NATIONALISM IN THE ARAB EAST

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Arab Nationalism or al-Dirayyah

al-Dirayyah is a very important event in the history
of the Arabs. It is closely associated with the decline
and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and with Arab aspirations
to political independence and unity. The Turks and the
Muslim Arabs lived side by side for about four hundred
years in a supra-national Ottoman Empire as members of
one great community, united by their faith and their
allegiance to a Muslim sovereign who was sultan or Caliph
at the same time. But towards the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the
reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and subsequently the
'Young Turks' led to increased discontent and rebelliousness in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Among the Arabs, nationalism did not emerge until
the later part of the nineteenth century. The sense of
solidarity and pride in the Arab tradition had long
existed; but they did not form the basis of coherent
movement until the west began to infringe upon the
Arab world. In my dissertation I have tried to write
down the situation and the relations which create a most important background to some of the contemporary political problems in the Arab East and to the awakening of the Arab political consciousness in West Asia, and the misunderstandings which developed between the Arabs and the Turks, which resulted in the genesis of Arab nationalism.
CHAPTER
I
THE GENESIS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

It is a known fact that nationalism is one of the most important dynamic factors of modern times. In the opinion of Hans Kohn: 'It is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution, has become and more common to mankind ..... The modern period of history, starting with the French Revolution, is characterised by the fact that in this period, and in this period alone, the nation demands supreme loyalty of men, that all men, not only certain individuals or classes, are drawn into this common loyalty, and that all civilization .... are now dominated more and more by this one supreme group - consciousness, nationalism'.

No doubt it is Europe where nationalism first appeared but it did not remain confined to Europe. As Lotrop Stoddard writes: 2

'In Europe where it first attained self-conscious maturity, it radically altered the face of things during the nineteenth century, so that century is often called the age of nationalities. But nationalism is not merely a European phenomenon. It has spread to the remotest corners of the earth, and is apparently still destined to effect momentous transformations.'

Nationalism thus has been a great force in the 15th and 20th centuries. Yet so far there has been no agreement among scholars about the nation of nationalism.

Many theories have been advanced seeking variously to identify nationalism with language, culture, race, politics, geography, economics, or religion. Now these, and even other matters may be factors predisposing or contributing to the formation of national consciousness. But in the last analysis, nationalism is something over and above all its constituent elements, which it works into a new and higher synthesis.\(^1\)

Nationalism is a political creed, that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority. Nationalism centres the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or described. It expresses itself in the most varied and opposite ideologies, as well as in the search for an "ideology. \(^2\)

As a matter of fact, nationalism is a state of mind; nationalism is a belief, held by a fairly large number of individuals, that they constitute a "nationality"; it is a sense of belonging together as a "nation". This "nation", as visualized in the minds of its believers, is a people or community associated together and organized under one

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1. ibid., p. 1-2.

government, and dwelling together in a distinct territory.¹

The Arab thinker Sati' al-Husri defines Arab nationalism in the sense 'Urubah. He writes:²

There is left no room to doubt that the division of the Arab provinces into several states took place because of the bargaining and ambitions of the foreign states, and not according to the views and interests of the people of the countries. So, too were the borders of these states determined by the wishes and agreements of the foreign powers, and not according to the natural demands of the situation or the requirements of indigenous interest .... As it is possible for us to consider, for example, the peoples of Syria as forming a true nation, different from the people of Iraq and Lebanon? Never, gentlemen. All that I have explained indicates clearly people of these states are temporary and superficial.... We must always assert that the Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Jordanians, Hejazis, and Yemenis all belong to one nation the Arab nation.

On the question of Arab Unity al Husri is very emphatic³

I believe that in the present circumstances, the first action that must be taken to realize Arab Unity is to awaken the feelings of Arab nationalism and to spread faith in the unity of this nation. When these feelings are completely awakened and when this faith is thoroughly spread and firmly established in the people, then the path for Arab unity will become clear and the obstacles which oppose it will vanish easily.

Arabism is the strongest and most important of the ties which bind Egyptians to each other. This is because all Egyptians, whether they are Muslim or Christian, from Upper to Lower

1. Lothocop Stoddard, op.cit., p. 133.
Egypt, speak Arabic. ... we can therefore, be certain that Egypt is Arab and that its future will be bound by the strongest of ties of Arabian.

From the Marxist point of view, 1

Nationalism is a principle of bourgeois ideology and politics expressed in national isolation. It is advocacy of distrust of other nations and enmity among nations. Nationalism has its roots in capitalism's specific features of development. Reflecting the character relations among nations under capitalism, nationalism appears in two forms: Great power chauvinism of a dominating nation, marked by contempt for other nations, and local nationalism of an oppressed nation stamped by the striving for national sedition and distrust of other nations. Nationalism developed in the process of formation of nation which was accompanied by the emergence of national languages and cultures and the moulding of a special national psychology and national sentiments. Speculating on the slogans of "nation wide" interests bourgeois and reformist ideologists and revisionists utilise Nationalism as a refined means for stifling the class consciousness of the working people, splitting the international working class movements and justifying colonialism and wars between nations. Nationalism is unacceptable in any form to the working people, whose interests are expressed only by proletarian internationalism. But at the definite stage of the national liberation movement, communist consider historically justified to support the Nationalism of the oppressed nation, which has a general democratic content (anticolonialism, striving for political and economic independence). This variety of Nationalism however, also has another side, expressing the ideology and interests of the reactionary exploiting top group, which leans towards compromise with imperialism.

Nationalism is most wide spread and tenacious in a petty bourgeois environment, under socialism which establishes real equality of nations, the social roots of nationalism are removed and its manifestation are preserved only as service of capitalism in the minds and behaviour of people.

The spread of nationalism on a global scale is a result of the Europeanization and modernization of western and pre-modern societies. As a phenomenon of modern European history the base of nationalism is closely linked with the origin of popular sovereignty; nationalism has from the beginning been a politically revolutionary movement, it has tried to transform or overthrow the "legitimate" government of that part, whose claim to authority was based upon divine ordination or hereditary rights. It wished to establish totally new political entities.

Nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century was regarded as the political doctrine of the upper classes of the rightists in the political spectrum of the age. It stood in sharp and repressive opposition to socialism, an international movement that included the industrial workers, and landless peasants, who generally felt excluded from the national society, and expressed their aspirations.  

The new development of nationalism "racial" was at first confined to the older centres of European civilization, but with the spread of Western ideas it presently appeared in the most unexpected quarters. Meanwhile, by the closing

decades of the nineteenth century, the first phase of nationalism had patiently passed into Asia. The 'Young Turk' and 'Young Egyptian' movements and nationalist stirrings in regions so far remote from each other as Algeria, Persia and India were unmistakable signs that Asia was gripped by the initial theories of nationalist self consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years of the twentieth century, numerous symptoms proclaimed the fact that in Asia, as in the Balkans, the second or 'racial' stage of nationalism had begun. These years saw definite emergence of far flung 'Pan'-movements; "Pan-Turkism," 'Pan Arabism' and "Pan Islamic nationalism".

The first major nationalist revolution that put equal emphasis on the socialist revolutionary aspects was the Mexican revolution of 1910-1917. It set the pattern for the development of nationalism in many underdeveloped countries, and for their fight against foreign political intervention and economic penetration and exploitation.

Nationalism, despite its relatively brief history, has undergone several transformations. It was an elite, a 'bourgeois' movement in the age of the ascent of the middle classes; it has become in its second century a mass movement in which the people at large demand an ever-widening participation in the political, social and cultural life of the nation.

After 1888, nationalism originally a movement of emancipation and constitutional rights. It is difficult to force the future of nationalism. It is a decisive force in a world growing more and more inter-dependent, a force capable of producing bitter tensions and one-sided, self-righteousness judgements that threaten the rational solution of international conflicts. On the other hand, nationalism is an important factor in prevailing any one or two of the strongest powers from establishing their hegemony over the whole globe, over a large part of it.

ARAB NATIONALISM

Let us now trace the genesis and growth of nationalism (al-Qawmiyya) in the near and middle East. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman empire contained within its dominions, most of the territories comprising the former Arab empires and nearly all those people speaking Arabic as their mother tongue. Arab nationalist tendencies germinating obscurely and confusedly throughout the first half of the

1. P.J.Vatikiotis writes: The term derives from 'Kamu' a term of tribal province used used to denote a group of people having or claiming a common ancestor, or a tribe descended from a single ancestor. One's 'Kamu' is simply one's people, either genealogically determined or mythologically and folklorically depicted. In this century 'Kawmiyya' refers to the movement of nationalism among the Arabs of the Ottoman dominations in the 'Fertile Crescent' that were conquered by the allies of the great war'. See 'Kawmiyya' in E.I.2 vol.IV p.781.
nineteenth century. Not until the second half of the century is there any clear conception of 'nationalism' in the western sense. There are distinct nationalist tendencies in the teachings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (who is philosophically the connecting link between Pan-Islamism and Muslim nationalism), while the Turkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were patiently influenced by nationalism as they were by other western ideas. It was in fact, in Turkey that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared.¹

John Marlowe describes Arab Nationalism as follows:²

The beginnings of Arab nationalism can be taken to date from the landing of Bonaparte in Egypt in 1798. This event was the starting point of a process by which the lands of the Ottoman Empire became more and more exposed to military, culture, economic and political influences from Western Europe. It was the impact of those influence on a culturally dormant, politically stagnant and economically sterile society which set in train those diverse spiritual, intellectual, social and political ferment which go to make up Arab nationalism.

In retrospect the two seminal movements during the nineteenth century which shaped and determined the future development of Arab nationalism were: (a) - the development of a specifically Arab consciousness among the Arabic speaking inhabitants of Syria and, (b) - 'Urabi's military rebellion in

¹. Lothrop Stoddard, op.cit., p. 138.

Egypt. There were of course other formative influences, but these two movements, the one providing nationalism with a theoretical basis, the other with a practical example. In its origin, Arab nationalism in Syria was an attempt, inspired mainly by scholars and intellectuals to realize, first a cultural and then a political unity based on a common language with the object of securing first Arab autonomy within and later, Arab independence without the Ottoman empire. Starting as a literary revival arising from the activity of Christian missions in Lebanon, it developed over a year as a coherent political movement, which included Arabic-speaking Muslims regarding themselves as fellow-members of a noble but oppressed race, 'rightly struggling to be free', under the Hamidian despotism, which was administratively tyrannical but racially liberal, freedom was seen as Arab autonomy within a politically reformed Ottoman empire. Confronted with the Pan-Turanian proclivities and the centralizing tendencies of the Young Turks, freedom became synonymous with national independence and as a necessary corollary, Arab nationalists began to think no longer in terms of reforms but of revolt.

Arab army officers, and Arab civilian officials in the Ottoman service, as well as Arab students and professional men bonded themselves into secret societies dedicated to the course of Arab nationalism and eagerly awaited some external
event which might precipitate the fall of the Ottoman empire and the parturition of Arab independence.

We must now take a brief look at the ideas underlaying Arab nationalism in its formative stage. These ideas appear to derive equally from European liberalism and Islamic modernism which undoubtedly influenced by European liberalism, was a conscious, attempt to combat European influences on the Muslim world by reinterpretting the principles of Islam with the object of founding a specifically Islamic way of life, which would be able to hold its own against all the spiritual, emotional, intellectual, social and economic pressures from the West. The pioneer of the movement was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d.1897) whose most influential disciple was the Egyptian reformer Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, (d.1905) 'Abd al-Rahman al Kawakibi. (d.1902), who was a Syrian from Aleppo and provided the principal nexus between Arab nationalism and Islamic modernism by presenting the one in terms of the other.

Islamic modernism provided a theoretical basis for Arab nationalism in terms of Islam which both supplemented and corrected the European liberal influence. While the European liberal influence was principally directed against the immediate pressure of Ottoman rule, the Islamic modernist influence was principally directed against the ultimate threat

1. Ibid., p. 10.
of European domination, Islamic modernism went back to the early Arab caliphs to emphasize the duty of the ruler to conform himself to the popular will.

Arab nationalism took root among the intellectuals of the Syrian cities. The concept of racial unity based on a common desert ancestry strengthened and extended the concept of unity based on a common language, a common religion and common aspiration towards freedom, language, religion and race, these were the three basic concepts of Arab unity. Their effects were local in respect of language and race, limited in respect of religion. In default of any realisable sense of Syrian nationality, unity language had been a means of expressing a unity of aspiration for the various Arabic speaking sects and tribes included within the geographical region known as Syria.¹

The idea of nationalism had dominated the minds of Arabs to a greater extent than any other ideology. It is significant that this new concept, in contrast with other imported ideas, has gained acceptance with but little opposition, and had spread so rapidly, despite Islam's tacit or expressed disapproval. Moreover nationalism has encroached upon certain dominance of life which Islam had one uncontested for centuries. Perhaps for this very reason the early reformers

¹. Ibid., p. 16.
did not become enthusiastic advocates of the concept, fearing that it might encroach upon traditional loyalties. Instead they sought to borrow only those concepts which would not enter into direct conflict with Islam. Very soon however, these early imports brought nationalism in their train, which proceeded to supersede the Islamic loyalty in varying degrees. With the exception of strictly religious concepts, all other concepts have been subjected to a wholesale re-examination by Arab thinkers, in the hope of their recent speculations on the idea of nationalism. Many Arab thinkers have consciously sought to associate religion with nationalism in an effort to reintroduce Islam as an element in this ideology. But religion is bound to take a subordinate position such as blend, and thus became a component rather than an opponent of nationalism.

About the genesis of Arab nationalism Majid Khadduri writes:

Turks and Arabs, the two major ethno-cultural groups which maintained Ottoman power, remained the least affected by the forces disrupting Islamic unity. But the decadence of Ottoman rule, arising from internal as well as external forces became visible by the later part of the eighteenth century, the Christian Arab thinkers, were the first to advocate the idea of Arab nationalism 2 without reference to Islam. Arab nationalism, as they advocated it, was explicitly secular only a handful of Muslim Arabs of liberal mind accepted it.


Muslim liberal thinkers who advocated the idea of nationalism did neither demand that Arab lands be detached from the Ottoman empire nor indeed that religion be separated from the state. Abdul-nâman al-Kawakibi, the most radical of Muslim thinkers who attacked Ottoman rule, called for the restoration of the caliphate from Turkish to Arab lands, but not for the break in Ottoman Unity.¹

The Christian Najib 'Azuri,² who advocated the liberation of the Arabs from Ottoman rule, accepted an attachment to Ottoman unity in some form. He proposed to divide the

¹ Al-Kawakibi's argument that the Turks usurped the caliphate from the Arabs was based on the doctrine that one of the qualifications of the caliph must be his descent from the Arab of Quraysh, according to authoritative legal texts. While the content of this argument was outwardly polemical, it spread among Muslim thinkers betrayed lack of loyalty to Turkish leadership. See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London, 1962), pp. 271-72.

² Najib 'Azuri was a former official under the Ottoman administration and served as a deputy governor Jerusalem before he resigned and settled in Paris. He published his proposals in 1905 Le Revéil de la nation Arabe, (Paris, 1905). Before 'Azuri another Christian leader called for the separation of Arab land from the Ottoman empire Yusuf Karim; but his suggestion was inspired by the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 rather than by nationalism Karim wrote from Paris to Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, the exiled Algerian leader in Damascus, urging him to come to an understanding with the European powers for a separate existence of Arab lands under his rule after that war (see Sam'ân Karim, Yusuf Beq Karam fi'l Manfa (Tripoli, 1905), pp., 33-36, 346-62). When the war was over and Blunt suggested a separate existence of Syria under Jaza'iri's rule, Britain was no longer interested in such an arrangement (see W.S.Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (London, 1907), pp. 118-119.
the Arab lands into two parts, the north (the Fertile crescent) and the South (Arabia), each with a recognition all its own. Arabia, the seat of the caliphate, would become an Islamic state, and the Fertile crescent a modern secular state. Al Kawakibi and 'Azuri, to mention but two distinguished writers made it clear that the idea of Arab nationalism remained vague and nebulous before the Turkish revolution of 1908.

The nature of Arab nationalism which took root at the beginning of the modern period among the Arabs of the 'Fertile Crescent' under the Ottoman domination. This area was occupied by the Allies of the first World War inspite of the fact that the Arabs supported the Allies which lead to their victory.

As Maxime Rodinson during the inter-war period the disappointment of the Arabs led to the profound modification of their ideology. He writes:

It was in Arab Asia that the development of a nationalist ideology went forward. It was there that hatred of imperialism, especially of British imperialism, reached its peak. The big, medium and petty bourgeoisie took up arms against the landowning aristocracy and seized control of the nationalist movement which the aristocracy had betrayed. The influence of worldwide ideologies began to make itself felt. We will return to Marxism's contribution later on. At the time, fascism's influence was more important. The nature of the enemy alliance between Anglo-French imperialism and Zionism was particularly significant in this respect. But racist ideology, which is so illusurated to the Arabs, was only radically taken up, and then only by a typical group as Antoun Sa'ad's Syrian Popular Party which created a Syrian racism implicitly opposed to Arab unity. The

unified Arab nationalist ideology was clearly predominant, and gaining ground. About 1936 it gained a hold in Egypt, and spread towards the Maghreb and the Sudan. This ideology tried to equip itself with a rational basis; theoreticians discussed the foundations of the Arab nation, its links with the Muslim religion and the federal or unified character of the state it would set up. People tried to define nationhood and of course they did so in terms of characteristics compatible with the particular traits of the Arab countries' situation. German influences, in addition, pushed people to think of the nation as an objective entity which imposed duties and demanded unconditional devotion from its members.

About characteristic traits of Arab nationalism during this period, he further writes:

Both for the theoreticians and for the masses whose aspirations and feelings they expressed, the main contradiction remained the struggle between the oppressed oriental world and western imperialism. The contradictions with other oriental nationalism, Turkish nationalism, for example, seemed quite secondary. Although it was hoped that one western imperialist power might be played off against another, this was purely a matter of tactics, except for the few genuine agents, of course. British efforts to make France bear the whole brunt of Arab nationalism were doomed to fail.

It was a nationalism which for a long time continued to make some use of religious feeling. This was natural enough, seeing as Islam, which was created by an Arab and revered as bequeathed by God revealed in Arabic, as an Arab cultural phenomenon, a feature of Arab culture despised and threatened by non-Arabs. Even the Arabic-speaking religious minorities, the Jews and Christians, think of it in these terms.

As we have seen, it was a nationalism led by the bourgeoisie; the landed aristocracy had been exposed as untrustworthy and had discredited itself. The nationalist movement minimized class struggle in favour of national unity. It was nonetheless accepted by the proletarian masses with little or no resistance. As long as national independence had not yet been achieved, class struggle quite easily turned into national struggle.
The ruling class which oppressed and exploited its compatriots denounced mainly as traitors to the national struggle, as collaborators with the imperialists. All miseries, difficulties and conflicts were explained in terms of imperialist domination.

It was a unified nationalism, for the reason we have mentioned. There were no fears that membership of a federation, or even of a united Arab state, would result in the threat of domination by one regional element over others, except perhaps amongst the governing elements and certain business circles. The divisions imposed by the imperialist powers had managed to create relatively specific economic units and particular interests within frontiers, despite the gross artificiality of the latter. But this was quite insignificant compared to the great feats towards unified solidarity.

After the mid-20th century Qawmīyya became the expressions of the purported economic political and social Arab revolution. Essentially, though al-Qawmīyya al-'Arabīyya, is the term widely used for the movement of Arab nationalism, Arab intellectuals since the last war have tried to formulate, theoretical and philosophical foundations as well as historical and ideological premises for this nationalism. Most active among them were Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi politicians, teachers, journalists, writers and publicists. Prominent among the more recent exponent and advocate of Arab nationalism have been the Ba'th Party founded in 1943, and its antecedents among smaller radical Arab youth movements in Iraq and Syria in the nineteenth thirties.

Briefly the advocates of Arab nationalism argue the

1. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
existence of an Arab nation (umma-arabiyya) which though actually divided into separate states, ought to be united in a single organiz sovereign political entity. What binds the members of the Arab nation together in a common faith, Islam, a common language, Arabic, a single culture, Islamic and a shared history, economic and other practical grounds for unity have, until recently, rarely been formulated or proposed. Religious sentiment, common identity and an aspiration to political unity, have been the fundamental ingredients of the movement of Arab nationalism, Arabism and Pan-Arabism—all aspects or variants of ummaiyya—in this country.¹

¹ F.J. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 781.
CHAPTER II

THE ARABS UNDER THE OTTOMANS

The Ottomans:

The Turks established the largest and strongest Muslim Empire, known as the Ottoman Empire, since the rise of Islam. At one time, the Ottoman Empire stretched from the gates of Vienna to the straits of Bab al-Mandab, and from the Caucasus to almost, the Atlantic Ocean across North Africa. A series of decisive victories in a long chain of conquests led the Turks to the Zenith of their military power and glory. An unbroken succession of the brilliant and great sultans led the Ottomans to acquire in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a vast empire.¹

In the beginning of the 10th century many Turanian tribes were roaming into Asia Minor, from their original homeland, known as Turkistan in Central Asia. Towards the middle of the thirteenth century, a small band of nomad Turks belonging to the Oguz tribes ² migrated from Khurasan into Asia Minor, the leader of the tribe was Sulayman who was accompanied by his son Erdogu. When he appeared on the scene, Sultan Ala al-Din was ruling at Konya. He was a Seljuk. When Erdogu and

² Yahya Armajani, Middle East Past and Present (New Jersey, 1970), p. 137.
his tribe entered in this country, they were non-Muslims. Ertogural had four hundred and twenty-four horsemen with him. These new comers in Anatolia became Muslim in the thirteenth century, only after settling among the Seljuks, who were already Muslims. A favourable opportunity arose when Ala al-Din was threatened by powerful Mongol hardes, and Ertogural, by coming to his help, extricated him from a different situation. In return for this providential aid Sultan Ala al-Din made a grant of territory to Ertogural to be held as a feif under the Seljuks.

1. Z.N. Zeine, op. cit., p. 5 Koprulu thinks it is wise to conclude from legends that Osman was converted to Islam. He dismisses the question of the Islamization of the Ottomans by saying: ‘These Turkish tribes were in general Muslims but free from fanaticalism’. The precepts of religion were too complicated and impossible for them to observe, so they remained faithful to their national traditions, covered with a light varnish of Islamism. . . . F. Koprulu, Les origines de l’Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1935), p. 58.

2. Lord Caversley, The Turkish Empire from 1288 to 1614 (London, 1928), p. 15. Also H. A. Gibbons, The foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 1916), F. Koprulu criticises H. A. Gibbons for accepting the legendary history of the Ottomans and believes that it is a mistake to attribute the establishment of this empire to the Muslim zeal and enthusiasm of a tribe of 400 tents which settled in the thirteenth century in the north west corner of Anatolia. He is the opinion that in the first half of the fourteenth century, the Seljukid empire had reached its political and cultural climax, and had already one of the most advanced Economic and Social Organizations of the Middle ages. The Ottoman Empire grew out of the political and social synthesis of all the Turkish elements in Anatolia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In F. Koprulu, op. cit., pp. 29, 33 and 73.
Ertogural lived as the head of his clan of Turks in the Ceded territory, till his death in 1288. Osman, his son, emerged as an old Gazi, hero of the Faith, active in frontier warfare. He soon commanded a much more ambitious career than that of his father. He increased his dominion from its very narrow limits of Sugat and Eski-Sheir to a territory extending thence northward to the Bosphorus and Black sea.1

As Gibbons writes:2

The new state thus created by Osman did not consist purely of Turks. It had very large mixture of Greeks and Slaves, who were welded with Turks by the religion of Islam. They were from an early period very distinct from the people of other Turkish states. They called themselves Osmanlis.

At the end of the century Osman reorganized his government before he died in 1326. Osman declared himself an amir, independent of the Sultan of Konya. His descendants were thirty-seven in number, who ruled for 622 years over one of the largest empires of the world. They called themselves Osmanlis—hence Ottomans and each one upon ascending the throne was girded with the sword of Osman as a symbol of Power.3

1. Lord Eversley, op. cit., p. 15.
2. Ibid., p., 17.
After the death of Osman, his third son Orkhan succeeded in 1326. He was the founder of Janissaries - 'Yani-Cheri', (the name 'Yani-Cheri' meaning 'New army') was given to Orkhan young corps by the Dervish Hadje Beitar.\textsuperscript{1}

The immediate objects of Orkhan's ambition on his accession were the Greek cities of Nicaea and Nicomedia, with their surrounding districts the last important possession of the Byzantine Empire in Asia.\textsuperscript{2} He enrolled a considerable body of infantry for continuous service. This new organization of the army commenced by Orkhan and extended and perfected by his son Murad, converted the nascent Ottoman state into a most powerful engine.

Murad I, who ruled for a period of 30 years from 1359-1369, was the first Ottoman ruler who assumed the title of Sultan.\textsuperscript{3} Murad's reign of thirty years is remembered mainly because of the great Turkish conquest in Europe. During Murad's reign the influence of the empire was considerably extended particularly to the Danube, Thrace, Macedonia and Bulgaria were fully incorporated in the dominion of the Sultan. Murad when not engaged in war, devoted himself to perfecting the organization of his army, on the lines laid down by his father

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Lord Eversley, op. cit., p.21.
\end{enumerate}
Urkhan. Murad's successor was Bayazid I nickname 'yildirim'. His rule lasted only fourteen years. He adopted a much bolder attitude towards the Christian powers of Europe. In Europe his first objective was to complete the suugestion of Bulgaria and Eastern Thrace (the older city of Tirinavo fell in 1393). In 1391 and 1392 he annexed Alaschir, Aidin with Ayasolu, (Izmos) Saruhan, Tekka, Mentische, Jeyzehchir and Kara hisar in the west and south, Gümüşhane, Kastamouu and Amasya in the north.

Another increment in Asia Minor came when the cities of Takat, Sivas, Kaysiri sought the Sultan's protection and acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty. His empire now started from Nish to Eastern Anatolia, and was interrupted only by the small but vital enclave of Constantinople. He continued his policy of expansion in Asia Minor defeating the prince of Karama and other rulers; but this policy was to bring him into conflict with the mighty central Asian conqueror (Timur-i-Lang).

Timur was born in 1333, at Samarkand, he succeeded in establishing an empire extending from the great wall of

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1. H.J.Kissling, op.cit., p. 11.
China to the frontier of Asia Minor, and from the sea of Aral to the river Ganges and Persian Gulf. He had by this time conquered twenty seven separate states and extinguished nine dynasties.

It was obvious that he would come into conflict with the Ottoman Empire. In 1400 he attacked and invaded Asia Minor from Armenia, he laid siege to Sivas, the city was captured. The Ottoman Empire for the time being completely collapsed out the Tartars of Timur dispersed without leaving any trace behind them. Timur died in 1405. On the death of Sultan Bayezid, the Ottoman Empire was doomed to extinction. The Turkish Empire, however showed an unexpected vitality. It survived the invasion of Timur and a civil war between Bayezid’s sons. Mahomet was now in undisputed command of the Empire as sultan. He reigned as such for only eight years from 1413 to 1421. He was succeeded by Murad II, who reigned for thirty years. Murad IIInd determined to put to an end to the Great Empire by the capture of Constantinople.

In 1444 the Ottoman Empire was shaken by an unexpected event, Murad IIInd, abdicated his throne in favour of his eldest son Mahomet II, who at the age of fourteen was proclaimed Sultan in his place. Mahomet IIInd "The conqueror", reigned at the age of fourteen, from the earliest moment
of his accession, he intended to signalize his reign by the
capture of Constantinople. In 1453 he collected an army infront
of the wall of Constantinople which was captured after seven
weeks of siege. The capture of Constantinople was in fact only
the first of a long list of conquests, which earned for him
from his countrymen the title "preeminence of the conqueror".

Mehomet IIInd is also known for his reforms. Eversley
writes: 1

Great as Mehomet was as a warrior and general, he was
not less conspicuous as an administrator and statesman...
He was also the sole source of legislation for his
empire...He founded Mosques, hospitals, colleges, and
schools in Constantinople and other cities of his empire.
He fully recognized the importance of Science and edu-
cation. He cultivated the society of learned men and
loved to converse with them. He had some reputation as
a poet.

He introduced many financial and land reforms. Among his
reforms included new monetary policy, farming out of land to
private individuals, confiscation of wasteful and private proper-

which, under his predecessor, had invaded Italy and captured
Otranto. The most important of his achievements was the com-
plete subjugation, in the second year of his reign, of Her-
zegovina, which had been a tributary state under his predece-
sors, but was now again invaded. It was finally incorporated
as a province of the empire. There were also many years of
desultory wars with Hungary.

In Asia there was war for five years with the Mamluk
government of Egypt and Syrian Mamluks defeated the Turkish
armies in three great battles. There was also war with the
Republic of Venice. The Turkish fleet defeated the Venetian
fleet in 1499 and met on equal terms the combined fleets of
Venice, Austria, and the Pope in 1505. The last two years
of Bayezid's fairly prosperous reign were observed by a civil
war, at the instance of his son and successor Selim.

The net result to the Turkish empire of the thirty one
years of Bayezid's reign was on the one hand, the incorpora-
tion of Herzegovina, and the expulsion of the Venetians from
the Morea; on the other, the loss of three frontiers in Asia
Minor to the Mamluks of Egypt and the withdrawal from the
South of Italy.

Selim I, surnamed Yavuz 'the Brave' was forty seven years
of age when he deposed his father, he reigned only eighth
years, and in that brief period he nearly doubled the extent of the Ottoman Empire. He was almost wholly devoted to war against the Shi'ite Safavid Kingdom of Persia. He was a ruthless persecutor of all Shi'ite movements. He conquered and annexed the great provinces of Diarbekir and Kurdistan from Persia and Egypt, Syria and a great part of Arabia, including the holy cities from the Mamluk government of Egypt.

In January 1517 having crossed the Sinai desert on their way to Cairo the Ottoman troops fought and won the decisive battle of Koydaniyah. Cairo fell, and the last Mamluk Sultan Tuman bey was captured and executed, all of Egypt and its dependencies thus passed into Ottoman hands. Sultan Selim carried the then Caliph al-Mutawakkil with him who was later on allowed to return to Cairo where he died in 1543. The

1. H.J.Kissling, op.cit., p. 27.

2. Egypt became a part of Ottoman Empire and that extraordinary dynasty of Mamluks or slave kings which had ruled Egypt and the Arab lands in the Near East from 1250 came to an end. Thus wrote Ibn Iyas, 'The rule of al-Asraf al Ghauri came to an end, in the twinkling of an eye, as though he had never been. Praise be to Him whose Kingdom never wares, and who never changes! Thus he and his Kingdom came to an end together; the kingdom of Egypt and the dominion of Syria over which he had reigned for fifteen years, nine months and twenty days....' Ibn Iyas, Bada'ial - Zuhuri wa't-tal'al Duhur vol. III, (Cairo, A.H.1312) pp. 58 and 168.


