AFGHANISTAN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FROM THE AFGHAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE TO 1947

ABSTRACT

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

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IN

HISTORY

By

MD. WASEEM RAJA

Under the Supervision of RAJKUMAR TRIVEDI
Professor of History

CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
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2000
This is a study of the Anglo-Afghan diplomatic relations, encompassing the last two and half decades of the British colonialism in the Indian subcontinent.

The period (1919-1945) chosen for study had been a complex one. With the dawn of 20th century, the International political scenario equally became more and more complex. The World War I had witnessed the division of the world into two rival camps. Whereas the Russian Revolution of 1917 brought forth the Marxian socialist ideology to the fore. A new element injected in the world on the basis of ideology. Western World's hunger for colonies and domination of the world, and unprecedented economic development of Germany, had disturbed the hitherto existing balance. It had its impact on Central Asia particularly on Afghanistan. Even the great power equation underwent changes. The international situation became more complex, and new problems cropped up. A religious undercurrent emerged as an ideology, which was visible, and enveloped the muslim world.

The entire Islamic world was in ferment. Partly it was fanned by the rival western imperialists as a tool to weaken their rivals. After the Treaty of Sevres the issue of Khilafat was up against British Imperialism. The awakening of the Muslim world was evident in Pan-Islamism and in the groups like Young Turks and Young Afghans. Muslim reformers like Mohammed Abduhu, Jamal-ud-Din Al-Afghani, and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, by initiating and advocating a new gospel, which gave rise to Muslim renaissance, stretching from North Africa to India. There was an attempt
to break from the tradition of the Islamic orthodoxy and Khilafat. These ideas, rather quietly and slowly, had begun to influence Afghan people and their society. There was a strong desire for change in attitude and modernization which would have put Afghanistan on an elevated position in the civilized modern world.

The period after the world war I, therefore, marked the "beginning of the trouble" for the British in India. The World War I had to a great extent exposed British weaknesses. The awakening and the ideologies, gave thrust to anti Imperialism and resentment against colonial domination. They posed a serious challenge to the might of the British Imperial domination.

Most powerful and significant was the ever strengthening and widening canvas of Indian National Movement. Evidently the partition of Bengal in 1905 and its annulment in 1912, for the first time resolved to fight the British unitedly. The formation of Ghadar Party, and the protest against the Rowllat Act (which was wholly against the formation of Provincial Government in Kabul, seditious activities) and similarly terrorist and other disruptive activities had put the British Indian Government on the defensive. There were agitations, boycotts, and hartal. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre caused the deepest resentment against the British rule. The Khilafat issue had particularly hurt the muslim sentiment. The movement for restoration of Khilafat took a new colour and for the first time the British faced the Hindu-Muslim unity working against the British Government in India. Khilafat and "Non-Cooperation Movement" were Mass agitations.

Such was the background in which we seek to study the diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the British Government of India (1919-
1945). The so called Great Game between the British and the Soviets were played in Afghanistan during the whole of the 19th century. In the the 20th century, the great power players changed, but the 'Game' and the victim- Afghanistan, remained the same. The period between the two World Wars all the powers attempted Afghanistan's tilt in their favour. For its strategic location, apart from the old rivalry of the Soviets and the British in which Afghanistan found itself sandwiched.

The study focuses its attention mainly on the diplomatic relations between the British India and Afghanistan. Nevertheless it explores and analyses the complex international scenario which some how had bearings on the diplomatic relation between the two. Any study of Anglo-Afghan relations can not be made in isolation. One has to see it through different angles and perspective for a proper assessment of the Soviet, German and various other regional and international power equations.

The Emergence of Germany during the 1920's on the Central Asian scene should not be viewed solely from the German strategic consideration from where they could have pursued their goal of challenging the British hold in Central South Asia. The "special relationship" that had developed between Germany and Afghanistan was part of the Afghan rulers attempt to maintain political and economic independence by playing off Afghanistan's neighbours against one another with Germany as the "third force" in the constellation of powers on the Central Asian scene.

The relations between the British Government of India and Afghanistan began to change under the new regime and with a new foreign policy. Amir Amanullah heralded, a period of break from traditionalism, isolationism to defensive neutralism and throwing off the
alliance with Britain. Such a relationship had relegated Afghanistan to a position of vassalage; which the growing spirit of nationalism in the East was no longer willing to tolerate. For countering the British influence, to start with Afghanistan had established normal diplomatic relations with Soviet union and also strove for solidarity with the Muslim world, (a complete break with the Pro-British attitude of the previous Afghan rulers). The first and fundamental conflict, which in a way set the tone for future relations between Amir Amanullah and the British Government was the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. More than that, the timing of the war when the British were busy with internal unrest in India, nearly half a million British Indian troops were in Mesopotamia, and India was in the grip of serious epidemic of Influenza and a hot summer. In this war there was the declaration of a jihad, use of Indian revolutionaries against the British. There was a move for getting Bolshevick support. All these struck at the very roots of British Imperial policy. It can be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the Third Anglo-Afghan War that the British officials distrusted the new Amir. Amanullah achieved diplomatic and moral victory in the ensuing Treaty of Rawalpindi (Aug. 1919). For the following decade the same distrust and acrimonious relations continued. The abrasive character of Anglo-Afghan relations during the Amanullah's reign was caused by differences in both policy and style. From the British point of view, Amanullah's activism presented immense threat to British India. But Amanullah believed that Afghanistan as a sovereign country was entitled to have close and friendly relations with USSR. It had every obligation to espouse the cause of millions of Indian Muslims who were still under foreign bondages and had historical, ethnic, and religious rights to have ties with the transborder Pashtun tribes on the Indian side of the Durand Line.
For the first time in the history of Anglo-Afghan relations Amanullah had caused deep consternation for the British "forward policy."

Justifiably, it can be concluded that Amanullah's relation with Britain were less than satisfactory, yet they were still heavily influenced by old geopolitical doctrines, generating many points of conflict and tensions. These frictions were made worse by serious differences in style and especially by cultural, psychological and personal inconsistencies. Anglo-Afghan tensions undoubtedly hampered the full development of modernization programme and contributed to the onset and the outcome of the rebellion in a number of ways unfavourable to Amanullah. They did not however, lead to the secret British intervention in the overthrow of Amanullah (which still is controversial). Nevertheless, the principal factor in the fall of King Amanullah was in the conflict between tribal power and centralized authority.

With the end of Amanullah ends a glorious chapter of Afghan foreign policy. A long civil war followed and with the end of Baccha-i-Saqqao's six month rule, Afghanistan strived for stability and not for grandeur. During this short period of Baccha's rule nothing happened significant in terms of foreign policy. On the contrary there was a show of cold shouldering by both the Soviets and the British.

Nadir Shah's rule from 19th October 1929 brought Afghanistan back to peace. He wanted to follow Amanullah's foreign policy but due to his own limitations he went for friendly relations with the neighbours. He like his predecessors experienced all kinds of foreign pressures and inducements, but he never gave in or compromised with the basic and traditional policy of his country, to follow complete "neutrality" and keep
Afghanistan out of rivalry between the two powerful neighbours, and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. He attempted to strike a balance between the Britain and the Soviet Union so that none could dictate terms to Afghanistan. Nadir Shah was acceptable to the British and they offered him monetary assistance. The British Government seemed was more or less satisfied with the existing treaty with Afghanistan having provisions for "neighbourly relations"; although the most contentious issue between them was the issue of transborder Pushtun tribes with whose support Nadir had acquired the throne. Pushtun's were expecting rewards from the new Afghan Government in terms of money and arms which the British would never have liked to happen. The frontier issue continued to dominate between the two for a long time.

Nadir Shah's reign was for short period of time. He was succeeded by a teenage Prince King Zahir Shah. However, his reign saw the beginning of stability and a better Afghan foreign policy. The following decade were most crucial and complex. The international equations were taking different shapes and the world was on the brink of another catastrophic World War. In the very first policy statement in 1934 Zahir Shah called for an attempt to work "for world peace and development of Afghanistan." He expressed a desire for friendly relations with all its neighbouring countries. The traditional policy of neutrality continued to be the hallmark of Afghan foreign policy. The British in India were facing an organized mass movement, internal disturbances, during the national movement. Zahir Shah's government had supported revolutionaries like Raja Mahendra Pratap and the Afghan tribes who were hostile to the British. When the World War II broke out in Europe, Afghanistan had by this time befriended the new emerging, Axis powers Germany, and Italy.
Afghanistan began to depend on them for financial and technical assistance. The Afghan's dependence on Germany brought a new power in Central Asia. The emergence of a third force was well utilised by Afghanistan in "playing off", one power with the other, especially Great Britain. But Afghanistan thwarted all attempts to turn the country into a theatre of war or a battle ground for European diplomacy." Afghan Parliament was quick to proclaim the "neutrality of Afghanistan which could safeguard its independence and territorial integrity. The decree of neutrality had restricted the activities of nationals of the belligerent powers. Though the Germans had tried their best to induce the Afghan Government for some kind of disturbance on the North West Frontiers with a view to weaken the British. Zahir Shah refused to comply with their wishes.

A serious issue of Axis Nationals had come up between the Afghan government on the one side and the Allies on the other side. The British, in particular, had pressurised the Afghan Government for the expulsion of the Axis nationals who were involved in subversive activities against the Allied interests. Allied powers exerted pressure through economic blockade and diplomacy. Afghanistan had to see that the German and Italians who were working in Afghanistan, leave the country during the war.

After the departure of Axis nationals from Afghanistan there was no further pressure from Great Britain or Soviet Union on Afghanistan. Possibly they were convinced of Afghanistan's adherence to strict neutrality. Afghanistan preserved its freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity throughout by pursuing an independent and neutral policy. With the end of the World War II in 1945 the changed international political scenario left its mark on Afghanistan as well.
We see a change in the interests of power groups, the old rivalry between Britain and the Soviet Union, had been replaced by the Soviets and the United States of America. Afghanistan remained sandwiched in their diplomatic and ideological skirmishes with no respite to its people.
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2000
Dedicated
To My
Late Father
Certificate

This is to certify that the thesis entitled "AFGHANISTAN AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FROM AFGHAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1919 TO 1947" is the original work of Mr. Md. Waseem Raja under my supervision and is suitable for submission for the award of Ph.D. degree in History.

(Prof. Raj Kumar Trivedi)
Supervisor
CONTENTS

BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN FROM THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR TO 1947

I. PREFACE i-v

II. ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY vi-vii

CHAPTER - I : AFGHANISTAN'S STRATEGIC LOCATION : GEO-POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. 1-16

CHAPTER - II : ANTECEDENTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITISH INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN TILL 1920. 17-36

CHAPTER III : ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING AMIR AMANULLAH'S PERIOD (1919-1929). 37-73


CHAPTER V : SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY : THE BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND ZAHIR SHAH'S INITIAL YEARS. 109-138
CHAPTER VI : ANGLO-AFGHAN DIPLOMACY 139-174
VIS-A-VIS GERMAN FACTOR
DURING WORLD WAR II.

CHAPTER VII : CONCLUSION 175-180

APPENDICES 181-194

(I) LIST OF AFGHAN RULERS

(II) VICEROY'S OF INDIA (1916-1945)

(III) LIST OF NADIRSHAH CABINET

(IV) HEAD OF NWF COMMISSIONERS AND
GOVERNORS (1901-1947)

(V) FOREIGN LEAGATIONS HEADS

(VI) DYNASTIC TABLE

III. SOURCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY 195-221
The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan has always been recognised and emphasised by academic scholars and diplomats. Situated at the crossroads of trade and commerce, hordes of invaders came through it into the Indian subcontinent. The purpose of the present study is to examine the historical, political and the diplomatic history of Afghanistan since 1919 to 1947. Afghanistan had been used as a buffer state, especially by Russia and British India; and the "Great Game" have been highlighted in several studies. The interest of Germany in Afghanistan and the attempt of successive Afghan rulers and policy makers to utilize it by playing off the British against the other to further its interests. Gradually evolving its independent and neutral position through a precarious balancing of external pressures. Amir of Afghanistan's basic interest was to secure his throne and preserve the territorial integrity of his country. The study lays its focus on the internal forces of disension and regression which had always put the Afghan polity in a mess. Afghan roots in tribalism and religious fundamentalism impeded the growth of nationalism. Apart from there internal factors the persistent threat of external aggression and domination - both from the British and the Soviet Russia enveloped Afghanistan into disensions. Unfortunately this is inherent in its composition and structure as a nation. Neither reforms nor modernization could succeed.
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters, including one on conclusion eight appendices, Sources and Bibliography. The chapter one discusses geopolitics and its bearings on the strategic location of Afghanistan. We have discussed the topography and its impact on the culture, its people and the national identity.

The second chapter deals with the background of the diplomatic relations between the British India and Afghanistan. The chapter contains a detailed study of the political developments inside Afghanistan: How it dealt with "the Great Game" between the British and the Czarist Russia? It also analyses the politics and diplomacy of the great powers vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

The third chapter is a study of Amir Amanullah's reign (1919-1929), who wanted to give Afghanistan new status, as a sovereign modern nation. That had resulted in the war of independence in 1919. The British designs worked against Amanullah and his fall in 1929. The Russian designs were to obtain access to the warm waters of the Indian ocean through Afghanistan.

The chapter fourth is about King Nadir Shah's diplomatic relations with the British and his efforts to seek the British support and assistance for upgrading its infrastructure.

The chapter fifth is about King Zahir Shah's initial years. The chapter also examines the various problems which Afghanistan had been facing before the World War II.
The chapter sixth is on the later phase of the Zahir Shah's reign and the German influence on Afghanistan which has been traced from the time of Amir Amanullah.

The chapter seventh is on conclusion. There are eight appendices including brief biographical notes about dramatis personae.

In the preparation of this work various kinds of evidences have been used. For any research scholar to undertake a study on such a theme is a difficult task, as the sources are scattered in different part of the world. My access has been limited and full of constraints. I could not get any opportunity to consult sources in Britain and Germany. For this reason I have relied on the materials available in the National Archives of India, New Delhi have been fully utilized by me. The diplomatic correspondence, reports and memoranda etc. included in the secret foreign political files in the National Archives, contemporary newspapers journals, books and official publications have been used. Since I had no access to the German and Russian records, therefore, I have relied upon the published works and these have been duly acknowledged.

I am indebted to many people. It is my duty to express my grateful thanks to Professor Satya Prakash Gupta, Chairman/Coordinator, Centre of Advanced Study, Department of History for his encouragement and inspiration during the course of my research. My thanks are due to all my teachers for their advice and suggestion.
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My parents and other members of the family stood by me in moments of despair and dejection that research entails. They had to suffer due to my devotion to research. My Abbu & Ammijan always inspired me during the period of my struggle to complete the work. My father expired before I could show him the fruit of my labour, I dedicate my work to my late father a debt that can never be repaid and his memory that is my precious possession.

Thanks are also due to Mr. Kafeel A. Khan & Jameel A. Khan for typing my thesis with wholehearted devotion and sincerity.

M. Waseem Raja
Aligarh
November, 2000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAA</td>
<td>Deutsches Aswaertige Amt, Born Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOL</td>
<td>India Office Library, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF</td>
<td>Foreign Secret Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRCAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>National Archives of India, New Delhi,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>British Cabinet Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Committee of Imperial Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Director of Intelligence Bureau (Delhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forminka</td>
<td>Foreign to Minister Kabul (coded Foreign Office Telegram to Kabul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFO</td>
<td>German Foreign Office (photocopy documents deposited at Cornwall House, London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI 1&amp;2</td>
<td>Military Intelligence (German War Departments responsible for India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHB</td>
<td>Naval Historical Branch, Admiralty London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Organisation Todt (German Spy System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCO</td>
<td>Viceroy's Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFI</td>
<td>Zentralstelle Freies Indian (Free India Centre, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>German Foreign Ministry (Microfilm Documents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>Indian Office Record, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll.</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Political and Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wkly. Intt. Sum.</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Summary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Millat</th>
<th>Afghan Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durre - Durran</td>
<td>Pearl of Pearls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hukmati - Kalan</td>
<td>Commissary, Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehad</td>
<td>Holy War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jirga</td>
<td>Tribal Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalq</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar</td>
<td>Tribal Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mir, Amir</td>
<td>Ruler, Leader, Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcham</td>
<td>Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pir</td>
<td>Saint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazi</td>
<td>Fighter for Islam against the infidel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majlis</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badal</td>
<td>Revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badraga</td>
<td>Tribal Escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brampta</td>
<td>A round up; usually of people or members of a tribe whose members have been causing trouble as an indemnity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darrah</td>
<td>Mountain passes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darbar</td>
<td>Large assembly, Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghairat</td>
<td>Self-respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faqir</td>
<td>Holyman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gusht</td>
<td>A patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafilah</td>
<td>Camel Caravan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khassadar</td>
<td>Tribal levy; they wore their own clothes and provided their own weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khel</td>
<td>Clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khudai Khidmat Gar</td>
<td>Servants of God called Red-shirts (surkh poshan) by the British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotal</td>
<td>Crest of a pass, as in Landi Kotal in the Khybar pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik</td>
<td>Tribal Chieftain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melmastia</td>
<td>Hospitality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizh</td>
<td>Dilect of the 'Pushtu Mong' meaning We soldiers of the Holy War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahiddin</td>
<td>A deputation (literally entrance) from the Pushtu Verb to enter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanawati</td>
<td>A direction, side, region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nang</td>
<td>Honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powrindeh</td>
<td>Merchant, trader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhund</td>
<td>Religious teacher or saint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbab</td>
<td>A Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khana-ba-dosh</td>
<td>house-on-back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwa</td>
<td>A direction, side, region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid</td>
<td>A renewer, reformer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salis</td>
<td>An arbitrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulus</td>
<td>A tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesh</td>
<td>Distribution of land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER - I

AFGHANISTAN'S STRATEGIC LOCATION:
GEO-POLITICS & DIPLOMACY

Afghanistan is located in the South Western corner of Central Asia. Lying in the northern subtropical zone, it extends from 29°21'N to 38°30'N latitude and from 60°31'N to 75° East longitude. It is bounded on the north by Russia, on the West by Iran; on the South and East by Pakistan; and in the extreme North-East (in the Wakhan region) by the People's Republic of China. Afghanistan's land area (650,000 sq.kms.) is second only to Mongolia. It has the largest population among the land locked states in Asia.

Afghan topography can be divided into the following regions: I. Mountain System. II. River Basins

The River Basin: (a) The Oxus River Basin (b) The Kabul River Basin (c) The Seistan Basin (d) The Hari-Rud Basin.

The central mountain system and its offshoots dominate the landscape of the country. It forms the main watershed for the important rivers of Afghanistan.

The north-eastern section of the system, the Hindu-Kush range, begins as the Muztagh range in the Pamirs. It

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1. For minute details on the geographical description, See also, Wilber, N. Donald, ed. Afghanistan. 'Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, 1956, p. 20.
becomes prominent only when it reaches a point northwest of Kabul in the Shibar pass where it gives way to the Koh-i-Baba.² The Hindu-Kush upto Shibar, are the highest mountain ranges in Afghanistan, whose average elevation exceeds 4000 mt. above sea-level. The central mountain massifs have an average width of about 400 kms, i.e. from Peshawar to Kunduz. In the southwestern section this width increases. It is basically "a wild desolate, a country of great peaks and deep valleys of sharp gorges and rushing grey-green rivers."³ Lofty transverse mountain ranges under permanent snow cover and deep narrow valleys, render communication difficult and give few choices for population concentration. Although, the Hindu-Kush have numerous passes (about 8 to 10) in their earlier course, Killick Pass (to Hunza), the Baroghil Pass (to Gilgit) and the Dorah Pass (to Chitral), are by far the most important and accessible ones. In its main axis, the Khawak, Bazarak, Shibar, Bamian Hajigak and Malakand passes provide gaps through which the Kabul river valley is connected with Balkh and Kunduz.

With Hindukush in centre Salang range transversing west and southwest to the north of Bamian and the Mir Samir range after Charikar gap, bifurcates into the Paghman range

² See, Fraser-Tytler, no. 11, pp. 5-6, Op.cit.
³ For details on the nature of watersheds, See. Hayden, no. 9.
and joins Koh-i-Baba. The Safed-Koh or Spingar mountain projecting eastward forms the Afghan boundary with Pakistan. It is separated from the main Hindu-Kush range by the valley of the Kabul river. The Salt range commences from the south-eastern side of the Safed-Koh and trends a south-easterly direction to Kala Bagh in Pakistan. The Sulaiman mountain commences from the Safed Koh. The Sulaiman range forms an important watershed between the Helmand and the Indus rivers. Khwaja Amran range commences at the northern extremity of the Kabul plateau and extends north east towards the Ghilzai country. It separates Shorawak from Pishin and then from the northern boundary of Pishin and afterwards takes the name Toba, from a country through which it runs. Another range trend eastwards to separate Pishin from Shawl. After traversing approximately 150 km. of the Koh-i-Baba bifurcates into two—a northern and a southern spur—known as Safed-Koh and Siah-Koh. The entire country between these mountains is characterised by dry barren elevated plateau and extremely rugged terrain. The Koh-i-Baba later gives way to the Parapomissus mountains, which trend a southeast northwest course with an average elevation of 3500 mt. above sea level.

The pattern of mountain distribution, then, suggests its

latent influence upon the activity of the inhabitants of the land-locked state. They formed difficult barriers of communication as well as assigned individual characteristics to the different social groups with distinct economic basis for livelihood. This later, induced loose political cohesion as groups among the inhabitants of the state.

Though the river basins of Afghanistan occupy extensive areas, it is only along the foothills and river valleys where most of the human activity is carried out. The Oxus river basin extends from Wakhan to Murghab in the west. The places of strategic importance like Balkh and Mazar-i-Sharif falls under this basin. Implant tributaries off this river are Kokcha and the Kunduz rivers. All other rivers, such as Balkhab, Andkhoi and Maimana disappear in the sands of Oxus plain.

The Kabul river basin includes the basin of Alishang, Panjshir and Konar rivers of the left bank, and of the Logar, Kurram, Ghazni and Kaitu of the right bank. This bank is full of numerous mountains and valleys. The Kabul rivers basin is "from the political geography point of view, the most significant region of Afghanistan."


The Kabul river valley, by far is the most important line of direct trade route from Peshawar. The main line of communication between Kabul and Peshawar is about 272 Kms. in length. Unlike the passes located in the extreme north and in the southern parts, the Khyber group of passes afford easy communication. The importance of this group of passes is that, they not only formed the primary line of approach to the North-West Frontier of the Indian Subcontinent in the colonial era, but also was essential transit route for the land-locked state. The Kurram pass is separated from the Khyber pass by the Safed-Koh range and its offshoots. Between Peshawar and Kohat there is an extension of the full formation eastward towards the Indus. Tochi valley is also one of the important and possible transit routes, thought it has got limited accessibility towards East-Central Afghanistan. The Seistan basin is in the extreme southwest. Seistan's northern river is made up by the Hindu-Kush ranges and the Helmand basin as a whole covers 350,000 sq.kms. little more than one tenth of Iran.\(^8\) It consists of series of Hamuns, (where the two major rivers Helmand system and Farah-Rud discharge their waters), lakes, terraces and benches. The main feeder line of the Seistan region, is Helmand river with Shala-Rud and Lake Gaud-i-Zirreh.\(^9\)


Seistan is dominated by clay and salt flats. The valleys of Helmand basins are deep and flat. Below Girishk, the river Helmand receives its largest tributary, the Arghandab which has three tubutaries of Arghastan, Tarnak and Dari rivers.

The Hari-Rud basin is delimited in the north by the Parapomissus mountain and Karakum desert, by the Siah-Koh in the south, by the Band-i-Turkestan and Koh-i-Baba in the northeast and east. In its middle course, Hari-Rud forms the boundary between Afghanistan and Iran. It is an extremely fertile area made up of alluvial and outwash plain. The Khwagar and Korukh rivers are important tributaries of the Hari-Rud.

The unproductive wastelands of southern and Western Afghanistan occupy nearly one-third of the total area of the country. In the South, Dasht-i-Margo on the right bank and Registan on the left bank of the Helmand river, are prominent features. Whereas the plateaus in western Afghanistan, consists of open wave-like plains of sandy and gravel covered flats. The entire area is located in a depression between the Iranian and Afghanistan boundary.

Physical relief has played an important role in shaping the nature of state activities of Afghanistan with persistent regularity, it had influenced the course of Afghan history. With its varied influences it had affected the historical,
political and economic development of the state. It has created acute regional imbalances and emergence of core areas which determined the political affiliation and relationships of the different regions between each other.¹⁰

Almost all aspects of life in Afghanistan are affected or even dominated by the climatic conditions. Although it varies with location and elevation, it is mostly dry through the country. Its climate with extreme cold and oppressive heat has left a deep impact upon the agriculture, industrial and commercial activities and the character of the inhabitants.¹¹

The impact of geographical environment has been persistently felt in the Afghan history. It had remained as a physical basis of its evolution as a state. The spirit of political freedom and independence among the various

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¹⁰ Lack of data and source materials have, however impeded a detailed analysis of the impact of geographical environment on political and economic actions of the state. An attempt has been made to select from the mass of information and observation and are presented in a manner to indicate the physical influence upon the state.

Afghan tribes or their periodic defections, are all probable effects of the geographical remoteness. The locational proximity had also helped in shaping its history. The weakening of central authority and the necessity of aggressive forward policies to maintain internal political stability as consequences, remained a recurrent theme of the Afghan history. The physical environmental conditions have more or less determined all the major aspects of the Afghan society and the nation state. The Hindu-Kush and its westward extension seemed to divide the westward migrating Central Asian tribes into two streams divesting one Westward to Herat and Iran and the other southward to the Indian Subcontinent through the seasonally open passes of the Hindu-Kush. It served so much to divide Central Asia from the Indian sub-continent.\textsuperscript{12} The mountain system have tended to prevent any sort of cultural exchanges between the various diverse social group inhabiting Afghanistan. As territories of each social group was physiographically limited from others the social group developed their own traditional political conception and organisation on the basis of modifying influences of the physical environment they inhabited. However the unequal physical division between northern and southern Afghanistan enabled the geopolitical inter-relationship to have far reaching impact upon Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{12} J.P. Singh Uberoi; \textit{Between Oxus And Indus, A local History of the Frontier, 500 B.C. to AD 1925}, \textit{Indian Horizon}, New Delhi, vol. XXII, No. 1 January 1974, p. 81.
The prevalence of semi-arid conditions enabled the northern half of the country to weave its own distinct geopolitical relationships. The social and economic landscape was markedly influenced by the availability of water for irrigation which led to the emergence of towns like Balkh and Mazar-i-Sharif.13

Southern Afghanistan was divided into eastern and western halves which was both physical as well as economic and political division. Although the region is predominantly inhabited by Pushtun tribes (unlike the Uzbek, Hazaras of the north) the geographical elements contrived to equate the power balance between the major nuclear areas of Herat, Kandhar and Kabul.

It is evident that in its efforts to develop, Afghanistan had expressed itself to foreign political pressures. The foreign economic assistance was formulated by foreign aid-givers and was contrary to the need and geographical environment of the state.

The geographical factor have played a significant role in shaping the national character and political outlook of Afghanistan. It inherited a harsh terrain and austere climate as well as the consequences arising from the cross-road location of Afghanistan in Central Asia. Conditioned by location and relief "an axial line of crest with its flank

facing two large units between which the minor one is buffer" was presented by the Hindu-Kush between Russia and England in Central Asia under these circumstances the political geography of Afghanistan becomes even more important, when, once the land people relationship is evident and established.

Afghanistan is a land-locked country, therefore, much of its problems emanate from its geo-political location. This inherent weakness of its enclosed location, had far reaching consequences on its development and existence. For centuries, it has faced, the unceasing expansionist designs of various powers, and its neighbours. Afghanistan lay in the between the great trade routes. Ever since the rise of Soviet-Union as a great power and the long existing interests of Great Britain; it became a zone of recurrent political and armed conflicts during the 19th century and rivalry during the 20th century. The country was not coveted for its resources, rather as a strategic zone, the inclusion would have tilted the balance between the two major powers. For this reason the location of Afghanistan had been the prime factor in the shaping of its history and diplomacy.15

Afghanistan perceived the threats posed by Britain and Russia to its independent existence, yet it was caught conflicting in the struggle of the two essentially European politico-territorial systems. As a result of the active forward policies of Britain and Russia, both the internal and external forces had undermined the stability, as well as, the survival of Afghanistan as an independent state. A situation, and in the new power equation, Afghanistan had no active role to play.\(^\text{16}\)

There are regional variations due to the inhospitable terrain and links between one region to the other were always weak, resulting in regional imbalances, in terms of modernization and development within the country. Such a geopolitical situation and with the consciousness of regional identity among the inhabitants of the state, the efforts of the Afghan rulers to consolidate their powers were frustrated. Afghanistan was under constant threat and influence of its neighbours. The boundary adjustments between Afghanistan and the colonial powers, reflected as how Britain and Russia had secured their strategic, administrative and economic interests. The boundary adjustments had deprived Afghanistan of valuable pasture lands and irrigation method in the North-West Frontier with Russia in 1886. In 1895, the trans-Oxus

region of Shignan and Darwaz was transferred to Russia. That loss was compensated by Wakhan strip which was actually meant to separate the British and Russian territories from each other. In the Southern and Eastern Frontier, with Britain (1895), the division of contiguous tribal areas not only resulted in the political division of the inhabitants of Afghanistan but also created administrative and economic problems. The political division of the traditional Afghan habitat therefore, became the primary consideration in the Afghan foreign relations with Britain and later with Pakistan.  

Arthur Conolly regarded that it was the failure of the Afghan Amirs to incorporate Baluchistan and the North-West frontier into its own territory in the 19th century could be regarded as the singlemost obstacle to its subsequent external relations. The ownership of these areas, perhaps, could well have led to a more tenable territorial claim towards the Indian Ocean coast, which would have enabled it to have


18. The stability of Afghanistan required the unity of the Pushtun populace but due to Durand Line it was divide into two parts. See for the detailed topography of the region in Conolly, Arthur: Journey To The North Of India, Overland From England Through Russia, Persia, And Afghanistan, London, 1838, pp. 834.
access to sea by recognised treaty agreements. The resultant stagnation of the continental interior reflected the impact of peripheral forces.

