THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH REFERENCE TO THAI–AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1975

ABSTRACT

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN Political Science

BY
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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ABSTRACT

Since 1950s the United States had invariably declaring that it was an Asian/Pacific power, whose destiny was intertwined with that of various countries stretching from Japan to Australia. Indeed, at various periods, the United States had embroiled itself in a most profound way with developments of the entire region, particularly in the sphere of security.

After the end of the Second World War, Southeast Asia had been strategically and economically important region for the United States and the United States policy was marked by its determination to safeguard and promote political, economic and strategic interests in the region. The containment of communism had been emerged as a major policy of the every American administrations and also to contain the widespread influence of former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which later on contributed to the instability and conflicts in the region, particularly in Vietnam.

The United States containment policy to preserve the
non-communist states from being controlled by the communists collapsed in 1975. It caused a major shift in foreign policy of Southeast Asian nations in general and Thailand in particular. The United States, therefore, reduced the assistance and military presence and urged each nation to rely largely on its own resources to preserve its national independence and security.

The United States decided to support the South Vietnamese government and also helped to block the elections, which were to be held in 1956, believing that such elections would be rigged in the North to achieve the communist success under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Again the United States decision was based on the nature of World Communism and on a desire to contain the expansionist tendencies of China in Southeast Asia. In 1957, North Vietnamese were furious over their failure to unite North and South Vietnam.

President John F. Kennedy in his short term of pre-evidency greatly broadened the commitment of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in South Vietnam. His policy towards the crisis in Laos affected his attitude towards commitments
in both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as his relationship with Cambodia. It became much more clear under John F. Kennedy than Eisenhower that American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia - the two Vietnams, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand - was pronounced and heading towards a major crisis.

President John F. Kennedy’s policy in Laos led to deeper United States involvement in Thailand. Actually, Thailand had long been greatly concerned over developments in its Mekhong neighbours. The steps towards a neutralization of Laos against a background of the weakness of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) caused Thailand to seek stronger assurance from the United States.

John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson believed that the world would be less dangerous if communism did not succeed in Indo-China. The basic American objective under President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, therefore, remained constant in South Vietnam denying communism to control the area. Although South Vietnam remained in existence due to American policy after the Geneva settlement of 1954, the United States often found
itself at the mercy of weak and inefficient Saigon regimes.

Both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations constantly pre-occupied with the Domino theory or a variation of it. The theory persisted despite the emergence of the rift between Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and despite the subsequent failure of the communist coup in the Southeast Asian country like Indonesia. Indeed, when Vietnam was viewed from United States in term of global strategic considerations, there was a certain aspect in outlook, a carry-over from an earlier period. After China fell to Mao Tse Tung and the United States policy towards communism became hardened and the importance of Indo-China in the United States security perception viewed seriously by the United States authorities to combat any eventualities of communists, particularly in Southeast Asian region.

During 1964 United States policy towards Southeast Asia shifted to new phase. In summer, the North Vietnamese attacked American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, then a congressional resolution permitted the President to response strongly to the incident. Moreover, when the North
Vietnamese government imposed pressure on South Vietnamese government, President Johnson approved American bombing in the North in an attempt to force the Vietnamese to the bargaining table. After 1965 the war became increasingly Americanized, such action certainly prevented North Vietnam's unification of the country. And later on, led to a crucial bloody, prolonged and indecisive conflict.

When President Nixon came to power, he continued to bring the parties of the Indo-China war to the Paris talks and when it did not materialized, he then, offered a new plan that was the process of Vietnamization of war. Still hoping for a negotiate settlement but without other significant bargaining power, the President then suggested he would use the Vietnamization process and would simply proceed on his own schedule. Otherwise he would speed up the process of American withdrawal if North Vietnamese would negotiate.

To fight a war with no hope of decisive victory reinforced the frustration of the American soldiers and citizen alike. Then Americans were instructed to fight a holding action and to minimize casualties. Beginning in early 1970s no major offensive operations were to be initiated. While
conserving American lives, the effect of this policy was perceived as abandoning any hope of victory.

The Paris Agreements of 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam ended American participation in the war. It committed the United States to stop all military involvement in South Vietnam, and to withdraw all its remaining troops, technicians and advisors.

Early 1970s, only Thailand had remained in geopolitical terms, potentially to focal point of United States involvement on continental Asia. The United States authorities, therefore, attempted to redefine the role of America forward line of defence in the region. The security planners thought that there could be an arbitrary limit to set off the rimland of continental Asia which would represent the extent of new American defence and security.

In 1974, Thailand asked the United States to stop flying over the Indian Ocean from Thai bases and argued that such flights contravened Thailand's support for the United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone and ASEAN agreement on the neutrality of the region. The Thai authorities also sought co-operation from neighbouring
countries as well as China regardless of differences in political, ideology, economic and social system.

The withdrawal of United States from Thailand in 1975 provided a useful bargaining tool for diplomatic negotiations with its neighbours. As Hanoi had long maintained that it would not open negotiations with Thailand as long as American troops were present. Hence, Thai insistence on United States withdrawal would be a useful gesture of good will.

Thai-American relations, however, have their own features, sometime if there were conflicts they mostly derived from problems of co-operation. During the Second Indo-China war the United States asserted itself too strongly, antagonizing its allies especially Thailand. Indo-China war ended with an American withdrawal. Allied which were parties to the war readjust themselves accordingly. By comparison, the Thai-American adaptation process had been remarkably satisfied.

As the competitive demands of the global economy propel the states of mainland Southeast Asia towards greater economic interconnection after the end of Cold War,
therefore, pressures upon Thailand to form a new and constructive relationship with government of neighbouring countries have multiplied and intensified. Thailand’s border area could no longer serve merely as buffer zones, instead, in the new politic and economic context of regional relations, they serve as gateways for trade and investment. Peaceful and open border were one major precondition for sustained economic development.

Economic and commercial relations since then, have replaced security ties as the Kingdom’s major foreign policy concern: Thailand economy is now integrated into the world capitalist system. The new tone of Thai-United States, therefore, reflected Thailand growing importance in the world economy. Major aspects of the relations between the two countries continue to include financial aid, co-operation to wage war on narcotics and support for Peace Corps.
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ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)
2000
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that ABDULROMAN KAYEM has pursued research for Ph.D. degree on the topic entitled: The United States Diplomacy In South East Asia With Reference To Thai-American Relations Since 1975 under my supervision and guidance.

His research work is original and in my opinion, it is suitable for the submission for the award of Ph.D. degree of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

(B. RAHAMATHULLA)
Supervisor
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ABDULROMAN KAYEM
PREFACE

Since 1950s the United States had invariably declaring that it was an Asian /Pacific power, whose destiny was intertwine with that of various countries stretching from Japan to Australia. Indeed, at various periods, the United States had embroiled itself in a most profound way with developments of the entire region, particularly in the sphere of security.

After the end of Second World War, Southeast Asia had been strategically and economically important region for the United States and the United States policy was marked by its determination to safeguard and promote political, economic and strategic interests in the region. The containment of communism had been emerged as a major policy of the every American administrations and also to contain the widespread influence of former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which later on contributed
to the instability and conflicts in the region, particularly in Vietnam.

The United States containment policy to preserve the non-communist states from being controlled by the communists collapsed in 1975. It caused a major shift in foreign policy of Southeast Asian nations in general and Thailand in particular. The United States, therefore, reduced the assistance and military presence and urged each nation to rely largely on its own resources to preserve its national independence and security.

An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the role of United States diplomacy towards Southeast Asia, particularly during Indo-China war and the subsequent developments in Thailand - United States relations since 1975 relating to political, economic, social and cultural aspects as the growing ties between the two countries had a profound impact on the politics of Southeast Asian region. The entire region including Thailand witnessed a new era of democracy, freedom and right of self-determination and
assertion to maintain the individual identity of a nation which was free from, external threat or domination.

The thesis consists of five chapters, conclusion, two appendices and the select bibliography. Chapter I, deals with the historical background of the United States interests and its involvement in Southeast Asian region. While the retrospective of Thailand - United States relations since the very beginning has been discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III explains the reasons and factors which led to the Indo-China war of 1970s. The Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization of war have been highlighted in Chapter IV. Chapter V is mainly concerned with Thailand - United States relations since 1975 focusing, particularly the economic and commercial aspects, which indicate the changing approaches in their bilateral dealings. The conclusion draws the assessment of growing bounds of friendship between the United States and Southeast Asian region in general and in particular between the United States and Thailand.
"With a prosperous and stabilized economy, Thailand would be ready to co-operate with U.S. in addressing issues of mutual concerns, ranging from the promotion of democracy, and human rights to narcotics suppression."

Dr. Surin Pitsuwan
(Thailand Foreign Minister)
January 16, 1998
CHAPTER-I

Introduction :  A Historical Background of United States Policy towards Southeast Asia

United States and Southeast Asia

The United States entered the Southeast Asia after 1898, when it defeated Spain and seized the Philippines\(^1\). After some three decades of self doubt, the United States enacted legislation in 1934 that set out a ten year timetable for the eventual independence of the colony. The United States interests in Southeast Asia in the initial stages, however, were minimal like trade and commerce.\(^2\)

Since 1940 Southeast Asia has experienced major war, the defeat of colonial powers by an Asian powers, a

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1. The term Southeast Asia was first introduced during the Second World War when Allies established the Southeast Asia command in 1943, under Lord Louis Mountbatten, against the aggression of Japanese military in the region which headquartered at Ceylon (Srilanka). Before that Southeast Asia was included in the term Far East.


disillusioning occupation by Japan, a great upsurge of nationalism, and the rapid growth of communism. Since the end of the Second World War, a wave of independence had swept Southeast Asia leaving their people freed of colonial rule, a host of new sovereign states, and a vast ideological and power vacuum. Economic and political problems had increased in complexity. Every states in Southeast Asia, except Thailand, had experienced major communist insurrection or invasion. A new Asian power Communist China had emerged as an immediate neighbour and, since the war, the issue of global conflict between communist and non-communist state focused sharply in the area.³

By this time, the United States was emerged as an unchallenged power. The globalization of the United States power was justified as a necessary sequel to the alleged Soviet aggressiveness.⁴ Therefore, the United States


intervention in other countries for preventing people from overthrowing a satellite government became a regular feature of post Second World War policy.\(^5\)

If the communists had not taken over China by 1949 and invaded South Korea and Tibet in 1950, United States interests in Southeast Asia would have remained at a low key, even though the communist insurrections had began in Southeast Asia in 1947. In early 1950, shortly after fall of China to the communist, there began a re-examination of United States Asian policy, which led to more intensive involvement in freed Asia.\(^6\)

However, the United States in Southeast Asia at early 1950 can be summarized in a few sentences. In the Philippines, things continued to go in a manner generally

\[\text{______________________________}\]

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. The kind of this involvement usually through the form of aid agreements, which were negotiated with every nation in Southeast Asia, bilateral treaties, including security, political arrangement and regional agreements, such as Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Frank N. Trager, n. 2, p. 13.
acceptable to the United States. In Burma, as U Nhu’s non-alignment became more perceptible. In Thailand, the United States began in this period to extend at first minimal assistance to the existing oligarchy, military led regimes. In Malaysia, the United States encouraged the British, whom she had assisted in Europe, to carry the burdens and costs involved in curbing the emergency. In Indonesia, despite the United States increasing annoyance at Sukarno’s excess and growing lack of amenability to United States wishes, the United States Authorities basically continued a standoff posture and refrained from any direct intervention. In Indo-China, the United States began after the initial hesitation of 1945-1948 of the France, who in any case appeared absolutely essential to its position in Europe, therefore, in the absence of the French, there would be no force save that of the United States itself that could have coped with the threat. 7

In the broad sense, America’s post-war Asia policy had been an extension of its European policy evolved during the late forties and early fifties. The latter was designed to contain Soviet expansion in Europe by showing up the defences of non-communists European nations and be reconstructing their economies, encouraged by the political stability and economic viability.8

President Harry S. Truman declared on March 12, 1947, that:

“One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples against aggressive movements that seek to impose on their totalitarian regimes.”9


United States interests in Southeast Asia

After the Second World War, Southeast Asia looms so large in American national interests that it fights for position with all other national interests, and secures military and economic commitments of a scope never previously participated. The main interests of the United States in Southeast Asia were: (I) containment of communism, (ii) its security concerns (iii) trade promotion.¹⁰

Of all reasons, for American concerns over the area that override consideration remained the threat of communist domination. American interests in the region, however, were further dominated with political, economic

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¹⁰ Perhaps these interests emerged from four principal events (i) The Seconds World War revealed the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to the United States both in military and economic terms. (ii) The independence achieved by some Asian countries resulted in the formation of new relationships between these states and the United States. (iii) Through the communist victory in China the relatively weak states of Southeast Asia became exposed to the possibility of communist aggression and domination and (iv) The key role assigned to Great Britain and Japan in Southeast Asia because of economic fact that access to the trade and resources of Southeast Asia was vital to the United States.

John Kenry King, n. 3, p.2.
commercial and strategic considerations. When consider it individually, it was hard to see which was vital to the conditions necessary for American security or strategy. But, when considered it as a whole area and when American interests were taken in combination as a multiplicity of extended from the Cold War to an increase global effort by the United States to prevent international communism, American interests in southeast Asia became extremely significant.\textsuperscript{11}

**Containment of Communism**

The Cold War strategists contended that Southeast Asia was the last barricade against communism in all Asia. If communism were to sweep through Southeast Asia, it would blanket the entire continent and tip the balance of world power to the communist bloc.\textsuperscript{12} The factors, which gave rise truth perception of communist threat to Southeast Asia in United States policy makers were:

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp.2-3.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.2.
(I) The highly aggressive and potentially extremely Soviet posture toward West Europe and the Balkan after 1946 led to the elaboration of Truman Doctrine in 1947.\textsuperscript{13} Containment in turn provided the conceptual parameters for the perception of spreading Moscow/Peking-directed communism in Southeast Asia.

(II) The Korean war further bolstered the American perception of a Sino-Soviet threat to the United States extended role in East Asia, and of aggressive communism on the move in Southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{13} Paul M. Kattenberg, n.6, p.21.

The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were the significant steps taken by the United States to respond what was described as the challenge of Communist expansionism. The President Truman said: “the free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.” he said confidently that Congress would face these great responsibilities squarely. The Truman Doctrine was based on a conception which subsequently the name domino theory was given.

(III) The United States unable to accommodate itself to communist-led nationalism in Southeast Asia even though the communism involves appears to have been largely autonomous in inspiration, needed the perception of a Sino-Soviet threat in order to mobilize itself for intervention in the region.¹⁴

As far as American policy of containment was concerned for the newly independent national states which sought to adopt their philosophies and institutions to the value their need, American applied the basic democratic


After 1949 the major forces shaped the direction of the foreign policy of the new states of Southeast Asia was the emerge of Communist China, the extension of Cold War from Europe to Asia and the United States sponsored effort to contain the widespread of communism by stepping the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Western power from the region.


In American eyes the France withdrawal from Indochina created a vacuum. So this vacuum must fill by American forces, and American was thinking that the whole of Southeast Asia might be over run by the communist.

values and representative government to the region. Although this interest has not been pursued with utmost vigour in Southeast Asia, traditionally it had provided a primary point of reference in the determination of American interests. The United States considered that a threat to democratic values anywhere in the world would ultimately became a threat to her anywhere.¹⁵

In considering the potential of communist aggression against Southeast Asia, two important factors that the United States kept in mind were:

(I) Individually, no Southeast Asian country had sufficient military power to withstand a determined communist attack launched either by Communist China or by Communist Vietnam and

(II) The non-communist countries of Southeast Asia, only two were participants in collective security arrangements for the area - the Philippines and

Thailand which known as Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).\textsuperscript{16}

The United States had attempted to establish the situation of strength throughout of pacts, alliances, and doctrine that enabled it to intervene anywhere. And also to give aid, militarily and economically, to any government which American believed such government would use it against the aggressive communists.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 175.

SEATO was an alliance of eight nations that signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty in Manila, the Philippines, on September 8, 1954. The member were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. Pakistan withdrew in 1972 and SEATO was dissolved in 1977. The treaty was initiated by the United States after communist forces defeated France in Indochina. The United States claimed that the alliance was needed to prevent the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the treaty, member states agreed to help defend one another as well as other designated nations against military aggression. This aggression included threats both from other nations and from forces within member nations. SEATO did not develop into an effective alliance, partly because many Asian states, including India, Indonesia, and Japan did not join. In addition SEATO members disagreed on the extent of the communist threat and on how to meet it.

\textsuperscript{17} The World Book Encyclopedia, (USA : World Book Inc, 1990), Vol. 18, p. 887.
However, the United States pursued a more flexible policy leaning on its powerful armed forces that had been deployed in the region and taking advantage of its partner weakness and soon gain a position of domination over the region. Due to American economic might and skillful propaganda the United States appeared attractive to some nationalist leaders in Asia. It was the United States that guided and coordinated Western policy in the region along neo-colonial lines. The United States used it economic and military aid to Asian countries as the main tool for securing its own interests. Aid was given to those regimes with the United States believed would be used against progressive forces. The United States doctrine of deterring communism formulated in 1947 for Europe, was applied in Asia and supplemented by the concept of rolling back communism; this called for using the most extreme means and method in


ideological and political confrontation.\(^{19}\) Thus, many Southeast Asians asserted that the United States was interested not in themselves but in their potential as a bulwark against communism.

**Security concerns**

Military analysts contended that Southeast Asia was vital to United States security even in term of military strategic alone.\(^{20}\) The United States considered Southeast Asia as an occupied position of global strategic importance roughly comparable to Panama and Suez.\(^{21}\) Only through the

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) John Kenry King, n. 3, p. 2.

\(^{21}\) In international relations Southeast Asia was considered to be a region of great strategic significance. Geographically, it was placed between two great Oceans of the world - the Indian Ocean and the Pacific ocean. Its position around South China sea and Malacca Straits had given it control over an important trade route of the world. Lying across the main sea and air routs, Southeast Asia occupied a significant position in the system of world communication. Secondly, this area was a major source of food stuff needed by other countries and, thirdly, it was in between two great competing political and ideological movements - communist totalitarianism and representative democracy.

narrow straits of Malacca may the barrier be penetrated conveniently. And if this region fall into the hands of hostile power, the peninsula and offshore islands of Southeast Asia in effect would cut the world in two. The same principle of American security applied in the Pacific during Second World War, the question of Japanese domination of continental East Asia and the island of the Western and Southeastern Pacific which was a vital pacific issue. Through such experiences as Pearl Harbour there was ample indication of the threat to American security of Pacific Ocean and domination of continental Asia by a single power after Peking - Moscow axis established control over a large part of Asia.\textsuperscript{22}

The power vacuum also, which left by the France defeat in Dien Bien Phu, plays a role of inducing factor for external powers competition for filling up the vacuum since

\textsuperscript{22} John Kenry King, n.3, p.8.
Southeast Asia strategically very important region connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean.²³

Actually, in early 1954, the Eisenhower Administration was seized with the apprehensive that France would withdraw from Indo-China war and opened a chance for communist to penetrate into Southeast Asia under the sponsorship of Peking and Hanoi. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sought to persuade the British government to join the United States in a military effort to bolster French position, but he failed.²⁴ He then, sought a fall back position, one that would prevent Hanoi from quickly expanding communist control over Indo-China and pressuring Thailand.²⁵

American policy of support to the French military action against the Viet Minh was based on the belief

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.
stemming from the domino concept that the fall of Indo-China to communism would lead to the spread of communism to other part of Southeast Asia. The national Security Council paper known as NSC 64, dated March 27, 1950, stated:

"It was important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indo-China is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a communist dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard."^{26}

In April, 1950 the National Security Council prepared a paper known as NSC 68 by which summarized Washington’s attitude towards threat posed by international communism. The paper recommended that the United States must resist, with force if necessary. Six days after the signing NSC 68, the Korean war broke out, and President Harry S. Truman ordered American combat troops into action to resist what

^{26} Jaya Krishna Baral, n.13, p.41.
the United States described as North Korean aggression against South Korea and in another move, Harry S. Truman increased economic and military aid to the French in Indo-China.  

It was clear that Southeast Asia was a critical elements in the balance of power in Asia because of its location with respect to China, India and Japan. For the United States, Southeast Asia had a quite special meaning as an area of forward defence of the Pacific. In addition, the United States shares to a significance degree the specific interests in Southeast Asia of its allies and others whose security

27. With the massive involvement of China in the Korean war towards the end of 1950 and with continued fighting by the Viet Minh against France in Indochina, the policy makers in Washington increasingly tended to believe that the operations in both Korea and Indochina were parts of the common effort made by the communists for furthering their expansion in the Far East and Southeast Asia. The danger emanating from China to Southeast Asia came to be increasingly stressed. NSC 124/2, June 1952 stated that the danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia was inherent the existence of a hostile aggressive Communist China. The document carried the implication that the less of any entity in Southeast Asia would be adverse to the security interests of both Western Europe and the United State.

Ibid., pp. 42-43.
would be threatened by the hegemony of single power in Asia.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, the United State took upon itself the role of self-styled policeman. Even it had been so before, but it assumed global dimension in the post Second World War. President Lyndon B. Johnson said in 1965 that:

"History and our achievements has thrust upon us the principal responsibility for the protection of freedom on earth."\textsuperscript{29}

There was one more factor which the United States worried about, that was the population of Southeast Asia. Because most of them were peasants who had very modest education and technical capabilities. All people in the region, highly educated and lesser educated alike, were capable of being trained and employed by insurgents or unfriendly foreigners for the purpose of converting their political rule and fermenting hostility against adjoining non-communist nations in the region. The United States


\textsuperscript{29} R.L. Walli, n.4, p.7.
accordingly had an interest in preventing sizable portions of the population in Southeast Asia from falling under unwanted totalitarian control.\textsuperscript{30}

**Trade Promotions**

As far as the United States was concerned Southeast Asia was important not only because of its strategical location but also because of the natural resources.\textsuperscript{31} Due to the world-wide energy crisis and scarcity of other natural resources, the position of Southeast Asia as source of raw materials had become much enhanced. Consequently, this economic factor attracted the foreign countries in the region.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Southeast Asia has rich, fertile, its remain agricultural products are rubber, tea, and spices. The region's forests produce most of the world's teak. The costal waters yield large quantities of fish. Parts of the area have rich petroleum deposits and mines that produce large accounts of tin and precious stones. Manufacturing largely underdeveloped except in large cities. 
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
After the Second World War, the United States was faced with the traumatic possibility of denial of its economic penetration into the markets, industries and raw materials in many parts of the world.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, American policy makers believed that the valuable raw material resources of Southeast Asia should not come under the control of elements hostile to United States and the West.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, American policy makers might have been interested in the markets of Southeast Asia for American products.\textsuperscript{35} Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, told a Congressional Committee:

"If you wish to control trade and income of the United States, which means the life of the people,


\textsuperscript{33} R.L. Walli, n. 4, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{34} A National Security Council (NSC) staff study of February 13, 1952 stressed the importance of the raw materials of Southeast Asia to Western powers. It said that: "Indonesia was a secondary source of Petroleum whose importance would be enhanced by the denial to Western powers of petroleum sources in Middle East."

Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 12, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 42.
you would probably fix it so that everything produced here would be consumed here, but that would completely change our constitution, our relations to property, human liberty, over very conception of law. And nobody contemplates that. Therefore, you find you must look to other markets and markets are abroad.”

It was rightly said that the United States elites, perhaps unconsciously but nonetheless effectively, sought a world climate propitious to access for United States trade, United States acquisition of essential raw materials and sought to use Robert W. Tucker’s term, a word congenial to America’s capitalist economic values as well as to its own democratic political ideals.

The Nationals Security Council paper (NSC-68) dated December 23, 1949 highlighted the strategic value of Asian raw materials. Asia was the source of important raw and semi processed materials, many of them of strategic value. Moreover, in the past, Asia has been a market for the processed goods of industrialized states, and had been for

37. Paul M. Kattenberg, n.7, p.36.
the Western colonial powers a rich source of revenue from investments and other invisible earnings.\(^3\)

The United States designed its foreign policy for protecting its business interests, seeking commercial and investment opportunities and raw materials abroad which would be done only by imposing its own concepts of economic order beyond its frontiers. President Harry S. Truman described the concept succinctly in March 1997 that: “the whole world should adopt the American system.”\(^3\)

38. Even in the case of Vietnam, the economic element had not been missing. The Vice-President of the Chase Manhattan declared in 1965 that:

“In the past foreign investor have been somewhat wary of the overall political prospect for the Southeast Asia region. I must say, though, that the United States action in Vietnam this year which have demonstrated that the United States will continue to give effective protection to the free nations of the region have considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors. Infact, I see some reason for hope that the same sort of economic growth may take place in the free economies of Asia that took place in Europe after the Truman Doctrine and after NATO provided a protective shield. The same thing also took place in Japan after United States intervention in Korea removed investors doubts.”