Memluk leaders were entrusted with the administration of Egypt; subject to the superior control of a Pasha appointed by the Turkish governor. Ghazali was appointed Governor of Syria and Khair Bey of Egypt. A garrison of five thousand Ottoman soldiers was left at Cairo. Selim hereby acquired for his dynasty the titular guardianship of the Muslim holy places in the Hejaz. He also assumed the title of Caliph.1

In 1517, Sultan Selim led back his victorious army from Egypt to Syria and held it for some months, first at Damascus and afterwards at Aleppo.

After Selim's death the throne passed into his son Suleyman (1520-1566), who is regarded as the greatest of all the Ottoman Sultans. In western Europe he became known as the "Magnificent" to the Turks he appeared as "Canuni, 'the lawgiver'. He gained a high reputation for his determination to secure justice to his subjects. The extension of the Ottoman Empire effected by Suleyman has been well described by Eversley in these words2.

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1. It is popularly believed that the caliph al-Mutawakkil had officially transferred to Sultan Salim and his all heirs rights to the Caliphate, at a ceremony held in the Mosque of Aya Sofya Istanbul. C.f. P.M. Holt & Others, (eds), The Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge, 1970) vol.1, p.320.

During the forty-six years of his reign Solyman added enormously to the Empire. Belgrade Rhodes, nearly the whole of Hungary, the Crimea the great provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basorunah, and apart of Arminia taken from Persia, Yemen and Aden in Arabia, Algiers, Orana, and Tripoli, and in undefined extent of hinterland inhabited by Arabs in North Africa, and a wide extent of Egypt in the direction of Mubia, where the contributions which he transmitted to his successors.

The Ottoman empire arose during the reign of Sulayman the Magnificent to its zenith.¹

Solyman's death in 1566, is reckoned by Modern historian to mark the commencement of the Ottoman Empire's long decline. Although its external expansion did not yet come to a halt, its internal condition began to show dangerous symptoms of decay.

From this time onwards, the house of Ottoman ceased, on the whole to produce capable rulers, the princes were spineless weaklings addicted to the pleasure of their hams and of the pathologically degenerate. The first signs of changes and corruption were seen in Suleyman's reign itself. His reign marks the beginning of a long decline. Powerful as he was, Sulayman could not cope with the greed of his own retine on the ambitions of his own officers the janissary corps had grown too large to be manageable and increasingly was taking active part in the political affairs of the state.²

¹ H. J. Kissling, op. cit., pp. 32.
² Yahya Aramajani, op. cit., p. 151.
The first real disorders were sighted in the reign of Murad III (1547-53). He was an insignificant ruler and entrusted the officers of the state changed hands regularly. "The currency rapidly depreciated and prices rose".¹ The Janissaries had been weakened by being allowed to marry, this caused the soldiers to give first loyalty to their families rather than the sultan. Murad III allowed the members of the organization to enlist their sons in the corps and later on unemployed Muslims were also employed. They became so powerful that the sultan had no control over them, they increased in number and became a great burden to the economy of the country.²

This process of degeneration continued and ultimately the empire was so weak that its armies were forced to abandon the siege of Vienna in 1683, Budapest was lost to the Austrians in 1686 whose advance was only checked by the treaty of Corlowitz in 1699. Meanwhile the Cossacks troubled them throughout the seventeenth century. The Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 culminated in the humiliating treaty of 'Kucuk-Kaynarca'. Later on the Russians captured Crimea provoking another ruinous war. At this stage Selim III (1789-1807)

¹. P.M. Holt & Others, op. cit., p. 344.
². Even they were disbanded in the 1800’s of the 150,000 on the roll only 2,000 had military training.
ascended the throne and with his succession began the era of reformation of the Ottoman Empire. His Nizam-i-Cevid followed an uprising which dethroned him. Another reformer was Mehmed II (1808-1839) in whose reign the Janissaries were exterminated. He was followed by Abdul Majid (1839-1861) who introduced the charter of 1839, the Hatti-i-Sherif of Cihangiri, which is commonly regarded as the starting point of the 'Tanzimat'. This principle was reaffirmed by the charter of 1856, the Hatti-i-Humavun. The culmination of this process was the promulgation of the constitution in 1876.

OTTOMAN RULE OVER ARAB LANDS:

As stated above a period of about one hundred years almost all of the Arab countries, except Morocco in the west and inner Arabia and Oman on the Arabian Peninsula, were included in the Ottoman Empire and for some three or four centuries suffered Turkish oppression, which in the 19th and 20th centuries was replaced by the even harsher colonial yoke of the European Capitalist powers....

The degree of the subordination to the Ottoman Empire varied from country to country. Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli were considered Ottoman provinces, but by the beginning of the 17th century they had already gained virtual independence from the Porte. In the middle of the 17th century the Turks lost real power in Yemen. Even in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iraq, where Turkish Pashas were installed, the domination of the Porte was often only nominal. Either the Pashas organized plots against the Sultan, or the local Arab feudal Lords rose against the Turkish Pashas, and from time to time fierce uprisings shook the Ottoman Empire.¹

The conditions prevailing in the Arab lands on the eve of the conquest have been aptly described by G. W. F. Stripling:

"The Turks entered the Arab lands at a time when a great economic change had taken place throughout the Middle East, a change that was rapidly rendering those lands economically insignificant and, in fact, threatening them with complete ruin. In the first years of the sixteenth century the mainstay of the Arab's economic structure had been shattered, and the consequences of that disaster had become evident long before the advent of the Turks upon the scene. Until the early sixteenth century the foundation of Arab prosperity was the trade from India to Europe which passed mostly through their hands and yielded to the Mameluke Empire, including Egypt, Syria and the Hejaz, much revenue from customs duties alone. But by the early years of the sixteenth century the trade route to India had shifted away from the Arab lands to Portugal, via the Cape of Good Hope, and the resulting decrease in revenue took its toll in more ways than in the lessening receipts from direct taxes on the Indian and European wares.


². The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, (Urbana, 19-2), p.15.
Not only were the governments of the Arab lands embarrassed by the outright loss of a goodly portion of their revenue which had been derived from customs duties, but also they missed the taxes of those whose income depended directly on the trade between India and Europe. Merchants and their clerks and servants, sailors, ship builders, brokers, camel drivers, strikers all these suffered a partial or total loss of income. But this was not all, as the farmers, shopkeepers, clothiers and men engaged in the transport of food and clothes for those in any way connected with the Indian European trade, together with those who rented houses, became unable to keep up their standard of living. Taxes, however, still had to go on, and even become higher than ever, in as much as the loss of customs duties had to be met elsewhere from the already depleted pockets of the Arabs, widows' and orphans' pensions were suspended. Taxes were levied even on collectors of cow dung. But all these measures were insufficient to meet expenses. Finally, debasement of the currency was resorted to, some coins fell to seventy per cent of their original values and eventually silver coin was worth no more than a copper. It is evident that the lessened revenue must have created havoc almost every where in the Arab lands.¹

¹ Ibid., p.16.
The Turks did not bring the Fertile crescent and Egypt under their direct administration. The practice adopted was that the local armies continued to rule and to pay tribute to the Sublime Porte. The Ottomans were content to send a governor general just to keep an eye on the affairs. According to G. K. F. Stripling:

The Arab lands under the Ottomans were not administered from Constantinople. Just as the whole Empire was divided into provinces, governed by beylerbeyis, each of whom had served Sanjakbeyis under him varying number. In his province each province, including a Mufti, a Rais effendi, and a difterdar, with a considerable body of clerks who advised him, recorded his decisions, attended to the revenues from the estate which were assigned to the support of his household, and kept account of the Sanjakbeyis in his dominon. Each sanjak-bey, in turn, held his group of assistant, with similar outties on a lesser scale.

Local government and the command of the spahis were assigned to officers appointed by the Sultan and called Subashis (Captains), who in time of piece governed towns and were supplied with enough joniissaries and Azab (regular infantry) to police the locality. Over these were Alai beys, or Colonels, who in turn were subordinate to the Sanjakbeyis, the latter governed important cities and the surrounding districts. Feifs were assigned to provide for incomes which were proportionate to the officers importance. All these local officers had sufficient Lieutenants, treasurers, and bookkeepers, and clerks to perform their duties. In time of war each subashi had to furnish eight or ten horsemen, and each spahi was obliges along a number of horsemen proportionate to his income.

1. The Turkish term şâbi‘alî (High Gate) was originally applied to the house of the sultan’s Chief minister, the grand vizir, wherever that might be situated. In the mid-seventeenth century the name was transferred to the official residence which was then assigned to him, adjacent to the palace. As the administrative work of most departments of state was carried out at a şâbi‘alî under the grand vizir’s eye, the rather free translation ‘Sublime Porte’ came to be synonymous, for European, with the Ottoman government. In the closing years of the Sultanate, the şâbi‘alî housed besides the Grand vizirate, the Ministers of the interior and of Foreign Affairs.

To understand the nature of Ottoman administration in the Arab lands, it is necessary to remember that the principles and the spirit of Ottoman Government were typically Muslim and, secondly, that it was necessary to have a special category of laws to govern and regulate the affairs of the non-Muslim subjects and of the foreign communities living in the Ottoman empire.  

The Ottomans were Sunni Muslims therefore, their government was a kind of theocracy, this meant that the power of the Sultan was limited by the law of Allah. The Ottoman Empire was dedicated to the advancement of Islam. It was the land of Islam and soldiers fought for the cause of Islam. Even the capital was sometimes called Istanbul. This naturally limited the power of the Sultan. He had to share it with the Shaykh al-Islam, the highest religious dignitary in the land. The balance between an absolute monarch and an absolute God was very delicate. It always wavered. It is safe to say that all Ottoman institutions and laws were attempts to find a balance between the two.  

Consequently the two institutions grew side by side. One is generally called the Muslim institution and the other ruling institution.  

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The government was based on the Shariah administered by religious courts under the supreme authority of Shaykh al-Islam. Shaykh-ul-Islam was a great and very powerful personality next only to the caliph himself. The legislation, the courts, the madrasahs (collegiate mosques) and huge ecclesiastical estates were concentrated in his hands. The Qadis (judges) the Qadi askari (Military judges) and the Muftis (expounders of the religious law) were under his control. The Muftis in each large centres of the empire headed the local clergy. It was they who decided whether legislative enactments were in conformity with the principles of Islam. The first mufti in the Ottoman Empire was the Shaykh ul-Islam himself. The theologians and scholars (Uloma) were also influential strata of the Muslim clergy.

The members of the Muslim institution were drawn from the madrasahs. It was this religious institution (Medrasah) which produced preachers, Muezzins, dervishes and most important of all qadis and Muftis. As Yahya Armajani writes: 2

Of the above, those who come directly into contact and sometimes into conflict with the members of the ruling institution were lawyers, usually called (qadi or mufti). The Ottoman courts from the lowest to the highest were run by these people. As in their administrative organization, the Ottomans had two chief judges, one for

1. V. Lutsky, op. cit., p. 22.
Anatolia (Asia Minor), and one for Rumelia (Europe). True to the military nature of the Ottoman Empire, each of the Chief Judges was called Qadi Asker (Chaplain of the army). At the pinnacle of this vast religious organization was the Shaykh ul-Islam who was as close to the Sultan and his chief advisor as to the intricacies of the Shari'ah in the history of the Ottoman Empire these men were sometimes very powerful individuals.

One of the responsibilities imposed by the institution was the administration of the waqf, religious endowment. It has complete charge of the expenditure of funds and management of lands and other properties which had been given by the pious for charitable and religious purposes. The Chief duty of the Judges, however, from small town mufti to the Shaykhul-Islam was to study each case, determined its relation to the Shari'ah and give an opinion, fatwa. The issuance of an opinion usually settled the case. The fatwa of the shaykh ul-Islam of course, had national importance, At least eleven Sultans were deposed by fatwa. On all matters the Shaykh ul-Islam, representing the Shari'ah, had veto power over the decisions of the Sultan. He usually said "obir" (can not be) or "olmez" (can not be), and the sultan had to obey. In practice the implementation of such an arrangement depended upon the power of the Sultan and the courage of the Shaykh ul-Islam. In some cases the religious leaders showed courage and good judgement as when the shaykh ul-Islam vitiated Sultan Selim the 'Ulma' s decision to kill the Christians who refused to learn Arabic. At other times these leaders went along with the wishes of Sultan, such as giving religious sanction to the practice of fratricide whenever a new sultan ascended the throne. All the members of this Muslim institution were called the ulama, learned men. As a class they were extremely reactionary, and were almost always opposed to change.

Parallel to the religious institution was the secular or ruling institution. This institution consisted of the Sultan, the grand vizir and officers of the standing army, the decision making body of the administration was the divan council, presided over by the Sultan the usual member were
the grand vizir. The two commanders of Rumelia and Anatolia, the two wadis, the two defterdars (treasurers) and the nishanji (Chancellor). Each of these vizirs had his own appointees on the provincial country, and city levels. Later the admiral of the navy (qapundan Pasha) and the Commander of the Janissaries (agha) were also members of the Council. The whole civil administration was created to support the army. In time of war the provincial governors joined the standing army with their levies. The sultan known as Padishah, was the supreme head of the state, he controlled absolute military and civil authority. In the 16th century he began to use the title of Caliph. He enacted from time to time irades and firmans, or royal Commands. He also issued certain regulations and laws known as Qanun. Lybyer describes the "interactions" of these institutions in these words:

"The two institutions contributed strongly to each other powers and permanence. The Huling Institution defended Moslem Institution by the sword, and carried out among the people the decisions of its wise men. It also protected the latter's source of regular revenue, and thus enabled the 'ulama, secure of a living to devote themselves to the study and teaching of the Sacred Law. The Moslem Institution, on the other hand, kept the Moslem population obedient and submissive to the sultan's authority as expressed in the Huling Institution. It taught that the Sultan was divinely appointed and therefore always to be obeyed, no matter what his character was or how oppressive his rule might become, so long as he did not transgress.

1. Ibid., p. 155.

The Sacred Law, and that it was for the ulema alone to decide when he had made such a transgression. Accordingly the two institutions, so long as they acted in harmony, were absolutely impregnable in their position among the Moslems of the empire.

The Millet System

The Ottomans had long given up the Ghazi practice of Jihad and instead adopted liberal attitude towards the non-Muslim groups as Zeine writes:

The word millet is an Arabic word for which there is no equivalent in western critical terminology. The millets were actually the members of the non-Muslim religious communities living in the Ottoman Empire, who had already been granted a wide scope of cultural and civil autonomy by Mohammed the conqueror, but in modern Turkish, millet is used to mean "nation", but the word had not yet lost its older sense. First in importance among these millets was the millet-e-rum which comprised all the Greek orthodox christian subjects of the Sultan. The next, in importance, were the Armenian millet and the Jewish millet. The nationality of every 'riyyah' in these millets was the

1. Although some of the administrative details (and possibly also the special significance of the term) were innovations of the Ottomans, the Millet system itself was not. Its roots lay in the universal practice of the Roman and medieval empires to allow subject communities to retain their own lands and to apply them amongst themselves under the general jurisdiction of some recognized authority who was responsible to the ruling power. Under the Sassanian kings of pre-Islamic Persia, the catholicos of the Nestorian church was formally invested with the headship of all Christian subjects of the empire, and that his successors preserved the same legal powers under the caliphs is attested by an abundance of secondary evidence, by the surviving documents of appointment of a Nestorian catholicos in 1138 and by the existence of numerous law-books of the various christian communities. The Jewish community or rather communities for the Hasidites and Karaites were separate, were similarly administered by Chief Rabbis at Baghdad and later at Cairo. In the Byzantine Empire also the Armenians at Constantinople had a parallel organization as well as the Jews. H.A.R. Gibb & D. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West I, (Cilford, 1950-57), pp. 212, 213.

2. Bp. cit., p. 31 & 33
particular religious denomination to which his millet belonged. Thus the time of demarcation was not along racial but along religious lines. The political identity of the sultans' subjects was Ottomans (Osmanlı) and his 'nationality' was the religion of the community to which he belonged, his millet. The idea of nationality in the West European nineteenth century sense was almost non-existent in the Ottoman Empire.

The rising economic status of the new middle classes challenged the traditional religion based power structure of the community, the millets into which the subjects of the sultan were organized. Demands for participation and impatience with the exclusive control of community life by the religious and noble aristocrats led to increased secularisation of Ottoman society. In the Muslim millet the move away from the dominance of the religious institutions as the direct product of the Tanzimat reforms, which undermined the Ulema's monopoly of justice and education and replaced their foundation revenues with direct state salaries.

A third category of law was embodied in the capitulations.¹ The impact of the Western thought and the political pressures of European powers in the nineteenth century resulted in various attempts to reform Ottoman institutions. A system of secular jurisdiction was introduced throughout the empire. The only exception was the personal law which still remained to be guided by the Shari'a.

In 1840 a new penal code was adopted based on the French penal code. In the same year a special Tribunal called Nails-Asker-i-Salih was instituted to deal with the cases of high state functionaries. A commercial code was promulgated in 1850, and in 1861, a special tribunal, of commerce was established to administer that code. One more civil law to be added to the foregoing list, was the Ottoman law of nationality, issued on January 19, 1869, and specifying the conditions under which Ottoman nationality could be gained.

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¹ In 1833 a treaty was concluded between Sulayman I and Francis I of France. This was a treaty of friendship and collaboration, directed against the Habsburgs, in which the French were granted many far-reaching rights and privileges. These privileges, called thereafter capitulations (from capitula or chapters of the treaty), extended to the French freedom of trade and navigation in Ottoman ports, reduced the customs duty to 5 per cent in their favour only, exempted French traders from Ottoman jurisdiction and placed them under French consular jurisdiction in matters both civil and criminal, guaranteed to French settlers full religious liberty as well as the custody of the Christian holy places (this, in turn, implied a quasi-protectorate of the French Kings over Christians of Latin rite in Ottoman possessions), and extended to French subjects (other valuable property and navigation privileges). Turkey suffered from important limitations of sovereignty due to the existing system of capitulations and special rights accorded to foreign powers. For example, the Ottoman government was not allowed to raise the customs tariff above a level determined by international agreements; cont'd. next page.
gained or lost. The nationality law, although, was a significant change in the Turkish concept of nationality, nevertheless, the individual was not a citizen of the empire but a subject of the Sultan.  

In principle the Christian was not allowed to ride a horse or carry arms, or could be join the Ottoman army or be admitted into the civil service. He was also outwardly distinguished by the colour of his dress, his head wear and his shoes. Although the inequalities were formally “on paper” abolished by the Hatti Humayun of 1856, but in practice the old millet system in the empire continued throughout the nineteenth century.

The Arab lands which were conquered by the Ottomans were not directly administered from Constantinople. The Ottomans not only retain but strengthen the feudal social system which they had inherited from the Nebeliks, the local feudal chiefs were living in freedom retail their social

certain sources of Public revenue were practically sequestered by foreign powers to assure the payment of the public debt, the vora was forced to observe certain imposed rules with regard to the treatment of national and religious minorities; and Turkey’s sovereignty over the straits was limited. (George Lenizowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York, 1956), pp. 5, 45.


2. During the early nineteenth century these old rules were disregarded and says cevdet Pasha, even some of the non-Muslim subjects, without authorization, could be seen in Public places, on caparisoned horse. Such unauthorized horse, riding by infants, being unsightly in the eyes of the people, was banned... see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 389-390.

3. Z.N. Zeine, op. cit., p. 31.
order. This was specially done in Lebanon. It has rightly been pointed out that ‘The land and power remained in the hands of the local feudelist’. The entire land was divided into three main categories: State land (mamlukat), the supreme of which was the sultan; land belonging to religious establishments (waqf) and privately owned land (mulk).

Land owned by individuals was relatively scarce. Its owners could dispose of it as they saw fit. The state collected only a land tax from the privately owned lands. People had to pay either to ‘ushr or the Kharaj. Non-Muslims also paid a pall-tax (jizyah).

Religious establishments owned large tracts of land. Ecclesiastical estates (waqfs) were formed by ‘endowments’ and were exempt from taxation. The Muslim clergy was the mainstay of the feudal system, and in order to consolidate it, big feudal lords presented large estate to Muslim religious establishments.

At the time of the Turkish conquest in some Arab countries there still consisted communal ownership of land. While abolishing communal landownership, the Turkish conquerors often preserved the falsheen community as an appendage to the system of exploitation. The whole community was held collectively responsible for the prompt payment of taxes.
The most widespread category of land in the Ottoman Empire was the state land, which was divided into two groups: 

**Khas** and military feifs. The **Khas** was a large estate with a revenue exceeding 100,000 thalers. It was held for life by a prince or on a princely title or on a high dignitary as long as he held his post. Military feifs were granted to the sipahi for life. The sipahis were exempt from state taxation. In return, they were obliged to provide first-class military service, regularly turn up at reviews and take part in campaigns with their cavalry.

In Egypt, the whole system of feudal land ownership which had existed under the Mamluk sultans was preserved. As V. Lutsky writes:

All the land belonged to the feudal lords: Multazims, the Turkish Pasha and the Muslim clergy. Formally the land was considered state property, but could be acquired by the Multazims. They were picked out from among the Turkish functionaries and officers as well as from the local Arab shaikhs. The Turkish rulers of Egypt inherited from the Mamluk sultans the custom of forming private guards from among the Mamluks, who had originally been slaves and were specially trained for military service. The Turkish boys appointed the Mamluks to important government posts and granted them large tracts of land. Multazims were exempt from military service but could be taxed, which was entered in a special register kept by a special clerk. Land ownership was usually hereditary. In the Mamluk circle, the land was not passed on from father to son but from the master to his in-curite "slave".

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He further writes:

In each iltizam (the estate of Multazim) the land was divided into two parts: The lord's land or 'umia, and allotted land or 'almar. The lord's land was tilled by the collective system or by hired labour. Allotted land was given to the peasants for life. If a peasant inherited a plot of land he had to pay a large redemption sum to the Multazim. The money rent, which was known as Mal-el-hurr, was collected from the peasant by the Multazim and divided into three equal parts. One part was paid as tribute to the Porte. Another part was used for the upkeep of the provincial administration. These two amounts were fixed by law and subject to unconditional payment the remaining part of the Mal-el-hurr given to the Multazims. Every village had to pay local taxes and duties. These were collected by the village administration headed by a qa'im maq'am.

Everywhere in the Arab countries, big feudal land ownership went hand in hand with small scale farming in the form of huge taxes and requisitions, the land owners appropriated product as well as and did nothing to increase production. The economy was stagnant and at its best was only able to ensure its own reproduction. Simple reproduction did not create any reserves in event of social or natural calamities. Frequent wars, feudal discard and draughts ruined the peasantry and brought about the decline of the agriculture, whole villages died out.

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1. loc. cit., pp. 13-14—
The process of the ruin of the peasantry, the dying out and depopulation of villages went on in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultans endeavoured to stop it by tying the peasant to the land. As far back as the 16th century, under Sulayman the law giver, laws were passed to prevent the flight of peasants. The code of laws worked out by the Turks for Egypt (Kanun-name Misr) ordered the Kashfi's. The mulazzims and Shaykhs to see to it that not one plot of irrigated land remained uncultivated, to prevent the flight of the peasants and to populate the ruined and empty villages with fellaheen. If a peasant ran away from his plot, the Shaykh was held materially responsible, the usia could be sold only together with the fellaheen who cultivated it.
CHAPTER III

THE YOUNG TURK MOVEMENT AND THE ARABS

The Arabs were fully conscious and awakened as to their fate and future destiny during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was speeding towards disintegration unless some radical changes were introduced to strengthen its internal organization and administration. From the first quarter of the nineteenth century, onwards, a group of enlightened Turks, which included 'Ulema' and a developing class of educated young Turkish administrators and diplomats, were becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of rejuvenating the old and outmoded institutions and administrative machinery of the empire. This group was called the 'New Ottomans' or the 'Young Ottomans'. This period of about half a century came to be known as the period of 'Tanzimat' or Tanzimat-i-Khairiyah (beneficent legislation). Harold Temperley wrote:

The health of the Turkish Empire depended on three factors: on the ability of the Turks to reform; on the willingness of the Christian subjects to acquiesce in the process; and on the readiness of the Great Powers to help or hinder this evolution. No one of these factors sufficed by itself... but the Great Powers could not save Turkey. She alone could herself, and reconcile her Christian Subjects to her by reform.

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1. Z.N., loc. cit., p.35.
As will be seen, the Turks in fact waxed weaker and weaker, and the Christians stronger and stronger."

Mahmud II (1808-39) had a cadre of reforms officials that helped shape his plans. Mustafa Rashid Pasha the foreign minister prepared reform programmes and convinced the Sultan to carry through many of these plans. These reform programmes known as the Tanzimat-i-izniva (Auspicious reorderings), modernized the Ottoman state and society and were the provocators of the main Tanzimat which were carried out in Sultan Abdul Majid's period (1839-61). The reforms that followed were often identical with any of Mahmud II's programmes. They were carried through mainly by Mustafa Rashid Pasha, once Ambassador of the Ottomans in Paris. He wanted to save the Ottomans from the doom that had be fallen on the French monarchy.

On November 3, 1839, Sultan Abdul Majid gathered the dignitaries of the empire at the square of Gulhane "the rose garden of the palace". The foreign minister read a statement which has come to be known as the bhuddi-sharif (the noble rescript) of Gulhane. The decree of Gulhane was not in any way an Ottoman constitution that limited the powers of the sultan, because we issued it and could abrogate it at will.  

That **Hatti-Sharif** recognized the sovereignty of law, the equality of all subjects and the universal application of justice. In the enthusiasm of the period, the Turks shaved their beards, wore European dress, listened to western music and exchanged the turban for the Fez.

Seventeen years after the promulgation of **Hatti-Sharif**, on February 18, 1856, the sultan issued another statement known as **Hatti-i-Humayun**, the imperial rescript. This consisted of two parts, the protocol or the text itself, prepared under Mustafa Ra'isid's guidance at the porte by its consultative council, and, the sultan's statement of authorization including his assent to the creation of new institutions that could (1) guarantee his subjects' security of life, honour and property (2) establish a regular system to assess and levy taxes and (3) develop new methods to assure a fair system of conscripting, training and maintaining the soldiers of his armed forces.¹

The **Hatti-i-Humayun** eradicated the differences which existed between the Muslims and the Christians, and extended to the Christians all the rights and privileges which were enjoyed by the Muslims. This meant equality in taxation, military service, and education. It also envisaged the founding of banks, and fiscal and agricultural reforms.

According to Uriel Hevd: 1

In accordance with the old Ottoman tradition, the sultan promulgated state law canun the reformers introduced modern criminal, commercial, land, nationality and other laws of western type, based on the principle of territorial instead of personal validity, but family and inheritance law remained religious, and the new law of contracts, obligations and civil procedure (Mejelleh) prepared by a committee under the Chairmanship of Ahmad Javdet Pasna, was a modern codification of sharia law.

The hatti-e-sharif and the hatti-i-tumayun, "both", writes Yahya Armajan, were issued under pressure and were partly made for the purpose of appeasing European governments. Nevertheless, they did inaugurate and endorse an era reform in the Ottoman Empire, which is called the Tanzimat. The Tanzimat was as much the result of upheavals in the eighteenth century as it was the cause of changes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 2

Evaluating in overall effects of the Tanzimat, Uriel Hevd writes: 3

The reforms of the Tanzimat period failed to prevent the dismemberment of the empire, and did not solve its major internal problems. The leaders did not realize, or realized too late, that economic and financial subjugation i.e. the powers was not less a threat to political independence than defeat on the battle front. Their reforms did not spring from the people, and were not supported by public opinion... The Tanzimat laid the foundation for a modern Turkish state and society.

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2. op. cit., p. 232.
In the 19th century a number of European codes were laid down, the Ottoman state felt that the needs of the age necessitated the issuing appropriate laws. Ottoman codification was influenced by foreign laws and most it was derived from foreign codes in text, in spirit and in arrangement, the Ottoman state was motivated in this endeavor by the current needs of commerce and social evolution, some of these codes were in conformity with the Islamic shari'ah.

The Ottoman state also decided to prepare a civil code. A seven men committee of jurists called the committee of the Majallah was appointed under the chairmanship of Ahmad Javadi Pascha. The committee began its work in 1869, it submitted the introduction in first book of Majallah to Shaykh-ul-Islam, and other dignitaries incorporated certain modifications and refinements, the compilation was completed in 1376.

Thus the Ottoman civil code came into existence. It was enacted by an 'iradah a royal decree, by the sultan under the title: "Majallah al-Ahkam al-adliyah, "("the corpus of judicial rules"), by a special committee of ulemas and non-ulemas. etc appointed for that purpose and called the

Majallah Jami 'iyati. Finally in 1879, there was a whole reorganization of the judicial system by a creation of a ministry of justice and of "regulated tribunals", or Meiakimi-Nizamiyah.

**Constitution of 1876:**

Abdul Aziz (1861-76) proved to be an unwise and extravagant ruler and brought his country to the verge of disaster. His nephew Murad V reigned in his stead for a short spell of three months, before he was succeeded by his younger brother Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908).

Abdul Hamid was helped in securing the throne by the liberal minded statesman Midhat Pasha on the express condition that he would establish a constitutional administration. On his accession to the throne Abdul Hamid appointed Midhat Pasha as grand vizir. The constitution, drafted by Midhat Pasha, Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha, was proclaimed on December 10, 1876.

Midhat Pasha was mainly responsible for the immediate promulgation of the constitution. He argued that its proclamation would dissuade the powers from intervening in Ottoman affairs under the pretext of enforcing reforms. On the other hand, once on the throne Abdul Hamid wished
to regain power for the Palace, and he was in no hurry to issue such a document.¹

Midhat continuously requested Abdul Hamid who, consequently, ordered the establishment of an constitutional commission to draft the constitution. Midhat was the chairman of the commission which had in all 28 members consisting of 16 bureaucrats, 10 ulema, and 2 military personnel. The final draft of the constitution was prepared on December 1st and the next few days were spent in discussing it. The cabinet finally approved the Commission work on December 6, but the sultan held up its promulgation.²

The commission's work had now come to an end so Midhat was, for a second time, appointed as the Grand Vizir. Finally the constitution was proclaimed on December 23, 1876. It had 119 articles which were distributed into 12 sections.

The first section (article, 1-7) was headed "the Ottoman empire". It defines the empire, named its capital, and lays down the rights and privileges of the sultan and the imperial dynasty.

². Ibid., p.174.
The second section (3-26) dealt with the public right of Ottoman subjects. It defined Ottoman nationality, and affirmed the equality of all Ottomans irrespective of religion, before the law.

The remaining sections dealt with the ministers (27-58) officials (39-41) parliament (42-59) the senate (60-64) the chamber of deputies (65-80), the judiciary (81-91) the high courts (92-95), finance (96-107), and provincial administration (108-112).

