ROLE OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIAN POLITICS FROM 1940-47

ABSTRACT

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
Political Science

BY
HAKIMUDDIN

Under the Supervision of
Prof. SHAN MOHAMMAD

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
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A B S T R A C T

The present thesis is an attempt to study the role and attitude of the Muslim League in Indian Politics from 1940 to 1947. Since the inception of the All-India Muslim League in December 1906 at Dacca cordial relations existed between the League and the Congress and it was only in 1929-30 that they parted company because of the non-settlement of the communal problem. At all stages the League endeavoured to make the Congress realise Muslim aspirations and grievances and at every step the Congress failed to see that the League was a representative body of the Muslims and a major factor in Indian politics which could not be ignored. My researches have led me to the conclusion that had the Congress taken the communal problem seriously, Lahore resolution and finally the Partition would not have taken place.

The period between 1922 to 1926 had witnessed the rise of communalism, which uprooted the brotherly relations between the Muslim League and the Congress. The communal relations had reached such an extent that even the Nehru Report rejected the Lucknow Pact, which
had commented the Hindu-Muslim unity, and forced M.A.
Jinnah, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mohammad Ali and many
other influential Muslim nationalists to leave the
Congress. The settlement of the 'Minority Question'
was the corner-stone of Jinnah's and Mohammad Ali's
political philosophies which they preached till they
lived. The League, thereafter met at Allahabad in 1930
and for the first time high-lighted its policy of secur­ing
a 'Muslim India' and declared emphatically that it
would not be content with any of the constitution that
fails to guarantee full Muslim representation on popula­tion basis in the Punjab and Bengal.

Efforts to secure the above goal continued.
The Government of India Act 1935 envisaged a Federal
structure with Provincial Autonomy. Both the Congress
and the League condemned the federal scheme but decided
to utilized its provincial part. In 1936 the League
for the first time planned to organise itself for the
election and projected the idea of Muslims being a
'nation' and not a 'community.' In the election that
held in 1937, the League could not secure the expected
number of seats but the Congress won the majority of
seats.
Though in U.P. Muslim population figured only 14% but because of its influence, the Congress had agreed to give the Muslim League two seats on the U.P. Cabinet. But when the Congress won the majority, it could not stick to its former promise and intended to offer only one seat to the League. Moreover the Congress sent a letter to League stating pre-condition for the inclusion of League in the Cabinet. The letter stated that 'The Muslim League party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress party and will fully share with other members of the party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved and no candidate will, therefore, be set up by the said Board at any election.'

This was taken by the League as an attempt to merge the separate entity of the League into the Congress. It created suspicion among the Muslims that the Congress wanted to integrate the Muslim community with the Hindus. Extreme hostility between the two was the outcome of this letter and the League henceforth
bitterly criticised the Congress ministries. It celebrated the Day of Deliverance and in Lahore in 1940 in its Annual session presented Lahore Resolution on the basis of two-nation theory, demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims. This was not accepted by the other political parties.

Since the Second World War had already started and the Congress refused to support the Allies and its ministries resigned, Jinnah made the most of such an opportunity and prevailed on Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, to accept that the British Government would not frame any constitution without the approval of the League and that in the Executive Council the number of Muslim members would be equal to that of the Hindus. The August Offer was the result of this persuasion.

While War position in 1942 was not satisfactory, America, Australia and China, supported the cause of India's independence. The British Government therefore sent Sir Stafford Cripps to explain to Indian Leaders certain constitutional proposals accepted by the Government of England. The Congress and the League both rejected the Cripps proposals on their respective
grounds. While the Congress rejected it because whatever it had offered was to be implemented after war and Indian aspirations could not be put in check for such a long time, the League criticised the procedure of the Constitution-making body feeling that inspite of the separate electorate, mentioned in the Cripps proposals, it would not be able to get more than 25 per cent of its representatives in the Constituent Assembly. Cripps failure was thus evident.

The attitude of the League towards the Quit India was also not friendly. Its opposition mainly rallied the point that the settlement of the communal problem should get the top priority and the issue of Independence should be given secondary position. The League was afraid that after the withdrawal of the British, the Muslims would not get their due. It was only in the presence of the British Government that they could get their grievances secured. This fear of the League continued and nothing was done by the Congress to allay their fear. To say that the League was opposed to the Independence of India is wrong. It only wanted the safety and security of Muslims in India along with the Independence of India.
The war ended in May 1945 with British victory and the British policy took a new turn to solve the constitutional deadlock. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, called a Conference of Congress and League representatives at Simla to form the government. But the Conference failed because Jinnah wanted the Muslim members of the Council to be chosen from the League. He further wanted some effective safeguards, other than the Viceroy's veto, to protect Muslim interests from majority decisions. Later, elections for the Central Legislature were fought. The League fought election on the basis of its demand for Pakistan and won almost every Muslim seat. The result of the election had now proved that the Muslim League had full control over the Muslim masses, securing 96.6% of the total votes cast in Mohammadan constituencies and the Congress had secure 91.3% of the votes cast in non-Mohammadan constituencies. It had also proved that there were two major parties - the Congress and the League.

While each party was busy to prove its following, the Government of England sent a delegation of Cabinet ministers to settle the issue of Pakistan and
Indian Independence. The Conference which discussed the above issues could not settle the main differences of the Congress and League. The main point of difference between the two groups was that the Congress wanted a United India with a unitary national government and the League opposed it and wanted the creation of Pakistan on the basis of two nation-theory. Later the Mission created grouping of the Provinces in Section A, B, and C and Jinnah agreed to accept it on the condition that "if the Congress would accept the Groups, the Muslim League would accept the Union." But it was rejected by the Congress.

The League in its ten points memorandum (May 12, 1946) said that the six Muslim provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) should be grouped together in one and would deal with all the subjects except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication and a separate constitution-making body for six provinces would frame the constitution while the Congress stood for one Constitution-making body and after the Constituent Assembly had decided the constitution for the All-India Federal Union, the representatives of the Provinces may form groups to decide the constitution for their group.
Thus both the parties had different approach and did not agree to participate in the formation of the interim Government. Later the League agreed to participate in the interim Government and somehow reluctantly accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan. But Jawaharlal's statement that he had every intention of modifying the plan and the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and that in all probability there would be no groups at all, shocked the League. To Jinnah if the Congress could change so many times while the British were still there, what assurance would the minorities have that once the British left, the Congress would not again change. Jinnah was not so keen for Pakistan.

Jinnah himself was not clear about the implications of his demand. He only wanted at least 'Pakistan' in principle to be accepted. He wanted some statutory safeguards for the minorities to be incorporated on the basis of parity in any scheme which was to deliver independence to India. Jinnah said 'Let us.....live as good neighbours, let the Hindus guard the South and West and let the Muslims guard the frontiers we will then stand together and say to the world "Hands off India. India
for the Indians." Sri Prakasha, India's first High Commissioner to Pakistan corroborates the above by saying that Jinnah wanted the two states to be known as parts of India.

Attlee the Prime Minister realised that the only solution lay in the partition of India into two separate states - Hindustan and Pakistan and sent Lord Mountbatten to solve this who did his job in August 1947.

Though Jinnah achieved Pakistan in 1947 but the question that comes in the mind of a reader is: Did he actually stand for it or he simply wanted safety and security for Muslims within India. A study of this question reveals that Jinnah took Pakistan as a bargaining counter. He actually wanted that some solution to come out if the dialogue between the League - the Congress and the British continued. Mr. Kuldip Nayar has right written:

"Mr. Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India got full independence and British control was altogether eliminated, the Hindu majority, could not be relied upon for dealing justly with the Muslim population of
India. He, therefore, was clear in his mind that some how or the other, overall British control must be retained over the Indian sub-continent. He never believed that Britain would withdraw leaving India totally independent ..... He consequently put-up objections and obstructions ..... and expected that the Congress demand for total independence would not be acceded to by the British and the Muslim population would continue to have overall British protection.

This is also clear from the letter of Dr. Chaman-lal which goes to prove of Jinnah's ideas on the unity of India. Congress attitude towards the League or Jinnah was not respective. When Mountbatten in his first visit with Nehru asked his estimate about Jinnah, Nehru presented him as a "monster of negativism." Later when Mountbatten argued with Jinnah for a United India Jinnah replied that 'even though nothing would have given him greater pleasure than to see such unity, it was the behaviour of the Hindus that had made it impo-
ssible for the Muslims to share it.' Congress never treated League as a representative body of Muslims and Jinnah as its sole spokesman while Jinnah wanted both of these to be accepted by the Congress. "That is all that I seek", he told Durga Das. Creation of Pakistan could have been avoided, if the Congress had been in a conciliatory mood. Besides the clashes of personalities the safety of the Muslims was the major issue to Jinnah. Had it been provided, it would have satisfied him. He accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan thinking that it would secure what he wanted. But Jawaharlal statement changed the course of history and his bargaining counter could not get his vision of a United India.
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that Mr. Hakimuddin has completed his thesis entitled 'Role of the Muslim League in Indian Politics from 1940-47', under my supervision. This work is original and is suitable for submission for the award of Ph.D. degree in Political Science.

SHAN MOHAMMAD
Supervisor

October 2, 1990
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The Partition of India and the dismemberment of the British Raj in 1947 are the most significant events in the history of India. It has generally been felt that the Muslim League is responsible for the vivisection of India which had brought massacre to the millions of people. This thesis is an attempt to study comprehensively the forces that had finally culminated into the creation of Pakistan.

The period under study is a very important one as it shows how a dormant organisation which had stood by the Congress from 1906 to 1936 became hostile to it and in 1940 raised its demand for a separate state for the Muslims of India on the basis of two nation theory. In this thesis an attempt has also been made to study if the Partition was inevitable. Could it have been avoided or how all this resulted into the division of the country?

The whole work is divided into Eight chapters. The First chapter is introductory which traces the historical background of the All-India Muslim League upto 1940 and without which it would have been difficult
if not impossible to understand Muslim politics.

The Second chapter deals with the Lahore Resolution. The circumstances which led to its presentation to the Twenty Seventh Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1940 at Lahore.

The Third and Fourth chapters study the Cripps Plan and the Quit India Movement vis-a-vis the League's attitude. The Fifth chapter brings to light Rajaji's formula, Liaquat-Desai Pact and Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence to break the Constitutional deadlock.

In 1945 the British emerged victorious and the Viceroy's-Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten in view of the rising tide of nationalism tried to solve the constitutional problems. The Simla Conference and the Cabinet Mission were the attempts made to this end and the Sixth chapter is devoted to its study.

Chapter seven presents a study of the long tussle between the British and the Congress, Congress and the League and the League and the British. This studies the Transfer of Power and the drawing of the boundary line to demarcate India and Pakistan.
Chapter eight forms the conclusion of the whole study. In this I have critically examined the whole trend of Muslim politics. My studies have led me to the conclusion that it was due to some Tactical mistakes of the Congress and also of Mountbatten's hurried calculations that the Partition had taken place. Partition could have been averted had not Mountbatten speeded it up for his own ambition to become the First Sea Lord. Jinnah raised Pakistan slogan as a bargaining counter to secure the safety and security of the minority. He accepted Pakistan only when he was disheartened and when there was no way out.

There is no dearth of published material on the period of my study. Though the official documents dealing with the Transfer of Power in India will not be officially released until 1999, yet Wavell's Journal, Professor Mansergh's Transfer of Power in twelve volumes, Professor Ziegler's Mountbatten give sufficient documents through which one can derive conclusions. Most of the original material was found at the National Archives of India and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and the Indian Council's of Social
Sciences Research, New Delhi. Relevant Newspapers and microfilms were provided by these Libraries. Some secondary sources were also found at the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

I owe my indebtedness to my supervisor Professor Shan Mohammad, who had been a source of inspiration and encouragement throughout this study. He supervised the work with profound interest. I am also beholden to Professor A.P. Sharma, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh for providing me facilities to work on this crucial period of the Indian National Movement. My thanks are also due to Professor A.P. Usmani, who helped me whenever I contacted him.

I am equally thankful to the staff members of the National Archives, the Nehru Memorial Museum Library, I.C.S.S.R. Library, New Delhi, Maulana Azad Library and the Seminar Library of the Department of Political Science and the Islamic Studies Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh who facilitated my research by providing relevant material.
I am grateful to my parents for their constant encouragement and financial support to pursue my research work. I am also thankful to Institute of Objective Studies, Aligarh, for their monetary support. My thanks are also due to my friends and colleagues Mr. Obaidullah Fahad, Mr. Q.M. Jamshed, Mr. Sohail Ashraf for their help and moral support. I wish to thank Mr. Zafar Khan and Mr. Abu Sufian for their proof reading of some of the chapters.

Finally, I record my sincere gratitude to my wife Shagufta Yasmeen for affectionate co-operation and endurance.

October 1990

HAKIMUDDIN

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The dawn of the twentieth century found the Muslims of India in a great mental anxiety. Political awakening was around them and they were unable to decide their course of action. While a section of their community wanted to indulge in politics to secure 'adequate representation' in the Councils, a sizeable section among them still adhered to the advice of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the great saviour of the community, who told them to be aloof from politics which he considered to be the other name of revolution and thus going back to the days of the great Mutiny. The speech of John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, finally settled down the controversy; whether or not, the Muslims should participate in politics. A pressurised Mohsin-ul-Mulk formed the Simla Deputation

1. See Articles in the Aligarh Magazine 1900 written by leading Muslims, some of them advising their co-religionists to join political movement and the others asking them to be aloof from it.

2. See Sir Syed's speeches in opposition to the National Congress in Lucknow, 1887 and Meerut, 1888, Mukkamul Majmoa Lectures Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, (Lahore, 1900), pp. 295-325.
which presented an 'Address' to Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, at Simla on October 1, 1906 that marked the beginning of political activity among the Muslims. The 'Address' highlighted the grievances of the Muslims community and implored the Viceroy for 'a due consideration of their genuine grievances, in the forthcoming political set-up of India. As a result of all this, the All India Muslim League was founded in Dacca on December 30, 1906, with Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk as the President of the Session.

The foundation of League had created the general impression among the Indians—Hindus and Muslims—that it was to oppose the Indian National Congress. But it was combated by the Muslim leaders who explained that the League was founded "to prevent the rise among the Musalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities." The League in its objectives very clearly mentioned


4. For the Address presented to Lord Minto by the Simla Deputation see Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947, (Karachi, 1958), Appendix II, p.3.


6. The Pioneer, October 25, 1906, see article 'Mahomedans and Hindus.'

that it would promote among the Musalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government and safeguard their political rights.

Since 1892 they had always been under-represented or sometimes even had no representation at all in the Councils and the majority community won all the seats. Therefore the Muslims fought for the separate electorate in 1908-09 and the League in its annual sessions of 1907-1908 demanded and resolved for the grant of the separate electorate. The Right Hon'ble Syed Ameer Ali, President of the London Branch of Muslim League, led a delegation to Lord Morley to convince him of the urgency of the separate electorate. The outcome of all these persuasion was the Minto-Morley reform scheme of 1909 which provided the right of separate electorate to Muslims. The moderate Congress leaders welcomed the separate electorates but the other section of the Hindus looked down upon the scheme as unfair to them. This led to a temporary cleftage between

8. Ibid.

Contd...
Hindus and Muslims but the Tripoli and Balkan Wars (1911-12) and later the World War I (1914) united them. The Hindu-Muslim unity was further cemented when the Lucknow Pact (1916) provided adequate representation to the important minorities by election and the Musalmans through special electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils. The Pact also said that for the Imperial Legislative Council "one-third of the elected members should be Mahomedans elected by separate Mahomedan electorates in the seven provinces in the proportion, as may be, in which they are represented on the Provincial Legislative Councils by 12 separate Mahomedan electorates......" Thus the long cherished dream of the League and Congress was fulfilled and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Maulana Mazharul Haq, Mr. Mohammad Ali, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Pt. Jagat Narain, A. Rasool thanked their communities for tolerance, adjustment and political insight which was to create a United India in

(Continued from the previous page)

11. The Pioneer, August 20, 1906; See also the Modern Review, October, 1907, p. 338 and p. 486 respectively. The Pioneer, July 18, 1909, See also the Presidential Address of Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya to the Lahore Session 1909 of the Indian National Congress.

future. The efforts made by Jinnah for this unification was highly applauded and Sarojini Naidu is said to have repeated the remarks of Mr. Gokhale which he had made for Jinnah that "He is the best ambassador of the Hindu Muslim Unity." The Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, in 1916 marked an epoch which spearheaded the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements in which both the communities stood unitedly to oust from India their common enemy, the British. Indian nationalism was mixed up with Pan-Islamism and one drew strength from the other. But the Hindu-Muslim alliance was short-lived and just after the suspension of the Non-Cooperation Movement by Mahatma Gandhi, the British once again succeeded in tearing asunder the unity of both the communities.

The period between 1922 to 1926 had witnessed the rise of communalism, finding expression in communal riots in India which further uprooted the edifice of this unity so assiduously built up between the two major communities. The communal relations had reached such a stage that even the Nehru Report rejected the Lucknow Pact, the base of Hindu-Muslim Unity, and forced nationalists like M.A. Jinnah,

13. Ibid., p. 97.
Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali and scores of other Muslim leaders to leave the Congress.

The settlement of the 'Minority Question' was the cornerstone of Jinnah and Mohammad Ali's political philosophy which they continued to preach till their last days. Not that they were opposed to the Hindus but what they wished was the acceptance by the majority of their genuine rights to ensure perfect safety to the Muslim community. In a persuasive speech Jinnah said, "what we want is that Hindus and Mussalmans should march together until our object is achieved. Therefore it is essential that you must get not only the Muslim League but the Mussalmans of India, and here I am not speaking as a Mussalman but as an Indian. It is my desire to see that we get seven crores of Mussalmans to march along with us in the struggle for freedom. Would you be content with a few? Would you be content if I were to say I am with you? Do you want or do you not want the Muslim India to go along with you? You must remember that two major communities in India, I say this without the slightest disrespect to other communities like Sikhs, Christians

and naturally therefore these two communities have got to be reconciled and united and made to feel that their interests are common and they are marching together for a common goal." But Jinnah was unheard of and Maulana Mohammad Ali also met the same fate. Hence in sheer desperation they left the Congress. The severence of Jinnah and Mohammad Ali from the National Convention of the Congress was most unfortunate and it was from here that the politics of separatism was perfectly on heels.

The League, thereafter, met at Allahabad in December 1930 under the Presidentship of Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal who had unambiguously declared the goal of the All India Muslim League and supported the resolution of the All Muslim Parties Conference passed a little earlier at Delhi. In his Address, Sir Iqbal pointed out the areas which he considered to be as 'Muslim India.' He said - "I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British


Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India." The League, thus, for the first time highlighted its policy of securing a 'Muslim India' and declared emphatically that it would not be content with any of the constitution that fails to guarantee full Muslim representation on population basis in the Punjab and Bengal. All this was certainly not liked by the Congress.

The British stood as an observer of the situation and to solve the constitutional deadlock the Home Government called a Round Table Conference on November 12, 1930 of the leading political parties, prominent being the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, Hindu Liberals, Hindu Mahasabha, Depressed Classes, Indian Christians and Princes of States. The galaxy of the Indian representatives discussed the constitutional problems of their community. There was a sharp difference at the attitude of the British and Indian members of the Conference on the

issue of Dominion Status. The British Government was willing to grant Dominion Status only when the process of realising responsible government was complete. It might take years. But the British Government accepted to take steps in the Provinces regarding the full responsible Government with certain safeguards. Towards the end of the general discussion the conference decided to set up a Federal Relations Committee to consider the structure of a federal system of Government in India.

While discussions were in progress minority question loomed large on the Conference. Like their previous stand, the Muslim delegates while desiring India to be free, wanted some safeguards for the Muslims and to achieve this they made the convincing speeches in the conference. The Congress did not participate in the First Round Table Conference and it joined the Second Round Table Conference and devoted most of its time on constitutional and communal problems. Gandhiji who also joined the Conference informally convened the meeting of leaders to study and get

20. Ibid.
some communal settlement but he did not like many of the communal demands of the Muslim delegates. He had brought with him the Congress scheme for communal settlement. The scheme insisted on the 'joint electorate' as the basis of representation in the future constitution of India and 'reservation of seats' for Hindus and Muslims in provinces, where they were less than twenty five per cent of the population. When the details were worked out, the minorities could not reach any satisfactory solution. Thus Gandhiji failed to secure an agreed solution of the 'Communal Question' and communal problem stood where it was in the First Conference. The Conference ended on December 1, 1931 without achieving any solution for minority problem. The Third Round Table Conference which met on November 17, 1932, took stock of the first two conferences and prepared a complete outline of the new constitution which was submitted to the Parliament and which came out as the Government of India Act 1935.

The Constitution of 1935 envisaged a Federal structure with a scheme of Provincial Autonomy in the Provinces. The All-India Muslim League condemned the Federal structure vehemently but decided to utilize its provincial part. In its Twenty-Fourth Session held at Bombay on April 11, 1936, the All-India Muslim League formally defined its attitude towards the Act of 1935. In its resolution the session resolved that "The All-India Muslim League enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people of India against their will, and in spite of their repeated disapproval and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country, the Muslim League considers that having regard to the conditions prevailing at present in the country the Provincial scheme of the Constitution be utilized for what it is worth, in spite of the most objectionable features contained therein, which render the real control and responsibility of the Ministry and the legislature over the entire field of Government and the administration nugatory." This session, also

emphasised that Hindus and Muslims were not "two communities" but "two nation" in many respects.

Sir Wazir Hasan, the President of the said session, also stressed on the reorganisation of the Muslim League and suggested the creation of its district branches to enforce League’s policy in view of the planned introduction of Provincial Autonomy. Keeping in view the new constitutional scheme the League under Mr. M.A. Jinnah formed a Central Election Board consisting of 35 members to take steps to contest the approaching elections. This was to be followed in Provinces also. But League was still a very weak organisation with no primary organisation worth the name and very insufficient means of propaganda to send its representatives to the assemblies to fight for the cause of the Indian Muslims.

A screening of the session of All-India Muslim League of 1936 reveals that for the first time it planned to organise itself for the election; became very active

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25. Ibid., p. 259.

and posed itself as the only representative body of the entire Muslim community of India. For the first time, in its chequered career the League pushed the idea of Muslims being a 'nation' and not 'community'. Never before such ideas were projected and it was a novelty. Henceforth the League mustered its courage to fight stubbornly for every issue related to Muslims in India.

In view of the approaching election for the Provincial Legislatures under the scheme of 1935 which were to be held in February 1937 the League released its election manifesto, stating that it would see that democratic self-government, be realised and it would utilize the legislatures to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution. The election manifesto also stood for the protection of the religious rights of the Mussalmans and pledged to fight against all measures which encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the people and economic exploitation of the country.

From the beginning the Congress stood for Hindu-Muslim as one nation. Throughout its long career, it

27. Ibid., pp. 152-56.
28. For more details see Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., pp. 243, 45.
fought for the cause of India and its people. In its Election Manifesto released in Bombay in its meeting of August 22, 23, 1936 the Party highlighted its programme, "The policy of Congress", the Manifesto said, "will be to resist British Imperialism and to end its various Regulations, Ordinances and Acts". It promised "decent standard" of living, regulated hours of work and conditions of labours, settlement of disputes and relief against old age sickness and unemployment and the right to form Unions and to declare strikes, removal of untouchability and uplift of Harijans, development of cottage industry and the improvement in the treatment of political prisoners were also given very prominent place in the Manifesto. To acquaint the Muslim masses and to bring them in its fold, the Congress started a Muslim Mass Contact Movement and this also found place in its Manifesto.

As scheduled the elections were held in 1937 and the Congress won the majority of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of six out of eleven provinces, whereas the League failed to win majority in any of the four Muslim

majority provinces. It won only 108 seats out of 484 seats contested. Seats captured by both the League and Congress and others were as follows:

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A perusal of the able table reveals that the performance of both the League and the Congress was not satisfactory. Congress performance in the Muslim majority areas as well as in its own was below expectation and similarly the League also failed to do well in its majority areas. This can be attributed to their organisational immaturity. Jawaharlal had realised this and after the election he remarked that 'only in regard to the Muslim seats did we lack success. We failed because we had neglected working among Muslim masses and we would not reach them in time.' However the Congress leaders were happy on their election results and declared that the Congress had entered the Legislature to combat the Act. It was also believed that the League and the Congress would cooperate in the Legislature to further the interest of the people of India as Mr. Jinnah had repeatedly declared his intention to work with other groups and parties. But now the position was changed. The Congress had emerged victorious and refused to entertain any proposal that might have the appearance of representing the Muslims as a separate political unit.


32. The Times of India, March 3, 1937.
Congress refused to form any coalition ministry with the Muslim League unless they liquidated their organisation and repudiated all vestiges for their claim to form a separate political body. This was soon proved in U.P. which was a testing-ground for the Congress.

In U.P. Muslim population figured only 14% but had been politically active and influential. The Congress won majority of seats in this province but was unwilling to accommodate League. On the eve of the formation of Congress ministry, Pt. Govind Ballabh Pant, asked Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, the leader of the Muslim League, about the adjustment of seats. Khaliquzzaman replied that the League would accept one third seats of the total strength of the Cabinet and assured his party's full cooperation in all Congress programme. But he refused to accept any Congress Muslim to be on the Cabinet and argued that only the Muslim Leaguers were entitled to represent Muslims in the Cabinet. The Congress had no objection to it but wanted League to cease functioning as a 'separate group'. Pt. Govind Ballabh Pant and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad handed over to Khaliquzzaman a

letter of the Congress party stating pre-conditions for the inclusion of League in the Cabinet. The letter stated that 'The Muslim League party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress party and will fully share with other members of the party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress party.' The letter also said that 'The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved, and no candidate will, therefore, be set up by the said Board at any election.

The letter was interpreted in the Muslim League circle as a mischievous attempt of the Congress to merge the separate entity of the League into the Congress. It created suspicion among the Muslims that the Congress wanted to integrate the Muslim community with the Hindus. Khaliquzzaman called it a 'death warrant' of the Muslim League and refused to accept any compromise between the League and the Congress. League wanted Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan, both Leaguers on the Cabinet and no Congress Muslim while Jawaharlal's strategy was to give one seat to League and the other to a Congress Muslim.

This was in keeping with the postures of the Congress that it was a body composed of both Hindus and Muslims and the League did not represent the entire Muslim community. League's demand was acceptable to Maulana Azad but unacceptable to Jawaharlal and the former could not prevail upon the latter. The negotiation between the League and Congress was a total failure and from here the Muslim League stood more firmly as ever to fight for Muslim cause. Jawaharlal's refusal had changed the course of Muslim politics in India and strengthened the conviction among the League circle that the Congress was an organisation of Hindus and represented them only. The refusal of the Congress for the inclusion of two Muslim Leaguers on the Cabinet was certainly a blunder. The Congress could not have lost any thing but gained the Muslim it support if had taken two leaguers on the Cabinet. It was also not foreseen by Congress leadership that such a small incident would flare up into a might opposition in future. Assessing the incident Maulana Azad in his India wins Freedom says: "Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim League in U.P. a new lease of life. All students of Indian politics know that it was from the U.P. that the League was reorganised."

35. Ibid.

Jinnah made the most of such a situation, appealed to the Muslims to unite and fight against Congress. From here onwards the League and Congress never saw face to face and as Ram Gopal rightly puts it, 'It was one of the most fateful and distressing failures in the political history of India; it gave strength to the belief, held by adventurous Muslim leaders, that the Muslim should have a separate homeland.

The popularity of the Congress among the Muslims was deteriorating but Jawaharlal, the Congress President, still claimed that two forces - British and Congress dominated the Indian scene and the Muslim League represented only a small group of Muslims. This was immediately replied by M.A.Jinnah who said that the Congress did not represent the Muslims at all and had no authority to speak on their behalf. He said that besides the two, there was the third party, the Muslim League which could not be ignored in the emerging constitutional set up.

The Congress had formed its ministries in provinces in 1937. Their treatment to the minority had been

rankling in the League's bosom. When tales of woo and oppression on Muslims in the Congress provinces were sympathetically described by the League Legislator, they were ridiculed and laughed at by the Congress.

The plight of Muslims in the Congress ruled provinces was a burning issue with the League and Jawaharlal's speeches for the Muslim Mass Contact Movement drew the attention of many observers of Muslim politics. Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal was one of them. He immediately wrote to Jinnah to counteract Jawaharlal's argument for the Mass Contact Movement and pressed him to call a Muslim convention at Delhi to combat Congress activities. In one of his letters dated June 21, 1937 Iqbal wrote to Jinnah: 'You are the


40. Jinnah in his presidential address said "when Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was reciting in the U.P. Assembly, the tales of oppression on Muslims in different places, and was even giving concrete instances in support of his allegations, what were the Congressmen in the House doing? They were laughing and ridiculing him", see Ibid., p. 288.

only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for a safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India. Palestine question was also an issue which agitated the minds of the Muslim masses and Dr. Iqbal told Jinnah to utilize it as well.

Jinnah was quick to react and in the annual session of the All-India Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 he condemned vehemently the attitude of Congress towards minorities. Delivering his Presidential Address he held the Congress responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India by pursuing a policy which was exclusively Hindu. He appealed to the Muslims to reorganise themselves to formulate a constructive programme for the uplift of the Muslim India. He called them to seek protection under one flag. "I entreat and implore that every man, women and child should rally round the common platform and flag of the All-India Muslim League. Enlist yourselves by hundreds and thousands as quickly as you can as members of the All-India Muslim League, Provincial Leagues and District Leagues." Leagues Lucknow session of 1937 was a milestone as

42. Ibid., pp. 32,33.
it was for the first time in the history of the League that it also worked on the Mass Contact programme for Muslims.

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League was directed to frame and put into effect an economic, socio-educational programme with a view to fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers; to fix minimum wages, to improve the housing and hygienic conditions of the labourers and make provisions for slum clearance, to reduce rural and urban debts; to derive means for the relief of unemployment, to advance compulsory education, to establish clubs and military colleges, to enforce prohibition; to abolish un-Islamic usages from Muslim society; to recognise a voluntier corps for social service and devise measures for the attainment of full independence and invite the co-operation of all political bodies working to that end.

To review the whole situation a special session of the All-India Muslim League was convened in Calcutta on

43. All-India Muslim League, Lucknow Session October 1937 Presidential Address by Mr. M.A. Jinnah. Printed and published by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing Press, Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945, pp. 6-18.

April 17, 1938 under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah. Over two thousand delegates from different parts of India participated. Mr. Fazlul Haq in his welcome speech drew the attention of Muslim India on the extremely critical position of Muslims created by the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha resulting into the suppression of the legitimate rights and liberties of the Muslim community.

Jinnah who delivered the Presidential speech acquainted the audience with the tremendous progress the League had made during this period by creating Provincial and District Leagues and enrolling lakhs of people. "Within less than six months," he said, "we have succeeded in organizing Muslims all over India as they never were at any time during the last century and a half. They have been galvanized and awakened in a manner, which has astounded and staggered our opponents. Muslims have shaken off their torpor and shed the miserable state of despair and demoralization into which they were sunk so deep. They are beginning to realize that they are a power. They possess the strength, the potentialities of which they have not yet realized, and if only they will take their affairs

in their own hands and stand together united there is no power that can resist their will." Thus Jinnah reinvigorated the League which it had never been in its history.

He had taken the challenges of the Congress most seriously and his speeches in opposition to the Congress were a sort of the 'declaration of war' against it. It surprised Gandhi who on February 3, 1938 in a letter expressed his anxiety over this change. He wrote to Jinnah:

"You seem to deny that your speech was a declaration of war, but your later pronouncements too confirm my first impression ..... In your speeches I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915 I returned from my self-imposed exile in South Africa everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest nationalists and the hope of the Hindus and Mussalmans. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? If you say you are, in spite of your speeches, I shall accept your words."

46. Ibid., pp. 290-91.
But this letter could not modify Jinnah's stand. He characterised the Congress as a 'Hindu body' and declared that the Muslims have made it clear more than once that, besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal law, there is another question, equally of life and death for them, and that their future destiny and fate are dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the national life, the Government and the administration of the country.

The high-handedness of the Congress against the Muslims in the Congress ruled provinces was League's main concern. In its meeting of March 20, 1938 it resolved to appoint a special committee to collect all informations about Congress atrocities. This led to the appointment of an Enquiry Committee under the Chairmanship of Raja Mehdi of Pirpur to investigate Muslim complaints against Congress ministries.

48. All-India Muslim League - Calcutta Special Session April 1938, Presidential Address by Qaid-e-Azam M.A.Jinnah, Printed and Published by S.Shamsul Hasan Assistant Secretary, All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing Press, (Daryaganj, Delhi, 1945), p.9.

Besides the Pirpur committee A.K. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, in December 1939 also issued a booklet entitled *Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule* which also brought to light the Congress atrocities on Muslims.

Both the Pirpur Committee Report and Fazlul Haq's book, clearly pointed out that the Muslims were the worst sufferers under the Congress rule. The Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League also appointed a committee to inquire into the hardships of Muslims under the Congress Government. The Report came to be known as the Shareef Report which also brought out that the Muslims in Bihar were in a state of constant fear.

These Inquiry Committee Reports provided much literature to the authors of the League and Congress. While the League authors criticised the Congress for its revengeful policies the Congress authors defended it. To Maulana

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Contd....
Abul Kalam Azad, all these charges 'were absolutely false.' "If there had been an iota of truth in any of these charges", he wrote, "I would have seen to it that the injustice was rectified. I was even prepared to resign if necessary on an issue like this." But in view of the discovery of letters of the Muslims addressed to the Congress High Command in the All-India Congress Committee papers, Azad's defence appears to be partisan. These letters were written to the Congress President and the Secretary by Muslims requesting the Congress leaders to tour their localities which suffered under the Congress Raj. Not only did the Muslims write these letters, even Christians too complained the way Hindu treated them.

