AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EGYPT-ISRAEL RELATIONS (1970-1980)

ABSTRACT

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
Doctor of Philosophy
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
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ALIGARH (INDIA)
1990
ABSTRACT

West Asia has been economically and strategically significant region for the United States and its policy towards the region was primarily directed towards the promotion of its political, economic and strategic interests in the area. The US-Soviet rivalry and the thrust of their respective policies conducted in their own interests contributed to the instability in the region. The mutual hostility between the Arabs and Jews as a result of the creation of the Jewish state, Israel in 1948 and the deprivation and diaspora of the Palestinians perpetuated the Arab-Israeli imbroglio in West Asia. This paved the way for the persistent crisis in the region.

The main thrust of the thesis is to explore the pros and cons of the American policy towards West Asia, particularly the US sponsored Camp David Accords of 1978 and the subsequent Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty concluded in 1979 and its repercussions.

Chapter I is an attempt to trace out the American actual involvement in the Middle East after the World War II which not only paved the way for the formation of US economic policy but it also prompted the US Administration to develop the political and strategic interests in the region in order to thwart the Soviet expansionist tendency and to protect the newly established Jewish state from its Arab neighbours which were opposed to the creation of Israel and the resultant
Palestinian deprivation and diaspora from their homeland. At the same time, the United States established close contacts with the oil rich Arab States in pursuit of the promotion of its oil interests in the region.

In Chapter II US policy towards the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 is discussed which also has wide coverage of the reasons and consequences of the war. Egypt which played an important role as the leader of the Arab world has been a focal point of US policy, particularly due to Egypt's patronage of the Soviet Union. But President Anwar Al-Sadat's apathy towards the Russians as a result of its initial failure to supply Egypt with some of the sophisticated weapons and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war paved the way for the decline of Soviet influence in Egypt and the entire Middle East.

In fact, President Sadat was determined to find a solution to the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict as the Israeli occupation contained vital parts of Egypt and further the maintenance of a large Egyptian military force adversely affected the Egyptian economy. President Sadat had declared 1971 as the "year of decision" and in order to materialise his declaration, he sought the "offensive weapons" from the Soviets. But the Soviet Union did not fulfil the Egyptian demands as it sought the peaceful solution of the Arab problem in view of the process of detente with the United States.
Hence, Sadat wanted to abandon the Soviet patronage and normalise the diplomatic relations with the United States. In pursuance of such policy, Sadat expelled 20,000 Russian advisers and personnel on July 8, 1972. But the US unresponsive attitude to Sadat's action disappointed the Egyptian President as the US Administration did not want to alienate the most significant pro-Israeli Jewish lobby in America.

President Sadat was passing through a crucial period as his credibility and position in the Arab world had begun to suffer a setback due to the failure of his much publicised "year of decision". But Sadat had decided to fight a war with the Israelis and he ordered his defense department to engage in thorough preparations for possible offensive. At the same time, he consulted President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria to chalk out a plan of "operation Badr" in which both Egypt and Syria would attack Israel on October 6, 1973, in order to restore their territories occupied by the Israeli forces in the 1967 war. The initial Egyptian and Syrian offensives proved to be effective and successful. While the Egyptian forces crossed the canal and captured most of the fortified Israeli defense line (The Bar Lev Line), the Syrian army recaptured most of the areas of Golan Heights.

The Soviet Union which did not want to abandon its client state due to its regional importance, sent the arms to
Egypt. But soon the Israelis pushed back the Egyptian and Syrian forces as a result of the massive US military assistance. The setback to the warring Arab partners prompted the organisation of Arab Petroleum countries (OAPEC) to declare the oil cutback of production and impose the oil embargo on the Western countries, Japan, particularly the United States for their support to Israelis. The embargo not only adversely affected the United States' economy but crippled the world industries and transportation as well.

At this juncture, the West European countries and Japan reframed their policies in support of the Arab cause. At the same time, the United States brought a considerable change in its policy, particularly in pursuit of the solution to the Arab-Israeli imbroglio. The step-by-step diplomacy played by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger during the 1973 war led to the signing of the disengagement of forces agreement between Egypt and Israel but Kissinger's step-by-step approach also aimed at the fragmentation of the Arab world as it could not include the other Arab parties to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In fact, Egypt's quest for regaining its territories occupied by Israel and the reconstruction of its economy, further paved the way for its strong inclination towards the
The US sponsored Camp David Accords of 1978 which almost brought a tremendous change in the Middle East politics due to the signing of the Accords between the Arab leader Anwar Al-Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, is discussed in Chapter III. At the same time, the consequences of the Camp David Accords have also been explored in the Chapter. After the assumption of office by Jimmy Carter as the President of the United States in 1977, the US Administration sought to solve the Arab-Israeli imbroglio by calling the Geneva Conference on West Asia. But the differences in approaches and perceptions of both the Arabs and Israelis and Israel's contention for excluding the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the Peace Conference as a pre-condition, did not yield any concrete results. At the same time, President Sadat, in order to achieve a breakthrough, visited Israel which drew bitter criticism from the Arab countries and the Palestinians. Undoubtedly, it helped the US Administration to encourage both President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to patch up their differences in order to sign the Camp David Accords in September 1978. The accords which was signed in the form of "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and the "Framework for the conclusion of Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel", however, was condemned by the Arabs and Soviets.
equally whereas, the Western countries hailed Sadat's and Begin's move.

The framework for peace provided for the autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip but it did not refer to the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. The PLO and the other Arabs outrightly rejected the accord and called it as Sadat's unilateral action as the PLO and the Palestinians never conferred the authority on Sadat to negotiate with the Israelis on their behalf.

Although, President Carter initially did not adopt Kissinger's policy of step-by-step diplomacy, later he had to follow Kissinger's approach in view of President Sadat's Jerusalem visit and his desire for peace with the Israelis.

Chapter IV which has dealt with the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 is an attempt to highlight the pros and cons of the treaty. It also discusses how the Israelis had emerged as successful in their quest for the recognition from Egypt.

The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty ensured the restoration of Israeli occupied Sinai and its oil fields in return of Egypt's recognition of Israel. It further called for the establishment of normal and friendly ties between Egypt and Israel. President Carter's presumption that the accords and
the Peace Treaty would lead to the Permanent Peace in the region, however, did not serve the purpose. On the contrary, it was condemned by the Arabs as a partial peace which neither granted the right to self-determination of the Palestinians nor gave any reference to the Israeli occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights of Syria.

Consequently, the Baghdad Conference of the Arab League States and the PLO, imposed certain political and economic sanctions on Egypt and fully isolated it in the Middle East affairs. At the same time, the Soviet Union strongly supported the PLO cause in order to influence the events in the region. But the Russian intervention in Afghanistan further prompted the Arabs to cast the doubts about the real intention of the Soviets in the Middle East.

Although, the European Economic Community (EEC) countries initially hailed the Camp David Accords and the subsequent Peace treaty yet, with the passage of time, the EEC countries felt that peace treaty signed between Egyptian and Israeli authorities left, an adverse impact on the Arab world and the accords did not solve the purpose of the comprehensive peace in the region. As a result, the Venice Summit of the EEC countries issued an statement on June 13, 1980 which called for "the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people", the Palestinians' right to self-determination, participation by the Palestinians and the PLO in the negotiations.

The EEC statement of Venice Summit attributed to the failure of the Camp David Accords which had evoked bitter criticism instead of positive response from the Arabs.

Egypt undoubtedly lost its identity as the leader of the Arab world as it was suspended from the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). At the same time the United States had to lose its credibility among the Arab powers as a result of its policy to encourage a partial peace between Egypt and Israel.

The thrust of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty was the establishment of close friendly ties at political, cultural and commercial level between Egypt and Israel which paved the way for the normalisation of Egypt-Israeli relations from 1979. At the same time, the negotiations to grant autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is delineated in Chapter V. Due to the conflicting interpretation of "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" which provided for the Palestinian autonomy, Israel's intransigent attitude towards the status of Jerusalem, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin's settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza strip culminated in the failure of autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel.
The conclusive part of the thesis focuses, particularly on the analytical assessment of the Camp David Accords and the subsequent Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. Although, the accords and the Peace treaty benefitted both Egypt and Israel yet, the entire documents were least significant in absence of the PLO and the Palestinian right of self-determination without which the Middle East crisis would further perpetuate.
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1990
Certified that Mr. Sohail Ashraf has completed Ph.D thesis entitled: "American Policy Towards West Asia With Special Reference to Egypt-Israel Relations (1970-1980)" under my supervision and guidance.

His work is original and, in my opinion, it is suitable for submission for the award of Ph.D degree.

(B. RAHAMATHULLA)
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West Asia has been economically and strategically important region for the United States and its policy was marked by its determination to safeguard and promote political, economic and strategic interests in the region. The containment of the Soviet influence, the rivalries of the two superpowers and the thrust of their respective policies conducted in their own interests contributed to instability in the region. Further, the persistent hostility between the Arabs and the Jews and their intransigent attitudes made the region in perpetual crises. This paved the way for the superpowers rivalry which further impeded the process of normalization of relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

The beginning of 1970, however, witnessed a tremendous change in the United States' policy perceptions and approaches towards the Palestinian issue and gradually the State Department favourably inclined to find an amicable solution to the Middle East crisis. At the same time, the Soviet Union which had been playing a significant role in the Egyptian affairs, failed to influence President Anwar Al-Sadat and expressed reluctance to supply sophisticated arms to counter the Israeli threats. This ultimately resulted in expulsion of Soviet technicians from Egypt. Equally, Sadat expressed his desire to invite the American officials to rescue the dwindling economy of Egypt. After the 1973 war, the officials in the State Department responded positively to assist Egypt both militarily and economically.
Intransigent attitudes of Israelis to vacate the occupied territories of Arabs and non-implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, setback to Egyptian and Syrian forces in wars against Israel led to the imposition of oil embargo in 1973. The world economy in general and in particular economies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan were adversely affected by the oil embargo.

After assuming the office of the Presidency, by Jimmy Carter, there was a serious and sincere thinking in the White House to solve the Middle East crisis amicably which eventually led to the conclusion of American sponsored Camp David Accords between President Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. This, however, proved to be a partial peace and the subsequent Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 fully isolated Egypt from the Arab world. Both Egypt and Israel were mutually benefitted by the treaty. On the other hand, the Camp David Accords and the subsequent Peace treaty drew strong Arab reaction. The accords further alienated the Palestinians whose right to self-determination was ignored by the signatories. Although, the Camp David Accords were an instant American success yet, the US had to lose its credibility among its traditional Arab friends.

An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the pros and cons of American Policy towards West Asia, particularly the

Chapter I discusses chronologically the historical events which laid the basic foundation initially for strengthening the friendship and to the further reciprocal policies between the Arabs and Americans. In Chapter II the reasons and consequences of the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 are explored. Chapter III covers the events leading to the American sponsored Camp David Accords of 1978 between Egypt and Israel which brought a drastic change in the Middle East Politics. The signing of the first peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is dealt in Chapter IV. The rapprochement between Egypt and Israel following the Peace treaty and Egypt-Israeli policies towards the autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza strip is delineated in Chapter V. The conclusive part is mainly concerned with the analytical assessment of the Camp David Accords which is the focal point of study.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study owes to a number of intellectuals, who from time to time assisted, encouraged and guided me notwithstanding their busy schedules. Of all, I am highly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. B. Rahamathulla, for his painstaking guidance, assistance and co-operation in my research. Without his help and supervision this study would not have been completed. I am equally grateful to Professor A.P. Sharma, Chairman of the Department of Political Science and Professor Mahmudul Haq, Director, Center of West Asian Studies, for their kind co-operation and encouragement. I would like to record my sincere thanks to the staff of Center of West Asian Studies, Maulana Azad Library Aligarh Muslim University, Indian Council of Social Science Research, Indian Council of World Affairs, American Center, New Delhi and my colleagues, Mahboob A. Neyazi, Masroor A. Neyazi, Shahid Imam, Sajid Bin Ali, Qazi Mohammad Jamshed, S. Farooq Azam, Danish Mooin and Hakimuddin for their moral encouragement and active assistance. I would, particularly acknowledge the help of Dr. Mohammad Yusuf Khan, Lecturer, Department of Arabic, Aligarh Muslim University, for having translated some of the Arabic newspapers which later on became an integral part of some of the chapters of my thesis. I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance and moral support given by my father, Kamal Ashraf, my mother, Zubaida Kamal, my uncle, Dr. Kamal Arshad and
aunt, Zaibun Nisa Arshad. Finally, my wife Saira deserves a great debt of gratitude for having endured my long absence and extending moral support while I was pre-occupied in writing this thesis. I wish to record my sincere thanks to S.M. Qamar Alam for having typed the manuscript in time.

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Sohail Ashraf
"The Nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave".

George Washington
CHAPTER - I

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN WEST ASIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prior to the World War I, the United States was primarily concerned with academic, philanthropic, cultural and missionary works in West Asia. In 1820, America entered the region and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission established their first Religious Missionary. As a result, the institutions like the Robert College of Istanbul in 1863, the Istanbul Women's College in 1871, the American University of Beirut (Syrian Protestant College) in 1866, and the American University of Cairo in 1919 were established with a view to bridge the cultural and educational gap between the new world and the Middle East. Though, the Muslims of the region initially did not come under the influence of Christianity but availed the educational and medical services rendered to them by the missionaries. The American Government in the initial stages did not involve in any controversy rather

   And also see for further details Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Middle East" in Tareq Y. Ismael (Edited), The Middle East in World Politics: A Study in Contemporary International Relations (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1974), p. 117.

contributed substantially towards the educational needs of the millions of Muslims, Christians and Jews alike in the region.

**US political and Economic Thrust**

The American interests, however, gradually changed and she indirectly expressed the sympathetic attitude towards the Zionist cause in Palestine. Consequently, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, was encouraged to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917, promising a national home for the Jews in Palestine. He issued the declaration on November 2, 1917, to Lord Rothschild, the representative of the Zionists, in the form of a letter which read as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or their rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

---

At the same time, President Wilson expounded his famous fourteen points which ensured the right of national self-determination to all people and the establishment of the League of Nations. Point twelve was directly related with the Arabs and the other minorities in the Ottoman empire as it emphasised that:

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." 7

In the Conference of Versailles from 1919-1920, it was realised that the right of self-determination proposed by President Wilson would, however, hinder the Zionist cause in Palestine and also thwart the ambitions of imperial powers in the Middle East. In order to avoid the chaos and deadlock between the American and French delegation in the Conference, President Wilson proposed a King-Crane Commission to know the desire of the inhabitants of the region who were directly

7. Paiz S. Abu-Jaber, n. 4, p. 4.
8. Ibid.
concerned with their area. On August 28, 1919, the Commission revealed that both the Arabs of Syria and Palestine desired an independent United Arab State. In case, Arabs failed to achieve the complete independence, they were ready to accept the United States or Britain as their mandatory powers. The recommendations of the Commission were kept secret for a long time in the archives and made public only in 1922. The Commission recommended Faisal bin Hussein as the head of United Syrian State, while favouring the constitutional Arab monarchies. Further, it opposed the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The United States abandoned its Middle East policies, particularly, after the rejection of Wilson's proposal to take the United States to League of Nations and thus paved the way for the British authorities to dominate in the Middle

9. France refused to participate in this Commission and Britain, after brief hesitation, also decided to remain aloof from it. Notwithstanding this boycott and despite intense Zionist objections, Wilson appointed a purely American Commission—composed of Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles Crane, a prominent businessman and student of International Affairs.

George Lenczowski, n. 1, p. 88.


10. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

11. Ibid., p. 90.

12. Ibid., p. 89.
East politics. Once again America confined herself to the missionary activities in the region and at the same time it cultivated friendship with the Arab countries as to import oil, needed for its industries and this gradually strengthened its economic and commercial relations. American companies on several occasions appealed to the US Government to acquire free access to the new and promising oil fields of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as these areas were in the hands of the British, French and Dutch competitors. The US Government sought for an open-door policy which would not discriminate the private American business and also appealed to the Dutch, French and British concern to promote private


In a conference held at San Remo in April, 1920, Britain obtained the consent of the Allies for the mandate which came into force on September 29, 1923.


14. The American Government helped its companies to obtain 23.75 per cent share in the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Ibid.

entrepreneurship in the region. With the issuance of the British White Paper in 1939, the Jewish immigration to Palestine was restricted. In fact, until 1939, American avoidance of actual involvement in Palestine problem bore certain factors. Firstly, the world Zionism was in the hands of Britain and, secondly, Britain, until 1939, had not restricted the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

American Role in the Middle East during World War II

During the Second World War Americans further developed their interest in the Middle East for two obvious reasons as the entire region was strategically significant and it

16. In this connection the United States concluded the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 which regulated relations between the two countries in connection with Palestine mandate and secured the protection of business and missionary interests of Americans in Palestine. Incidentally, the preamble of this treaty included a reference to the Balfour Declaration inserted at the insistence of the British negotiators, which was to be interpreted later by various parties as giving the United States the right to have a say in any changes in the mandate.


18. George Lenczowski, n. 1, p. 531.
had vast oil resources. American troops deployed in Iran to handle the lend-lease supply line to Russia and they also supplied arms and ammunition to Egypt and Palestine to strengthen the supply center. Apart from this, the United States also concluded lend-lease agreements with the West Asian countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in order to establish a chain of bases linking North Africa and Far East.

On the other hand, the Palestine problem was raised through the Baltimore Program on May 11, 1942, by the Zionists, moulding the American public opinion and seeking the United States' support to the Zionist cause. Several pro-Zionist resolutions were passed by the State legislatures in America and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt also endorsed the Zionist aspirations. It was on January 27, 1944, that

19. Ahnad R. Elkashef, n. 15, p. 11.

20. Lend-lease supply was the arrangement announced (1941) by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in which the United States undertook to supply weapons and equipment to countries fighting the Axis. In return, the U.S. obtained the right to use certain Allied bases.


Congress passed the resolution which said:

"... the Sixty-Seventh Congress of the US on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved that the United States favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people..." 24

President Roosevelt pledged during the 1944 election campaign that he would favour the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. However, he made ambiguous promise in a letter to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that he would do nothing which might prove contrary to the Arabs' wish without the prior consultation with the Arabs and Jews. In the meantime, the War Department expressed pessimism over the Congressional and Presidential support to the Jewish cause as it would endanger the war efforts of Allies and at the same time the State Department pointed out that Britain was solely responsible for Palestine and the American Government main concern was to alleviate the sufferings of the European Jewry. 26


It appeared after the World War that the United States would leave the Middle East considering the area as British responsibility. But Britain was exhausted as a result of the War and there was a sharp decline in its control over the Middle East affairs. The United States, however, renewed and framed its policies in the Middle East in order to protect the Western interests and to counter the Russian expansionist policy. At the first instance, Russians abruptly attempted to subjugate Iran through stimulating and supporting the Azerbaijan rebellion and securing oil concession by coercive measures in 1945-1946. The United States responded by encouraging Iran to resist the Soviet pressures. Meanwhile, Washington felt a new Communist threat in Greece and Turkey. It was on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman declared:

"One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion... We shall not realise our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples... against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes..." 30

29. Ibid.
President Truman further appealed to the Congress for granting $400 million to Greece and Turkey to meet the Communist challenge both financially and militarily.

The rising persecution of Jews in Europe prompted the Zionists to spread the movement in the United States and their perpetual pressure on Congress and the President led the United States to frame a clear-cut policy in Palestine.

The Zionists tried to secure the American support on two pretexts. Firstly, they quoted the Biblical promises which was made to the descendants of Abraham, as if the Jews were his only descendants. Secondly, they expressed their pathetic and tragic conditions owing to the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the World War II. Thus, the Americans became the Jewish sympathisers and favoured the Jews at the cost of the Palestinians who were quite unattached with the Zionist catastrophe in Europe. The Zionists further constituted a force to be reckoned with in the United States as the "Jewish Vote".

31. The Truman Doctrine proved to be a success; aided and financed by the Americans, the Greek Government wiped out the Communist guerrillas and, thus, saved itself from sharing the fate of its less fortune Balkan neighbours. Similarly, strengthened in her economy and her military posture, Turkey successfully resisted Soviet pressure for the control of the Straits and the annexation of her eastern provinces. Consequently, the Northern Tier was saved.

George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 795.

became a decisive factor in US polls.

The United States pressure on the British Government to secure a large measure of Jewish immigration to Palestine had created a tension between British and American Governments and ultimately the Anglo-American Committee was set up in 1946 to find out a solution.\(^{34}\)

The British Government did not want to go ahead with the Jewish immigration, which was contrary to the wishes of Palestinians. Further, the persistent pressure from the United States and a series of Zionist violence led the British Government in 1947 to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations.\(^{35}\) The General Assembly of the United Nations appointed the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which provided two plans in its final report in September, 1947.\(^{36}\) In fact,


34. The Committee found that hostility between Jews and Arabs made the establishment of an independent Palestine impossible at the moment and, therefore, advised that the British Government retain the mandate until a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations could be arranged. Meanwhile, the Committee recommended the admission to Palestine to 100,000 European Jews as requested by President Truman. *Ibid.*, p. 24.


36. The eleven member UNSCOP was comprised of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

they were regarded as majority plan and minority plan. The majority report provided that Palestine should be partitioned into three parts - an Arab State and a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem should be kept under the international regime of the United Nations. The minority plan provided for a federal state consisting of the Arab and Jewish units. The Arabs opposed the partition plan and condemned it as unlawful, unjust and undemocratic attitude towards the majority of the inhabitants. They challenged the legal competency of the UN recommendation of partition of their ancestral homeland. However, their efforts to take the help of International Court of Justice went in vain.

On October 11, 1947, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Hershal V. Johnson, emphasised in his statement that:

37. The majority plan was signed by the Netherlands, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay; whereas the minority report was signed by India, Iran and Yugoslavia. 

Ibid.

38. Ibid.

And also see for further details Michael E. Jansen. The United States and the Palestinian People (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), pp. 18-19.

"The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provide for partition and immigration. It is of the opinion, however, that certain amendments and modifications would have to be made in the majority plan in order more accurately to give to the principles on which that plan is based. My delegation believes that certain geographical modifications must be made. For example - Jaffa should be included in the Arab State because it is predominantly an Arab city ... Any solution which this Committee recommends should not only be just, but also workable and of a nature to command the approval of world opinion." 40

Notwithstanding the Arab opposition, the General Assembly passed its majority plan with certain modifications on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against with 10 abstentions. 41


41. In favour - Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, USSR, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Against - Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Abstained - Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.


And also see for further details Official Records of the General Assembly (GAOR), Second Session, September-November, 1947, pp. 131-151.
The partition plan divided Palestine into six principal parts of which the three parts constituted the Jewish State and the rest three with the enclave of Jaffa were given to the Arab State. The City of Jerusalem and its adjoining area, including Bethlehem were declared as an international zone under the banner of the United Nations. When the Palestine was divided in 1947, the Jewish population had risen mainly through immigration to about 650,000, whereas the population of the Arabs increased via natural growth to about 1,350,000. Thus, 67.5% of population were of the Arabs while the Jews constituted 32.5% only. It may be noted that partition resolution divided the country discriminately. In fact, the United States played the most important role in influencing the voting pattern in the General Assembly in favour of partition. Stephen B.L. Penrose,

42. An important aspect of this unnatural division was to include within the Jewish State all areas owned and inhabited by Jews, even though this meant the inclusion of large areas owned and inhabited by Arabs. The Arab State, on the other hand, was to include the least possible number of Jews and the smaller amount of Jewish property.

Ibid., p. 35.

43. Ibid., p. 36.

44. (a) To the Jewish State it gave more than 56% of the total area i.e. more than ten times what the Jews owned in land property;

(b) To the Arab States was given only 42% of the whole country, although the Arabs constituted 67.5% of the population, and owned more than 94% of the total area;

(c) 497,000 Arabs, who represented 37% of the total Arab population, were placed under the domination of the Jewish State.