R.L. Walli, n.4, pp.9-10.
In the broad sense, the raw materials of Southeast Asia were very important for American politically and economically. The National Security Council (NSC-5405) dated January 16, 1954, contained the usual reference to the raw material resources of Southeast Asia and reiterated that the loss of Southeast Asia to the communist would have serious economic consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc.\(^{40}\)

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39. Aid and Military power also were used for facilitating foreign investments and trade by the United States and other metropolitan powers. As the then World Bank’s President, Eugene Black, said that:

“Our foreign aid programmes constitute a distinct benefit to American business. The three major benefits are:

(i) Foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for United States goods and services.

(ii) Foreign aid stimulated the development of new overseas market for United States companies and

(iii) Foreign aid orients national economies toward a free enterprise system in which United States firms can prosper.”

Jaya Krishna Baral, n.13, pp. 5-6.

40 Ibid, p.45.
CHAPTER-II

A Historical Retrospective of Thai - United States Relations

Official and non-official relations between American and Thailand rest on a long and cordial basis. The first treaty negotiated between the United States and Thailand was made in 1833 by Thai King, Phra Nang Klao (Rama III), and Edmund Roberts, a diplomatic envoy sent to Southeast Asia by President Andrew Jackson. For over a century American Protestant missionaries entered Thailand in a small numbers and initial reforms in education, medicine and technology. At the beginning of the 1920s King Chula Longkorn employed advisers from the Harvard Law school to assist Kingdom in abolishing extrateritoriality and other unequal treaty restrictions.

Between the two World Wars the United States government began to play an increasing role in the contacts between the two countries. With the beginning of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, the United States replaced Great
Britain as a major foreign influence in Thailand. The policy of containing communist aggression led the American government to undertake a rapidly expanding role in the relations between the two countries.¹

After the end of the Second World War, Thailand became the foremost American ally in the region. It was the United States that quickly accepted the Thai nullification of

1. The American interests in Thailand after the Second World War had been three folds:
   (i) **Geography**: Thailand comprises a strategic area in the center of mainland Southeast Asia. To American policy makers, Thailand appeared as an oasis of stability in a region of turmoil. The geographic importance had been increased in the struggle against external aggression which Thailand was a crucial base in the defense of the entire region.
   (ii) **People**: The Thai people comprise the largest population of any state on the mainland Southeast Asia. They can be trained for the advancement and defense of their own country, and they can be trained by outside hostile power for the overthrow their government as well.
   (iii) **Resources**: Thailand was the World's leading rice exporter. Other important products were rubber, tin, teak, meat and Kapok. A modest lightened medium industrials base was being developed and almost every year more manufactured good were produced locally, over one hundred American firms, subsidiaries, or affiliates operate in the Kingdom, including several large banks and oil companies.

the state of war and prevented punitive action against Thailand by Great Britain. Thereafter, the United States provided technical and economic as well as military assistance to Thailand. A statement by Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, issued on August 20, 1945 stated that: "the American government had always believed that the declaration of war of Thailand against the United States during the Second World War did not represent the will of Thai people." He recalled that the Thai minister in Washington had organized the Free Thai Movement (FTM),


The Second World War threatened the new political arrangement. Faced with Japanese invasion, the government of army leader Pibun Songkhram precipitously joined the Axis power effort. When Japan's ultimate defeat became assured, the previously decide parliament in 1944 removed Pibun and replaced him by a widely respected civilian, Khuang Aphaiwong. As the war suddenly ended, before any fighting had taken place within Thailand, the government passed into the hands of the Free Thai Movements (FTM) that had opposed Japan, the Thai underground led by Pridi, and a group of Thais who had been in Western Countries at the time of the Japanese invasion. The Pride supporter quickly dominated Thai.

which contributed substantially to the allies cause. This statement of policy concluded by asserting that the United States regarded Thailand not as an enemy, and that it looked to the resumption by Thailand of its former place in the community of nations as a free, sovereign, and independent country. This declaration clearly put the British and other Allied powers on notice that the United States would opposed any effort to deprive Thailand of its independent.

By this period Thailand was facing several problems. Its transportation systems were destroyed, economy

3. Ibid.

The United States recognized the Free Thai Movement (FTM), which emerged as an underground organization, working in league with the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This organization aimed at ousting the Japanese and overthrowing the dictatorial regime in Thailand. Members of the FTM were trained mostly in the United States. The FTM established contacts with United States forces and assisted them in fighting against Japan. Thus the United States and FTM co-operated with each other for common objective. This co-operation, ultimately, led to the foundations of a durable friendship between the two countries.

Ganganath Jha, Foreign Policy of Thailand. (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), p.34.

declined. It was only the United States adopted a most friendly attitude toward Thailand. In January 1946, it reestablished diplomatic relation with Thailand. And above all, the United States supported Thai leaders in the difficult task of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and facilitated Thailand's admission into the United Nations.  

It was American that helped rehabilitate Thailand's economy in the hopes of turning the country into Southeast Asian ally, that would counter balance Indo-China. Beginning in 1946 the United States paid a higher price for Thailand rubber. In 1946-1947 United States granted Thailand a large loan to enable Thailand to purchase railroad and reconstructed transportation system. American diplomacy made no secret of its desire to establish a firm order in Thailand and the circumstances favoured this line.  

5. Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.36.  
During that period also, Thailand was facing the potential danger from the local communist insurrection and from the Vietnamese minority, living in Northeast Thailand. Coupled with the emergence of Communist China in 1949, the United States alarmed and decided to do something that halted the advance of communism in the region. As a result, the United States Ambassador, Phillip C. Jessup visited Bangkok for three days conference. He conferred with Marshal Pibun Songkram, Thai Prime Minister, and sought his support in the battle against communism. Shortly after his returning to the United States, President Harry S. Truman

7. The Northeast was populated mostly by Moas and North Vietnamese. It was the poorest region in the country and had always been neglected by the center. There were nearly 40,000 North Vietnamese living in the Northeast whose loyalty had always been suspected. Many of them were alleged to continue to own allegiance to Hanoi. Most of the inhabitants were of Laotian extraction. Culturally there appears to exist a great deal of co-ordination between the Pathet Laos forces and the insurgents of North Thailand. The geography of the area greatly helps these insurrections. At some places, the Mekhong river is so narrow that people could easily skip one side to the other.

approved a grant of military aid to Thailand. Two months later the economic assistance also was extended to Thailand through the economic co-operation administration.  

On February 28, 1950, Marshal Pibun Songkram decided to recognize the government of Bao Dai in South Vietnam as an earnest of Thailand’s solidarity with the Western powers. He also supported the French-sponsored governments in Laos and Cambodia and ordered closure of Vietminh headquarters in Bangkok. In June 1950, when there was a conflict between North Korea and South Korea, Thailand supported the latter along with the Western powers, Thailand sent four thousand ground troops to fight as integral part of the United Nations forces in Korea when the United Nations decided upon a military intervention in order to end that conflagration.  

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9. Ibid.
was treated with great respect by the United States in the
tension of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{10}

It was the Korean war that turned point for both the
United States and Thailand, in so far as the military defence
of Southeast Asia was concerned. Until that time American
in the area was largely economic and cultural. After June
1950, the military implications of Communist China's
ambitions in Asia made the United States military and
economic assistants to Thailand of vital importance to both
countries.\textsuperscript{11}

On September 19, 1950, the United States signed an
Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement with
Thailand. Under this agreement, the United States
established a mission in Thailand called the United States
Operation Mission (USOM). To work in close cooperation
with the USOM, Thailand created a Department known as
Department of Technical and Economic Co-operation

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 38

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
stressed the importance of basic projects. The economic aid made available under this agreement consist of grants for the financing of technical assistance, training abroad and rural developments projects.¹²

On October 17, 1950, a Military Assistance Agreement was signed. Under this agreement the United States agreed to provide weapons and equipments to Thailand and to give military training to Thai officers. After signing, Edwin F. Stanton, the head of American team said that:

"This agreement follows the request by the Government of Thailand for American arms and equipments to strengthen Thailand’s forces with a view to enabling them to better defend Thailand and Thailand’s people from any aggression which may threaten the peace and tranquility of this country. The agreement contains no provisions for military, naval or air bases, The Governments of Thailand has not offered such bases, nor the

¹² Among the first projects sponsored by the USOM were schemed for the eradication of Malaria, for the installation of village wells, and for the dredging of the Chao Phraya River to provide a deep water channel to the port of Bangkok. Technical and economic assistance made available through the USOM totaled upto approximately $ 440.1 million for the period from September 1950 to June 1965.

Ibid.
Government of the United States ever requested such bases or any specific concession".  

Alliance with the United States - Communist China's strongest enemy - had been the keystone of Thai foreign policy since 1950 formalised in terms of several military, economic and cultural agreements and above all by the membership of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954, which initiated by the United States  

According to Thanat-Khoman, the former Thai Foreign Minister (1959-72), the Thai-American military agreement of 1950 was the landmark in Thai-United States Relations. It was through this treaty only, not through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) that the United States acquired a full grip over the military aspects of Thailand. In October 1950, Thailand was given a loan of $ 25,400,000 from the World Bank for the reconstruction of railroads, and development of the harbour in Bangkok. It was the first loan to any nation in Southeast Asia. At the end of 1951 the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) replaced the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA). The MSA launched a vast programme of military, economic and technical assistance. On July 4, 1951, the Independence Day of the United States, the Bank of America saluted the Kingdom of Thailand where independence had become the watchword of the nation. And both nations stood in the forefront of world efforts to promote and defend the democratic way of life.

Ibid., pp. 39-40.


After becoming member of SEATO, the United States provided more aid to Thailand economically and militarily. In 1959, a
The King of Thailand, Bhumibol Aduldej, expressed his happiness over United States assistance to Thailand in his address to the two Houses of United States Congress in Washington, D.C., on July 29 that:

“The United States was applying the old of conception of family obligations upon the largest scale in giving assistance to foreign countries. The nations of the world were being taught that they were but members of one big family that they had obligations to one another and that they were closely interdependent. It may take a long time to learn this lesson but when it will be truly learnt, the prospect of world peace will be right.”\(^{15}\)

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SEATO Graduate School of Engineering (known as the Asian Institute of Technology) was established in Bangkok in response to an increasing demand for highly trained engineers in the developing countries of Southeast Asia. In the same year, the SEATO also sponsored a project known as the Skilled Labour Project to help overcome the shortage of skilled workers. Another project was a military oriented project, known as the Military Technical Training School. The School provided training for technical supervisions, skilled workmen, and instructions of the Royal Thai Army, Navy and Air Force.

In 1960, a SEATO Medical Research Laboratory was established to undertake investigations into the principal diseases of Southeast Asia, especially malaria and haemorrhagic fever.

Ganganath Jha, n. 3, pp. 48-49.

Thailand Security and United States Policy

Between 1946 and 1953, when the French began to reassert control over Indo-China, about eighty thousand Vietnamese refugees owing allegiance to the Government of Ho Chi Minh fled across the Mekhong and reached Northeastern Thailand. The Bangkok administration thought that they were supporters of communism and that they were, therefore, a menace from the point of view of the security and integrity of Thailand. As they could not be repatriated, the military rulers of Thailand dealt with them in a ruthless manner.

On January 31, 1953, the People’s Republic of China established a Thai Autonomous People’s Government in Yunan districts, which Thai called Sibsong Panna, which aimed to smash the American imperialist activities in the region, and to unmasking the corrupt military rulers of Thailand and started a guerrilla war against the military regime in Thailand. In their establishment, the Chinese communist stated that:

“They would learn from the Han Chinese and the example of the Han Chinese cadres to guide the Thai people to help other national minority to implement area autonomy, make concerted efforts to smash the sabotage activities of the American imperialists and special agent of Chiang-Kai-Shek and struggle to strengthen national defence of the fatherland and construct a new Hsi-Shuang Panna area under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and the Central People’s Government.”

In the spring of 1953, the situation made Thai leaders more feared of communist invasion when the Viet Minh forces moved into Laos and set up a so-called Free Laotian

17. Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p. 41.

18. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
government and then moved into Cambodia in April 1954. At this critical juncture, Thailand appealed for more American military aid to counter the subversion and such assistance was given.\textsuperscript{19}

By this period, it was coincided with the Thai feared of communists aggression, American intended to build the Kingdom into a bastion of the free world in Southeast Asia and to prepare the country for an assault from Communist China. Since then, the United States rapidly expanded economic and military aid to Thailand.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19}  Donald E. Neuchterlein, n. 1, p. 113.

As President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated in February 1953 that:

"his Administration would follow a new positive foreign policy to block any further advance by the communists and bolster the nation's anti-communist allies. A new look would be given to the American military positive, and a new stress would be placed on deterrent military power and collective regional security, appreciating that economic need, military security and political wisdom combined to suggest regional groups of free peoples, within the frame work of the United Nations to help strengthen such special bonds the world over."

Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p.43.

\textsuperscript{20}  Frank C. Darling, n.1, p.217.
On April 14, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, explaining the seriousness of communist threat in Indo-China and persuading British to form a collective military organization. Meanwhile John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, persuaded Australia, France, Great Britain, and New Zealand to join in a Southeast Asia defence pact. And only three Asian countries agreed to join it namely Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.

21. He wrote that if Indo-China passed into the hands of communists, the ultimate effect of it on the global strategic position of the United Kingdom and the United States would be disastrous. He proposed the establishment of a new "ad hoc" grouping or coalition composed of nations professing a vital concern in the checking of the communist expansion in the region. He pointed out that in the past they had failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time and had paid the price for their negligence through many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril.

Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp.43-44.

22 In response to Dulles plan, the Thai Foreign Minister said that the proposed Southeast Asia Defence Pact should be on the pattern of North Atlantic Organization (NATO). He felt that Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam should also be persuaded to join it.

Ibid., p.43.
On September 6, 1954, the conference was held in Manila participated by the representatives of the countries accepted the Dulles plan. On September 8, 1954 the treaty was signed, which known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to create regional defence organization. The treaty had a preamble, eleven Articles and a Protocol. Articles 2 and 4 constituted the operative part of it.\(^2\) The protocol of the treaty extended its protection upon

\[23. \text{Ibid., p.} 43.\]

Under Article 2, the parties to the treaty agreed, jointly and severally and by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive acts both within and without their territorial integrity and political stability. In Article 4, the main political military obligation was contained according to which each member of the bloc undertook, in case of aggression in the area covered by SEATO, to act for overcoming this common danger in accordance with its constitutional procedures. Besides, the participants in the treaty pledged to act jointly in case the "inviolability or integrity of or sovereignty and political independence" of any of them was endangered by the means other than armed attack or it is influenced or threatened by any other factor situation. Thus, support for the United State in Indo-China was one of the major lines of the bloc’s activity in 1964-1973.

Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam even it was repeatedly rejected by Laos and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{24}

With the signing of this treaty, the United States became very close ally of Thailand and help Thailand to develop its infrastructure such as air bases, roads, hospitals and other activities with a view to meet the requirements of the United States forces going to Indo-Chin to war with the communists.\textsuperscript{25} American influence, therefore, was widespread, the Thais were highly appreciative generally of the lavish assistance given by the United States. A few, however, criticised it on the ground that it put too high a premium of armament and neglected to build the national economy so that the result was an economic and political crisis in Thailand. And with the help of the United States, Thailand’s military grew stronger and stronger and threatened the country’s social balance.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p.107.

\textsuperscript{25} Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.47.

\textsuperscript{26} Describing the bad effect of United States aid on Thai Society, some Thai students remarked that support for the previous
When Marshal Sarit came to power on September 17, 1957. He also brought Thailand closer and more deeply concerned with the United States as table 2.1 shows that the United States military assistance to Thailand had gone upward.

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Thai development in the period of Prime Minister Sarit and his immediate heirs took place in the context of an increasingly threatening international situation. The turning point came during the Laos crisis of 1960-1961, in which the military government had led to the decay of democracy in Thailand and American air bases here have tarnished the good image of Thailand as an independent country. They pointed out that Thailand was used as a “laboratory” for testing American instrument of torture, prior to their application in Vietnam, Africa, or even in the United States itself.

Laos right wing forced the Pathet Lao out and installed a government and ultimately led to the civil war which reported that North-Vietnamese supported Pathet Laos. The situation rapidly deteriorated and the Thai became seriously alarmed at the growing strength of Pathet Laos that communism had come to her borders. In March 1961, Thailand requested the SEATO to take action against the Communist Laotian forces but SEATO failed to a unanimous decision on it. So this action did not satisfy Thailand leaders and they felt betrayed when the United States

27. As a result, Sarit demanded the reforms in the structures of SEATO, he proposed, when he felt that lukewarm support only had been given not the SEATO ideals, that “I am ready to support a move to refashion SEATO in such a way as to inject into it a new sense of purposefulness composed of members who completely share the same thoughts and interests, and same hopes and aspirations whose fundamental goal was to be safeguarded and maintain peace and welfare in Southeast Asia and who are ready to make common sacrifices to build up a location against impeding danger.”

Ibid., p. 194.

And the Thais, however, realistic enough that they could not manage to expel France and Britain from SEATO. They therefore, pressed the United States to offer a unilateral guarantee of Thailand’s security and to replace the rule of unanimity in SEATO’s decision by a majority system.
abandoned the Laos right wing and supported the neutralist Souvanna Phouma whose position at the head of Laos government of national unity was secured by the Geneva Conference on Laos in July 1962.  

The refusal of SEATO led the Thai government to question the "raison d'etre" of the membership of the Western alliance. The Thais wanted the traditional of friendship with all countries. As a result, on May 17, 1961 the United States Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson visited Bangkok to restore shaken Thai faith in the United States. The Thai-American relations, however, remained strained in the mid 1961, as the Thai was worried about the Laos situation. They opposed such American not intervention that this would be a prelude to the communists take-over of Laos. The Thai leaders felt that the United States was not attaching


the same importance to the view and interests of Thailand as it was to its European allies.\textsuperscript{29}

In March 1962, the Thai's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, visited Washington for talks with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on the question of the security of Thailand and to assess the danger posed by the Pathet Laos forces which advanced towards Thailand's borders.\textsuperscript{30} On March 6, 1962 at the end of the talks, a Thai United States joint statement was published. It clearly stated that:

"The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States. The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of States reviewed the close association of Thailand and the United States in Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} Lalita Prasad Singh, n.14, pp.125-126.

\textsuperscript{30} Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.51.

\textsuperscript{31} This joint statement was well received in Thailand. The significant of this joint statement lies in the modification of members' obligations which, contrary to the explicit provision
Thai - Cambodia relations had been a problem for Thai-American as well as Cambodian-American relations. During the third quarter of 1962, the Thai - United States relations became soured when the United States gave military aid to Cambodia for preventing the North Vietnamese Communist guerrillas from using Cambodian territory for infiltration and subversion in South Vietnam. The Thais, however, felt cheated because of the failure of the United States to consult them before an armed deal with their traditional rival. Who might not use army against Viet Cong, but against Thailand. Thus, Thai leaders, the Minister of Interior, of unanimous agreement for any SEATO action, were now declared to be both individual and collective. The United States declared that she would go ahead, if she wanted to do so, with her actions in the defence of Thailand and elsewhere in the treaty area even if others did not approve. This was what Thailand had been hoping for long time. In their view, as said the Foreign Minister, it gave a new lease of life to the shaky structure of Southeast Asia Collective Defence System.


32. Viet Cong was a term applied to all Vietnamese revolutionaries and members of resistance movement against French colonists and United States aggressors in South Vietnam. In other words, the Viet Mint was called "Viet Cong" by Americans in South.
General Prapas, used this accident to advocate a return to Thailand’s traditional neutralism.³³

Thailand, however, still an enthusiastic ally of the United States. This because of the common United States-Thai perception of communist threat in the region.³⁴

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³⁴ But when India was attacked by People’s Republic of China forces in October 1962, the Thais, therefore, concluded that neutralism was not a realistic proposition for Thailand in the existing circumstances, as Thanat put it that:

“We do not think of neutralism as an answer to our position. Some of our neighbors profess non-alignment and this only in theory. In practice they lean to one side. They are fearful and oppose the side that threatens them.”

Lalita Prasad Singh, n.14, p.129.

The presence of a Chinese minority of over five million in a country and the creation of the Thai Autonomous in South China were viewed by the Thais as the sources of future troubles that People’s Republic of China might create for Thailand. Thai suspicions had been confirmed ever since the publication in Peking’s Daily, on December 14, 1964 and February 5, 1965 of a Thai Communist Party manifesto of the movement for the independence of Thailand and the reported formation of a Patriotic Front of Thailand to expel American imperialist and to overthrow the traitorous and despotic government of Thailand.

Gnaganath Jha, n.3, p.53.

Subversion had been considered to be the main danger. As King Bhumipol warned after the fall of South Vietnam that:
When the situation in Laos became more serious especially, when the Pathet Laos forces occupied the Nam Tha, which border on Burma, China and Laos on May 6, 1962. This made it necessary for Robert Mc Namara, the then United States Secretary of Defence to pay a visit to Thailand to see the situation himself. Mc Namara, then, thought of implementing a single strategic plan to protect Southeast Asia as a region. Hence, on May 16, 1962, twelve United States Super Subre-jet fighters landed at a Thai airfield, it was the first jet fighter landing in Thailand followed by 1,000 marines of the United States Seventh fleet. On May 1, 1962, Sarit, the Thai Prime Minister stated that:

"the entry of the United States troops had become necessary because the circumstances following the fall of Nam Tha constituted a threat of the Kingdom of Thailand." \(^{35}\)

\[\text{"Thailand is now a direct target of an enemy who wants to control our country."}\]


35. Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp. 53-54.
By mid 1964, the situation in Indo-China looked increasingly threatening to Thailand and the United States. The Thais, therefore, agreed to a substantial upgrading of their military - base facilities. From March 1964, United States aircraft were based at Takhli airfield and after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of that year, additional aircraft were based at Khorat. The American military build up continued up to 1968, and through most of this period and beyond, there were nearly 45,000 United States military personnel stationed in Thailand, with nearly 600 aircrafts, including B-52 bombers based at Utapao.\textsuperscript{36}

Thai American relations had improved rapidly following the deaths of President John F. Kennedy and Marshal Sarit in late 1963, and their replacement by the Lyndon B. Johnson and General Thanom. But Johnson was increasingly concerned to bolster American prestige in Vietnam, while the new regime in Bangkok was less stable than that of Sarit and thus more vulnerable to American

\textsuperscript{36} David KI. Wyatt, n.28, pp.287-288.
pressure. The Thanom so called secret treaty or contingency plan, agreed in Bangkok in 1964, provided for co-ordination between United States and Thai troops in any number of detail patterns in case of over attack by land, sea or air.

The growth in 1960 of anti government and separatist activities, presumably communist - inspired, opened the eyes of Bangkok. A number of economic and social improvement schemes were put into operation and the police and army action against insurgents was intensified and the United States had shown equal interests in the country’s problem. Special units of the United States Army had been busy training Thais in counter-insurgency techniques and United States helicopters and crews provided training for the Thai Air Force and transport to Thai army and police units. Several of the largest United States military installations in the Southeast Asia were located in the region. Thai acceptance of this foreign military build-up obviously was

based on the premise that United States would gradually assume, if necessary, the same kind of counter-insurgency commitment as in Vietnam.\(^8\)

The United States aid programme to Thailand had been closely linked to American involvement in Vietnam and the major part of this programme had been devoted to various form of several development and protection under the heading of counter-insurgency and two third of it had been channelled into the sensitive Northeastern region. The aid programme under Military Assistance Program (MAP) had generally been much larger than economic aid, and disbursements for 1969 were estimated at $ 75 millions.\(^9\)

By 1968, the United States programme constituted the major portion of foreign aid in Thailand, accounting for about 75 percent of the total assistance that Thailand was receiving from foreign countries, as shown at table 2.2.

\(^8\) Lalita Prasad Singh, n.14, p.131.