It also indicated the highly volatile character of the internal political dynamics; and the rival regional interests and the persistence of widely dispersed and diversified population groups. An amalgam of different cultural and ethnic groups, Afghanistan's internal sub-divisions, could not merge into form an effective political unit. For more than a century, Afghanistan's physical and cultural isolation stressed the internal political weaknesses, accentuated grievances and hindered economic development.

There were political intrigues conspiracies, turmoil and even the threats of secession - between Kabul and Kandhar


20. The role of Afghanistan as a corridor of power was formulated in geographical terms by the great British Geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, and by Captain Alfred Mahan of the US navy as they wrote about the influences of geography on the political destiny of nation. According to them, "the central factor was the existence of the "world island" the connected land mass of Africa and Eurasia. The "heartland" of this world island lies in the great landmass of interior of grasslands, steppes, and deserts of Central Asia. Protected by geographical isolation from attack, this heartland operating along internal lines of communication, can exert enormous pressures. Population and other pressures originating in the heartland are translated into expansionist forces towards any direction particularly towards warm sea. For more details on the theory propounded by Mahan and Mackinder, See, Halford Mackinder; Democratic Ideas and Reality (New York: Norton, 1962) and Alfred Mahan, The Problem of Asia (London, Sampson Low, Marston, 1900).
or Afghan -Turkistan and Herat-formed a recurrent theme in Afghan political history. Keeping in view the ethnic factor, dissensions had been a feature of Afghan polity. The Southern Afghan tribes, mainly Pushtu speaking are in majority and had the tendency to dominate over the northern tribes who are mainly Uzbeck, Turkomen, Hazaras, Kizill-Bash.

Afghanistan's internal communication networks had been its weakest link and had caused impeded economic and political development of the state. The access to the sea had been the most sought after issue for the land-locked country of Afghanistan during the 19th & 20th centuries, and failure to it resulting in Afghanistan's negotiating from a position of weakness, and discovering to its coast that compromise was there by denied. Afghanistan was thus forced to accept the subordinate role in the decision-making processes affecting the transit trade and economy. The resultant subordination to the Soviet-Union or the British India for an transit outlet led the Afghan state to feel somewhat weaker.


Afghanistan, therefore, lacked homogeneity and free intermingling of its populace.\textsuperscript{24}

Afghanistan being a mountainous country with more than 40 percent of the total land area above 2000 metres. It has only 22 percent of the total land area with predominantly agrarian economy, on which more than 85 percent of population depended on agriculture, for their living and provides about 87 percent of the total commodity exports of the land-locked state. The Afghan relief is a "desolate belt of mountain ranges, salt stepp and irregular Playas, all of which are for the most part uninhabited or sparsley

\begin{itemize}
\item The Afghan relief has also been divided by Dudely Stamp; Asia, \textit{A Regional and Economic Geography}, London 1967, pp. 179-81, into six distinct regions and by W.K. Fraser-Tytler: \textit{Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and South Asia}, London, 1967, pp. 6-7, into four principal river-systems. Survey of Land and Water Resources: Afghanistan, 6 vols. The Food and Agriculture Organisations of the United Nations (Rome, 1965), Classified the physical relief according to elevation. The basis of the present classification is based on the fact that though each subdivision shows certain degree of similarity, they are distinctly separated from each other. Further, the mountain systems have been taken as a separate unit, solely due to the reason that they act as the important water parting of the state. The unproductive westerlands are included in the river basins to facilitate the analysis.
\end{itemize}
populated region. The Afghan relief is dominated by the mountainous backbone and its offshoots; thereby forming a barrier between Central and South Asia.\textsuperscript{26}

CHAPTER-II

ANTECEDENTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN TILL 1920's

"India is like a fortress with a vast moat of the sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her wall on the remainder. But beyond those walls, which are sometimes of by no means inseparable height and admit of being easily penetrable, extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes." [Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India :1899-1905].

Afghanistan emerged as a nation in 1747. The Anglo-Russian rivalry and had its strongest impact on Afghan foreign policy. A study of this development would enable us to understand Afghanistan's past and present history.

The word "Afghan" denotes the national name of all the people of Afghanistan and symbolises an indivisible unit in the heart of Asia.¹ Hasan Kawun Kakar writes that Afghanistan had three principal names ----- Ariyana in antiquity, Khorasan in the medieval era and Afghanistan in modern times.² Modern Afghanistan confirms almost to the land mentioned in the old Greek as Ariana, in the old

persian as Airya or Airyana, in Sanskrit as Arya Vartta or Arya Varsha and in Zend as Eriene-Veejo, situated between India and Persia, Aryana was a geographical and cultural rather than a political name. The name Aryana lasted for about 1500 years from 1000 B.C. to the 5th Century of the Christian Era.

The word Khorasan denoting the "land of the rising sun" gained currency during the second century of the Christian Era. Even upto the 19th century the name Khorasan, refering to Afghanistan, was in vogue along with the words Pushtun-Khwa and Sarhad. Thus it was only towards the end of the 19th century that "the appellation Afghanistan replaced the word Khorasan completely." Hasan K. Kakar therefore holds the view that Afghanistan is not a new name and believed to have appeared with the accession of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. Afghanistan was then called Aryana.

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3. According to Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, an eminent Afghan Historian, "for fourteen centuries the name Khorasan was applied initially to the parts of Afghanistan and later to the whole country and is still in use for a small region to the north-west of Afghanistan. For a detailed study see. Ghulam Mohd. Ghobar, Khorasan (Kabul History Association 1946).


5. Opcit, Kakar, No. 2, p.XV.

6. Ibid, Kakar, No.2, p.XVI.

According to available evidence the word "Afghanistan" was applied in a political sense to a land for the first time in the third decade of the 14th century by Saifi Herawi. The advent of Islam during the 7th century proved instrumental in regard to overhauling the entire culture and civilization of Afghanistan. The Muslim conquest brought Afghanistan within a greater political entity, stimulated trade in the region and preserved the country's geographic importance as a crossroads between India, Central Asia the Mediterranean world.

For about two centuries the local dynasties ruled over Afghanistan — Tahirids (820 A.D. - 870 A.D.), and the Samanids (874 A.D. - 999 A.D.). The closing years of the 10th century witnessed the advent of regime of Subuk-tagin in Afghanistan, who was succeeded by his son Mahmood Ghaznavi, who ruled over Afghanistan till 1157 A.D. The Ghaznavi's empire extended over Kabul, Bulk, Badakhshan, Persian Khorasan and some parts of India. The Mongol invasion brought economic disaster for Afghanistan during the 13th century. During the 14th century Afghanistan was

9. For details See; Pazhwak, No.8, pp.77-91, opcit.
invaded by Taimur Lane and the early decades of the 16th century witnessed the establishment of Mughal rule in Kabul by Zaheeruddin Mohammad Babur, a descendent of Taimur in 1504. Following the death of Babur which led to the collapse of Mughal rule in Afghanistan, the local tribes again vied for establishing their paramountcy in Afghanistan. During this period Afghanistan was divided "Between the Empire of Persia and Mughal India, the Northern Tribes being under the Mughal rule."

The Afghan identity found its early assertion during 16th and 17th centuries under the inspiration of Roshannia Movement and with the leadership of Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613-1689) who inspired the Afghan tribes to "defend their independence and strive for political unity."

The geographical situation in the region underwent a substantial changes and the early period of 18th century witnessed the southern Afghan tribes led by Ghilzais, rise in revolt against Persia, which in later years spread to Herat and south-east of Persia. The first successful attempt to establish an autonomous Afghan state was made in 1709, when Mir Wais a prominent Ghilzais chieftain rallied his tribes in a successful revolt against the Persian empire. and

15. Ibid, Gregorian, No.14, p.44.
succeeded in establishing the rule of Ghilzais. With the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali emerged the leader and was made the king.\textsuperscript{16}

Ahmad Shah Abdali after assuming the reins of power, consolidated his position and took stringent measures to strengthen his empire. He led eight expeditions into India and succeeded to incorporating portions of Punjab, Kashmir and Multan in his empire. By the time of his death in 1773, the Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali extended from Atrek river to the Indus and from Tibet to Arabian Sea. While his successor managed to continue his legacy but without any major changes in the domestic and external policies.\textsuperscript{17}

The closing years of 19\textsuperscript{th} century had been witnessing the rise of powerful France, evincing interests in the country of south-west and Central Asia, and also the ascendancy of British power on the Indian sub-continent. During Zaman Shah's reign (1793-1799) the external threat to Afghanistan had increased with the expansion of British interest in India and Persian plans to reassert its sovereignty over Herat portended the threat to Afghanistan. According to Vartan Gregorian, "Afghanistan thus, entered the 19\textsuperscript{th} century a politically disunited state."\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Adamec, W. Ludwig : Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (Tuscon, Arizona, The University of Arizona Press, 1974), p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Khan Sultan Mohammad; Tarikh-i-Afghanistan (Persian), New Delhi, 1953, p.27.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Gregorian, opcit, No. 14 p.51 and also, Bilgrami, A.H., Afghanistan and British India, 1793-1907 (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers 1972,) p.13,
\end{itemize}
Afghanistan was frequently involved in foreign conflicts during the 19th Century. The signing of the Anglo-Sikh Treaty of 1809 enabled the British to acquire the passage towards the west and came in clash with Afghanistan. The British found in Shah Shuja a friend. They despatched the Mountstuart Elphistone Mission on October 13, 1808 who indicated towards increasing the French and the Russian threat to Afghanistan. However the Afghans had discovered the real intention of the British and regarded "an alliance for the purpose of repelling one enemy was imperfect and that true friendship between the two states could only be maintained by identifying their interests in all cases."

Despite the opposite interests, the British Government of India and Afghanistan had signed a treaty in June 1809, under its terms Afghanistan was expected to prevent the passage of French and Persian troops on their way to India. While the British Government pledged to pay the Afghan's for their services against the confedracy. Besides Afghanistan would exclude all Frenchmen from its territory. After the defeat of Shah Shuja by Shah Mahmud, the treaty became almost a dead letter.

22. For the full text of treaty, See Aitchinson; Opcit. Vol. XIII pp. 53-55.
With the emergence of strategic importance of Afghanistan for the Russians, the British and the Persians\textsuperscript{23} were alarmed and thus signed two treaties in 1809 and 1814 against Russian design against attack by Afghanistan. On the other hand, considerable Russain gain from the two treaties of Adrianople and Turkmanchayi brought considerable alertness for the British who concluded that only "Persian or Russian gain at the expenses of Afghanistan" as tantamount to an extension of Russias' political and economic gains on the doorstep of India.\textsuperscript{24} Lord Ellenbrough (Viceroy of India) writes that "the Russian Commerce could be utilized to prepare the way for Russian armies in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{25} For putting a check to the Russians, Lord Palmerston, the then British Foreign Secretary, is of the view that "a Pro-British power in Afghanistan could influence officers in Persia in which Russia was deeply interested.\textsuperscript{26}

The advice of London to Lord Auckland, the then

\textsuperscript{23} The name Persia is used for Iran here because the official use of name Iran was started only in 1937. Hence prior to that reference is made to Persia in the Present study. For the text of treaty of 1809 See Aitchison, Op cit, No.25 Vol.13, pp. 53-55. For the text of Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814, See, ibid, p.54. Also See Hurewitz, J.C: Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East : A Documentary Survey, 1535-1914 (New York, 1956), Vol.I, pp.86-88.

\textsuperscript{24} Mosley, Philip, E.; Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question, 1838-39 (Cambridge, Mass, 1934), pp.3-4.


Governor-General was advised by London to pursue Afghanistan issue more vigrously in order to check Russians and the Persians.²⁷

In this background famous Alexander Burne's Mission was despatched to Afghanistan in November 1836 with the objective of securing political and commercial advantages.

However, the Mission sent by the British Government of India could not bring the desired results. Therefore, the British tried to put Shah Shuja an exile (then a British guest in India) on Afghan throne in order to bring Afghanistan under British sphere of influence. In October 1838 the then Governor General of India, Lord Auckland, issued a "Manifesto" accusing the Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammad of taking meausres, prejudicial to the security and peace of the Indian frontiers.²⁸ In November 1838, the British Army launched expedition against Afghan Amir Dost Mohammad. Though they had succeeded in installing the British protege Shah Shuja on Afghan throne, but in the ensuing Civil-War around 1500 British Armymen along with Shah Shuja had perished. Despite this blowing defeat, the British forces again had entered Afghanistan in the Autumn of 1842, again suffered defeat.²⁹

²⁷. Ibid. p.603.
The British appeared to have not learnt any lesson from the first Afghan War and continued to commit mistakes in understanding the Afghan issues by launching the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The period between the First Afghan War in 1842 to the start of the Second Anglo-Afghan War proved to be quite harmonious as far as the relations are concerned. The treaties concluded between the British Government of India and the Kingdom of Afghanistan on 30th March, 1855 and 26th January 1857, had terms of friendship and a subsidy of Rupees One Lakh to the Afghan Amir, followed by a mission under Major H.B. Lumsden who was to stay at Kabul for mutual trust and faith in each other.30

In spite of instability in Afghanistan, following the death of Amir Dost Mohammad in 1869 the British and the Afghans nevertheless forged closer relations. In the same year, the Amir Sher Ali Khan had paid a visit to India and signed the Anglo-Afghan agreement under which the British had declared that they would not interfere in the Afghan internal affairs.31

Having seen the Russian advances towards Central-Asia

30. For the text of the treaty, see, Bilgrami, A.H.; Op cit, No.23, pp.313-15, for Lumsden Mission, see N.A.I. Files Foreign and Political Diary for April 1857.

and the capture of Khiva and Bukhara etc. had alarmed the British Government of India and the British Policy makers were in favour of establishing a permanent British Mission in Kabul and wanted a pro-British Afghan Government.\textsuperscript{32}

In this way the earlier British Policy of non-intervention was replaced by a "forward policy."\textsuperscript{33} Afghanistan was torn with the internal disturbances thus the then Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khan rejected the British desire to establish a permanent mission at Kabul.\textsuperscript{34}

About at the same time Russian Mission under General Stolietoff\textsuperscript{35} was accorded a grand reception at Kabul. This was sufficient for the British to get provoked, and that culminated into the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In the ensuing battle inspite of British military superiority the English Army suffered a humiliating defeats at the hands of Amir Ayub Khan\textsuperscript{36} (who later on became Amir of Afghanistan). In the same year Amir Sher Ali Khan's demise on 21\textsuperscript{st} February 1879 led to the signing of Treaty of Gandamak\textsuperscript{37} in May

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1879. Under this treaty the new Amir of Afghanistan, Amir Yaqub Khan agreed to the appointment of a British Agent in Kabul and followed the advice of the British in the conduct of Afghan foreign relations. But soon after the British agent Sir Louis Cavagnari was murdered in Sept. 1879 which led to the British reprisal. Amir Yaqub Khan was forced to abdicate in 1880 and Amir Abdur Rehman Khan took over as the new ruler of Afghanistan.\(^{38}\)

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan made his intentions clear to the then Chief British Agent in Kabul, Lepel Griffin in 1880 that "I desire nothing in lieu of services rendered nor do I demand favours in exchange for duties performed but I have claims on the desire of the Afghan Nation".\(^{39}\) In a royal proclamation issued in 1887, he appealed to the Afghan's sense of honour, national dignity and patriotism drawing their attention to Anglo-Russian Threat.\(^{40}\)

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan pursued the policy of isolationism. Afghanistan was isolated from Persia and Russia while even dealing with the British the Afghan Amir exercised and asserted his independence to decide the important

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39. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 34-40, August 1889, No.34. See also NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 256-280, July 1880, No. 261, p. 8.

issues. Amir's insistence on British envoy to Kabul as Muslim was also a contentious issue and was agreed upon Afzal Khan in place of Mir Hashim Khan. He even refused to give permission to the British troops and offices to visit the strategic areas in Afghanistan. He had also turned down the British project of rail-links to Chaman. He endeavoured hard to keep the foreign influence at bay by not inviting British troops during the Ghilzais reprisal of 1887-88. To this effect Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India had aptly remarked to Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1886 "as your mind is constantly occupied by the idea of asserting your independence of all control in internal affairs, that you see interference in every British action."

Abdur Rahman was now getting influence by Pan-Islamism also. This was also due to the thinking of the Russians anti-muslim attitude. The Amir was afraid of

42. NAI Foreign and Political Files, No. 56, Nos. 213-239, August 1882 KWI, p. 4.
45. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 573-577, August 1892, No. 575, p. 5.
possible Russian and British coalition against these Muslim countries of Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{48} In that case Amir was interested in coalition of Muslim countries of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan against the then superpowers.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, the Amir had kept Afghanistan politically intact by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality by warding off the internal or external interference by either great power. He has also maintained the balance of power to the advantage of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{50}

Following the death of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in October 1901, his son Amir Habibullah Khan had succeeded as new Amir of Afghanistan. As Russian wanted to have direct relations with the new Amir the British were opposed to such a move and thus Amir Habibullah was faced with critical foreign political challenges.\textsuperscript{51} For further cementing the relations the British Government of India had sent a condolence message on the demise of the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and wanted the confirmation of previous Anglo-Afghan Agreements. Amir had replied on 31 Oct. 1901 promising the honour of the agreements made by his late father with the British Indian Government saying "so

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p. 266.

\textsuperscript{50} Maaroof, Op.cit., p. 16.

long as the illustrious British Government firmly adhered to them.\textsuperscript{52}

On the other hand the Russians had been looking forward for a possible peaceful coexistence with the British Govt. of India on the question of Afghanistan and a "move which could help in removing the British distrust of a Russian invasion of India".\textsuperscript{53} In that regard, M. Lesar's, (Secretary at the Russian Embassy in London) declaration that "Russian Afghan relations had been defined by the arrangement of 1872 and 1873 which Russia regarded as still being in effect and as placing Afghanistan entirely outside her sphere of action" suggest that Russia was predetermined to have direct relations with Kabul even prior to the taking over by Habibullah as the new Amir of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{54}

For that matter a series of diplomatic negotiations between Russia and England had started in order to ascertain the intention of each of the two in having direct relation with Kabul. On 29 January, 1902 the British envoy in St. Petersberg conveyed a verbal declaration of his government's point of view to the Russian that Britain did not wish to contend that "there was no force in the Russian

\textsuperscript{52} NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Section, F. No. 94-128, Oct. 1908, No. 99.

\textsuperscript{53} For the press review of Russian Publications. See Novoe Verema, as taken from NAI Foreign and Political files No. 106-108, May 1899, No. 108.

\textsuperscript{54} Quoted from Adamec, Op.cit. No. 55, p. 33.
arrangements for direct communications on matters of local details, but that a having charge of Afghan foreign relations they held that arrangements for the purpose could only be made with their consent.\textsuperscript{55} Ludwig W. Adamec feels that now it was left to Russia to formulate proposals as to the change of the status quo and to give guarantee that any relations would remain of a non-political character.\textsuperscript{56} Following that both Britain and Russia stuck to their respective positions which created an impasse. Russian then had started taking interest in Meshhed and Herat region through border infringement and other shady deals with local Afghans. Reacting to the developments London wanted permanent British Representative at Meshhed but Lord Curzon had declined. The British were now more interested in renewal of agreements and sending a mission to Kabul. However the Louis W. Dane Mission reached Kabul on Dec. 1904 and thereafter the renewal process of the agreement of 1880 had started. Though Amir Habibullah never wanted to serve as "mere pawn on the chess-board of Indian Military defence."\textsuperscript{57} The prolonged series of negotiations had resulted in the conclusion of what came to be known as Habibullah-Dane Treaty on 21st March 1905. In that agreement the

\textsuperscript{55} Quoted from Adamec, Op.cit. No. 55, p. 33.


\textsuperscript{57} Sykes, Percy: History of Afghanistan (London: 1940), Vol. II, p. 47. Also NAI Foreign and Political Files, Foreign Section F. No. 111, 14 August 1901.
position of Amir Habibullah was more affirmed and a British subsidy £400,000 was started. But the British failed to get the maximum advantage of a trading concession and setting of a diplomatic mission in Kabul. As obvious, the treaty brought discomfiture to the Russian who foresaw a great danger in the agreement. In that regard the British foreign secretary, Lord Landsowne, with a view to allay the Russian misgivings assured the Russian Ambassador in London, Count Benckedorff, that Britain could not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and would maintain the status quo.

In the ensuing misgivings the Russians felt satisfied at last, despite various objections to that agreement.

Following these developments Russia and Britain feeling the impulse of developments on the International scenario, tried to forge a closer tie through the famous Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which comprised the three agreements one each on Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The pact pertaining to Afghanistan was more favourable to Britain. The Russians had agreed to conduct the political relations with Afghanistan through the intermediary of the British


59. NAI Foreign and Political Files, Nos. 83-162, August 1903, No. 155, Notes.

Government. The Russians had gained only in terms of local question of a non-political nature which could be settled directly by the Afghan and the British officials.

However the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was extremely disgusting even for Amir Habibullah and for the people of Afghanistan.

According to Vartan Gregorian perhaps "no single event gave as much impetus to the growth of Afghan nationalism as the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 did." Fearing the attack on Afghan independence the Amir had expressed his reluctance to adhere to the Anglo-Russian Convention in which Afghanistan was cited as the third party and without whose approval the terms would not come into force.

However the Afghan misgivings continued leading to the acrimony between the Amir and the British Indian Viceroy. In reply to the question regarding the Convention, the Afghan Amir had replied to the viceroy in a massive fifty four pages letter that "the same had destroyed the independence of Afghanistan and the same was never signed by the Afghan government."


However, sensing the impediment in its approval by the Afghan government the Anglo-Russian party declaring Afghanistan 'a neutral', they agreed to sign in her absence. Despite these difficulties, Afghanistan's relation remained normal with the British preceding the outbreak of the First World War. The caution and independent nature of foreign policy pursued by Amir Habibullah had deterred both Britain and Russia from exerting any sort of pressure on Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{64}

The outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 1914 had forced both Britain and Russia not to force the Convention of 1907 on Afghanistan and in return Amir Habibullah pledging his adherence to the Anglo-Afghan treaty, declared his determination to maintain neutrality in the war.\textsuperscript{65} Even when it was the question of Turkish entry to the war, Amir Habibullah reiterated his country's continued commitment to the policy of neutrality.

Despite Amir Habibullah's strict neutrality in the ensuing international crisis, the general mood in Kabul was of strong anti-British\textsuperscript{66} and wave of sympathy for the Turkish cause.

\textsuperscript{64} An Englishman wrote to his relatives in Bombay from Kabul "Almost every one in Kabul was strongly anti-British and Pro-Turkish, except the Amir who speaks seldom in public.

\textsuperscript{65} NAI Foreign and Political Files, FPS War, Nos. 1-202, March, 1916, No. 16, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{66} NAI Foreign and Political Files, FPS War, Nos. 1-202, March, 1916, No. 16, p. 7.
Even Mahmud Khan Tarzi had blamed the war on English for their commercial rivalry with the Germans as is reflected in his writings in *Siraj-ul-Akhbar*. Germany also tried to woo the Amir in their favour but the Amir did not respond positively. The Germans tried to woo the Amir to sign a treaty but the Amir did not respond.

Though the maintenance of strict neutrality by Afghanistan during the war did not do much good to Afghanistan, as in terms of reward from the British government nothing came concrete as the Indian Viceroy's overture of "being generous" was hardly heard by London.

Following the assassination of Amir Habibullah on 19 February, 1919, Amanullah had succeeded the throne of Afghanistan on 21st February, 1921. Just after the assuming of power the Amir tried to convey a clear message to the British government of India of Afghanistan's acquiring a new status of "a free, autonomous and independent country both internally and externally, and would not tolerate any outside

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interference. But as expected the British reply was an impression that Amanullah's rise to power was 'not favourably viewed by London'. The acrimony continued between the British government of India and Amir Amanullah Khan which led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The war had proved to be a costly affair for the British, whereas Amir Amanullah Khan had succeeded in securing full independence for Afghanistan and many such issues were settled.

CHAPTER-III
PART-I

AMIR AMANULLAH'S ASSUMING OF POWER 
AND THE THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

Amir Habibullah was assassinated on Feb. 19, 1919 and with that the race for the throne begun. Nasrullah the brother of Habibullah, and Inayatullah were two powerful contender who had been with the king in Jalalabad and and declared themselves the kings. whereas Amanullah\textsuperscript{1} who had often served as the regent in his father's absentia, and had been taking independant decision was fortunately at Kabul\textsuperscript{2} during the event. He captured the Arg (a combination of royal residence, fort and treasur) and spent the money lavishly for getting support of the army.\textsuperscript{3} The army though was in his command was rejoiced with the improved condition and increased salary, gave him overwhelming support. Nasrullah was captured alongwith his family members and brought to

\textsuperscript{1} For detailed sketch of Amanullah's contest for the throne. See Rhea Talley Stewart; \textit{Fire in Afghanistan} (New York. Double day, 1973).

\textsuperscript{2} He had been helped by the circumstances of his being is Kabul while every possible claimaint was in the south, as quoted from Wild Roland; \textit{Amanullah, Ex-King of Afghanistan}. Hurst and Blackett Ltd. London, 1932.

\textsuperscript{3} Army seeing the prospect of freedom from British tutelege supported Amanullah, see for detail in this regard Abdul Ghani; A Review of Political situation in Central Asia, Ch. 4; See also. Ikbal Ali Shah, \textit{The Tragedy of Amanullah} (London : Alexander, 1933).
kabul. Those who were found quitly were put to death, some were confined to prison and those found innocent were freed including Inayatullah.  

Amaullah in this way seized the throne of Afghanistan on April 13, 1919 and held a public Darbar and was recognised as the full fledge king of Afghanistan. Before that Amanullah, a few week ago vowing to bring the murderer of his father to justice, had steered the people by his public oratory. He claimed that his legitimacy and his mandate to rule emanated from the Afghan nation. Personal popularity of Amanullah in the army and among the Barakzais provided him an added strength from the start of his reign.

After the arrest of his uncle Nasrullah and most of the members of Habibullah's entourage, kept in pending investigation of the assassination. This was an astute move that immobilized the leadership of the traditional of force.

4. Nasrullah was put to confinement and died in jail. Whereas Inayatullah who was found innocent freed.

5. "Darbar" is common among Afghan tribal chiefs and particulary during such occassion as coronation of new king powerful tribal chiefs from all over are invited to attend.


7. During the Habibullah's regime (called Serajiya) the court was divided into two faction, one was Pro-reform other opposing it. The Pro-reform was led by Amir Habibullah, while Nasrullah being very religious led the orthodox conservative faction. Getting rid of Nasrullah, meant a big relief for the new dynamic Amir who wanted no such hindrances. See May, Schinasi, Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century: A study of Siraj-ul-akbar (1911-1918) Naples, 1979, pp. 34-35.
Nasrullah died in jail and the other members of Musahiban family who were found innocent were released.

Amir Amanullah then with consolidating his position at home began to unfold his manoeuvres in foreign affairs. He lost no time in indicating a complete change in the Afghan politics as he had spoken in his coronation speech of complete Afghan independence on March 1, 1919. One of the Amanullah's first acts after seizing the throne was to write a letter on March 3, 1919 to the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, declaring Afghanistan to be entirely independent and before that he had declared himself and his country as entirely free, autonomous and independant country internally and externally in his coronation speech. It appeared that the British did not view these development with any seriousness and attached no significant

8. Among the four leading families of Afghanistan, the Amanullah family, Charkhi, Tarzi and Musahiban played important role in Afghanhistory. Amir Abdur Rahman had Tarzis and Musahiban exiled in turkey and British India respectively. Though Habibullah permitted both of them to return. It was Nadir Khan from Musahiban family who succeeded Amanullah. Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, Cornell University Press, pp. 35-36. This family is also known as "Peshawar Sirdar family" Cf. Caroe, p. 307.

9. Appendix to document no. 98, NAI foreign Political files, Fronties 6, 1919.

apparently. They were aware of the new ruler's Barakzai lineage and tradition and hence possibly were convinced that this was a pretext for seeking an increase in his stipend. The viceroy of India in a letter offered no comments on his declaration of Independence. On the contrary, praised Amir Amanullah and expressed the hope that the good relation established by ancestors with the British would be continuing by the new Amir as well.

Amir Amanullah's declaration of independence and autonomy had come at a time when the British were facing problems in India. On 13 April 1919 hundreds of peaceful political demonstrator had been massacred by the army at Jallian Walla Bagh in Amritsar. The protest which followed had swept across India's major cities of Bombay, Delhi and


12. Amanullah's mother Queen Ulaya Hazrat belonged to this tribe of Barakzai who had considerable influences. See May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the Beginning of the 20th century, Naples, 1979, pp. 109-110.


15. The Hunter commission found that General Dyer had ordered his troops to fire into a packed crowd of 15,000 confined in a stadium resulting 379 dead and 200 wounded (Annual Register, 1919, p. 272).
Lahore. An Afghan declaration of independence at this point could only be viewed by the Indian as an example to be followed.\textsuperscript{16}

As soon as the reports reached Kabul of serious roiting, in the Punjab, the Afghan government took steps to put pressure on the British in India.\textsuperscript{17} On April 13, 1919 Amanullah invited a number of influential frontier chiefs to Kabul and told them that the holy war was imminent.\textsuperscript{18} He also ordered concentration of Afghan Army on the eastern border, where one section under General Swaleh Khan,\textsuperscript{19} proceeded to Dakka\textsuperscript{20} near Khyber, second under Nadir Khan\textsuperscript{21} to Matun (Khost) and third commanded by Abdul Quddus, was posted at Kandhar.

The British government of India deployed 7,50,000 troops all along the Durand line\textsuperscript{22} in an operation involving

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Cited from, Raja Anwar; \textit{The Tragedy of Afghanistan}, Verso, London, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Cited from, Fletcher Arnold; \textit{Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest}, Cornell University Press, New York, 1966, p. 189.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Quoted from, Arnold Fletcher; \textit{Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest}, Cornell, 1966, p.189.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Swaleh Khan was the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Dakka was an important military outpost four miles away from Khyber Pass.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Nadir Khan, the Afghan war Minister during the Afghan war of Independence had succeeded Amanullah as king.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The drawing of this "boundary" the so-called Durand line had often been challenged by the Afghan at various times. See D.S. Franck;
\end{itemize}
some 400,000 transport animals. Facing this army were 38,000 Afghan infantry men (one half of them with small bore rifles and the rest with 19th century Martinis and Sniders) 8,000 cavalry men and 4,000 artillery men with low quality guns. The Afghan army had neither aircraft nor mechanised units.