A final section of "miscellaneous provisions" included article 113, giving the imperial government the right to proclaim martial law and the occurrence of expectation of disorders, and giving the sultan the exclusive right after reliable police investigations, to deport persons harmful to the state from Ottoman territory. 1

The constitution of 1876 remained enforced for a very short period. The parliament met for the first time in March 1877 with a senate of 25 and a chamber of 120 deputies. The last meeting of the parliament, which was its fifty-sixth meeting, was held on June 28, 1877. A second parliament was elected and met on December 13, 1877 and showed unexpected vigour. The very next year on February 13, 1878 the deputies

met and on specific charges demanded that three ministers should defined themselves and appear in the chambers. The sultan, consequently, dissolved the chamber and ordered the deputies to return to their constituencies.

The proclamation issued was:

Since present circumstances are unfavourable to the full discharge of the duties of the parliament, and since, according to the constitution, the limitation and curtailment of the period of session of the said parliament in accordance with the needs of time from part of the sacred imperial prerogatives, therefore, in accordance with the said law, a high imperial order has been issued —— that the present sessions of the senate and chamber, due to end at the beginning of March —— be closed as from today.

The life of the parliament was for only two session lasting for about five months in all. It did not meet again for the next thirty years.

On Abdul Hamid’s accession to the throne on 31st August 1876, the future of the Ottoman Empire was bleak. There was threat of war from Russia, Europe was hostile and in a position of dictating terms. This was the time ripe enough for the movement of new ideas to make a decisive advance Arab National consciousness which had already rooted itself in Syria began spreading speedily to the other Arabic speaking

1. Ibid., p.643.
countries. Reforms in the provincial administration were pressed hard. Midhat Pasha, known for his reformist views was leading a strong movement pressing for a constitutional government.

Abdul Hamid granted a constitution in 1876, and Midhat was made the grand vizir, shortly it became evident that the grant of the constitution by Abdul Hamid was not because he desired or believed in that form of government, but because circumstances had made some such gesture necessary, both as a sop to his subjects and as a torpedo to fire at the European conference. Both these aims had now been achieved; the Sultan had become the idol of his people, and the conference, badly wounded, had broken up. He set out to destroy the constitution. The only serious obstacle that remained was Midhat. Early in February, ‘Abdul Hamid abruptly dismissed him and sent him to Europe in exile. Then, having early in March inaugurated the Parliament with a grandiloquent speech from the throne, he seized the pretext of Russia’s declaration of war to decree the suspension of the constitution.

1. On Midhat Pasha see Sir William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its successors (rev. and enlarged ed.; Cambridge, 1936) chap. XV;
   Mehmed Zeki Pakalim, Midhat Pasha (Istanbul, 1940)
During the first year of his reign Abdüllah was more liberal and open-minded towards new ideas than any of his immediate predecessors — "praying with the common people during the Friday services, talking with Ottomans and foreigners about the problem of the state, summoning bureaucrats, scribes, intellectuals and even the young Ottoman leader Namik Kemal to whom he said "Let us work together Kemal bey, let us raise this state and sultanate to a higher condition than before." 1

Abdül Hamid did not confide in the integrity or ability of the statesman associated with the Porte, and the internal and external crises that convulsed the empire led him to adopt an increasingly personal, autocratic, and absolutist policy of administration. 2 These circumstances forced him to believe that he could achieve effective administration only through centralized rule, not by diffusion of power. He was in fact a reformer but unlike the men of Tanzimat he felt that the parliament led only to delays, inefficiency, frustration, internal weakness, and further defeat and disintegration, therefore he resolved that the empire was not ready for democracy and that autocracy was the only way for it to survive in troubled times. 3

2. Ibid., pp. 211-20.
3. Ibid., pp. 212, 213
In Abdul Hamid's time the Ottoman's Arab possessions included Syria and Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan in Africa. In 1881 Tunisia was occupied by France and the following year Egypt and Sudan were taken by the British. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 dealt a severe blow to the Ottoman. The treaty of Berlin ended the Ottoman Empire as a significant European power. A number of petty Balkan states were created - Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro were independent or so autonomous that they were independent in every thing but name. Bosnia and Herzegovina were under an Austrian occupation that was considered temporary only by the Ottomans. All that the Sultan had left in Europe was a strip of territory South of the Balkan mountains extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. These were the remains of the once mighty Empire that at one time stretched all the way to the gates of Vienna.¹

Immediately afterwards some very rapid changes were affected in the administration of the Empire. Albania was divided into four vilayets whereas the league and its supporters sought to unite them into a single province, thus initiating a movement towards Albanian Solidarity. The Albanian national Consciousness began to develop. Albanian rebel bands rose in the mountains attacking Ottoman officials and troops, villages resisted tax collectors, and the railroads were attacked. They were somehow suppressed and a general control was maintained.

¹ Ibid, p. 195.
Although experiencing many difficulties, late in his reign as the terrorist threats and foreign attacks mounted, his fears of personal assassination or deportation led him to subordinate his concentration on reform to his desire to destroy treason and revolt within the empire.  

**THE YOUNG TURKS**

The disintegrating effects of the external pressure exerted by the Great Powers and fearing of internal rebellions made Abdul Hamid's reign more tyrannical. There came into being increased suspicion between the Arabs and the Turks. The Sultan was greatly disturbed by the anti-Turkish agitation in Lebanon and the appearance of revolutionary placards in Beirut. He made several attempts to win the hearts of the Arab by expensive gifts or exclusively generous hospitality to Arab leaders visiting Constantinople or by appointing the Arabs to high administrative or military posts in the government and above all by posing as a champion of Pan-Islamism.

Abdul-Hamid, destined to influence even in one of the most critical periods in Ottoman history, was full of contradictory characteristics. The European were so attracted to him,
at first that the predicted that he might become a second
Sulayman the Magnificent.¹

A net work of his spies were spread all over the empire,
there were spies to watch the activities of other spies.
Agents in the foreign Capitals were also posted, not together
vital secrets out to say on their own subjects. Inspite of
all these measures this autocratic sultan was unable to pre-
vent the rising nationalistic aspirations of non-Turkish
subjects within the Empire, the most troublesome being the
Arminians and the Kurds.

The young Turk revolution of 1908 was the result of the
influence of western ideas, and the activities of a group of
liberals who under western impact concluded that "the Ottoman
Empire was doomed to extinction if drastic steps were not
taken to check the decay which had set in" the spread of
western ideas stirred the Turkish intelligensia.

The young Turks movement began around 1860 and its first
journal Hurriyet (Liberty) was founded in 1864 in London with
Rifat bey as its editor. He was assisted by Kemal bey, (Nasik
Kemal) and Ali Pashe, and such others as Mustafa Pazil Pasha,
Nuri bey, Rifat bey and Ali Subi.

1. Yahya Armajani, op.cit., p.238.
Sultan Abdul Hamid lost his reputation abroad towards the final phase of his reign, particularly in England and America. Richard Davey wrote in his book, "The Sultan and his Subjects", in 1897.

... Sultan Abdul Hamid seemed to be earnestly against cruel odors to do what was best for his people. But recent events demand a change of opinion. The good he has done is drowned -- drowned in the blood of countless murdered men, women, and children and in the lurid light of these scenes of horror, he takes on the semblance of some loathsome spider, caught in the silken web of his own careen, and condemned there to reincarnate the worst evil of his ancestors, whose very names conjure up dread memories of murder and rapine.

The spirit of the first young Turks movement was still alive, but in the beginning of his reign Abdul-Hamid was not troubled by any organized movement against himself and his policies. In the evening Abdul Hamid made it felt that he was using his absolute powers for the welfare of the country and the liberals, to show that they are more nationalistic, did not agitate against the abandonment of the constitution. But soon they had to realize that Abdul Hamid was selfish and the darkest days of the empire were ahead. A new resistance movement developed and the seeds of the young Turk Revolution were sown.

1. (New York, 1897), vol.1, p.197.
The young Turkish critics who accused the bureaucrats of being more interested in emulating the West than creating the new Ottoman society were more important than any of the other opponents on Tanzimat. These consisted of civil servants, army officers, and a number of 'ulema', but very few businessmen. They formed a secret society in 1865 called the "Patriotic Alliance". They made extensive use of the press and distributed literature to mould the public opinion and criticize the government. They were not satisfied with modernizing the machinery of the state, but wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy and revitalize Islam. They developed a kind of Muslim Ottoman nationalism and leading ulama belonging to a narrow circle of privileged families. They demanded a restriction on the absolutism of the sultan's rule. Their belief was in a limited form of Pan Islamism joined together by the power of the Ottoman Empire. 1

In a short time the Young Ottomans gained support from among the non-Turkish Muslim subjects of the Empire. Arabic speaking subjects of the Ottoman Empire were attracted to them and Ottomanism was beginning to be written and discussed in Arabic literature. The Arabs had also tested nationalism and did not want to throw in their lot with the Turks. They met in secret societies and worked together forming their ideas almost entirely on the basis of the Quran.

1. Y. Arjani, op. cit., p. 236.
Namik Kemal became the most important intellectual writer of the Young Ottomans, writing extensively in the newspaper, the organ of the Young Ottomans and which approached the problems from the Islamic point of view. The bitter quarrel with the ruling forced them at a stage to flee from Istanbul and carry on their propaganda from abroad. In the meantime Midhat Pasha got the opportunity to dethrone Sultan Abdul Aziz and then his successor Murad V, in favour of Abdul Hamid II. The new sultan promulgated the constitution and Midhat was made the grand vizier. The very next year Midhat was dismissed and vanished from the Empire. The parliament was prorogued sine die and the constitution was suspended.

A number of ‘ulema’ were attracted to the Young Ottomans Islamic learnings, even them the young Ottoman remained suspect in the eyes of reactionaries like Abdul Hamid II. Their headquarters were raided by the police. By 1876 the Young Ottoman movement had come to an end. Even though the Young Ottomans failed to graft Western ideologies to the body politic of Islam, they were successful in introducing new values to the Turks. During this ‘period of despotism,’ the place of the defunct Young Ottoman society was taken by a new revolutionary organization, found in 1899 by students of military college in Istanbul, this organization later took the name of the Ottoman "Committee of Union and progress" its members became
commonly known as the Young Turks.\(^1\)

Their express purpose was overthrowing Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The driving force behind this group, which marked the real beginning of the Young Turk movement against Abdul Hamid, was an Albanian named Ibrahim Temo, or Edhem Pasha.

In May 1889 Temo approached three fellow students whose views were already well known to him, with the suggestion that they form a secret Patriotic Society. These four students became the nucleus of an organization which soon began to attract other students. In a short time the original quadru- mwirate was joined by many more.

Within the military Medical School the movement spread rapidly and soon overflowed into the other government higher schools in Constantinople. All of the young revolutionaries were steeped in the works of the proscribed Nationalist poets, Namik Kemal Shinasi, and Zia Pasha. In 1892, the existence of the society became known to Abdul Hamid who reacted violently. A number of students were grilled, but only a few were finally taken into custody, including Abdullah Jeddit, Giritli Shefiq, and Sherefeddin Magsud subsequently some fourteen more were arrested when they protested against the confinement of their fellow students.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Yahya Aragjani., *op. cit.*, p. 237.
The society meanwhile went on growing and its membership had now crossed the limits of the schools. It became popular that in 1896 a number of prominent personalities joined it and they now began to direct its activities. Haji Ahmad Efendi, a civil servant, was one of them and he, along with makkale-sebri of the Military Medical School began to spread the ideas of the organization.

Outside the limits of the Ottoman Empire the young conspirators had already assembled in Paris and they also included Ahmad Riza who was destined to become the best known of the European young Turks. He also became the director of "Mecheveret (consolation or deliberation) a Turkish fortnightly, the official organ of the committee of union and progress. Its first number was brought out on December 3, 1895 setting forth the aims of the society for its readers.

Meanwhile at Constantinople the movement kept on spreading. The government being suspicious enough made a few arrests but for the time being the leaders were at large till late in 1895 several of them were arrested and exiled, still others were able to escape and continue their activities in Europe. Three main factors are said to have caused these assets - firstly, the appearance of Mecheveret in Turkey

1. Mecheveret was the official organ of the C.U.P; it was from the start to a great appointed by Ahmad Reza as his own personal property.
through the foreign post office, secondly, the membership of the organization had swelled to such an extent that "All Istanbul thus became aware of the existence of a society," and finally, one Murat bey, (a teacher of history of the Mulkiya or civil college), had chalked out a list of reforms he thought necessary for the empire and presented it, although his suggestions were insignificant, and for this he had to leave the country determined to undermine Abdul Hamid.

The arrests made by the government only increased the determination of the revolutionaries of the two publications of the society which were new trickling into Turkey from abroad through the foreign post offices, *Mizan* was by far the more popular. Ahmad Hiza and *Macberret* were held in ill repute. Both of these characteristics of Ahmad Hiza, his positivist learning and his overbearing ways, kept in Young Turks in exile in a constant uproar. Arif bey Cülu, one of the Young Turks of Geneva, wrote to Ibrahim Temo on July 27, 1896 to express his concern about the use of the positivist calender on Macberret’s masthead. He writes:

> What I am afraid of is that if Istanbul publishes this among the already uneducated public, the little sympathy which exists in our favour will be ruined, and we will not be able to accomplish anything after this, moreover he marked, "If he had enjoyed confirming to the

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2. Another anti-Hamidia Journal founded by Murad.
The plot to overthrow Abdul Hamid had gained momentum in Constantinople and possibly the Paris and Geneva branches of the Young Turks had no knowledge of it. Haji Ahmad Efendi appears to have become president of the central committee of the society in Constantinople in 1896. Under his general guidance were various other groups, including one under Sheikh Nalini which was composed chiefly of ulama, the learned men of Islam, and magistrates and one at the war officer under lieutenant colonel Shefek Bey. Presumably by this time the various student committees had also accepted Haji Ahmed's leadership. 1

The coup d'etat was planned for August 1896 as the organization had been in existence for quite some time, and wanted to strike sooner as possible. Although many arrests had been affected, still the membership of the society was larger enough in Constantinople to achieve its goal. By an accident the plot was revealed intentionally by Naldr Bey, a member of the society resulting in the exile of the Conspirators to remote parts of the empire. The exiles included all the singleaders. They bounded on a ship and sent to the places of their respective exile. The most dangerous ones were put down in Libya.

1. Ibid., p., 30.
All the conspirators were guilty of treason and Abdul Hamid's policy of exiling cannot be put up against logic. Many of the exiles made good their escape. The society was of course badly hit in Constantinople but the purpose had still not been given up. Nevertheless the society was not dead, the young Turk Publications, Mizan in particular, were still flowing into the country and being passed from hand to hand. Revolutionary notices appeared on the main streets and the doors of the Mosques.

The fall of 1866 saw most of the remaining Young Turk leaders in Europe, where they concentrated chiefly in Paris and in Geneva. Riza had commenced his barrage, the Sultan had persuaded the French government then headed by Leon Bourgeois to suppress Mecheveret and expel its director from France. Ahmad Riza countered by bringing the paper out in the lithographed edition and then moved to Belgium. Meanwhile he brought great joy to the members of the society in the empire by publishing an eight page supplement (April 15, 1896) containing nothing but articles from the French press supporting the Young Turks in their fight against the Sultan.¹

The next year the Sultan counter attacked Ahmad Riza and his colleagues by ordering the Turkish embassy in Paris to bring suit of defamation of character against the editors

¹ Ibid., p., 36.
of Mecheveret. After the hearing the court's judgment though in favour of the plaintiff, was like a slap in the face to the Sultan. Late in 1896 the Egyptian government felt uneasy about the activities of the Young Turks, and Murad bey was ordered to transfer his operations to Europe by the directing committee of the society. There he immediately became the leader of the Anti Hiza faction within the society and attracted most of the members to his side. In comparison to Ahmed Hiza, Murad bey was extremely popular. His literary efforts resulted in giving him a considerable following in the society. The fact that he was a Pan-Islamist, was an additional advantage. His highest ambition was to free the Muslims from foreign domination through the Caliphate and the establishment of a great Islamic empire.

All these factors led to Murad being elected the president of the Geneva branch of the Committee of Union and Progress. Mizan and Mecheveret continued to be the organs of the society, in Geneva and Paris respectively.

The same year the society's headquarters was transferred from Constantinople to Geneva. The same time saw quarrels between two factions in the organization coming to ahead.

On May 15, Mecheveret carried the following notice:

"The Committee of Union and Progress has the honour of informing the readers of the Mecheveret that its president, M. Murat bey and its director, M. Ahmet bey de Tcherukous are going to Geneva to pass the Summer season..."

1. Ibid., p., 40.
The next issue announced the resignation of Murad and
that Ahmad Hiza had been excluded from the Committee of Union
Progress.§ i.e., however, was to continue to edit the Turkish
dition of Mechevret, but with a council of surveillance of
act as a board of censorship.

Ahmed Hiza kept on with his work, i.e., the struggle
against Abdul Hamid. Murad bey published a booklet containing
a useful summary of Young Turk thoughts at this period. They
thought that Abdul Hamid is singled out as the source of most
of the evils rampant in the empire, and the remedy proposed
is simplicity itself: remove the sultan (but not the dynasty),
and restore the short lived constitution of Midhat Pasha.
Islam is still to be the cornerstone of the state, and the
dynasty is needed to maintain the unity of the empire. The
subject nationalities are told that they are betraying their
"Common father land" by striving to achieve a national identity
of their own, and they are offered the bleak alternative
of becoming "Ottomans" an alternative which implies nothing
but a continuation of the system in force under Abdul Hamid.1
These thoughts are described by name of author as a "curious
mixture of incipient nationalism, imperialism, and what may
be described as religious imperialism." 2

This was the condition of the society in Europe and
in the Ottoman Empire, it was recovering from the blow it

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1. Ibid., pp. 41-43
2. Ibid., p. 44
received by the failure of the coup. Still many young men were determined to fight the government of Abdul Hamid. They belonged to the military schools as well as the other schools including the military medical school and the artillery school.

The man responsible for the collapse of the Young Turks movement of 1897 was Ahmad Jalaleddin Pasha, who was the chief spy of Abdul Hamid. The sultan had also tried to disband the European organization, and his spies had penetrated inside the organization. But all these efforts were of no avail and a definite result was obtained only when Jalaleddin Pasha was sent to Europe. Only on the assurance of Jalaleddin Pasha that the sultan would make concessions and introduce reforms did the society lay down its arms and its publications. He had also urged of a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles. Murad bey had realized that the Mizar was mainly responsible for the arrest and exile of many of his countrymen outside he was not prepared to give way although Jalaleddin Pasha was more than anxious to supply his wants but Murat refused to accept money from him.

"The main result of the truce of 1897 was to destroy almost entirely the organization of the society within the empire and to set back the Young Turk cause for a number of years.... The break was thus complete, both within and without the empire, and Abdul Hamid could breathe easily once more."

1. Ibid., p. 50-51.
"With the almost complete collapse of the Young Turk movement in the summer of 1897, Ahmad Riza and his associates found themselves virtually alone in maintaining the struggle against the Sultan, through cut the negotiations with Ahmad Jelaleddin Pasha, Mecheveret had bitterly resisted the more to compromise with Abdul Hamid and his publishers had consequently been branded as intransigent by Murad and his colleagues." 1

A new Young Turk organ entitled Cemani (Ottoman) was founded in Geneva in 1892, by Ishak Bektuti and Abdul ah Javdet. It soon gained prominence and relegated Mecheveret to its old position as an organ of the opposition within the movement with many prominent throwing their lot with the new journal. The publication of this journal was later transferred to England.

An event dramatically focused the attention of Europe on the Young Turks movement. Damat Mahmut Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law fled the country along with his two sons Saba-heeddin and Lutfullah. Abdul Hamid was now in search of a way to force to return home and anticipating that Damat Mahmut would go to France, the Sultan directed his representative in France to declare that Damat Mehemet had fled to escape the punishment of a series of crimes he had committed, and also that before fleeing the country he had shown some signs of mental disorder. 2

1. Ibid., p.52.
2. Ibid., pp. 54-56.
On January 1, 1900 Mecheveret reported the arrival of Damat Mehmet Pasha and his sons in France in the following words:

On the arrival of the steamer in Marseilles the representative of the Press ascertained, not without astonishment, that Damat Mehmet Pasha, represented as deranged by the official dispatch from Yildiz, is a gentleman of parts, not only sane but even very enlightened and very liberal. They were able to perceive with no less stupefaction that the two minor children mentioned in the same dispatch are two gallant men, of whom the youngest is twenty-two years of age, completely emancipated not only from the ill-omened tutelage, Uncle Abdul-Hamid, but also from all sentiment of fanaticism and from reactionary prejudices.

The first two years of the twentieth century saw a new impetus in the Young Turk movement and it was able to win back some ground lost in 1897. But this only concerned the movement outside the Ottoman Empire and no attempt was made in Constantinople to reconstitute the first society.

The Albanians, who were active in Europe, had founded the journal 'Albania' (in April, 1897) to push through their demand for the autonomy of Albania within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. For the Kurds, Abdur Rahman Isdirihan, published the journal "Kurdistan" in London, and aided in the publication of Osmanli.

1. Ibid., pp., 54-56.
2. Ibid., p., 56-57.
For the Arabs there was an organization known as the "Turco-syrian Reform Committee" which was headed by Amir Amin Arslan. The first "Congress of Ottoman liberals, presided by Sâbâhâeddîn, set in Paris from the fourth to the ninth of February 1902. Some forty seven delegates presented themselves at the Congress Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Kurds, Albanians, Arminians Cîrç assign Jews. Many of the delegates came from organizations which would far more than the replacement of Aboul Hâni by another member of the same family, although most were willing to consider such a move as a step in the right direction. Actually, only a confirmed optimist could have expected the congress to accomplish anything concrete; yet the interesting thing, was that the main cleavage developed between different Turkish groups rather than between groups of different nationality.1

The actual result of the congress was a negative one—riit between Sâbâhâeddîn and Ahmad Rîza. A new organ carrying the name of the Society of Union and Progress was founded under the direction of Mehmet Ali Fa'izî Pasha, Ahmet Rîza, Selani-ki Nazîm Efendi, Cîsezayî bey, and Ahmet Saîp bey. This new paper was called Cîhoual-ummet (Council of the people).

1. Icid., p. 66.
The following years saw the development of the Young Turks movement on two fronts – one led by Sabaheddin and the other by Ahmed Riza. Sabaheddin’s main aim was to correct what he considered the main defects of the Ottoman Empire. According to Sabaheddin the Sultan was responsible for the miserable conditions of the Empire and so too were the people who submitted to him apathetically.

In time with these views Sabaheddin than laid down the following four point plan of action:

1. To propagate amongst the Turkish people the taste for social studies, with the aim of stirring up private initiative and of leading the way to administrative decentralization.

2. To seek means of arriving at an entente amongst the diverse races which constitute the Ottoman Empire.

3. To uphold the rights of the Ottomans in countries with a more modern civilization and to promote there a current of opinion in their favour.

4. To create in the interior of the country leagues and committees with a view to working for the realization of the programme and to opposing themselves to the encroachments of an oppressive power.

1. Ibid., pp. 65-86.
Ahmet Riza bey, on the other hand, had continued to wage war on the Sultan as he had been doing unremittingly, since his flight from Turkey. Mecheveret continued to seep into the empire, and there can be little doubt that it was institutional in keeping the spark of the Young Turk movement alive at the time when it could be fanned into flame once more. It was also important that Ahmet Riza and his associates were preserving the name of the original Society of Union and Progress which was to be reborn in not too-distant future.

Thus Sabaneeddin and Ahmet Riza were the most important leaders of the movement in exile, but sabaneeddin did not represent, as did Ahmet Riza, the most powerful force which was germinating within the empire - "Turkish Nationalism".

Aodul-Hamid's schools were producing an increasing number of bureaucrats, officers and intellectuals who, unlike most of the Ottomans and Young Turks who preceded them, came from to lower classes, were not related to the existing ruling classes and were willing to change the system by force if necessary to achieve their ends. In the army, especially, the lower officer ranks came to be filled by educated and political minded officers from the subject class, who were frustrated by the long years of unsuccessful struggles against the macedonian and arminians territories. Though Aodul Hamid had limited his military expenditures because
of financial problems, most of these officers were convinced with some justice, that the sultan kept the army from developing because he was afraid of them.

Mustafa Kemal, who had just graduated from the war academy in January 1909, organized a secret group, known as the fatherland (Vatan) society. Branches were established among brother officers in Jerusalem, Jaffa and manifestos were drawn up demanding that the Sultan fully observe the constitution and established a governmental regime that could deal efficiently with the needs of the army and other organs of the state. The name of the group soon was changed to fatherland and liberty (Vatan va Murriyet Cemiyeti) and number of provincial bureaucrats also were included.

Mustafa Kemal was welcomed when he came to spread the word of fatherland and liberty early in 1906. He formed a number of kindred spirit in the third army, including Jemal bey and Talat bey. He formed there into a branch of the Damascus society but with a different name, the 'Ottoman liberty society' (Usmanli Murriyet Cemiyet), had expanded rapidly among officers and bureaucrats in the Macedonian provinces, organized in small cells on the model of those of the Bulgarian terrorists. The new organization held its meetings in the lodges of the masonic order and received financial and other assistance from 'donmes' who hoped
that its triumph might alleviate their situation in Ottoman Society. Towards the beginning of 1907 it also established relations with the Young Turks in Paris mainly with those of the Ahmet Riza faction. The two groups were after some months amalgamated under the name of the Paris organization. The Committee of Union and Progress with the primary aim of restoring the constitution.

The second Young Turks Congress met in Paris towards the close of 1907 in a new effort to secure cooperation against the common enemy. It was chaired jointly by Ahmet Riza, Saadeddin and K. Mahsunian of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, who hoped to use the Young Turks to gain their own national objectives. It was the Armenians who carried the days as the Young Turks were convinced to accept a far more violent programme of action than they had been willing to espouse in the past. The final declaration stated that the Sultan had to be deposed and the existing regime replaced by a constitutional and representative government, and any means, including revolutionary violence if necessary, would be used to achieve the goal. Within the empire, armed resistance to oppression had to be organized along with peaceful resistance in the form of strikes, refusal to pay taxes, circulation of propaganda, and arrangement for a full-scale revolt if all else failed. To keep the organization intact, Ahmet Riza at first reluctantly agreed to the statement, but
soon react a to the occting of the Armenians that the Turks had in fact accepted the methods that they had in eastern Anatolia. Split with Prince Sabeheddin once again, and returned to his original position. The reconciliation of the different groups in Europe, thus proved illusory, and in the end, they played no active role in the Young Turk revolution when it came.

When it finally did take place, the Young Turk revolution was one of the strongest events of its kind ever seen in history. It was not planned, at least in the manner and at the time it finally broke out, it really did not even happen, and it certainly did not depose Abdul-Hamid. Yet it forced him to recall the parliament and for all practical purposes, to give up most of his powers.

In fact it was the loss of the many small uprisings which took place throughout the empire since 1907. The reasons being more financial then ideological. A bad harvest in Anatolia resulted in slow payment of further resulting in salaries being in arrears and, above all most promotions had been suspended. Many soldiers and officers as well as bureaucrats showed their displeasure by leaving their jobs. There had been some C.U.P propaganda in Anatolia and Romania, but with little effect. The troops in Macedonia were especially unhappy because of a recent upsurge of Christian terrorism,
now supported by the Greek churches in the area. The C.U.P leaders in Salonica at first attempted to use the situation simply to inform the powers of the Committee's existence and ability to bring order to Macedonia if only it was given proper sanction. Starting that all the people of Macedonia were suffering from the Sultan's oppression, they concluded that the recall Parliament would solve the Macedonian problem. All the elements of the empire would be able to work for the common good. There would be equality under the law, and the powers would no longer need to intervene to protect the Sultan's subjects. The manner in which the events took place are well described in the following words:

In 1907 the number of mutinies increased still more, and during the course of the years, civilians began to participate in Anatolia, uprisings against corrupt officials took place in Bitlis, Van, Erzurum, and other cities; governors were deposed and new laws rejected by popular movements which the army made no attempt to suppress. And the army mutinies now commenced to spread. In October 1907 there was trouble in Constantinople itself, and at the beginning of 1908 the ferment spread to Smyrna and even down into Syria.

In July 1908 all of a sudden a military revolution took place which shocked Abdul-Hamid so much that in a panic he granted a constitution the next day censorship was abolished, all political prisoners released and that whole army of 30,000 spies was disbanded.

1. Ibid., p. 266
The new constitution was none other than Midhat's projects of 1876, resuscitated with all its imperfections rendered more incongruous by the passage of time and the growth of national sentiment. The resolution of the constitution rendered the people happy and rejoicing in the belief that the constitution would fulfil everybody's wants.

At this time the first Arab society named *al-Ikha al-Arabi al-Uthmani* was founded. Its main objectives being the protection of the constitution, uniting all the races in loyalty to the sultan promoting the welfare of the Arab provinces on the footing of real equality with the other races of the Empire, spreading education in the Arabic language and fostering the observances of Arab customs. The membership of this society was open to Arabs of all creeds and it was intended to find its branches throughout the Arab and also a newspaper was actually started to promote the defusion of its ideas which according to Antonius 'rested on a confusion of thought.'

In the following April another revolution broke out at the instigation of Abdul-Hamid who was trying to overthrow the C.U.P. As the news of this out break reached Salonika, Muhmud Shaukat Pasha, an Arab Commander of the Turkish

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2. Ibid., p. 103.
army corps stationed in Salonika, marched on the capital and after a stiff "fight entered Constantinople and restored the authority of the C.U.P. and after three days the senate and the chamber met together and decided to depose Abdul Hamid and instead proclaimed his brother Hasnid as the new sultan. The C.U.P. was now in absolute command and the next five years of their rule saw the establishment of a tyranny which although different from that of Abdul Hamid was in no way less despotic and, so far as the Arabs societies, founded by non-Turkish racial groups and with them the *al-Ikhā al Arabī*.

A movement of purely Turkish nationalism was beginning to assert itself. It has its roots in a new assertion of the Turanian origins of the Turkish people, which had given birth to the creed that the path of the regeneration of the Turkish race lay towards reunion with the kindred populations of Turanian descent of whom the majority were under Russian rule.

The forces generated by the national awakening were at work in directions painting away from the centres differences of language, customs and culture were still the main aspirations of these forces, the diversity of races within the empire called for the centralized form of government,
which should have given the Arab and other non-Turkish provinces a large measure of home rule and the freedom to pursue their political and cultural development as autonomous members of the empire. The policy followed by the C.U.P. was the very opposite. They adopted the centralized form of government which they found in existence when they came into power.

The propagation of Arab national ideas was henceforth conducted on two planes, that of the open platform, functioning through the agency of recognized clubs and associations, and that of the sub-Turanian channel, fled by secret conspiratorial organizations.
Arab nationalism made its appearance in the Levant in the middle of the nineteenth century. The first society which was founded in Beirut in 1847, through the efforts of the American Protestant missionaries with learned testes, for the purpose raising the level of culture, was al-Jamiyya al-Suriyya. Its members were all Christians, and included the famous writer Nasif al-yaziji (d.1871) and Buturus al-Justai (d.1883) as well as a members of missionaries and the English writer of the Lebanon, Colonel Charles Churchill, living near Beirut. The society met regularly until 1852, in 1857 it was succeeded by al-Jamiyyat al-Ilmiyyah al-Suriyya, a larger society on the same model, but including Muslims and it has corresponding members in Cairo and Istanbul including the reforming Prime-Minister Fuwad Pasha.