**Table 2.2**: United States aid by field of activity and project (in thousands US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Project</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Police Administration</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>6479</td>
<td>14075</td>
<td>20019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Action</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>6461</td>
<td>12455</td>
<td>18067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Radios</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Security Units</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Roads</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(II) Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Rural Development</td>
<td>7462</td>
<td>8877</td>
<td>20999</td>
<td>22745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD training</td>
<td>2442</td>
<td>4331</td>
<td>10326</td>
<td>10733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Development Unit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>1680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Agricultural Development</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Rural Health</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Water Supply</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>1367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>1501</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>2175</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Development</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Kw. Portable Transmitter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Electrification</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(III) Technical Support | 864  | 1693 | 2237 | 2020 |
Programme Technical Support | 864  | 1084 | 2237 | 1854 |
Special Participant Training | -    | 9    | -    | 166  |

(IV) Human Resources | 1223 | 464  | 1672 | 1296 |
Manpower | 300  | 156  | 655  | 277  |
Chiengmai Medical School | 435  | 183  | 820  | 834  |
Vocational Education | 328  | 125  | 194  | 55   |
Research Activity | -    | -    | -    | -    |
General Education | 170  | -    | 3    | 100  |

(V) Government Management | 514  | 654  | 781  | 745  |
Management Improvement | 320  | 343  | 320  | 305  |
Civil Services | -    | 130  | 131  | 175  |
Statistics | 182  | 153  | 272  | 215  |
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals | 170  | 28   | 58   | 26   |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Department Administration</th>
<th>25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(VI) Private Enterprise</td>
<td>61 20 409 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>- 20 79 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Investment</td>
<td>- - 320 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>61 - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>- - 10 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(VII) Eco Infrastructure</td>
<td>237 1052 2809 1174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>127 404 676 567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mun and Chee Basin</td>
<td>- 142 678 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautical Ground Service</td>
<td>84 128 1455 272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway</td>
<td>26 380 - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12488 18639 42982 48309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nixon Doctrine and Thailand**

In the beginning of 1969, Richard M. Nixon became the President of the United States. His views on world affairs were similar to both Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson.⁴⁰

However, President Richard M. Nixon was not free to act as his predecessors like John F. Kennedy, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman and Franklin D. Roosevelt had been. It was because he had no majority support in the

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⁴⁰ According to Dulles, the two bloc powers in the Cold War not represented only in terms of military, economic strength and ideological orientation but also in moral terms. He said once that the United States should take-up every military conflict as a moral crusade requiring the unconditional surrender of the enemy. He was convinced that democracy, especially the United States pattern of democracy, was the best form of government and was ready to any kind of risk to save democracy from extinction. For Dean Acheson, he stated that in spite of the death of Stalin, very little had changed in the Soviet Union. The communist purpose of world domination through threat of military showdown was, according to him, unalterable. He tended to regard hard military measures as more significant in the Cold War than soft economic programmes.

Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp.62-63
United State congress. Also, the United States Press was very critical about the involvement of United States troops in Vietnam and in other Indo-China countries. Above all, the Republican Party had charged President Nixon in September 1968 with the task of implementing a programme aimed at bringing peace to Vietnam.

At a Press Conference at Guam, the Nixon Doctrine was announced as the guidelines of United States foreign policy with regard to Asian countries he stated that:

"While the United States would of course keep its treaty commitments, it must avoid that kind of policy which would make Asian Countries so dependent upon the United States that it is dragged into conflicts such as the one in Vietnam. The time has come when the United States, in its relations with its Asian friends, should be emphatic on two points: (i) American would keep its treaty commitments for example - with Thailand under SEATO, (ii) as far as the problems of international security and military defence are concerned, except for a threat by a major power involving nuclear weapons, the United State of America had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled, and responsibility for it assumed, by the Asian nations themselves. If the United States just continued on the road of responding requests for assistance, for assuming

41. Ibid.
the primary responsibility for defending their countries when they had international or external problems, they were never going to take care of themselves.”^42

In regarding Thailand, President Nixon stated on July 1969, that:

“The People of Thailand value their freedom so much for themselves that they are willing to fight for it for others too. That is why Thailand keeps a special meaning for the United Stated Thailand is truly the land of free, and it is this sense of self-reliance, of freedom, of willingness to fight for freedom both at home and abroad, that we wish to develop all over the world as something very proud to be associated with, with our friends from Thailand.”^43

Although President Richard M. Nixon tried his best to remove the possible misunderstanding about his policy, but it was almost inevitably became a subject of controversy,

42. Ibid., p.64.


43. Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p. 65.
subject of doubt among Thai leaders. Obviously, Thailand wanted to see the United States continue to maintain its forces and play its part in Southeast Asia. In the opinion of Thai leaders the ideas of military alliance among Southeast Asia was a pipe dream because the countries of this area had no military potential, they need their resources for the development.\textsuperscript{44} The Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, openly criticised the Nixon Doctrine in August 1969, and pointed out that:

\begin{quote}
"The first fact that need to be repeated was that the United States of its own free will involve itself in Asia, and particularly in Vietnam. Secondly, the United States asked the Thai-Government to accept American soldiers in Thailand. Among all the Asian people and nations, Thais are the one which accepted and still accepts American soldiers who are in Thailand don’t come here to fight and risk their lives in the defense of Thailand against enemy encroachment. They come to Thailand to prosecute Vietnam war at Thailand’s risk and peril."
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{45} Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p. 65.
Seni Pramoj, the founder of the Democratic Party of Thailand also criticised that:

"Thailand joined hands with America and committed itself to the extend of allowing the bases to be set up here. It is adequate reason for retaliation if the North Vietnamese get it into their heads to take action. This has created a dangerous situation for Thailand. Thai commitment to Western Camp made her most vulnerable to communist attacks. In this situation, Thailand should make good relations with the people of East and Northeast Thailand, because they constitute the buffer with China, with which Thailand already wants to have good relations."\textsuperscript{46}

Since then Thailand began to think seriously about the relationship with China and Soviet Union\textsuperscript{47}, which ultimately led to the agreement, between the United States and Thailand of United States withdrawal on September 30, 1969.\textsuperscript{48} In

\begin{itemize}
\item[46.] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 66.
\item[47.] The motivation of the Thai government was probably two fold: Firstly, it was a desire to go on the record as showing more flexibility and preparing to future contingencies and Secondly, it was designed to warn the United States against full withdrawal from the region.
\item[48.] Astri Suhrki, n. 39, p. 432.
\item[48.] The experience of alliance with the United States during the Vietnam war and what was seen to be the sudden American decision to withdraw from Indo-China had taught the Thais the
considering the presence of Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, Thanat told American audience in November 1969 that:

“If you avoid a tiger (China) and come to face a crocodile (the Soviet Union), it is not much of change, if we do not have any other alternatives, may be we will have to live with crocodile. This is exactly the international pattern that may emerge if and when the United States has to yield to the pressure of completely withdrawing from this part of the world because we can not claim that our regional grouping is powerful enough. We hope that you will be understanding and that you will discreetly support the efforts of the nations of the area.” 

It was the Paris Agreement in January 1973 between the United States and Hanoi impressed upon Thailand the necessity of reviewing its alignments once again. Thai officials visited Hanoi and sought the assistance of some countries for an understanding with Hanoi. One was

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49. Astri Suhrki, n. 39, p. 432.
expected that Bangkok was seeking assurances from Hanoi that the latter would not actively assist insurgents in Thai Northeast. In return, Thailand would gradually disengage from its military entanglements. On January 16, 1974 Thai Foreign Minister, Charunphan Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, outlined the basis for the new government’s foreign policy, which aimed at the achievements of a balance of interests in the region. And his most interesting remarks were directed towards the role of the Soviet Union, which was described as being in a strong position to contribute to the stability of the entire region of Southeast Asia. The pace of events was accelerated in early 1975 with the fall of Saigon to the Viet Minh. Thailand, therefore, promptly asked the United States to transfer its military bases and withdraw its military personnel from Thai territory in a year. Within a week SEATO folded its tent and Thailand assured its communist neighbours of good neighbourly relations. Since then the


51. Leszek Buszynski, n.34, p.1040.
features of Thai-United States relations had been reshaped in accordance with the changes of circumstances and also Thailand became closer associated with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which would since then began playing increasingly significant role in the Southeast Asian region.

52. Lalita Prasad Singh, n.14, p.131.
CHAPTER-III

The United States and Indo-China War in 1970s

Vietnam before the Geneva Accords of 1954.

There was hardly any country in the world which claim to have suffered as much as Vietnam in the Second World War period. Perpetual conflict, with only a brief of peace following the Geneva settlement of 1954, had marked its recent history. Millions of Vietnamese children had grown up to adulthood in this period carrying memories of bloodshed, terror, bombing and dislocation. The long undeclared war in which the United States was involved divided public opinion all over the global effecting human values, national economies, presidential prospects and military strategies.

The French conquest of Indo-China was completed by 1884 and divided Vietnam into three parts: (i) Tonkin in the North with Hanoi as capital, (ii) Annam in the centre with Hua as capital; (iii) Cochin-China in the South including the
Mekhong Delta as administrative headquarters.¹ Since the very early years of French rule, the people of Vietnam expressed their opposition to foreign rule. During the Second World War, Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese which in return provided the good opportunity for the nationalist, to achieve their goal².

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2. Ibid., p. 2.

The nationalist movement was not new in Indochina. The natives especially those of Annam, had never been fully reconciled to French rule, which had been imposed between 1860 and 1885. At first protest was unorganized and limited to a few disparate, disconnected groups, mainly among the young and intelligentsia.


At the outset the Viet Minh was not predominantly Communist. In fact, the communist were in a small minority, even among the leaders. The majority were of the middle class, resolved only to free their country from France. If communist had the same end they were willing to work with them but by their close origin few would have welcomed and still fewer approved communism as such. In 1927, the nationalist were organized under the name of Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam Nationalist Party (VQDD). It has been called the most significant of all non-communist revolutionary nationalist organizations, it was modeled on the Kuomintang and frequently received support from it. During the Second World War years, Nationalist and communist
In the meantime, the big three powers in Europe, the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, were deciding the fate of the Asian country. On August 22, 1945, a week after Japan had accepted the Allies terms, the Viet Minh set up a provisional government at Hanoi to take in Annam, Tonkin and Cochin-China, where more than four fifths of Indo-China live. By Agreement at Postdam British and Chinese troops were to occupy Indo-China until the French returned. The British in the South of leaders found refuge in China. And some members of the old VQDD continued a party of that name, other formed the Dai Viet QDD (Great Vietnam Nationalist Party). With the assistance of Kounmintang, these two formed a nationalist coalition which included the Vietnam Restoration League. This coalition came to be known as the Vietnam Cach Menn Dong Mint Hoi (the Vietnam Revolutionary League or League of Vietnamese Revolutionary Parties). Because Kounmintang leaders were suspicious of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party, the Communist in May, 1941, organized another United Front to include certain independent nationalist elements the Viet Nam Doc lap Dong Min Hoi (Revolutionary League for the independence of Vietnam), popularly known as the Viet Minh.


3. Ibid.
16th parallel and the Chinese in the North, but when the British arrived early in September the administration of most of the colony was already in the hands of the Viet Minh. By the time French arrived the ground was already laid for struggle.

The British refused to deal with the Viet Minh. Instead the British ordered the release of the French and thus gave them the chance to re-establish their rule. In October 1945 the French forces were reinforced by troops from home under General Leeker. But with nationalist resistance in Saigon and guerrilla attacks in the countryside did the French again control the Mekhong Delta and by then the British had felt.

4. Under the circumstances, the two occupying armies in the North and South of 16th parallel followed different policies. The British, General Gracy refused to reorganize the Viet Minh Administration and rearmed the French and help them to re-establish their power south of 16th parallel, and by March 1946, the British withdrew. The Chinese who occupied the North proclaimed a policy of non-interference in Vietnam's internal affairs and left the Viet Minh in charge of the administration.

B.S.N. Murti, n.1, p.3.

In September Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the country and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).⁷

Moreover, when the French occupied certain areas around Saigon. The French installed Bao Dai as a Chief of the state of Vietnam. The United States of America and Britain also recognized him as the ruler of the whole of Vietnam.⁸ But the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China recognized the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.⁹


7. Ibid., p.133.


The formation of the Vietnam government under the Ho Chi Minh created a situation that France would have to deal with at once French troops arrived in Indo-China early in 1946 and after some difficulties with the Chinese, who at first refused to evacuate, took over entirely by the end of February. But the
There was some moderation in the Ho Chi Minh regimes that was the Indo-Chinese Communist Party was dissolved and replaced by an Association for Marxist Studies. When Ho realized that he would not get political backing from the United States he decided on temporary cooperation with the French. Then, the negotiations with the French were held and the Treaty was signed on March 6, 1946, after the France made a pact with China in February 1946.\(^\text{10}\)

By this treaty, the French recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as a free state having its own government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of Vietnam government was in being and there had been some minor skirmishes.

Nathaniel Peffer, n.2, p.474.

As a result, the legal position in Vietnam became confused with the DRV in the North and the State of Vietnam in the South both claimed authority over the whole of Vietnam. Thus, the conflict in Vietnam had its origins in the French refused to accept the Viet Minh's right to rule Cochin-China.

B.S.N. Murti, n.1, p.4.

\(^{10}\) Richard Allen, n.6, p.186.
the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union. It was also agreed that the referendum would be held in Cochin-China, where most of France interests and much of colony’s wealth lay, to determine whether Cochin-China should join the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.¹¹

There had been apparent accord on the way in which the future of Cochin-China was to be determined, but the French made it clear that there would be no referendum. On one pretext or another, principally the necessity of first re-establishing law and order, they postponed it and then on their own decision declared the status of Cochin-China to be that of an autonomous republic under French authority. But Ho Chi Minh wanted a literal application of the original application: unity of whole Vietnam as an independent political entity but within the French Union as an equal partner, with economic and cultural co-operation between

¹¹ Nathaniel Peffer, n.2, p.474.
Vietnam and France. HO Chi Minh would not accepted a restoration of colonial subservience.\textsuperscript{12}

From 1946 until 1950, the struggle between the French army and the Ho Chi Minh, guerrillas was a large scale colonial comparing of pacification against rebels with hardly more than local significance. But, in 1950, the operation changed into a confrontation of the free World and Chinese-Russian Communist powers when Ho Chi Minh received military equipments from China and Russia.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.475.


When Harry S. Truman became the President on April 12, 1945. He initiated a change in United States policy on Indo-China. He wanted to achieve unity among the Western European powers including France, in opposition the communist power in Europe. The United States therefore, felt that it was in its national interest to assist France in regaining its lost power and influence in Indo-China.


As early as 1950, President Truman gave substantial arms and aid to the French at the same time as the Americans themselves entered the war in Korea. This policy was continued and accelerated when Eisenhower gained the Presidency in 1952.
As the time went on and the French showed no desire for accommodation, the native inhabitants became convinced that France was resolved to keep their land a colony as before. Therefore, nationalism became more widespread. As an usual in such situations, in proportion to the growing strength of the independence movement grew the power of the communist leadership, since communists were a compact group who always knew that they wanted. The hostilities between the French and the Viet Minh, which had been continuing throughout this period, were temporarily halted by a new agreement, the Modus Vivendi of September 14-15, 1946. Nevertheless, sporadic clashes continued. On

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This supports was the outcome of the perception of threats from the Soviet expansion policy. The American policy-makers, therefore, identified the Soviet Union as the principal adversary and communist parties in various parts of the world as accessories of the Soviet Union whose activities endangered the United States interests.


November 23, the French bombed Haiphong and on December 19, the North responded with concerted attacks on Fronts forts in Tonkin and Annam. Thus began the full scale war which ended for a time - in 1954, with the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.\textsuperscript{15}

When communist became victory in China in 1949, it changed the situation in Vietnam. France was forced to look to the United States for help in fighting against the Viet Minh.\textsuperscript{16}

The United States assistance to the Forces of the French Union and the Communist China help to the Viet Minh led to the an escalation of the arm conflict. Various attempts to enter into negotiations to end the conflict were thwarted by the United States which was keen on achieving a military victory against the Viet Minh.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Frank N Trager, \textit{n 2}, p 59
\textsuperscript{16} B S.N. Murti, \textit{n 1}, p 4
\textsuperscript{17} The join Franco-American statement issued on September 30, 1953, declared that the total defeat of communism in Indo-China was the aim of France, thus, ruling out negotiations and
So the years from 1950 to 1954 passed, the existing trends growing ever stronger. Meanwhile, the United States had intervened at one removes when it perceived that France could no longer carry the financial burden - the money spent by France in Indo-China almost equaled what it obtained from the United States under the Marshall Plan - the United States took over a large part of the burden. In another word, Indo-China had become a sector in the Cold War. Then came 1954, the door of conference to settle the affairs of compromises. On January 12, 1954, John Foster Dulles, the then American Secretary of States, said, that the communist menace would be opposed by massive retaliation by means of our own choosing. On March 29, 1954, he further stated that: “the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Russia and its Chinese Communist allies by whatever means would be a great threat to the whole free world. The United States of America feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. Dulles proposed a confined front of major Western powers to initiate United action in Indo-China to save that area from Communism.”

Ibid., p.5.

Indo-China was opened on April 26, 1954, just few days before the French defeated at Dien Bien Phu. This conference participated by Russian, British, Chinese and American Foreign Ministers.19

France could no longer conceal to itself either the fact of the reverse it had suffered on the consequences the reverse dictated. The cease-fire was to go into effect along the 17th parallel, which meant in actually that at that line Indo-China was being partitioned. This left France an area of 50,000 square miles, including Cochin China, with a population of 10,000,000. The Viet Minh would have a population of 12,000,000 and area of 77,000 square miles, including the Red River Delta, the city of Hanoi, and the port of Haiphong. Laos and Cambodia were to be evacuated by communist troops and maintain such relations with France. Elections were to be held after two years in all Vietnam to determines its future.20

19. Ibid., p.478.
And the significance of this was communism had advanced another step on the continent of Asia. The new Republic of Vietnam was left distressed, chaotic, impoverished. There was no organization, no point of cohesion, no array of groups that a government could base itself on.\textsuperscript{21}

This was led to the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which intended to put the communist world on notice that a line was being drawn beyond which it could not go with impurity. Whether the Communist World would be deterred by the warning remained to be seen. Thus, all Southeast Asia was incorporated in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.479.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
Post Geneva Accords and United States Policy towards Vietnam

Southeast Asia became a subject of headlines in the Spring of 1954 when the French was defeated at Dien Bien Phu by the forces of Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam headed by Ho Chi Minh. Three major international conferences were convened in Geneva and Paris in less than three decades and several agreements were concluded to solves the problems on the exit of France from the area.23

At the conclusion of the Geneva conference, neither the United States nor South Vietnam signed the Geneva declaration. General Watter Bedell Smith, the Chief United States delegate, however proclaimed an unilateral American declaration that the United States would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the Geneva accords. The Eisenhower Administration viewed the Geneva accords as a major diplomatic defeat for the United States. In meetings in

23. Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 8, p. 3.
August 8 and 12, the National Security Council (NSC) concluded that the Geneva settlement was a disaster that completed a major forward stride of communism which may lead to the loss of SouthEast Asia. Therefore, most concern of the United States was to prevent communism from spreading into other parts of Southeast Asia.24

During the Geneva meeting, the United States undertook a few covert activities against the Viet Minh in Indo-China. From June 1954 to August 1955, a team led by Colonel Edward G landsdale, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative who had earned a reputation for counter guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, was instructed to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political psychological warfare.25

25. Ibid.

In the evaluation of American policy regarding Indo-China in general and Vietnam in particular had to be review in the context of the overall objectives of American foreign policy. In the Immediate post war period, American policy-makers identified the Soviet Union as the principal adversary and
The United States views the conflict between North and South Vietnam as an extension of the clash between the forces of freedom and communist totalitarianism. The United States had perceived the problem as being military, not political and perceived the conflict in South Vietnam mainly in terms of aggression by North Vietnam. Hence, almost seventy-five percent of United States economic aid provided to South Vietnam was used to bolster the country's military budget. A White Paper entitled A threat to the peace stated that:

"The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in North Vietnam to destroy the Republic of Vietnam and subjugate its people is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of communist parties in various part of the world as accessories of the Soviet Union whose activities were minimal to the interests of the United States. The emergence of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent of communist takeover in Czechoslovakia served to deepen the anxiety of American policy-makers to formulate measures for the "containment" of Soviet expansion.

Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, p. 38.
Vietnam and their immediate neighbours but also to all other free nations.”  

Thus, the American policy towards Vietnam was principally governed by the doctrine of containment of communism. With the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued the “united action” within two months of the Geneva Agreement.

The Geneva Accords were only binding upon the United States to the degree admitted in Smith’s Declaration. When France quit her involvement and ran out on her


27. Ibid., p. 400.

As regards Vietnam the conference took note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and ammunition. The two parties in Vietnam further took the obligation:

... To see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy...

Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 8, p. 6.
obligations, the United States had to enter the scene or see another slice of territory fall under communist despotism. The policy of picking up the pieces abandoned by older imperial nations had began with the Truman Doctrine applied to Greece and Turkey in 1947. In case of Vietnam, however, the United States did not depart from its position, only France did. The reason was explained by M. Pinean, France of Foreign Affairs, February 23, 1956 that:

"We are not entirely masters of the situation. The Geneva Accords on the one hand and the pressure of our allies on the other creates a very complex situation... You ask me what will be our position after the reckoning of July 1956 provided by the Geneva Accords. The position in Principle is clear: France is the guarantor of the Geneva Accords. But we do not have the means alone of making them respected." 28

Meanwhile, the United States had assumed that any forceful attempt by external invasion on internal subversion inspired and aided from the outside to seize South Vietnam

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after a failure to get it was aggression against a sovereign state and within the scope of Smith Declaration and the SEATO treaty of September 1954, temporarily or permanently. The United States, therefore, explained her stand on the case of election in Vietnam by Dwight D. Eisenhower that:

"I have never talked on corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting possibly 80 percent of population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai."\(^{29}\)

One of the first acts in the post-Geneva American policy in Vietnam was the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It was in a way the brain of Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles for common defence against Chinese expansion. Soon after the Geneva conference was over, there started a big debate in Washington on whether the United States should impart

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military training to the South Vietnam. It was mainly a tussle between the State Department and the Defence Department. John Foster Dulles was very forcefully argued that the United States take over the responsibility of giving military training to the forces of the Saigon regime. He also insisted that political stability was not possible without military security.\(^\text{30}\)

In case of general elections, according to the Geneva Accords, it must be held in July 1956 throughout Vietnam. For this, North and South Vietnam were required to begin consultation in July 1955. But, when the time had come, Saigon refused to undertake any consultation with Hanoi. She argued that there was no use in holding the proposed election because it would not be free and democratic in North Vietnam. There might have been some elements of truth in this charge but the motivation of the Dien regime for bulking at the election seems to have been different. The

\(^{30}\) Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, p. 52.
Pentagon Papers revealed that the United States had a hand in it.\footnote{Before the Geneva conference was over, the JCS had pointed out that communists were likely to win if an election were held in Vietnam. In August 1954, the CIA reported that if elections were held in 1956, the Viet Minh would win. In 1954 President Eisenhower himself was reported to have said that Ho Chi Minh would win 80 percent of the votes if the election were held that year. Thus Washington was almost convinced that the communists were sure to defeat the Dien regime in election. Against this background, Dulles' instructions and demand guarantees that the Communists were likely to reject seems to have been a deliberate ploy to prevent the holding of general elections in Vietnam. On July 7, 1954 Dulles wrote to General Walter Bedell Smith, the Chief United States delegate at Geneva that: “Since undoubtedly true that the elections might even eventually mean unification (of) Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, this makes it all more important they should be only held as long as after cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give democratic elements best chance.”}

On June 17, 1954, Ngo Dinh Dien was appointed as the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam. President Dwight D. Eisenhower promptly promised his country's support to assist the government of South Vietnam towards developing and maintaining a strong viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 54-55.
From that time the American involvement in the State of Vietnam became deeply felt and increasingly directed.\textsuperscript{32} Dien, however, on October 23, 1955 declared the State of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and on October 26, 1955, proclaimed himself as its first President. It was mainly American influence which removed General Nguyen Van Hinh, a powerful opponent of Dien from Vietnam, enabled Dien to devide and defeat the seats, and displaced the French in the South of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{33}

According to Geneva Agreements the Commanders of the French Union Forces and the People’s Army of Vietnam were responsible for the execution of the provisions contain therein and affording full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the International Commission in the performance of its functions. But between the end of 1954 and early 1955, the French gradually withdrew their

\textsuperscript{32} B.S.N. Murti, n.1, p.11. \\
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p.12.
forces from Vietnam, and the United states gradually assumed their functions, supporting the Dien regime in the South. The premature withdrawal from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) of the French who were considered responsible for the election in the South complicated the question of implementing the Geneva Agreements, especially the provisions concerning elections. The government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) adopted a categorized stand that it was not bound by the Geneva Agreements and refused to talk with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to prepare for general elections which was supported by United States and Britain.\textsuperscript{34} Besides, there was enough evidence to say that the United States was at no stage serious about a political settlement of the Vietnam problem on the lines visualised by the Geneva Agreements. The real reason was that they wanted the RVN as a separate anti communist state. They were convinced that if elections were held Ho

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.12-13.
Chi Minh would win them and the whole of Vietnam would go under communist rule. Dulles made no secret of this when he said that:

“South Vietnam must be strengthened; and we must not be trapped into a fictions legalism that could condemn ten million potentially free persons into slavery.”