Ibid.
president of the American University of Beirut, criticised the American policy and commented that:

"The political manoeuvring which led to the final acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the majority report of UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in the history of American international politics. There can be no question but that it was American pressure for partition of Palestine with Economic Union voted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. It was this American pressure for partition which is largely responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of the Arab and Muslim world." 45

Partition plan evoked considerable protest from the Palestinians followed by demonstrations and violence. The whole Arabs opposed the partition of their country, the Jews, on the other hand, were determined irrespective of the consequences to establish a Jewish State.46

Strangely enough, in the early part of 1948, the US intelligence estimates showed a deep concern of Zionism, which of course, dragging the United States into a dangerous programme of territorial conflict in the Middle East. 47

45. Quoted in Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 27.
46. Ibid., p. 31.
47. In March, 1948, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Paper on "Force requirements for Palestine", anticipating the termination of the British Mandate, predicted that the Zionist strategy will seek to involve (the United States) in a continuously widening and deepening series of operations intended to secure maximum Jewish objectives. The JCS listed the objectives as: "(a) initial Jewish sovereignty over a portion of Palestine, (b) acceptance contd... 16
In the meantime, the State and Defense Departments realised that its economic and strategic interests would be jeopardised in case the United States went ahead to approve the partition plan. The United States wanted to impress the Arabs that it was a blunder on the part of Americans to pursue the partition plan. In pursuance of this policy, on March 19, 1948, Warren R. Austin, the US representative to the United Nations, asked the Security Council to establish a temporary UN Trusteeship over Palestine in view of the non-implementation of plan. The change in American policy was criticised by the American Zionists, politicians and other important citizens. But when the Trusteeship matter was being discussed in the United Nations, the Jews in Palestine were provided with the shipment of Russian arms. And on May 14, 1948, as soon as the British forces withdrew from Palestine, the Jews launched an attack on Palestinians and occupied most of the areas allotted by the great powers of the right to unlimited immigration, (c) the extension of Jewish sovereignty over all of Palestine, (d) the expansion of "Eretz Israel" in Trans-Jordan and into portions of Lebanon and Syria and (e) the establishment of a Jewish military and economic hegemony over the entire Middle East.


to them under the plan and then on the very day they proclaimed the Jewish State calling it as Israel. On the same day a letter was received by President Truman from the Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel, which stated that:

"DEAR PRESIDENT. I have the honor to notify you that the State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of November 29, 1947... The act of independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948 Washington time.

With full knowledge of deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine. I have been authorized by the provincial government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community.

Very respectfully yours,

ELIAHU EPSTEIN
Agent, Provincial Government of Israel"

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel. Recognition of Israel by the Truman Administration contradicted the earlier statement of president wherein he had

51. Ibid.
expressed that partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner "as he had hoped." His memoirs indicated the fear of some of the State Department experts who would try to block the recognition of Israel." In order to avoid any such hindrance, eleven minutes after the proclamation of Israel, Charlie Ross, the President's Press Secretary, intimated the correspondents of the de facto recognition. The establishment of State was followed by the hostilities which broke out between Israel and its neighbouring Arab States, namely, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The Arab armies could not face the strong Israeli army as it was fully equipped with sophisticated weapons supplied by the Western countries and at the same time Count Bernadotte, the appointed UN mediator, made his efforts and arranged the truce from June 11 to July 7, 1948. But after the expiry of the truce the hostilities were revived with the Israeli seizure of the whole of Western Galilee as well as Lydda, Ramleh and a larger part of central Palestine evacuated by the Arab legion of Trans-Jordan. This seizure of Arab land was beyond the territory originally allotted to Jews according to the partition plan.

53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 34.
56. Ibid., p. 35.
After a series of truce conclusion and their subsequent violation, the Palestine War ended with the conclusion of four Armistice Agreements, which was signed by Israel with Egypt on February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan on April 3, 1949, and with Syria on July 20, 1949.57

The total area which was occupied by the Israelis amounted to almost 30 per cent of the territory of the country.58 Before the creation of Israel, the United States involvement in the region bore the strategic and economic interests but as soon as the State of Israel was established, USA became the guardian of the new Jewish State.59 In early 1950, Israel sought arms from the United States to match the British shipments made to some of the Arab states in accordance with the outstanding treaties. Although America was sympathised to the Israeli needs yet, it foresaw the threat of renewed war due to the arms race development in the Middle East.60 Immediately, the United States consulted the United Kingdom and France and afterwards a Tripartite Declaration was issued on May 25, 1950, which stated that:

57. Ibid., p. 36.
58. Ibid., p. 37.
"The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. The three Governments take this opportunity to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area. Should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."

The signing of the Declaration implicitly made the three powers the guardians of the State of Israel and obliged to do their best to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. But the declaration was violated as a result of 1954 secret Franco-Israeli arms arrangement. This had almost become null and void for both Britain and France after the Suez War in 1956.

United States and the Suez Imbroglio

The Soviet entrance in the Middle East and Egypt’s growing contacts with the Soviet Union perturbed the United States. In


And also see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 570, June 5, 1956, p. 886.

62. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 50.

order to combat the Soviet influence and to pursue its national interests in the Middle East, the United States assured the Egyptian authorities to extend financial help to construct the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The financial assistance was to be shared by the World Bank and the United States.  

The US constraints and its intentions of withdrawing the aid was however, indicated by Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, who told Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State of the foreign office in July, 1956 that:

64. A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p. 10.

65. Negotiations with the Bank President Eugene Black were hard but from Nasser's perspective, successful. Egypt agreed to allow the Bank to supervise its foreign currency needed for the project, at the then current market rate of 5.5 per cent interest. The United States also had conditions and these were even harder to meet. Egypt would make no more arms purchases from the Soviets, would accept the US and British monetary conditions for the loans as they were presented, and would conclude a peace agreement with the Israelis. Taken together, the various World Bank and US conditions for Aswan Dam financing, amounted to a surrender of a considerable amount of national sovereignty of control over Egyptian economic and foreign policy.

Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 131.
"Dulles in all probability shortly renege on the Aswan Dam loan. This was largely to internal political problems ... Although, the government had tried hard to get back on terms with Arab World the damage done by President Truman's pro-Israeli policies, there were powerful anti-Arab, and more particularly anti-Egyptian voices in Congress. Zionist influences were very strong ... for letting Nasser get away with his blockade of the Suez Canal against Israeli shipping ... Now the Zionist lobby in opposing aid to Egypt, and with the presidential election coming alone in less than four months, it just was not practical politics for the administration to go ahead and ask Congress to approve so large a loan to Egypt." 66

The American Government pleaded that the United States did not find any feasibility in that circumstances to engage in the Aswan project. The Administration further said that the Nile riprian States did not accept the project and Egypt was unable to spend the financial resources as she had already exhausted its financial resources owing to the arms deal with the Soviet Union. In July, 1956, American Government owing to the above-said reasons, withdrew the Aswan Dam aid.67 It was already presumed by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser that the aid to Egypt was being opposed in the Congress and the United States as a whole. Notwithstanding that Nasser was


67. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 892, July 30, 1956, p. 188.
determined to go ahead with the construction of Aswan Dam, and made the historical announcement on July 26, 1956 that:

"The Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company S.A.E. is hereby nationalised. All funds and rights and obligations connected therewith are transferred to the State. All bodies and committees at present existing for its administration are dissolved..."

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company took Britain and France with surprise. The Congress members and the diplomatic observers viewed it as the alarming situation, but they did not declare it illegal. The 1956, being the presidential election year, Suez crisis was the focal point and both the Democratic and Republican parties knew the importance of the crucial 'Jewish Vote' and thus Israel's friendship was favoured by the US Administration.

68. Nasser thought that if he wished to proceed with construction: accept Soviet aid and the inevitable Soviet conditions, or find a way to finance the dam with Egyptian funds. At the time, Egypt had two major sources of foreign currency earnings: cotton exports, and the small stipend provided by the largely British and French owned Suez Canal Company as a tip of the hat to Egyptian sovereignty. Cotton earnings alone would not finance the project, and were in any event partially mortgaged to pay for Soviet arms. Nasser's choice of nationalisation of the Suez Canal - the Aswan High Dam would be built with revenues from the passage way - through which was carried the majority of Europe's fuel supplies.

Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 132.

69. Ibid.

70. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 52, pp. 181-182.
prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was adamant to use force, although full compensation to the share and bond holders of the Suez Canal Company was assured by Nasser and no single attempt was made to restrict the vessels passage through the Suez Canal. The British Prime Minister expressed his view that "a man with Nasser's record could not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe." 71

The Egyptian President, Nasser, had played a vital role to weaken the British empire in the Middle East as the Britishers had lost their grip in Jordan and other Arab principalities and also in the African continent. This had indeed provoked both the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and the French Premier, Guy Mollet, to wage a war against Nasser's regime. 72 The French were further angered with the Egyptians because of their support to Algerian Revolution in 1954. 73 Despite Eden's contention to use force, the United States was opposed to such resort, although, on August 1, 1956, in London meeting, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had declared that they should use such force as a last resort. However, Britain and France indirectly sought backing of the United States and they hoped that the United States would take care of the "Bear". In the real sense, he meant that America

would impede Russia if it came to Egypt's rescue. Prime Minister Eden presumed that he succeeded in persuading the US authorities to come to their rescue in the event of a war. But there were three vital reasons which led the US Administration to deny the use of force to settle the Suez crisis. Firstly, due to the presidential election year America wanted to solve the Suez crisis peacefully. Secondly, in no way the US interests were jeopardised in the region as there was a continuous flow of oil to its industries and Western nations were also equally provided the needed four per cent crude oil by the Middle East. Lastly, the United States was suspicious of age old European phenomena - the European "colonialism". Sherman Adams, one of President Eisenhower's closest advisers, indicated such reason in his statement that:

"Our firm opposition to colonialism made as sympathetic to the struggle which Egypt and other Arab States were making to free themselves of the political and economic control that the British felt they had to maintain in the Middle East in their own self-interest." \(^{75}\)

It was on September 23, 1956, that Britain and France brought this matter to the Security Council for the settlement which ensured the effective control of the Canal by the

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74. \textit{Ibid.}

Egyptian authority through the six principles. This was, however, resented by the British and French leaders and both the countries decided to use force. The planning of invasion had already been done and French Defense Ministry had sought the clarification of Israeli Military Attache regarding the willingness of indulging with the Joint Anglo-French military action. By mid-August British and French Defense Ministries fully prepared the "operation Musketeer" Plan, which aimed at the seizure and holding of the Suez Canal Zone. After the contact of the French Defense Ministry with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on September 1, 1956, regarding the participation in the "operation Musketeer", a detailed discussion was held between the host French General Staff from September 29 to October 1, in Sevres, near Paris to sort out the mode of "Operation Musketeer". After returning from Sevres, Moshe Dayan, the

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76. The six principles were:

(a) Passage and shipping through the canal should be free and open, subject to no political or technical discrimination;

(b) Egypt's sovereignty should be respected;

(c) The operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of all countries;

(d) Egypt and the users were to fix tolls and charges by agreement;

(e) A fair proportion of the dues was to be set aside for canal development;

(f) Disputes between the old Suez Canal Company and Egypt should be settled by negotiations or arbitration.


77. Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 135.
IDF Chief of Staff, informed the General Staff of IDF in a meeting that Israel would join the Anglo-French military action against the Arabs. John Foster Dulles felt that Britain and France were determined to wage a war with Egypt. Further, the Department of State was also apprised by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Israel and France had concluded an agreement for the supply of French arms to Israel. During the last week of October, the Military Intelligence informed the US Government that Israeli troops had started mobilisation. It was on October 25, 1956, the same day when Israeli forces mobilised Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, while speaking before the United Nations Security Council proclaimed:

"The Government of Israel will faithfully observe the cease-fire so long as the cease-fire is observed by the other side. It will initiate no violence."

Abba Eban while officially visited Dulles in his office on Sunday, the 28th of October, 1956, and informed that the report gathered by the Israeli Intelligence showed an Egyptian intention

78. Ibid., p. 136.
79. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 92.
to attack Israel. But Dulles was aware of the Israeli intention and told Abba Eban that the Eisenhower Administration would try to prevent the outbreak of hostilities irrespective of the Jewish influence on the presidential election.  

Though the Pentagon did not get any information of Anglo-French-Israeli secret talks for a joint attack at the first moment, yet it apprised the occurrence of a war consequence in the Middle East. In fact, the Pentagon's Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) informed the office of the Secretary of Defense that "in the short term" there might be a brief war "initiated by Israel against Egypt to overthrow Nasser's Government, to cripple his army, and to gain territorial objectives." It was also informed that Israel might mobilise its forces before November, 1956. On October 29, 1956, Sinai was invaded by the Israeli troops and it proceeded rapidly both to Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. This was followed by the Joint Anglo-French ultimatum on October 30, 1956, given both to Egypt and Israel. This ultimatum called for the cessation of military action by both Israel and Egypt and withdrawal of their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. Egyptian Government was also asked to accept the temporary Anglo-French forces' deployment on the key position at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez so that the free passage of ships of all countries through the Canal could be ensured. This ultimatum was to be

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82. E.B. Childres, n. 80, p. 246.
83. Stephen Green, n. 47, p. 134.
responded within twelve hours by the two governments. If they failed to accept the ultimatum, the Anglo-French troops would intervene "in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance." As it was already planned, the Israeli troops remained ten miles away from the Canal as a follower of the ultimatum whereas the Egyptian Government refused to accept the ultimatum which gave the Anglo-French aircrafts the opportunity to operate from Malta and Cyprus and bombarded the Egyptian airfields in the Delta and in the Canal Zone resulting in sinking of an Egyptian frigate in the Gulf of Suez. In order to materialise a complete Egyptian blockade of the Canal, President Nasser ordered the sinking of 47 ships filled with concrete.

On the 30th of October, 1956, when Anglo-French ultimatum was given to Egypt and Israel, a resolution was sponsored by the United States in the Security Council urging Israel to cease-fire and withdraw her forces immediately behind the armistice lines. In an address to the nation through Radio and Television on October 31, 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarded the

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86. Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited), n. 6, p. 371.

invading actions as incompatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. It was on November 4, 1956, that Canada sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly, emphasising that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, would chalk out a plan to set up an emergency international United Nations force, to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, abiding the November 2, 1956 resolution terms, sponsored by the United States. The next night Hammarskjold proposed the establishment of a United Nations Force under General E.L.M. Burns, who was already as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations.

88. The president added that: "... beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations ... There can be no peace-without law. And there can be no law - if we were to invoke once code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."


The resolution had urged that (a) all parties in hostilities in the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire, (b) the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice line, (c) all member states should abstain from any act that might delay or prevent the implementation of the resolution, (d) upon the cease-fire of being effective, steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal, (e) requested the Secretary-General to observe the report compliance promptly to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine. On November 5, 1956, when the voting was being carried out in the General Assembly, the same day Anglo-French paratroops were landing at the north end of the Suez Canal, though fighting was ceased by both Egypt and Israel. Meanwhile, Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the Soviet Union sent a strongly worded message to the British Prime Minister Eden, Guy Mollet, the French Premier and David Ben Gurion of Israel. In his message, Bulganin expressed Russian determination to resort to force in order to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East.

In the meantime, the United States Government refused to provide the further financial assistance to both Britain and France and also prevented the supply of oil in order to pressurise the Anglo-French forces. On November 6, 1956, Britain and France accepted the cease-fire and the UN force supervision in the war torn. It was a common belief that Anglo-French hostilities was ceased due to the sincere endeavours of President Eisenhower. Some scholars, however, also gave credit to Soviet Premier Bulganin's warning, which worked as a deterrence to war.


91. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 100.


hysteria in the region.\textsuperscript{94}

English Prime Minister Anthony Eden's falling health, domestic economic conditions, and political pressures also paved the way for the cessation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{95}

The State Department officials indirectly pleaded for a sanction on Israel through stopping the American aid. Three days earlier, on November 5, Premier Bulganin had also sent a letter to Ben Gurion accusing the Israeli Government of "criminally and irresponsibly toying with the fate of the world and its own people" and of "inculcating such hatred as bring into question the actual existence of Israel as a State."\textsuperscript{96} The American pressure and the Soviet threat led Prime Minister Ben Gurion of Israel to announce Israel's readiness to withdraw from Egyptian territory.\textsuperscript{97} The withdrawal of British and French forces was completed on December 23, 1956, which was supervised by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).\textsuperscript{98}


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{96} Quoted in Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970), p. 100.


However, Israelis did not materialise the declaration of withdrawal of its troops from Egypt. On November 5, 1956, Dulles, the US Secretary of State, in a press conference declared that the United States would seriously consider the economic sanctions against Israel provided General Assembly would so desire. But this move was criticised by some senators. In a meeting on February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower, while explaining the reasons for the American pressure on Israel for the acceptance of UN resolution for an unconditional withdrawal of troops, pointed out that if the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank did not support Israel it would soon face the financial crisis. It should avoid such an event. President Eisenhower cautioned the Congressmen of the Arabs possible inclination towards the Soviets as a result of Israel’s non-compliance to the UN order. He admitted that he was aware of the Congressmen opposition to the sanctions against Israel but he did not find any way to protect American interests. He stated that the principles of world peace organisation would be jeopardised in case US fail to support its resolutions on Israel.

It was on May 1, 1957, UN resolution of economic sanctions on Israel was moved in the General Assembly. But immediately the

100. Leila S. Kadi, n. 60, p. 105.
101. Ibid.
Israeli authorities announced the withdrawal of forces from Egypt before the resolution was approved in the General Assembly. In fact, it was principally the Americans efforts and their firm stand against Britain, France and Israel which resulted in end of war crisis in the Suez. The United States wanted to avoid the world's opinion of its being connived with the three powers and she was antagonised with the Allies secret plan which was not revealed to her and even the American warnings were ignored by the Israelis. These events eventually paved the way for American inclination towards Arabs.

**Eisenhower Doctrine**

It was after the two months long span of hearings that the US Congress ultimately adopted a joint resolution on March 9, 1957, better known as Eisenhower Doctrine which emphasised to contain the Soviet influence in the entire Middle East and to establish the US supremacy in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was framed to "promote peace and stability in the Middle East". and the President was further conferred on with the authority by

105. *Ibid*.
106. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, pp. 46-47.
the Congress to "co-operate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, undertake military assistance programs with such nations, and use of some $200 million for implementing the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954."

The United States regarded the doctrine as vital to the national interest and world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. It was provided that if the President so determined, the United States was prepared to use its armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism, consonant with its treaty obligations and with the US Constitution."

This doctrine, however, received a poor response abroad, and at the same time divided the Arab world into two camps. Though, the British Government did not foresee any danger of Soviet armed attack, it mainly foresaw the threat of Middle East arms race due to the Eisenhower Doctrine and its intentions to drive undue advantages of power vacuum and protecting its oil

108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
Interests in the region were further intensified in the name of doctrine.

When the US Ambassador, P. Richards was sent to the Middle East to secure adherence to the doctrine, all the Arab countries except Lebanon, Greece, Turkey and Iran, opposed the policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine was first applied in Jordan in April, 1957, when Jordanian monarchy was jolted by an attempt at a coup staged by the pro-Nasser faction in the army and supported by a civilian coalition comprising the Baathists and the Communists. Washington reacted by sending the US Sixth-Fleet to eastern Mediterranean waters and Dulles declared "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital" to its national interests. Fortunately, King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan was able to defeat his enemies and retain control over his Kingdom by dissolving the parliament and political parties, arresting the dismissed Prime Minister, Suleiman Nebulsi, and imposing martial law. This was followed by the United States announcement of an emergency grant of $10 million to the Jordanian Government.

During the summer of 1957, pro-Nasser and pro-Soviet groups in the army controlled the Syrian Government followed by

110. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, p. 47.
111. Harry N. Howard, n. 63, p. 126.
112. George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 798.
considerable Soviet military and economic aid to Syria. In view of this new development, the United States speculated that the Soviet Union might stimulate Syria against Turkey and warned the Soviet Union to desist herself from intervention in the Middle East and reiterated its stand to defend Turkey. Fortunately, the threat of war soon disappeared and Egypt and Syria formally joined together and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) which was hailed as a prelude to Arab unity. This was a great blow to the US influence in the region and soon the authorities in the White House realised that the pro-Nasser groups and Egyptian Agents were creating hindrances for the US policy in the Middle East.

In May, 1958, an armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon following President Camille Chamoun's pro-Western policies and his support to Eisenhower Doctrine. President Chamoun alleged that the foreign agents were responsible for the revolt and he sought the United States assistance to overcome the crisis in Lebanon. Once again, the US Sixth Fleet was sent to Mediterranean and Lebanon was provided with US military aid to suppress the revolt. Lebanon and Jordan became more apprehensive when the Iraqi Government was overthrown on July 14, 1958, by the pro-Nasser faction under the leadership of General Abdul Karim Qasim and they immediately sought the US help.

114. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, p. 51.
In fact, on July 15, 1958, 14,000 marines were ordered to put ashore in Lebanon by President Eisenhower ignoring all the Congressmen's contention of the inapplicability of Eisenhower Doctrine and the opposition from Pentagon. On July 17, the British paratroops and the American land forces were sent to Jordan and this act of the United States and Britain was condemned by the Soviet Union as an "aggression" and their withdrawal was demanded. In October, 1958, the US forces were withdrawn from Lebanon followed by the British withdrawal of its forces from Jordan a month later. This intervention was brought discredit to the US policies and adversely affected its goodwill earned in the Middle East during the Suez crisis.116

This, of course, paved the way for Russian entry in the region and at the same time they felt that some of the Arab countries were interested in sharing the Soviet technology particularly, in the military affairs.

Assumption of the office of the presidency in 1961 by John F. Kennedy brought considerable changes both in thinking and policy posture which, however, inclined favourably to those progressive states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq etc. as these states had a decisive role in the Middle East policies, apart from


their broader approach in the international affairs. Soon this policy was encountered with a number of problems like the civil war in Yemen and followed by massive intervention by the Egyptian forces with the supply of military aid etc. Though the United States intended to cultivate good relations with Egypt yet the US Administration could not ignore Nasser's aggressive posture towards Saudi Arabia which had friendly relations with the Americans. The new policy initiatives spelt out by the Kennedy Administration for the Arabs remained far from implementation because of the untimely death of President in November, 118 1963.

US and the War of 1967

A relative peace was apparently witnessed between the Arabs and Israelis for almost a decade after the Suez Crisis. But internally the massive war preparations were on both sides. President Lyndon B. Johnson Administration did not formulate any new policies for the Arabs but perpetuated the previous foreign policy programmes of Kennedy Administration ensuring economic and military supplies regularly to Israel and to keep working relations with revolutionary states like Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman

118. George Lenczowski, n. 28, p. 803.

119. The Arabs, particularly the UAR, had received considerable amount of economic and military aid from the Soviet Union which had greatly undermined US influence in the Arab countries. The Israelis had, on the other hand, received a much larger amount of aid and military equipment from the United States.

M.L. Gujral, n. 115, p. 351.
also continued undisturbed.

Due to the past conflicts the problem of displaced Palestinian Arabs became intractable and this led to the emergence of a number of militant movements like Al-Fatah and Palestine Liberation Army apart from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to counter the Israeli aggression in the region. Both the Palestinians and Israelis involved in attacking each other and the Palestinians faced a number of casualties, particularly of those residing in the Arab territories. The border incidents and clashes frequently occurred between the Arabs and Israelis.

