 23, 1966), p. 3. Nehru was also reported to have said that the nationalisation decision was symptomatic of the decline of Western power in Middle East and Asia - See The Hindu, 2 August, 1956.

61. See Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 57.
Nasser had already dealt blow after blow to western prestige and power in the Arab world by his aggressive Non-alignment. Prior to the Suez Crisis, the Northern Tier Alliance posed a great challenge to his Nonalignment. Nasser successfully withstood it and could carry practically the whole of the Arab world with him except the Iraqi leaders. Soon however, Nasser could make amends for this loss by forging firm links with Nehru and Tito at Brioni during their conference on July 18-19, 1956. It was evident to them as well as to the western leaders that this was a great blow to western policies in Asia as well as in Europe. Thus the calculated insult hurled at Nasser, the latest to join the ranks of non-aligned statesmen through the brusque and sudden withdrawal on July 19, 1956, of the proposed United States' loan for the Aswan Dam followed by Britain and the world Bank was as much a challenge to the newly forged unity between the three non-aligned nations as it was to Nasser's survival and leadership of the Arabs.

As one commentator has observed "Dulles and Eden were under no illusions about the importance of the Aswan Dam to Nasser as a symbol of revolutionary purpose and achievement, nor about the risks he would be prepared to take to achieve

his aim.... If, in search for an adequate weapon with which to strike back. Nasser grabbed the Canal, Dulles would not be unduly concerned. No matter what difficulties arose, he was confident that American know-how and ingenuity would overcome them. Eden hoped that dissident elements inside Egypt and anti-Nasser Arabism in other countries would revolt and overthrow Nasser before he had time to resort to drastic counter measures. If not, and Britain’s oil lifeline was threatened, Eden would be justified in sending troops back into the Canal Zone, and Nasser’s fate would be the same.

Dulles’ well-known contempt for Nonalignment and his statement that the withdrawal of the loan was to cut Nasser down to size, gave this act of his a touch of vengeance.

India And The Suez Base:

It is against this background that India’s policy during this crisis will be examined below. Nehru and Krishna Menon were with Nasser on their return flight from Brioné to Cairo when they appear to have heard of the withdrawal of the Asian aid over the radios. And on their arrival at Cairo in


the early hours of July 20, 1956, they got confirmation of the news at the airport itself. Nehru and Menon had a number of meetings with President Nasser and his colleagues during their two day stay in Cairo. No Communiqué was, however, issued by them. Nehru and Menon left Cairo on July 21, 1956. Nehru told Parliament on July 31, 1956 that "These discussions did not relate to the Suez Canal or any aspect of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The recent decision of the Egyptian Government in regard to the Suez Canal first came to my knowledge from the reports in the Press after my return to Delhi."

If this was the truth and there is nothing concrete to contradict it, it was clear evidence of the fact that Nasser had not confided in Nehru and that there was important differences between them on Anglo-UAR relations. These differences were reflected in the somewhat equivocal stand taken by India on the British evacuation of the Suez base. The Suez base and the Suez Canal were vital for India's defence and economic development. The Communiqué issued on June 9, 1953 by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers said "that the


66. Terence Robertson (op.cit., p.69), claims that Nehru was probably aware of it. But Nehru denied it again on August 8, 1956 in Parliament - See below, n.81.

69. See *Survey*, 1953, p. 163.
Prime Ministers recognised the international importance of the Suez Canal and of the effective maintenance of the military installations in the Canal Zone. They agreed that it is in the common interest that the outstanding issues in the Middle East should be settled on the basis of ensuring the peace and security of the Middle East countries consistently with the sovereignty of each, and promoting their social and economic development."

On his way home from this conference Nehru had talked with General Neguib who was then the President of the United Arab$ Republic and others, including Nasser, during his stopover at Cairo. Reporting to Parliament Nehru had nothing more to say than the observation that India's sympathy with national movements was well known. But it is known now that both Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan had stressed on the effective maintenance of the Suez base. Prof. Northedge has written that "...Help was eventually to come to Britain from the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers who conferred with Nasser on their way home from a Commonwealth

69. A part of these discussions were conducted between the UAR leaders, Nehru and the P.M. of Pakistan - Ibid.
70. F.C. Northedge, op.cit., p. 217.
Premiers' Conference in London, which ended with the issue of a communique insisting that the base must be effectively maintained. Their influence was brought to bear on the Egyptian leader in the sense of the communique and a further initiative, this time by the Pakistani charge d'affairs in Cairo, Tayeb Hussain, led to the resumption of informal talks by British and Egyptian teams at which progress was made with the two basic issues of the conditions of re-entry into the base and the status of British technicians who were to maintain the base after the evacuation.

Thus the evacuation treaty which gave Britain the right to return within a period of seven years in case of an attack on Arab countries or on Turkey coupled with Nasser's agreement to observe the 1888 convention regarding the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal was in accord with India's vital interests. Neither Britain nor the United States had raised the issue of free passage to Israeli ships at this stage. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind for, it was on this issue that the Anglo-French laid stress later during the crisis, thus perhaps provoking Israel in a way to attack Egypt, as shall be seen later.

During 1955 and early 1956 India and the United Arab Republic had occasions to differ, notably on Algeria.

71. See M.S. Rajan, India In World Affairs 1954-56, op.cit., pp. 573-576 for an account of the differences between India and other Afro-Asian nations on Algeria. Though...
even Israel as already indicated. At Brioni Nehru and Nasser, it would appear did not agree on the creation of a nonaligned bloc. Nehru was unwilling to be used by others. He did not want to commit himself and thus restrict his freedom of action which was basic to his foreign policy. As Sisir Gupta observed:

"What heightened India's suspicion of the use of such a conference was the fact that these conferences, while avoiding blocs, did tend to involve the participating countries in problems generated by any one of them."

Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company:

This difference in outlook was perhaps the reason why Nasser did not confide in Nehru, as he did in Tito, at any time, on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

(Continued from previous page)

2 Prof. Rajan does not make this clear, it would appear that India's conciliatory attitude towards France during 1965-66 stemmed from the fact that during this period the Government of India were conducting delicate negotiations with France about the evacuation of the French pockets in India. The treaty providing for de jure transfer of power was signed on May 28, 1956. Placing the copies of the treaty before the Parliament on the same day Nehru praised the French Government in very high terms - See The Hindu, 29 May, 1956.

72. India And Regional Integration In Asia, op.cit., p.69.

73. Tito said in his speech on November 11, 1966, at Pula that Nasser had told him about it in 1965. See Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism And Popular Revolt In Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press, 1966), p.537. However, when the decision was actually taken by Nasser, it appeared to have been kept a well guarded secret till the last moment. Bulganin too had pleaded ignorance of any such move being in the offering - See David J. Dallin, op.cit., p. 406.
Thus Nehru appeared to have been thoroughly unprepared for it when it came on July 26, 1956. It is not known whether the Indian Embassy in Cairo had any inkling of this and had reported the matter to the Government of India. However according to Sisir Gupta, "while there is no doubt that the decision to withdraw the Aswan Dam aid which followed the Brioni Conference was appearing to this group of nations as an attempt by the U.S. Secretary of State to deal a blow to the weakest link of the neutralist chain at this time, viz. Egypt, the violence of Egyptian reaction was unexpected and illustrated the inevitable involvement that it might imply in situations undesirable from the Indian point of view...." And according to Eden "when Egypt first seized the Suez Canal, the Indian Government showed some embarrassment, no doubt accentuated by the fact that Mr. Nehru had been the guest of Col. Nasser in Cairo only a few days before."

74. It is a little surprising here India could be unprepared, when the Anglo-French and U.S. leaders appeared to have feared some such reprisal by Nasser.

75. *India And Regional Integration In Asia*, op. cit., pp.69-70.

76. Eden, op. cit., p. 444.
It is thus not surprising that the Government of India took more than ten days to make their stand clear on the dispute. This Nehru did, in a lengthy statement in Parliament on August 8, 1966. India's immediate interests in the dispute were well summarised by Nehru in this speech: "The Government of India had to take a decision in the situation as it confronted them. India is not a disinterested party. She is a principal user of this water way, and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the disputes, not to speak of worse developments, in regard to it." He also pointed out that the Egyptian nationalisation was precipitated by the Aswan Dam decision of the U.S. Government in which the U.K. Government later joined. More than the decision, the way it was done, however Egypt's pride and self-respect and disregarded a people's sentiments. Nasser, himself, is reported to have said: "If you did not want to make the loan all that you needed to do was to say 'No!' plainly. Why add the excuses, and the insults about our economy! You just wanted to teach us a lesson before everybody in the world because we disagreed with a good deal of

78. Id., p. 531.
79. Id., p. 530 (Italics mine).
80. Cited in Herman Finer, op. cit., p. 566.
your policy — we had every right to do! We are sensitive, we like nice words!"

Nehru then pointed out that "The suddenness of the nationalisation decision and the manner in which it has been implemented may have contributed to the violent reaction. But the terms of the nationalisation itself under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that Government." Nehru again clarified that: "As I informed the House some days ago, the Suez Canal issue was not discussed between President Nasser and myself when we met recently. The consideration of it and the concerned decision must have been made later."

It is thus not clear what Nehru wanted or expected Nasser to do, or whether he wanted him to do anything at all, to face the challenge hurled at him by Dulles and Eden, especially, when it was realised that it was as much a challenge to the nonaligned nations as it was to Nasser. It is almost certain that if Nasser had not retaliated in kind to the western move, nonalignment would have received a body blow from which it might not have recovered. As Anthony Nutting has


83. No end of a lesson: The story of Suez (Constable, London 1967), p.47. This is the most authentic book on the subject coming as it does from a Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the Crisis. He resigned following the British attack on the UAR.
revealed, the nationalisation gave "Eden the challenge for which he had been waiting. Now at last he had found a pretext to launch an all-out campaign of political, economic and military pressures on Egypt and to destroy for ever Nasser's image as the leader of Arab nationalism." The decision to eliminate Nasser was taken by Eden as early as March 1, 1956. It was only when the British and French Governments had realised that Dulles' plan had boomeranged to their disadvantage and that Dulles was not prepared to use force against Nasser, that they began to conspire with Israel to commit the 'supreme folly' of aggression in the hope perhaps that Dulles might stay at least neutral if he could not join them willy nilly.

It is important to note that before coming out in support of the United Arab Republic, the Government of India waited to watch the situation in the Suez Canal which convinced them that it was being properly maintained by the former. So Nehru said: "The present decision of the Egyptian Government would appear to antedate the taking over by them of the Company." And that "The Egyptian Government have also reiterated that they will honour all their obligations arising from

84. Id., p. 17.
85. Id., pp.87, 90-99 and 100-109 for the full story.
86. Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 57.
88. Ibid.
international agreements, and in their reaffirmation have referred both to the convention of 1888 and to the Anglo-
Egyptian Agreement of 1954."

Nehru also said that the Government of India "have kept in close contact with Indonesia and Ceylon and with others who, broadly, have an approach and attitude similar to that of India on this question...." Among the others Yugoslavia must have been consulted. The Government of India appear to have consulted the Soviet Union, especially on the participation in the first London Conference proposed by Britain, U.S.A., and France, as the close similarity between the views of India and the Soviet Union would suggest. Nehru announced India's acceptance of the imitation to participate in the conference in his speech of August 18, 1956 in Parliament and said: "It has always been quite clear to the Government that they could not participate in any conference which bound its participants before hand as to the conclusions to be reached. The Government would equally decline participation in any arrangements for war preparations or sanctions or any step which challenged the sovereign rights of Egypt." He then took exception to the exclusion of Yugoslavia and

89. Id., p. 532.
90. Supra, n. 59, pp. 162-167.
91. Id., pp.530-531. This announcement appears to have preceded Nasser's own announcement. See Mideast Mirror, (Vol.8, No.32, August 11, 1956), p.2.
Burma from the list of invitees declaring that "The Government of India, therefore, do not subscribe to the appropriateness of the list of invitees."

"They have sought clarifications from the United Kingdom Government and feel assured that participation in the conference does not in any way imply that they are restricted to or bound by the approach and principles set out in the joint communique. They recognise that Egypt could not and would not participate in a conference on the Suez Canal to which she is merely an invitee and in respect of which there have been no consultations with her."

It was more important for Nehru and India that the Suez Canal was properly maintained and was not closed irrespective of the authority controlling it. Hence Nehru said: "India is passionately interested in averting a conflict..... The settlement of this problem, on the basis of the sovereignty and of dignity of Egypt, and by agreement amongst all concerned, and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence and of unilateral action by either party, are of the utmost concern to India."

92. Id., p. 531.
93. Id., p. 529.
So he regretted that "The French and the United kingdom Governments reacted to the Egyptian announcement quickly, sharply and with vehemence," and that "press reports of military and naval movements ordered by the United kingdom and France and some military measures in Egypt ...... have aggravated the situation. All this has influenced public opinion not only in Egypt but over the Arab world. In Asia as a whole, with its colonial memories, great resentment has been aroused." Therefore, Nehru was forced to state. "I have no desire to add to the passions aroused, but I would fail in my duty to this House and the country and even to all the parties involved in this crisis, and not least of all to Britain and France, if I do not say that threats to settle this dispute or to enforce their views in this matter by display or use of force, is the wrong way. It does not belong to this age and it is not dictated by reason. It fails to take account of the world as it is today and The Asia of today...... we deeply regret these reactions and the measures reported to be taken in consequence, and we express the hope that they will cease and the parties will enter into negotiations and seek peaceful settlements."

93. Id., p. 529.

94. Ibid.
That there was nothing original or striking in the stand taken by the Government of India at this stage may be seen from the fact that it was not very much different from the stand of the British Opposition as Gaitskell presented it to the House of Commons. He said: "It is difficult to find......in anything.....he (Nasser) has done, any legal justification for the use of force. What he may do in the future is another matter." He also mentioned that if nothing at all were done, it would have very serious consequences, for all of us and especially for the western powers." But he also cautioned against hasty and ill-considered actions by the British Government and said: "It is important that what we do should be done in the fullest possible co-operation with the other nations affected. We should try to settle this matter peacefully on the lines of the international commission as has been hinted. While force can not be excluded, we must be sure that the circumstances justify it and that it is, if used consistent with our belief in, and our pledges to the Charter of the UN and not in conflict with them."

Menon At The London Conference:

Whatever were the motives of the Government of India in agreeing to participate in the First London Conference on

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95. *Supra*, n.59(a) col. 1617.
Suez held during 16-23 August, 1966, the diplomacy of India as practised by Krishna Menon, with the support of Nehru, was directed first at the protection, and if possible, furtherance, of India's economic interests in the Suez Canal and then at the protection of United Arab Republic's rights and interests in the Canal. Krishna Menon did not mince words when he told the London Conference that India's stand was dictated as much by considerations of national self-interest as by the desire to assist and contribute to a peaceful settlement of the question. Menon's speech at the Conference was full of paradoxes on the one hand, he stated that the canal is an integral part of Egypt. On the other hand he claimed that "...it is necessary to state that this water way ..... has an international character." Again, he said: ".....the factual position is that the rulers of Egypt, whoever has sovereign power in Egypt, are really the people who can guarantee freedom of navigation." So, he said: "So far as the problem in this issue is concerned it lies in finding ways and means by which the Egyptian Government is under the obligations of law and of the Charter of the UN to carry out this particular obligation."

96. Suez Canal: Nationalisation After July 19 to September 13, 1956 (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, September 1956), pp. 51-72.
A little later he said "The question arises whether the present Egyptian Government would honour those obligations ..... they say they would honour those obligations....." In the same breath Menon pointed out, obviously, unmindful of the contradiction involved in it, that, "Therefore, since our interest in this Canal is not a political one, it is a user interest and that user interest can best be served by negotiation, by trying to make the interest a mutual one, by persuasion, by making Egypt a party to a solemn agreement which comes under the obligations of international law and of the charter of the UN."

Did Menon not believe in Nasser and the United Arab Republic Government? Was it true, after all, as Professor Finer, forcefully argues that "Menon hit at the root of the practical need for some kind of international reservation on the full sovereignty of Egypt: the reliability of the government of Egypt to fulfill its obligations. Nehru the cultivated aristocrat, who had twice met Nasser, at Bandung and Brioni, well understood the need for some, if minimal curbs on the uncouth dictator's powers? For, Holding Suez, Nasser had a struggle hold on India also."

That there is truth in this observation may be seen from a careful examination of the 'Menon Plan' proposed at the London Conference. Menon proposed to bind the United Arab Republic to a revision of the 1888 convention to include provisions concerning equitable tolls and charges, the proper maintenance of the canal, the association of international interests with the new Corporation for the Suez Canal and to the creation of a consultative body of user interests to be formed on the basis of geographical representation and interests charged with advisory, consultative and liaison functions. The United Arab Republic was also to transmit to the United Nations annual reports of the Corporation operating the Canal. The plan was said to have been formed after wide consultations, including w/c Aly Sabry, the Political Adviser to Nasser, who was present in London during the Conference period. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the Menon Plan was not entirely in accord with the sovereign rights of the United Arab Republic. Nasser was, therefore, right when he said in 1958 that

98. See Texts of Documents, op.cit., pp.249-250. Also Supra, n.96, pp. 73-74.
100. Thus Walter Hippimann wrote that "The end result of the two approaches (Menon's and West's) might have had little real difference" — See The Hindu, 21 September, 1966.
"with the exception of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, all stood for the internationalisation of the Suez Canal." He would have, therefore, rejected the plan.

It has, however, to be pointed out, to be fair to Menon, that he did not say or believe that his plan was a solution of the problem. He said that it was only a proposal for negotiations. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of this plan meant that it would have furthered the Soviet aim of gaining a foothold in the control of the Canal. And Menon might have, on the other hand, calculated that India would be the most likely acceptable choice for the chairmanship of the Canal Consultative body, which would secure it a key position in the management of the Canal.

There was another paradox in Menon's stance, to which Nehru himself was a party. Menon repeated Nehru's view that the nationalisation of the canal company "was an act within the competence of the Egyptian Government." And, following Nehru's example, he added: "I think, however, that my Government would like it to be stated that there are, in the manner

102. Supra, n. 96, p.


104. Supra, n.96, p. 55.
in which the nationalisation was carried out, features which have led to the present aggravated situation. We would like to have seen that nationalisation carried out in the normal way of international expropriation, where there is adequate notice, and the way of taking over is less dramatic. 'This was injudicious in the part of both the leaders. They could not have forgotten the motive behind the Anglo-American withdrawal of the Aswan Dam aid! Menon himself told the London Conference that: "We also say that, in international affairs, when we have to deal with countries, it is the approach of my Government that we have to take their internal structures and their administrations and their Government as they are; it is not possible for us to approach problems by first desiring a change of government or constitution or personal in another country."

But what may be said to be the supreme paradox in Menon's stand was to unfold when Menon recommended the Menzies Mission to Nasser on the ground that "Any attempt at conciliation deserves Indian support. We certainly will not


do anything which would throw a hurdle in the way of negotiations...." It is difficult to say whether Kenon thought that Nasser would start negotiations on the basis of these proposals. Nehru, however, told Parliament on September 13, 1956 that "The Menzies Mission which recently visited Cairo asked the Egyptian Government to accept international control of operation and administration and the establishment of an international corporation displacing the Egyptian National Corporation. Egypt has declined to accept them as being contrary to her sovereign rights and not related to the purposes of the convention of 1888 and the interest of users, which are freedom of navigation toll, maintenance of the canal, etc., which the Egyptian Government alone can guarantee."

In the same speech Nehru pointed out that the western proposal to set up a Suez Canal users Association was full of dangerous potentialities for it was unacceptable to the United Arab Republic. "It is clear," he said, "that the action

109. Supra, n. 102, pp. 365-366.
111. Id., p. 532.
proposed is not the result of agreement, but is in the nature of an imposed action" and that "It is not calculated to secure to the users peaceful and secured use of the canal which is and should be what is required by the users and the international community."

With reference to the reply given by the Government of the United Arab Republic to the Menzies Mission, proposing negotiations, Nehru said: "The reply of the Egyptian Government has opened a way to negotiations. In the view of the Government of India, such negotiations could have led to a settlement which would have met all requirements of the users and the international community without prejudice to or derogation of the sovereignty of Egypt and has national rights in respect of the Canal which is admittedly an integral part of Egypt." He then pointed out that he had written to the Prime Minister of England and the President of the United States on these lines. Nehru issued a further appeal to them to negotiate with Nasser and added that "To seek to impose a settlement by force or by threats of force is to disregard the rights of nations even as the failure to observe international treaties and obligations would be."


Nehru also regretted that Britain, France, Italy and others had withdrawn their pilots from the Suez Canal: "This is an action not calculated to promote the use of the canal and is not in the interest of user nations. The Government of India is desirous that no statement of theirs should come in the way of efforts to lower tension and to open the way for negotiations. But, they cannot fail to point out that the steps announced to assume the operation of the canal without the consent and cooperation of the Egyptian Government are calculated to render peaceful approach extremely difficult and also carry with them the grave risk of conflict. I should like to say that I have read the report of Sir Anthony Eden's speech with surprise and regret as it appears to close the door to further negotiations. The action envisaged in it is full of dangerous potentialities and for reaching consequences."

Nehru ended his speech with the reminder: "As I have stated previously the proper functioning of the Suez Canal is of vital importance to India. We are convinced, however, that this can only be achieved through a peacefully negotiated settlement ensuring the rights not only of Egypt but of all the user countries."

114. Id., pp. 533-534.
115. Id., p. 534.
This was then the dominant theme of India's diplomacy. The west believed that this was in favour of Nasser. It was so only because the western stand had no basis, as many including, Gaitskell, pointed out quite clearly. It was not so because India was pro-UAR. Explaining his proposals tabled at the first London Conference on Suez, to a press conference, Menon said, on the day following, that he sought "to obtain enforcement and regulation of all political problems by treaty obligations." More significant was his observation that "My plan does not involve the abdication of the position the Western Powers have taken upon internationalisation. They can keep that position. But we must find a position between the western and defacto position of Egypt. The purpose of negotiations is to alter the position of both sides." And "we are trying to get a workable arrangement." Thus India was certainly not partisan in the dispute as Professor Rajan has said.

Nehru Criticises Nasser:

Then on September 23 Nehru stated at a public meeting in New Delhi that: "I would, however, say that the way Egypt

118. See The Hindu, 24 September, 1956. Much is made of this statement of Nehru by Indians claiming that our style was different from that of the UAR. As has been shown above this was a rather tall claim, and in the context in which it was made it was highly injudicious.
took hold of the Suez Canal was not ever way. We follow a different way, but who are I to criticise others? Our way is a little different. If they had followed a different way so many difficulties would not have arisen. But they had a right to follow their own method."

All this led to a suspicion among the Arabs about India's position in the dispute. The Economic Weekly, in its issue of October 6, 1956, drew attention to these misgivings and sought to dispel them. It wrote, "some observations of Pandit Nehru... have caused misgivings. Not only within the country, but in the entire Arab world there is growing suspicion about New Delhi's Suez diplomacy. Pandit Nehru's statement, that New Delhi does not approve of the manner in which Egypt has assumed control over the canal, seems to have deepened these suspicions."

Coming as it did, after Nehru's statement in Parliament in September 13, 1956, it could not but give rise to suspicions even if it were assumed that the real motives behind the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam aid, were forgotten by Nehru. If it were assumed that by...this the danger of conflict were removed, there was no ground for such assumption.

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120. See Herman Finer, op. cit., p. 268 for this view.
121. Even the Eastern Economist expressed surprise at the "bellicose tone of the British P.M.'s first statement" after the failure of Menjies Mission. It also pointed out that Nasser's willingness to negotiate a new convention does in fact, contain promise, and it seems unwise

Contd....
In the light of these developments giving rise to suspicions regarding the stand of India, it is difficult to agree with the view that "The firmness and promptness with which Nehru pointed out the risk of war inherent in the proposal of establishing a users' Association was probably responsible for the Anglo-French decision to take the dispute to the UN ...." This is, to say the least, an attempt to blow too high the Indian balloon.

To see things in their proper perspective one has to take into consideration the fact that there were other states who were equally prompt and firm in condemning the Users' Associations an act of prevocation and violation of the 1888 convention. The Soviet Union was foremost in the field. Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin addressed more or less identical letters to Prime Ministers Eden and Mollet on September 13 and to the UN and the Soviet press was actively...

(continued from previous page)

for any country, or for the world at large to decline such an offer. Why has they been done, and the threat of force presented so early." The Journal asked — See Eastern Economist, 14 September 1956, p. 382.


123. For the contents of Bulganin's letter — See Eden, op.cit., pp. 486-487.
engaged in denouncing the colonial nature of the western stand on the crisis. Moreover, there were differences between England and the U.S. over the use of force. At a Press Conference on September 11, 1956, Eisenhower ruled out the possibility of the use of force against Nasser. Two days later, Dulles told a press Conference: "We do not intend to shoot our way through" the Suez Canal and "would...send our vessels around the cape...." According to Elizabeth Monroe, Britain and France took the problem to the Security Council "as much to forestall appeal to the UN by others than out of faith in its supposedly slow mechanism." Above all, Nasser had declared: "We shall not allow the western-proposed canal Users' Association to function in the canal."

Menon At The UN:

While these developments were taking place Menon was going from capital to capital to seek concessions from all sides. He arrived in Cairo on September 17 on the invitation of Nasser and had a series of discussions with him during his four days' stay in Cairo. Prof. Finer claims that:

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125. Supra, n.102, p. 333.
126. Id., pp. 337-341.
127. Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p. 197.
128. Mideast Mirror, Supra, n.1109.
was reported that India had induced him (Nasser) to agree to some form of international control of the level of canal dues, the factor in the dispute of most importance to India." On September 24, Menon arrived in London for talks with Selwyn Lloyd and other British ministers. He returned to Delhi a few days later. In the first week of October he arrived in Cairo again on his way to New York as the question has since been taken to the UN Security Council. Menon also halted at London on his way to New York from Cairo.