(Continued from the previous page)

52. See Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, Rise and Growth of All-India Muslim League, (Allahabad, 1942), pp.371-72.
Under these circumstances the League convened its Twenty Sixth Session at Patna in December 1938. To challenge the Congress atrocities the course of action was to be decided here. Jinnah chaired the session and in his Presidential Address he refused to admit that the Congress was a representatives body of Muslims or Christians. It was a 'Hindu body' and represented 'Hindus only', Swaraj meant a Hindu Raj and the National Government a 'Hindu Government.' He criticised the Congress policies in most vehement manner and said that its policies had forced the Muslims to a life and death struggle. Jinnah's speech infused fresh energy in League every year and day by day it was gaining momentum.

The League charges were refuted by the Congress President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad. He desired the complaints of League to be investigated by an impartial authority such as Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of India. But Jinnah had already referred the matter to Viceroy and did not agree. Meanwhile the World War II had started and the Viceroy declared India a belligerent without consulting the Congress ministries. This administered a rude shock to Congress and it resigned on October 28, 1939. The League heaved a sign of relief and celebrated the 'Day of Deliverance and thanks giving', on December 2, 1939.

57. M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammed Ali Jinnah, A Political Study*
Jinnah, had been a believer of one nation theory but held that the rights of minority be duly considered. Since Nehru Report failed to give the Muslims their due, he left Congress and became active member of the League but his ideas of a composite nation never wavered. The Congress ministries of 1937 which were atrocious to Muslims had shaken his faith and he started feeling in terms of Muslim being a separate nation and in reply to one of Gandhi's letter he wrote: '.....I have no illusion in the matter, and let me say, again, that India is not a nation nor a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations.' Similar ideas were expressed by him in an article for The Time and Tide in which he reiterated, "Experience has proved that whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule will

(Continued from the previous page)


vote for his castefellow and the Muslims for his coreligionists." He concluded that 'Democracy' of the Western type would not be suitable to India where things were determined by majority detrimental to minority. The Congress ministries served as an example and experience had also proved that Jinnah would not agree to any such Constitution. Hence he appealed to the British Government to consider the entire problem of India's future constitution. According to Suleri, Jinnah's fear regarding the federation were well founded for he foresaw that "once saddled in the Centre (Federal Government) the Hindus will be in a commanding position to muzzle the four or five Muslim provinces into complete subordination."

As stated earlier after 1938 Muslims had developed the idea of their being a separate nation but they had not caught the idea of a separate homeland for themselves. Of course, they viewed with great concern the principle of self determination to decide their future in India. Various schemes were suggested from time to time. Iqbal in his

60. The Statesman, Calcutta, November 21, 1938,
Presidential Address of the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930 demanded the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. During the Round Table Conference in London Muslim students propagated among the Muslim delegates a proposal for 'Muslim India' and 'Hindu India'. The Muslim delegates took it as no more than a student scheme. The booklet of Rahmat Ali also found much currency in England in 1935 in which he took himself as the founder of the Pakistan national movement. Similar other schemes put by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab and Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad in 1939 also proposed the division of India. The League did not take them seriously. But the Congress ministries in 1937 and its anti-Muslim politics disturbed the League and there was non escape for it now.


64. Uma Kaura, op. cit., p. 156.

The League met at Lahore on March 22, 1940 for its 27th Annual Session with Jinnah as its President. This session is very remarkable in the annals of the All-India Muslim League as it is for the first time that Jinnah boldly proclaimed Muslims a separate nation and since Hindus and Muslims could not live together because of their social, economic and political differences they needed a separate country.

CHAPTER TWO

LAHORE RESOLUTION

From the beginning the League did not agree to the federal scheme of the Government and Jinnah opposed the British idea of introducing democratic institutions in India based on the Parliamentary Government. To Jinnah India was a heterogeneous country, having people of different faith and religions and it would be futile to apply western type of democracy in India. "It is accepted" Jinnah remarked, "that there is in India a major and a minor nation, it follows (therefore) that a parliamentary system based on the majority principle must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation. Experience has proved that, whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule, will vote for his castefellow and the Muslims for his co-religionists." It was on this that Jinnah was opposed to the Western type of democracy in India and suggested that on the basis of the experience gained by the working of the Congress ministries, the British Government should consider the entire problem of India's future constitution. The Congress ministries would mean a 'Hindu Raj', which was unacceptable.

2. Ibid.
to the League. In the League's circle, therefore, the Federal scheme was rejected and even Choudhry Khaliquzzaman in an interview at London, apprised the Under-Secretary of State Col. Muirhead of League's viewpoint. He suggested two zones i.e. North-West and North-East in which Muslims were in majority to be separated from India. But even Khaliquzzaman did not have a clear picture of the proposed zones. Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, wrote to Lord Linlithgow on March 28, 1939 that what Khaliquzzaman and Abdul Rahman Siddiqui proposed was the establishment of three or four federations of provinces and states which would be co-ordinated by a small central body of some unit. "The whole object of the scheme was, of course," he said, "to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the centre as the Hindus. They were very vague when they came to the details of the scheme, but I rather gathered that what was in their minds was a federation of the Muslim provinces and princely states in the north west India, a further federation of Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the east."


By this time a few other schemes had been suggested to the League and they were all under its serious consideration. But no scheme was taken up as final. This was all to escape Congress domination which collapsed because of the Congress resigning from the ministries and the League announced to celebrate the Day of Deliverance on Friday December 22, 1939 by organising rallies and public meetings against the Congress which was responsible for the wrongs done to the Muslims and other minorities.

Gandhi made a personal appeal to Jinnah to call off the observance of the Day of Deliverance but Jinnah would not listen to it and only said that he had asked the British Government to appoint a royal commission to investigate the charges. Jawaharlal also wrote to him to discuss communal question. But Jinnah insisted that the Congress had not accepted League as the sole representative of the Muslims. Hence, there was no question

5. Sir Mohammad Iqbal's scheme, Rahmat Ali's scheme, and Dr. Syed Abdul Latif's scheme etc.

6. Jamiluddin Ahmad, (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, (Lahore, 1942), pp.104-05
of any discussion. Moreover he also said that the League was not prepared to back the Congress demand for the declaration of War aims and convening a constituent assembly.

Apart from the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha was also very much opposed to the League's 'Day of Deliverance' and its demand for the appointment of a royal commission to investigate the alleged atrocities of the Congress. It had been very critical to the League from the very beginning.

Hindu Mahasabha condemned League's approach to the formation of a federation. Sarvarkar, like his previous arguments, made some more significant additions to it and he gave a new definition of the term 'Hindu'. 'Any one who considered India as both his fatherland as well as holyland in the sense of the land of the origin of his religion was a Hindu'. According to V.V. Nagarkar, 'By this definition, the Muslims, the Christians, the jews and also the parsies came to be excluded implying thereby that the followers of these religions might not be accorded equal citizenship rights.' The League was not going to concede such attitudes.

7. V.V. Nagarkar, op.cit., p. 316.
Jinnah was having separate meetings with the Viceroy on November 4, and 7, 1939 and many letters were also exchanged between him and the Viceroy. In this correspondence Jinnah stood for two things.

(1) 'No declaration should be made by the British Government without the approval and consent of the representatives of the Hindus and the Muslims and

(2) The British Government should not frame any constitution or make any declaration regarding the question of further constitutional advance without the consent and approval of the Muslim League.' The Viceroy appeared not to be in concurrence of the League's demand as he thought that other constitutional problem would arise but he assured that the Government 'would give due weight to the views of the Muslim community.'

The League after the celebration of the Day of Deliverance very seriously started working for the safety

8. Ibid., p. 318.
and security of the Muslims in India. The Working Committee of the League met for four days from February 3, 1940 and pressurised the Viceroy to reconsider the matter regarding the assurances demanded by the League in its earlier resolutions of September 18 and October 22, 1939. The Working Committee also concluded that a delegation comprising the premiers of the Punjab and Bengal, and Nazimuddin and Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman be sent to London to gain the British support. This was a very crucial meeting of the Working Committee which was considering all facets of an all-India federation. Khaliquzzaman says that on the second day, his suggestion for partition by separating the Muslim zones in the north-west and Bengal and Assam in the east from the rest of India was accepted by Jinnah. Jinnah in return informed the Viceroy about the decision of the League for Partition which worried both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State who wanted to come to a settlement with the Congress and League in view of the unfavourable situation of the Allies in War. But no settlement was reached at. On February 25, 1940 again the League met to review the situation and expressed its determination to fight for the Muslims in India.

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Meanwhile early in 1940 Choudhry Rahmat Ali propagated his scheme for a sovereign Bang-e-Islam including Bengal and Assam. It was a much talked off Scheme in the Congress circle. At that time the Indian National Congress was meeting at Ramgarh for its fifty third session on March 19, 20, 1940 under the Presidentship of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Maulana Azad devoted the major portion of his speech on the communal problem. It will not be out of place to quote him in extenso:

"I am a Musalman and am proud of that fact. Islam's splendid traditions of thirteen hundred years are my inheritance. I am unwilling to lose even the smallest part of this inheritance. The teaching and history of Islam, its arts and letters and civilisation are my wealth and my fortune. It is my duty to protect them.

As a Musalman I have a special interest in Islamic religion and culture and I can not tolerate any interference in them. But in addition to these sentiments, I have others also which the realities and conditions of my life
have forced upon me. The spirit of Islam does not come in the way of these sentiments; it guides and helps me forward. I am proud of being an Indian. I am a part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element which has gone to build India, I can never surrender this claim.....

Full eleven centuries have passed by since then Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the religion of the people here for several thousands of years, Islam also has been their religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with equal pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism so also we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I shall enlarge this orbit still further. The Indian Christian is equally entitled to say with pride that he is an Indian and is following a religion of India, namely Christianity.
Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour. There is indeed no aspect of our life which has escaped this stamp. Our languages were different, but we grew to use a common language; our manners and customs were dissimilar, but they acted and reacted on each other and thus produced a new synthesis. Our old dress may be seen only in ancient pictures of by-gone days; no one wears it today. This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to the times when this joint life had not begun. If there are any Hindus amongst us who desire to bring back the Hindu life of a thousand years ago and more, they dream, and such dreams are vain fantasies. So also if there are any Muslims who wish to revive their past civilization and culture, which they brought a thousand years ago from Iran and Central Asia,
they dream also and the sooner they wake up the better. There are unnatural fancies which cannot take root in the soil of reality. I am one of those who believe that revival may be a necessity in a religion but in social matters it is a denial of progress.

These thousand years of our joint life have moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be undone artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in the course of centuries. The cast has now been moulded and destiny has set her seal upon it, whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity. We must accept the logic of fact and history and engage ourselves in the fashioning of our future destiny."

In a resolution, the Session said that "It will always be ready as it ever has been to make every effort to secure

10. Arsh Malsiani, Abul Kalam Azad, (Publication Division, Delhi, 1976), Appendix 4, pp. 154-156.
communal harmony, no permanent solution is possible except through a Constituent Assembly, where the rights of all recognised minorities will be fully protected by agreement, as far as possible between the elected representatives of various majority and minority groups or by arbitration if agreement is not reached on any point.

The resolution further highlighted the long standing policy of the Congress. It said that "India's Constitution must be based on independence, democracy and national unity, and the Congress repudiates attempts to divide India or to split her nationhood."

A study of the above speech of the Congress President, Maulana Azad and the resolution passed in the Ramgarh session reveals the differences of approach between the League and the Congress. League stood for two nation theory and was opposed to the convening of the Constituent Assembly and thus drastically differed with the Congress. It was in response to these Congress challenges that the League met at Lahore on March 22, 1940. In view


of the great victory, League achieved in overthrowing the Congress ministries by its clamour and thus celebrating the day of Deliverance this session of the League was also to be momentum.

On Friday, March 22, 1940 the League took its 27th session at Lahore in a decorated Pandal a few furlong from the Mughal Fort. Over one lakhs people has the assembled to watch/working of the session which started with the Chairman of the Reception Committee, Nawab Sir Shah Nawas Khan of Mamdot who recalled the struggle of the League in protecting Muslims and other minorities. Referring to the working of the Congress ministries, Sir Shah Nawas said that a popular Government could only function when the minorities were satisfied. He regretted that the Congress ministries failed to inspire confidence in the minorities and had to pay heavy cost.

He was followed by the Presidential Address of Jinnah who described the Congress policy of oppression and said that he had 'never thought that the Congress High Command would have acted in the manner in which they actually did in the Congress- governed provinces'. But

he was thankful that the Muslims realised this. They were awaken and the League was grown into such a strong institution that its fall was now impossible. He referred to the statements of C. Rajgopalacharia, Babu Rajendra Parasad and Gandhi, who talked about the joint electorate and the Constituent Assembly which was only a myth. Jinnah said that Gandhiji should not be shy of calling himself a 'Hindu' and saying that Congress was a 'Hindu' organisation with a total Hindu backing. He rejected the oft-repeated sentence that the Muslims were a minority and pleaded that they were 'a nation by any definition.' He supported the comments of the Times, which wrote that 'the difference between the Hindus and Muslims is not of religion in the strict sense of the word, but also of 'law and culture', representing, 'two entirely distinct and separate civilizations.' He asked the British Government to realise the 'fundamental truth' and divide India into 'autonomous national state' to 'secure the peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent.

Continuing his Presidential Address, Jinnah said, "It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu

15. Ibid., p.337.
friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies-social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions." He further said that "their aspects in life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and like-

16. Address (Delivered Extempore) by Qaid-e-Azam Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Printed and Published by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary, All-India Muslim League at Muslim League printing Press, (Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945), p. 11.
wise their victories and defeat overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state."

Continuing Jinnah said that by any definition 'Mussalmans are a nation' and 'they must have their home-land, their territory and their state.' The acceptance of any Constitution without the consent of Muslim League would mean 'a Hindu majority government.' 'Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean a Hindu Raj. Democracy of the kind with which the Congress High command is enamoured would mean the complete destruction of what is most precious to Islam.'

17 All-India Muslim League Lahore Session March 1940 Verbatim Report of the Presidential Address by Quid-e-Azam Mr. M.A.Jinnah, printed and published by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary, All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing Press (Daryaganj, Delhi, 1945), p.20.

18 Ibid., p. 21.

19 Ibid., p. 21.
The speech of Jinnah was highly cheered. The same day in the night the Subject Committee discussed the draft of the historic Lahore Resolution which was to be presented to the open session next day.

Fazlul Haq moved the Lahore Resolution which said:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no Constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and soverign."

The resolution was prefaced by a long speech of the Bengal Premier who apprised the audience of the latest development in Congress circles. He criticized Maulana

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Agad's Ramgarh address which said that 80 million Muslims should not be afraid of any force. "Situated as we are, our political enemy can take advantage of the situation", he said. He asked the Muslims to be united and exercise a calm and sober judgement to prove their strength.

The Lahore Resolution was seconded by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman who pointed out to the audience that the Muslims of India had been forced to demand for a separate homeland. He condemned other Muslims who created organizations other than League and added that 'the responsibility of those Muslims who had damaged Muslim rights in India was great, for they were not only betraying the present generation, but the future generations also.'

Extending his support to the Resolution, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan said that he had been a member of the Congress for quite a long time but found that the Congress was not anxious to achieve freedom. Its sole objective was to suppress the minorities.

22. Ibid., p. 343.
23. Ibid., p. 344.
Other prominent members of the League were Sardar Aurangzeb Khan of Frontier, Sir Abdullah Haroon of Sind, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan (Bihar), Mohammad Isa Khan (Baluchistan) and Abdul Hamid Khan (Madras), I.I. Chundrigar (Bombay), Syed Abdur Rauf Shah (C.P.), Dr. Iqbal Aslam (Punjab), Syed Zakir Ali and Begum Mohammad Ali. While Sardar Aurangzeb, concluded that "we do not want British democracy which is nothing but a counting of heads. Muslims are a separate nation; we want a home for the Muslim nation, and our home is as indicated in the resolution," Sir Haroon warned the Hindus that if the Muslims in Hindu provinces were not justly treated, the Hindus in the Muslims provinces would also be treated likewise. After a heated discussion which continued next day also, the Lahore Resolution was declared passed amidst great rejoicing. In that very session the League's constitution was slightly modified to strengthen it with more disciplinary powers in dealing with the Provincial League which 'fails in its duties, and infringes or ignores the decisions or directions of the All-India Muslim League or hinders the progress of the League in any manner whatsoever, subject to a right of appeal to the council of the All-India Muslim League.'

24. Ibid., p. 345.
25. Ibid., p. 347.
26. Ibid., p. 348.
The Lahore session was a landmark in the history of Muslim India. It was a landmark as it finally defined their goal which they had hitherto failed. The concluding remarks were given by the Quaid-e-Azam himself who said, "the more you organise yourself, the more you will be able to get your rights." The Lahore resolution did not employ the word Pakistan, although in his Presidential speech he specifically said that the Hindus and Muslims represented two different cultures and social orders and could not evolve a common nationality. A Hindu correspondent asked him whether the resolution 'meant a demand for Pakistan?' Jinnah in reply said that he would think and that he was prepared to accept his interpretation.*

The idea of a separate home land was not a new one. Since the beginning of the twentieth century it had been realised by Muslims that they were not adequately treated by the Hindus. The formation of the Muslim League and the demand of separate electorates was the outcome of this feeling. But circumstances united them temporarily

27. Ibid., p. 348.
till 1922. Between 1922-26 communal riots again separated them and it was realised that both the communities would not be able to live together. Lala Lajpat Rai in 1924, therefore, suggested a scheme of Muslim state in the provinces of the Punjab, North West Frontier, Sind and Bengal.

Six years later, Dr. Iqbal also in his Presidential Address to the League in 1930 suggested a federation of autonomous states with a weak centre within India.

The great historian Dr. Tara Chand says that a memorandum by Plowden-justice of U.P. High Court, was also sent to the Tory group stating the division of India into Hindu and Muslim states to ensure peace in the country. The special correspondent of the Bombay Chronicle in London had also suggested the vivisection of India into Hindu India and Muslim India. At that very time, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, a student of Cambridge University, also floated a scheme of the division of India. He published a pamphlet in 1933 which gave the shape of what Pakistan

30. Ibid., p. 318.
was to comprise with. Though it was rejected as 'a boyish exercise' and 'a chimera' but soon thereafter many schemes provided a common central government for all India. By 1938-39 the idea of Pakistan had become clearly manifest and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman in consultation with Chaudhry Rahmat Ali at Cambridge brought home a complete picture of the division of the country. Jinnah is credited with having put the scheme so logically and emphatically in 1940 which was not done by any one before him.

The whole of India watched the development of Muslim politics in Lahore with great anxiety. The Lahore resolution shocked it and produced a quick reaction throughout the country. Its discussion in Press ultimately gave it the name of the Pakistan resolution. Sarvarkar was the first to declare that his party would fight to the last to the partition of India.

Jawaharlal who had hitherto been thinking of bringing the Hindus and Muslims on one platform through negotiation felt disappointed and apprehended that there was no

33. The Hindu, March 26, 1940.
question of settlement or negotiation on this issue. Gandhi wrote a series of article in the Harijan in which he expressed his resentment.

Scholars on Indian History have also criticised the Lahore Resolution. Dr. Tara Chand is of the opinion that 'The resolution bears the marks of precipitancy and inadequacy of thought and appears to have been passed because the leaders were apprehensive lest the worsening of the war situation in Europe and the hardening of the Congress attitude might force the Government to yield to the Congress demand.' To Lal Bahadur "The Lahore Resolution was the highest culmination of Muslim aspiration roused by leaders from Sayyid Ahmad's time. Not only the Hindus but there was also a section among the Muslims who did not approve of the Lahore Resolution. They were Allah Baksh of Sind, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan from North Western Frontier Province and Syed Abdul Rahman of Bengal. They speculated to present a United front but the rising and influential personality of Jinnah did not encourage them to go ahead beyond murmuring.

34. The Statesman, (Calcutta), April 16, 1940.


Jinnah defended the resolution and to its critics he replied comprehensively with all the aspects of the scheme. He said:

"In the first place a wrong idea and false propaganda appear to be set in motion in order to frighten the Muslim minorities that they would have to migrate en bloc and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim brethren that there is no justification for this insidious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, however, on the physical division of India as far as practicable will have to be considered. Secondly the Muslim minorities are wrongly made to believe that they would be worse off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition or division of India. I may explain that the Musalmans, whenever they are in minority cannot improve their position under a united India or under one central government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority. They can rightly demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilised government to the utmost extent. But by coming in the way of division of India they do not and cannot improve their own position. On the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruction, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of Musalmans under the government, where they would remain no more than a minority in
Jinnah continued replying to his critics wherever he had the occasion to explain his viewpoint. To his audience he again said "The issues involve the future fate and destiny of ninety million of Muslims and I am sure that Muslim India today is fully alive to the gravity of the situation both internal and external that is facing us. Our ideal and our fight is not to harm or injure any other community or interest or block the progress but to defend ourselves. We want to live in this country an honourable life as free men and we stand for free Islam and free India."

Viceroy, since the commencement of World War II, was asking both the Congress and the League to support the British in their war efforts. He wanted their representatives to join Executive Council. But the Congress rejected this. The League continued corresponding the Viceroy and finally in July, 1940 sent its proposals to the Viceroy. The proposals said that the Home Government


would not announce any scheme which may be contrary to the Lahore Resolution and that a previous approval by Muslim India of any scheme would be appreciated. Jinnah assured full cooperation of the League in war efforts provided equal representation was given to League along with the Congress on the proposed war council and the Executive Council of the Governor General. It also claimed that all the Muslim members should be exclusively from the Muslim League. This resulted into the announcement of the August Offer on August 8, 1940, by the Viceroy which said:

"They could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government."

This announcement was a departure from the previous policy of the Government. The Secretary of State for India was convinced that the question of minority was a major issue. The Viceroy announcing the British policy on this complicated question further said:

"His Majesty's Governments concern that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision, has also been brought out. That remains the position of His Majesty's Government. It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities, for the peace and welfare of India, to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life."

The Secretary of State was conscious of the great followings of the Congress and the constitutional problems of the British Government would have been diminished if the other important section had accepted Congress as a national organisation. This section was the Muslim minority, which was adamant to be treated equally with the Congress in any constitutional advance in India. It was this element which could not be ignored and the August offer was the outcome of this thinking. Thus the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow and Lord Amry, the Secretary of State fully endorsed the Lahore resolution, based on the two nation theory. British attitude had emboldened Jinnah and in his birth day message on December 24, 1940 to his

41. Ibid., p. 335.
nation he said that the Muslim nation had to prove its fitness to 'govern and achieve' the goal as enunciated in the Lahore Resolution. He reiterated that the Muslim League was 'The only authoritative and representative body of the Muslims of India'. Pakistan was their goal and they were determined to fight for it.

Jinnah led a vigorous campaign and through his speeches and writings explained the scheme of Pakistan. He spoke to the Muslim Progress Society and Muslim Youth Majlis on January 3, 1941; the Kanpur Muslim Students Federation on March 30, 1941; the Muslim Educational Service League at Bombay on January 10, 1941 and explained to them that the Pakistan was a necessity to them. He gave them a call for the observance of March 23, 1941 as 'Pakistan Day' and told them that there could be no settlement because of the differences of approach between the Congress and League.

The Foreign Committee of the All-India Muslim League was also very active. It also published the scheme of Pakistan and divided India in three Sovereign

42. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, op.cit., pp. 203-04.
43. Ibid., pp. 232-33.
Muslim states - one in the North West stretching up to Delhi, the second one in the East, comprising Bengal and Assam and the third one in the south with Hyderabad and Berar.

Amidst this propaganda the Twenty-Eighth Session of the All-India Muslim League was convened at Madras on April 12-15, 1941 under the Presidentship of M.A. Jinnah. A special feature of the session was the presence of a large number of non-Muslim leaders, including Sir R.K. Shanmukhan Chetty, Dewan of Cochin, Sir K.V. Reddy, Sir A.P. Patro, E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, leader of the justice Party, Kumarajah M.A. Muthiah Chettiar, C.R. Srinivasan, Rao Bahadur M.C. Rajah and Rao Bahadur N. Sivaraj. They were special invitees and Jinnah had given them, the idea of the creation of another independent state by the name of Dravidistan which found emphatic support from Jinnah in his Presidential address. This was an extempore address which had taken two hours. The speech was confined not only to political affairs but to the socio-economic uplift of the Muslims. Jinnah wanted Muslims to take commerce and industries which could pull them out of the morass in which they had fallen for the last century. He declared

44. The Statesman, (Calcutta), April 19, 1941.
45. All-India Muslim League, Madras Session, April 1941 Presidential Speech by M.A. Jinnah, Published by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Hon. Secretary from the All India Muslim League Press (Daryaganj, Delhi).
a Five Years Plan for Muslim India based on three things
(i) a definite well considered educational plan (ii)
Taking up commerce for the uplift of Muslim India and
(iii) Political training.

Mr. Jinnah condemned the misrepresentation and
mis-interpretation of the Lahore Resolution by the Con­
gress in the Press. Therefore he once again clarified
the position and the goal of the Muslim League:

'Let me tell you as clearly as possible', he said,
'the goal of the All-India Muslim League is as follows.
We want the establishment of completely independent states
in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India with full
control of Defence, Foreign Affairs Communication, Customs,
Currency, Exchange etc. and we do not want under the cir­
cumstances, a constitution of an All-India Character, with
one Government at the Centre. We will never agree to that.
If you once agree, let me tell you that the Muslims will be
absolutely wiped out of existence. We shall never be a sig­
matory to any power of Government at Centre so far as
the North-Western and Eastern Zone's free national homes
are concerned. This fully explains Jinnah's stand. He
would not agree to participate in the Constituent Assembly

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
due to the fear of the Congress being in majority, which, by sheer majority of votes, would force the Constituent Assembly to do what it liked.

He supported the demand of Dravidistan and criticised 3 per cent of Brahmin high castes to rule the rest of the races inhabiting South. Expressing his sympathy and fullest support to non-Brahmins and Christians he said that "the only way for you to come in to your own is to live your own life, according to your culture, according to your language and according to your own history."

This was a masterly address, an address which touched every thing from top to bottom and fully explained the viewpoint of the Muslim League. A slight modification, to suit the changed condition, in the League's constitution was made and resolutions to achieve the goal passed.

48. Ibid.
The Lahore resolution accepted by the All-India Muslim League in its session at Lahore in 1940 was a watershed in the history of India. It presented a sharp departure from the Hindu-Muslim unity who were thinly tagged with the one nation theory. The Lahore resolution, as we have seen, treated Hindus and Muslims as two different nations and demanded a separate homeland for Muslims. But it was not favourably viewed by the political parties in India. After two days of the acceptance of Lahore Resolution by the All-India Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha leader, Mr. Savarkar declared his party's view and proclaimed that it was unacceptable to it and that it would wage war against it.

Master Tara Singh, leader of the Sikh community, presiding at the First U.P. Sikh Conference at Lucknow said, "If the Muslim League wants to establish "Pakistan" they will have to pass through an ocean of Sikh blood." He further said "opposing the Pakistan scheme, some sikhs have lost their heads and are preaching establishment

1. *The Hindu*, March 26, 1940.
of Sikh rule. This will simply be adding to the confusion already created by the Muslim League. The 'Pakistan' scheme may prove to be a declaration of civil war and therefore proposed in mad."

Mahatma Gandhi called the two nation theory or Lahore Resolution as 'an untruth' and wrote:

"The vast majority of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are the descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that the Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has the same amusements as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim. The same phenomenon is observable more or less in the south among the poor, who constitute the masses of India .... Hindus and Muslims of India are not two nations. Those whom God had made one, man will never be able to divide."


But while Congressmen did not accept the two nation theory and the proposed partition of India they continued to make it clear that they would not use coercion to resist the demand for Pakistan or Lahore Resolution.

The Muslim leaders of different political parties also expressed their views and condemned the Lahore Resolution.

Azad Muslim Conference called a meeting on behalf of the Jamiyatul-Ulama and other Muslim organizations like Majlis-e-Ahrar-i-Islam, the Independent Party of Bihar, the All-India Momin Conference, the Anjuman-e-Watan of Baluchistan and the Central Standing Committee of the All-India Shia Conference in April 1940 at Delhi. This conference voiced its opposition to the division of India. It reiterated its deep concern for the religious and cultural safeguards of the Muslim community in any future constitutional set-up of the country. The Jamiyat never admitted the principles of two nation theory advocated by the League.

4. Ibid.
But Jinnah was not a man to be stooped down. Like a rock he stood firmly and replied to his critics. In one of his replies he clarified the misunderstanding of the Muslims who had said that they would have to migrate Pakistan if it was created. Jinnah continued:

"In the first place a wrong idea and false propaganda appears to be set in motion in order to frighten the Muslim minorities that they would have to migrate en bloc and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim brethren that there is no justification for this insidious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, however, on the physical division of India, as far as practicable, will have to be considered. Secondly the Muslim minorities are wrongly made to believe that they would be worse off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition or division of India. I may explain that the Musalmans, whenever they are in a minority, cannot improve their position under a united India or under one Central Government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority. They can rightly demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilised government to the utmost extent. But by coming in the way of division of India they do not and can not improve their own position. On the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruc-
tion, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of the Musalmans under one government where they would remain no more than a minority in perpetuity." In reply to Jinnah's call to celebrate Pakistan Day on April 19, 1940 thousands of public meeting of the Muslims were convened and attended by tens of thousands of Muslims in all parts of India. Jinnah sent his messages to these meetings in which League's point of view was further clarified. In a message to the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League conference convened at Hubli on May 26, 1940, Jinnah said:

"I am asked, will the British agree to the basic and fundamental principles of Lahore Resolution, namely to create independent Muslim states in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch. I know that the British politicians, press and public are still holding on the conception of unity and one India, but I am convinced that it is a self-deception and complete ignorance of reality. At the same time I am confident that we have successfully dispelled the false pro-

7. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, op.cit., pp. 157-58.
paganda and removed the delusion under which the British public are suffering, they with their sense of sagacity will not fail to meet us." The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League Council met in Bombay on June 15-16, and passed a resolution authorising Jinnah to corresponed the Viceroy to explore the possibility of effective measures regarding India's defence.

Meanwhile on July 1, 1940 Jinnah made some very important proposal to the Viceroy, persuading him to accept that:

(i) The British Government would not make any declaration which would go contrary to the Lahore Resolution.

(ii) The Government would not frame any Constitution without the approval of the Muslim League.

(iii) In the event of the expansion of the Executive Council, the number of Muslim members would be equal to that of the Hindus, and if the Congress fails to join Muslims must have the major share.

8. Ibid., pp. 162-163.

(iv) In the proposed War Advisory Committee, Indian princes should have sufficient representation and with regard to the representation from British India, Muslim representation should be equal to that of the Hindus.

The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow in reply to Jinnah on July 6, 1940 endorsed Jinnah's viewpoint and wrote that 'I readily accept the importance in the event of any expansion, of securing adequate representation of Muslim interests and that is a point which I would bear in mind.'

The British policy was moving favourably to the Muslims. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, on August 8, 1940, declared the British policy and said that it could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government."


Contd....
This was very appealing to the Muslim League and its Working Committee expressed its satisfaction with the Viceroy's announcement and gave a mandate to Jinnah to seek further details from Lord Linlithgow. When Jinnah had a talk with the Viceroy, he was unsatisfied. Jinnah actually wanted Muslim League's majority on the Executive Council to which the Viceroy did not agree and Jinnah rejected the offer with regard to both the Executive Council and the Defence Advisory Body on December 26, 1940. Two days earlier to the rejection Jinnah in his birth day message on December 24, 1940 said "we have now to prove to the world that we are fit to govern and achieve our goal as laid down by the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League, popularly known as Pakistan. Our organisation, which is undoubtedly the only authoritative and representative body of the Muslims of India has given us a flag, a platform, a programme and a cherished goal, which we are determined to fight for and, if necessary, to die for. But we have yet to do many (things) before we can achieve our political emancipation.'

(Continued from the previous page)

12. Ibid., pp. 238-42.

As seen earlier the Congress was not happy over the British attitude on the question of the declaration of war and resigned. The Linlithgow announcement of August 8, 1940 had annoyed it deeply. Since freedom of speech was restricted the Congress proposed to launch a 'Satyagraha' under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi who suggested that it would be an 'Individual Satyagraha.' On October 17, 1940 the campaign was successfully taken and many of the Congressmen offered themselves for imprisonment. In 1941 the movement was vigorously taken up and about 20,000 men and women were imprisoned and put on trial.

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met at and Delhi on February 23, 1941/criticised the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress and in a statement it said that it was designed to pressurise the British Government from the position it had taken in regard to the future of India relating to the Muslims and other minorities.

On July 21, 1941 the Viceroy again issued a Government communiqué regarding the expansion of the Viceroy’s

Council and the Constitution of the National Defence Council. He reiterated that the objective of the above bodies were "non-political and non-communal" and further announced that the Government still held the promises made in the August Offer and there was no change of policy since then. The Viceroy nominated the members of the League also in the Councils to win the support of the Muslim League and some of them had joined it also without seeking the permission of the League. The Viceroy actually prevailed over the Muslim Premiers who joined the Council without referring it to the League. Jinnah objected to this and regretted that the nomination of the Muslim members would not solve any purpose as "it will not secure the whole hearted, willing and genuine support ... for the simple reason that the persons chosen and nominated ... are neither real representatives of the people nor will they command the confidence and trust of the Muslims." He continued to oppose the Viceroy who in spite of the declaration of August Offer did not give the representatives of the Muslim

League a real and substantial share in the authority and power of the Government.