The stage was set for the Third British Afghan war, which began on May 6, 1919. From the beginning it was the most uneven contest ever fought. The British forces were fifteen times stronger in size to that of the Afghan Army. They were armed with mortars, tanks and aircraft. In addition to it had behind it the experience of four years of first World War. Compared to the British they had outdated weapons. The British bombed Kabul. The fighting began on three major fronts. At Khyber the tribal militia raised by British rebelled and occupied the area. However, British counter attacks had not only regained control, but pushed

(continued from previous page) Pushtunistan: Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land; Middle East Journal vi (1952) p. 49-62, Louis Deupree; Pushtunistan V.no. 2, 3, and 4. Poullada B.L., Some International Legal aspects of the Pushtunistan Disputes; Afghanistan (Kabul) XXI No. 4, 1969, pp. 10-36.

23. A good account of the type of the guns, and other war machinery can be found in Molesworth, G.N. (Lt. Gen.) Afghanistan, 1919 (N.Y. Asia Publishing House, 1962) Chap. VII.


25. Spin Baldak was an important Afghan fort north west of New Chaman, a strongly built fort.
back the Afghan nearly 20 km. into their own territory. In the Qandhar sector also British attack was successful. There was heavy fighting around the Afghan post of Spin Bolaak which the British eventually captured.

At Khost the Afghan army fought valiantly and advanced as far as the cantonment of town of Tal. In this engagement the military governor of Paktia General Nadim Khan, emerged as hero. As hostilities began he pressed the local tribes into service. Thirty thousand armed Waziris tribesmen, who were settled in British occupied territories marched to him and they were joined by other tribesmen. Emboldened by the success, tribal parties began to carryout daring raids into the British territories. In 1919 according to one estimate a total of 611 raids took place, resulting in 198 killed, 392 wounded and 463 abductions, property worth 300,000 rupees was damaged and of the invading tribal fighters 119 were killed, 60 injured and 40 taken prisoner. Most of these raids were carried out behind British line and the main targets

26. Many of the tribal militia armed by the British including powerful Waziris and Mahseed tribes revolted in ensuring war. See the series of Secret Telegrams from the Chief Commissioner, NWPF, to the Government of India, IOL, LPS/10/808/1061, 1919.

27. Waziris a highland tribe speakers of soft Pushtun wear long hair, not true Afghan. See Olaf Caroe; The Pathans, for detail Macmillan.


were British and Indian officers.\textsuperscript{30}

On May 24, Amanullah responded to British feelers and the government of India accepted an end to the hostilities, as the situation all along the NWF had rapidly deteriorated.\textsuperscript{31} The hostilities in the third Afghan war lasted only a few weeks yet the relations between them had deteriorated considerably. Now that the tribes were roused at last, British would have met far more serious opposition if the war had continued. In fact the ferocious Darwesh Khel Waziris alone could have done considerable damage to the British army. Moreover an epidemic of cholera broke out in the British army, with heavy mortality.\textsuperscript{32} Thus war was to end, though as a military stalemate. The viceroy, Lord Chelmsford and his delegate Sir H.R. Grant were keen for a peaceful settlement of the issues.

Thus on May 28, while the army of Nadir Khan was investing Thal, the viceroy received a message from Amanullah Khan, who wrote that the action of Swaleh

\textsuperscript{30} The detail comes from, Spain, J.W., The Pathan Borderland, Hague, 1963, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{31} See the series of Secret Telegram from the chief commissioner NWFP, to the Government of India, IOL, LPS, 10/808/1061, 1919.

\textsuperscript{32} All this led to afghan attack more furiously as their main tactic was guerilla warfare. See Arnold Fletcher; Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, New York, 1966.
Khan had been misinterpreted and that the Afghan had not contemplated attacking India. He also requested for armistice. In the British reply, the condition under which an armistice would be granted, were "that the Afghan's were to withdraw all troops from the border...... that the British troops should remain where they now are in Afghan territory...... British troops. will not bomb or machine gun Afghan localities or troop [...] further that you will undertake that your people won't fire upon or molest British aircraft. Amanullah's response was the show of defiance and challenge. He pointed out that the civil and military forces of Afghanistan as identical and that it was impossible to move the tribes from the border. He also wrote "the spirit of freedom...... has nearly brought to its death, agony, oppression and domination among the various nations."

Whether the British government was impressed by the new Amir's philosophical defiance or forced by circumstances, they now agreed to a peace conference. But the die hards in the imperial structure both in India and England wanted to see the upstart young king of Afghanistan, who had dared to challenge British power, eat

33. Swaleh Khan, the commander-in-chief then at Peshwar commanding the army, could not wait for the expected uprising of the tribals against the British and jumped the gun before. Through he was dismissed later on.

dirt. They objected even to cease fire and were outraged at the suggestion that Britain should relinquish control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs.  

The British agreed to the peace conference, which was to be held at Rawalpindi. The Afghan delegation was led by Ali Ahmad Khan, one of Amanullah's cousin and the British by Sir Hamilton Grant. The discussion lasted for about a fortnight (from July 26 to August 8, 1919) and were acrimonious in the extreme. To the astonishment and the anger of the British the Afghans did not behave in the least like a vanquished nation. They put forth the claims to all of Waziristan, to a much larger subsidy, and to their own independence and sovereignty and in their spare time they made inflammatory speeches for the benefit of an admiring audience of Indians. On August 8, treaty was concluded. Its five articles called for the withdrawal of British, the cessation of British subsidies and a stop to the flow of Afghan war materials through India. No mention was made of Afghan sovereignty, but at the request of the Afghan delegation a


36. Sir Hamilton Grant, the foreign secretary to the Govt. of India assisted by the Viceroy's personal secretary and nine civilian officials and military men. The nine member Afghan delegation was led by Ali Ahmad Khan, commissiary for Home Affairs. Cited from Naftula Khalfin. British Plots against Afghanistan, Novosty, 1981, pp. 92-93.

rider to the effect, that it had been implied was attached to the treaty.\textsuperscript{38}

Compared with the previous wars the Third Afghan War was less bloody yet the British Government of India had to spend a huge sum of about £ 16,500,000. It was a drain on them immediately after the end of the World War I.

The question needs to be examine as to why did Amanullah had gone for a war against the British? Fraser Tytler holds' that the flood of popular sentiment which had swept Habibullah his throne swept Amanullah on to it.... But the Afghan like other young people are liable to be volatile."\textsuperscript{39}

Within a few weeks of his accession Amanullah had antagonised the powerful religious factions by imprisoning his uncle Nasrullah\textsuperscript{40} for his complicity in the murder\textsuperscript{41} of his father and incurred the resentment of the army by releasing the distinguishing Musahiban family.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, when

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} As cited fro, Aitchinson C.U., \textit{A collection of treaties, Sanads and engagement relating to India and neighbouring countries} (Cal. 1933), vol. XIII, pp. 45-60.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Fraser, Tytler, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Nasrullah as has been stated earlier was extremely orthodox person opposed to Habibullah's modernizing programme. He had a powerful factions of religious men. See May Schinasi, \textit{Afghanistan at the Beginning of 20th century}, Naples, 1973, pp. 34-35.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Nasrullah at that time of Habibullah's murder was with him in Kalla Ghosh. (Laghman Province) and this is suspected of complicity.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Musahiban family along with Nadir Khan (the Minister of War) was disliked the Proturkish group in the army. There was a kind of schism in Amanullah's
Amanulah felt his position was endangered he sought to reunite his people and bring them under his fold. The opinion prevails that war resulted primarily due to domestic Afghan causes. Amanullah needed independence. Though the British viewed relation with Afghanistan in the same way as was concluded with Habibullah but Amanullah took it differently. But with the emerging of situation, Amanullah wanted to concluded a new agreement with Britain, in which complete independence a major term, and which Britain was reluctant to grant. British Government was inclined towards Nasrullah. These all made Amanullah hostile towards the British.

To sum up it can be said that the most important reason for the Third Afghan War were Amanullah's fear that Afghanistan would again be subjected to the British tutelage if he was to practice the policy of his predecessors. Amanullah emerged from the conflict as the champion of Afghan freedom and Afghan looked upon this war as "war of independence." Amanullah emerged upon the war with enormous prestige, not only as nationalist fighter who had successfully twisted British lion tail, but as one who had done in the name of jihad.

(continued from previous page) cabinet later on as Pro- and anti-Turkish factions opposed each other. See, the Secret Report on the kabul mission by Sir H.R. Dobbs, IOL, LPS/10/809, 1909, for military reform controversy.
CHAPTER-III

PART II

ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING AMIR AMANULLAH'S PERIOD

Afghanistan became the biggest concern of the British for securing their colonial interests in India. Both from the strategic and diplomatic point of view, it occupied a prominent place in British policy concerns in the region. Situation had become more complex after the Bolshevick Revolution taking into consideration the Indo-Afghan relation dealt by the British. Soviet intentions were aggressively threatening. Whereas the new Amir Amanullah was mainly concerned with the issue of "complete Independence for Afghanistan."

This way from the strategic considerations Afghanistan became buffer for their vested interests. Therefore, British

1. See, Ludwig, Adamec: Afghanistan (1900-1923), A Diplomatic History, Berkley, 1967, who has extensively dealt with the diplomatic and strategic importance of Afghanistan in relation to the defence of British India.

2. The Russian were more aggressive after the Bolshevick Resolution and by the time of Amir Amanullah's assuming of power, they had already encroached upon the independent Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, etc. the Soviet Policy makers had been eyeing towards the British India through Afghanistan. See also, Gregorian Vartan; The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. In particular Stalin's statement that "Central Asia and the States bordering India are to Russian outposts from which the Soviet authority should be able to threaten England; The Times, Jan. 1, 1923, p. 9 as cited by Samra, C.S.: India & Anglo-Soviet Relations (1917-1947), Asia Publication, 1959.
obviously wanted to put pressure on Russians by seeing that Afghanistan remained titled towards the British India. This had been the British ploy to be used for their "forward policy." And the British had pursued it towards the Amir's of Afghanistan in the past. Amir Abdur Rahman however, had strong disliking for such a stereotyped pattern of foreign policy yet he was aware of the limited option available to Afghanistan and thus remained clueless. Amir Habibullah turned out to be a "Pro-British and he bowed down before the British designs. Amir Habibullah's policy antagonised a large section of Afghan intellectuals, Young Afghans including young Amanullah.

3. The previous two full scale wars (Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1838, 1878) and continuous diplomatic edge in terms of sending envoys to Kabul and getting Afghan cooperation was in fact how the British would pressurise Russia (as the Russians were acting in the historical pattern of previous heartland empires and was intent on the conquest of the Asian rimlands and on gaining access to the warm seas). Similarly the Russian leaders were convinced that Britain had sought to restrict and frustrate Russia's legitimate expansion in Asia and at some point would resort to military aggression to ensure containment within limits which the latters could not accept.

As an Amir of Afghanistan Amanullah found it totally obnoxious to follow the imperialist design of either the powers and was unwilling to follow even the stereotype patterns of foreign policy set by his predecessors.\(^5\)

Amanullah was a witness to and was aware of the developments taking place in some of the muslim countries. The Pan-Islamic upsurg against imperialism, strong anti-British feelings had surfaced in Afghanistan. Amanullah had to take notice of these forces to make Afghanistan an extremely independent nation.\(^6\)


Amanullah's resolve to cast off all signs of British domination and control the affairs of Afghanistan particularly at this moment which had coincided with the problems faced by the British in the area. Especially British government of India had been struggling hard against the Non-Cooperation Movement and the threats posed by Bolshevick Russia. Amanullah's announcement of a new and independent foreign policy had its effect on the morale of the British government of India. Amanullah initially looked towards Soviets for military help, for raising a soviet trained Afghan Air Force. The British had always viewed the Russio-Afghan ties a dangerous sign for them. Amir Amanullah's departure from the earlier established pro-British policy was a revolutionary step. Amanullah took advantages of the serious internal turmoils posed by the British in India, and declared war against the British in May 1919. He proclaimed it to be

7. The period is marked with the web of confusion and the disorder for the British government of India as the series of problems related to the post-war settlement of the promises, the Khilafat questions, the Non-Cooperation Movement etc. combined with the aggressive threat from the Bolshevick Russia had, raised their dragon heads. See for details on the problems facing the British Government of India. Trivedi, R.K.: The Critical Triangle, (India Britain and Turkey), Jaipur 1993. Particularly the chapter on "Turko-German Intrigue in India during the world war II." Also Bamford, P.C.: Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement, Deep Publication, 1974. and Zelda, Coates: A History of Anglo Soviet Relations, London, 1945.

8. The defeat of Turkey and the neutrality of Afghanistan in the world war I led to the Afghan's developing strong anti-British Sentiment. See, Sareen, Anuradha, op.cit., p. 107.

a jihad. Nadir Khan's Pushtun uprising" in the NWF against the British and Amanullah's seeking help from the soviet had caused consternation in the British ranks and files.

Though the Afghans themselves had created this situation as is evident from the reports and secret letters. The clashes between the British India and Afghanistan proved not only costly but a bloody one. The attack was to start as a tribal incursion from Afghan sides into a tiny piece of disputed territory in the Khyber pass and would coincide with the uprising of the Indian nationalists in Peshawar planned by the Afghan Secret Service. The brain behind the Peshawar uprising, was the famous Afghan Secret agent, Ghulam Hyder However, the British thwarted the Afghan plan through a swift counter move relying on its efficient

10. Amanullah's proclamation of jihad, was a means of waking up public enthusiasm and at the same time divesting the attention of hostile elements in the country from his own person by the call of Islam as his accession to power was not very legitimate. See Maconachie, R.R.: A Precis on Afghan Affairs, February 1919 to Sep. 1927 (Simla, 1928) no. 1, p. 14.

11. Nadir Khan was sent for inciting the Pushtuns on the British side of the Durand line against the British. See, Annual Register, 1919.

12. According to the Annual Register, 1919 the one month Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 had resulted in an increase of 4,750,000 pound in the military Budget of the govt. of India.

13. Ghulam Haider, the famous Afghan Post Master at Peshawar was in fact operated as a Soviet secret agent and had liaison with Indian nationalists, as is revealed through numerous documents. The Government (Provisional) formed by Mahendra Pratap as President, Barkatullah as Prime Minister and Obaidullah Sindhi as Home Minister. See for further details. Trivedi, R.K.; Op.cit. pp. 173-177.
spy system. Kabul had offered shelter to a number of Indian revolutionaries who had formed "the Provisional Government of India in exile".

The British government of India considered those developments as a blatant interference in the internal affairs of the country. Amanullah went on to the extent of even condemning the Rawlatt Act and declaring the Third Anglo-Afghan war to be a jihad.

Nadir Khan though was successful in leading a rising of the Pashtun tribes against the British. At one point of time the entire frontier threatened to explode against the British, but due to the superb handling of the affairs by experienced George Roos Keppel and Sir Abdul Qayyum, they managed to save the situation for the British.

The war was keenly contested and evenly matched. Though in terms of losses, in this war too the British had considerable losses in terms of men and material. Even with


15. George Roos Keppel was the Chief Commissioner of the N.W. Frontier Province and Sir Abdul Qayyum as a British Agent.

the upper hand the Afghan forces had got, Amanullah thought it wise to call for a truce\(^\text{17}\) and a deal favourable to his policy, resulting in the rise of his status —— a very disgusting situation for the British.\(^\text{18}\)

Among the British ranks and files this war had led to the emergence of divergent views and clash of opinions in regard to the future Anglo-Afghan policy to be pursued. Lord Chelmsford, the then British viceroy to India was in favour of "an entirely new game to be played in Asia". He wanted a 'drastic policy shift' towards Afghanistan.\(^\text{19}\) But the


\(^{18}\) For the war and the subsequent negotiations for peace. See Adamec, Op.cit., A publication of the British Govt., Papers Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, gives an account of the Third Anglo Afghan war on the basis of sixty seven documents. For some time this publication was of necessity the most important source for this war; however, its usefulness is limited because the documents published are largely communicated between India and England and only such documents were listed, as could safely be published at the time. For the most comprehensive coverage of the war, consult the files on the Afghan war containing about one thousand documents bound in seven volumes, as follows: NAI, Foreign and Political Files. Secret Afghan War, August 1919, no. 90; Sept. 1919, nos. 92-101, file 1, July 1919, nos. 1-235; file 2, August 1919, nos. 1-200B; file 3. August 1919, nos. 201-422; file 4, Sept. 1919, nos. 6-195; file 5, Oct. 1919, nos. 18-191. For an account by a participant in the war. See India Office Memorandum A183, Afghanistan, Diary of Events, Feb. 20, 1919, Sep. 15, 1915.

\(^{19}\) Even Hamilton Grant, the then Foreign Secretary of the British Govt. in India had suggested for a "relation based on real friendliness and mutual trust with Afghanistan and for that advocated for treaty based on Afghan terms. See, NAI Foreign and Political Files Secret Frontier, Oct. 1920, No. 705-806, as cited by Sareen Anuradha, Op.cit. p. 122.
suggested new approach, found in the bureaucratic and geopolitical thought of the imperial policy makers "too deeply ingrained for a general attitude to change even in the changed scenario". There were conflicting and distorted perceptions of each others policies.\(^\text{20}\)

Though the real intentions of the British policy makers could not become clear. The same acrimony and conflicting policy debate among them led to misunderstanding and tension among the Afghan elite too.\(^\text{21}\)

The leading newspapers and journals of Afghanistan particularly the Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Aman-i-Afghan journals of Afghanistan were vehemently anti-British in the tone and content. These journals more reflected the Amir's point of view and had been praising the German efforts during the World War I, which was part of the tirade against the British India.

Though the real intentions of the British policy makers

\(^\text{20}\) The so called "New Approach" in relation was not destined to succeed as Lord Chelmsford himself embarked upon a "policy of releasing Afghanistan from the leading strings of the British" of which, though Afghanistan was free, and independent but policy wise had to be treated then as dependency. Cf. Lord Chelmsford's Secret Report to the Rt. Hon. Edwin Montague in Despatch no. 73, Oct. 2, 1919, India Office Library, LPS/10/808/1919, as cited by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 243.

\(^\text{21}\) Amanullah, Tarzi and Young Afghans proud of a new freedom, they felt they had wrested from the British by skilful diplomacy and force of arms, deeply resented the British patronising attitude. Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 243.
could not become clear. The same acrimony and conflicting policy debate among them led to the misunderstandings and tension among the Afghan elite too.

Seeing the consistent tirade against the British government and its policies by these journals, the government had come out with a ban on circulation of journals into India. Even Amir Amanullah had lost no occasion to thrash the British through media, for their colonial policies in India. Time and again he had interacted himself on the British attitude towards the Indians, as he had espoused the cause of Indian nationalist leaders for their fight against the atrocities and high handedness of British Indian authorities. There is enough evidence to suggest a closer link between the exiled Indian nationalist's and Amanullah's secret agents in India, i.e. Hakim Aslam and Maulvi Manzoor. Afghan intrigues in the tribal areas of the North West Frontiers had become a constant source of friction. Amanullah's Tribal Affairs Department was reported to give extensive subsidies to the tribes on the British side and goaded them to agitate


and propagate against the British.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand the British activities in the tribal belt also raised the level of conflict with Afghanistan. British had a modified forward or "close Border Policy," which involved gradual peaceful penetration, with extension of roads and railways upto the Afghan borders.\textsuperscript{25} later on Afghan attempt to negotiate the tribal problems with government of India, was simply ignored and given a cold reception.\textsuperscript{26} Afghan pride was seriously hurt in finding that the British had not accorded them the respect due to a sovereign state.

In 1920, a Afghan mission was not permitted to plead the cause of the Khilafat in London. British also had protested to Italy about a projected commercial agreement with Afghanistan on the ground that Afghanistan lay within the British sphere of the influence.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} It was suspected by the British Government in India that the money was coming from the Soviet Union. Cf. Telegrams India, Afghan, Bolshevick Connection, India Office Library, LPS/10/809/1919, Soviet Activities in India, NAI Home Political Files, 7-379, 1930, as cited by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 247.


\textsuperscript{26} On tribal question, Curzon heading the Foreign Office in London did not give any indication of enthusiasm in discussing the matter with Afghan envoy, which had created problem for both parties. See also Amanullah-Chamberlain discussion in this regard as cited by Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., p. 247.

During the same period, as the acrimony continued, the British government of India continued to impose the sanction on the transit of goods through India to Afghanistan. During the Mangal revolt the British had stopped arms shipment from France and Germany to Afghanistan, which Tarzi had termed to be a flagrant violation of Afghan sovereignty. British had regarded with great suspicion and displeasure the system of interlocking treaties among USSR, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan that had as a common denomination hostile to Britain.

Afghan exiles in India were additional source of friction and suspicion between Amir Amanullah and the British. The British projected them as the heir apparent to the Afghan throne. Consequent to the various tribal revolts, they had


raised various objections to Amanullah's efforts to initiate modernization programmes in Afghanistan. Sir Francis Humphry's had never considered Amir Amanullah more than a mere kinglet. The slight and scorn was intolerable for the Amir and his people. Naturally those developments had bearings on the Anglo-Afghan relations.  

The Projected rail-road for Afghanistan sponsored by Clemenceau was Humphry's target and did everything to discourage and scuttle that. During Baccha-e-Saqqao's attack on Kabul, Humphry's had tried to be more blatant in approach dealing with Afghanistan and accordingly on numerous occasions the Afghan air space was violated and the rebels were helped by that way. The pamphlets were dropped from the planes which had to incite the rebels against Amir Amanullah's regime. These pamphlets contained malicious propaganda stuffs hostile to the regime and objectionable photographs of Queen Soraya.  

30. Sir Francis Humphry's stay in Kabul covers whole of Amanullah's reign (1919-1929) and from all the known sources. Humphry's had developed utter dislike for the Amir and was responsible in more deteriorating diplomatic relations. See, Leon B. Poullada, Op.cit., pp. 252-253 and also Telegrams from Sir Francis Humphry's in the British Legation, Kabul, to the foreign office London no. 39, 1927-1929. Also, Minutes of the India Office London, prepared by A. Wakeley, no. 1178, February 16, 1929.

31. Micheal Clemenceau was leading the Kabul Qandhar Railroad Project and had conducted survey of the area during Summer of 1920.

Although Amanullah was accorded a cordial and dignified reception in London during his visit, sending down a positive signal and hope for better relations in future. But in general the relation between Amir Amanullah and the British were highly unsatisfactory. The blame for the rebellion of 1928 was put on the shoulders of the British. The Press of the Soviet Union, France and Germany had laid the blame on the British. The suspicion of the British intrigue was evident and focussed on the presence of Col. T.E. Lawrence (of Lawrence of Arabia fame) in the tribal area during the revolt. That cannot be termed merely a coincidence, rather a definite link could be seen. Humphry's unsympathetic report about the rebellion led the British to adopt a neutral attitude between the Amir and the rebels. Undoubtedly, the declaration of neutrality operated dangerously against Amir Amanullah in a number of ways. That deprived him of the support which could have saved him.

33. Whether there was a British complicity behind the revolt which had ousted Amir Amanullah, from the power, is altogether a different question, but for a long time Anglo-Afghan relations could never improved.


Deep in trouble, in the final phase of the rebellion, Amir Amanullah had sought the British help, but was regretfully told of the "British neutrality" in that regard.\textsuperscript{36}

Later on, Amir Amanullah had deep regret in not forging a close relation with the British and that failure he had attributed to his "hands off policy".

Still the British did never want a chaotic scenario in Afghanistan or a power vaccum, which could have given the Bolshevick a chance to expand in the region.\textsuperscript{37}

To sum up, the failure on forging a better relation lay on both the sides i.e. the British and Amir Amanullah, because in the given geopolitical circumstances old perception continued to influence their policies.\textsuperscript{38}

Both the parties concerned had to differ almost on all issues and sometimes personal ego was also involved. The Anglo Afghan acrimony and tension through his reign had


\textsuperscript{37} Cited from Ludwig Adamec W. Op.cit. p. 4. Ludwing has given an incisive concluding remark on Anglo-Afghan relations and its intricacies.

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Leon, B. Poullada had worked extensively on Afghan Affairs with all minute details. See for Anglo-Afghan Relations, his work \textit{"The Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan (1919-1929).}
undoubtedly hampered the full development of the modernization programme of Amir Amanullah.

Social resistance to a process of modernization and change is understandable. It gathers political overtones when such a resistance receives foreign assistance. But for the British sympathy, the conflict between Amir Amanullah and the tribal interests against the central authority would never have succeeded.
CHAPTER-III

PART-III

RUSSIO-AFGHAN RELATIONS DURING AMANULLAH'S REIGN

"My spirit will remain in Afghanistan though my soul go to God. My last words to you my son and successor, we never trust the Russians".

... Abdur Rahman Khan (d. 1901)¹

"That Central Asia and the State bordering on India are to Russia outposts from which the Soviet authority should be able to threaten England".

... LENIN, Times, Jan. 1, 1923, p. 9.

Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of three different cultural zones. The Islamic world, the Indian culture and Chinese influence.² For this reason Afghanistan had a long history of conflict in Central Asia. Inspite of this Afghanistan owed much of its importance to its strategic location.³

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2. See Rahul, Ram; Struggle for Central Asia, Vikas, 1982, p. 45.
3. Afghanistan was a place where the territorial interest of Imperial and colonial powers i.e. Russia and British was to clash apart from interests of Germany and France. For dertail on the same, see C.C. Davis, Frontiers : A study in Imperial Policy, p. 1.
Afghanistan had been the main route of invasions from the great Eurasian heartland to the Middle East and the south Asia. The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan can be understood by looking at the theories propounded by the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder and by Captain Alfred Mahan of the U.S.A., in which they have discussed the influence of geography on the political destiny of nations. The doctrine admirably apply to the situations of Afghanistan, which could act like a "wheelchair" for any expansionist power.

It was due to occurrence of any weakness in the peninsular power the pressure from heartland broke through and that happened a number of times in the apparent case of Afghanistan. Due to this position, Afghanistan has traditionally been one of the great political unstable and contentious zones. The history of Afghanistan offers an appropriate examples of the theory put forwarded by the geo-politicians. Nevertheless there are many critics of such theories.

Such propositions and theories may not exactly fit in


the case of Afghanistan, yet the area around Afghanistan had been incessant warfare in the past and the "Great Game" between the Russian and the British interests in Central Asia, had been unparalleled in history.\(^6\)

The conflict in the region intensified with the British acquiring foothold in the Indian subcontinent and advancing towards Central Asia by the 18\(^{th}\) century. On the other hand Russian too, had started their assertive policy for their interest in Central Asia. The two empires then began territorial aggression and occupied a large chunk of territories by 19\(^{th}\) century. Their advances were rapid and so convincing that they had presumed their own clash at any point of time and the place which obviously occurred at Afghanistan in the later phase of their rivalries. Then "the great game"\(^7\) with players like Arthur Conolly\(^8\), Charles Masson\(^9\),

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7. The "Great game" was the term coined by Sir John W. Kaye, *A History of War in Afghanistan*, 3\(^{rd}\) ed. 3 vols. London, 1874.

8. Arthur Conolly along with Colonel Stoddart the British agents before the first Afghan war, were beheaded in Bokhara in June 1842, Cf. Dupree, *Afghanista*, p. 374.

9. Charles Masson was a deserter from the East India Company army, who was later on found to be American agent, See the Masson Papers, 631-657. Also Louis Durpee, p. 385.
Alexander Burnes\textsuperscript{10}, B. Vickovitch\textsuperscript{11}, and other with their extremely intriguing conspiracies in the region.

It was from the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali's succession, that the Russian had planned to expand towards the region, by establishing a military base at Orenburg near Ural mountain by the border of the Afghan territory. The British too had started territorial occupations in India, swallowing one native kingdom after another until they occupied the Indus plain by August 1843. Now it was the time when the two empires was to clash in Afghanistan in order to thwart each other's expansionist policy. The British fear against the Russian worked well and thus then moves resulted in two full scale wars, namely the Anglo-Afghan war of 1838\textsuperscript{12} and in 1878\textsuperscript{13}. The two empires had been fighting in Balkans and in Turkey too apart from the high plateau of Afghanistan. Their intentions mainly emanated from their fears and aspirations\textsuperscript{14}. They had resorted to military means as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Capt. Vicovich (also called Vickovich, Vitkievich) a Russian agent was sent to counter the Burnes mission came to Kabul in Dec. 1837/ See Louis Dupree, op.cit. p. 371.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} For the first Afghan war the best modern explantion comes from J.A. Noris, The First Afghan War 1838-1842, Cambridge 1967.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} For a best detail work on second Anglo-Aghan war, See The Road to Kabul, Brian Robson 1986, Arms and Armour Press Limited, London.
\end{itemize}
solution to these issues. But to the outside world they manifested them as that of purely defensive in nature. Amir Abdur Rahman was inclined to the British sphere of Influence yet he had aspired to free Afghanistan. Though he had to contend with balancing tact between the two empires and thwarted attempts from both sides for rail Road projects. But the Russians had to say no to the "close border policy" and kept on interfering in Afghan affairs which culminated in the "Punjdeh Crises" and occupied a portion of Afghan territory. The incident, had far reaching consequences and aggravated the atmosphere, compelling the British to ask Russia for delimitation of Russio-Afghan border in 1887. By that time the British wanted Afghanistan

15. Both wanted to extend the boundaries which of course were ill-marked at that time. See A. Lobonov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, New York, 1951, p. 113.


18. The Panjdeh affair (1885) was of utter significance as for the first time Russians did venture into Afghan territory and occupied it after a short battle. At the same time when Amir Abdur Rahman met Viceroy Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi, he chided the viceroy for the lack of British armed assistance in their hour of need. See for detail Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 423.
to behave as "unilateral buffer state" against Russia.