120. George Lenczowski, n. 28, pp. 803-804.

121. In early sixties, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established with the active support of Egypt. It was headed by Ahmad Shukairy, a barrister from Cambridge, who was a Palestinian refugee himself. Simultaneously, a front organisation named the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was formed to free the Holyland from the "Zionist occupation". About the same time, Al-Fatah, another liberation movement, came into limelight. This organisation was founded in late sixtees by Yasser Arafat, an Arab refugee, with the aim of liberating Palestine from the Jewish usurpers. Arab refugees were recruited to the PLA and Al-Fatah, and they carried guerrilla raids inside Israel.

A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p. 20.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.
It was in May, 1967, that Soviet Union informed Syria of heavy deployment of Israeli forces at its border and Syria communicated this information to Egypt. Initially, President Nasser thought that the massing of the Israeli troops was simply a deterrence to the fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) border raids. But he later believed the Syrians about the possible Israeli attack on their territory. As Nasser got the message from Colonel Anwar al-Sadat who headed a parliamentary delegation to North Korea via Moscow from April 27 to May, 1967, and was told by Podgorny about the Israeli plan to attack on Syria.

This was marked by the proclamation of State of emergency in Egypt and the mobilisation of Egyptian forces into Sinai followed by President Nasser's request on May 18, to the UN Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was duly complied. On May 22, 1967, President Nasser, while announcing the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, stated:

"... Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jews threaten war. We say they are welcome to war, ... but under no circumstances shall we abandon any of our rights. These are our waters ..."126


125. Ibid., p. 39.

Reacting to the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, on May 23, 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel stated in the Knesset that:

"An interference with and in the Straits (of Tiran) constitutes a gross violation of international law, a blow at the sovereign rights of other nations and an act of aggression against Israel". 127

On the same day, in a broadcast to the nation the US President Lyndon B. Johnson regarded it as the "grave demonstrations to the crisis". He declared that the United States considered the Gulf as an "international waterway" and felt the blockade of Israeli shipping "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." He further committed to the "political independence and territorial integrity" of all the nations in the region and pledged that he would support the UN efforts to diffuse the tension in the area. 128 The Soviet Union felt the gravity of the situation and anticipated that it might result into direct conflict. Nasser was advised to avoid over-reaction and keep restraint. But he was annoyed with the Soviet suggestion as the Soviet Union herself gave information about the massing of Israeli troops on the Syrian and Egyptian borders. 129

However, on May 30, 1967, in a spectacular move a Joint Defense Agreement was signed between President Nasser of UAR and

King Hussein of Jordan. On June 4, 1967, Iraq also joined the Defence Pact originally signed between the UAR and Jordan. These developments paved the way for a direct conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. It was on June 5, 1967, that Israel launched a major attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan leading to the destruction of air forces of these countries. It took Nasser and other Arab leaders by surprise. President Nasser requested the Soviet Union to intervene but due to the fear of superpower confrontation in the conflict, the Soviet Union went only to the extent of condemning the Israeli Government and demanding the Israeli withdrawal and cessation of conflict. This was followed by the Soviet and American efforts in UN to pass a resolution for the cease-fire. The war was stopped with the conclusion of cease-fire agreement on June 10, 1967. But Israel occupied Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, West Bank of Jordan and Golan Heights of Syria after defeating the three countries in the six-day war. The war no doubt, gave a jolt and shock to the Arabs in general and Nasser in particular. Mohamed Heikal pointed out that three fundamental facts had contributed to the swift and massive Israeli victories - Firstly, the Arabs were facing an enemy in receipt of massive aid. Secondly, Israel

130. *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 31, 1967.
133. Aftab Kamal Pasha, n. 124, pp. 41-42.
had utilised the resources she received, with exceptional skill. Thirdly, in tackling Israel with the resources— which were not inconsiderable, the Arabs acted with exceptional inaptitude.

No doubt, the Arabs were quite unhappy with the Russians for their inability to render military assistance during war. Yet the Arab dependence on the Soviet Union was increased as president Nasser had expressed faith in the Soviet authorities to receive military assistance and to stimulate his own socialist policies at the home front. On the other hand, the United States equally extended the massive military assistance to Israel.

The Arab Summit which was commenced on August 29, 1967, in Khartoum, Sudan, approved unanimously that Israelis should withdraw to the existing line before June 5, 1967. On June 19, 1967, addressing at the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, President Johnson gave the five great principles for peace settlement in the Middle East. The first principle was the recognition of the right of national life; second, justice for all the refugees; third, opening of innocent maritime passage to all nations; fourth, limits on the wasteful


137. Fuad A. Jaber (Edited), n. 126, pp. 655-656.
and destructive arms race and fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

The grave concern was expressed about the Middle East in the Summit meeting which was held between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexie Kosygin on June 23, 1967, at Glassboro, New Jersey, and approved that both the powers would cooperate to ensure peace in the region. This, however, gave a new impetus to the policy perception of both the powers in the region because of their own interests and this gradually laid foundation for rapprochement.

It was on November 22, 1967, that the United Kingdom sponsored Security Council Resolution 242, for peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict which was unanimously approved. In fact, this outlined the principles and measures given by President Johnson on June 19 and also during the talks with Premier Kosygin on June 23, 1967, at Glassboro Summit.


140. Fuad A. Jaber (Edited), n. 126, p. 268.

The resolution 242 urged:

"I Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

II Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secured and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force." 142

After the passage of resolution 242, the UN Secretary-General U Thant, appointed Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador, to Soviet Union as Special Representative to bring about agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis. Though he shuttled between the Arab States and Israel for more than two years but all efforts went in vain due to the conflicting interests of the super powers and to the conflicting views expressed by both 143 the Arabs and Israelis.

As a result of the Egyptian defeat in 1967 war, Nasser launched a "War of Attrition" against the Israelis.

142. It further affirmed the necessity "(a) for granting freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugees problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."


near the frontier along the Suez Canal in March, 1969, in order
to achieve three aims:

"(a) To enable the Egyptian army to confront the
Israeli Defense forces in a limited war under
favourable conditions.

(b) To diminish the Israeli forces and erode
Israel's staying power, and

(c) To get the Americans to pressurize Israel to
withdraw from the occupied territories without
any meaningful change in the military... balance." 144

In the beginning of the "War of Attrition", the Egyptian
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forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Israelis. At this
juncture, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, on December 9,
1969, came forward with a set of proposals known as "Rogers
Plan" which aimed at the cessation of hostilities between Egyptian
146
and Israeli forces. The plan, however, did not draw any

144. Johny Mehta, The Arab-Israeli War, 1973; Strategy Tactics &
145. William R. Polk, The Elusive Peace; The Middle East in the
146. Michael Adams, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-75" in
The Middle East and North Africa, 1975-76 (London: Europa

The Rogers Plan provided Israel to withdraw to the interna-
tional boundary with Egypt (that of the mandate period),
Gaza Strip and Sharm al-Sheikh, to remain subjects for nego-
tiation, on the assumption that they will not remain under
Israeli control, Israel to withdraw to the 1949 armistice
lines with Jordan with slight revisions, the Arab refugees
to be accorded a status equal to that of Israel in the
religious, economic and civil spheres.
Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited), n. 6, p. 329.
And also see for further details The New York Times (New
favourable response from Egypt and Israel.

Meanwhile, the war took a new turn due to the Israel's success and its massive air raids against Egypt involving heavy civilian casualties. This paved the way for the Russians to come closer to Egypt with further military assistance to its army. It worked as a deterrent to the Israelis whereas the United States got alarmed by a new form of Soviet presence in the region. On June 19, 1970, in a renewed diplomatic initiative the revised Rogers plan for cessation of hostilities was launched by the United States. President Nasser, on July 23, 1970, accepted the US proposal. This was followed by the Israeli

147. Ibid., p. 37.

The Soviet Union had begun to commit not only advisers but operational troops and air defense units for the first time outside Warsaw Pact countries.

Ibid., p. 173.
150. Ibid., p. 397.

approval of the Rogers Plan on July 30, 1970, and ultimately a cease-fire was declared. The 90 days cease-fire agreement became effective on August 7, 1970, which was renewed on November 6, 1970, and again in February, 1971. Though, the cease-fire was allowed to expire on March 7, 1971, the de facto cease-fire was continued until October, 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

153. Yair Evron, n. 151, p. 120.
CHAPTER - II

EGYPT - ISRAEL : 1973 WAR

After the death of President Gamal Abdul Nasser on September 28, 1970, Vice-President Anwar Al-Sadat became the president of Egypt and brought a sudden and drastic change in the delicately balanced position of Egypt, previously maintained by Nasser in political and economic spheres both in internal and external policies. President Sadat, with the help of Nasserian right and the Egyptian army, liquidated the leftist group of Ali Sabri-Gomaa and also inclined towards Colonel Muammar Al-Qaddafi of Libya, who had developed anti-Soviet stand.

President Sadat had made up his mind to combat the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was in early 1971 that he declared the

1. President Nasser had made repeated economic and political concessions to the entrenched bourgeoisie and a more demanding "new class" as well as to Anglo-American interests, which had previously lobbied vainly against his encroachment on their areas of influence. At the end of 1967, he recalled the Egyptian forces which were helping to stem the Royalist and Saudi Arabian influence in North Yemen, and he withdrew his support from the South Yemen nationalists and insurgents in the Persian Gulf oil Emirates. He, in fact, suspended all and to Arab revolutionary movements and drew closer to the reactionary monarchies, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and to King Idris in Libya, which poured substantial money into the Egyptian treasury.


2. Ibid., p. 365.
"year of Decision" to resolve the conflict and restore to Egypt its territory occupied by the Israelis. During the first visit to the Soviet Union in March, 1971, Sadat proposed the conclusion of a treaty between Egypt and the Soviet Union. The factors which led to pursue such a policy were: Firstly, both Nasser and Sadat thought that in any event of conflict with Israel which would naturally involve the Soviets due to their physical presence in Egypt, Israelis would go back due to the undesirable risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Secondly, Sadat's apprehension was that any internal power struggle or opposition or change in the leadership might cause a change in the Soviet policy thereby affecting the Egypt's military plans and strategy with Israel. Thirdly, Sadat suspected that certain internal or external policies might shake Soviet confidence in him. He wanted to pacify the Soviets by proposing a treaty. Lastly, Sadat thought that the treaty would strengthen his hands to recover the captured territories through negotiations either with Israel or the United States which would be helpful to boost his bargaining position and would be quite worthy. On March 31, 1971, President Sadat sent a special letter through Sami Sharaf, Minister for Presidential Affairs, who led one delegation to the twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU to

Moscow. The letter, which contained the proposal for an Egyptian-Soviet Treaty, was accepted in principle by the Soviets and they communicated their inclination towards signing a treaty in early May that was before the dismissal of the leftist Ali Sabri Gomaa. By the time, however, the Soviet leaders learnt about the bitter power struggle in Egypt. The Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny arrived in Cairo on May 25, 1971, one week after the dismissal of Sabri Gomaa to assess the confused situation in Egypt and it was on May 27, 1971, that a fifteen year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union. The treaty pledged Soviet support to the United Arab Republic (UAR) in its struggle to transform Egypt into socialist society, and bound each of the two parties not to make any alliance or act against the other party or conclude any international accord which would be defiance of the terms of the treaty. The treaty, however, seemed to be one-sided and reflected the Egypt's full dependence on Soviet Union. The treaty which was only justified from the Egyptian point of view, contained the secret military clauses (as Sadat pointed out in his speech before the People's Assembly on July 2, 1971) "added new guarantees which had not been defined previously".

5. Ibid., p. 69.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Egypt's Apathy towards the Soviet Union

The Soviet-Egyptian friendship went through a bitter experience as a result of the Communist coup in Sudan. President Sadat of Egypt and Muammar Al-Qaddhafi of Libya were making their efforts to help Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry of Sudan, in his campaign against the Communist despite the Soviet denunciation of repression. Immediate instructions were given to Sudanese brigade on Suez to return to Khartoum to help Nimeiry in his counter-coup. Naturally, the Soviets were unhappy with Egypt's participation in reinstating Nimeiry which caused Soviets reluctance to further delivery of arms. The Soviet promise of 1971 to supply arms to Egypt, did not fulfil and on the contrary

9. In February, the Sudanese Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry had announced his intention to "crush" the local Communists from key positions in the army, the Police and the State apparatus. The Communists then staged a coup on July 19, 1971, but within three days, Nimeiry was back in power. The military plotters as well as many leading Communists, including the Secretary-General of the party, were executed. Pravda denounced the "mass-scale bloody reign of terror" in the Sudan, while Nimeiry proceeded to expel the Bulgarian Ambassador as well as a Soviet Counsellor and to describe relations with the Soviet Union as "extremely bad". Subsequently, it transpired that, as in Egypt, Soviet leaders had not been informed, let alone consulted, about the intended coup perhaps, because the conspirators feared they would veto it.


10. Ibid.

the arms were diverted to India during 1971 Indo-Pak war. This had indeed affected the honour and prestige of President Sadat in Egypt and the beginning of 1972 witnessed considerable deterioration in the Egypt-Soviet relations.

Immediately, Sadat sought the "offensive weapons" like medium or long range ground to ground missiles, and MIG-23 Foxbats, the most advanced Soviet Plane. The Russians surpassed his request and told diplomatically that still Egyptian army was too inadequate to win a war against Israel. Moreover, Moscow kept cool to the Egyptian request due to the significant political development such as signing of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States in February, 1972, and at the same time the Soviet authorities felt that the spirit of detente might pave the way for peace in the region. Sadat felt that Soviet leaders had accorded top priority to the detente with the United States, as a result there would be risk of formation of Soviet and the United States condominium which might prevent an emergence of war in the region. Sadat's request for "offensive weapons" had already been refused by the Soviets and there was also some tension between the Soviet advisers and the

Egyptian forces and these developments were virtually resulted into expulsion of all Soviet forces from Egypt by President Sadat. It was on July 8, 1972, that President Sadat informed the Soviet Ambassador that the services of Soviet technicians:

"to be terminated from 17 July. Soviet arms which were in Egypt should either be sold to Egypt and Egyptians be trained to use them or should be withdrawn ... Any remaining Soviet forces should be placed under Egyptians' command or be withdrawn." 15

The expulsion of Soviet advisers was however, taken calmly by the Russians. It was a crucial question for the Americans to initiate a new diplomatic ties with Egypt after having understood Sadat's apathy towards the Soviets. In fact, it was Saudi Arabia, which encouraged Sadat to relieve from the Soviet hold and assured to convince the United States to reduce its support to Israel.

Though, some American officials were of the view that time had come to approach both Egypt and Israel, yet, the State Department felt that the time was not congenial to replace Soviet arms with the American weapons in Egypt. The United States officials, however, could have encouraged some European countries to supply weapons and regain its lost credibility in Egypt. But 1972 was the election year in America. President Richard Milhous Nixon

did not like to displease Jewish lobby by taking a favourable stand for Middle Eastern policies as to diffuse tension in the Middle East or for Egypt. Sadat was not positively responded which made both Saudis and Egyptians unhappy.

The gap between the Soviet Union and Egypt was bridged and the October, 1972 visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Aziz Sidky, to Soviet Union was followed by the resumption of arms supply to Egypt. A top level Soviet Committee was set up in December, 1972, to review the bilateral relations. It was followed by the restoration of relations between the two countries, after the National Security Adviser of President Sadat, Hafez Ismael, visited Moscow. Interestingly enough, the Soviet Union began to deliver a huge quantity of arms which also included the sophisticated "offensive weapons". Soviet Union also continued

18. Ibid., p. 299
21. These included an additional number TU 16 Bombers, armed with Kelt stand off missiles and, much more important, a limited number of scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Egyptians had long been calling for a "deterrent" weapon against Israeli attack and the provision of the scuds, some thirty of which were sent to Egypt, where they were placed under Egyptian operational command while being partially serviced and operated by Soviet personnel, was an important factor in the Egyptian decision to go to war. As well as increasing the strategic threat to Israel, the Soviet Union also augmented Egypt's tactical offensive capabilities. Soviet deliveries included some 600 additional tanks, over

contd...
the supply of arms to Syria and it was during the summer of 1973
that in pursuance of Soviet promise to President Hafez Al-Assad
of Syria during his visit to Russia in April, a complete air
defense system was established.

The Clouds of War

By 1973, the Egyptian economy was in doldrum. Further,
Sadat's "year of decision" led to unrest because the Russians
failed to deliver the needed weapons and the entire Egypt-Soviet
affairs to counter the Israelis with the Soviet weapons became
a big joke in the Arab world. Mohamed Heikal, the then editor
of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, pointed out: "One of the

contd...

250 new armoured personnel carriers, anti-tank and anti-
aircraft missiles.

Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East

22. This gave Syrians, missile coverage of air-space over
Israel occupied territory of Golan.

Ibid., p. 127.

23. Industrial development, the High Dam, and the burden of
war in the Yemen had made the early and middle sixties a
period of extreme difficulty. Then had come the 1967
defeat and the need for an almost complete rebuilding and
reequipping of the army. In five years between 1968 and
1973, Egypt spent $8-9,000 million on the war effort.

The Middle East and North Africa: 1975-1976 (London:

And also see for further details Mohamed Heikal,
n. 15, p. 204.
most potent forces acting on President Sadat was the attitude of Israel. The almost incredible arrogance of Israeli politicians in public reached its peak as the general election, due on 31 October 1973, came near. During the spring and summer, parties and candidates were out-bidding each other in their plans for what to do with conquered Arab territory. The Labour Alignment, under pressure from General Moshe Dayan changed its position over annexation. Creeping annexation, or "creating facts", as it was called, gathered momentum. Dayan talked openly of his designs for the new port of Yamit at Rafah which was to isolate Egypt for ever from contact with the Gaza Strip.

It was in the end of June, 1973, that a rough plan of "operation Badr" was prepared by both Egyptian president, Sadat and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez Al-Assad. The plan envisaged Egypt as the senior partner and Syria was to act in accordance with Cairo. The Egyptian decision to fix October 6, 1973, as their "D-Day" bore certain factors like the night in which the weather and moon conditions were expected to be the best suited for the effectiveness of their plan and the symbolic religious importance which was also significant for their plan. No doubt, President Sadat must have been inspired by the tenth day of the Muslim month of Ramdhan (which corresponded to October 6 in 1973), the day on which the preparations for the most significant early

24. Sadat took it as an insult to his "self-respect".

Mohamed Heikal, n. 15, pp. 204-205.
Islamic battle, the "battle of Badr", was started by Prophet Mohammed. The battle led to the conquest of Mecca which was taken as divine approbation of his small and persecuted community. Further, October 6, 1973, was also the Jewish festival of Yom Kippur, which was the most congenial time to launch an offensive.  

Outbreak of War

On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a powerful offensive across the Suez Canal while Syrian target of attack was the Golan Heights. Though, Jordan did not confront Israel with military front yet it sent the army to the Syrian command to indulge in the fighting. The Syrian army diminished the Israeli defense line and reoccupied most of the parts of Golan.


One of the important elements of the plan was that "Jordan should be brought in as a potential associate in order to help pin down enemy forces".


On the Egyptian front, its forces gained a remarkable success in crossing the Suez Canal and destroying the defenses of the Bar-Lev Line.28

When this news reached US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, he found it very surprising as only a day before, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mohammed H. al-Zayat, met him but did not give any slightest idea about the possibility of sudden development regarding the outbreak of war. Moreover, it was a week earlier that a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars was signed between the Egyptian Government and American financial group for the construction of a major oil pipeline in Egypt. The State Department spokesman, Robert J. Mclosky, also showed surprise and said: "We never had any indication there was military action intended..."29


Bar-Lev line was the unofficial name of system of Israeli fortress erected at the Suez Canal between October 1968 and March 1969, as a means of defense in the Egyptian "War of attrition" launched in breach of the June, 1967 cease-fire.


In the Senate, a resolution was introduced by the majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat) and the Republican minority leader, Senator Hugh Scott on October 8, 1973. The Senate resolved that it condemned the outbreak of war in the Middle East region and urged the US President and Secretary of State to use their good offices:

"to bring about a cease-fire and a return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied by them prior to the outbreak of current hostilities, and, further, that the Senate expresses its hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in the region". 30

In the United Nations, the Security Council meeting was held on October 8, 1973. It was, however, adjourned and again it met on October 9, without any concrete decision. Israel blamed the Soviet Union for current tension in the area whereas the Soviet Union called Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli representative as a "representative of murderous gangsters." On the other hand, Yosef Tekoah expressed that the Russians were responsible for the encouragement of hatred of Israel and their presence in the Middle East further jeopardised the chances of restoration of peace. 31

The war was on and in the first week about one-fourth of Israeli air force was lost as most of the planes were shot down


by Egyptians' Soviet built SAMS. Similarly, from October 6 to 10, 1973, Syrian forces, while gaining an upper hand on the Israelis had achieved a remarkable success in penetrating more than fifteen miles into Israeli occupied territory and reoccupied Kuneitra which was lost by the Syrians in the war of 1967. They drove their forces across the Golan Heights within a few miles of the 1949 Armistice demarcation line. It was on October 10, 1973, that Soviet Union delivered a large amount of weapons to both Egypt and Syria. The last Israeli fortified position on the east bank of the Suez Canal was also surrendered between October 10 and 13, 1973. Many Israeli aircrafts and arms were destroyed during the five days of the war. The United States was alarmed and finally decided to stabilise the crisis by supplying more military personnel and arms to Israel so that the Soviet backed victory could not occur against Israelis.

In a press conference held on October 12, 1973, the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, declared that:

"As far as we are concerned, you all know that we do have an ongoing military relationship with Israel, which we are continuing..."

34. Ibid., p. 188.
It was already on October 9, 1973, that Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, in a confidential briefing to newspapers editors said that:

"... We decided first of all to throw out the Syrians, to really get at them. Nobody retreats from there. We will finish with Syrians and not withdraw. This is our approach to the Syrians now, because we want to shorten the front and because there is also the possibility that the Jordanians and the Iraqis may join the Syrian front. As far as Egypt is concerned, the view is that we should not allow forces to be worn down. That would be futile. We must redeploy and establish defense lines."36

The Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Golda Meir decided to address first the Syrian front as Golan front seriously threatened Israel and where the Israelis could get fast success. On October 12, 1973, the Israelis pushed back the Syrian army behind the 1967 cease-fire line and they penetrated beyond it and into the Syrian territory.37 Syria, however, pressurised Egypt that Egyptian army should launch a major offensive if it wanted to continue the war. Under such pressure Egyptian army launched a major offensive on October 14, 1973.38 The Israelis launched a counter-offensive and as a result, they crossed the Suez Canal. An Egyptian army, that crossed the Canal in the southern stretch of the front was encircled by the Israeli forces. The initial achievements of Egypt were upset and eventually Israelis succeeded

37. Itamar Rabinovich, n. 27, p. 57.
38. Ibid., p. 58.
in halting the Egyptian offensive and achieved the military success.  

President Sadat, in an address to the people's Assembly, on October 16, called for the cease-fire on the basis of Israeli withdrawal "from all occupied territories, under international supervision, to the pre-5th June, 1967 lines." He also proposed an international peace conference at the United Nations.