The League brought to the notice of Government one of the statements of Gandhi who wrote in the Harijan: "So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League civil resistance must involve resistance against the League." On the basis of the above statement of Gandhi, the League said that it had no doubt that the Satyagraha Movement was launched against the British as well as the League. It warned the Government that if any concession to the Congress was made which was against Muslim demand it would resist it. But the Individual Satyagraha Movement of Congress had to be stopped in view of war situation. Russia was hard pressed by Germany and Japan also had entered into the war and was knocking at the gate of East of India. The Government realised the gravity of the situation and began releasing the Satyagrahis one by one. The Congress Working Committee

was worried on the entry of Japan in war which threatened India and therefore the Satyagraha was suspended.

The Working Committee at its meeting at Bardoli on December 23, 1941, repeated that full cooperation would be forthcoming if its demands were met. Gandhiji wrote to the Congress President that the means contemplated by the Working Committee were those of violence while he was a believer of non-violence. He asked that he should be relieved of the Congress.

As stated above Japan had entered into the war and it was feared that its entry would create more problems for the Allies in India and therefore America and Australia who were also anxious for a solution of the Indian problem pressurised the British Government to solve the ticklish problem of India. Mr. Churchill did not listen to it first and was known to have said that 'I did not become the king's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.' But on February 22, 1942, President Roosevelt of America and Dr. Evatt,

18. Ibid.
19. Peter Heens, op.cit., p. 139.
Foreign Minister of Australia, again made speeches in the Parliament supporting the cause of India's independence. In view of the American and Australian pressure, Mr. Churchill sent Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the British war cabinet, to explain to the Indian leaders certain constitutional proposals accepted by the Government of England. Sir Stafford Cripps, had been a very successful British diplomat in Russia who had persuaded the Russian Government to join the Allies. He was specially selected by Churchill to go to India to gain its support in war while convincing them with full British sympathy for its national aspiration.

Sir Stafford Cripps landed in India on March 23, 1942. After reaching Delhi, Cripps soon called a Press Conference and in the course of his opening speech he said:

"I have come here because I am, as I have always been, a great friend and admirer of India and because I want to play my part as a member of the war cabinet in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties.

20. Ibid..
which have long vexed our relationship. Once these questions are resolved, the Indian peoples will be enabled to associate themselves fully and freely, not only with Great Britain and the other dominions, but with our great allies, Russia, China and the United States of America, so that together we can assert our determination to preserve the liberty of the peoples of the world. There is no time to lose and no time for long discussions .... My intention is to stay at Delhi for two weeks ... and I believe that within that time with energy and goodwill, the essentials of success can be achieved."

Continuing the speech he further said, "My association in the past had been more close with my friends in the Congress than with members of other parties or communities, but I am fully impressed with the need in any scheme for the future of India to meet the deep anxieties which undoubtedly exist among the Muslims and other communities. I shall therefore embark upon my task with a "mind equally open to all points of view - Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and others." With these notions in mind he imme-

22. Ibid.,
diately plunged into negotiation with the Viceroy, his councillors and advisors. Thereafter he proceeded to interview the leaders of the various leading political parties. He talked to Gandhi, Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru together with other members of the Congress Working Committee. Of the League members, he called upon M.A. Jinnah, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq and others. He held discussions with leaders of minor though influential political parties. Important among them were Savarkar (Hindu Mahasabha); Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar (liberals); Dr. Ambedkar and M.G. Rajah (Depressed classes); representatives of Sikhs, Indian Christians; Anglo Indian and Europeans and representatives of Indian states.

On March 29, Cripps published the Draft Declaration at a Press Conference. The summary of the proposals is as follows:

(1) To speed up the realisation of self-government in India the British Government proposed that steps should be taken to create a new Indian Union, with full status of a Dominion by a

common allegiance to the Crown, and free in its internal and external affairs. The Union could secede from the British commonwealth.

(2) At the cessation of hostilities a constitution making body was to be set up on the basis of the proportional representation by the lower houses of the Provincial Legislatures; Indian states were to send their representatives in the same proportion of their total population.

(3) The British Government would implement the constitution so framed on two conditions.

(a) Any Province of British India not prepared to accept the new Constitution had a right to retain the existing constitutional position. It could accede to the Union later if it so wished and for that provision would be made later. Similarly the states were also free to take a decision according to their willingness.

(b) A treaty would be negotiated and signed between the British Government and constitution-making body for the complete transfer
of responsibility. Minorities interests would be looked after in accordance with the British Government's past commitments to them.

(4) During the making of the Constitution, the British Government would remain responsible for the defence of India, but they invited effective participation of the leaders of principal sections of the Indian people.

A thorough analysis of the Draft Declaration reveals that the clause beginning with the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands was certainly a promise for the future Independence of India. The other clause of the Declaration was concerned with the method by which the new constitution was to be framed and it dealt with a treaty between the British Government and the Constitution-making body. The Draft Declaration also dealt with the right of any Province of British India to retain its position if it was not prepared to accept the new constitution.

25. Ibid.
It is said that the Draft Declaration made no improvement over the August Offer. The August Offer had previously promised Dominion Status after the war and also accepted that the framing of the new constitution was the responsibility of the Indians. But a close study of the two documents reveals that it did make an advancement over the August Offer. Prof. Reginald Coupland, assessing the two has rightly said that the Draft Declaration was more 'concrete and constructive'. It clarified the meaning of Dominion Status and explicitly declared that the people of India would be solely responsible for making the new constitution. 'It can not be said', Professor Coupland pointed out that 'those improvements on the August Offer' were of no great moment. On the contrary, the Draft Declaration provided precisely those additional aids required to bring a settlement between the British Government and the Indian parties within the bounds of possibility.

But these proposals were subject to vehement criticism from all political parties. The Congress was disappointed on the question of independence for which promise was made for some future date. It wanted

26. Ibid., p. 50.
that the National Government must be a Cabinet Government with full power while Cripps from the very beginning said that no change was possible during war. On March 25, at the second conference, he made it absolutely clear that 'there is no question of negotiating a fundamentally different scheme.' And on March 30, he further said 'Everyone agrees that in these troublous times we cannot, here and now set about forging a new constitution.' Gandhiji said that it was 'a post-dated cheque on a bank that was obviously crashing.' Secondly the clause concerning the provision for the non-accession of provinces to the new constitution was also not acceptable to the Congress, which implied that it directly encouraged the partition of India, a demand raised by the League.

Cripps met Maulana Azad the Congress President on March 25, 1942. Azad insisted that to mobilize Indians "effectively" it was "necessary" to give them "control of the defence" of their country. Cripps pointed out that

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 35.
29. Ibid.
strategically India had to be regarded as part of "a much greater theatre of war". Azad reiterated his point, however, and Cripps decided that what Congress really wanted was the "appearance and name of an Indian Defence Minister", not actual control over, "the movement of troops or other military arrangements." This solution demanded that the Government should make a fair appraisal of the Congress stand. The sympathy of Congress lay with the Allies. It was willing to support Britain in the war provided two main conditions were fulfilled. First, the British Government should give a definite and solemn assurance that India would be made independent immediately after the war, and would be allowed to frame its own constitution through a democratically elected constituent assembly. Secondly, Congress should be allowed to form a 'national government' at the centre with other parties during the continuation of the war. Congress was in a distrustful mood. The past experiences of its leaders had made them believe that the British Government did not intend ever to transfer power to Indian hands but was perpetually occupied in out-maneuuvring the national movement by setting against it the communal forces

of the Muslim League, which was entirely their own crea-
tion. Congress had noticed with grief that it had taken
decades of hard struggle and sufferings on its own part
to get one of its demands accepted by the British Govern-
ment, while the Muslim League's demands were incorporated
in toto in British policy even before they were made. The
Congressmen believed that the Muslim League movement thriv-
ed on the support of the British. It had neither body
nor soul and would evaporate as soon as the British left
India.

Throughout the negotiations the provision of the
non-accession of the Provinces of British India formed
the crux of the controversy, specially in view of the fact
that Sir Stafford Cripps had in his broadcast speech on
March 30, 1942 declared that in the great sub-continent
of India there were more than one people. There were many
peoples and races - as there were in the great sub-conti-
nent of Russia. "Our object is to give to the Indian peo-
les full self government with complete freedom as to how
they will devise and organise their own constitution." To

31. B.N. Panday, The Break-up of British India, (New York,
Congress it was quite enough, and soon after the Draft Declaration was published, the Hindu Press started a powerful campaign of propaganda against it. The Congress objected from the very beginning to several important and far reaching proposals for the future. It had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head.

The interim proposals contained in the declaration were vague. The long term proposals contained certain features which were unpalatable to the Congress, such as 'provincial option' and the inclusion in the constitution-making body of states representatives who would not be the choice of the state people, but it was contended that such provisions were essential in order to make the scheme as a whole tolerable to other parties and interests in India, and to fulfil certain solemn pledges of His Majesty's Government.

The attitude of the other non-Muslim political parties was also not favourable. The Depressed classes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-Indians, the

Liberals, and the Europeans community took different views of the Cripps proposal. The Depressed classes needed special safeguards from the caste Hindu domination and said that they were a distinct community and not a 'part of the great Hindu society'. To Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah, the proposals were 'circulated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed classes, and were 'sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule.' The Indian Christians and the Anglo-Indian were more apprehensive of their fate and pleaded that the 'safeguards' should be given to them for about fifty years. The Liberals like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar mainly concentrated, like the Congress, on the non-accession proposals. They declared that 'the creation of more than one Union, however consistent in theory with the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests of the country and its integrity and security.' The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the proposals on the ground that the option given to the provinces to stay out of the Union would destroy the unity of the country.

33. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
The Sikhs also protested against the non-accession of the provinces and said that they would resist by all possible means separation of the Punjab from the all India Union.

When Cripps came to Delhi airport, the second anniversary of the 'Pakistan Day' was celebrated in Delhi by a mile-long procession and a mass public meeting was addressed by Jinnah.

"I can say without fear of contradiction that the Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom and independence of this country than any other party", the Quaid-i-Azam told a crowd of 50,000 Muslims in Urdu Park.

"We are asking for justice and fair-play. We have no designs upon our sister communities. We want to live in this land as a free and independent nation. We are not minority but a nation." About Cripps Mission Jinnah said:

"There is the fear that he is a friend of the Congress. He had enjoyed the hospitality of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru ..... That is all true but we should

34. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
not be afraid on that score. Don't get cold feet ..... We are prepared to face all consequences if any scheme or solution which is detrimental to the interests of Muslims is forced upon us. We shall not only accept it but resist it to the utmost of our capacity. If we have to die in the attempt we shall die fighting."

On April 2, 1942, Jinnah left Delhi for Allahabad where the annual session of the All-India Muslim League was convened and which was to be chaired by him. The League's attitude is clear from the Chairman of the Reception Committee, Sir Mohammad Yusuf, who explained his party's standpoint. Referring to Sir Stafford Cripps he hoped that some solution for a readjustment of Hindu-Muslim problem will be found out which would be in consonance with the two nation theory, leading to the creation of Pakistan.

Thereafter Jinnah made his Presidential speech. In his address he took up the Cripps Proposals. He

36. Ibid.

analysed the whole scheme to the audience and said that it was based on four important points. The first was the creation of a new India Union equal in every respect with other Dominions which had to give its allegiance to the Crown; secondly after the cessation of hostilities an elected body would be created to frame a new constitution for India, thirdly, provision for the Indian states was made and fourthly, the Constitution framed by the constitution-making body would be accepted and implemented by His Majesty's Government with few exception. One very important exception was concerned with the right of any British Indian province to retain its existing constitutional position, if it was not willing to accept the constitution. The League had studied the pros and cons of the proposals and was very critical to the composition of the constitution-making body. Cripps in his scheme about the formation of the constitution-making body said that its members would be elected from the Provincial Legislatures by a system of proportional representation. It meant that out of the Assemblies of 11 provinces an electoral college of 1600 members would be made which would be entitled to elect one-tenth, which means in all, 160 members by means of proportional representation. Jinnah felt that
Mu'almans even by separate electorate, would not be more than 25 per cent in it and by the system of proportional representation, they might be still less in number in the Constitution-making body. Thus a non-Muslim majority would dominate the process of framing the constitution and the majority would be absolutely in favour of only 'one Union'.

He also attacked the provision of the scheme which said that any province not willing to accept the constitution had a right to secede from it. There was no clear indication as to how that province or provinces would express their willingness to accept or reject the constitution. A suggestion to this effect was made by Sir Stafford that if a province, in the Legislative Assembly of the province, was in favour of accession by 60 per cent of votes, there would be an end of it. It meant that the province was bound to accede. But if they got 59% of votes and the minority happens to be 41 per cent, then there would be a plebiscite of the people of the province and these non-acceding province or provinces could form another Union or a Dominion or a single province may stand

38. Ibid., p. 385.
by itself as a Dominion. To Jinnah this was all meaningless. He said that after the publication of the proposals Muslim India felt 'deeply disappointed that the entity and integrity of the Muslim nation has not been expressly recognised.' He felt that the real issue i.e. the issue of Pakistan had been deliberately evaded "by over emphasizing the territorial entity of the provinces, which are mere accidents of British policy and administrative division is fundamentally wrong." He asked the British Government to accept the right of 'national self-determination' 'unequivocally recognised' for Muslims. In a long speech Jinnah reiterated that India was never a country or a nation. Cultural, social, political and economic differences had been so fundamental among different nations that it would be impossible to conceal them. 40 They need a clear handling by the realists.

He did not agree with the power of minority in the matter of secession. To him it was 'illusory' as Hindu India would give its decision in favour of one All-India Union of all the provinces, and the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab would be at the mercy of the Hindu

39. Ibid., pp. 385-88.
40. Ibid.
minority in those provinces. "The document shows" said Jinnah, "that Pakistan is treated as a remote possibility and there is a definite preference for a new Indian Union, which is the main objective and suggestion, and the rules of procedure and the process; indicated in the document, and the interviews and explanations of Sir Stafford Cripps 41 so far, are against us."

Later the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met on April 11, 1942 and while appreciating the pronouncement made by the British Prime Minister regarding the 'Draft Declaration' which maintained the validity of August Offer which had promised that no constitutional machinery for the framing of the constitution should be set up or the constitution enforced without the consent of the Muslims of India, it expressed its disappointment on the Cripps Proposal. It objected to the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the fundamentals of the 'Draft Declaration' which were not open to any modification. The League, therefore, resolved that it, has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones, and it will, therefore, be unfair

41. Ibid., pp. 388-89.
to the Musalmans to compel them to enter such a constitution making body, whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union.

"Besides the machinery which had been proposed for the creation of the constitution making body ... is a fundamental departure from the right of the Musalmans hitherto enjoyed by them, to elect their representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only sure way in which true representatives of Musalmans can be chosen." It also resolved that "The right of non-accession to the Union, 'as contemplated in the Draft Declaration, has been conceded, presumably, in response to the insistent demands by the Musalmans for the partition of India, but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object ..... The Musalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject."

True, the failure of Cripps was because of the obstinacy of the political parties but it was itself

42. Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943 published by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary All-India Muslim League Delhi, pp. 1-6.
responsible for its failure. It did not explicitly described the character of the proposed National Government or the method of its operation. It only talked about 'the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of principal sections of the Indian people in the councils of their country'. This was slightly different from the demand of the Congress which had been demanding from the very beginning a 'National Government.'

On the question of personnels, it was agreed that the majority of them on the Viceroy's Executive Council would be Indian save the Commander-in-Chief. But its mood of operation was not diffused. The Governor-General was still required to act in his discretion when emergency arose and whereby the safety, or interest of British India or any part thereof, was in danger.

Thus the powers of the cabinet consisting of Indians was still limited. But it should be said to the credit of Sir Stafford Cripps that he had come to secure an agreement on the Draft Declaration and his concern was not with the details. But the Congress Working Committee did not look eye to eye and insisted on a 'Cabinet with full powers.' However, Sir Stafford Cripps could not have accepted it because the minorities were not to
acquiesce. When Congress was proceeding ahead with its clarification, Jinnah told to a Press Conference on April 13, that the Muslims would be at the 'mercy' of the Congress Rule, while his object had been to secure an inter-communal agreement 'as to how independence should be achieved after the war' and 'next, on the basis of such an agreement, to bring about the formation of an interim government. Thus minority opposition to the Congress demand was in itself an obvious and conclusive reason for its rejection.'

After the Cripps Mission left India, the All-India Congress Committee met at Allahabad and resolved that it was impossible 'for Congress to consider any schemes or proposals, which retain even a partial measure of British control in India ..... Britain must abandon her held on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.' Though the resolution was passed its objective was not to 'embarass' the British Government. The morale of the Congress High Command was high and it was not going to surrender to Japan or any invader.

44. Ibid., p. 63.
45. Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

Generally the incident of the Quit India Movement was of great importance to the followers of the Congress objectives propagated by Gandhi, who planned it as a means for getting power from the British, but not for the Muslim League which considered it a precursor of Hindu Raj in India. Why the Muslim League opposed the Movement? What were the consequences had the Muslim League joined Gandhi in this movement? What benefits Jinnah wanted to gain during the movement? Why the Government crushed it? What was the impact of the Movement on Indian politics? Whether all the minorities, the Muslims being the largest, participated in the Movement? These are some of the questions which emerge in the mind which need answer, but to the disappointment of a scholar the contemporary writers have written the least on the causes of non-participation of the Muslim League and its reaction to the movement in different states.

However, to have a clearer understanding of the circumstances of the movement and League's opposition to it, it is indispensable to know the depth of the differ-
ences between the Congress and the League. Since the Quit India Resolution was adopted at the Wardha Congress meeting (1942) the political developments have to be reviewed before and after this date.

For Churchill, "Freedom" meant freedom for the British and other European nations, and for Roosevelt democracy meant democracy for the United States, though they advocated the principle of independence through the U.N. Charter. The same policy continued to be followed by the British Government for retaining their control in the colonies. During the World War II the U.S. Government, though played a significant role in the effort of breaking the constitutional deadlock in India, Churchill's directives to Cripps, proved all his plans a farce. The Allies had started war to safeguard their own interest against Germany, Japan and Italy. The United States saw in it a threat to American global interest. Roosevelt – Churchill pronouncement for the liberty, peace and democracy in all the dependent countries only aimed to draw men and material support from them. The change in the U.S. and British foreign policy was met with surprise by the American and

European nations. If the European nations and the United States were fighting against the Axis powers for the establishment of peace, liberty and democracy, Churchill declared that this principle was not applicable to India. In view of this embarrassing statement, Cripps Mission to install an interim government in India with the assurance to get India's assistance in the war and to grant independence after War was a clear indication of the oppressive British policy. As a result, the Congress opposed the Cripps proposal and demanded independence first and to take the question of the defence of India later, to which the British did not agree. When the war broke out on September 3, 1939, Linlithgow declared India a belligerent without making any effort to consult the Indian leaders. The British used the rule of force. The Congress asked the British Government to state her war aims, which made the Congress-Viceroy negotiations stagnant. Hence, the Viceroy turned towards the Muslim League for support in the British War aims.

Initially, there was cleavage between the Muslim political parties. The United Muslim Party was led by

the Nawab of Dacca, representing big landlords and the Krishak Proja Party (KPP) was led by Faz-ul-Haq, representing the poor peasants. He was Vice-President of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League. In Bihar, the United Muslim and Ahrar Parties did not join the League. In Central Provinces and Madras also, there were differences between the Muslim Parties. In Sind, since the Azad Muslim party did not like interference of others in the provincial matters, the formation of a single Muslim party in the state was not possible. In U.P., the Muslim Unity Board, led by Khaliquzzaman was sympathetic to the Muslim League. Jinnah had already purified and revived the League and stressed the need for a United Muslim front. Jinnah made the Muslim League the only representative body of the Muslims. He exhorted the Muslims all over India to rally round the League banner. After the 1937 elections, the League's position became so weak that the Congress proposed the merger of the Muslim League within its own. However, the Jinnah League survived and on June 30, 1937, Jinnah appealing the Muslims said:

5. The Leader, March 22, 1937.
"My only object in organising the Muslim League, and the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, and putting forward the programme for the "Nazm" (organization) of Musalmans ... is that Musalmans should unite among themselves as they have been ordered to do by God and his Prophet."

The appeal had a sharp effect on Muslim voters and the Muslim League emerged victorious at Bundelkhand and gained strength. In February, 1938, Pant wrote to Nehru that it would not be possible to ignore the Muslim League and, therefore, the Congress resolved to settle communal issues with it. The Congress Mass Contact and Movement's atrocities in the Congress governed provinces created in the hearts of Muslims an anti-Congress feeling and made them a nation by 1939. Encouraged by these developments, Jinnah demanded the Muslim homeland for Muslims in 1940 at Lahore, which caused the alienation of

7. Pant to Nehru, February 11, 1938, Nehru Correspondence, Vol. 79.
Muslim League from the Congress and later from the Quit India Movement.

On May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister and on May 19, 1940, L.S. Amery became Secretary of State for India in place of Lord Zetland, while Lord Linlithgow remained the Viceroy of India. Amery, the Leader of the Labour Government, changed the British policy towards India and declared that the "attainment by India of full and equal partnership in Commonwealth was the goal of British policy." On the one hand, on June 15-16, 1940, the League's subject committee authorised Jinnah only to negotiate with the Congress, and on the other, the Congress Working Committee meeting on July 7, 1940, resolved that its struggle for India's independence would continue without violence, and above all the Viceroy, on July 6, 1940, had assured the expansion of the Executive Council with adequate representation of the Muslims. If the Congress


11. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 89.
demanded complete independence before assisting the British war committee, the League would mean it the establishment of Hindu Raj which would be unacceptable to the Jinnah League which demanded the creation of Pakistan. The Viceroy realised that the Congress help would not come and, therefore, he turned towards Jinnah for help asking the League to cooperate with the Government in the war efforts.

On August 8, 1940, Linlithgow declared that power would not be transferred to any system of government whose authority is directly denied "by large and powerful elements in India's national life." Further, the Cripps proposal in 1942, indirectly indicated the recognition of the establishment of Pakistan, as it provided for the creation of two or more independent Unions in India. The Congress Working Committee expressed its indignation over these proposals. On July 13, 1942, Gandhi threatened that either the British should recognise India's independence

12. See Correspondence between Jinnah and Lord Linlithgow between February 1940 to July 1940 in Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed.) Historic Documents.


14. Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1942, to May 1943, Delhi, p.2.
or he will launch an open rebellion. This was too much for Jinnah. He accused the Congress of aiming to establish 'Hindu Raj' placing the Muslims and other minorities at the mercy of the Congress Raj. However, Jinnah was apprehensive that the British government would be pressurised by the Congress to accept its terms, leaving the League in the cold.

In 1940, while the War between the Allies and the Axis powers was fought in Europe and Japan was capturing British territories in the East and there was a possibility of Japanese attack on India also, the Congress on September 15, 1940, decided to start a civil disobedience movement against the British war efforts and announced its plan for "direct action" and consequently started satyagraha on November 7, 1940. The Government took repressive measures and arrested Nehru, Azad and as many as 4,749 congressmen. The Muslim League

characterised the Congress movement as a pressure on the British to concede its demand and declared to resist the movement with its power. The Government suppressed the movement with all power at its command by arresting the Congressmen and the Congress was forced to suspend the movement. Jinnah was much encouraged by the statements of Amery and Linlithgow on this occasion and he found in it a favourable climate to propagate the idea of Pakistan and win the support of Muslim masses for it. In November 1940, he said:

"The whole effort of the Congress seems to me to be like that of a bat which has entered a room and flies round and round knocking against the walls but will not, cannot, see that the door is wide open. That is what the policy of the Congress is like."

Jinnah was happy on the failure of the Civil Disobedience Movement and gave an impression to the people that Congress aimed at capturing power by sword. He exhorted the Muslims not to cooperate with the Congress and its movement. He said:


22. Ibid.
"I say to Musalmans, please don't get mixed up or involved in this terrible situations, for which the Congress alone is responsible. But if we find at any time that our interests are at stake we shall play our part and intervene, if necessary. Let that be understood."

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met on February 23, 1941 and in a resolution it said that 'the Civil Disobedience Movement started by the Congress is designed to bring pressure on the British Government to resile from the position it has taken in regard to the future constitution of India relating to the Muslims and other minorities and concede to the Congress demands, which are fundamentally opposed by Muslim India as they are detrimental to its vital interests.' The resolution also quoted a statement of Gandhi of November 5, 1939 published in the Harijan which said. 'So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League Civil resistance must involve resistance against the League.'

"The resolution concluded by saying that 'if any concession to the Congress is made which adversely affects or militates against the Muslim demands it will be resisted by the Muslim League with all the power it can command and the Muslim League desires to place it on record that
if the situation demands it would not hesitate to intervene and play such part in the struggle as may be necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the Mussalmans of this country." This amply clarifies the stand taken by the League.

Thereafter the All-India Muslim League met at Madras for its annual deliberation on April 12, 1941 and was attended by eminent leaders like E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, the leader of the justice Party; R.K. Shammukham Chetty, Dewan of Cochin, K.V. Reddy, A.P. Patro, Kumarrajah, M.A. Muttiah Chettiar, C.R. Srinivasan, the editor of the Swadesi Mitran, and M.C. Rajah, besides N. Sivaraj and other non-Brahmin leaders. In the session Jinnah declared that the League goal was Pakistan and he extended his support for the establishment of Dravidistan. He asked the Muslims to have education which was a means to an end and which was Pakistan. "Your biggest task is to have Muslims," he said, "so well-trained in political science, in political language, in the political movements not only of this country, but of the whole world." Defining the League's policy he said that under no circumstances, it would accept

24. The *Bombay Chronicle*, April 15, 1941.
any constitution of an 'All-India Character with one Government at the Centre.' He was afraid that if the League agreed to this the Muslims would be absolutely wiped out of their existence. He bitterly criticised for Pandit Jawaharlal's statement in which he stood/"Akhand Bharat" and said that Muslim did not like to live in Democracy. It would mean the rule of majority.

Announcing the League's policy Jinnah said that its policy was to endeavour to promote goodwill and harmony among other peoples on the basis of equality, fair play and reciprocity. This can best be secured by agreement with other peoples and parties....Any ambition of domination by one over the other must be abandoned and the sooner that is abandoned the quicker will be the solution of India's problems.

The Conference also passed a resolution to the effect that "every Muslim who is to join the League from now onwards will have to take an oath of allegiance to Pakistan." The session characterised the Gandhi's Civil

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
Disobedience Movement as a pressure tactics on the British Government to make it accede to the Congress demand. The session warned the Government that any constitutional change, either interim or final, made without the approval of the League, would mean violation of the solemn pledges of August 1940, and threatened that "if any attempt was made to depart, in any way, from the declarations of August, 1940, the Muslims would feel constrained to resort to any measure and method to resist it with all the powers they possessed.

Meanwhile what annoyed the Muslim League more was Mr. Amery’s Statement in the House of Common on April 22, 1941. He said:

"It was suggested that the framework of India’s future constitution should be devised by Indian themselves and not by this House ... Even more important in this connection is the stipulation that the constitution itself, and also the body which is to frame it, must be the outcome of agreement between the principal elements in India’s national life. That is a pre-requisite to the success of the future constitution. For if Indians cannot agree upon the kind of constitution they are prepared

to work, how are they likely to agree upon the actual working of it. I have dwelt deliberately upon Indian responsibility in the matter; for unless Indians are prepared to face that responsibility now, they will fall to face it hereafter. Any agreement imposed by us from without cannot survive the withdrawal of our power to enforce it. Only a real agreement freely reached, can stand that test." Contrary as it was to the previous policy of the Government. The Working Committee of the League took the above statement very seriously and requested the British Government to stand by their declaration and pledges solemnly given earlier by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. It threatened the Government that if the Muslim League's demand of Partition would not be forthcoming, Muslim League would be forced to resort to methods which would be other than peaceful.

There was no settlement between the League, the Congress and the Government while an understanding on some constitution which may serve as a future guide was very necessary at a time while all these were busy in speculating their own efforts. Hence the British Government sent

Sir Stafford Cripps to India to negotiate with the Indian leaders about a workable constitution.

Cripps Mission reached India on March 23, 1942. His arrival gave fresh hopes to the people of India because he called himself 'a great friend and admirer of India' who was eager to bring a 'final settlement of the political difficulties' of Indian people. He was confident that his efforts would resolve the problems and a generally acceptable line of practical action could be laid down. In his message to the people of India he said that His Majesty's Government desired to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps leading to the realisation of self-Government in India. Their 'object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.' The Cripps proposals published on March 30, 1942 announced the formation of 'one Indian Union' and 'one constitution-making body'. Thus the Draft Declaration on one hand had accepted the Congress demand to frame a constitution through a Constituent

conceded

Assembly and on the other to the Muslim League's demand for the establishment of Pakistan by giving the Provinces the right either to join or not the Indian Union.

But the League was very critical to these proposals. Its Working Committee met on April 11, 1942 and criticised the idea of 'one Indian Union.' In a resolution it said that since Muslim League had been trying to be friendlier with the Indian National Congress and got no success it was neither just nor possible to constitute one Indian Union. It reiterated its demand of Partition of India into independent zones. It criticised the machinery which Cripps had proposed for the creation of the constitution making body and said that it would take decisions by a bare majority and Muslims would not have their say.

The non-accession clause and Cripps Defence Formula could not bring about a settlement between the Congress and the League and the Mission, having failed, flew back to England on April 2, 1942. After the departure of the Mission both the parties began to accuse it and the political deadlock continued. The League met at Allahabad on

April 3-6, 1942 for its 29th session and the Cripps proposals were subject of heated discussion. In his Presidential speech Jinnah concluded 'We will ... endeavour that the principle of Pakistan which finds only veiled recognition in the document should be conceded in unequivocal terms.' To solve this problem, Rajagopalachari, better known as "Rajaji", on April 23, 1942, recommended to the All-India Congress Committee to "acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation." Rajaji's resolution in favour of the creation of Pakistan was rejected at the All-India Congress Committee which met at Allahabad on May 2, 1942. Rajaji being disappointed began his campaign in favour of Pakistan and met Jinnah also. On July 22, 1942, Jinnah warned the Government that serious consequences will follow if the Congress demand against the creation of Pakistan would be accepted. The Congressmen were completely disappointed and they realised that if the Congress would not

33. See All-India Muslim League Allahabad Session, April 1942, Presidential Address, by M.A. Jinnah, Printed and Published by S. Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary All-India Muslim League at Muslim League Printing Press (Darya Ganj, Delhi, 1945), p. 12.

34. The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, January–June, 1942, pp. 294-95. See also Jinnah-Gandhi Talks (September Contd.....
start any movement to engage the masses it would suffer a great setback.

Since news were forthcoming that Gandhiji will intensify the non-violence non-cooperation movement, the war cabinet was authorised to take decisive action whenever it seemed necessary. The Governors were asked to take political leaders in their confidence in order to suppress the movement, but they were unable to find any influential Indian politician to speak out against the Wardha All-India Congress Committee Resolution of July 14, 1942, which stated that since the Government had not given any consideration to the Congress proposal, Gandhiji would be authorised to launch a non-violent and widespread struggle. The Wardha Resolution was to be ratified by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 7, 1942.

(Continued from the previous page)


However, there was a lull in the political activities in India. British officials were sceptical whether Gandhi could really start the non-violent non-cooperation, no-tax or no-rent movement interfering in the British military and administrative services. A responsible official of the British Intelligence Department noted that there was no apparent sign of Congress assault on the British Raj and it was simply a bluff on the part of Gandhi. But, in fact, Congress and League workers were in action in the states. A Central Intelligence officer, Lahore, reported on January 15, 1942, that Congress work was proceeding without a break in NWFP and members of the Red Shirt Movement organised many demonstrations and harassed the Government. Abdul Qaiyyum was paid Rs. 2,000/- to carry on the Congress work, while Dr. Khan Saheb was found unfit for piloting the Congress movement on socialist lines. Geo D. Parkin an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department, wrote to all Superintendents of police of the United Provinces on July 24, 1942 that the Congress anticipated their arrest on the inauguration of the mass movement. Therefore, they had made arrangement of suitable successors. He also wrote that the Congress had planned

that open and subversive groups would paralyse the Government. In Andhra Pradesh Dr. Pattabhi Sittaramayya and Kala Venkata Rao organised programme for laying the trees on road sides, marching in government offices, appealing to police not to do their duties, and removing fish plates from railway lines. Parkin reported on August 4, 1942, Congress plans of boycott, non-payment of rent, strikes, sabotage and inactivation of army in U.P. to paralyse the Government in the shortest possible time. In Bengal the Congress movement seemed to have no influence. Faz-ul-Haq said to Lt. Governor that he did not think that civil disobedience would succeed in Bengal and that the League and Hindu Mahasabha were enough to deal with it. But he was reluctant to issue any statement against Gandhi in view of his relations with Jinnah.