An organized effort, the first of its kind, for the Arab national movement is traceable in the year 1875. Five young men, educated at the Syrian Protestant college in Beirut, formed a secret society. Their aim was revolutionary and their procedure was, in the beginning, confined to secret

1. This term commonly used in modern Arabic to mean a 'society or 'association' meaning to collect or join together, in its modern sense it appears to have come into use quite recently, and was perhaps first used to refer to the organized monastic communities or congregations, which appeared in the eastern uniate churches in Syria and Lebanon at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries. In the middle of the nineteenth century the term came into more general use, first in Lebanon and then in other Arabic-speaking countries to refer to voluntary association for scientific literary benevolent or political purposes. Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. II, p.428.
meetings. After a period of about four years secret activities they decided to broaden their activities under a vigilant Turkish bureaucracy they had no other option to choose from than to post anonymous placarders in the streets. They did that with the agility of youthful conspirators.

George Antonius writes:

The young man who had been educated at the Syrian Protestant college in Beirut, a secret society. They were all Christians, but they saw the importance of getting Muslims and Druze to join and manage after sometime to enlist the membership of some twenty two persons belonging to the different creed and representing the enlightened elite of the country. Freemasonry on the European pattern had just found its way into Syria and the promoters of the secret society were able, through one of their members, to interest the recently-founded lodge in its activities.

The centre of their organization was Beirut, and they established branches in Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon. Their aim being frankly revolutionary, they could scarcely indulge in any of the pleasures of their procedure was at first entirely confined to secret publicity, and meetings at which they would exchange views and discuss plans, and to the dissemination of their political ideas through personal channels. At last after three or four years of whispering conspiracy, they realized that to continue preaching to themselves would serve only to increase their own order, and they decided to broaden their appeal. The method they chose— the only one open to them under a vigilant Turkish bureaucracy was that of posting anonymous placards in the streets.

A young enlightened elite of whom were Christians, and some of whom had studies at the Syrian Protestant college in Beirut, wanted first and foremost to emancipate the Lebanon from the Turkish yoke. They formed a 'secret revolutionary society' sometime around 1876, which used to meet during certain evenings on the rocky seashore, near the Pigeon Rock, south of Beirut, to

1. George Antonius, op. cit., p. 75
exchange view and discuss ways and means of achieving their objective what was upper most in the minds of these young men was their being humiliated and made to feel 'inferior' by the Turks. It soon became evident to these young men that the success of their goal, the Co-operation and support of the Muslims was necessary. They reached the conclusion that the only way to get rid of Turkish domination in the Lebanon and to be treated on the footing of equality with the Arab Muslims was through a successful Arab movement directed against the Turks and based on Arabism. The leading members of the secret society had already joined this lodge. A few Muslims did join the lodge and did learn about the existence of the secret society. Muslims and Christians agreed on combating Turkish injustices and despotism, on asserting their Arabian and insisting on equal rights for the Arabs and the Turks; but they disagreed on the ultimate goal of the society.

According to Faris Nimr Pasha, sometime between 1862 and 1883 this particular secret revolutionary society, the existence of which was one of the best kept secrets of the time, suspended its activities, burned its records and dissolved itself. Other secret societies were formed a few years later.

The anonymous placards in Arabic, which appeared in 1850 and which denounced the evils of Turkish misgovernment and exhorted the population to overthrow it. They appealed to the Arabs to their patriotism 'Nawabiyya' and their 'glorious past', to rise and expel the Turks from the Arab lands and, thus, emancipate themselves from the evils of Turkish despotism.

On June, 28, 1880, the British acting consul General John Lidkson in Beirut, considered it important enough to inform, telegraphically, the British Ambassador G.T.

Goschen in Constantinople, that 'revolutionary placards' had appeared in Beirut. The telegram was followed by his dispatch of July 3, 1860 in which he wrote that 'such placards had recently appeared several times in Beirut, calling upon the people to revolt against the Turks', adding, 'There is no doubt that for the last five years a secret society has existed in Syria, having branches at Baghdad and Constantinople... These placards may have emanated from this society.' According to Dickson these revolutionary papers were posted up in the streets of Beirut for the first time.

More placards of a revolutionary nature continued to appear towards the end of 1860 in Syria. The language moreover in which some of these placards are couched, would show that they are the composition of educated persons. Several of these placards undoubtedly, put out by the secret society, formed in Beirut.

In an age when representative institutions did not exist, and newspapers were still non-existent, such societies provided an opportunity for educated men to form political ideas and exert a certain pressure on the government.

The placards contained violent denunciations of the evils of Turkish rule and urged the Arab population to rise in rebellion and overthrow it. The authorities, both in Constantinople as well as in Syria, were puzzled and perturbed.

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1. Ibid., p. 63.
The effect was that secret emissaries were sent by the Sultan to Beirut, to investigate. It was generally understood that Midhat Pasha knew about the existence of the society. Whether he had actually created it or not, it is a fact that he was shielding it. It was believed that by fomenting trouble in Syria he wanted to wrest it from the Sultan. Taking this as granted the Sultan recalled him from Syria. It became pretty certain that Midhat had no connection with the society as it remained in existence even three or four years after his recall. Then Abdul Hamid stepped down on it so heavily that the activities of the society were suspended. Its records were destroyed and most of its active members emigrated to Egypt, their identity being never known to the government or to the public. As George Antonius writes:

There followed several dispatches some from Beirut and others from Damascus which told the story as it became known to the British consular agents at the time, with their conjectures as to the origin of the placards. The council general in Beirut had thought it wise to transmit as enclosures to his despatches the text of the three different placards in the Arabic in which they were written:

The first, which accompanies a despatch dated July 3, 1880, is the shortest and least interesting. Although it is the first to have been noticed by the British Consulate, it was obviously not the first placard issued by the society, for it refers to a previous appeal and seeks to assert the sincerity and the patriotism of its author's in connection with some former pronouncement. It rebukes the people of Syria for their lethargy under the tyranny of the Turks and for their habits of dissension, which make them a prey to European ambitions. It stresses the importance of unity and incites to sink their

1. *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84.
their differences and write against their tyrants under the inspiration of their Arab pride.

The second which is enclosed in the same dispatch is more specific in its condemnation of the Turks. It indicts them for their failure to carry out the reforms which for twenty years—that is to say since 1860, they had promised to introduce and brands them in incarrigible and hopeless.

1. The third which is described in a covering despatch was have been posted up on the night of December 31, 1880, in the most significant of the three, since its contains the first recorded statement of an Arab political programme. The mainpoints of that programme were:

1. The grant of independence of Syria in union with the Lebanon.
2. The recognition of Arabic as an official language in the country.
4. The employment of locally recruitment units in local military service only.

To quote Antonius again:

The... the society's appeals were the first trumpet call emitted by the infant Arab movement. It was the earliest organization to be founded with a primarily political object. It is the first statement of political aims which there is any recors in the history of the movement, and its merits attention as the only document of the period that provides us with an authentic pictures of the nature and the trends of Arab nationalism in its earliest days.

... the movement had kept within the narrow limits of its environment. The movement had drived its ideas from the familiar success of its environment, long before it took to borrowing the western nations of political evo

lution.

1. George Antonius, op.cit., pp. 82-84.
2. Ibid., p.85.
It should be noted that the concept of a nation had not penetrated to any depth in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It was only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the concept of nation made its inroad into the world of ideas in Syria, to graft itself on the indigenous tree of Arab nationalism. Until then the movement which had sprung in a sail of its own had derived its main sustenance from the earth in which it had its roots. And the programme placarded by the Beirut society in 1880 has this added historical value.

The first plank in that programme aimed at the achievement of independence based upon the unity of Syria and the Lebanon. In the Beirut programme the emphasis put upon the community of interests and the political identity of the Lebanon with the rest of Syria, was only the natural reflection of that revulsion against the mere idea of partition and separatism. Here, too is the root of the idea of Arab unity which, spreading outward from Syria, has embraced the whole of the Arab nationalist world and taken a place of the forefront of Arab aspirations.

The second point in the programme is the direct reflection of the earliest phases of the revival, namely the rehabilitation of Arabic as a medium of literary expression and the campaign against ignorance and fanaticism. From 1864,
onwards, as the policy of greater centralization is the Ottoman Empire developed, the use of Turkish as the language of government become more widely imposed in Syria. The higher officials were all Turks, and the majority of them totally unacquainted with Arabic. The business administration, in the law courts and the principal Arabic services were conducted in Turkish, and acknowledgment of that language which had remained a foreign language despite centuries of Ottoman sovereignty was now becoming an indispensable medium for official transaction.

The third point in the programme was a protest against the newly introduced practice of detailing the Arab troops recruited in Syria to fight the Arabs of the Yaman. The publication of the programme was the outward climax of the society's activities. It continued to exist over the next three or four years. The revolutionary efforts of the Beirut secret society was the first of the series of waves which were to follow each other at irregular intervals; and the programme of 1880, its achievement remained hidden in the secret recesses of the national consciousness whose signpost it became.

A French writer who visited Syria in 1880 has given a vivid description of the Syrian movement and its political ferment in the following words:

A spirit of independence is abroad. During my stay in Beirut, young Muslims were busy organizing societies

to promote the establishment of schools and hospitals and to work for the regeneration of the country. An interesting feature of this activity is its freedom from all strains of sectarianism. The societies which are being formed are designed to admit Christians and enlist their co-operation in the national task. The Turks were left out of account ...

In the interval, the Arab movement stood still so far as its visible manifestations went, not only were the censorship, the spies and the unseen terrors of the Hamidian regime during of its ardent spirits into voluntary exile it was also delimitated by a variety of influence — and more particularly by three — of which Abdul-Hamid's Arab policy was the most insidious. The other two were offshoots of the progress of Western education and the growing powers of the clergy.

The progress of Western education had also a stultifying effect. Its development in Syria during the Hamidian reign was on a much longer scale than in the preceding generation, and led to the establishment of a network of schools and colleges spread over the whole country. These were no longer solely dependent on French, American and British enterprise of Russian, Italian and German missions had come to add their activities to those of these forerunners. The progress of Western education was not an unmixed blessing. Although it raised the cultural standard to a relatively high level and made Syria into the most advanced portion of the Arab world, in other ways it did harm. It became an instrument of political penetration as well as a vehicle
of culture, and it facilitated and sometimes deliberately encouraged the acquisition of political power by the clergy.

One of the lasting contributions, which the development of Western education in Syria made to the Arab national movement was that it helped to transfer the leadership from Christian to Muslim hands. So it came to pass that the ideas which had originally been sown by the Syrian Christians were now roughly at the term of the century-finding an increasingly receptive sole among the Muslims. The unrest was no longer confined to Syria, it had spread to other parts of the eastern Arab provinces. Although its immediate causes were not everywhere identical, its outward manifestations tended toward liberation from Turkish rule. At a slightly later date, there arose other societies with more clear practical aims, Zeine writes:

Hence, also the rise of secret societies with the object of working for the introduction of reforms in Arab countries and, in some extreme cases, for the entire liberation of the Arabs from Turkish or any other alien domination. After Arabia, in the nineteenth century, it as in Egypt and in the vilayet of Syria (including the Lebanon) that anti-Turkish agitation developed and gathered strength. During the second half of that century the strongest reaction to local Hamid's despotism and Turkish mis-government came from the Syrian province of his empire. Two assertions are, however, unsupported by any serious historical evidence; namely: (a) that a small group of "enlightened elite", through their secret society in Beirut, spread the seeds of Arab nationalism, and

1. Z.N. Zeine, op. cit., p. 59.
(b) that the first organized efforts in the Arab national movement can be traced back to the activities of that group. Unfortunately the whole story has been exaggerated as far as the concept of 'nationalism' is concerned.

In the 1870's the development of the national consciousness and the comparative freedom of expression in Egypt led to the growth of specifically political associations, at the beginning of the reign of the Taufiq. It included 'Abdullah al-Nadim and other Muslim nationalists and a number of Lebanese Christian journalists working in Egypt; one of them, Adib Ishaq, published the journal of society until it was suppressed. It had a programme of reforms ministerial responsibility, equality before the law, liberty of the press etc., but could do nothing effective to carry it out, and only remained in existence for a year or so.

In Egypt the earliest political group with called itself was the Young Egypt like the Miscal-Fatat this group al-Mizbal-Wataui, was also opposed to the Khedive and his minister Mustafa Hiyad but seems to have had no connection with the former. Its members were ex-ministers, like Mohammad Sharif Pasha, this group became connected with the officers who, under Arab's leadership and moved by military grievances, carried out a coup d'etat against Taufiq and his government,
on 9 September 1881. The ostensible aims of this *hizb* were a constitutional and parliamentary regime for Egypt and the cessation of foreign interference.

These aims were taken over by 'Urabi, and his followers, when the coup-d'état having demonstrated their power, they supplemented sharif Pasha and the other notables in political leadership, these officers in fact became *al-hizb al natan* and with their defeat by the British army in 1902, the party ceased to exist. At a slightly later date there arose societies with more practical aims: for example the first feminist society which had been founded in Beirut in 1881, or earlier, was *Jamiyyah Bakrora suriyya* and a number of benevolent associations. Perhaps the first of these was *Jamiyyah al Kharriyya al Isamiyya*, founded in Alexandria in 1878 as an expression of the new public consciousness which was appearing in Egypt in that time. Its aim was to found national schools for boys and girls. A later organization of this society started in 1892, had more success, the great reformer of Egypt, Shaih Mohammad 'Abduh, was the active member of it.

After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Arab and Turkish nationalists flocked to Cairo and Alexandria when they

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2. *Hizb* means primarily a 'group, faction of group of supporters' a man who share his ideas and are ready to defend him and this is why the term has been adopted in modern Arabic to mean 'political party', the use of the word 'hizb' in the sense of a political party is a recent one, dealing from the beginning of the twentieth century and there about, but this modern usage was in a way a natural and legitimate extension of the traditional and classical one.
enjoyed great freedom for their political activities. Sometime, soon after 1897, a political society founded by Arab leaders in Egypt appeared under the name of Jam‘iyah al-Shura al Uthmani, the Ottoman consultative society, two of its founders were Muhammad Rashid Reda and Rafiq al-Azam. But other national in the Ottoman empire took part in its organization and its activities such as Turks, Armenians and Circassians. The purpose of the organization was to oppose Abdul-Hamid's tyranny and unjust administration and to try to change the form of government into a representative parliamentary system. Abdul Hamid was naturally greatly perturbed by it. He himself confessed to one of his entourage that when he first heard about that society, he could not sleep for three nights until he learned, through some of his spies in Egypt, who its founders were. He called it the 'corrupting society.'

The Jam‘iyah al-shura al Uthmani had several branches throughout the empire. Its propaganda material was printed in Arabic and Turkish. Some of it used to be sent with passengers and members of the crew of Russian ships to Turkish ports on the Black Sea. From there, secret messengers would take them and distribute them throughout Anatolia.

The society dissolved itself soon after the young Turks came to power in 1908. Zeine writes about the secret society, that according to Faisal Nomar Pasha, the first revolutionary ideas which he and a group of his friends got while at the

Syrian Protestant college, were of French origin and came to them secretly through Elias Habarlin. 1

More famous although scarcely more effective was the Jam‘iyyah al’Urwah al-Muthaq a secret society of Muslims pledge to work for the unity and reform of the Muslim world, through the restoration of a true Islamic government, and more specifically for the liberation of Egypt from British control. The moving spirits in this society were the famous publicist Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani, and his disciple Muhammad Abduh. It was established in the period after the British occupation of Egypt and appears to have had branches in several Muslim countries and an oath initiation. Little is known its activities, and perhaps in fact it did nothing except to sponsor the publication of the famous periodical "al urwah al-muthaq" is used in Paris by Afghani and 'Abduh in 1880. Although this lasted for a few months only, it had a far-reaching influence on educated Muslims, and the leading art classes are still represented from time to time and widely read.

The earliest parties in the Arabic speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire were in their origin and character, somewhat similar to the earliest Egyptian parties. They were group of young men touched by European influences and in contact with

1. Elias Habarlin was born on Nov. 1, 1839 in the village of Iug in Lebanon and died on Oct. 8, 1889 in Egypt. He taught French at the Syrian Protestant college in Beirut from 1871-1874. He was a Maronite than he joined the freemasons. He had read Voltaire and was very progressive and revolutionary in his ideas.
what they considered to be the constructing and stagnant conditions of the empire under Abdul Hamid II. In those years there was little scope for overt political action nor were the generality of the subject, much inclined to question in established and traditional order. Such groups were small clandestine and ephemeral.

A group which came into being at Damascus in the early years of the twentieth century. It was composed of young Muslims who were disciples of Shaykh Tahir al-Jaza'iri, this group is known as narakha-lamashtal sadhira, and it included Shaykh Jamal al Din al kasidi, Abu al Nasir al zamravi, Shukri al aal, Abd al heman al Shahbandar, Mohammad Kurd 'Ali, Fa'is al Khuri and Salim al Jaza'iri. Some of the younger members of the circle went to Istanbul in about 1905 and in 1906 Muhhadin al Khatib and his friend Arif al Iskaeli founded there a secret society, iqtihiyah al Nahada, and it consisted entirely of a small group of young educated Damascus and inspite of its foundation at Istanbul, Damascus was its centre. After the young Turk revolution, the party applied for permission to function openly, and interested itself for a few years there after spreading knowledge of Arab history and Arabic literature and in providing a local forum for discussing such political issues as it was safe to raise publicly.

1. He was inspector of education in Damascus vilayat and who live in Damascus from 1890 to 1905.
Another group, which came into existence at the beginning of twentieth century, is the League de La partee Arabe, founded by Najid Azuri, who apart from the French retired official E. Jung, collaborated with him, and whether he was the agent of one of more European powers, is obscure.

The programme of his League was the creation of an Arab empire extending over Mesopotamia, Arabia and the Levant, and the creation of a Siritish Republic. But the League seems to have been of little consequence and to have sunk into obscurity when his political, L'Independence Arabe, of which eighteen members came out in 1905-1906 ceased publication.

In 1906 the Syrian Najid Azuri, had founded an Arab patriotic society with the object of gaining France's assistance the detaching of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman empire, with the introduction of the constitution. However, he regarded his goal as attained and ceased publication of his newspaper L'Independence Arabe founded by him together with the former French colonial official E. Jung.

It was only after the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, that many Arab parties were formed, and

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1. A Syrian Christian, who had studied in Paris and then became an official in the Jerusalem vîlâyêt, this post he left in apparently suspicious circumstances and he was condemned to death in Absentia by an Ottoman court in 1904 for treasonable activities in Paris.

became quite active for a time because of the vicissitudes of the Ottoman parliamentary regime of 1908–14, these parties could not function as normal parliamentary parties, nor could they owing to the state of society than obtaining espires to enlist mass support. They were small ephemeral actions and such others as had access to European ideas, it is commonly agreed, that the first of these groupings was Jam‘iyyah al-Ikba‘al Arabî, founded by the Damascene Shafi‘î al-Mu‘ayyid and other mainly Syrian officials and notables in Istanbul in 1908.¹

Dieue gives a brief description about the societies which was founded after the revolution of 1908. He writes:²

As a result of young Turks Turkifying programme, the Arab leaders objective of gaining full national independence received a great stimulus which consolidated it. As far as Arab political nationalism is concerned it can safely be asserted that it was the national and racial policies of the young Turks which fanned its flames. Nationalist sentiments are dangerous to play with in a multi-national empire. A nationalist revival is bound to generate so much rivalry and antagonism as to lead inevitably to the break up of such an empire. Hence, when the young Turks made the nationalist ideal and their racial superiority the basis of a new Turkey, culturally and politically united and strong, the Arab leaders reaction was to think precisely in the same terms about the future of the Arab lands. As a result, a number of Arab societies and political parties were formed by enlightened and educated young Arabs to defend the Arab cause and protect the Arab rights, among which were the following, established after 1908.

¹. A report in the Arab Bulletin (24 May, 1918) records that the group came into being as a consequence that 1908, parliament refusing to accept. Yusuf Shittan a member of Sanghîa and Shafi‘î al-Mu‘ayyid as member of Damascus, the group seems to have been dissolved in 1909.
². op. cit., p. 53.
Jam'iyyah al-Ikha 'al Arabia al-Uthmani. (The society of Arab Ottoman brotherhood) was founded with great fanfare at a big meeting of the Arab community in Constantinople attended by the C.U.P. leaders. As a gesture of good will, the C.U.P. decided to end the fifteen years exile of Husain Ibn Ali and send him to Arabia, to take the post of grand Sharif of Mecca which had just fallen vacant. They disregarded the advice of Abdul Hamid II. who warned against to move. 

2. Al-Muntaza al-Adabi (the Arab literary club). The Arab officials, deputies and literary in Istanbul formed an estansioy purely literary club established in the summer of 1909, which was soon able to set up branches in Egypt and Syria and in particular endeavored to arouse Arab national feeling in the youth, the society dissolved in March 1915.

3. Al Jamiiyyah al-Qahtaniyyah (the Qahtani society) led by Major Aziz Al Misri, (later inspector general of Egyptian army and a noted Egyptian nationalist). Its aim unite the Ottoman Arab provinces in a single Kingdom within the empire, which would then became a Turco-Arab dual monarchy along the lines of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

In February 1914, anti-Turkish feeling among the Arabs hardened with the arrest and trial of the founder of al-Qahtaniyya, Major Aziz al-Masri. He had replaced al-Qahtaniya with a new society, al And (the conventant)

2. Brockleman, c., op. cit., p. 481.
which consisted almost entirely of army officers, with a preponderance of Iraqis who were the most numerous Arab element in the Ottoman army. When it became known that al-Asri had been secretly condemned to death on a trumped-up charge of having planned to sell Cyrenaica to the Italians, there was a public outcry, which was reinforced by a strong British protest. Eventually al-Asri was released and allowed to return to Egypt.

Apart from these groups which functioned publicly, a number of secret groups in Istanbul, a secret group composed of officers and university students mainly from Syria, (al-Jamiyyah al-Ustaniyyah), the group was dedicated to the encouragement of Arab nationalism, and among its prominent members were the two officers, 'Amin Litfi Mo'iz and Salim al-Jaziri, nephew of Shuyukh Ta'ur, 'Abdal-Karim al-Khalil and Arif al-Shikabi; all of them were executed for treason by the Ottomans in 1915-16.  

4. Al-Imr al-Abhar (the green flag). It was founded by students in Istanbul in September, 1912, but seems to have been more ephemeral than most and there is no record of any activity for which it was responsible.

5. Al-Ahd (the covenant), the period between two Italian conquests of Tripoli, and the outbreak of the first world war saw also the creation of a secret society named 'Jam'iyat al-Ahd,' which was founded on 26 Oct. 1913 by Dinbash 'Aziz al-Asri.' Its members were army officers and included Salim al-Jaziri, Nuri al-Said, Yasin al-Jashiri, his brother Taha, Jamal al-Madfa al-Amin Ali, Kawthar Mukhlis, Amin Litfi,

Ali Jawdat al Ayyubi, and Abdul an al Dulaymi. Its official program was to promote autonomy for the Arabic-speaking countries of the Ottoman empire, and to transform the empire into a dual monarchy on the lines of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy but the fact, it was a secret society composed of army officers ready to take action in support of their political views and that many of the members deserted from the Ottoman army before and during the First World War at least as important as the times of the official programme.

As regards 'Al-Anad, Alnay N. Fisher writes:

Partially in reply, an Arab, Major Aziz Ali al-Asiri of the Ottoman general staff, initiated a new society called the covenant (Al-Ahd) the covenant was comprised exclusively of army officers and be aie for the military, what the young Arab society was for civilians, it had many members in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. Perhaps getting wind of the action 'young Turks' without warning arrested Aziz Ali in 1914. He had been a member of Union and progress in Salonica before 1908 and had won honour during their rich in Istanbul in 1906, during a military mission to Yemen in 1910, and during the war against Italy in Libya, charged with treason in Libya Aziz Ali was tried, found guilty, and condemned to death. Public opinion he was so indignant especially in Egypt, that the British protested to the Porte. He was pardoned and sailed for Egypt as a public hero, to lead his covenant from Cairo. Any hope that in Young Turk leaders had for Arab cooperation and participation was now completely dispelled. Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism for Arab leaders disintegrated in the face of an Arab obvious and understandable drift to Turkish nationalism seen in actions of radical 'Young Turks'.

As usual, a welter of societies and parties sprung into being not only among the Arabs in Istanbul but also among the 

cities. An important one was the 'Literary club', which almost immediately took the place of the Ottoman Arab Paternity in Istanbul. The successor disallowed political activities, it posed as a meeting place, library, and club house for Arabs, living at the capital and a centre for Arab travelers. Within a short time its membership reached thousands and branches were located throughout Syria and Iraq. This was a testimony of growing Arab consciousness; but it was impossible to prevent Arabs, sitting relaxed in the club house, from discussing political philosophy as it pertained to the Arab situation.

Another important group which was formed by maronite notables in Cairo, in November 1919, was el-itthad al-Lubnan. It was founded by Iskander Amun, Arjun al-Jalibyat and Saad Razzak. Before the war, its program consisted in demanding better commercial facilities within the emirate for Mount Lebanon, widening the suffrage for its assembly, increasing the number of its members and widening its powers, and annexing the Biqa, Tripoli to Beirut to Mount Lebanon, to form what came to be known under the French mandate as the Grand Liban. This last point came to form the main issue for which the Ittihad worked after the outbreak of war, when the partition of the Ottoman empire, became a possibility. The Ittihad, the president of which from 1917 was August Adib, lost its raison d'être with the French occupation of the Lebanon.
The most famous of the Arab nationalist societies of late Ottoman days was called *al-Jam'iyyah al-Arabiyyah al-Fatat*. Simply known as *al-Fatat*, it was an ultra-secret Arab society, was founded in Paris on November 10, 1909, by a group of Arab students who were then pursuing their higher studies in that city, most active among whom was Taufiq al-Nature. It is significant that this society was an entirely Muslim Arab organization. It was first called "Jam'iyyah al-Natiqin bi'l-Dad." which was later, in 1911, changed to "Al-Jam'iyyah al-Arabiyyah al-Fatat*. The purpose of the society was, politically, to obtain Arab independence within the framework of a racial Ottoman and e.

*Al-Fatat*, founded in Paris in 1911 by seven Arab students, its center later moved to Damascus, and its membership grew to two hundred. It played an important part in the secret negotiations between the Sharif Hussein and the British authorities in Cairo, which led to the revolt in Transjordan against Turkish rule; the military leader of the revolt, Husayn ibn Faisal, called himself a member of the society.

*Al-Fatat*, the most important of all these societies, aimed at complete independence for the Arab provinces. It moved its seat quickly from Paris to Beirut, and then to Damascus, where its membership rapidly increased.

Peter Mansfield writes about this society:

On the initiative of *al-Fatat* the movement then shifted to Paris, where an Arab national congress was held in June 1913. The meeting was hastily organized, and then overwhelming majority of the delegates came from Syria rather than the other Arab provinces of the empire.

However, it aroused considerable interest and caused...

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1. Literally "the society of those who use the letter Dad." L.d. is the fifteenth letter of the Arabic Alphabet, the Arabs claim that this letter is found only in their Alphabet and that is correct pronunciation is the test of a true Arab. Z.N. Zeine, op.cit., F.No., p.94.
2. Ibid., p.95.
the C.U.P. to react. Having failed to persuade the French to ban the congress, the C.U.P. sent their secretary to Paris to enter into negotiations with its leaders.

The argument that they reached, appeared to be an important victory for the Arabs. Arabic became the medium of instruction in primary and secondary schools, and the important point about localizing military services was conceded. There were to be five Arab governors general and minimum of three Arab ministers in the Ottoman government.1

George Antonius, describes this society:2

Al-Fatat, was founded in Paris in 1911, no other society had played as determining a part in the history of the national movement. Its founders were seven young Arabs, all of them Moslims, who were pursuing their higher studies in the French capital, its foundation recalls that of the Beirut secret society of 1875, the objects of the society were to work for the independence of the Arab countries, and their liberation from Turkish or any other alien domination.

For the first two years, its centre was Paris, and its membership remained small, then, as its founders graduated and returned to their homes, it was shifted to Beirut in 1913 and in the following year to Damascus. Its membership rose to over 200, all of whom were Moslims, but with a few christians3.

He writes about the other societies also:3


These four societies, and a few others of lesser importance, were in existence when a fresh wave of the Arab movement broke out against the Turkish resistance. It began in Beirut in the last days of 1913 but the same tide carried it to Paris where an Arab congress was held six months later.

In Beirut, the initiative was taken by an influential body who formed themselves into a committee of reform composed of eight, six members of all creeds and drew u. a scheme for the grant of have rule to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. The scheme fitted into the framework of existing administrative divisions and fully recognized Turkish domination. But it drew a distinction between questions of an imperial character such as Foreign affairs, defence, Turkic Communi-

1. op.cit., p.184.
2. op.cit., pp. 111-112.
cations and national finances, and questions of a regional character, such as provincial administration and revenues and local services. Among other reforms and the scheme provided for the recognition of Arabic as the official language and for its adoption on parliament on a footing of equality with Turkish.

About the middle of February 1913, the committee of reform gave publicity to their scheme. Public meetings were held in Damascus, Aleppo, Acre, Nablus, Baghdad and Basra, and telegrams acclamng the scheme as being the expression of the universal desire in the Arab provinces. Proud into Constantinople. The C.U.P., in power, hostile to the thought of decentralization, took measures to press the agitation.

The Arabs, meanwhile, continued to press for reforms. Indeed the keynote of the year 1913 whether in Constantinople itself or in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire was the word 'Istan' reform. Consequently, on December 21, 1912, a group of reformers drew up a statement containing fourteen items of reforms which included the appointment of foreign advisers and experts in various government departments, chosen from European countries, with no political interests in the Ottoman Empire.