Amir Abdur Rahman was also subjected to a pressure tactics for agreeing to a border settlement with British India. They split the Pushtun tribe into two parts, one part to British Indian side and other to Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman succumbed to the British pressure against Russian and accepted the British view of unilateral buffer state. He was more scared of Russian aggressiveness and expected help from the British which was in order to contain Russia.\(^\text{19}\)

Amir Habibullah followed the legacy of his father and wanted to play a balancing tactics between the Imperialists\(^\text{20}\) from 1901. But Russia's defeat in 1905 in the Russio-Japanese war, compelled Russia to come to term with the British on Afghanistan and signed the Convention of St. Petersburg in 1907 and agreed on their sphere of influence.\(^\text{21}\) The Entente led them to become allies during world war I.

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19. The Orenburgs and Tashkent Railways built by Russia near Afghan border touching Kushk, was the disturbing sign for Abdur Rahman. Apart from various other points of aggressiveness by Russians. See Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, p. 264 et sq.

20. Habibullah's home task was already finished by Amir Abdur Rahman who had placed Afghanistan on a strong footing both in external policy (by implying unilateral buffer state theory favouring British India) as well as the domestic, peace. See, Bilgrami, A.H., Afghanistan and British India, p. 241.

21. It was the convention which was favourable to the British as it guaranteed the British India's security. See for the text of the convention, Philips, C.H. The evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, Oxford 1962, pp. 485-6. Also G.P. Gooch, British document on the origin of war, 1927.
But after 1917 revolution the Anglo-Russian rivalry once again was revived.

With the assassination of Amir Habibullah in 1919 young Amanullah assumed the leadership in Afghanistan. Amanullah was about 28 years old when he succeeded his assassinated father. He inherited also the political intrigues, conspiracies and divided loyalties of the tribal leadership. These he sought to surmount and establish order in the state. Much more daunting were the geopolitical intrigues of the powers like the Soviet Russia and Great Britain.

With his accession whole diplomatic scenario was bound to change as the young Amir was a die hard anti-Imperialist in general and anti-British in particular. He worked for total independence for Afghanistan which culminated in Third Anglo-Afghan War. The Soviet saw the anti-British stand of the Amir, decided to give immediate recognition to him and even an assurance for future help. Amanullah's diplomatic initiative in writing to Lenin and the despatch of Mohammad Wali Mission to Moscow was soon reciprocated by the Soviets with great cordiality. This was the period when the

22. Just after the third Afghan war Amanullah wrote two letters to soviet union stressing the fact that Afghanistan was free and independent and pointed out that Afghan Psychology had always contained in it ideas of equality, humanity and liberty. Cf. Iizvestia (Tashkent), May 21, 1919, Dokumentry 11, 175, Teiipliniski, pp. 7-10, Masson and Romodin II, 402-5.
soviet were in desperate need of having Muslim Allies.\textsuperscript{23} Lenin had despatched a Mission under K. Bravin with the offer of material assistance against the British.\textsuperscript{24} With that Amanullah got relieved from the Russian pressure on Afghanistan.

Amanullah exploited the opportunity and turned the military stalemate of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, into a brilliant piece of diplomatic triumph at the peace negotiations at Rawalpindi. The Afghans achieved the sought after "complete Independence." With this began a new era in Afghanistan. In the hectic diplomatic rounds Afghanistan had an upperhand. Negotiations with the British India were held first in Mussorie in 1920 and again in 1921 with Henry Dobbs in Kabul. Afghan now had a secret military dealings with the soviet union.\textsuperscript{25} A high water mark of success of the Afghan diplomacy under Amanullah like which had never been achieved before by any other Afghan ruler. Yet there

\textsuperscript{23} Lenin had replied on 27, 1919, congratulating the Amir and the Afghan people\textsuperscript{ii} for the defence of liberty and accepted proposal for diplomatic ties. Cf Izivestia (Taskent) May 21, 1919, The Times, June 13, 1919.

\textsuperscript{24} Cited from, Adamec Ludwig, op.cit pp. 144-148.

\textsuperscript{25} The treaty was quite advantageous for the Afghan as they were given (i) free transit of goods through Russia, (ii) 1 million gold Rouble aid annually and a promise of freedom for Bukhara and Khiva. Cf Secret Telegram from Viceroy to the Secretary of India no. X-3061, March 6, 1921 (irepeating messages from Dobbs in Kabul) IOL/LPS 912 P 5261, 1920. Also Reysner, Afghanistan, p. 207; Raskolnikov, Afghanistan, p. 20. See the text in Documentary III, 550-55.
were many snags as the Russian had continued the suppression of the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, the Russio-Afgan Relations received a set back and could not further improve thereafter. The relation also worsened due to soviet double standard in terms of maintaining good neighbourly relations. As per the terms of the soviet Afghan Treaty of 1921, they had to give back to Afghanistan's Punjdeh territory conquered by them and an economic subsidy of one million gold rouble per year.\(^{26}\)

Russian also began to show cordiality towards the British which caused an alarm to Afghans. The success of soviet-Afghan relations depended upon the lesser contact between the soviet Union and the British India. The Russian realising more benefits from the British therefore they tilted towards them and even concluded the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement,\(^{27}\) and to Afghans it appeared to have marginalised the terms of the Russio-Afghan Treaty. In turn the British gave recognition to the soviet union in 1924. Although the honeymoon between the two old rival was soon over and relations were once again strained. Consequently the British withdrew the recognition of the USSR in 1927\(^{28}\). As Amanullah had realised soviet intentions of using Afghanistan

\(^{26}\) Cited from Ludwig Adamec, op.cit., 157ff.


\(^{28}\) See for the basic diplomacy involved behind the agreement, Ullamn, H. Richard, Britain and Russian Civil War, Princeton, 1968, p. 173.
as a launch pad for their adventure against the British India, he never became a Russian protege. During the tribal revolt of 1928, Soviets were reluctant to help Amanullah. In fact the Soviets had encouraged Amanullah for his reform programme and in his anti-British policies. At the same time the Soviets never wanted Amanullah to quit for he was thoroughly anti-British. The support from the Soviets never came and Amanullah was forced to quit. Amanullah had reportedly remarked that "the Soviets had instigated him into enemity with the British and then did not help him in the crises". It was too naive for Amanullah to have expected such help from the Soviets. They had their own designs against Afghanistan and Amanullah failed to see them.


30. Cf. Secret Telegram from Major E.T.R. Wikham to the Government of India, May 28, 1929. NAI Foreign Political file 137-F 1929. As quoted from Leon B. Poullada, op.cit. p. 231. He is reported to have said that "Soviet's instigated him into enemity with the British and then not lifted a finger to help him."
CHAPTER-IV

KING NADIR SHAH & THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA : PERIOD OF NEUTRALITY (1929-33)

Nadir Shah¹ was fifty years old when he assumed power. He was mature, rationale² and pursued traditional Afghan policy towards his neighbours i.e. the Soviet Union and the British India. The change in his attitude was due to the long period of internal confusion and political instability in the country. This was reflected in his address to the opening of the Afghan National Consultative Assembly and he explicitly referred to his foreign policy towards his neighbours."

He termed the "Policy of Neutrality" as the most useful and hoped for "entertaining good friendly relations with the neighbours." He invited friendly neighbours who were not against the Afghan national interests to come forward for a

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1. Mohammad Nadir Khan (1883-1933), son of Sardar Yousuf Khan and cousin of Amir Amanullah, was Afghanistan's envoy to France had returned during civil war and won the battle devisively against Baccha. His takeover is marked by transfer from "Kabul Sardars "to the Peshawar Sardars" as he had massive support of Peshawar Sardars.

2. His major flaws were a tendency towards severe and arbitrary action and a convinption that anyone who opposed him was "ipso facto" an enemy of the nation. See, Fletcher Arnold.; Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, Cornell 'N.Y. 1985.
cordial relation with his country.  

Nadir Shah asserted that Afghan neutrality was a reality: In that case he sought to convince the Soviets, muslim nationalists and modernists, inside and outside the country, that he was not a protege of the British Imperialists. Though Nadir Shah nearly followed the pattern of Amir Amanullah Khan with regard to neutrality." This seems to have been deliberate for he had no time to formulate a new policy.

Despite his best efforts to come out clearly on the issue of neutrality yet Afghans were convinced of his role in the ouster of Amir Amanullah with the help of the British. During the final phase of uprising, against Amir Amanullah Nadir Shah reportedly had met Richard Maconachie, a former Counsellor of the British Legation in Kabul and at that time was, the British political agent in the Kurram Valley near the frontier, confirmed their suspicion. Later on the Afghan apprehensions of British complicity with Nadir in the ouster of Amir Ammanullah appeared more convincing because the British had instantly granted aid to Nadir Shah in 1931, in the form of 10,000 rifels, five million catridges

3. For the text of the speech see. Islah, July 8, 1931 and as it is reproduced in the Gregorian, Vartan; Op.Cit.


5. Infact it was with the Maconachie's support that the final over throw of Baccha-i-Saqqao was possible.
and some £ 1,80,000 in cash. This generosity on the part of the British was a further indication of the British endorsement of Nadir Shah's takeover. In order to allay the doubts, Nadir Shah emphasised that the aforementioned help from the British was not accompanied by any conditions. He even compared these British overtures as being similar to that had been given to the Amanullah when Afghanistan was in the grip of internal political difficulties. In order to further strengthen his position amidst controversies regarding British help; Nadir Shah vehemently denied that he and his brother had ever received British assistance, in their struggle to over throw the infamous Bandit Amir Baccha-i-Saqqao. Apparently, he did not want to show his inclination for pro-British policies. He emphasised that "It was only through the exclusive help of the Almighty God, and thanks to the sacrifices of the people of Afghanistan unassisted by any foreign power that I took Kabul. It was only the divine help and the zeal of the entire Afghanistan that saved our

7. Islah, July 8, 1931, as quoted from Gregorian Vartan, Op; Cit.
8. Tadjik Bandit Leader Habibullah Kalakani by name popularly known as the Baccha-i-Saqqao (son of Water Carrier) had over thrown Amir Amanullah. After a short span of just about six months reign he himself was overthrown by Nadir Khan. For details regarding Baccha's overthrow see; Pioneer, April 24, 1929. Habibullah, Amir of Afghanistan: My Life From Brigand to King. London, N.d, 1930, p.221. See also Gregorian Vartan, opcit, pp.285-292.
fatherland." Even his brother Shah Wali Khan had denied any help given to him by the British and claimed that "during the initial and crucial stages of the anti-Baccha struggle the British authorities, far from helping Nadir, had in fact obstructed him. The fact remains that the British did help Nadir's campaign against Baccha; as such reported by the Soviet Newspapers, confirming the military and monetary help given to Nadir by the British.

Nadir chose to follow a different course and set of policies than Amir Amanullah. Yet on foreign policy he had said that "Afghanistan would like to pursue the same foreign policy as it was during Amanullah's time." He adhered to a policy of non-involvement both in India and in Central Asia, seeing in "positive neutralism" the best means of

9. *Islah*, July 8, 1931. See also; Fletcher, Arnold; *Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest*, NY 1965, p.232. According to him the British had given nothing to the hard pressed Amanullah" but this is not the case as examined by Gregorian, who is of the opinion that the British had supported him.

10. Shah Wali Khan, a brother of Nadir had fought alongside his brother for the overtake of Kabul. His decisive victory was at Charasiah against the Baccha's forces and he was first to take Kabul.


securing internal political stability, consolidating the new royal
dynasty's power, and guaranteeing both the flow of Afghan
trade and the success of a modest modernization
programme. Such a policy made it essential for him to stay
on friendly terms with both the British and the Soviet. 14
Apart from the friendly relation with the British which was
never made too open, Nadir Shah also found it very handy
in developing a better ties with the Soviets. The Soviets had
granted immediate approval to the Nadir government as the
Soviets too had realised the importance of better relation
with Afghanistan. 15 Even Izvestia in its editorial had hinted
Afghanistan to better its ties with true friends like Soviet
Union, Persia and Turkey to overcome its grave internal
problems and instability. 16

Afghan policy makers preferred to strike a balance
between the Soviets and the British. They had sensed the
danger from both the side as the Soviets could have
championed the irredentist or revolutionary movements in
northern Afghanistan, the British could have stirred up the
tribal opposition to the Afghan monarchy, and either or both
could champion the cause of Amanullah against the

14. Gregorian Vartan: The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Stanford
15. Jane Degras, (Edit) "Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London,
1951), Part II pp. 430-31.
Musahiban family.¹⁷

With the consolidation of the power in Kabul Nadir Shah made his brother Shah Wali an envoy to London; while the other brother Muhamad Aziz was sent to Moscow.¹⁸ Shah Wali was born and brought up at Dehradun when the family was in exile, and a guest of the British Government of India; was move to better the ties of bilateral relations. However, the appointment of Allah Nawaz Khan,¹⁹ an Indian migrant to the position of Minister of Court was not appreciated by the British Government of India because they considered him to be an active "anti-British" and anti-Russian revolutionary.²⁰

¹⁷. Gregorian Op.cit., p. 233. Nadir Shah was Durrrani Afghan of the Muhammadzai branch, and a direct descendent of Painda Khan, the founder of the dynasty. Nadir's father Muhammad Yousuf Khan was exile by the Amir Abdur Rahman, he and his four brothers were born and brought up at Dehra Dun in the United Provinces of India. After Abdur Rahman's death the Musahiban family as they were called, returned to Afghanistan and entered the services of the Amir Habibullah and continued till Amanullahs was pleased. See for details. Fraser-Tytler; W.K., Afghanistan, A Study of Political Development in Central Asia. Geoffery Cumberlegs Oxford, 1950. p.223.


¹⁹. Allah Nawaz was born in Multan, fled Afghanistan in 1920 studied at Lahore, actively involved in Indian revolutionary party, had been a short time Assistant Editor of the Ittihad-i-Mashriqui of Jalalabad and later on became the interpreter of DACOM, the German Afghan Company. NAI, Foreign and Political File, 325-F, 1929 nos. 1-15, No.2.

²⁰. DDA Inner Politik Afghanistan, Politik 5, and as quoted by Ludwig Adamec opcit. p. 183.
The new foreign policy formulation of the new Government started soon after Nadir Shah's assumption of office. The attitude of new government's foreign policy was made clear with the issuance of ten point policy declaration. Significantly the text envisaged the continuation of previous government of Amir Amanullah's foreign policy. Amanullah's policy had confronted many contradictions in relation to Russia the British India. The policy was based on the ideas of Amir Amanullah who tried to broaden the diplomatic infrastructure of Afghanistan. The first foreign power to respond to the diplomatic overtures of Afghanistan's new government was the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Commissary L.M. Karakhan, explained that the Soviets wanted a "constant neighbourly relation", and "consolidation of Afghan independence and economic and cultural progress." The Soviet ambassador Leonide Stark was accorded a cordial reception. On 18 November 1930,

22. DDA, Politik 5, Afghanistan, Inner Politik, Vol. 6, India Office Memorandum A231 for the Persian text see, Munasebat, no. 43, pp.43-44.
24. Rahul, Ram, Op.cit p.28. See also Islah, Dec. 31st, 1930, Ettelat, Jan. 1st 1931. It was in order to minimize the influence of the two powerful neighbours apart from Afghanistan's need for Japanese products which included clothes, chemical products and machinery. See also Morrison, Ronald; "H.M. King Mohammad Nadir Shah Ghazi of Afghanistan" (obituary) JRCAS Jan. 1934.
Afghanistan concluded a treaty with Japan in London. The Japan connection was aimed to boost the military and commercial prospects of Afghanistan. It was necessary, in order to minimise the influence of its two powerful neighbours.  

The Civil War which overthrew Amir Amanullah, had destroyed, plundered the foreign legations: and were left under the care of Afghans themselves. The British Minister in Kabul, Sir Francis Humphrys left Afghanistan and leaving the British legation under one Rahmat Khan, an Afghan landowner from Peshawar as its caretaker. Rahmat Khan did not enjoy any diplomatic status but he carried on certain tasks like collecting information and maintaining contact with the British official in Peshawar. But the British thought it would be better to settle some of the unresolved question and security for its diplomatic staff in the country before resuming full diplomatic ties. Therefore, the British Secretary of State's response to the Afghan overtures was somewhat evasive. He stated that his government had "followed the events of the last few days with close interest"

26. Sir Francis Humphrys, the British Minister to Kabul had served there from 1922 till Amir Amanullah's abdication in 1929.
27. The Soviet Commisar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litinov had expressed the feeling that Nadir Khan was the best choice even though he was pro-British, Munasebat No. 43, pp. 43-44. Also see Gregorian Op.cit pp. 321-322.
and ardent trust that the hopes which are now entertained of peace in a united, friendly, strong and independent Afghanistan may speedily be realised and the old friendly relations between the two countries be continued. London did not wish to delay the recognition of new Afghan government, yet it was cautious in its approach considering the situation prevailing then. They just wanted to be sure of the security of the British consulate in Kabul and elsewhere. Kabul Legation had suffered some damages but Jalalabad Consulate was totally destroyed due to the ensuing civil war between the forces of the Baccha and Amir Amanullah.

The Afghan foreign minister, Faiz Muhammad Khan had informed the British government of its government's decision of appointing Shah Wali Khan as Afghan Minister in London and requested them to give their approval. Through this Afghan government was trying to convey the gesture of goodwill and an eagerness to establish the diplomatic ties.

29. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, F. No. 278, 1929 Nos. 1-66, Notes No. 22.
30. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, F. No. 278, 1929 Nos. 20, 24.
31. It seems that apart from the security fear and the normalization of the business activity, the British had been waiting for Soviet move. They did not recognise the new regime until it was confirmed by Soviet recognition. It took the British one more months than the Soviets to recognise and give legitimacy status to Nadir's regime on Nov. 14, 1929. See NAI Foreign and Political Files, 278-F, 1929, Nos. 1-66, No. 9-A. Also Ludwig Adamec opcit p. 180.
On November 14, 1929, the British Secretary of State Arthur Henderson informed Faiz Muhammad Khan that Britain had recognised" the government established by His Majesty the King Muhammad Nadir Shah, as the legal Government of Afghanistan" and expressed the hope "that the friendly relation of the past may continue with the new government." Still it was a wait and watch situation for the Afghan government. Not knowing what kind of relationship British government intended; and what interests, they hold for the British? The British diplomacy, stuck to its old modus operandi of "offering money and material support apart from a fixed subsidy. The British government had been paying yearly subsidy until the Third Afghan War (1919). But when

32. In order to pacify the Afghan elite of the time, Nadir Shah had chosen some of Amanullah's men. Faiz Mohd. Khan (who was Minister of Education with Amanullah) made Minister of Foreign Affairs, whereas Ali Mohd. Khan (the former Minister of Commerce) was made Minister of Education.

33. Though Nadir Shah was known as pro-British as there was a general feeling regarding Amanullahs overthrow done under the aegis of the British inspite of that British took time to recognise Nadir's government. See NAI Foreing Political Files 378-F, 1929, Nos. 5, 20, 24. See also, ADF, Dundas: Precis On Afghan Affairs, Vol 1927-36, India Office Library, pp 236-51 as cited from Ludwig, Opcit.
Amir Amanullah had proclaimed Afghanistan's independence, no subsidy was given and none was accepted.³⁴ Acceptance of monetary support from the British might give impression to Afghan people that they were returning to the previous position of dependance on the British assistance. On the other hand the British government at that particular juncture seemed to be reluctant to extend the fullest assistance in terms of financial or material assistance, as they were not too sure of tangible benefits and considered it unlikely that any Afghan government would ever ask for support, if it involved granting of certain concession.³⁵ Even Amir Amanullah was assisted by the British government on an ad hoc basis by providing loans for the purchase of weapons and airplanes and by financing Survey Projects for the construction of roads and railroads inside Afghanistan. Sometimes gifts were also offered and loans extended

³⁴. See for details on the British reluctance in according the Nadir regime the legitimacy. According to Sir Richard Maconachie the British Minister to Kabul, on the ascension of Nadir Shah that "there had been few rulers of Afghanistan who have succeeded to the throne without a struggle or maintained there hold upon it without difficulty, but perhaps none of them have found himself in a more precarious situation that kind Nadir Shah was on his capture of Kabul in October 1929" makes thing amply clear that in British point of view, Nadir to start with was on a very delicate foundation. See Richard Maconachie's "Annual Report of 1930." India Office Library, 1930. As cited by Ludwig Adamec, opcit , pp.178.

³⁵. With the better chance of improving diplomatic ties after the Anglo Afghan War of 1919, then Soviet Government had agreed to return to Afghanistan territory in the Panjdeh district and to pay Afghanistan a yearly subsidy of 1,000,00 gold or silver roubles which the British formerly paid. See. Rahul, Ram; Op.cit p.25.
without the condition of repayment.\textsuperscript{36}

The British government actually intended to give loan to the Afghan government of Nadir Shah, although undecided about how much to be offered and whether the amount should be extended without any explicit request from the Afghan government? Though way back in 1925, the British government had actually decided to offer the subsidy to Afghan Government a hefty sum of around Rs. 700,000, but except a paltry sum of few thousands of rupees (spent on Kabul-Peshawar Road Project) nothing was given substantially, due to the suspicious atmosphere created by Amir Amanullah's government towards the British designs in frontier area.\textsuperscript{37}

Foregoing all such reservations the British government of India decided to give the loan money to the new government of Afghanistan. As to how much loan was to be

\textsuperscript{36} At that particular juncture infact new Afghan government needed massive support, as it had inherited nearly empty treasury, trade being at stand still, no custom collection to compensate the current expenses of the Government. See Ali, Mohammad; Afghanistan (The Mohammadzai Period) Kabul 1959, p.172. See also ADF Dundas : Precis on Afghanistan series, Vol. 1927-36. IOL, pp.236-51 as cited from Ludwig Adamec opcit, p.186.

\textsuperscript{37} Subsidy issue for cash starved Afghanistan is as old as Afghan Amir's relation with the British. British for their ulterior motives and geopolitical consideration had always sought to get favour of the reigning Amir in form of cash and other gifts. The practices continued down to modern rulers like Abdur Rahman and Amir Habibullah for their Pro-British policies. Amir Amanullah who had different thinking all together, too was not deprived of that. See for details, Ludwig Adamec, opcit, p.30.
given remained a question among the British policy makers? Humphrys suggested that the money previously agreed upon was around Rs. 10 million, while some were of the view that the amount was too big. Later on they agreed upon to a lesser amount of around Rs. 700,000. The British Government of India had an important voice and role on the issue of aid to Afghanistan, because the funds needed for such an aid were actually borne by India rather than the Home Government.

The British were not going to encourage Afghan Government to bargain for an increase in the amount of subsidy provided by the British government of India. They felt that the Afghan should take the first step in asking for such the assistance. However, Shah Wali Khan while

38. The British disinterest in advancing subsidiary at that point of time suggest a "suspicious British move as Afghanistan had already been seeking such subsidies from Soviet Union. But Afghanistan was desirous of getting British subsidy as the cash was needed for the new government. See Ludwig Adamec opcit. p.95 as cited from India Office Memorandum, A.204.

39. It was always difficult as to judge how much was too much to satisfy the Afghan regime for a pro-British tilt. Previously the advance was made in cash, but later on with modernization set in Afghanistan needed various technical instruments and alongwith arms and amunition for keeping Afghanistan stronger. See for details on the subsidy issue. Dundas ADF : The Precis on Afghan Affairs, pp.236-51.

40. The new form of colonial exploitation is best reflected in this context, as the colonise country had to bear the expenses of the army movement and wars, advancing loans and subsidy in order to keep the Imperial flag high. India had to pay for such expenses on numerous occasions, on the costly Afghan wars and in advancing loans to Afghan rulers.
returning from London to Afghanistan passed through India; and was hinted to ask for the assistance from the British government of India, but to their great dismay he did not do so. The British Govt. of India through an informal channel, was informed that Shah Wali actually held no authority to deal in "money matters" with them. Possibly the Afghans did not want to deal with British India, instead wanted to hold discussion on the issue in London. By passing the Government of India, that would have implied giving special leverage to the British and that was sure to hurt the hard earned Afghan pride.

The then existing treaties with Afghanistan seemed satisfactory to the British government but they wanted "minor" amendments to the wordings of the previous treaty. That was of special importance for the British to obtain from the Government of Afghanistan a precise definition of the term "neighbourly" relations, used as basis for the Treaty of Kabul in 1921. In a way a promise from the Government of Afghanistan for her amiable conduct on the NW frontier bordering Afghanistan.

The most contentious of the issues between the Govt. of Afghanistan and the British India was the issue of the

41. See for details NAI, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL FILES, F-278, 1929 nos. 1-66 notes on 212.
42. See NAI Foreign and Political Files No. F-278, 1929 Nos. 1-66, notes on 212, Nos. 20, 34, 40, 44, 46.
North West Frontier. That was so from the time of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, who had accepted the Durand Line\(^43\) as the boundary between India and Afghanistan. The Durand line though accepted in principle by Amir Abdur Rahman still the division of the Pushtuns through the line had never gone from his mind. He had always considered the tribes from the Indian side of the border as part of the greater Pashtunistan, and thus the division was seen as "a deceitful tact of the British Government."\(^44\) In fact all the tribals united alongside the Durand could have posed greater danger to the British. Thus, the British ploy was to keep them divided. As for years the cross border shady deals and activities had been the real source of friction between these two governments, the attempt from one side to belittle the other had never ceased and there had been numerous border infringements both in the time of Amir Amanullah Khan and

\(^{43}\) Durand line was never acceptable to the Afghan intelligentia as it was in order to weaken them by dividing them into two parts. Most of the frontier tribes who had been living together for centuries, had then found themselves in dilemma as the line had placed half of their people on the other side of the border. In fact that was a greater victory for the British diplomacy as it was led by George Roos Keppel (first as Adjudant of the Kurram Militia and later as Political Agent) Mortimer Durand, Olaf Caroe and others. See for details; Caroe Olaf. Op.cit pp. 381-383.

\(^{44}\) After the third Anglo-Afghan War which Amanullah had celebrated as a great victory for Afghanistan upon the Imperial British, the problems of accepting subsidy had arisen. Since it was feared in Afghanistan that accepting monetary support form British might imply a return to the previous position of dependence on British India both Afghanistan and the Great Britain were suspicious of each other. See Dundas ADF, \textit{A Precis on Afghan Affairs}. Op.cit pp. 236-51.
during Nadir Shah's reign. In most of the cases the British war planes had violated the border. Even during the civil war which overthrew Amir Amanullah there was widespread news of the tribes, belonging to British India from across the border, actually taking part in the civil war. About Nadir Shah's ascension to power following the civil war, was also due to the help coming from across the border i.e. from the Indian side of the Durand line. That line was never actually demarcated, though the British government officials applied the term "presumptive line", indicating a certain measure of doubt. The Pathan tribes particularly the dominating tribe of Pushtuns, though divided had always maintained that they were independent of both Britain and Afghanistan, but that on the basis of culture and ethnicity as well as fellow religionists, they considered themselves one nation with Afghanistan. Afghan rulers did never wish to end contacts with the transborder tribes even after Amir

45. The Pushtun tribes east of the Durand line, whose territory was increasingly regarded as an irredenta as nationalism began to replace the traditional ethnic or tribal loyalties. Both the Afridis and Mohmands had posed grave threat to the British see. Fletcher A.: Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, Cornell University Press, 1966, p.23,83.

46. In one reported case, there was huge export of arms and ammunition to Afghanistan from India, for subversive activities against Amir Amanullah's government. NAI file Foreign & Political Department 1929 File No. 85-F (Secret) & also NAI file No. 163-F, F.No. 337 (F) to confirm the export of arms to Afghanistan.

47. A number of times British surveillance planes had violated the Afghan air space by crossing through Durand line see. NAI Foreign & Political Department File No. 294 1933.
Abdur Rahman had signed the Durand Agreement. Those contacts remained a perpetual source of border frictions between the British government of India and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{48}

In spite of the British sympathies for the cause of Nadir Shah, Indian officials had noted with apprehension that the new ruler of Afghanistan had actively sought the support of Afghan tribes from the British side of the border.\textsuperscript{49} The tribesmen always expected to be rewarded for their help in such venture and the most coveted reward in their eyes was the acquisition of weapons and ammunition which thus strengthened them in their fight against the British penetration and persecution. Already at the beginning of the revolt against Amir Amanullah, Richard Maconachie, who was then the political agent in the Kurram, had feared that after receiving money and arms, the tribes would have turned against the British in the "Unadministered Frontier Areas". He had noted that the Jajis, the Mangal, and the Chakmani (also

\textsuperscript{48} The Pushtu speaking Afghans on both the sides of the Durand line were ethnically one people, they constituted the most formidable soldiers and they had acknowledged the Afghan rulers as their "Islamic King."

\textsuperscript{49} In order to continue their claim on these Frontier tribes the Afghan rulers had to show their support by paying subsidies to these tribes, conveying the Jirgas of tribesmen to Kabul (a show of honour), given military assistance to them at times and by employing them as Khassadars (paid soldiers), the border remained rough throughout a fundamental contradictions were not resolved of the Anglo-Afghan relations. See, Islah September 12, 1935, The Anis, September 18, 1935, No. 25 and NAI Foreing and Political files, 518-F, 1935 No. 1-40, note 7.
called Chamkanni tribe) had gained considerable booty in weapon and money following the surrender of Afghan government posts, and he had felt that "their attitude at present is friendly enough, but when there is no more loot available in their own country, there is likely to occur the combination of idle hand and full bandolies for which Satan can usually find work, and raids into Kurram Territory may possible be made........"^50

Moconachie's assumption of those tribes and their misadventures had become true. After the conquest of Kabul they were used in quelling a Kuhistani uprising August and September of 1930.\(^51\) Then they turned their attention towards the frontier and attacked the Kurram Valley. The British Intelligence blamed that tribal adventure through propaganda by the Indian Khilafatits agents. As they believed that propaganda against the British would assure them immense money to the tribal chiefs."^52

For reducing the chances of such misadventures and

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50. Its no denying a fact that Nadir Shah's coming to power is also attributed to the active support of the tribals form across the Drund Line and thus for further consolidation of his power and just for acknowledging their support and help Nadir Shah wated to have contact with them.

51 The revolt had begun in 1930 among the Tadjik of Kohistan led by an uncle of Baccha-e-Saqqao, as Kohistan had tried to regain what Baccha had lost. Nadir sensing the great danger had pitched Pushtun tribesmen against them and emerged victorious, See for details, Fletcher Arnold, Op.cit, p.228.