And also, as a legal justification, the United States had maintained that:

“From the very beginning, the North Vietnamese violated the 1954 Geneva Accords. Communist military forces and supplies were left in the South in violation of the Accords. Other communist guerrillas were moved north further training and then were infiltrated into the South in violation of the accords.”

For the American views the Geneva Accords marked the end of the French presence in Asia which, however obnoxious at one time to Americans on general anti-colonialist principles, could have been regarded useful in anti-communist terms. Having decided in 1954 not to buttress

35. Ibid., p.16.
36. Ibid., p.17.
French rule any longer, the United States sought an alternative anti communist and anti Chinese forces. They disapproved of the General Accords because it not only failed to constitute such a force but threatened to accelerate Chinese Communist expansion by giving Ho the whole of Vietnam in two bites - the North by the armistice agreement and the South through elections - they regarded Ho Chi Minh as a satellite and discounted his chances of becoming the Tito of Asia. They resolved, therefore, to maintaining the independence of the anti communist regime established by Bao Dai in the South, and also to create a new anti-communist alliance to check China in Asia as NATO had checked the USSR in Europe.  

The Buddhist Crisis

In the wake of national revival, Buddhism in Vietnam had become a strong political force. Naturally, Dien's biased

religions policy turned a large number of Buddhists who were in majority in South Vietnam, to become his staunch opponents.\textsuperscript{38}

This enraged the anti-Dien Buddhists who had formed in 1963, the body known as the Buddhist United Church of Vietnam (BUC) which had played an important role in the frequent changes in government in South Vietnam. The BUC was, therefore, considered by the Americans as a trouble making and anti-American organization. But its demand for a sovereign national assemble and opposition to Dien’s puppet government showed that it was following a nationalist policy.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} The Buddhist were regarded by Dien as his religions enemies as he himself was a staunch Catholic. Besides, his Catholic brother Archbishop Ngo Dinh Nue and his another brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife prevented him from showing any conciliatory attitude towards the Buddhists. To add to this, on the advice of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Dien had given official recognition in 1963 to one eldest sect of Buddhists, namely, Co-Son-Mon, which was completely a political. It was called the General Association of Buddhists in Vietnam.

R.S. Chavan, n.13, p.111.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
Another reasons for the annoyance of the Buddhists was the order issued by Dien prohibiting them from exhibiting the Buddhist flag and other signs on the Birthday of the Buddha (May 8). They protested against such an anti-Buddhist order and took out demonstrations.\textsuperscript{40}

The Buddhist protests aroused great concern in the United States. John F. Kennedy urged Dien to improve his dealing with the Buddhists. But Dien ignored the advice, John F. Kennedy then supported a group of South Vietnamese general who opposed Dien’s policies. On November 1963, the generals overthrow the Dien government. Against Kennedy wishes, Dien and Nhu were murdered.\textsuperscript{41}

The fall of the Dien government see off a period of political disorder in South Vietnam. New government rapidly

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

succeeded one another. During this period, North Vietnam stepped up its supply of war materials and began to send units of its own army into the South Vietnam by late 1964, the Viet Cong controlled up to 75 percent of South Vietnam's population.  

The Gulf of Tonkin incident

During August 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved secret South Vietnam naval raids against North Vietnam. He announced that the United States destroyers Maddox and C. Turnerjoy had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam.  

42. Ibid.
43. Some Americans doubted that an attack had occurred, and the attack had never been confirmed.

Later on, when the war was as it height, the captain of Maddox admitted that his ship had not been attacked. The aim of the noisy campaign raised over the “Tonkin incident” was to justify the attack on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to arouse anti Vietnamese sentiments among Americans.
However, following this doubtful events President Lyndon B. Johnson asked Congress for powers to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression and he reacted sharply an issued instructions to the United States Pacific Command.44

Meanwhile, on August 7, Congress approved these powers in the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The United States did not declare war on North Vietnam. But Lyndon B. Johnson used the resolution as the legal basis for increased United States involvement. In March 1965, he sent a group of United States Marines to South Vietnam.45

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44. That was
(i) to continue patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin
(ii) to provide a combat air pilot over the destroyers
(iii) to attack any force which attacked United States Naval patrols with the object of destroying it

R.S. Chavan, n.13, p.117.

Mc Namara, the then American Defence Secretary, told the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1964 that the United States efforts in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) carried the risk of escalating to military actions outside the border of South Vietnam. Thereafter, an incident that took place on August 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin changed the complexion of the conflict in Vietnam. It provided a turning point in the United States war policy in Vietnam to one open and direct participation.\(^{46}\)

Following these events, the Communist guerrilla attacked Bienhoa airfield in November against the United States officers’ billet in Saigon in December and against the United States advisers’ compound at Pliku in February 1965.\(^{47}\)

\(^{46}\) Actually, this crisis was not an accident or a sudden event. It had its origin in the covert operations against North Vietnam approved by President Kennedy in 1961.

R.S. Chavan, n.13, p.117.

46. B.S.N. Murti, n.1, p.28.
Ultimately, this incident offered President Lyndon B. Johnson an opportunity to have his policy of escalation unconditionally endorsed by Congress in the so-called Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which authorised the President to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.  

**Escalation of war**

The gathering momentum of National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1961 alarmed President John F. Kennedy who, in May 1961, gave green signal for covert operations against North Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agencies (CIA) and the Pentagon.  

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Actually, in the middle of June 1960 the Strategic Hamlets Programme was conceived and implemented when William Colby was promoted as the Chief of the CIA station in Saigon. It was based on the assumption that the villages which were the targets of attacks of the underground communist guerrillas should be enabled to defend themselves by providing them weapons so that they would not have to depend on the Vietnamese army units which were never there when needed. The weapons were to be provided by the CIA the only American agency with the flexibility that could respond to such a local request directly and did not have to set up a complex programme through Vietnamese government channels, which might or might not pass the material to the place it was needed. Colby and his associates decided to combine the self defence concept with the economic and social improvement for the villages, and recommended that the Vietnamese Special forces be put in charge of the effort, with American in supporting role only.

Along with the Strategic Hamlets campaign to fight the Vietcong at the local level, the CIA developed other approaches also like recruiting, training, and running Mountains Scouts of Highlanders to patrol deep into the unpolluted areas along the Cambodian and Laos borders to bring back intelligence of communist infiltration there, and assisting a so-called “People’s Force” of politically trained terms in their programme of moving into rural communities to live with, work with and help the peasants in their community efforts.

A part from fighting the Viet Cong in South Vietnam the CIA also undertook upon itself the taste of penetrating North Vietnam and undertaking para-military action there. According to William Colby, he once stated that:

“with our experience in Korea and against China, CIA was the natural agency to which the job of penetrating North Vietnam should be assigned.”

In July 1962, Premier Pham Vandong had told Bernard Fall, the United Nations Secretary General that:

"We fully realize that the American imperialists wish to provoke a situation in the course of which they would use the heroic struggle of the South Vietnamese people as a pretext for the destruction of our economic and cultural achievement. And he added, we shall after them no pretext that could give rise to an American military intervention against North Vietnam." 50

In the very first days of the Kennedy Administration the number of American advisors in Saigon totaled first to 10,000 and then 18,000. The President allowed them to take part in military operations. 51 At the time of Kennedy’s death these were between 14 and 16 thousands American troops in Vietnam. And that number was to grow substantially after his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson takeover. There was a

50. Charles E. Morison and Astri Suhrke, n.47, p.68.

However, North Vietnamese responses to American and South Vietnamese operations on the North Vietnamese Coast in 1964 appeared in retrospect to have provided such a pretext.

Ibid., p.69.

51. Alexander Lavrentyev, n.43, p.47.
hint of what was to come in the first major speech on his 
occasion to the Presidency in November 1963, that was:

"Under John Kennedy’s leadership, this nation has 
demonstrated, that it has the courage to seek peace 
and it has the fortitude the risk war. We have 
proved that we are a good and reliable friend to 
those who seek peace and freedom. We have 
shown that we can also be a formidable foe to 
those who reject the path of peace, and those who 
seek to impose upon us, and our allies. This nation 
will keep its commitments through South Vietnam 
to West Berlin. we will be increasing in the search 
for peace resourceful in our pursuit of areas of 
agreements, even with those with whom we differ, 
and generous and loyal to those who join with us 
in common cause."


By spring 1963, United States forces in South Vietnam 
numbered 45,500 in the next twenty-four months the number 
would rise to a staggering half-a-million. Corresponding 
United States estimates were 160,000 in spring 1964 and 
250,000 two years later. The United States military strategy 
was to search and destroy the enemy in the South through a 
variety of means, including bombing, chemical warfare, 
psychological warfare, and counter-insurgency operations. 
And the criterion of success was not how much territory was 
conquered or brought under control but how many Viet Cong 
were killed. To complement these actions in the South, the 
continued bombing of North Vietnam was aimed at crippling 
its economy, interdicting the infiltration of North Vietnamese 
troops and supplies and forcing Hanoi to agree to a negotiated 
settlement. At the same time, the United States gave massive 
economic and military aid to the Saigon Government, whose 
armed forces numbered nearly one million by the end of sixties.

D.R. Sardesai, n.25, p.414
By 1964, the Johnson Administration adopted the McNamara plan which provided for increasing South Vietnam’s armed strength to a half a million officers and men and concentrating the forces in the Mekhong Delta.\(^5^3\) It was decided to extend hostilities to the entire peninsula of Indo-China. The United States Air Force executed raids on the North Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Cambodia and Laos. The United States of America tried to enforce a blockade on the North Vietnam. When there steps prove ineffective, the United States of America decided to enter the war. By this time the National Liberation Front (NLF) controlled more than three-quarters of the country’s total area. The United States of America Landed military units in the ports of South Vietnam which was a repetition of the French invasion, only an incomparably larger scale.\(^5^4\)

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p.417  
\(^{54}\) Gennadi Chufrim and Igor Mozhaiko, n 9., p.149.
Since overt military operations against the North were rejected as being overly risky and not feasible at the moment. American attention was focused on a programme of covert activities designed to harass and sabotage enemy transportation facilities and other installations where ever accessible. General Maxwell Tayler, speaking for the joint Chiefs of staff in January 1964, declared that the stakes for victory over Communist insurgency in South Vietnam were compellingly high. Such wars of national liberation must not be allowed to succeed. Taylor concluded that:

"The United States must make the ranking service commander at Saigon responsible for the total United States program in Vietnam and take over from the Saigon authorities the actual direction of the war. The United States should organize and direct large scale commando raids against North Vietnam, using South Vietnamese and some Chinese Nationalist volunteers to destroy military facilities on the ground and operating under South Vietnamese cover would conduct reconnaissance and paratrooper drops."

The unflinching United States commitment to maintain a non communist government in Vietnam led to the step by step escalation of the United States war from the limited risk gamble of Eisenhower through counter-insurgency operations of Kennedy to open aggression under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.  

The full scale United States war from 1965 onwards was aimed at attaining full victory. This strategy was tailored to compel and pressurize North Vietnam to persuade the National Liberation Front (NLF) to give up in the South. Interestingly, it was promised on the awareness of NLF’s indigenous sources of strength. This policy of escalation of war into North Vietnam coupled with the maximization of military pressure against NLF in South was hoped to give total military victory to the United States in Vietnam. With the United States military terror tactics extended from South to North, the North Vietnam (DRV) was left no choice

except to respond to aggression throughout the state of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{57}

The arrival at Danang of 1400 men at 9 A.M. on March 8, 1965 also marked the beginning of induction of 542, 558 (June 1966) United States troops, and thousands of troops from Australia and its Asian satellites. This was in addition to one million puppet troops from combat the formidable. United States military build-up since 1965 included all conventional and non-conventional weaponry.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, p 142

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
CHAPTER-IV

The Vietnamization of War

In the country where civilian leaders were loudly declared that their people had no desire to shed their blood to protect the interests of United States and where government troops viewed the war as belonging to Americans, therefore, how could the United States saved such a people. Opposition to the war rose to enormous proportions by 1967, especially on college campuses. The compulsory draft in the army and the growing casualty rates awakened the youth to the cost of war.¹

¹ Roger Hilsman, a former United States Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, revealed that the President John F. Kennedy's policy was to meet the guerrilla aggression within a counter-guerrilla framework, with the implied, corollary that if Vietcong could not be defeated within a counter - guerrilla framework and the allegiance of the people of Vietnam could not be won then the United States should accept the resulting situation and would be free to enter negotiations without fatal consequences to our position in the rest of Asia.

The Johnson Administration came under considerable pressure to end the war which had taken over 16,000 United States lives and was costing over 55 million a day without achieving political results intended. Influential American and many Southeast Asian specialists all over the world urged the United States to accept the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon, including National Liberation Front (NLF) and other political forces, and the subsequent gradual withdrawal of United States military power. Such a solution could permit a disengagement of major powers from Indo-China peninsula. The Johnson Administration, however, kept on trying to keep South Vietnam safe for the free world.\(^2\)

American's steps in the escalation of the war were taken in large part during the Administration of President Richard M. Nixon who assumed office in January 1969. He reduced the number of American servicemen from 543,000 in early 1969 to around 23,700 at the time of the cease-fire. The withdrawal was done carefully and related to the overall

\(^2\) Ibid.
military, political and diplomatic situation. Indeed, the American withdrawal of military forces without loss of United States credibility abroad was one of the major accomplishment of the Nixon presidency. Vietnamization, a policy of preparing the South Vietnamese to fight their own war, was the rationale employed by the White House and Pentagon.³

³. It should be observed that "Vietnamization" was not a new concept, for the French under the Navarre Plan in 1953 and even President Lyndon B Johnson, especially after March 1968 had tried to implement it.


It was stated that when Nixon came to power, he interested in getting out of Vietnam but without abandoning the objective of sustaining an independent South Vietnam. The Nixon approach, was to change the tactics, not the goal, so as to reduce the domestic dissent on Vietnam. As Henry A. Kissinger wrote in the prestigious journal of the United States opinion elite that :

“A new American administration must be given to benefit of the doubt and a chance to move towards a peace which grant the people of Vietnam what they have struggled so bravely to achieve : an opportunity to work out their own destiny in their own way.”

Nixon and his advisors believed that they could achieve what the previous administration could not (an American withdrawal with a guarantee that the Saigon regime would not be overthrown by communists). This was the promise of ensuing negotiations for peace and the policy of “Vietnamization of
On November 3, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon offered a strategy upon the twin approach of negotiations and Vietnamization of the war, accompanied by withdrawal of American forces. He was pessimistic about the outlook for negotiations and told that Vietnamization would permit the United States to disengage from the war even if negotiations failed. In the period since, the United States had further downgraded negotiations as an essential parts of any solution. The only subsequent hint that the government might

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war”. The United States ground troops were withdrawn to make the United States public happy but the air war was continued so as to undermine the NLF and Hanoi's war efforts.

Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 1, p. 17.

Realizing the inevitability of United States withdrawal, and seeing an opportunity in the communists post Tet fall back, the United States had launched a three month - accelerated pacification programme in November 1968 and then prolonged it as fixed policy. Accelerated pacification, i.e. a rush to “clear and hold” territory as communist strength declined, coordinated and updated programme that previously had functioned separately and been given low priority. One programme financed by the CIA and headed by former Viet Minh Officer Ngu-Yen Be, trained 59 man teams to spearhead rural construction. Rural Development (RD) teams were sent out to help reorganize village administration, start construction projects, and train villagers to defend themselves.

not consider the Vietnamization strategy sufficient by itself was provided by the President's speech on April 20, 1971 announcing future troops withdrawal, in which both the volume and tone of his discussion of negotiations implied a recognition that there was important. He stated explicitly that negotiations at least provide a better, shorter path to peace. But there was no evidence following that speech of a change in the United States position in the Paris negotiations, and the President's action in Cambodia 10 days later clearly gave priority to Vietnamization. This priority was reflected in the renewed emphasis upon the use of military means to end the war and in the justification of the Cambodian intervention on the grounds that it was needed to protect American lives and to guarantee the continue success of American withdrawal and Vietnamization programme.4

As the 1970s opened, both Washington and Hanoi were prepared to make new efforts to reach an agreement. The

The Nixon Administration had been compelled to reformulate American policy towards Vietnam due to the impossibility of attaining a victory within the limit set by the domestic opposition to the war, the obstacles posed by a tenacious enemy, and the fear of courting a major confrontation with China and Soviet Union as well as alienating America’s friends. The new strategy of Vietnamization consisted of unilaterally and gradually withdrawing American combat troops while simultaneously strengthening the Saigon government and its armed force. The Administration was still committed to maintaining an anti-communist stand in Saigon. But the change of means and the reduced importance of Vietnam to the American policy makers implied then to suggest an opening of negotiations with the North Vietnamese.\(^5\)


However, the Vietnamization programme was not welcome by everybody such as General Iran Van Don, the former chairman of the Senate and House Defence Committees, and finally Minister of Defence of South Vietnam had said that:
"I was an opponent of Vietnamization. I will tell just one story. I visited some unit in the field and tried to understand the programme of Vietnamization of war.... it was the head quarters of the 5th Division. I discussed the question with the commander of the division, General Minh Non Hieh, a most honest general and capable too. I was surprised by his answer; it opened my eyes. I ask him, "what do you think of Vietnamization? He said to me it is impossible to be implemented, why? He said, the 5th Division covers an area where there were two other divisions, Americans, and now with the departure of the two American divisions I have only my division to cover the whole area. I have three regiments for this area and must use one regiment to replace one division. How can I face the enemy like this? I have become weaker. He looked very disappointed. I was surprised; he was a quite man, polite man and he tried to do his best. But he said to me that this was impossible. How can I cover a bigger area with less units? So the Vietnamization of war means that we are becoming weaker."

Colonel Nguyen Huy Loi, a veteran staff officer with a military adviser to the South Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, thought that Vietnamization had not been approached properly; he started that:

"When I was in Paris, people came to ask me, How do you feel about the Vietnamization? I thought a Vietnamization Programme was possible, really, because we did it before in 1954 with the French. But the important thing is to Vietnamize the whole structure, right from the top, from those who conduct the whole war not just the small units. We had good officers who would stand and fight but we needed to put them in a right structure of force."

President Nixon's policy to vietnamize the war was first avowed during the spring of 1969. It involved the continuing but unscheduled withdrawal of American ground combat troops and the systematic strengthening of Army of Republic of Vietnam forces (ARVN). From the beginning the proposal was far from popular at Saigon. The political context of the Vietnamization proposal changed during the summer following the virtual abandonment of hope for progress in the peace negotiations and in broadening the political base of the Saigon government.\(^6\)

The Vietnamization programme not only implied approval of the military suppression of any peace sentiment, but also the abandonment of deep seated demands for revolutionary social change, long denied by the French, by Diem, and successor governments at Saigon.\(^7\)


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 602.
The new United States strategy required, the United States allies in Asia to take upon themselves the bulk of the defence burden. Washington assigned itself the role of good old uncle sam always willing to give its allies every help and support.\(^8\) However, this strategy was accompanied by systematic demonstrations of United States military might, such as resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in late 1971 and the massive incursions by American and Saigon troops into the territory of Cambodia and Laos.\(^9\)

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9. Cambodia won international recognition at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The Cambodian delegation told the conference that the new independent state would refrain from joining any military or political alliance and would pursue a peaceable foreign policy. Indeed, the Cambodian government did resist Western attempts to draw the country into the SEATO military bloc. In reply to blatant pressure Cambodia rejected all types of American aid and expelled some United States services from the country. Among other things, it prohibited the propaganda activity of the United States Information Agency (USIA) on its territory. At the same time the Cambodian government condemned the United States aggression in Vietnam and did all it could to help the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. It did it utmost to prevent the United States from involving Cambodia in the hostilities, which were gaining in scope and ferocity in neighbouring Vietnam and Laos. The Pentagon regarded Cambodia as a breach in the unstable
The new strategy of Vietnamization of war, while at the same time bringing greater military pressure to bear on Hanoi and steadily withdrawing United States forces, turned on the ability of the South Vietnamese to carry on the war on their own. In this sense this strategy was a gamble, betting that the South could hold its own with the North. With the adoption of the new Vietnamization strategy, it became paramount to make every possible disruptive effort against the enemy, particularly his logistic and troop reinforcement system, while substantial members of United States combat troops were still in the country.\(^{10}\)

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frontline in Indo-China The American Generals insisted that Washington should permit an extension of hostilities to the territory of Cambodia so as to gain one more sector from which to attack Vietnam

_Ibid._, pp 51-52

10 This basic purpose lay behind the cross-border operations into Cambodia and Laos. Cambodia was more or less off limits to major operations by allies forces, however, until Sihanouk's overthrow in March 1970. He had allowed the historically hated Vietnamese both North and South to use Cambodia as a forward base, yet he continued to proclaim his country's neutrality.

President Richard M. Nixon, however, put Vietnamization at centre stage in his plan to end the war, stating his strategic concept that:

"We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in co-operation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and then replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly schedules timetable. The withdrawal will be made from strength and not weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater."\(^{11}\)

In the sense, Vietnamization had begun in 1968 with a general mobilization that had raised the total of armed forces under Saigon's command to over 800,000 of which 380,000 were in the regular army. By 1970, the total was near one million, over half those troops were irregular territorial defence forces (see table 4.1).

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Source: James Lawson Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army 1950-1972

(All figures are approximate.

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Table 4.I: Republic of Vietnam armed forces strength (a)
President Nixon's noteworthy November 3, 1969, speech was directed towards two critical situations, one growing out of the anti-war demonstration in Washington and the other concerned with a serious political crisis emerging in late October 1969 in Saigon. The President declared that his programme of Vietnamization was the only feasible alternative to an abrupt American withdrawal from South Vietnam, which would betray long-standing commitments to the people effected and would precipitate a blood both of incalculable dimensions. An American retreat from Southeast Asia would allegedly cancel existing restraints on the reckless endeavours of great powers intent on world conquest. President Richard M. Nixon affirmed that the successful termination of the Vietnam war was the last hope for peace and freedom of millions of people about to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.12

The speech also discounted the prospects of a negotiated settlement. President Richard M. Nixon cited Ho

Chi Minh’s alleged rejection of a letter sent to Hanoi on July 15, in his reply dated August 25, just two weeks before Ho’s death. As subsequently disclosed, Ho’s reply had affirmed North Vietnam’s desire for a real peace with independent and freedom. He argued that the United States would have to agree to withdraw its troops and to respect the right of the population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves without foreign interference. Ho concluded that with good will on both sides, we might arrive at common efforts in finding a correct solution.\textsuperscript{13}

President Richard M. Nixon concluded his address with an emotion laden denunciation of the vocal minority in the United States who were, he said ready to court defeat, humiliation, and disaster, and the massacre of Asian friends in order to gain their ends. The President’s temporary success in quieting American protests had no observable effect on bringing the war to an end. Neither the Hanoi nor the NLF representatives in Paris saw any point in seeking a

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 603.
cease-fire in South Vietnam without an unequivocal promise of the withdrawal of the half-million allied troops assigned to support the unacceptable government in Saigon.  

The task of improving the discipline and performance of the Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces as part of the Vietnamization programme was critically important, but the plan also carried ominous political overtones. The admittedly superior fighting performance of the North Vietnamese troops and their Southern Vietcong allies was clearly attributable to better leadership and motivation. The anticipated economic impact of Vietnamization was also distributing. The continuance of large-scale American financial aid was an integral part of the laboured agreement reached between Saigon and Washington during 1969.

The Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) fire power was increased as departing United States units left behind their arms and equipments. The value of United States arms

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 604-605.
transfers to Saigon rose from $775 million in 1969 to $925 million in each year of 1969 and 1970.\textsuperscript{16}

However, Saigon recognised that Vietnamization or self-reliance required substantial efforts to build up the government forces. The logic of Vietnamization gave Saigon a convincing rationale to press for increased military and economic assistance in compensation for the gradual withdrawal of American combat troops.\textsuperscript{17}

**Nixon Doctrine**

In 1969, the Secretary of Defence, Laird, said that the United States would ensure permanent control of Saigon government over South Vietnam. On November 3, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon revived the Domino theory. He held that American defeat in Vietnam would result in a worldwide loss of faith in its leadership and that its withdrawal

\begin{flushleft}
16. William S. Turkey, n. 3, p. 130.

17. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Sukrke, n. 5, p. 95.
\end{flushleft}
from Vietnam would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but also of Southeast Asia.\(^\text{18}\)

The Nixon Doctrine flowed out of his various statements, starting with his informal Press Conference on July 1969 at Guam on November 3, 1969 and January 11, 1970 statements, and state of World Message of February 10, 1970. It does not involve any shift in the United States policy in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine enjoins on client states to provide the man power and the rest of the resources.\(^\text{19}\)

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19. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

The Nixon Doctrine was a philosophical statement emphasizing reduced engagement for the United States and urging greater self-reliance upon others. And it was also abroad strategy dealing with the United States responses to various level of military threat. As a strategy, it seeks to shift primary responsibility for providing military man power to nations under threat, while at the same time reaffirming all existing treaty commitments. It therefore, leaves a large area of future policy in determinate. Finally, the Doctrine rationalize United States military withdrawal tactics in a fashion that provides wide latitude in responding, on the other hand, to the pressures of United States domestic public opinion and, on the other, to reactions of United States friends and forces.