Among the societies, one most important society Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah al-Istiyyah al-uthmani, (the Ottoman administrative decentralisation party). This party established in Cairo in 1912, by experienced Arab public figures. The objectives were to mobilize Arab public opinion and impress upon the 'young Turks' the need to organize the new Ottoman Empire on a more federal basis. Its headquarters remained safely in

Cairo, although branches were located in Iraq and Syria and close contact was maintained with the literary club in Istanbul. The decentralization party stressed party machinery and enjoyed political success during the last half of 1912, when the Union and progress party was out of power. 1

Al Hizb al-Lamakaziyya al-Idariyya al-Uthmaniyya, which was founded in Cairo in December 1912, and which as its names showed, was dedicated to the achievement of administrative decentralization and provincial self-government in the Ottoman Empire. The founders were again Syrian, the most prominent among them being Mohammad Rashid Alida, Rafiq al-Azm, Shibli Shumayl, Iskender Amnelin and Muhabbal bin al Katib. The programme of the party was obviously akin to the ideas of Prince Sabah al-Din and the Hurriyat al-wa'il tilaf fer-basi, in Istanbul, which was opposed to the committee of union and progress. It may well be that the activities of Al Hizb al-Lamakaziyya are to be understood not so much in terms of Istanbul politics which eventually led to the complete hegemony of the Committee of union and progress. Again their programme cannot explain, rather contradict their activities at the beginning of the 1914-18 war, when they seem to have organized spying in Syria and Mesopotamia on behalf of the British authorities in Egypt. 2

Antonius gives the following account about the Decentralization party: 3

The other important public society was founded in Cairo towards the end of 1912, with the name of 'the Ottoman Decentralization Party. Its objects were two folds: to impress upon the rulers of Turkey the need for decentralizing the administration of the empire; to mobilize Arab opinion in support of Decentralization. Its founders were, for the most part, men of experience and good standing, who had made their mark in Public life. The statutes of the society provided for an elaborate party machine. The control was vested in a

committee of twenty members domiciled in Egypt and a smaller executive body of six of their own number. Branches were established in every town of Syria and smaller agencies in a number of other localities and the closest contact was maintained between its branches and other Arab political associations in Syria and Iraq, and of course with Al-Muntada al-Adabi in Constantinople in about a year, the Committee of the Decentralization Party had become the best-organized and most authoritative spokesman of the Arab aspirations.

The importance of this society in the history of the Arab movement was that it provided its first essay in the science of organized effort. The battle between the C.U.P. with their policy of verification at the centre and the Arabs clamouring for home rule had gone on for three years in that intermittent dispersed way which is characteristic of Arab warfare; and the foundation of the society was an attempt at co-ordinating the efforts into one, concerted and continuous pressure.
CHAPTER V

ARAB REVOLT

It is a well-known fact that Sultan Abdul Hamid was an astute ruler. He employed a vast number of agents and spies. He vigorously followed the policy of 'divide and rule' and used all possible means to invite tribal and family feuds whereas possible to kill his opponents. Sometimes his opponents were so popular and prominent that he was forced to adopt other methods. In this case he issued them with an invitation, which they could hardly refuse, to come and settle in Constantinople where they would be treated with honour and difference but kept under the close watch of the sultan's spies.

Historically the most important of these compulsory quests of the sultan was Husain b. Ali, Thirty seventh in line of descent from the prophet Muhammad and a member of the Hashimite family of Arabia, which by long tradition had provided the holder of the prestigious office of Grand Sharif of Mecca. In 1223 Husain, at the age of thirty-nine, arrived in the capital with his wife and four young sons. Ali, Abdullah, Faisal and Said, to stay for fifteen years in a villa on the Bosphorus. Dignified and imperious, if sometime wilful and patulant, Husain became a familiar figure in Constantinople where he had a large circle of admirers. His sons were educated and grew to manhood during this period.¹

¹Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 177
By the spring of 1914, the young Turks were deeply regretting their rejection of Abdul Hamid’s advice in having sent Husain b. ’Ali back to Arabia as Grand Sharif of Mecca. But they were forced to admit there as no easy solution. A mere threat to remove him from office had been enough to provide a violent reaction in the Hijaz.

Farthest among the Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament was the Amir ’Abdullah, the second son of the Sharif of Mecca. Outside the Hijaz, ’Abdullah made the fullest use of his opportunities as the sharif’s son and the right hand man of his father. He was bent upon a trail of strength with the Turks. Husain looked towards the Britain as his ally.

In the first week of February 1914 he sent ’Abdullah to Cairo to call upon Lord Kitchener. In the presence of Sir Ronald Storrs, he gave Kitchener on account of the strained relation between the Turkish authorities and the sharif. He knew that the CUP had secretly decided to depose his father, and he gave Kitchener to understand that if they carried out their intention there would probably be a revolt in the Hijaz. At that time Kitchener did not make any commitment against the Turks because Britain was still committed to the policy of preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

1. Kitchener was the British Agent in Egypt.
2. Mr. (now Sir) Ronald Storrs, the oriental secretary of the British Agency.
The importance of those conversations lay in this, that 'Amir 'Abdullah's approaches happened to synchronise with certain speculations which were entering Kitchener's own mind. Different solutions presented themselves to his mind. One was that a portion of southern Syria, might in course of time be detached from the Ottoman Empire and made to come under British protection, so that the belt of British influence might stretch uninterruptedly from Egypt to the Persian Gulf. Another was that the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire might be encouraged to form themselves into an autonomous state or chain of state friendly to Great Britain and extending all the way from the Mediterranean sea board in the West to the Persian frontier in the East. In other words he had come by an independent process of reasoning, to a point where he was envisaging the very possibilities that were being contemplated by Arab nationalist leaders; and it was at a time when his mind was busy with these speculations that the Amir 'Abdullah, himself a member of one of the secret societies and an enthusiastic believer in the fruitfulness of an Anglo-Arab understanding.

Nevertheless, this first encounter between Kitchener and the young Hashmite prince was to have important consequences. It led to the creation of three Arab monarchies, with British support, and a political association between England and the Arabs, which, although impermanent and in many ways disastrous, was to dominate the affairs of west Asia for a generation.

The first Kitchener-'Abdullah meeting had no practical results, but it established a rapport between the two men. Prior to the outbreak of the war, German influence in the Ottoman empire had grown out of all proportion to the influence of the other powers. It was especially noticeable in the military field. In 1914 Ottoman army was trained and instructed by a mission of forty-two German Officers under the Command of General Limon von Sanders. In August, 1914
the whole situation changed, British diplomacy had failed and Turkey signed a secret treaty of alliance with Germany. ¹

At the outbreak of the First World War on August 2, 1914 the Ottoman Empire was ruled by Sultan Mohammed V over seventy years of age and in frail health the Sultan, who had been held prisoner in a Palace in Constantinople for thirty-two years by his predecessor, 'Abdul-Hamid II, and who had been placed on the throne by the young Turks, was a nominal ruler only. The Ottoman Empire was now effectively ruled by a triumvirate of young Turks Enver, Talat and Jamal. But Enver Pasha was the dominant figure of the three and he was inclined towards Germany. Even the Grand Vizir, the Egyptian Prince Syed Halim, was no more than a convenient front for these three leaders. Enver was Minister of War, and chief of the General staff, but his influence far exceeded these functions and eventually he emerged as a real master of Turkey at war.

Ottoman involvement in World War I, and on the side of the central powers, certainly was not inevitable. Despite

¹ The treaty continued to be kept secret in the hope of securing delivery of the battleships from Britain, with strict press censorship being established to make sure it would not leak out. J.S. Show, op.cit., p. 113.
the newly emerging patriotic fervour, most members of the cabinet and the C.U.P. many Turkish people, realized that the Empire was hardly in a state to support any major military efforts, so soon after the series of war, that had decimated its population and finances as well as its armed forces. Although Germany had been building up the army, it did not really expect the Porte to be able to make a significant military contribution even if it decided to join the Central powers. Modernization has only begun. Besides, most members of the C.U.P. and the mass of the Public still felt closer to Britain and France than to Germany.  

The rapid adoption by the traditional nations of the non-European world of the European ideological and institutional complex known as nationalism has been a dominant characteristic of the twentieth century. The prevailing interest in nationalism also attracted the Arab world. The revolt of June 1916 raised by Amir Husain b. Ali of Mecca was an event of greatest influence in directing non-Arab attention to the problems of the Arabs. Within the Arab world the Arab revolt is viewed as the culmination of the Arab awakening which had long since been developing, among the Arab peoples. 

The revolt which began on Monday, the 5th of June 1916 was on a much smaller scale than what the Sharif wanted. He rose in revolt only when the government refused to guarantee

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1. Ibid., p. 310.
his Amirate in the Hejaz. The shārif's negotiations with the British undoubtedly raised prospects of something far greater than an autonomous Amirate of Mecca. Husain began his revolt against the Ottoman government after having reached agreement with representatives of Arab nationalist societies. Husain's son Abdullah became convinced of the necessity of armed revolt well before his father, and by July 1914, had become a convert to Arab nationalism. These two persons played an important role in the revolt. 1

The Arab revolt was strategically important to Britain. It immobilized some 30,000 Turkish troops along the railway from Amman to Madina, prevented the Turko-German forces in Syria from linking up with the Turkish garrison in Yaman. 2

The shārif of Mecca was one of the most privileged and respected grandees of the Ottoman empire, since the middle of the tenth century Mecca and the Hejaz had been autonomous under the rule of the Amir of Mecca, always one of the numerous shārif's or descendants of Muhammad, native of the Hejaz. By the Ottoman period Mecca and Madina were of great importance to the powerful Muslim sultans, as the Mughals, the Mamluks and the Ottomans, who sought to bolster their positions by patronising Islam in order to validate their assumption of the honorifics and prerogatives of the caliphate.

1. Ibid., p. 67.
2. Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 197.
The Amirs of Mecca, honoured and powerful though they were, could never assert complete independence. Although the Ottoman lacked the capability of subjugating the Hejaz to direct rule, they could on no occasion employ irresistible pressure or force. When the Amirate of Mecca became vacant in the summer of 1906 the rivalry between the two Meccan clans for the office became entangled with the rivalry between the victorious committee of Union and Progress and the 'Old Turks'. Ali Haider who had long been at odds with sultan Abd al-Hamid, sought to obtain the appointment. According to Abdullah, the young Turks tried to name Ali Haider to the position, but the grand vizier, Kamil Pasha, and the sultan were working to limit the influence of the committee for this purpose they appointed Husain as Amir of Mecca. 1

Husain's policy as Amir followed the general lines of Abd al-Hamid's memorandum. He stressed his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan and the religious sentiment which bound the Hejaz to the empire and provided the basis for the prestige and authority of the Amir of Mecca. On the other hand, he resisted the efforts of the unionist government and its adherents in the Hejaz to encroach on the special position of the Amir. Despite his difficulties with the Unionists from 1908 to 1911, Husain showed himself to be a loyal subject.

1. Earnest G. Dawn, op. cit., p. 4
of the sultan. In 1911 the Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament sent a letter to him through 'Abdullah requesting him to lead the Arabs in throwing off the Turkish yoke. The latter included a declaration signed by thirty-five Arab deputies. However, Husain did not respond to the Arab call. Despite Hussain's loyalty to the Ottoman Caliphate, the campaign in 'Asir to the first really serious crisis in the relations between Husain and the government.

The end of the Balkan wars saw the Turks intensifying the policy of centralization. Their attempt to strengthen their control over the Hejaz, created a crisis which caused the Hashmites to consider the idea of revolution and which perhaps turned the eyes of Arab nationalists once more towards Mecca. Towards the end of 1913, Wahib bey was appointed Wali and Commander of troops, and arrived in the Hejaz, with the instructions to extend the railroad from Madina to Mecca and to apply the law of Vilayats. But he was opposed by the people of Hejaz. After the arrival of Wahib, Abdullah left the Hejaz for Constantinople to attend the coming session of the Ottoman parliament. In Constantinople, Abdullah tried to win the cabinet to his father's policy. Talat opened a conversation with him, with the statement that the crises in the Hejaz had been settled, and thus acquired, what 'happened'? Abdullah replied that the government wished to end the special position of the Hejaz and make it an Ottoman vilayet, but the sharif
was determined to maintain everything as it was.

In the meantime, certain events were leading 'Abdullah to consider the possibility that British might enable his father to resist the Turks. Early in Feb. 1914, during the height of the crisis in the Hejaz, the Kitchner called on 'Abdullah, and said that he had knowledge that the Turks had strengthened their forces in the Hejaz and intended to introduce fundamental changes there. In the course of discussion, Kitchener asked to Abdullah what his father would do in case the Turks should try to remove h.m. Abdullah replied, by asking whether Great Britain would aid Hussein if he resisted the Turks. Kitchener's reply was that Britain could not interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, with which Great Britain had friendly relations. 'Abdullah then proceeded to Constantinople and discussed the question of the Hejaz with the Grand vizir, Talat and Anwer. 'Abdullah returned to Hejaz, but before reaching Hejaz he stopped in Cairo and met Kitchener, who sent Honald Storrs the oriental secretary, to see him. During his conversation 'Abdullah asked Storrs whether Great Britain ought not send a dozen or a half dozen machine guns to Hussein for use against the Turks. Storrs replied that his government could not supply arms for use against a friendly power.\(^1\)

'Abdullah's knowledge to the Arab nationalist movement also helped convince him that a revolt could be successful.

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1. Ibid., p. 20.
On the other hand, the crisis of early 1914 seems to have
impelled 'Abdullah to join the nationalist movement. In
April, 1914, 'Abdullah returned to the Hejaz to present
to his father the government's offer and, in addition, his
own plans and arguments for a revolutionary solution. He
argued that the Hejaz, with the aid of the Arabs units in
the Ottoman forces in Syria and Iraq and with British diplo-
matic support, could obtain independence from the Turks,
and then work for the formation of a large independent
Arab state. Specifically, 'Abdullah proposed to seize the
pilgrims, Faisal and Ali, (Husain's other sons) opposed
the scheme on the ground that Turkey was too strong, but
the plan was finally adopted, provisionally, with action
being set for sometime in 1915.

At the same time Husain also delayed and made compromise
proposals to the Turks. After 'Abdullah informed him of
Talats' proposals, the Amir of Mecca wired his reply to
the government:

My son... has transmitted to me the high proposals
and decisions from the Grand vizir in the matter of
the extension of the Hejaz Railroad to Mecca. There
is nothing which requires that considerations be
given to what my share will be, while I enjoy the
prosperity of the caliphate. At the first oppor-
tunity, I shall send by my son... my impressions
regarding possible means of attaining this high
goal without affecting the means of livelihood
of the tribes and of the population of the Islamic
holy lands.

1. Ibid., p. 22.
The commencing of war in 1914, and the subsequent Ottoman involvement put aside the questions of the provincial law in the Hejaz and the extension of the railroad and created a new dilemma for Husain and his sons. On the Hashimite side, since the war changed the conditions upon which the tentatively planned revolt had been predicted, the provincial plan was dropped. On the other hand, the Ottoman government began to press Husain to support the empire's war efforts. When Abdullah returned from Constantinople and informed his father of the talks, the later wrote letter to the sultan in which he advised him against entering the war.

The policy adopted by the sharif of Mecca mixed debly with requests for military and economic arrangements designed to reduce the perils of the situation. In August the Amir wrote to the Grand vizier that if the empire enters the war, it would be necessary to provision at once the Yemen, 'Asir and Hejaz, with three years of stores of supplies, arms and equipment for both regular troops and volunteers. After Turkey entered the war, Husain wired the government requesting him to send the money to the Yemen, Asir and Hejaz. The Amir received nothing supplies nor money, and on repeated requests, received the same treatment.
The Turkish order for general mobilization was issued on the 2nd of August and under cover of it, the countries surrounding Egypt, Syria was the most important from the military point of view. When Turkey entered the war, these groups were formed into an army, known as the fourth army, with headquarters at Damascus. On the western frontier of Egypt there was the unknown quantity, the Fanusi chief, who, although he professed friendship for Great Britain, was known to be in close relations with the Turks and with the sultan of Darfur. He was still engaged in hostilities with the Italians. Turkish emissaries were soon despatched to him and with offers of money and honours, and with injunctions from the caliph to preach jihad in his name. 1

Among the statesmen of the Entente, no one perhaps more alive to the dangers of the position in the Arab world than kitchen r; and it must remain to his credit and that of Ronald Storrs that they were the first to think of meeting them by the bold stroke of an alliance with Mecca. The grand shirif’s position was indeed unique, as regards both the military contribution he could make and the political value of his intervention. Other chiefs in Arabia there were, ascendency over their own followers was absolute and whose military resources were at last as promising as those of the Hejaz. But from the Entente point of view, Husain had two outstanding assets which were not possessed by any of his neighbours. One was the strategic advantage of his

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position at the centre of the Turkish power in the peninsular. The other was the incomparable asset of his prestige in the Muslim world, which drove its force from his descent as well as from his office.

Husain, meanwhile, had been approached by British authorities. On October 17, 1914, 'Abdullah received a letter from Storrs containing a message from Kitchener inquiring whether Husain would support Turkey or Great Britain in case Turkey should enter the war on the side of Germany. 'Abdullah's reply on behalf of his father, which reached Cairo on October 30, was friendly though cautious. It indicated that the Amir would not willingly support the Turks. At the beginning of November, immediately after Turkey's entry into the war, Storrs sent another letter to 'Abdullah containing a message from Kitchener. The message stated that if the Sharif and the Arab nations aided Great Britain in the war, Britain would recognize and support the independence of the Amirate of the Arabs and would guarantee Arabia against intervention and the Arabs against external aggression. Britain moreover expressed approval of the assumption of the caliphate by an Arab. The sharif's reply, which reached Cairo on December 10th, was that he would not adopt a policy hostile to Great Britain, but that because of his position in Islam he could not break immediately with
Turkey. During the first half of 1915 contacts between the British authorities in Egypt and the Amir of Mecca continued, principally through the intermediary of Sir Reginald Wingate, who was the Governor General of Sudan.  

Throughout the entire period Husain expressed no change in his position, but in April Wingate informed him that:  

His majesty's Government would make it an essential condition in the peace terms that the Arabian Peninsula and its Mohammedan Holy Places should remain in the hands of an independent sovereign state. It was impossible to define at the moment how much territory should be included in this state.  

In January 1915 Sharif Husain received an emissary from Fauzi al-Dakri who was the member of al-Fatat. His elder brother Naseef was a member of al-Fatat, but before receiving his orders to proceed to Mecca, he was taken into the society's secret, and given a message to take to the shairif.  

The message which was oral, was to this effect:  

The nationalist leaders in Syria and Iraq, including senior Arab officers in the Turkish army, favoured

1. Ibid., p. 26.  
3. This young member had recently been mobilized for service in the Turkish army and had obtained, ostensibly as the perquisite of a younger son, a decorative post in the body guard of the Grand Sharif.  
a revolt for the attainment of Arab independence; would the sheik consent to lead it, and if so, would he receive a deputation in Mecca or delegate persons of trust to concert measures.

Fauzi arrived in Mecca in the last week of January and told Husain, the nationalist plans, and proposed that Husain assume the leadership of the Arab revolt. It would like the form of a mutiny by the Arab troops stationed in Syria, whose officers were members of Al-Ahd.¹

In January, 1915 an accident revealed to Husain how far the young Turks had been prepared to go in order to unseat him. At Jamal's request, Husain had ordered an Arab force under the command of Ali, to accompany the Turkish force, which Wahib was moving north to join in the attack on the Suez Canal. When Wahib set out in January 'Ali accompanied him from Mecca to Madina, but in the latter place Ali declared that Husain had ordered him to leave to Wahib here. In the meantime a secret correspondence between Wahib and Constantinople which dealt with plans to depose Husain and his family and to end the special position of the Dejaz became known. Only the outbreak of war had interfered with the execution of these plans. Therefore, Ali stopped at Madina and then went to Mecca, where he showed the documents to his father. This unexpectedly

¹. Earnest C. Dawn., op. cit., p. 27.
discovered proof of Unionist intentions, when it did, placed Husain in a quandary. He personally was still inclined towards seeking a solution within the Ottoman Empire. Faisal were therefore, charged with presenting the documents to the Grand Vizir and seeking redress for the plot. At the same time, Faisal was to make contacts with the nationalists in Syria surveying the situation in order to estimate the extent to which a revolution was likely and what preparations had been made for such a revolution.

Faisal arrived in Damascus on March 26, 1918, and became a guest of At. Pasha al-Bekri. He received the leaders of al-Hatat and al-Ahd, and discussed the political situation with them. Faisal found the situation in Syria confused. Many persons begged Faisal to accept the leadership of the revolt, which would begin soon, and three of the regular divisions in Syria were ready to revolt. But public opinion was divided, and in military circles the opinion that Germany would soon with the war prevailed.  

At soon as it had become evident that Turkey was joining the war, 'Aziz 'Ali had, from his retirement in Egypt, sent a peremptory message to the leading members of al-Ahd.

1. Ibid. p., 28.
That they were on no account to be tempted into
hostile action against Turkey, as the fact of her
becoming belligerent would expose her Arab provinces
to foreign conquests; until some effective guarantee
against European designs, were obtained, it was their
duty to stand by Turkey. 1

On their side and acting independently, the leaders
of al-Fatat had passed their resolution, which in substance
said the same thing. The two societies were now of one mind,
and their main concern became to explore the changes of their
seizing the opportunity provided by the war to obtain valid
guarantees of future Arab independence. They knew nothing
at the time of Kitchener's correspondence with the Sharif.

Faisal st yed in Constantinople less than one month,
and reached Damascus on May 23, there he found that the
members of al-Fatat and al-Ahd had drawn up a plan in his
absence. They had drawn up a protocol 2 defining the condi-
tions on which the Arab leaders would be prepared to co-ope-
rate with Great Britain against Turkey, and they planned
that Faisal should take this protocol to Mecca and ask his
father to find out whether it was acceptable to the British
government as a basis for concerted action.

On June 20, Faisal arrived in Mecca, reported to his
father, and declared himself to be a convert to revolution.


2. The Damascus protocol is extremely important text,
not only for what it contains, but also on account of the
use to which it was afterwards put by the Sharif Husain
when in the following July, he resumed his negotiations
Sharif and his sons went on to his summer residence at al-Taif, to discuss the policy. Faisal gave advice to his father to delay the revolt, until the British had been properly approached and until Turkey had either suffered crippling losses or an allied landing had been made at Alexandria. But 'Abdullah was not satisfied with Faisal and advised his father for proclaiming the revolt. 'Abdullah seems to have carried the day with these arguments:

The war could have only one consequence for the Arabs: They would remain in the noose of the government whether the Turks and Germany or the French and British won; it was necessary to proclaim the Arab movement and (thus) escape through war the necessary consequence of submission to alien rule.

In the internal, the British authorities in Egypt had taken what measures they could to parry the threat of Jihad. At first the principal actors had been the oriental secretary at the British agency (Mr. Ronald Storrs) and the director of military intelligence in Cairo (Lt. Col. G.F. Clyton). In January 1915, Sir Henry McMahon took up his duties as high commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan. Storrs and Clyton opened conversations with the Arab leaders domiciled in Egypt. One of the first to be approached was 'Aziz 'Ali, and with him Sayyid Hashid Hida, a far famed theologian, politician and reformer, and a fervent exponent

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1. Earnest C. Dawn, op. cit., p. 31
of Muslim-Arab regeneration. The conversations turned on
the theme of Kitchen's message to the sharif and were
directed to persuading the Arabs that their future lay
in an alliance with England. 1

Those leaders who, like Aziz Ali and Rasid Pids, had
enough influence to sway their followers in Syria and Iraq,
asked for guarantees of Arab independence as an indispen-
sable condition of a call to Arab revolt. And no one in
Egypt was in a position to give the required assurance. The
conversations were not without result, they opened the eyes
of the British authorities to the futility of trying to win
over the Arabs without definite pledges to them. Wingate
had come to the same conclusion that it called for the
immediate issue of a proclamation with definite assurance
relating to the future of Arabia and the fate of the Cali-
phate. This declaration was intended to allay Muslim fears
rather than satisfy Arab political aspiration. The declara-
tion was published early in June.

In authorising this declaration, the British govern-
ment were, in one direction, going a step beyond Kitchener's
assurances of 31st of October 1914. He had promised the
sharif that Arabia would be defended against external aggre-
sion. But on the essential Arab demand that...
should apply to Syria and Iraq as well as to the Peninsula. The government of India had been active in their field, and looked upon the Arabian Peninsula as their special concern. It was held that had directed the operations for the occupation of Jazra in November 1914. Towards the end of the year, Captain J. W. Shakespeare, of the Indian Political Service, had been delegated on a mission to Ibn Sa'ud, to try and secure his co-operation in the cause of the Allies. Ibn Sa'ud was not so well-disposed towards the Turks as to need reducing and just as Turkey was entering the war, a member of ai-Ahd, deputed by 'Abd al-Aziz 'Ali had, arrived at this capital to solicit his support for the nationalist cause and had been well received. At the same time, his role, as the chief of the Wahhabis, placed him in a delicate position in regard to the holy war. Ibn Sa'ud had warmly supported the sharif in his abstention from endorsing the call to Jihad.  

An agreement was also concluded by the government of India, with the Idrisi in April. Like the subsequent treaty with Ibn Sa'ud, this agreement related to local interests only; and neither instrument contained any reference to the broad issues of the Arab national movement. Nor was Idrisi

1. Ibid., p. 161.
any more than Ibn Sa'ud, in a position to make a substantial military or moral contribution to the war against Turkey. When the sharif resumed negotiations in July 1915, the war was going none too well for the Allies in the Near East. The operations in Galipoli had been costly and unsuccessful. The Turkish attack on Egypt had been repulsed, but the threat remained and was immobilizing large forces, the Sultan of Darfur, still in close touch with the Sanusi, was showing signs of responding to the call of Jihad. The Turkish forces in the Yemen had invaded the Aden protectorate and driving off the British troops sent to protect Lahaj, the British forces in the Arab world were everywhere on the defensive.1

It was while he was thus preoccupied with the dangers still threatening Egypt that Sir Henry McMahon received a note from Sharif Husain.

The Hashimites having decided to undertake the revolt, Husain initiated negotiations with Great Britain by sending an unsigned and undated letter to Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo, which was sent with a letter

1. Ibid., p. 162.
dated July 14, 1915 from Abdullah to Storrs. In the exchange of letters which followed during the second half of 1915, Husain sought to obtain British recognition of an Arab State within the frontier specified by the Damascus protocol, while McMahon sought to exclude certain areas in which Great Britain and France had special interests. By the end of 1915 agreement had been reached on all points except certain vaguely defined territories in Syria wherein French interests were involved. In a letter dated January 1, 1916, Husain stated to McMahon that the villayets of Aleppo and Beirut could not be excluded from the Arab Kingdom, but that in order not to damage the alliance between Britain and France, he would postpone his demands until the end of the war. Husain's negotiations with the British then were not entirely satisfactory in achieving acceptance of Arab territorial demands.

The negotiations between Britain and the shari'ah and the agreement which led to his final decision to raise the flag of revolt are embodied in an exchange of letters between July 1915 and January 1916 known as "the Husain-McMahon correspondence". Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, was delegated to act in this matter on the British government's behalf.2

1. Earnest C. Davis, op. cit., p. 31.
This correspondence is of cardinal importance because it became the subsequent basis of Arab nationalist charges against Britain of betrayal. The debate continued to this day and will never be resolved because of the deliberately imprecise style in which the letters were written: ¹

McMahon's letters resemble a Gilbert and Sullivan parody of the Arabian Nights. One began: To the excellent and well-born sayyed, the descendant of Sharif's, the crown of the proud, scion of Mohammad's Tree and branch of the Quraishtite Trunk, him on the Exalted presence and of the lofty rank, Sayyed son of Sayyed, Sharif son of sharif, the venerable, Honoured Sayyed, his excellency the sharif Husain lord of the many, Amir of Mecca the Blessed the lodestar of the faithful and the Cynosure of all devout deliers, may his blessing descend upon the people in their multitudes.

In his first letter Husain proposed that Britain should support the creation of an area of Arab independence embracing the whole of what is now Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and the entire Arabian Peninsula with the exception of Aden - a British Colony administered the government of Bombay. In the ensuing correspondence the sharif made a few reluctant and imprecise concessions. He accepted that Britain's treaties with certain Arabian chiefs should remain and agreed to the temporary British military occupation of Mesopotamia. Sharif Husain did not comment on the claim in McMahon's second letter that: ²

¹. George Antonius, o. cit., p.167 (F.N.)
². Peter Wansfield, o. cit., p.192.
It is understood that the Arabs have already decided to seek the counsels and advice of Great Britain exclusively and that such European advisers and officials as may be needed to establish sound system of administration shall be British.

The most crucial passage of all was the British assertion that the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be expected from the proposed delimitation. Husain neither accepted nor rejected this claim but postponed his decision. The question therefore, remains open whether the land of Palestine (which was not an Ottoman administrative region but a widely accepted geographical entity) was or was not intended to be included in the area of Arab independence. British apologists have had to use dubious logic to claim that Palestine lay to the west of Damascus. They have a stronger case in asserting that the sharif always understood that the Allies never intended Palestine to be an independent Arab State.

The British government's contention is that Palestine was excluded by implication, when Sir Henry McMahon notified the sharif that portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo were to be excluded from the area of Arab independence. The controversy

1. Ibid., p. 193.
is still going on, and eminent people in an out of govern-
ment circles are still loudly maintaining in some cases,
quite genuinely — that Palestine was in fact excluded by
Sir Henry McMahon from the area of Arab independence.¹

The truth can scarcely be denied that Britain was
double dealing with the Arabs, because at the same time
it was negotiating with the sharif Husain over the future
of the Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire and was
discussing the same subjects with France and Russia and
keeping the two sets of negotiations separate. In extenua-
tion it can only be argued that Britain was engaged in a
deadly war with Germany and had to take account of the
wishes of its principal allies.

In February 1916, Husain dropped his bombshell, he
telegraphed Constantinople demanding immediate recognition
of the hereditary claims of his dynasty. On June 8, 1916,
Husain formally proclaimed the independence of his Hashimt
dynasty and the existence of a 'state of revolt' against
Ottoman authority. A fortnight later, in a lengthy Public
proclamation pronouncements, the sharif listed the reasons
for his action. He cited the loss of influence and territory
suffered by the empire since 1908, the inaptitude of the

¹. George Antonius, q. cit., p. 175.
young Turk regime in domestic as well as foreign matters, Constantinople's unfair treatment specifically, of the Hejaz and the brutal hangings of certain eminent Arabs. Yet the largest part of the manifesto was devoted to religious grievances, e.g. laws of Islam had been disregarded, the sharia had been flouted, the 'Quran' had been breached, fast days had not been observed. Apparently Husain preferred to base his case on the alleged atheism and impiety of the young Turks.\footnote{1}

At sunrise on the 5th June, the two brothers rode out to the tomb of Hamze, where the 15,000 recruits raised by the sharif were in camp, and proclaimed the independence of the Arabs from Turkish rule in the name of the sharif-Husain Lord of Mecca, the Arab revolt had begun.\footnote{2} In Mecca, the revolt was fixed for the following saturday, the 10th of June.

Fai al soon became the acknowledged leader of the revolt. When arrived in Damascus, early in the following January, he found conditions changed beyond recognition. He had come with the settled purpose of fomenting a revolt of the Arab divisions in the Turkish army and a mass rising of the population, on a signal from his father. The last remaining Arab divisions had been transferred with most of his friends from al-Ahd, and their places taken by battalions manned by Turks.