After the resignation of Congress ministries in October 2, 1939, the Governors in the Non-Muslim majority states and the Muslim League in the Muslim majority pro-

39. Dr. P.N.Chopra, op.cit., p.10.
vices had taken over the provincial administration and Jinnah's hand was considerably strengthened. Further, the Viceroy began "to lean more on the support of the 41 Muslim League" and Muslims began trickling into the League and Jinnah, an 'adroit politician that he was' made the most of the situation. Jinnah organised the scattered forces of Muslim India and League's position became more and more satisfactory. The Viceroy realised that Jinnah's politics were realistic and he was not a visionary. His suggestions and cooperation made the Viceroy to think that he would be helpful in the most successful prosecution of the War. Thus, Jinnah considerably impressed the Government, and this contributed much to Jinnah's success and he launched an anti-Congress movement throughout the length and breadth of India.

Congress was in a dilemma. It could not go back to the Legislature or start a programme with a dual policy - one to keep the leadership intact and other to gain power by militant means. Joining the Legislature was fraught with Hindu opposition and Government's harsh terms and

41. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 69.
42. Ibid., p. 70.
surrender to Muslim League. Launching a movement was the only way out which could engage the masses and therefore, the Congress adopted the second move. Gandhi declared that "whoever did not coalesce with the Congress programme was essentially selfish, and consequently against India's independence." Gandhi committed mistake in assessing the strength of the Muslim League and its hold on Muslim India, in spite of protests and objections raised by them. In such political uncertainty, the All-India Congress Committee met at Bombay on August 8, 1942 and endorsed the July 14th resolution, which proclaimed to start "a mass struggle on non-violent lines" under the leadership of Gandhi. Gandhi remarked:

"Mr. Jinnah does not seem to believe in the Congress programme and in the Congress demand. But I can not wait any longer for India's freedom. I can not wait till Mr. Jinnah is converted, for the immediate consummation of Indian freedom." This implied that Jinnah did not want independence of India and this was the greatest libel on the Muslim leader. Gandhi's charges against

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Jinnah were characterised by the Muslims as extreme violence on the Muslim League and the Muslim India. The All-India Congress Committee demanded Britain to withdraw, which to League clearly meant handing over power to the Hindus. Gandhiji said that he was fighting to evolve a National Government to represent the masses in the fullest sense of the term. An analysis of it reveals that the National Government would be in a position to decide the fate of India in the event of Axis entry in the country, and to decide the fate of Muslims in the event of British remaining in India after the war.

A day before the resolution of Quit India was to be moved at Bombay there was a great deal of sensation in India. The Government was prepared to crush the movement in order to save the population from the evils of civil war. Police were tighten in view of the Congress threat to the administration of law and order. The Congress had made preparations in all parts of the country to launch the movement violently and it was the game of life and death for the Congress either to win independence by demonstration or to perish in jail. The Congress gave a

feeling to the Hindus that the movement would completely annihilate the leadership of Jinnah and would result in the fall-out of Muslims from the demand of Pakistan and thus, they would save the vivisection of their motherland, the Bharat. This aroused the religious feeling among the Hindus and they were prepared to participate in the movement at the cost of their lives and property. The Muslims became very suspicious to the impending situation. Jinnah visualised the situation that there was possibility of serious Hindu-Muslim clashes, which would bring about a complete estrangement between Hindus and Muslims while his silence would bring death to his own political career and the demand of Pakistan. In case of conflicts, there was every possibility of Muslim support to him and the creation of Pakistan was crystal clear. Thus his desire of becoming the 'Father of Pakistan' began to pang in his heart. However, he did not like the destruction of Muslim lives and property. Therefore, he appealed to the Muslims to view the political developments calmly and wait for the decision of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee to meet in the middle of August, 1942. The decision of the League depended on the political situation in India as a result of Gandhi's launching the
Quit India Movement. He, with his usual cool and thoughtful mind, was watching the situation.

In the morning of August 9, 1942, Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani, Asaf Ali, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and many other Congress leaders were arrested. This was followed by the arrest of Congressmen all over the country. This was for the first time after the Great Revolt of 1857 that a vast number of people stood to challenge the British forces without arms. Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, on August 9, morning was the first to break the news to Jinnah of the arrest of the Congress leaders in Bombay and the latter took the local paper from the former's hand and went through its columns. Soon Jinnah began to receive information of disturbances in the city. The Hindus committed outrages against the Muslims and angry mobs of Hindus surrounded the business premises of Muslims, who enquired on telephone from Jinnah as to what they should do. Jinnah had made arrangements to face such happenings with the help of the local Muslim League, who handled the situation with great tact and courage.

In Delhi, a large number of Hindus were arrested including a few Muslims. On August 9, there was a hartal in Delhi. "The Hindu shops were completely closed although Muslim shops were generally open." The Communists had joined the procession, but the Radical Democratic Party abstained. According to a C.I.D. report, "Of the 15,000 mill-labourers in Delhi only a small portion were probably involved." Another C.I.D. report dated August 14, says that "The Delhi disturbances have been roughly planned by Asif Ali." Another C.I.D. report dated August 15, says that "most Hindus closed their shops forthwith, but Muslims plainly refused to do so and are carrying on their usual business." Despite Jinnah's opposition to the Movement, Jamayat-ulema-i-Hind joined hands with the Congress. Maulvi Hussain Ahmad Madni was imprisoned in U.P. The students of Banaras, Allahabad, and Lucknow Universities played an important role in the disturbances and destructions in urban and rural areas, while the Aligarh Muslim

51. Ibid., p. 15.
52. Ibid., p. 16.
53. Ibid., p. 17.
University was an exception. It is reported that "Vice-Chancellor Sir Ziauddin Ahmad had been most useful to the authorities and has kept his students completely aloof from the Movement." In Baluchistan, a large number of Kandaharis took interest in the movement because the Hindus said that the Congress aimed at the re-establishment of their ex-king Amanullah on the throne of Afghanistan. Abdus Samad Khan, the Chief Leader of the Anjuman-e-watan after his return from Sind on August 17, began to organize support for the Quit India Movement. According to the Intelligence Report dated September 11, 1942, the Khan failed to create any interest.

However in Bombay, the effect of the Movement was very serious and the students, who led the Movement, and when mob violence started, receded into the background. The Communists were in a dilemma whether or not to participate in the movement. Hindu Mahasabha allowed its members to join the Congress movement, while the Muslim carried on a certain amount of anti-Congress and anti-civil Disobedience propaganda. The Government gave discretionary

54. Ibid., p. 25.
55. Ibid., see also Pattabhi Sitarammay, Vol.II, op.cit., p.373.
57. Ibid., p. 43.
powers to the Provincial Governments to deal with the Movement. Obviously the League Ministers in the Muslim majority provinces used their full influence to crush the movement. The All-India Muslim League Working Committee met on August 16, 1942 at Bombay. Since there were disturbances and riots, a few Muslim leaders could not come in time. The League Committee passed a lengthy resolution which deplored the Congress decision of August 8, 1942, to launch an "open rebellion", which resulted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property. The committee considered that the Movement was directed "to coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy "and" to force Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and conditions." The Committee observed that while the Congress claimed the right of self-determination for India i.e. for Hindu majority, "it has persistently opposed the right of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny." The Committee also stated that settlement of communal problem was a condition precedent to the attainment of the freedom and independence.

59. Ibid., p. 396.
60. Ibid.
of India and, since the All-India Congress Committee on May 1, 1942, repudiated the League's demand for the right of self-determination, the Congress had closed the door for the settlement and instead "substituted the fantastic theory that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem could only follow the withdrawal of British power from India." The Committee deplored that the Congress movement aimed at the establishment of Hindu Raj and it was a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan. The Committee warned that "if the Congress demand is accepted, it would bring the hundred millions of Musalmans under the yoke of Hindu Raj which must inevitably result either in anarchy and chaos or complete strangulation and annihilation of Muslim India and all that Islam stands for." In the end, the League's Committee called upon the Musalmans "to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to continue to pursue their peaceful life. The Committee hoped that the Congress would avoid "to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with

61. Ibid., p. 397.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
the normal life of the Muslims", otherwise the Muslims

"would be compelled and justified to offer resistance

and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the

protection of their life, honour and property."

Jinnah described the movement as "tentamount to

forcing their demands at the point of bayonet and inter-

necine civil war." He appealed the Muslims not to par-

ticipate in the movement and "to stop this internecine

civil war' before it was too late. However by the end

of 1942, police and army resorted to firing 538 times,

as a result 40 persons were killed, 1,630 injured, 26,000

convicted and 18,000 detained under the D.I.R. The Govern-

ment collected Rs. 25,000,000 as fines.

Had the Muslims joined the movement Gandhi

ji could have claimed that he represented the whole of India alone

and that his demand was supported by Muslim India also.

65. Ibid.

66. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan,

op.cit., p. 191.


68. Sir Regionald Coupland, Report on the Constitutional

Problem in India, op.cit., pp. 239-40.
But the Muslims did not fall into Gandhiji's trap, Jinnah characterised, the Movement a "gambler's Law throw."

Jinnah asked the Muslims, to let them fight it out and told them to be neutral. This is one of those cases which was the most effective policy. Therefore, the movement went without even the slightest support of the Muslim.

The British Government admitted that the Muslims had not cooperated with Gandhiji's Quit India Movement, with the exception of a few cases and hence, exempted the Muslims from the punitive tax that was later levied in certain areas on the saboteurs. Further, since the provincial Muslim Leaguers had been persuading the Muslims to keep themselves aloof from the movement, the League devoted much attention to getting the Muslims exempted from collective fines, which was imposed on areas where sabotage had taken place. In N.W.F.P. many Muslims had participated in the Congress movement, but there were also anti Congress propaganda, "organised by British officials"

70. Ibid., p. 783.
71. Ibid.
72. The Morning News, September 1 and 8, 1942.
through ulema. In the Central provinces and Berar, Muslims were "generally exempted from collective fines but individual liability was enforced." Although the League and Hindu Mahasabha kept aloof from the Movement in Bihar, there were cases of arrests of Muslims, because they participated in the lawlessness. Big landlords of Bihar did not participate in the movement.

The remarkable feature of the Quit India Movement was that there was absence of any communal incident or disorder. It was because of two reasons. Jinnah on August 16, 1942, reiterated his faith in Pakistan as a peaceful solution of India's constitutional problem in the interest of both the Hindus and the Muslims and expressed his willingness to consider any proposals, with any party on the basis of equality. The Hindus should consider it a right of Muslims for self determination. Secondly, a number of parties, organisations and eminent persons opposed the Movement. Sapru called the Wardha

74. Fortnightly Report for Central Provinces and Berar for the first half of September, Home Department, Political, File No. 18/9/1942.

75. Fortnightly Report for Bihar for the first half of September, Ibid.

However, a few Congressmen were let loose to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the Congress and the British Government. The Muslim League sensed some sort of compromise which could effect the Muslim interest. Jinnah thought that the Congress would never start the Movement and the British Government would never agree to any terms with the

79. Ibid., p. 231.
Congress in view of the contemplated Japanese attack on India. Therefore, it was the ripe time for Jinnah to assert the League's stand. In November 1942, Jinnah made a bold and courageous statement:

"People ask, supposing the British and the Congress make up their differences and the former yield and surrender to the Congress demand, what will happen to us? The answer is. "If the British Government after all their solemn pledges attempt to sacrifice us, let us down and throw us at the mercy of the Congress Raj, believe me, they will not succeed if we are united and organised."

Jinnah, in the same statement, cautioned the British Government against any settlement with the Congress in harsher words. He said:

"Now we are able to stand up and make such a Government impossible. Even the combined forces/China and America cannot impose on us a constitution which will sacrifice Muslim India. But if such a mad blunder is committed by the United Nations, remember even a worm turns, and notwithstanding the foreign bayonets upholding

the Congress Raj, we shall make the administration of the country impossible, for it is far too grave an issue for us to submit to."

The Quit India Movement was launched by the Congress as the British Government did not yield to their demand of handing over power to them. The Muslim League characterised the Congress move as a plan to annihilate the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan. Since the Movement involved disturbance in the country, the British Government crushed the movement and the Congress leaders were imprisoned. The League stood calmly to watch the development, believing that disturbances at a time when the British were busy in their life and death struggle would be of no use.

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81. Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SOLVE THE LEAGUE-CONGRESS CONFLICT BETWEEN 1943-45

The Congress and the League both were instruments in the hands of their communal leaders, who were not visible in the political hue and cry but were playing a very effective role in the background, in view of the fact that neither all the non-Muslim communities in India took part in the Quit India Movement nor all the Muslims of the sub-continent supported the Lahore Resolution which purported the very objective of the creation of Pakistan. Hence, there were a few in both the communities who were leading the sheep. They organised mass movement to engage the people in politics to strengthen the flame of nationalism, patriotism and fight against colonialism. However all the people were not able to foresee the consequences of the Lahore Resolution and the Quit India Movement. A Survey of the educational institutions of that period reveals that no more than 5 per cent people were educated and those educated were mostly officials. In the mind of common men the doubt crept that Jinnah's demand for Pakistan in the Eastern and Western parts of India was alone to fight with their destiny. Likewise, average educated Hindu thought that the Quit India
Movement was a course of creating open gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims; giving unremedial wound to the Motherland.

In the above background, one would realise that the future panorama of Indian political scene could be no other than antagonistic, uncompromising and conflicting between the Congress, which claimed to be representative of all the communities, including Muslims, and demanding independence for a United India. The Muslim League, on the other hand, which claimed to represent all the Muslims in India and demanded a separate Muslim homeland including Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP and Kashmir. The Congress did not agree to leave any corner of India for the creation of Pakistan. Cripps proposals envisaged the right of any province to secede from the Union and that the British Government would agree to accept their new constitution. Jinnah expressed doubt to Cripps that no more than 25 per cent votes would be cast in favour of Muslims on the principle of proportional representation and they would not be able to join the Union. Cripps assured that "if less than 60 per cent of the provincial legislature voted in favour of accession, the minority would have the right to call
for a plebiscite of the adult male population of the province, the verdict of which would be implemented by the British Government. Jinnah was rather surprised and satisfied with Cripps assurance and did not raise any objection to it. However, since Jinnah was convinced that the Whitehall was creating a political climate for consultation and transfer of power he avoided any settlement with the Congress. Truly, the 1935 Act became null and void and the British Government was engaged in search of an agreeable plan for transfer of power to India and the principle was oriented partly in the Cripps proposals, partly in the Congress demand for a United India and partly in the League's demand for Pakistan.

However after the failure and departure of the Cripps Mission on April 12, 1942, the situation in India had become very tense. Gandhiji's Quit India Movement


2. Ibid., pp. 480-81.

was labelled with the charges of "ugly situation", "violent activities" and "lawlessness", while Jinnah invented the slogan of "Divide and Quit." Since Jinnah organised the League and its membership rose in Central Provinces to 33,541 (1943), in Bengal 5,50,000 (1944) and in Sind 3,30,000 (1944) with its divisions, sub-divisions, city branches and wards, it became a "revolutionary" and "mass movement." The Muslim National Guards infused a new spirit in the Muslims. Jinnah's second Five Year Plan, started after 1941, mainly concerned with the educational, social and economic uplift of the Muslims in the proposed area of Pakistan. He also desired to turn the agricultural environment into that of an industrial and commercial complex with the help of Muslim businessmen. These developments were being made in Punjab. At the same time the Sikhs were planning to establish their own state. Cripps assured the Sikhs that, in case of partition of Punjab, he would setup a semi-autonomous district for them on the Soviet model. Since Cripps had assured partition of Punjab, the failure of Cripps Mission greatly relieved the


Sikhs, but the Muslims and Sikhs became increasingly suspicious of one another. A reign of terror prevailed. The Akalis, the League, Hindu Mahasabha, Rashtriya Sewak Sangh and Khaksars raised their voice against each other. The Sikhs armed the Sikhs on the semi-military basis. The U.P. League Defence Committee was for the defence of Muslims against the attacks of Hindus. In Bihar, the League organised the Muslim protection scheme against the Hindu aggression. However, the Congress opposed the formation of communal volunteer corps and called for unity amongst the Indian to fight against the British imperialism. The Congress invited the League to participate in a Non-Party Defence Committee, but the League Defence Committee did not attend the meeting. The reason may be that there were already the Hindu military organisations like RSS and Hindu Mahasabha working behind the curtain in the interest of the Hindus, while there was no such organisations except the League Defence


Committee to safeguard the Muslims in India. The British assessed the political deadlock and were in the process of imposing some formula for agreement between the Muslim League and the Congress, while the Hindu and the Sikh army officers had planned for the establishment of Hindu Raj in India. Sensing this danger, the Muslim League had made their interests identical to that of the British.

In the Congress circle there was a section led by Shri Rajgopalachari who was willing to look into the demand of Pakistan. Rajagopalachari met Gandhiji and the Viceroy and discussed with them the political situation. The advocacy of such a leading Congressman for Partition of India strengthened the demand of Muslim League for Pakistan. Further it was received with a shock by the non-Muslim communities, especially the Sikhs, who lost their confidence in Congress, and demanded demarcation of the boundaries of the Punjab between Delhi and Lahore, for a state of Khalistan. To enforce their stand, they on the one hand rapproached the British Government for their favour of a separate autonomous Sikh State, and on the other, improved their relations with the Unionist Party.

which then dominated the Punjab ministry. Since the Sikhs were against the creation of Pakistan and Unionists also did not like Partition some Muslim unionists thought to strengthen their party with the Akali support. In June 1942, Sikandar-Baldev Pact was signed, which among other things, provided "maintenance of Sikh representation in the provincial services at 20 per cent. It was also agreed upon that the Sikh claim for representation in the Executive Council would be supported by the Unionists.

Tara Singh challenged the demand for Pakistan and threatened that it would amount to "Civil War." However the demand of Pakistan loomed over the head of Punjab and the Sikhs.

Sir Sikandar Hayat was the leader of the Unionist party in Punjab and he opposed the partition of Punjab. He was a dominant force successful in keeping Punjab ministry stable. He wanted a peaceful settlement of the partition and proposed a scheme as follows.

"In the absence of 75 per cent majority of members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either

10. Fortnightly Report for Punjab for first half of June 1942, Home Department, Political, File No.18/6/42.
accession or non-accession to the Indian Federation, the Muslim community should be given an opportunity of deciding on non-accession by means of referendum if they so decided, the non-Muslim portions of the Punjab should, by a similar referendum, be accorded the right to cut themselves adrift from the provinces. If it actually came to the point where non-Muslims decided to break adrift, it would mean (assuming the unit concerned to be a district) that the Ambala division and a large part of the Jallunder division, and also the Amritsar district, would *cease to belong to the Punjab.*" 

The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, discussed with Sir Sikandar Hayat the scheme and intended to publish it.

Sir Sikandar Hayat had resigned from the Muslim League soon after the League conference held on May 29, 1942, and in spite of persuasion and request made by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, on behalf of Jinnah, he did not withdraw it as the League was not agreeable to change its stand.

13. Ibid.
By the beginning of 1943, the Quit India Movement was completely suppressed by the Government while Gandhiji was still in jail. However, after the Quit India Movement the British had decided to leave India at the earliest. The Indian officials were looking forward, without antagonising any party - Congress or League, to go on to the winning side after Independence had been granted. The Hindu officials had the Congress sympathies, while the Muslim officials had planned to reap a good harvest in the Pakistan area. In this political environment, the Muslim League planned to capture ministries in Assam, Sind, NWFP and Bengal.

When the Congress leaders were in jail in 1943, the Viceroy asked the Governors to form non-Congress ministries in the provinces.

In Assam the Congress ministry was in power since 1937. After the arrest of Congress MLAS, the ministry fell and Mohammad Saadullah formed a coalition ministry.


15. Conran Smith, Ibid.
with the representation of other parties.

In Sind, Allah Bakhsh renounced his titles, which gave an opportunity to Linlithgow to dispose him of and make the way open for G.H. Hidayatullah to form a ministry. The Provincial League joined the ministry of Hidayatullah in spite of Jinnah's instructions not to enter the government in which they did not have a dominant position. Surprisingly, Hidayatullah joined the Muslim League. The League membership grew to 30,000.

In NWFP, detention of eight, of the twenty-one Congress legislators, had brought the Congress to the verge of defeat by the Muslim Leaguers. Firoz Khan Noon, a member of the Viceroy's Council, suggested the Governor Sir George Cunningham, to allow the League to form the ministry as it had the support of the non-Congress members, but the Governor rejected his suggestion. However, in

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16. Fortnightly Report for Assam for the first half of September 1942, Home Department, Political, File No. 18/9/42.

17. Viceroy to Governor of Sind Telegram, September 26, 1942, Linlithgow correspondence, Vol. 98.

April 1943 Aurangzeb Khan formed the League ministry in co-operation with the Akalis. Ajit Singh accepted the portfolio in Aurangzeb ministry on the condition that Pakistan issue would not be raised in the Assembly. The Mahasabha withdraw from the coalition ministry and Mehr Chand Khanna was not appointed speaker. However the League-Akali ministry could not have the support of more than 19 out of 43 members in the Assembly.

In Bengal, the Governor Sir Herbert J. Maynard asked Fazlul Haq to resign and proclaimed the application of section 93 in spite of his majority and established Nizamuddin’s ministry, supported by 25 Europeans, who had also supported the Haq ministry. All the Muslims in the ministry were members of the League. Bose group and Mahasabha stood aloof.

In the Punjab, after the sad demise of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in December 1942, Jinnah selected Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, as the new leader of the Unionist party. The motion of confidence was seconded by Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan.


20. Ibid., p. 135.
Mamdot, President of the Punjab Muslim League. Linlithgow doubted Khizr's ability, but he hoped that the Punjab Governor, Sir Bertrand James Glancy would give him a great deal of assistance, in the interest of war efforts. For this purpose, he was committed to prevent the fall of the Unionist ministry.

In the remaining provinces—Madras, Bombay, C.P., U.P., Bihar and Orissa the administration was under the Governors since the resignation of Congress ministries in 1939. Jinnah, thus, after making the League's position very strong and establishing League's ministry in the five important provinces, celebrated its victory/April 24, 1943, in Delhi, in a procession of elephants, camels and horses, thousands of cyclists and tens of thousands on foot. Jinnah in his speech said:

"I say to the Hindus, and the Britishers know it better than anybody else, that the quickets way for the freedom of the peoples, both Hindus and Muslims is Pakistan. It may come in my life time or not, you will rememb-

ber these words of mine. I say this with no ill-will or offence. Some nations have killed millions of each other. That is not permanent. An enemy of today is a friend of tomorrow. That is life, that is history, so I say this, with a clear conscience. My profound regret is that it is the Congress and its Hindu leadership that are holding up the achievement of freedom of both the Hindus and Musalmans. Our conscience is clear. I appeal to the Hindu public and Hindu leaders. Revise your policy."

Jinnah claimed that all the Muslim majority provinces (Assam, Sind, Bengal, NWFP and the Punjab) were under the control of the League ministries and presented a demand for Pakistan in a very forceful manner. He reiterating the Congress stand for establishing Hindu Raj, which the League would never accept, Jinnah, recalled the duty of the Congress to find a truce and said: "Nobody would welcome it more than myself." He inviting Gandhiji for direct negotiations said:

"If Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of

Pakistan, let me tell you that it will be the greatest
day both for the Hindus and Muslims. If he has made up
his mind, what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writ-
ing direct to me."

Explaining his viewpoint Jinnah continued:
"Mr. Gandhi gets all the information, all the news-
papers and knows and understands what is going on. If
there is any change of heart on his part he is only to
drop me a few lines, when I assure you, the Muslim
League will not fail, whatever may have been our contro-
vercies in the past." The Subject Committee of the
Muslim League decided to oppose any move of the Govern-
ment to impose the all India Federation. He exhorted
the Muslims to sacrifice everything to reach their
cherished goal of Pakistan.

The most tragic incident of 1943, is that Gandhiji
wrote a letter from prison to Jinnah expressing a desire
to meet him and without referring anything to the League's

25. Ibid., p. 105.
demand. The Government held up this letter and sent an abstract of it. The press seriously commented that the he was afraid of the Government and would retrace his steps.

The other tragedy was the imposition of restriction on Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi to go out of Madras. Therefore, the Allama met Rajaji and other pro-Congress leaders and issued instructions to his followers to influence Jinnah to meet Gandhiji. A fanatic Khaksar from the Punjab went to see Jinnah at his residence and in his frenzy attacked him with a knife. However, he was overpowered and Jinnah was saved.

In spite of the Government's pro-League politics, Jinnah could not escape accusations due to rapidly deteriorating economic condition of the people. Firstly, since the Congress leaders were in jail and Jinnah was propagating against the Congress, he was fighting in the air and thus the League was losing its impact on the masses. Secondly, the Congress adopted progressive measures and the Muslims began to come into the Congress fold. Thirdly, there was unemployment and shortage of food and

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27. See for details Jinnah Faces on Assassin, (Bombay, 1943).
famine in Bengal, Assam, Mysore, Coorg, Travancore due to supply to the warring Allies. Fourthly, cyclone and floods destroyed stocks on a very large scale which resulted in famines in Bengal in 1943-44. The people blamed the League ministries and held it responsible for these calamities. Indian soldiers in Bengal and Assam wanted immediate assistance for the people of Chittagong and felt that "the Sarkar had already failed in duty." Likewise, the families of the solidiers of East Bengal were "already apprehensive of the effects of food shortages upon their families." The industrial, economic, social hygienic and political problems had worried the people.

As a result of all these the League ministry fell in Bengal in spite of Governor's support.

The political deadlock continued and Rajaji also continued to propagate the realisation of the partition

29. Ibid.
of India to settle the Congress-League differences for the sake of Indian independence which was considered by B. Shiva Rao worthy of consideration. At the AICC Bombay session on August 8, 1943, the League policy was discussed and Azad, Nehru and Abdul Latif did not approve of any scheme of Partition. However the AICC made the following concessions to Muslim League that:

(a) for the interim period if the British agree to the formation of a real National Government Mr. Jinnah would be asked to form a Government, and

(b) in regard to the permanent constitution, the Congress would prepare to accept the largest measure of autonomy being conceded to the federating units and residuary powers vested in them. If however, a territorial unit would not agree with the basic structure of the new constitution, and desired secession the federation would not resort to coercion.

The above proposal did not satisfy the League. It gave an impression to the Indians that settlement between the Congress and the League was impossible.

32. Ibid.
Meanwhile a new development had taken place, Sir Archbold Wavell, the Field Marshall of India, was appointed the Governor-General of India. Churchill was the Prime Minister and Amery was the Secretary of State for India. Amery declared in the House of Commons that his appointment did not imply any change in the settled policy to which His Majesty's Government were pledged with regard to the development of Indian self-government. Wavell took charge of the Viceroyalty from Linlithgow on October 20, 1943. Earlier, Wavell was the Commander-in-Chief of India and had taken a prominent part in the negotiations between different parties and the Government during the Cripps Mission in India. Wavell was cautious that the Indians would demand and press for independence of India after the war which had dragged India into a severe state of misery. Wavell's speeches gave an encouraging inspiration to the Indians that the British Government was keenly interested in breaking the constitutional deadlock and in arranging the Transfer of Power but the precarious situation in India made him to review the whole affairs in view of Amery's direction.

Wavell knew the attitude of the British Prime Minister Mr. Churchill and was convinced that under such a man so hostile to Indian problem, it was difficult for him to take any initiative for a new line. Amery was a loyal conservative and desired that India should remain united and be an equal partner in the British Commonwealth. Wavell had decided to turn the Executive Council of the Viceroy into that of a Cabinet with power to the Viceroy for either rejecting or agreeing to the decisions. He hoped that the political parties would co-operate in finding a suitable constitution. But his Assistant Secretary, Joseph Patric, was apprehensive of Jinnah's opposition. However Wavell liked that India should have the status of Dominion in the international society of communities. Further, the Secretary of State for war, Sir James Grigg, opposing the recommendations of the India committee, asserted that "a settlement in India is impossible as long as Gandhi is a live."

On October 28, Amery, in a speech in the House of Commons, pointed out that the Congress had "embarked upon

34. A.C. Guha, op.cit., p. 685.
35. Ibid., p. 689.
36. Ibid., p. 690.
a policy of irresponsible sabotage of the war effort" and, hence, no negotiations could be undertaken with the Congress. He warned Wavell that he should not "go beyond the Cripps proposals during the war." Therefore, Wavell felt himself quite unable to rectify the "mistake" and "blunders" committed in the past and only declared that Cripps offer still remained open for negotiation. But it could satisfy neither the Congress nor the League and the deadlock continued.

Four groups were politicising the freedom movement. By the end of December 1943, Wavell was anticipating that the Indian leaders would demand for independence soon after the War and it would be difficult to deny or delay the transfer of power. Congress was almost inactive because Gandhi was in jail and he wanted to talk with Jinnah to find any solution. He knew that the League leaders had realised that they had committed a mistake in rejecting the Cripps proposals, but was astonished that Jinnah continued to reject it. He anticipated that Jinnah might reconsider the Congress August 1943 offer. Contrarily, Jinnah established 'Action Committee' and

38. D.C.Gupta, op.cit., p.239.
39. Its member were Nawab Mohamed Ismail Khan, Sir

Contd....
Parliamentary Board, at the All-India Muslim League Karachi Session held on December 24-26, 1943, in order to supervise the working of the League in the State Assemblies and "to organise the Muslims all over India to resist the imposition of a unitary constitution and to prepare for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pakistan." In the absence of Congress leaders, the Hindu Mahasabha had emerged as an effective organisation and in a meeting in Amritsar it demanded "the preservation of the integrity of India, the introduction of Federation with a strong centre, and the refusal to any province, community, or section of the right to secede." It raised a new slogan asking the Government, for Divide and Quit", as a counterblast to "Quit India."

(Continued from the previous page)


40. Khaliquzzaman had opposed the formation of a "Supervision Committee" but on the advice of Jinnah, the Committee of Action and Parliamentary Board were established. See Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 311.


42. Ibid.

43. A.C. Guha, op.cit., p. 697.
On February 13, 1944, Wavell delivered his first speech in the joint session of the central legislature and emphasised on "United country enjoying complete and unqualified self government as a willing partner of the British Commonwealth" and laid the responsibility of delaying the transfer of power mainly on the shoulders of the Congress and the League which failed to accede to a common proposal. Jinnah criticising the use of the word 'united country' said that the Viceroy was "fishing in Congress waters," and the Congress and Liberals accused the Viceroy for his refusal to release the Congress leaders. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru regretted that co-operation of the political parties to form a national government was not forth-coming. Dissatisfied with the Viceroy's policy, the Congress and the League joined in the Central Legislative Assembly, and defeated a number of Government decisions. In particular, they threw out the Finance Bill. However, Liberals efforts failed to break the impasse between the two communities and Wavell refused the formation of provincial Executive Councils with hostile legis-

44. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 154.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
latures. While, these negotiations were going on the Congress was demanding the release of Gandhi. Since Gandhi got malaria, he was released on May 6, 1944, on medical grounds. The Congress leaders were apprehensive of some accusations for their launching the Quit India Movement which caused national destructions and riots. To minimise the impact of its consequences they began to call the movement as Civil Disobedience Movement. However, after Gandhi's release, the Movement came to an end.

On July 27, 1944, Gandhi wrote to Wavell that he was prepared to advise the Congress Working Committee for giving its cooperation in the war efforts "if a declaration of immediate Indian independence is made and a national government, responsible to the Central Assembly be formed subject to the proviso that during the war, the military cooperation should continue as at present, but without involving any financial burden on India." Wavell observed that this was the same offer as was made by Azad to Cripps in April 1942. The Viceroy made it clear that

freedom was made conditional upon the framing of a constitution agreed to by the main elements of India's national life, in order to "safeguard the interests of the racial and religious minorities and of the Depressed classes and their treaty obligations to the Indian States." The Viceroy laid down the following measures for the transfer of power to the Indian hands. "For such a transitional government to succeed, there must, before it is formed, be agreement in principle between Hindus and Muslims and all important elements as to the method by which the new constitution should be formed."

The Viceroy also said that the minority's problem were not imaginary. They were real and could only be solved by "mutual compromise and tolerance."

Wavell's proposal disappointed Gandhiji, who characterised the Viceroy to be a "conjurer" and suggested

52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 880.
that the Congress needed enough strength to wrest with the British by "purely moral means." Wavell did not care for such remark. His only worry was that in case of elimination of Gandhiji the Hindu Mahasabha would replace Congress and adopt an even more hostile attitude towards Muslims.

On the other hand, Jinnah was convinced that Pakistan would soon be a reality. Helplessly, Gandhiji turned towards Jinnah for a face to face talk, for a communal settlement, while the Viceroy awaited the outcome of their meetings.

Rajaji believed that independence could be achieved only through Congress-League unity and peace could be maintained in future. For achievement of this objective, he wrote several times to the Viceroy, Linlithgow seeking permission to meet Gandhi, "but was not allowed."

However, according to other verdicts, Rajaji discussed the set of proposals with Gandhiji in March 1943

55. A.C. Guha, op.cit., p. 700.
56. Ibid., p. 701.
57. Mohamed Raza Khan, op.cit., pp. 110-111.
and even before in jail in February, and Gandhi had given his approval of the same. Rajaji felt that the Viceroy had a strong anti-Gandhi bias and was using the League as a counterpoise to the Congress. Therefore, he wanted a settlement between the Congress and the League as soon as possible. With this view, Rajaji wrote a letter to Jinnah on April 8, 1944, enclosing a draft of the formula on behalf of Gandhiji.

The formula embodied the following six points, to which Jinnah was requested to agree:

1. Subject to the terms set out below as regards the Constitution for free India, the Muslim League would endorse the Indian demand for independence and would co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.

2. After the termination of war a commission would be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the North-West and East of India wherein


the Muslim population was in an absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated a plebiscite of all the inhabitants, held on the basis of adult franchise or other practicable franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decided in favour of forming a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, such decision would be given effect to without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to join either state.