Oil Embargo and Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy

With the outbreak of the war, the world witnessed the most crucial energy and currency crisis which threatened the world economy, transportation and commerce which adversely affected not only Europe but even the Third World as well. Petrol as an oil weapon in the hands of Arabs made the Europeans and Japanese feel that in order to safeguard their own interests, the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem became imperative. The Arabs earned billions of dollars due to energy crisis and even they decided to influence the world events by using oil as their weapon. Thus, the Arabs demonstrated that


40. The Egyptian President declared that "we are prepared as soon as withdrawal from all these territories has been completed, to attend an international peace conference at the United Nations."


they were also a sixth power after the United States, Soviet Union, Europe, China and Japan. 42

In fact, it was on January 6, 1973, that a resolution was passed in the Kuwait National Assembly which emphasised to use "oil as a weapon" against the Israelis. The resolution pointed out that:

"... a major conflict can be expected to break out at any moment between the forces of Israeli-Zionist aggression and the mainstay of the Arab forces - the Arab Republic of Egypt - We propose that the Government should unambiguously recommend that as soon as the fighting breaks out, if not before, all our oil resources be immediately brought into the battle by suspending our links with the Western oil countries..." 43

On October 17, 1973, the oil ministers of the member states of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), held in the city of Kuwait to cut the oil production by 5 per cent every month until "such a time as the international community compels Israel to relinquish" their occupied territories. 44 The United States came under the same spell

42. Ibid., p. 26.

And also see for further details BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/4188/A/10.
44. Middle East Economic Survey (Beirut), Vol. XVII, No. 4 November 16, 1973, p. iii.
as it was also resolved that:

"The United States be subjected to the most severe cut proportionally with the quantities of crude oil, oil derivatives and hydrocarbons that it imports from every exporting country. The participants also recommended that this progressive reduction leads to the total halt of oil supplies to the United States from every individual country party to the resolution."

The resolution further pointed out that the friendly nations, however, would not be affected by the embargo. Initially, the oil as a weapon did not adversely affect the countries of Europe but with the passage of time it became more powerful and devastating as Saudi Arabia, by far one of the largest Arab oil producers, decided to cut its production unilaterally by 10 per cent. Naturally, the West suffered the loss of the better part of million barrels a day. Qatar followed the suit. Abu Dhabi went into new action and announced a total ban on shipments to America, and Libya also followed it. This was in addition to the general oil cutback throughout the Arab Exporting countries. It may be noted that in the Kuwait meeting of October 17, 1973, the pressure of total embargo was resisted by Saudi Arabia as she did not want to break close friendly relationship with the United States. In order to pursue the officials in the State Department to settle the Middle Eastern dispute, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia sent his Foreign Minister,

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
Omar Saqqaf to Washington to meet President Nixon on October 17, 1973. But on October 19, after Foreign Minister Saqqaf and President Nixon meeting, the US President requested the Congress for $2.2 billion emergency military aid to Israel. Though, the United States had already started a huge arms airlift to Israel yet it was a formal confirmation. American heavy rearmament and President Nixon's declaration at this crucial stage made King Faisal to think that it was an American betrayal and insult to the Arabs. On October 20, 1973, Saudi Arabia announced the complete oil embargo to the

47. Saqqaf informed King Faisal that Nixon had given him certain assurances, on the strength of which King Faisal was prepared to persist in exercising his enormous influence on the side of moderation.


48. The US president expressed that "I am requesting that the Congress authorize emergency security assistance of $2.2 billion for Israel... This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action... if we are to build a global structure of peace."


And also see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, November 12, 1973, pp. 596-597.

During that period, the American diplomacy was directed by the Secretary of State, Kissinger, and aimed at several divergent ends as he wanted to combat the Soviet threats in the Middle East and also wanted the United States to exert considerable influence in the region. The United States, however, sought to give the Soviets a sense of participation instead of exclusion from the diplomatic negotiations and at the same time to retain an upper hand in the affairs. Further, the American officials did not want to ensure the image of victory to Israel over Egypt. As there was a danger of direct Soviet-American confrontation due to the support to their respective client states, the Secretary of State, Kissinger, proceeded to Moscow on October 20, 1973, at the invitation of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, to

50. In a statement issued by the Saudi Government, it was announced that "... in view of the increase in American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt oil exports to the United States of America for taking this position."


Also see BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4430/A/6.

And also see for further details *Middle East Economic Digest* (London), October 26, 1973, p. 1261.

51. Itamar Rabinovich, n. 27, p. 60.
discuss the Middle East crisis. In order to divert the attention from the Watergate problems, Nixon wanted to achieve a landmark success in American foreign policy and in a message to Brezhnev he indicated that he had conferred on Kissinger the "full authority" and he would fully support the commitments of Kissinger during the course of his discussion. The four hours of intensive discussion between Kissinger and Brezhnev resulted in drafting of the text of a cease-fire resolution. It was passed as Resolution 338 by the Security Council, on October 22, 1973, calling for a cease-fire. The statement issued by the Government of

52. The same day President Nixon fired Watergate Special persecutor, Archibald Cox, an action that led to the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus.


53. Ibid.

54. The Security Council Resolution declared that it:

"1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately not later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of the decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

Egypt confirmed its acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution. The Israeli Cabinet also decided to accept the cease-fire. Notwithstanding the bilateral agreement of cease-fire resolution, fighting erupted on the Suez front from October 23 to 24 and both the parties blamed each other for such violations. The Security Council again met on October 23, 1973, and passed a resolution 339 which reiterated the call for cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to send observers to supervise "the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt." The Israeli forces, however, had entered the town of Suez by October 25, and the Egyptian Third Army was encircled. President Sadat requested both, General-Secretary, Brezhnev, and President Nixon to despatch a Joint Soviet-American Peace Keeping Force to the Middle East to police the cease-fire impartially. But as soon as the proposal was turned down by Kissinger and Nixon, Brezhnev sent

57. This fighting, which took place on both banks of the Canal, was particularly heavy for the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army to break out of the encirclement and recross the Canal. J.R. Gainsborough, n. 33, p. 189.
a message via Ambassador Dobrynin to Washington that:

"If you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."

This was taken by Kissinger as a serious challenge to the Americans as the implementation of the Soviet programme would certainly once again draw Egypt into the Soviet orbit and reestablish the Soviet presence in the region. Even if both American and Soviet forces supervised the cease-fire, the action would be presumed as the setting up of US-Soviet condominium.

It was on October 25, 1973, that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger declared a world-wide alert of the American forces. In the morning when Kissinger held a press conference and outlined the meaning of the US alert and its reasons, a reporter asked if the world-wide alert was "prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements (Watergate) as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East". Kissinger, however, ruled out any such speculations and went on to explain

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60. Quoted in Dan Caldwell (Edited), n. 52, p. 121.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 122.

For detailed study of reasons for US alert see Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore:John Hopkins University, 1978), pp. 192-196.
the Soviet non-compliance of the principles of co-existence.\textsuperscript{63}

On the same day, the Security Council passed a resolution 340, which called the disputing parties to return to the cease-fire lines of October 22, 1973, and also decided to establish a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which would be comprised of personnel drawn from member states of the United Nations with the exception of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{64}

Further, the Security Council Resolution 341 passed on October 27, 1973, limited the strength of the UN Emergency Force to 7,000 men and fixed the deputation period initially to the six months. The main task of this force was to supervise the observance of cease-fire on the Suez Canal front and to make arrangements so that both Egypt and Israel return to October 22 positions held by both side.\textsuperscript{65} There was, however, no peace keeping force on the Syrian-Israeli front but there was already a long established UN truce-observers who were operating on the Egyptian-Israeli fronts.\textsuperscript{66}

It was by October 30, 1973, that the oil exports to the United States was totally stopped by ten Arab countries namely, 

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{64} Official Records of the Security Council (SCOR),1973,n.58,p.11.


\textsuperscript{66} J.R. Gainsborough, n. 33, p. 190.
Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Dubai and Oman, and nine of them with exception to Saudi Arabia, spelt this decision to Netherlands also, with Iraq opting for nationalisation of American and Dutch oil interests in the Basra Petroleum Company. It was again from November 4 to 5, 1973, that the Arab oil exporting countries met in Kuwait and decided to cut the oil production by 25% and reduce the oil exports with 5% cutback to the importing countries and also provided that the friendly countries would be exempted from such cutback. It was further decided to send a mission consisted of "the Algerian Minister of Energy and the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to explain the Arab point of view regarding" the cutback in oil production.

This announcement of oil cutback had a profound impact on the industrialised countries and on November 6, the nine Governments of European Economic Community (EEC) countries decided to demand the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinians' legitimate rights. On the same day, Kissinger reached Cairo and carried on negotiations with President Sadat. This was resulted in the

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decision to resume the diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt on November 7, 1973. Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, was also sent to Israel as "anchorman" of the armistice team. The talks between Egyptian and Israeli military representatives under the aegis of the United Nations was held in order to discuss and negotiate the details of the cease-fire and supply of food and water to the encircled Third Army. As a result of the strong US pressure, the Israelis agreed to allow food supply to the Army. The following day, Egyptian acting Foreign Minister, Ismael Fahmi, who was later confirmed as Foreign Minister, was sent by Sadat. President Sadat's inclination towards the United States ushered an era of improvement in the Cairo-Washington relations. Although, the Egyptian and Israeli Generals who met at 101 kilometres on the Cairo-Suez Road, they did not find a concrete solution to the problems of exchange of Prisoners of War (POW), disengagement of forces etc., and due to the rising tension, a renewed war seemed to be in the offing. Secretary Kissinger, however, had been successful in arranging a cease-fire implementation agreement.

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70. In a Joint US-Egyptian announcement on November 7, 1973, it was stated that "The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an early date. The two Governments have also agreed that in the meantime the respective interests sections (sic.) of the two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambassadorial level."


during the first of a series of his lightning Middle East visits. The six point agreement which was ultimately signed by the Egyptian Lt. General Mohammad el-Gamasi, and his Israeli counterpart, Major General Aharon Yariv on November 11, 1973, at 101 Kilometres on the Cairo-Suez Road, provided for an exchange of prisoners (7,000 Egyptian prisoners were held by Israelis and 450 Israelis were held by Egyptians), regular supplies to the Egyptian Third Army under the UN supervision, negotiations on a more satisfactory cease-fire line to be followed by general peace negotiation.  

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia criticised American perpetual support to Israel and King Faisal was not convinced by Kissinger that the oil embargo should be lifted. King Faisal stuck to the demand of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories including East Jerusalem. On November 18, 1973, the Arab oil Ministers who met in Vienna, decided to cancel the cutback scheduled for December, against the European community. The decision was in pursuance of the pro-Arab stance by the European Common Market Countries regarding the Middle East crisis. The embargo, however, was to be continued on the United

And also see for further details *Keeling's Contemporary Archives*, n. 26, p. 26203.  
On November 21, 1973, while speaking at a press conference, Kissinger asserted that "economic pressures" against the United States were "inappropriate" when the peace was being negotiated. But the embargo pressure would not influence the US policy. He also threatened that countermeasures might be taken against the Arabs. The next day, Saudi Oil Minister, Shaikh Zaki Yamani, threatened to blow up the oil fields in the event of any US military action. Due to the oil embargo, the situation in Japan was becoming worse as the Japanese economy wholly depended on import of oil from the Middle East and its daily consumption of oil was 6.2 million barrels. Forty per cent of oil needed by the Japanese industries was imported from the Middle East. These figures were quite significant when it was realised that 70 per cent of Japan's total energy consumption was derived from oil. While renouncing the neutral stance, Japan, on November 22, announced its full support to the Arab cause. Later, the Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Miki, while touring various Arab countries in mid-December, explained the Japanese stand and situation, as a result the

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The signing of the cease-fire agreement on November 21, 1973, further paved the way for the Geneva Conference under the shuttling guidance of Secretary Kissinger. It would be noted that in order to bring Israel to the negotiating table for further disengagement of forces along the Suez front, Kissinger promised the Israelis with the supply of more arms and security. Equally, it was obvious that Secretary Kissinger in his first trip to the Middle Eastern countries had promised that the first step towards the Israeli pull back would disengagement which would lead to the total Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. While President Sadat had already agreed to attend the Geneva Conference, Kissinger could not similarly influence the Syrian President, Hafez Al-Assad. On December 31, 1973, the Peace Conference opened in Geneva in the Plais de Nations, which


While meeting in Kuwait on December 25, 1973, the Arab Oil Ministers "decided to accord Japan special treatment which would not subject it to the full extent of the across-the-board cutback measures, out of a desire to protect the Japanese economy and in the hope that the Japanese Government, in appreciation of this stand, will continue to adopt just and fair positions vis-a-vis the Arab cause. The assembled ministers, in recognition of the political stand on Belgium, also decided to lift the cut-back on oil supplies to that country..."


was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, without Syrian representation. The Conference, which was adjourned the next day, paved the way for further negotiations between Egypt and Israel which was conducted by Kissinger between Aswan and Jerusalem. 79

During the oil embargo, Saudi Oil Minister, Zaki Yamani, pointed out that despite the cut in oil production, Arabs could earn more money than could absorb. Consequently, oil prices soared. It was on December 11, 1973, that Iran announced the oil price hike up to $17.40 barrel. The Gulf Oil Ministers, however, fixed the prices for their crude oil at $11.65 per barrel. Although, the prices softened somewhat during the ensuing months yet it was obvious that petroleum would be two or three times as expensive as in previous years and this would not only affect the price of goods which would be produced by the industrialised countries or the funds for development purposes to the poor countries but a massive shift of the world monetary structure would also be witnessed. 80 These factors were certainly recognised during the Middle East crisis as most important factors that led the United States to intervene dramatically and repeatedly in pursuance of achieving a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. 81 On December 27, 1973, Kissinger, in

a news conference in Washington reiterated his disappointment with the oil embargo imposed on the United States.\textsuperscript{82}

It was, however, in December 1973, that Saudi Oil Minister, Zaki Yamani, in a meeting with Kissinger in Washington, indicated that if Israeli withdrawal began, the embargo and cutback would be modified. This was, in fact, a significant shift from the original call for the unconditional Israeli withdrawal.\textsuperscript{83} No doubt, Kissinger's early success to bring about a cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel which led the Egyptian and Israeli troops on each side of the Canal, was considered to be a major breakthrough.\textsuperscript{84} This peace effort made by the United States was also recognised by the Arab Oil Ministers meeting on December 25, 1973 and it was said

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\textsuperscript{82} Secretary Kissinger expressed that "I am expressing the view that the United States has consistently taken and which I have expressed at every previous press conference; namely, that discriminatory action against the United States becomes increasingly inappropriate when the United States is the principal country engaging itself in search for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This is a position that has been taken by this administration from the beginning".

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\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 228.
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in communique that:

"The Ministers noted with satisfaction the gradual change which has begun to become evident in American public opinion, significant segment of it has begun to recognize the reality of the Arab problem and Israel's expansionist policy. The assembled Ministers hope that the desire of the U.S. Government to participate in the search for a just peaceful settlement of the problem will be fruitful and will lead to results beneficial to the peoples of the world and in particular to bilateral relations between the Arab and American peoples." 85

On January 11, 1974, Secretary Kissinger started his third Middle East tour and flew to Aswan to meet President Sadat of Egypt in pursuance of the peace settlement process. The following day, he shuttled to Israel to meet the Israeli Cabinet and returned back to Egypt on the 13th of January. Again he flew to Israel on 14th, and on 16th of January, 1974, he went both to Egypt and Israel. Agreement between both countries regarding disengagement of forces was secured by Kissinger so that it could be announced simultaneously in Egypt, Israel and the United States on January 17, 1974.


The US President, Nixon, on January 17, 1974, expressed that he had an announcement regarding Middle East which stated that "In accordance with the decision of the Geneva Conference, the Governments of Egypt and Israel, with the assistance of the Government of the United States, have reached agreement on the disengagement and separation of their military forces. The agreement is

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The agreement was divided into two parts: The first part provided with the actual pullback of troops and the creation of disengagement zones. The second part dealt with the arms and troops limitation in the zones. Details of the second part were kept secret and this was signed by President Sadat in Aswan and Premier Golda Meir in Jerusalem. The treaty which contained the withdrawal of forces was signed at 101 kilometre on the Suez-Cairo Road. Kissinger attended both the signing ceremonies. While the signing ceremony of the first part was presided over by the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Lt. General Ensio Siilasvuo, the Egyptian and the Israeli Chiefs of Staff—Major General Mohammad el-Gamasi and Lt. General David Elazar became the

scheduled to be signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt and Israel at noon Egypt-Israel time, Friday, January 18, at Kilometre (sic) 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road. The Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, General Siilasvuo, has been asked by the parties to witness signing.


It would be noted that Sadat regime was now committed to the cause of peace which the Israel Government recognized so clearly that it had demobilised large chunk of its army immediately. But President Sadat's policy of relying heavily on Kissinger's goodwill was criticised by most of his close friends and supporters, including Mohamed Heikal, the influential editor of Egyptian Newspaper Al-Ahram. He was also criticised for his failure to secure the return of the oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula, which was Egypt's major economic asset. Sadat unheeded the criticism and went to the extent to work with firm commitments with the United States. On January 22, 1974, while

87. The text of the agreement was accompanied by a map delineating the zones of disengagement. Israel was to abandon its bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal and withdraw its forces on the east bank 14-20 miles from the waterway. In the Southern Sector, the Israelis would be deployed immediately west of the Mitla and Giddi passes, which controlled the routes into the heart of the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians were to remain on the east bank in a 5-7½ mile wide zone. The Israeli zone was to be of equal size. Both forces were to be separated by a buffer zone 3½ - 5 miles deep patrolled by UNEF troops.


88. Various rumours circulated through the Middle East about a quid pro-quo - the amount of aid which the United States would give to Egypt following a conclusion of peace. No authoritative figure were brought forward but, in May, the administration put a request to the Congress for an appropriation of $ 250 million to assist in the restoration of the Suez Canal and other projects.

replying the question of continuation of oil embargo at the time of American peace efforts, Kissinger responded that the disengagement agreement would lead to the end of oil embargo as indicated by certain Arab leaders. 89

On January 23, 1974, President Sadat made a declaration in the press Conference that United States' attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict had significantly changed. 90 President Sadat, during his six-day tour to the Arab capitals, including the oil producers, explained the disengagement agreement and tried to mould public opinion for the end of oil embargo on America. At the same time, King Faisal also showed inclination in favour of lifting the embargo. It was, however, opposed sharply by Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria. 91

Meanwhile, Soviet Union felt itself quite aloof and upstaged by American diplomatic initiatives and developments

89. Joe Stork, n. 83, p. 239.
91. Syria was openly critical of Sadat's willingness to disengage the Suez front without any negotiations on the Golan, permitting the Israelis to concentrate forces there. Any proposal to weaken or end the embargo would thus have small chance of acceptance of a good number of Arab States without Syrian concurrence or at least visible progress on the Golan disengagement.

Joe Stork, n. 83, p. 239.
in the region. At the same time, she sought to prove herself as the major factor in the Middle East politics. In pursuance of such policy, it appeared that the Soviets stimulated the Syrians to carry on the war and in January, 1974, supplied them with the nuclear capable Scud-B missile which had a range of 165 miles. It was at this moment that while recognising the Soviet antagonism, Secretary of State, Kissinger, arranged meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyoko, in Cyprus, and also in various public statements reassured the Soviets that America did not intend for their exclusion from the influential position in the Middle East region. While the implementation of the Egypt-Israeli disengagement agreement was on, the United States and the Soviet Union were making efforts by mutual consultations to achieve a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel.

It was during the meetings of the oil ministers held in Tripoli and Vienna from March 13 to 18, 1974, that the ministers decided to lift the oil embargo on the United States.

93. Ibid., p. 410.
94. Surendra Bhutani, n. 65, p. 111.
95. The communique which was issued in Vienna on March 18, stated that "... there were signs of manifesting themselves in many American circles of a more even handed US policy in the Middle East vis-a-vis the Arab world. The Oil Ministers are aware that oil is a weapon that can be employed in a positive manner to yield more effective results than may be obtained from its use in a negative fashion. Therefore, they came out of the meetings with contd.....
Meanwhile, Kissinger once again shuttled between Damascus and Jerusalem. During the course, he explained the demand of each side to the other and made efforts to find a solution to satisfy both the Syrians and the Israelis. Finally, on May 29, 1974, Nixon announced that the negotiations between Syria and Israel carried by Secretary Kissinger had successfully resulted in "an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces", which would be signed on May 31, 1974. The disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel was signed on May 31, under the UN auspices. It provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from their advanced positions in the Golan Heights. The bulk of the Heights was, however, left under the Israeli control. A neutral zone which was established, was to be supervised by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). This force, which was supposed to be consisted of 1,250 men did not

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the decisions for the employment of the oil weapon in a positive manner with a view to encouraging those countries which showed willingness and determination to strive for a just solution to the Arab question leading to the complete termination of the occupation and restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians."


And also see for further details The New York Times (New York), March 19, 1974.

98. George Lenczowski, n. 3, p. 568.
belong to the five permanent members of the Security Council. According to the Agreement, prisoners of war were exchanged between Syria and Israel on June 1, 1974, and on June 5, 1974, disengagement of forces began.

In June, 1974, President Nixon toured the Middle East countries and Egyptian President Sadat announced that the solution of Palestinian issue could be found without harming the Israeli existence and it was indeed a welcome gesture. While offering the American nuclear technology for power plants in Egypt and Israel, Nixon in return sought that both the recipient countries would agree to international inspection. This was still rejected by Israel whereas Sadat was considering the offer as a sign of Palestinian state on the west bank and Gaza Strip.

During his visit to Riyadh, President Nixon highlighted Saudi Arabia's crucial role in the US Peace efforts. As a result, the US technological help was confirmed as a positive response to the moderating role, played by Saudi Arabia among the oil producers during the embargo.


100. Georgiana G. Stevens, n. 19, p. 12.

101. Ibid.

Faisal controlled the largest single source of crude oil, in the context of the confrontation with Israel, questions of how to use oil resources as a lever and a weapon were unavoidable. Before the War, it was sufficient for Faisal merely to talk about not raising production. Once the War

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On October 28, 1974, heads of twenty Arab Governments decided in Arab Summit Conference at Rabat that any Palestinian territory, which would be relinquished by the Israelis should be taken over by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Israel outrightly rejected the offer to deal with the PLO and the decisions for a peaceful settlement, however, became impossible. In March, 1975, President Sadat said that he would not object to an extension of the peace keeping mandate. The Suez Canal was reopened to traffic in June, 1975, and Sadat rebuilt the cities in the

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broke out, Faisal had to act. At the first meeting of the Arab Oil-producing States, held more than ten days after the fighting broke out and then only as a result of public pressure from Sadat, Faisal initially blocked strong proposals for an embargo of the United States, and, of course, refused to follow the Iraqi example of nationalisation. Only after President Nixon proposed $2.2 billion in arms aid to Israel did Faisal consent to the embargo. Faisal certainly wanted to pressure the United States into taking a more "pro-Arab" stand, but he was also compelled to participate in the embargo or face a loss of influence in the Arab world, and, perhaps, even his throne.


The subsequent period between 1967 and 1973 was marked by new type of confrontation. The Arab Palestinians under the leadership of PLO had been trying through diplomatic and political means to achieve their inalienable right to return to their homeland.


Canal Zone.

As a result of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, another interim Egypt-Israel Agreement was produced on September 1, 1975. This Agreement was regarded as Sinai II, in which it stated that the Egyptians would advance to the Israeli line and Israel would withdraw to the east of Mitla and Giddi passes which would be maintained as a neutral zone by the UN Force stationed in the area. Israel would return Egypt the Abu Rodies oil fields with a connected road to them. It was agreed that non-military cargoes destined to Israel would pass through the Suez Canal. They further agreed to avoid using force or threat to them. It was also provided that there would be operation of Radar Warning Systems in the Mitla and Giddi passes which would be manned by American technicians. On September 4, 1975, this agreement was signed in Geneva. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait endorsed it after Kissinger pledged that he would continue his efforts on the Golan front as well.

104. Ibid., p. 13.
105. Ibid.
And also see for full text of the Agreement, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1892, September 29, 1975, pp. 466-470.
106. Ibid.
The Soviet role in the Middle East was adversely affected, particularly after the October 1973 war as the authorities in Kremlin did not foresee the events and withheld initially the supply of sophisticated weapons to Egypt in spite of President Sadat's requests for weaponry. Consequently, Egyptians were inclined towards the United States both in economic and political affairs. The war, however, reduced the Soviet influence and replaced the Soviets by the Americans in the region.