Once in New York, Menon began intense diplomatic parleys outside the Security Council as India was not a member of the Security Council. The result was a revised version of the 'Menon Plan' presented at the first London Conference in August 1956. Menon presented this revised plan to the Foreign Minister of Britain, France and the U.A.R. as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The haste with which Menon did all this suggests that India did not want the Security Council to take any decision which did not include its views and which might go against its vital interests in the Suez Canal. This type of activity was not, however, now

130. See Texts of Documents, op.cit., pp. 257-269. This plan was later published by Al Gumhouria on October 21, 1956, and was officially announced in New Delhi on October 24, 1956. See Mideast Mirror (Vol. 8, No.43, August 28, 1956), p.11. The text is at pp. 8-10.
for Menon. He did much the same thing two years earlier, during the Geneva talks on Indo-China. Menon's anxiety was, obviously to present his own plan before the Security Council could take a decision.

This plan of Menon is only of historical interest now. It differed only slightly from the first 'Menon Plan'. As the *Eastern Economist* wrote: "The revised Indian plan was worse than the original Menon plan where it contemplated no advisory function for the users' association; it was better where it laid down that tolls could not be increased within 12 months without the prior agreement of the users' association. Otherwise the two plans were virtually identical." Professor Rajan claims that "In some respects (e.g. in the recognition of the Users' Association) they were more favourable to the users than the western plan." They might have thus found expression in the Anglo-French draft resolution, the first part of which was approved by the Security Council on October 13, while the second part, the operative part, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Eden, however, finds a different origin for the

133. *India In World Affairs*, op. cit., p. 162.
Anglo-French draft proposal. Similarly, the Indian plan might have had the approval of Egypt broadly, for it was worse than the original Menon plan where it contemplated nonadvisory function for the users' association...."as the Eastern Economist" put it. No wonder, if "India was, therefore, doubly pleased at the Security Council resolution." 138

Nehru Miscalculates:

But India's pleasure was to prove misplaced and short lived. It was on October 16, just three days after the adoption of the Security Council resolution that Eden decided finally to use force against the UAR, in the company of France and Israel, who had already prepared their plans for an attack on Egypt. 140 The Government of India were entirely unaware of these developments, "We had hoped", Nehru later confessed 141 in the Lok Sabha on November 16, 1966, "however, that after the Security Council's resolution, more peaceful methods would be adopted to solve this dispute." There was, in fact, no ground


137. Supra, n.131.

138. Supra, n.132.

139. Eden, op.cit., p.510. According to Anthony Nutting (op.cit.,p.87) the collusion started on October 13,1966.


for such hopes for various reasons. For as Anthony Nutting says, neither Eden nor Mollet, the French Premier, were in favour of a compromise with Nasser. They, therefore, did not welcome the concessions made by Nasser in deference to the views of Nehru and his Arab colleagues. Nutting has further said that they even tried to subvert the talks with Fawzi and Hammerskjöld when Fawzi accepted the Sim Principles proposed by the British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd.

Another indication of the British intentions was that Eden had, at this time, informed the Conservative Party Conference that force could not be excluded for a solution to the dispute. Similarly the mood in France was extremely hostile to Nasser. Further the Soviet Union was experiencing difficulties with the Eastern European countries, especially in Hungary, where the Communist Party had rehabilitated Imre Nagy on October 13. And on October 27, the Soviet Union


143. Id., p. 76.

144. Eden, op. cit., p. 508.

145. Supra, Chapter III, n. 51.

announced that England, France and Israel had decided on October 23 to attack the United Arab Republic. The first Soviet armed intervention in Hungary occurred on October 24. According to Professor Finer, the Israeli attack on the United Arab Republic which was scheduled for a later date was brought forward to October 29, mainly to take advantage of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. For, "It would enable Israel to achieve a victory without interference either from the United States or from the United Nations. Moreover, the total impotence that the United Nations could be expected to display, in any attempt it might make to apply a civilised standard to the brutalities of the Soviet in Hungary, might result in some understanding and condonation of the action of Israel. If the United States could not apply the moral law and the Charter to Russia, could it fairly apply them to Israel? One law for both, or no law for either?"

Moshe Dayan himself has admitted that perhaps the Sinai Campaign would not have been launched, if the Soviet

147. See David J. Dallin, op. cit., p. 42 and Finer, op. cit., p. 342.

148. Op. cit., p. 363. See also Survey, 1956-58, pp. 56-57. Indeed, the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam Aid by Dulles also appears to have been influenced by Soviet preoccupation with its Eastern European satellites - See Survey, 1956-58, p. 304.

threat of rockets had come earlier, instead of on November 5, 1956, owing to the situation in Hungary. It is not difficult to say that these were also the calculations of Britain and France. Eden appears to have been confident that the Soviet leaders understood the special interests of the west in the Arab world.

**Nehru Condemns The Aggressors:**

The Government of India and the External Affairs Ministry, however, were so much confident that "the danger of war was over", that their Ambassadors to Cairo and London were both permitted to come to India for rest during the second half of October, 1956 and they had to rush to their places as soon as Israel launched its aggression, as Nehru told Parliament on November 20, 1956. It is a measure of India's unpreparedness that Nehru had to confess in Parliament on November 16, 1956 his ignorance of the developments after October 13, 1956. He said: "whether there was any previous consultation among the aggressor countries, I do not know."

The attack on the United Arab Republic was the one thing Nehru and Menon wanted to avoid, at all costs, since

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any hostilities would affect the functioning of the Suez Canal and jeopardise India's economy. The methods employed by Nehru and Menon, however, do not appear to have been either imaginative or affective. Indian diplomacy appears to have been too much preoccupied with attempts to revise tolls and freight charges and to have overlooked to a certain extent the deeper issues involved in the conflict, and the possibility of Israel exploiting the situation for its own purposes. This could have been foreseen perhaps with a little more of imagination. The aggression destroyed, though only for the time, Nehru's cherished views of Britain as a Commonwealth nation. The fact that India was a Commonwealth nation with regular contacts and consultations with Britain and other Commonwealth nations, the failure of Britain to consult India on such a crucial issue, and Eden's refusal to listen to India's pleas for compromise, appear to have contributed to Nehru's reaction to the British action. Besides, the Anglo-French attempt to recapture the Suez Canal and to overthrow Nasser, were dangerous moves from the point of view of weak Afro-Asian nations. No wonder, then, that Nehru was

154. Answering Acharya Kripalani's criticism that our diplomats abroad failed to sense this, Nehru said that nobody had sensed it and that how they could do it was more than he could understand, Supra, nosp. 151, col. 586.

155. Id., col. 587.
indignant at the aggressors. He had no hesitation in denouncing the aggression as 'dastardly action'. Possibly Nehru also wanted to make amends for his earlier criticism of the policies of the United Arab Republic Government.

Equally quick was Nehru's demand for the withdrawal of the forces of the three aggressors. India's diplomacy was then directed to achieve this objective in the shortest possible time. Fortunately for India, not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but the Commonwealth and a large part of Afro-Asia demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces from the United Arab Republic. The United States took the lead in demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces through a draft resolution introduced on October 29, which was vetoed by England and France. A similar Soviet resolution was also vetoed by England and France. Then, Yugoslavia, prompted by India from outside, took the initiative by introducing a motion under the 'Uniting For Peace' resolution of 1950, calling for a special emergency session of the General Assembly, which was accepted by the

156. See The Hindu, 2 November 1966. Nehru did this at a public meeting at Hyderabad on the occasion of the inauguration of the new state of Andhra Pradesh. I was one of the many privileged to listen to Nehru on the occasion.


158. Ibid.
Security Council on October 31, 1966. Thus the Anglo-French attempt to paralyse the United Nations was defeated. The Assembly passed the United States sponsored resolution on November 2 demanding an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines of 1949.

India also supported Canada's proposal for the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force, a peace keeping force. Nehru, however, refused to sever the Commonwealth link with Britain, even temporarily, as suggested by Rajagopalachari, to force Britain to vacate aggression, though he appears to have threatened to do so, if the other Commonwealth nations, especially Canada and Australia, had supported England. Such a step would have been, perhaps, detrimental to India's economy, which was already affected by the closure of the Suez Canal as a result of British and French attack. Nehru, however, conceded that India's association with the Commonwealth could not be taken for granted. Fortunately for him and India,

160. Id., pp. 28-29 and 35.
161. Supra, n.151, cols. 596-597.
162. See The Hindu, November 5, 1956.
163. Robertson, op.cit., p.179.
164. Supra, n.160. See also The Hindu, November 10, 1956.
the Anglo-French forces were withdrawn from the United Arab Republic in the last week of December, 1956, giving place to the UNEF consisting of forces from India, Canada and some other countries. This withdrawal was achieved by a combined pressure from the United States, the Commonwealth and an outraged public opinion at home, especially in England.

Thus, as Professor Rajan has rightly concluded: "Even though the sympathies of the Government and people of India over the dispute were with Egypt, they were equally animated by friendly feelings towards the west—more especially Britain. They were certainly not partisan in their role . . . . not only because that would not be conducive to a mutually acceptable settlement (which was the final objective of their efforts), but also because of India's own vital interests in keeping the Suez Canal free and open."

The Government of India appear to have put as much pressure on the United Arab Republic for concessions, as upon the Governments of U.K. and U.S. According to Professor Rajan,


166. Supra n. 119.

167. Ibid., The Economic Weekly (Vol.VIII, Nos.51 & 52, December 22, 1956) wrote: "Both the Indian P.M. and President Tito are known to have exercised a restraining influence on President Nasser...." According to Nutting (op.cit., p.74) some Arab States also brought pressure on Nasser.
again, "objective western observers conceded that to India was due much of the credit for moderation and restraint in the actions and opinions of the Egyptian Government throughout the acute phase of the Suez crisis." No wonder that Indo-British relations were not overstrained either during the crisis or after it. In fact they quickly returned to normalcy soon after the crisis, no doubt due to the success of U.S. efforts in forcing the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from Suez.

It would thus appear that there was some truth in Asoka Mehta's criticism of India's stand on the Suez crisis. Speaking in the debate on the international situation in Parliament on November 19, 1956, he drew a parallel between India's stand on Algeria and the Suez Crisis. Pointing out the lack of firmness in India's stand Mehta said: "The result is both the French and the British Governments were emboldened and, perhaps, they thought they could get away with this kind of treatment or with this kind of adventure in Egypt. I am not saying that if we had taken a firm stand earlier these things would not have happened, but I feel that our record would have been much stronger, our moral voice would have had

much greater authority if we had functioned in an unequivocal manner all through."

Apart from moral considerations, a more unequivocal stand would have perhaps saved the situation. Such criticism could be made against the United States too, and, has, indeed, been made by an Indian scholar. According to Professor Finer, there is enough evidence to believe that many in the state Department knew of the proposed attack on the United Arab Republic. The United States, if it had been more careful, could have prevented the Israeli attack. Commenting on Eisenhower's two cables to Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Premier, on the eve of the attack, Moshe Dayan, has said that "The terms of both messages were general and could be 'swallowed'."

In the words of Graham Spray, "The response and policy of the Government of Canada... was instinctive but not unconsidered and unprepared.... The possibility of military action by the UK, however, had not been wholly ignored from the moment when further British forces began to move after 2 August


to Malta and Cyprus." All they did was to issue warnings. Nothing appears to have been done to prevent it.

While the United States and Canada could be indifferent to the fate of Nasser and would have welcomed his downfall, India and Nehru could not be so indifferent. Indeed, India had a moral obligation to protect the interests of the United Arab Republic as the leading champion of Nonalignment of which Nasser had become a crusader. Thus India's inability to keep abreast of the developments, especially in the crucial stages of a crisis of such vital importance to its own security and economy, as well as to international peace, which appears to have been responsible for its failure to act with more foresight and forethought, was most unfortunate. India, however, made amends for this failure after aggression.

*India And Israel:

This study would be incomplete without an examination of India's attitude towards Israel's claim for freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for more reasons than one. On the one hand, a western writer 173 has claimed that "The origins


This study was intended to cover the events upto the Suez Crisis of 1956 originally and was completed in its major form before the June 1967 West Asian crisis. It has since been revised to include a brief-very brief mention of this crisis also.
of the Suez crisis lie in Israel, where the decision to fight a preventive war was deliberately timed to take advantage of what Israeli leaders thought to be widespread disenchantment with Colonel Nasser and his policies ...." This, however, appears to be an oversimplification. On the other hand, India's stand has been depicted as almost immoral by writers like Professors Herman Finer and Michael Brecher.  

What gave importance to the Israeli claim for free passage was the western attempt, in their anxiety to prove Nasser's 'Hitlerism', and to give undue importance to it, completely forgetting that the blockade of Israel was not Nasser's policy and also overlooking the fact that "the case of Israel was an exception that had been tolerated by the Canal Company, by the UN, and by the world opinion generally for five years." Even Gaitskell fell victim to this error. He said "......if there is anything he has done which would

174. Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, op.cit., Chapter 5. Here Professor Brecher is critical of India's refusal to extend diplomatic relations to Israel. Professor Brecher's partiality for Israel is well illustrated by the fact that in this book he devotes one full chapter to Israel. No other state of Asia, not even communist China receives such treatment. Prof. Brecher came out with a categorical assertion during the Arab-Israel war of June 1967 on the 'immorality' of the Indian stand. See letters to the Editor, The Hindu, 21 June 1967. See P. Kodanda Rao's sitting reply to Prof. Brecher in The Hindu, June 27, 1967. Also see below n. 199.


176. Supra, n. 95.
justify force at the moment, it is one thing on which we have never used force — the stopping of Israel's ships."

But as Anthony Nutting has revealed in January 1954, Eden had held almost emphatically that, as an Arab country still in a state of war with Israel, Egypt had an arguable claim, under Article 10 of the Constantinople Convention governing the Suez Canal to deny passage to Israeli ships as a measure necessary to 'assure the defence of Egypt'. Selwyn Lloyd had written a minute to the Prime Minister denying that Egypt had any such rights and, on learning this, Eden had waxed very angry and hastened to correct his Minister of State." And in an interview granted to press men on October 9, 1969, Nasser said, inter alia: "As for the state of war, I was amazed when the British Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, asked me via the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to send him a letter promising not to apply to British ships what we are applying to Israeli ships. This took place in 1956 after the failure of the aggression against Egypt when the occupation forces were obliged to withdraw; Mr. Lloyd's point of view on the situation included a frank recognition that there was a state of war existing between us and Israel...."

Another question is had the canal been free for navigation always under the western Powers? The answer is an emphatic negative, as Krishna Menon revealed at the first London Conference. And, according to Freda Utley there is another "interesting fact ...... that when Rommel was only fifty miles from the Canal in 1943, President Roosevelt sought assurances that Britain was prepared to blow up the Canal if necessary — despite the provision of the Convention that the Canal was to remain open in time of war as well as in peace."

As against all this, India's stand as stated by Menon at the London Conference was that this dispute should be settled at the world Court. Professor Finer is indignant at this stand. Nehru, he writes "was as calm as a marble god about Israel's troubles." But he does not know, or would not wish or care to know that Nehru did not say a single word against Israel till it committed aggression on the United Arab Republic. And the fact that India had either recognised Israel or that Nehru had always reservations on the Arab attitude towards Israel till this aggression, do not matter much for either Prof. Finer or Prof. Brecher. And "Menon", says the former, …

179. Supra, n.96, pp. 56-57.
181. Supra, n. 178.
183. Id., p. 159.
"knew surely, that the Security Council had rejected the claim of Egypt's, and he also knew the hazards not only of getting a decision from the court, but even if it was ever obtained, of getting it carried out."

It was not India's fault, however, if the Security Council and its members had failed to enforce its decision. Indeed this was Nasser's charge against the UN. As he told Hassanain Heikal on June 30, 1959, "It is strange that Israel should demand today that a recommendation should be obeyed, while the whole world witnesses Israel trampling a long and successive number of resolutions adopted by the UN in the interest of Palestine people. It has even gone past the mere violations of these resolutions to planning crimes of murder against the representatives of the United Nations." That Nasser was quite right was once again proved by Israel in its inhuman killing of Indian troops of the UNEF in June 1957.

Similarly, India is not to be blamed or hauled up for the ineffectiveness of the world Court. If the South West African case could be taken to the World Court, why not the Israeli claim against the U.A.R.? Is there any other way out for the peaceful solution of such intractable disputes?

Professor Finer speaks as if Nehru and Menon had committed a great sin in suggesting that the matter be referred to the world Court. His chauvinistic bias is evident from his observation that: "The world .... had tried hard to develop and to some extent has succeeded in developing, international officials whose loyalty is to a service, a function, and not a nation or nations. How could a juvenile from the primitive Nile village of Beni Mer, not anxious to study hard at school and nurtured all his life in nationalistic vendettas in army barracks and in the streets rise to such a civilised conception?" This is a reference to Nasser and his criticism of the World Bank as a political institution. Perhaps, Nasser was more than justified, when the Bank's loan offer for the Aswan High Dam, which was conditional upon the U.S.A.'s and U.K.'s offers, fell through, when the latter withdrew their offers. Prof. Finer seems to feel that the World Bank was more unbiased than the World Court. On does he mean that while the former could be influenced by the Big Powers, the latter could not be?

**Israeli Charges Against Nasser:**

Nasser has also been charged by Israel and its supporters everywhere, that he wants to destroy Israel, at the

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earliest opportunity. Eden, for example, wrote: "I thought then, and I think now, that the Israelis had justification for their action. It is at least a grim possibility that they would not be a free nation today had they not taken it." This is patently meaningless. If this were the truth, it is difficult to understand the reasons for Eden's efforts to hide his collusion with Israel, resulting in the crude Anglo-French Ultimatum to Israel and the UAR, which has been justly condemned by all decent people all over the world. Eden perhaps did not realise that his diplomacy did not bring England the gratitude of Israel. On the other hand, it provoked the contempt of Moshe Dayan: "I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of complicating matters to such a degree." Had Eden been alive, he could have perhaps derived satisfaction from the fact that Dayan had placed Britain in good company, that of the Almighty!


However, Nutting has a different story to tell; that Britain had supplied more arms to the United Arab Republic than Russia had done.

To disprove this charge against Nasser it is necessary to give certain expert opinions of western writers. According to Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, "Hostile propaganda has him perpetually threatening the destruction of Israel, but in none of his speeches have I found that he has gone beyond the statements made to the New York Times correspondent published as an interview on October 6, 1956: "War is not an easy decision for any one, especially for me. No Arab is saying now that we must destroy Israel. The Arabs are asking only that the refugees (from Palestine) receive their natural right to life, their lost property, which was promised to them by the UN resolutions seven years ago .... No, we are not aggressive. The threat is from the other side."

"Of course, in the flood of propaganda which powers constantly out of the Cairo press and radio, there have been many threats of direct vengeance on Israel, some of them made by persons in authority. The Israelis argue that in an

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authoritarian state, such as Egypt, the mass media of communication are rigidly controlled, and what is said must therefore reflect the policy of the responsible authorities. This ignores the nature of propaganda, which is not necessarily a statement of intentions of those who control the propaganda sources, but is a mode of inducing a desired frame of mind in those who listen to it. Thus it can properly be deduced that the Egyptian propaganda masters want the Arab population believe that Egypt implacably hostile to Israel and proposes, at some indefinite time in the future, to go to war with the object of overwhelming the Israeli state. But it is not proof that they are actually planning to do so."

Burns writes further that Nasser could not pursue the plan of forging a United Arab Nation and "simultaneously wage an all-out war against Israel." But "If the Union of Arab states under a strong central Government could be achieved ..... the balance of power, economic and eventually military, would turn against Israel, and the settlement of the Palestine Question on terms satisfactory to the Arabs could be achieved by economic and military pressure. This possibility was by no means ignored by the Israelis."

192. Ibid.
According to Georgiana Stevens, "In 1953 and 1954, the period of the new regime's first struggles, Egypt's actions in regard to Palestine reflected the general remoteness of that issue from Egyptian life. An effort was made to keep the Palestine issue quiescent so as to prevent any further military encounters on the uneasy Israel - Gaza border. At this stage Egypt had neither the capacity nor the interest to stage an attack on Israel and preferred to be as free of the whole problem as was politically possible." And Erskine B. Childers has observed that till the Gaza raid by Israeli forces in February 1956 "The Egyptian revolutionary regime had ..... evinced signs of at the least - wishing to reduce the Arab-Israeli tension." That this was true is evident from the fact that "There were minor agreements between the two countries - such as the shipping agreement of July 23, 1953 concluded under the auspices of the United Nations."

And to quote Burns again "Gamal Abdel Nasser told me when I first met him on November 16, 1954, that it was his


desire that there should be no trouble on the north-eastern border of Egypt, no disturbance of the six years of quiescence of the armistice regime, no military adventures. But after the shock of February 28, 1955, as he told me and many others, he could no longer maintain such an attitude. Shortly before the raid, he said, he had visited Gaza and had told the troops that there was no danger of war; that the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line was not going to be a battle front. After that many of them had been shot in their beds. Never again could he risk telling the troops they had no attack to fear; never again could he let them believe that they could release their vigilance...."

What then was the reason for the success of the Israeli propaganda against Nasser? In Burns' words: "The US Jewish Community, through its economic power especially as related to many media of mass information under the leadership of the well-organised Zionist pressure groups, exerts an influence.

(Continued from previous page)

It was after this raid and Israel's refusal to accept UNTSO proposals to reduce frontier tension that Nasser accepted the organisation of the fedayin for raids into Israel - See Esskins B. Children, op.cit., pp. 98-99; Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 56. Burns, op.cit., pp. 84-86.

on United States policy which goes far beyond what might be calculated from a counting of the so-called 'jewish vote'.

"Over many years, it is only Israel's side of the Palestine story which has been presented to Americans ... The picture of Israel as a small nation gallantly struggling to rebuild existence in its ancient home ..... is accepted by the majority of non-Jewish Americans and Canadians, especially those Christians who believe fervently in Biblical inspiration ....."

This is an understatement and does not explain the western attitude in full. The Jewish propaganda comes in handy for the United States to fulfil its desire to keep the Arab Arab world under its domination. Israel is only a pretext or a tool. Perhaps Israel also realises this well. Its very creation was a product of this desire. The western Powers and the United States were warned well in advanced by the King – Crane Commission instituted by the latter, of the consequences and the untenability of the Zionist claims of a home-land in Palestine. The United States just shelved the report.

197. See Harvey Day, "A Peep Into History : Oil Tickles Desert Guns To Boom In West Asia," The Hindu (Weekly Magazine), 18 June, 1967. Harvey Day explodes another myths of western or Jewish origin viz., that Jews alone are gifted or talented people, that there is no Biblical support for the Jewish claim for a home and for Palestine.
Thus, there is no substance in the western claim that their support to the Zionist claim was a result of humanitarianism. This would simply mean that the western Powers did not believe that the one million and odd Arab Palestinians who were mercilessly driven out from Palestine to give place to Jewish immigrants from Europe, constitute a part of humanity, so that their rights and feelings could be trampled upon under the self-styled humanitarianism of the Colonial Powers. The manner in which the Palestine Mandate was framed, bears testimony to this fact. There is thus, not the slightest exaggeration in what Professor Mohammad Habib said of Israel, in a talk over the All India Radio on June 14, 1967: "The State of Israel is

198. See Cecil V. Crabb Jr., Supra, n.196. Of course, many Arabs accept this theory. They seem to be appealing to the good sense of the western Powers without any effect so far—See Clovis Maksoud, 'Israel. The Basis of Arab case', The Hind 18 August 1967 for an excellent statement of Arab case against Israel and the west.

199. It is alleged that the Mandate was based on drafts prepared by Zionists. See G.A. Nasser, The Philosophy of The Revolution (op.cit., pp.61-63) for quotations from Weizmann's memoirs. See also Mohammad El-Hadi Afifi The Arabs And The United Nations (Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., London, 1964), p. 54, n.2.

200. See G.S. Bhargava, ed., India And West Asia : A Survey of Public Opinion (Popular Book Services, New Delhi-3, 1967) p. 46. If Indians point out the colonial and racial origins of Israel, it does not seem sound to argue, as Prof. Brecher does (See above chapter n.63 ) that India's attitude to Israel is shaped by anti colonial and racial feelings. Also see above n. 174.
not the product of Jewish culture but one of the most cruel types of European Jewish Colonialism that the world has seen."

**Israel wants Military Superiority:**

Having created Israel through pressure tactics of the worst kind ever used by a Great Power in the United Nations, the United States undertook to maintain a militarily superior Israel in the Arab world. For it was realised that Israel could not exist without such support as was evident during the first war between the Arabs and Israel, in which the latter was rescued by the western powers, led by the United States, once again through the machinery of the United Nations. This was the policy enunciated by the United States and its allies in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 as already indicated.

Israel was naturally encouraged by this support and began to exert pressure on the western powers to force the Arabs to recognise its existence and to grant it freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, which the Arabs were unwilling to do, even under the rule of decadent monarchs and corrupt governments which depended upon the western powers for their very existence. The efforts of Israel, however, resulted in

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the Security Council Resolution of 1951, recommending the freedom of passage to Israel in the Suez Canal.

But when Britain signed with Nasser the treaty for the evacuation of the Suez base, Israel began to develop cold feet. In a typical statement on October 19, 1954, the Israeli Foreign Ministry bemoaned: "it is more than ever necessary that Egypt should be called upon to respect its international obligations and to renounce its policy of hostility and violence towards Israel. For this reason, it is difficult for Israel to join in the chorus of congratulations which the signing of the agreement has aroused. The transfer of the Canal Zone, with all its installations..... without any request having been made to Egypt that it should modify its attitude towards Israel or calm the latter's well-founded apprehension. In fact Egypt has recently demonstrated, yet once more and in the clearest fashion, its complete indifference to the most elementary international obligations by taking possession of an Israeli merchant vessel....."

There is here not the slightest mention of the fact that if the United Arab Republic has an international obligation to allow freedom of passage to Israeli ships, Israel has a much

203. See Documents for 1964, p. 255.
more important and greater international obligation towards the Palestinian Refugees, not to speak of many other obligations of this kind.

However, the Israeli displeasure at the Suez agreement was a reflection its desire to see that the relations between the western Powers, especially the United States, and the Arabs, especially Nasser, did not improve. The Anglo-U.S. approach was on the other hand, aimed at improving their relations with Nasser, so as to bring the Arabs into an alliance system aimed against the Soviet Union. As John C. Campbell has written: "When the Suez agreement was finally reached, in October 1954, the United States and British Governments were engaged in a thorough study of all the possibilities. This study covered all the theory questions and sketched out tentative settlements in considerable detail, including frontier adjustments, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and a special status for Jerusalem. It seemed at least possible that these matters could be discussed by the two western powers

204. See in this connection, Hedley V. Coopce, *Israel: A Blessing And a Curse* (Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1960), for a more or less objective study of the Refugee problem and Israel's obligations towards them. This book also reveals the exclusive nature of Israeli state—an anachronism in the modern world.

separately with Egypt and with Israel, without any direct confrontation between the two parties.....