(3) It would be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into in respect of Defence, Commerce and Communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population would only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms would be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility to the Government of India."

On June 30, 1944, Rajaji sent a telegram to Jinnah asking for his consent otherwise he would publish his rejection of the proposal. Jinnah, on July 2, replied that he could neither accept nor reject it and he would place the formula before the Working Committee of the Muslim League if it was sent to him directly by Gandhiji himself.

According to Jinnah, the proposal had many drawbacks. On July 29, 1944, Jinnah discussed the proposal clause by clause. In clause 1, these words: "The Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence" implied that the Muslim League was against independence and thus, it was the cause of insinuation to the Muslim League. In clause 2, Jinnah raised the question as to who would appoint the commission, what would be its terms and conditions, personnels, and power. Jinnah opposed the words, "contiguous districts", while the Lahore Resolution embodies "geographical contiguous units", where Muslims were in majority. In clause 3, Jinnah meant plebiscite to be held according to "geographical contiguous units." In clause 4, Jinnah questioned as to who would safeguard the defence, commerce and communication in case of separation,

61. The Dawn (New Delhi), July 31, 1944.
as there was no indication of the form, character and personnel of the provisional government. In clause 5, Jinnah had no objection to transfer of population absolutely on voluntary basis. In clause 6, Jinnah commented that all steps for partition would remain on paper pending transfer of power to the Congress by the British Government. Therefore, Jinnah rejected Rajaji's formula saying: "it offered a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan that torpedoed the Muslim League Resolution of 1940."

The release of correspondence between Rajaji and Jinnah caused a great sensation and strong reaction in the circles of Hindu Mahasabha, Sikhs and the Leibirals, including V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, but they could not affect any change on Jinnah's mind as he did not recognise Rajaji capable of carrying out these negotiations. He said that neither Gandhi nor Rajaji were authorised by the Congress

63. The Dawn (New Delhi) July 31, 1944.
to do so. Therefore Jinnah interpreted them "as pure and simple dictation without a sincere desire to nego-
tiation." In fact, League's position in Bengal and Punjab was deteriorating due to internal differences with Fazlul Haq and Khizr Hayat Khan and in case of referendum, League could have lost the ground.

Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, a Muslim Leaguer, opined that the motive of the formula was to put Jinnah and the Mussalmans of India in the wrong and bypass the League's demand for Pakistan. Different opinions were expressed by the Press. The Dawn observed that like the Cripps proposals, the formula also did not accept the principle of self-determination demanded by the Muslim League. Cripps proposed a plebiscite province to province" and the formula suggested "plebiscite district by district." The paper characterised the formula "Booby trap". The Spectator commented that Jinnah did not find it attractive as the whole formula "rests on the air as it talks of independence during war which will not be granted by the British." The Tribune wrote that Jinnah had been treading

65. The Dawn (New Delhi), July 31, 1944.
66. Ibid., July 13, 1944.
67. Ibid., July 12, 30, 1944.
68. The Spectator (London), July 13, 1944.
the path leading "not to the heaven of peace and prosperity but to the jungles of civil strife and rancour."

Moonje, Jayakar and Arundala opposed the formula as it envisaged division of the country. A number of politicians said that the formula was "fraught with dire consequences for the future and will imperil the very independence of the country....." The Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh, opposed it as it had to put 17 districts in Pakistan and 12 districts in Hindustan. Lord Wavell opined that the formula was a try out and Gandhi's aim was to "assess the strength of the Hindu feelings against Pakistan." Amery rightly observed: (1) it was conditional to transfer of power; (2) it was partial because it did not include the whole of Punjab, Bengal and Assam, and (3) it meant humiliation of Jinnah and his removal from all-India Politics. However, though the formula was a shrewdest stroke of policy, it became the basis for Gandhi-Jinnah talks.

69. The Tribune, (Lahore), July 12, 1944.
71. The Tribune, (Lahore), August 21, 1944.
73. Ibid., p. 1101.
Gandhi considered the demand for Pakistan a mere slogan of Jinnah, but the word 'two-nation' propounded by Jinnah created an idealogical differences, which stood in the way of talks between them. The Congress wanted transfer of power according to Rajaji's scheme, while the League wanted it under the aegis of the British so that the Muslims may not be left on the mercy of Hindus. Gandhiji wrote to Jinnah on July 17, 1944, wishing to discuss the question of the partition of India. The All-India Muslim League Working Committee met in Lahore and fully authorised Jinnah to negotiate with Gandhi.

Gandhi-Jinnah talks continued almost daily from September 7 to 27, 1944. On the one hand, Jinnah was alone carrying on the talks, without assistance of Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League General Secretary, while on the other side, Gandhiji was assisted by Rajaji and a few others. There were daily exchange of letters reducing the discussion in writing. They held 14 sittings and discussed also Rajaji's formula. On September 10, Jinnah questioned the representative character of Gandhi to continue the talks. Jinnah remarked: "I thought you had

74. See for details V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 163.

75. The matter of discussion was brought in writing for clarification and record. See Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947, (Delhi, 1985), p. 83.
come here as a Hindu, as a representative of the Hindu Congress." Gandhiji said; "No I have come here as an individual" Gandhiji assured that he would be able to get his agreement with him, if any, ratified by the AICC.

On September 27, the talks brokdown as there was a world of differences between their viewpoints.

On September 11, Gandhiji laid down the following conditions before Jinnah:

"(1) The immediate grant of independence to India as one single unit;

(2) The immediate formation of a provisional interim government responsible to the existing central assembly or a newly elected one (naturally with a 75 per cent Hindu Majority).

(3) The provisional government to frame the constitution of India or to set up an authority to frame the constitution after withdrawal of British power;

(4) This government to draft the treaty and agreements as regards administration of matters of common concern such as foreign affairs, defence, communications, customs,

76. Mohamed Raza Khan, op.cit., p. 113.
commerce and the like which would be matters for efficient and satisfactory administration under a central authority.

(5) The provisional government to setup a commission to demarcate contiguous districts having an absolute Muslim majority. After all these conditions had been complied with, the demarcated areas would be permitted to decide through a plebiscite of all their inhabitants whether they wished to form a separate state. But in any case all matters of vital importance were to be administered by a central authority with a Hindu majority."

Gandhiji called this scheme a partition between two brothers, but Jinnah refused to accept it as it indicated an overwhelmingly Hindu federal authority and demanded a sovereign Pakistan.

On September 24, Gandhiji put forward another proposal to Jinnah but Jinnah rejected that also as these were fundamentally against the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Jinnah insisted for acceptance by the Congress the following terms:


(1) The Muslims should be recognised as a nation with an inherent right of self determination.

(2) Pakistan should comprise six provinces, that is, Sind, Baluchistan, the NWFP, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject only to minor territorial adjustments;

(3) Important matters like Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communications, Customs and Commerce should not be delegated to the Central Government.

However, no settlement between Gandhi and Jinnah could take place. According to Pyarelal: "They met, they shook hands, they embraced each other. There seemed to be a genuine human touch in their first meeting. Jinnah came out into his porch to receive the Mahatama and to escort him back at the time of leaving and even posed with him to be photographed. Observers fancied they noticed in Jinnah's parting warm handshake a mere historic gesture."

On July 27, 1944, Gandhi declared that the talks had failed.

But by these talks, Gandhi had recognised the Muslim Leadership of Jinnah, who found a virtual equality with

79. Ibid., pp. 550-551.
Gandhi. Maulana Aqad stated that these talks were a great political blunder of Gandhi. The Hindu Mahasabha criticised the talks as it gave importance to Jinnah. The Sikhs considered Gandhi's offer a sword hanging over their heads. Amrita Bazar Patrika criticised the increasing demand. The Bombay Chronicle highlighted the uncooperative attitude of Jinnah. The Tribune held Gandhi and Jinnah both responsible for the failure of the talks. In the League circle, Liaquat Ali Khan characterised Gandhi's offer as "a fraud calculated to thwart and frustrate the Muslim demand of Pakistan." However, Jinnah's rejection of Gandhi's offer of 'plebiscite' caused the deprivation of Muslim majority areas (11 districts in Punjab and 12 districts in Bengal including Amritsar and Calcutta) to Pakistan. However, the Unionists, the Sikhs and Mahasabha were pleased on the breakdown of the talks, while the Provincial Leaguers were happy that Gandhi conceded to the principles of Pakistan.

83. The Tribune, (Lahore), October 2, 1944.
85. The Dawn, (Delhi), October 31, 1944.
87. Fortnightly Report for Punjab for first half of October, 1944, Home Department, Political, F.No. 18/10/44.
The Viceroy, however, pressurised the Congress and the League to settle their differences so as to establish a Central Government. Further, Gandhi also realised that independence was impossible without an agreement between the Congress and the League. Meanwhile, reports came that Liaquat Ali Khan was desirous to come to an agreement. Gandhi advised Sapru and Shulabhai J. Desai to meet Liaquat. Desai and Liaquat drew the following private and confidential proposals (known as Desai-Liaquat Pact) for settlement between the Congress and the League:

"The Congress and the League agree that they will join in forming an Interim Government in the Centre. The composition of such Government will be on the following lines:

(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not be members of the Central Legislature.

(b) Representatives of minorities (in Particular Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs);

(c) The Commander-in-Chief."

The draft further explains:

"The Government will be formed and function within the framework of the existing Government of India Act.

89 Syed Mahmud to Desai, November 18, 1944, Syed Mahmud Collection.
It is, however, understood that, if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure passed by the Legislative Assembly they will not enforce the same by resort to any of the reserve powers of the Governor-General or the Viceroy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Governor-General. It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release the Working Committee members of the Congress.

"The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end are at present indicated to take the following courses:

"On the basis of understanding, some way should be found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires an interim government to be formed in the Centre on the agreement between the Congress and the League and when the Governor-General invites Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Desai either jointly or separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they are prepared to join in forming the Government.

"The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in the provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Governments, on the lines of a coalition."

Desai had drawn the proposals with the approval of Gandhi and latter had corrected somewhere in the papers of the former, and Gandhi had asked Desai to go ahead. On the other hand, Liaquat after remaining quiet for a considerable time replied that whatever he told was his personal opinion and Jinnah, on January 20, 1945, disclaimed any knowledge of the pact. In fact, the Congress was trying to form an interim Government and to get the transfer of power, so that the demand for Pakistan may be dead. While the League was foreseeing in the near future a quick turn in Indian politics due to the ending of the war in near future in the West which would fetch for them Pakistan. At last Liaquat declared that it was a "cock and bull story" and it was never concluded. In consequences the Congress repudiated the pact and Desai, like Rajaji, made his exit from the Congress.

91. Ibid.
93. C.H.Philips and M.D.Warnwright, op.cit.,p.570. Wavell's impression was that Jinnah was "Playing his usual slippery game in fact "See Wavell Journal entry for February 26, 1945, p. 114.
The war in Europe ended with the victory of the Allies on May 7, 1945, and the British policy in India took a new turn. On June 14, 1945, Wavell in a broadcast from Delhi offered the following plan of an interim government to end the communal deadlock:

(1) Executive Council of the Governor-General was to consist of equal number of caste Hindus and Muslims.

(2) All the members of the Executive Council were to be Indians except the Viceroy (who was also the Governor-General) and the Commander-in-Chief, and would retain the responsibility for defence of India.

(3) The war portfolio was to be retained by the Government.

(4) A British High Commissioner was to be appointed to look after the commercial interests on the lines of the Dominions.

(5) The new Executive Council was to work within the framework of the 1935 Act, and the Governor-General retained the power of veto against a majority decision of the councillors.
(6) The interference of the Secretary of State was to be decreased to the minimum.

(7) The portfolios of External Affairs, Finance and Home Affairs were to be placed in charge of an Indian Members of the Council. The Members were to be elected by the Governor-General after consultation with political leaders. They were to work under the Government of India Act, 1935.

(8) The interim Government would in no way prejudice the final constitutional settlement, and that the proposals intended to make a long term solution easier.

On the same day, Amery also in a broadcast in London said that the Viceroy had been empowered to make proposals for formation of an interim government and that

"No limit was set to India's freedom to determine her own destiny, whether within the Commonwealth or outside it, and secondly, this destiny could only be achieved by a constitution framed and agreed to by Indians."


As announced by Wavell on June 14, important Congress leaders like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and others were released three years after facing great hardship in jail. This paved the way for a conference at Simla.

Wavell invited twenty-one eminent leaders of different communities at the Viceregal lodge in Simla, on June 25, 1945, for discussion. Wavell invited Abul Kalam Azad (Congress President), Bhulabhai Desai (Congress), G.S. Motilal (Congress), M.A. Jinnah (League President), Hussain Imam (Muslim League), Liaquat Ali Khan (Muslim League), P.N. Banerjee (Leader of the Nationalist Party), Sir Henry Richardson (Leader of the European Group), Master Tara Singh (Sikh leader), N. Sivaraj (Leader of the scheduled castes) and Premiers and Ex-Premiers of the provinces, etc. etc. The whole basis of the Wavell proposal was an agreement on the principle of 'parity' between Muslims and caste Hindus and representation was given to the main communities and not to the parties. But the Unionists in Punjab were a party and had offered support

4. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 191.
to the war effort. They hoped to secure, at least, one seat in the Executive Council, because Sir Bertrand James Glancy had encouraged their expectations. Therefore, Wavell counted the Unionists as Muslims.

On June 25, 1945, Wavell invited Azad and agreed that the Congress could nominate Muslims and scheduled castes, but said that "the principle of parity must be maintained." This was opposed by Jinnah who said that since other minorities will support the Congress, the League would be in minority in the council. The Viceroy did not agree to Jinnah's proposal that all the Muslim members should be nominated by the Muslim League. The Viceroy told Jinnah to keep in mind that he had to nominate a Unionist Muslim to which Jinnah reacted sharply. Jinnah interjected that the Congress represented only Hindus, to which Dr. Khan Sahib vehemently objected. However, Wavell concluded that the Congress represented its members and both Congress and the Jinnah accepted this.

On June 26, the conference discussed point by point the various issues relating to the proposed Executive
Council of the Governor General. The Viceroy explained "caste Hindus" meaning Hindus not belonging to the scheduled castes. Wavell said that the purpose of appointment the British High Commissioner was to safeguard the British interests in India. Regarding the Congress goal of independence, the Viceroy referred to Amery's statement of June 14, and assured that "there was nothing in the proposals to brand the Congress as a communal body."

Sir Henry Richardson supported Wavell's proposals, Khizr Hayat Khan said that the short-term plan would affect the future. The Maharaja of Parlakimedi said that "The interests of persons who supported the war effort should not be neglected." Master Tara Singh did not identify the Sikhs with the Congress. Sivaraj asked for safeguard of the interest of his community i.e. scheduled castes. Jinnah asserted that the League would not agree to any constitution on any basis other than that of Pakistan and recalled Government's proclamation that future constitution would be made by agreement and would not be imposed on the country. Jinnah said that since the League represented

8. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 196.
9. Ibid., p. 197.
90 per cent of the Muslims and the Congress represented 90 per cent of the Hindus, the Congress could not claim to represent all the minorities and thus, insisted that decisions should be taken on the basis of communal party.

On June 28, Jinnah-Patel discussion produced no agreement. Hence, the Viceroy proposed all the interests to send him by a specified date list of the persons containing more names than seats in the council whom they would like to be included in the council and he would finalise the same by adding or excluding some names from his own side. Azad pressed for inclusion of members of all communities, particularly the scheduled castes and Christians, in his Congress list. Sivaraj objected to it and "insisted that the number of its members should bear the same ratio to their population as the Muslim members bore to theirs." By this he meant that if the Muslims were recognised on the basis of Jinnah's two nation theory, the scheduled castes were also a separate elements in the national life of India. Sivaraj and Jinnah said that they would send the list after consulting their working committees. The Viceroy adjourned the conference till July 14, 1945.

10. R.C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 718.
The Congress Working Committee met on July 3 and selected a panel of the following names and submitted it to Wavell.

On July 6, the Muslim League Working Committee met and, the next day, Jinnah made three proposals to the Viceroy: (a) the Muslim League should not be asked to submit a panel, but its representatives should be chosen on the basis of personal discussion between the Viceroy and himself; (b) all the Muslim members of the Council should be chosen from the League; and (c) some effective safeguard, other than the Viceroy's veto, should be provided to protect Muslim interests from majority decisions of the council." Since the Viceroy did not guarantee these terms, Jinnah refused to submit any list. On the other hand, the Viceroy found the Congress list disappointing as it included stooges for Congress from the minorities. Meanwhile, he received lists from other delegates and made his provisional selection. Wavell met Jinnah on July 11,

12. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 205.
and asked him to include in a 14 members council, four members of the Muslim League and one member of the Unionist party, to which Jinnah did not agree and demanded that all the five Muslim members should be nominated by the League and that it may be guaranteed that no decision objected to by the Muslims should be taken except by a clear two third majority, or some thing of the kind. However, Wavell did not agree to these two proposals.

His provisional list contained the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim League</th>
<th>4 + 1</th>
<th>Liaquat Ali Khan, Khaliquzzaman, Nazimuddin and Essak Sait and Sir Mohammad Nawaz Khan (Unionist).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress (Caste Hindu)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Dr. M.S. Aney, and Sir B.N. Rau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Master Tara Singh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Caste</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dr. Ambedkar and M. Pilai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dr. John Matthai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.

On July 11, 1945, Wavell informed Gandhi that due to Jinnah's harsh terms, the conference had failed.

Khizr Hayat Khan, Maulana Azad and Pant expressed indignation at the League's attitude. Jinnah said that the Congress and the League took entirely different measures according to their policies. Congress wanted a United India and the League wanted Pakistan. It may be concluded that the Simla Conference "was a fraud upon the Public as well as upon its members."

Meanwhile there was also a change of Government in England. As a result of elections held on July 20, 1945, the Labour party assumed power. Churchill's caretaker Government was replaced by Attlee's Government, and Amery was replaced by Lord Pethick Lawrence, as Secretary of State for India.

The new Government in England visualised the boiling situation in India, while the Muslim League was afraid of Attlee's rejection of its demand of Pakistan the Congress was happy as Churchill had given veto power to the Muslim League and was antagonistic to the Congress. After the failure of the Simla Conference, Cripps opined to hold early elections, to which the Muslim League, the Congress

15. Ibid., p. 245.
and other parties agreed. In August 1945, Wavell held a meeting of the provincial Governors, who unanimously favoured the elections.

On August 24, Wavell accompanied by Sir Evan Jenkins and Menon, left India and reached London on August 25, 1945. On September 11, Attlee declared that the "broad definition of British policy contained in the Declaration of 1942 ..... stands in all its fullness and purpose."

Wavell returned to India on September 16, and made an announcement on September 19, 1945, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the Government in consultation with the leaders of the Indian opinion, would work for the early realization of full self-government in India and also convene as soon as possible a constitution making body after the elections to Central and Provincial Assemblies in winter, 1945.

Wavell announced that the term of existing Assembly would expire on October 1, 1945 and the new members would take their seats at the budget session of 1946. As the

electoral rolls were not ready, the life of the chamber was extended up to May 1, 1946. Wavell announced that elections to the Central Legislature would be held first and then elections to the provincial legislatures would take place. The elections to be held on the basis of 1935 Act, with restricted franchise.

The elections were a trial of Muslim League to prove that it was the representative body of the Muslims who favoured the creation of Pakistan in spite of opposition of the Congress off-shoots - the Nationalists, Ahrar, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind, Muslim Majlis, Momin Conference and Azad Board. It was very easy for the Congress to win the elections, as far as the general seats were concerned in view of its strong organisation, long experience, better financial resources and strong support of the Nationalist party, while the Muslim League had the experience of 1937 elections, had little financial backing, and had no English Press to support it, except the Dawan in Delhi, Star of India in Calcutta and Deccan Times in Madras. But the League had established its strong hold on the Muslim voters all over India. As a result many Muslims, who were earlier in the Congress joined the League and Jinnah welcomed

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18. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 221.
them like lost sheep. For instance, Abdul Qaiyum Khan of NWFP, the Deputy leader of the Congress party, in the Central Assembly changed his allegiance to the Muslim League and 30 Unionist Muslims joined the League since 1944. In 1945, Major Mumtaz Tiwana, the biggest Tiwana land-owner, joined the League. He was followed by Firoz Khan Noon.

Further the nationalist Muslims found themselves in a difficult position as they knew that Muslims would not vote for them until and unless they were assured of some protection from the Congress.

However, the Muslim League declared to fight the elections on the issue of Pakistan and its title to represent all the Muslims. But the Congress came out to disprove it. The Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League guided by Liaquat Ali Khan and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman selected the League candidates. There was a heavy rush

22. Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional Position of the British in India, Nos. 34 and 35 L/WB/17/1459.
of Muslim Leaguers and politicians for the League ticket and for every constituency there were three or four candidates which indicated the success of the League. Since G.M. Syed's group in Sind was not given League ticket, they put up their own candidates.

On August 6, in his first election speech at Bombay Jinnah said "there are only two major parties in this country. Invitations issued to Mr. Gandhi and myself were on the basis that Mr. Gandhi was the recognised leader of one of the parties and myself the leader of the other. The British called them parties, but in fact they were two major nations." At another speech, Jinnah said that every vote in favour of the Muslim League candidate meant 'Pakistan' and every vote against the Muslim League meant 'Hindu Raj.' Jinnah advocated the two nation theory on the basis of differences in religion, civilization, culture, language, architecture, music, jurisprudence, law, food, society and dress. On November 1, he said that he

23. The Statesman, January 3, 5, 9, 1946 and February 1, 1948, The majority of Syed's candidates were defeated and it was a personal triumph for Jinnah.

24. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah op.cit., p. 387.

25. See for details Ibid., p. 235.
would 'sweep' at the polls and did not care about the critics of his Pakistan plan. He charged the nationalist Muslims that they were not true Muslims because they did not join the League. The election results were announced on December 31, 1945. January 1, 1946 showed the elected members as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Election Results</th>
<th>Previous members of dissolved Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>56(57)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Group</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akali Sikhs (Represented for the first time)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 (Nationalists)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nominated on January 4, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Non-Official</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>101(102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results revealed that the Congress won an overwhelming success in the General Constituencies and

Muslim League won every Muslim seat, while the Nationalist Muslim forfeiting their deposits in many instances. The Congress secured 91.3% of the votes cast in non-Mohammadan constituencies and the Muslim League 96.6% of the total votes cast in Mohammadan constituencies. On January 11, 1946, Jinnah celebrated the League's Victory and "congratulated the League on winning all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly." The result proved that the Muslim League had full control over the Muslim masses and that there were two major parties the Congress and the League.

Meanwhile election to the Provincial Legislatures were also to take place. Elections commenced on January 9, and lasted up to the middle of April 1946. The Muslim League formed Parliamentary Boards in every province with President of the League as the President of the Board. The All-India Board scrutinised the recommendations of the Provincial Boards, under the supervisions of Liaquat Ali Khan. However, fissiparous tendencies had developed

29. Ibid.
and there was a keen competition amongst the League leaders for the League tickets, although the League's position in the provinces was not so good.

In Punjab Khizr Hayat Ministry was in power and encouraged by Congress it was trying its best to secure as many Muslims seats as possible. In Sind, G.M. Syed had broken away from the League and was running a rival organisation. In NWFP, Dr. Khan Sahib was using his position for the defeat of the League. In Bengal, due to group struggle, which could cause harm to the League, Khwaja Nazimuddin retired himself, giving the leadership to Shahid Suhrawardy.

The results of the elections were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Seats own by Congress</th>
<th>Seats own by League</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>58 out of 108</td>
<td>35 (All Muslim Seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27 (35 All Muslims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>30 (19 Nationalists Muslims)</td>
<td>17 out of 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>51 (22 Akali Sikhs)</td>
<td>79 out of 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>20 (Unionist)</td>
<td>116 out of 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras)</td>
<td>87 out of 250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa)</td>
<td>Absolute Majority</td>
<td>All Muslim Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Congress won 930 seats and the Muslim League 428 seats. The result also showed an emergence of the Panthic Akalis in Punjab and disappearance of the Hindu Mahasabha and Justice party in Madras and decline of Unionist Party. In brief, the Congress secured 80 per cent of the general votes and the League 74 per cent of the Muslim votes cast.

Thus the Congress and the Muslim League formed their ministries in the provinces in the following manners.

- Assam: Congress Ministry
- Sind: League Ministry
- NWFP: Congress Ministry
- Punjab: Coalition Ministry (Congress, Akalis and Unionists)
- Bengal: League Ministry
- Bombay ()
- Madras ()
- U.P. ()
- Bihar ()
- Orissa ()
- C.P. ()

On April 7, 1946 Jinnah convened a convention of Muslim League Legislators at the Anglo-Arabic College Delhi, which lasted for three days, and which was unparalleled in the political history of Muslim India. The
convention, attended by 500 members of the Central and eleven provincial Legislatures, supported the League demand for Pakistan. Its importance may be assessed by the fact that there were 200 journalists representing the world press and among the eminent visitors were some Akali Leaders, including Giani Kartar Singh. Jinnah addressing the gathering said:

"It is heavy and sacred responsibility that we bear as elected and chosen representatives of our people. The convention is going to lay down once for all in unequivocal terms as to what we stand for and I have no doubt that we are of one and one opinion that we stand for Pakistan, and we shall not falter or hesitate to fight for it, to die for it if necessary, and achieve it we must or else we perish."

Referring to the elections, Jinnah said that the League fought "against heavy odds, powerful organisations and all the manoeuvres, and machinations of our enemies. We have routed our opponents. He added:

30. The Dawn, April 8, 1946.
"We can not accept any proposal which would be in any way derogatory to the full Sovereignty of Pakistan. Our formula gives to the Hindus three fourths of this subcontinent....Hindustan will be a state bigger than any other state in the world, both in area and population except China, and we shall have only one fourth."

The Convention adopted the following resolution amidst thunderous cheers and shouts of Allah-o-Akbar.

"This Convention of the Muslim League Legislators of India, Central and Provincial, after careful consideration, hereby declares that the Muslim Nation will never submit to any constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the people of India, which does not conform to the following just and equitable principles, calculated to maintain internal peace and tranquility in the country, will not contribute to the solution of the Indian problem.

(1) That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, 31.

Sind and Baluchistan in the North West in India, namely Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent state and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.

(2) That two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by the people of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions.

(3) That the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be provided with safeguards on the lines of the All-India Muslim League Resolution passed on March 23, 1940 at Lahore.

(4) That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan and its implementation without delay are the sine qua non for Muslim League cooperation and participation in the formation of an interim government at the Centre."

The British Government sent a Parliamentary Delegation consisting of ten members, headed by Prof. Robert Richards, "to make personal contacts" with the Congress

32. See Latif Ahmad Sherwani, op.cit., p. 98.
and the League leaders to assess the depth of Congress-League confrontation on communal problem, constitutional development and independence. On January 28, 1946, the Viceroy, addressing the newly elected Central legislature said that the Government was determined to establish a constitution-making body and a new Executive Council as soon as possible. While Patel welcomed the speech, Jinnah opposed it and reiterated that "the Muslim League was not prepared to consider anything short of immediate recognition of the Pakistan demand." The delegation toured India and returned to Delhi in the middle of February and reported that Pakistan would have to be conceded and the sooner the better.

In the General Election of 1945 in Britain the Labour Party came to power. With the success of the Labour Party there was a dramatic change in Indo-British relationship. At the conference of the Labour Party prior to elections, Mr. Bevin declared:

"If we are returned, we will close the India Office and transfer this business to the dominions."

With conditional surrender of Japan in August after the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima it was not difficult for the British to postpone the issue of Indian Independence for an indefinite period. But the Labour Government could not commit themselves to a definite course of action without a stock-taking of the Indian situation. The new Government had also to correct the mischief done by British in encouraging the disruptive elements in India's national life. In these respects the policy of the Labour Government recorded an appreciable change. It invited Lord Wavell for consultations and on his return from Britain on 19th September, he declared that the elections of the Central and Provincial legislatures which were held up because of war, would soon take place and on the basis of the results of the election, the British Government would convene a 'Constituent Assembly.' In the declaration it was also pointed out that the Government proposed to converse with the representatives of the Legislative Assemblies to ascertain if the proposals contained in the Cripps Draft were acceptable or some alternative scheme was to be made (though it was well-known that the Cripps proposals were unacceptable by the Congress). Discussion were also to be taken with the Indians for their representation in the Constituent Assembly.

While the elections were in progress the British Government decided to send a Parliamentary Delegation drawn from different parties on a good-will mission to India. The new year message from Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State, was also very encouraging. He made it plain that the British Government had decided to grant India freedom and 1946 would be a fateful year. "If we all bend our minds and wills to this high endeavour", he said, "we can do something in 1946 for the greatness of India, for the future of peace and prosperity of Asia and the world."

The Parliamentary Delegation reached India on January 5, 1946. It toured throughout the country, contacted the Indian leaders and registered their impressions of the Indian situation. Jinnah made it plain that without a declaration on the part of British accepting the principle of Pakistan and of Muslim parity with all other parties he would not take part in an Interim Government. He would resist all attempt of a single constitution-making body to impose a constitution on the Muslims. He wanted

35. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 227.
two constitution-making bodies and did not contemplate pre-dominantly Non-Muslim areas like the Ambala division in the Punjab to stay in Pakistan. The demarcation of the frontier between Pakistan and Hindustan could be settled by negotiation.

The election results to the Legislative Assembly at the centre were available by the end of 1945. Congress turned victorious at polls in general constituencies and there was a complete rout of nationalist Muslims for Muslim seats, because of the Muslim League's opposition. The figures for 102 elected seats were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Muslim League</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Akali</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the elections to the Provincial Assemblies the Congress had a notable success in the North-West Frontier Province where Muslims formed 95% of the population. In other provinces the general seats mostly fell to the Congress and Muslim seats to the Muslim League. The Congress formed ministry in eight out of eleven provinces and

37. Ibid., p. 256.
in the Punjab it entered into a coalition with the Unionist Party. In Sind and Bengal the Muslim League formed ministries.

On February 19, 1946, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, announced in the House of Lords that the Government had decided to send a Cabinet Mission to assist the Viceroy in these deliberation. The Cabinet Mission was to consist to Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The situation on the eve of the Cabinet Mission was grim. The national movement in India was at its height and it had taken its inspiration from the national movements of Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, and Malaya, which were also agitating for their independence. The risings of the Royal India Navy in Bombay, Karachi and Madras had alarmed the Britishers. The strike of the Indian Air Force at Ambala was initiated at other centres of Air Force and British felt it. The trail and acquittal of the

leading officers of the Indian National Army (INA) emboldened the people of India. Above all it was realised everywhere that the British position notwithstanding their victory had weakened and it would not be able to withstand the Indian revolutionaries.

The Cabinet delegation landed in Karachi on March 23, 1946 to explore whether Indians would like to associate with the Commonwealth or would be completely independent and to find out the means for transfer of power to the Indian hands. On March 24, 1946, the Secretary of State said that the delegation intended to help the Indians to decide their own constitution themselves "with the minimum of disturbance and the maximum of speed." The delegation made it clear that the Muslim League would not be allowed "to place a veto on the advance of the majority," which encouraged the Congress. From April 1-7, 1946, the Mission interviewed 742 leaders in 182 sittings, covering every shade of opinion in the country. The Cabinet Mission did


40. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 236.

not think justifiable to renew the Cripps proposals. It "put aside the right of provinces to opt out of an Indian Union if 60 per cent of the population voted in a plebiscite, as the balance of Hindu and Sikh votes would probably turn the verdict against Pakistan." Therefore, the Mission thought to form a constitution-making body and then to consider the principle of Pakistan. They were convinced that no settlement was possible on the basis of a Union Government, and that if Pakistan was conceded, the Hindu population could not be forced to stay in Pakistan, against their will. On the other hand, the racial sentiment was very strong and the loyalty of the armed forces was doubtful. Therefore, the British aimed to avert the Indian unrest through constitutional means. In view of it, Attlees had declared that the Indians will have "full control of their own destiny and the formation of a new interim government." The cabinet was afraid also that if the armed forces had to be called to suppress any rebellion of the Congress and the League in case of the failure of the Mission, it was possible that they would


43. Ibid., pp. 980-82.

obey, in view of the mutinees of the Royal Indian Air Force and Royal Indian Navy in January and February, 1946. Therefore, the Mission concluded that their "negotiations must succeed" and they must refuse to permit a breakdown."

Further, they wanted to transfer power to a United India to keep the army undivided so that, in case of war, they may use India for operational and administrative purposes. They knew that the Congress would not like to stay in the Commonwealth at all and Pakistan would be economically and militarily unviable. They preferred a settlement between the Congress and the League, and if there was no agreement the British would produce a settlement. Jinnah had declared that he would boycott the interim government. They thought, if they would allow the Congress alone to form the government, it would mean suppression of the Muslim League, which they wanted to avoid because the Muslims had supported them in their war efforts and wished to join the Commonwealth. However, the cabinet decided to "secure their long term aim of maintaining India within

45. Note of meeting between Cabinet delegation and Viceroy's Executive Council, March 26, 1946, Ibid. p. 7.


47. Note by Craft and Turnbull, Ibid., p. 337.
the imperial security system; and therefore made every 

48
effort to achieve it."

Further the British were anxious due to civil 

war situation in India. In Punjab, the Sikhs feared 

49
Muslim domination in the form of Pakistan. In NWFP Muslim 

League volunteers, had been carrying spears in their 

50
processions. Liaquat Ali Khan inspired the Muslims in 

51
his speeches declaring "Pakistan or death." Sikandar Hayat 

Khan had called the Muslim ex-military personnels to 

52
command the force of Muslim League National Guards. In 

U.P., there were deteriorating communal relations. In 

53
Sind, the RSS was playing a sinister role in every violent 

communal incident, and had given a slogan "Hindustan only 

54
for Hindus."