The October war indeed paid good dividends to the Arabs as all the Arab countries unanimously raised the voice against Israelis and became united for the first time to face the Israeli challenge despite differences and discord among them. Secondly, for the first time, OPEC Arabs realised that oil


And also see for further details Francis Fukayama, "New Directions for Soviet Middle East policy in the 1980s: Implication for the Atlantic Alliance" in Steven L. Spiegel (Edited), The Middle East and the Western Alliance (London: George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1982), p. 132.

108. Ibid.

could be used as a political weapon to bargain their interests in the international fora and eventually the OAPEC decided to play a significant role in production and reduction of oil and in manipulation of its price, which of course, would affect the entire economy of the world. The United States finally realised the importance of oil which could be instrumental to influence and mould the politics in the region. Sadat asserted that the October War had marked the emergence of Arab as the sixth power in the world.

Although the "shuttle diplomacy" pursued by Kissinger, was partially successful as he had secured Egypt-Israeli agreement on troop disengagement on January 18, 1974, but it failed to include the other Arab countries in this peace process. Further, Kissinger's step-by-step approach aimed at fragmenting the Arab camp and solidarity.

110. "Yom Kippur War provided OAPEC with political Motivation", International Perspectives, November/December, 1975, p. 5.
111. Col. B.K. Narayan, n. 41, p. 35.
The 1973 War proved to be extremely costly for Israel as it suffered heavy casualties apart from the heavy financial expenditure. It impaired Israel's economic viability and increased the dependence upon the United States. Similarly, Egypt had been financially exhausted due to the 25 years confrontation with Israel and it had neglected the country's domestic problems. President Sadat contended that the strain in Egypt-Israeli relations must be pacified in order to devote the Egyptian Government's attention primarily to internal needs. 114

114. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., n. 112, p. 112.
CHAPTER - III

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND ITS IMPACT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

With the assumption of office as the US President, Jimmy Carter decided to launch negotiations with the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to resolve the crisis before the end of 1977. President Carter's approach to the Middle East crisis was in sharp contrast with the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and former President Gerald Rudolph Ford, in three respect - (a) unlike the step-by-step approach of Kissinger, Carter aimed at a comprehensive settlement. (b) he sought to bring the Soviet Union into the peace-making process. (c) Carter regarded the Palestinian role as significant in any settlement.

American Initiative

In pursuance of his policy of amicable solution to the Middle East problem, President Carter sent the Secretary of


State, Cyrus vance on a fact finding mission to Israel and some Arab states in February 1977. On the conclusion of his tour on February 21, 1977, Vance noted that the Arabs and Israelis were "sharply divided" on the peace process. President Carter discussed the possibility of a Geneva Conference with the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin from March 7 - 8, 1977 in Washington. Carter, however, proposed a new sort of settlement and in order to please Rabin, he referred to Israel's need for "defensible borders". The recognised borders would be mutual and permanent and they would be accepted by the Arabs and Israelis alike. Carter further maintained that Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas with some "minor adjustments" was

3. The Arab states to which Secretary Vance was expected to visit were Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. 


4. Secretary Vance further expressed that "on the other hand, there are areas of common ground which provide a basis for some encouragement in the fact that all of them really do, sincerely in my judgement believe that there is a desperate need for peace. That is a positive factor."


This stand was in contrast with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which referred to the "secure and recognised borders."

also necessary. President Sadat of Egypt criticised Carter's proposal during his address at the opening of the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) on March 12, 1977.\(^7\)

But it was on March 16, 1977, that President Carter made a historic statement calling for a "homeland" for the Palestinians.\(^8\) At the same time he observed that:

"Palestinians claim till this moment that Israel has no right to be there... and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. This has to be overcome". \(^9\)

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6. President Carter explained that "this would involve substantial withdrawal of Israel's present control over territories. Now, where that withdrawal might end, I don't know. I would guess it would be some minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But that still remains to be negotiated ... I think there might be minor adjustments in the 1967-pre-1967 borders".


7. President Sadat asserted that the issue of secure borders was "nothing but a fantasy. It is not admissible that anybody should speak of secure boundaries as part of the Israeli conception; it is absolutely unjust and unacceptable."

*Al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 13, 1977.

8. President Carter in a speech to a town hall meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts, declared that "there has to be homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many years."


9. Ibid.
It was the first time in the history of American diplomacy that the United States President publicly called for a "homeland" for the Palestinians which automatically meant that the Palestinians had legitimate rights to Palestine. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, Yasser Arafat remarked that:

"It is a progressive step because it means he has finally put his hand on the heart of the problem of the Middle East Crisis. It helps the whole situation". 10

Whereas President Carter's call came as a great shock and dismay in Israeli circle and Israel suspected Carter of being influenced by the Brookings Report of 1975, that contained a blueprint for a Middle Eastern settlement. In fact, it was Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor who contributed to the document as one of its framers. President Sadat of Egypt who reached Washington on April 4, 1977, to confer with his counterpart in the United States, rejected

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

The report provided for the resolution of Palestine question and urged the Arab parties to work for the normalisation of international and regional political and economic relations, which would be in exchange for the withdrawal of Israel to the June 5, 1967 lines, with some mutually accepted modifications.

Carter's plan of "defensible borders". He, however, appreciated the US President's move for a Palestinian homeland. He further expressed that the Palestinian's participation was indispensable to bring about the peace in the region and he sought US help in convening the Geneva Conference.

Meanwhile George W. Ball, a former US Under-Secretary of State, created a sensation by writing an article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs entitled "How to save Israel in spite of herself" and Ball suggested that the United States should assert itself as to protect the sovereignty of Israel. He contended that:

"It is not whether we should try to force an unpalatable peace on the Israeli people, but rather how much longer we should continue to support policies that impede progress toward peace... With all the dangers that holds not only for the industrialised democracies of Western Europe and Japan..." 15

13. Sadat contended that "Sovereignty is indivisible, and we cannot have two borders - each country has one border."  
Al-Ahram (Cairo), April 8, 1977.

14. Ibid.

15. Ball further observed that "The unhappy dilemma of Israel is that so long as she refuses to give up the territorial gains from her 1967 conquest and thus prevents possible progress toward peace, she must continue as a ward of the United States."

Thus, Ball urged the United States to take a firm stand to "save Israel from herself". George Ball's article raised an Israeli fear of American imposed solution to the Middle East problem, although Carter Administration regarded his views as unconducive.

In a Joint Press interview in London, on May 11, 1977, the US Secretary of State, Vance sought to assure the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon that the United States would maintain its "special relationship" and the Israeli security would be ensured through perpetual military and technological assistance in future. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Allon, however, was convinced and he appreciated Cyrus Vance for having reassured the American positive role in the process of

16. Ball asserted that "Thus the time is ripe for the United States to take a strong hand to save Israel from herself and in process try to prevent a tragic war that could endanger the economies of the major non-Communist powers, separate the United States from its allies and precipitate enormous internal debate, and pose a serious danger of a clash with the Soviet Union."

Ibid., p. 470.


establishing durable peace in the region. Israelis were further assured of the American support by President Carter on May 12, 1977, when at a news conference, he stressed the special relationship and American "special security responsibilities" to Israel.

The return of Likud Party of Menachem Begin in May General election, to Knesset, worried the US Administration as Prime Minister Begin was expected to maintain a rigid stand on the question of Israeli occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza strip. Carter thought that Begin's declaration of the occupied territories as "liberated territories" and refusal to withdraw from these areas, was a hard nut to crack. In fact, a narrow victory for the Labour Party was predicted by the State Department and White House experts. The Carter Administration had hoped to deal with Shimon Peres - who had

19. Allon hoped that "the United States will facilitate with its good offices the parties to the conflict in such a way that the hope for peace will be implemented and realised."

Ibid., p. 608.


21. Menachem Begin joined the militant Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation) and was a Commander of that group from 1943 - 1948. He joined the National Unity Government (1967-70) as a Minister without Portfolio and in 1970 became Joint Chairman of the Likud (Unity) Coalition.


expressed once in principle, his belief that Israel could withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange of real peace.

In order to convene the Geneva Conference, the Secretary of State, Vance revisited the Middle East countries including Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel from August 1 - 11, 1977. While stressing the importance of direct talks between the US and the PLO, the Saudi Foreign Secretary Prince Saud al-Faisal urged that the PLO should be encouraged. Vance expressed that the United States would allow the PLO in negotiations provided they accept the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which would automatically be a recognition of Israel's right to exist.

23. Ibid., p. 7.
Meanwhile, an American educator, Landrum Bolling, the then Director of the Lilly Foundation whom the United States was using as intermediary, brought a secret message to Washington from the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat who proposed that the PLO would concede the American stand in return for the US guarantee for establishing a PLO state. But the Carter Administration did not want to grant such promise as it would mean direct confrontation with Israelis or its American supporters. In an editorial of the *Middle East International*, it was expressed that:

"the real Confrontation seems imminent between on the one hand a strongly based intensely nationalistic Israeli government, backed by the very powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, with its grip, on the houses of Congress and its resourceful friends in the press and then television networks and on the other hand the American President and his Advisers." 29

In view of the cold response by the United States the PLO argued that it would not accept the Resolution 242 of the Security Council unless it was rewritten and the reference of the national rights of the Palestinians instead of the vague


28. Ibid., p. 106.

reference of the "refugees", was incorporated. PLO's plea was, however, not considered by the United States.

During the mid-September, the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan met President Carter in Washington and clarified that PLO's participation in Geneva Conference was unacceptable to Israel. But there was no sign of agreement by the Arabs in view of the uncertainty of PLO's role in Geneva Conference. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismael Fahmi, on September 26, 1977 rejected Israeli conditions of PLO's non-participation in Geneva Conference and expressed that the summit would be a "non-starter".

In the meanwhile, the US Secretary of State, Vance and Andrei Gromyoko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee...


Finally, the PLO led by Arafat declined to accept the UN Resolution 242.


of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who was also the
Foreign Minister of the USSR, had bilateral talks with the
United States authorities which resulted in issuing of the
Joint US-Soviet declaration on October 1, 1977, to convene the
Geneva Peace Conference. Both these countries were the co-
chairman of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.
It was extremely noteworthy that the US Administration accepted
in the Statement "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people" which would be ensured in any settlement. The communi-
que that called for the participation of the "Palestinian
people" sought "normal peaceful relations on the basis of
mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence" and a role for the
United States and the Soviet Union in such guarantees.

In fact, two reasons had evoked the US interest to
become the co-signatory with the Soviet Union. Firstly, the
Soviet position was unexpectedly mild and she had also not

34. It was further stated that "In their capability as Co-
Chairman of the Geneva Conference, the United States and
the USSR affirm their intention, through joint efforts
in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facili-
tate in every way the resumption of the work of the
Conference not later than December, 1977."

Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVII, No. 2002,

And also see for further details The New York Times (New
insisted on PLO's participation or a Palestinian State. Secondly, the United States officials assumed that the US-Soviet declaration would be conducive to the Soviet co-operation to persuade the Syrian President, Hafez Al-Assad not to insist on a veto over the Geneva decision. The PLO hailed the Joint Communiqué and regarded it as the healthy step towards a just peace in the Middle East. Israel, however, decried that the document would further lead to the perpetuation of hard positions taken by the Arab States and it would be an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. In order to settle the controversy out of the Joint statement, President Carter invited the Israeli Foreign Minister, Dayan for meeting on the night of October 4, 1977, in New York. The meeting which lasted up to 2 AM, witnessed certain rough exchanges of talks between the two but it produced an American-Israeli working paper, drawn by the Secretary of State, Vance and Moshe Dayan, on October 5, 1977. But the contents of the paper was disclosed by Dayan on October 13, 1977. Israel agreed that the Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza, who would be allowed to attend the

38. Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p. 66.
Geneva Conference as members of the United Arab delegation, would also participate along with the Jordanian and Egyptian delegation, in a working group to discuss the future of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Both the United States and Israel, however, expressed their agreement on the Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 as the basis for the negotiations at the proposed Conference. The Likud Cabinet on October 11, 1977, had already approved the text of the working Paper. It was

40. In the working paper, the United States and Israel expressed that:

"(a) The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening sessions, the Conference will split into working groups.

(b) The working groups for negotiations and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows:

A. Egypt-Israel B. Jordan-Israel
C. Syria - Israel D. Lebanon-Israel

(All the parties agree that Lebanon may join the Conference when it so requests).

(c) The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian Arabs.

(d) The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.

(e) The agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East are UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

(f) All the initial terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference remain enforce, except as may be agreed by the parties."

contd....
further declared in the US-Israeli Joint Communique that:

"Acceptance of the Joint US-USSR statement of October 1, 1977, by the parties is not a prerequisite for the convening and conduct of the Geneva Conference".40

The United States sent the working paper to the Arab capitals for their consideration. Egypt proposed a modification in the document by seeking the PLO representation in the Conference.42 Whereas PLO spokesman in Beirut declared the Communique as "totally unacceptable".43 It was announced by the Al-Fatah, the largest guerrilla group, headed by its founder and leader Yasser Arafat that it was only the PLO which had the right to represent the Palestinians "at all international Conferences" including the proposed Geneva Peace Conference.44 Syria was critical of the US-Israeli working Paper and its position was perpetually hardening.45

contd....

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), October 14, 1977.
And also see for further details Middle East Monitor (New Jersey), Vol. VII, No. 19, October 15, 1977, p. 1.


45. Ibid.
Amidst such controversy, President Carter in his address at Democratic National Committee Fund raising dinner on October 22, in Los Angeles, said that:

"I would rather commit suicide than to hurt the nation of Israel".46

Later, at a meeting of the World Jewish Congress on November 2, 1977, Carter assured that he did not favour the establishment of a Palestinian State on the West Bank.47 One of the important reasons for this policy reversal was the domestic political compulsion as the Zionist lobby in America had become alarmed by President Carter's Middle East policy. Carter's press Secretary, Jody Powell, called it the most sensitive political problem and announced that the US Administration did not want "any public confrontation with the Jewish Community over the Middle East".48

46. Carter further said that: "If I should ever hurt Israel, which I won't, I think political suicide would almost automatically result because it is not only our Jewish citizens who have the deep commitment to Israel, but there is an overwhelming support throughout the nation, because there is a common bond of commitment to the same principles of openness and freedom and democracy and strength and courage that ties us together in an irrevocable way".


Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and Its aftermath

On the other hand, President Sadat was disappointed by Carter's policy of Soviet inclusion in the peace process by releasing the US-Soviet Joint statement. Besides, Sadat was also unhappy with the United States having pampered Syria and the PLO. In fact, US had assumed that any settlement acceptable to radical pro-Soviet Syria would be appreciated by the other Arab States. Whereas President Sadat thought that the US approach to the USSR, Syria and the PLO would lead to undue power to influence Egypt which in turn would jeopardise the Egyptian interests in any settlement. On November 2, 1977, President Sadat, in his speech before the People's Assembly of Egypt announced his intention to visit Israel and talk directly to the Israeli authorities. His idea was welcomed by Prime Minister Begin of Israel who equally expressed his desire to


50. Sadat said that "Israel must be greatly surprised to hear me say that I am ... ready to go to the Knesset and discuss with them."


And also see for further details Al-Ahram (Cairo), November 10, 1977.
go to Cairo for peace. In a news conference on November 10, 1977, the US President, Carter praised Sadat's willingness to go to Israel for peace. It was on November 15, Israel sent an invitation to President Sadat to visit Jerusalem.

Before his visit to Jerusalem, Sadat went to Damascus on November 16, but he could not convince President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria. President Sadat announced that he would proceed to Israel on November 19 for a two-day visit, despite the opposition from Assad of Syria and the resignations tendered by Ismael Fahmi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Mahmoud Riad, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

51. The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), November 13, 1977.

52. The President further said that: "I was pleased with the statement yesterday by President Sadat that he was willing to .... consult directly with Israel and with the other Arab nations without quibbling any more about the detailed working of the procedures, that's our position."


53. The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), November 18, 1977.

54. Assad pointed out to the violent Arab reaction that he would have to face. Sadat said that even if such a reaction took place, it would disappear within three months, for within that period the Arab-Israeli strife would have been resolved, since Israel would be at loss to find an argument to justify its continued occupation of Arab lands.


President Sadat reached Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, for a two-day visit of Israel in order to break what he described the "Psychological barrier" which was making obstacles in the Middle East peace process and Sadat expected that his efforts would pave the way for reconvening of the Geneva Conference. The most significant aspect of President Sadat's speech before the Israeli Knesset on November 20, 1977, was his willingness to accept Israel's existence. He stated that:

"In all sincerity, I tell you we welcome you among us, with full security and safety... we really and truly welcome you to live among us in peace and security". 57

He observed that the existence of Israel was a significant point to reach a just and permanent peace. Israel, however, would also have to withdraw from all the Arab territories including East Jerusalem, occupied during 1967 war. Further, peace could not be achieved unless the Palestinian problem was solved. Sadat declared that he did not come for a separate


And also see for further details Al-Ahram (Cairo), November 21, 1977.

58. Sadat expressed that "The Palestinian question is the heart and crux of the conflict. Peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians ... the only way to deal with (the Palestinian problem) in the direction of just and permanent peace in the establishment of a state of the Palestinian people". Ibid., pp. 177-179.
deal or treaty with Israel but he sought a comprehensive peace.

In his speech, Prime Minister Begin, however, neither directly responded to President Sadat's offer of recognition nor spoke about the questions of territories or Palestinian problem. He praised Sadat for his courageous step to visit Israel. Begin further expressed that normal relations between Israel and Arab states should be established and everything should be negotiable. He also invited the Syrian and Jordanian heads of state to negotiate peace treaties with him.

In Arab capitals, the people were in deep grief and shock to see the telecast of Sadat's visit on their Television and they wondered that Egypt which considered Zionism and Israel as the enemy of the Arabs for the last thirty years, was being represented by President Sadat as Israel's friend.

President Sadat's move was supported by Morocco, Oman and Sudan and the state controlled media in Egypt praised him as a Hero. Whereas he was strongly criticised by Syria, the

59. Ibid., p. 172.
60. Prime Minister Begin said that: "... I am renewing my invitation to President of Syria to follow in your footsteps, Mr. President, and come to us to open negotiations for a peace between Israel and Syria so that we may sign a peace treaty between us... I invite King Husayn (sic.) to come to us to discuss all the problems which need to be discussed between us."


PLO and the rejectionist states—Algeria, Iraq, Libya and South Yemen and they charged Sadat with treachery.

Notwithstanding the opposition from the Arab States, the Egyptian president declared to maintain the peace momentum and called for a preparatory conference in Cairo and invited Israel, US, USSR, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the PLO and the UN for the Conference. It was, however, rejected by Syria, USSR, the PLO and Lebanon to visit Israel yet. King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan and his Government placed the condition that they could attend the Conference in Cairo if all other parties to the dispute attended. The United States State Department formally accepted Egypt's invitation whereas the Israeli Government promptly responded positively to Sadat's invitation. The UN also gave its approval to send its official to Cairo. In a press Conference statement on November 30, 1977, President Carter expressed his views that he did not desire for "a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel" excluding the other parties. At the same time, he pointed out that:

"If at some later date it becomes obvious that Jordan does not want peace, or that Syria does not want peace, or that Lebanon does not want peace in a settlement with Israel, then an alternative might have to be pursued. But we've certainly not reached that point yet." 64

62. Arab Report and Record, n. 56, p. 927.
An Arab mini-summit was held from December 2 - 5, 1977 in Tripoli, Libya which was participated by Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and Iraq and they decided to freeze the relations with Egypt. Sadat reacted by breaking Egypt's relations with these countries on December 5, 1977. The Arab differences came to the surface and Egypt began to be isolated in the Arab world.

It was on December 14, 1977, that the Cairo Conference started with speeches by the heads of the Israeli, Egyptian and US delegations and they expressed their respective position regarding peace settlement. Egypt stressed that there must be full realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement. The Egyptian representative Abd al-Majid further asserted that peace must be based on the international law, the UN Charter and the Resolution 242. Whereas, the Israeli delegate, Ben Elissar referred to the Resolution 242 only, as the basis for a comprehensive peace in the region.

66. Mahmoud Riad, n. 54, p. 308.
68. Al-Ahram (Cairo), December 15, 1977.
69. BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5693/A/10.
In the meantime, Prime Minister Begin visited the United States from December 15 - 17, to discuss a newly drawn peace plan with President Carter which consisted of two sets of proposals - one dealing with Israel's intention to recognize Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The other provided for the self-rule for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

President Carter talked to Sadat telephonically and sought a Sadat-Begin meeting which was accepted by the Egyptian president. Prime Minister Begin expressed that Carter had regarded the proposals as a "fair basis" and a "constructive" plan for the Middle East negotiations. The State Department, in order to avoid any embarrassment, however, clarified that the US Administration was not endorsing the proposal but it wished to accept the plan provided both Egypt and Israel agreed to it.

70. Arab Report and Record, n. 67, p. 1020.

The text of the peace plan was, however, disclosed by Prime Minister Begin in his address to the Knesset on December 28, 1977.

For the full text of the plan see The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), December 29, 1977.

And also see BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5702/A/1-7.


72. Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p. 102.

President Sadat, in a news conference on December 17, 1977, expressed his optimism about the possible outcome of a settlement in view of Begin's plan. In fact, Begin's plan was based on the assumption that Sadat urgently sought peace and he would go to the extent of signing a separate peace treaty with Israel provided Israel returned back Sinai to Egypt and provided Israeli Government showed a sign of flexibility regarding West Bank and Gaza strip.

Meanwhile, the Cairo Conference did not yield any concrete results and it was suspended on December 22, 1977. It was on December 25 that Begin reached Ismailia in Egypt to negotiate his peace plan with President Sadat. In his Press Conference on December 26, Begin, however, clarified that Resolution 242

73. *Arab Report and Record*, n. 67, p. 1020.

74. This view was reflected, for instance, in Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman's statement to the Likud members of the Knesset who observed that: "The Egyptians are fed up (with the Arab-Israeli conflict). They would be willing to go for a separate agreement with Israel, if only a formula was found that would enable them to delay (decision on) the question of the comprehensive settlement to a later date".

Quoted in Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 94.

75. *Arab Report and Record*, n. 67, p. 1019.

76. Mahmoud Riad, n. 54, pp. 308-309.
did not impose total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Sadat's counter proposal that a Palestinian State should be established on the West Bank and Gaza strip was rejected by the Israeli Prime Minister, Begin.

The Ismailia summit failed to evoke any significant decision except the formation of two committees - one political at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the countries and the other, military at the level of Ministers of Defense. In a way, the possibility of a Geneva Conference or any agreement was completely undermined.

Again from January to July 1978, no significant change in the peace process was witnessed between Egypt and Israel. In fact, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November

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77. The Prime Minister added that: "... This matter is a matter for negotiation, to establish those secure and recognised boundaries which are mentioned in the second paragraph of Resolution 242".

*The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), December 27, 1977.

78. This was indicated in the joint "agreed declaration" by Israel and Egypt after Sadat-Begin talks in Ismailia


79. Mahmoud Riad, n. 54, pp. 308-309.

of
1977 had reduced the possibility of a comprehensive peace settle-
ment in the Middle East to an Egyptian-Israeli dialogue and even
that achievement seemed to be thwarted. The US officials felt
that it would lead to another war, with the spell of oil embargo
by the Arabs leading to the massive energy crisis, which would
also affect the American influence in the region. 81

President Carter ultimately took a dramatic step and
invited both Begin and Sadat at a tripartite Summit at Camp
David, in order to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle
East. 82 The White House announced on August 8, 1978, that President
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin had agreed to reach Camp David
on September 5, 1978, to participate in a meeting with President
Carter in which an attempt to draw a framework for peace in the
Middle East would be made. 83

In an interview to the Newsweek, Begin reiterated his
stand to conclude a permanent partial peace in case of Egypt's
and Israel's failure to reach an agreement on comprehensive peace
at the Camp David Summit. 84 It was, however, rejected by Sadat

83. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), Vol. XXV, 1979,
p. 29654.
84. Begin stated that: "Should Egypt be prepared to sign with
us a peace treaty with the understanding that it is to be
followed by peace treaties with the rest of our neighbours,
we would be prepared to do so. But if it transpires that
contd...."
who sought a comprehensive peace settlement instead of separate peace.