"No one can be sure what might have come of these endeavours had not Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955, which resulted in 69 casualties....frightened Nasser into turning all his attention to the need for strengthening Egypt....."

The Israeli raid on Gaza was thus a calculated move and an attempt on the part of Israel to subvert the improvement of relations between Arabs and the Western Powers because it did not want to make any concessions to the Palestinian Refugees. As Campbell has observed: "Israel paid remarkably little heed to the necessity of coming to some terms with the fact of living in the heart of the Arab world..... It merely offered compensation, in principle for their property while barring their return, meanwhile opening the doors wide to Jewish immigration."

Another effort made by Israel to achieve its objective was its attempt to blow up the American Information service buildings in Cairo. As Georgiana G.Stevens, has put it this

206. Id., p. 82.
207. Supra, n. 192, p. 205.
"seemed to indicate Israel's determination to prevent, if possible, any improvement of relations between Egypt and the United States."

Israel wanted to justify the Gaza raid as an act of reprisal against Arab infiltration and raids. However, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned the raid as aggression and the western powers were compelled to censure Israel in the United Nations. According to Burns, Dayan calculates that the Arabs seeing themselves helpless to counter the drastic Israeli military relations, would be forced to realise that they must make peace with Israel."

"...the wrongness of the policy was not that it sought to make the Arabs stop sending marauders into Israel, but that it was a slightly indirect method of using military power to force the Arab states (primarily Egypt) to accept the Israeli terms of peace. That is to say, it was an attempt to settle an international dispute by military force, in complete disregard of Israel's engagements as a member of the United Nations."


As if in defiance of the UN censure Israel carried out another bloody raid on Khan Yunis on the night of August 31 - September 1. The United States on the other hand, refused to give arms aid to Nasser, which he so desperately needed. France on the other hand seems to have assured Israel of substantial military aid, as Nasser revealed after announcing his arms deal with Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1965. And Erskine B. Childers has observed that "early in November 1956 ..... Nasser told a Life magazine reporter that the Czech decision had been taken, not so much in terms of Israel's strength as it was then, as in terms of her strength when her existing secret arms arrangements with France were completed. He detailed the types and quantities of French weapons to be delivered to Israel. The next day, Israeli spokesman denied the existence of any arms deal with France at all. But in 1966, when French arms deliveries to Israel were revealed, it was notable that they matched very closely, in type and quantity, the details which Nasser had professed to know in 1956."

Burns writes that "I have been told that Prime Minister Nasser, decided to accept this offer (Czech arms)

210. Id., p.90. And for Burns' report Supra, n.207, pp.365-
369.

211. For the announcement see Supra, n.207, pp.370-373.

212. Supra, n. 194.

after the Khan Yunis raid." Thus, the United States appears to have failed to make Israel give up its policy. Nasser's arms deal sent the Israeli policy makers into a rage and panic, for it shattered all their plans of keeping the Arabs and especially, the United Arab Republic militarily weak for ever. The effect on Israel and the western Powers has been well explained by Elizabeth Monroe: "The whole elaborate structure of Anglo-American defence policy was altered by this coup. It nullified the western arrangement for an arms balance between the Arabs and Israel, it converted western aid from a weapon in western hands into a bargaining counter for Egyptian or Arab use in the profitable process of taking aid from both sides of the iron curtain and, above all, it confirmed all but a few Arabs in the view that Nasser was a new Saladin. Others had talked; here was the man who acted and who had given Middle Eastern states dignity and equality at last."

In a desperate move to rescue the western prestige, the United States and England decided to extend aid for the Aswan High Dam. And in a speech in Guild Hall on November 9, 1956, Eden proposed a readjustment of Israeli frontiers. All this


216. See Documents for 1955, pp. 382-385
was most frustrating for Israel. It began putting pressure on the United States administration to withdraw the Aswan aid promised to Nasser. This was one of the important factors in the withdrawal of the Aswan aid by Dulles. Even Eisenhower appears to have been convinced by Israeli propaganda. But the United States and Britain refused to accept Israel's demand for large scale military aid. Two important reasons underlay this decision. Firstly, as Campbell has observed, "it may have been soundly based on knowledge that even the heavy Soviet deliveries to Egypt would not, in the present state of Egyptian military competence, upset the balance against Israel. Yet it did contribute greatly to the growing feeling in Israel that it was standing alone against an enemy who was daily growing stronger as he acquired new weapons against which Israel had no defence."

Campbell has also observed that "it would be a mistake to say that the Arab leaders including Abdel Nasser, had set any time schedule for the destruction of Israel." And Henry Byroade, the United States Ambassador to Cairo at the time, is reported to have said that the Czech arms did not make the

218. See Herman Finer, op.cit., pp. 45-46.
220. Id., p. 91.
United Arab Republic strong enough to attack Israel, for even then the latter was twice as strong as the former. 221

The other reason for the western refusal to give more arms to Israel, was that they had decided to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union for an embargo on arms supply to Middle East. As already indicated it was this agreement between England and the Soviet Union that provoked Nasser to recognise Communist China, defeating the aims of the western Powers and of the Soviet Union. It was this success of Nasser at defeating the western policy of maintaining a military balance in favour of Israel, that appears to have led Israel to decide to destroy the strength of the United Arab Republic as quickly as possible through a swift military action and if possible to force Arabs to accept its military superiority. At the same time England and the United States had also decided to overthrow Nasser, through the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam aid. The rest of the story has already been told.

It was clear from the beginning of the Suez Crisis that England and France would attack the United Arab Republic. And it was plain commonsense that Israel would exploit such a situation. And there was ample proof of Israeli preparation.

for an attack against its chief enemy. According to Prof. Finer himself "Israel's growing activism spurred the Arabs towards military unions" culminating in a "joint Egyptian - Syrian - Jordanian command ....... with the Egyptian Commander in chief to be its head if there were major fighting with Israel." This was formed on October 24, 1966, long after Israel and its allies had finalised plans of aggression as already indicated.

Thus the argument advanced by Israel and its supporters that it was the formation of the joint command that gave the signal for Israel to act in self-defence is contrary to facts. Nasser was not foolish enough to attack Israel at a time when the western Powers were anxious for a casus belli. Nasser had successfully avoided falling into the trap even under such highly provocative acts as the withdrawal of pilots, or the refusal to pay canal dues to the new Canal Authority etc. But the military steps taken by Nasser were legitimate in view of the troop movements and concentrations being undertaken by England, France and Israel since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company. As Nasser is reported to have said on September 16, "As a responsible person I have to be ready. I cannot treat aggressive western declarations as mere bluff."


223. Anthony Nutting, op.cit., p.50. Also Supra,n.168,p.130.

Under the circumstances, it would have been folly on the part of Nehru to protest against these military steps taken by Nasser, as Professor Finer would like India to have done. He has complained that "Nehru did not protest the Arab joint military command or the explicit threat to annihilate Israel. For Indian ships do not pass through Israel, they passed through the Suez Canal."

**Israeli Aggression of 1956:**

As soon as the three countries committed aggression against the United Arab Republic it was evident to the Government of India that it was all preplanned, though they did not know of it earlier. Thus Nehru told Parliament on November 16, 1956: "It is obvious that their plans fitted in, and the Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression..." Nehru was thus forced to see the reality of Israeli intentions. It took an effort on his part to describe the brutality of the aggression on the UAR. In the same speech on November 16, 1956, he said: "The story of the past three and a half months ever since the nationalisation of the Suez canal company is full of tragic drama, and events have happened which I would have thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find

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227. Ibid.
it a little difficult to deal with this record of unabashed aggression and deception. The explanations which have been given from time to time contradict one another and exhibit an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African countries and to world peace itself."

As against this, Nasser's action in nationalising the canal company, which Nehru thought was provocative, paled into insignificance. Nehru was forced to confess. During all the controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Egypt has conducted herself with a large measure of propriety and forbearance. Without the least justification Egypt was attacked not only by Israel but also by the United Kingdom and France .... Egypt the victim of Israeli aggression was attacked immediately after by the armed forces of the U.K. and France .... Indeed some attempt has been made to minimise and justify this utterly impromptuated and brutal attack on Egypt ...."

Nehru was convinced that the Arabs' charge that Israel was a beach-head of imperialism was a just one. Though Gandhiji and he himself were opposed to the partition of Palestine on the very sound moral, legal and political ground

228. Id., pp. 536-537.
that it disregarded the rights of one million Palestinian Arabs; independent India, under the latter's leadership recognised Israel as a state. But India was not happy with Israeli and western attitude to the Refugees rights. Therefore India withheld extending diplomatic relations with Israel. But India did not show any hostility to it.

However, soon India and Israel found themselves in the opposite camps in the developing conflict between national independence and western imperialism, while India had found more and more friends in the Arab countries. Finally, when Nasser emerged as the leader of Arab Nationalism, whom India at once recognised as a friend and ally against the western attempts at domination and dictation, Israel not only made frantic efforts to undermine his position but also committed the crime of aggression in the company of two of the erstwhile Colonial Powers. Nehru pointed out all this in his speech in Parliament on November 20, 1956. And on August 14, 1966, he declared that "Ever since it came into existence it has been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries. The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years ago is fresh in our memory. Apart from this, there is the big problem of the old Palestine refugees."

229. See Bimla Prasad, Origins Of Indian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp.117-123 for the Congress stand taken by Gandhiji and Nehru.

230. Supra, n.151, cols. 594-595.

In the same speech Nehru also declared that "The major fact in West Asia is the growth of Arab Nationalism in a very powerful, resurgent way. Egypt took the lead in this matter and, under the wise leadership of President Nasser, has played a very important part. Nasser, in fact, became the most prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. This fact, which was patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers, and an attempt was made to split the Arab countries, in fact, Arab nationalism." He also pointed out that "It was stated that some kind of an Arab empire was being built up, which was dangerous. I do not know about the future, but I see no empire, much less an Arab empire." He then stated in categorical terms: "We are convinced that any effective solution of the problems of West Asia must be based on the recognition of the dominant urge and force of Arab nationalism. Any settlement must have the goodwill and cooperation of the Arab nations...."

This is also what Nasser and the Arabs demand of Israel, that it should take its due place in West Asia which is predominantly Arab. Thus it is Israel and its supporters that have to accept the greatest reality in West Asia: the will of the Arabs to live as self-respecting individuals and

nations. Then only the Arab could be expected to accept the reality of Israel.

India and the West Asian Crisis:

These are the deeper issues involved in the Arab stand against Israel and India's support to them. These are also the basic tenets of Nonalignment. It was, again, these motives that led the Government of India to stand resolutely by the Arabs when Israel committed another brutal aggression against them in June 1967.

The origins of the 'West Asian Crisis', or the June 1967 war between the Arabs and Israel, lie in the circumstances in which Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza strip in March 1967. Israel did this, under the pledges given to it by the United States, unilaterally, in an aide memoire of February 11, 1967, that Israel would have free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and protection by the UNEF from Gaza attacks. It was perhaps with this intention that the UNEF was moved from the Suez Canal area to the Gaza strip, which Nehru pointed out in a speech in Parliament on March 25, 1967. This was a major

233. This does not mean that India is not moved by national interests in its support to Arabs. For an account of these see the excellent article by G.H. Jansen, The Statesman, April 19, 1967.

234. See S.A.H. Haqqi, 'India, Israel and the West Asian Crisis' Mainstream (June 7, 1967, p. 7) and K. Rangaswami, 'New Dimensions of Foreign Policy', The Hindu, June 5, 1967, Also see, below, Chapter 8.


236. Nehru, op. cit., p. 539.
gain for Israel, a fruit of aggression and was against the Charter. This was a failure of the United States and was contrary to statements made by Eisenhower and other US spokesman that the withdrawal should be unconditional. Another failure of the United States was that it could not make Israel accept the UNEF in its territory or to settle the refugee problem in accordance with the UN resolutions or on some other satisfactory basis.

How or why the Government of India, or for that matter Nasser, accepted this sort of unsatisfactory solution, is not clear, especially when Israel had declared openly that it would consider any interference with its shipping through the straits of Tiran as a casus belli for fresh aggression. However, the conditions on which India agreed to send troops to the UNEF, were stated by Nehru in categorical terms in Parliament on November 19, 1966. He said: "I want to make it perfectly clear on what conditions we sent these forces to join the United Nations Force. First of all, we made it clear that it was only if the Government of Egypt agreed that we would send


238. Id., p.205. See also Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, op.cit., p.136. It is surprising that Prof. Brecher should support this claim in utter disregard for international law and justice.

239. Supra, n.16?, cols. 371-372.
them; secondly, they were not to be considered in any sense a continuing force continuing the activities of the Anglo-French forces, but an entirely separate thing, thirdly, that the Anglo-French forces should be withdrawn, fourthly, that the United Nations Force should function to protect the old armistice line between Israel and Egypt, and finally that it would be a temporary affair. We are not prepared to agree to our forces or any force remaining there indefinitely. It was on these conditions, which were accepted that these forces were sent there."

Thus when Nasser asked the United Nations to withdraw the UNEF he had acted within his rights. And India was right in accepting Nasser's demand and Secretary-General Uthant was perfectly justified in his acceptance of the demand. The storm of protest raised by many people in India and by the Government of the United States and England against Nasser, Uthant and India was baseless, and extremely short sighted and ill considered. It only served to help Israel launch a pre-planned and surprise attack on the UAR, Syria and Jordan, on June 5, 1967.

If the United States and Britain led by Johnson and Wilson, respectively, had not been carried away by their traditional hostility to Nasser, they would have been able to appr...

240. For Uthant's defence of his acceptance of and Nasser's right to demand the withdrawal of the UNEF. See The Hindu, Contd......
ciate the nature of Nasser's move which was to make the UN realise that peace was threatened in the area on account of the refugee problem which had been neglected by it. The UNEF had largely become ineffective and there was increasing hostility between Israel and Arabs. Israel had not during the past ten years shown any inclination either to accept the UNEF on its territory, or to respect it, not to speak of its supreme indifference to the need of a solution to the refugee problem. Only a few in the west seemed to be worried about the increasing tension in the area. The UNEF had only become an instrument through which Israel was enjoying the fruits of its aggression in 1956. Surely it was not the purpose for which the UNEF was created and it certainly was not the reason for which either India or the United Arab Republic accepted it. It is patently absurd to say that the United Arab Republic had no right to ask for the withdrawal of such a force. And it is

(Continued from previous page)

4 and 21 June, 1967.


243. See in this connection Yashpal Tandon, 'UNEF, the Secretary-General, and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War', International Organisation (Vol. 27, No. 2, 1968), pp. 529-556.
much more so to think that the United States and England were more devoted to peace than the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

By demanding the withdrawal of the UNEF Nasser had only restored the conditions prior to the 1966 aggression by Israel and had opened a way for a permanent solution of the dispute. Instead of ceasing this opportunity to find a solution to the problem, the United States and England tried to discredit the United Nations and its Secretary-General, and went on to champion the cause of Israel, against the Arabs in utter disregard to facts. They also chose to warn Nasser, while Israel was preparing plans to attack the Arabs. Once again, they proved that they were incapable of doing justice to the Arabs against Israel.

The Israeli aggression was a repetition of the 1966 aggression in its motives, planning and execution. The failure of the United Arab Republic to anticipate it and to be unprepared for it even after the experience of 1966, is surprising, indeed! This is besides the point here. What is relevant is that the Arabs had, once again, revealed remarkable

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political sagacity in refusing to accept the admirable gesture of Nasser to step down from power. Nothing would have been more welcome to Israel and the United States and perhaps to the Soviet Union also.

By refusing to accept the Israeli demand for surrender, the Arabs have once again demonstrated their determination not to yield to aggression. This is their greatest asset. Gandhiji would have understood it and admired it for it was the essence of his satyagraha. With rare insight, Charles D. Crenshaw has drawn attention to this feature of the Arab character: "Reflection of Israel shows aspects of Arab character which are in striking contrast to the western approach to international problems. It is probably a mistake to attribute the Arabs unwillingness to acknowledged Israel to a lack of realism. Actually, their attitude is consistent with their understanding of political reality and of the most effective ways of dealing with it. As Gandhi used passive resistance in the struggle against British rule in India, the Arabs employ their own weapons and techniques...."

Unfortunately, no living Gandhian in India had shown any sympathy to the Arabs' struggle against Israel. The

criticism leveled against the Government of India's support to the Arab cause, does not even take into account the fact that the United Nations has passed a resolution accepting the fact of Israel's aggression and demanded the withdrawal of its forces from Arab territories. The policy of the Government of India during the west Asian Crisis was in the best interests of the country.

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion it may be mentioned that the two crises present two important turning points in the history of Non-alignment. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on the United Arab Republic constituted a great challenge to Non-alignment just when it was blossoming into a world wide policy. Nasser's statesmanship supported by Nehru's rescued it from a premature death and the two leaders came to admire each other. The support given by the Super Powers to the United Arab Republic proved the soundness of the basis of nonalignment. For, this was the first occasion when a nonaligned power was directly attacked by more powerful nations in an attempt to change the

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246. See *The Hindu*, July 19, 1967, Even Prof. J.L. Talmor of Hebrew University, admits that the Arabs have a just cause against Israel - See *News From Israel*, (Vol. XIV, No.16, August 16, 1967), p.13.
balance of power in their favour. The Super Powers intervened and restored the status quo. The crisis thus gave a new life and confidence to nonalignment and it began to grow from strength to strength.

The West Asian crisis has, on the other hand, demonstrated that the balance of power in the world has changed in such a way that the Super Powers are not so sharply opposed to each other as they were in 1956, thus making it possible for them to apply joint pressure on the nonaligned nations. It thus creates a problem for the nonaligned states, and perhaps also indicates a crisis in Nonalignment from which it has to be rescued, if it has to serve the nonaligned states as an effective foreign policy. This aspect will, however, be discussed in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER VI

INDIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

The Revolution

The Hungarian Revolution broke out on October 24, 1956. Its genesis may very briefly be described as follows. Ever since Khrushchev inaugurated de-Stalinisation at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 14, 1956, there were demands for freedom from Soviet control in Eastern European states, notably in Poland and Hungary. In Hungary, as already indicated, Imre Nagy was rehabilitated into the communist party on October 13, 1956. Six days later, the Hungarian Government agreed to several measures asked for by students including the abandonment of compulsory Russian Language Courses. On October 22, a number of meetings were held in Budapest, the capital of Hungary. The largest meeting was held at the Building Industry Technological University and ended after formulating a programme of national policy demanding, interalia, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and the reconstitution of the Government under Imre Nagy.

2. For details, see Survey, 1956-58, pp. 72-79.
4. Supra, n. l, p. 429.
A student demonstration in sympathy with the Poznan trials in Poland was first banned and was allowed on October 23.

Erno Gero, the then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Hungary, who had just returned to Hungary after talks with Tito in Yugoslavia, condemned the demonstration, which resulted in a violent reaction from the mobs. On October 24, Imre Nagy was made Prime Minister and at the same time the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact intervened in the revolt of the people, on the invitation of the Government of Hungary. This marked the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution.

In his famous speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, Tito said that this intervention was 'not necessary' and was 'absolutely wrong coming at Gero's invitation'. On October 25, Gero was replaced by James Kadar. In the week that followed, there were several developments in Hungary. On the one hand, Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister,

6. Supra, n.4.
9. Id., p. 527
10. See Kadar's broadcast of October 25, 1956 - Supra n.1, pp. 452-453.
was forced to accept the demands of the revolutionists\textsuperscript{11}, such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the revival of democratic institutions and free elections etc. The Soviet Union also appeared willing to withdraw its troops from Hungary as it announced on October 30, and had begun talks with the Hungarian authorities\textsuperscript{12}. On the other hand, there were Soviet troop movements on a large scale into Hungary across the border\textsuperscript{13}. And, finally, at dawn on November 4, 1956, the Soviet troops which had encircled Budapest, suddenly struck and began to suppress the revolution in a ruthless manner.

The U.N. Resolutions

On the same day the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution (1004-E.S.II)\textsuperscript{14}, which, among other things, condemned the Soviet action in Hungary and called upon


\textsuperscript{12} For the announcement see Supra, n.1, pp.465-468.

\textsuperscript{13} Supra, n. 3. pp.463-469. For Nagy's Telegrams of November 1 and 2, 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations complaining a Soviet troop movement and seeking UN protection.

\textsuperscript{14} See Y.B.U.N. 1956, pp.84-85 for the text and the voting record.
it to withdraw its forces from Hungary. Krishna Menon, on behalf of India, abstained from voting on the resolution along with many other Afro-Asian delegations, including that of the United Arab Republic. The propriety of this act was questioned by a few friends of the West in the United Nations.

On November 9, 1956, Menon voted against a second resolution (1005 S.E.-II), calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and the holding of elections in Hungary under the auspices of the United Nations. Then began as shall be seen below, a vigorous attack on India, Nehru and Menon, both in India and abroad. However, India also abstained on a 3rd (1006 E.X.-II) and a 5th (1008 E.S.-II) resolution of the Emergency Session and voted for a 4th (1007 E.S.-II) resolution as it dealt with relief work in Hungary.

When the matter came up before the 11th Session of the General Assembly, it adopted another six resolutions on Hungary, of which India voted in favour of only two, (1128 (xi)) and (1129 (xi)). The former was co-sponsored by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, and sought the

15. Sec., G.A.O.R., Second Emergency Session, 564th Plenary Meeting; The delegate of "Nationalist China, for example, inquired "whether these delegations of Asia and Africa, mean to tell us that principles of the Charter were good only for Asia and Africa and not for Europe."
17. Id., p.94.
18. Id., p.87.
19. Id., p.87.
20. Id., p.87. This was adopted on November 21, 1956.
21. Id., p.95. This was adopted on November 21, 1956.
cooperation and permission of the Hungarian government for the nominees of the Secretary-General to enter Hungary. The later resolution dealt with relief work. The United Arab Republic voted in favour of the latter and abstained on the former.

The United Arab Republic had abstained on the November 9, resolution of the Emergency Session demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the holding of elections under the United Nations auspices. It also abstained on the rest of the resolutions of the General Assembly along with India, since these demanded the withdrawal of forces and holding of elections and condemned the Soviet intervention.

Nonalignment and Double Standards

What emerges from this voting record of India and the United Arab Republic is, that they were not prepared either to condemn the Soviet Union or to force any action on it, without its consent, through the United Nations' organs.

22. Id., p. 75
23. Id., p. 87
24. Id., p. 95
25. These were 1127(xi) of 21 November, 1130(xi) of 4 December, 1131(xi) of 12 December, and, 1132(xi) of 10 January 1957, pp. 87-89 for the texts and voting record.
It should not have been difficult to understand this policy, after all the unsuccessful attempts made by the Western Powers, headed by the United States, to undermine and subvert the authority and prestige of Nasser and Nehru and their policy of Nonalignment and friendship with the Soviet Union culminating in the Suez Crisis which was at its height at that moment. As against this, the Soviet Union had been supporting them with moral and material help, not only to withstand the pressures of the West but also in their disputes with Western-supported neighbours like Pakistan in the case of India, and Israel in the case of the United Arab Republic.

But, as K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador to Moscow and Budapest at the time of the Hungarian revolution, has observed: "Nothing has caused so much misunderstanding... regarding India's foreign policy than her attitude towards the Hungarian Revolution". It would be more accurate to say that it was the misunderstanding of the basic tenets of the Nonalignment of India and the United Arab Republic, that resulted in the total misunderstanding of India's role in this crisis, especially, in India.


27. India and the Cold War, op. cit., p. 48.
For, no other crisis prior to this had revealed with such clarity, the real nature of Nonalignment as the pursuit of national interests and not of moral values and human ideals. It is doubtful, if the United States stand itself was inspired by such ideals. It was certainly not so, with regard to Britain, France and Israel, as shall be made clear below.

However, the misconceptions about the real nature of Nonalignment have been so deep rooted that all sorts of arguments have been advanced to explain the policy of the nonaligned states, especially India. Thus, motives like anticolonialism, antiracism, antieuropeanism and, of course, procommunism or belief in Marxism-Leninism, have been attributed to support what was supposed to be a 'double-standard' in the approach of the nonaligned states to Western Powers and the Soviet Union. 28 It has already been explained that these factors have not been the main determinants of the Nonalignment of India and the United Arab Republic.

And what is this charge of a 'double-standard'? It is in the main, an attempt to apply moral standards, which are irrelevant in the evaluation of foreign policy. Hence such criticism appears to have been motivated, at least in certain quarters, by a desire to 'discredit India's Nonalignment'. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this charge in some detail.

Professor Brecher, for example, has written that Nehru was 'slow, painfully slow' in reacting to the events in Hungary and that the demand for the withdrawal of forces was immediate and sharp in the case of Suez, it was not in the case of Hungary, at least for a long time.

Among the Indians, Asoka Mehta and Jayaprakash Narayan took this line of argument, the former in Parliament and the latter outside it. I do not, however, think that Nehru was as slow as is made out by Professor Brecher, a little dramatically, in reacting to the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution. The moralist in him asserted itself immediately. For, speaking at the Ninth General Conference of the UNESCO in New Delhi, on November 5, 1956, he said: "We see today in Egypt as well as Hungary..."
both human dignity and freedom outraged and the forfe of modern arms used to suppress peoples and to gain political objectives. Old colonial methods, which we had thought, in our ignorance, belonged to a more unenlightened age, are revived and practised. In other parts of the world also, movements for freedom are crushed by superior might.'