49. Jenkins to Wavell, April 1, 1946, N. Mansergh, Transfer 

50. Fortnightly Report for NWFP for second half of March 

1946, Home Department, Political File No. 18/3/46.
51. The Civil and Military Gazette, March 26, 1946.
52. The Eastern Times, May 11, 26, 29, 1946.
53. Fortnightly Report for Sind for first half of May 

1946, Home Department, Political, File No. 10/5/46.
54. Letter to Secretary, AICC from Tuta Singh AICC 

In these circumstances, the Mission invited Azad to meet them on April 1, 1946. Azad pleaded for independence and after it, for the formation of a constitution-making body to draw the constitution of United India. He said that the constitution-making body should consist of fifteen members. (11 provincial representatives and 4 places for ministers). He suggested a federal constitution (Central Control over Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs; and provincial control over other subjects). He suggested that after the constitution was made, the provinces would either (1) stand out of the constitution; or (2) enter the constitution by federating for the compulsory subjects only, or (3) to federate for the compulsory as well as for the optional subjects. He urged that the provincial legislatures should be taken as federal colleges to choose the constitution-making body. He rejected the partition proposal of Jinnah.

After Azad, Gandhi was interviewed, Gandhi urged that Rajagopalachari's formula should be implemented. He denounced Jinnah's two nation theory and urged for one constitution-making body. He suggested that Jinnah may be

55. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 238.
asked to form the Government for the interim period and if he refused, the offer should go to the Congress. The Interim Government must be absolutely national. The Secretary of State said that in this case, Jinnah's Government would be predominantly Hindu as there would always be majority of the Congress. Gandhi said it was "inescapable."

Jinnah was interviewed on April 4, 1946. Narrating the history of India from the days of Chandragupta to the British Raj he proved that India was never one. He demanded Pakistan on the basis of his two nation theory.

Dr. Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram opposed the Constituent Assembly and demanded separate electoral college for their communities. Giani Kartar Singh demanded a separate sovereign state-Khalistan. Baldev Singh demanded a United India. Sapru and Jayakar, the Liberal leaders, suggested immediate formation of an interim Government,

56. R.C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 729.
57. See for details V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 240-41.
58. Ibid., p. 241.
opposed Pakistan and suggested equality of Muslim and caste Hindus in the Central Government. The leaders of the princely states expressed their willingness to join an All India Federation.

On April 26, 1946, Jinnah reiterated his demand for Pakistan and the Mission concluded that constitutional settlement was possible in one of these two ways: (1) Acceptance of a separate state of Pakistan including Muslim majority districts of Bengal, Panjab and Assam, and (2) the establishment of a union at Centre for essential subjects. Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications forming a federation including the proposed territories of Pakistan with equal representation of Congress and League with provision to secede after 15 years.

Cripps proposed that there should be no Union Parliament, but instead an Union Executive should be formed by the federation choosing the members with equal rights to the Congress and the League, but Jinnah said that it was not possible within the same Governmental system, and opposed the Indian Union, because in this case

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 49.
61. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 250.
the Muslims always had to remain under the domination of the Hindus. The Secretary of State said that if the six provinces and Calcutta, demanded by League, are accepted as Pakistan, the Hindu population would internally, and India externally would oppose it and thus, it would be a very hostile and dangerous situation. Jinnah said that it was an exaggeration as "all the non-Muslim could not be counted as Hindus.

There were three contestants in the field of claiming Power from Britain (1) Congress (2) Muslim League and (3) the States.

On April 17, Azad had proposed two lists of Central subjects compulsory and optional. The Secretary of State explained that it would involve sub-divisions of the Centre into two parts: (a) "the provinces that had opted for the full range of subjects, and (b) the provinces that were federated for the compulsory subjects only," which would "work out in practice as separate centres for Pakistan and Hindustan" though the Congress refused to

62. Ibid., p. 251.
63. Ibid., p. 252.
accept the three tier basis agreed to by Jinnah. Azad on April 26, agreed to it, and hence on April 27 the Secretary of State sent letters to Jinnah and Azad to send four names of negotiators for discussing and adopting either of the following:

**Section A**

There should be a loose federation in the form of a "Union of all India" consisting of three principal parts, the Hindu majority provinces, the Muslim majority provinces, and the states, with Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications nominally in the hands of the Union Government, but with a wider range of optional powers that might, by agreement, either be exercised by provinces cooperating as groups, and thereby constituting a third tier in the pattern of Government, or be transferred to the Centre.

**Section B**

There should be two India Hindustan and Pakistan. The Pakistan element consisting only of the majority Muslim Districts that is roughly Baluchistan, Sind, North-West Frontier Provinces and Western Punjab in the North West and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta, but with the
Sylhet District of Assam in the North East. The two divided parts would have a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive but nothing in the way of an actual executive centre and, therefore, no common defence of the sub-continent.

The Congress sent Azad, Nehru, Patel and Abdul Ghafrar Khan and the Muslim League sent Jinnah, Mohammad Ismail Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdul Rab Nishtar. They met at Simla between May 5 and 12, 1946. The main point of difference between the two groups was that the Congress wanted a United India and a unitary national government and the League opposed it and wanted creation of Pakistan on the basis of two nation theory.

On May 6, Jinnah said "if the Congress would accept the Groups the Muslim League would accept the Union. Gandhiji had rejected the Viceroy's formula saying that it was worst than Pakistan.

As the matter could not be settled, Nehru on May 9, proposed an umpire to settle the differences including

64. Sandhya Chaudhri, op.cit., pp. 159-60.
66. Ibid., p. 466.
Americans. But Jinnah refused the proposal of an umpire. Since no settlement could be reached the Viceroy asked them to submit their statements. The League and the Congress, therefore, submitted their memorandum on May 12, representing their stand taken earlier. The League in its ten points memorandum (May 12, 1946) said that the six Muslim Provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) should be grouped together in one and would deal with all the subjects except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication. A separate constitution making body for six provinces would frame the constitution etc., etc. While the Congress stood for one Constitution-making body and after the Constituent Assembly has decide the constitution for the All-India Federal Union, the representatives of the Provinces may form groups to decide the constitution for their group. Thus both the parties had different approach. The Viceroy closed the conference on May 12 and returned to Delhi on May 14, and published his own scheme on May 16, 1946.

67. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p.259.
68. The Indian Annual Register, Vol.1, January-June, 1946, pp. 142-143.
The Plan may be divided into three parts: The first part envisaged examination of the proposals for creation of Pakistan; the second, setting up of an interim Government (short term); and the third, a long term plan i.e. application of the cabinet scheme.

With regard to the first part, the League claimed the formation of Pakistan including the six provinces - Assam, Bengal, Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan to which the Cabinet did not agree. The Cabinet proposed that the Pakistan should consist of the Muslim majority areas which was not acceptable to the Muslim League. However, the Mission rejected the claim of Pakistan on certain grounds such as, the number of Muslims in India, and non-Muslims in Pakistan would remain considerable; predominated Hindu areas in Pakistan was inconsistent; the partition of Punjab was against the wishes of Sikhs; it would be very difficult for the Indian states to join either India or Pakistan and so on.

The second part, related to the short term plan, which meant establishment of an interim Government, comp-

70. Ibid.
71. V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 263-64.
rising of only Indian Ministers, having fullest cooperation of the British Government, which later became operative.

The third part regarding long term plan, envisaged a union of India, residuary powers vested in the Provinces; states retaining all powers, except Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication ceded to the union, freedom to provinces to form groups with executives and legislatures, terms of constitution to be reconsidered after 10 years, and mainly, Constituent Assembly to have three sections:

(i) Section A - Madras, Bombay, U.P., C.P., Bihar, Orissa
(ii) Section B - Punjab, NWFP and Sind, and
(iii) Section C - Bengal and Assam

The plan also envisaged that each of the above three sections would decide its provincial constitution; the groups would settle the union constitution, and the union Constituent Assembly would negotiate with the British for Transfer of Power.

The Mission announced that elections to the union Legislative Assembly would be held and, the party not

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72. Ibid., pp. 470-75.
accepting the plan of May 16, would be excluded from the Interim Government. This forfeited the veto power of the Muslim League. The Mission opened a list of number of representatives to be elected by each provincial Legislative Assembly in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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| **Section B** |     |  |     |
| Punjab       | 8   | 16 | 4    | 28 |
| NWFP         | 0   | 3  | 0    | 3  |
| Sind         | 1   | 3  | 0    | 4  |
| **Total**    | 9   | 22 | 4    | 35 |

| **Section C** |     |  |     |
| Bengal       | 27  | 33 | -    | 60 |
| Assam        | 7   | 3  | -    | 10 |
| **Total**    | 34  | 36 | -    | 70 |

*Grand Total* | 210 | 78 | 4 | 385

Max. for Indian States 93.
In Group A the states were Congress dominated provinces. In Group B, the Muslim League could form the Ministry using influence over other Muslim leaders. In Group C in Assam the Congress had dominated position.

The above plan, accepted the Congress demand of a United India, and also the League demand of compulsory grouping. Thus making the creation of Pakistan. Though Gandhi expressed to wreck the compulsory grouping of provinces but on May 20, 1946, wrote that the Interim Government should be formed immediately.

On May 27, 1946, Jinnah complained that Pakistan was divided into groups B and C; that instead of two only one constitution-making body was devised; that there was no indication how the Union would raise finances, either by contribution as desired by the League, or by taxation as desired by the Congress; that in the Legislature there would always be the majority of Hindus; that there was no provision that Pakistan might secede after 10 years from the Union; that how the representatives of Baluchistan

would be elected; and that there was provision of adding more subjects to the Union Government against the principle of three subjects. However, since the Congress proposed to make an attack on the compulsory grouping and opposed the "parity" in the Interim Executive, which the League demanded to be retained.

On June 12, Nehru had given a list of 15 members for the Interim Council (4 League, 5 Congress Hindus, 1 Non-Congress Hindu, 1 Congress Scheduled caste and 1 Congress women), which was unacceptable to Jinnah. Thus, the constitutional deadlock continued. To break it, the Viceroy suggested 13 members (6 Congress including a member of scheduled caste, 5 Muslim League and 2 minorities). Jinnah proposed to place it before the League Working Committee, but the Congress turned it down. Therefore, the Viceroy submitted another formula on June 16, 1946 (6 Congress including scheduled caste, 5 Muslim League, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian and 1 Parsi). The Viceroy declared that if the Congress and the League had failed to form a coalition Government, he would invite those to form the government who would be willing to accept the statement of May 16. The Mission left India on June 29, 1946.

74. For details see The Dawn, (New Delhi), May 23, 1946.
75. Papers relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Publications División Government of India, 1946, pp. 43-44.
The Viceroy invited the following to form the Interim Government:

1. Sardar Baldev Singh
2. Sir N.P. Engineer
3. Mr. Jagjivan Ram
4. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
5. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
7. H.K. Mahtab
8. Dr. John Mathai
9. Nawabzada Mohammad Ismail Khan
10. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin
11. Sardar Abdul Rab Neshtar
12. C. Rajagopalachari
13. Dr. Rajendra Prasad

Jinnah said that the names of five Muslim League members were included without calling a list from the League leaders; that Parity between the Muslim and caste Hindus had not been devised; and that Jagjivan Ram would add strength to the Congress. However, he requested for the distribution of portfolios.

76. Paper Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, op.cit., pp. 43-44. See also Jamiluddin Ahmad, Historic Documents, op.cit., pp. 517-18.
The Viceroy did not agree to the Congress demand to include a Muslim of the Congress choice. However, on June 25, 1946, Nehru became President of the Congress Working Committee in place of Azad and in reply to a correspondent who asked about his future plan Nehru said that he had "every intention of modifying the plan "and the "Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and that in all probability there would be no groups at all. The non-Pakistan provinces (Section A) would decide against grouping and so would the NWFP and Assam, leading to the collapse of the other groups as well." He said that he would solve the minorities problem as a domestic problem.

Nehru's statement touched the heart of Muslims and Jinnah exploited it for boycotting the Interim Government. On July 27, 1946, he convened the All-India Muslim League Council at Bombay and, addressing a gathering of 450 followers from every provinces, said that Pandit Nehru on July 10, in Bombay had said that "the Congress was committed to nothing (Long-term plan) ... What is the use of imagining things and dreaming." He also said that

79. Jamiuluddin Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah op.cit., pp. 408-11.
Gandhiji had begun to talk like a Universal adviser, who said: "The Congress ...... is the trustee for the people of India ...... we have enough experience of one trustee that has been here for 150 years. We do not want the Congress to become our trustee. We have now grown up. The only trustee of the Muslims is the Muslim nation."

The Muslim League ultimately on July 29, 1946, withdrew its acceptance of the Mission's May 16, proposals and declared to resort to Direct Action. Jinnah said:

"Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us; one with power and machine-guns behind it, and the other with non-cooperation and the threat to lunch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met, we also have a pistol."

By the end of July election results for the Interim Government were declared and the Congress won 209 seats and the Muslim League 73, out of a total of 296 seats allotted to British India. Jinnah realised that the

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81. Ibid., p. 560.
82. Manmath Nath Das, Partition and Independence of India (New Delhi, 1982), p. 75.
Congress would use every possible means to suppress the
League's demand for Pakistan and the Assembly would prove
the graveyard of Pakistan since the Congress would always
be in majority in the Assembly.

Jinnah called upon the Muslims throughout India
to observe Friday, August 16, 1946, as 'Direct Action
Day' 'as a protest and in token of their deep resentment
of the attitude of the British.'

In Calcutta, riots broke out on August 16, and
lasted up to August 20, 1946, leaving 3,000 dead and
17,000 injured. More Muslims than Hindus were killed.
The cause of the riot were goonda elements. However, the
riot proved that Hindu-Muslim co-existence was impossible.

The Viceroy invited Nehru to form Interim Govern-
ment on the formula of 6-5-3 i.e. 6 Congress mah, 5 Muslim
Leaguers and 3 others minorities. On September 2, the
Interim Government was inaugurated. The portfolios were
distributed as follows:

83. Jamiluddin Ahmad, Historic Documents, op.cit., p.536.
84. N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.VIII (London,
1979), p. 274.
Pandit Nehru ..... Vice President (Virtual P.M.)
Sardar Patel ..... Home Affairs (Police)
Baldev Singh ..... Defence (War)
Muslims ..... 3 (Nominated by Viceroy)
Muslims ..... 2 (Left for Muslim League members)
Members ..... 6

The Leaguers led demonstrations, processions, meetings and hartals and hoisted black flags on residences, places of business and mosques and there was going to be a total war in every city, town, street and house. Jinnah called the Viceroy's action as double betrayal for its ignoring and by passing the Muslim League.

Gandhiji being much grieved due to riots, toured Noakhali and Bihar to pacify the people though he was then 77 years old.

On October 13, 1946, Jinnah wrote to Viceroy that the League had decided to join the Interim Government, and agreeing to the Cabinet Mission Plan, abandoning the Pakistan proposals, as conditioned by the Viceroy. On

86. The Dawn (Delhi), August 3, 1946.
87. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 20, 1946.
October 14, 1946, Jinnah proposed five names of Muslim League members, who joined the Interim Government on October 15, without accepting the long-term plan on May 16, 1946. Jinnah nominated a scheduled caste in the Muslim League quota and decided to wreck the Interim Government. The five League members were: (1) Liaquat Ali Khan (2) I.I.Chundrigar (3) Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (4) Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Joginder Nath Mandal (SC), who were given Finance, Commerce Communication, Health etc. Azad had proposed to give Home Department to the League, but Patel did not like to part with it. Azad knew that if Home will be given to League it would satisfy it. He wanted Finance to be with the Congress. But Patel opposed this. He wanted to keep Home and give Finance, Maulana Azad knew that such an arrangement would not be congenial due to one reason or the other but he had to accept it. Liaquat Ali Khan introduced such a budget which harmed the industrialists, businessmen and majority of Hindus. Further the budget handicapped the Congress Department,

89. Fortnightly Report from New Delhi for the first half of October 1946, Home Department, Political, File No. 18/10/46.
which almost paralyzed them and the Congress realised that the Interim Government would not be workable for want of cooperation between the Congress and the League. In consequence, the Congress bloc and the League bloc became rival without caring and national policy. The Viceroy declared to summon the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1946. Jinnah, on November 21, declared to 91 boycott the same.

On November 25, 1946, Jinnah proposed to the Viceroy for exchange of population as the best means for settling the communal tangle and also rejected the Mission Plan, and thus it could not remain part of the Interim Government. To break the deadlock, the Viceroy-Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan went to London on November 30, 1946, to discuss the matter with Attlee, but their talks ended in failure, and attitude of the Congress and the League towards each other still more stiff. The Congress suggested to bring their differences in the Federal Court on the proposal of May 16 but Jinnah rejected.

However on the principle of individual status of provinces, the Viceroy convened the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1946. League's 79 members boycotted the

Assembly. On December 11, Attlee appealed "to all the communities in India to cooperate in framing a constitution" which encouraged Jinnah and he took more tough line against the Congress. On the other hand, Nehru on December 13, 1946, declared "This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent sovereign Republic, wherein all power and authority ... are derived from the people. The Muslim League continued to frustrate the Interim Government from outside and almost a civil war position dominated in all parts of India.

Attlee, the Prime Minister was convinced that the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, had failed to bring about an agreement between the Congress and the League. He realised that the only solution lay in the partition of India into two sovereign states - Hindustan and Pakistan. Therefore, on December 10, 1946, Attlee called Lord Louis Mountbatten and offered him the Viceroyalty of India. After much hesitation, Mountbatten accepted Attlee's invitation.


Tragically enough, Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru, Azad and Patel failed to iron out their disagreements and to keep pace with communal problems for a peaceful settlement. On October 18, 1939, the Viceroy stated that communal differences would be settled after the War with some modifications in the Government of India Act 1935. As the communal impasse continued, the Congress became a party to partition, though Gandhi believed in the ultimate victory of good and truth. Jinnah's Lahore Resolution and demand for Pakistan with clear terms, failure of Wavell Plan and Simla Conference, Cabinet Mission Plan and the Interim Government made the partition of India inevitable.

In 1946, the important factions were the Congress, the League, the Sikhs, the Backward and Scheduled Castes and the Princes in the political arena. Azad wanted independence first, and anything later. Jinnah wanted to settle the fundamentals of Pakistan first, and anything

1. Speeches and Statements of Linlithgow, October 18, 1939, Linlithgow Collection, National Archive of India.

afterwards. Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram opposed the Constituent Assembly dominated by the Caste Hindus and demanded separate electoral college for the Scheduled Castes. Giani Kartar Singh, Baldev Singh and Master Tara Singh demanded a separate sovereign state of Kailishtan. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Liberal leaders vehemently opposed the partition of India. The question of Princely States had lingered on due to war in Europe.

After the failure of the Wavell Plan on May 16, 1946, the League had refused to enter the Constituent Assembly and Nehru had installed the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1946. Prime Minister Attlee informed the House of Commons on December 11, that conversation with the Indian leaders during the last week ended in a failure. While Nehru had left for India on December 12, 1946,

4. Ibid., pp. 243-45.
5. Ibid., pp. 242-43.
6. Ibid., pp. 245-46.
and Wavell, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were still in London, Attlee was looking around for a successor of the Viceroy, because of the Wavell's failure. Attlee looked to Dickie Mountbatten and the idea for the appointment of Lord Mountbatten struck to his mind. Mountbatten was suggested as a replacement for Linlithgow for the first time by Leo Amery in the summer of 1942, and again nine months later by Sir Ralph Glyn. Krishna Menon had also told Sir Stafford Cripps that Mountbatten's appointment as Viceroy of India would be welcomed by the Congress in view of the fact that Nehru had established good relationship with the King-Emperor's cousin. Attlee also realised that the extremely lively and exciting personality of the Royal family member would also influence the Princes. Further, Mountbatten had liberal ideas and was acceptable both by the Liberal Government as well as the Conservatives.

Prime Minister Attlee invited Mountbatten at 10 Downing Street on December 18, 1946, and offered him the

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Viceroyalty of India. Mountbatten agreed to the proposal on certain conditions. He insisted to fix a firm date for transfer of power. On March 18, 1947, Attlee fixed June 1948, as the effective date. Mountbatten was granted 'plenipotentiary powers' or 'discretionary powers' far wider than his predecessors. He had also the benefits of invention of the telegraph which had enabled him to consult with Whitehall from New Delhi within a few minutes.

On the request of Mountbatten Pethick-Lawrence was replaced by Lord Listowell in April. Further, he was facilitated with a staff of his own choice to be superimposed on the existing staff in Delhi. However, on February 11, 1947, Mountbatten formally accepted the office of the Viceroy. Mountbatten's departure to India was fixed for March 20, 1947. On January 31, Attlee had already informed Wavell about the appointment of a new Viceroy. However, he was not officially informed until February 13. It extremely shocked Wavell who said to Abell: "They've sacked me."

Before arrival to India, Mountbatten had studied the proceedings of the House of Commons relating to Indian debate and almost daily consulted the Cabinet in London to find a solution of the thorny problem of establishing a unitary government or vivisection of India between the two major parties - Congress and the Muslim League. He concluded to advise the Indian leaders that the "retention of Indian Army under Central control was vital both to the external security of India and to the maintenance of internal law and order" and that "he would not allow them to use British bayonets to keep law and order, but only to protect British lives." Further, Mountbatten had the experience of visiting India with the Prince of Wales in 1921, when he realised that hostile crowds, students boycott and the Congress demonstrations were unlikely to be tranquilled. When Mountbatten had visited India, as Supreme Commander in 1943, he found Jinnah in a better position than Gandhi, who was put behind the bars, but the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by him was still in progress. The same year, Linlithgow was replaced by Wavell, who failed to reconcile with the demands of the Congress and the Muslim League. After the

Japanese threat dwindled, Whitehall became anxious for a rapid settlement in view of civil war condition in India; but Wavell was not allowed to have an informal talk with Gandhi. Mountbatten thought it an important cause of the failure of Wavell's plan. Therefore, he decided to have an informal talk with Gandhi.

Before Mountbatten's arrival in India, Attlee had already declared on February 20, 1947, that the power would be transferred to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948, (for which Wavell was unsuccessfully pleading for months), and if a constitution was not framed by a fully representative Constituent Assembly by that date, the power would be handed over as desired by the His Majesty's Government. This statement, on the one hand, deferred Congress demand that the League should be asked to leave the interim government so as to watch the League's actions to the new policy of the Government, and, on the other, closed the doors of all possibility of the creation of Pakistan in the event the League failed to join the Constituent Assembly. Jinnah would not


17. R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., p. 757.
like this and feeling his humiliation, became more antagonistic to the Congress and an agreement with the Congress inside the Assembly became more unlikely than ever. Jinnah reacted to the statement because it meant partition but not on the principle desired by him. He did not like the transfer of power to different Muslim majority states, but to a union of Muslim majority states, particularly of Punjab and Bengal, to which the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha did never agree. Nehru echoed that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, including only Muslim majority provinces, because League persisted settlement on the basis of strong States or groups of States with a weak Federal Centre, which could make the Congress quite incapable of handling India's problems of poverty, illiteracy and out-moded social customs. Therefore, Nehru preferred "to lop some of the branches from the main trunk" and "to let Jinnah and the League take the areas


which they could indisputedly claim." This hypothesis was agreed to by all the Congressmen, except Gandhiji, as it involved much shedding to blood.

On March 15, 1947, Woodrow Wyatt advised that the Muslim League would be "warned that if they no longer hold their portfolios by June of next year, the power will be given to the Congress Interim Government." He also suggested that the Army should not be handed over to any one party but to a Central Government and that the military should not be used to suppress communal disturbances so that the Indians may learn the problems of law and order. Wyatt also suggested partition. On that very day Attlee declared in the House of Commons:

"India herself must choose what will be her future Constitution. What will be her position in the world. I hope that the Indian people may elect to remain within the British Commonwealth ..... The British Commonwealth and Empire is not bound together by chains of external compulsion. It is a free association of free peoples."24

21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
Prime Minister Attlee had realised that the power of veto given to minority had blocked the constitutional development ever since. Therefore, he declared that the British Government "cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority." He warned that any attempt "to persist with old methods would lead not to a solution but a deadlock." He wrote to Mountbatten:

"It is the definite objective of His Majesty's Government to obtain a unitary Government for India and the Indian States, if possible within the British Commonwealth, through the medium of a Constituent Assembly ... and you should do the utmost in your power to persuade all parties to work together to this end ... If by October 1, you consider that there is no prospect of reaching a settlement on the basis of a unitary government ... you should report to HMG on the steps which you consider should be taken for the handing over of power on the due date...."

The Cabinet Mission was sent to India to bring about an agreement between the Congress and the League in view of the probable "direct action" by the Congress.

Though the object of the Mission was all right, yet it were restricted to make any discretionary arrangement i.e. they were not allowed to make an "Award" in case of default of an agreement. Wavell was of the opinion that due to lack of discretionary powers, the Cabinet Mission could not produce a better plan. The rigidity of the Mission Plan was also responsible for its failure. On the one hand, the Congress claimed that the groupings of states were not 'Compulsory' and 'Fundamental', while the Muslim League considered it otherwise. This was the fundamental point of difference. Pethick-Lawrence did not allow Wavell to explain these points to Gandhi in the right perspective for six months as a result the Constituent Assembly delayed its installation. Since the Congress did not accept the 'compulsory groupings' as Attlee stated on December 6, 1946, the Muslim League emphasised that the Congress did not accept it. Further, Nehru's statement that he would make amendments in the grouping principle after the formation of the Congress Interim Government, had annoyed the

30. Ibid., pp. 647-51.
Muslim League. Even in view of such a challenge, it was Wavell's favour that Nehru was allowed to form the Interim Government and later, when Muslim League members joined the Council, the Congress and League members sat in opposition as the greatest rival and, thus, the Interim Government did not work properly. Therefore, Mountbatten was empowered to impose his own scheme, in case the Congress and the League failed to produce a common plan for establishing a unitary Government to which power could be transferred and which could frame a constitution agreed to by them. In such circumstances, Mountbatten was sent to India. On November 14, 1948, Mountbatten, delivering the Second Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture at Cambridge, stated that he was sent "to expedite the withdrawal" and was given the power to make his own decisions in India and that he was given "plenipotentiary powers".

There was controversy over treating the 'Interim Government' as 'Dominion Government'. Wavell's letter to the Congress President, Azad, and the statement of the Secretary of State for India in the House of Lords on March 13, 1947, had made it clear that "the Interim Government would not have the same powers as a Dominion Government",

31. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 15, 1968.
but HMG would "give it the greatest possible freedom in
the day-to-day exercise of the administration of the
country." The Congress Working Committee which met on
March 8, 1947 resolved that transfer of power should be
made to the Interim Government deeming it "Dominion Govern-
ment with effective control over the services and administ-
ration" and converting the Viceroy into its "constitu-
tional head." If this scheme was practised, the Congress
Centre kept all the existing powers without devolution of
authority to the provinces and denying the Indian states
to have authority in matters of Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Communications. In this way the Congress aimed to
preserve the unity of India. Since the Congress dominated
the Interim Government, the acceptance of the Congress
plan could have established a Hindu Raj after Independence,
which Jinnah could never tolerate, and it was a betrayal
of the British pledges to the League and the Princes.

32. Letter dated March 18, 1947, to Mountbatten; see
972-74.

33. Ibid., pp. 899-900.

34. Note on proposals handed to the Secretary of State
by Sudhir Ghosh, Annexure II to Document 524,
N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol. IX, op. cit.,
pp. 923-24.

Further, it would have had a very hot discussion between the Labour and the Conservatives. Mountbatten conceived this problem and, hence, was granted the plenipotentiary powers. Thus, Mountbatten "came to India with a freer hand to make and to implement policy than any proconsul before him in the history of British India."

Louis' Mountbatten, the nineteenth and the last Viceroy, reached New Delhi on March 22, 1947 accompanied by his own staff, including General Lord Ismay, as Chief of the Viceroy's Staff, Sir Eric Mieville, as Principal Secretary, Captain R.V. Brockman, as Personal Secretary better known as Private Secretary, George Abell, as Public Secretary, Lt. Col. Baskine Crum as Conference Secretary, V.P. Menon as Reforms Secretary, and Allan Campbell-Johnson as Press Attache. The new Viceroy was greatly welcomed by the Congress. Since Nehrus had good relations with Mountbatten, Lord Ismay had already warned the British Government that Mountbatten's appointment as Viceroy would be considered as a favour to the Congress, and an affront to the Muslim League. Jinnah had no such relationship with the Mountbattens as Nehru.

36. Ibid., p. 250.
37. See for details V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 352.
Mountbatten met Wavell the day he arrived, and discussed the political situation in India. Wavel briefed Mountbatten what happened since the Mission left and the conflict between the Congress and the League members in the Interim Government. Between April 1947 and June 1948, there was only a gap of fifteen months. Mountbatten noted that the Indian leaders were not realising the problem of transfer of power before June, 1948. Wavell wondered "whether the partition of Punjab and Bengal could take place inside the Cabinet Mission's plan." Mountbatten said that he would like to transfer power to some strong authority in India and that "any solution must be based on the Indian Army." Mountbatten realised that the Indian leaders were not appreciating the sincerity of the British Government in the transfer of power in view of statement of P.C. Joshi, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, that "the British had no real intention of leaving."

However, at the swearing-in-ceremony on the morning of March 24, the Viceroy, addressing his audience said: "I

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am under no illusion about the difficulty of my task...
I shall need greatest goodwill of the greatest possible number and I am asking India today for that goodwill."
Wavell left New Delhi the next day. In the afternoon, Mountbatten met Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan. He had already written to Gandhi and Jinnah to meet him in New Delhi at their earliest convenience. Gandhiji met him on March 31 and April 4, and Jinnah on April 5.

The Viceroy, without loss of time, started collecting an overall information about the political ideas of the Indian leaders of all communities, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Parsees. He quickly observed that the real powers and decisive forces were the Congress led by Gandhiji, Nehru and the Congress Party "boss" Sardar Patel, and the Muslim League solely led by M.A. Jinnah and his right-hand man, Liaquat Ali Khan. Meeting with each leader lasted for one hour and the discussions were immediately recorded.

Later when Mountbatten met Nehru, he asked Nehru about his estimates of Jinnah. Nehru presented him as

a "monster of negativism, a man who would agree to nothing because it might split his followers if he did." Thus, Nehru showed his hatred for Jinnah, underestimating his real position. Nehru also spoke of him "with mingled 43 respect and loathing." About India's remaining within Commonwealth after Independence, Nehru wondered how it could remain within it. Instead of partition, Nehru proposed "relationship between the Centre and the provinces, and the right of the provinces to associate with each other on grounds of politics, propinquity or religious 44 faith." However Mountbatten realised that the Congress was "grouping for a formula" which might keep India inside the Commonwealth. Nehru was surprised to learn that "the British intended to withdraw all their officers in the army and the civil service regardless of how far the nationalisation process had progressed." The Viceroy conveyed to Pethick-Lawrence that Nehru wanted to retain the services of the British officers for some time after


44. Ibid.

power was transferred. Since Mountbatten considered that whichever authority would control 'an unified army, or the most efficient divided army' would control India, the question of the future of Indian army had become his biggest bargaining point with the Congress. However, Nehru emphasised the need for the partition of Punjab and Bengal and Mountbatten assured to Nehru "to approach the problem in an atmosphere of stark realism." It may be noted that, on the one hand, the Congress was pleading for partition, and on the other, Gandhi was declaring in Bihar that "he could not give consent to the idea of partitioning Punjab and Bengal or any other province." He was afraid that partition would make the communal trouble a permanent features.


49. The Tribune (Lahore), March 14, 1947 (Gandhi's Speech on March 13, 1947).
Maulana Azad was invited by the Viceroy to meet him on March 27, 1947. Azad expressed hope that there was still possibility of a United India under the Cabinet Mission Plan and requested the Viceroy to deflate Jinnah "partly by flattering him and partly because he really has nothing to stand on."

Mountbatten had met Patel on March 25, 1947 who talked on lines of his March 9 speech in which he said that power should be transferred to the Central Government "as it then stood," and if there was to be any conflict in the Cabinet the majority would rule, and also reiterated Nehru's views. Mountbatten had already heard about Gandhi's Patna speech delivered on March 13, 1947, in which he had opposed the partition of India. When Gandhi reached Delhi, on March 31, Azad met him. Gandhi forcefully said that the partition would be over his dead body. So long as he was alive, he would never agree to the partition of India. After the Viceroy's meeting, Patel met Gandhi and they talked for two hours. Later, when Azad

met Gandhiji he found that Gandhiji had changed his view and supported Patel's opinion that partition was inevitable. Earlier Patel, addressing a public meeting in Lucknow, had said, "The earth may split and the heavens may fall, but India will not be divided." But now he had changed his arguments. Thus, the opinion of the Congress leaders was fast changing and wide rift had come up between the Congress ranks. Mountbatten concluded that partition had become inevitable as the Congress and the Muslim League both argued for the same.

Mountbatten met Gandhiji at five separate meetings from March 31 to April 4, 1947. During discussion, Gandhiji proposed that Jinnah should be asked to form a Cabinet and if he accepted this offer, he should be assured of Congress cooperation so long as his all measures were in the interests of the Indian people with Mountbatten as a sole referee. He suggested that no National Guards were to be there, not even private army and Jinnah would be free to present for acceptance a scheme of Pakistan, even before the transfer of power.