If the Kennedy and Johnson Administration's proceeded on the assumption that saving South Vietnam was a vital national interests of the United States, the statements and actions of the Nixon Administration seem to suggest that the United States government no longer considers this to be so. In his 1971 report to Congress on United States foreign policy, President Richard M. Nixon made the following statement about the United States response to aggression which does not involve one of the nuclear powers that:

"we will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources appropriate to our size and our interests. But it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defence and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility."

In discussing the reasons why he had decided on a de-
escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the President said:

"Some urged that we escalate in an attempt to impose a military solution on the battle field. We ruled out this approach because of the nature of the conflict and of the enemy, the cost of such a policy, the risks of a wider war, and the deeply held convictions of many of our people".

In effect, Richard M. Nixon once said that:

"the struggle in Vietnam was not vital to United States in the world and that seeking a military solution to the war was not worth the cost involved. Therefore, a diplomatic solution which did not abandon South Vietnam was seen as the objective. We sought above all a rapid negotiated solution to the conflict by progressively defining the terms of a settlement that would accommodate the legitimate interests of both sides. And in the absence of a settlement, we sought through Vietnamization, to shift American responsibilities to the South Vietnam."\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) Thus, within the span of only ten years, the United States government’s perception of its national interests in Asia had shifted dramatically. In the summer and fall of 1961, the mood in Washington was that China posed a growing threat to United States interests in Asia generally, and in Southeast Asia specifically, and that those interests were so vital that they had to be protected with United States arms if the South Vietnamese government was unable to do so itself. In 1971, another president representing another political view point, decided that China may not be a military threat to United States interests in Asia and that the accommodation with China which included a political solution in Vietnam was more in America’s interests than trying to press for a military solution to that problem.

One may conclude from this shift in policy by Nixon Administration, and the apparent willingness of the American people to support it, that the United States no longer perceives any vital interests at stake in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the two factors cited above, on which Kennedy advisors justified
The principle which President Richard M. Nixon enunciated that, certainly was a change from the policy followed by his immediate predecessors. Let the principle be described in Nixon's own words:

"It central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defence and developments of allies and friends, but that American cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all the programme, executive all the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help where is considered in our interests. America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effect in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests and thereby building peace."\(^{22}\)

the view that Vietnam was vital - the Asian balance of power and United States world wide prestige - Nixon seemed prepared to take care of those remaining balance in Asia - Peking - while reassuring American allies Taiwan-Thailand and South Vietnam - that he would not abandon them as part of an accommodation with China. In the summer of 1971, it was not certain whether Nixon would succeed in extricating the United States from what he believed to be an over commitment of United States resources and prestige in South Vietnam. However, the American people were clearly in the mood for a searching re-examination of United States national interests in Asia, including the normalization of relations with China.

Ibid., p. 1067.

It was interesting that the genesis of this principle, according to Nixon himself was learnt by him from a leader of an Asian country. He said in his nation-wide television address on November 3, 1969 that:

"When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, United States policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. In accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy towards Asia: First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitment. Second, we should provide a shield if nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with United States or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, increase involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall took to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence." 

23. Ibid.

When President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to stand for re-election. Underlying the decision was the American frustration over its role in Southeast Asia. Increasing loses in men, money and material in Vietnam so demolished the United States that its desperately sought an honourable withdrawal. The wide spread intellectual unrest, a situation approximating a rebellion on diverse American campuses, and a severe rift in democratic ranks had played the Johnson administration. The effects on the United States economy were more telling: it could not provide for both guns and butter. A later MIT study estimated the comprehensive cost of Vietnam war up to 1971
Peace initiations

The realization of futility of the war in Vietnam came to a number of high Government officials as early as 1967, though such were then in minority. Thus on May 19, 1967 in a memo to the President, Defense Secretary McNamara stated that:\footnote{24}

"The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."

at $753 billions, or equal to the gross national product of the United States for one year. Richard M. Nixon, appeared metamorphosed as he got himself elected on a platform of disengagement promising massive troops withdrawal and rapprochement with China.


24. After McNamara resigning. His successor, Clark Clifford (from March 1968) soon came to the similar conclusion. He had stated that:

"I was convinced that the military course we were pursuing was not only endless, but hopeless. A further substantial increase in Americanization of the war, and thus leave us even further from our goal of a peace that would permit the people of South Vietnam to fashion their own political and economic institutions."

The situation in Vietnam during 1970 could be summed up in one sentence: it had been a year of progressive military de-escalation and growing political confrontation. To every combatant - the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front - it had become undeniably obvious that military victory was unattainable. But it was equally obvious that no one was prepared to accept defeat either. Everyone was tired of an endless war, but no one was prepared to call a halt to it. The blood and suffering of the hundreds of thousands of lives thrown into battle had to be justified by some concrete results, however, meager. Thus, the struggle for South Vietnam had shifted to another sphere. Fighting had been replaced by negotiations, propaganda and the manipulation of popular opinion.  

The choice for the United States in Vietnam, therefore, was between unattainable victory and unacceptable defeat. Both negotiation and escalation were beset with many

imponderables. If the limited escalation of 1963 had any lesson it was an exercise in futility. The United States had to blame herself for such a state of affairs.\textsuperscript{26}

The misadventure in Vietnam had invited the conclusion that United States arms and technical advisors cannot in themselves provide national cohesion or build a nation, even in opposition to an externally assisted guerrilla enemy, and that without such cohesion United States efforts may prove futile and debilitating both at home and abroad.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

It was a mistake to think that a viable state can be built in South Vietnam without a requisite political base and it was a blunder on the part of the United States to take over the war. How easy it was for the communist-dominated National Liberation Front (NLF) to convince the countryside that the current war was a continuation of the war of independence. As a prominent Buddhist leader one said that:

"The more American troops sent to Vietnam, the more the anti American campaign led by the NLF becomes successful, Anger and hatred rise in the hearts of peasants as they see their villages burned, their compatriots killed, their houses destroyed by American soldiers holding guns with bayonets, make people think of Indo-China war between the French and the Vietnam and cause pain even to anti Communist Vietnamese."

This conclusion was implicitly expressed in both the Nixon Doctrine and President Ford's Pacific Doctrine.27

However, the sequence of events that led to negotiations probably started with General Westmoreland's visit to Washington in November 1967. On that occasion, General Westmoreland told a joint session of Congress that the war was being militarily won. He outlined indicators of progress and started that a limited withdrawal of United


During the post-1968 period, the main strategic problem was to sustain enough pressure on the battle field to support the negotiations in Paris and definitely bring an end to the limited war. As the Vietnamization strategy became the main focus of United States policy and withdrawal of American troops proceeded, the defeat of the Saigon forces became the main focus. While the purely military balance of forces had not been a major preoccupation of Hanoi during the period of greatest United States involvement. During the 1969-70 period the issue was what level of military activity was necessary to support the Paris negotiations and counter pacification and Vietnamization while waiting for the United States to complete its troop withdrawal.

States combat forces might be undertaken beginning late in 1968.\textsuperscript{28}

A new phase in the conflict began and Washington recognized that it was manifestly impossible to clear South Vietnam of communist forces, as the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report had noted the growing menace of communist militants on March 1, 1968. The North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (NLF) discerned in this a long awaited opportunity to exploit American hesitation. The proposal presented by the NLF delegate, Tran Bun Kien to the Paris talks in May 1969 contained concessions designed to give the talks momentum, instead of unconditional American withdrawal, the NLF now called for unilateral withdrawal. The previous demand of political settlement must be achieved by the time of the military cease-fire was modified. Although, the principle was maintained in order to avoid a repeat of events

following the Geneva Accords, the NLF was willing to accept an interim government at the time of cease-fire thus leaving elections and the eventual settlement to a future date. But the NLF stood firm on its demand that the interim government must be a peace cabinet, the existing Saigon establishment headed by President Nguyen Van Thien, whom the NLF regarded as an American puppet, could not be represented.  

The American response to the NLF plan subsequently gave rise to a lost opportunity thesis. President Richard M. Nixon on May 14, 1968 called for a partial military withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces. An International Control Commission (ICC) would supervise the remaining withdrawals.  

Whichever the case, the American position was soon classified. A joint Washington - Saigon proposal in June 1969 called for an election formula whereby the NLF would

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29. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, n. 5, p. 76.
30. Ibid., p. 77.
be integrated into the existing Saigon government. This was totally unacceptable to the NLF which saw it as a prelude to its own destruction. Moreover, the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary Government for South Vietnam (PRG) in June 1969 demonstrated its willingness to accept any compromise that would be little its prestige and power in an eventual settlement.\(^{31}\)

However, a partial bombing halt and preliminary negotiations with the communists would be continued, the pressures on the Saigon government to adjust were rapidly mounting. Thus, Thien was in quick order to accept the American conditions for a bombing pause, sent a delegation

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\(^{31}\) Stalemate was also evident on another level. When the secret talks between Hanoi and Washington commenced in August 1969, Henry A. Kissinger proposed to Hanoi’s chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, that both states should withdraw their forces from the South as part of an overall settlement. Le Duc Tho rejected this. Hanoi did not publicly admit that there were Army of Republic of Vietnam (RAVN) regulars in the south, and continued to maintain that Vietnamese forces in Vietnam and the American aggressors could not be equated. Le Duc Tho also reiterated, the demand for Thien’s exclusion from any coalition government in Saigon as a pre-condition for cease-fire.

to Paris to negotiate with the Northern Vietnamese and the NLF, to formulate a policy on the question of a political settlement in the South which at least had the appearance of flexibility, and acquire in gradual American troops withdrawal without reciprocal actions by the North Vietnamese. The contrast between their demands and Thien's desires was demonstrated by Saigon's five-point proposal of June 23, 1968.\(^{32}\)

Thien initially stuck to a maximalist position and referred to send a delegation to the first plenary session of the Paris talks scheduled for November 6, 1968. He stated that:

"We do not and will not accept the participation of the so-called South Vietnam National Liberation Front (NLF) as a valid participant at any stage of the peace talks, even in the

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32. Those were (1) the communist must stop all military and subversive activities in the South (2) North Vietnam must disband the NLF "puppet organization" and withdraw their troops from the South. (3) the RNV must determine its domestic political affairs without outside intervention. (4) The United States should remain in the South until peace is restored; and (5) The independence of the RVN must be effectively guaranteed.

Ibid.
While United States engagement and Vietnamization were in train, the Nixon Administration was also attempting to get serious negotiations underway with North Vietnam. President Richard M. Nixon had written to Ho Chi Minh in late December 1968 on the subject as a gesture of good will from the newly elected United States government, but received a brutal, totally negative response on December 31. In February 1969 Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Cyrus Vance as the United States representative in the largely open talks in Paris, and in August 1969 Henry Kissinger tried to initiate meaningful secret talks with the North Vietnamese, but to no avail. Although serious secret negotiations were resumed between Henry Kissinger and Le Duy Tho in February 1970, it was not until October, 1972, when their Eastern 1972 offensive ran out of steam, that the North

Ibid., pp. 92-99.

34. Ho Chi Minh died in September of the following year, but the Hanoi regime continued its unrelenting and uncompromising outlook without a change in beat.

General Bruce Palmer Jr, n. 10, p. 119.
Vietnamese finally indicated that they were ready to make a political settlement.\textsuperscript{35}

In the meantime, President Richard M. Nixon had sought to bring increasing pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate by seeking separate talks with the Soviet Union and China. The strategic arms limitations talks with the USSR, which began in mid November 1969 and led eventually to SALTI, were initiated partly for this purpose. Likewise, the President’s trip to China in February 1972, which reopened contact between the two countries, was also intended to put pressure on Hanoi.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\end{itemize}

But the huge gap in perception and principle still divided the two sides. Hanoi’s terms had not changed since April 8, 1968, when Premier Pham Van Dong had enunciated “four points” based on the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The four points called for (1) recognition of Vietnam’s national right to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, and cessation of all United States military activity in both the North and South. (2) strict implementation of the 1954 prescription against military alliances with foreign countries and foreign military bases’ while Vietnam was still temporarily divided into two zones. (3) Settlement of South Vietnam’s internal affairs in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam National Front for liberation and (4) Peaceful
While the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) would negotiate a military settlement of the war, the Saigon government would seek a political solution with the National Liberation Front (NLF). American forces would be gradually withdrawn; the Vietnamization of the balance of the war would leave Saigon as a strong and friendly government. The new policy was also based on rapprochement with China, which seemed eager to grasp the American hand of friendship progressively in the hope of using it against the Soviet Union. 37

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reunification by the Vietnamese people in both zones without foreign interference. The third point required establishment of a coalition government that would have to include the NLF. The Johnson administration had insisted on withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops in advance of United States withdrawal and had refused to discuss political arrangements except in terms of the South’s self-determination. Nixon and Kissinger persuaded to propose a mutual troops withdrawal and restoration of the demilitarized zones as a boundary. But this proposal by implying that North Vietnamese as well as United States troops were “foreign” to South Vietnam and that Vietnam was two countries ran directly counter to Hanoi’s non-negotiable position that Geneva had affirmed Vietnam’s juridical unity.

William S. Turkey, n.3, p.119.

The plan for gradual withdrawal of United States troops was not achieved without further bloodshed. Efforts to make the operation compatible with the achievement of peace with honor involve more saturation bombing of Vietnam - North and South - than ever before, mining of Hai-Phong Harbour, escalation of the clandestine war in Laos and an overt invasion of Cambodia. From 1970 to 1973, the Vietnamese conflict became truly an Indo-China war.\(^{38}\)

For the President, the peace package was a means to extricate United States ground forces from Vietnam while simultaneously buying an understanding from the communists not to force the demise of Nguygen Van Thien’s regime before a decent interval that would undoubtedly be kind to American prestige in the world and Richard M. Nixon in the history books.\(^{39}\)

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), Vol. 80, No. 16. p.27
Factors led to the Peace Agreement

International circumstances at that time were of course unfavorable to any wider war, whereas in 1970 there were no such obstacles, the Vietnam war was being wound down, the American’s withdrawing, bombing of North Vietnam had ceased, the non-aligned Sihanonk was in exile and the Lon Noi government in Cambodia was desperately seeking help. The Soviet Union, maintaining its embassy in Phnom-Penh, had not recognized Sihanouk’s government in Peking. The Chinese, for their part, had been confidentially negotiating for nearly two months with Lon Noi. They were urging the new regime to revive Sihanonk’s policy of accommodation of North Vietnam and the NLF in return for China’s friendship and non-recognition of the Sihanouk. But the confusion in Cambodia following the overthrow of Sihanouk - North Vietnamese pressure on Lon Noi to see reason, the uncertain nature of support for Sihanouk among officials, towns people and peasantry, the historic Cambodia fear of the Vietnam invader - all conspired to drive the Khmer regime, toward
neutrality or a new alignment with the communist powers, but into the arms of the West.\textsuperscript{40}

By 1967, more and more Americans were coming also to the conclusion that the war was atleast unwinnable if not totally wrong. The first anti war demonstrations had already taken place in Washington, and on many United States campuses in April and May 1965, and in October 1967, 35,000 demonstrators descended on Washington. Increasing number of government officials as well were beginning to wonder as reportedly had Assistant Secretary of Defence John Mc Naughton as early as December 1964, if they were on the wrong side.\textsuperscript{41}

The discordant voices in the American administration had been proceeded by a nation wide student concern. By 1968, an election year, the anti-Vietnam war protest

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} J.L.S. Girling, "Nixon's Algeria Doctrine and Disengagement in Indochina," \textit{Pacific Affairs}, (Vancouver), Vol XLIX, No. 4, winter 1971-72, p.532.
\end{itemize}
movement had widened to include most of the intellectuals and created a severe rift in the Democratic Party's ranks. After the initial benefits to the war, the economy had began to deteriorate and thus causing concern to the United States authorities. The recession, growing unemployment and the declining dollar boasted public clamour to end the war. Both the sides in the Vietnamese war had an eye on United States political situation. North Vietnam and the NLF's decision to launch a major offensive on all the main cities and towns of South Vietnam around the time of the Tet offensive in January 1968 must had been taken with a view to exploiting the American electoral politics. The attack would be followed by negotiations in which the Americans would be at a distinct advantage.\footnote{D.R. Sardesai, n. 24, p.416.}

The Tet offensive, however, produced a military stalemate, though it had a tremendous impact on American politics. The NLF was not successful in holding any of the cities and towns except Hua for a short period. The NLF's expectations of major popular risings in its favour in the urban centres were not fulfilled its losses were heavy, about 40,000 killed, with many more casualty. The impact of the offensive on United States and South Vietnamese forces was disastrous. In
Moreover, there had been tremendous pressure on the United States from all over the world to stop bombing of North Vietnam unconditionally. At the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Session of the United Nations General Assembly, even though Vietnam was not on the agenda, most of the members who participated in the general debate spoke on the Vietnam situation. An analysis of the speeches provides an interesting insight into world opinion on American bombing of North Vietnam. Out of 109 members who participated in the debate, only six countries, including the United States supported the bombing policy. America had the support of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Nationalist China and Thailand. Eight countries demanded mutual de-escalation of hostilities in Vietnam or as some of them put it, there should be reciprocal action or that all the parties should stop fighting. Countries

Washington, a major debate on the potential costs of continuing the war took place based on the assumption that only a quarter of North Vietnam’s forces were involved in the Tet offensive. From that point of view, the United States seemed resolved to disengage from Vietnam with honour. Bombing and other forms of warfare would be continued to secure the best terms in the preferred course of negotiations. An immediate result of all this was Johnson’s decision not to seek office again. By the end of the year, the former Cold War hero, Richard Nixon, was elected the Presidency platform of disengagement from Vietnam.

\textit{Ibid.}
like the United Kingdom, Belgium, Austria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Argentina and Uganda belonged to this group. Fifty-five countries including some allies of the United States and the NATO partners, like Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, demanded an unconditional end the American bombing. A total of thirty seven countries either did not mention Vietnam or express no definite opinion on the question of bombing, four countries Equador, Mexico, Barbados and Jamaica extended full support to U. Thant’s proposals, and eight more hoped for achieving peace in Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. Pakistan, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, Laos, Singapore and Madagascar came under this category.43

43. Added to this world opinion, there had been a great deal of criticism within the United States itself which almost forced President Lyndon B. Johnson to revise his bombing policy. On September, 29, 1967, President Johnson, in an address to the nation from San Antonio in Texas said that :

"The United States is willing immediately to stop aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We would assume that while discussions proceed North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitations."

Undoubtedly, this offer went further than any of his previous offers. He was not anymore insisting on prior commitment or promise by Hanoi about reciprocity. Instead, he seemed to leave it to Hanoi to reciprocate suitably while the talks were in progress. However, his offer did not go for enough to promise
The cost of war also was enormous as well as the casualty. In 1968 it was estimated that United States was spending about $22 billion a year. The exact figures were debatable but no doubt about the huge sum had been spent. In early 1971, President Richard M. Nixon had reduced the cost but it was still huge. Economic assistance to South Vietnam also was costly. The heavy burden of the war contributed to a rise in the United States taxes and facilitated inflation in the country.44

The casualty figures of the war mounted on both sides. With January 1, 1961 American battle deaths came to 45,665 and American wounded numbered 302,774 through March 18, 1972 as shown in table 4.2.

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### Department of Defense OASD (Comptroller) Directorate for Information Operations

Date: March 22, 1972

![Image with text](image-url)

#### Table: Casualties

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<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Jan. 23-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 30-Feb. 5</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Department of Defense OASD (Comptroller) Directorate for Information Operations

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**Note:** The table above shows the number of casualties incurred by U.S. military personnel from January 2, 1972, through March 18, 1972, in connection with the conflict in Vietnam. The total number of casualties over this period is 90.
The Cease-fire

It looked as if the Paris Agreements of 1973, like the Geneva Accords of 1954, had merely transferred the struggle from military to the political plan. Several Statements from the spokesman of the Nixon Administration indicated that the United States would continue to assist Saigon in its struggle for survival. Concerned about the possibility of re-entry into the Vietnam war, and distrustful of Nixon in view of the Watergate revelations, the United States Congress adopted, overriding the President's authority to use troops only in the event of a war declared by Congress or if sanctioned by a Congressional statutory authorization.

45. It was revealed later that Nixon had actually written to Thien promising military support if Hanoi attack South Vietnam again.

Lalita Prasad Singh, n.1, p.18.

46. Ibid.

During the past three years British and United States governments had consistently stressed the importance of getting talks with North Vietnam start. Two statements from North Vietnam raised hopes that such talks would at last begin. The first North Vietnamese statement to inspire hope of talks was the assurance by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in December 1967 that, if the United States stop the bombing
In the conference on January 30, 1969 Ambassador Xuan Thuy indicated that the problems of South Vietnam must be solved by the population of the South on the basis of self-determination. Consequently, the Americans had of the North, North Vietnam would talk with the United States. But when the President Johnson wrote to Ho Chi Minh in February 1967, he had shown no signs of being troubled about the will issue, and asked for no clarification on it. He appeared to accept that if the United States bombing of North Vietnam stop, North Vietnam would be ready to talk. Neither in February 1967, not ten months later whom Nguyen Duy Trinh said : "will" was the United State prepared to end the bombing of North Vietnam unconditionally and permanently in return for talks.

Two months later, in response to President’s Johnson speech of March 31, the second statement came to arouse hopes of peace and stated that :

“The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declare that it is ready to have its representative meet with representatives of the United States to decide on the unconditional cessation of the bombing and other war acts against the DRV so that discussions could start.”

Up to the mid April these were no indications that either side seriously envisaged an early settlement. As the debate about the site for the Vietnam talks dragged on, the North Vietnamese demonstrated their continuing distrust of President Johnson by pointing out, with obvious relish that the American President’s of expressed willingness to meet his adversaries any time and anywhere did not mean what it appeared to mean. On April 8, United States and South Vietnamese forces launched the largest allies offensive of the Vietnam war. This operation gave North Vietnam its heavy bombardment for more than three months - though all the action, was south of the 19th parallel.

apparently accepted the principle of self-determination for a considerable time. At the time of the Honolulu meeting on July 19, 1968, President Johnson spoke to President Thien about an honourable peace which would allow the people of South Vietnam to decide their own future. Moreover, the Americans also declared that they had no desire to retain military bases or alliances with South Vietnam, thus accepting the principle of neutrality.47

47. By the end of January 1969, therefore, the character of the Paris conference had been clearly defined. It had in fact become the follow-up of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The goal was the definite decolonization of South Vietnam on the basis of the self-determination of its people and the diplomatic and military neutrality of the country. The problem was to find out what self-determination meant to the participants. From the start, it appeared that their interpretations were contradictory. The Americans, convinced that only North Vietnamese military help allow the NLF to impose its rule on the South Vietnamese, demanded first the withdrawal of Northern troops. In return, Washington was prepared to withdraw its own forces once the Saigon army was in position to take over the struggle. Hence, the Americans Paris had demanded the mutual withdrawal of non South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam since the beginning of February.


Preliminary talks between the United States and the DRV began on May 13, 1968 in Paris. The Government of the DRV
The Paris Accords finally signed by the four parties concerned the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), the Thien Government and the United States - on January 27, 1973 brought about a cease-fire in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The Accords provided for withdrawal of all American troops, the return of prisoners of war, a cease-fire in place without demarcation lines. A democratic solution for the South was envisaged. The PRG and the Thien government were to resolve their conflicts through mutual consultation. A Council of Reconciliation and Concord was to be established for organizing elections in the South. Thereafter, a tripartite coalition government of Thien,

nominated Mr. Xuan Thuy former Foreign Minister of the Government of DRV, as its representative at the Paris talks. This preliminary talks constitute only a beginning in the settlement of the complex problem. The time taken to decide Paris as the venue for talks, despite President Johnson’s repeated statement that he was ready for talks at any place and at any time, was a clear indication of the difficulties involved. Both sides appeared anxious to keep the dialogue going till they were able to settle the preliminaries and pave the way for the convening of the Geneva Conference.