The United States officials, particularly the State Department officials were worried at Carter's decision as any failure of the Camp David Summit would affect his reputation both in the United States and abroad. Consequently, the US Middle East policy would be undermined. But Carter showed his determination to stick to his decision.

Camp David Summit

It was on September 5, 1978, that Carter, Sadat and Begin reached Camp David. The first meeting between the three leaders was held on September 6, and although, Carter assumed there are now insurmountable difficulties to achieving this goal, I have a concrete idea about the possibility of a partial agreement which would be of a permanent nature".


86. Zbigniew Brzezinski, n. 27, p. 252.


From Thurmont, Maryland, the road uncoils for seven miles up to Catoctin Mountain, through Virgin forests, to Camp David, the presidential retreat, sixty miles or a thirty-minute helicopter ride from the White House.

that the summit would lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty yet, President Sadat pointed out that it would take a long time to discuss the important matters in details. They, however, decided to reach an agreement which could be transformed into a peace treaty within the span of "perhaps three months". During the meeting, Sadat placed a Peace Plan which sought the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories in exchange for the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and the Arab countries concerned, the redivision of Jerusalem, the removal of Israeli settlements from the occupied areas. The plan further proposed the termination of Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza strip with a five-year transitional period during which the administration of West Bank and Gaza would be supervised by Jordan and Egypt, respectively. It was also urged to grant the Palestinians rights of self-determination including the right to establish a Palestinian State. But Begin rejected the plan outrightly.  

At this juncture, the United States presented a draft on September 10, which was equally rejected by Begin. The US

88. Ibid., p. 344.
And also see for further details Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p. 160.

89. Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p. 162.
And also see for further details Al-Ahram (Cairo), September 19, 1978.

90. Zbigniew Brezezinski, n. 27, p. 260.

contd.....
plan was modified in conformity with the Israeli demands and confined itself to a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. At the same time, President Carter's new procedure to separate the Sinai issue from the issue of West Bank and Gaza was approved by Sadat. Consequently, the Sinai agreement was being dealt with by Carter whereas Secretary Vance concentrated on the framework for a comprehensive settlement which were discussed separately.

On September 14, 1978, during the discussion on Sinai, Sadat's demands of termination of Israeli settlements from the Sinai area was rejected by Begin and as a result Sadat decided to depart from the Summit. Carter, however, persuaded Sadat to stay, on the plea that Sadat's departure from the Summit would naturally affect the US-Egyptian relations and their personal friendship, thwart Sadat's peace initiative and also lead to an end to the Carter's presidency. Carter further feared that the Summit fiasco would be a major victory for the Soviet Policy in the Middle East.

The draft dealt with the West Bank, the Palestinians and the Israeli withdrawal on the basis of UN Resolution 242.


92. Zbigniew Brzezinski, n. 27, p. 244.
It was decided on September 16, that the disputed issues would be discussed by exchange of letters among the dignitaries. It was on September 17, 1978, that Begin in a letter to President Carter, expressed his readiness to place the Egyptian demand for the removal of Israeli settlements from Sinai, to the Knesset, which would decide and vote on it within two weeks after his return to Israel. In the meantime, Sadat agreed to discuss the West Bank and Gaza issue on behalf of the Palestinians "following consultation with Jordan and representative of the Palestinian people".

The issue of East Jerusalem became the focal point of the Summit when President Carter implicitly expressed that the United States considered the East Jerusalem as Israeli occupied territory and he further reiterated that it was the stand the United States took in the United Nations in 1967 and 1969 as well.

95. Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 124.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.

On July 14, 1967, the US Ambassador, Arthur Goldberg, declared in the UN General Assembly that the United States did not recognise Israeli measures to change the status of Jerusalem by annexing the occupied East Jerusalem. Similarly, Ambassador Charles Yost on July 1, 1969, in UN Security Council deplored the Israeli action of occupying the East Jerusalem.

But Begin retorted and threatened to leave the meeting. However, the crisis was overcome by an acceptable formula which provided that Egypt, Israel and the United States would draft a letter stating their respective positions regarding East Jerusalem.

It was also reported that Begin threatened not to sign the Accords, in case President Sadat and President Carter called Jerusalem as "occupied territory". Ultimately, both Presidents had to bow to the wishes of Prime Minister Begin.

In the meantime, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Kamal resigned from the post as he did not want to participate in approving a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and he also disapproved the contention that Egypt should talk on behalf of the Palestinians.


President Sadat had never been given a mandate either by the PLO, the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, or by any of the Arab states to act on behalf of the Palestinians.

However, the Camp David Summit resulted in the two agreements - A "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and a "Framework for the conclusion of Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel". Eventually, this accord was signed by President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel, in a White House ceremony witnessed by Jimmy Carter on September 18, 1978.

It may be noted that with the Camp David Summit, two significant shifts in the US policy occurred - (a) In spite of the US stated goal of comprehensive settlement, the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace accord was signed. (b) The United States shifted her policy of being an "honest broker" to a "full partner" in the Camp David talks.

The Accords

Under the term of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East, "Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the palestinian people should participate in negotiations for the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and Egypt and Israel agreed that in order to achieve that objective,

103. Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 124.
And also see for further details Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p. 188.

negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza should be carried in three stages:

In the first stage, Egypt and Israel agreed, they would invite Jordan to participate in negotiations to determine the details of a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza which would not exceed five years. The framework further provided for a self-governing authority, freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza strip to replace the Israeli military government and Civil Administration, thus leading to full autonomy to the inhabitants of these areas and to implement these arrangements, it was agreed that:

"due consideration should be given both to the principles of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved".105

In the second stage, Egypt and Jordan would agree on the procedures to set up the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians might be included in the Egyptian and Jordanian delegations provided the parties mutually agree. The powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority would be defined by Israel, Egypt and Jordan. The


And also see for further details Department of State Bulletin, n. 96, pp. 7-11.
framework further provided that:

"A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement would also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order". 106

In the third and final stage, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would participate in the negotiations:

"to determine the final status of the West Bank and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period". 107

Finally, the Egyptian, Israeli and Jordanian representatives and self-governing authority would form a continuing committee to take decision "by agreement on the modalities" for admitting persons, who were displaced from the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1967, with important measures to prevent disruption or disorder. 108

It may be noted that the autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza would be transitional instead of being permanent arrangement. Not only that, Israel would also have her control over the area through the redeployment of the Israeli forces on

106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
vulnerable locations. Most surprisingly, the Camp David Accords did not mention the PLO.\textsuperscript{109}

While commenting on the Camp David Accords on the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", Abba Eban, the former Foreign Minister of Israel observed that:

"The hard truth is that on the most crucial and complex issue - that of the Palestinians and the West Bank - the Camp David signatories did little more than postpone their confrontation by the kind of Semantic dexterity that is quick to wear out". \textsuperscript{110}

The "Framework for the conclusion of peace treaty" dealt with the signing of peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within three months of the signing of the Camp David Accords. It provided for the phased Israeli withdrawal from Sinai which would begin within 3 to 9 months after signing of the Accords and this process would take 3 years period. According to the framework, "the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and Suez canal" would be ensured. The Accord further provided for the normalisation of diplomatic and commercial relations between Jerusalem and Cairo.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Abba Eban, "Camp David - The Unfinished Business", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 57, No. 2, January, 1979, pp. 343-344.
\item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Near East Report}, n. 105, p. 171.
\end{itemize}
President Sadat who reached Cairo on September 23, 1978 after signing of the Camp David Accords, was extended warm welcome by hundreds of thousands of cheering Egyptians. The Egyptian cabinet had already described the accords as Egypt's "most marvellous victory in its contemporary history". In the meeting, which lasted three hours, the cabinet pledged full support for Sadat and Premier Mamdouh Salem expressed that the result of the Summit "heralded an era of co-operation and co-existence between Arabs and Jews".

Whereas, the opposition Unionist Progressive Party (UPP) accused Sadat for deviating from the promise not to establish relations with Israel unless there was complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.

On the other hand, the Israeli Knesset unanimously approved the Camp David Accords on September 26, 1978 and granted its approval to remove the Israeli settlers from Sinai provided Egypt and Israel concluded peace. It was voted after 18 hour heated debate with 85 in favour, 19 against and 16 absentees. During the course, Prime Minister Begin was, however, criticised by his own Likud coalition Party which blamed him for having betrayed his own nation and jeopardised Israel's security.

113. Ibid., p. 673.
114. Ibid.
Amidst the debate, Likud's Geula Cohen observed that:

"Now we all feel cheated. Israel's connections at Camp David, were made on the very heart of Israel". 115

Meanwhile, the Israeli Transport and Communication Minister resigned following differences with other ministers over foreign policy issues and revealed his intention to form a party which would take more flexible stand than that followed by the Begin Government. 116

Arab reaction to the Camp David Accords

The Camp David Accords were, however, vehemently criticised by the Arab leaders. The PLO declared that peace could not be achieved in the Middle East without the Palestine Liberation Organisation which was not mentioned in the accords. 117

PLO leader, Yasser Arafat denounced the accords as a "dirty deal" and he accused President Sadat of having surrendered the Arab Jerusalem in return of Sinai desert. Arafat further declared that President Carter and "American interests in the Middle East" would "pay" for the Egyptian-Israeli accords. 118

116. Ibid.
Jordan criticised the Camp David documents in a statement issued by the Jordanian cabinet on September 19, 1978. The statement called the Palestinians should be "the first and most important party in a peace settlement" and urged the Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, including Arab Jerusalem. It stressed that Jordan would not be bound by the accords as the Government had not been a party to them.\(^\text{119}\)

The Saudi statement, issued with the conclusion of the special cabinet meeting, headed by King Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz declared the Camp David formula as unacceptable as it did not provide an "absolute clear Israeli intention to withdraw" from the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem. It was further stated that the documents also failed to include:

"the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and set up their own state in their own soil and ignored the role of Palestine Liberation Organisation which Arab Summit Conferences have recognised as the sole representatives of the Palestinians".\(^\text{120}\)

At the same time, the statement commended President Carter, for his peace initiatives but it said that Saudi Arabia could not accept formulae that "contradict higher Arab interests"

\(^{119}\) But it had been alleged by the PLO on September 19, that Jordanian King, Hussein Ibn Talal, had through the United States and British diplomatic channels tacitly agreed to the arrangements provided in the accords for the West Bank. \(^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{pp. 29658-29659.}\)

\(^{120}\) \textit{Asian Recorder}, n. 115, p. 14559.
and termed the present situation critical and finally called for a Joint Arab stand. The Camp David deal was also denounced by Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad al Sabah of Kuwait, who presided over a special cabinet in Kuwait. Meanwhile, President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria toured the West Asian countries to explain the hardline Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords.

President Assad charged Sadat with having "defeated to the enemy" by abandoning "not only Jerusalem but the whole Arab cause". The Syrian President made his accusation on September 20, 1978, in an address to the opening session of an emergency meeting of the "resistance front" in Damascus. At the conclusion of the meeting on September 24, 1978, a communique was issued which called:

"To establish a unified political and military command to resist President Sadat's policies; to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union to counter US influence in the Middle East; to initiate a complete economic boycott of Egypt and to sever all remaining political and cultural links with that country and, to seek the removal of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to another Arab capital."

121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. The "resistance front" was established in December 1977, at Tripoli Conference which called to oppose the Egyptian peace initiatives and it comprised Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the PLO.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n. 83, p. 29659.
124. Ibid.
Earlier, it was on September 20, 1978, that the US Secretary of State, Vance flew to West Asian countries to persuade Arab leaders to accept the accords. But his tour did not draw any favourable response from the Arab States, not even the moderate ones like Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In a brief statement during his departure at Damascus airport on September 24, 1978, Vance called his five hours long meeting with President Assad of Syria as satisfactory and he further claimed that Assad was inclined to continue dialogue between their two countries for the benefit of the shared hope of accomplishing a just peace in the area. This claim was contradicted by some officials in Damascus and they explained that President Assad had clarified to Vance that it was impossible for him to accept the Camp David Accords because, they violated Arab summit decisions, particularly those specifying that the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was the PLO. On the other hand, President Jaafar Al-Nimeiry of Sudan approved the accords and promised to assist in implementation of the peace process in the Middle East. Apart from President Nimeiry of Sudan, Morocco and Oman also favoured the accords.

During the course of October 1978, the Iraqi Government played a dominant role in rallying Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords and as a result of intensive diplomatic efforts by Iraq, the ninth Arab Summit Conference was convened in Baghdad from November 2 to 5, 1978, which was attended by the representatives of 21 of the 22 Arab League members, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia and other moderate states, but Egypt was not invited in the Conference. Though initially there was an uncertainty, later the Iraqi invitation to the Conference were accepted on October 9, 1978, by the five members of the "resistance front" namely, Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the PLO. 128

Syria's acceptance to the invitation paved the way for the reconciliation of the long standing mutual hostility between Syria and Iraq which was accomplished during the talks between President Assad and Iraqi President, Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr in Baghdad from October 24 to 26, 1978. 129

The Communique of the ninth Arab Summit observed that the accords were detrimental to the Palestinian people's rights and rights of the Arab people in Palestine and the occupied Arab


129. *Syria reopened its border with Iraq on October 22, confirming reports of a reconciliation between the rival regimes.*

It was realised that these documents had emerged beyond the purview of the Arab collective responsibility and were contrary to the Arab Summit conferences, the Arab League Charter and the UN Resolutions regarding the Palestine question. The conference declared that these accords did not result in the Just Peace as sought by the Arab nation. Therefore, it decided to reject the accords and dissociate itself from them and further, the Conference "rejected all the political, economic, legal and other effects resulting from them".

At the same time the Communique stated that:

"The Conference decided to call on the Egyptian Government to abrogate these agreements and not to sign any reconciliation treaty with the enemy. The Conference hoped that Egypt would return to the fold of Joint Arab action and not act unilaterally in the affairs of the Arab-Zionist Conflict."

However, the Communique adopted by the Baghdad Conference was regarded as less hostile to Egypt than it had been presumed. It was in fact, Saudi Arabia and other moderate states which opposed the demands for an immediate political and economic boycott of Egypt and as a result such resolution was not adopted by the Summit. On the other hand, it was reported that the agreement had been reached by the majority of the countries except Sudan, Morocco and Oman which voiced their dissension.

131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
that if Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel then the steps would be taken to remove the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo and to impose economic sanctions on Egypt.\footnote{Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, n. 83, p. 29660.}

In pursuance of the Baghdad Summit resolution to dissuade Sadat from signing a peace treaty, a four-man delegation led by Labenese Prime Minister, Salim Hoss visited Cairo to meet with President Sadat on November 4, 1978 but he refused to meet them and at the same time in an address to the people’s Assembly Sadat termed the Summit participants as “cowards and dwarfs” and expressed that he would not heed to “hissing of snakes”.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{Western and Soviet Attitude}

The Western attitude to the Camp David Accords was favourable. The accords were hailed by the Western powers including the member states of the European community whose Foreign Ministers, in a statement, issued on September 19, 1978, congratulated Sadat, Begin and Carter for the grand accomplishment and expressed the hope that: “the outcome of the Camp David Conference will be a further major step on the path to a Just, comprehensive and lasting peace” and they pledged that they would render their possible support to achieve such a peace.\footnote{Ibid., p. 29659.}
Whereas, the Soviet News Agency Tass on September 19, 1978, bitterly criticised the accords as a "betrayal of the Arab cause" and charged Sadat with "complete surrender before the expansionist ambitions of the Israeli aggressor". In fact, with the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, the Soviet Union, in order to influence the Middle East politics, brought the Palestine Liberation Movement under the ambit of her foreign policy.

It was on October 29, 1978, that the PLO Chairman, Arafat visited Soviet Union in order to draw the Soviet support. In a Joint Communique, they condemned the accords between Egypt and Israel and they further welcomed the proposed Baghdad Conference.

136. Ibid.
138. During the course of the talks which passed in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding, they discussed the situation in the Middle East and the tasks of arising in the struggle for a just settlement of the Palestinian problem.

New Times (Moscow), No.45, November 1978, p. 3.
139. The Communique stated that: "Considering the obtaining situation, they are profoundly convinced that the task of rallying and activizing all forces opposed to anti-Arab separate deals is of special movement. In this connection the parties welcomed the convening in Baghdad of a Summit Conference of Arab States and the PLO".

Quoted in Dmitry Volsky, "Duel of Tendencies", New Times (Moscow), No. 46, November, 1978, p. 10.
CHAPTER-IV
WEST ASIA AFTER CAMP DAVID

The Egyptian-Israeli peace talks for the conclusion of a peace treaty was held in Washington on October 12, 1978, with the respective delegation led by the Egyptian Defence Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali and the Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer Weizman and the Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan with the US President, Jimmy Carter attending the opening ceremony. Though, an announcement was made on October 22 that the provisional agreement had been reached on the basis of a draft text which was prepared by the United States, major difficulties, however, subsequently arose.

The Israeli official announcement made during the later part of 1978 for further expansion of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, created tension not only between Egypt and Israel but also between the United States and Israel. The major factor that impeded the process of negotiations, was the Egyptian contention regarding linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the implementation of a Camp David provision relating to the West Bank. It was in mid-November, 1978 that

3. Ibid.
in an interview to the Newsweek, President Sadat admitted that:

"there are some difficulties in the treaty between Egypt and Israel that are surmountable. We can overcome them very easily. But the serious point of difference is the question of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and autonomy in Gaza and on the West Bank".4

Israel strongly resisted the Egyptian demands for the linkage between the two framework.5 Meanwhile, the controversies led to the expiry of December 17, 1978, the target date for signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and both sides blamed each other for the fiasco. While the Egyptians charged the Israelis with being more rigid, the Israelis maintained that Egypt put forward the new demands which were not covered by the Camp David Accords.6

It was on February 22, 1979 that the Israeli cabinet rejected the US invitation to Prime Minister Begin to attend a summit conference with his Egyptian counterpart, Mustafa Khalil which was interpreted in Israeli circle as equalising Khalil, who was a nominal head of Egypt, with the rank of

Begin, the real head of Israel. As a result of Begin's rejection to meet Prime Minister Khalil and Sadat's refusal to visit the United States for negotiating purpose, President Carter announced on March 5, 1978 about his programme to visit Egypt and Israel which was welcomed by both Begin and Sadat. In fact, Carter's domestic and foreign policies were increasingly undermined and he did not want to allow the greatest achievement of his administration - the Camp David Accords, to fall apart. He decided to take risks by involving himself personally in the negotiating process. Washington officials were cautiously optimistic about Carter's decision to travel to the Middle East in order to bring about a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. For instance, Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York observed that the Carter Administration was courageously "taking some risks" to ensure peace in the Middle East.

7. *West Asia Diary* (New Delhi), Vol. IV, No. 18, April 30-May 6, 1979, p. 1560.


President Carter reached Cairo on March 8, 1979 in order to begin talks for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egyptian and Israeli Governments. President Sadat proposed that if autonomy in the West Bank was impossible, it should be established in Gaza strip first, and Egypt should set up a "liaison office" there. In an address to the People's Assembly of Egypt on March 10, 1979, President Carter said that:

"The conclusion of a treaty between Israel and Egypt will enable your government to mobilize its resources not for war but for provision of a better life for every Egyptian".

In order to ensure the incentive for a treaty, he further pledged the American support for the developments of Egypt and its policies to maintain stability in the region. On the same day, Carter reached Jerusalem and presented Begin with Sadat's amendments of proposals which was rejected by the Israeli Prime Minister. The US President sought Begin to sign

14. The President added that "the conclusion of the peace treaty that we are discussing will strengthen cooperation between Egypt and the United States in other ways. I fully share and will support President Sadat's belief that stability must be maintained in this part of the world, even while constructive change is actively encouraged".
15. David Hirst and Irene Beeson, n. 12, p. 319.
the peace treaty during his visit to Jerusalem so that the failure of negotiations and the undermining of his personal prestige in America and elsewhere in the world would be avoided. But Prime Minister Begin resisted Carter's demand to sign the peace treaty. White speaking at the Israeli Knesset on March 12, 1979, President Carter expressed that:

"The risks of peace between you and your Egyptian neighbours are real. But America is ready to reduce any risks and to balance them within the bounds of our strength and our influence".17

He also promised the Israelis the American economic and military assistance. Though, Carter's visit seemed to be on the verge of fiasco due to Begin's refusal to pay heed to Sadat's proposal and to sign a peace treaty, an attempt was made at the eleventh hour to solve the disputes in negotiating process and finally, a break-through was achieved as a result of the consultations between Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan and the US Secretary of State, Vance leading to the formulation of proposals such as (a) Israel would be allowed to buy oil from

18. Carter said that: "we know Israel's concern that the price of peace with Egypt will exacerbate an already difficult economic situation ... We are prepared to see Israel's economic and military relationship with the United States take on new and strong and more meaningful dimensions even than already exist".

Ibid.
Egypt on the basis as other customers, (b) Egypt would withdraw for the time being, its demand for the liaison officers in Gaza, with the understanding that it would be discussed later, (c) The treaty would specify the stage of interim Israeli withdrawal and the ambassadors would be exchanged one month after completion of withdrawal. The new proposals were accepted by Begin. However, he asserted that the treaty would be signed only after the Knesset approval.\(^{19}\)

On March 13, 1979, President Carter reached Cairo and in the Conference, he announced Israel's readiness to sign the treaty with Israel.\(^{20}\) It was on March 14, 1979, that the Israeli cabinet approved the final proposals and the whole peace treaty package was accepted on March 19 and the following day, the treaty was placed before the Knesset which passed it after 28 hours of debate with 95 votes to 18.\(^{21}\) President Carter in a statement on March 22, hailed the Israeli approval of the

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19. Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer, n. 8, p. 113. And also see for further details Moshe Dayan, n. 16, pp. 273-278.


peace treaty and he observed that:

"The binds of shared values and common purpose between the United States and Israel are strong and enduring. The achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt will strengthen even more our relations with these two parties in peace and help more towards a stable, co-operative and peaceful future for all the peoples of the Middle East".22

Egypt - Israeli Peace Treaty

On March 26, 1979, in the White House ceremony in Washington, the Peace treaty was signed between Sadat and Begin in English, Hebrew and Arabic language which was duly signed by President Carter as witness. Carter, in an address after witnessing the signing of the Peace treaty, said that:

"The country sides of both lands are free from the litter and the carnage of a wasteful war... The dedication and determination of these two world statesmen have borne fruit. Peace has come to Israel and Egypt. There now remains the rest of the Arab world whose support and whose co-operation in the peace process is needed and honestly sought. I am convinced that other Arab people need and want peace. But some of their leaders are not yet willing to honour these needs and desires for peace".24

24. The President added that: "we must now demonstrate the advantages of peace, and expand its benefit to encompass contd.....
After thanking President Carter, President Sadat said that:

"The steps we took in the recent past will serve Arab vital interests. The liberation of Arab land and the reinstatement of Arab authority in the West Bank and Gaza would certainly enhance our common strategic interests. While we take initiative to protect these interests, we remain faithful to our Arab commitment. Let there be no wars or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis". 25

Prime Minister Begin equally expressed his joy on signing of the Peace treaty. His speech, however, revealed the adamant attitude of Israel on the status of East Jerusalem when he eloquently said that:

"No more war, no more bloodshed, no more breavement. Peace unto you ... And it is... the third greatest day in my life. The first was May 14, 1948, when our flag was hoisted. Our independence in our ancestors' land was proclaimed after, 1,878 years of dispersion, persecution, humiliation and ultimately, physical destruction ... The second day was when Jerusalem became one city ... this is the third day in my life. I have signed a treaty of peace with our great neighbour, with Egypt". 26

contd....

all those who have suffered so much in the Middle East"


25. Ibid., p. 64.

26. Ibid., p. 65.
The terms of the treaty basically provided for Israeli return of the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, captured in 1967 war in exchange of Egyptian recognition of the State of Israel. The treaty highlighted that:

"(a) There will be Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai - including its settlements, sophisticated military bases and the oil fields - within three years. Within nine months Israel would withdraw two-thirds of the Peninsula.