\footnote{1} Howard M. Sachar, \textit{The Emergence of the Middle East-1914-1924} (New York, 1969), D.130. \footnote{2} George Antonius, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 194.
Prominent civilians had been deported by the hundred, to distant places in Anatolia. ¹

Among these were some of the best known and most influential names in Syria, where arrests seemed to show that Jamal had done with his tactics of public for bearance. Sharif Husain intervened with telegrams to Jamal to the grand vezir and to the sultan urging that, if any the accused found guilty, punishment be limited to life sentences; otherwise, blood would cry for blood. ³

Faisal received the order to return a few days after the execution of the 6th of May. It was so worded in the code he had agreed upon with his father, as to convey that the revolt was imminent. On the 10th of May, Faisal left for Madina. His brother 'Ali, had been in constant communication with their father and know that the revolt was imminent. ⁴

The names of the revolt caused stupor in Turkey and in Germany and was screened from the public for several weeks. As late as the 26th June, on the 29th, the first admission was made in an announcement published in Damascus in the official al-sharah of that to say that certain tribal sections had attacked a few posts in the neighborhood in

1. George Antonius, op.cit., p. 188.
2. Jamal passû was the governor and commander in chief of the Ottoman forces in Syria.
3. George Antonius, op.cit., p. 189
4. Ibid., p. 193.
in Medina, but making no mention of the capture of Mecca and Jeddah or the sharif.

In Syria the Turks took particular pains to discredit and belittle the sharif's rising. In the interval, 120 other Arab notables from all over Syria had been arrested and deported to Anatolia. The effects of the sharif's rising in Iraq, and more particularly in those tracts which were already under British Occupation was mainly conditioned by the reaction of the government of India to it. Two factors governed that reaction. One was the deep sentiment of attachment to the caliphate prevailing among the Muslims of India, the other was that the government of India had designs upon Iraq which they regarded as a field for future colonization. Their attitude to the Arab movement was fundamentally determined by these two factors; and this gave their foreign policy a parochial and acquisitive outlook which made it inimical to the idea of an Arab revolt.

In the Arabian Peninsula, the news of the rising had a profound effect. It did not win over the two Arab rulers -- Ibn Hashid and the Imam of the Yemen. All the other rulers in the Peninsula hailed the revolt with an approval which found its open expression in a durbar held on the 20th of November at Kuwait, the shaikh Muhammeda and

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1. Ibid., pp. 202-205.
and over 150 other persons amongst whom were powerful minor chieftains.

In Egypt and the Sudan the news of the Sharif's rising came at a particular opportune moment. At first, the news of the Sharif's rising made little impression in Egypt. There was a stringent censorship of the press which prevented any open condemnation, but the hostility was real and scarcely valid. Among the Syrians and Iraqi communities the revolt was hailed with universal enthusiasm. Syrian influence in the newspapers of Cairo and Khartum gave it a good press.

Within days after raising the standard of revolt, the Sharif's followers achieved their first success, the captives were slaughtered instantly. On June 9, another 4,000 Arab attacked the part of Jidda. Initially they were beaten off, but two days later a squadron of British gun-boats and seaplanes bombarded the town, and the Turks promptly capitulated to the Arabs. Hebech defended by less them 30 Turks, was captured with similar ease. So on July 27, Yanbo, Taif, was besieged by, 5,000 tribesman and eventually surrendered on September 22, and within the period of one summer, eventually the entire Arabian Red Sea coast had been cleared of Turks.

1. Ibid., op. cit., p. 207.
After these initial victories however, the revolt soon lost its momentum. Husain's men failed to overrun other Turkish strongholds, in the Hejaz. The Sharif's undisciplined bands hardly formed an army in the modern sense. Led by Husain's sons, the Arabs were concentrated in three principal groups. One of about 5,000 men under 'Ali, based on Rabigh; another of 4,000 under 'Abdullah, near Mecca; and another of 7,000 under Faisal, based on Yambo, the Hashimite forces were separated. The revolt had begun with a series of brilliant surprises, but the Turks had regained their composure, and within six months after Husain's declaration of independence, they were threatening to win back all they had lost.

In that first and most important of his proclamations, the sharif explained his action and appealed to all Muslims to follow his example. He took his stand on the two platforms of religion and nationalism, but spoke as one who was primarily concerned with the welfare of Islam. The proclamation denounced the Anti-Muslim practices of the C.U.P. of which it enumerated instances, and the arbitrary tyranny of the Enver-Jamal-Talat clique. It represented the revolt as a religious and national duty, and as a God given opportunity for the attainment of independence. It ended

by calling upon all Muslims throughout the world to follow his example, in discharge of their obligations to him, as sharif of Mecca, and to the cause of Islamic solidarity.

One of the first military consequences of the revolt was that it disposed of the German expedition under Baron von Stotzingen. The German mission had journeyed down on the Mejaz Railway as far south as al-Aqla. The main Turkish force had gone to Madina. It was the arrival of this Turco-German expedition that had decided the sharif to proclaim the rising when he did. He had not intended to do so until the following August, by which time he could have completed his preparations. But he having weighted the alternatives had decided in favour of immediate action.

Sharif had failed to capture Madina, but his immediate military objectives had all been attained with the fall of Taif in the latter half of September, the three months that followed were the darkest in the history of the Arab campaign. All danger of a march on Mecca was finally dispelled in the following January, when one of the sharif's armies led by the Amir Faisal, moved northwards, and with the help of the British navy occupied the port of Jazira.

1. George Antonius, op. cit., p. 207
It was during these months that British and French missions established themselves in Jeddah.\(^1\) The actual control of Arab military operations was at first entrusted to Aziz 'Ali who had volunteered for the task.\(^2\) He arrived in Jeddah in September to assume command. But he did not hold his command for long; he left, and was eventually succeeded by Ja'far al-'Askari. Ja'far, too, had at first been unwilling to join revolt. He was profoundly affected by the news and, uttering a curse on all Arabs who continued to serve the Turks after such savagery, volunteered for service with the sharif.\(^3\)

On the 2nd of November, it was announced that sharif Husain had been proclaimed king. The news was at once telegraphed by Amir Abdullah, to the principal Allied and neutral governments, requesting for their recognition of the new title.

The chapter which had opened with the rising in Medina on the 5th of June closed with the capture of Wajh on the 25th of January. The revolt had found its feet the forces

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1. The first to arrive was Lieut Colonel C.C. Allison, of the Sudan political service, who came as British agent. In September a French mission under colonel E. Bremond landed in Jeddah. T.E. Lawrence arrived in October, Sir Reginald Wingate was made Commander in Chief of operation in Hejaz.

2. Aziz had been watching events closely and biding his time shortly after Turkey's entry into the war, he had been approached by the British authorities in Cairo that an discovering that Great Britain was not yet prepared and prepared to give an explicit and specific pledge in favour of Arab independence.

of the revolt had, by that time, sorted themselves out into three main groups each of which was led by one of the Sharif's sons. As the occupation of Mafja on the 25th of January, 1917, had brought the first phase of the revolt to close, so the capture of 'Aqaba' in the following July marks the beginning of the last and the most spectacular phase of the Arab drive towards Damascus. The capture 'Aqaba' marks the turning points. Hitherto, the revolt had the Hejaz for a theatre and the forces supplied by the tribes by its fighting elements. Now the scene had shifted to Syria.

In its military implications, the move to 'Aqaba' caused serious embrace to the Turko-German command in Syria at a time when every available man and gun were needed to oppose the British advance on Jerusalem. But its political consequences, although less apparent at first, were more damaging still. 'Aqaba' became the tangible embodiment of the revolt and a base for the political undermining as well as the military undoing of the Turkish power in Syria.1

The political action manifested itself in a variety of ways, all of them tending to weaken Turkey by winning the Arabs of Syria over to the Allied side. The principal weapon or propaganda employed was that, thanks to the agreement concluded between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif

Hussein the Allied cause had become identical with the cause of Arab independence. And that the triumph with Allied arms would bring freedom to the Arab peoples. The political consequences of this phase of the Anglo-Arab partnership are important not only from an historical point of view, but also for the sake of their bearing upon the controversies which raged in the years following the war.¹ These controversies affected the fate of all the Arab territories that lie outside the Arabian Peninsula, and everywhere, in those regions protests accompanied by violence taking the form of armed insurrections were made against the settlement divided by the Allies. In course of time, these protests led to radical revisions of the original settlement, with the single exception of that portion of Syria, which is now known as the mandated territory of Palestine, which had not been excluded from the area in which Great Britain had pledged herself to recognise and uphold an independent Arab state.²

The Arab risings had already resulted in greater losses than Turkey could afford. It may be reckoned at a conservative estimate that, by the end of March 1918, in all the number of Turk killed, captured or contained by the Arab

revolt amounted already to some 35,000.

The Arab regulars covered their right flank, dogging the steps of the Fourth Army; while the tribal hosts charged widely at the retreating Turks, galloping and fighting as they went, in a mad race towards the goal of the Revolt. The first to arrive were the Sharif Naser and Nuri Sha'lan with their forces who, reached the outskirts of Damascus on the evening of the 30th of September, but in defence to the wishes expressed by the Commander-in-chief, they abstained from entering it that night and contented themselves with sending in a strong contingent to carry the tidings to the population and a message enjoining the setting up of an Arab government. This had already done, and Nasir's messengers, as they reached the main square, held the Arab flag flying. Four hundred years of Ottoman domination had passed into History. The rest of Syria was occupied before October, the occupation of Beirut and Aleppo and almost every other town in Syria gave rise to similar scenes of rejoicing as had greeted the liberators in Damascus. In Lebanon which had the worst of the visitation whole villages perished. The effect of these visitations was only too visible, when the British forces entered Beirut.

As the war went on, the Entente's need to secure allies against the control powers led it to make arrangement by which enemy territory, mainly that of the Ottomans, was
promised in return for various forms of wartime assistance. The result was a series of agreements dividing the Ottoman Empire, some of which particularly those involving the Arab nationalists and the Zionists, were contradictory. The promises were successful in securing effective wartime support, but they gave rise to new conflicts and bitterness in the post-war world. In the two score years that had elapsed between Abdul-Hamid's accession and the war of 1914, the sultan had to surrender several rich provinces in Asia Minor to Russia, Syria and Egypt to Great Britain, Tunisia to France, Libya to Italy and Bosna-Herzegovina to Austria.

Negotiations were opened early in 1915, and presently a series of secret agreements were concluded at various dates in the first three years of the war, in which the four Allies helped themselves handsomely to slices of the Ottoman Empire. There were three major agreements concerning West Asia made during the war. The first often called the Istanbul Agreement, because it purported to settle the question of who should control the Ottoman Capital, was concluded by an exchange of notes among Russia, England and France on March 14, 1915.

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The Muslim Holy places in Mecca and Madina and the rest of Arabia and the Arab world would be detached from the Ottoman Empire and placed under independent Arab rule. The division of Iran between Russia and Britain as agreed on originally in 1907 would be continued. The neutral zone formerly maintained as a buffer between them would go to the letter, with the exception of Isfahan and the eastern sections near Afghanistan, to be taken over by Russia.1

Probably the best known and most significant of wartime secret agreements regarding the Middle East was that reached between Britain and France on May 16, 1916, as a result of a long series of negotiations carried on by Sir Mark Sykes and George Picot (and thus usually called the Sykes - Picot agreement) to adjust their claims to the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire. The Constantinople agreement was, therefore, the true progenitor of the Sykes-Picot agreement.

Sykes-Picot agreement:

The Sykes-Picot agreement, as it is generally called, was entered into by Great Britain with France and Russia, in the spring of 1916:2

The two delegates (the France delegate was Monsieur F. George-Picot, his British colleague was Sir Mark Sykes), together drew up a scheme for the disposal of those parts of the Ottoman Empire which were coveted by Great Britain and France. They were then instructed to proceed to Petrograd in order to discuss their proposals with the Russian Government. Negotiations were opened there about the middle of March 1916, and resulted in a three-cornered understanding:

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2. George Antonius op.cit., p. 245.
expressed in draft notes to be exchanged between the three governments and, recently, the notes were formally exchanged on various dates in April and May of that year. In them were defined the Ottoman territories which each of the three powers desired the other two to recognise as its sphere of influence.

Peter Mansfield describes the Sykes-Picot agreement in these words:

The Sykes-Picot agreement is described by Arab writers such as George Antonius as a shocking document, and it is easy to see why: in the so-called rectangle formed by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Iraq of today, Britain and France planned to assume direct control over the most populous advanced areas.

Yahya Emajani gives an interesting account of the agreement in these words:

During World War I, there were three secret agreements among the members of the Triple (Britain, France and Russia) Entente which dealt with the Ottoman Empire. One was the Constantinople Agreement of March 18, 1915 which divided parts of north Syria and Asia Minor among the member countries. The second was the London Agreement of April 26, 1915, which was arranged when Italy joined the war and demanded its share of the spoils. In these two agreements the Fertile Crescent was left to Great Britain and France.

On October 21, 1915, the British informed the French about the Hussein/McMahon correspondence and suggested they get together and discuss their interests in the Fertile Crescent. Accordingly, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Charles Georges - Picot of France reached an agreement by February 1916. Later this McMahon agreement was ratified by Russia and Italy. Without regard to the pledge to the Arabs,

1. _op. cit._, p. 193.
the Fertile Crescent was divided into three parts. At the insistence of Hāifa, Palestine, because of its holy places, was made international. The rest was divided by a line extending from the Mediterranean coast, north of Hāifa in a north-easterly direction to the Persian border south of Mosul. The region north of this line was to go to France and south of the line to Great Britain. Furthermore, the northern region was divided into two parts, one under direct French control and the other its 'influence'. Similarly the southern region was divided into two parts, one under the direct British control and the other under its 'influence'.

What the Sykes-Picot Agreement did was, first, to cut up, the Arab Rectangle in such a manner as to place artificial obstacle in the way of unity. An awakening had taken place since Palmerston's days, and the national movement was now a force with the plank of Arab unity as well as independence in the forefront of its aims.

Another peculiarity of the agreement was that it provided for a topsy-turvy political structure in which the first were to come last and the last first. The inhabitants of Syria and Iraq were politically more developed and mature than the inhabitants of the inland regions. Yet the agreement provided the greater part of Syria and Iraq might be placed a regime of direct foreign administration. While the inland region were in any case to form independent Arab states.
The agreement had been negotiated and concluded without the knowledge of Sharif Husain and it contained provisions which were in direct conflict with the terms of Henry McMahon's compact with him. He only heard of the existence of the agreement some eighteen months later.¹

The Agreement was secret, but the Bolsheviks made it public property in November 1917. Jamal Pasha of Turkey sent the agreement to King Husain and proposed a separate Turkic-Arab peace. He despatched a secret emissary to Aqaba, carrying a letter from him to Amir Faisal and the other to Jafar Pasha. The letters were dated November 26, the latter addressed to Faisal was worded as an appeal from one serious minded Muslim to another.²

That it was the duty of those who cared for the glory of Islam dedicated their energies, and if need be their lives, to its service; that Faisal and his father had been misled by promises of Arab independence into rebelling against the supreme authority in Islam; that those promises had now been shown to have been utterly mandacious since the true intentions of the Allies were to partition the Arab countries and British in Iraq and international in Palestine; and that the only course left for the Arabs to take was to return to the Ottoman fold and secure their legitimate rights by coming to an understanding with the Turks.

¹ George Antonius, op. cit., p. 248.
² Ibid., p. 252.
The letter concluded with an invitation to Faisal to come in person to Damascus under promise of a safe-conduct in order to open negotiations.

The other powerful threat to Britain's new relations with the Arabs was less apparently dangerous but was to have a more lasting effect. This was the famous Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. It was a statement of British government policy, although it took the form of a letter from the British Foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, to a leading British Jew, Lord Rothschild. Its terms which are deeply ingrained in the minds of most Arabs must still be recalled for any understanding of the Arab psyche:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the facilitation of the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political states enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

An inter-departmental Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Breslin of the Foreign Office, was appointed to formulate the policy for the future of the Ottoman Empire, in Asia. The committee recommended that the French demand

for the incursion of 'Palestine' in the territory claimed
by them should be opposed. 'Palestine', said the Committee
must be recognised as a country whose destiny must be the
subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents
and neutrals are interested. Although Great Britain had
in 1912 accepted the view that Syria was politically French
Preserve.1

G. Antonius says:2

The thought began to gain ground in certain British
circles that in the event of a breakup of the Ottoman
Empire, an effort should be made to detach Southern
Syria as far north as Haifa and Acre to form a separate
entity and to fall under British influence.

These fundamental considerations were added a new one,
as occasioned by the necessities of war, revolt and disorders
within the Ottoman Empire would hasten its collapse. The
sick man of Europe who had been kept alive for so long in
Britain's interests must be allowed to idle. The foreign
secretary Sir Edward Grey, told the French Ambassador of
that we had already stipulated that;3

When Turkey disappeared from Constantinople and
the straits, there must, in the interest of Islam,
be an independent Muslim political unit somewhere
else. Its centre would naturally be the Muslim Holy
Places and it would include Arabia. But we must
settle what else should be included, we ourselves,
had not yet come to a definite opinion whether Mes-
opotamia should be included in this independent
Moslem state, whether we should put forward a claim
for ourselves in that region.

1. Eli Kedourie, Middle East and England (London 1956) p.33
3. Sir Edward Grey, Twenty five years (London, 1925)
   vol.II, p.236.
Arkes-Picot Agreement was kept secret. When Husain heard about the existence of the Agreement, he asked the British for explanations, and they, on three occasions, assured him that they would help in the establishment of an Arab state. The Arabs believed their assurances; with the Ottomans losing practically all fronts, a Turco-Arab treaty did not have any meaning. The Arabs could not do much else but to hope for the better. The Arabs have appealed to the British government for the establishment of an Arab state, to which Arabia and the Moslem holy places would belong.¹

In so far as this concern the British government, they have declared their agreement with this request, on condition that Arabia declares her sentinity to Turkey, and that Syria shall be excluded from this new state in view of our commitments to France.

In the spring of 1918, when the feeling aroused by the appearance of the Dajlour Declaration and the disclosure of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was working havoc with the Anglo-Arab alliance, a group of seven prominent Arabs living in Cairo presented a memorandum asking for a clear declaration of British policy. The British reply, which became known as the Declaration of the Seven, was given the widest publicity.

¹ Ibid., p. 243.
Referring to the Arab territories liberated by the actions of the Arab armies, the British government declared its policy in these to be that "the future government of those territories should be based upon the principles of the consent of the governed". With regard to those territories still under Turkish rule the British government merely asserted its desire that the oppressed people in these territories should obtain their freedom and independence.¹

The declaration of the seven is the most important of policy publicly made by Great Britain in connection with the Arab Revolt. In their statement, the Foreign office dealt with the whole of the region claimed by Sharif Husain as the area of legitimate Arab independence, and defended the British Government's policy with regard to the future of that area. For the purpose of that definition they regarded the area as falling into four categories determined by the military situation at that time.

The first categories comprised (i) the Arab territories which were free and independent before the war, and (ii) the territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Arabs themselves.

The third category comprised (iii) the Arab territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Allied armies.

The fourth category comprised (iv) the Arab territories that were then still under Turkish rule.²

¹ Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 207.
² George Antonius, op. cit., p. 272.
Lastly, there appeared a few days before the Armistice yet another Declaration, issued jointly by Great Britain and France in this time, in which pledges were made to the Arabs in regard to the future of the northern Arab countries. On the 7th of November 1918, an official communique was given to the press in Palestine, Syria and Iraq by the British military commissaries in these territories, and given even wider publicity than the Declaration of the Seven. It contained the text of a statement of policy, in which the aims pursued by the French and British governments in regard to those countries were broadly outlined.

The text of the statement is universally known as the Anglo-French Declaration. The issue of this Declaration was brought by the critical situation which had suddenly arisen in the Arab territories occupied by the Allies. The initial cause of it had been the incident of the Arab flag in Beirut.¹

This said that the goal of the British and French governments was the complete and final liberation of peoples oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administration which should derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous population.

The war was won, victory had carried its standard as far as it had dreamed, to the very confines of its Kingdom.

¹ Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 207.
All the Arabic speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia were at last rid of the alien yoke that had lain on them for four centuries. The area of the Turk's defeat was precisely the area of Arab aspirations and its frontiers coincided exactly with those defined by Sharif Husain as the natural limits of Arab independence.

When the war came to an end the Allies described the whole area of Arab rectangle as occupied Enemy Territory, to be administered under military law pending a peace settlement. Already the broad lines of the amended Sykes-Picot agreement were becoming clear. Iraq was maintained as a single unit under Anglo-Indian administration with a British civil commissioner as its head. Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (C.E.T. A South) covered the approximate area of the future Palestine mandate. C.E.T.A. West comprised the whole Syrian and Lebanese coastal area from Tyre to Cilicia and was under the French.

When Amir Faisal arrived in Paris in Jan. 1919, as head of the Hejaz Delegation to the Peace Conference, he encountered three main influences at work in opposition to the fulfilment of Arab hopes. One was the British imperialistic interest in Iraq and Palestine, the second the French imperialistic interest in Syria, the third in league with the first

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2. Another French administration, known as C.E.T.A. North had been set up in Cilicia, but this lay outside the Arab Rectangle.
the Zionist nationalistic interest in Palestine.

It was of little use because all the important decision has already been taken without his knowledge as the British and French Prime Ministers Lloyd George and Clemenceau, had reached an understanding on the revision of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

The unfortunateaisal attempted to retrieve what he could for Arab aspirations. Taking his stand on the doctrines of self-determination preached by President Wilson and restated in the Anglo-French Declaration, he proposed that a commission of enquiry be sent to Syria and Palestine to examine the wishes of the inhabitants. President Wilson enthusiastically accepted the proposal, and his suggestion that the commission should consist of British, French, Italian and American members was endorsed by the conference. But in reality the French were strongly hostile to the Commission, while the British were lukewarm. Eventually all the parties except the Americans withdraw. The American appointees, Henry King and Charles Crane, decided to go on their own, and their report fully explains British and French hostility toward the commission. After exhaustive consultations with the people of Syria they reported that while overwhelming majority opposed the mandatory system, there was an acknowledged

1. Ibid., p. 299
2. Dr. Henry C. King was president of Oberlin College in Ohio. Mr. Charles H. Crane, a prominent businessman and oriental traveller, was a political supporter of President Wilson, who appointed him U.S. Minister to China in 1920.
need for outside assistance, provided it came first from the United states or, as second choice, from Britain. On no account why did they want from France. Realizing that the mandatory system was inevitable, the commission recommended that the United states should have the mandate for Syria, and Britain for Iraq. Provided that the mandate was of limited duration and that the mandatory was in no sense a colonizing power. They also recommended that Faisal should become King of Syria and that Iraq should have an Arab monarch.

On the Zionist question they declared themselves to have set out with a strong disposition in favour of Zionism and to have found much to approve of in the Zionist aspiration and plans, but to have concluded that the extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified if the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine are to be protected in accordance with the terms of the Sultair Declaration. The King Crance commission's report was ignored by the Allies: The commissions' report interlinked the fact, that it was not only Anglo-French imperialist ambitious but also those of Zionism which were likely to conflict with the hopes and aspirations of the Arabs.

1. Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 211.
However, in March 1918 a Zionist commission arrived in Jerusalem headed by Chaim Weizmann. Its official mission was to act as a link between the British authorities and the Jewish population, to help with relief work to stimulate Jewish educational and cultural activities. In 1918, the reality about Palestine, which the Zionists had to face, was that the country was overwhelmingly Arab and it was Britain's duty as the mandatory power to bring it to self-government as quickly as possible. There was little likelihood that the Zionists would be able to create a Jewish majority in Palestine before this happened and in this case the Arabs would be in the position to decide just what size and kind of Jewish national home should exist in their country. As John Kimchi wrote:

Thus, when Weizmann departed for home in September 1918 his mission and that of the Zionist commission was in effect at an end. They had come to lay the foundations of a Jewish state and they left with Palestine yet to become an Arab state—and it probably would have become one but for the Hitler holocaust and the second world war.

While Faisal was away in Paris the former secret Arab nationalist society al-Fatat formed an Arab independence party which gained Faisal's support on his return. A General Syrian Congress meeting in Damascus, called for recognition of the independence of Syria and Iraq, and it was all the more vigorous as it was voiced by those who had taken an active part in the revolt. A great number of political leaders,

1. "Chaim Weizmann, lecturer in chemistry at Manchester University were active in England during the War. Dr. Weizmann who materially contributed to the British war effort by discovering a new method of producing acetone attracted the attention of British officials to Zionist aspiration as early as 1914.

2. Palestine of Israel: The untold story of why we failed
army officers and students from Palestine and Iraq, as well as from all parts of Syria. Taken together, they represented the views and feelings of the vast majority in those countries on the two dominant issues: unity and independence. Faisal alone was aware of the harsh realities of power. Dowing to the strong pressure from Britain which he could not afford to ignore, he returned to Paris in November 1919 to reach a provisional agreement with Clemenceau, pending a final settlement, providing for French occupation of the Syrian coastal areas and a French monopoly of assistance to the Arab state in the interior. Faisal's hot-blooded young followers in Damascus refused to accept any such promise and in March 1920 the General Syrian passed a resolution proclaiming the independence of Syria as a sovereign state and a constitutional monarchy with Amir Faisal as king. A meeting of Iraqi leaders passed a similar resolution concerning Iraq and chose Amir 'Abdulah as king. Britain and France reacted swiftly. Declaring that they did not recognize the Damascus resolution. They hastily convened a meeting of the supreme council of the League of Nations, the supreme council met at San Remo and took the following decisions on the 25th of April.

2. Peter Mansfied, op. cit., p. 214,
As George Antonius writes: 1

The whole of the Arab Rectangle lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier was to be placed under mandatory rule. Syria was to be broken up into three separate fractions: Palestine, the Lebanon, and a reduced 'Syria'. Iraq was to remain undivided.

The decision taken at San Remo were made public on the 5th of May and their promulgation gave birth to a new sentiment in the Arab world. The decisions of San Remo Conference were not carried out without considerable bloodshed. Apart from the fighting in Syria there was an uprising against the Jews by Muslim and Christian Arabs in Palestine. In Iraq also where Arab hopes had been thwarted by the establishment of an Anglo-Indian administration with virtually no Arabs participation. 2

To devise a unified policy for the whole region, London created a Middle East Department in December 1920. It was placed under the colonial office, at that time headed by Winston Churchill. The Colonial Secretary scheduled a general British conference on Middle Eastern affairs, which met in Cairo, March 12-24, 1921. It was presided over by Churchill himself, and attended by Sir Percy Cox and Sir Herbert Samuel, Laurence, Clayton, Cornwallis, Gertrude Bell and others.

1. op.cit., p. 305.
2. Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 216.
This conference made the following decisions: 1. The Kingship of Iraq was to be offered to the deposed King of Syria, Faisal. 'Abdullah was to be offered the amirate of Transjordan. In order to appease Iraqi nationalism the Mandate was to be replaced by a treaty of alliance, which would be concluded with Faisal upon his advent to the throne.

After the Cairo Conference, Churchill went to Jerusalem where he reached an agreement with Abdullah by which Britain would endeavor to obtain from France to liberalization of her policy in Syria in order that an Arab government under Amir 'Abdullah might be established in Damascus. Now Faisal in Jeddah and 'Abdullah in his new capital of Amman, their aged and now bitterly resentful father still presented a problem. Lawrence was dispatched to Jeddah to persuade the old man to accept the accomplishment fact that Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were all lost to the rule of his family. 2

Thus by 1921 the foundations for the new order in the Arab Middle East were laid. Despite the Wilsonian ideology of self-determination and despite American intervention in Paris, the new peace was imperialistic in character and corresponded in the main to the major war time agreements. Yet for the Arabs it was not exactly a change from old to new masters. True enough, the new settlement did not fulfill

the Arab political program as conceived in 1919. Nevertheless, it marked an important advance toward eventual emancipation with the acceptance of the principle of mandates, the big powers had to pay at least lip service to self-determination and to international responsibility. Further more active and violent opposition to the new system, manifested in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine, revealed new, deeply stirred forces of nationalism which the West in the long run, would no longer be able to disregard and with which, as in the case of Iraq, it would be obliged to compromise.¹

¹ George Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
The attitude of the Arab nationalists towards the western powers was determined during the First World War and subsequent peace settlement. Those years were not without their gains. In the light of the foregoing events, the years 1918-20 seem to have been crucial in the modern history of the Arabs. They ushered in the first phase of Arab struggle with the west for political independence. It was during this period that Arab nationalism reached its formative age, became, more militant, more anti-Western and anti-imperialist. It lived almost exclusively on deep rooted suspicion, resentment and hostility towards Anglo-French domination in Arab lands, and towards the establishment of the Jewish National home in Palestine.\(^1\)

During the period between the two world wars, Great Britain, and to lesser degree France, tried to regulate their relations with the countries under their tutelage by means of various treaties, which slowly granted longer measures of self-government, and which helped in laying the foundations of indigenous government in those countries. The former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into

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several states, only the most backward of which was recognised as immediately independent, the other being placed under British or French Control. This was all the more disappointing because it was Great Britain which had promised the the Arab independence and unity, and had appeared to be the friend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took on, in those years, an anti-British and anti-French, and even in general an anti-western complexion. Indeed, the mere fact that Great Britain and France were now in control of the Arab countries would have been enough to give it such a complexion. The hostility was mingled with disappointment, since politically these two powers had seemed for a moment to be the friends of the nationalists; but also with gratitude since culturally the movement was deeply indebted to them.

The development of Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent proceeded during the post-war period. It was stimulated by the tensions between the mandatory powers and the Arab peoples under their control, by the partition of the Fertile crescent into five separate territories and by Jewish immigration into Palestine. Although these were current clashes between the Arabs and the Jews from 1920 onward, these did not have wide repercussions until the following decades.

1. A. H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 104,
2. Ibid., p. 104.
The serious disturbances of 1936, marked the point at which the Palestine problem became in the repertory of Arab nationalism.  

The resentment of the nationalists increased all this time, and led to more unrest and agitation in 1936, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. General Bakr Sidq, supported by young nationalist army officers, carried out a successful military coup d'état in Baghdad on 29 October 1936. The military dictatorship which he established, came to an end within ten months, but the army's interference in the government continued in the years followed. The French Government entered into prolonged negotiations first with a Syrian and then with a Lebanese delegation for the purpose of 'turning a new page' of peace and friendship between France and the Arab nationalists. The result was a Franco-Syrian treaty and a Franco-Lebanese treaty. There were certain difficult and complicated conditions to be fulfilled before these treaties were to enter into force. Syria and Lebanon were first to be admitted to the League of Nations and, of course, the French Syrian and Lebanese parliaments had to rectify the treaties. Finally after a period of transition which was to last three years, Syria and Lebanon were to

1. P.M. Holt, op.cit., p. 300.
emerge as fully independent states. However, the next blow to nationalist aspirations was the loss of the district of Alexandritta which, after Franco-Turkish negotiations, became autonomous with the consent of the council of the League of Nations, and 1939 was integrated in Turkey. Moreover after waiting for two years, the French government, under various national and international tensions, and especially with the gathering menacing war clouds in Europe, was still hesitating to rectify these treaties.  

Great Britain's trouble in Palestine were not any less than France's difficulties in Syria. The enormous increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1933 and 1936 intensified Arab resistance and opposition to the Balfour Declaration and led to disorders, strikes, bloodshed, and finally open rebellion from 1936 to 1939.  