BSN Murti, n.43, p.63.
the PRG and neutralist would be established. Reunification of Vietnam could be considered though consequent consultations between the North and the South. As for Laos and Cambodia, the Paris Accords confirmed the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. An unwritten clause of the agreement was the United States promise to pay $3.2 billion towards the reconstruction of the DRV. This was never paid - Hanoi’s march against Saigon in March 1975 had, in Washington’s view, absolved it of that promise.48

It had been evident for several months that the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam considered the 1954 Geneva Agreements to be a basis of a possible settlement. However, it had been clear for some time that Washington and Hanoi did not interpret these Agreements in the same way. From the start it appeared that the object of the American tactics was to push first and foremost the military clauses of the Agreements and especially those

which seemed advantageous for Saigon: the re-establishment and control of the demilitarized zone, the mutual withdrawal of external forces, and the reactivation of the International Control Commission. On the other hand, the delegates from Hanoi, insisted that the political aspects of the Agreements were the fundamental one and should have preference that most of the military clauses were temporary and aimed only at permitting the political settlement.\footnote{Philippe Devillers, n.45, p.340.}

The Agreement also provided for a cessation of all acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the withdrawal of all the arm forces of the United States and its allies from South Vietnam within a two-month period, and

\footnote{Philippe Devillers, n.45, p.340.}

The Accords brought the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Le Duc Tho, Chief North Vietnamese negotiator (who did not accept it) and Henry Kissinger, but no peace to states of Indochina. The three Vietnamese parties to the Accords viewed the agreement as a temporary truce, giving time to each to prepare for the final phase of the conflict. The Accords had implicitly allowed the DRV to station about 140,000 troops in the South until a political solution was reached. The cease-fire left south Vietnam with pockets of PRG rule. The withdrawal of United States forces left the South Vietnam exposed to an eventual invasion by the North.

D.R. Serdesai, n.24, p.428.
for the interference of the warring states in the domestic affairs of the Vietnamese people. The signatories to the Paris Agreements came to an understanding on a political settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs, based on the principle of recognition of the actual alignment of forces in that country.  

The cease-fire agreement and implementing protocols relative to Vietnam ended the words of presidential proclamation issued May 7, 1975 active participation conflict. President Nixon on January 26, 1973, issued a proclamation stating that the United States had achieved its goal of peace with honour in Vietnam and calling the next day for a "National Moment" and "Thanks giving". The next year President Nixon issued a proclamation on February 26, in which he designated March 29 as Vietnam Veterans Day, observing that the departure of the last United States Combat Soldier from Vietnam on that day in 1973 marks the final

50. Alexander Laurentyev, n. 8, p. 53.
conclusion of America's longest, and without question its most difficult war.\textsuperscript{51}

Moreover, this agreement retained main principles of the October draft agreement. It recognized, although not as explicitly as the PRG and the DRV had demanded, the existence of two administrations and two armies in South Vietnam (the PRG and the Thien government) and three political tendencies (the PRG, the Thien forces and a neutral third force). It ended direct American military pressure on the North and finalized the withdrawal of American forces from the South. The United States even made a conditional promise over five billion dollars in reconstruction aid to the DRV, although this was much less important and at any rate did not materialize. The agreement did not provide for a peace cabinet even on an interim basis in which, and Thien had promised of continued American economic and military equipments assistance. Hanoi did not exclude the possibility of renewed American bombing, or even of the reintroduction

\textsuperscript{51} Russell H. Fifield, n. 2, p. 685.
of ground troops, if the Saigon government were seriously threatened. Still, it was not an unfavourable agreement if viewed as a transition to the final phase of the conflict. The central committee of the Lao Dong Party hailed it as the basis for their people to march forward and win new victories and achieve independence and democracy in the South and proceed to the peaceful reunification of their fatherland. The PRG similarly claimed that a new period was opened very advantageous for the completing of the national and democratic resolution. Of most importance for destiny of the Vietnamese people was Article 15 of the Paris Agreements, in which the signatories recognized the principle of unity and territorial integrity of the whole of Vietnam.

The world opinion welcomed the Paris Agreements. It was regarded as a historic victory of the Vietnamese people. It guaranteed the political and legal bases for the Vietnamese people’s fundamental right and self-determination as well.

52 Charles E Morrison and Astri Suhrke, n. 5, p. 88.
CHAPTER-V

New Initiatives in Thai - United States Relations

since 1975

Since 1973, Thailand was in a state of internal turmoil as successive governments were pursuing multiplicity of political interests and unable to compromise on vital national issues.¹

The Thai policy and action were predicted on conditions within Thailand itself as well as on the thinking and perception of individual leaders who were at the helm of governmental affairs. The democratization of the Thai policy had a direct effect upon the new foreign policy orientation in the beginning of 1973 which was designed to reflect both the changing realities of international policies as well as the growing popular participation in the policy formulation process.²

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When Kukrit Pramoj became Thai Prime Minister in 1975 he had expressed a policy of stressing the desire for friendly relations with all countries regardless of political differences. On March 9, 1975, he outlined the foreign policy of his newly-formed coalition government to the House of Representative that:

"This government will pursue an independent policy taking into account national interests which are based upon economic and security considerations. This government will promote peaceful co-existence by befriending every country which demonstrates goodwill towards Thailand, irrespective of differences in ideologies or political systems; rather non-interference in internal affairs, justice, and equality will be the considered principles in ordering bilateral relations. In order to create a balance in relations with the superpowers, this government will endeavour to recognize and normalize ties with the People's Republic of China, to effect a withdrawal of foreign troops from Thailand within a year, through friendly negotiations and taking into account prevailing conditions in the region. This government will strengthen ties with neighbouring countries and support co-operation with ASEAN in every way, while continuing to seek constructive contacts with the Democratic

2. Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, JNU, 1976), p.3.
Republic of Vietnam. On foreign assistance, this government will consider obligations as being vital, and will not put itself in any disadvantageous position, as the government intends to go as far as possible—and as rapidly as possible in creating a basis for economic and military self-reliance.”

In fact, the prevailing mood in the United States in 1975 was one of withdrawal. Neither the United States government nor the American public was inclined to continue heavy involvement abroad politically, militarily, or otherwise. Coincided with prevailing sense of resignation in the United States, the Government of Kukrit set a one-year deadline for the removal of American troops and military equipments from Thai territory. In addition, student-led demonstrations against continued United States military presence in Thailand naturally put an additional strain on the bilateral relations.4

3. Ibid., p. 1

4. The question of United States bases and military presence was a big issue in 1973 and the short-lived Seni Government, which had proceeded the Kukrit Government, had set a schedule of 18 months for the withdrawal of United States military forces from Thailand. Prime Minister Kukrit later shortened it to one year. Consequently, the United States agreed to pull out 7500
On May 7, 1975, when Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj sent the United States a Memorandum stating Thailand’s intentions to review all the existing bilateral agreements with the United States, there was a tacit understanding between the two governments of the necessity to structure a new set of relations requiring a termination of the existing military base agreements which the United States was unwilling to sustain and Thailand was unable to maintain.5

5. Ibid.

In the course of United States withdrawal from Indo-China, President Richard M. Nixon enunciated a new doctrine of United States policy towards Southeast Asia, and after the communist victory, President Gerald Ford provided a capstone with his Pacific Doctrine. In his foreign policy report to the Congress in 1971, Nixon made clear that the United States would seek to reduce its military role in Southeast Asia and...
Thai-United States relations in this period had formed an integral part of the American development in Asia and Pacific. Following the American decision to withdraw military from South Vietnam in the early 1970s Thailand had remained, in geopolitical terms, potentially the focal point of United States involvement on continental Southeast Asia.\(^6\)


The post-1975 period of Thai-American relations offers a vignette of the evolving process of adjustments to prevailing international realities as experienced by both the United States and Thailand. It seems that the post 1975 period had given rise to an unusual circumstances which permits both the United states and Thailand to much better understand and appreciate their respective positions, particularly in the context of their bilateral ties and adjustment to prevailing realities.\footnote{Ibid., p. 119.}

Since Henry Kissinger’s appointment as Secretary of State, the American foreign policy had been geared towards what would call the “big power syndrome.”


Kissinger had never paid great attention to the Pacific or Southeast Asia, concentrating his policy on Moscow and Peking. The manner in which the Paris Peace Accord was concluded indicated the Kissinger style of foreign diplomacy, the accord was reached through consultation with the Soviet and China but with little regard to South Vietnam. While the United States attained the objective of disengaging itself from Southeast Asia, South Vietnam and Cambodia were left to defend for themselves. The final outcome of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 showed a total lack of action on the United States’s part to reserve the declining trend of the American fortunes in Southeast Asia,
By 1975, the United States strategic withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia was well underway. The failure of the former policy to deter the communist attempt at predominance of power was manifested by the growing contradiction of the Vietnam problems. President Richard M. Nixon, therefore, took a bold step in reshaping the United States to reorder its relations with China which was the key to this planned military withdrawal while the new strategy was rationalized as an attempt to forge more sound and realistic relations with the Asian Countries.\(^8\)

which was obvious reminder to Thailand of the ongoing American strategy. But what cause the Thai leaders to finally break from the traditionally reliance on United States was the disregard for small nations’ rights and sovereignty, as demonstrated in the Mayaguez Affairs. The United States showed a high-handed approach in using Thai territory to launch relation against the Khmer Rouge. The incident not only unleashed a popular outburst (in the form of student demonstrations against the United States Embassy in Bangkok), but gave cause for the Kukrit Government to announce a revision of all existing treaties and agreement between the two countries. This move amounted to the first real decision to revamp Thailand’s stand and reflected the many problems of the non-formal treaty agreements of the past.


8. American allies such as Japan and Thailand began charting new courses to face a changing regional environment. For one thing, both countries swiftly moved to accommodate their
Since that time, the Thai government introduced a new foreign policy line and stated that the Thai government would give priority to ordering relations with all friendly countries irrespective of ideological, social and political differences. Emphasis was given to improving relations with neighbouring countries. It also showed a significant decision to move away from previously singular dependence on the United States to a more balanced posture in relations with the power based explicitly on normalization of ties with China. Hence, Thailand by the beginning of 1975, was somewhat prepared to absorb the impact of the United States withdrawal.  

The heart of the new strategy called for Thailand to recognize People’s Republic of China diplomatically and to seek an accommodation with Vietnam. This in actual fact

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former antagonist, the People’s Republic of China. And the impending United States military withdrawal meant a fundamental change in the power equilibrium of Southeast Asia, especially when it became obvious, with the American troops pull out starting in 1973.

Ibid.

9. Ibid., p.120.
conformed with the expressed feature of the New American policy line emphasizing self-reliance and initiatives by Asian states to workout differences among themselves.\textsuperscript{10}

As far as Thailand was concerned, 1976 saw the conscious attempt to seriously live with new and more flexible policy. The Bali Summit of the ASEAN heads of government in February gave new significant to the life and meaning of this regional organization which had existed since 1967.\textsuperscript{11} The former strategy of dependence on the United States was gradually modified as emphasis shifted increasingly to ASEAN as a regional grouping given not merely to economic and regional cooperation, but more importantly to a collective security endeavour responding to 'the new political arrangement.'\textsuperscript{12} This new direction, desires a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) announced in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. The foreign policy

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p.121.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p.128.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 129.
\end{itemize}
readjustment process culminated in Thai demand for a dismantling of all American military installation in the country, and a complete troop withdrawal during 1975 and 1976. Having been frustrated all along by anti-war movements at home, the United States government seemed to understand, if not sympatize, with Thai sentiments at the time. In short, the United States logically lessened its commitments to Thailand. By de-emphasizing the United States role in Southeast Asia, Thailand or its part committed itself to regionalism. The new policy of peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries automatically de-emphasized ideological differences. To some, the Thai-American relations during this period were defined as being downgraded. Yet it could preferably by argued that they were strengthened, they attained maturation through criticism and self criticism process.


14. Ibid.
This action, however, opened the way for Thailand to establish some kind of balanced relations with mainland China and new communist regimes of Indo-China. In other words, this major shift of Thai foreign policy was to accommodate to the new situation of the post Vietnam War and was a result of the United States abandonment of its containment policy.15

Thailand moreover, view the collapse of United States policy to prevent a communist take over of Indo-China as a major setback of the United State policy in this area, likewise the United States commitment to defend Thailand became in doubt.16 However, as far as the containment policy of United States was concerned, both Thailand and the United States have admitted that they failed to achieve their common goal. They finally dropped this policy and

15. Makata Ma, Consequences of the Vietnam War on Thai Foreign Policy, (Thesis), California State University, 1980, p. 27.

conducted their new policy of rapprochement based upon the foundation of mutual interests.\textsuperscript{17}

The collapse of United States policy in Indo-China had also brought about a new situation in Southeast Asia. For instance, every nation in the region must reevaluate its policies and alignments. It may be said that this was a period of confusion and frustration for Southeast Asian people especially those who trust for their security in the United States. Therefore, in conducting this policy Thailand had developed friendly ties as well as economic relations with all countries.\textsuperscript{18}

This was review of Thailand’s reassessment close alliance with the United State as a consequence of Vietnam


\textsuperscript{18} \textit{News Bulletin}, No.14/1977, (Bangkok : Information Department, Ministry of foreign Affairs 1977), November-December 1977, p.15
War. A statement made by the spokesman of the Thai foreign Ministry, Mr. Nissai Vejjajiva declared that:

“All American military bases on Thai soil solely belonged to the Thai government and that all American forces should be withdrawn from Thai territory before March 20, 1976.”

The United States troops withdrawal from Thai soil cleared the way for Thailand to make friends with its new communist neighbours. In addition, Thailand could avoid becoming a target of communist attack, or becoming an arena of fighting among major powers. This review of Thai foreign policy was based on a consideration of the shifts of United States policy, for example, the Nixon Doctrine, the Nixon visit to Peking in 1972, and United States Congress’s limitation of American involvement abroad or Congressional limitation of the Presidential power in foreign policy.


20. Makata Ma, n.15, p.22.
Economic Co-operation

In January 1974, the Thai Foreign Minister, Charoonphan Israngkul na Ayuthaya made it clear that the government was hoping for a change in emphasis by the United States from military to economic and technical cooperation. He said that:

"Thailand’s future relations with the United States will have to be modified and adopted to the changing of circumstances. During the past decade one characteristic of our relations with the United States has been an overemphasis on military cooperation. This needs to be adjusted in order to achieve a more truly balanced relationship."^21


Since 1950, when Thailand and the United States signed their first Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, the United States had provided US $ 653.3 million of development aid to Thailand. A significant amount of the military aid funding was also provided for security purposes to accomplish projects which were also of direct economic value. The United States provided funds for international development through the United States Agency for International Development bureau of the government. The United States Operations Mission (USOM) was USAID's branch in Thailand.

The United States had consistently been Thailand's second largest trading partner, generally since 1960. In 1973, Thai-United States trade shared in the sharp expansion of Thailand's total foreign trade. Imports from the United States increased by 25 percent to a value total of US $ 292 million, and exports from Thailand registered comparable figures of 25 percent and $ 170 million. Moreover, income from American tourists, the United States military presence and from United States economic assistance exceeded the trade deficit and gave Thailand a surplus in its total accounts with the United States.22

However, the best proof of the success of Thailand-American economic and trade relations during the past two decades was probably the signing in May 1966 of the Treaty of Amity and Economic relations between the two countries. Moreover, the United States in the following years decided to grant privileges to Thai products entering the United States market under Generalized System of the Preference

22. Ibid., p. 45.
(GSP) starting with six GSP items in 1979, Later on, there were more than 200 Thai products enjoying GSP privileges from the United States.23


The General System of Preferences (GSP) was a system by means of which developed countries extend advantages to developing countries by waiving or cutting customs duty on good imported therefrom. Such preferences were extended unilaterally, the motive being to promote world trade, to encourage poor countries to sell to their richer counterparts and to lessen trade imbalances. The United States joined GSP in 1979, granting duty free status to 3,062 items from developing countries. The first project came to an end in 1984, then extended until January 1993. The new system, in contrast, was intended to prompt developing countries to adopt policy that served United States economic interests. It was, therefore, determined that developing countries should
   - extend protection to United States intellectual property.
   - open their markets to United States goods and investments.
   - reduce investment promotion that leads to trade imbalances, and
   - extend to their workers rights acceptable by the international community.

The rules also became subject to general and annual review, thus, the General Review took place, during 1985-1986, granting privileges on the conditions that receive nations should
   - open their markets to United States goods and services.
   - give protection to intellectual property, for instance, copyrights, patents and trade marks.
   - reduce promotion of investments that create trade distortions.
During 1975-1981, it was a trying period for Thailand and the United States which saw both sides undergoing a fundamental review of the structure of their relations shaped since the early 1950s. In 1975, it was discovered that political polarization in Southeast Asia had developed to such an extent that the simplistic dichotomy of the Free World versus Communism mentality was becoming increasingly anachronistic and as indigenous nationalistic forces and democratization process became increasingly marked, the old-style security arrangement as existing between the United States and Thailand was no longer adequate. On American side, the United States military

- ensure that working conditions and workers' rights were of international standard.
- be at a level of development measured by per capita income of not more than US $ 8,000.

The results of the annual review were announced in early April and came into effect for one year from July each year. The review identities items that have become competitive on the United States market and rescinds the privileges given to them earlier using the following criteria.
- if the value of an item imported into the USA from particular country exceeds 50 percent of total United States imports of that items or if it exceeds the minimum value.
- if the value of the import exceeds the maximum value.

The Nation, (Bangkok), No. 1, 1990, p. 132.
defeat in Vietnam sounded the death knell of its massive military involvement on mainland Southeast Asia. On the Thai side, the end of its erstwhile military oligarchic rule meant the reordering of more equitable and mutually productive relations between the two long time allies.  

Cooperation also covers the field of tariff concessions. In 1979, as a result of the 1979 Tokyo-round meeting of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the United States and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to grant tariff concessions to a package of products of both countries. Expected to come into force in 1982, the Memorandum would enable about 50 American and Thai products to enjoy the tariff concessions.

As a member of ASEAN, Thailand also receives the prospective ASEAN-US economic and technical cooperation. In August 1980 both sides signed a project agreement on the Agriculture Development Planning Centre whereby the

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United States approved US $ 3 million in financial aid to the project covering a period of five years.\textsuperscript{26}

The transition in the United States outlook had probably been influenced to a degree by Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan, who visited the United States in February 1979. Kriangsak was able to impress upon President Jimmy Carter that apart from being a consistent friend and ally of the United States, Thailand was a key member of ASEAN, economically, socially and politically

\textsuperscript{26} Thai students also benefit from the United States scholarship granted to the ASEAN-AIT scholarship and Research Programme. As of January 1980, eighteen Thai students among 50 ASEAN graduates were recipients of the United States sponsored scholarship which enable them to further their studies and research at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) in Thailand.

\textit{Ibid.}

Thailand and the other ASEAN member countries had always cherished the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for Southeast Asia, which essentially means development of peace and progress in the region to the exclusion of adverse outside power interference. This notion had earned support from the United States. On the contrary, 1975-1981 showed that there had been an intensification of the sort of power rivalry diametrically opposed to ASEAN’s aspiration, particularly through the intensification of power rivalry brought on by Vietnam in Kamphudia.

resilient, and equally important, shared several common ideals and aspirations with the United States. Another functional usefulness of Thailand was the fact that Thailand could serve a strategic purpose for the United States in United States military deployments in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, apart from being itself contributive to peace and stability in Southeast Asia.27

In early October 1981, the then Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond visited the United States. It was in many ways a history-making event in the bilateral relations of the

27. Ibid., p. 149.

As a world power, the United States needs access and support for its naval and air forces in the Indian Ocean, where the Diego Garcia Island base had been developed. Its stop over landing rights at Takli base in Thailand and its great air and naval bases at Clark field and Subic Bay in the Philippines were currently important in the disposition of its power. The United States could retain its military capabilities in South and Southeast Asia without the use of these bases, but their re-entry into the region, reduce some costs, and heightens the flexibility of United States military operations in the area. It, therefore, appears that “anti-imperialist” propaganda or activities emanating from Indochina and directed at Thailand or the Philippines, to encourage their withholding military base privileges, threaten a United States military advantage.

Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, n. 5, p. 166.
two countries. Not only did the Thai premier have the chance to carry his message directly across the United States private sector, but he also met with the United States President, Ronald Reagan. The two leaders held talks with the clear objectives of setting any bilateral issues in an amicable manner and helping to ease Thailand's economic and security burdens.\textsuperscript{28}

During his official visit to the United States, apart from seeking security aid, the Thai Prime Minister also explained the country's immediate problems to President Reagan and senior members of the United States administrative on trade and agriculture. In addition, he had top level meetings with some of America's most influential business leaders in both New York and Dallas, including representatives of Import-Export Bank and the Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{29}

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\item[{28.}] Ibid., p. 192.
\item[{29.}] Ibid., p. 193.
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Thailand's serious concern since the seventies had been the increasing imports of oil in terms of value and amount. Fortunately with the help and support of American technology
In 1982, John Gunther Dean, the United States Ambassador to Thailand had addressed in Bangkok that:

"On the policy level, many of the economic issues between the United States and Thailand are trade related. Unfortunately, sometimes those issues introduce misunderstandings or strains in our relationship. In pursuance of our own domestic priorities, we find ourselves forced to adopt trade measures which disadvantage our trading partners for third markets, and this competition is sharper edged during periods of economic slump. Here, the key to preventing misunderstanding and friction in our bilateral relations is a free and open exchange of information and options between the two governments."\(^{30}\)

Relations with the United States continued to show strains in 1988. Early in that year, Thai complaints about the

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and Finance, Thailand had, since September 1981, tapped its oil imports. Exploration and development of Thailand’s offshore natural gas would have been impossible had American oil firms like Union Oil and Texas Pacific not been involved. Although both Union Oil and Texas Pacific found natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand some years ago, Union oil was the first firm to supply to fill Thailand immediate needs. Union oil had worked closely with the Thai government through the Industry Ministry and Thailand’s Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) which led to prompt agreement on the price of natural gas.


declining level of aid from the United States were matched by United States protests over a tougher Thai policy toward Vietnamese refugees, in which the Thai military forcibly blocked Vietnamese from entering the country.\textsuperscript{31}

The Foreign Ministry displayed nervousness and irritation over demands in the United States Congress and elsewhere that Thailand and China end aid to the Khmer Rouge. Thai officials and military leaders reacted strongly to an article in the Washington Post alleging that a group of Thai officers had siphoned off about $3.5 million in United States aid to the non-communist Khmer resistance forces. Thai newspaper often provided thoughtful analysis and new information on the allegation, but army leaders denounced the charges as untrue and baseless.\textsuperscript{32}

More fundamentally, Thai officials foresaw a future loosening of the relationship because of trade disputes. The


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
issue of copyright protection for United States products came to a need at the end of the year when the Thai government rejected United States demand for special legislation to guarantee such protection. The Reagan Administration threatened to end the General System of Preferences (GSP) trade benefits to Thailand if it did not exact legislation by December 15. The Thai Prime Minister Chatichai asserted on December 13, during intense United States Thai negotiations, that a retention of GSP privileges was not worth the concessions demanded by Washington, although Thai negotiators reportedly promised interim measures to protect pharmaceuticals.\footnote{Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), December 17, 1988, p. 15.}

Following the unsuccessful conclusion of the talks, the Reagan administration began a process of determining the extent to which it would withdraw GSP benefits. The cloud on trade relations worsened, when the two governments failed to reach agreement on quotas for Thai exports of textiles, garments and steel products. Thai officials
downplayed the impact of GSP cuts, but they expressed concern that Thailand in 1989 could be the target of United States retaliation under section 301 of the 1988 United States special trade act.34

Thai-United States Commercial Strains

With the end of Cold War the security environment were likely to undergo changes. The future conflicts however, were concentrated relating to economic and trade relations. The 1990s were a fertile, formative periods for world politics and American foreign policy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, bipolar global competition was over.

In early of 1990’s the United States demanded for copyright and intellectual property protection. In response to this demands the Thai Prime Minister Chatichai argued in January 1990, that:

“Thailand was coming of age and would not bind despite Washington’s reduction of Thai

34. Larry A. Niksch, n. 31, p. 173.
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)."

While escaping the full fury of the United States Trade Bill’s Section 301 for encroachments on United States patents, Thailand was high on Washington’s watch list and could face further cuts in its GSP quotas.\(^\text{35}\)

However, the Thai-United States talks at Amsterdam in April 1991 had collapsed. The Thai delegation, led by Commerce Permanent Secretary Bajr Israsena, failed to convince Deputy United States Trade Representative, Sandra


In November 1990, the International Intellectual Property Alliance, the Motion Picture Export Association of America and the Recording Industry Association of America filed a section 301 petition concerning Thailand’s failure to enforce its copyright laws.

Bankok Post, (Bangkok), April 6, 1994, p. 15.

Under United States trade law, the listed countries would have six months to strengthen their intellectual property protection laws and their enforcement, or face punitive trade retaliation. Default could mean end to duty free treatment for some of their exports to the United States or tariff level of up to 100 percent on some shipments.