Mountbatten on April 2, suggested Gandhiji the transfer of power "to the areas in accordance with the

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53. Ibid.
wishes of the majority of the residents in those areas."
"Broadly speaking this could make a Hindu India with a Congress Government in India, a truncated Pakistan, and the large States like Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, Hyderabad and groups of States, each having separate power turned over to them, owing allegiance to a Central authority for Defence, External Affairs, Communications, and possibly food." Gandhiji was convinced, but he persisted that whatever decision be taken should be implemented as early as possible. The Viceroy informed Azad accordingly. Azad felt the greatest shock of his life. However, he met Gandhi on April 2, and was surprised and grieved that Gandhi "began to repeat the arguments which Sardar Patel had already used." Azad writes that he pleaded with Gandhiji for over two hours "but could make no impression on him."

The withdrawal of the British was to give the problem of Defence. Since partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan was possible only if law and order and defence arrangement was ensured in both the regions, the


question of division of army became an important problem. Therefore, considering the defence implications, the Chiefs of Staff (India) at a meeting on April 1, 1947, resolved that expenditure on the maintenance of two separate defence forces for Hindustan and Pakistan would increase since "the administrative overheads must be duplicated and there is no flexibility." The important problem was that in that case "it will be impossible for Pakistan to maintain defence forces of the proper size" and "it will be impossible to find the necessary officers and technicians for many years" and it will not be possible for India to afford the "duplicate administrative layout." Therefore, it was considered that "the proposal to have separate defence forces for Pakistan and Hindustan was economically wasteful and quite impracticable, since Pakistan was in fact quite incapable of maintaining the forces required. This problem was also being considered by the Muslim League, the Congress and the Viceroy as a major step before partition of the country. The Muslim League claimed that the Defence Forces should be divided.

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
Jinnah in a statement said "The transfer of power to Pakistan and Hindustan Governments must mean division of the defence as a sine qua non of such a transfer and the defence forces should be completely divided ... and the states of Pakistan and Hindustan should be made absolutely free, independent and sovereign. This is a clear cut road and the only practical solution of India's constitutional problem."

Mountbatten invited Liaquat Ali Khan to meet him on April 3, 1947. The Viceroy charged that the Muslim League was responsible for all the disturbances in several provinces in order to advance their demand for Pakistan and strongly said that "they should either resign or refrain from taking any active part in the Committee of Action." The Viceroy asked whether the League would agree to the Cabinet Mission Plan if the Congress would accept it. Liaquat Ali Khan's reply was in negative because of the lack of the spirit of compromise with the Congress.

Liaquat Ali Khan explained that there was no possibility of the establishment of a unitary government


under the Cabinet Mission Plan, but regarding transfer of power, he gave such a statement, which later made Jinnah to accept a truncated Pakistan. Discussion with Liaquat Ali Khan also revealed to Mountbatten that the Muslim League would accept even the smaller size of Pakistan rather than comprising of six provinces and Calcutta. If Jinnah was interviewed first, he certainly had demanded the larger Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan had to follow suit.

Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India about the Indian situation, who cautioned him that he had to face the toughest Jinnah "whose Pakistan Day message suggests that even in the new circumstances he does not contemplate a conciliatory move, at any rate in the first instance." Agreeing on some points he wrote to the Viceroy that:

"...in spite of its grave practical difficulties and dangers, the partition of the Punjab to such degree and in such form as will satisfy the rival nationalisms in the Province is really unavoidable

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.
from the political point of view of the transfer of authority in June, 1948. If, however, we were to go for partition in the Punjab, we should, I think, have to go for it also in Bengal for broadly similar reasons.”

Nehru had bad tastes during the Interim Government formed by him. He was quite sure to become Prime Minister of Independent India. Hence, he was shocked to know that Gandhiji offered the Prime Ministership to Jinnah. Nehru criticised that since Gandhiji was out of Delhi for four months, he did not know the present events at the Centre. Nehru and Patel did their best to satisfy Gandhiji that partition was necessary. As Gandhiji did not agree to their views, Nehru and Patel began to isolate him from the Congress Policies. Had Gandhi's proposal was conveyed to Jinnah, it was quite possible that it had some effect on Jinnah's ego and partition was anyhow avoided. However, Nehru during the course of discussion told to the Viceroy that Gandhiji's offer was "quite impracticable."

65. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p.316.
After talking with the Congress leaders and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Viceroy was fully convinced that the Cabinet Mission Plan had totally died and partition of India was the only problem before him. The Viceroy realised that if Pakistan was created in the East and the West, as demanded by Jinnah, it would be a 'truncated Pakistan' while India still would remain a big dominion, which could, sooner or later, absorb the Muslim Indian States or they would join India willingly or unwillingly owing to their geographical situations. Then he had only to break the hard nut, Jinnah, to come to a definite conclusion regarding partition. Mountbatten prepared a list of 'Awkward Questions to Ask Jinnah', which included, among others, as to how Jinnah would justify "the claim to the thirteen districts in the Punjab and the eight districts (including Calcutta) of Bengal which did not have a Muslim majority", and how he would organise defence of Pakistan in view of strained resources and whether he would like to have a defensive alliance with Hindustan. Further, the Viceroy, as expressed by Nehru on March 24, thought that Jinnah would come down to a settlement for immediate transfer of power in view of the inflexibility of the


time-limit by June 1948. If Jinnah persisted for Pakistan, it was a truncated Pakistan and the army was necessarily to 'be divided.' If army was not to be divided, then India had to remain united, which was impossible in those circumstances. But abolishing the centre meant, cutting up the army and delaying the British withdrawal beyond June, 1948, which Mountbatten did not like because it would manifest "the thankless role of an umpire powerless to endorse the rules." Moreover, he wanted to evolve a mechanism to avoid bloodshed after Independence and left no stone unturned to make it clear that the only solution of India's problem was a "surgical operation" of India.

Mountbatten invited Jinnah on April 6, and his sister, Fatima, to dine with him. They had their food till late in the night. During this Jinnah gave a fearful account of Congress atrocities on Muslims and told the Viceroy of his own fear that Congress could do anything to "deprive" him of Pakistan. He said the only way left for the Muslim League was to get Pakistan

70. N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Viceroy's Staff Meeting, April 5, 1947, p. 128.
72. Alan Campbell Johnson, op.cit., p. 56.
by force, that is, by direct action which involved 'violence' and 'riots' to prove the reality of his "Two Nation Theory." In spite of these arguments, the Viceroy stuck to his proposal of a unified India, which made Jinnah to realise that all things would not go as he liked and he was unable to influence the Viceroy.

Mountbatten and Jinnah met again in the afternoon of April 7, while the Viceroy, tried by every means to get Jinnah agreed to the Cabinet Mission Plan and enter the Constituent Assembly, he remained adamant, and said:

"That was impossible, it was quite valueless entering the Constituent Assembly or trying to go back to the Cabinet Mission Plan since the whole of that plan was co-operation and mutual trust. Now a year later, the atmosphere, far from improving, had taken a serious turn for the worse and it was clear that Congress had no intention of accepting either the spirit or the letter of that plan."  

However, Jinnah's demand that power should be handed over as soon as possible "preferably Province by

74. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 318.
75. Ibid., p. 318.
Province, and let the Provinces themselves choose how they formed into groups" was not realistic and it was a programme of Balkanization of India which could never have been beneficial for the people of the provinces. Secondly, there were large number of Hindu majority states encircling the Muslim majority states in the South, such as Nizam of Hyderabad, in the North, Rampur, and in the Central India, Bhopal. In these three provinces, the majority of inhabitants were non-Muslims. The ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu and the majority of the population was that of Muslims. However, in the East, East Bengal and Sylhet, the Muslim majority areas, and in the West, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP could join to form Pakistan. Jinnah wanted to create Pakistan in the heart of India, which could never be agreed upon by the Congress. The Viceroy was also convinced that it could be the cause of perpetual conflict ending in the merger of Hyderabad, Rampur and Bhopal into India vanishing Jinnah's dream of a larger Pakistan.

Jinnah forgot the Congress claim that Punjab and Bengal should be partitioned due to majority of Hindus

76. Manmath Nath Das, op.cit., p. 83.
in East Punjab and West Bengal and that it would be
injustice to leave the Hindus on the mercy of the Muslims
of Pakistan, to which the Congress would never agree.
Jinnah could not calculate the depth of the intense situa-
tion going against him and thought the Congress claim as
"bluff" to frighten him in order to force him accept the
Cabinet Mission Plan. As the matter could not be settled,
Jinnah, as a sole spokesman of Muslim India, demanded a
settlement by a British award, provided 'Pakistan' was
accepted in principle with the right to maintain its
separate army. On the question of 'Defence', Jinnah said
that "he had come to the conclusion that the Defence
forces must be separated and that Pakistan and Hindustan
must be responsible separately for their own defence. On
no other basis would it be possible to have any form of
central organisation on terms of parity." Liaquat Ali Khan
also informed Mountbatten on April 7, 1947, that a Pakistan
without an army would collapse like a 'house of cards.'
Jinnah as a shrewed politician knew that it would be impos-
sible for the Viceroy to divide the army and partition


78. Ibid., p. 152.
of India before June 1948, and, thus, a permanent settlement would be delayed and the Viceroy's Mission would be unsuccessful. But the Viceroy had plenipotentiary powers and was determined to transfer power by that time. Mountbatten, as a man of great wisdom, felt the inner motive of Jinnah. Therefore, the Viceroy made it clear that it would be impossible to cut the army into half by June, 1948, and the time table could not be delayed. This came to Jinnah as a "shock." Jinnah asked as to how they would like to propose the terms for leaving India by June, 1948. Whether they intend to leave India turning the "country over to chaos and bloodshed and civil war?" Mountbatten warned that the Muslim League had either to accept the Mission's proposals or to take its 'Pakistan' carved out of India by partitioning Punjab and Bengal.

Mountbatten told Jinnah that he had decided to recommend to the British Government how best the power could be transferred to the Indians after hearing the views of all major parties and that he would not wait for the parties to reach an "agreement" in view of the date

already set. Jinnah became anxious as he had agreed to abide by the decision of the Viceroy and he had no power of veto. Seeing Jinnah thoughtful, the Viceroy imagined the fall of the Muslim leader into his own net of earlier arguments. To bring him to the most delicate problem, the Viceroy asked Jinnah as to what was his solution if he was in his (Viceroy's) place. Jinnah immediately said that he would have accepted the demand for Pakistan and the splitting of the Defence Forces. Acceptance of Pakistan meant 'partition of India' and splitting of 'Defence Forces' meant 'creation of two powers', that is, India and Pakistan. Thereafter, Mountbatten asked Jinnah to put forward his arguments for partition. Jinnah reiterated the two-nation theory, which implied that the Muslim majority areas would like to join Pakistan and the Hindu majority areas would like to join Hindustan and it was quite injustice to put the Muslim majority areas at the mercy of Hindustan and vice-versa. On this Mountbatten pointed out that his remarks "applied also to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, and that by sheer logic if I accepted his (Jinnah's) arguments in the case of India as a whole, I had also to apply them in the case of these two provinces." Thus, the

Viceroy offered only a "moth eaten Pakistan." Jinnah became very upset, dismayed and distressed, because by partitioning these two provinces he could not be in a stronger position to bargain with Hindustan. Appalled by the Viceroy's firm determination, Jinnah begged the Viceroy "not to destroy the unity of Bengal and the Punjab, which had national characteristics in common; common history, common ways of life; and where the Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members of the Congress." Mountbatten put the second pressure on Jinnah by insisting that "what was good for the Muslims was good also for other communities." Jinnah still did not believe that the two provinces would really be partitioned. Therefore, he said: "this demand for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to try and frighten him off Pakistan. He was not to be frightened off so easily." In a statement Jinnah said "The Hindus have their homelands ... consisting of six vast provinces purely because a portion of the minorities in the Pakistan provinces have taken up this attitude, the

82. Ibid.
84. Mountbatten 191, Interview No.41, April 8,1947; See also N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power, Vol.X, op.cit., pp. 159-60; See also H.V. Hodson, op.cit., p.227.
British Government should not now continue it because the result of that will be logically, that all other provinces will have to be cut up in a similar way, which will be dangerous....'

Jinnah met Mountbatten again and appealed to the Viceroy not to give him a "moth eaten" and "truncated Pakistan." But the Viceroy was adamant and replied:

"I simply could not visualise being so inconsistent as to agree to the partition of India without also agreeing to partition with any provinces in which the same problem arose."

However, though Jinnah's high hopes of a grand Pakistan were razed to the ground and he was feeling secluded. He, being a man of great courage and ambition, wanted to be successful in achieving Pakistan in any way.

April 10 was an important landmark in the history of partition of India when Mountbatten and Jinnah discussed for three hours on the future destiny of the country. Jinnah demanded 'viable' Pakistan. The Viceroy said that

87. Ibid.
he was bound to work on principles and that he would like to discuss only on the limitations of Pakistan, which would be "a state containing Sind, half of the Punjab, and probably the North-West Frontier Province in one group, and part of Bengal in an other group."

Since the adoption of Lahore Resolution in 1940, the Muslim League and Jinnah were demanding Muslim right to self-determination. In view of this, the 'right to self-determination' could not be denied to the substantial non-Muslim minorities living in contiguous districts in the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah threatened to demand a partition of Assam if the Congress insisted on the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Mountbatten said that the League's claim on Assam would be considered on the same merits as Congress's claims on parts of the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah knew that in Assam, Sylhet was the only Muslim majority state, which, if included in Pakistan, would still make a 'moth-eaten Pakistan'. As he wanted a larger and stronger Pakistan, he retorted on a different line and said that


to avoid partition of India power should be transferred to the provinces. Ayesha Jalal says: "This was a line which fitted in well with the interests of his constituents in the Muslim provinces, but his weakness relative to them had made him nervous of pushing it." However, Jinnah demanded that, after transfer of power, the provinces would then decide as to what groups they should join—whether Hindustan or Pakistan Constituent Assemblies. If Mountbatten had accepted this demand, the partition of India could have been avoided. Further, it was likely that the Indian states could have joined the Indian constituent due to encircled by the Indian territories. However, the remote areas in the East and West could have formed a strong independent and autonomous body to meet the Congress challenges at the weak Centre. There was also a possibility that the Muslim majority states also joined India in future to form a stronger and larger India with a perpetual policy of keeping peace, friendship and cooperation between the Hindus and the Muslims. Thus the continued riots and bloodshed could have been avoided. Truly, by his proposal, Jinnah wanted to avoid the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, but Mountbatten did not like to include the Hindu

91. Ibid.
majority areas in the Muslim sovereign states. Therefore, the Viceroy insisted that the Hindu majority areas from Bengal and the Punjab should be separated to meet the Congress demand. Whether Mountbatten be charged that he favoured the Congress demand as he was a close friend of the Nehrus? If not, why Mountbatten did not persuade the Congress to accept Jinnah's proposal without partitioning the Punjab and Bengal. This, to some extent, infers that Mountbatten failed to understand the inner motive of Jinnah that India should not be partitioned. But the Viceroy's insistence made the partition of these two provinces inevitable which resulted also in the partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan.

However, on Jinnah's proposal for transfer of power to provinces, Mountbatten invited Jinnah to help him in working out the mechanics of a scheme which could ensure cutting out the Muslim majority districts from the Punjab and Bengal and transfer of Power to them. Jinnah refused to assist and involve himself in the execution as he could

92. Philip Ziegler, op.cit., p. 367; See also the Manchester Guardian, February 25, 1947; Lord Ismay warned the British Government that Mountbatten's appointment would be considered a concession to the Congress and an affront to the Muslims; see A Campbell-Johnson, op.cit., p. 23; See also Leonard Mosley, p. 102.
be blamed and held responsible for the vivisection of India. Mountbatten was shrewd enough to lay this responsibility on Jinnah and shirk this prosecution from his own shoulders. Jinnah plainly said that he did not want vivisection of India and partition of the Punjab and Bengal but transfer of power to undivided provinces. Jinnah asked the Viceroy to see the Congress proposals regarding the partitioning of the Punjab and Bengal. By saying so he aimed to lay the responsibility of partitioning of the two provinces on the Congress. Jinnah, requested the Viceroy "not to spell out the procedure to be adopted in determining the will of the provinces," but the Viceroy warned that the Quaid-i-Azam was in danger of throwing away the "substance for the shadow", getting "an almost unworkable truncated Pakistan which would still be obliged to share a common organization at the Centre to arrange overall defence." This comment of the Viceroy is an adequate evidence of his favourism to the 'Congress will' for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal.


94 Ibid., p. 188.
Jinnah, feeling that the Viceroy was determined to the scheme of partitioning the Punjab and Bengal, demanded the partition of Assam also. The Viceroy agreed to this demand. Jinnah demanded also that without Calcutta Pakistan would be economically very uncertain and unworkable. The Viceroy agreed to it also. The Viceroy asked Jinnah as to why he was not prepared "to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, which gave him the whole of the Punjab, the whole of Bengal including Calcutta and the whole of Sind with complete autonomy ... a really worthwhile and workable Pakistan." The Viceroy tried to convince Jinnah that under the Cabinet Mission Plan, there would be a limited, weak and joint Centre at Delhi and he would be able to control Defence, Communication and External Affairs while he would also enjoy virtual independence in all his provinces. He said that he did not believe in the Congress leadership and it would be difficult for the autonomous Pakistan under the Cabinet Mission Plan to work with such freedom as was held out in theory. He was afraid that since there was no constitution agreed upon by the Congress and the Muslim League, the Hindus being in majority in most of the provinces would be able to change the weak centre into a

95. Mountbatten, 191, Interview No.46, Jinnah, April 10, 1947. Ibid.
strong centre. It may be inferred from the discussion that Jinnah was fighting a losing battle.

On April 11, when Mountbatten told Nehru that Jinnah had demanded partition of Assam also. The latter gave his consent forthwith as "this was a perfectly reasonable request and could easily be agreed to." Likewise Liaquat Ali Khan also stated: "I would in no circumstances prevent the Provinces from being partitioned if I accepted the principle of Pakistan." He also said: "If your Excellency was prepared to let the Muslim League have only the Sind desert, I would still be prepared to accept it." Patel still hoped that Jinnah would accept the Cabinet Mission Plan because the people of the Punjab and Bengal might revolt against partition of their provinces. Azad expressed grief that Jinnah refused to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan which also gave him the right to secede from the rest of India after ten years. Azad felt that the truncated Pakistan would be a disaster for the Mussalmans.

98. H.V. Hodson, op.cit., p. 224.
Mountbatten, on April 11, 1947, fully realised that the Congress accepted Pakistan with the partition of the Punjab and the Bengal, and Jinnah could be forced to accept the truncated Pakistan. The Viceroy needed the declared parties to negotiate with regard to the settlement.

Mountbatten, as he was a man of quick inference and judgment, decided to take a quick decision at this stage. Mountbatten, to bring the Congress and the League leaders, the difficult contenders from "emotionalism to stark realism" set out alternative proposals with hard terms, that is, either a Balkan Plan - a transfer of power to provinces severely to decide their future or divide the Punjab and Bengal creating a truncated Pakistan.

The events in India and the question of permanent settlement were thoroughly thrashed out at the Staff Meeting held on April 11, 1947, while Mountbatten conceded that "there was no possibility of shifting Jinnah from his position, and that without his agreement unity could only be imposed on India by force of arms." Mountbatten

discovered this reality quickly and that the solution was imposed on him. However, he reluctantly accepted the partition of India. The Staff Meeting recorded that the Viceroy said:

"...he wanted a most careful preamble to be written making it clear that his view had all along been completely impartial; that it was only when it became apparent that the retention of any form of a united India would start civil war that he had regretfully been obliged to give up this idea; and that he had therefore chosen a means which gave the choice of their future, as well as the somewhat primitive democratic machinery could allow, to the Indian people themselves."

Mountbatten devised a plan as follows:

"the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab should meet separately in two parts i.e., representatives of the predominantly Muslim areas, and representatives of the predominantly non-Muslim areas; and if both sections of each of these Assemblies voted for partition, then that province would be partitioned. Under the plan, in the event of the partition of Bengal, the predominantly Muslim

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district of Sylhet in Assam would have the option of joining the Muslim province."\(^{102}\)

By mid of April, the Viceroy was sure that partition was inevitable but it was not clear as to what would be the form and how it would be achieved. Before his arrival, the Indian leaders except Gandhiji and Azad, had already decided for it. Two weeks before the Viceroy's arrival, the Congress Working Committee had approved a resolution which envisaged the division of the Punjab. Nehru told Michael Brecher that "partition had become inevitable a year before it happened." Jinnah was mouthing the sentiments about Indian unity, but, in fact, the cause was lost. The Viceroy asked Ismay to prepare a plan for the partition of India, which could be acceptable in practice to everyone concerned.

As directed by the Viceroy, on April 11, 1947, Ismay drew up an outline for the transfer of power, the


\(^{104}\) Michael Brecher, op.cit., p.375.
main features of which "was the dimension of authority to the provinces, or to such confederations of provinces as might decide to group themselves in the intervening period before the actual transfer of power." Ismay sent the draft to V.P. Menon, an agent and mouthpiece of Nehru, for his amendments and working out a rough time-table. Menon, carrying out the order, appended his own opinion that the plan was "a bad one and certainly would not work." The finished plan was placed before the Governor's Conference called by Mountbatten on April 15-16, 1947, to discuss the matter of the transfer of power to the Indian leaders.

A day before the Governor's Conference the Punjab Governor Sir Even Jenkins met Ismay, Mieville, Weightman and Abell and expressed that the partition of Punjab would mean an 'immediate blow up' and would be disastrous to the province, involving a huge military operation. The Governor of Bengal, Sir Frederick Burrows, said that partition of

105. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, op.cit., p. 291.
106. Ibid.
107. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 354.
the province "would reduce Eastern Bengal to a 'rural
slum'". Mountbatten became more determined to implement
his plan although the Governor were against the partition.
On the other hand, "The greater the insistence by Jinnah
on his province-wise Pakistan, the stronger was the Cong­
ress demand that he should not be allowed to carry unwilling
minorities with him." On April 17, the Viceroy wrote
to the Secretary of State that a "partition is probably
inevitable." He continued:

"This opens a new vista, since now we could go
ahead giving Mr. Jinnah his truncated Pakistan
whilst keeping a strong Centre for the rest of
India at Delhi; all this on the assumption that
the N.W.F.P. remains a Congress Government and
that the Muslim League will not want the expense
of trying to run a Province which needs \( \frac{3}{2} \)
crores spent on it over and above its income
(mostly for the tribes) and that Suhrawardy will
not agree to the partition of Bengal and will
throw in his lot with Congress."

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110. Ibid.
111. Mountbatten 120, Viceroy to Secretary of State,
April 17, 1947. See N. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*
Jinnah, disagreeing with the Viceroy's proposal, said: "this is your scheme not mine."

All this was worrying Liaquat Ali Khan, who demanded an acceptable solution, and requested the Viceroy to use his influence to bring considerable pressure on the two parties to agree to a plan produced by him in order to get them out of their 'present impasse.' When the Viceroy suggested to modify the "Mission's plan to allow for a central defence authority which would be supported by taxing the various groups according to their populations and the size of the armies they required" Liaquat Ali Khan jumped with joy thinking that the plan would allow also all the Indian states to remain within the Commonwealth for a period of five years. He completely supported the proposal in view of League's 'phobia' against the word 'Cabinet Mission.' Ayesha Jalal says that the League also feared that "the Congress could easily deploy its numerical strength to frame a constitution providing for a strong Central Government. Without parity for the League


in the Central Government constitutional safeguards were simply promises on paper. There would be nothing to prevent the centre from interfering in the Muslim provinces; the Congress might use the Indian army to discipline the Muslim provinces, and, worse still, squeeze their domestic economies to raise finances to run the centre."

Observing the emotions of Liaquat Ali Khan, the Viceroy assessed that Liaquat Ali Khan would be helpful in finding "a more reasonable solution than this mad Pakistan."

The situation in the NWFP by that time had completely changed against the Congress. Therefore, the Viceroy decided that the will of the people should be respected. To solve the problem, he also decided to hold a referendum instead of elections, but the Congress believed that the party would be in the loss of province.

However, Nehru "accepted the referendum without much demur." He demanded that Caree, the Governor of NWFP, must go and he went. Mountbatten said that if Caree was present, "it would have been impossible to carry through

the referendum." As the Viceroy intervened, an order was issued to release the League prisoners, but, backed by Jinnah, they refused to accept freedom. After Mountbatten's departure from the province, the Muslim League started its agitation of civil disobedience again with such a ferocity that the Viceroy felt that if power would not be transferred soon, there would be no authority to whom power could be transferred. All this compelled Nehru to declare:

"The Muslim League can have Pakistan, if they wish to have it, but on the condition that they do not take away other parts of India which do not wish to join Pakistan."

Nehru categorically told the Viceroy that "there was no question of the High Command accepting a centre where Congress would share power with the League on the basis of equality between the "two" and that Congress would not share power at all. Nehru also said that the Congress "would not tolerate any deal by which it joined the League and Pakistan at an all-India level." Thus, decisive

118. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 354.
deterioration of the Congress was 'partition' and not of the Viceroy.

The urgent question before the Viceroy was how to grant some form of Dominion Status during 1947 if the Cabinet Mission Plan was not accepted. He decided that there should be some form of Pakistan. But since the Congress did not agree to Dominion Status the Viceroy was unable to recommend to His Majesty's Government any proposal. Had the two sides agreed to the Commonwealth proposal, the partition had become easy.

On April 23, Jinnah, pressing his last lever, proposed the division of army though he knew that it was impossible before June, 1948. He hoped that by this delaying tactics, Congress would come to terms and 'all inter-communal feeling would subside and Hindustan and Pakistan would be able to come together and work out the details.' On one hand, he wanted to maintain a parity, and, on the other, he desired the India's army to "march shoulder to shoulder, to discipline the common enemies of the Congress"

and the League beyond the sub-continent's border." He argued that India and Pakistan would not be able to stand alone against a powerful aggressor. Jinnah hoped to arrive at an ultimate goal of parity by having parity over external defence. Jinnah also realised that in case of division on communal lines, India will retain a moth-eaten and truncated army because the Muslim regiments of the Punjab, which have been the mainstay of India since the last ninety years, would be separated and they would prefer to join Pakistan.

On April 24, Mountbatten reported that Jinnah's demand of parity over external affairs with common arrangements with Hindustan and parity in terms of land and air forces had put Jinnah into a 'ridiculous situation.'

On April 25, Patel said to the Viceroy that the Congress had "reached the maximum limit of their concessions" and, hence, "(a) Congress would not accept any suggestion for a further degree of parity for the present Central Government; (b) if the Muslim League did not accept the


123. Ibid.
Cabinet Mission’s Plan, Congress desired partition.” Nehru also declared “Our aim is to liberate as much of India as we can, and then to deal with the question of the independence for the rest.” Nehru also reiterated that the Punjab and Bengal had no alternative save partition.

At the ninth miscellaneous meeting on May 1, 1947, the Viceroy believed that the Cabinet Mission Plan was still alive, but Jinnah repeatedly stated that he did not accept it on the grounds that the Congress ‘did not intend to carry it out fairly.’ The Viceroy stated that Jinnah was frightened with the prospect of a Centre permanently dominated by the Hindus. Mountbatten and his senior colleagues were convinced that Jinnah’s fear had some foundation and it led to the rejection of the Cabinet Plan. Jinnah insisted on Parity, but Patel warned the Viceroy that if he would raise the question of parity he would

125. Ibid., p. 337.
126. Ibid.
129. Ibid., pp. 507-508.
have to incur the everlasting enmity of Congress. He said that he would never agree to this for which he had been fighting since long. Ayesha Jalal rightly infers that "It was Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against partition." Seeing all this the Viceroy concluded that the Cabinet Mission Plan was dead and he had to plan for the partition of India.

Jinnah rejected the partition proposal and called for the transfer of power to the provinces as they were then constituted. He urged the Viceroy "not to fall into the "trap" set up by the Congress and "commit a grave error." The Viceroy was not sure whether Jinnah's attitude was "due to fear of his own followers or merely his maddening methods of bargaining." Further, Gandhi who

was once the greatest opponent of partition, had agreed to Nehru and Patel in proposing partition provided it involved the partition of Bengal and Punjab. Moreover the Congress Working Committee had also "virtually accepted the outline of the plan." In view of the Congress firm determination for getting partition of the Punjab and Bengal, the Viceroy realised that Jinnah had become powerless to prevent partition of India.

Mountbatten wanted a formula within ten days to send Ismay with the plan by the end of the month to London for acceptance by the British Cabinet and to call a conference of the Indian leaders at Simla on May 15. There were "almost innumerable alternative drafts" and each formula had the same design, that is, partition of India with some form of Supreme Defence Council hoping that one day a federal India would emerge. Mountbatten appointed a committee consisting of the Viceroy, Ismay, Abell and Mieville, for drafting an acceptable formula by all the


parties. They adopted the following formula and sent it to London with Ismay and Abell on May 2, 1947. The formula laid down that Pakistan was inevitable. The division would involve district-wise partition of the Punjab and Bengal, and the appointment of a boundary commission. The formula also stated that before the division has taken place members of the Legislative Assemblies of the provinces concerned should be given the opportunity to decide whether they would prefer to remain in the Indian Union or have a separate state for their areas. If the M.L.As. decided in favour of Partition then they would be asked to elect new representatives to a Constituent Assembly or Constituent Assemblies for their joint or separate areas on the basis of one representative for each million. The present Constituent Assembly for the Indian Union will remain intact. Only the members representing the partition areas would cease to be its members.

Though the Viceroy kept the formula 'most secret', it was published in The Hindu, on May 2, and in The Hindustan Times on May 3. Since the Plan was published, it was commented by various newspapers and it had become

137. Manmath Nath Das, op.cit., p. 91.
a matter of wide discussion in the country. On May 3, the Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State:

That the Congress had agreed for the division of the country but the division should be absolute and complete since that alone would give the majority of the people of India the opportunity of building up a powerful State with a strong centre. The Viceroy further drew the attention of the Secretary of State that there must be partition of the Punjab and Bengal giving chance to the non-Muslim areas to join the Indian Union. Since violence had become a part of politics Congress objected to its use, in the North-West Frontier Province the Punjab and Assam to settle political issues.

The Viceroy further told the Secretary of State that the Congress had no objection to a separate Constituent Assembly or Assemblies being summoned for those areas that choose to stand out of the Indian Union but it desired that such areas should decide for themselves whether they would remain independent or form union with other parts.

Mountbatten in this communication to London had also urged that His Majesty's approval should be communi-

cated to him by May 10. Meanwhile, the Viceroy planned to call a meeting of the Indian leaders of all the important parties on May 17, to ascertain their views on his proposals, which may be considered the first stage towards the process of the partition scheme.

Mountbatten's plan, which Ismay and Abell presented in London on May 3, provided for "partition, with Bengal and the Punjab having the option of being split between India and Pakistan, joining in entirely with either state, or going it alone." The plan had left the position of the Princely states quite obscure giving them the right to decide their own future. The parliamentary draftsmen in London changed the Viceroy's plan to some extent. First, the revised plan, besides giving different parts of India to decide their own future, included the proposal that the N.W.F.P. should also be allowed to opt for independence, which was opposed both by the Muslim League and the Congress.

From London the Viceroy received the amended plan a week later and showed it to the leaders a day before

140. Ibid.
the meeting on May 17, so that they should not get much
time for suggesting amendments. But, having friendly terms
with Nehru, Mountbatten gave the revised plan to Nehru
in the night of May 10, when he was going to bed. Nehru,
being anxious, read the plan at midnight and found it
quite unacceptable. Nehru woke up Krishna Menon and the
two wrote a letter to Mountbatten up to 4.00 A.M. Next
morning, the Viceroy received the letter which he referred
as 'Nehru bombshell' in his diary. Nehru had charged
vehemently:

"The whole approach was completely different
from what ours had been, and the picture of
India that emerged frightened me. In fact
much that we had done so far was undermined
and the Cabinet Mission's scheme and subse­
quent developments were set aside, and an
entirely new picture presented a picture of
fragmentation and conflict and disorder,
and, unhappily also, of a worsening of
relations between India and Britain."

Nehru also observed that the proposals invited the
Balkanisation of India, provoked certain civil conflict

142. Nehru to Mountbatten, May 11,1947, N.Mensergh,
and 'disorder', and broke the Central authority which alone could prevent the chaos that was growing and, demoralising the army, the police, and the central services. Seeing Nehru's note, Mountbatten was stunned. "It was one of the worst blow he had suffered in his life," and "for a few hours he was as close to despair as he had ever been." Patel demanded that all power should be transferred to the Central Government as the London approval had no force.

Nehru hoped that Jinnah would accept the proposal but, contrarily, Jinnah announced his disagreement to such 'a monstrous proposal' as the one put forward by Mr. Patel to restore peace, which was only a dream of his.

Jinnah demanded the partition of Indian provinces on the basis of population of Muslims and non-Caste Hindus in the Hindu majority provinces, though he knew that it was impossible. He raised this demand only to prevent

143. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, which, he believed, would be absolutely destructive and 'dangerous for the present but more so in the future.'

However, referring the Congress and the League objections to the plan, Mountbatten immediately sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on May 11, suggesting for "redrafting the plan." At this point, Attlee asked Mountbatten to fly home immediately.

Mountbatten left for London on May 19 and he informed Attlee and his Cabinet colleagues that "the Muslim League would resort to arms if Pakistan in some form were not conceded."