Between 1939, when the second World War broke out, and 1956 when the Suez crises occurred, Anglo French Paramountcy in Egypt and the Fertile crescent come to an end the French position in Syria and Lebanon could not be maintained after the collapse of French in 1940. At the end of the war, Britain

1. Z.N. Zeine, opcit., p. 571.
2. Ibid., p. 571.
lacked both the material strength and the will to hold on, while the United States emerged as the predominant Western Power in the region. Britain abandoned the mandate for Palestine in May 1948. The establishment of the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli war had momentous consequences for the whole region. The War, the last act of the old generation of Arab nationalist, their failure to defeat the Israelis, or even to agree a concerted strategy, discredited them and the governments in which they predominated, A revolutionary situation was created.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA:

Outside Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf were under direct or indirect British control. However, the Imam Yahya (1903–48) never accepted British rule over the Aden protectorate in Southern Arabia. Although in 1934 he signed a forty-year treaty of peace and friendship with Britain which accepted Yemen's southern frontier as the status-quo until future negotiations could reach a final settlement, it was only an uneasy truce which followed. In 1936 and 1937 Harold Ingrams, one more outstanding Anglo-Arab, persuaded the tribes and rulers of the Hedramount to sign a truce which became known as Ingram's peace; and 1938 the Aden protectorate, divided administratively into

1. P.M. Holt, op.cit., p. 301.
the western protectorate. Along the western shores of the Gulf many of the frontiers of most of the small tribal states under British protection remained undefined. This was of small consequence until this desolate region was discovered to contain a large proportion of the world's oil resources. Thus the ownership of the subsoil became a question of major importance.¹

The delimitation of Ibn Saud's northern frontier was a matter for negotiation with Great Britain who held the mandates for the territories bordering upon his post war acquisitions. Shortly after his annexation of the Jabal Shamar, the frontier between that territory and the mandated state of Iraq was fixed in an agreement concluded in 1927, by the Muhammara Agreement.² The British Government decided to open negotiations with Ibn Saud without waiting for the conclusion of his campaign against the Hejaz. On November 2, 1925, an agreement was concluded by Sir Gilbert Clayton and Ibn Saud, by the name of Hadda agreement. This was the first agreement. The second was a general British Saudi Arabian treaty signed at Jidda on May 20, 1927. The treaty reaffirmed Britain's recognition of Ibn Saud's 'complete and absolute independence', provided for non-aggression and

and friendly relations, for Ibn Saud's acknowledgment of the special British position in Bahrain and in the Gulf Sheikdoms, and for cooperation in suppressing the slave trade.¹

The treaty of Jedda made no radical change in the traditionally good British-Saudi relations but by culminating some causes of friction it placed them on a solid footing. Britain did not ask for and did not obtain any bases or political privileges in Ibn Saud's Kingdom, but her position remained pre-eminent.² Having placed his relations with Great Britain upon a new and satisfactory basis, Ibn Saud proceeded to strengthen his international position by the conclusion of treaties with those foreign Powers whose interests involved the governance of Muslim populations, that is to say with Holland, France, Russia and Italy. He also entered into treaty relations with Turkey and Persia. But still more significant from the point of view of the Arab national movement was the chain of pacts and treaties which bound the Kingdom of Saud Arabia to its neighbours in the Yemen, Iraq and Egypt.³

At the outbreak of World War II Ibn Saud adopted a policy of neutrality. As a result his policy was markedly benevolent toward the West. The King's friendly neutrality

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¹ George Lenczowski, op. cit., p.436.
² Ibid., p. 437.
³ George Antonius, op. cit., p.344.
was by no means a negligible asset to the Allies, especially to Great Britain. Had he succumbed like some Arab extremists to pro-Axis temptations, he might have preached a holy war on the west. The most significant political development affecting Arabia in war time was, however, the growth of close co-operation with the United States. It was revolutionary in its consequences for both countries, for Saudi Arabia and for the United States. Until 1940 the American Government had practically ignored Saudi Arabia. For seven years American Oil Companies had carried out vast operations in eastern Arabia without the benefit of official government protection, the war changed all that.

**EGYPT**

Before the second world war, Egypt was a constitutional monarchy. By the convention of Montreux in 1937 the capitulations had been abolished, and in the same year, Egypt had been admitted to the League of Nations. When the second world war began in September 1939, the Egyptians by then had known British rule directly or indirectly for fifty seven years. These were years of trial and tribulation for all concerned. It is true, that this period of foreign rule imposed upon the Arabs by military conquest and victory was unpopular.

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but it is untrue to say that there was no cooperation what so ever with the representatives of Great Britain and France in this region. There were those who by education, temperament and political inclination, admired the western institutions of democracy, western culture, and western ways of life. They were a minority, but some of them were influential and helpful to the mandatory powers. At the same time the struggle for political independence consolidated regional and territorial nationalism in the mandated territories. Thus while the ideal of Arab unity was maintained, a strong attachment developed in every newly born country to the preservation of its independence.\(^1\)

The manner in which Britain Unilaterally declared Egypt's independence, while reserving its right to control what it regarded as vital imperial interests in the country, was a prescription for political instability in the country. While Britain aimed to secure a treaty with Egypt which would place Anglo-Egyptian relations on a permanent footing what would be satisfactory for Britain.\(^2\)

In 1939, three years after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Great Britain had not evacuated Egypt as it had promised. When the war came in September, the British used the provisions

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of the treaty and sent more troops into the country. During the war the Egyptian did nothing to sabotage the British war effort. But neither did the government bow to the British demand to declare war against the Axis. They believed that the Axis powers were going to win (and did not acceptable to the British). It is one of the ironies of history that in 1942 the British surrounded the royal Abdin Palace in Cairo with tanks and told King Faruq either to appoint the weffest Nahhas Pasha as Prime Minister or leave the country. He surrendered, and appointed the formerly anti-British Nahhas Pasha. 1

When the danger of German victory was lifted by the defeat of General Rommel at al-Alamyn and the landing of Americans in North Africa, Nahhas Pasha had served his usefulness to the British. King Faruq, took advantage of the situation and dismissed him. He choose the Anti Waf leader of Sa'id party, Ali Mehar, 2 to form a government, on February 24, 1945 Mahar was assassinated by young Egyptian. Nuqreshi Pasha, who was second in Command of the Sa'ad party, succeeded him. Two days later he declared war on Germany and Japan. Egypt also later became a charter member of the united nations.

2. Son of that Maher Pasha whom Cromer had caused to be removed from office as under secretary for war as a bad adviser.
Ali Maher had acquired great influence over the young King Faruq. It now appeared that the Prime-Minister was actively encouraged by the King to adopt a policy of reinsurance with the Axis powers in view of the impending defeat of Britain, and he resisted British requests that the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Italy. The British suspicions were not without grounds: was demonstrated some months later, when the columns advancing into Cyrenaica in Wavell's push captured an Italian general a highly secret letter addressed by the G.O.C. British troops in Egypt to the Egyptian Minister of Defence and discussing the defence of the Saina Oasis, which had been entrusted to an Egyptian unit. The British authorities concluded that the Italians had obtained the letter before the departure of Italian legation staff and accordingly suspected Ali-Maher and his 'Inner cabinet' -- Salih Harb, the minister of Defence, and Aziz Ali al-Misri, the Chief of Staff -- of being responsible for the leakage. The Egyptian authorities subsequently held an inquiry which purported to vindicate these persons, claiming that it was not established whether the leakage had occurred on the British or the Egyptian side.²

Although Egypt did not declare war against the Axis, her army did assist in the defence of the Western Desert in

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2. Ibid., p. 197.
the anti-aircraft defence of the Canal Zone and the cities of Egypt. And in April 1944, stimulated by General Wavell's winter success in routing the Italian armies in Cyrenaica with a force only a fraction of their size, the Egyptian government accepted British representations that the consulates of such neutral, but unfriendly powers as Japan, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in such strategic centres as Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez were nests of espionage, and closed them down.

Egyptian leaders struggled to secure their full independence. Those Egyptian politicians who might have been prepared to compromise with Britain were constantly outbid by more extreme nationalists, who rejected any idea that Britain should continue to act as Egypt's guardian. 1

The Middle East political barometer continued to fluctuate with the changing strategic situation. By January 1942 the disasters of Pearl Harbour and Singapore, and the second British retreat in Cyrenaica before Rommel's forces gave new encouragement to the enemies. In Egypt the government of Husain Sirri had since 1940 co-operated loyally. But having no majority backing in parliament its life was precarious and its policy correspondingly irresolute. Faced in the autumn of 1941 with a growing tide of pro-Axis anti-

1. Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 244.
British propaganda, in which the powerful and extremist Ikhwan al-Muslimun or the Muslim Brotherhood organization played a prominent part, it acceded to British representations by arresting its leader Hasan al-Bunna.¹

In January 1942 the failure of the Egyptian authorities to break the Black market and ensure a proper distribution of bread Cairo coincided with the military disasters and promoted a wave of anti-British feeling, with students marching down main streets shouting 'we are Hommel's soldiers'. For some time the British embassy and military authorities came to the conclusion that a strong government in Egypt was necessary to secure the military position, and this could only be secured by bringing back the Wafd, which had recently been growing restive in opposition. The Wafd government loyally co-operated with Britain in the anxious days of June-July 1942. In this second great military crisis of the Middle East campaign, faced clearly with choosing for Britain or the disguised Italians, the Egyptian government and people firmly stood behind Britain.²

There were now three major political forces in Egypt. The King, Zaghloul's Wafd party and the British, with the

¹ George E. Kirk, op.cit., p. 200.
² Ibid., p. 201.
last holding ultimate authority. In the years 1922-36 same pattern repeated itself several times. The King who regarded the Wafd as his enemy, would dissolve parliament or suspended the constitution and rule for a time through ministers of his own choice. Liberal constitutionalism failed to take root in Egypt.¹

British dominance was reduced by the declaration of independence, but it was still quite enough to arouse the angry resentment of Egyptian nationalist under Sa'ad Zeghlul's fiery leadership. Anglo-Egyptian relations reached their first major crisis in Nov. 1924 with the murder in Cairo of Sir-Lee Stack.²

Zeghlul, the old nationalist warrior died in 1927 and was succeeded at the head of the Wafd by Nahhad Pasha. He was a lesser man, but the Wafd was still the only popular party with mass support. In 1931 King Faud succeeded in his aim of ousting the Wafd from power. Suspending the constitution, he called upon Sidqy Pasha an able right-wing authoritarian and millionaire businessman, who amended the electoral law to ensure the defeat of the Wafd in the elections. On several occasions between 1926 and 1936 renewed attempts had been made to agree on an Anglo-Egyptian

¹ Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 24.
² The governor-general of the Sudan, who by convention was sirdar (Commander in chief) of the Egyptian army.
treaty. But they had all broken down on the question of
the reserved points in the 1922 declaration of independence
especially the Sudan. But in 1936 the situation had changed.¹

The struggle against the Anglo Egyptian treaty of
1936 took Egypt much of the way towards full independence.
The treaty was to last twenty years; both parties were commi-
tted to a further alliance in 1956, but Egypt would than have
the right to submit to third party judgement, the question
of whether British troops were any longer necessary in Egypt.
The British occupation of Egypt was formally ended, but this
did not mean that British troops would leave the country.
As Egypt's defence capability improved they would be withdrawn
gradually to the Suez Canal Zone, and Sinai, where their
number would be limited to 10,000 land forces and 400 air
pilots. The treaty contained another provision which ultimately
meant that it did not finally settle the Anglo-Egyptian
problem. Britain reserved the right of re-occupation with
unrestricted use of Egyptian ports, airports and roads in
the event of War.²

At the same time Egypt gained control over its own
security forces for the first time since 1882. The British
high commissioner became an ambassador. The British inspec-
tor general of the Egyptian army was replaced by an Egyptian,

¹ Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p.245.
² Ibid., p. 246.
and military intelligence was Egyptianized. The number of European in the police was to be reduced by 20 percent a year, although an Englishman, Thomas Result, Scourge of narcotics', pedlers, remained head of the Cairo police until 1946. The capitulations were finally removed and Egypt obtained full rights of jurisdiction and taxation over all residents.¹

IRAQ:

The political development in Iraq after the first World War is marked by the conclusion of four different treaties of alliance with Great Britain, namely, those of October 1922, January 1926, December 1927 and June 1930.² This multiplicity was perhaps inevitable: It was the reflection of the gap between the British and Iraqi nations of what the treaty should

1. Ibid., p. 246.

2. In 1930 when General Nuri as-Sa'īd concluded the Anglo Iraqi Treaty, a regrouping of parties immediately followed. General Nuri formed the 'Ahd party whose aim was to carry into effect the treaty of 1930 and to oring the mandate to an end. The treaty was regarded by rival politicians, such as Yasin al-Hashmi and his followers, as unsatisfactory for the realization of the national aspirations of Iraq. Former members of the Shaib and Watani parties came together and organized the Ikha' al-watani (National Brotherhood) party. The leader of the Ikha was Yasin al-Hashmi and the most prominent members were Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, Hikmet Sulayman, and Mohammad Zaki, the Watani Party while officially remaining as a separate party was in close 1930, like former parties, these new parties also aimed at achieving the independence of Iraq and the only differences among them were on the means of effecting this. After the winning of Iraq's independence in 1932 the 'Ahd party dissolved. The other two parties, though they survived after 1932, lost their purpose and were dissolved in 1934 and 1935 respectively. Thus all the political parties died natural death since their, raison d'être had disappeared. See Majid Khadduri, Independent of Iran 1932-1958 (London 1960), pp., 29-30.
aim at, and of the attempts made to bridge it. In the British mind, the treaty was to be a new robe for the mandate and would have to grant Great Britain a right of control in the affairs of the new states. In the mind of the Iraqi leaders, the claim to a right of control and indeed to mandate of any kind was not one that they were prepared to admit, and in their understanding the treaty would have to be one of alliance between two independent partners entering freely into ties for the furtherance of their mutual interests.¹

The decisive treaty was that which was concluded at Baghdad on June 30, 1930 and rectified later in the year. It would sponsor the admission of Iraq as a sovereign independent state to membership of the League of Nations in 1952, and that it would come into force as soon as Iraq had been admitted to the league. The admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, writes Majid Khadduri,²

¹ the end of an epoch during which King Faysal and the Iraqi nationalists had been too much pre-occupied in bringing the mandate to an end to pay proper attention to internal reforms.

² In 1939, the Prime Minister of Iraq was 'Nuri al-Sa' id. Nevertheless, he merely broke diplomatic relations with Germany and did not declare war. Local politics in 1940 forced Nuri

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¹ Antonius, George., *op.cit.*, p. 360.
² *op.cit.*, p.34.
al Sa'id to resign the premiership in favour of the nationalist Rashid al Gailani, a man hostile to the British. This with Britain's initial reverses at the hands of Germany gave rise to neutral trends in Iraqi political circles. As Majid Khadduri writes: ¹

...Not only did General Nuri fail to influence the course of Iraq's foreign policy after Rashid 'Ali had become Premier, but, more significant, the later consciously moved to reverse Nuri's policy. -From the outbreak of the war to the fall of France (June 1940) opinion in Iraq had so radically changed that Hashid 'Ali, undoubtedly to his great satisfaction crept into the leadership of a movement which had been in the making.

The Pan-Arab ideology, xenophobia, because widely spread among the politically conscious people of Iraq and it had become the traditional policy for the Iraqi government to work for the realization of that ideology. With Syria and Palestine under foreign control Iraq had naturally become the hot bed of Arab Nationalism².

It will be recalled that Great Britain had invited Iraq to participate in the 1939 conference to find a solution to the Palestine problem. Furthermore, Hajj Amin al Husaini, who had fled to Lebanon, was given asylum in Baghdad, Iraq and had become the center of Pan-Arabism. The nationalist Prime-Minister, Rashid 'Ali al Gailani, quite naively to entice the British into discarding the 'Balfour Declaration' and declaring the independence of Arab Palestine,² in return

¹. Ibid., p.162.
². Ibid., p.162.
Iraq would formally join the Allies and declare war against the Axis, but the refusal of Great Britain to comply with such a request strengthened Gailani and his fellow nationalists in their hope, that cooperation with the Axis might help them to achieve their goal. Hajj Amin al-Husaini was already in touch with Germans. Gailani joined hands with him and established contact with von Papen. The British could not tolerate such activities, and asked the regent Abdullah, to dismiss Gailani. As a result of the interplay of Iraqi politics, Gailani lost his office to General Taha al-Hashid in January 1941. Determined to return to power Rashid, in conspiracy with a group of four colonels known as the Golden Square, executed a Coup d'état on April 3, ousting Taha and assuming the premiership. Regent 'Abdullah Nuri al-Sal'id and a majority of the cabinet members escaped to Transjordan. For the remainder of the war, Nuri-Sal'id was Prime Minister. By declaring war against the Axis, Iraq was the first West Asian country to become a member of the United Nations, Iraq played a part in the transportation of war supplies to the Soviet Union.

1. The German Ambas dor in Ankara.
2. These were Colonels Salih ed-Din, Kamal Shahib, Fehmi Said, and Mehmud Salman.
The collapse of Rashid Ali's regime enabled the regent and the exiled to return to Iraq. The country was governed by the pro-ally group, and no major difficulties were experienced into Iraq during the next four years. In 1942 Iraq became a recipient of land-lease aid from the United States and an American military mission arrived in Basra to aid in forwarding war supplies to the Soviet Union. On January 16, 1943 Iraq declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan, on the 22nd she signed the United Nations declaration, the first Arab country to become eligible to attend the future San Francisco Conference.¹

It is true that Axis propaganda had aroused the Pan-Arabs against Britain, but it was in fact the latent anti-British feeling which, under changed world conditions, was fully exploited by the opponents of Anglo-Iraqi collaboration. The revival of anti-British feeling was not an isolated phenomenon confined to Iraq. The failure of the general Arab nationalist movement to achieve the Unity and independence of the Arab countries was one cause, and there were other factors peculiar to Iraq, as Khoduri writes:²

The talent cause of any nationalist upheavals in the Arab world were inherent in the unsatisfactory settlement following the First World War. Great Britain had promised the Arabs the realization of their national aspirations, namely freedom from

¹ George, Lenczewski, op.cit., p.248.
Turkish control and the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom Comprising, in the main the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. By the peace settlement, however the Fertile crescent was neatly divided into separate entities under British and French mandate, while the Arabian Peninsula, which was left to work out its own salvation, was exposed to foreign influence on its borders. The Arab nationalists needless to say, were far from satisfied by such an arrangement, since they were not proposed to accept any settlement sort of unity and complete independence. They wanted independence as a matter of right, as embodied in Great Britain's pledges to Sharif Hussein, rather than as a matter of capacity for self government as laid down in the mandate system. Failing to achieve unity and independence the Arab nationalists naturally contended that both Britain and France had deliberately followed a policy of divide et impera by creating small and weak states in order to satisfy their imperialist designs. Britain perhaps, would have allowed a greater degree of unity among the Arab countries if she were to sell European power in the Arab world, but the instance of France in claiming Syria and Lebanon, as assigned to her in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 16 May 1916, had decidedly aggravated the tendency of dividing the Arab world into separate spheres of influence.

In the later part of the war, Iraq's energies, so far as foreign relations were concerned, were focussed on collaboration with other Arab states in the creation of the Arab League and in advocating, simultaneously, the "Greater Syria" plan, which would result in the unification of Syria, Iraq and Transjordan under a common Hashmite crown.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

From the beginning of 1923 the French rule divided the Mandated Territories into four different administrative units: The State of Great Lebanon, known later as the

1. Ibid., pp. 168-169.
Lebanese Republic; The State of Syria later called the Syrian Republic; which included Sanjaq of Alexandretta, the state of the Alaws, known from as the Government of Latakia and the government of Jabel Druze. This organization lasted until 1936 when the France-Syrian Treaty was signed in the same years which was to last for 25 years. According to the Treaty, the Syrian Government was to bound to give all the facilities required by the French forces, including the use of Syrian waters and ports by French Vessels.

However, what was important to the Syrian nationalists was the fact that the country was still under foreign domination and that the Arab leaders had no direct authority in their own countries. But the extraordinary events which took place during and after to second World War did not keep the Arabs in the same place. The Arab lands found themselves directly involved in the war after the collapse of France in 1940. In June 1940 the France authorities in the Levant threw their weight on the side of the Vichy government in France, with the result that the British and Gaullist Free French forces, operating from Palestine, attacked and defeated the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon in July 1971.

The Syrian and the Lebanese nationalists considered the fall France as an opportunity to press for their immediate

1. Z.N. Zeine, (eds) P.M. Holt, op.cit., p.530
independence. The collapse of the French franc, and the economic hardship which resulted, gave the Syria and the Lebanese people occasion to carry on strikes, organize political demonstrations and demand independence. The measures which General Wenz took to satisfy the nationalists were not effective.¹

The outbreak of war brought immediate changes in every sphere of life, in Syria and Lebanon, as in the other countries involved. At the beginning of the war the important part of which the forces in the Mandate Territories were cost was shown by the appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-chief of the French forces in the Levant. Other measures were taken to place the territories in a state of defence. The urgency of the situation was somewhat eased, however, by the decision of the Italian Government to remain neutral.²

Various political measures were also taken to ensure the safety of the country. On July 7, 1939, the president of the Republic resigned, and on July 10th new French High Commissioner, Gabriel Pueaux suspended the constitution dissolved the chamber, and appointed a non-political council of director to govern the country under his authority. Similar measures were also taken in Lebanon soon after the out

¹ Yassine Armajani, op.cit., p.340.
break of the War. There the High Commissioner suspended the Constitution and dissolved the chamber. The President of Lebanon, however, remained in office, but the normal cabinet was replaced by a single secretary of state who governed through civil servants under French supervision. ¹

At the out-break of War the French dissolved a number of nationalist organization believed to be in sympathy with the Axis, sentencing some of their members to long terms of imprisonment. The majority of politically-minded Syrian, like the brethren in Palestine decided that there was nothing to choose between oppression by a democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism; and consequently the general attitude towards the War one of apathy and scepticism towards both sides, though some flirted with the Axis Armistice Commissions and a few committed themselves more deeply.²

Towards the French, who were facing a threat to their survival, Syrian and Lebanese political leaders circles expressed, at least outwardly, their loyalty, stressing also their attachment to the camp of democracy. In reality, however, the Arab public opinion was hostile to France and the Allies in general. Resentment at what was believed to be

¹ George Lenczowski, op.cit., p.275.
a betrayal of the Arabs after World War I, appeasement of Turkey on the Alexandretta issue, the non-ratification of the Syrian and Lebanese treaties and the excitement over the Zionist question in Palestine—all contributed to a definite anti-Allied trend in the Levant. ¹

Apart from these, other currents of political feelings existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to the measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control. The safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs, one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November 1939, of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact, and in March 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western Front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June, it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.²

¹ George Lenczowek, op. cit., p. 278.
² A. H. Kurani, op. cit., p. 231.
Subsequent development increased the anxiety of the British government. In August 1940, the Italian and German Armistice Commissions arrived in Beirut, Herrvon Henting arrived in Syria, and German propaganda, usually successful with the Arabs, was stopped up considerably. The real crisis occurred in May 1941.¹

At the beginning of 1941 the unrest which had been so long latent, came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in Syrian towns, and very soon turned into political disturbances directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Uwallayti, who issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing government of Bahj al-Khatib. He declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function. He, therefore, demanded the immediate formation of a national government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, the Government of Bahj al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of the unrest which the High Commissioner negotiated with the shukri al-Uwallayti and others for the formation of a more representative Government, but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.² During these uncertain months the true centre of

¹. George Lencwaxki, op. cit., p. 276.
². A. H. Houroni, op. cit., p. 293.
Syrian political activities was Baghdad.

On June 8, 1941, British troops, under the command of Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon and invaded Syria from Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. The Free French elements accompanied them. General Henri Dentz's troops put up and unexpectedly strong resistance, but after a month of fighting he sued for peace, and on 14th July an armistice was signed. Syria and Lebanon were included in the area under the British Middle East Command. The question of Franco-Syrian Lebanese relationship remained to be solved. On the day of the invasion, the French Commander General Catroux issued a proclamation in which he stated that the Free French intended to put an end to the Mandatory regime, to proclaim Syria and Lebanon free and independent, and to negotiate a treaty which would define their mutual relations:

The proclamation said:

Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon!

At the moment when the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the British empire, her ally, are entering your territory, I declare that I assume the powers, responsibilities and duties of the representative of France in the levant. I do this in the name of Free France, which is the traditional and real France, and in the name of her chief General de Goulle. In this capacity I came to put an end to the mandatory regime and to proclaim you free and independent.

you will therefore, be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples, and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate states or to unite into a single state. In either event, your independent and sovereign states will guaranteed by a treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined. This treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representatives and myself. Pending its conclusion our mutual position will be one of close unity in pursuit of a common ideal and common aims.

Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, you will see from this declaration that if the Free French and British forces cross your frontier, it is not to take away your liberty, it is to ensure it. It is to drive out of Syria the forces of Hitler. It is to prevent the Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against the British and against ourselves.

We who are fighting for the liberty of peoples cannot allow the enemy to subjugate your county step by step, to gain control of your persons and your belongings, and turn you into slaves. We cannot allow the populations which France has promised to defend to fall into the hands of the most wanton and pitiless master that history has known. We cannot allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant to be handed over to the enemy.

Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, if, in answer to our appeal, you rally to us, you should know that the British Government in agreement with Free France has promised to grant you all the advantages enjoyed by the free countries which are associated with them. Thus this blockade will be lifted and you will enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous advantages from the point of view of your imports and exports. You will be able to buy and sell freely with all the free countries.

Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon! A great hour in your history has struck. France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world.
Catroux’s declaration was endorsed in a separate statement issued in Cairo on the same day by Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson (Lord Killarn) in the name of Great Britain. On June 24 General deGaulle appointed General Catroux “Deligate General and Plenipotentiary of Free France in the Levant” — a little replacing the former title of High Commissioner — and General deGaulle laid down the main lines of the policy which he was to adopt in regard to Syrian and Lebanese independence.

General Catroux, as representative of General de Gaulle, head of Free France, appointed new governors for Lebanon and Syria. This did not satisfy the nationalists, who clamoured for national independence. In the meantime, the British, who had to supply the economic needs of Syria, Lebanon through their Middle East supply center in Cairo, revised the currency and brought the two regions under the sterling block. It was an open secret that the British were encouraging the nationalist leaders in their demand for independence.

The attitude of the British government towards the future political regime in Syria and Lebanon was made clear from the beginning of the Free French administration.

First, it desired to see these States given their independence, but secondly, subject to the fulfilment of that condition, it acknowledged the priority of France's position over that of any other European power in Syria and Lebanon. Attempts were made to reconcile these attitudes. On August 15, 1941, Oliver Lyttelton, British minister of state for the Middle East, and General de Gaulle exchanged letters in which they re-affirmed that "Great Britain has no interest in Syria or Lebanon, except to win the war" and that once independence of the Levant states has been achieved, "France should have the predominant position in Syria and Lebanon over any other European power". On September 9, 1941, since declarations were made by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons.

There followed a period of negotiations and discussions, during which the government of Khalid al-Azm in Syria and that of Alfred Naccoche in Lebanon remained in office. General Catroux, in the letter in which he asked the Syrian Prime Minister to remain in office, stated that the Mandatory regime could not be terminated until the occupation of the

1. A.H. Hsibi, op. cit., p. 245.
country was complete. After that a regime of independence would be inaugurated, to be guaranteed by a treaty negotiated on a footing of equality.

A few days later, on September 28, 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria. The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26, 1941. To implement these documents, General Catroux asked Shaykh Taj al-Din to assume the presidency of Syria and requested Alfred Naccache, president of Lebanon, to remain in that post.¹

After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to restore constitutional government. In March 1943, provincial government were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections, that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Thabit.² In May 1943, the Syrians conducted an election and chose nationalist leader Shukki al-Luwaytly as President of the new republic. The Lebanese followed the same procedure in August and chose their nationalist leader Bashara al-Khuri as president.³

¹ George Lenczozski, op. cit., p.278.
² A.H. Haurani, op. cit., p.256.
³ Yahya Armajani, op. cit., p.341.
On November 8, 1943, the Lebanese parliament adopted a resolution to drop from the constitution all those articles that referred to France as a Mandatory power. The French arrested the president of Republic and the majority of his cabinet under arrest, suspended the constitution and appointed Émile Eddé as head of the state and of the government. The Lebanese replied with a general strike and anti-French riots. On January 24, 1944 a similar crisis occurred in Syria, though in less violent form. Great Britain and the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the two republics and they, in turn, by declaring the war against the Axis in 1945, became Charter members of the United Nations. Nevertheless, General de Gouille insisted upon 'French prerogatives' and the French army did not fully evacuate Syria until April 1944, and remained in Lebanon until December of the same year. Thus both republics achieved complete political emancipation. It was also during 1946 on 22 March, that independence was granted to Trans-Jordan.

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The opening of the Peace Conference brought to Paris a strong Zionist delegation, both from Great Britain and from the United States. On April 25, 1920, the Allied Supreme Council allocated the mandate over Palestine to Great Britain and on July 22, 1922 Great Britain was formally confirmed as mandatory power by the Council of the League of Nations. The mandate expressly provided for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Fundamentally, the Palestinian Arabs never accepted the British mandate at all. For this reason they consistently rejected Britain's tentative steps towards creating representative institutions as prelude to self government at some time in the future. Moreover they did this at a time when the Zionists were also opposed to such moves because the Jews were still only a small minority of the population and would have been consistently outvoted.  

1. The Zionist view of 'Jewish National Home' has been described by a Zionist Harry Sacher in the following words: "I say that we are concerned with is the establishment of the Jewish National Home what we are concerned with is that we shall have, as I said before, immigration to which there shall be no artificial restrictions, that we shall be enable as a Jewish people to pull all our energies into making what is to be made of this country so as to enable Jews to come here and create this civilization. I expect and demand under the mandate of the Government that it shall do its part in facilitating that work. It may be, and I say frankly we hope that one day as a result of this natural process there will be a Jewish majority in this country. See by Mehmood Husain, the Palestine Liberation Organization, (Delhi, 1075), p.3.

In 1921 anti-Jewish disturbances broke out, when appeals, protests, arguments, demonstration, and strikes failed to move the British government to fulfill its pledges to the Arabs and follow a policy of justice and equality, the Palestine Arabs, resorted from time to time, to violence. The first expression of Arab feeling occurred on Easter Sunday in April 1920, the second in May 1921, the third in August 1929; and between 1936 and 1939, an all-out rebellion broke out which was preceded by an unprecedented six months strikes. The symbol of this totally uncompromising Arab attitude was Hajj Amin al-Husaini.¹

Four principal Commission of inquiry were appointed directly as a result of the riots. The Zionist made no secret of their intentions, for as early as 1921, Dr. Eder ¹ boldly the court of enquiry;²

¹ A young member of one of the leading Jerusalem Arab families, who had studies at al-Azher University in Cairo and had acted as recruiting officer for Faisal's army under British occupation. He headed the Anti-Jewish demonstration in April 1920 and was sentenced by a military court to fifteen years in prison. He absconded but was pardoned by Sir Herbert Samuel, who decided as a measure of conciliation of Arab opinion, that he should be offered the post of Mufti of Jerusalem, when the post fell vacant on the death of his step brother. In 1922 he was elected head of the Supreme Muslim Council which had been formed by the British mandatory government. From then onwards, he was the effective leader of the Palestinian Arabs. If for a period he was prepared to hold his hand, in effect he never altered his determinations to wage all out war against both the British and the Zionists to make Palestine and independent Arab states. See Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 248.