(b) After the completion of Israeli interim withdrawal in nine months, normal relations will be established. One month after the completion of the interim withdrawal, Israel and Egypt will exchange their respective ambassadors.27

(c) Security arrangements will be made on both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian border, including limited forces zones and UN troops to monitor, will also conduct surveillance flights to monitor compliance.

(d) Israeli ships will have the same right of free passage in the Suez Canal and its approaches as the vessels of other nations.

(e) Israel will be permitted to buy oil from the fields it is returning to Egypt under normal commercial terms".28


28. Ibid.
However, before the signing of the peace treaty, the two memorandums of agreement between the United States and Israel was clandestinely signed by the American and Israeli authorities on the same day of signing the peace treaty. In fact, Egypt was not apprised of such memoranda. The memoranda provided for the US action in case of the treaty violation by Egypt and it also ensured oil to Israel for 15 years, should Israel’s sources jeopardised.\(^{29}\) The Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Khalil protested against the memoranda and asserted that it indicated that there could be violations only from the Egyptian side and he observed that the memoranda would “adversely affect the whole process of peace and stability in the region”.\(^{30}\) The US State Department responded to Egyptian

29. The memoranda stated that: “The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, the treaty of peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, interalia, a blockade of Israel’s use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the treaty of peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the areas, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violence”.


30. Ibid.
protest and offered to sign a similar document which Egypt refused to sign.  

US aid to Egypt and Israel

After the conclusion of the peace treaty the US Administration provided both Egypt and Israel with the financial assistance. Speaking at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 11, 1979, the US Secretary of State, Vance gave details of additional financial assistance as a reward to Egypt and Israel for the signing of peace treaty, which amounted to the total of $4.8 billion over three years, provided by the United States. Out of this amount, Egypt would be financed $1.5 billion whereas Israel would be provided with $3 billion.

The Director of the US Agency for International Development (AID), Donald Brown said that the $1.5 billion financial assistance approved by the Congress, would be given in loans.


32. The amount of the American aid to Israel was in addition to the $1.8 billion in annual military and economic aid that Israel got from the US. The American aid to Egypt was in addition to the $750 million in economic aid $200 million in food aid that Egypt currently received from Washington.

Time (New York), April 2, 1979, p. 6.
and military credits to Egypt and apart from this amount, $300 million in supplementary aid would be extended to Egypt. A further $15 million committed for 1979 was allocated in order to provide 1,500 scholarships, which costed $45 million over three years. AID also agreed to grant $1,225 million to set up local developments funds which would provide loans to village council for investment in profitmaking projects. The funds would be controlled by the village Council, and each of which would be made up to the equivalent of $5 million in local currency. The supplementary aid of $300 million would be provided to Egypt over three years in order to help President Sadat for solving the real human needs of his people.

The $1.5 billion of military sale to Egypt as indicated by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was necessary to ensure the security of Egypt and to promote the stability in the region.


34. Middle East Economic Digest (London), Vol. 23, No. 41, October 31, 1979, p. 35.


It was in October 1979, that a study mission headed by the Pentagon's Research Director, William Perry reached Egypt to review the Egyptian request for 200 F-15 and F-16, 100 tanks along with the technical assistance to manufacture F-5E Jet fighters indigenously and he recommended a major American commitment to modernize the Egyptian military power. As a result, the White House informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about its plan to sell to Egypt 85 F-16 air crafts and also some military equipment.

However, behind the scene lobbying against the quantity of arms aid to Egypt was launched by Israel when in December 1979, the Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman sought the US Administration to reduce the US arms aid to Egypt. This was followed by the US National Security Council (NSC) consideration on February 15, 1980, which studied the Egyptian arms request and also Israeli protest against the proposed aid. It was reported that the NSC members and President Carter justified the sale of F-16 to Egypt and ultimately Carter decided to sell 38-F-16 fighter bombers to Egypt. On February 25, 1980, it was

37. The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), February 20, 1980.
39. Ibid.
reported that formal agreement on the sale of $2 billion worth of US arms to Egypt was concluded between Egyptian Defense Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali and the US Assistant Secretary, McGiffort and on March 13 and 25, 1980, the Pentagon apprised the congress with proposed arms sale to Egypt which included 244 M-60 advanced battle tanks, 40 F-16 aircrafts with spares, support equipment and armament, including F-16 flight simulator, related Communication System, training, to spare engines and air-frame components, 600 Hughes AGM-65 Maverick ASMs, 20 mm ammunition, 2500 500-lb MK-82 bombers, 850 2000-lb MK-84 bombs and associated services. On April 22, 1980, the "principal agreement" for two billion arms purchase was signed by Egyptian Defense Minister, Ali in Washington. These arms were supplied to Egypt under the Foreign Military sale (FMS) which meant cash payments and approved by the Congress in May 1980. 40

In a letter to Israeli Defense Minister, Weizman, the US Secretary of Defense, Brown, on March 19, 1979, expressed that the United States would provide extraordinary assistance to Israel for relocating the Sinai air bases to the Negev and in addition to this, Israel would also be supplied with

40. Ibid.

And also see for further details Middle East Monitor (New Jersey), Vol. X, No. 4, March 1, 1980, p.3.
military equipment. The new aid commitment included $3 billion over three years period for construction of two air bases in the Negev and to assist in meeting other relocations costs. The $800 million grant of the total $3 billion assistance would be paid in the form of loans to be spread in the fiscal years 1979-80. In addition, the United States would extend "managerial and technical assistance" for the base. Long-term loans would be granted to enable Israel to purchase $2.2 billion worth arms from the United States which included 200 tanks, 800 armoured personnel carriers, air to-ground missiles and artillery weapons. Terms for the loans would be in accordance with the current market rates, a 10 year deferment on payment of principal, and then 20 years to reply the loan.

Further, the US Administration was also prepared to accelerate the delivery of F-16 fighter planes promised to Israel in 1978. Although, the planes had been scheduled for delivery in 1981, the date moved up to January 1980 for the delivery of the planes.

42. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
Arab opposition to the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty

There was widespread condemnation of Peace treaty in the entire Arab world. For instance, in an interview to the Newsweek, President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria denounced the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and placed Sadat "in the position of an enemy of the Arab nation, in the same trench with Israel". He further observed that the United States was trying to divide the Arabs in a calculated way. On March 26, 1979, the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, speaking at the Sabra refugee camp in Beirut, threatened to "crush the triangular alliance of Carter, Begin and Sadat" and to "chop off their hands" for ignoring Palestinian rights. The Palestinians protested and demonstrated in many Arab and other capitals and also in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza, followed by several incidents, including temporary seizure of the Egyptian Embassies in Kuwait and Dacca and of the Egyptian airline office in Damascus, where two bombs blasted outside the US Embassy but without causing any injury.

45. President Assad expressed that: "The US is trying to divide and rule by ... transferring some of the Arabs to the Israeli side. There are also US attempts to create an atmosphere of tension in the area... And these objectives coincide, of course, with Zionist aims - things the American people are not aware of and would not, agree to if they understood what is happening."

Newsweek (New York), April 2, 1979, p. 8.


47. Ibid.
A three day Conference of Arab League Ministers was held on March 27, 1979, in Baghdad in order to take actions against Egypt for the signing of the Peace treaty with Israel.\textsuperscript{48} The Conference which was attended by Foreign Ministers and Economy Ministers of 18 members States and by the PLO (Sudan and Oman being absent in addition to Egypt, which was not invited) was marked by sharp disagreement between the hardliners led by Iraq, Syria, Libya and the PLO and the moderates - Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritiana led by Saudi Arabia, regarding sanctions against Egypt. The split in the Arab ranks was averted due to the sagacity of King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan and Kuwaiti leadership. In fact, in a pre-Conference meeting with King Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz, King Hussein succeeded in persuading the Saudi King for the suspension of Arab economic assistance to Egypt apart from moving the Arab League headquarters from Cairo, suspending Egyptian membership in the Arab League and boycotting the Egyptian firms or individuals who dealt with Israel. A further tension occurred during the Conference, when at Iraq's call, it was decided to suspend Egypt from various organisation attached to the Arab League or in Arab League sponsored Joint projects and to ban economic aid to Egypt from the Arab funds, banks

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Middle East Monitor} (New. Jersey), Vol. IX, No. 7, April 1, 1979, p. 4.
etc.\textsuperscript{50} It seemed that the moderates and the hardliners were on the verge of final split regarding the question of severance of diplomatic relations with Egypt. But Kuwait's diplomatic manoeuvre and its crucial mediatory role on March 30, 1979, averted the final breakdown between the two ranks. The severance of diplomatic relations with Egypt was the thorniest issue to crop up during the summit as it was contrary to the basic principle of traditional Saudi policy, namely - to keep its options wide open to avoid irrevocable breaks with any Arab State that too with Egypt, which was influential in Arab affairs. In spite of Saudi Arabia's strong feelings, severance of diplomatic relations with Egypt was adopted as a recommendation which was to be implemented within one month's duration instead of the decision which was immediately enforceable.\textsuperscript{51}

It was at the eleventh hour of the Conference of Arab League members that succeeded in putting together a credible and far-reaching package of sanctions against Egypt which marked a spectacular show of Arab unanimity in which both hardliners and moderates alone patched up their differences and attitudes regarding sanctions against Egypt for the peace

\textsuperscript{50} Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia), Vol. XXII, No. 25, April 9, 1979, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
And also see for further details Middle East Economic Digest (London), Vol. No. 14, April 6, 1979, p. 3.
treaty with Israel.

The Conference unanimously approved the resolutions which seemed as going further than the "minimum position" recommended by the previous Arab Summit, and a wide ranging political and economic boycott was recommended against Egypt. However, the Conference neither take any decisions to withdraw Arab funds from Egyptian financial institutions nor made any reference to the possibility of using the Arab "oil weapon" by halting supplies to the United States and other governments which supported the peace treaty, although, an embargo was placed on oil supplies to Egypt.

As for political decisions, it was decided that:

"(a) The Arab states would withdraw their ambassadors from Egypt forthwith and would sever diplomatic relations with Egypt within a month.

(b) Furthermore, Egypt's membership in the Arab League as well as in several specialised Arab institutions, would also be suspended and the Arab League headquarters and those of its ancillary institutions would be moved out of Egypt. This of course would deprive Egypt of a principal forum of inter-Arab diplomacy and influence".

52. Ibid.
54. Ibid.

And also see for the full text of the Conference decisions BBC Monitoring Service Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6082/A/7-12.
It was also agreed that in order to intensify Egypt's isolation, Arab states would make their efforts to bring out the suspension of Egypt's membership from the non-aligned movement, the organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), organisation of African Unity (OAU) etc.\[55\]

As far as economic decisions were concerned, Arab economic loans, deposits, guarantees, bank credits, contributions in cash or kind to Egypt would be stopped. Economic aid from the Arab funds, banks and financial institutions which existed within the sphere of the Arab League and Joint Arab co-operation was equally prevented to the Egyptians.\[56\]

The resolution further asserted that:

"These measures which have been adopted by the Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy are considered to be the minimum steps to confront the danger of the treaty and it is left to the governments individually to take whatever steps they believe necessary."

\[55\] Ibid.

\[56\] The resolution further urged that: "(a) consequent to the suspension of Egypt's membership from the Arab League its membership in the establishment funds and organisations shall also be suspended and all the benefits Egypt may enjoy from these sources shall also be terminated. In case, any of these bodies are based in Egypt, they should be transferred to other Arab countries temporarily. (b) As the "Egyptian-Zionist" treaty and the annexes attached to it commit Egypt to sell oil to Israel Arab countries shall refrain from supplying Egypt with oil and its derivatives. (c) To ban trade exchange with the public and private Egyptian establishments that engaged in transactions with the Zionist enemy."

Middle East Monitor (New Jersey), Vol. IX, No. 10, May 15, 1979, p. 2

\[57\] Middle East Economic Survey, n. 50, p. 9.
In pursuance of the resolution passed by the Arab ministers in Baghdad, the organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting countries (OAPEC) decided at its extraordinary ministerial level meeting in Kuwait from April 16 - 17, 1979, to suspend Egypt's membership in the organisation and the Joint ventures sponsored by it. At the same time, the nine Arab States - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco snapped their diplomatic and political relations with Egypt. Egypt also equally reacted by breaking the diplomatic relations with the hostile Arab States.

In a statement, the Saudi Minister of Information, Muhammad Abduh Yamani, expressed that in view of the Egypt-Israeli Peace treaty, Saudi Arabia would not provide any new aid to Egypt but the government would continue to meet the

58. Apart from Egypt, OAPEC comprised of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, the UAE, Syria, Qatar and Bahrain.

59. Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen had already severed the diplomatic relations with Egypt when President Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977 and Jordan had called her ambassador from Cairo following the signing of the Egypt-Israel-Peace Treaty.

60. Middle East Economic Survey (Nicosia), Vol. XXII, No. 28, April 30, 1979, p. 5.
existing obligations to Egypt. The minister explained that Saudi Arabia decided to break the relations due to the fact that Egypt

"accepted and intended to exchange diplomatic relations with the Zionist enemy and had started establishing normal relations with him without taking into consideration the realisation of the minimum demands of the Arab nation for establishment of a comprehensive and just peace".62

Further, there were also several Arab organisations and Joint ventures which decided to suspend Egypt's membership in consonance with the Baghdad decisions.

Non-Arab Reaction to the treaty

Initially, Western reaction to the treaty was more or less similar to that as followed by the Camp David Accords. In a statement on March 26, 1979, Nine member states of the European Economic Community (EEC), appreciated "the will of peace

61. Ibid., n. 58, p. 6.
62. Ibid., n. 66, p. 6.
63. These included the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) which also imposed a ban on any loans, guarantees or any other financial or technical assistance to Egypt, the Arab Labour Organisation, which decided to move its headquarters from Cairo to Baghdad, the Arab Union of Chemical Fertilizers Producers, the Union for Iron and Steel Industries, the Arab General Union for Textile Industries and the Arab Organisation for Administrative Science.

Ibid.
which has led President Carter to engage himself personally in these negotiations, as well as of the efforts made by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin". The nine members asserted that the Peace treaty constituted the correct implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242 but they also stuck to the previous declaration of June 29, 1977 which declared that:

"...the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only take place within the framework of comprehensive settlement, must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and must translate into fact the right of the Palestinian people to homeland". 64

With the passage of time, the governments of the EEC sought to evolve a United policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in contrast with the thinking of the United States as the European leaders felt that the US Palestine policy was alienating the Arab and muslim world which would eventually pave the way for the Soviet presence in the Middle East. 65 A Venice Summit of the EEC took place on June 12, 1980, which

64. Middle East International (London), No. 96, March 30, 1979, p. 15.
issued a statement on June 13, that:

"(a) The nine countries of the community base themselves on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338...

(b) ... the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community, the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

(c) A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

(d) The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration ... The principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations".66

On the other hand, the Soviet Union condemned the Egypt-Israeli Peace treaty and in a speech on April 6, 1979, made at a lunch given in the honour of visiting Foreign Minister Ben Yahia of Algeria, the Soviet Counterpart, Andrei Gromyok, criticised the treaty as an attempt to legalise Israel's presence on the

Arab territory and he further condemned the treaty as a "separate deal".67

Again in Mid-April 1979, a Joint Syrian-Soviet Communique was issued on the occasion of the visit of Gromyoko to Damascus, which stated that:

"Under the cover of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, imperialist forces are seeking to extend their military presence in the Middle East. They condemn the capitulatory actions of the Egyptian leadership as causing serious harm to the struggle of their independence".68

It was from November 12 - 14, 1979, a week before the tenth Arab Summit, the PLO leader, Arafat visited Moscow and in a Joint Communique he, expressed his "deep felt gratitude for" from selfless support and assistance of the Soviet Union.

67. Gromyoko expressed that: "Both the Soviet Union and Algeria are deeply concerned about the situation in this area and strongly condemn the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, a separate deal concluded under the aegis of, or to be more exact, under pressure from, the United States".

Soviet News (London), No. 5967, April 16, 1979, p. 120.

68. New Times (Moscow) No. 14, April 1979, p. 5.
The communique called for:

"(a) a full and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab lands including Palestinian territories occupied by it in 1967;

(b) the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to self-determination and the establishment of its own independent state;

(c) and also the right of Palestinians to return to their home".69

By the end of 1979, the Soviet Union expressed its full support to the cause of PLO and its policies. The Soviet gesture, however, was not viewed with favour by the conservative Arab States because they suspected the Soviet intention and policies in regard to PLO's rights, particularly after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.70

It was by the end of 1980 that the Soviet Union propounded a political settlement of the Middle East conflict. It recognised Israel's right to exist and the Security Council resolutions Number 242 and 338 and opposed Zionism and supported the Palestinian right to struggle for an independent state.


70. Ibid., p. 213.
Further, it considered the PLO as a catalyst against the American imperialism.\(^71\)

The reaction of the non-aligned countries was, however moderate towards Egypt. But a Foreign Minister level Conference of the co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) was held in Colombo from June 6 - 10, 1979 and condemned the treaty as the "partial and selective agreement" and it bitterly criticised both the US role in aggravating the situation in the Middle East and also Israeli policy of expansionist imperialism which involved "annexing occupied Palestinian territory including Jerusalem, and establishing para-military Zionist settlements".\(^72\) It was also emphasised that the PLO had the right to reject all settlements which aimed at undermining the "Palestinian question and denying the natural rights of the Palestinian people".\(^73\) The declaration further criticised the "policies which the United States" sought "to impose on the region to the detriment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the total liberation of occupied Palestinian and Arab territory".\(^74\)

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71. Ibid., p. 215.
72. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n. 2, p. 22842
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
Again in September 1979, the Non-alignment Summit was held in Havana, Cuba. During the course of debate in the political committee, African States defeated the efforts by the Arab hardliners to get Egypt expelled from the Non-aligned Movement as a punishment for the Peace treaty. The delegates set up a panel to review Egypt's actions and decide whether Egypt should be suspended from NAM. At the same time, the head of Somalian delegation Ahmad Mohammad Adan came short of demanding the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Ethiopia, its neighbouring rival. However, the NAM summit ended with only "denunciation" of Egypt for signing of the Peace treaty with Israel.75

CHAPTER V

EGYPT-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT AND
PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY

The thrust of Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty was to promote friendly ties between the two giant war waging nations of West Asia and to solve the Palestinian problem amicably. On April 2, 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel paid a state visit to Cairo as the first Israeli leader to an Arab country despite the protest from the Arab ambassadors stationed in Cairo. The dignitaries left the capital of Egypt in anger and registered their anguish and expressed their reluctance to accept the peace treaty, signed between Egypt and Israel. Prime Minister Begin, however, remained calm and unperturbed during his visit to Cairo and announced that both the countries would open their border for promotion of mutual understanding and co-operation. He also announced that they would meet again in El-Arish, the capital of Sinai on May 27, 1979, and the town would be reverted from the Israeli hold to the Egyptian sovereignty. President Sadat expressed happiness over the announcement and emphasised that both the countries should develop direct contacts for mutual benefit and peace in the region.


In fact, their agreement to open the borders in less than eight weeks seemed to be a concession by Sadat who had once urged that in each step towards the normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel be synchronised with the progress in the autonomy talks for the Palestinian Self-Government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return to President Sadat's concession, Begin expressed his agreement on speeding up the Israeli withdrawal from El-Arish which had been occupied by the Israelis since the 1967 war. The two leaders further decided to set up a communication line between them so as to talk directly and to take decision in case of exigencies.

**Process of Normalisation**

On April 25, 1979, Egypt and Israel officially ended the 31 years of hostilities by exchanging treaty ratification documents at an American monitoring base in Sinai. Meanwhile, the Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman and his Egyptian counterpart, Kamal Hasaan Ali had talks regarding the arrangements for the return of El-Arish in Sinai to Egyptian control. They also discussed the co-ordination of the Joint military committee's work on the return of all Sinai installation from Israel to Egypt. Both the ministers declared that Israel would withdraw

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3. Ibid.

4. *Middle East International* (London), No. 98, April 27, 1979, p. 15.
from El-Arish on May 25, 1980, two days before the schedule. While speaking on Israeli Radio, Weizman emphasised that after the return of El-Arish, the process of normalisation of relations between the two countries would begin initially with tourism "in an organised way".  

On April 29, 1979, Ashdod was the first Israeli flag ship to pass through the Suez Canal since 1954 and it was cheered by thousands of Egyptians which indicated the Egyptians' zeal to strengthen further friendly ties between the two countries. The first Egyptian civilian and military personnel reached El-Arish on May 14, 1979, to take charge of various installations and on May 23, Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Butrus Butrus Ghali and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan met and solved the question of currency transfers and movement of students from Gaza Strip to Egypt. Eventually, on May 25, 1979 El-Arish and Zone I were handed over to the Egyptians. The handing over ceremony, however, was marred by the Jewish settlers who refused to evacuate vegetable garden in the region and ultimately, they were persuaded by the Israeli authorities to vacate the area on the assurance of better

dwelling place in other parts of Israel.  

Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin announced on May 27, 1979 to open the borders between the two countries, to release prisoners of war and to hold another meeting as to assess the progress of their newly build relationship.  

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8. In order to develop the ties between Egypt and Israel, Begin and Sadat expressed their agreements on certain points:

(a) Despite some last-minute Egyptian reservations, the borders between Egypt and Israel were open, citizens of one country would be able to visit the other. Officials said later that details would have to be worked out, but there was an agreement in principle not to wait until next January, as specified in the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty.

(b) In return for Sadat's agreement to open the borders, Begin would "undertake steps to set free a number of Arab prisoners whose release will not impair Israel's Security". Other sources reported that 50 to 60 Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip held on suspicion of subversion would be released. Earlier, Egypt had asked that Israel release certain political prisoners as a goodwill gesture, including about 20 who were being held without specific charges. Israel had indicated that it would do so.

(c) Begin would go to Alexandria, Egypt in the first week of July "to hold important talks about problems" which concerned them.

(d) The Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan would go to Cairo before the next session of the Palestinian autonomy talks in Alexandria.

the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance met for about half an hour in a Villa in El-Arish and then they flew Beersheba in Negev for State reception to Sadat and finally they flew from Beersheba over Tel Aviv to Cairo in order to formally open the air corridor which finally would allow direct commercial routes between Egypt and Israel.  

The talks between Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Khalil and other Egyptian officials were concluded with an agreement between Egypt and Israel, to allow their citizens to travel freely between the two countries.