He also made a specific reference to the "Five Principles", and said\textsuperscript{34}: "we now see that those Five Principles are also mere words without meaning to some countries who claim the right of deciding problems by superior might.' This could have been a reference to the Soviet Union, only, which had declared adherence to the Five Principles with India\textsuperscript{35}. And in his letter, in reply to Bulganin's letter promising the facts of the Hungarian crisis, Nehru was reported to have said\textsuperscript{36} that all declarations of adherence to the Five Principles seemed to have no meaning left and the world reverts to international barbarism'. And K.P.S. Menon\textsuperscript{37} has written: "I myself made repeated representations to Mr. Sheppilov, then Foreign Minister, to Mr. Bulganin, then Prime Minister, and Mr. Khrushchev, then Secretary of the Communist Party, expressing our grave concern at

\textsuperscript{34. Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{35. See Texts of Documents, op. cit., pp.185-187.}
\textsuperscript{36. For the correspondence See The Hindu, November 9,1956}
\textsuperscript{37. Supra, N. 27, pp.48-49.}
at the turn of events in Hungary". He is, therefore, right in asserting\textsuperscript{38} that "The accusation of having adopted double standards, which are persistently levelled against India by those who would stop at nothing to discredit her policy of non-alignment and which was unfortunately swallowed by many of our own people, has no substance".

But, in my opinion, this talk of Panch Sheel by Nehru was unnecessary, if not also improper. Firstly, it was this type of talk that supplied ammunition to his critics. Thus he was himself responsible for some of misunderstanding about his foreign policy. Secondly, Krishna Menon had already abstained from voting on the November 4, resolution of the Emergency Session of the General assembly, calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Finally, it was not in the interests

\textsuperscript{38} Id., p.30 Some Indian scholars appear to admit of "different" if not "double" standards in India's attitude to Hungary and the Suez Crises. See M.S. Rajan, \textit{India in World Affairs}, op. cit., pp.146-147. He accepts the theory that Indians believe that there is no use criticising the Soviet Union in contrast to the Western democracies where public opinion moulds policy. See also Surjit Man Singh, "India and the Hungarian Revolution". \textit{India Quarterly} (XXI, No.2, April-June 1965), p.141. But as Asoka Mehta pointed out in Parliament (\textit{Supra}, n.31, cols.414-415) this would have called for a stronger reaction against the Soviet Union for, in the Western democracies the opposition parties could take care of the situation as in England during the Suez crisis.
of the country. It was the realisation of this fact that appears to have made him, in fact, more cautious and less unequivocal, in his subsequent utterances, contrary to the general impression that it took a long time for Nehru to speak out the truth.

**Anglo-French-Israeli Betrayal**

Among the factors that were responsible for the change in Nehru's tone was undoubtedly his disgust at Western, especially British and French, attempts to exploit the Hungarian situation to cover up their crimes elsewhere. He told Parliament on November 19, that "every attempt is being made by one party to lay stress on what has happened in other places so as to hide its own mis-demeanour. There was the Anglo-French action in Egypt and there was a world outcry against it in the United Nations. Then came Hungary, Bad enough.

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39. See Nehru's speech at the All India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C.) meeting at Calcutta on 9 November, 1956—The Hindu, 10 November, 1956 and his speech to Parliament on November 19—Supra n.31 cols.377-386.

40. Commenting on Nehru's observation in his speech to Parliament on November 19, that "the desire of a majority of the people for a change had been suppressed by Soviet armed might", Ross. N.Barkes and Mohinder S.Bedi (op.cit.,p.53) have observed that this "as a statement was chiefly remarkable in that it took official India so long to make it". This is to overlook Nehru's observation at the UNESCO meet in Delhi on November 5, and his correspondence with Bulganin.

41. Supra, n.31 col.382.
But immediately it was made use of to hide what is happening in Egypt. The struggle in Hungary was the basic thing so as to somehow cover up the misdeeds in Egypt. Now on both sides this is happening. And on November 20, he went further and declared that the "warfare in Hungary... would probably have taken a very different turn if there had been no invasion of Egypt."

The significance of this statement is two-fold. Firstly, it was a fairly accurate statement, as it is, more or less, an established fact that the Anglo-French attack on the United Arab Republic was to some extent responsible for the hardening of the Soviet and also Yugoslavian policy towards Hungary. And it cannot be denied that it was this attack that made it easier for the Soviet union to crush the Hungarian revolution with ease. Secondly, Nehru seems to have realised that England, France and Israel, had deliberately chosen this moment to achieve their evil designs against the United Arab Republic, as indicated above. It is

42. Id., No. 5, 20 November, col. 579.
43. See Richard Lowenthal, op.cit., pp.82-83, Also Supra, n.2, p.115.
44. See M.S.Fajan, India In World Affairs, op.cit., p.148.
difficult to say whether or not Britain and France realised that their folly would make it impossible for the United States to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union on Hungary. It was this among other reasons, rather than real sympathy for the United Arab Republic, that led Eisenhower and Dulles, to demand an end to their aggression and withdrawal from occupied territories. For, after all, the Soviet Union was, and is the first concern of the United States.

It was thus England, France, and Israel, that chose to exploit the sufferings of an European people, cynically one might add, to inflict humiliation and suffering on an Asian people, and not India and the United Arab Republic. The latter had simply refused to be diverted from their primary object of protecting their vital interests from the ambitions of the very same Western Powers. No doubt, the United States had condemned the aggression against the United Arab Republic and had thrown, its weight on the side of the victim of aggression. But, it was an act dictated by the need to protect the vital interests of the West as a whole.

There was no other way in which the prestige of the West could be saved from utter disaster. Here also it was its struggle against the Soviet Union that was dominant, for if it had failed to act as it did, it would have conceded a walk-over to the Soviet Union in the struggle for influence in the uncommitted World. Therefore, it might not have been difficult for Nehru and Nasser to see that once the crisis was over, the United States would revert to its policies against the nonaligned states, as it in fact did through the Eisenhower Doctrine for West Asia, which was opposed by Nasser and Nehru.

Defence of National Interests.

In the circumstances, it was not open for India and the United Arab Republic to antagonise the Soviet Union by supporting the Western Powers on Hungary. This would have been the surest way to lose the goodwill of the Soviet Union and other Communist Powers, with no

46. See Documents for 1967, pp. 233-240. Eden claimed in his Memoirs that this was a direct consequence of his military adventure. See Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 577.
47. For the various joint statements issued by Arab leaders including Nasser, See Documents for 1957, pp. 257-267.
prospects of a better deal from the Western Powers. For, an East-West entanglement on Hungary would have given an opportunity for England, France and Israel to continue to remain in possession of the territories of the United Arab Republic, occupied by them through aggression, not to speak of other dangers, like the occupation of the Suez Canal itself. For England, which had bombed for days the Air fields and other military targets in the United Arab Republic to cripple the latter's defence forces, it would have been easier to force its way into the Canal Zone if the other big powers did not interfere. As long as the forces did not withdraw from the territories of the United Arab Republic, the Suez Canal would have remained closed putting India's economy and plans in jeopardy. And a long drawn-out struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States might have put a heavy strain on the former's aid programmes to India and the United Arab Republic, which would have further increased the strain on the economy and even the defence preparations of these countries.

The Soviet Union might have made this clear to India through Bulganin's letter to Nehru received on November 8, 1956 containing its version of the Hungarian Revolution, which Nehru explained to the All India Congress Committee meeting on November 9, thus bringing a greater sense of reality into his pronouncements. Even if the Soviet Union had not issued any warning, a little reflection on the part of Nehru and the External Affairs Ministry would have made things clear to them and they might well have reflected on things. Tito also had written to Nehru and might have stressed these points. Nehru told Parliament on November 20, that he was to some extent guided by the former's views on Hungary.

Besides, the measures advanced by the Western Powers, for the solution of the Hungarian crisis, viz., withdrawal of Soviet troops, and particularly, the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations, were diametrically opposed to India's stand on Kashmir. It would, therefore, have been an act of extreme indiscretion, if Menon had voted for, or even abstained, on the November 9 resolution which included a call for holding

50. Supra, n. 39
51. Supra, n. 42 cols 582-583. Nehru said that he attached great importance to Tito's views on Europe.
52. See above, pp. 135-143, 150-151, 195-200
such elections. The suggestion that India should have abstained from voting on the resolution was ill-considered for it would have meant an acceptance of the principle of holding elections under the auspices of the United Nations. Therefore, Mónon voted against the paragraph containing this clause while he abstained on all other paragraphs of this resolution when a separate vote was taken on each paragraph before it was put to vote as a whole-explaining the para-wise voting on this resolution to Parliament, Nehru pointed out that when India abstained on the clause on the withdrawal of forces from Hungary, it stood for withdrawal, but voted against the resolution as a whole because it contained the clause on which India voted against. It is significant in this connection to add that the United Arab Republic only abstained on this resolution since it contained no such threats to its vital interests.

This negative vote of Mónon, as already indicated, had given rise to a storm of protest in India and abroad. It was also reported that Mónon had acted without instructions. And the instructions, I think, even if

53. See 'A double standard', Eastern Economist, Supra, n. 28.
54. Supra, n. 31, cols. 389-392.
55. Id., col. 391.
56. See below, n. 57.
they had not reached in time, would not have been different from what Mönöon did. Nehru told Parliament that Mönöon's vote "was entirely in consonance with our general policy and instructions". And explaining the reasons for Mönöon's vote Nehru said: "The resolution was, in our opinion, improperly worded. But the most objectionable part of it demanded that elections should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations. We took strong exception to this because we felt this was contrary to the Charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state. Any acceptance of intervention of this type, namely foreign supervised elections, seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilised in future intervention in other countries."

Though Nehru did not spell out the country where such intervention might occur, the Communist spokesman in Parliament, M.K. Gopalan, did it for him: "As far as the Indian vote in the United Nations is concerned..... India had acted perfectly well. It is significant

57. See Nehru, op.cit., p.556 Also Supra, n.42, cols589-594. In view of this, it seems improbable that the Foreign Ministry was surprised at Menon's vote as the New York Times correspondent in New Delhi is said to have reported, unless the Foreign Ministry was ignorant of the contents of the resolution—See Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, op.cit., p.52.
58. Nehru, op.cit., p.556
59. Supra n.31, col.402.
that one of the chief sponsors of the resolution was Pakistan which illegally grabbed part of Kashmir and its attitude towards this whole crisis had been of a dubious character. The elections under the United Nations auspices constitute a violation of sovereignty of any country. Tomorrow, the same logic may be applied as far as Kashmir is concerned, so, those who criticise India's stand on the resolution should ponder over this aspect.

**Western Double-Standards**

It was unrealistic on the part of the Western Powers to condemn the Soviet Union for its suppression of the Hungarian Revolution and to demand the withdrawal of its forces from Hungary, a country which the Soviet Union considers so vital for its security, when all of them, including the United States, felt that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by the United Arab Republic, a legally and politically justifiable act, was an act of Hitlerism, justifying military action on their part. Therefore, the attempts to equate the two crises, deliberate or otherwise, were and are misleading, to say the least. As
K.P.S. Menon has aptly remarked "the Revolution in Hungary, as it developed, threatened not merely the prestige but the security of the Soviet Union and the existence of that belt of States, the cordon sanitaire, which the Soviet Union had so laboriously erected all along here vulnerable Western and Southern frontiers.

If reasons of State ever constitute a justification for a state's conduct, they existed in this case but they did not exist in the case of the British action in the Suez."

In spite of this basic difference and the totally unjustified attack by England, France and Israel on the United Arab Republic, leading Western diplomats made all attempts to prevent a condemnation of England and France as aggressors, while they went all out to condemn the Soviet Union. As Terence Robertson has written, "Every one asked what was the difference between the Soviet Union crushing Hungary, and the British and French assaulting Egypt? Was it because an attack on an African or Asian country was more acceptable than an attack on a

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60. Supra, n. 27, p. 50. Also Supra n. 2, p. 116. It has to be pointed out that Nehru also committed the mistake of equating the two on occasions—See his speech to the A.I.C.C., at Calcutta on November 11, 1956: The Hindu 12 November, 1956. On November 16, 1956, he told the Lok Sabha, on the contrary, that both differed in nature—See Nehru, op. cit., p. 555.

Typically, however, neither Pearson nor Hammarskjöld was diverted from the conviction that Britain and France should at all costs remain untarnished by the brand of aggression."

And according to Prof. Francisco Wilcox, "Actually, the Assembly resolutions condemning the actions of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian regime were more vigorously worded than those addressed to the guilty parties in the Suez crisis."

Inspite of all this, as has already been indicated, India did its best to restrain the United Arab Republic at every step, even when the actions of England and France were highly provocative, and, after the initial outburst against England and France, Nehru quietly worked with other commonwealth countries to rescue Her Majesty's Government and their allies from disgrace.

But, from the point of view of India and the United Arab Republic, the security of their vital interests lay in not antagonising the Soviet Union rather than the Western Powers in the Hungarian crises. Nasser who had

been attacked by the major allies of the United States could only look to the Soviet Union for support. And Nehru, who had written in the early forties that the Soviet Union could not be indifferent to India in its own interests, and who was to claim later that the Soviet Union was India's second line of defence and vice versa, could not, indeed, have been indifferent to the threats to the former's security from the Western Powers in the then prevailing tension between the two blocs. Tito was also motivated by similar considerations of self-interest.

A. Balancing Act

Thus once again the three nonaligned nations found themselves in full agreement over the need to maintain the balance of power between the two super Powers, in their own interests, as well as in the interests of world peace. For, a serious disturbance

63. See above p. 92
64. Id., p. 95
65. In the early forties Nehru gave indication of his future policy towards the Soviet Union in his reactions to the Soviet claims in Iran which is highly reminiscent of his stand on Hungary—See Bimal Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 242-243.
66. See his speech at Pula in which he justified the Soviet action in crushing the Revolution—Supra, n. 3, pp. 527-530. Nehru told Parliament on November 20, 1950 that Tito's speech at Pula was sent to him by telegram—Supra n. 51. See also Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 61-87 for a very able analysis of Tito's role in this crisis.
67. As G. Barraclough has aptly observed the 'long term' contd.
of the balance of power which the Hungarian Revolution threatened to do, was fraught with dangerous consequences for world peace and security and for the position of the nonaligned states.

It is from this point of view that one has to judge the frequent mention of the cold war and the cold war pacts by Nehru in his speeches in Parliament and outside it\(^68\), during the Suez and Hungarian crises. There was also no point in trying to force United Nations' resolutions on the Soviet Union which it was not prepared to accept. And there was no way in which it could be made to do so, short of a war with it, for which, the United States, least of all, was prepared\(^69\). And it was most unrealistic on the part of the United States to believe that it would be able to make the Soviet Union accept the United Nations' resolutions when it could not or would not make a state like Israel, which depends upon it entirely for its very survival, to do it, as already indicated.

Contd..

...consequence of the Hungarian crisis was that "the division of spheres of influence, agreed in 1945 at Yalta and Potsdam was irreversible so far as could humanly be foreseen..." - Supra, n. 2, p. 137
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in mid-1968 by Russia only confirm the truth of this observation.

68. Supra, n. 39. and see Nehru's speech at the A.I.C.C. Meeting on 11 November-The Hindu, 12 December 1956.
69. See Wood House, op.cit., p. 61.
Thus, though Nehru had expressed genuine sympathy with the Hungarian people and their aspirations, and even criticised Soviet excesses, his policy was one of avoidance of any condemnation of the Soviet action in Hungary\textsuperscript{70}. Krishna Menon said\textsuperscript{71} in the General Assembly on December 12, 1956, that India did not want to call for the withdrawal of Soviet forces either from Hungary or from other East European states, but was only opposed to the intervention of Soviet forces in the internal affairs of Hungary, for which there was no justification. Nehru endorsed\textsuperscript{72} this argument in Parliament on December 13, 1956.

\textsuperscript{70} See the A.I.C.C. resolution passed on November 9, 1956, \textit{The Hindu}, 10 November 1956. This was criticised as weak on Hungary. Nehru defended it saying that this "did not imply any difference in our way of judging events" and that it was "difficult, having regard to facts before us, to say more"—see \textit{The Hindu}, 12 December 1956. See also the joint statement of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India issued on November 14 1956 in New Delhi regretting the Soviet action in Hungary and demanding the withdrawal of its forces—\textit{Supra}, p. 35, pp. 267-70


\textsuperscript{72} See Nehru, op.cit., pp. 561-562.
India's Mistakes

But to jump from this to the conclusion that Nehru lacked moral fervour or applied double standards is to commit a grievous mistake. Nehru was, in fact, more agonised over the events in Hungary, than many of his counterparts in Western countries, who had chosen to exploit the situation, as was evident from his weak, ambiguous and somewhat apologetic explanations of his policy in Parliament and outside it, instead of a vigorous and forthright defence of it, as it was largely in the interests of the country, as they stood then.

Another, and perhaps a more important reason for Nehru's ambiguity, was of course, the impossibility of reconciling the policy in this case with the laboriously built conception of Nonalignment as a moral alternative to 'power politics', a term which the Indian politicians have found it too easy to condemn with or without justification and in or out of context.

73. This is the inescapable impression that one gathers from a study of Nehru's speeches. One undesirable result of this ambiguity was attacks on our diplomatic missions abroad in and outside Parliament. Nehru was forced to defend them in Parliament. Supra, n. 31, col. 375 and Supra n.42 cols 586-589.
It is also doubtful, if many of the Indian scholars are any better in this respect, who find it easy to dismiss India's stand on Hungary, as a departure from, or inconsistent with the so-called theory or principles of Non-alignment by which they mean the Panch Sheel, etc. It is hardly necessary to reiterate that India had never adhered to the Panch Sheel whenever its security was threatened.

It has, therefore, to be admitted, in fairness to the foreign critics of India's policy, that their criticisms are understandable, though hardly justifiable. It is difficult not to lament the failure of Indian scholars to interpret the country's foreign policy in realistic and intelligible terms. Nothing appears to have contributed more to the misunderstanding of India's foreign policy and worse still to damage its image abroad, than the misplaced moral fervour of many Indian scholars. This is not to forget the role of our diplomats who seem to have been well trained to project this false image of India in the outside world. This will, however, be examined in the concluding chapter.

74. See above, Chapter 2, p. 30
The significance of the Congo Crisis for Nonalignment lay in the fact that, Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations, in his definition of the areas and conflicts in which the United Nations could play a major role, as in the Congo Crisis, identified it with one of the major aspects of Nonalignment, viz., the prevention of the spread of the cold war into Africa and Asia, as far as possible. These views were put forth clearly and pointedly by him in his Introduction to the 'Annual Report on the work of the United Nations Organisation' on August 31, 1960, in the following words:

"In Africa the first beginnings can now be seen of those conflicts between ideologies and interests which split the world. Africa is still, in comparison with others, a virgin territory which many have found reason to believe can or should be won for their aims and interests....

"Fundamental though the differences splitting our world are, the areas which are not committed in the major conflicts are still considerable..... Conflicts arising within the non-committed areas offer opportunities for solutions which avoid an aggravation of big power differences and


can remain uninfluenced by them. There is thus a field within which international conflicts may be faced and solved with such harmony between the power blocs as was anticipated as a condition for Security Council action in San Francisco. Agreement may be achieved because of a mutual interest among the big powers to avoid having a regional or local conflict drawn into the spheres of bloc politics.....

".....Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the United Nations should bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localisation. In doing so the organisation and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will then not be for one party against another, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate.

"Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy to which the efforts of the United Nations must thus to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be the result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must be in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter action from the other side.....

"The view expressed here as to the special possibilities and responsibilities of the organisation in situations of a vacuum has reached an unusually clear expression in the case of the Congo. Here the main argument presented for the United Nations intervention was the breakdown of law and order, the rejection of the attempt to maintain order by foreign troops, and the introduction of the United Nations Force so as to create the basis for the withdrawal of the foreign troops and for the forestalling of initiatives to introduce any other foreign troops into the territory with obvious risks for widening international conflict which would ensue.....(Talics mine).
"It is with this background that the initiative for the United Nations intervention in the Congo conflict was taken under Article 99 of the Charter for the first time applied fully, according to its letter and in the spirit in which it must have been drafted...."

It is against this back ground that the roles of India and the United Arab Republic in the Congo crisis have been examined below:

The Crisis Begins:

The Congo, which was under Belgian occupation for a long time, had become independent on 30 June, 1960, without, as it soon became evident, adequate preparation for the tasks of independence. Soon the Congolese army or the Force Publique, which was described by Rajeshwar Dayal (towards the end of his term as the personal representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo) as the "greatest danger to law and order in the Congo today", rebelled against the Belgian Officers who were manning the army. Taking this as a pretext, Belgium moved its troops into the Congo, with the 'professed objective of restoring order and protecting the civil population', especially the Belgians, who were present in large numbers in the

3. For Lumumba's speech on the occasion of Independence (in French), see Documents for 1960, pp. 263-265.
5. See Quincy Wright, op.cit., p.6.
Congo working in different capacities. And on July 11, 1960, Katanga, the richest province of the Congo, seceded under its president Moïse Tshombe.

In those circumstances, on July 12, 1960, the Secretary General received an urgent appeal from the Government of the Republic of the Congo signed by President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba for assistance to "protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace." They pointed out that Belgium had violated the Treaty of June 29, 1960, between it and the Congo which permitted Belgian intervention only on an express request of the Government of the Republic of Congo, which had not been made. In a second note, the Congolese authorities said that aid was requested "not to restore the internal situation in the Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggressive force by Belgian troops." They further stated that the United Nations force should include only military personnel of neutral countries, thus excluding the forces of the Big Powers. If the aid was not received without delay, the government would be obliged to seek help from the Bandung Treaty Powers.

6. Supra, n.3, p.269 for Tshombe's appeal to Britain for aid which was refused.


8. Ibid.
Lumumba and Kasavubu also appealed to the Soviet Union on July 14, to watch the situation and developments in the Congo. Earlier, the Congolese Cabinet with Lumumba and Kasavubu absent, had appealed for United States help which was refused with the advice that the United Nations be approached.

The Secretary-General Acts:

The Secretary-General responded immediately to the request of the Congolese Government by invoking Article 99 of the Charter which gives him the authority to bring to the notice of the Security Council any development which in his opinion threatened international peace and security. The Security Council met on July 13, 1960. After stating the case for the proposed UN action he asked the Security Council to authorise military assistance to the Congo as he himself could authorise only technical assistance. In the early hours of July 14, 1960, the Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by Tunisia, with the United States and the Soviet

10. 364
11. Supra, n.3., pp. 271-273.
Union voting for it, and Britain, France and China abstaining. It called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary General "to take necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the government, to meet fully their tasks." It also requested the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the implementation of the resolution.

In accordance with his views on preventive diplomacy, Hammarskjöld decided to make the United Nations Force a predominantly African Force with some troops from Sweden and Ireland, both being unquestionably neutral nations. The United Arab Republic, Ghana, Morocco, Mali and Indonesia, besides Sweden and Ireland, agreed to send troops to the Congo. In his Report to the Security Council on July 18 the Secretary General stated that his statement of July 13 to the Security Council was a "basic document for the interpretation of the Security Council's Mandate." He repeated

that the case for the United Nations intervention was based on the breakdown of the instruments of law and order and the explicit request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Therefore, he stated that "it would be understood that Belgium would see its way to a withdrawal", if the Congo Government succeeded in restoring law and order. The United Nations assistance would "yield results only after a certain time" and meanwhile "the force introduced is to be regarded as a temporary security force present in the Republic of the Congo with the consent of the government for the time and purpose indicated." But, he continued, "the force is necessarily under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council. This is in accordance with the principles generally applied by the organisation. The force is thus not under the orders of the Government nor can it, as I pointed out in my statement to the Council, be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict. A departure from this principle would, seriously endanger the impartiality of the United Nations and of the operation."

The Secretary-General also laid down another 'basic' principle of good faith on the part of both the host Government and the United Nations. He laid stress on the exclusion of units from any of the permanent members of the Security
Council, to be followed by both the United Nations and the host country while giving its consent. He said further that "the United Nations' operation must be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities", and that "the United Nations' units must not become parties in internal conflicts, that they can not be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution...."

On July 20, 1960, the Secretary-General stated that all the United Nations Forces had reached the Congo; that India was approached to send a person to act as military adviser to the Secretary-General in the Congo, and that Ralph Bunch of the United States, an Assistant Secretary-General in the United Nations, was sent as the personal representative of the Secretary-General.

On July 22, the Security Council adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the July 14, Resolution and requested the Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the resolution. No member of the Council had questioned Hammarskjöld's interpretation of the Security Council's Mandate.

15. (S/4405), Id., pp. 34-35.
In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on July 31, 1960, Lumumba complained of delay in the withdrawal of Belgian Forces from the Congo. On August 12, 1960, the Secretary-General, who had arrived in Leopoldville on July 29, 1960, told the Congolese cabinet that all Belgian troops had been withdrawn from all regions in Congolese territory where there were United Nations troops, and that the Belgian Government had accepted his interpretation of the Security Council resolution that all Belgian troops would be withdrawn from all parts of the Congo, as the United Nations forces arrived. The "United Nations", he said, "is faced with no problem of Belgian opposition. This was an over simplification of the Belgian presence in the Congo, especially in Katanga. Tshombe had written to him on August 13, that he would oppose the entry of the United Nations Force into Katanga. The Secretary-General had threatened Tshombe, saying

18. Id., p. 46.
19. Id., p. 49.
that he would call for a Security Council meeting which would not let him go easily.

But, in accordance with his interpretation of the principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts, the Secretary-General sent Ralph Bunch to Katanga on August 4, to arrange with Tshombe, the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on August 6. Bunch returned to Leopoldville on August 5, and reported that he met with "unqualified and unyielding opposition of Tshombe, his Ministers, and the Grand Chiefs." Hammarskjöld then returned to New York to place the question before the Security Council and ask for a fresh mandate.

Hammarskjöld, after giving the above account of his visit to the Congo, told the Council when it met on August 8, 1960, that Tshombe was non-cooperative and that there was

20. Id., p. 49.
21. Id., p. 51.
22. Id., p. 52.
23. See S.C.O.R. 16th Year 884 Mtg. August 8, 1960, pp. 2-7. See Lumumba's telegram dated 5th August 1960, which he transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 7th August stating "I shall be compelled to review misposition if United Nations troops do not enter Katanga on Saturday 6, August, in accordance with undertakings subscribed to by the United Nations, by yourself and myself ...." (S/4421) Supra, n. 2, p. 90.
'distrust' of the United Nations among the Congolese Cabinet members. On August 9, the Security Council adopted a resolution which called "for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way in the implementation of the Council's resolutions" (para 2). It also declared "that the entry of the U.N. Force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution" (para 3). And reaffirmed "that the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise" (para 4). In paragraph one, it confirmed "the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July" and requested him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby.