52. See Dundas, ADF, A Precis on Afghanistan Affairs, p.19.
tribal uprising in future, the British government therefore, sought assurance from the new Afghan regime of Nadir Shah. Further that for friendly relation they would disarm the tribesmen at frontiers. Like the other previous Afghan rulers, Nadir Shah too made a vague promise that he would control the tribes and would desist in supporting any, anti-British activities among Afghan tribes in India or in Afghanistan. Nadir Shah had his own constraints because as long as he was dependent on tribal support and goodwill.

On January 12, 1930 Shah Wali in an interview with Maconachie in London, expressed Afghanistan's desire to be on good terms with Britain. He drew attention towards the fact that the King Nadir Shah, had chosen his own brother as an Afghan representative in London to emphasise the importance the Afghan government attached to its relation with Britain. Shah Wali said that Afghanistan wanted to be at peace with all powers and "had no intention of quarrelling with Russia; as that would be "luxury they could not afford." He also desired that the British

53. In the very beginning of Nadir Shah's reign the British Secretary of States had already hinted in favour for a "united, friendly, strong and independent Afghanistan" but the tribal affairs was always there to create perpetual tension between the two parties concerned. See NAI Foreing and Political File 278-F, 1929, No. 1-66, notes No. 66. p.9. For speeches by Stark and Nadir Shah see text of Munasebat, Nos. 44 and 45.

54. NAI, Foreign & Political Department F.278-F. Nos. 1-66, Notes No. 66. Also see Ludwig Adamec Op.cit, p.188. It was Nadir's policy of non-intervention in any Soviet Central Asian issues as it was not affordable for Afghanistan which had neither the financial
Government would accord him a proper place; just as the Afghan mission in Moscow was accorded and "treated with greatest respect and ceremony". In a way he implied that the treatment of the British minister in Kabul would also depend entirely upon the treatment accorded to the Afghan minister in London. Shah Wali also urged the British government to send its minister together with the legation personnel, including the wives to Kabul without any undue delay. In spite of his urgings, the British sent on May 11, 1930 Maconachie to Kabul.

Going through the whole aspect of British India's relation with Afghanistan, we find that during Nadir Shah's reign their relations were complex and contradictory. Compared to this Afghanistan's relations were better and smooth with Germany and the Soviet Union. Apparently the

(Continue from previous page) means nor the military power to deal with any such issue. A weak Afghanistan had to put its house in order and bring about the socio-economic integration of the Kingdom, not embark upon any irredentist movement that might result in its own disintegration. See Viollis, Andree: Tourmente Surl' Afghanistan. Paris, 1930, pp. 225-26, also Zaria Vostoka (Tiflis), January 28, 1931.


56. Due to Afghan neutrality the Soviet had felt troubled as according to Soviet point of view, Amanullah's anti-British stance had endeared him to the Soviets. The passivity of the Nadir administration towards the Pathan tribal revolts and the Indian National Liberation Movement was construed by the Soviets as a betrayal of Amanullah's former policies and tacit collaboration with British Imperialism, and moreover "Nadir had justified the hopes placed in him by the British." See Fisher Louis: The Soviets in the World Affairs. London, 1930, 2 Vols., pp. 793-94, also Zaria Vostoka (Tiflis), July 21, Sept. 14, Sept. 21, 1930.
British officials in London and Delhi seemed optimistic and somewhat satisfied with the way the developments had taken place and efforts made to forge closer ties. The Pro-Amanullah groups were suspicious of the British who were instrumental in bringing him down. Therefore, the British appeared more strong and efficient in deciding their future course of action and diplomacy. The British also found a friendly voice among the Afghan policy maker in the person of Muhammad Hashim Khan, for reason that he had "an intense dislike for all things Russian."

Although, no assistance was extended till then, Austin Chamberlain, the then British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had indicated a willingness to help Afghanistan, saying, "His Majesty's Government earnestly desires the establishment of a strong central government (in Afghanistan) and they will be prepared when this government is


established to show their friendship for the Afghan people by giving it such assistance as they can in the reconstruction and the development of the country.\textsuperscript{59}

The Government of Afghanistan had asked for British material assistance through their Foreign Minister in June, 1930. Afghanistan had first requested the Soviet Union, who by the treaty of 1921 was obliged to pay one million Roubles in gold. However, the Soviet cited unsatisfactory policies pursued by the new regime in regard to the ties with the Soviets therefore, had held back the loan nevertheless made some vague promises.\textsuperscript{60}

Faiz Muhammad Khan the Afghan Foreign Minister, formerly requested Britain to supply twenty thousand rifles with one thousand round of ammunitions and four hundred thousand streling pound in cash. The British Government however, responded to their request and offered exactly half of the demand made. The loan of money was advanced in one time payment of one hundred thousand pounds, immediately. After a period of four months during which Afghanistan was watched for her good neighbourly behaviour,

\textsuperscript{59} Dundas opcit. No. 890, p.82; NAI, Foreign & Political Department 843-F, 1932 part 2.

\textsuperscript{60} NAI, Foreign & Political Department 843-F, 1932, Part 2, 187-F, 1930 nos. 1-167, nos. 36, 7, Demands were made for payment of the subsidy or for arms in the amount of subsidy; further more, Afghanistan wanted the weapons returned that Ghulam Nabi had taken with him during retreating into the Soviet Union.
the second installment of seventy five £75,000 was reserved at the suggestion of the British Minister at Kabul to be used for payments which Britain wanted to make at an appropriate time.61

Britain's policy appears to have been to buy the Afghan friendship with gifts in the shape of money, goods and services. The British Government of India, had to provide the British funds and felt that it should not be paid while gave impression that the British subsidy could easily match that of the Soviet's. At the same time they were not appreciating the Afghan policy of balancing between the Soviet's Union and the British. Yet the policy by which the British wanted to "wean Afghanistan away from the USSR" and at the same time "to lubricate the wheels of the Afghan Government" was a dilemma for the British. For the time being Britain decided to advance subsidy to Afghanistan in kind.62

In a note E.V. Howell the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1930 also the Political Agent, Waziristan, significantly laid stress upon the stresses upon the importance of having a friendly neighbour to the north, he wrote that "twice in the comparatively short period of


our relations with them [Afghanistan] in the two great crises of the history of the British India, it is little exaggeration to say that our fate in India, hung upon the loyalty of the rulers of Afghanistan....."  

Then, that was decided as a matter of British national interest, to give a tangible sign of friendship to a small nation, just similar to the post World War II help extended to the smaller agrarian states.

We have seen how the policy of assistance to Afghanistan was formulated in 1920's Amir Amanullah was unaware of it and hardly anything happened in this regard. During Amir Amanullah's regime the relation between the British Government of India and Afghanistan remained strained and no sincere effort to better the ties was made. A part of subsidy was spent in the purchases of spares for the military hardware and ammunitions and some on the foreign tour of Amir Amanullah Khan while he was a guest of the British Government. The same vague kinds of considerations were applied to the advancement of assistance to Nadir Shah's regime. The British assistance or for that reason any such offer could have led the Afghan people to


think of "involvement of some ulterior malignant foreign motives" behind that. For this reason the issue of foreign aid was not given any publicity and advertisement. Above all the new government was apprehensive of the advancement of tribal chiefs (who had helped Nadir Shah in getting the throne). Possibly they had heard that money was in Kabul they would have created problems for the new things. They had expected a handsome reward in lieu of the help extended to Nadir Shah. But due to the shortage of money, the Afghan Government had only given them honorary military titles for their services.

The British Government of India and Afghanistan shared numerous common interests therefore circumstances demanded amicable relationship between them. Afghanistan served the purpose of a "buffer" for the British India against the Soviet designs. Afghanistan could have no objections to such an status, provided there would have been no infringement - to the Afghan independence. In spite of the desirable strong cordial relations between these two parties, the stumbling block was the question of age old frontier tribal problems. These tribals had always opposed the British Policy of gradual penetration. Early in 1920's the Indian National Movement gained momentum and by 1930's the

movement had become widespread. The north-west frontier was also affected by these developments in India. The Red Shirt Movement under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other leaders of the frontiers had widened its base further.\textsuperscript{66} Naturally many muslims of India looked towards Afghanistan for inspiration and active support.\textsuperscript{67} The frontier Afghans allied themselves with the Congress Party and many of them took part in agitations and fought for the independence for India. For example the Congress Committe of Free Tirah, in a message to Mahatma Gandhi, had chided the Indian leaders for conspiring with the British in the Gandhi -Irwin Agreement. They had sent a letter to Mahatma Gandhi, insisting him to take up the task of challenging the British. The tribes had assured him of the help of 400,000 Free tribe fighters for the cause. They even suggested Gandhi to raise various issues in the forthcoming Round Table Conference. They had raised the issue of full independence to India, and the release of Sardar Bhagat

\textsuperscript{66} The Times, Feb. 24, 1931 as its quoted in Ludwig, opcit. p. 299. The British Government had publicised the aid and that had caused enough embrassment to Afghan Government who was again trying to raise its national pride by denying any such receipient of aid.

\textsuperscript{67} The origin of this party "Khudai Khidmatgaar" (or servants of God) or later known as Surkhposhan (Red Shirts) is very humble as it arose from a Utmanzai village in the Hashtangar area of the Peshawar district, led by Two brothers Dr. Khan Saheb & Abdul Gaffar Khan, belonging to Mohammadzai clans, see for more details. Caroe; Olaf; The Pathans (550 BC - A.D. 1957). Macmillan & Co. Ltd. London 1965, pp. 431-2.
Singh, Sukhdev, Rajguru, the Garhwalis and others, the compensation of 50 laks to the family of innocent Ghazi Habib Nur\(^{68}\) (who was hanged by British), the grant of reasonable pension to the widows and orphans of Indian uprising, the withdrawl of the British forces from the free tribal areas of Kajusi, alongwith the payment of an indemnity of 50 lakhs rupees to the Afridi's, and at last if the government makes delay in accepting above demands, they would rise against the government with all their might to free India.\(^{69}\)

While the British Government of India was not only concerned about the threat by the community of Free Tirah, it had sensed the danger that a coalition of Afghan tribes and the Indian Nationalists, with arms and ammunitions alongwith capable leadership, would pose a serious threat to the British rule in the Indian Sub-Continent.

The British planes had bombarded and to some extent reduced the power of the tribes. The independent frontier tribes therefore, constituted a potential threat to both Afghanistan and the British India. Any triggering of revolts

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68. British officials in India, suspecting Soviet support for the Frontier Afghan, had initiated a campaign of anti-Bolshevick propaganda in the frontier areas. NAI, Foreign & Political Department 1932, 370-F, Nos. 1-22.

69. Ghazi Habib Nur was a transborder Afghan of Mohmand tribe, who had allegedly made an attempt on the life of the British Captain Barnes. NAI Foreign & Political Department, 1932 843-F, Part 4.
and uprisings in the region could have threatened the very stability of both the states.  

The Viceroy called the conference of his Council on July 1933 to discuss the threat and how to destroy the tribal power? The solution agreed upon was to destroy the tribal power once and for all through "the gradual penetration of independent tribal territory and disarmament of the tribes." The Council was disturbed by the fact that possession of firearms by the tribes had risen from 80,000 rifles in 1913 to 2,20,000 in 1933. In the mountain fastness of the North-West frontier, it seemed every house was a fortress and every man a soldier, and that no man ventured to go out without a gun. While the penetration to the frontier seemed feasible by constructing roads and extending rail-road terminals; but the question of the disarmament of the tribals would have clearly meant an undeclared war. The Viceroy's Council had deliberated upon the question as to "why should not the task of bringing the tribes in terms was to be achieved even at the risk of having to face war"?

70. The intensification of the Indian Nationalist activities during 1930's, the frontier tribes had started allying themselves which the movement. Frontier Afghans with their leader Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and others associated with the Congress Party of India and the tribal congress of Free Tirah activated its coordination with them. Apart from that British officials in India suspecting Soviet support for the frontier Afghans initiated a campaign of anti-Bolshevick propaganda in the frontier area, NAI Foring and Political Department, File No. 370-71, 1932, Nos. 1-22.

However, there was opposition and a serious objection to the option of war as "the war had always been a costly affair in terms of men and material." But those in favour, therefore, forwarded the view "that since the money could have been considered principally a capital expenditure for which there were budgetary provision, and that made the war economically feasible. They saw an advantage in winning so as to keep their hold on the territory across the Indus or otherwise the British would be forced back to the line of the Indus." The Viceroy seemed reluctant, as he had foreseen "a no effect exercise if any undertaken." Whereas the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province was in favour of complete occupation of the whole region "for a permanent and lasting solution to the tribal problems." The Governor even went to suggest as how to control the Afridis, who had fallen to desperate plight since Afghanistan had stopped their subsidies. British India, by extending subsidies to them could have garnered favour for themselves. Whereas the Commander-in-Chief was in favour

72. NAI, Foreign & Political Department File, 346-F, 1933 Nos. 126, Notes No.1.

73. Among the famous North West Frontier Tribes the Afridis, Khattak, Orkzais, Bangash, Wazirs, Mahsud, and Tusi are few names. Afridis in particular are supposed to be not true Afghans but Karlanri (they are presented in geneological legend as descendent from a founding, ancestor, named Karlanri). However they are eminently Pukhtuns or Pushtuns, the tribes who never fell under the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and they formed the backbone of the so called tribal belt. See Olaf Caroe, opcit. Introduction XV.
of first "pursuasion and then forcible compliance," his suggestion was that "we should have to say them that we want so many rifles and take the consequences" (that is to make war if they do not comply). He found slow process of penetration "as the best possible remedy." On the question of League of Nation's possible objection to the "peaceful penetration"; as the tribal land and the tribes were Indian citizens, no objection could be expected to any such policy.\(^7^4\)

The other option to crush the tribes, was the blockade of the supply of strategic materials, prohibition of transport of raw materials to the frontiers, which could have been used in the tribal factories for the production of weapons. In fact the flexible policy of exporting arms to Afghanistan was one of the cause which led to the spread of arms-culture among the tribes, as a number of previous internal disturbances the arms had fallen in their hands. There was an urgent need to confine the exports of arms to machine-guns, aeroplanes and arms of a kind which the tribes could not use.\(^7^5\)

British tribal policy could explain in these words: "penetration, control and civilization" of the independent

74.  NAI Foreign & Political Department, F.No. 347-F, 1933, Nos. 1-6, Notes 1.

75.  NAI, Foreign & Political Department File, 346-F, 1933 Nos. 1-6, Notes No.1.
tribal areas meaning by the taming of the tribes. The problem with the British Indian Policy in regard to these tribes, was that the Government had already concluded agreements with many of the tribes and as long as the tribes adhered to their part of the bargain as it was difficult for the government to change the status-quo.76

A note drafted by an officer of the Political Department of Government of India in 1935 suggests a better planning to end the impasse when he says that "penetration should preferably take place, peacefully with the consent of the tribesmen, and that failing such consent it should be enforced by military action when tribal misbehaviour gives us a good case, sufficient to justify such a step in tribal eyes; otherwise we should count a degree of resistance and sympathetic rising which would hinder the application of our policy."77

76. By 1929 it was quite apparent that after 40 years of British administration of the frontier region, they had failed to stabilise the frontier areas. For that matter there was need to exercise control and influence beyond the border. Even by 1930 the British Indian authority had been paying 885,790 rupees annually in subsidies to these tribes, apart from using other means of use of force and air bombardments in taming them. See for more details S. Gopal: The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, Oxford, 1957. pp.73-74. Brock, H. Le M. "Air Operations on the North-West Frontiers," J.R.C.A.S., January 1932.

77. A memo by Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Bruce, "Policy In Waziristan" recommended a forward policy for control of Waziristan. India Office Library (IOL), Memo, A210, as quoted by Gregorian Vartan, opcit., p. 242.
In other words, Britain was to look for the plausible causes or grounds for declaring war, to further her objective of permanent conquest of the Afghan tribes. Building of roadways was one means of penetration. The roads were primarily of a strategic value and did not bring tangible economic benefit to the tribes through those areas they passed. A large number of tribesmen were employed for the construction works of the roadways and later on for the maintenance of it. Though, in between, due to financial crunches, the Government of India often had to stop the construction of works and as a result the dismissal of the tribesmen, leading to acrimony between the two parties concerned. Besides the frontier Afghans had realised that the roads as the linkages, constituted a clear danger to their ever cherished independence.\textsuperscript{78}

The mistrust had been seeping into the minds of the tribal chiefs of the frontier, as they had visualised the "process of penetration" working. But any resistance to the British plan would have provided the much sought after pretext for a war. The British had another ploy in buying the tribal favour as they had been paying subsidies to the tribes who had been finding difficulties in earning a livelihood in their mountain homelands. The British had then started to employ them as Khassadars,\textsuperscript{79} tribal militia men and gave

\textsuperscript{78} NAI, Files Foreign & Political Department, 162(2)-F, 1933, Nos. 1-255, Notes. on 247.

\textsuperscript{79} A soldier whose arms are furnished by their employer. These Khassadars were paid for their services rendered in petty issues such as road and camp protection. Hauner Milan Op.cit p. 82.
them a "vested interest in the maintenance of law and order," as understood by the British. The purpose was to make the tribals more and more economically dependent upon the Government of India and thus whenever they would resist the British move, was to get temporary suspension of subsidies or to pay heavy fines. In order to contain the tribals the British Government of India used to employ some of the aggressive tribals⁸⁰ in order to counter the other tribes. The rugged, treacherous mountains and unknown passes had always made it difficult for the British to wage a war against the tribals in that kind of hostile region. The Afghan guerilla war tactic due to the tribal affinity, the British found it difficult to tackle them. Whenever the British were unable to quell their upsurge, they took the recourse of bombing the Afghan villages by planes or simply taking the hostages of the Afghan Sardars. But they were released soon as the younger member of the tribes could be stopped in joining the upsurge.⁸¹

To the British authorities in India it all appeared legal, when they had tried to enforce Barampta to arrest any offender particularly from the Sulaimankhel's. The regulation was equally justified under the Pathan custom of 'Tarbur par Tarbur Wahale Shi (A man is called to account for the offences of his cousin).

⁸⁰. Mandakhel tribe was one of the ferocious tribe which the British always dared not to disturb them.

That case of enforcement was done with Sulaiman Khel when some members of that tribe were arrested in Calcutta and in Dera Ismail Khan, where 13 had died while in prison. For justification to such cases British government had cited "Barampta. The system of Barampta was so useful for controlling the unruly tribes that the British government had made it a kind of international method. The usefulness of that method in 1924 and for years after that even that official policy came to be known as "The Government of India" policy and the same do not admit that their liberty of action with regard to Barampta of Afghan subject in anyway circumscribed except by consideration of law.  

Though, with the changing art of warfare and military technology, the losers were of course the tribal lashkar (conventional army) and they had no match for the aerial warfare, machine guns, powerful artillery, bombs and napalm. The fact is supported by the secret military document completed in 1948 by the Indian General Staff entitled "The Basic Handbook of Afghanistan" When it says "the new

82. The wholesale arrest of the person under section 21, Frontier Crimes Regulation. Barampta is word of central Asian Turkic origin, meaning by the seizure of person's animals or property belonging to a tribe or an individual at fault, in order to bring pressure for restitution. Caroe. Olaf, Opcit. p. 350. See also Macconachie, Op.cit., pp. 229-231.

frontier of Afghanistan offer little resistance to the invader from the North & West or East ..... even desert of Afghanistan was difficult to cross ..... but due to technological changes the case has become simpler.\textsuperscript{84}

The tribes were not destroyed but due to the persistent policies of the British government - they were efficiently contained and much of the independent tribal areas had come under the influence of the government of India. British tribal policy in independent tribal belt was viewed in Kabul with great alarm, on the contrary the Afghan ruler considered these tribals a buffer between British India and Afghanistan. If that buffer were gone, Afghan government felt that Afghanistan could not be able to maintain its independence as the frontier tribes considered Afghan King as their ruler in Islam.

To avoid the brunt of hostile criticism and implications of selling out the Afghan tribes to the British, the Afghan ruler had to show his support in some way.

Though with superficial cordiality, Anglo-Afghan relation were frequently under stress as fundamental contradiction could not be resolved.

\textsuperscript{84} Islah Sep. 12, 1935, had vigorously protested British forward policy as a danger to Afghanistan. NAI, Foreign & Political Department, 518-F, Nos. 1-40, Notes 7. The Anis Sept. 18, 1935 No. 25 voiced similar protest about British moves in Mohmand area. Ibid. No. 32.
King Zahir Shah ascended the throne at a very young, age of Nineteen. He was educated at Habibia & Istripal Schools and was sent to France where he attended several Lycees (French Schools). After his return to Afghanistan in 1930, he underwent military training and graduated from the military school at Kabul. Though his selection to the throne ensured Musahiban legitimacy, yet the actual power rested in the hands of his three powerful paternall uncles. The occupied the highest posts and wielded total control over the internal and external affairs of Afghanistan. During Hashim Khan as the Premier of the country continued the process of strengthening, Afghan Nationalism and modernization.

In the realm of foreign affairs all the policies were


2. Sardar Hashim Khan was appointed as Prime Minister of Afghanistan, his two uncles Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali were elevated to high offices. See, Rahul Ram; Afghanistan, Mongolia & USSR. Vikas Pub. N.D. 1987, p. 24 and also for an account of Sardar Hashim Khan, See Fraser Tytler W.K.; Afghanistan, A Study of Political Development in Central Asia, Geoffery Cumberledge, Oxford 1950, pp. 243-245.
formulated according to the wishes of King Zahir Shah. This was evident from his speech of 1934, in which he had explained his foreign policy, asserting that Afghanistan's foreign policy had to be shaped "according to the desire of the King and his government, for world peace; so that Afghanistan could continue to deal with its socio-economic backwardness and resume the path of progress." The three points of his programme were aimed at maintaining friendly relations and cooperation and understanding specially with the neighbouring countries. He was against raising any political issues lest it could jeopardise the chances for a better deal and development of the state. He expected a similar approach from any other governments towards Afghanistan too. In general he had adopted Nadir's policy of maintaining 'cordial relation' with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Close friendly ties were to be maintained with


4. In 1936, to the great satisfaction of the Soviets, the Afghan Government had renewed the 1931 Soviet Afghan Mutual Pact, extended until March 29, 1946. See, Pravada, March 30, 1936; Izvestia, Sept. 6, 1936. For the text and the protocols of the treaty, See, Degras, Calendar of Soviet Documents, p. 152. The pact was followed by Commercial Agreements (May 1936), providing transit right for Afghan and a financial arrangements between the Soviet Commissariat for external commerce and for the Bank-i-Milli for full text of the agreement see. Islah, May 23, 1936.
countries like Turkey, Persia and other Muslim countries. He was cautious in his approach towards the British and the Soviet Union. Zahir Shah discouraged Anti-Soviet activities in Afghanistan and advised those leaders to emigrate to other countries. Similarly he discontinued to give support to the Indian rebels and the Afghan frontier was to be closed for any hostile activities against the British. At the same time took step discourage the NWF tribes against any hostility towards the British India. In the light of new development Afghanistan took no fresh initiative instead chose to follow the big powers.

The British attitude towards Afghanistan was one of caution in the light of new developments and changed International scenario. They were aware that if they could not control "Afghanistan's foreign policy, they would not be able to guarantee her northern frontier, and in the event of any crisis. Therefore Russian was to adopt its policy keeping an eye on the British Interests". In the changing

5. In order to allay mutual fears of interference and particularly Afghan attempt to please the British, both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had decided to close their respective Consulate in Tashkent and in Mazar-i-Sharif. See. Islah, April 25, 1938.

6. Sensing the emergence of complex International relations on the eve of World War II, the policy of the then Afghan Government seemed to be activated by a sincere desire to maintain friendly relation with all the powers, particularly with great Britain and Russia, NAI-Foreign & Political Files 38-F, Appendix to Soviet Treaty 540-F, 1931, 137-F Nos. 1-51, No. 8.

7. NAI, Foreign and Political Files, Appendix to Soviet Treaty 540-F, 1931, 137-F nos. 151 (8).
International diplomatic perspective Afghanistan had desired to be a part of the international organisations as that would have provided her guarantee for its security, above all free from the bullying tactics of its two powerful neighbours. On the question of joining the League of Nations, Afghanistan did not join till Soviet Union had done it. The British Government of India, as advised by the Military Branch, had been paying heed to the problems in regard to relations with Afghanistan on a very strategic basis. They had sensed that India by herself could do nothing effective north of the Hindukush unless in cooperation with Afghan Government. They were also convinced that occupying the southern provinces of Afghanistan as a counter to the Russian invasion from the north, was fully justified even though such occupation would have brought no desired result. For maintaining better relations, the British Government had tried to convince the Afghan Government

8. The Afghan move was purely diplomatic and quite disgusting to the British as that would have lessened their controlling Afghan affairs effectively. Memorandum of India Office Library, A-205, NAI Files 15-F, 1931 Nos. 1-8 notes, No. 3, as quoted from Ludwig Adamec Op.cit., p. 216. For more details, See P. Sykes: "Afghanistan: The present position" JRCAS, April 1940, p. 161.


that it was through the British interests that would guide their diplomatic relations, and a strong independent and friendly Afghanistan was best suited to them. Though, that had hardly assured Afghanistan of anything concrete.

In their next attempt of reassuring, Kabul the British cabinet had instructed Sir R. Maconachie, the then British Minister to Kabul, to assure the Afghan Government that "there was no danger to Afghanistan from the Soviet attack". Further more, Afghanistan was advised to join the League of Nations in order to raise its status and emerge stronger. The attack on Afghanistan, they had assured, would be considered an attack on British and the Indian interests.11

Sensing the Japanese move on Manchuria, which had put the Soviet on the defensive, Afghanistan was hardly impressed by the British assurance, as there was no danger from the Soviet side. Very aptly and quickly realising the importance of alliance with Japan, Afghanistan had managed to undermine the Soviets. Just after that the Soviets had softened their hostile attitude towards Afghanistan and there

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11. In 1935 Afghan Prime Minster had confided to the German Minister saying it was due to the Japanese that the Soviets were not agresive towards Afghanistan. See, DAA, Innere Politik Beziehungen Afghanistan Und Deutschland, Vol. 4 No. 635, March 29, 1935).
were no border disputes.\textsuperscript{12} Japanese aspiration towards Central Asia was evident from its coming closer to Afghanistan and it was quite startling. They reportedly had aspired to become Afghanistan's neighbour at Wakhan corridor.\textsuperscript{13} The crisis of Italian planned aggression to Abyssinia had also alerted Afghanistan, who had criticised the very existence of the League of Nations as it was giving in to the designs of Imperial power. That had led countries like Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan to even think of joining with the Soviet Union, if ever threatened by the other Imperial powers. Afghanistan therefore, felt an urgent need for a stronger Afghanistan and the creation of a more powerful army.\textsuperscript{14} In the changing world scenario Afghanistan also needed the help of a western power to help her in its efforts of modernization and development. For a while,

\begin{enumerate}

\item Reported by Dr. Georg Ripken, the new German Minister in Kabul, who succeeded Ziemke, DAA, Beziehungen Afghanistan Und Deutschland Personalien Staatsmanner, vol. 1, no. 1830, Sept. 24, 1935 as cited in Milan Hauner Op.cit. See also Adamec pp. 239, 250.

\item DAA Beziehungen, Afghanistan Deustchland Innere Politik, Vol. 7, no. 465, April 4, 1933. See also for details on German Economic and Political moves, Ludwig Adamec, Op.cit, pp.238 specially the chapters on World War II.
\end{enumerate}
Germany was still the best option. It was believed that Germany would act as a balancing power between the Soviet Union and the Great Britain. Germany's distant location too was favourable for Afghanistan as it could hardly think of any territorial aspirations.

The rise of Hitler in Germany was seen as a welcome move in the interest of Afghanistan as any existing possible secret link between Germany and the Soviet Union would come to end (Hitler was a thoroughly anti-Bolshevick). The fear in Kabul was that both Germany and the USSR might desire restoration of Ex-Amir Amanullah to the throne, or that an aggressive anti British policy might force Afghanistan into hostilities with India. With the formation of a Nazi Club in Kabul, Germany was to show their presence felt. In the words of Dr. Herbert Schworbel, the German Minister in Kabul, "Germany had replaced both the English and the Soviets in education and technical field and in Construction and Agriculture and had a plan to open a German Air Lines to Kabul." On July 10, and 29, 1935, Georg Ripken, the head of German Legation in Kabul, in a confidential report attributed to about the major shakeup in Afghanistan's domestic and foreign policy and felt comfortable with the

exclusion of both London and Moscow from any such participation. There was an intense competition among Afghan elite lobbies of different shades such as the Pro-German, Pro-British, Pro-Soviet as well as the section of isolationalist party; had worked really hard to impress upon the Afghan Government and shape its policies. Nevertheless the majority of the Afghan intelligensia was in favour of an "independent national Afghan policy" which would give the country a maximum of protection from foreign aggression. But the strongest group which the Afghan King Zahir Shah himself belonged to along with the Ministers of the Court; the King's cousins Muhammad Nasim Khan and Muhamad Daud Khan, the President of the Afghan National Bank, a number of younger secretaries and directors in various ministries) were strongly in favour of a "pro-independent national Afghan policy;" were in general wanted that Germany should to be given the sole responsibility of modernization and other such construction works in Afghanistan.

On Sep. 24, 1935, as reported by the German Minister Ripken, the Afghan Cabinet had agreed to work exclusively with Germany in all affairs at least in principle. Though there

16. The "Independent Group" as the Ripken had called it, intended to set up a central planning agency to coordination and supervise all Afghan development projects, to balance the national economy in terms of trade and audit the expenditure and income.

were attempts to get support from London & Moscow too, but contrary to that London was not in favour to extend any such support at that point of time.\textsuperscript{18}

As the International situation was becoming complex Afghanistan became more interested in military matters rather than economic issues. The Treaty of Versailles has put great restriction on Germany in dealing with arms, Germany was no longer abiding by that (as per Hitler's speech on May 21, 1935) and was to provide Afghanistan a credit of around 18 million Marks for military equipments apart from the German Ministry Instructors though the so called \textit{Indian Circle}, which was against the sole collaboration with Germany, had opposed such ties.\textsuperscript{19} Inspite of that in 1936

\textsuperscript{18} The socalled India Circle or Pro India Group included Allah Nawaz and his friends. Allah Nawaz was an Indian from Multan, educated at Lahore in 1920, had migrated to Afghanistan and became Assistant Editor of, \textit{Ittihaad-i-Mashriqi} of Jalalabad. Because of his Indian origin, he was suspected to be an Indian spy. See, Dundas, A.F. : \textit{Precis on Afghan Affairs (1927-1936)}, also See, NAI Files Foreign & Political No. 224-F 1931, Nos. 1:3 No. 1, 680-F, 1937. and for circumstances leading to Allah Nawaz's migration and story of famous Silk latters conspircy. See Trivedi, R.K. : The Criticial Triangle, India, Britain and Turkey. Jaipur, 1993, p.177. For Hitler's speech and his bypassing the very terms of the treaty of Versailles see. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922-1939, ed. by N. Baynes, 2 vols. Oxford 1942. See for the prohibition for arms deal of Germany, Article 170, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Versailles.