The Nation, (Bangkok), May 1, 1992, p. B.1.
Kristoff, who led the United States mission to the Amsterdam bilateral talks, to resolve the escalating trade disputes on intellectual property protection. The Thai Commerce Minister, Amaret Sila-on insisted that the delegations could not agree on several crucial points. He had pointed out that:

"It was unacceptable for Thailand to extend patent protection to new drugs that were awaiting registration in the producing countries, or allow patenting of animal and plant varieties as demanded by Washington or limiting the state's power to force patentees to license their rights in case of non-use or national emergency, and there demands were beyond what Thailand can accept. Moreover, the international community which is negotiate for better protection of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations have not yet accepted these conditions, if Thailand was to accept the United States demands, its negotiating power in the Uruguay Round would be diminished.\(^{36}\)

Although Amaret could not predict how the United States might respond to the failure of the talks, he insisted that his ministry would consider the national interests as the most crucial point in negotiating with United States and

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\(^{36}\) The Nation, (Bangkok), April 25, 1991, p. BT10.
Lastly he said that no matter what would be happens, we will have to accept it.\textsuperscript{37}

In December 1991, the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) determined that Thailand’s acts, policies and practices were unreasonable and burden or restrict United States Commerce.\textsuperscript{38} Thailand remained on the latest United States priority list of foreign countries charged with failure to enforce United States copyright and deficiencies in protection of pharmaceutical patents.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{flushright}
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
\end{flushright}

On pharmaceutical patents, the United States wanted Thailand to narrow the conditions under which the government can force patent holders to license their rights. It also demanded that patent protection be extended to drugs not yet marketed in Thailand.

\textit{The Nation}, n. 35, p. B.1

As a result, the Student Federation of Thailand (SFT) on April 24, 1991 asked the United States to drop its pressuring on the Thai government to protect pharmaceutical products and active ingredients under the patent law. In the letter submitted to the American Embassy in Thailand by the group of 12 students, the SFT pointed out that the existing legislation was in line with internationally agreed conventions on intellectual property protection.” The SFT also called on Thai Deputy Public Health Minister, Athasit Vejajiva to oppose the government’s decision.
Thailand had been named along with Taiwan and India on the priority list announced in Washington on April 30, 1992 by the United State Trade Representative (USTR). The allegation was that the listed countries have done little to stop violation of United States intellectual property rights, making war, therefore, for retaliatory trade measures.40

In March 1992, the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) again determined that Thailand acts, policies and practices related to patent protection were unreasonable even the Thai government had stated that it would continue to increase enforcement efforts.41

to patent drugs. They also supported the Medical Council's decision to condemn the United States move.


40. _Ibid._

41. _Bangkok Post_, (Bangkok), n. 4, p. 14.

In 1989, the United States trade deficit with Thailand amounted $ 2.1 billion, up $ 330 million compared with 1988. Thailand was the United States' 28th largest market in 1989, and United States imports from Thailand totalled $ 4.4 billion in 1989, United States direct foreign investment in Thailand totalled $ 1.1 billion in 1988, ad decline of $ 148 million compared with 1987. United States direct investment in Thailand was heavily geared towards the petroleum and electronic equipment industries.
Reacting the USTR announcement, Surakiat Sathienthai, an economic advisor to the Prime Minister, said that the announcement only had psychological effect. There were two measures Thailand should undertake. Firstly, explain to exporters and importers that the issues in dispute were subject to negotiations and show that the country was sincere towards their resolution. Secondly, the government must detail the impact of possible United States retaliation and reassure the people that everything was being done to protect national interest. He affirmed that the Thai was doing everything according to the principles of the discussion under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.42

The Nation, (Bangkok), April 5, 1990, p.16.

In 1991, the United States trade deficit with Thailand was $2.4 billion or $65 million higher than 1990. United States exports to Thailand were $3.8 billion, up $767 million from 1990. Thailand was the United States' 23rd largest export market in 1991. United States imports from Thailand totalled $6.1 billion in 1991 higher than 1990. The Stock of United States direct investment in Thailand was largely concentrated in manufacturing and petroleum.

The Nation, (Bangkok), April 2, 1992, p.48.
The United States also in that year, asked Thailand to relax regulations in 11 areas namely, professional, business communication, construction, distribution, environmental, financial health and social, tourism and travel, recreational, sporting and others, and transportation. The main features of the United States demands were the financial, banking and insurance sectors areas which employ accountants, lawyers and architects. The United States requirement involve the proportion of shareholdings, rules and origin and foreign ownership.

42. The Nation, n. 35, p. B.1.

The United States was threatening to make it harder for Thai companies to get into the United States financial market if Thailand fails to further open its own financial market, said Mr. Therachai the Director of the Bank of Thailand's financial institutions supervision and development department. The United States demanded that the maximum amount of shares Thai legislation allows aliens to hold in Thai banks and financial institutions should be raised from the current 25%. The United States threatened to put Thailand in the second tier of countries that readily open their door to United States companies.

Mr. Thiraechai feels disappointed by the United States attitude that time considering the long-cherished bilateral relationship. He said that United States business had always been privileged in Thailand under special agreement.

Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), December 25, 1994, p. 17.

43. The Nation, (Bangkok), August 8, 1992, p. B.1.
In response, Thailand rejected a United States demands. Suchai Jaovisidha, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Commerce Ministry said that:

"Thailand is just a small country and it is not ready to comply with all the United States demands. And Thailand would consider suspending the bilateral Thai-United States Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations of 1968 which give special for Americans working in Thailand privileges. Instead, Thailand would bring the bilateral agreement under GATT jurisdiction."\(^\text{45}\)

Efforts by Thailand to reduce copyright increased substantially in 1993, with the Thai police conducting more raids in Bangkok and expanding enforcement activities

\(^{44}\) Ibid.  
\(^{45}\) Ibid.

The Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations of 1968 obligates both countries to accord national treatment to each other’s national and companies with respect of establishment and operation. Under the treaty, the United States companies may hold 100% equity in Thailand subsidiaries in many sectors of the economy where other foreign owner would generally be limited to 40%. The Treaty does, however, allow each country to prohibit, or limit the extent of, establishment or acquisition of interests in enterprises engaging in fiduciary functions of banking involving depository functions.

outside Bangkok. United States Industry Associations had been instrumental in securing more energetic enforcement.\textsuperscript{46}

While considerable improvements had been made, copyright piracy of audio and videotapes, computer software and printed material remains extensive. The Thai government had publicly stated its commitment to continuing and vigorous enforcement.\textsuperscript{47}

Following the consultations with the United States in mid 1993, the Thai government pledged to address those concerns in new copyright legislation which was being considered by the Thai Parliament. The Thai Government had pointed out that:

“They aims to bring its copyright into conformance with international standards, including the intellectual right provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements and the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971).”\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
American was satisfied in 1993 with Thai moves to protect intellectual property rights, starting with the suppression of piracy, a continuing with a number of other administrative and legislative moves on copyrights and patents, including the decision to set up an intellectual property court to improve judicial handling of prosecutions. As a result Thailand was placed on lower priority watch list of the American call for reduction in barriers which was clearly showed in the letters of the United States Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, on September 7, 1993 to the Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai Panitchpakdi and Uthai Pimchaichon, Minister of Commerce, announcing his decision to drop Thailand from the Priority Foreign country list and put it on a Priority Watch list instead. 49

49. Excerpt from the letter to the Deputy Prime Minister.
As a result of steps that Thai Government had taken and the commitment for continued enforcement and to bring Thai intellectual property legislation up to world standards that your government has made, I am revoking Thailand’s identification as a Priority Foreign Country. Thailand will be placed on the special, 301 “Priority Watch List” and monitoring of Thailand’s progress will continue under section 306. As I explained to you in July, I will review the enforcement efforts and status of intellectual property legislation again in January.
During the beginning of October 1994, the Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai visited United States and met the United States President, Bill Clinton, The both agreed that trade liberalization in the Pacific Rim should be a priority at an upcoming summit of Asian-Pacific Leaders. Clinton also reaffirmed the importance the United States attaches to its long standing relationship with Thailand, one of five treaty allies in the Asia Pacific region.\(^\text{50}\)

Following meeting, the two leaders greeted a group of Thai and American business leaders and expressed strong

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This review will include on examination of whether Thailand should remain on the "Priority Watch List."

Excerpt from the letter to the Commerce Minister.

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of my decision to revoke Thailand's identification as a Priority Foreign Country. The steps that Thailand has taken, beginning with the enforcement measures that you instituted, and the commitments to continued enforcement and to bring Thai intellectual property legislation up to world standards, has allowed me to make this decision.

You have played an important role in resolving these standing issues and I wanted to convey to you my appreciation. I took forward to working with you and your colleagues on many trade issues of mutual interest.


50. Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), October 8, 1994, p. 3.
support for strengthening private sector ties between the two countries.

On November 26, 1996, the United States President, Bill Clinton visited Thailand, he called on King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the World longest reigning monarch at the King Palace.

Under a blazing sun, Clinton witnessed the signing of minor taxation treaty in a palace garden. His voice was hoarsed at the end of a 12 day trip. He said that the treaty closes 15 years of negotiations and opens a new era of trade and investment.

**Thailand Economic Crisis and American Assistance**

After a decade of spectacular performance, with per capita income (GNP) growth averaging more than 8%.

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51. Ibid.

Thailand’s economy began to slowdown in 1996. The stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), mirroring the condition of the economy, fell steadily from 816.79 points on December 20, 1996, to 385.25 points on December 19, 1997.\(^{53}\)

On July 2, 1997, the Bank of Thailand (the Central Bank) announced that it had abandoned the fixed exchange rate system and had allowed the baht (Thai currency) to float. This allowed the international currency markets to establish the value of the baht, thereby precipitating a significant devaluaiton. The Thai Finance Minister, Thanong Bidaya, on July 9, 1997 had sought a package of loans from International Monetary Funds (IMF) value at between $ 10-20 billion to help ailing companies write off bad debts and improve the core strength of the economy.\(^{54}\)

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Following the Thai devaluation of its currency, rescue operation was undertaken by the IMF and several other countries, including Japan. However, the United States did not join the efforts. By August 1997, rescue fund for Thailand was finalized at $17.2 billion. Since the middle of 1997 and the beginning of the year 1998, the phenomenon of falling economic dominoes was witnessed in Southeast Asia.

The IMF was created by Bretton Woods Agreements and came into existence on December 27, 1945. The Chief objectives were:

1. To promote International Monetary Cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary.

2. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all member as primary objectives of economic policy.

3. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

4. To assist in the establishment of multilateral system of payment in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.

5. To give confidence to members by making the funds resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to control maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national on international prosperity.
However, the rescue package were different for different countries - Thailand $ 17.2 billion, Korea $ 57 billion and Indonesia $ 54 billion. The conditions of the loan were stringent and, if implemented, would certainly lead to recession in the short term. The following conditions were stipulated a value-added-tax (VAT) increase from 7% to 10%, a reduction of the current account deficit from 7.9% of GDP in 1996 to 5% in 1997 and 3% in 1998 and a fiscal goal of keeping the consolidated public sector in a surplus of one percent of GDP in 1997 and 1998.

In July 1997, Thailand supported Myanmar entry into the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). As a result, the United States had appealed to the ASEAN member

The money for the Fund comes through contributions made by the members. Each member contributes 25% of its share in gold and the remainder in the currency of its country.


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.
state to turn down Myanmar’s entry into the grouping on grounds of its human rights performance. Some observers of Thai-United States relations attribute United States apathy during Thailand’s financial crisis to the Thai government’s adament stance in regard to Myanmar. Certainly, Thailand was given far less assistance than South Korea. By the year’s end, Thailand’s foreign relations had become inextricably linked with solving the financial crisis.


Ibid.
The Southeast Asians led by Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad were quickly declared that Washington was trying to impose its human right standards on others and that it failed to appreciate the importance of Asian Values. During the World Bank - IMF seminar in Hong Kong in 1997, Mahathir Mohamad again strongly denounced that:

“American financier, George Soros, and Western leaders in general, wanted to prevent the Southeast Asian countries from becoming prosperous, developed societies because of envy over their economic success.”⁶¹

On March 11-17, 1998, the Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai headed a delegation on an official visit to the United States. Among those accompanying were Finance Minister, Tharrin Nimmanheaminda and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Surin Pitsuwan. Following a meeting with United States President, Bill Clinton, on March 14, it was announced that

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the United States had agreed to provide aid worth $1.7 billion to Thailand, including $1 billion in export credits. The remainder of the package was directed to providing assistance for two electricity production investment projects and scholarship for Thai students studying in the United States and agreed to release Thailand from the purchase of F 18 fighter aircraft worth $392 million which the Thai government claimed it could no longer afford.\textsuperscript{62} The United States also promised to try to seek reimbursement for the $75 million Thailand had already paid for the jets, agreed to finance $1 billion of raw materials imports, offered to help clean up landmines along the border with Cambodia, vowed to keep United States Peace Corps strength in Thailand at current levels rather cut the programme as earlier planned, and would move ahead with talks to create an international law enforcement training institute in Bangkok. The United States Oversea Private Investment Corp (OPIC) also

approved $400 million in Loan guarantees to construct two power projects expected to employ more than 2000 Thais. A group of private American investors told Thai Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, that it would put more than $600 million into a steel mill.\textsuperscript{63}

Clinton and Congressional leaders had been impressed by Chuan's moves to slash spending and hike taxes, push privatization, drop foreign exchange control that limit investor confidence, install capable technocrats instead of cronies, float the bath (Thai currency) and put into place the reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).\textsuperscript{64}

It was the World Bank on July 4, 1998, approved two loans total $700 million in order to aid financial reform and to help mitigate the adverse social impact of the economic crisis on the poor and unemployed. A $400 million


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid}.
economic and financial adjustment loan was to help with restructuring of the country’s financial and corporate sector while a $300 million social investment project was to be used to create employment generation schemes and provide essential social services, such as basic health and AIDS care. Both loans were repayable over 15 years, including three year grace period.  

The extra funding was in addition to $1.5 billion which the World Bank had already pledged to lend as part of wider IMF economic rescue package agreed in August 1997.

In early 1999, the Thai Deputy Prime Minister, Supachai Panitcphakdi was proposed as a candidate for the Director General of World Trade Organization (WTO) to replace Renato Ruggiero, whose term ended in early May 1999. He was strongly supported by Japan, the countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most


66. Ibid.
of the Europe Countries. On the other hand, the United States as well as some European countries supported the former Prime Minister New Zealand, Mike Moore, which perceived him as the more likely of the contenders to back free trade or, at least, the American agenda. Then, an


The World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) came into existence on January 1, 1995 with 81 member countries. Membership of the organization with its headquarter in Geneva, would eventually be open to all 125 member countries of the GATT upon their ratification of the Final Act of Uruguay Round Agreements. Its aims differed from the GATT in several respects, for instance:

1) the WTO aspired to a wider global remit, obliging members to subscribe to its more extensive range of agreement, unlike the GATT which permitted countries not observe some GATT rules

2) the WTO would have a wider sphere of investment, regulating for the first time commercial activities which had been beyond the justification of the GATT, including trade in services, intellectual property rights and investment

3) as an international organization in its own right, the WTO aimed at a more coherent framework than the GATT, which had emerged from a provisional treaty serviced by and adhoc secretariat

Kessing's Record of World Events, (London), January 1995, p 40387

68 Bangkok Post Mid-Year Economic Review 1999, (Bangkok), December 1999, p 3
extraordinary decision taken after month of Wragling, the World Trade Organization would appoint two Director-General to replace Renato. Both Supachi and Moore would share a six-year term and Moore would be in office for the first three years.\(^{69}\)

However, Thailand economic crisis started to be recovered before the end of 1999, as the value of export had been increased. The Permanent Secretary of Commerce Sompol Kiatpaibool, once stated that:

"Thailand could see export growth of 8.6% in the year 2000 if the Commerce Ministry was correct in its forecast of a $ 5 billion rise on an estimated $ 5.8 billion for 1999".\(^{70}\)

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69. Thomas Abraham, n. 32, p. 64.

70. Bangkok Post, n. 33, p. 2.
CONCLUSION

After 1954, the United States decided to support the South Vietnamese government led by Ngo Dinh Dien. The United States also helped to block the elections, which were to be held in 1956, believing that such elections would be rigged in the North to achieve the communist success under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Again the United States decision was based on the nature of World Communism and on a desire to contain the expansionist tendencies of China in Southeast Asia. In 1957, North Vietnamese were furious over their failure to unite North and South Vietnam and to overthrow the Dien government.

The Eisenhower Administration asserted that the United States objectives in Vietnam would be helpful and capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means or an independent North Vietnam endowed with a strong government, which would be so
responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance.¹

President John F. Kennedy in his short term of presidency greatly broadened the commitment of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in South Vietnam. His policy towards the crisis in Laos affected his attitude towards commitments in both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as his relationship with Cambodia. It became much more clear under John F. Kennedy than Eisenhower that American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia - the two Vietnams, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand - was pronounced and heading towards a major crisis.

President John F. Kennedy’s policy in Laos led to deeper United States involvement in Thailand. Actually, Thailand had long been greatly concerned over developments in its Mekhong Neighbours. The steps towards a neutralization of Laos against a background of

the weakness of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) caused Thailand to seek stronger assurances from the United States. At the end of February 1962, the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, was invited to Washington to discuss the ways to assure the security of Thailand under the framework of SEATO. President John F. Kennedy then, assured Thailand of full United States support for its independent and territorial integrity.

However, the crisis in Indo-China provided the occasion for the United States to take additional precautionary measures in Southeast Asia, particularly measured of pre-position which strengthened American capacity in the event of any eventuality.

John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson believed that the world would be less dangerous if communism did not succeed in Indo-China. The basic American objective under President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, therefore, remained constant in South Vietnam denying communism to control the area. Although South Vietnam
remained in existence due to American policy after the Geneva settlement of 1954, the United States often found itself at the mercy of weak and inefficient Saigon regimes.

Both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations constantly pre-occupied with the domino theory or a variation of it. The theory persisted despite the emergence of the rift between Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and despite the subsequent failure of the communist coup in the Southeast Asian country like Indonesia. Indeed, when Vietnam was viewed from United States in term of global strategic considerations, there was a certain aspect in outlook, a carry-over from an earlier period. After China fell to Mao Tse Tung and the United States policy towards communism became hardened and the importance of Indo-China in the United States security perception viewed seriously by the United States authorities to combat any eventualities of communists, particularly in Southeast Asian region.
During 1964 United States policy towards Southeast Asia entered a new phase. In summer, the North Vietnamese attacked American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, then a Congressional resolution permitted the President to respond strongly to incident. In additional, when the North Vietnamese imposed additional pressure on South Vietnamese government, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved American bombing in the North in an attempt to force the Vietnamese to the bargaining table. After 1965 the war became increasingly Americanized, with the introduction of hundreds of thousands of American troops. Such action certainly prevented North Vietnam's unification of the country. But, however, led to a crucial, bloody, prolonged and indecisive conflict.

When President Richard M. Nixon came to power, he continued to bring the parties of the Indo-China war to the Paris talks and when the prospect of getting settlement did not materialize, he offered a new plan that the United States was going to begin a process of Vietnamization of
war that was the withdrawal of American forces and military preparation of the South Vietnamese themselves to take over the fighting. Still hoping for a negotiated settlement but without other significant bargaining power, the President then suggested that would use the Vietnamization process as his holecard, if the North Vietnamese would negotiate the war would come to an end promptly and he would speed up the process of American withdrawal, otherwise he would simply proceed on his own schedule.

What became known as Vietnamization under Nixon Administration was really a reaffirmation of what President John F. Kennedy had come to recognize just before his death. While Vietnmization was fine as far as the remaining North Vietnam forces was concerned, it did not provide the framework within which American or South Vietnamese attacks on an extended time basis.

To fight a war with no hope of decisive victory reinforced the frustration of the American soldiers and
citizen alike. Then Americans were instructed to fight a holding action and to minimize casualties. Beginning in early 1970s no major offensive operations were to be initiated. While conserving American lives, the effect of this policy was perceived as abandoning any hope of victory. The war was made even more difficult because, unlike battle lines of previous wars, there was no simple way to measure progress.

The Paris Agreements of 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam formally ended American participation in the war. It committed the United States to stop all military involvement in South Vietnam, and to withdraw all its remaining troops, technicians and advisors. The United States, in contrast, withdrew completely and unequivocally in 1973 and thereupon reduced its aid levels to South Vietnam.²

Early 1970s, the only Thailand had remained in geopolitical terms, potentially to focal point of United States involvement on continental Asia. The United States, therefore, attempted to redefine the role of America forward line of defence in the region. The security planners thought that there could be an arbitrary limit to set off the rimland of continental Asia which would represent the extent of new American defence and security. But in time, such a concept gave way under the weight of reality and practicality, and the United States was to compelled once again to regard the entire Asia/Pacific expanse as an integral part of its global strategy—the strategy of meeting the growing of Soviet Union Challenges.\(^3\)

The Thai government still permits United States planes to fly over Indo-China, although in July 1974, it

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asked the United States to stop flying over the Indian Ocean from Thai bases. The Thai Foreign Minister, Charoonpan Israngkul na Ayuthya, told the United States Ambassador to Thailand, William Kinter, that such flights contravened Thailand's support for the United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone and ASEAN agreement on the neutrality of the region. Since then, the trend in Thailand was definitely towards regional. The Thai authorities also sought co-operation from China regardless of differences in political, ideology, economic and social system. Dr. Thanat Khoman, the then Thai Foreign Minister, once pointed out the wisdom behind regional cooperation that even if China were interfering in Thailand, Thailand should take the initiative to try and normalize relations with China. A nation of 35 million was no match for 300 million. So Thai's have no choice but to circumvent by diplomatic means the hostility China shows to government which choose to rely for security on American planes and guns. Thailand can not even make a
plane of its own, so, how ridiculous it was for Thailand to refuse to talk with China.

The withdrawal of United States troops from Thailand in 1975 provided a useful bargaining tool for diplomatic negotiations with its neighbours. Many Thai's feared repercussions from North Vietnam for the Thai role in allowing United States forces within Thailand to bomb Indo-China. As Hanoi had long maintained that it would not open negotiations with Thailand as long as American troops were present. Hence, Thai insistence on United States withdrawal would be a useful gesture of good will.

As the competitive demands of the global economy propel the states of mainland Southeast Asia towards greater economic interconnection, therefore, pressures upon Thailand to form a new and constructive relationship with government of neighbouring countries have multiplied and intensified. Thailand's border area can no longer serve merely as buffer zones, instead, in the new politic and economic context of regional relations, they serve as
gateways for trade and investment. Peaceful and open borders were one major precondition for sustained economic development.

Thai-American relations, however, have their own features, sometime if there were conflicts they mostly derived from problems of co-operation. During the Second Indo-China war the United States asserted itself too strongly, antagonizing its allies especially Thailand. Indo-China war ended with an American withdrawal. Allies which were parties to the war readjusted themselves accordingly. By comparison, the Thai-American adaptation process had been remarkably satisfied. The clearest example in the new era of Thai-United States relation was the intellectual property rights (IPR) controversy. For the Thai, the issue was defined in terms of long-term ally, nationalism and economic development. While in United

States consideration, the issue concerned the lack of Thai protection of the United States products as well as fairness in trade relations. The intellectual property rights has, therefore, symbolized the new importance of economic concerns and the decline of security considerations in relations between the two countries.

Economic relations since then, have replaced security ties as the Kingdom's major foreign policy concern. Thailand economy is now integrated into the world capitalist system. The new tone of Thai-United States relation reflected Thailand's growing importance in the world economy. Major aspects include financial aid, cooperation to wage war on narcotics and support for Peace Crops. In the relationship of the two countries, therefore, some essential points should be taken into considerations.

(i) Thailand as well as the other member states of Southeast Asian nations must live alongside its neighbours, therefore, the United States should not be in a position to dictate the relationship of their own.
(ii) Infact, the United States have an important interests in Thailand with regard to external security. Thailand holds a strategic position in regard to the security of ASEAN, where the United States has vital interests. Hence, Thailand should be given a high priority in the United States foreign policy considerations.

(iii) The United States should consider Thailand’s security from a wider perspective, not purely from military aspect. Political and economic development are also closely associated with national security. Therefore, both political and economic should be emphasized.

(iv) As Thailand’s foreign policy became more collective reflection of ASEAN, the United States finds it at time difficult to assist Thailand in some specific and concrete instances. The reason was possibly that because a policy line requires a joint effort by several partners it may not always be clear to the United States. Thailand has to listen to the views of the other ASEAN members, to China as well as to United States, and various factors of its domestic needs.
Appendix-I

Peace Proposals

The “Four Points”: Pham Van Dong Speech
DRV National Assembly, April 8, 1965

It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its “military alliance” with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.
4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving Governments and peoples in the world.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

The U.S. Version of the "Four Points"
Presented to Mai Van Bo by Edmund Gullion, August 6, 1965

Point I -- The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, international discussions without preconditions and subsequent negotiations. Such discussions and negotiations should consider, among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of foreign military and quasi-military personnel and weapons from South and North Vietnam; the dismantling of foreign military bases in both areas; the cancellation of military alliances in contravention of the Accords; and the regrouping and redeployment of indigenous forces.