On August 12, Hammarskjöld presented to the Security Council a Memorandum containing his interpretation of paragraph 4 of the August 9 resolution as intimated to the Government of the Republic of Congo. Basing his argument on the experience of Lebanon, the Secretary-General stated:

"Applied to the situation in Katanga this means that the United Nations is directly concerned with the attitude taken by the provincial government of Katanga to the extent that it may be

24. (S/4426) Supra, n.2., pp. 91-92.
26. (S/4417/Add.6) Id., p.64.
based on the presence of Belgian troops, or as being, for its effectiveness, influenced by that presence ... the resolution of August 9, 1960 which reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention, put the main emphasis on the withdrawal of Belgian troops. Therefore, in the application of operative paragraphs as seen in the right of precedents, it can be concluded that if Belgian troops were withdrawn and if pending full withdrawal, a Belgian assurance were given to the Secretary-General that the Belgian troops would in no way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of the conflict between the provincial government and the central government ... the question would be one in which the United Nations would in no sense be party ... It might be held that the United Nations is duty bound to uphold the Fundamental Law.... However, the United Nations has to observe that de facto the provincial government is in active opposition.

"..... the United Nations Force can not be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action. It further follows that the United Nations' facilities can not be used, for example to transport civilian or military representatives under the authority of the central government, to Katanga against the decision of the Katanga provincial government...."

The Secretary-General concluded by adding that "the policy line stated here ..... represents a unilateral declaration of interpretation by the Secretary-General. It can be contested before the Security Council. And it can be changed through an explanation of its intentions in the resolution of August 9. The finding is not subject to agreement or negotiation."

The Secretary-General then left New York for Léopoldville via Elizabethville and Kamina, reaching Léopoldville
on August 14, to report to the Congolese Cabinet. On the same day he received Lumumba's letter stating that "the Government of the Republic of Congo can in no way agree with your personal interpretation which is unilateral and erroneous...... in its intervention in the Congo, the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organisation but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my Government." Lumumba also charged that "The manner in which you have acted until now is only retarding the restoration of order in the Republic, particularly in the province of Katanga, whereas the Security Council solemnly declared that the purpose of the intervention is the complete restoration of order in the Republic of the Congo. Further more the conversations you have just had with Mr. M. Tshombe, the assurances you have given him and the statements he has just made to the press are ample evidence that you are making yourself a party to the conflict between the rebel government of Katanga and the legal Government of the Republic, that you are intervening in this conflict and

26. (S/4417/Add.7)Id., p.71.

27. Id., pp 71-76 for the correspondence between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld on August, 14 and 15, 1960.
that you are using the United Nations Force to influence its outcome, which is formally prohibited by the very paragraph you have invoked." Lumumba ended by saying "It is incomprehensible to me that you should have sent on only Swedish and Irish troops to Katanga, systematically excluding troops from the African states even though some of the latter were the first to be landed in Leopoldville. In this matter you have acted in connivance with the rebel Government of Katanga and at the instigation of the Belgian Government."

When the Secretary-General in his reply complained that Lumumba had made allegations against him, the letter retorted in a letter of August 15, that he had only revealed "facts which should be made known to the Security Council and the world at large." In a second letter on the same day Lumumba alleged that "If no member of the security council has taken the initiative to question the validity of your memorandum and your plans of action it is because the members of the Council do not know exactly that is going on behind the scenes..." And he categorically stated that "In view of all the foregoing, the Government and the people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations."
The effect of these developments has been well described by Catherine Hoskins. On his return to New York on 16 August Hammarskjold made no effort to hide the extent of the gulf which now existed between the United Nations and the Central Government. He was clearly furiously angry and felt personally insulted by the tone which Lumumba had adopted. In addition he felt that Lumumba's attitude was damaging the prestige of the Organisation and threatening to split the Afro-Asian block in a way which would only prejudice further the success of the Congo operation. Joseph Lash states that at this moment Hammarskjold became convinced that Lumumba was an incipient dictator who in his drive for power was prepared to wreck the Congo and the United Nations.....'

Although the Secretary-General was justified in being offended by the tone and contents of Lumumba's letters, he should not have failed to see that Lumumba was making a valid point in refusing to accept Belgian assurances in Katanga especially. The Secretary-General seems to have failed to see the basic fact that the success of the United Nations Policy and its main aim of isolating the Congo from the cold war depended upon a speedy end to Katanga's secession. After all, it was this realisation on the part of President Kennedy, as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. has pointed out, that led to his support to the use of force in Katanga in 1962, against the opposition of Britain and France.

29. Id., p.178
However, when the Security Council met on August 21, the Secretary-General restated his arguments and answered Lumumba's charges. He said that if any member disagreed with his interpretations, they might introduce a resolution to the effect. He indicated that he was setting up a Consultative Committee consisting of representatives of states with troops in the Congo. The Soviet Union disagreed with the Secretary General and called for the use of force against Katanga or to withdraw the United Nations' Force. Among the Afro-Asians, only Guinea appeared to disagree with the Secretary-General.

The African Dilemma

However, in this controversy, the sympathies of the United Arab Republic and the other African states, especially those who had contributed troops to the United Nations' Force in the Congo, were with Lumumba. But they were not prepared to do anything which might retard the success of the United Nations' operation, which depended so much upon the Secretary-Generals' diplomacy and leadership. Nkrumah, therefore, appears to have taken the lead in trying to impress upon Lumumba the need to keep on good terms with the Secretary-General.

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32. Id., 888th Meeting, August 21, 1960, pp. 7-8.
33. Id., pp. 3-9.
and to concentrate on internal matters of law and order. He writes that in a series of letters to Lumumba in August, he urged the latter to keep the Force Publique under restraint and to move cautiously in his relations with Kasavubu. In a letter dated August 19, Nkrumah had written: "I am absolutely certain that the Secretary-General will never allow the Belgians to reestablish themselves in the Congo, but if the situation remains chaotic, as at present in Leopoldville, there is a grave danger that the Congo which is dear to us may become a battlefield between East and West. This would be a disaster for all of us in Africa."

Nkrumah writes further that Lumumba, on the other hand, declared martial law and threatened to attack Katanga unless the United Nations enforced his rule there and that "with each day that passed the situation in the Congo grew more serious. It became clear that the Congo Government could neither command full political support nor maintain order in the country without external help......"

35. Id., p. 33
36. Id., p. 34
The lawlessness in Leopoldville was such that even the Indian personnel in the United Nation's troops were manhandled on August 18, 1960. Nehru informed Parliament on August 20, 1960, that he had written to Lumumba about the incident. "It is a matter of sorrow," said Nehru "that the Indian personnel should have been given unfriendly and rough treatment by members of the Congolese Force Publique."

But Lumumba had other plans. He seemed determined to attack Katanga with Soviet support, which was ready to help him. In the circumstances, it was necessary to take positive action. Either the United Nations or the African States should have been permitted to give necessary aid to the Republic of Congo to end the secession of Katanga. But neither the United Nations was prepared to take the initiative, nor were the African States in a position to do it, since they were committed to the United Nations. The African states who were exerting pressure upon Lumumba to desist from the use of force against Katanga, either unilaterally or with Soviet assistance, were finding it more and more difficult to keep up the pressure in the face of United Nation's policies.

37. See The Hindu, 21 August, 1960
38. See Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 38
The United States seems to have failed to understand the needs of the Congo, and also of the difficult position in which the Afro-Asian States were put. On the other hand, it appears to have taken advantage of the situation by supporting Kasavubu against Lumumba, under the easy, but, false assumption, that any one that takes help from the Soviet Union was a Communist. Nehru and Nasser either did not teach them anything or taught them too much. They, therefore, chose not only to intensify the cold war in the Congo, but more seriously, to create more chaos in the Congo. The one thing that the Congo could not afford at the time was chaos. But this was precisely what Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba on September 5, admittedly supported by the United States ensured.

A Turning Point.

This appears to have been a turning point in the attitude of the United Arab Republic and other African States with forces in the Congo, towards the United Nations' policy and the United States too. For they did not like Kasavubu whom they considered pre-west. And the western support confirmed them in their fears that the United States was working to turn the Congo into

41. Supra., n. 3, p. 294.
a western strong-hold in Africa. Nasser plaintly told later that he turned against the United States because it had supported Kasavubu against Lumumba and brought it to downfall.

And on September 6, the United Nations' Force took a step in the Congo which created bitterness in the minds of all supporters of Lumumba inside and outside the Congo. On that day Andrew Cordier, the United Nations' representative in the Congo, ordered the closure of the National Radio Station and all airports in Leopoldville. Lumumba was refused permission to use the Radio Station in an attempt to regain control of the Government. Impartial observers agree that this action of the United Nations, though necessary and justifiable in the interests of law and order in Leopoldville, did, in fact, deny the only available means for Lumumba to regain his position. Such was the complex nature of the problems which the United Nations had to face in the Congo.

At this stage the United Arab Republic appears to have decided to give help to Lumumba in regaining power, by allowing him to occupy the Ndjili Airport and the National


44. Hoskyns, op.cit., p.223 Cordier was then acting as the UN representative in the Congo, as Rajeshwar Dayal had not yet joined his post to succeed Ralph Bunche.
Radio Station closed by the United Nations Force. According to Nkrumah, his ambassador to the Congo wrote to him that "the UAR representative told us that in view of the improper interference of the United Nations in the internal affairs of the country, they had received communication from President Nasser authorising their soldiers to withdraw when the Congolese arrived to take the Airport.".

The ambassadors of the United Arab Republic, Morocco and others were also reported to be making attempts to effect a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu. In a letter addressed to Nkrumah on September 17, Lumumba mentioned this and blamed Kasavubu for the failure of these efforts and accused the latter of playing the game of the imperialists. The efforts of Rajeshwar Dayal, who had taken over from Ralph Bunche as the United Nations' representative on September 8, also failed to bring the two leaders together.

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46. See The Hindu, September 18, 1960
47. Nkrumah, op.cit., p.62.
48. Supra, n.46.
Any lingering hopes of a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu, were dashed to earth, when Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief s
dissed power on September 14, dismissed Parliament and appointed a Council of Commissioners consisting of University students to run the Government. He also expelled the Russian and Czechoslovakian missions from the Congo. According to a Western scholar, the immediate object of the United States policy—the ousting of Russia—had been achieved, with Mobutu's expulsion of communist bloc missions in September. The Congo was saved from becoming a 'Central African Cuba' and Lumumba (who accepted Soviet aid for his attack on Katanga) prevented from assuming the role of an African Castro.... Lumumba, in the American view, remained completely unacceptable....''

India's Initial Response

Meanwhile, the Security Council had met on September 14, for another discussion on the Congo. The Soviet Union, infuriated by Lumumba's dismissal, attacked the Secretary-General bitterly. On September 16, Ceylon and Tunisia introduced a draft resolution, endorsing the fourth report

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49. Supra, n.3, p. 298.
52. Id., p. 63.
of the Secretary-General on the Congo operation. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. The United States responded by invoking the Uniting For Peace Resolution, which was approved. The Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly opened on September 17, 1960. This marked the beginning of greater interest by India in the Congo operation.

India's initial response, as that of the United Arab Republic, was one of wholehearted support to the Secretary-General's policy. Though the Secretary-General did not ask India for troops, he was depending upon India for various technical personnel and aid. It was reported on July 17, that India was shipping 1000 tons of wheat to Congo in response to a request from Hammarskjold. And on August 2, the first contingent of 36 Indian Air Force personnel was sent to Congo. Nehru informed Parliament on August 31, 1960, that: Some countries have been called upon to send their armed forces to the Congo. We are not one of them. But we have rendered a good deal of assistance,

53 Id., pp. 63-64
54. Id., p. 64
55. Ibid.
56. See The Hindustan Times, June 17, 1960
57. Ibid.
58. Id., August 2, 1960
rather important assistance ......... Of the principal officers whom we have sent, one is a kind of Military Adviser to Mr. Hammarskjold, and another is very soon going to be his personal representative in the Congo. ..... There was very recently another rather heavy demand on us for setting up immediately a 400 bed hospital in the Congo ..... we were pressed very earnestly, and we agreed." Nehru told Parliament on August 31, that the choice of Dayal was made by the Secretary-General himself and that he had reluctantly agreed to relieve him. He said that Dayal would be representing and reporting to the United Nations and not to the Government of India.

Thus India was not involved in any way in the Congo operations, though it was contributing to it. Nehru also refused to offer an opinion on the controversy between Hammarskjold and Lumumba, on the plea that it was before the Security Council. At his monthly Press Conference on August 11, 1960, he had paid a tribute to the Secretary-General for having acted with "vision and also wisdom." He also said that the situation in the Congo was both straight forward and also complicated and that it was the presence of the Belgian troops that had aggravated the

60. Rajeshwar Dayal was appointed in this capacity on Aug. 20, 1960. See The Statesman, August 22, 1960.
63. Id., August, 12, 1960.
trouble in the Congo, though there might be other reasons too. Therefore the sooner the Belgian troops departed from the Congo the better. He added that India recognised only one Congo State.

On August 31, 1960, Nehru paid a similar tribute to the Secretary-General and the United Nations, in Parliament\footnote{353}: "When the troubles arose in the Congo, the United Nations was appealed to and the latter responded with speed and efficiency. This particular action which the United Nations took in the Congo is unique. In a sense it marked a new phase in the activities of the United Nations. Taken all in all, I think it is a good and desirable phase and the manner in which the United Nations has functioned in the Congo has been commendable. I do not quite know what would happen in the Congo if the United Nations was not there. Apart from the possibility of a great deal of internal conflict, there would be a possibility of intervention by other countries, big and small. I would like to express on behalf of the Government our appreciation of the steps which have been taken broadly by the United Nations in the Congo".

\footnote{64. Supra, n. 59, Col. 5929.}
And as late as September 26, Nehru refused to say anything against the Secretary-General's policy. One reason for this hesitancy appears to have been lack of first hand information on the developments, people and personalities in the Congo, including the leading figures like Lumumba and Kasavubu. India wisely decided to open an Embassy in Leopoldville, in the last week of August, 1960, and the appointment of a chargé d' affaires was announced on September 12, 1960.

With the opening of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly India appears to have decided to take active part in the proceedings. On September 20, the Emergency Session adopted a resolution supporting the Security Council resolutions of July 14 and 22, and August 9, 1960 and appealing to all the Congolese within the Republic of Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in

65. See *The Hindu*, September 27, 1960
69. For the text and the voting record see *Y.B.U.N.* 1960, pp. 99-100. While the date of the resolution is given as September 20 in this source, the *G.A.O.R.*, 4th Emergency special session, 17-19 September, p.102 shows the date as September 19.
consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation.

On October 3, 1960, Nehru urged in the General Assembly that steps should be taken to help Parliament (of Congo) to meet and function so that out of its deliberations the problems of the Congo may be dealt with in the people themselves...". He also suggested that a Commission might be sent to the Congo to inquire into the situation obtaining in the Congo. Lumumba was reported to have welcomed the suggestions of Nehru.

UN Recognises Kasavubu

The next move of the Afro-Asians was an attempt to seat the Lumumba delegation in the United Nations. Lumumba and Kasavubu had appointed two separate delegations on September 11, and the matter was referred to the Credentials Committee which was expected to meet in December, 1960. The initiative to seat the Lumumba delegation was first taken by Sekou Toure of Guinea when he proposed it in the Assembly on October 10, 1960.

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70. G.A.O.R., 15th year, 882nd Meeting, 3 October, 1960, p. 327
72. Supra, n.3, p.298.
On October 18, India and the United Arab Republic joined others in co-sponsoring a joint resolution to this effect. They soon appear to have realized that there was no chance of the resolution being accepted and therefore Ghana moved for an adjournment of the debate till the conciliation Commission which had been set up by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, had visited the Congo. This motion was adopted on November 9, 1960. But the United States pressed for an immediate meeting of the Credentials Committee which, on November 9 and 10, and recommended Kasavubu's delegation. The United Arab Republic and Morocco did not participate in the Committee. The General Assembly accepted, on November 22, Kasavubu's delegation by a vote of 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions, with India and the United Arab Republic voting against the resolution.

India's permanent representative at the United Nations, C. S. Jha, told newsmen on November 24, that he deplored deeply the fact that India's vote against

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74. See The Hindustan Times, October, 19, 1960
75. Hoskyns, op. cit., pp. 251-262.
76. G. A. O. R., 15th Session, Plenary Meetings, 913th Meeting, November 9, 1960, pp. 848 and 854
77. Y. B. U. N. 1960 p. 70.
78. Ibid.
the seating of the Congolese delegation named by President Kasavubu, was described in some press commentaries as a vote for the ousted Premier, Patrice Lumumba and against Kasavubu. He said that India had always recognised Kasavubu's status as Chief of State, adding that he had himself gone to convey his Government's respects when Kasavubu came to New York for the Assembly meeting. India, he said, did not favour any one person or party, and had not voted for Lumumba against Kasavubu; it simply considered that in the existing situation it was better to delay seating any delegation until the Conciliation Commission could finish its task. He also rejected the Soviet interpretation of India's vote as a vote against the United States as not correct. He finally stated that the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission should go to the Congo on November 26, as arranged.

Nehru was reported to have expressed the opinion that perhaps it would have been wiser to defer a decision on the seating of the Congolese delegation in the United Nations till the United Nations delegation had gone to the Congo and reported. For, he told Parliament that "the process of some kind of reconciliation etc., envisaged in the Congo was hit on the head".

82. Nehru, op.cit., p.518.
Another result of the United Nations' decision was, as Nehru pointed out, that Lumumba escaped from his place of detention, taking himself out of the protection of the United Nations. He was arrested by Mobutu's men and put in jail. As Hammarskjöld told the Security Council on February 15, 1961, the United Nations' Force had neither the authority nor the means to prevent his arrest or to know his whereabouts.

The U.A.R. Attacks The UN Policy

At this stage Nasser appeared to be moving away from the United Nations' policy and contemplating unilateral intervention. On the other hand, Nkrumah had begun to press him for the creation of an African High Command. In a letter dated November 21, Nkrumah made formal proposals for Nasser's consideration. For some reason Nasser did not appear to favour Nkrumah's proposal. Then, on December 2, 1960, the United Nations' Force including the troops of Ghana were asked to stand by, when Lumumba and his companions, were transferred to jail from their place of detention. This was a humiliating

83. Ibid. See also Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 273.
85. Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 86.
experience for the Africans and others present on the scene.

Then Kasavubu expelled the United Arab Republic's Embassy Staff from Leopoldville and ordered the closure of the Embassy. Nasser retaliated by breaking off diplomatic relations with Belgium and seizing Belgian assets to the joy of his people 86, and, Nkrumah 87 congratulated Nasser on December 6, saying that Ghana had also severed diplomatic relations with Belgium.

Clearly, Nasser was thoroughly disillusioned with the United Nations' policies in the Congo. The frustration felt by the United Arab Republic was evident from the fact that Al-Ahram, Cairo's most influential newspaper, launched a scathing attack on Brig. Inderjit Rikhye, blaming him for allowing Col. Mobutu to hold an impressive military parade in Leopoldville on the United Nations Day, for permitting the expulsion of the Ghanaian diplomat Helbeck, and, for withholding an inquiry into the allegations that western sources had helped to pay Col. Mobutu's

86. See The Times of India, December 5, 1960
87. op.cit., pp. 88-89.
indisciplined forces. Reporting this, K.C. Khanna of the Times of India News Service observed that significantly.... the disclosures made by Al-Ahram closely follow a meeting the U.A.R. Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Husein Sulfiqar Sabry, had with the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, at Cairo airport on the morning of November 30, when the latter was on his way to New York. This, and Nehru's own statement in Parliament that it was wrong to have allowed Mobutu to bring back his indisciplined soldiers into Leopoldville after they had been pushed out from there with some difficulty, go to show that Al-Ahram's story was not entirely 'one sided' as the Times of India correspondent had surmised.

The West Asia Correspondent of The Statesman in a dispatch published on December 31, 1960, wrote "in a conversation with one of President Nasser's closest friends and advisers, who because of this wished not to be named, criticism of India's refusal to withdraw her troops and of both Mr. Dayal and the Brigadier were professed, though more of the latter officer than of the former.

88. Supra, p. 86
89. Nehru, op. cit., p. 522
They were accused of being too formalistic and of placing loyalty to Mr. Hammarskjöld above loyalty to the cause of freedom. There were many occasions, according to my interlocutor, when they should have disobeyed orders from New York or resigned. Only the U.A.R.'s friendship for India prevented these criticisms from being made more frequently and openly, he said.

And speaking in the Security Council on December 9, 1960, Fawzi asked indignantly: “Are we in the United Nations merely to adopt paper resolutions and express futile resentiments if those resolutions are flouted and looked on with disdain? Are we to continue for ever to talk about helping the Congo, while imperialism helps itself to the Congo?... A new, more realistic and responsible approach by all of us to the present situation and eventually to other situations has become imperative.” He was pleading for the release of Lumumba.

Though Nasser had threatened to withdraw his troops from the Congo, he had not yet carried the threat into action possibly through pressure from India and Ghana.

On the other hand, the United Arab Republic joined India, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq and Morocco, in co-sponsoring a draft resolution on December 19, 1960. The resolution urged the immediate release of all political prisoners under detention, more particularly members of the Central Government of the Congo and the officials of parliament and others enjoying parliamentary immunity; the immediate convening of parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures thereto by the United Nations including custodian duty; and finally demanded that all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, advisers and technicians be immediately withdrawn in pursuance of the resolutions of the United Nations and the repeated pledges and assurances given by the Government of Belgium in the interests of peace and security. In the first operative paragraph of the resolution, the United Nations was told that it must henceforth implement its mandate fully. Hammarskjöld did not recommend the draft resolution on the ground that national conciliation and a return to normalcy could only be achieved by the normal political and diplomatic means of persuasion and advice. The draft resolution was rejected on December 20, by 42 to 28 votes with 27 abstentions.

91. The operative part of the draft resolution was read in Parliament by Nehru—See Nehru, op. cit., p. 51.  
92. See Y. B. U. N., pp. 77-78.  
93. Id., p. 78.
With the failure of this resolution the United Arab Republic appears to have become convinced of the need of withdraw its troops from the United Nations' Force and to take unilateral action. This was the line it appears to have adopted at the much publicised Casablanca conference of heads of the Governments of Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Guinea and the United Arab Republic. According to Nkrumah, "The central problem for discussion was whether the African states should withdraw their troops from the Congo. It was felt that the United Nations was clearly not going to take effective action and that our troops should no longer be made available.

"I spoke strongly in favour of allowing African troops to remain in the Congo pointing out that withdrawal would be tantamount to betrayal. But after much heated discussion it was finally agreed that troops of the Casablanca powers should be withdrawn unless the United Nations acted immediately in support of the Central Government of which Lumumba was Prime Minister. I, however, remained adamant ...."

94. In fact this was what all the African States with troops in the Congo felt. See Hoskyns, op.cit.,p.272.
In his "Address on victory Day Celebrations" in Cairo on December 23, 1960\(^6\), Nasser made, perhaps the first major attack on the United Nations' operation in the Congo:

"Western newspapers often claim that the UAR does not support the United Nations in the Congo and that Gamal Abdel Nasser bites the hand that fed him in 1956.

"That is all wrong. When we went to the United Nations in September this year we declared that the Congo was in jeopardy, as was the United Nations itself.

"In 1956, we expressed our gratitude to the United Nations for its attitude against aggression. We had thought that was a turning point in the annals of the world organisation to which small powers attached great hopes.

"However, those hopes were totally dashed later when the United Nations assumed responsibility in the Congo and allowed itself to be used as a vehicle for big Colonialist powers carrying out a Colonialist policy which stands for the overthrow of National rule and makes of Patrice Lumumba a lesson for the entire African continent.

"The United Nations has become a vehicle for imperialism. If it has become a tool in the hands of imperialism, and the imperialistic countries, and if it has become a means for the implementation of imperialistic policy, the people will look at the United Nations the way it looks at the imperialistic countries.

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The United Nations has unfortunately betrayed itself in the Congo. I hold the imperialistic countries responsible for this betrayal. And I hold the United Nations Secretariat also responsible.

"When I was in New York last September we said that the United Nations had succeeded. We said that we wanted to preserve the United Nations and keep its prestige. But the events in the Congo have given the proof that the administrative system followed by the United Nations requires a change."

Nehru Blames the UN Policy

That the charges levelled by Nasser were not entirely unfounded, is evident from Nehru's own exposition of the failures of the United Nations' Policy in the course of his speeches in Parliament. The Press in India had also begun to criticise and attack the Western policies.

The Statesman, for example, wrote on November 25, that "when .... on August 5th at Leopoldville a nervous United Nations' spokesman told journalists that the move into Katanga, due to start in another four hours or so, had been suspended, the implications of the retreat were already clear to some. At the end of that line of repeated retreat lies the latest United Nations' decision to accept the Kasavubu delegation. Perhaps the United Nations will yet serve some purposes in the Congo; and these may be the ones some big powers consider good.... They are, however, definitely not India's ....". And, The Times of India wrote on the same day that "at the back of it all, of course, is the full undiluted wickedness of the cold war. It is a
matter of deep regret that the United States should be leading its Western allies in a mischievous and dangerous campaign to bolster the lawless and unrepresentative regime of Col. Mobutu.

On November 22, Nehru drew the attention of Parliament to the Second Report of Dayal on the Congo and said97.

"Many facts come out of this. One basic fact is, I regret to say, that Belgians there have not functioned, as they ought to have functioned. Indeed, after the first four weeks, Belgians who had left in the earlier stages of independence returned in considerable numbers in the Congo. This became a heavy flow, not only in a province like Katanga which, of course, is practically completely controlled by Belgians of all types, military, civil, technical, and others, but even in Leopoldville itself. The House will remember that the Security Council said repeatedly that Belgians should be made to withdraw. Naturally the Security Council referred to the military element, but the military people are there still, having gone back there in some numbers..."

After quoting passages from Dayal's report, he observed in a significant statement:

"You will find that wherever Belgians are in the greatest numbers, that area is asking for separation from the Congo and the separate statehood. In fact, Belgians are often leading these movements. It is not an unjustifiable assumption for me to make that one of the first things that should be done in the Congo is to carry out firmly and clearly what the Security Council said previously about Belgians. In the circumstances, it is very difficult to draw a line between civilians, military personnel and para-military formations. I feel a basic fact is that the Belgian authorities there are supporting the disruptive elements...."