Germany and Afghanistan was engaged in preparing the way for implementation of the German Afghan programme. The Afghan delegations were sent to Berlin and a number of agreements were reached in principle. At the same time Afghanistan had signed the protocol for a ten year extension of Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression.20

The resulting agreements had brought various goods to Afghanistan. A fifteen million German Marks credit to Afghanistan in October 23, 1936 was agreed upon. Arrangement for sending 30 Nejat students to Germany for higher education January 1937 were made; similarly arrangement for flying instructor and planes, and considerable expansion of German-Afghan trade through Payment Agreement of August 1939 was also made.21

These diplomatic activities and the increasing size of the German colony in Afghanistan, was being watched closely by the Soviets and the British. Interestingly enough, until 1938 Britain did not express any concern about increasing German influence as that was a deterrent for the Soviet influence too, or till it was confined to German need for raw materials and foreign exchange. The British, however,


had always feared German expansion in the Middle East, with its terminus in Afghanistan rather than in Persia, which they believed might lead to Soviet counter measures.\textsuperscript{22} A situation that would place Britain in predicament. Since Afghanistan cooperated with the British and the Soviets they would not raise any finger against the German factor. But when in 1937 German Government had tried to extend German Airlines to Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and China the eyebrows were raised as both Britain and the Soviet Union had disliked the idea of German advances into that area. By June 1938, Fraser Tytler, the British Minister to Kabul, had warned the British Government of serious penetration of Afghanistan by the Germans involving both the economic and military aspects and that "involvement was acquiring a menacing proportion concerning British Empire."\textsuperscript{23} Further commenting on the enlarged cooperation with the German, the British Minister had felt that "general prestige of the British had suffered and that there was urgent need to increase the cooperation with Afghanistan in every way possible in order to protect the interest of the

\textsuperscript{22} NAI File Foreign and Political Files. No 410-F No. 68, 1936.

\textsuperscript{23} Apart from German & the Soviet Union (with whom around $1,05,000 worth of trade pact was on) Afghanistan wanted close relations with the Muslim countries in order to improve its image among them and to safeguard itself from the Northern neighbours. See Elizabeth Bacon & Alfred E. Hudson, "Afghanistan Waits", Asia Sec. 41, No. 51, p. 31, For details on Saadabad Pact, See. Sykes, P.: A History of Afghanistan. AMS Press, New York, 1975, Vol. II, p.333.
British India).

A significant development was the conclusion of a pact among Muslim countries known as Saadabad Pact July 1937, an alliance which included Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan. The objective of this pact was for "ensuring peace and security in the Near East, non-interference in the others internal affairs and always working as a group during any crisis whatsoever". The move was welcomed by the British Government of India and the USSR. Though there was an air of apprehension, from the Soviet point of view the pact was an extension of Collective Security System of the League of Nation which could bring stablisation of peace in the region. Saadabad Pact was concluded with the tacit approval and even active encouragement of both the Soviet Union and the Great Britain. Germany's initial reaction to this pact was favourable, but Italians strongly objected to this, as they considered it to be an instrument of British

26. Saadabad pact had aroused the Soviet fear as they sensed the increase Turkish influence in Afghanistan, as Turkey, though not hostile to the Soviet Union, was supporting the camp headed by Britain. See, Rahul, Ram; Afghanistan Mongolia & USSR, Vikas Publishing, N.D. 1587, p. 30 also, Fraser Tytler W.K., Afghanistan, A study of Political Development in Central Asia, Geoffery Cumberledge Oxford, 1950, p. 251.
Imperialism in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{27}

The Saadabad Pact was the first regional security and friendship pact entered by Afghanistan, which was to ensure greater solidarity among the signatories in meeting aggression from European power and in forestalling the possibility of an attack against another Middle-Eastern states.\textsuperscript{28}

Moreover, Afghanistan's increasing dependence on the financial and technical assistance of the Axis Powers in their economic development programme had placed them in a precarious position on the eve of the World War II. The Allies would never like that to happen to Afghanistan but neither "American chose to do anything nor the British". The alternative left to Afghanistan was to go to the Russian side, which again would be a point of discomfiture for the British. On the other hand, even the British presence was not welcomed by the Afghan's. The development had come to


\textsuperscript{28} Afghanistan was heavily dependent upon Germany, Italy and others for various kind of cooperation. The dilemma of the powers like the Great Britain and Russia was as to how cope with the situation, Ludwing Adamec, op.cit., p. 238.
create problem on both the fronts of the Axis vs. Allies, as well as head long collision between the British and the Soviet Union in Afghan matters. William Barton had proposed a different course for the British to follow in that kind of situation. Accordingly, the British had aimed at three points formulae which would eliminate the Amir Amanullah's influence in Afghanistan, contribute to the defence of British India, and gain the gratitude of the Afghans.²⁹ He argued that "a strong and friendly Afghanistan" was essential in the pacification of India's turbulent border area, and economic development was "of the prime impotance." Further elaborating, he maintained that "Afghanistan's foreign trade and economic development heavily depended upon the cooperation of its neighbour who would provide her the outlet to the sea, and in return Afghanistan would not hesitate to grant special trade facilities to the British India."³⁰ But Barton's idea had hardly found any takers among the British policy makers. In case, such a concession would have been conditional on the most favoured nation clause and capitulatory treaties for the Great Britain. At the very last the Soviet response would have been for reciprocity. Both consequences were unacceptable to the Afghan ruling elite. Under the circumstances, then, the Afghan government


could only continued to walk on a tight rope during 1938.

Eventually the most fundamental principles of Afghan foreign and economic policy thus far pursued received a jolt after the outbreak of World War II. More so after the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non Agression Pact in 1939.31 The dilemma of the Afghan government was apparent and the possibility of Afghanistan's independance might be jeopardised and that the country might become a battleground for European diplomacy; may even be a theatre of war, seemed very real.32 The Hashim Government sought to salvage its modernization programme and to safeguard the country's independance followed the traditional Afghan foreign policy by proclaiming Afghanistan's neutrality. Zahir Shah declared Afghanistan a neutral country "who wanted to have close economic and political ties" and was in favour of

31. Bacon, Elizabeth & Alfred E. Hudson; "Afghanistan Waits" Asia Part 41, No. 51, p. 31. The Nazi Soviet Pact shocked the Afghan government. As long as the European war did not break out, the Afghans believed to be in an unenviable position to play off Russia and Britain against one another. See also, "Documents on German Foreign Policy/D/VII, Nos. 228, 229, as cited by Milan Hauner : India in Axis Strategy, Klett Cotta, Stutagart, 1981. pp.90-92, 132-133 also 183-186.

peace in the World in September 1939.33 Serious internal and external pressures were brought to bear upon that neutrality, however. There were Afghan Nationalists and modernists who could not see how Afghanistan could stop in defence efforts, interrupt its modernization programmes, and severe its diplomatic and commercial ties with the Axis's powers without actually jeopardising its independance and sovereignty. There was frustration in Afghan ruling circle because the proposed plan of industrial development and military re-equipment had begun to arise and was in coming into full operation. Much material ordered from Czecho-slovakia and Germany had been delivered, but there was much still to come. Textile Mills were half finished, hydroelectric installation lacked essential parts, there were guns without ammunition and ammunition without guns. Nothing could have been more unfortunate than a severance of relation with Germany, at least until the delivery of all recent purchases had been completed."34 Afghans were able to complete some of their programmes during 1939-41, period since the Soviets did not pressurize them to severe

33. In order to keep intact the German favoured emotion intact Afghanistan was pushing up very cautiously. Since Afghanistan was never sure of the outcome of the war it was very difficult to decide which side to favour for. Thus keeping intact good old tradition of neutrality See, Kissing's contemporary, Archives, 1940-43 (Bristol) Part 4, p. 427-1. also. Vedic Ved Pratap, Op.cit. p.

their connection with the Axis, while the Nazi-Soviet pact was in effect. The British for their part, were in a poor position to make such a demand. A confrontation with Afghanistan would have played into the hands of Nazi-Germany and seriously threatened the British defences in India. Since 1938 the Great Britain had been trying to prevent an erruption in the NWFP, where the Pathan tribesmen did not need much prompting to assert their autonomy, a fact that had always created difficulties in Anglo-Afghan relations and had continued to do so even during this period. An explosive situation developed in Waziristan in the spring of 1939. Tribals at Waziristan, were fighting against the British intrusion in their area and were more angry with the Afghan Government's attitude towards. Because Government of Afghanistan had not supported them in any way. The tribals of Sulaiman Khel resented to the collection of taxes from the nomads who had hither to freely conducted their trade without any hindrance.

35. With the trade pact between the Soviets and Afghanistan just prior to the declaration of the neutrality by the King Zahir Shah, the various development programme could be continued. Daniel J. Dalin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy (1930-42) New Haven, 1942, p. 421.


37. Ludwig Adamec, op.cit., p. 228, also NAI Foreign and Political Deptt., F-558, 1937.
About the same time a Syrian Adventure Saadi-al Geilani, known as the Shami Pir, had denounced King Zahir Shah as an usurper. On June 13, 1938 al Geilani had convened a Loe-jirgarh which was attended by some 3,000 tribals, and in that tribal meeting he had denounced King Zahir Shah as an usurper and supported Ex-Amir Amanullah as a lawful King. Geilani had raised a tribal force had attacked Afghan frontier fortifications. Though the attempt proved futile when and he failed to capture the fortification but that led the Afghan Government to lodge strong protest - with the British Government over the incident. As some Afghan circles had seen in the incident - a British hand

38. Saadi-al Geilani, popularly known as Shami Pir from Syria, was distantly connected to with Queen Soraya Tarzi, the wife of Ex-Amir Amanullah, was a Pir of Qadiriya Silsila, had managed to gather a large number of followers in the frontier. He was known to have German connection too. For detailed information regarding Ali Geilani the reference is obtained from British Counsel in Damascus, who provided a personal file of the Shami Pir. The report was based on his personal acquaintance with the religions leader as well on information from other sources. L/P&S/12/1665, Coll. 3/96, No. 73, July 15, 1938, India Office Record. As quoted from Frase Tytler's Afghanistan - Annual Report, 1938, para 1 and further paras, 51-88, 128-129, 142-153, 303-310. Also Caroe, The Pathans, 550BC-AD, 1947, London, 1958, pp. 408-409.

39. On the question of why that had happened, Al-Geilani had represented the entire affair as a "matter of chance" when sought after by the members of the Qadiria sect for overthrowing the oppressive regime of Afghanistan, he had gone to Waziristan with the help of Fagir of Ipi and some leading Qadiriya Shaikhs, a force of 5000 men were raised and had attacked Afghan frontier post. See, L/Pes/12/1665, Coll. 3/96, No. 73 July 15, 1938, India Office Record. Cited in Fraser Tytler, pp. 266-267.
applying pressure against the Afghan Government for its extensive ties with the Germans. The Indian political Department, had then managed to defuse the situation reportedly by persuading the "holy man of Damascus" to accept $20,000 and go home.40

The Shami Pir incident was a serious indication of how the NWF had become a volatile region. From 1937 onwards, the periodic anti British uprising in Waziristan led by Haji Mirza Ali Khan, the famed Faquir of Ipi, drained both British wealth and manpower, and "acted as a magnate to draw adventurous German and Italians".41 Aftermath of the World War II, at the Nuremburg Trial it was revealed that, the Italians had tried to induce the Faquir of Ipi (with large sum of money) to carry on Pro-Axis activities in the Frontier Areas and to create difficulties for Britain.42

40. For that matter Govt. of India was heavily criticised by the Government of Afghanistan, as the anger shown in a letter by the Afghan Foreign Minister to the British Minister in Kabul on the incident that government of India not only had spared man's life but had accorded him the honour of flying from Wana to Delhi and from there via Karachi to Basra. See, Spain, James; The Pathan Borderland, The Hague, 1963, p. 235 and The People of the Khyber; The Pathan's of Pakistan, New York, 1963, pp. 134-35. Also L/P&S/12,1665, Coll. 3/96, no. 84 enclosure 1, July 20, 1938, India Office Records. In an article in Islah, Faiz Muhammad Called Geilani "one of several Lawrences", Islah, No. 282, July 11, 1938.

41. See, Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan, op.cit., pp. 253 and People of the Khyber, pp. 134-35. Also Fletcher Arnold, Afghanistan, op.cit., p. 239.

42. Among the most notorious of the self styled tribal leader in Waziristan from 1936 was Mirza Ali Khan, better known as the
The Italian negotiation with the Faqir of Ipi were carried on by Anzillotti, the counsellor of the Italian Legation in Kabul. In Feb. 1941, the Italians and the Germans gave the Faqir Rs.160,000. In February 1941 after a visit to the Faqir's camp Anzillotti had reported that Faqir was willing to intensify the border fightings and to accept Axis nationals as Radio technicians. In order to intensify hostility, however he would need a large amount of money. The Italians were not able to provide the necessary amounts promptly. The German Legation in Kabul made a new proposal, instead of £ 25,000 every two months, the Faqir was to be paid Rs. 309000 (Indian) a month to keep up his "petty hostilities"

(Contd. from previous page) Faqir of Ipi. He had gradually acquired a reputation of saintliness until he had emerged as a powerful religious leader and champion of Islam to whom miraculous powers were commonly attributed by his followers. Even Indian intelligence report had to admit, notwithstanding that a large number of those who flocked to his banner did so out of genuine belief in his claim to divine support. In 1937 nearly 40,000 British and Indian troops were reported in the field to trying to curb the Faqir's activities but with little success. Note on Faqir of Ipi, War Office London, 24/11/1937, 208/773, L/P and S/12/32-36-7, 3249, 3217-9, 3192-3; Waziristan, India Office Records. Activities of Fqir of Ipi; question of cooperation by Afghan Government in Operation against; 1937-1941; Italian and German interests in Affairs in Tribal Territory, 1935-1944; Disturbances, 1937/38, Peshawar Weekly Summary from Deputy Director of Intelligence, 1936-39. Baluchistan Weekly Intelligence Bureau Summary, 1937-39. War Office 106/5446; Waziristan 1933-38; Foreign Office 371/24766. See also Swinson, North West Frontier, People And Events, 1839-1947, London,1967. pp.327-332. C.E. Bruce: Waziristan, 1936-37. The Problem of North West Frontier of India And Their Solution: Aldershot 1938; J.G. Elliot; The Frontier 1839-1947, London 1968, pp.266-289, as cited by Hauner Milan; India In Axis Strategy, Ernest Klett, Stuttgart 1981, pp.83-84.
double that amounts if he extended the hostilities to other areas, and triple the amount if he could stirrup a general uprising in the North-West Frontier Province.\textsuperscript{43}

It was also revealed that after the War, Peitro Quaroni the Italian Minister to Kabul, had prepared a major plan for the insurrection of the North West Frontier tribes, which the Italian Govt. had communicated to the German High Command.\textsuperscript{44} In the belief that Britain was about to succumb any way, the Germans shelved the project, explaining that "they did not want to diminish further the prestige of the Whites in the Middle East or in India."\textsuperscript{45}

There were German plans in 1939-40 to divert the British attention in India by encouraging the Soviet Union to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} See U.S. Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Ministry, July 14, 1941. For Italian activities in Afghanistan and border areas, See also Quaroni, Pietro; Il Mondo Di Un Ambasciatore, and Vaigia Diplomatica Milano, 1956, and 1965, pp. 120-128, as cited in Milan Hauner op.cit. p.228.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ripken the German Minister during his negotiation in Kabul had met the Italian Minister Quoroni, and there was proposal for close German-Italian cooperation in economic and political matters apart from Quaroni's emphasis on the strengthening of their position in Kabul so that in the event of war, they could promote unrest on the North West Frontier and compel Britain to keep strong force in India. Adamec-Ludwig-Op.cit. p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Mussolini's conversation with Ribbentrop, May 13, 1941, as quoted in Kirk, Survey, p. 143. See also. W.B. Smith; Trois Annees A Moscou (Paris, 1951), p. 100.
\end{itemize}
move into Afghanistan. Brauchitsh, the Commander-in-Chief of Germany's land forces, recalled in January 1940 that, the Reich was intent on channeling Soviet expansion into Afghanistan and India. But even as the Nazis were thinking in these terms, the German envoy in Kabul was making further overtures to win the Afghan to the Axis cause. In 1940 he confidently announced to them that Hitler would be in London by August. He reportedly offered Afghanistan a restoration of the Durrani Empire, proposing that she be given Baluchistan, Sindh, Kashmir and the Western Punjab including the port of Karachi.

In 1941 the Germans had renewed their efforts in attempting to enlist the Afghan government to the cause of the Rashid Ali al-Ghilani Government in Iraq, which was carrying on a nationalist, anti-British campaign in which Afghan Government would also be involved. The idea of


48. Though with some close cooperations in economic field Germany had already penetrated into the Afghan rank and files but the Germans had desired to further their political objective on the eve of the World War II. The Abwehr, the German Armed Forces Intelligence Department in Cooperation with the Foreign Office wanted to resume
sending Germans to Afghanistan through Iraq, though was disliked by the Afghan government at Kabul. The Afghan Government was not in favour of such adventurism and thus decided to maintain its neutrality like that of Amir Habibullah during the 1st World War. The Government adopted a better attitude towards British India and the Soviet Union, reiterating often and loudly its devotion to peace and neutrality, and the Neutrality Act promulgated by Zahir Shah was approved by both the Houses of the Afghan Parliament. The Afghan's rejected the suggestion of the

(Continued from previous page) arms deliveries to Arab countries, especially to Iraq, where anti-British elements under Rashid Al Geilani had assumed power. See Woermann's memoranda of 4/2 and 26/2/1941 (Under Secretary of State, Germany) (Document of German Foreign Policy/D/XII, Nos. 12 and 92 Grobba-Canaris, Wilhelm, German Admiral's Conversation on 6/2/1941 (German Foreign Office) and Woermann's notes of 19/3/1941 as examined by Hauner. op.cit., p. 197.

49. In August 1939, Abdul Majid had told Ripken that Afghanistan had intended to remain neutral, as Afghanistan faced dangers for two neighbours. Although Ripken had hinted that Afghanistan's neutrality "might become benevolent if Germany would help in regaining the territories, Afghanistan had lost to Indian annexation. See DAA, Bureau des Staatssekretaer, Afghanistan, Vol. I. Report by Ripken, Nov. 7, 1939, no. 479899-910. The Abwehr German Armed Forces Intelligence Department in Cooperation with the foreign office wanted to resume arms deliveries to Arab countries especially to Iraq, where anti-British elements under Rashid Al Geilani had assumed power. See Woermann's memoranda of 4/2 and 26/2/1941 (Under Secretary of State, Germany) (Document on Foreign Policy/D/XII, Nos. 12 and 92 Grobba Canaris, Wilhelm, German Admiral's Conversation on 6/2/1941 (German Foreign Office) and Woermann's notes of 19/3/1941. As examined by Hauner. Op.cit., p. 197.

50. For the text of Afghan neutrality act, See Kabul Alamanch: 1939-40, pp. 432-33; its approval by the Afghan Parliament, was reported in that and its reaffirmation was carried in The Times, July 3, 1942.
Iraqi government that they take up its cause under the terms of the Sadabad Pact, such move, they replied should have come before not after, the hostilities. Another Iraqi suggestion, that Afghanistan take the initiative and call for a jihad against Britain, was also rejected. Fraser Tytler then the British Envoy to Kabul, described the situation as one in which "The Afghan figuratively buttoned their coats and turned their backs to the blast, crouching behind the frail shelter of their international frontiers, and their proclaimed neutrality hoping that the whirlwind would pass by them".

Though such was not the case, however after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it became evident that neither Great Britain nor the Soviet Union, now allies, would tolerate the presence and activities of hundreds of the Germans and Italians (as well as Japanese) nationals in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Allies fears of Axis activities were not unfounded. In 1941, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, the

51. US Deptt. of State, Foreign Relation p. 508: Mac Murray (U.S. Ambassador to Turkey to Secretary of State, May 13, 1941).

52. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan p. 253.

53. British Officials were worried of the appointment of Von Henting, who was of Wassmuss's calibre (German agent in Persia who during World War I had given Britain considerable trouble in Southern Iran) and had visited areas in Middle East, had greater risk of fomenting trouble in Central Asia. See Ludwig Adamec, Op.cit. p. cited from IOL/P&S/12/1689, no. 3 file 113, P.Z. 7641/38 & L/P&S/12/256, August 5, 1938.
German Foreign Minister had instructed Dr. von Hentig, the newly appointed German minister to Afghanistan, to coordinate the activities of German teachers, officers, engineers, and doctors, to establish contacts with Afghan nationalist circles in order to use them (if necessary against the Govt.) to coordinate the German intelligence services, and to contact the frontier tribes and their nationalist leaders. He was also instructed to speed up German propaganda in India, to note British military measures in Baluchistan and along the Iranian frontier, and to support the national independence movement in Iran and Afghanistan, "particularly in so far as these were connected and cooperate with one another." More correctly, the Nazir hoped for permission from the Afghan Government to establish a short wave radio transmitter in the Afghan Indian border to allow "inconspicuous German participation" in using the transmitter of Kabul Radio and to tolerate "certain amount of smuggling of arms." As for the Italian as noted, their negotiation with


56. See U.S. Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, XIII 51 June 29, 1941, Instructor to Ribbentrop, XII 971. As part to the Axis propaganda both German and the Italians were quick to understand the importance of propaganda through radio transmission.
the Faqir of Ipi were carried on through their legations in Kabul.

Both Britain and Soviet Union had separately expressed concern over the presence of Axis subjects in the Afghan Kingdom earlier, now they were in a position to take concerted action. In October 1941 they had sent similar notes to the Afghan Government, demanding the ouster of German and Italian citizens.57

The Afghan reaction to this ultimatum were apprehension, bitterness and public outcry as the same was done to Iran before invasion.58 The Afghan government summoned Loya jirgah for consultation. It had agreed to comply with the demands but it also expressed Afghanistan's will and determination to preserve its strict neutrality.

(Continued from previous page) Radio Himalay, an Italian Station had already been in operation and were broadcasting to Afghanistan and India. Now the German's were seriously looking a chance to use the Radio Kabul for such propaganda. IOR L/P & S/12/3249: GOI to Kabul, No. 2340, 21/5/1941 (as cited by Hauner op.cit., p. 235).


58. The Anglo Soviet attack and invasion of Iran had thoroughly alarmed the Afghans. The German envoy had reported in Sep. 1941 that "the hostile feeling against England and Russia on the part of the govt. and people, produced by the Iranian events, still persists. Although the govt. had taken amounts of this feeling sharply criticising what had happened public statements in the newspaper events could be repeated here" Sec. US Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, XIII 463-64; Pilger to Foreign Ministry as examined by Gregorian Vartan. op.cit., p. 388.
independence and territorial integrity. In order to curtail the range of Axis activities in the country, the Afghan authorities not only placed the Kabul area under strict surveillance but in July 1941 began restricting travel by imposing gasoline rationing (three gallons a day per car). In the same month Afghan border guards shot two German agents on their way to the camp of Faqir of Ipi, killing one and wounding the other, Hashim Khan conveyed his regrets to the Germans. The Afghans guards, he said had mistaken the two agents for Amanullah's son and the nephew of Ghulam Siddiq Khan. He also told that the German, in strict confidence that the British who had previously protested the appointment of the "agitator," Dr. Von Hentig, now had filed a protest "almost in the form of an ultimatum" demanding not only on behalf of the British Government but on behalf of the Soviet's as well that the German colony's activities be restricted. Hashim Khan assured the German that he had rejected these protests; nevertheless, he demanded that Afghanistan's neutrality be observed, and that such incidents not be repeated, for they could be used by agents who

59. For the proceeding of Loya Jirgah of 1941 Sec. Kabul Amanach 1941-42 pp. 280-85. For details about the exodus of Axis nationals Sec. US Deptt. of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy XIII. 640-41.

60. Ghulam Siddique Khan, the former Afghan Foreign Minister and Amanullah's brother-in-law had been living in Berlin since 1930 and was engaged in Pro Amanullah activities (Foreign Office German 402/20: Record of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan, p. 25) as examined by Hauner op.cit., p. 161.
wanted to provoke.

The convening of Loya Jirgah was an astute move on the part of Hashim Khan. It gave a national mandate to his foreign policy, eliminating the possibility of the charge of appeasement of the Allies and contributing to a greater sense of national unity and purpose. An aroused Afghan nationalism allowed Hashim Khan to push forward measures that at any other time would have been highly unpopular. Among them a new national conscription law making military service obligatory for all male Afghan citizens over the age of seventeen and a special tax to help the government increase the size of the army, purchase arms, and improve the country's communication.

The only resolution that was passed by the Great Assembly boldly stated that Afghanistan would not tolerate occupation of any part of her territory by another power.

61. The Loya Jirga summoned for the first-time in Nov. 1941 after a gap of almost a decade (Last summoned in 1931) was hailed as brilliantly stage managed by the Afghan Premier Hashim Khan who not only saved his face and buttressed the position of Yahya Khel dynasty in the aftermath of the expulsion of the Axis colonies, but succeeded in gaining approval for his policy through this unusual demonstration of national solidarity, equivalent to a selective plebescite. Instead of weakening his semi-dictatorial position, Hashim Khan strengthened it. About 1150 delegae met on 8/11/1941 and was entertained in Kabul at Government expense. Compiled by Hauner, Op.cit. from Katodon 410 & 421 of 10 and 8/11/1941: Kabul Weekly Intelligence Sumary, no. 46 of 15/11/1941; General HQ Wkly. Intell. Summary of NWF and Afghanistan Nos. 43, 44, 45 of 1,7 and 14/11/19541 in Foreign Office 371/31322, WO 208/773.
would under no circumstances allow other states to use her land and air routes, would not enter into any treaty which might prejudice her neutrality and would preserve her right to maintain and establish diplomatic relation with any country she chose.\textsuperscript{62} It was obvious that these provisions were intended to forestall the possibility of further Anglo-Soviet demands, and to make it clear to the Allies that any further move on their part which could compromise Afghan independence or neutrality, would mean war. They also served the premier to allay tribal fears that the Yahya Khel Government were sacrificing country's right to manage her own foreign relations and thus returning the country to the position of dependence it had occupied before the Third Anglo Afghan War.

Thus it was an evident neutrality that Afghanistan had pursued vigorously during the world war of 1939-1945. Though in the best interest of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah had given in the issue of Axis national, but that was purely diplomatic move as that had saved Afghanistan becoming the theatre of war between Allies and Axis powers.

The conclusion of the second world war in 1945 had changed the international political scenario with certain marks on Afghanistan as well. The war time allies - United State

\textsuperscript{62} British Cabinet Paper 68/8 : W.P. (R) (41) 75, as cited in Hauner, op.cit. p. 326.
and Soviet Union as the main rivals for dominating the world scenes. The conference of the Three Great Power, at Yalta (USSR) on 10 Feb. 1945, assigned Afghanistan to the Soviet Sphere of influenced. Apart from that Afghanistan became the signatory of the UN charter and joined the UN on 19 Nov. 1946.

When the British Withdrew from India in the summer of 1947, the raison 'dete for Afghanistan as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the British India had disappeared. In that place the war time allies - United States and the Soviet Union had emerged as the main rivals for dominating the world scenes. The traditional great power United Kingdom had lost its "Sun never sets in the British Empire" status its withdrawal had changed the geopolitical power configuration. The Soviet now rivals on the block the Soviets Vs. US had yet to unleash an era of cold war and yet another "Power Game".
CHAPTER-VI

PART-I

INITIAL RESPONSE TO GERMAN INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN

In between the two world wars there appeared on the Afghan scene, Germany, about which neither the British nor the Russian at first took any serious note of. German interests in Afghanistan right from the beginning was motivated by the "wishful strategic consideration". The 1915 adventurous expedition led by Warren Otto, Von Hentig and Oskar Von Nidermayer, reached Kabul with the intention of using Afghanistan for subversive activities against the British India. Warner Otto Von Hentig had led in 1915-16 with the purpose wining over Amir Habibullah towards the Central powers. The ultimate aim of Hentig/Neidermayer Mission was to direct from Afghanistan an anti-British as well as Pan-Islamic propaganda into India to help foment disorder and


2. There is a recent study on the Turco-German Intrigue and pan-Islamic interest in Afghanistan, see R.K. Trivedi, The Critical Triangle - India, Britain and Turkey. Infact German's were so much interested in Afghan affairs that they had offered Amir Habibullah a treaty without precedent, besides the assurance of Afghanistan's complete independence the treaty provided for military assistance in personnel and equipment on a fantastic scale, quoting 10,000 modern rifles, 300 Artillery pieces a free gift of $ 10 million. See Text of draft treaty between the German Empire and Afghanistan, dated 24.1.1916 and signed by Hentig and Neidermayer (Cf Vogel R., die Persien, pp. 292-294) as quoted from India in Axis Strategy. Milan Hauner, p. 70, 1980.
became not only the most important promoter of industrialisation in Afghanistan but also chief supplier of arms to her armed forces. German experts and advisers came in large numbers and outnumbered the other Europeans, working for similar ends in Afghanistan. Germans for example were about ten times more in numbers than the British. The German had nearly acquired monopoly and willingly set out to build the Afghan communication network, the roads' bridges, civil aviation and telecommunication works. The German pattern of penetration during the 1920's and 30's indeed offers the most striking parallel with the systematic soviet infiltration of Afghanistan later on since the 1950's, which culminated in the complete military take over of that country.