² A member of the Zionist Commission.
"there can be only one 'National Home in Palestine, and
that a Jewish one, and no equality in the Partnership
between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish preponderance as
soon as the numbers of the race are sufficiently in-
creased." 1

The commissions of inquiry which were appointed to
establish the causes for the riot were each followed by
the issue of a 'Statement of Policy' each attempting to
interpret the meaning of 'a National Home'. On 3 June 1927,
the British Government issued what became, known as 'The
Churchill Memorandum' 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as
England in English?'

The statement went to point out that "His Majesty's
Government regarded any such expectation as imprac-
ticable and have not such aim in view. Nor have they
at any time contemplated... the disappearance or the
subordination of the Arabic population, language or
culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to
the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration
referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a
whole should be converted into a Jewish National
Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Pales-
tine.

Between 1931 and 1935 there was a great surge of Jewish
immigration into Palestine. Initially this was encouraged
by Zionist fund and the optimistic economic prospects in

1. Sami Haddad, 'Bitter Harvest: Palestine between
2. Ibid., p.61.
Palestine at a time when the rest of the world was suffering from a slump. In 1933 Hitler's advent to power in Germany was an additional stimulus as it spread fear throughout the Jewish Communities of Europe.

In April 1936 the various Arab political groups in Palestine united to form an Arab High Committee under Hajj Amin al-Husaini. In creation against continuing fear of the growth of Jewish numbers in Palestine and more immediate alarm at the discovery that the Zionists were smuggling in arms for self defence, the Higher Committee called for a general strike, which developed into general Arab rebellion supported by Syrian and Iraqi volunteers. ¹

In 1937 a new British Commission of inquiry under Lord Peel declared the mandate as unworkable, and for the first time recommended the creation of an Arab-Jewish state in Palestine with a third small state under British administration for Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth and the surrounding areas. This idea was rejected by both Arabs and Jews and in the following year was declared unworkable by the woodhead technical Committee. In 1938 the Arab rebellion was renewed with increasing, violence. It was primarily directed against

¹ Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 250.
the British but Jewish settlements were also attacked.¹

Britain's next move was to call a Round Table Conference in London in the spring of 1939, which was attended by Zionist and Arab representatives from Palestine and by delegates from the existing Arab states. The composition of the Conference introduced an element of novelty into Palestinian politics. Hitherto the British had tried to settle the controversy by consultation with Arab leaders from Palestine. This Conference acknowledged the Arab world's interest in Palestine by inviting the independent states of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen to attend but it broke down to failure. It was at this point that the British government decided to take drastic action to try to settle the problem in the face of an inevitable coming War.

The Conference met in London in February and March 1939. The Arabs and the Jews held separate meetings because of the refusal of the Palestinians to set with the Jewish delegation. The Conference produced no agreement; each party adhered stubbornly to its own formula. The Arabs reiterated their demand for independence and insisted on the stoppage of Jewish immigration. The Jews made an eloquent plea for implementation of the Balfour Declaration in 'this blackest

¹. Ibid., p. 251.
hour of Jewish history and stressed the need of continued uninterrupted immigration. British compromise proposals were rejected by both parties. The conference disbanded without producing any agreement.

On 17 May 1939 the British Government issued a 'Statement of Policy' which became known as 'The MacDonald white Paper'. After referring to the terms of the Mandate, the 'Statement' point out, the Royal commission and previous commissions of enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression of 'a national home for the Jewish people' and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy fundamental cause and hostility between Arabs and Jews. The Government was convinced that, in the interests of peace and well being of the whole people of Palestine, a clear definition of policy and objectives was essential. Consequently, the British Government declared that neither their undertakings to the Jews nor the national interest of Britain warranted that they should continue to develop the national home beyond the point already reached.

The Government therefore declared:

1. That the Jewish National Home as envisaged in the Balfour Declaration and in previous statements of British policy had been established;

2. That to develop it further against Arab wishes would be a violation to Britain's undertakings to the Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried out by the use of unjustifiable force.

3. That, therefore, after a admission of a final quote of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants over a period of five years, Jewish immigration should stop.

4. That during this period of five years, a restriction should be placed on the acquisition of further land in Palestine by the Jews and

5. That at the end of the period of five years, self-governing institution should be set up in the country.

The white paper of 1939 envisaged the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine state. Those 10 years were to be considered as a transitional period during which the British Government would continue to administer the country giving to Arabs and Jews an increasing share in the government. A representative body to be set up at the end of five years to review the working of arrangements would make recommendations for the drafting of a constitution of the Independent Palestine State. During these five years Jewish immigration would be limited to 75,000 new entrants, and further immigration would depend on the consent of the Arabs. The Jews throughout the world denounced the white paper. Demonstrations and protest meetings were held in Palestine. The white paper turned the Zionist movement emphatically against Britain for the first

time, but the outbreak of war in September placed the Zionists in the Paradoxical position of having to support Britain against the common enemy of Nazi Germany. The fate of Palestine clearly depended on the outcome of the war.¹

During World War II the Jews of Palestine were whole heartedly with the British in the prosecution of war and against them in the implementation of the 1939 White Paper. All that can be said about the Arabs of the Jews of Palestine is that they did not do anything to antagonise the British or to sabotage the war effort.²

Perhaps the most important single event affecting Palestine occurred in the United States. The occasion was an extraordinary Zionist organisation meeting in New York held on May 11, 1942. In this Conference the Zionist programme was reformulated to meet the changing situation and has since been called the 'Biltmore programme'. The Conference urged the fulfilment of the 'original purpose' of the Balfour Declaration which was interpreted to be the creation of an independent Jewish state. It rejected the 1939 'White Paper', supported the creation of the Jewish army under its own flag, favoured unlimited immigration of

¹ Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p.253.
² Yahya Armajani, op. cit., p.341.
Jewish to Palestine and urged that the Jewish agency be given power and facilitates to develop the state lands in Palestine for the use of Jewish refugees. In Palestine the opposition was voiced by members of 'Abd Party, mostly intellectuals led by Juddai Magnus, who opposed the idea of a pure Jewish state. Instead, they were far reconciliation with the Arabs and supported the creation of a binational state.¹

On the basis of the 'Biltmore Program', the Jewish agency presented the British government on 22 May 1945 a fortnight after VE Day — with the following demands:²

1. That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine undivided and undiminished as a Jewish state.
2. That the Jewish agency be invested with the control of Jewish immigration into Palestine;
3. That an international loan be raised to finance the immigration of the 'first million' Jews to Palestine;
4. That reparations in kind from Germany be granted to the Jewish People for the rebuilding of Palestine, and as a first instalment that all German property in Palestine be used for the resettlement of Jews from Europe.
5. That free international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews who wish to settle in Palestine.

In July 1947, the Palestine Government, in a supplementary memorandum to the U.N. Special Committee said:³

1. Ibid., p.342.
2. Sami Hadawi, op.cit., p.66.
3. Ibid., p.74.
"When the war against Germany and Japan was seen to be approaching a successful conclusion, the Jews brought into action their weapons of lawlessness and terrorism in support of their own political aims and ambitions". The Memorandum pointed out, "The right of any community to use force as a means of gaining its political ends is not admitted in the British commonwealth. Since the beginning of 1945, the Jews have implicitly claimed this right and have supported, by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage, their contention that, whatever other interests might be concerned, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of Jewish state and free Jewish immigration into Palestine".

The United Nations passed the Partition Resolution on 29 November, 1947. The Partition Resolution of 29 Nov. 1947 had recommended the creation of a Jewish state on 56% of the territory of Palestine, and Arab state 43% and an international Zone of Jerusalem and Environs on the remaining 1%. The resolution declared the Arabs living in the area set aside for the Jewish state were to continue to reside there and to enjoy their fundamental rights and basic human liberties under the guarantees of the United Nations. The resolution further stipulated that the Jewish and Arabs States were to come into being two months after British withdrawal on 15 May 1948. Therefore, what actually emerged as the Jewish state on 14 May 1948 was anything but the 'State' planned for under the Partition Plan. The new 'State of Israel' was the product of brute force, it was created in complete violation of the principles
of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Partition of Palestine not only led to the Arab Israeli war in 1948.

With the establishment of the State of Israel, Zionism achieved its major objectives: the creation in Palestine of a state that was exclusively Jewish. Having been given the territorial base by the British, the Zionists used every available means to terrorise the indigenous Arab population out of Palestine. This was essential for no other method would have induced the Palestinian Arabs to leave.

On 14 May 1948, the Zionists proclaimed the state of Israel and formed a provincial government. The armies of the Arab countries (all of which were under European control), which faced the Israeli forces, did not exceed 20,000. As for the Palestinian Arabs, they had been systematically disarmed by the Mandatory government during the Mandate. Consequently, they could not defend themselves. By the conclusion of the war, eighty percent of the area of Palestine was occupied by the Israelis and two thirds of the Palestinians were uprooted and dispossessed.

Hence, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is, in its essence the struggle of an indigenous population against the occupation of its territory by invading foreigners.
who came to the area with no other intention other than to colonise the land and displace its inhabitants. The question is simply one of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination.

As a result, a dilemma has existed for the Palestinians. On one hand, they aspire to regain their country and reassert their identity. On the other, their country has been occupied by a colonizing community whose zionist nature and structure has deviated their fervent hopes.¹

Maxim Hodinson writes: The 1949 armistice agreements had made provision for demilitarised zones, which presented serious problems and were variously interpreted. These zones caused a number of incidents, despite the presence of Joint armistice commission over presided by officials of the U.N. truce supervisory body. Generally speaking, Israel’s attitude in the innumerable cases of friction resulting from these fragile frontiers was for the most part roundly condemned by the various military commanders of the U.N. truce supervisory force. With monotonous regularity, the Israelis denounced them as anti-semites. The repeated accusation led to the recall of some of the commanders, and induced others to take up a conciliatory attitude towards Israel. It seems unlikely that the U.N. should have placed a series of anti-semites at the head of its mission. In reality, Israel’s intransigent and aggressive attitude emerges clearly from all these incidents, and it is an attitude which is really explicable.²

The league of Arab States or the Arab League, as it is popularly called, came into existence with the signing of a pact at Cairo on March 22, 1945. It has very deep roots. Its genesis is traced back to the early period of the development of Arab nationalism and the onslaught of British imperialism which came in direct contact with the Arabs during the First World War.

It was after the Second World War had passed the midway mark that formal efforts to establish Arab Unity, which were due to culminate in the founding of the League of Arab States, began to mark themselves felt.

The popular desire for Unity had been present and forceful for two decades. The timing of the mid-war efforts of Arab officialdom, however, was the result of many new circumstances. Seven Arab countries had attained an adequate measure of self determination by the early 1940's. It is true that, except for Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the emancipation of the other five other countries had remained incomplete. Nevertheless, they had achieved a degree of independence sufficient to
enable them to conduct their relations with one another, if not with the rest of the world, without much direct interference from Britain or France.

Since the struggle for unity had been suspended, in the early phases of Post World War I period, pending the attainment of independence; and since the Arab nationalist movement had consistently maintained that the objective of unity be pursued immediately after the objective of self-determination had been achieved, there was a natural compulsion in the early 1940's to the pursuit of Unity.¹

The Arab League not only confirmed and respected the independence and sovereignty of its member States, but it also laid down the foundations of their political, economic and cultural ties, without interfering in one another's system of Government. The precursor of the Arab League was Anthony Eden's statement in the House of Commons on 29 May 1941, in which he said.²

The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than the now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to be both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too should

² P.M. Helt & Others (ed.), op. cit., pp. 582-583.
It is true that the traditional British policy to maintain the independence of the Ottoman Empire had a triple purpose. One was to use it as a buffer state against the Southward expansion of Russia, second was to use it for the safeguarding of the route of India, and third was to maintain the balance of power in Europe. By the middle of the twentieth century, the protection of the vast oil reserves of the Middle East, perhaps outweighed all these considerations. During World War I, Great Britain decided to continue its previous policy by replacing the defunct Ottoman Empire by a United or federated Arab state in the Fertile Crescent. An agreement embodied in the so called Hussein McMahon correspondence was a direct result of such a policy. The Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration, however, prevented the implementation of this policy. Instead of a United or federated Arab States came into being, excluding Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Shirkhs. ¹

A number of treaties had been concluded among the Arab states, and had been hailed by Arab nationalists as a token of Arab brotherhood and as portents of future Unity, as Najla Izzedoin States:

¹. Yahya Armajani, op. cit., p. 343.
On the official level, the trend expressed itself in the form of treaties of friendship and good neighborliness concluded between several Arab states. A series of agreements settling boundary disputes was reached between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iraq, Transjordan, and Yemen on the other. A Treaty of Arab brotherhood and Alliance was signed in April 1936 between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It expressed the need for cooperation and mutual understanding, arranged for the peaceful settlement for all differences, and provided for the exchange of cultural and military missions. Adherence to this Treaty, which Yemen joined in the following year, was open to any independent Arab state. In May 1936, Ibn Saud and Egypt became parties to a treaty which settled their differences. Another document of interest and significance is the Treaty of Taif, signed in May 1934, which ended the hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.1

The advent of the second world war, increased inter-Arab Cooperation. Under the pressure of war, economic regionalism made a hopeful beginning in the Arab World. War time regional economic cooperation was conducive to the progress of thinking, within the ranks of Arab officials, in terms of Coordination and Union. To quote Najla Izeddin again:

The necessities of war compelled the powers to view the Middle East as a unit. A regional organization, the Middle East supply center, was established for the purpose of assuring the essentials of livelihood for the civilian population of the area within the framework of the requirements and exigencies of conducting a global war. Since it was imperative to save, as much as possible, shipping space, port capacity, and internal transportation for war supplies material, the shipment of civilian goods had to be drastically reduced. But as all the countries of the Middle East depended heavily upon foreign imports, this drastic reduction of imported supplies threatened the area with the serious shortage. It was

1. The Arab World, Past, Present and Future (Chicago, 1953)
necessary, therefore, on the one hand to develop as fully as possible the local resources and to arrange for their exchange between the various states, on the other hand to survey the essential needs which could not be locally supplied to provide the required transport, and to assure equitable distribution.

Thus the Middle East supply Centre, created by Great Britain in 1941 and coming under joint Anglo-American control in the following year, had to consider the Middle East as a single whole in ascertaining its needs and developing its potentialities. The Centre arranged for regional conferences on economic problems in which the various governments participated.

Apart from the experiences and knowledge pooled and exchanged at these meetings, the conference showed the need and the possibility of organizing the Middle Eastern countries on a regional basis. From economic to political regionalism was a short step.

During the World War II because of the defeat of France British troops controlled all of the Fertile Crescent as they had done in 1917. As early as 1935, the British Government called a Conference on Palestine and for the first time involved representatives of Arab states. On May 29, 1941 Anthony Eden, British foreign Secretary, announced the need for Arab unity and spoke of their desire for a greater degree of the unity then they now enjoy.

The idea of Pan-Arabian was in the ascendency among the Arabic speaking peoples of the Fertile Crescent, so that the remarks of Eden fell on receptive ears. In direct response

1. Ibid., pp. 320-321.
to this invitation, Nuri al-Said of Iraq in 1942 proposed a Union of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and possibly Lebanon, with the possibility of others joining later on. This sounded very much like the 'Greater Syria' movement under the Hashmite family and was not acceptable Nahhas Pasha of Egypt, who had not previously shown enthusiasm for Pan-Arabism. He invited an Arab Government for the consultations of an Arab Unity. The consultations which lasted more than a year in which Syria and Iraq were for a federative scheme, Transjordan Champion to Union with Palestine, Syria and possibly Lebanon with a greater Arab Union, and Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen favored a Confederation of States. On October 7, 1944 the eight states signed a protocol of Alexandria in which they agreed to form an Arab league. As stated above the final fact of the league of the Arab states was signed in Cairo on March 22, 1945. It considered Palestine 'legally' an independent Arab State.

By the end of the War, Arab nationalism had for the first time a legally though constituted body to represent it against the Zionism nationalism in Palestine.

"If the First World War," writes P.K. Hittle, "served the Arab Components of the Ottoman Empire and set them on the way to full or semination hood. The Second World War, combined with the threat political Zionism ..., Contributed to bringing those parts closer together, Common interest and the
In the course of the ensuing two years, Arab officialdom in the seven then-independent Arab states were active in building the new Pan-Arab structure. This activity which culminated on March 22, 1945, in the promulgation of the Pact of the League of Arab states, passed through five stages:

The stage consisted of a series of separate bilateral talks between the Premier of Egypt, on the one hand, and the Premier of each of the six other Arab States, on the other hand. This stage lasted from July 1943 until February, 1944. All participating Governments were represented by their Prime Ministers, save for Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

At the second stage, the Preparatory Committee of the Pan Arab Conference held its first session, which lasted from September 17 to October 7, 1944. The Committee was composed of the Prime Ministers of the seven Arab states, and a representative of the Arabs of Palestine. At the end of its session, the committee proclaimed a Protocol containing the resolutions of the group and calling for the establishment of a League of Arab states. This Protocol of October 7, 1944, commonly known as the Protocol of Alexandria, defined the general purposes of the proposed League, and the principles of inter-governmental Arab Cooperation. The drafting of the constitution of the League was entrusted to a sub-committee.

The session of the sub-committee comprised the third stage in the Arab discussions. Composed of the Foreign Ministers of the seven signatories, and a representative of Arabs of Palestine, the sub-committee convened from February 14 to March 3, 1945, and prepared a Draft Pact for the League.


2. The undersigned chiefs and members of Arab delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, strengthened and consolidated the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations. Have met at Alexandria from (Sept, 23, 1944 to October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary committee of General Arab Conference.
The preparatory Committee then convened its second session in Cairo, from March 17 to 19, 1945. At this penultimate stage, the Draft Pact was revised and approved.

Finally on March 12, 1945, the Preparatory committee transformed itself into a Pan-Arab Conference, and approved and signed the Pact of the League of Arab States.

At the Alexandria Conference, as during the preparatory talks which preceded it, three forms of Arab unity were proposed. The closest form of union under a central government was not considered possible or desirable. Another proposal was a federal union with binding authority upon the component states. But this form also was considered impracticable under present conditions. It was finally decided to establish, as a first step, a loose form of union whose authority would be vincing only upon those states which accepted its discussions and resolutions.

The preliminary Conference drew up a document known as the Alexandria Protocol which provided for the establishment of a League of independent Arab States for the purpose of strengthening the existing bonds and relations between them, consolidating their efforts, and promoting closer cooperation on the political, economic and cultural levels, thus securing their well-being and protecting their independence.

1. Faye A. Sayegh, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
The major responsibility for the league's failure rests with the member states over whom the league has no binding authority. These states, persisting in a course which gave precedence to local problems and considerations over more vital matters of general Arab concern, have lacked the vision and the willingness to develop an Arab policy directed towards the realization of the broad and ultimate interests of the entire Arab nation.

Unlike the Charter of the United Nations, the Pact of the Arab League does not clearly define its principles in a separate article. The pact establishes the principle of non-aggression, forbidding member states to resort to force for the settlement of their disputes. Thus the Pact may be said to have laid down the following principles:

1. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. Respect for the established form of government.
3. Non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes. The members are prohibited from resorting force, but collective security is not automatic and the Arab League's jurisdiction with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes is not obligatory.
4. Independence in foreign policy and right to conclude agreements.
5. Equality and unanimity. Each member to have one vote and unanimity required in respect of discussion to repulse aggression. Thus, the Arab League may be said to have the 'Veto system'.

The objects of the League may be summarized as follows:

1. To strengthen the relations between the member states.
2. To coordinate their policies with a view to achieve close collaboration and the safeguard their independence and sovereignty.
3. To supervise, in a general way, the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.
4. To establish close cooperation between member states with due regard to the organization and circumstances in each state in the economic, financial, social, cultural and other similar affairs.¹

The functions and organization of the League were defined in accordance with its ultimate purposes.

According to Article II of the Pact, the League had three-fold purpose: "To strengthen the relations between the member states of the League; to coordinate the policies of these states, with a view to the realization of cooperation among them and the safeguarding of their independence and sovereignty; and to consider, in a general way, the affairs and interests of Arab lands",²

Under the auspices of the League, a measure of cooperation was realized between the Arab States in the social, economic, cultural, health, and other fields. Twelve treaties, agreements and conventions, furthering the objective of "coordination of policies and measures among member-states", have been concluded.

But treaties do not tell the whole story; nor can the amount of collaboration among the Arab States be adequately measured by treaties alone. An inter-governmental Arab community has been slowly emerging, in which the vital functions of government exercised in each state

² Fayez A. Sayegh, op. cit., p. 134.
have been progressively enmeshed in an expanding net work of intra-Arab relations. Inter-state institutions and bodies, diverse surveys and studies, and seminars and conferences of experts in any fields have been respectively created, inspired or convened under the auspices of the League.1

The League council held its first extraordinary session at Cairo on June 4, 1945 which lasted a week. In its first resolution adopted on June 5, the council declared the League to be an interested party.2

Any international conference called to solve the dispute between Syria and Lebanon on the one hand and France on the other, should include the League of Arab states in addition to the representatives of Syria and Lebanon. It should also be understood that every negotiation on the question should be based on the recognition of complete independence and sovereignty of both these countries.

Speaking on March 22, 1958, on the occasion of the League's thirteenth Anniversary, Abdul Khalik Hassouna, the secretary General of the League said:3

The fact is that the League has paved the way for the political, military, economic and social unity of the Arabs. The Pact of the League, the convention of Arab collective security, the Arab Cultural Treaty, the many economic and financial agreements which culminated in the conclusion of the economic convention between Arab states and in the project of the Arab Development Bank, and the continuous series of conferences and seminars which were held during the last thirteen years, all these are the support in which the foundation of our unity has been built.

1. Ibid., pp. 135, 136
2. Resolution No. 1 dated June 5, 1945.
3. Fayed A. Sayegh, op. cit., p. 137
Writing in 1953 from a different perspective, however, Nejla Izzeddin writes:

"The league, as it has developed, has dissipated much of the hope that was placed on it. Instead of working towards a greater consolidation of Arab ties, the league has immobilized the relations between the Arab state at the stage where it found them. It has proved, during these eight years of its existence, to be not the first step leading to a more binding union but an instrument to consecrate the status quo."

During the first phase the League's greatest political success may be said to have taken place in the case of Syria and Lebanon at a time when Britain was herself interested in getting the French out of the Levant and France had also found herself in a tight corner on account of her own time recognition of its independence.

Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations ended in a deadlock in 1946 and thereafter, be it Yemen, Palestine or Egypt, the Arab league could no realize what it resolved because it was up against Britain, surveying the period between 1945 and 1950 George Kirk dismisses the League in the following words:

"Since the breakdown of negotiations with Britain, however, Egypt had been using the Arab League (which she influenced through its Egyptian Secretary General Abdur-Rehman Azzam, and through the fact that Egypt

1. Arab world, op. cit., p. 324.
provided 42 per cent of the funds of its secretariat) as an instrument of her anti-British Policy.\footnote{George Kirk, "Survey of International Affairs" in The Middle east, 1945-50, p. 144.}

We enter the second phase by 1950, which marked a decisive change in the character of the Arab League on the conclusion of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation. During this period of Anglo-Egyptian conciliation no anti-British issue flared up before the League.

The greatest contribution made by the league to the cause of Arab unity, however, was the bringing-together of all sectors of the Arab world into one Pan Arab fold. Even though the League was far from being a vessel for political unity, then it has nevertheless rendered the service of preventing the establishment of such conditions of political diversification as may have militated against the prospects of Arab unity in the future.\footnote{Fayez A. Sayegh, op. cit., p. 139.}

The failure of the Arab League does not signify the failure of the Arab nationalism. The League, as it has been already stated, is a league of Arab states, this is its official name, as its development has reflected the policies of the individual states. Thus the league is not identical with Arab unity. It is a phase of the movement and a step
along the path. The general impatience expressed at the slowness and ineptitude of the League indicates the popular urge towards unity.¹

The Arab League itself is an international body with its own independent statutory powers and general objectives.

The League of Arab States is a voluntary association of sovereign Arab states designed to strengthen the close ties linking them and to coordinate their policies and activities and direct them towards the common good of all the Arab countries. It was founded in March 1945.

While it is prerequisite that members must be Arab states that are fully independent, the activities of the league also often include Arab countries which are not independent. Palestine is considered an independent state, and therefore, a full member of the League. The status of Palestine as a full member of the League was confirmed at a meeting of the Arab League council in September 1976.

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In the nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire was rapidly declining, the Western world was going through a great transition and growing in military, political and economic power as a result of revolutionary developments in industrial capitalism and in the progress of technology. There was also a process of secularization which had gained momentum in the social and government institutions of the Western countries. This had contributed greatly to the growth of militant type of nationalism.

When the Arabs came in actual contact with the West in their own lands, during and after the World War I, it was a militarily and politically powerful West. The Arabs in Egypt and Palestine had seen Napoleon I from 1798-1801. But the situation of twentieth century was quite different. The Arabs experienced a national awakening towards the end of nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Their nationalism had been submerged by nearly four hundred years of Ottoman domination. Throughout the four centuries of Ottoman rule the Arabs did not forget their language (Arabic). Nationalism had undergone several changes in meaning during the course
The Arab ideologues trace the beginning of Arab nationalism from the advent of Islam itself or even earlier. In the modern period Arab nationalism was born as an intellectual movement in literary circles and secret societies and especially through the feisty powers of Arab poets. The most important thing about Islam was that it was revealed by an Arabian Prophet, in the Arabic language in Arabia. Islam was the Prime creator of the national life and political unity of the Muslim Arabs. When Islam became the religion of such non-Arabs as the Persians and the Indians, the Arab felt still more conscious of their Arabism "Urubah" and continued to consider themselves superior to the non-Arab Muslims known as clients. As Jurji Zaydan (d. 1914) writes:

The Arabs believed themselves at this time to be superior to all other nations, whether clients or member of tolerated creeds. In his own opinion, the Arab was born to rule, and everyone else to serve; whence, the commencement of Islam, the Arab occupied themselves only with governing and politics; and other occupations, especially arts and crafts, were relinquished by them to non-Arabs. An Arab and a client had a dispute in the presence of 'Abdullah ibn Amir, governor of Iraq, when the client said to the Arab: God give us few like thee! The Arab
As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, an 'Oriental Student' observed that:

"Damascus consider themselves, on the double ground of being Moslems and Arabs, as the noblest race in the world, and that the government of the sultan is the first in rank, not because he is Malek-er Rodm, or sovereign of the Greek Empire, but the Caliph, or successor of Mohammed. The Modern Syrians, p. 202.

Arab national consciousness survived throughout the centuries. They never forget their nationalism under the Turks. After 1906, separatism was almost forced upon some Muslim leaders by the shortsightedness and chauvinistic Pan-Turanian policy adopted by the young Turks. The despotic policy of Jamal Pasha, when he ordered the hanging of prominent Arabs in Beirut and Damascus, in 1915 and 1916, widened, still further, the breach between the Arabs and the Turks. It greatly intensified the Arab leaders desire to detach completely from the Ottoman Empire. Finally the promises of the Allies, during the First World War, that they would liberate the Arabs from the Turks and give them their independence led to the Arab Revolt, which took place..."
in Mecca, on 10 June 1916, under the leadership of Sharif Husain.

'Political nationalism may be considered as the second stage in the development of Arab nationalism. It was actually the product of political and social conditions prevailing during the last years of Turkish rule in Arab lands. As that religion could not be separated from Arab nationalism. The first leader of Arab political nationalism was Sharif Husain of Mecca, who envisaged immediately before and during the First World War, an Arab State rising out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, built around an Arab Muslim King. In a memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference on January 1, 1919 Emir Faisal wrote: The country from a line Alexandretta-Persia, southward to Indian Ocean is inhabited by 'Arabs-by which we mean people of closely related somatic stocks, all speaking the one language, Arabic... The aim of the Arab nationalist movements (of which my father became the leader in war after combined appeal from the Syrian and Mesoopotamian branches) is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation...

And again in a second memorandum to the Peace Conference, on January 29, 1919 the Emir wrote: As representing my father, who by request of Britain and France, led the Arab rebellion against Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabis-speaking peoples of Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbeik southward on the Indian Ocean, be recognised as independent sovereign peoples under the guarantee of the League of Nations...

2. Ibid., Document, 251, p. 300
The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916 was transformed into a semi-colonial Mandate system by the Allied supreme Council meeting at San Remo, from April 19 to 25, 1920, consequently Iraq and Syria were recognized as two independent countries under the tutelage of Britain from 'Iraq' and France for 'Syria' as mandatory powers. The presence of the Mandatory powers intensified the struggle for self-determination and political independence. It gave birth to a number of political parties and unified the opposition against imperialism. The post-War period is a period of frustration and disappointment caused by the Western promises of independence which the Arab leaders had, unfortunately, interpreted them literally. This fact is marked with a great mistrust and lack of confidence in the policies of the Western powers in West-Asia. It often lead even to hostility and open revolts against colonial policies. This post-War period may be considered an important stage in the evaluation of Arab nationalism.

Since the Second World War and especially the last decade may be considered as a new stage in the evolution of Arab nationalism, which a complex process of secularization and consolidation of regional nationalism took place.

During this period, ideal of Arab Unity has been maintained although the Arab League did not succeed in establishing a federation of the Arab countries. Several attempts at the unification either failed to materialize or did not last very long. However, an important development was tried hard to replace the concept of Islamic Umurah by that of the al-\text{awdiyyah al-'Arabiyyah}. By this new term al-\text{awdiyyah al-'Arabiyyah} is meant today not only Arab nationalism but also Arab unity. By the exponents of Arab Unity the concept of \text{awdiyyah} is an important weapon to fight against imperialist encroachment in the Arab world.

It is true that Arab nationalism defies any definitions as no single definition can include all its diverse and apparently contradictory aspects. It is a fact that Arab nationalism is both a political movement and a religious revival, it is both secular and theocratic. But as a progressive force it aims at the ideal of uniting all the Arab lands against imperialist domination.

It is a fact, that Arab League has not been able to realize the Arab unity in economic and political fields. But the failure of the Arab League, as Najla Issaeddin writes, does not signify the failure of the Arab movement. The League, as it has been already stated, is a League of
Arab states; this is its official name, as its development has reflected the policies of the individual states. Thus the league is not identical with Arab Unity. It is a phase of the movement and a step along the Path. The general importance expressed at the slowness and inaptitude of the League indicates the popular urge towards unity.¹

¹ op. cit., p. 346.
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