97. See Nehru, op. cit., pp. 513-516.
Clearly, the premises on which the Secretary-General based his action originally that with the introduction of the United Nations' Force Belgian would see its way out were proved wrong. There was, therefore, now need for strong and positive action. In the circumstances, the failure of the Western Powers, especially the United States to support the Afro-Asian draft resolution of December 19, 1960, was unfortunate. The Secretary-General, as has been mentioned, too did not support this resolution. In the words of a Western scholar it was questionable, to say the least, whether, the principle of non-intervention on which the Secretary-General laid the greatest emphasis till the end was a principle which could be applied in the anarchic context of the Congo. Hammar skjeold argued that the Congo operation followed in a direct line from its previous commitments in the Middle East, but the Congo crisis had in fact confronted the United Nations with an unprecedented problem demanding unprecedented responses. But Hammar skjeold appeared extremely reluctant to draw this conclusion.

Thus the United Nations had become largely ineffective in the Congo. Nehru pointed out in Parliament on December 20, 1960, that the position of the United Nations in

98. Supra, n.13.
the Congo underwent a change. They became less and less effective and Col. Mobutu became the most effective person though not wholly so. They (the UN) could not do anything. The instructions that they got were that they must be completely neutral—whatever that might mean. Actually this meant that while the killing of one group by the other took place on a big scale in front of them they looked on. So from the point of view of law and order they had no position at all because of the instructions or the interpretations of the instructions of the Security Council. In effect the Congo gradually began to disintegrate**.

He continued 'If the United Nations can not effectively deal with the situation it would fade away in the Congo and its reputation will continue to suffer. The suggestion that we should withdraw our contingent has not been approved by us. The fact remains that under present conditions, our men, or any country's men there, are frequently insulted and manhandled by the Congolese soldiers under Colonel Mobutu. We have put up with the many difficulties that face us, but I can not, if our people are not treated properly and given opportunities to do the work for which they were sent, guarantee that the question will not arise whether it is worthwhile keeping them there or not. Normally we would have withdrawn them, but we have hesitated and we hesitated to do so because it would really mean the collapse of the United Nations' work. It would mean most inevitably leaving the Congolese to fight it out amongst themselves, and it would also mean the intrusion of foreign powers with their troops and, therefore, war ''.

On December 21, 1960, Nehru criticised the draft resolution introduced by the United States and United Kingdom in the General Assembly which failed to secure the required two-thirds majority as containing a number of pious hopes but contains nothing you can get hold of. It

101. Id., pp.521-522. This resolution would merely request the Secretary General to continue to discharge his mandate and continue his vigorous efforts to ensure the non-entry of military and para-military personnel into Congo, to do everything possible to assist the Chief State of the Congo in establishing conditions in which Parliament could meet and to continue his efforts to help the Republic of Congo to ensure respect for civil and human rights for all persons within the countries etc. See. Y.B.U.N. 1960, p.76.
again comes against the same difficulty which has been pursuing the United Nations' work in the Congo namely tying up the hands of the Secretary-General, limiting what he can do and he cannot do. This has pursued him almost from the beginning". If the United Nations' Force were to take action only in "self-defence", he said, "they need not have gone there. But they were sent there to help not to interfere, not to encourage conflict, but surely, when the need for it arose, to prevent wrong doing". He pointed out further that "if you look at the whole context of events, you see how by gradual pressures a situation has been created in the Congo in which the United Nations' Forces have been put in a most difficult position. They have been humiliated often and they have to watch humiliating spectacles without being able to do anything. A large number of African countries have been infuriated by the turn of events. They have started withdrawing their forces from the Congo".

Nehru concluded his speech by saying that "In such circumstances, it is difficult for a country like India to function effectively or to help fully ..... Our broad attitude is in favour of the Afro-Asian approach."
That does not mean we agree with everything they say, like the formation of an all African force. They have demanded many measures which we think are not feasible. Our attempt has been to put forward something which we think might avoid this element of anger as much as possible and also be feasible otherwise.

**Nasser Withdraws Troops**

Thus Nehru had identified himself with the position of the United Arab Republic and other African states of the so-called 'radical' or Casablanca group on the role of the United Nations' Force, even while disagreeing with their proposals to remedy the situation. He was still hopeful of making the United Nations change its attitude. But it has to be noted that the Casablanca Powers had been making these attempts ever since they agreed to join the United Nations' Force, without much success. The Secretary-General who had invited them to participate in the United Nations' enterprise, appeared to be less and less willing to take their counsel, perhaps because they had identified themselves with Lumumba, or because they were suggesting what were considered to be 'radical' views, which were being supported by the Soviet Union.

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Even then the United Arab Republic had not withdrawn its troops yet. It appeared to entertain a lingering hope of influencing the United Nations' policy and perhaps of saving the life of Lumumba. These hopes might have vanished when Kasavubu took that fatal decision on January 17, 1961, of getting rid of Lumumba when the latter together with his companions was transferred from Thysville army camp to Elizabethville, the capital of Katanga. As Baradough has observed, it is clear that Kasavubu now felt the moment had arrived to rid himself of Lumumba's explosive presence before the precarious balance of forces tipped decisively in his favor. Since Lumumba was certainly the most hated figure in Katanga, he was virtually signing his death warrant and consigning him to his executioners.

Three days earlier, on January 14, 1961, Kasavubu had requested the recall of Dayal. And a few days later he requested for a security Council meeting alleging flagrant interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic, though no specific charges of interference were made. More than anything, this appears to have been a move to counter the United Arab Republic's severe attack on him and its demands for the release of Lumumba. There were, however, rumors that the United Arab Republic had supplied arms to Lumumbist forces in

105. Supra, n. 103-(S/4629).
106. Id., pp. 59-60.
Stanleyville. At the same time, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia and Morocco announced their intention to withdraw their troops from the United Nation's Force.

Clearly the conditions stipulated in the Casablanca agreement were fulfilled and Nasser appears to have acted accordingly.

Nehru Demands Use of Force.

Whatever might be the demerits of this decision of the Casablanca Powers, it was this withdrawal of troops by them that appears to have given a jolt to the United Nations. For, nobody, least of all the Secretary-General, was willing to pull out of the Congo, for, above all, his own personal prestige was at stake in the failure of the United Nations in the Congo. There were only two alternatives in which he could continue the United Nations' operation. One was to ask the states withdrawing troops to reconsider their decision, and the other was to ask other nonaligned states to contribute troops. In the event, Hammarskjöld appears to have resorted to the second alternative by writing to Nehru on January 21, 1960, for a battalion of Combat troops. Nehru, very wisely, took this opportunity to impress upon the Secretary-General...

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109. Supra, n. 103, pp. 81-82.
that before India could send troops, the United Nations' policy in the Congo had to undergo a change.\footnote{\textsuperscript{110}}

Explaining the conditions stipulated by India, Nehru said in Parliament on February 15, 1961, that the United Nations 'can stay on only if it changes its past policy very largely and if insists on these basic matters. One of the actions which are quite essential is that the foreign elements must be controlled and must be made to withdraw, specially Belgians.... We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions so that the United Nations authority can function there effectively and strongly. This means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force and not merely look on while others use armed force for a wrong purpose, that the foreign elements must go from there, and that the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed. Having got the situation under control, the United Nations should try to get parliament to meet for deciding what kind of government they will have, the object being that the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo should be preserved. If any help has to be given to them it should go through the United Nations and not through other sources.... If our views could be accepted, would get over our reluctance and help by sending some combat troops to the Congo. That is the position we had taken up earlier and it still holds'.

Then on February 10, it was announced by one of Tshombe's Ministers that Lumumba had escaped, giving rise to suspicions of foul play\footnote{\textsuperscript{112}}, which were confirmed on February 13,\footnote{\textsuperscript{113}} by the same Minister at a press conference called for the purpose. It was murder. And it shook the

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} L.S.D., 13th Session, Second Series, Vol. 50, 23 February 1961, Col. 1558.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Nehru, op. cit., pp. 525-526 (Italics are mine)
\item \textsuperscript{112} Id., p. 524.
\item \textsuperscript{113} For the announcement see Supra, n. 3, pp. 734-6.
\end{itemize}
United Nations to its foundations. The Soviet Union in a 'savage' attack against Hammarskjöld accused him of complicity in the murder, demanded his resignation and announced its withdrawal of recognition from him.\footnote{114} Nehru and Nasser were equally indignant. The latter charged Kasavubu and Tshombe for the murder, accused the imperial powers for conspiring in it, and demanded an immediate inquiry into it.\footnote{115} Nehru wrote to Hammarskjöld that it was an 'international crime of the first magnitude.'\footnote{117} He wrote further: "I know that you have been trying your utmost to control the situation but unfortunately United Nations activities have been obstructed both directly and indirectly by some countries who have been supporting Mr. Tshombe and Mag. Gen. Mobutu. The feeling in our country is strong and unless effective steps are taken immediately it will be difficult for India to associate itself with policies which permit the perpetrators of these crimes to continue in their gangster methods.'

Security Council Author Use of Force

In addition, the United Arab Republic also extended diplomatic recognition to Gizenga's Government of

\footnote{115} Nasser's Speeches, 1961 op. cit., pp.19-20  
\footnote{116} The Hindu, February 16, 1961.  
\footnote{117} The Indian Express, February 16, 1961
Stanleyville. Nehru, of course, did not take this step. It was feared that the United Arab Republic might intervene unilaterally on behalf of Gizenga. Actually, it joined Ceylon and Liberia in sponsoring the crucial resolution of February 21, 1961, which was adopted by the Security Council with the Soviet Union and France abstaining from voting. A Soviet draft resolution of February 14, calling, among other things, for non-military sanctions against Belgium, the arrest of Tshombe and Mobutu, the termination of the United Nations' operation within a month and the removal of Hammarskjöld was defeated by 8 to 1 votes.

The February 21, 1961, resolution based the authority of the United Nations on the threat to international peace and security and it called upon the United Nations to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. It also called for the

120. For the text see Supra, n.103,pp.147-8.
121. For the text of the resolution see Supra n.114,pp.23-24 For the voting see Id.,942nd Meeting, 20 February,1961 p.18.
withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign personnel of all descriptions and mercenaries and it also decided to hold an immediate and impartial investigation into the circumstances of the death of Lumumba and his colleagues and to punish the perpetrators of these crimes.

The acceptance of this resolution by the United States clearly indicated a change in its attitude, which was expected with the assumption of office by John F. Kennedy as President in January, 1961. Besides, with the removal of Lumumba from the scene, it appears to have felt that the Congo was safe from Soviet and non-aligned influences. At the same time, the image of the United States which the new President wanted to project required this change in its attitude in order to placate Afro-Asian opinion, especially when the Soviet Union was moving earth and heaven to influence the Afro-Asian nations, especially India, as was evident from the letter addressed by Khurshechv to Nehru, on February 22 denouncing the United Nations and the Secretary-General and also renewing his proposal for the reform of the Secretariat by replacing the Secretary General by three Secretaries-General representing the cold war blocs and the neutral bloc.

122. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (cit., pp. 468-661, for a brief account of Kennedy's approach to the Congo.
India Sends Combat Troops

On February 23, Nehru indicated in Parliament, in answer to a question that the passing of the Security Council resolution of February 21, had made it possible for India to agree to send troops to the Congo. India announced its decision to send combat troops on March 3, through a letter from Jha to the Secretary-General. It was generally believed that this decision which was made even before the clarifications sought by Nehru from the Secretary-General were received was a polite but firm rejection of the Soviet views on the United Nations and the Congo and a reaffirmation of India's faith in the Secretary-General and the United Nations. While this was true, Nehru did appear to have received some clarifications, at least, before the decision was announced. For it was reported on February 28 that C.V. Narasimhan, Assistant Secretary-General (Political) in the United Nations had met Nehru the previous day in New Delhi on the initiative of Hammarskjöld and had a thirty-minute exchange of views in this regard. Narasimhan was also reported to have met the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon.

125. The Hindu, March 5, 1961, The Statesman, March 5, 61.
126. See, for example, Surveyor's article in The Times Of India, March 6, 1961.
However, on March 6, 1961, Nehru announced in Parliament that he had received a reply from the Secretary-General which was satisfactory, and, that India would be sending troops to the Congo. This decision of India and the additions made by Malaya, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Liberia to their troops, rescued the United Nations from its worst crisis to-date.

But the implementation of the February 21, resolution was not easy, since it was opposed by the Congolese authorities as well as Britain, France and Southern Rhodesia. Kasavubu and Tshombe opposed it largely on the ground that it had accepted the views of the Casablanca Powers. They had also opposed the entry of Indian troops into the Congo and threatened to wage war and Hammarskjold was pressed hard for the recall of Dayal from the Congo. Nehru was reported to have threatened to withdraw the Indian troops if Dayal who had been called back to New York on March 10, 1961 for consultations, was not returned to the Congo. As Kasavubu opposed his return he was not sent again and none was appointed in his place formally.

131. Ibid. Also see The Hindu, March 23, 1961.
133. See in this connection The Hindu, March 28, 1961.
It was stated that Nehru accepted this formula on condition that the British and United States' Ambassadors in Léopoldville would also be replaced, as they were, soon after Dayal's resignation towards the end of May 1961. Al or Britain and Rhodesia had started a campaign against India. The resignation of Conor O' Brien, who had been sent to Katanga as United Nations' representative for the implementation of the resolution of February 21 on December 1961, and his accusation that Britain, France and Belgium are putting obstacles in the way of the United Nations work and that they had been spreading false accusations against Indian troops in the Congo, which Nehru endorsed, put a heavy strain on India's relations with Britain. It was also reported that not all of India's anger with Britain and France was based on the Congo issue alone. Their attitude to Portuguese Colonialism and France's Algerian policy were also counted as factors in shaping India's attitude.

The United Nations Uses Force

The rest of the story could be rapidly told. On April 17, 1961, Kasavubu signed an agreement with the United Nations, accepting the February 21 resolution of the Security Council. Under these agreements Parliament was convened and a coalition government headed by Cyrille Adoula was formed in the first week of August. At the request of the Adoula Government, the United Nations moved against Katanga by occupying strategic points in Elizabethville. Tshombe's troops resisted the United Nations force and the latter opened fire after some hesitation. This brought the United Nations under heavy criticism from Britain, France and their friends. Worried by the happenings, Hammarskjöld decided to fly to Katanga to arrange a cease-fire between the United Nations and Tshombe and met with his tragic death in a plane crash near Ndola in Southern Rhodesia on September 23, 1961.

Soon after, U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary-General and he made it clear on November 24, 1961, that he would not hesitate to take firm action against Tshombe's mercenary force. Meanwhile a cease-fire

was arranged between the United Nations and Katanga which dragged on for another year. Though Tshombe accepted the authority of the Central Government and the indissoluble unity of the Congo and recognised Kasavubu as head of state and Kitondela, on December 21, 1961, he seemed unwilling to take the logical step of ending Katanga's secession as evidenced by his unwillingness to execute the UN plans of September 1962, and, his harassment of the United Nations' force. The position of Adoula was becoming more and more difficult and things appeared as bad as they were in the previous year.

In the circumstances in December, 1962 U Thant gave his consent to the United Nations Force in Katanga to use force to end Tshombe's resistance. In a swift action the United Nations' Force put an end to Tshombe's resistance which collapsed all too soon. Thus was ended the three-year old secession of Katanga and it was finally integrated into the Congo in January 1963.

141. For the text See Documents for 1961, op. cit., pp. 770-771
Throughout this period, India steadfastly refused to be pressurized by England and others, and stuck to its position that strong action should be taken, if necessary, to end Tshombe's resistance. The United Arab Republic appeared, by and large, to accept India's lead and Nasser continued to keep the United Nations under pressure demanding strict and prompt implementation of the resolution of February 21, 1961. He also continued to support Gizenga's Government, till the Belgrade Conference of the nonaligned states, in September 1961 which was attended by Adoula, Gizenga and Bomboko. This appears to have made him and other Afro-Asian leaders less hostile to the Adoula Government.

In conclusion, it may be observed that India's role in the Congo Crisis beginning with the acceptance of Haarmarstjkeold's concept of preventive diplomacy and strict non-intervention and ending with the acceptance of a military solution, revealed, once again, that Nehru's advocacy of peaceful settlement of disputes did not preclude the use of force when circumstances really demanded it. If anything, this should have made it clear that India would, if necessary, take Goa by force. But

145. Ibid.
146. For details see Hoskyns, op.cit., p.413.
very few in the West appear to have grasped the significance of the Indian policy and adopted a complacent attitude towards Portugal. When finally, India took Goa by force in December 1961 the United States in particular accused India for violating its own norms and also the Charter. Of all the unhappy things said about Nehru's Goa policy, the views of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., appear to be unfortunate not because he is an American, but because he is an enlightened American.

Perhaps Nehru's observation at the Belgrade conference on Colonialism was a factor in shaping the Western attitude to Portugal. In contrast, Nasser and other Afro-Asians laid as much stress on Colonialism as on the cold war. However, even a perceptive observer like Charles D. Crewe, comments that "unlike Nasser... Nehru seems fundamentally opposed to any arrangement which would involve the uncommitted countries in the use of force". And in a comment on Nasser's Congo policy he observes that Nasser "became so obsessed with the danger of the reestablishment of Colonialism that he would not evaluate Soviet actions with his usual objectivity .... Nasser did not see the Congo as a likely seed bed for Communism".

148. See above, p. 40.
150. Id., p. 258.
This, in my opinion, is not correct. An underlying factor in Nehru's and Nasser's opposition to Colonialism has been the fear of the spread of Communism. They understood far better than the Western powers that Colonialism and its continuance were the real seed beds of Communism. Their opposition to Colonialism and support to Nationalist independence movements was an effort to fight Communist infiltration as well as Western Colonialism. If Nasser had supported Algerian Nationalists, it was because of his realisation of this danger. His Congo policy was also an effort to support Lumumba in order to prevent the growth of Soviet influence as well as Western influence, and also of Israel, in Africa.

In the Congo crisis, Nasser appears to have realised that there was less chance of Soviet infiltration, once the Belgian forces were withdrawn and the authority of the Central Government restored all over the country. If there had been a real threat of Soviet intervention, perhaps the United States would have adopted a different

151. See above pp. 44-50, 145-149.

152. See Nasser's speech to the National Assembly on January 23, 1961, explaining his objectives in attending the Casablanca Conference-Nasser’s Speeches, 1961, op.cit.,pp.4-10.
policy in the initial stages. The western scholars tend to overlook or minimize the importance of the fact that Lumumba's government had first sought help from the United States. It is very difficult to find substance in the charge that Nasser failed to see the threat of Soviet infiltration, for on not a single occasion did he appear to support the Soviet policy on Congo. After all is said and done, it has to be admitted that not all of the Soviet Criticism of the United Nations' Congo policy was unfounded. So it was the Soviet Union that identified itself with the nationalist forces rather than the latter identifying themselves with the former.
CHAPTER VIII

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND INDIA'S CONFLICTS WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN

The Chinese Aggression:

The border dispute between India and China which had been a source of tension between the two countries since 1969, suddenly acquired the dimensions of a large-scale armed conflict between them, when China launched a massive attack on India on October 20, 1962. The impact of this attack on India's Nonalignment has already been examined. It is proposed to examine here the role of the United Arab Republic, as a leading nonaligned country with very close relations with India.

Nasser Offers Mediation:

The first response of the United Arab Republic was a cable from Nasser to Nehru and Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, on October 21, suggesting conciliation and offering his good offices. This proposal of Nasser disappointed the Indians. Nehru himself was reported to have set aside this suggestion. More recently Theodore C.


Sorensen, has advanced a similar view. This view does not, however, fit in with the view of G.H. Jansen, that Nehru did not only accept Nasser's offer but that "Indian Officials actually suggested to the United Arab Republic that it should not take a firm denunciatory line against China lest this jeopardise its role as a future mediator".

That such a suggestion might have been made by Nehru, appears true from what Nehru said in Parliament on January 25, 1963. "When Mr. Ali Sabry their Prime Minister, comes here he is asked to say that China is an aggressor. Here is a man coming as a mediator. He has to behave with some decency towards the parties concerned. It is very unfortunate that he was treated that way".

It would thus appear that the United Arab Republic had told India, through diplomatic channels, that it considered that China was an aggressor. Otherwise, the question of India's suggestion for restraint on its part would not have perhaps arisen at all. Even if the United Arab Republic had not taken such a stance against China so early in the crisis, the fact

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that Nehru and some others in the External Affairs Ministry thought that the United Arab Republic should not condemn China and play a mediating role, suggests an identity of approach between India and the United Arab Republic or at least between Nehru and Nasser. Did they then think that however deplorable China's action might have been their long range interests would be better served in conciliation with China? If they had these calculations in mind they appear to have been correct at least to some extent, as the developments since the Chinese aggression indicate, especially the increasing reapproachment between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed if this were true it also vindicates Nehru's whole approach to China as we shall point out in the concluding remarks.

However, it was this type of mediating role that India, and especially Nehru, had attempted in many international crises including the Suez Crisis, notwithstanding Nehru's condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on the United Arab Republic. Nasser might have, therefore, thought that Nehru would welcome such a move from him in India's dispute with China. So much so he might not have liked to condemn China thus spoiling the chances of mediation.

Nasser's initial response would perhaps be compared to the response of India to the nationalisation of the Suez
Canal Company by Nasser. Further India does not appear to have at any stage taken either the United Arab Republic or any other country into confidence in its dispute with China. As A.G. Noorani has pointed out, Nehru did not raise the issue even at the Belgrade conference of the nonaligned States in September 1961. It has been mentioned earlier that a more intelligent and judicial use of nonalignment by India would have perhaps prevented the Chinese attack or at least would have prepared the world to grasp its significance much earlier and much better than when it came at an extremely delicate situation in international relations. It was the extreme stress of the Cuban Crisis that appears to have produced some of the distortions in the judgement of even eminent thinkers like Bertrand Russell on the merits of the Sino-Indian dispute.

It is not without significance that the United Arab Republic in a post-mortem analysis of the debacle bitterly lamented that so poor had been India's diplomatic and public relations work amongst Afro-Asians that few countries had any clear idea about the dispute, and few were prepared to believe that the Chinese had mounted a powerful and

8. Our credulity And Negligence, op. cit., p.57
9. See above pp.100-103.
   cols. 6047-8 see also Jansen, Afro-Asia And Nonalignment, op. cit., pp. 349.
massive invasion of India's frontiers*. This conforms to the allround failure displayed by India in various other spheres in this dispute.

**Nasser Accepts India's Stand**

However, it is to the credit of Nasser that he grasped the real nature of China's aggression, as soon as the facts were known to him, if not from the beginning itself, and took a firm stand favourable to India by proposing in letters addressed to the Prime Ministers of the two countries on October 26, 1962 inter alia that both sides cease fire and withdraw to the positions held by them prior to September 8, 1962, a proposal which Nehru himself had made just two days earlier, on October 24, while rejecting the Chinese proposal of the same day as completely unacceptable. Nasser's proposal was made public by the United Arab Republic through a statement of the Presidential council on October 31, 1962 thus ending public speculation as to where it stood in the conflict.

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12. Supra, n. 2 p. 2 see also *The Hindu*, November 2, 1962.
15. Supra, n. 2 pp. 1-3.
This proposal of Nasser earned from Nehru a well deserved tribute which the latter paid on November 8, 1962 in Parliament. Nehru said: "I must pay my tribute to President Nasser in this matter because he did not make a vague proposal in the air. People advise us to be good and peaceful as if we are inclined to war ... people talking to us to be good boys and make it up has no particular meaning unless they come to grips with particular issues involved. Now President Nasser took the trouble to understand the facts and thereafter, issued a presidential decree or communiqué issued by the President-in-Council of the United Arab Republic in which he made certain proposals. These proposals were not exactly on the lines we had suggested but were largely in conformity with our proposals. They laid special stress on troops withdrawing to their lines where they stood prior to the 8th of September. That was a major thing that fitted in with our proposal. China has rejected this proposal made by President Nasser."

That China had rejected the proposal made by Nasser was announced on November 2 by Ali Sabry in Cairo. Why did China reject this? The answer was given by Nehru on December 10, 1962 in Parliament: "We decided long ago, two or three months ago, to suggest this 8th September line because, if accepted by the Chinese Government it shows that all that has happened since then has been their aggression. It is a very big thing for them to accept and they have not accepted it."

This proposal of Nasser proved that his offer of mediation was not based on a refusal as some had thought then to see the rights and wrong of the dispute. It might have been a reflection of uncertainty about India's own stand in the dispute.

17. See The Hindu November 3, 1962
19. Supra, n.3 & n. 4.
It might have been a reflection of uncertainty about India's own stand in the dispute. Once Nehru spelled out his terms, Nasser accepted them and tried his best to secure the approval of as many Afro-Asian and nonaligned countries as possible as this statement issued by the Presidential council made clear.20

Nasser Appeals for Afro-Asian Support:

Finally, Nasser was also concerned with the damage that the conflict between India and China would cause to the Afro-Asian solidarity. As the statement of October 31 put it:

"Motivated... by the spirit of Bandung and the principles of Afro-Asian solidarity, the United Arab Republic hastened to assume its incumbent role of positive action and to take such steps as are required to stop these armed clashes, clear away the growing shadow of danger and contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem and eliminate the cause of dispute between India and China, both of whom occupy positions of prominence and great influence among the community of African and Asian countries."

It also said: "while the United Republic believes in the principles of Bandung which call the countries of the world to solve their international problems through means other than the use of force, it still holds unshakeable faith in the need for the application of this call in particular to the problem between two countries which are signatories of the Bandung Charter-China and India - both of whom contributed to the establishment and to widespread adoption of the principles of the Charter.

"The United Arab Republic asserts that it will spare no effort in its endeavours to preserve the wonderful image of Afro-Asian solidarity unblemished by drops of blood and battles between countries working for peace."

Nasser appears to have been been more interested in Bandung Principles than India had ever been and this not/For India.