Amir Amanullah's project of reforms and his political manoeuvring between Britain and Soviet Union resulted in establishing Germany as the most important third power in Afghanistan. It was in December of 1923, that Fritz Grobba, the German, charge d'Affaris arrived in Kabul and the German colony rapidly increased in numbers. By August

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6. Ibid., p.290.
7. Ibid., p.291.
8. Dr. Fritz Grobba was very manipulating diplomat who got the German interests established in the very beginning of his arrival. See f. Grobba, Manner and Machte in Orient, 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit in orient Gottingen, 1967, pp. 14-59; IOR L/P & S/12 1878; German Minister at Kabul 1922-1947 as cited by Milan Hauner; India in Axis Strategy, London 1980, p.73.
1924, seventy two German experts not counting their families resided in Afghanistan, constituting the largest European colony in the country. It is notable that on the occasion of Grohha's first audience with Amir Amanullah, the Afghan ruler had expressed his appreciation for all that Germany had accomplished in Afghanistan. Amanullah had indicated that he would rely largely on German skill and expertise in his efforts to modernize Afghanistan. He wanted that the Afghan graduate studying in German schools in Kabul should be admitted in the German universities which he thought was the best in the world. Infact the Afghan sent to Germany had made quick progress than students studying in other countries. Amanullah had seen that the stature of Germany had not declined inspite of her defeat in the war. He attributed this to be internal strength of Germany.

Grobba cautiously dealt with the other European diplomats in the Afghan capital and made friendly were indeed motivated by economic rather than political.

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9. A special Afghan diplomatic mission reached Berlin with a long list of wishes, amongst which predominated the desire to establish diplomatic relation between the two countries to purchase machinery, to sent Afghan student for training to Germany and to acquire German experts. Cf. H. Glaesner, Das Dritte Reich unter Mittlere Osten. Politische and Westschaftliche Beziehungen Deutschlands Zur Turkei 1933-1939, Zu Iran 1933-1941 and Zu Afghanistan 1933-1941 Diss. Weirzburg 1976 pp. 421-424 as cited by Milan Hauner, op.cit. p. 73.

Germany's economic well being depended on the success of her foreign trade and even in areas as remote as Afghanistan. In 1923 German trading interests in Bremen founded an export-import company for the purpose of developing trade with Afghanistan. The company was at first called Deustch Orientalische Handelsgese Uschaft, A.G. but a year later the name was changed to Deustch Afghanische Company (DACOM).

In the summer of 1923, DACOM opened a branch office in Kabul which was staffed by three Germans, Kurt Wanger (a member of the Hestig-Neidermayer expeditaion) Emil Trunkker, a geologist, explorer and author and Gottiff Blaich, a technical consultant. Thereafter two German directions of the firms namely Fritzebner and S. Silbermann, arrived in Kabul. A year later DACOM imported to Afghanistan such items as cast itions. Pipes telegraph poles, Cement, and various types of machinery. Until July 1925 DACOM was exclusively engaged in importing the products and equipments needed by the Afghan government for its various development projects.

The fortunes of the German company took a turn for the worse, fearing an unfavourable trade balance, began to

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12. See details on the affairs of the Company. Milan Hauner, op.cit. p. 74
the worse, fearing an unfavourable trade balance, began to restrain its activities and imposed certain limitations. DACOM was prohibited from dealing with merchants other than those designated by the Afghan laws. The measure was not appreciated by the company and their profit went down.

Grobba observed that the company, always lived from hand to mouth.\(^{13}\)

Considering Amir Amanullah's respect for German experties in military science and weapon's technology it was natural that he hoped to obtain German military supplies and instruction from Afghanistan's military academy.\(^{14}\) But Germany was prohibited by Article 176 of the treaty of Versailles from giving military aid to any country. Consequently the Germans were replaced by Russians for military supplies and the British had heaved a sigh of relief. Still in April 1924 a group of 41 Germans had arrived in Kabul (some former military officers') who were to be employed as teachers and military advisers.\(^{15}\)

The most important among the officers were Major A. Christian, Freiherr Roland, Von Kalternborn Stachau and Karul G. Von Plater. Inspite of a lot of objections Germa entered into Afghan government services. Germans were

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 133.

\(^{14}\) Milan Hauner, op.cit., p. 134.

\(^{15}\) See Adamec, op.cit., p. 214.
mechanics. They had contributed greatly in the success of the Afghan government against the tribal forces during the Khost uprising of 1924-25.\textsuperscript{16} British had visualised the cementing of Russian interest in Afghanistan as a counterpoise to the German threats.\textsuperscript{17}

Amanullah had tried to invite people from different nationalities so that no particular country could monopolise or dominate in Afghanistan. Nevertheless by 1924 German had gained a predominant position projects. They got more chances after the famous piper no incident (in which an Italian engineer Afghan national) in July 1924 in which most of the Italian engineers had left Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{18} The incident greatly affected the prospects of Italians in Afghanistan as well as their diplomatic ties with them. More significantly it affects German relations as it served as a precedent to a similar case involving a German Stratil Sauer and a Afghan citizen. Though sauer was pardoned but that made Grobb to leave Afghanistan. August Feizel came to Kabul on June 18, 1926 after his departure. German interest did not decline but there was no advance in their bilateral relation hereafter till the commencement of World War-II.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 215.
\textsuperscript{17} See W.A.K. Fraser Tytler, \textit{Afghanistan of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia}, Oxford, 1953, p. 253.
\textsuperscript{18} See Adamec, op.cit. p.218.
CHAPTER-VI

PART II

ANGLO-AFGHAN DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS GERMAN FACTOR DURING WORLD WAR II

Afghanistan's role as a buffer state underwent a critical change due to the emergence of Anglo-Soviet Partnership. During the Second World War another German invasion of Soviet Union made it more apparent. Afghan policy makers therefore, realised that it would be difficult to resist the combined British-Soviet pressure to open and provide for a free passage of supplies to the Soviet-Union. Realising this predicament and the adverse situation King Zahir Shah in his speech of 6th July, 1941 before the National Council of Parliament clearly expressed the desire to remain neutral, and preserve their cordial political and economic relations the with two powers; at the same time, safeguarding the country's rights and interests. Allies therefore, wanted to take the advantage of the situation and get all Axis powers nationals expelled from Afghanistan at the earliest. Afghanistan wanted to maintain trading relations with the outside world in order to keep their the stock of essential goods intact during the war. For this reason Afghanistan maintained good relations with Great Britain, because the only outlet to sea routes was through India. The British, therefore, secured effective economic stranglehold over Afghanistan and they did not hesitate to apply again and
again, to see that the Axis colonies were removed from Afghanistan.¹

However, the first reaction in Afghanistan against the German invasion of Soviet-Union was, of great relief that their hated neighbour had been attacked by the Germans. The British Government of India was apprehensive that this news might well influence muslim opinion throughout India too. Although they had realised that Indian opinion was mostly sympathetic to Soviet Union. Such was not the response in Iran and Afghanistan. "Moslem hatred of Russia's godlessness" was regarded as being a genuine sentiment among the Afghans and on the North West-Frontier inhabitants.² Anticipating a possible intensification of German propaganda, in the Muslim world the Government of India therefore adopted certain measures to counter their intrigues. German promise to Saadabad countries, would be a prelude to the Axis attack, and if Russia was defeated in the war, then these countries would also be destroyed. German policy was one of "Drang nach osten" (the drive towards the East),


2. The file concerning correspondence between the Government of India and the India Office, No. 3190 27/6/1941; repeated to Kabul and Tehran, Main Office London 106/3765 has been cited in Hauner. op.cit 307.
included Turkey and Iraq in the Lebensraum (under German rule or sphere of influence) and the German domination of Iran and Afghanistan. This was their dream since 1890s. German Imperialism was more intense and seemed more unprincipled than the Russian threat. After the Russian Revolution Russia was considered a Godless country by Orthodox Muslims, yet Germany then posing a greater threat to Islamic ideas. The news from the Soviet front was reaching Kabul with the report of the advance of German troops, in Russia. Afghans naively began to speculate that the defeat of the hated Russia was only a matter of time, and the Soviets state would disintegrate and thereby the perpetual northern menace to Afghanistan would be removed, for generations to come. On the second day of the Nazi-Soviet clash the Afghan premier had made several enquiries as to whether Russia would be able to hold off the German advance? The British Minister in Kabul had reported regarding Hashem Khan harboured ideas in "the hope that the two powers would weaken each other" and spread the war to the Middle East." Presumably he was right. The German Minister was assured of Afghanistan's sympathies with Germany. That was owing to the new


Anglo-Soviet partnership in the war. Afghanistan was not in any position to help Germany as it was militarily powerless.\(^5\) Pilger had reported that the Afghan War Minister had held a conference with senior officers who were asked "whether the moment was opportune to open hostilities against British India?" Only the Air Force commander and Prince Daud were said to be in favour of attacking, the rest suggested waiting.\(^6\) The German Military Adviser, Major Walter Schenk had confirmed that the country was not engaged in any military preparations whatsoever, the stocks of petrol was critically low and the military spare parts including munitions had not been improved since 19 Sep.1939.\(^7\)

Nevertheless, Berlin assured Afghanistan about the arms delivery to them, in order to strengthen and modernize their somewhat weak army based upon traditional mode of warfares.\(^8\)

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5. Correspondence of Dr. Hans Pilger, Minister at Kabul, No. 197 of 24/6/1941 to German Foreign Office 617/249945. Cited in Hauner op.cit., p. 08.

6. Ibid.

7. Carl Rudolph Rasmuss (a German Trade Commisioner in Calcutta) was attached to German legation in Kabul in Feb. 1944 nominal as Commercial Attache; and there he was also involved in espionage for Abwehr and provides information (See pilger/Rasmuss, Correspondance to German Foreign Office 391/19 5566-7 No. 233 of 17/7/1941, cited in Hauner op.cit. p.308.

Equally there was a great expectation, among German ranks that Afghanistan would join the Axis Powers after the fall of Moscow and replacement of Churchill as the British Prime Minister. On July 11, 1941, Joachim Von Ribbentrop the German Foreign Minister gave instruction to his Minister in Kabul to impress upon during his interviews with the Afghan Government, and or whenever such opportunities occur to inflict a fact that the Red Army had win practically destroyed by Germans and that Afghanistan's future hope laid on the side of a victorious Germany. German optimism was reflected merely in words and her interest in Afghanistan's affairs. When the Operation BARBAROSSA, was launched that activities started in Afghanistan to put up a front against the British and the Soviets.11

Barely one week after on 29 June, the beginning of BARBAROSSA, Werner Otto Von Hentig, a German expert on Oriental affairs had received instruction from, Ribbentrop,


(despite the fact that he had been on the retired lists since Oct. 1939) to go to Kabul. Hentig had led a mission during the First World War, now leading a retired life since October, 1939. Suddenly his services were required and was ordered to replace Hans Pilger the German Minister to Kabul, who was regarded too passive. This was the second mission of Hentig. He was instructed to ascertain the British strength and position both in India and in Afghanistan, to co-ordinate all Abwehr agents on the spot, doctors and teachers in German schools, engineers of the Organisation Todt (A huge road construction firm and a vast Nazi institution) alike in order to use them, if necessary against the Government in power. Hentig's task on his second mission was not only to observe and report on but actively to support "the national independance movements in Iran and Afghanistan, particularly in so far as these were connected issues and needed co-operation. The other objective of Hentig was to establish contact with the frontier tribes on Indo-Afghan border and their leaders to open communication with India, and to exert political influence by means of

12. See Hentig, W.O; Aufzeichnungen. 1957, Vol. 2 pp.41-42 also Hentig's biography published in 1963 (Hentig,W.O., Mein Leben Eine Denstreise, Gottingen 1963). Hentig has since claimed that his acceptance of the post in Kabul was subject to Ribbentrop fulfilling his conditions first, that he (Hentig) decided about the timing of the mission, and that all Germans nationals, in Afghanistan, members of the Nazi Party, Abweher (the German espionage) agents alike, would be "wholly and unconditionally" subjected to his command. For details of Hentig's activities during World War I. See, Trivedi, R.K; The Critical Triangle : India Britain And Turkey (1908-1924), Publication Scheme, Jaipur,1993.
propaganda. He was also to observe military measures taken
by the British in Baluchistan and along the Iranian border. Significantly Hentig's proposed assignment was thoroughly
questioned and challenged by Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi
leader and the Head of AuBen Politische Amt. or NSDAP
German Foreign Policy Office on the ground that he was
considered to be an "enemy of the oriental people."

The British had strongly reacted to the news of Hentig's
nomination at Kabul in the strongest possible way. The
British got alarmed over the increasing German intrigues and
activities in Afghanistan. Therefore, they demand for the
expulsion of the German nationals from Iran and
Afghanistan. This became a major policy item on British
agenda immediately after Hitler's attack on Soviet Union.
London rightly assumed, that with the cessation of trade
between Afghanistan and Germany through Russia the reason
for the stay of many German nationals in Afghanistan had
no base whatsoever. However, the British was not yet keen
to call upon Soviet co-operation in the matter of bringing
political pressure upon the Kabul Government. That was
considered dangerous. Instead the idea of using the Soviet

13. German foreign Office files, 329/195546-8 as examined by Hauner
op.cit p.308.

14. See for the views of Rosenberg about Hentig, Rosenberg, A; Der
Zukunftsweg einer deutschen An Benpolitkk, Munchen, 1927. Also
Rosenberg A; Aktennotiz ciber die Tätigkeit des Gersandten V. Hentig in
AA; Doc. PS-231, 8/7/1941 forwarded to Hitter through the Chief of
the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammes on 12/7/1941 also Seraphim, H.G.;
36-42. As cited in Hauner op.cit, p. 309.
economic blockade on Afghanistan along with the British measures was an acceptable alternative. The British Minister in Kabul was told that he would raise the subject of repatriation of Germans with the Afghan government at the earliest opportunity. The Government of India in agreement with the military advisers stressed over and over again the point of strategic unity of the entire region. The possible penetration of either Iran or Afghanistan, or both, by the German forces, was seen by them as one problem. They had regarded Iran a key point in that front, and emphasised that from military point of view, Iran is the responsibility of Indian and therefore their views must be taken into account. But before the British Minister in Kabul could raise the subject of German nationals and request their expulsion, the Hentig affair had flared up. As soon as Fraser-Tytler the British Minister in Kabul had learnt that present German Minister in Kabul was about to be replaced by Hentig, he had protested at once on July 10, 1941, only to be told that the Afghan Government after careful

15. India office, Note of 23/6/1941, "The situation in Iran and Afghanistan created by Germany's attack on Russia" IOR L/P & 5/12/1778, cited by Hauner op.cit. p. 310.


consideration, had already given their consent to the appointment of the new German Minister. Fraser-Tytler therefore, replied that he was surprised to hear this act of folly as the Afghan government must have been aware of Hentig's contact with the Shami Pir. Knowing that Afghan Government had refused Hentig's appointment. He could not have imagined "short of flying the German flag on the palace of Kabul" anything more calculated to disturb the Anglo-Afghan relation. The Afghan Foreign Minister Ali Mohammad Khan endeavoured hard to assuage British resentment with dignity. As long as the British trusted the Afghan Government, no individual German would make any difference to their policy at the same time they could accept no pressure from outside. Had they refused the agreement for Hentig, they would have been accused of succumbing to British pressure, which they could not face.

The British closely watched and kept their surveillance on Hentig's movements. The British Counsel in Damascus had reported in February 1941 that he had heard how Hentig was putting great pressures on Shami Pir to return to

Afghanistan, but so far the latter had not agreed.\textsuperscript{19} Under these circumstances Fraser-Tytler had suggested two alternative course of action first was to watch the present situation and hope for the better; as their were no immediate signs of internal disruption in Afghanistan. The number of Germans in the country was relatively small, and he had warned that if the Germans had managed to reach the Caucasus, the situation would adversely change with the Axis propaganda and plans. Thereon subversion would be speedily set in motion.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, the alternative was immediate pressure on the Afghan Government to eliminate the German influence. But for the second course Fraser Tytler had suggested some concession (financial & military) to the Afghan Government for the purpose of replacing the German technician by the British. The activities of road building on the Kandhar to Herat route by the Germans was

\textbf{19.} Shami Pir was undesirable man in the NWF province both from Govt. of Afghanistan's point of view (due to his family connection with ex-Amir Amanullah) and for the British (as he had German connection) and had links with Islamic fraternities. See for details Fraser-Tytler's, \textit{Afghanistan, Annual Report}, 1938 para 8 and further paras 51-58, 128-9, 142-53, 303-10.

\textbf{20.} Correspondence of Gardner, (the British Counsul in Damascus) to Foreign Office, London, No. 13, 14/2/1941, Pz 981/41. Fraser-Tytler in Kabul was duly informed about this meeting. Correspondence to Foreign Minister to Kabul, 36 of 12/2/1941 and warned the Prime Minister Hashem Khan. Correspondence from Kabul to London 55 of 12/2/1941, all in India Office Records, L/P&S/3258 and Foreing Office London 371/45216. When Sardar Ahmad Khan, the Afghan Minister in London, called on the Foreign Office to complain about an unfriendly article in British press he was told immediately the fact that Hentig had contacted the Shami Pir earlier
also a cause of concern for the British.\(^{21}\) The reaction of London to these activities had disquiten the policy makers. Now the policy makers were concerned that the Germans were planning to start more active measures" to stirrup trouble for the British in Afghanistan, Iraq and no doubt in India too.\(^{22}\)

(continued from previous page) that year in Syria, and the Afghans should have ruled him out as Minister at Kabul. See Foreign Office Spokesman Sir Horace Seymour, Note dated 18/7/1941, E. 3960/144/97; Foreign Office London, 371/27033. Hentig also mentions his visit to the Shami Pir in his private papers but not in his published memoirs. (Hentig, Aufzeichungen, Bd. 2, pp. 83-143. Reise durch Syrein Januar 1941/1942). Also cited in Hauner op.cit, p. 311.

21. Kabul to London (Correspondence regarding situation in Afghanistan) file No. 230 of 11/7/1941 also Fraser-Tytler, W.K, Afghanistan. A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia, London 1967. Fraser-Tytler had calculated that there were about 120 Germans employed in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government employed 23 as teachers, 10 as doctors, 41 as architects and technicians, 19 on miscellaneous tasks, 27 were employed by private firms.

22. Cf; Dr. Trott, Berlin to Pilger, the German Minister to Kabul, 6/6/1941, German Foreign Office Record 195/139/66 as cited by Hauner, op.cit p. 312, 329 & 333. (A detailed questionaire on the possibilities of setting up an intelligence network operating from Kabul which would provide information on and co-ordinate subversive activities against India.) Ausl. Abw, Nr. 02667/41 geh III E, Britische Ma Bnahan on Der indiisch - Iranischen Grez. Bericht eines Zuverlassigen V-Mannes; 14/6/1941 in: BA-MA/Wi/II 2.2 Report on road condition in Afghanistan, on troop movements and fortification works along the Indo-Afghan border, by Maj. Schenk, the Military Adviser to the Afghan Government, dated 25/7/1941; in Ibid; Ausl./abw, Nr. 7329/41 geh. Iia. Cf. 9N. above and part-II-6, 80 N. See also various reports on the Afghan economy, road network etc. prepared by the OKW (Ober-Kommando de Wehrmacht / Armed Forces High Command) Wirtschafts-und Rustungsant in BA/MA/Wi/II B 2.1, R88/506-7, 843 : EAP 66-c-g-12/2-5. Cited in Hauner, op.cit, p.311.
There was some justification in Axis claim as the Iraqi Charge d'Affairs in Kabul, Yamulki, was reported as having been in touch with the German Minister in Tehran on his way through and asked to help in fomenting an uprising in Afghanistan against the present Government.\textsuperscript{23}

The British Department of Military Intelligence was greatly alarmed to know the designs of Baron Von Hentig, who along with Oskar Von Neidermeyer attempted to establish a close co-ordinated link between Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in order to create a "Germanophile Islamic federation."\textsuperscript{24} Hentig however, failed to persuade Amir Habibullah to remain neutral during the WWI. Yet succeeded in laying the seeds of trouble, in the North-West Frontier in India between 1916 and 1920. On the Hentig issue measures suggested by against his appointment by Fraser-Tytler (The British Minister in Kabul) to the Government of India, was read with caution and apprehension, still the Government of Afghanistan was approached not to accept Hentig. The British Government also had approached the Soviet Government in an attempt to bring continued pressure to

\textsuperscript{23} India Office Minute by R.T. Peel, Head of the Political Department (External) in India Office 11/7/1941, India Office Record L/P & S/12/1778/ as cited in Hauner op.cit. p.312.

\textsuperscript{24} Yamulki who was meanwhile supplying information to the British legation in Kabul, which the Govt. of India enthusiastically granted in order to pick up Pro-German agents who was supposed to meet him in Lahore. See the Correspondence between the Govt. of India, and the to India Office London F.No. 3547/1941, also War Office London, F. No. 106/3765, \textit{Ibid}.  

bear on Kabul not to accept Hentig.\(^\text{25}\)

Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, on August 1st, 1941, that the Soviet Government would support the British protest concerning Hentig's appointment at Kabul. Although the Soviet policy towards Afghanistan was still under consideration. In another meeting with Afghan Prime Minister, Fraser-Tytler on 27\(^{th}\) July 1941 again discussed the matter of Hentig's nomination and had refused to alter his decision while making it clear that Afghanistan would not accept dictation in its internal policies.\(^\text{26}\) In retaliation the Government of India promptly imposed a "mild economic sanction" on Afghanistan from 1st August 1941. The oil supplies from India were reduced to 25 percent; they delayed the arrival of new lorries and imposed delays on the issue of export licenses from Afghanistan.\(^\text{27}\) Though oil

\(^{25}\) For a more detailed account of the Turco-German intrigues during the World War I and the activities of Hentig-Neidermeyer See, Trivedi, R.K; *The Critical Triangle, India Britain and Turkey*, (1908-1924). Publication Schemes, Jaipur, India, 1993. Whole chapter on Turko-German Intrigues in India during the World War I.

\(^{26}\) See, Files regarding the Hentig issue, in Government of India to Kabul repeated to India Office, No. 16/8-S, 13/7/1941; Govt. of India to India Office, No. 3583 of 16/7/1941, India Office Record, L/P & S/12/1778, See Linlithgow Papers, Correspondence with Amery (the Secretary of State for India, Vol VI (1941), 26/4, 7/5, 16/5, 15/7/1941, Correspondence from Kabul to London 126 of 23/4/1941, Government of India to India Office No.2765 of 28/4/1941, also Correspondence of Sir Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary to Cripps, No. 826, of 18/7/1941, repeated to Kabul and Delhi, Cripps to Eden, No.828, 20/7/1944; Foreign Office 371/2704) cited in Hauner, op.cit. p. 314.

\(^{27}\) Ibid. Correspondence regarding that, Kabul to London, file No. 247 of 27/7/1941, War Office London, 106/3767.
sanction had seemed reasonable during war period, the seized lorries (supplied by General Motors U.S meant for Afghanistan numbering 670), "very strategic act to stop these lorries "in the words of Indian General Staff.\textsuperscript{28}

In order to see the case of explosion from Afghanistan a reality the British Governemtn of India imposed stringent measures against Afghanistan to see that the Axis Nationals were expelled from its territories. An unfriendly act, which was to undermine the influence of the Pro-British faction in Afghan politics.\textsuperscript{29} Much to the relief of the Allies, before any further step in that direction of increasing economic sanctions against Afghanistan could be taken, the Afghan Foreign Minister informed Fraser-Tytler that Hentig was not, coming to Kabul.\textsuperscript{30} Meanwhile on July 19, 1941 while the Hentig affair was on a serious incident of subotage, was reported from the Logar valley, where two German agents

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid. Kabul to London, file No. 247 of 29/7/1941, War Office 106/3767 Govt. of India to India Office, No. 3913 of 31/7/1941. Also cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 312.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid. Government of India's Correspondence to India office, No. 3432 of 14/7/1941, War Office 208/4 : 1941 heading "Lorries for Afghanistan." Also see in Hauner, op.cit., p. 315.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid. Kabul to London, file No. 252 of 1/8/1941, On 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 1941, the Indian General Staff had sent to the War Office the text of two telegrams, intercepted a week earlier" from our usual source," one was from the Afghan Minister in Berlin urging Kabul to agree to Hentig's appointment. The other came from the Afghan Embassy in Moscow and had warned that the British and the Soviets might demand the expulsion of German subjects from Iran and Afghanistan.
\end{itemize}
Professor Oberdorffer, Leprosy Expert and Dr. Brandt, an entomologist, accompanied by twelve tribesmen were moving at night with arms and ammunitions, meant for Faqir of Ipi. The group was intercepted by the Afghan patrol party and their interrogation was startling because they were conspiring to foment trouble under the codename of FEUERFRESSER (fire eater") which was in fact part of a bigger operations, a full scale uprising codenamed TIGER. The incident were quite revealing to the Afghan Government on the German activities. Allah Nawaz was reported to have remarked to Hentig that the German activities were only tolerable in Afghanistan till those were in consent with the Afghan Government and that Faqir of Ipi had the support of Afghan Government against the British.31

Hashem Khan, the Afghan Premier had informed Pilger, (the German Minister to Kabul) that Afghan Government was ready to assist the approaching German troops, "with 500,000 mobilized men including tribes," but Logar valley type of incident would hardly do any good to the Germans against the vast British spy network. He had also disclosed that the British and the Soviets had again lodged a sharp protest against Hentig's appointment and demanded drastic

reduction of the German colony in Afghanistan. When Hentig did not come to Kabul the Government of India therefore, decided to relax economic sanctions, except on the patrol rationing measures. The British even then tried to persuade the Afghan Government to accept their objections against the presence of Germans in their country was "a breach of neutrality". The similar move of the British and the Soviets in Iran was aimed at to see the ouster of the Germans by combining economic and political pressure to bear on them to expel the Germans. In no way the axis power national's presence in Afghanistan was to be tolerated by the Allies, particularly Britain. The British occupation of Iran was justified by London telling the Kabul Government that this was necessary in order to "prevent Germany from establishing herself in Persia, thus menacing the security of Central Asia as a whole." After occupation of Iran the British were more keen to see the expulsion of the Axis nationals particularly Germans and the Italians from

32. Ibid., correspondence by Pilger, No. 259 of 30/7/1941 German Foreign Office, 617/249988-94 and Document on German Foreign Policy/D/XIII, No. 169, Compiled also from earlier Kabul despatches of 22, 23, 24 and 28/7/1941 German Foreign Office file No. 617/249984-8, 329/195, 554-63).

33. Ibid., correspondence between Commander-in-Chief to War Office London, No. 9429/G, 18/7/1941, also file No. 106/3795 and 193/644.

34. Ibid. Foreign to Minister Kabul file No. 265 of 22/8/1941, India Office Records L/PS/12/1778.
Afghanistan. As the secret report suggests the British were in commanding position and that "Afghan would give in to any such demand which they would ask for."  

Meanwhile, the newly appointed British Minister to Kabul, Sir Francis Wylie, too favoured the policy of evicting the German colonies from Afghanistan. The German constituted around 2,000 in number. The British nevertheless continued to put pressure on Afghanistan, by all means possible including the toughest option of economic stranglehold through the economic blockade.

Infact, the British diplomatic circle had even contemplated the annexation of Afghanistan on the similar pattern adopted in the case of Iran. But Sir Francis Wylie the British Minister to Kabul foresaw the repurcussions, so Afghanistan was not to be attacked. The Government of India was therefore, advised to modify their aggressive posture. Wylie had seen twofold disasters of such a course firstly there would be a Soviet annexation of Northern Afghanistan and secondly her end as a buffer state against Russia from the British point of view.


36. See, Anis (Kabul) of 30/8/1941, Anis the Kabul paper had appeared with leader entitled "The deplorable incident in Iran, "which drew a protest from the Soviet Ambassador who insisted that the Afghan Government publish the statement he had offered them at the time of the invasion of Iran. The Soviet version was then duly
Compared to Iran British had no stakes in Afghanistan; there were no oilfields, or the transterritorial railways nor was there any need to secure cover for their flank. On the other hand, India could not afford to tie up her forces on and beyond the NWF and to the maze of tribal resistance in a difficult topography. The British were also apprehensive of the repercussions such a policy would have on India's Sunni Muslim if they chose to attack Afghanistan. Finally, there was perennial fear of tribal risings in reaction to the threat of blockade and even more in case of invasion. The British Government accepted the views and worked on the alternative policy of showdown in case of Axis nationals. They demanded from the Kabul Government guarantee of strict surveillance of Axis legation and to expel non-official Axis nationals, within a month under guarantee of safe-conduct to Axis controlled territory. But at that stage the Afghan Government was still refusing to give in. But as the pressure was mounting, the Afghan Premier Hashem Khan had to accede to their demands while having reservations. The time bound repatriation of the Axis nationals was not acceptable and before that whole issue was to be put up

(continued from previous page) published in the Anis on 6/9/1941, also correspondence from Kabul to London file No. 300, 301, 313 & 328 of 5,7, 14 and 27 of Sep 1941, for the German reaction, see Pilger No. 328 of 8/9/942 in Document on German Foreign Policy /D/XIII No. 289. Also cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 319.

before to the Afghan Cabinet and to the National Council (Parliament) and afterwards even to the Loe-jirga (the Grand Assembly of Mullahs, notables and tribal chieftains). He further asked for a written guarantee from the British Government that they were not seeking to substitute supply routes for Russia via Afghanistan, and that they would bear the full cost of repatriation provided that the Axis nationals were expelled within a month.\(^\text{38}\)

But with the threat of a possible expulsion of Axis nationals becoming apparent there took place numerous deliberations regarding the issue. The German Minister in Kabul was informed about the content of the joint Anglo-Soviet deliberation (demarche) and quickly summoned the entire German colony on 13\(^{th}\) October, 1941. They were told that Berlin had agreed that they would be handed over to the British under the guarantee of safe passage and that they should pack with all speed lest the British should change their minds.\(^\text{39}\)

Acting very fast, the authorities had arranged the whole thing in a very short time. In less than a fortnight altogether 204 German and Italian nationals had left for Peshawar in two batches, the first on 29\(^{th}\) October and the second on

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\(^\text{38}\) India Office Records L/P & S/12/1778, Cf. Kabul to London, 328 of 27/9/1941. As examined by Hauner, op.cit., p. 319.