Point II -- Strict compliance with the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in
accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions and subsequent negotiations.

Point III -- The internal affairs of South and North Vietnam must be settled by the South and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-determination without any foreign interference.

Point IV -- The issue of reunification of Vietnam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of South and North Vietnam without foreign interference.

"Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia" (White House press release, January 7, 1966)

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi’s four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be a problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

The Lewandowski 10 Points

1. The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in Vietnam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding
an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Vietnam must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam.

3. The U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-term military presence in South Vietnam.

4. The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with respect to the settlement.

5. The U.S. is willing to accept the participation of "all" in elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body.

6. The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace and proper representative organs are established in South Vietnam.

7. The U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral South Vietnam.

8. The U.S. is prepared to stop bombing "if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution." In this regard the U.S. is prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infiltration into South Vietnam.

9. The U.S. will not agree to "reunification under military pressure."

10. The U.S. will not declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Vietnam's 4 or 5 points."

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peoples' fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world.

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

CHAPTER I

Article 1

THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS

The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

CHAPTER II

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS
Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on Jan. 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Articles 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to insure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.
(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

* All acts of force on the ground, in the air and on the sea shall be prohibited.
* All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Articles 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Article 5

Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above mentioned countries to all para-military organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.
Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of Control and Supervision.

CHAPTER III

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location
and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION

Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable and shall be respected by all countries.
(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

* Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other.

* Insure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect
and mutual none limination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and insurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce
their military effective and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

CHAPTER V

THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th Parallel is only provisional and not a political
or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to re-establishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the provisional military demarcation line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

CHAPTER VI

THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Article 16

(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of insuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this agreement:
* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam.

* Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that article.

* Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a).

* Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a).

* Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

* Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this agreement and end its activities in 60 days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity
and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of insuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this agreement:

* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties.

* Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article.

* Article 8, regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.
(c) After the signing of this agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on
the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International conference provided in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this agreement:

* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam.

* Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by United States forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that article.

* Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam.

* Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a).

* Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a).

* Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.
The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the international conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this agreement:

* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire through South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties.

* Articles 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article.

* Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam.

* Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam.
* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operations.

(c) Until the international conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this agreement:

* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties.

* Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article.

* Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam.
* Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam.

* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18(b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of
Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the international commission and the international conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.

Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an international conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people’s fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this international conference: the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International of Control and Supervision and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam.
CHAPTER VII

REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
CHAPTER VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Article 21

The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam and the strict implementation of this agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER IX

OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 23

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in
the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this agreement and its protocols.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Lam
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Binh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

2-PARTY VERSION AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Government of the United State of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people’s fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese peoples’ right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:
CHAPTER IX

OTHER PROVISIONS

The Paris agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The agreement and the protocols to it shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

PROTOCOL ON CLEARING SEA MINES, PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE REMOVAL, PERMANENT DEACTIVATION OR DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, PORTS, HARBORS AND WATERWAYS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
The Government of the United States of America,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

In the implementation of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the war and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The United States shall clear all mines it has placed in the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This mine-clearing operation shall be accomplished by rendering the mines harmless through removal, permanent deactivation or destruction.

Article 2

With a view to insuring lasting safety for the movement of people and watercraft and the protection of important installations, mines shall, on the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, be removed or destroyed in the indicated area; and whenever their removal or destruction is impossible, mines shall be permanently deactivated and their emplacement clearly marked.

Article 3

The mine-clearing operation shall begin at twenty-four hundred (2400) hours G.M.T. on Jan. 27, 1973. The representatives of the two parties shall consult immediately on relevant factors and agree upon the earliest possible target date for the completion of the work.

Article 4
The mine-clearing operation shall be conducted in accordance with priorities and timing agreed upon by the two parties. For this purpose representatives of the two parties shall meet at an early date to reach agreement on a program and a plan of implementation. To this end:

(a) The United States shall provide its plan for mine-clearing operations, including maps of the minefields and information concerning the types, numbers and properties of the mines.

(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall provide all available maps and hydrographic charts and indicate the mined places and all other potential hazards to the mine-clearing operations that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aware of.

(c) The Two parties shall agree on the timing of implementation of each segment of the plan and provide timely notice to the public at least 48 hours in advance of the beginning of mine-clearing operations for that segment.

Article 5

The United States shall be responsible for the mine clearance on island waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall, to the full extent of its capabilities, actively participate in the mine clearance with the means of surveying, removal and destruction, and technical advice supplied by the United States.

Article 6

With a view to insuring the safe movement of people and watercraft on waterways and at sea, the United States shall in the mine-clearing process supply timely information about the progress of mine clearing in each area, and about
the remaining mines to be destroyed. The United States shall issue a communique when the operations have been concluded.

Article 7

In conducting mine-clearing operations, the United States personnel engaged in these operations shall respect the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall engage in no activities inconsistent with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and this protocol. The United States personnel engaged in the mine-clearing operations shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration of the mine-clearing operations.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall insure the safety of the United States personnel for the duration of their mine-clearing activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall provide this personnel with all possible assistance and the means needed in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that have been agreed upon by the two parties.

Article 8

This protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the two parties.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the
United States of America

For the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
PROTOCOL ON THE CEASE-FIRE
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE
CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT
MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam.

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provides for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 1

The high commands of the parties in South Vietnam shall issue prompt and timely orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command to completely end hostilities throughout South Vietnam, at the exact time stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement and insure that these armed forces and armed police comply with these orders and respect the cease-fire.

Article 2

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in
order to insure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party’s area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

1. Armed patrol into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

2. Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

3. All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

4. All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

5. All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

(c) The above mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

1. Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam.

2. The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public
facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population.

(3) Normal military proficiency conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(d) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties.

Article 4

In order to avert conflict and insure normal conditions for those armed forces which are in direct contact, and pending regulation by the Joint Military Commissions, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into force with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to insure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

Article 5

(a) Within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, each party shall do its utmost to complete the removal or deactivation of all demolition objects, minefields, traps, obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper the population’s movement and work, in the first place on waterways, roads and railroads in South Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed or deactivated within that time shall be clearly marked and must be removed or deactivated as soon as possible.
(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except as a defensive measure around the edges of military installations in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads. Mines and other obstacles already in place at the edges of military installations may remain in place if they are in place where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads.

Article 6

Civilian police and civilian security personnel of the parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, shall strictly respect the prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of this protocol. As required by their responsibilities, normally they shall be authorized to carry pistols, but when required by unusual circumstances, they shall be allowed to carry other small individual arms.

(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement armaments, munitions and war material permitted under Article 7 of the agreement shall take place under the supervision and control of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and through such points of entry only as are designated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree on these points of entry within 15 days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. The two South Vietnamese parties may select as many as six points of entry which are not included in the list of places where teams of the International Commission of Control and Supervision are to be based contained in Article 4(d) of the protocol concerning the international commission. At the same time, the two South Vietnamese parties may also select points of entry from the list of places set forth in Article 4(d) of that protocol.
(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall be available only for that South Vietnamese party which is in control of that point. The two South Vietnamese parties shall have an equal number of points of entry.

Article 8

(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in Article 5 of the agreement shall take with them all their armaments, munitions and war material. Transfers of such items which would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be made subsequent to the entry into force of the agreement except for transfers of communications, transport and other noncombat material to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the International Commission or Control and Supervision.

(b) Within five days after the entry into force of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision of the general plans for timing of complete troop withdrawals which shall take place in four phases of 15 days each. It is anticipated that the number of troops withdrawn in each phase are not likely to be widely different, although it is not feasible to insure equal numbers. The approximate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase shall be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision sufficiently in advance of actual withdrawals so that they can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

Article 9

(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in that article shall dismantle and remove from South Vietnam or destroy all military bases in South Vietnam of
the United States and of the other foreign countries referred to in that article, including weapons, mines and other military equipment at these bases, for the purpose of making them unusable for military purposes.

(b) The United States shall supply the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision with necessary information on plans for base dismantlement so that those commissions can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

The Joint Military Commissions

Article 10

(a) The implementation of the agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the agreement.

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has the task of insuring joint action by the parties implementing the agreement by serving as a channel of communication among the parties, by drawing up plans and fixing the modalities to carry out, coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the agreement, and by negotiating and settling all matters concerning the implementation of those provisions.

(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission are:

(1) The coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the agreement by the four parties.

(2) To deter and detect violations, to deal with cases of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention between the parties relating to the above-mentioned provisions.
(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint teams as required by specific cases, to any part of south Vietnam, to investigate alleged violations of the agreement and to assist the parties in finding measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases.

(4) To engage in observation at the places where this is necessary in the exercise of its functions.

(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, by unanimous decisions, determine.

Article 11

(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military Commission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate immediately a military delegation of 59 persons to represent it on the central commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be a general officer, or equivalent.

(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military Commissions located in the regions shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Places</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Hue</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
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<td>Bien Hoa</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
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<td>VII</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each party shall designate a military delegation of 16 persons to represent it on each regional commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel, or equivalent.
(c) There shall be a joint military team operating in each of the areas shown on the annexed map and based at each of the following places in South Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region I</th>
<th>Region IV</th>
<th>Region VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
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<td>Bao Loc</td>
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<td>Phan Rang</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region II</th>
<th>Region V</th>
<th>Region VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoi An</td>
<td>An Loc</td>
<td>Tri Ton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tam Ky</td>
<td>Xuan Loc</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
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<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>Ben Cat</td>
<td>Vi Thanh</td>
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<td>Cu Chi</td>
<td>Khanh Hung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tan An</td>
<td>Quan Long</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Region III
Kotnum
Hau Bon
Phu Cat
Tuy An
Ninh Hoa
Ban Me Thuot

Each party shall provide four qualified persons for each joint military team. The senior person designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of major to lieutenant colonel, or equivalent.

(d) The Regional Joint Military Commission shall assist the Central Joint Military Commission in performing its tasks and shall supervise the operations of the military teams. The region of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the responsibility of the central commission, which shall designate joint military teams to operate in this region.

(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide support and guard personnel for its delegations to the Central Joint
Military Commission and Regional Joint Military Commissions, and for its members of the joint military teams. The total number of support and guard personnel for each party shall not exceed 550.

(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may establish such joint sub commissions, joint staffs and joint military teams as circumstances may require. The central commission shall determine the numbers of personnel required for any additional subcommissions, staff or teams it establishes, provided that each party shall personnel for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, to include its staffs, teams and support personnel, shall not exceed 3,300.

(g) The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties may, by agreement, establish provisional subcommissions and joint military teams to carry out the tasks specifically assigned to them by Article 17 in the agreement. With respect to Article 7 of the agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties’ delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall establish joint military teams at the points of entry into South Vietnam used for replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which are designated in accordance with Article 7 of this protocol. From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties’ delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional subcommission and provisional Joint military terms to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel. Where necessary for the above purposes, the two parties may agree to assign personnel additional to those assigned to the two South Vietnamese delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.
Article 12

(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the agreement, which stipulates that the two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate their respective representatives to form the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, 24 hours after the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated South Vietnamese parties’ delegations to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall meet in Saigon so as to reach an agreement as soon as possible on organization and operation of the Two-Party Joint Commission, as well as the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties’ delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall simultaneously assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels, in addition to their functions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military Commission cease its operation in accordance with Article 16 of the agreement, agreement has not been reached on organization of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission the delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties serving with the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall continue temporarily to work together as a provisional two-party joint military commission and to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels until the Two-Party Military Commission becomes operational.

Article 13

In application of the principle of unanimity, the Joint Military Commissions shall have no chairmen, and meetings
shall be convened at the request of any representative. The Joint Military Commissions shall adopt working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities.

Article 14

The Joint Military Commissions and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions. Each Joint Military Commission shall inform the international commission about the implementation of those provisions of the agreement for which that Joint Military Commission has responsibility and which are within the competence of the international commission. Each Joint Military Commission may request the international commission to carry out specific observation activities.

Article 15

The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operation 24 hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The Regional Four-Party Joint Military Commissions shall begin operating 48 hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The joint military teams based at the places listed in Article 11(c) of this protocol shall begin operating no later than 15 days after the cease-fire comes into force. The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties shall simultaneously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 12 of this protocol.

Article 16

(a) The parties shall provide full protection and all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint Military Commissions at all levels, in the discharge of their tasks.
(b) The Joint Military Commissions and their personnel, while carrying out their tasks shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Commissions may carry pistols and wear special insignia decided upon by each Central Joint Military Commission. The personnel of each party while guarding commission installations or equipment may be authorized to carry individual small arms, as determined by each Central Joint Military Commission.

Article 17

(a) The delegation of each party to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall have its own offices, communication, logistics and transportation means, including aircraft when necessary.

(b) Each party, in its areas of control, shall provide appropriate office and accommodation facilities to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels.

(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission by means of loan, lease or gift, the common means of operation, including equipment for communication, supply and transport, including aircraft when necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may purchase from any source necessary facilities, equipment and services which are not supplied by the parties. The Joint Military Commissions shall possess and use these facilities and this equipment.
(d) The facilities and the equipment for common use mentioned above shall be returned to the parties when the Joint Military Commissions have ended their activities.

Article 18

The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall be borne equally by the four parties, and the common expenses of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam shall be borne equally by these two parties.

Article 19

This protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Lam
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Binh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

2-PARTY VERSION

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE
CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the war and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of protocol Articles 1-18 same as above]

Article 19

The protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.
Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the
United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

PROTOCOL ON CONTROL COMMISSION
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of control and Supervision, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The implementation of the agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the agreement.

The functions of the international commission are to control and supervise the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 18 of the agreement. In carrying out these functions, the international commission shall:

(a) Follow the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the agreement through communication with the parties and on-the-spot observation at the places where this is required.
(b) Investigate violations of the provisions which fall under the control and supervision of the commission.

(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint Military Commissions in deterring and detecting violations of the above-mentioned provisions.

The international commission shall investigate violations of the provisions described in Article 18 of the agreement on the request of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, or of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission or of any party, or, with respect to Article 9(b) of the agreement on general elections, of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, or in any case where the international commission has other adequate grounds for considering that there has been a violation of those provisions. It is understood that, in carrying out this task, the international commission shall function with the concerned parties' assistance and cooperation as required.

Article 3

(a) When the international commission finds that there is a serious violation in the implementation of the agreement or a threat to peace against which the commission can find no appropriate measure, the commission shall report this to the four parties to the agreement so that they can hold consultations to find a solution.

(b) In accordance with Article 18(f) of the agreement, the international commission's reports shall be made with the unanimous agreement of the representatives of all the four members. In case no unanimity is reached, the commission shall forward the different views to the four parties in accordance with Article 18(c) of the agreement, but these shall not be considered as reports of the commission.
Article 4

(a) The headquarters of the international commission shall be at Saigon.

(b) There shall be seven regional teams located in the regions on the annexed map and based at the following places:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Places</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
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<td>Phan Thiet</td>
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<td>Bien Hoa</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>My Tho</td>
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<td>VII</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The international commission shall redesignate three teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

(c) There shall be 26 teams operating in the areas shown on the annexed map and based at the following places in South Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region I</th>
<th>Region II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>Hoi An</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Bai</td>
<td>Tam Ky</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region III</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Kontum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hau Bon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Cat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinh Hoa</td>
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<td>Ninh Hoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ban Me Thuot</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moc Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giong Trom</td>
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</table>
(d) There shall be 12 teams located as shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region IV</th>
<th>Region V</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tri Ton</td>
<td>An Loc</td>
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<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>Xuan Loc</td>
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<td>Vi Thanh</td>
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<td>Bao Loc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
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</table>

| (e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall be available for assignment to the points of entry which are not listed in paragraph (d) above and which the two South Vietnamese parties choose as points for legitimate entry to South Vietnam for replacement of armaments, munitions and war material permitted by Article 7 of the agreement. Any team or teams not needed for the above-mentioned assignment shall be available for other tasks, in keeping with the commission’s responsibility for control and supervision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lao Bao</th>
<th>Vung Tau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Het</td>
<td>Xa Mat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duc Co</td>
<td>Bien Hoa Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>Hong Ngu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(f) There shall be seven teams to control and supervise the return of captured and detained personnel of the parties.

Article 5

(a) To carry out its task concerning the return of the captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties as stipulated by Article 8 (a) of the agreement, the
international commission shall, during the time of such return send one control and supervision team to each place in Vietnam where the captured persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in south Vietnam mentioned in Article 8 (c) of the agreement, the international commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in south Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured and detained persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons shall be taken to the places of return.

Article 6

To carry out its tasks regarding Article 9 (b) of the agreement on the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam, the international commission shall organize additional teams, when necessary. The international commission shall discuss this question in advance with the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If additional teams are necessary for this purpose; they shall be formed 30 days before the general elections.

Article 7

The international commission shall continually keep under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the international commission shall be reduced correspondingly.
Article 8

The international commission shall continually keep under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the international commission shall be reduced correspondingly.

Article 8

Each member of the international commission shall make available at all times the following numbers of qualified personnel:

(a) One senior representative and 26 others for the headquarters staff.

(b) Five for each of the seven regional teams.

(c) Two for each of the other international control teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh and Vung Tau, each of which shall have three.

(d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of providing support to the commission headquarters and its teams.

Article 9

(a) The international commission, and each of its team, shall act as a single body comprising representatives of all four members.

(b) Each member has the responsibility to insure the presence of its representatives at all levels of the international commission. In case a representative is absent,
the member concerned shall immediately designate a replacement.

Article 10

(a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, assistance and protection to the international commission.

(b) The parties shall at all times maintain regular and continuous liaison with the international commission. During the existence of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the parties to that commission shall also perform liaison functions with the international commission. After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, such liaison shall be maintained through the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, liaison missions or other adequate means.

(c) The international commission and the Joint Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, the concerned party shall designate a liaison officer to the team to cooperate with and assist it in carrying out without hindrance its task of control and supervision. When a team is carrying out an investigation, a liaison officer from each concerned, party shall have the opportunity to accompany it, provided the investigation is not thereby delayed.

(e) Each party shall give the international commission reasonable advance notice of all proposed actions concerning those provisions of the agreement that are to be controlled and supervised by the international commission.

(f) The international commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably
required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the agreement. In carrying out these functions, the international commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned.

Article 11

In supervising the holding of the free and democratic general elections described in Articles 9(b) and 12(b) of the agreement in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon between the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the international commission, the latter shall receive full cooperation and assistance from the national council.

Article 12

The international commission and its personnel who have the nationality of a member state shall, while carrying out their tasks, enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

Article 13

The international commission may use the means of communication and transport necessary to perform its functions. Each South Vietnamese party shall make available for rent to the international commission appropriate office and accommodation facilities and shall assist it in obtaining such facilities. The international commission may receive from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the necessary means of communication and transport and may purchase from any source necessary equipment and service not obtained from the parties. The international commission shall possess these means.
Article 14

The expenses for the activities of the international commission shall be borne by the parties and the members of the international commission in accordance with the provisions of this article:

(a) Each member country of the international commission shall pay the salaries and allowances of its personnel.

(b) All other expenses incurred by the international commission shall be met from a fund to which each of the four parties shall contribute twenty-three per cent (23%) and to which each member of the international commission shall contribute two per cent (2%).

(c) Within 30 days of the date of entry into force of this protocol, each of the four parties shall provide the international commission with an initial sum equivalent to four million five hundred thousand (4,500,000) French francs in convertible currency, which sum shall be credited against the amounts due from that party under the first budget.

(d) The international commission shall prepare its own budgets. After the international commission approves a budget, it shall transmit it to all parties signatory to the agreement for their approval. Only after the budgets have been approved by the four parties to the agreement shall they be obliged to make their contributions. However, in case the parties to the agreement do not agree on a new budget, the international commission shall temporarily base its expenditures on the previous budget, except for the extraordinary, one-time expenditures for installation or for the acquisition of equipment, and the parties shall continue to make their contributions on that basis until a new budget is approved.
Article 15

(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in place within 24 hours after the cease-fire.

(b) The regional teams shall be operational and in place, and three teams for supervision and control of the return of the captured and detained personnel shall be operational and ready for dispatch within 48 hours after the cease-fire.

(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place within 15 to 30 days after the cease-fire.

Article 16

Meetings shall be convened at of call of the chairman. The international commission shall adopt other working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions and consistent with respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

Article 17

The members of the international commission may accept the obligations of this protocol by sending notes of acceptance to the four parties signatory to the agreement. Should a member of the international commission decide to withdraw from the international commission, it may do so by giving three months’ notice by means of notes to the four parties to the agreement, in which case those four parties shall consult among themselves for the purpose of agreeing upon a replacement member.

This protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.
Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are officially and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Lam
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
Nguyen Thu Binh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

2-PARTY VERSION PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION


In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

Have agreed as follows:
[Text of protocol Articles 1-17 same as above]
Article 18


Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

PROTOCOL ON THE PRISONERS PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this data providing for the return of captured military
personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained
Vietnamese civilian personnel,
Have agreed as follows:

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS

Article 1

The parties signatory to the agreement shall return the
captured military personnel of the parties mentioned in
Article 8 (a) of the agreement as follows:

* All captured military personnel of the United
States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in
Article 3 (a) of the agreement shall be returned to United
States authorities.

* All captured Vietnamese military personnel,
whether belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall
be returned to the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall
be returned to that South Vietnamese party under whose
command they served.

Article 2

All captured civilians who are nationals of the United
States of any other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3
(a) of the agreement shall be returned to United States
authorities. All other captured foreign civilians shall be
retained to the authorities of their country of nationality by
any one of the parties willing and able to do so.

Article 3

The parties shall today exchange complete lists of
captured persons mentioned in Article 1 and 2 of this
protocol.
Article 4

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol shall be completed within 60 days of the signing of the agreement at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States forces and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the agreement.

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or maimed, old persons and women shall be returned first. The remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one detention place after another or in order of their dates of capture beginning with those who have been held the longest.

Article 5

The return and reception of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol shall be carried out at places convenient to the concerned parties. Places of return shall be agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The parties shall insure the safety of personnel engaged in the return and reception of those persons.

Article 6

Each party shall return all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol without delay and shall facilitate their return and reception. The detaining parties
shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any ground, have been prosecuted or sentenced.

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 7

(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which reads as follows:

"The term ‘civilian internees’ is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities."

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

(c) Within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall exchange lists of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained by each party and lists of the places at which they are held.
TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS
DURING DETENTION

Article 8

(a) All captured military personnel of the parties and captured foreign civilians of the parties shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange postcards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages against personal dignity. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced. These personnel shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange postcards and letters with their families and receive parcels.
Article 9

(a) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured military personnel of the parties and foreign civilians of the parties, the parties shall, within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where captured military personnel and foreign civilians are held.

(b) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, the two South Vietnamese parties shall, within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel are held.

WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSING PERSONS

Article 10

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall insure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8(b) of the agreement. When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Party Joint Military Team shall be maintained to carry on this task.

(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South Vietnamese parties shall help each other to obtain information about missing persons, determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead, in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations.
OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 11

(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Military Commissions will have the responsibility of determining immediately the modalities of implementing the provisions of this protocol consistent with their respective responsibilities under Articles 16(a) and 17(a) of the agreement. In case the Joint Military Commission, when carrying out their tasks, cannot reach agreement on a matter pertaining to the return of captured personnel they shall refer to the international commission for its assistance.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form, in addition to the teams established by the protocol concerning the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions, a subcommission on captured persons and, as required, joint military teams on captured persons to assist the commission in its tasks.

(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional subcommission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel.

(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol at each place in Vietnam where such persons are being returned and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained at each place in South Vietnam where such persons
are being captured, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

In implementation of Articles 18(b) and 18(c) of the agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall have the responsibility to control and supervise the observance of Articles 1 through 7 of this protocol through observation of the return of captured military personnel, foreign civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel at each place in Vietnam where these persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return, the examination of lists and the investigation of violations of the provisions of the above-mentioned articles.

Article 13

Within five days after signature of this protocol, each party shall publish the text of the protocol and communicate it to all the captured persons covered by the protocol and being detained by that party.

Article 14

This protocol shall come into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America  
William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam  
Nguyen Duy Trinh  
Minister for Foreign Affairs
For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
Tran Van Lam
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Binh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

2-PARTY VERSION PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL


In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of protocol Articles 1-13 same as above]

Article 14

The protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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