20. Supra, n.2, p.3.
21. Supra, n.2.
22. Id., p.3.
the Panch Sheel was more attractive than the Bandung principles. Nasser never openly subscribed to the Panch Sheel. Afro-Asian solidarity was less attractive for India because of its rivalry with China which was becoming more and more open. The uses of Afro-Asian solidarity were better illustrated in problems of colonialism than elsewhere to the extent that India was not so immediately concerned and/or confronted with this problem it had less use of it. One important occasion on which India had depended upon this Afro-Asian solidarity in the United Nations was when a large number of Afro-Asian states and the Soviet bloc supported India's seizure of Goa.

Thus Nasser appears to have appealed to Afro-Asian nations especially nonaligned nations to make common cause in the matter, According to the statement of the Presidential Council in pursuance of the policy of consultation and exchange of views current among the friendly states on all events, President Gamal Abdul Nasser communicated with the heads of state and heads of Governments of Afghanistan, Indonesia, Algeria, the Sudan, Morocco, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Cambodia and Mali, inviting them to join in the common effort of the Casablanca Charter countries and the nonaligned countries in Africa and Asia to ward off the danger on the frontiers between India and China .... A PTI correspondent reported from Colombo that

24. Supra, n.2.
Ali Sabry said that "As soon as the conflict occurred, the UAR Government got in touch not only with Peking but a number of nonaligned Governments as well. It would have been very useful had there been a combined approach to the problem then. However ... some Governments made individual approaches and this to some extent vitiated the position.""  

The Eastern Economist wrote on 26 October that the Chinese note of October 24 "was the outcome of the mediatory efforts performed by President Nasser." The Soviet Union was also believed to have exerted influence on China. It was possible that Nasser had also approached the Soviet Union as he was reported to have done after India's appeal for arms to the United States. 

However, Indians were not satisfied with the response of Nasser. A member of Parliament, U.M. Trivedi observed that "we wanted stronger words from President Nasser in our help". It would thus appear that Nasser had missed a golden opportunity of earning the gratitude of the Indian masses by his failure to condemn China before anything else. Had he done so, he would have become as much a hero for Indians as he is for his own people, even if he had done nothing else afterwards. It was surely a tactical mistake on his part, since his

29. Supra, n. 16 col. 186.
friendship for India was genuine and sincere. If the Government of India had not restrained him, as reported, he might have as well done it, sooner than he actually did, and thus established a reputation for himself among the people.

But, for good or bad, he chose a less attractive and more difficult role of supporting India's cause in the Afro-Asian circles. And he seems to have succeeded in his role to a large extent especially in the role his country played in the Colombo Conference of the Six nonaligned states as shall be seen in a moment.

As the conflict deepened with no sign of China stopping short of completely humiliating India, Nehru overcame his reluctance to seek military aid from the West and appealed initially, it is said for 'sympathy' and 'support' of the United States. Soon however, he had asked for large scale military aid from the United States, which Kennedy did not think wise to supply without first ascertaining India's needs and capabilities. There was, however, an immediate supply of small arms in large quantities, which however were considered insufficient for any offensive to be taken by India. In the wake of this supply of American arms came the news of the resignation of Krishna Menon as

30. See Sorensen, op.cit., p.748.
31. Ibid.
32. Supra, n.8, p.135.
Defence Minister. This meant an obvious increase of United States influence in the Government of India. Such a development was of direct concern to Nasser. At this stage he appears to have decided to intensify his efforts to bring greater pressure on China to desist from further aggression. To this end he was said to have approached the Soviet Union also to bring sense to China as indicated above.

It is from this point of view that one has to view his decision to make public his proposal of October 26, and to support India publicly and influence others to do the same. And once China rejected these proposals the press in the United Arab Republic called China aggressor in its war with India. On the same day i.e., November 6, the official Yugoslav Newspaper Borba came out with criticism of China on the crossing of the McMahon Line.

China Announces Cease-fire:

Then, on November 21, China having overrun more than 14,000 square miles of India’s territory, announced a unilateral cease-fire beginning from the next day and a

33. Sorensen writes that Kennedy was greatly satisfied with this development. (Supra n.29). Perhaps the acceptance of the American aid was not approved by Menon and might have been a factor in his resignation.
34. Ibid.
35. See The Hindu, November 6, 1962
36. Ibid. This would suggest close contacts between Nasser and Tito.
37. See The Hindu, November 22, 1962.
withdrawal from December 1, 1962 to what it called the line of actual control, stipulating that Indian troops should not attack after the cease-fire, nor again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, that is the 'illegal' MacMahon Line, and/or refuse to withdraw but remain on the actual line of control in the middle and western sectors. It also stipulated that Indian troops should not cross the line of actual control and regain their positions prior to September 8.

As A.G. Noorani\(^\text{38}\) aptly observes "these were clearly surrender terms which a victor would impose on the vanquished, like the earlier three point plan, except for one more condition, namely that India should not move her troops to the MacMahon Line\(^\text{a}^\)." India clearly had only two alternatives either to reject the cease-fire and fight to regain its territory or to accept the humiliating terms offered by China. It is difficult to say what China would have done if India had decided to fight. But the question is was India in a position to fight to regain the lost territory? It was not, as the Harriman report to Kennedy made clear. Kennedy was therefore, not willing to support India to win back the lost territory.\(^\text{40}\) Similarly, Khrushchev also appeared unwilling to go further to make China withdraw.

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38. Supra, n.8, p.101.
even if he could, having perhaps already exerted pressure on China to cease-fire, without endangering his position in the Kremlin. The fact that he did not support China against India was proof of his rejection of China's claim that it had acted in 'self-defence', ruling out thereby Soviet support for China under the mutual-security treaty, even after American arms supply to India. Khrushchev might have also known that Kennedy was prepared to provide air-defence to India in case of further attack against India.

India, therefore, needed a better alternative than the acceptance of the Chinese cease-fire. The Colombo Proposals of the Six nonaligned nations provided India with the alternative which India so desperately needed to make its acceptance of the cease-fire look less humiliating than it might otherwise have been, as shall be seen below.

The Colombo Conference

The course of India's response to the proposed Colombo conference itself suggests that this is not an unjustifiable conclusion. The initial response of India and the United Arab Republic to the idea of the Colombo Conference was not enthusiastic. As G.H. Jansen reported from Colombo on

42. Supra, n.1, p.144
43. Sorensen, op. cit., p.760.
December 10, 1962 " the suggestion of Ceylon happened to fructify mainly because one of those invited, Burma, responded promptly and gave it a certain momentum. Ghana tried to shift its venue to Accra and till a few days ago there was a strong feeling here that if the United Arab Republic temporised further then it should be left cut." More recently Jansen has revealed that ^From the start India was not at all enthusiastic about the Colombo Conference......India....at first tried to scattle, and then to delay, the holding of the conference. In this she was aided by the United Arab Republic - also most reluctant to attend. Egypt managed, by requests for clarification to delay the opening from the 1st December until the 10th but on or about the 6th, an indignant Ceylon issued a scarcely veiled threat to the United Arab Republic that the conference would be held with or without her." And that "The United Arab Republic seems finally to have agreed to attend mainly in order to be of assistance to India." 

This reluctance on the part of the United Arab Republic to attend the conference appears to have been due to the fact that Nasser was conducting mediation between China and India in Cairo. As Jansen reported from Cairo

45. See Afro-Asia And Nonalignment, op.cit.,p.334.
"While the nonaligned begin to foregather in Colombo, the real dialogue between India and China is taking place in Cairo with President Nasser acting as intermediary.

"Having heard the Indian point of view twice over, from the special Indian mission, President Nasser, with some Indian prompting, is in a position to ask the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Hwang Chen who arrived here yesterday, what his country's final negotiating position is.

"The bargaining will probably involve some struggling between military and civilian control over territory between the line of September 8, and the line of October 20."

But once it was evident that the Colombo Conference would be held even without the United Arab Republic, it would have been a grave mistake for the United Arab Republic, to refuse to attend, and India to persuade it to do so for India would have achieved nothing and perhaps the outcome of the conference would have been different from what it actually was mainly due to the presence of the United Arab Republic at the Conference. When China, which was in a strong position, was making efforts to influence the outcome of the Conference, it would have been folly if India had tried to keep aloof from it, by persuading the one friend it had

47. Jansen feels that India should have done this. See Afro-Asia And Non-alignment, op. cit., pp. 334-335.
not to attend it and try to influence its deliberations. As such it is difficult to agree with the opinion that "At this stage those conducting Indian foreign policy were thoroughly flustered......India's Foreign Ministry was off balance" that the United Arab Republic itself was motivated by such calculations was evident from the statement of Ali Sabry made to a P.T.I. correspondent who had travelled with the latter from Bombay to Colombo, that "Since so many Governments were participating in the Colombo Conference it was considered desirable for the United Arab Republic as well to do so."

The Colombo Proposals Censure China.

At the very beginning of the conference Ali Sabry made it clear that one of the principles which should govern the conference deliberations was that "there must be no gain on account of military operations". K. Nadarajah of Express News Service wrote on December 11 from Colombo that "the United Arab Republic would like to call a spade a spade and pronounce a forthright view on aggression. However it is not expected that any such stand will be taken because that would bring about an abrupt end of the Conference." "Though the United Arab Republic failed to get its view adopted, it was at least able to get its principle of 'no gains on account of military operation', incorporated

48. Ibid.
49. Supra, n.28.
51. See The Indian Express December 12, 1962.
as one of the principles underlying the Colombo proposals, it said, inter alia:

"In the formulation of these proposals, the six paid particular attention to the following principles:

(A) Neither side should be in a position to derive benefit from military operation;

(B) A stable cease-fire must precede any attempt at negotiations between China and India;

(C) Any cease-fire arrangements must be without prejudice to the boundary claims of either party;

(D) In the establishment of a stable cease-fire neither side should be requested to withdraw from territory which is admittedly theirs, or from territory over which they exercised exclusive civilian administration;

(E) The establishment of a stable cease-fire may or may not according to circumstances require the establishment of demilitarized zone."

It was reported in The Hindu on May 14, 1963, that "One of the documents of the Colombo Conference of the 'Six nonaligned countries' which has just become available, has in effect, accused China of having committed aggression on India. It is believed Peking rejected the Colombo proposals because of the clear indictment of China."

This document of the Colombo Conference also states that:

53. Id., Appendix II, pp. 18-23. See also The Hindu, May 14, 1963
"1. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute must be settled by peaceful negotiations between China and India. The object of the Six is to create an atmosphere which would enable China and India to enter negotiations with dignity and self-respect.

"2. The proposals of the Six are intended to create such an atmosphere.

"3. In considering the proposals made by them, the six welcomed the announcement of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal made by China on November 21, 1962.”

Put together, the 'principles' of the Six and the statement of objectives indicate that they had devised a subtle diplomatic device of telling China that it had committed aggression and that they did not accept its gains, instead of an open and forthright condemnation as Ali Sabry advocated initially, since their purpose was to mediate and no to arbitrate the dispute. As the Times of India commented on December 13, 1963: "It is to their very real credit that they have rejected the easy way out of adopting an innocuous resolution vaguely commending the virtues of peaceful negotiation..... It is unreasonable to expect any member of a mediating group to commit itself to an assessment of the merits of the dispute itself. Any tendency, indeed, to 'take sides' even by powers which are basically sympathetic to New Delhi would be inconsistent with the larger interests of promoting a rational settlement..... the preference for 'quiet diplomacy' is
undoubtedly an extremely wise one ......''

It was in defence to this consideration that the United Arab Republic appears to have accepted the quiet diplomacy of the Colombo proposals. It is difficult to agree with the view\(^54\) that the United Arab Republic had compromised on its principle of 'no gains on account of aggression', in agreeing to the Colombo proposals. For the proposals were neither a solution of the dispute nor did they judge the merits of the dispute but were only an attempt to make India and China start negotiations, with dignity and self respect. So much so their acceptance by either India or China did not mean their rejection of their conception of the dispute as Nehru himself said\(^55\). The same could be applied to the Colombo Powers. The United Arab Republic might have also calculated that if the nonaligned nations failed to reach an agreement at Colombo it would deal a blow to Nonalignment when it was supposed to be "at a discount" as a commentator put it, in the wake of India’s failure to meet the Chinese aggression.

**India Accepts The Proposals**

It is perhaps a measure of the strict neutrality of the Colombo proposals that while many in India have criticised them as unsatisfactory\(^57\), China rejected them.

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\(^55\) See below n. 69

\(^56\) See below n. 69

\(^57\) See below n. 63 & 62.
as supporting the Indian claims. That the Chinese
interpretation was not entirely unfounded was borne out
by the fact that the Government of India and parliament
accepted the proposals. Explaining the proposals in
Parliament on January 23, 1963, Nehru said:

"...The proposals as originally framed were not
clear with regard to one or two matters and were liable
to different interpretations. Therefore the first thing
which we did when the representative came here was to ask
them to clarify their proposals and to make us understand
what they were in order to avoid any misinterpretations or
different interpretations.

"The issue before us was how far these proposals
were in conformity with what we had said repeatedly, namely
that the position prior to the 8th September be restored.

It must also be remembered that it was stated all
along that any response that we or the Government of China
may give to the Colombo conference proposals
would not prejudice in the slightest the position of
either of the two Governments as regards their
conception of the final-alignment of the frontier.

"The merits of the dispute were not considered by
the Colombo countries. The conference was designed
only to pave the way for discussion between the
representatives of both the parties.

"These proposals as explained and amplified by the
representatives of the Colombo Conference in answer
to our questions related to three sectors, the
western, middle and eastern of our border.

"In regard to the eastern sector, the position prior
to the 8th September was that the Chinese forces were
to the north of the international boundary called the
McMahon Line and the Indian forces were to the south
of this boundary. Before the 8th September no Chinese
forces had come across that boundary except in Longju.

58. Supra, n. 52 pp. 10-11
59. Supra, n.7, cols 5988-5992.
in Longju. In regard to this, the position that was taken was that for the present neither party should occupy it. The Chinese forcibly occupied it previously and later it was suggested that neither party should occupy it. The Colombo conference proposals as clarified by the visiting delegations, confirm this position except as regards the Thag La ridge area, which the Chinese call Chedong and where we have a border post known as the Dhola post. The Colombo proposals and the clarifications refer to these areas, Thag La ridge and Longju, as remaining areas arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China by direct discussion. That is to say, in regard to the eastern sector, the 8th September position was according to the Colombo conference proposals, entirely restored except in regard to Thag La ridge area and the Dhola post. These are withing three miles of the McMahon Line. The Colombo proposals stated that this matter might be left undecided. They left it to the parties to decide by direct discussion.

"With regard to the middle sector, the Colombo Conference proposals required the status quo to be maintained with neither side doing anything to disturb the status quo. This conforms to the Government of India's position that the status quo prior to the 8th September, 1962 should be restored as there had been no conflict in this area and the existing situation has not been disturbed.

"Coming to the western sector of Ladakh, the restoration of the status quo as it obtained prior to the 8th September would result in reestablishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the map circulated to Members. This would also mean that the Chinese will maintain the old Chinese posts at the locations shown in red in the same map. The Colombo Conference proposes that a 20 kilometer area will be cleared by the withdrawal of Chinese forces, and this area is to be administered by civilian posts of both sides, covers the entire area in which Indian posts existed prior to the 8th September except for two or three posts to the west of Sumdo. On the other hand the 20 kilometer withdrawal by the Chinese forces entails the Chinese forces going several kilometers beyond the international boundary in the region of Spangugur and further south. The Colombo Conference proposals and the clarifications thus satisfy the demand made for the restoration of the status quo prior to the 8th September. The slight variation is about two or three Indian posts west of Sumdo. This is however enabled by Chinese withdrawals in the region of Spangugur and further south, and also by the fact that many Chinese military posts have to be removed from the withdrawal areas. If hon. Members consider this matter with the help of maps they will observe that this position, indicated by the Colombo Conference proposals, has certain advantage over the one which we had previously indicated, that is the restoration of the 8th Sept. position. In the 8th Sept. position the Chinese were there in very large strength and we had also some posts in the area. If the Colombo Conference proposal in regard to the western sector is accepted, it removes the Chinese strength from that
sector and makes that sector a demilitarized area, with our posts as well as Chinese posts by agreement being civilian posts, in equal number of people and similarity of arms. It would be civil arms, police arms or small arms. I think this is definitely better than the restoration of Chinese posts in that area in a big way with large arms.

"On full consideration of these matters as contained in the Colombo Conference resolutions and their clarifications we came to the conclusion that these proposals fulfilled the essence of the demand made for a restoration of the status quo prior to the 8th September...."

This statement has been reproduced here at such length because it explains clearly the Colombo Conference proposal and the reasons why the Government of India accepted them as fulfilling their demand of restoration of the status quo prior to September 8, 1962. Nehru had repeated the same arguments on January 29 and said:

"The question is how to bring about the Chinese withdrawal to a certain extent in order to be able to deal with this matter in a manner which may lead to results.... I think from both the political and the diplomatic points of view this is desirable. Our rejecting the Colombo proposals would be harmful to us, diplomatically and from every point of view. Not only the countries which have made these proposals, but other countries big and small will think that we are acting wrongly and will not continue the support they have given us....."

**Colombo Proposals: An Evaluation:**

The proposals were criticised by some, especially by A.G. Noorani. "Indeed", he said: "the most damaging effect of the proposals was that it completely restricted India's freedom of action." How, this was alone so, is not easy to comprehend

60. See *Nehru's Speeches, Vol.4, op.cit.,* pp.261-265.
61. *Supra,* n.8, p.115.
unless it could be assumed that but for the proposals, India could have sent its troops into areas occupied by China or thrown the Chinese out from our territories. This was hardly possible. Similarly, even if the proposals sought to give China what she wanted in the western sector—that she considered important—and to satisfy India in the east, which was the vital area for her, the alternative would have been surrender to Chinese terms.

The United Arab Republic has conceded that the proposals did not give India all she wanted. But they gave India sufficient to start negotiations with China with self-respect and dignity. Thus they were definitely what Nehru once called 'the lesser of the two evils'. And the United Arab Republic was not satisfied with them. Commenting on the refusal of some of India's neighbours to demand the vacation of aggression by China it says that "The Asian neighbours of China were apprehensive of China's wrath." This might have been true and the United Arab Republic might be justified in being angry with them. But India and the Indians, smarting under the blows

63. Supra, n. 11.
64. Nehru, op.cit., p.35.
65. Supra, n.11.
inflicted by China neither had, nor have, any justification in accusing them of moral failure as G.H. Jansen does.

The role of the Six nonaligned nations appears to have been quite in conformity with the role which the nonaligned nations have generally played of not allowing either side to gain much over the other, consistent with their interests. Moreover they had also to keep in mind the fact that the major powers should not be allowed to step in on either side in order not to turn it into a world wide conflict. And as seen above the Big Powers themselves were not prepared to give all out support to India. It is just possible that they might have felt that the Colombo Conference serves their purpose and interests better than anything that they might do. It is difficult to say whether the Big Powers could not have made China accept the Colombo proposals by concerted pressure. It is also difficult to say whether an offer of the Security Council seat to China for voluntary renunciation of its aggression against India would not have made China more responsive and given Kennedy the much wanted break-through in United States relations with China.


U.A.R.'s Support to India:

However, in all this, there was at least one country, besides India which was not satisfied with the outcome of the Colombo Proposals and it was the United Arab Republic. Inspite of the initial offer of mediation, the United Arab Republic had consistently supported the Indian Government in all phases of the crisis. G.H.Jansen reported from Cairo that "Inspired 'leaks' to Indian correspondents speak of President Nasser's full moral and material support to India." He also later on wrote that "Indian newspaper correspondents in Cairo, and through them the world were informed that President Nasser had bluntly told the Chinese Chargé d'affaires in Cairo that China had committed aggression and should withdraw, but not one word of this appeared in the United Arab Republic's press. The question is not so much whether the United Arab Republic's stand was given publicity in the United Arab Republic as whether or not the information given to the Indian correspondents was accurate.

It was also reported that Nasser was believed to have categorically rejected Peking's contention that India was

68. Supra, n. 46
69. Afro-Asia And Non-Alignment, op.cit., p. 332.
70. See Africa-Diary, 1962-63, p.888. In all this, there was one single jarring note. It was reported that there were fitting articles on Indians in the UAR's press. (See

Contd....
violating the Bandung spirit by taking arms from the United States and other western countries. At a press conference with members of the third floating world conference of journalists at Cairo on October 1, 1963. Nasser said, in reply to a question on the rejection of the Colombo Conference proposals by China, that "our opinion was that all troops should return to the lines they were on the 8th of September, 1962, the day on which incidents started between India and China..." About the rejection of the proposals by China he said "China had some reservations, then Mr. Ali Sabry, President of the UAR's Executive Council, visited Peking, he demanded that China should have no reservations on what Colombo Conference countries had decided. And they said that they will withdraw their reservations." China had not. On the other hand it had begun to accuse the Colombo powers of favouring India and being unfair to it, as the Political correspondent of Statesman reported.  

(Continued from previous page)

M.S.Agwani, op.cit.). It is not difficult to understand what or who prompted such writings, was it, by any chance in response to similar stuff in Indian papers or journals? Even if this were not so, was it government sponsored? It is not known whether the Government of India took note of it and protested against it. The effect of this has been naturally damaging. It is remembered even to-day in India. See K.Rangaswami's article in The Hindu, June 5, 1967.


He wrote further that "To prove this allegation it has cited the fact that India finds the proposal better than even the September 8 line" and that "Mr. Chou-En-lai's letter to the Ceylon Premier is stated to be quite offensive in tone. It criticises the nonaligned nations for going beyond their mediatory role and trying to judge the merits of the India-China dispute. Apparently, China wanted to use the nonaligned countries to compel India to negotiate on Peking's terms but when they refused to oblige it has started condemning them."

**Indian Grievances Against Arabs:**

Despite all this, the feeling somehow persists even in some well informed and influential quarters that not only the nonaligned neighbours of India but also the United Arab Republic and the Arabs have not reciprocated India's friendship fully. Thus The Hindu, wrote on April 11, 1966, in its review of the External Affairs Ministry's annual report for 1965-66:

"The main objectives of any country's foreign policy are to promote its national interests to win the friendship and support of other countries necessary for the advancement of its cause ..... What is India's record in this respect? When Pakistan attacked us last year, not a single country with the exception of Malaysia, was prepared to come openly to our support and condemn Pakistan's aggression even though the U.N. observers had squarely found it guilty. Much the same thing happened at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962, when apart from the Western Bloc member's, the other countries all chose to turn the Nelson's eye on China's aggression. This was a sad reflection on our
foreign policy. It meant that all we had achieved since Independence was to maintain fairly easy relations superficially with most of the world but had not been able to establish such terms of firm friendship with any country as would make it stand by us through thick and thin. This was largely the result of the ambiguity in our own attitude to other countries, the double standards we have sometimes adopted in judging others, a pusillanimous reluctance to call a spade a spade, the absence of give-and-take in our foreign relations, and a general lack of clear-cut objectives and direction in our policy. The injustice done to Israel in not establishing diplomatic relations with it is an example of our Government's pusillanimity. Nor does it seem to have been worth the candle, judging by what the Ministry's report has said about Arab attitude towards India. Among our immediate neighbours, Nepal, Burma and Ceylon have all normal relations with Israel and they do not seem to be any the worse for it."

It will not perhaps be wrong to assume that much of this criticism is in relation to India's relations with the Arabs and in so far as the United Arab Republic is not excepted, with it also. Indeed, since it has been the most friendly Arab country, this may as well be mainly against the United Arab Republic. To the extent it is meant for India's relations with the Arabs in general and the United Arab Republic in particular, these views are, it is submitted, not in accordance with facts.

It has been indicated above that the United Arab Republic has consistently supported India in its conflict with China. Among the other Arab states none supported China.
As Professor M.S. Agwani has written "In sum governments as well as the Press (barring a small section which was favourably disposed towards Peking), and the general public in the region, grasped the true nature and meaning of the Chinese threat to India ..... No government in the area approved of the Chinese action or rendered her any support."

India-Pakistan War: Nasser Supports India.

During the India-Pakistan war in 1965 also the United Arab Republic and a majority of the Arab states were not merely neutral, but were positively friendly to India. As it is not possible here to make an exhaustive analysis, a few press reports and comments are quoted below to illustrate the point. The Indian Express wrote on 16 September 1966:

"In the Arab world the dominating force is language and culture, not religion. Saudi Arabia is no doubt a theocratic state, but the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Sudan as well as the countries of the Maghreb are essentially secular states. It may be that India is somewhat disappointed in the stand adopted by the United Arab Republic and some other countries but it will not make the mistake of thinking that their attitudes have been determined by considerations of religion. ......."

74. The Indian Express (Vijayawada), September 16, 1965.
Here are a few reports from A.N. Dar of the Express News Service:

"Cairo, September 14: "Opening the third Arab summit in Casablanca yesterday President Nasser gave no hope to Pakistan that he would allow its India-Indian game to be played here. He spoke of India-Pakistan fighting with "regret" and refused to go beyond this one-line statement.... The UAR continues to be opposed to allowing the summit to be used for anti-Indian manoeuvres. Pakistan has been banking on countries like Syria and the four kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Morocco to help it in rousing Muslim sentiment on the Arab stage. Arabs have been looking with distaste at the way Indonesia, Iran and Turkey have let Muslim sentiment have better of their reason in the context of India-Pakistan fighting. The Chinese prestige too has slumped by its open fanning of flames."

"Cairo, September 15: Saudi Arabia and Syria were today reported to betraying to get pro-Pakistan reference included in an appeal which the third Arab summit now meeting in Casablanca is likely to issue for peace in the Indian sub-continent. Several other countries taking a bold lead from President Nasser were still holding out against Pakistani pressures..... Earlier yesterday, the summit was reported to have rejected a proposal from Pakistan's friends to name India as the aggressor. That this suggestion was summarily rejected shows the lack of support Pakistan's friends could muster. This was a rebuff to Pakistan..... one thing is clear inside the summit India's battle is being heroically fought by President Nasser despite this forcing on him the additional burden of his having to fight off appeals for Muslim sentiment in a predominantly Muslim gathering....."

75. Id., September 15, 1966.
76. Id., September, 16, 1966.
"Cairo, September 18: The Arab summit which ended at Casablanca yesterday issued a communiqué which does not favour Pakistan but which it will be able to exploit in its campaign against India.

"A vaguely worded paragraph in the final communiqué urged India and Pakistan to put an end to fighting through peaceful means in accordance with the principles and previsions of the UN. Though a not-so-clever an attempt, this statement is linked with another para which in a general statement calls for ending international problems by peaceful means and respecting the right of self determination.