\(^\text{39}\) Ibid, correspondence between India Office to Govt. of India file No. 10880 of 6/9/1941, repeated to Moscow & Kabul.
following day, to proceed from there to Karachi and further via Iraq and Turkey to an Axis controlled territory.\(^{40}\)

Unexpectedly the whole matter of their expulsion was given wide publicity by the Afghan Government through broadcast on Kabul Radio and a print in daily \textit{Islah}.\(^{41}\)

The Government of India were then convinced that the removal of Axis legation from Kabul was desirable.\(^{42}\) But the Government of India's utter cautiousness in the matter of getting rid of Axis legations and the advantages accrued from it, they insisted that India's war effort must not to be divested to a new Afghan War.

\(^{40}\) See for details, correspondence from India Office to Government of India, Nos. 11231 & 21231 & 11263 of 13/9; also correspondence from Govt. of India to India Office, file No. 5023 of 16/9, also to Foreign Minister to Kabul 299 of 19/9; Govt. of India to India Office, file No. 51545 of 21/99, Govt. of India to India Office file No. 11835 of 24/9; Kabul to London 318 of 19/9; Kabul to London 337 of 3/10; Foreign Minister to Kabul 336 of 4/10/1941. As cited in Woodward, L.E.; \textit{British Foreign Policy in the Second World War}, 4 Vols. London, HMSO, 1970-5 Vol. II pp. 57-58.

\(^{41}\) The British Cabinet papers, 68 files No. 68/8 W.P. (R) 41, 69. As examined & cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 324.

\(^{42}\) See War Office London files No. 106/3767 Correspondence from Kabul to London No. 361 of 14/10/1941, No. 42 of 18/10/1941, Foreign Office, 371/31322, for the German reaction see, Pilger's despatches of 8/9 and 22/10/1941 in DGEP/O/XIII, Nos. 289 & 398; Conversation between Hashem Khan and Pilger on 18/10/1941 in German Foreign Office, 329/195510; Weizsacker (German Secretary of State to Pilger, file No.366 of 25/10/1941, and 195505-06. See also \textit{The Times} (London) of 21/16/1941. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 325.
Meanwhile, just concluded Loejirgah (Great Assembly) attended by 1150 delegates on 6th November 1941, had come with the resolution that "Afghanistan would not tolerate occupation of any part of her territory by another power, would under no circumstances allow other state to use her land and air routes, would not enter into any treaty which might prejudice her neutrality, and would preserve her right to maintain and establish diplomatic relations with any country she chose.\textsuperscript{43}

It was obvious that these provisions were intended to forestall the possibility of further Anglo-Soviet demands, and to make it clear to the Allies that any further more on their part which could have compromised Afghan Independence on neutrality, would meant war.

But Wylie the British Minister at Kabul\textsuperscript{44} though admitting the success of Loejirgah resolution, had continued to work for his objective of seeing the German and Italian legation closed. For that matter he had suggested a Tripartite

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., correspondence from Kabul to London, 371 of 18 Oct. 1941, Govt. of India to India Office, No. 5861, See also The Times of 7 Nov. 1941, Out of 204 Anis nationals expelled 176 were Germans, including 57 women and 12 children, the rest were Italians as compiled from Pilger correspondence file No. 337 in German Foreign Office 617/250053, General H.Q. Weekly Intelligence Summary of the North West Frontier and Afghanistan, file No. 46 of 15 Nov. 1941, British Cabinet Papers file No. 68/8, w.P. (R) (41), No. 69, also Pilger, file No. 444 of 30/10 and No. 462 of 8 Nov. 1941, German Foreign Office 329/195562 and 250100).

\textsuperscript{44} See, Islah 19 Oct., 1941, also Correspondence from Kabul to London, file No. 370, 374 & 375 of 17 and 19 Oct. 1941.
Alliance among Afghanistan, Britain and Soviet Union.

The Wylie proposal had fallen flat as that was almost impractical due to Afghan dislike of "Godless Russia" and the Government of India was convinced that the Afghans would resist strongly any alliance with Soviet-Union. Though Wylie had continued to work over the Winter month of 1941/42 on the future possibility of an Anglo-Soviet Afghan Alliance, which could work as a bulwark against the Axis designs, but without any success. Wylie's plan though not very acceptable, Government of India just wanted to give some technical help to Afghanistan (not the economic assistance which was needed most) for keeping some contact or in order to replace the contingent of Axis technical personnel.45

Again it was the 'buffer state' diplomacy which the Government of India, thought better to continue. The only effective assistance they thought for Afghanistan was a gift of money (50,000 Pound, in instalments spread over two years) in order to help the royalty against any possible tribal uprising, or as a means to bribe the mullahs and tribal leaders in order to check the Axis activities and pro-Amanullah elements. But as Afghan Premier Hashim Khan had replied" Afghanistan needed help in kind especially in forms of armaments."46

Despite serious setbacks received by the Axis

45. Correspondence from Govt. of India to India Office, No. 6338 of 12 Nov. 1941. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 325.

46. Ibid., Files regarding Military Intelligence, War Office London, Department responsible to India, 15 Nov. 1941.
conspirators in Logar valley incident, Hentig Affair and at on the issue of the expulsion of German nationals, their intrigues had continued. During the evacuation of the German nationals, the German legation had seriously considered leaving its abwehr (German Spy) agents behind. They were to have wireless contact with Germany and penetrate into the Afghan Army. The retention of Abwehr agents by the German legation in Kabul testified to the continuing interests of German War planners in India.

The intelligence reports suggest that the British Intelligence tried hard to track down the leader of the remaining contingent but none of the left German nationals deserved attention. In this regard Soviets also supplied information to the British which suggests of a possible link between the Soviets and the British Intelligence.

Regardless of the strict control imposed by the Afghan authorities on the movements of foreigners outside Kabul. Indian intelligence believed that the Axis legations were still in communication with the Faqir of Ipi, and even with

47. Loye Jirgah wa an medieval institution which may have comprised up to two thousand representatives of the various Afghan tribes. It met only three times between the two World Wars, the last time in 1930, when Nadir Shah had summoned it to acclaim his right to throne. About 1150 delegates had met on 6th Nov. 1941 and had to be entertained in Kabul at Government expenses. See for more details, correspondence from Kabul to London, file No. 410 & 421 of 10 and 18 Nov. 1941; Kabul Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 46 of 15 Nov. 1941 in Foreign Office (London) 371/37322, War Office 208/773. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 326.
certain Afridi tribesmen. The Italians and the Germans were reported to have supplied money (Rs. 300,000 by Italians) arms and wireless sets.48

By 1943 Indian intelligence had estimated that the Faqir must have accrued about a half million Afghanis paid to him through the Axis legation.49 But a more fair picture of Faqir's fortune emerges through British intelligence sources, which indicated that Faqir's fortune was not that high as it was made out to be.50

In December 1941 some agents gave to the British with doubtful information about "two Germans mechanics with the Faqir of Ipi who had escaped from Iran.51 Despite the setbacks and rapidly deteriorating Axis position in Afghanistan, preparation for a"bigger action" condenamed


49. Ibid., General Headquarter Weekly. Intelligence Summary of NWF and Afghanistan No. 43 of 11 Nov. 1941, para. 6 & 7 also, India Office to Govt. ofIndia, No. 12109 of 30 Sep 1941, Foreign Minister to Kabul 331 of 30 Sep 1941; Govt. of India to India Office No. 25 Oct. 1941, Foreign Minister Kabul to 3759 of 26 Oct., 1941.


"Tiger" were speeded up meant for wider sabotage action.  

The operation remained in force even after the expulsion of the Axis nationals from Afghanistan, and was still on the agenda during the following year, when it must have been obvious that the chances of its success were becoming more and more remote.  

After another failure the Abwehr decided in Oct 1941 to switch the destination of the planned operation from the NWF to Soviet Turkistan. The TIGER Unit under captain Walter Harbich being at the time about 70 men strong, was to be complimented by Turkomen prisoners of war.  

In between emerged the Turanian question for liberation, a situation of discomfiture for the Soviet's. It was a linked issue with Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism. Around 80,000


53. Ibid., India Office Records, R/12/1/22, Statement of Ghulam Qadir, Nizam Bazar, Bannu, dt. 6/5/1943; Statement of Ghulam Qadir resident of Karachi, aeroplane mechanic dated 22 July 1944, Sir Francis Whylie expressed his emphatic disbelief in the existence of "two Germans at Katawaz, as alleged by the Peshawar Intelligence Summaries to D. Pilditch DIB, Delhi, dated 11 Oct. 1942, 10/2 and 10th March 1943, in Foreign Office 371/34920, E 2649/86/97, IORL/P&S/12 1928.

Turkic refugees lived in Afghanistan and there were various elements supporting their cause alongside of the Axis elements. One Syed Mubashir Tirazi (an official in Royal Secretariat in Kabul) in 1942 had risen to champion the cause of Pan-Turanism. Continuing his plan he had written to several supporters of the Bukhara-Mohajir Association' in Delhi apparently asking them for assistance in liberating Russian-Turkistan from the Soviet rule. In Nov. 1942 he had instructed the Association to develop branches in various Indian cities, and contacted the President and the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulmai-e-Hind, the Muslim Section which at the time still co-operated with the Indian National Congress Party. The Government of India had immediately sensed subversion when they had intercepted Tirazi's correspondence and claimed confirmation of German backing of the whole scheme.\(^{55}\)

The Tirazi affair whose importance was certainly inflated by India's domestic insecurity, offered a pretext for second Anglo-Soviet intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. That had resulted in Tirazi's arrest in April 1943 and further allied pressure, particularly by the Soviet Ambassador who had presented a list of 51 suspects.\(^{56}\) Thus it was also partly

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55. See Auslandsorganisation (Foreign Organisation)/Abwehr II/SOS 2396/41 g of 4 Nov. 1941; Instruction to send Abwehr agents -Dohl. and Witzel from Kabul to the NWF. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 333.

thanks to the Anglo Soviet co-operation in intelligence matters, however paradoxical it might sound in a different context that the British Raj had been fortified and approaches to the Sub-Continent safeguarded against the intrigues of a hostile power.

The chief contact between the Axis legation and India had remained, however, Bhagat Ram alias Rahmat Khan, a young communist sympathizer from the NWF Province, escorted Subhash Chandra Bose (the Indian revolutionary leader) from Peshawar to Kabul. He was a trusted name among the conspirators and particularly the Italians and the German legations reposed a lot of faith in him. With Uttam Chand, Harvinder Singh Sondhi (a Punjabi Communist, who was trained in Moscow), Santimoy Ganguli (a Bengali terrorist) he was to co-ordinate all such activities. Uttam Chand was an Indian Political refugee in Kabul, who had been expelled in May 1942 by the Afghan authorities acting under British pressure. He was then duly arrested and interrogated by the Peshawar Police and remained imprisoned, for the rest of the War period. Rahmat Khan continued to be the source of information used for subversive activities. He had supplied the Axis legation with

57. See, Note by Wilhelm Keppler, Sec. of State "for special duties" in German Foreign Office of 15th Oct. 1942, on the possibility of regular contacts between Tirazi (codenamed Hansa') and the Grand Mufti of India.' Also collated files an "Axis Intrigues" in Afghanistan in IOR:L/P&S/12 1778, 1799 & 1933, MI.1 file "Axis conspiracy
the information of military importance concerning recruitments, troops movement and fortification being built in the passes which guarded the approaches to India from Afghanistan.  

With the Russian winter approaching which had halted the German advances before Moscow and the new and more imminent threat coming from the East where the Japanese finally had decided to launch their own concerted attack against the Allies, the attention of the major powers had turned away from Afghanistan. While still fearing the Soviets as their main enemy, the Afghans had showed no particular admiration for the Japanese. The criticism of the British for their lack of farsight in sufficiently protecting their Far-Eastern possession, was mingled with a strong sense of relief that the chances of a British invasion of Afghanistan, so much alive in the Autumn had now become more remote. For the internal situation, even on the NWF as the active zone prone to happenings had remained surprisingly quite. If there were any warnings about Axis intrigues and agents ready to start trouble on the frontier

(continued from previous page) in Afghanistan' IOR is L & S/12/1798, 1799 & 1933, MI 2, File "Axis Conspiracies in Afghanistan (in War Office in 208/30) especially Govt. of India No. 3682 to India Office, 10th May 1943, Wylie to Caroe, No. 42 of 29 May 1943 (IOR L/P/S/12/1789). As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 334.

58. See files containing Interview between the Soviet Ambassador and the Prime Minister Hashim 8 June 1943, War Office 208/30. As cited in Hauner, op.cit., p. 335.
and in India itself, nothing had stopped so far.

For the notorious Faquir of Ipi, he remained (during those dramatic months) in seclusion on the British side of the Durand Line at Gorwekht, despite alleged German intention to induce him into action. In one of his letters to mullahs in Southern Waziristan which came to the knowledge of Indian intelligence he stated while continuing to vilify the British, that no help should be given to the Germans they were apposed to Islam. Thus by close of 1941 the Afghan saw the future of their neutrality in somewhat brighter colour. They hoped that with the skillful diplomacy they might endure the war with their neutrality unscathed.


60. See Pilger the German Minister to Kabul, No. 352, 372, & 375 of 20/9 and 1/10/1941, GFO 617/250035-6, 250039-42. As cited in Hauner, op. cit., p. 335.
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan emerged successful, in warding off the threats of European Imperialism during the 19th Century and the first quarter of the 20th century. Its unique tribal apparatus of fighting its location and topography along with the love for freedom enabled it to save itself. During the first half of the 20th century through diplomacy and policy of "neutrality" in between the competing great powers, Afghanistan managed to keep them at bay.

Unlike the numerous Afro-Asian countries, who could not withstand the colonial advances; Afghanistan managed to survive the severest of the onslaught from the two great powers Great Britain and Russia during the 19th century; their rivalry had seen the drama on the Central Asian stage the so called Great Game. The Russian desired to get access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the British for safeguarding their prized colonial possession the British India, impelled them to have control over Afghanistan. No denying the fact that other important reason for her success in staving off the foreign dominion were the strategic location, the difficult terrain skillful tribal militia and the fighting spirit of the major tribes (Pushtuns, Uzbecks) of Afghanistan. The British could not get foothold on Afghan territory through two full scale Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1842
and 1888. The skillful diplomacy of the Afghan Amirs during the 19th century, also helped them to not to fall prey to one of the two fighting powers. Though the British had managed to have some say in the Afghan foreign affairs during the closing quarters of the 19th century.

Afghanistan had managed to reduce their influence through the "Policy of isolationism" and by taking full control of the Afghan foreign policy during the period roughly from 1880-1919. The Afghan Amirs had managed to have full control over their affairs, away from outside interference. For the above odd forty years Afghanistan had resisted British advances in the country which was not only in terms of military but also through economic concession, (subsidies etc.) extension of railroads and telegraph lines deep up to the Afghan territories and through the bribing of the tribal chiefs. The subsidy factor was one of the most important ploy for the British as the cash starved Afghan royalty was always in need of the hard currency. The British had used cash in buying off certain tribal chiefs and proteges in order to penetrate into the ranks and files of the Afghan elite.

In maintaining Afghan political independence Afghanistan had to pay dearly as the country had to make a number of compromises in regard to its foreign relations with the British and later on through the acceptance of much hated Durand line as the boundary between Afghanistan and the British India during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.
Beyond that through isolationalism (a policy which Afghanistan often pursued) was a successful weapon in warding off any outside vested interests, the same was very i.e. detrimental to the socio-economic development of the country (of which the economy was never looking up).

The Afghan state found herself culturally politically as well as economically isolated. Her isolation was also due to Afghanistan being the landlocked country.

Not only the external aggression but also internal forces of dissension and disturbances due to its regressive tribal social set-up, Afghans rarely saw peace. The Afghan rulers found it equally tough to rule the country which was a heterogenous ethnic tribal state, where a majority of the populace show loyalty to their chiefs (Sirdars) and where religious bigotry not rationalism played important role in shaping the destiny of the nation.

Whenever, any modern and forward progressive looking rulers tried to work for developments. He had to face stiff resistance and severe opposition. In glaring case of Amir Amanullah the same forces had tried to block all his modernisation plan and ultimately that cost his throne. Though his continued modernisation programme is rightly termed as "defensive modernisation" by Cyril Black in his work. "Dynamics of Modernization" (pp 121 ff). On the other hand it is true that the same modernization was a necessity for political unification of the country and for
consolidation of power at the centre apart from a degree of military and economic self sufficiency. With the emergence of various new elements, developments taking place after the World War I the Anglo Afghan relations passed on from conventional pro-British Afghan policy to the aggressive anti-imperialism and particularly anti-British. Amir Amanullah for the first time championed the cause of Afghanistan's total independence both internally as well as externally and called for removing any sign of British domination. The resultant acrimony between the two neighbours i.e Afghanistan and the British India, led to the outbreak of so called War of Independence in 1919. Though the war a military stalemate, the Afghan diplomatic circle claimed that to be a big diplomatic win. That was humiliation for the mighty British empire and thus a turning point in the Anglo-Afghan diplomatic relations. Though that was hardly beneficial for the poor nation of Afghans to continue without the help and the assistance of the old neighbour. As the relation with the British empire strained the problems for Amir Amanullah had compounded. Then he had to fight with the external as well as internal forces of dissension which were obviously fomented through outside support as various documents suggest. The turmoil and regression continued throughout his short nine years reign and ultimately with the outside help and support the regressive forces prevailed over the reforming zeal and thus his final ouster.

Bacchae-Saqqao's take over symbolises the very nature
of disintegrative state where the kind of tribal pattern is the natural breeding ground for such dissension. Though against majority Pushtun domination no leadership from other tribes could have prevailed but the attempt to modernise the medieval oriented state had received severe jolt and the whole edifice established by Amir Amanullah had fallen flat due to the tribal onslaught and other orthodox elements oppose to his radical views. Though Baccha's reign was of around six months but he had rolled back Afghanistan to about a century.

Afghanistan after Amanullah was in grip of anarchy due to Bachha's not being a Pushtun and his unpopularity. In the ensuing civil war he miserably failed and the mantle passed on to the powerful Musahiban famly which was laid by Nadir Shah. The British were also looking for a suitable leadership in Afghanistan and more a pro-British one. Since Nadir Shah feared a return of Ex-Amir Amanullah and more uprising, he found more reason in thinking a pro-British policy for Afghanistan. That was the need of the hour too, as Afghanistan was severly facing financial chances and arms and ammunition were urgently needed. Unfortunately he had also fallen to the designs of recalcitrant elements.

The period of Zahir Shah's reign had heralded a period of lasting internal peace in Afghanistan and a more pronounced foreign policy towards the British, based upon mutual trust and goodwill. Though Afghanistan declared its
total neutrality in that regard. Due to the complex international scenario as the Nazi Germany had a showdown with the Allies, Afghanistan was found in the web of international conspiracies and intrigues. All these powers involved in the World War II had desired to launch their propaganda and war efforts from Afghanistan. The design was due to the strategic location of Afghanistan and its suitability for any of the warring party to launch military onslaught or war propaganda. Zahir Shah was under tremendous pressure as all the powers involved had started inducement process. But for his astute diplomatic move he saw the better of Afghanistan in the neutrality stand. By this way Afghanistan was saved from turning into the battleground of Central Asia and thus it emerged unscathed from the destructive World War II under the able leadership of King Zahir Shah.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX - I

AFGHAN RULERS (1919-1947)

Amir Amanullah (1919-1929)
King Nadir Shah 1929-1933
King Zahir Shah 1933-1947 onwards

*** Sardar Nasrullah Khan was king for about five days in Feb. 1919 and Sardar Inayatullah Khan was king for three days in Jan 1929.

VICEROYS (BRITISH INDIA 1916-1947)

Lord Chelmsford 1916-1921
Lord Reading 1921-1926
Lord Irwin 1926-1931
Lord Wellingdon 1931-1936
Lord Linlithgow 1936-1943
Lord Wavell 1943-1947
# APPENDIX - II

**NADIR SHAH CABINET**  
*(Islah No. 6 as on Nov. 14, 1929)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premier &amp; Minister of Interior</td>
<td>Sardard Mohd. Hashim Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Minister</td>
<td>Sardar Shah Mohamud Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Faiz Muhamad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Hazrat Sher Agha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>Muhamad Ayyub Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>Ali Muhammad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Commerce</td>
<td>Haji Muhammad Akbar Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Court</td>
<td>Ahmad Shah Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Mudir Director of Medical Department</td>
<td>Muhammad Akbar Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali (Governor of Kabul)</td>
<td>Muhammad Yaqub Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Undersecretaries:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To the Premier</td>
<td>General Muhammad Gul Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the War Minister</td>
<td>General Muhammad Hashim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Foreign office</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Minister of Interior</td>
<td>Adam Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Mir Ata Muhammad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Minister of Finance</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Hussain Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Minister of Commerce</td>
<td>Muhammad Husain Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the Minister of Court</td>
<td>Ghulam Muhayyuddin Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX - III

**Heads of the N.W. Frontier Province (1901-1947)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Commissioners</td>
<td>Sir Harold Deane</td>
<td>1901-1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir George Roos-Keppel</td>
<td>1908-1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Namllor Grant</td>
<td>1919-1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Lord Maffey (Lord Rugby)</td>
<td>1921-1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Norman Bolton</td>
<td>1923-1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Stuart Pears</td>
<td>1930-1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Ralph Griffith</td>
<td>1931-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Sir Ralph Griffith</td>
<td>1932-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir George Cunningham</td>
<td>1937-1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Olaf Caroe</td>
<td>1946-1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX - IV (A)

Foreign Legations and Embassies in Afghanistan (1919-1947)

British:

Sir Francis Humphsrys Jan 27, 1922- Feb., 1929

Sir Richard Maconachie March 2, 1930

Lt.Col. W.K. Fraser-Tytler 1935

Sir Francis Wylie 1941

Sir Giles Fredrick Squire 1943

Soviet Union:

K.Bravin Sep., 1919

Z. Suritz 1919

F. Raskolinkov 1921

Leonide Stark 1924

Boris E.M.Skvisky 1936

Constantine Mikhailov Alexandrovich 1938

Ivan Bakulin 1944

Sinlovski Ivan Vasilovich 1947
German:
Fritz Grobba Dec., 1923
August Fogel 1926
Baron Von Plessen Feb. 27-Aug 4, 1929
Herbert Schworbel May 2, 1931
Kurte Ziemke 1933
Hans Pilger 1936-1945

Turkey:
Abdur Rahman Beg Peshawari 1921
Fakhir Pasha 1922
Nabil Bey 1926
Yusuf Hikmet Bey 1928, 1930
Mamduh Shevket 1933
Kemal Ko Pruln 1942
Ahmad Cevad Ustun 1945

U.S.:
Charles W. Thayer 1942
Cornelius Van Engert 1942
Ely E. Patmer 1945-1948
APPENDIX - IV (B)

AFGHANISTAN LEGATIONS AND EMBASSIES ABROAD

LONDON:
Marshal Shah Wali Khan Ghazi 1930
Ahmad Ali Sulaiman 1931
Ali Muhammad Khan 1933
Ahmad Ali Sulaiman 1938
Sardar Mohd. Naim Khan 1945-1948

PARIS:
Ahmad Ali Khan Sulaiman 1929
Marshall Shah Wali Khan Ghazi 1931
Sardar Moh. Daud Khan 1948-1949

BERLIN:
Abdul Haq Dawi 1929
Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi 1931
Sardar Muhamd Aziz Khan 1933-1945

ROME:
Abdul Husain Aziz 1930
Muhammad Naim Khan 1932
Muhammad Akbar Khan 1935
Abdul Samad Khan 1936
Muhammad Akram Nur 1946-47

MOSCOW:
Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan 1929
Abdul Husain Aziz 1933
Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy 1937
Mohd. Nauroz Khan 1946

ANKARA:
Ghulam Nabi Charkhi 1929
Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy 1930
Faiz Muhammad Zakaria 1938
Muhammad Akbar Nur 1948
APPENDIX - V
THE DURRANI RULERS OF AFGHANISTAN

SADDOZAIS
Ahmad Shah
(1747-1773)
Timur Shah
(1773-1793)
26 sons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st wife</th>
<th>2nd wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shah Zaman *</td>
<td>Shah Shuja +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793-1800</td>
<td>1803-1809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839-1842</td>
<td>1800-1803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MUHAMMAD ZAIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sultan Muhammad Khan</th>
<th>Dost Muhammad Khan</th>
<th>Sher Ali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 sons</td>
<td>Afzal  Azim</td>
<td>1863-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1869-78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yaqub Khan ~ Ayub Khan
1878-1879

Abdur Rahman
1881-1901
Habibullah
1901-1919
Amanullah
1919-1929

Nadir Shah + Mohd. Aziz
1929-1933
Zahir Shah o Daud Khan
1933-1973 1973-1978

+ Assassinated
* Blinded
o Exiled
~ Abdicated

* Those who ruled are under lined; only the principle characters are identified.
APPENDIX - VI
AFGHANISTAN
Rivers and Mountains

Mountains:


Rivers:

APPENDIX - VII

SPOKEN LANGUAGES OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Iranian Languages :
   (i) Persian  (ii) Pushtu  (iii) Baluchi

2. Pamir Languages :
   (i) Shughri Roshni  (ii) Wakhi  (iii) Murzi-Yidgha
      (iv) Ishkashmi

3. Other :
   (i) Ormuri  (ii) Parachi

4. Dadric - Kafir Languages :
   (i) Kati  (ii) Waigeli
      (iii) Ashkun  (iv) Prasun  (v) Gwar-Bati  (vi) Tirahi

5. Turkic Language :
   (i) Uzbeck  (ii) Turkomen  (iii) Kirghiz

6. Others :
   (i) Mangolian  (ii) Kurdish  (iii) Arabic  (iv) Lahnda
APPENDIX - VIII

SHORT SKETCHES OF PERSONALITIES INVOLVED IN ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS (1919-1947)


Cunnigham, Sir George, FCIE, CSI, OBE (1888-1964) Governor of North-West Frontier Province (1937-1946), DIARIES.

Gurzon of Kedleston, Lord George, KG, GCSI, GCIE (1859-1925) Undersecretary of India (1891-92), Viceroy of India (1898-1905).


Hamilton, Lord G.F. (1845-1927) Secretary of State for India (1895-1903).

Emerson, Herbert, OBE (b. 1907) joinded ICS 1930; IPS 1935. in NWFP Assistant Commissioner Nowshera,
1937; Assistant Political Agent at Southern Wazirstan 1937, Assistant Commissioner Manshera 1940, Secretary to the Governor of North West Frontier Province 1941.


**Roos Keppel, Sir George, GCIE, KCSI, (1866-1921)** In North West Frontier Province; Indian Army, Kurram Militia (1893-1897); Political Agent Khyber 1899, Comandant Khyber Rifles 1903; Chief Commissioner North West Frontier Province (1908-1919).

**Barkatullah (d. 1928)** Indian Revolutionary. Founding member of Pan-Aryan Society, Prof. of Urdu in Tokyo edited *Islamic Fraternity*, formed Provisional Government of India at Kabul.

**Pratap, Raja Mahendra** (1886-1982). Indian Revolutionary and an active member of Provisional Government of India formed at Kabul.


**Wylie, Sir Francis** - British Minister in Kabul, active during
World War II, acted for Anglo-Soviet patch up and was instrumental in causing expulsion of Axis nationals from Afghanistan.

**Uttam Chand** - Indian Revolutionary active in North West Frontier Province acted as spy.

**Shami Pir Al Geilani** - Syrian adventurer in Afghanistan, had acquired immense popularity due to his saintliness and was instrumental in uprisings in North West Frontier Province. Anti imperial and anti British later turned against Germans too.

**Ribbentrop, Von Dr.** - German Foreign Minister during World War II.

**Rahmat Khan**, (real name Bhagat Ram) - Instrumental in subversive activities in North West Frontier Province and used to provide shelter to other revolutionary, had escorted Subhash Chandra Bose to Afghanistan.

**Quoarani, Pietro;** Italian Minister in Kabul, had proposed close German Italian cooperation as War effort, wanted to pursue the reinstatement of Ex-Amir Amanullah.

**Pilger, Dr. Hans** - German Minister in Kabul.

**NiederMayer, Dr. Oskar Von.** (A Bavarian German Officer), A prominent member to the **Turko - German Mission** to Kabul during World War I in 1915 for
inducing Afghanistan to side with the Central Powers in the War. Attempted to mobilize the Afghan tribesmen, in order to tie up British and Russian forces in that area.

**Nadir Shah** (1929-1933) King of Afghanistan, had taken over after a Civil War in Afghanistan which had ousted Amir Amanullah and had provided chance to a bandit named Bacche Saqqao to occupy Kabul. After the Civil War Nadir had replaced Bacche Saqqao. Ruled for a short period of 4 years.

**Lawrance T.E. of Arabia** (the famous British Agent and spy) Instrumental in causing immense damages to the Central Powers in Middle East and the allegedly brought the fall of King Amanullah.

**IPI, Faquir of (Mirza Ali)** - Self Styled tribal leader from Waziristan acquired reputation of saintliness, emerged powerful religious leader and Champion of Islam against the British Imperialism. Operated actively against the British interest in the North West Frontier Province from 1936.

**Hashim Khan, Mohammad** - Afghan Prime Minister (1929-1946) brother of King Nadir Shah from Yahya Khel tribe.

**Habibullah, Amir of Afghanistan** (1901-1919). Succeeded father Amir Abdur Rahman, assassinated while on hunting trip, with Pro-British leanings.
Grobba, Dr. Fritz, German Charge d' Affair in Kabul from Dec. 1923, instrumental in increasing German pressure in Afghanistan and setting up large number of German Colonies.

Ghulam, Siddiq Khan, Afghan Diplomat and Foreign Minister in Berlin under Amir Amanullah Khan, executed on the charge of murdering King Nadir Shah's eldest brother.

Anzillotti, Enrico, the Italian spy who had been busy in subversive activities in Afghanistan against the British interests and had contact with Faquir of Ipi in the North West Frontier.

Amanullah, Amir of Afghanistan (1919-1929), succeeded his father Amir Habibullah, Anti-Imperial and Anti-British leanings, Pro Pan-Islamic, champion of modernization in Afghanistan, succumbed to the tribal revolt and fled the country in 1929.
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  1919.
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access to these sources.
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