Jinnah demanded a 800-mile long "corridor" on May 20 to link West and East Pakistan and wired to the Cabinet that "before Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned a referendum should be held in each province to determine will of its people in this vital regard." The Viceroy rejected it as it could result in delay.

Mountbatten returned to India on May 31, 1947. He drafted a personal message to the people. On June 2, the Viceroy held a meeting in New Delhi with Liaquat, Nishtar, Jinnah, Patel, Kripalani, Nehru, Baldev Singh and gave them the draft of the partition plan to/approval of their Working Committees. Nehru and Patel accepted the Plan. Jinnah refused to sign though the Muslim League Working Committee had already authorised him to take any decision he would like suitable. He said that "he and his Working Committee would have to go before their masters, the people, for a final decision." Mountbatten realised that he was using the tactics of delaying the matter. Therefore, he warned Jinnah that there should not be "No" from the Muslim League. In fact, Jinnah did not like to be wholly responsible for the partition. On the same day, Jinnah met the Viceroy at 11.00 P.M. and about the acceptance of the plan, he used the word "hopeful." Mountbatten reports: "I finally asked him whether he felt I would be justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and

150. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 374.
make the announcement, to which he replied very firmly,
"Yes."

On June 3, Mountbatten called a meeting of the leaders and observed that there was 100% acceptance of the plan. In the course of discussion, as promised, Jinnah nodded his head and also promised to do his best to get the plan accepted by his followers. The Viceroy declared that the Partition Act would be implemented not later than August 15, 1947.

Immediately after the morning conference on June 3, Mountbatten communicated to the Secretary of State that Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh had accepted the partition plan. In consequence, Attlee announced the plan in the House of Commons on June 3, which came to be known "the June 3rd Plan." In the evening of June 3, Mountbatten also broadcast over the All-India Radio. Highlighting the cause of partition, the Viceroy said:

"To my great regret it has been impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet Mission

153. Ibid., p. 117.
Plan, or any plan that would preserve the unity of India. But there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority to live against their will under a government in which another community has a majority. And the only alternative to coercion is partition.**155

The Viceroy expressed grief on account of the partition and further said: "I am, of course, just as much opposed to the partition of provinces as I am to the partition of India herself." He also said that the people of India should decide the question of partition themselves. He made it clear that though the people of the Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam would lay down the boundaries between India and Pakistan, the ultimate decision would be taken by a Boundary Commission.

The Viceroy's speech was followed by His Majesty's Government's Statement confirming the Plan.


156. Ibid.
After the Viceroy, Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh broadcast their speeches. Nehru said ".... it must always be remembered that the future of India can only be decided by the people of India, and not by any outside authority, however, friendly."

Jinnah without giving clear acceptance of the plan, said: ".... the plan does not meet in some important respects our point of view, and we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of the matters dealt with by the Plan." Jinnah also said that he had called the All-India Muslim League Council to meet on June 9, and was hopeful of the acceptance of the Plan. He also commended Viceroy's "fairness and impartiality." He said that according to paragraph 11 of the Statement, a referendum would be made to the electorates of the then Legislative Assembly in the N.W.F.P. which would decide whether the province would join India or Pakistan.

Baldev Singh accepted the plan reluctantly. On June 4, Mountbatten, addressing a press conference, said

158. The Dawn (Delhi) June 5, 1947.
159. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 380.
that "independence through Dominion Status was complete and that the different administrations were at liberty to opt out of the Commonwealth whenever they pleased."

Mountbatten held a meeting on June 5, with the political leaders in his office, while Jinnah expressed pain that both States would be independent and equal in every respect. On the other side, the Hindu Mahasabha resolved calling for an all-India 'Anti-Pakistan Day.'

On June 7, the Viceroy produced a 33-page document entitled: "The Administrative Consequences of Partition" before the party leaders and formed a Partition Committee consisting of Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar with Lord Mountbatten as the Chairman. On June 27, the Committee gave way to partition Council.

The All-India Muslim League's meeting held on June 9-10, 1947 in a resolution said that the only solution of India's problem was to divide India into two-Pakistan and Hindustan. The Council was of the opinion that although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and

160. Ibid., p. 381.
162. V.P-Menon, op.cit., p. 382.
the Punjab, or give its consent to such partition, it has to consider His Majesty's plan for the transfer of power as a whole. The Council authorised Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League 'to accept the fundamental principles of the plan is a compromise and leave it to him, with full authority, to work out all the details of the plan in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the complete division of India on the basis and fundamental principles embodied in His Majesty's Plan including Defence, Finance and Communication.' But orthodox Mullahs, mighty landed barons and mercantile magnates cried out angrily against the plan calling it "betrayal" and a "tragedy for Pakistan."

At the first meeting of the Interim Government on June 12, the Congress and the League members were almost to fight on the question of appointment of Pandit Nehru's sister, as an ambassador, which was opposed by the League. Mountbatten realised that nature of Indians cannot be assessed and felt fear of the collapse of his plan. Therefore he hurried to make arrangement for transfer of power and to leave India as early as possible. A joint conference

of Sikh organisations in Lahore also accepted the division of the Punjab on June 14. The Bengal Legislative Assembly and Punjab Legislative Assembly, opted partition on June 20 and June 23 respectively. On June 26, Sind Legislative Assembly and Baluchistan Legislative Assembly opted to join Pakistan. In view of these options, Jinnah on June 27, reported to Mountbatten: "Thus, we can now look upon the creation of Pakistan on the 15th August as legally decided upon."

On June 27, Mountbatten invited Jinnah, Liaquat, Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh to discuss this important issue. Two High Court judges were chosen each by the Congress and the League to work as commission for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah with the consent of the League suggested Sir Cyril Radcliffe to chair the commissions which was reluctantly accepted by the Congress. Radcliffe reached New Delhi on July 8. The Viceroy gave him five weeks to draw new national boundaries. Soon separate committees went to work to partition the army and the territories, which remained for some ninety years under the British control.

164. Ibid.
Nehru had requested the Viceroy to remain on as the Governor-General of India, but Jinnah desired himself to be the Governor-General of Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Jinnah suspected that Mountbatten being a friend of Nehru would treat Pakistan as a stepchild.

Jinnah assured the minorities that in his Pakistan they would have "protection with regard to their religion, faith, life, property and culture. They would, in all respect, be citizens of Pakistan without any discrimination ... The same principle ... would apply to the minorities in India as well."

The Indian Independence Bill was passed by the House of Commons on July 16, at its third reading, and on July 18, the Indian Independence Act received the Royal assent. On July 19, Mountbatten announced the establishment of two separate provisional governments, India and Pakistan. A communique was issued confirming taking-over of the portfolios of different ministries by the Congress and the League Wings in the Cabinet of the Interim Government of India and Pakistan respectively. A similar

procedure was adopted in the Punjab and Bengal legislative assemblies before partitioning of these States.

There were the following provinces in August, 1947, before partition of India: The strategic provinces were Bengal, Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sylhet. As decided by the members in the Legislative Assembly of Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas, East Bengal and West Bengal decided to join Pakistan and Hindustan respectively. Likewise, the members in the Legislative Assembly of Punjab of the Muslim majority areas and non-Muslim majority areas of West Punjab and East Punjab decided to join Pakistan and Hindustan respectively, the Muhammadan and Indian Christian constituencies in Sylhet in Assam in a referendum favoured to join East Bengal (Pakistan). Sind, Baluchistan, and NWFP decided to join Pakistan. The other seven provinces, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, being Hindu-majority provinces, decided to join India.

The problem of accession of Princely States to India or Pakistan became controversial. The Viceroy, on June 3, 1947, had announced:

"When the British withdrew from India, paramountcy would lapse and the rulers of the
Indian states would become technically and legally independent; they could enter into any relationship with the successor government or governments; or they could remain independent; and they were free to decide all this at their convenience.** 166

The Congress pleaded that as 'paramountcy' came into existence as a fact and not by an agreement, the Congress had the right to rule over the princely states after independence and the princes would have no right to declare independence or to decide to accede to India or Pakistan. Further, the Congress demanded that the people of every state should decide whether they wish to join India or Pakistan, while the Muslim League committed a grave mistake by claiming that the right to accede or secede to India or Pakistan should be given to the rulers, so that the Muslim states of Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur could join Pakistan, but it forgot that due to their geographical situation, it was impossible.

Meanwhile, the Radcliffe's final Award was kept secret till the eve of the partition and declaration of independence.

Jinnah with his sister left for Karachi in the Viceroy's Dakota in the morning of August 7. They were welcomed by tens of thousands of admirers with the slogan of "Pakistan Zindabad." The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan met on August 11, and unanimously elected Jinnah to preside over its meetings. Two days after, Mountbatten reached Karachi and inaugurated the Dominion of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. Jinnah was sworn-in as Governor-General of Pakistan. The Viceroy flew back to New Delhi and inaugurated the Dominion of India on August 15, 1947. The Radcliffe Award was given to the leaders of India and Pakistan on August 16, 1947.
In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to describe the relation between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, the two great political parties of the period between 1940-1947 which is a very crucial period in the political history of modern India. Their political faults and lack of adjustment ultimately led to the vivisection of the country which cost tens of thousands of lives of the people of this continent and even today when more than four decades have gone by, the two countries are at dagger's drawn. One, not knowing much about Indian politics and Muslim League, takes it for granted that it was the Muslim communalism that was opposed to a United India and the Muslim League was the precursor of many problems that led to the division of the country.

But an objective study leads one to the conclusion that League from the beginning was not opposed to United India, neither was it founded to oppose the Congress. A study of its objectives reveals that it was not anti-Hindu since its birth. When the non-Muslim Secretary of the Nawab of Dacca issued a circular to the leading Muslims,
on behalf of the Nawab, inviting them to assemble at Dacca to form an anti-Hindu association, it was very much resented by almost every Muslim leader. It was suggested by them that the Muslim community needed a political organisation for the Indian Muslims with a view to safeguard their political interests. It had nothing to do with the Hindus and the Congress. Thus the League was founded only to safeguard their political interests. The formation of the League was welcomed by the non-Muslim Press and save a very microscopic section, the Muslim move was appreciated.

Some controversy had erupted at the grant of separate electorate to the Muslims but sober-minded Congress leaders welcomed it also and Gokhale recognised the justice in the claim of the Muslims for 'adequate, real and genuine representation in the Council through separate electorates. He wrote to Minto, 'My Lord, I sincerely believe that your Lordship and Lord Morley have saved India from drifting towards what cannot be described by any other name than

chaos. For, however strong a government may be, repression never can put down the aspiration of a people and never will."

The Tripoli-Balkan War of 1911-12 united the League and Congress. The Council of the All-India Muslim League chalked out a new policy in 1912 and the "achievement of self-government" was adopted as one of its objectives which was decidedly a departure from the current policy of the League and it "marked an important step in Muslim politics." Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla who presided over the Muslim League session of 1913 at Agra very extensively dealt with the League's ideals of 'self-government' which astonished Maulana Azad who remarked that since the advent of Muslim political movement it was the first speech in their political literature so coloured in Indian nationalism. The Lucknow Pact (1916) further cemented the bond of unity between the two organisations. Their relations


3. The Times, January 1, 1913, see also the letter of Mirza Salimullah Beg to the editor of the Pioneer regarding "The Future Policy of Mohammadans." January 15, 1912.

4. The Tribune, January 1914.
were so cordial that the Congress Leaders attended the League annual session and the League leaders participated in the annual deliberations of the Congress. During the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation Movements, both the organisations worked amicably for the major cause of the country. This could have continued had not the Nehru Report annoyed Jinnah and other Muslim political leaders. Jinnah wanted perfect safeguards for the minorities inspite of his being a Congress leader which the Report failed to provide and Jinnah withdrew himself from the Congress. Mohammad Ali who was once the President of the Congress stepped into his boots on the same ground; withdrew himself from the Congress and this secession administered a severe blow to the Congress. The Congress could have very easily conceded the Muslim demands without any loss to its programme or prestige but it did not do so and thus missed many influential Muslim leaders one after the other. During the Round Table Conference 1930-31 the question of minority was raised again and again and here also it failed to reached any compromise and the deadlock continued.

5. For Jinnah's speech See The Times of India, December 29, 1928.

6. For Mohammad Ali’s speech see The Indian Daily Mail December 24, 1928.

Then came the Act of 1935 under which elections took place and both the Muslim League and the Congress fought for their destiny. The Congress won the election by a thumping majority in eight out of eleven provinces. In the United Provinces the League won 27 seats out of 64 Muslim seats. The Congress won almost all Hindu seats and was in a position to form a government. But in view of the settlement which had earlier taken place between the Congress and League for providing considerable seats to the Muslim League, the Congress could not fulfil its promise and instead of two seats in the cabinet it proposed to give one on the condition that the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces would be dissolved. It was a high price for the League and it did not accept it. Leaguers formed the idea that the Congress wanted to merge the League within its fold.

According to Azad - "If the U.P. League's offer of cooperation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes have merged in the Congress. Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim League in the U.P. a new lease of life..... It was from the U.P. that the League was reorganised. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage
of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately 8 led to partition." This was Himalayan blunder.

This view has been supported by many scholars also. Dr. S.P. Sen in his Dictionary of National Biography says: 'In 1937 when the Congress was flushed with victory in the majority of Provinces, it was mainly because of Nehru that a chance of communal harmony was spoiled by his idealistic and doctrinaire intransigence ..... The political destiny of India would have been shaped in an entirely different way if Nehru had shown more political maturity and accommodating spirit, hoping for a real rapproachement between the two major communities in India. But Nehru could not rise to the occasion.' Dr. R.C. Majumdar has this to say in relation to the above: "To sacrifice collaboration with the Muslim League in the name of ideals which did not at all correspond with existing facts was an extremely unwise - almost fatal-step for which India had to pay very dear ... The Muslims now realised that as a separate community they had no political prospects in future. The Congress ultimatum was the signal for the

parting of ways, which by inevitable stages, led to the foundation of Pakistan."

Then came the Congress rule in eight provinces and the League raised much hue and cry for Hindu atrocities on Muslims in their provinces. **The Pirpur Committee Report; Fazlul Haque's Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule** branded the Congress Rule as Hindu Raj and demanded its withdrawal. There is no doubt that in some of the provinces the Congress ministers did not take into account the Muslim grievances and it was injurious to the national cause. Since Hindi language was allowed an equal status along with the Urdu in the Congress ruled provinces, Hindus in vengeance Sanskritised the language throwing Urdu away. According to Ram Gopal "The more communal-minded among the protagonists satisfied their communalism by loading textbooks with biographical sketches of Hindu heroes, practical ignoring Muslim heroes. The indiscretions committed at lower levels of the administration were capable of correction at the annual stock taking of administrative activities, but the Congress Governments stayed in office for barely two years, and had no time for correction. Two year:

was too small a period for curing the chronic ills." This is one example of Congress negligence and Jinnah on these issues demanded the withdrawal of the Congress ministries. The opportunity automatically came when the World War II was declared by the British and Lord Linlithgow announced India as a party to it. The Congress resigned the office and the League celebrated "The Day of Deliverance" on December 22, 1939.

The gulf between the Congress and the League had widened. Jinnah was now completely a changed man. He started thinking on the two nation theory and in an article he strongly pleaded about two different languages and cultures - one of the Muslims and the other Hindus between which there was no meeting ground. This attitude of Jinnah had certainly shocked Jawaharlal Nehru who in December 1939 wrote to Jinnah "It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. Jinnah could not be checked. Congress and League were now poles asunder and in the annual session of All-India

Muslim League at Lahore on March 23, 1940 Jinnah presented a resolution, known as 'Lahore Resolution' demanding a separate Homeland for the Muslims on the basis of his popular two nation theory. "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state." He later made a call to observe Pakistan Day on April 19, 1940 which was taken by the Muslims as an occasion of great festivities. By all this Jinnah wanted to prove the strength of the League which had not been accepted as a representative organisation of the Muslims. Thus from now an struggle between the Congress and League started which ended in the partition of the country.

Jinnah had come to make the demand for Pakistan not all of a sudden. Though he had revived League but till 1939 he considered himself as nationalist which is clear from the letter he wrote on March 17, 1938 to Nehru in which he said. "It is the duty of every true nationalist

15. In March 1937 Nehru said: "There are only two forces in India today, British imperialism and Indian nationalism as represented by the Congress."Jinnah immediately responded to this and said that there was the third party also - the Musalmans."
to whichever party or community he may belong to help
achieve a united front."

Though the demand of Pakistan was made yet neither Congress took it very seriously nor the League insisted much on it. Both the parties still believed in evolving a formula on which Hindus and Muslims might have lived peacefully in a United India. Search for a solution continued. The League wanted no more than the safeguard of the rights of minority. This feeling ultimately led to Desai-Liaqat Ali Pact which proposed an equal number of persons, nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Legislature and the formation of the Coalition ministry to repair the loss in their relation done in 1937. It was an attempt to bring parity between the Congress and League in forming the coalition Government. The rejection of the Pact by the Congress was another jolt in the Congress-League relation.

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, was very sincere in his efforts to bring about a solution of Hindu-Muslim problem to keep India united. The Conference he convened at Simla on June 25, 1945 agreed on the parity principle but Jinnah

insisted all the five members of the League. In other words the Congress did not have the right to appoint any Muslim on its quota and thus the Conference failed.

While Azad was aware of the Muslim fear about their safety which led them to oppose the nomination of any Muslim on the Congress quota, the Congress was not prepared to allely the fears of Muslims about their fate in a free and united India. He founded a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem in a proposal sent to Gandhi in a letter dated August 2, 1945 in which he rejected Pakistan on two grounds. Firstly, it would not be in the interest of the Muslims themselves and secondly its acceptance by the Congress would be a defeatist policy. The proposal he made in his letter was a midway between both the wrongs. He suggested (a) a federal government in which central subjects of an all India nature were agreed upon by the constituent unit. (b) The units were given the rights to secede (c) There were to be joint electorate in Centre and Provinces with reservation of seats. (d) There must be parity of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Legislature and the Central Executive so long as the communal suspicion and frenzy did not disappear.

This was the best solution that Azad had founded but Gandhiji and the Congress was silent about it and nothing was heard of it. Had this proposal which was only a "rough outline" been accepted Pakistan could have been averted but the Congress did not take it seriously and it lost one of the best solutions founded by Azad. The Congress further did not take any lesson from the results of December 1945 election wherein the Muslim League won almost every Muslim seat defeating every nationalist Muslim, and was now the sole spokesman of the Muslim masses. This was accepted by Gandhiji who signed with the Jinnah the formula which said:

"The Congress does not challenge, and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles, they alone have today the unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India."

When in March 1946 the Cabinet Mission visited India and discussed with Azad and Jinnah the future constitution of India, it accepted Azad's proposal which while preserving

18. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 673.
the unity of India also secured Hindu-Muslim Unity. The proposal did not provide for a strong centre and thus Muslims' fear was allayed. The grouping of the subjects was reluctantly accepted by the Congress and was also accepted by the League. The Muslim community had secured all that Pakistan would give it. But the unfortunate statement of Nehru on July 10, at Bombay changed the whole situation. Replying to a correspondent Nehru said that "Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly completely unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situations as they arose." This was slightly confusing. The "Press representatives further asked if this meant that the Cabinet Mission Plan would be modified." In reply Jawaharlal Nehru emphatically said that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan."

This left Jinnah unsatisfied and forced him to think that Jawaharlal's statement represented the real mind of the Congress. He argued that if the Congress could change so many times while the British were still in the country and power had not come to its hands, what assurance would

the minorities have that once the British left, the Congress would not again change and go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal's statement." Thus the acceptance of the Plan changed into its rejection and this hastened the process of partition which took place on August 15, 1947. Mountbatten had no choice. Jinnah was not so keen on Partition but he wanted safety for the minority. When Mountbatten argued with him for a United India Jinnah replied that 'even though nothing would have given him greater pleasure than to see such unity, it was the behaviour of the Hindus that had made it impossible for the Muslims to share it.' Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India got full independence and British withdrew from here, Hindu majority could not be relied upon. Jinnah was a 'strong bulwark' against the partition of the country but as B. Shiva Rao says that 'new and formidable forces' turned the 'apostle of Indian unity' for the first time to see the need of the partition of the country.

There was a clash of personalities also which led to the partition. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah were

20. Ibid., p. 141.
21. The Illustrated Weekly of India, August 13, 1972 see Article 'Break-up of Pakistan - A Prophecy Come True' by Kuldip Nayar, p. 17.
the top ranking leaders who were determined to decide the fate of India. Jinnah mistrusted both Gandhi and Nehru and Nehru in turn underestimated Jinnah. Dr. Tara Chand criticises Congress for ignoring Jinnah which 'wounded his vanity'. The great scholar deplores the chauvinistic attitude of some of the Hindu leaders for alienating Muslim sympathies. Kanji Dwarkadas says that if Congress leaders could have been friendly with Jinnah and his ego had not been hurt, Jinnah might not have raised a slogan for partition. Apart from this the Congress and the League leadership differed regarding the political set-up in the country. Jinnah had always stood for a loose federation with the centre having limited powers and residuary powers resting with the states. While on the other hand the Congress always pleaded for a strong centre. In these circumstances a United India was an impossibility.

Jinnah was not happy with the creation of Pakistan. At the height of his glory he was disillusioned and lonely. When the Nizam's emissary Laiqat Ali Khan met Jinnah, the


25. Ibid.

later was in tears as he realised what great harm the partition of India had brought to the millions of innocent people who suffered beyond their control. He also visualised a poor future for Pakistan because of the poor calibre of the Pakistan leadership. He was not even happy with his Prime Minister, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan who did not give any proof of his sharpness in political matters.

Jinnah is said to have told his Prime Minister, "you have started thinking yourself as a big man. You are nothing... you think you have made Pakistan. I have made it. But I am now convinced that I have committed the biggest blunder of my life. "Jinnah was in his death-bed that time and after taking a fresh-breath he continued "If now I get an opportunity I will go to Delhi and tell Jawaharlal (Nehru) to forget about the folies of the past and become friends again." It, therefore, appears from the above that Jinnah was not keen on Partition. He only needed protection for the minorities and used the idea of Partition merely as a bargaining counter. There appears to be much truth in the letter of Rajgopalachari who wrote to Kuldip Nayar in October 13, 1971 that

"Mr. Jinnah was certain in his mind that if India got full independence and British control was altogether

eliminated, the Hindu majority could not be relied upon for dealing justly with the Muslim population of India. He, therefore, was clear in his mind that somehow or the other, overall British control must be retained over the Indian sub-continent and its affairs. He never believed that Britain would withdraw leaving India totally independent. Nor did he wish it. He consequently put up objections and obstructions to which, he calculated, the Congress would not yield. He, therefore, expected that the Congress demand for total independence would not be acceded to by the British and the Muslim population would continue to have overall British protection."

In his letter to the editor Dr. Chamanlal, brings to light one more incident of history which goes to prove of Jinnah's ideas on the unity of India. He said that when he met Jinnah sometimes in 1943, Jinnah told him to write to Mahatma Gandhi, then in Poona Jail, that if the principle of Pakistan was accepted, he would not ask for a division of the country. Dr. Gopichand Bhargava was expected to go to Poona to deliver that letter of Chamanlal but since he could not proceed the message had not been

delivered to him. Thus the opportunity was lost.

Even before that Jinnah invited Chamanlal to a lunch. During conversation Jinnah asked him as to why the Congress did not give him the two annas. This financial conundrum confused Mr. Chamanlal who requested Mr. Jinnah to explain his point fully. In reply Jinnah said, "The communal award has given me 14 annas in the rupee. I want the other two annas." Mr. Chamanlal wanted more clarification to which Jinnah said, "First of all I want joint Electorates" and "secondly I want a 33\(\frac{1}{2}\)\% representation in the centre and suitable weightages in the U.P., Bihar and elsewhere." Mr. Chamanlal was so astonished that the fish knife and fork dropped from his hand on the table. It was unexpected from Jinnah to be so mild. He would not believe it and asked the late Raizada Hans Raj who was also a friend of Jinnah to check it from the League leader. He did it and found that Jinnah actually wanted what he said. Just after this Mr. Chamanlal sent a letter to Gandhiji, briefing him the gist of his conversation with Jinnah. Gandhiji received the letter and wrote back to Chamanlal to wait for further instructions. Gandhiji consulted Jawaharlal Nehru whose reaction to this was most unfavourable. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to
Chamanlal that he had no objection to meeting Mr. Jinnah. But it was not Nehru but Gandhi with whom Jinnah wanted to talk and settle the problem once for all. Eventually Gandhiji wrote to Chamanlal that "he was not even a four anna member of the Congress, that he did not see the light, and that we must wait for a better opportunity." This was an excellent opportunity provided by Jinnah who happened to be in a conciliatory mood after League's debacle in 1936. "Thus ended a dialogue", says Chamanlal "which might have changed the course of recent events."

In the face of all these evidences it is not wrong to say that the lack of the spirit of conciliation on the part of Congress leadership prompted Jinnah to go ahead with his plan. Durga Das holds that inspite of Congress opposition Jinnah was still a nationalist. He wanted only an acknowledgment from the Congress that he was the 'sole spokesman of the Muslims.' "That is all that I seek", he told Durga Das. The election of Maulana Azad as a Congress President to preside over its annual session in March 1940, at Ramgarh further irritated him. By electing Maulana Azad Congress wanted to show to the world that Jinnah was not the sole spokesman of the Muslims and Jinnah bitterly remarked that "they have now added insult to injury by
selecting that show-boy." He held the Congress leaders responsible and told Durga Das that 'if only Gandhi would join hands with me, the British game of divide and rule would be frustrated.'

After this frustration Jinnah on March 23, 1940 in the Annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore presented his resolution known as the Lahore resolution. The resolution did not use the word Pakistan and when a Hindu correspondent asked him whether the resolution "meant a demand for Pakistan?" Jinnah avoided the word Pakistan and only replied that "it was open to him to think so and that he was prepared to accept his interpretation."

After the session Durga Das met Jinnah and told him that "Sikandar Hayat Khan had categorically told me that the resolution was essentially a bargaining counter." Jinnah replied: 'A bargain my friend, is struck between two parties. Let the Congress first accept the League as the other party.'

This amply goes to prove that Jinnah was interested in the recognition of Muslim League as the only party of

31. Ibid.
Muslims to look after their interest. The vivisection of India was far from his mind.

Another question which is very much asked: could the Partition have been averted? The answer may be 'yes'. If the Congress had been in a conciliatory mood the League would not have insisted on it. To Jinnah the safety and security of the Muslims was the major issue. Had it been provided, it would have satisfied Jinnah. Even in the Cabinet Mission when the League accepted the Plan, thinking that it would secure what it wanted, Jawaharlal's statement provoked his ire and Jinnah took his last weapon, 'The Direct Action' to get Pakistan.

B. Shiva Rao by his personal experience further opines that the Partition would have been averted if:

(i) The Congress had accepted Gandhiji's advice of unconditional cooperation with the Government or

(ii) The Congress Leaders had accepted Sir Aurobindo's advice to accept the Cripps offer without discussion.

32. Ibid.
In his opinion the League would have made no objection and cooperated the Congress as it had been cooperating with the Government. These counsels were not accepted and as a result of many formidable forces in the latter half of the war, partition was thought out to be the only way out of a tangled situation. Both Jinnah and Gandhi had accepted the partition much against their willingness but 'both Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah', says Shiva Rao, 'looked forward during their life-time to a happy relationship between India and Pakistan either on the basis of a treaty or, at least, as a gentleman's agreement.'

Jinnah, as said earlier, till 1939 was a nationalist and he in spite of his two-nation theory and slogan of Pakistan continued to have soft corner for India. It is evident from the fact that when the Cabinet Mission decisively rejected the idea of Pakistan the Muslim League accepted its Plan. Jinnah himself was not clear about the implications of his demand, he only wanted at least 'Pakistan' in principle to be accepted. He wanted 'statutory safeguards' for the minorities to be incorporated

33. The Statesman, August 15, 1966 see B. Shiva Rao's article 'Road to Partition: Paved with Good Intentions.'

34. Ibid.
on the basis of parity in any scheme which was to deliver independence to India. To Jinnah India was a bigger whole to which both Pakistan and Hindustan (as he called the rest of India) were to belong. Elucidating his point Jinnah said "Let us therefore, live as good neighbours, let the Hindus guard the South and West and let the Muslims guard the frontiers. We will then stand together and say to the world 'Hands off India, India for the Indians.' Mr. Shri Prakasa India's first High Commissioner to Pakistan corroborates the above by saying that Jinnah wanted the two states to be known as parts of India. This can further be seen in Jinnah's dealing with the Cabinet Mission. The Cabinet Mission told Jinnah that he had to make choice between "an Indian Union, confined to defence and foreign affairs having under it two Federations of Pakistan and Hindustan and a sovereign Pakistan, but from which large blocks of territories inhabited pre-dominantly by non-Muslims, would be excluded." It was rejected by both the Congress and the League. Thereafter both the sides presented their proposals. The Congress proposals formally put forth on May 12, provided that "groups of provinces may be formed." In this connection what is most noteworthy


36. Ibid.
is that while on April 29, 1946 Mr. Jinnah sent to the Mission a copy of the resolution passed by the subjects committee of the All-India Muslim League Legislators Convention with a scheme of Pakistan the formal proposal he put to the Mission on May 11, did not provide for the Partition of India, but for a confederation of Pakistan and the rest of India. This amply goes to prove that Jinnah was not keen on Partition and was willing to solve his differences with the Congress amicably. The swift Journey towards Pakistan also took place because of the British decision to leave India by June 3, 1948. Lord Mountbatten who succeeded Lord Wavell on March 22, 1947 was determined to end the drama by any means accepted by the political parties.

Jinnah had rejected the Plan after Nehru's statement at Bombay and there was no means left to him except the Direct Action demonstrated to the Government. An explosive situation had come to surround the whole country. While the leaders of the Congress and League saw more disaster in the coming months, Mountbatten on the other hand found that 'the British Government were sitting on

37. Ibid.
the crest of a volcano. General Ismay who accompanied Mountbatten to India as his Chief of Staff described the situation in 1947 as "an ammunition ship on fire." It could explode any time and it was Mountbatten's business to see that when the explosion came the British were on dry ground." June 3, 1948 appeared to him to be a distant time for transferring power in such an atmosphere. The Viceroy therefore hastened the process of division. Mountbatten's persuasive power finally convinced the League and the Congress that Partition of the country was the only solution which could bring peace to India. According to Mr. R. Thaper, Nehru was "impatient to throw the British, and though emotionally opposed to Pakistan, immediate compulsion had become irresistible to him. There was a

38. The Sunday Standard, September 28, 1975, see article The Road to Partition by D.P. Mishra.


40. Leonard Mosley says that since his youth Mountbatten decided that he would one day become the First Sea Lord and his first consideration, when he got his assignment as Viceroy of India was to see that it did not constitute a break in his naval career. It was the naval compulsion that made him rush the partition. See The Hindustan Times, September 1, 1980.
gnawing fear that delay would certainly spark uncontrollable extremism — communal, feudal and secular—which even an exhausted alien ruler could exploit for further vivisection of the sub-continent." It appears from a chronological study of documents that neither the British authorities, nor the Congress leaders nor the Muslim League contemplated over the partition in human terms. General Tukar opines that all the three forces in the sub-continent were absorbed in their own calculation. What worried Lord Wavell was the safe deportation of the British army which could have been attacked by the mob any time. His successor Lord Mountbatten was worried for his next promotion as the First Sea Lord. The Congress finding the League slightly nearing its goal insisted on the partition of Punjab and Bengal, not anticipating the lose of human lives. The League which had raised the Pakistan demand as a bargaining counter had lastly to accept the trunk-cated Pakistan never believing if it could happen. This ultimately led the Congress to accept partition without foreseeing the magnitude of the disaster that followed. With the creation of the two dominions, the migrations on either side of the border were so colossal, that imagination fails to

41. The Hindustan Times, September 28, 1966, See 'Was it Possible to Prevent India's Partition.'

42. The Hindustan Times, December 31, 1972.
visualise. By the end of 1948 about 6,599,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan and 5,563,000 Hindus to India. In the wake of migration countless people - variously estimated at 2,00,000 to two millions were massacred and the Viceroy and the Indian and Pakistani statesmen stood helplessly watching 'the calamitous consequences of the decision to divide India.' The main actors of the drama were not aware of the magnitude of communal frenzy which had bewildered them and Jawaharlal had very candidly admitted it to Liaquat Ali Khan that "we never foresaw anything like this when we agreed to it." Lord Mountbatten, who hastened the speed of Partition because of British disillusionment regretted it and felt that partition might have been avoided. Pakistan was not 'a gift of the Britishers to the Muslims' as assessed by Y.B. Mathur. If it has been so why a million lives were lost and many more millions people were uprooted from their homes. The creation of Pakistan was due to some tactical mistakes of the

44. The Sunday Standard, November 16, 1975, see Politics of Partition in Retrospect being a Review on Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre's book 'Freedom at Midnight,'
45. Ibid.
47. Ayesha Jalal, op.cit., p. 262.
Congress on one hand and of the last Viceroy's on the other who had their nationals safety in view as well as their personal ambitions. In view of what had been discussed above it is not incorrect to say as Dr. Ayesha Jalal has said that "it was the Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was against it."

During the Round Table Conference, "a palmist who read Jinnah's hand prophesied for him the headship of an independent state at the end of his career. Jinnah laughed at the suggestion as absurd. 'Certainly in 1930-31 when the British were at the top of their excellence politically and administratively and when Jinnah himself a nationalist could not have thought of it. Neither at the end of 1946, there was any clue of his becoming the head of a country. It was the drift of events within six months that changed the course of Indian history; won Pakistan for League and headship of a Muslim states for Jinnah."

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