"Despite Pakistan's pleadings it refused to believe the Pakistanie lie that India was the aggressor. It gave no support to Pakistan's claim on Kashmir.

"But reading the two paragraphs together one can discern the hand of a draftsman who is not able to find support for any kind of stand against India. He managed to give Pakistan a crumb which it could exploit to bolster its morale at home than to find support abroad."

Cairo, September 26: "Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon ended his three-day visit here yesterday with a marathon two-and-half-hour meeting with President Nasser and the impression that Pakistan and Chinese propaganda against India has cut no ice here.

"He discussed with Mr. Nasser the situation created by Pakistani aggression and the latest Chinese posture. He said after the meeting that so far as UAR was concerned it wished for peace in the Indian sub-continent. The resolution passed by the Arab 'summit' in Casablanca, Mr. Menon was told, was a general statement of UN principles and nothing more.

77. Id., September 19, 1965.

78. Id., September 27, 1965.
"So far as self-determination was concerned, Mr. Menon has been categorically told here that UAR does not subscribe to it except in general terms of the UN Charter to which India also subscribes." (Author’s Italics).

Only one conclusion is possible from the above facts. 79  A.N. Dar has drawn it. He writes:

"Much has been said of the Arabs’ lack of support to India during the recent trouble with Pakistan. Despite the religious link, they did not actively support Pakistan either. So far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, there is a limit to which this sullenness can be taken. The Indian Government spokesmen have several times acknowledged that it was President Nasser who stood against the passage of an anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani resolution at the Arab summit at Casablanca while the fighting was on."

And K.P.S. Menon has written "The United Arab Republic is firmly wedded to the policy of nonalignment. No country barring India is so sincerely and unflinchingly devoted to this policy as the United Arab Republic; nor has any other state been more friendly to India. Between President Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru, there was complete understanding, respect and affection." Even if Shastri failed to establish such cordial relations with Nasser, according to Hassanein Heikal of Al-Ahram, who’s views could be questioned, the

80. India And The Cold War, op.cit., p. 55.
81. Supra, n.78.
82. I doubt if Heikal’s views always authentically reflect Nasser’s views.
United Arab Republic's friendship for India did not lessen. Why, otherwise, did it declare a "seven day mourning—the longest period declared in any country", as A.N.Dar has put it, on Shastri's death? Commenting on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision not to visit Cairo on her first tour Abroad, breaking a tradition set by her father and her predecessor in office, A.N.Dar said: "If Mrs. Gandhi knew (as doubtless she does) of the enthusiasm here which greeted her election precisely because she was Mrs. Indira, she would have known how much store people here lay by the continuance of the tradition of friendship."

One would have, therefore, expected The Hindu to correct the impression created by the report of the External Affairs' Ministry—i.e. if that was the impression created by it—that there was something seriously wrong with Indo-Arab relations if not also with Indo-UAR relations or that Pakistan's religious propaganda has been more successful than India's own propaganda. If things are against India in two or three Arab countries, it does not seem proper to conclude that it is so with all the Arabs and then to proceed to antagonise, perhaps permanently, all of them by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. As a report of a seminar held

83. Supra, n.78.
84. Ibid.
85. See Bimla Prasad, 'A Fresh Look At India's Foreign Policy; International Studies, (Vol.8 No.3, January 1967), p.285. Also Supra, Chapter 5, n.233 and 234. (italics mine)
at the Indian school of International Studies puts it, such a "move on our part at the present moment is bound to unsettle our well-established and cordial relations with Arab nations in the economic and political fields, and this might result in incalculable harm to our economy and facilitate the success of Pakistan's campaign against us in that region."

In more significant words, it adds: "It was also stressed that by not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel we were neither adopting an unfriendly gesture towards that state nor violating any basic principle of our foreign policy. After all, we do not have diplomatic relations with every country in the world. On the other hand, we have never followed the Arab line on Israel in its entirety....." Still The Hindu claim that India's Government has been pusillanimous in not having diplomatic relations with Israel. And when the Arab League supported the candidature of Syria for the Security Council seat against India, it came out with the comment that: "It is a pity that the Arab League should have chosen to oppose India's candidature for the latter has always been a staunch supporter, sometimes going out of its way, of Arab causes. There may perhaps be a lesson in this for our Government which has more

86. See The Hindu, November 14, 1966.
than once taken international stances, even if they went against the grain, in the hope of pleasing some other country or countries. *Appeasement never pays in the long run.....*"

I do not excuse the Arab League for its sponsorship of Syria's candidature against India. But I do think that it was not an anti-Indian step. If it was, perhaps it was a reflection of the growing disenchantment between India and the Arabs towards which the supporters of Israel in India appear to be contributing freely. But the claim that India has ever appeased the Arabs or even the United Arab Republic is not in accord with facts where the entire Arab world was overjoyed over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal company. Nehru and India expressed reservations on the manner in which it was done, unjustifiably, as been said earlier. If Nehru had not condemned Israel and then England and France when they committed aggression on the United Arab Republic, he would, perhaps, have condemned India in the eyes of the world, though he might have gained the goodwill of a few people here and there. He would certainly have incurred the wrath of the Arabs and Pakistan would have benefited greatly.

In the other Arab causes like Algerian independence, Yemen, etc., India's attitude has been equivocal. But in this

talk of Arab appeasement, it is not at all remembered that the United Arab Republic and the Arabs had given full support to India when it occupied Goa by force which some said was a violation of the Charter. If the liberation of Goa was an article of faith with India, the fight against Israel is no less an article of faith with the Arabs.

That the Government of India does not share these views became evident when Chagla and Indira Gandhi promptly rallied to the support of the Arabs in the West Asian crisis of 1967. Chagla, certainly, cannot be accused of being an appeaser of Muslims either in India or inside India unless every act of friendship with the Arabs is dubbed as such.

If India had supported the Arabs against Israel in 1956, it was to gain their goodwill. If it had supported them in 1967 it was not merely to retain it, but also to advance its own claims against its enemies. Perhaps the supporters of Israel in India do not realise that the talk of injustice to Israel, gives a lie to India's claims against Pakistan and its stand in Kashmir.

88. Supra, n.23.

89. According to Acharya Kriplani India's West Asia policy is based on fear of Arabs, Pakistan and Muslims in the country. This last is a fantastic claim. See The Hindu July 19, 1967.
It has already been pointed out that India's support to the Arabs goes much deeper than merely the need to contain Pakistan, in which, however India has not succeeded in so far as the latter's relations with the Big Powers and China are concerned. If India loses the goodwill of the Arabs also it is not very difficult to imagine the consequences to India's position in the world. All this could be brought about by a simple act of extending diplomatic relations to Israel. In other words India would be reduced to the position of Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, in its relations with the Arabs and possibly with the outside world also.

On the other hand, if we can make proper use of our relations with the Arabs, it is possible to mend our fences with Pakistan and much else. Whether or not this is desirable will be examined in the next few pages.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

It is not my purpose here to give a brief resume of the main conclusions made in the earlier pages. What follows is a general discussion containing certain general observations based on the analysis of the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic, in theory and practice made in the preceding pages, and in the light of some recent policies of the big Powers vis-a-vis India and the United Arab Republic.

The central thesis of this study has been that Nonalignment is a balance of power policy and that its primary object has been the protection of the security and the progress of the country. According to its Chief exponent, Nehru, the policy has three main aspects viz.

(i) The maintenance of a defensive balance of power through friendly relations with the Big Powers,
(ii) Maintenance of the world balance of power as far as possible, and
(iii) Prevention of the spread of the influence of the Big Powers in the Afro-Asian states which have attained statehood in the wake of the second world war.
As has already been indicated the three aspects were closely integrated and have the same main objective namely the protection of the security and the progress of the nation. The other aspects of the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic such as their fight against Colonialism, racism and communism have also the same main objective.

This policy has been based on a deep understanding of international politics as well as the forces at work in the resurgence of Asian and African nationalism and its basic urges. For, Nonalignment stood and stands for these basic urges, which are common to all national movements. Firstly, there is the desire to throw out vestiges of foreign domination and to shape one's own future to the best of one's ability. Secondly, there is the desire to be independent in foreign as well as domestic policies as far as possible, in a world of ever increasing interdependence. Thirdly, there is the desire to play a major part in world affairs consistent with their past achievements, present possibilities and future potentialities.

When the second world war ended, and the United Nations was created, there emerged two super Powers, with a number of satellites around each, each being hostile to the other. And both were determined to dominate the
vast areas of Asia and Africa which were struggling to throw out the shackles of colonialism. It appeared to many at that stage that these small, weak, and poor nations, have no other choice, except to join this or that bloc. The Big Powers seemed certain about it. Hence they were shocked when there arose a voice which clearly declared that there was a third alternative, that of nonalignment. They could not believe either themselves, or these voices, which had soon multiplied, and, therefore, denounced them outright.

However, the architects of Nonalignment clearly saw that the struggle between the Super Powers was not primarily ideological, as it was presented to them, but that it was a struggle for power. In so far as the ideologies represented by these Powers were concerned, they found that neither was of exclusive use to them. Even after accepting one or the other of these ideologies, either in full, or in part, these states were not prepared to join in the ideological crusade.

In so far as the struggle was a power struggle, the nonaligned leaders realised that their interests would be better served by not joining either side, rather than joining one side against the other. This was, again, in conformity not only with the hard realities
of international life, but also with the deeper urges of national resurgence, awakening the Asian and African nations from decades and centuries of slumber and slavery.

Nonalignment, therefore, put a halt to the growing bipolarity of the world driving it to a precipice from which there might have been no possible retreat. It also put the nonaligned nations in a position to influence world affairs in a larger measure than would otherwise have been possible for them. That this was a well thought out policy is evident from Nehru's statements on foreign policy made in the late forties, which have been extensively quoted in section one of this study.

It was unfortunate that this policy should have been interpreted in terms of human ideals and religio-philosophic terms. Indian scholars, and in terms of anticolonialism, antiracialism and procommunism by western scholars. While Indian scholars like Prof. Appadorai have taken the balance of power to be outmoded following some of their counterpart parts in the

western countries, some other western scholars like Alan Du Rousett, have argued that the nonaligned powers deride the balance of power while taking shelter under the balance of power which is maintained by the western powers. While accepting the criticism that the Indian scholars have failed in a larger measure to explain India's foreign policy in realistic terms, I find that to be no reason why the western scholars should be excused for their own failure to understand it, especially when India's chief spokesman on foreign policy for over 18 years, had more often than not, explained his policy in realistic terms.

Moreover, there is no substance in the argument that the nonaligned states are shielded by the balance of power, maintained by the Western powers for it requires more than one side to maintain it. Even if this were accepted for the time being, it is no proof that the Western Powers were willing to allow the nonaligned states to be shielded by the balance of power without asking a price for it.

It has already been explained in earlier chapters, how the nonaligned nations have been struggling to play

\[2\] 'On understanding Indian Foreign Policy', Id., (Vol. I, No. 11, April, 1989), pp.543-556.
a more and more responsible role in mitigating the dangers of a bipolar balance of power and to bring about a more stable balance of power. It has also been seen how these attempts have been often foiled by the Western Powers, only to realize their folly and to make one retreat after another. Even now the United States appears unwilling to accept the legitimate policies of the nonaligned states since they stand in its drive for an all powerful place in the world, which is being opposed by its own allies in Europe.

Some of the misunderstanding of India's foreign policy abroad and in India is no doubt due to the false image of India projected outside India mainly by our embassies abroad and also by our politicians who visit foreign countries. And some of our failures in foreign policy were also no doubt due to lack of proper understanding of the basic tenets of Nonalignment, especially among the persons who were in charge of the implementation of this policy. Sometimes Nehru himself, and his closest political advisers like Krishna Menon, appear to have been carried away by what they wanted to see, instead of seeing what actually existed, especially in India's relations with China. Some of these defects in the working of the
External Affairs Ministry, and its executive organs abroad, have been pointed out by Badruddin Tayabji, India's former Ambassador to Japan, and a one time Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry. It is difficult to say how far the situation has improved in recent years.

However, as Tayabji says "Nonalignment was and is the right policy for India, situated as she is, historically, geographically, and economically. India is too big a country to align herself with either of the Super Powers".

Even Nehru's policy towards China does not seem to be that bad on second thoughts, especially in the light of the more recent trends in the Big Power policies. Nehru wanted to be friendly with China, as far as it was humanly possible, because he realised that India would not be able to meet the Chinese challenge without depending upon the Big Powers for a very long time to come. This is precisely the position in which India finds itself today. Some might say that this was of Nehru's making but it is not true.

Nehru's approach to Pakistan was also marked by the same concern not because Pakistan posed a serious threat to India, but because he realised that Pakistan as a small power would naturally lean towards some big power, if it felt insecure. Perhaps Pakistan would have made friends with China and the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, if India had taken up the Chinese challenge at the time of the Korean Crisis and the Chinese occupation of Tibet (as Sardar Patel is believed to have advised) in the company of the United States. It is difficult to say what the consequences would have been for India, but Nehru, as already indicated, said that the present troubles would have arisen then. It would have led to a further bipolarisation of the world. Internally, perhaps, there would have been a polarisation in public opinion between the right and the left, with what consequences, it is difficult to say, Certainly, the foreign policy of India would not have made the impact it had made on world affairs, due to Nonalignment.

Again, the criticism of Nehru and his approach to China, seem to overlook the fact that when China became independent in 1949, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, had all been particular to make
friendship with China. Even today, the United States would prefer China's friendship to that of India. The friends of the United States in India, do not seem to know this, either in their enthusiasm for it, or out of fear of, or hostility to, China.

Perhaps China knew its own position, and it is this that appears to have made it press its demands on India to such an extent as to make India an enemy. Of course, it might have also realised that it would not be able to make good its claims if it allowed India to grow stronger, for India was building its strength, though at a slow pace. Hence it struck the blow in 1962, for which the Indian leaders should have been prepared, when they were not prepared to accept a compromise solution with China on its claims on India's border, possibly because of the fear of public opinion.

The same fear of public opinion appears to have been responsible for Nehru's inability to translate his desire for friendship with Pakistan into some compromise solution more attractive to Pakistan and to the popular leaders of Kashmir. Of course, Nehru himself and many of his advisers on foreign policy had, for historical reasons, a greater dislike of Pakistan and what it
stands for, than for China and what it stands for: them
given a chance, it would have been easier for them to
make up with China, than with Pakistan.

Moreover, friendship with China rather than with
Pakistan, is of greater importance to India, for it
would relieve the big Power pressure on India's foreign
policy, especially in other fields like Pakistan,
because Pakistan is able to exploit India's conflict
with China, not only to seek concessions from India,
but also from the big Powers themselves, who are more
afraid of China, than is realised by people in
India.

It is not without significance, that after the
initial angry outburst against the Soviet Union, at its
proposed military aid to Pakistan, Prime Minister India
Gandhi said that India's attitude towards China and
Pakistan was not rigid but flexible. Thus the Soviet arms
supply to Pakistan, has put India back by two decades.
It has created for the Indian policy makers the same
dilemma in which their predecessors were probably placed
in the late forties viz., whether or not to seek the
friendship of China and Pakistan in order to be Nonaligned
and be free from the big Power pressures.
It is difficult, therefore, to agree with the view held by many important people in India, that Nehru's policy towards China lacked reality. Nehru's realism was so great that he was dubbed an idealist.

India's struggle with China is a struggle for Power in Asia. If it has to succeed in this struggle, it has to act as a potential big Power, which it is. The solution does not lie in joining the Western bloc or depending upon it exclusively as some of the opposition parties in India seem to believe. The solution lies rather in building India's own strength as rapidly as possible and at the same time to isolate China from its neighbours and its allies. India simply cannot afford to lose the friendship of the Soviet Union, not only because it is essential for its security against China, but also because it is a great power which is capable of providing aid to India in many ways. Otherwise, India would have to depend exclusively upon the Western powers which is not at all desirable. India has, therefore, to avoid interfering in the Soviet Union's struggle against the Western Powers in Europe, which had been divided into zones of influence by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. There is no use blaming the Soviet Union alone for the state of affairs in Europe. It is a legacy of the past which was a legacy of conflicts as Nehru said again and again. And Nehru also said a number of times that India would not take any part in these conflicts.
In the circumstances, the stand taken by the government of India on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, seems justifiable from the point of view of India's national interests. Still the popular reaction against the Soviet Union seems to have been enough to put heavy strains on Indo-Soviet relations. The Indian Public does not seem to realize that the state of affairs in Europe is a direct consequence of the division of Europe into zones of influence. This was no direct consequence for India's interests, and hence the popular reaction appears to have been mostly ill-informed, if not irresponsible too.

Whether this was in any way influenced by the anger generated in India at the proposed Russian supply of arms to Pakistan is difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that the latter had some affect on the former. While the government and the people of India had greater justification in protesting against the supply of arms to Pakistan by the Soviet Union, I feel that it should not have been carried to such hysterical proportions, bordering almost on jingoism. In a speech in Parliament in 1959 Nehru cautioned the House against jingoism. One wonders whether Nehru's caution has gone unheeded.

It is difficult to say that the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan was an exclusively anti-Indian move. It might, however, well have been a caution to India that the rise of anti-Soviet elements in India in the recent past, is not unnoticed by the Soviet Union. Shrewd tacticians as they are the Soviet leaders seem to be building Pakistan as an alternative to India in their struggle against the West and if necessary against India. Any way it is not only in their interests, but also in our interest that Pakistan should remain out of China's sphere of influence. We could have, therefore, been more restrained in our protests to the Soviet Union.

In the normal course it should have been India's responsibility to isolate China in Asia. Since India is not able to do it because of its hostility to Pakistan and its weakness vis-a-vis China, the Soviet Union appears to have stepped into the Asian arena. It is time India plays a more positive role in Asia, than merely reacting to the moves of others in an irresponsible and hysterical fashion. India has, therefore, to strive to improve its relations with Pakistan. If Big Powers like the Soviet Union and the United States try to help Pakistan in one way or the other, it should be a lesson for India.
It is difficult to say what should be done by India to improve its relations with Pakistan, since it is not merely a question of India's intentions alone. But one or two steps might yield positive results. The first is to allow Pakistan to secure the arms it might feel necessary for its defence without opposing it all the time. We have, of course, to be prepared for all contingencies, which does not call for angry protests against the Western Powers or the Soviet Union, which, however, go unnoticed and would create unnecessary frictions.

A more positive step might be to make use of the good offices of a country like the United Arab Republic to make Pakistani leaders realise the need to seek better relations with India. It is difficult to say whether the government of India, had at any time made such an attempt. Perhaps they had been concentrating on the need to isolate Pakistan from these friends. Now that India has fairly strong ties with the United Arab Republic in particular, it may not be difficult for India to make such an effort, as it is not merely in the interests of India but also of the United Arab Republic and also of Pakistan that India and Pakistan should live in peace. For it would then remove the major irritant in the relations between India and the United Arab Republic.
on the one hand, and the United Arab Republic and Pakistan on the other. India might then be able to have the entire Muslim world behind it in its struggle against China. They might then be able to make a greater impact on the super powers than they are able to do at present. Since such a development would be as much in the interests of the Arabs as of India, the Arab States friendly to Pakistan should be made to exert some pressure on Pakistan to come to terms with India, provided the Arabs want to retain the goodwill of India on a permanent basis.

Even otherwise, India needs to be on friendly terms with as many Arab states as possible, since Pakistan is at present able to carry half the Muslim world on its side. India can hardly afford to lose the support of the other half represented by the Arab states. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the attitude of the opposition parties and a large section of literate public in India towards the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Harrassed as they are by Israel supported by the United States, the Arabs now look mainly to the Soviet Union and other nonaligned powers to support them. They have fairly good relations with China but they do not have
as good relations with it as with either the Soviet Union or India. Still China is potentially capable of helping them in their struggle against Israel, if they chose to take its help. Since we cannot help the Arabs in any significant measure, we should not demand outright condemnation of China from the Arabs for what it has done to us. The United Arab Republic had incurred the displeasure of China in its role in the Sino-Indian border dispute. It is not for nothing that the Soviet Union is supporting the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in its struggle against Israel. If the Soviet Union does not support them, they would have only one source of support and that is China.

Public opinion in India, appears to be at present as hostile to the Arabs as to the Soviet Union. If this trend continues it is possible that these countries might become unfriendly to us, one after the other or all of them together. And with China and Pakistan already hostile, India would be completely isolated in Asia. Whether the United States and its allies would then be able to protect all our interests is difficult to say. India might then be reduced to the status of a western satellite.
The Government of the United Arab Republic appear to have committed the same mistakes in June 1967, which the Indian Government did in 1962, that is of not being prepared for the aggression from Israel and then to rely too much on the capacities of the Great Powers to restrain unscrupulous states like China and Israel, unless their own vital interests are at stake. In both the cases the aggressors have not so far vacated their aggression. China is a great Power. Hence it is difficult to see how China would be made to vacate its aggression unless there is a big war against it. But it is not so with Israel. Israel is neither a great Power nor is one potentially, unless it succeeds in expanding itself for more than at present in size as well as in numbers. Hence, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to make it vacate its aggression seems to pose a greater challenge to Nonalignment than the Chinese aggression on India did.

Indeed, it seems to have brought about a crisis in Nonalignment in as much as the capacity of the Nonaligned states to influence the Big Powers has declined. This is due to the detente in the East-West relations and the desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to decide
international issues on a bilateral basis. This has come to pass because the nonaligned nations have come to depend upon them more than ever, in view of their disputes with their neighbours. This is particularly so with the United Arab Republic and India. For both, the solution would seem to lie in seeking a detente with China, in order to make the Big Powers more reasonable. But this has its own difficulties, and it might be very risky to take this step at this stage. Moreover China does not seem to be in any mood for a rapprochement with India. May be a day will come when China would need the support of the nonaligned states. But this would be possible when it is completely isolated and when the nonaligned states strengthen their own position.

Thus the one course open for the nonaligned states is to close their ranks, and to recruit more members into their fold if possible from Europe also. For India, as already indicated, it may be necessary to make friends with Pakistan and other neighbours. The Arabs have to close their ranks. If the Arabs could do this, then their position in the world would undergo a great change. The Arabs seem to need many more Nasser, than they have at present.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia may present a similar problem to Tito of Yugoslavia. He has to be more cautious and careful in his dealings with the Soviet Union as well as the western Powers. It is difficult to say whether the proposed conference of the nonaligned states would achieve greater unity among them, and whether the nonaligned states would emerge stronger and more determined in their efforts to resist Big Power pressures and also to meet the challenge posed by aggressions from China on India and Israel on the United Arab Republic. Clearly, a great effort is needed to rescue nonalignment from the present crisis. Otherwise, nonalignment might not die, but it would cease to be a force in international affairs. Each nonaligned state may then have to salvage its own affairs to the best of its ability with the support of one or the other of the Big Powers.
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NONALIGNMENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS PRESENTED TO THE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of Nonalignment with particular reference to the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic in theory and practice. It is an endeavour to interpret Nonalignment in realistic terms as the foreign policy of these countries, and to evaluate it on its own merits and demerits.

The study is divided into two major parts and a Conclusion.

Part I presents an analysis of Nonalignment as formulated and explained by Nehru and Nasser. It has three chapters.

In the first chapter an attempt has been made to explain that Nonalignment is not based on such principles as nonviolence and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, that its basis does not lie in religion, and that it is not neutralism or passivity.

In the second chapter, it has been explained that maintenance of peace, anticolonialism, antiracialism and anticommunism, have not been, either the major objectives, or the

* The reference is to Egypt which is known as the United Arab Republic even after the dissolution of the union of Egypt and Syria which originally formed the United Arab Republic.
major determinants of Nonalignment, as is generally believed. It has also been explained that Nonalignment does not either mean independence, or a total rejection of all military alliances and military aid, but is only a rejection of entangling alliances which go against the aims and objectives of the non-aligned states.

The third chapter explains the central thesis of this study; that Nonalignment is a balance of power policy divided into three major aspects and that its primary objective has been the protection of the security of the nation and achievement of rapid economic and industrial progress.

Part II deals with the Nonalignment of India and the United Arab Republic in practice. It is divided into five chapters.

In the first of these, i.e., the 4th chapter, the beginnings of India's foreign policy have been traced briefly, to be followed by an analysis of India's role in the Korean Crisis. It was in this crisis that India's Nonalignment made a debut in international affairs.

In the next chapter, the 5th, the evolution of Arab Nonalignment in the hands of Nasser and the emergence of Nonalignment as a world phenomenon with the development of close relations between India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia and their leaders, Nehru, Nasser and Tito have been sketched.
This is followed by an analysis of India's role in the Suez Crisis which shows that India acted in such a way as to protect its vital interests, without antagonising either party to the dispute. This chapter also contains an analysis of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and India's stand on it.

The 6th chapter contains an analysis of the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic in the Hungarian crisis. It will be found that the roles of India and the United Arab Republic were consistent with the basic tenets of Nonalignment and strictly in accordance with their national interests as they stood then.

In the 7th chapter, the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic in the Congo crisis are analysed. This crisis symbolised the struggle of the nonaligned States to contain the Big Powers from gaining influence in Africa and highlighted the type of role the United Nations and its Secretary-General could and should play in such situations. Our analysis of this crisis brings out the fact that in spite of some superficial differences in their approach to the problem posed by Colonialism and Communism there was basic agreement between India and the United Arab Republic on essentials.
The next chapter, the 8th, contains an analysis of the stand of the United Arab Republic on the Chinese invasion of India's borders in 1962 and Pakistan's aggression against India in 1965. It becomes clear that in both the cases, the United Arab Republic led by Nasser, staunchly supported India. In the light of this some recent criticisms of India's support to the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in their conflict with Israel have also been examined.

Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied by it after the aggression in June 1967, and the refusal of China to vacate India's territories occupied by it in 1962, coupled with the increase in the Big Power pressures on the nonaligned States, pose a challenge to Nonalignment and its future validity as a force in international politics. This is the theme of the Conclusion, wherein it has been argued that India and the United Arab Republic have to strive to come closer and then to wean away all their neighbours from the influence of the Big Powers and China, forming a solid group of nonaligned States. Then only will they be able to resist the growing Big Power pressure on them and resist such Big Power acts as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.