On September 4, 1979, President Sadat sailed into the Israeli Port of Haifa for three-day talks with prime Minister Begin of Israel. The following day, Sadat and Begin announced the conclusion of the agreement on June 6, 1979, Premier Khalil expressed that the prospective visitors could apply for visa through the respective Egyptian and Israeli Foreign Ministers or through consulates of third countries. It was further agreed that the travel between the two countries would be allowed only by air or sea, not over-land through the Sinai Peninsula. Prime Minister Khalil said that the national airlines of Israel and Egypt would not provide direct air service between Cairo and Tel Aviv for some time. He said the international airlines would be permitted to do so.

bilateral agreements on the return of Sinai to Egypt before the schedule, Joint Egyptian-Israeli Patrols in the Peninsula and Egyptian oil sales to Israel.\footnote{Middle East International (London), No. 108, September 14, 1979, p. 12. And also see for further details Asian Recorder (New Delhi) Vol. XXV, No. 41, October 8-14, 1979, pp. 15110-15111.}

It was further announced that the early withdrawal from the Saint Catherine monastery area in Southern Sinai, would be materialised before November 19, 1979, the second anniversary of Sadat's historic Journey to Jerusalem and this return would take place two months before the schedule set up by the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Joint Patrols would also be installed for the next two and a half year as a temporary measure for smooth transactions in Sinai.\footnote{Near East Report (Washington, D.C.), Vol. XXIII, No. 36, September 5, 1979, p. 159.}

It was further reported that Begin and Sadat also reached an agreement on the supply of oil to Israel. The main intention of President Sadat to supply adequate oil to Israel was to solve the two important thorny issues - the question of Arab sector of Jerusalem and the question of autonomy for the Palestinians.\footnote{Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. XXV, No. 41, October 8-14, 1979, p. 15112.}

But no agreement was announced on either the amount of autonomy to be granted to Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip or on the status of Jerusalem. It may be noted that while speaking at
a Joint Press Conference, President Sadat said that East Jerusalem should be included in the autonomy plan which was countered by Begin who replied that Jerusalem was the "capital of Israel" and he added that it was "an indivisible city". 14

An agreement with Egypt was approved by Israel on November 8, 1979, which provided that Egypt would sell oil to Israel on discount prices for one year and after that, it would be allowed to buy unlimited quantity of oil at the market price. 15

Meanwhile, Israel, on November 14, handed over to Egypt a fourth section of Sinai area, including the Mount Sinai and the oil fields in southern Sinai, two months before the schedule in order to facilitate President Sadat to go to Mount Sinai to celebrate the second anniversary of his trip to Jerusalem. 16 The El-Arish border - crossing station which was opened in December, for free passage, in both directions to Sinai inhabitants also marked the progress towards normalisation before January 26, 1980, the date which was formally scheduled for its


15. Israel pumped about 20 percent of its oil needs from the oil fields which were began producing commercially only 20 months ago. Other oil came from Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria.


16. Ibid.
beginning. 17 The withdrawal of the last Israeli combat forces on January 23, 1980, from one of the most strategically significant areas which included Mitla and Giddi passes and the huge military base in Bir Gafgafa, marked the completion of the first phase of Israeli withdrawal under the treaty. 18

Resumption of relations in January, 1980, between the two countries was marked by President Sadat's anxiety to get on with the negotiations to conclude agreements on aviation, trade and culture within six weeks and to further expedite the autonomy issue for the Palestinians. 19

The linkage of autonomy and normalisation of relations, however, had been resisted by the Israelis, who were anxious to speed up the normalisation and drag their feet on the Palestinian autonomy talks. 20 The Israeli diplomatic mission reached Cairo


18. Israel had now returned two-thirds of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and was scheduled to return the final third in April 1982.


And also see for further details Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. XXVI, No. 10, March 4-10, 1980, pp. 15350-15351.


20. Ibid.
on February 17, 1980 and the Israeli Embassy was formally inaugurated on the following day. Both Egypt and Israel exchanged ambassadors in accordance with the Peace treaty on February 26, 1980.21

The process of normalisation, however, was accompanied by disillusionment and friction both for the Egyptians and Israelis as first the Israelis complained that their ambassador in Cairo was being socially boycotted and further the ambassador and his staff faced hardships in renting apartments in Cairo. On the other hand, there were practically a few number of tourists from Egypt who visited Israel and only a few commercial deals were materialised between the Egyptians and Israelis. Although, people had welcomed the peace process and exhibited great hospitality to visiting Israelis, the attitude of the Egyptian intelligentsia remained distinctly reverse. The three major ideologically diverse classes - the leftists, the neo-Nasserites and the Radical muslims vehemently opposed to President Sadat and rejected the Camp David Accords and Peace

21 Saad Mortada presented his credentials to Israeli president Yitzhak Navon and simultaneously the Israeli Ambassador Ben-Elissar presented his credentials to President Sadat of Egypt.

treaty with Israel. Many politically conscious Egyptians felt that the Camp David Accords did not guarantee the right of Self-determination to the Palestinians. The Egyptians by and large, favoured the opposition expressed by the other Arab countries as they feared that their economic, political and cultural aspirations would be jeopardised if Egypt established relations with Israel. President Sadat was displeased with the negative attitude of his countrymen and on certain occasions he personally explained the significance of peace process which would pave the way for ensuring the progress and solving the Palestinian problem in the region.

The Israeli authorities expressed resentment over the reaction of Egyptians and argued that the implementation of peace process would be impracticable as even the Egyptian Intelligentsia and press media were against normalisation of relations.

22. The leftists rejected the treaty because, it was based on "Pax Americana" and coupled with the capitalististic "open door" policy, the neo-Nasserites disapproved the treaty because it was seen as a betrayal of Pan-Arabism and of Nasser's anti-imperialistic struggle, the Radical muslims opposed because, it relegated part of Dar al-Islam to a dhimmi minority which had no legitimate claim to statehood. While representing these views the opposition Press in Egypt vehemently criticised the peace process and the Israelis in general.


23. Broadcasts from the Arab countries which in fact, black listed the Egyptians accused of establishing contacts with Israel, further raised their fears.

Ibid.

24. Ibid.
between Egypt and Israel. The tension further heightened as a result of the publications of/series of carricature by Al-Akhbar newspaper of Cairo which depicted Prime Minister Begin as a Nazi and ridiculed the Israeli officials. This generated very angry reaction from the Israeli circles. Notwithstanding the editor Musa Sabri's apology to Israelis, the tension further accelerated. But it was in September 1980 following the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir to Cairo from September 9 to 11, 1980, the normalisation process once again gathered momentum. President Sadat and his Foreign Minister Butrus Butrus Ghali assured the visiting Foreign Minister of Israel that normalisation would be accelerated despite opposition and further, the negotiation for autonomy for the Palestinians would be discussed peacefully. The visit of the Israeli President Yitzhak Navon to Egypt from October 20 to 29, 1980 removed misunderstanding between the two countries to such an extent and to both the countries further agreed/adopt various measures to accelerate the process of normalisation of relations.

25. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

26. It included a reiteration of the promise to open the land route for the movement of goods, a fourth weekly flight to Cairo for El Al; the restoration of the Status quo ante with regard to tourism arrangements at the Saint Catherine monastery (in October, the Egyptians had decided inter alia not to allow any more non-Israelis to visit the site from Israel); the exchange of industrial, agricultural and educational exhibitions; visits to Israel by an Egyptian parliamentary and a party delegation; as well as Ministerial visits; to speed up the ratification of earlier agreements dealing with civil aviation, cultural and scientific exchanges, and trade and economics; the establishment of contd.....
Navon, who was also a scholar of Arabic, was the first Israeli head of State to visit an Arab country. Navon's visit was considered to be the most successful and in fact, he delivered his speech in Arabic which did not reflect any political orientation. He expressed that he did not come to "negotiate or bargain". His speech mainly highlighted the Joint heritage of Arabs and Jews in general and Egyptians and Israelis in particular. Besides, Navon's success was partly due to Egypt's determination to make president's visit a success. The enthusiastic and warm reception accorded to president Navon was viewed both in Egyptian and Israeli circle as Sadat's effort to demonstrate to the United States as well as to the Arab and Israeli public that he did not deviate from the peace process and that his tussle was with Begin Government alone, not with Israel and the Israelis. But the Israeli authorities viewed a "supreme command for peace" i.e., Joint Committee of authors, Social scientists, educators and psychologists and an agreement to make further searches for the bodies of Israeli soldiers who had fallen in Sinai in 1973.


And also see for further details BBC Monitoring Service Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6563/A/9.


the entire peace process as "too slow". In the meanwhile, an agreement was concluded on November 6, 1980 for transportation of goods via El-Arish. Since then there had been a significant progress in bilateral trade between Egypt and Israel as the volume of trade in October 1980 reached to $9 million. During the last quarter of 1980, the trade average per month turned to be $2.25 million. 29

President Sadat's personal interest to boost up agricultural cooperation between the two countries resulted in the signing of several agreements and also set up agricultural production. 30

29. Israeli exports to Egypt included Soya meal, refrigerated eggs, butter, one-day chicks, bananas, other food products, plastic goods, aluminium ware, equipment for the pharmaceutical industry and vaccines and equipment for poultry-raising. Israeli firms intended to buy Egyptian cotton products. Oil exports from Egypt to Israel in 1980 reached 2 million tons, costing $490 million. Egypt also agreed to extend them to 2.5 million tons in 1981, and it further reduced oil prices during the first half of that year, in accordance with price reductions in the World market. 

Ibid., p. 155.

30. The agreements included:

(a) An agro-industrial project on an area of 5,000 hectares of reclaimed land near Salihiyya to include a cattle ranch of 20,000 head.

(b) A tomato farming and vegetable growing project in Nubariya.

(c) Control of animal diseases, especially Rift Valley fever.
The cultural relations, however, remained at the low ebb as very few Egyptian academics, journalists, and artists visited Israel and at the same time Israeli intellectuals exchanged the dialogues either by direct contact or through the press. It was in mid-November that an Israeli-Egyptian Friendship Association was formed and on February 26, 1981, both the countries signed an agreement relating to the youth exchange programme. 31

The Autonomy Talks

On March 26, 1979, the day when the Peace treaty was concluded, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed a document entitled "The complimentary Agreement on the Establishment of the Palestinian Self-Governing Authority with full

contd....

(d) The sale of agricultural equipment to Egypt.

(e) Exchange of technological expertise.

(f) Assistance in marketing Egyptian agricultural products in Europe and the Persian Gulf.

(g) Co-operation in developing fisheries in the Red Sea and the Bardawil Lagoon (on northern Sinai Coast).

Ibid., pp. 155-156.

31. Many obstacles to normalisation remained. Some resulted from the differences in individual approaches and political culture, and in the structure of the two societies and their economies; some from the hesitancy of dealing with the unfamiliar. However, both Egypt and Israel were making their best efforts to strengthen the growing friendship among them out of the Peace treaty.

Ibid., p.156.
Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and invited Jordan to participate in the negotiations for the implementation of the provisions of the Camp David Accords. In an event of Jordan, not deciding to join the negotiations would be held between Egypt and Israel. Jordan did refuse and consequently, Egypt undertook to conduct these negotiations alone.

The Israeli policy of new Jewish settlements in the occupied areas dominated during the autonomy talks held in Alexandria on June 12, 1979. In fact, the question of settlement cropped up as a result of Israel's creation of a new civilian outpost near the West Bank Arab town of Nablus which witnessed the first settlement after the conclusion of the Peace treaty. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Khalil said that the settlements which were illegal, would hamper the chance of autonomy talks. Similarly, the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance viewed Israel's decision to establish the settlements as a "hindrance to the Peace process". As a result, the talks in Alexandria broke up

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32. Egypt decided to negotiate alone, in spite of the categorical rejection by the Arab countries and the PLO, who reiterated that Egypt had absolutely no right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and was not empowered in its Treaty to accept the continuation of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.


without any concrete outcome. Despite such eventuality, President Sadat expressed his satisfaction with autonomy talks. The differences between Egypt and Israel was further surfaced when on September 16, 1979, the Israeli Government lifted the 12 year old ban on the purchase of private property in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Israeli individuals and companies. In the autonomy talks, which was held from September 26-27 in Alexandria, declared that the lifting of ban constituted an "obstacle to peace" which would discourage other parties from joining the peace process.

In the meantime, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan resigned in October 1979 as a result of Israel's continued

36. Until now, Jewish civilian settlements sponsored by the state and built on requisitioned public lands could be built only with ministerial approval on the basis of security needs. The prohibition against civilian land acquisition, imposed by the former Labour Party Government after the 1967 war, had been intended to curtail Jewish land speculation in the West Bank and confine Israeli inhabitation in the territory to narrow security picket lines mapped out in the territorial compromise proposed by the then Foreign Minister Yigal Allon.

land expropriation policies in the West Bank. Dayan had recently conducted talks with the local Arab sympathisers of the PLO without Prime Minister Begin's approval as he sought Israel to consider the Palestinian views. He asserted that the government "can't get the Arab opinion by sitting and talking with Jews". At the same time, the Begin Government had to face another setback following the court's decision over its controversial policy towards the Israeli occupied areas which was politically detrimental to his Government. The stalemate in the autonomy talks, however, led Robert Strauss, who was made "super ambassador" reporting directly to Carter, to initiate the change of venue and change of negotiation tactics. The outcome of the London meeting which ended on October 26, 1979, was the agreement on two significant points:

"(a) In order to ensure that elections will be held in a sound and free way, it has been agreed that the elections will be organised, held and supervised by a responsible civilian Israeli body and through local Palestinian Arabs to be agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators along with other claims. The international media will be allowed to oversee these elections in accordance with the topics which will be discussed and agreed upon by the working group."

38. Middle East Monitor (New Jersey), Vol. IX, No. 20, November 1, 1979, p. 1.

39. Ibid.
(b) While the two delegations of Egypt and Israel continue to discuss their divergent viewpoints on several basic principles related to which side will affect the autonomous authority - the Administrative Council - the two delegations agreed that the Israeli delegation will continue to provide the other parties participating in the negotiations with a detailed description of the powers and responsibilities now being exercised by the military government and its civilian administration. These specifications of the present situation will provide the parties with basic information so that they can discuss the transfer of authority as stipulated by the Camp David framework. 40

The outcome of the meeting reflected the compromise between Egypt and Israel. But the basic differences persisted between the two countries over autonomy issue. The meeting, however, indicated a certain degree of flexibility. 41

The Israeli authorities submitted a detailed proposal to grant autonomy to Palestinians in a meeting of the working groups in Al-Giza, Egypt, on January 14-17, 1980. In the proposal, the Israelis emphasised on the creation of an 11 member Palestinian Council with strictly limited jurisdiction over health Services, agriculture, religious affairs, labour and welfare, commerce and industry, transportation and communications, justice, administration and education. 42 It also conferred on the Israelis to retain

41. Ibid.
42. Africa Diary (New Delhi, Vol. XX, No. 15, April 8-14, 1980, p. 9961.
the control over vital spheres as use of public land, water resources, internal security, Jewish civilian settlement, fuel and power and currency. 43

The proposed plan was outrageously rejected by the Egyptian delegation and the leader of the Egyptian side to the powers committee, Ambassador Izzat Abdul Latif expressed that the plan was not in conformity with the concept of Camp David Accords, which sought a comprehensive autonomy having full powers and jurisdictions in the legislative, judicial and executive spheres for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 44

The Egyptian stand seemed motivated to show their Arab critics that Egypt had not sold out the Palestinian cause in the interest of a separate peace with Israel. It also indicated that Egypt's refusal was an attempt to force the United States to act more effectively in order to break eight month old stalemate in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. 45 Following this, Dan Patir, the spokesman for the Israeli delegation to the talks of the autonomy working teams, reacted to the Egyptian assertion about the incompatibility of the Israeli plan with that of the accords and

44. BBC Monitoring Service *Summary of World Broadcasts* ME/6322/A/4-5.
he expressed that the draft, submitted by the Israeli team was in fact, the structure of the self-administration and its power based entirely on the Camp David principles. 46

It was on January 17, 1980, that the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Khalil expressed that:

"We demand that Israel honour what it has signed. Egypt honoured its commitments and will fulfil the commitments outlined in the treaty. Autonomy can not be interpreted by one side alone. We do not accept Begin's statement on granting limited powers to the Palestinians." 47

At the same time, in order to divulge the attention of the Arab States from the Camp David and draw the attention at the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Khalil pointed out the initiative, Egypt had taken on the day of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the measures proposed in the people's Assembly. He said that it was regrettable on the part of the "rejection States" which "justified the aggression". Khalil cautioned that the method used by Soviet Union in Afghanistan might be used again in other countries linked with the Soviets by treaties of friendship, such as the People's

46. BBC Monitoring Service Summary of World Broadcasts ME/6322/A/5.

47. Ibid., ME/6323/A/1.
The working groups of the Egyptian, US and Israeli delegation again met from January 28-29, 1980, in Tel Aviv. The Egyptians submitted their own detailed plan for autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It proposed the formation of a Palestinian Council of 80 to 100 members with full legislative, executive and judicial authority over the territories.

Israel on January 29, declined to accept the Egyptian proposals and Haim Kubersky, head of an Israeli working group told his Egyptian Counterpart, Izzat Abdul Latif that Egypt's plan was a model for sovereignty and not of autonomy. The parties also remained differ over the status of Jerusalem which was proposed by the Egyptians as the seat of autonomous institution. There was also dissension over Egypt's plan for the Palestinians, to elect a legislative instead of an executive authority as provided by the Israeli model of autonomy. There was further disagreement over the Jewish settlements in the territories. The Israelis expressed that Security was their concern, and not a subject for negotiation in the autonomy talks.

48. Ibid.
49. Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n. 22, p. 120.
50. Al-Ahram (Cairo), February 25, 1980.
51. Africa Diary, n. 42, pp. 9961-9962.
Prime Minister Begin regarded the Egyptian counter-proposal as a distortion of the letter and spirit of Camp David and declared that Israel would not approve any proposal which would lead to a Palestinian state. The Egyptian proposal demanded the transfer of the existing authority of the Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to a local Palestinian parliament, and that Self-rule apply to East Jerusalem as well. Begin asserted that Jerusalem would never again be divided. 52

It was from 27-28, 1980 that the next talks were held in Scheveningen, near the Hague. According to Israeli sources, the US - Israeli friction on such questions as security and settlements was witnessed in the meeting. It was, however, eventually agreed to form two new committees - one for legal matters, and the other for economic affairs. They were in addition to the two existing committees - for powers and elections. 53

US Vote against Israel

The smooth US-Israeli relations came to the lowest ebb when the United States along with the fourteen members of the UN Security Council, on March 1, 1980, voted against the Israeli

52. Ibid., p. 9961.
settlements in the occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem and called for the cessation of establishment, construction and planning of new ones and described the Israeli measures as "serious obstruction to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East".54 The resolution stated that:

"... all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem or any part thereof, have no legal validity".55

Speaking at the UN during his explanation of US support to the Security Council resolution, the US Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry asserted that:

"We regard the settlements in the occupied territories as illegal under international law, and we consider them to be an obstacle to a successful outcome of the current negotiations which are aimed at a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East".56

Although the US Ambassador managed to delete a key paragraph on the status of Jerusalem yet the resolution still contained seven other references to Jerusalem which implied that

55. Ibid.
the occupied territories included Jerusalem as well. 57

Israel, while protesting angrily called the resolution as "unjustified and one sided" and Israeli Foreign Ministry justified the settlements stand taken by the Menachem Begin's Government and condemned the American statement as the Security considerations of Israel was given top priority in Israel. 58 But the Arab States were pleased by the apparent shift in the US policy. 59 However, to avert the strong Israeli reaction and the American Jewish opinion against the Carter Administration, the President himself announced that the US vote was casted due to the communication failure. He expressed that:

"The United States vote in the United Nations was approved with the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted. The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote in favour of the resolution rather than abstention." 60


Though, Prime Minister Begin accepted Carter's admittance of communication breakdown yet he was too critical of the US policy in the United Nations and he pointed out that:

"... it is no surprise that the support of the American representative for this terrible resolution aroused deep resentment within our nation and among our friends". 61

In fact, the Israeli officials were, particularly antagonised that the Security Council resolution made a reference to the Arabs' and Palestinians' "occupied territories" including "Jerusalem". 62

On the other hand, President Carter's confession of the communication failure that resulted in the US vote in the Security Council against Israel of course, drew bitter criticism from the Arabs, on March 5, 1980, the Arab League members condemned the US policy reversal and the media and the government officials in the Middle East expressed that President Carter tried to woo the Jewish voters for the forthcoming presidential election. It was felt by the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Butrus Butrus Ghali that the US vote in the Security Council was true and the announcement of Carter afterwards was an attempt


62. Ibid.
to improve his standing among Jewish voters. A senior PLO official Majed Abu Sharar in Beirut, expressed that the US reversal was "a blow to those Arabs who run after America". The Kuwait Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Abdul Aziz Hussein was equally critical of the US policy and he observed that:

"Carter's attempt to reverse position could lead to a crisis in Arab-American relations".64

The Republican candidate and the former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan criticised President Carter and said that the UN vote raised "fundamental questions about Carter's real attitudes and intentions toward Israel". While considering Israel as the United States' "strategic asset", Reagan himself steadfastly called for the US support to Israel as "a trusted ally". He further expressed that "Israel cannot be pressured into actions that threaten her security" and if the United States jeopardised the Israeli security by "actions such as the UN vote" it would not only let down an ally but also "impair" its own security.65

At the same time, in an intensive questioning in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the US Secretary of State,


64. *Middle East Monitor*, n. 61, p. 1.

Cyrus Vance, while owning the responsibility for the communication failure, spoke that he was "mistaken" and he had "accepted full responsibility for the misunderstanding". However, he expressed that the US Administration considered the East Jerusalem as occupied territory.\(^\text{66}\)

In fact, Carter had to pay the price for the US vote against Israel in the Security Council and in November 1980, Ronald Reagan came into power with landslide victory.\(^\text{67}\)

**Failure of the Autonomy Talks**

Despite the setback to the US Administration following the UN vote, President Carter carried on his mission to achieve the break-through. And in a White House briefing on inflation and energy, Carter realised the exasperation expressed by the Arabs and favoured Arabs co-operation in meeting the challenge created by the energy crisis and assured to establish durable

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peace in the Middle East. He emphasised that:

"To the extent that we can be successful in realising the goals established in the Camp David accords, including the resolution of the Palestinian question, that will go a long way toward re-assuring the world about the supplies of scarce energy in the future and the stability of the world's economic system".68

At the same time, Carter again invited both Sadat and Begin to consult with him separately in Washington as Egypt's and Israel's hope to agree on the self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by May 28, 1980, appeared to be inimical to the norms of the Camp David Accords. The delay in the resolution of the Palestinian question had also in fact, obstructed Carter's efforts to rally the Islamic nations of the Persian Gulf against the threat from the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan.69

However, for both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, the domestic political constraints seemed to limit the possibility for compromise between them. Begin's support at the domestic front reached a new low which reduced his ability to win his government's backing to make any big concessions. President Sadat was equally opposed by the Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt and at the same time, these demonstrators


demanded that the Arabs in East Jerusalem should be permitted to participate in elections leading to the establishment of Palestinian autonomy.70

President Sadat's visit to Washington on April 8, 1980, on a two-day visit for talks with President Carter regarding Palestinian autonomy negotiations, and Prime Minister Begin's visit from April 14-17, did not evoke any major break-through on autonomy negotiations. In their separate talks with Carter, Sadat and Begin reiterated their divergent attitudes on such issues as Jerusalem, Palestinian self-determination, the meaning of "full autonomy," the settlements in occupied territories etc. Both the leaders were rigid in their respective stand and did not compromise on any issue.71

It was however, agreed that they would carry on the non-stop negotiations on the Palestinian autonomy until May 26, 1980. The resumption of the talks would begin soon in Israel and shift to Alexandria in Egypt in mid-May.72

Again the autonomy negotiations was opened on May 1, 1980, in the Tel Aviv suburb of Herzliyya. The Egyptian delegation

presented the security proposals on May 6, 1980 and it provided that a Palestinian Entity would be established in the territories; its self-governing authority would be responsible for all internal and external security matters (Police, Security Services and border Police); in order to separate the autonomous territory, a borderline would be drawn and the border Police would maintain checkpoints along that frontier; the border Police would operate in the West Bank in collaboration with Jordan, and with Egypt in Gaza Strip. The Israeli authorities were surprised and shocked and they outrightly rejected the Egyptian proposal. The Egyptian stand was softened with 24 hours and they declared that everything was negotiable except settlements.

The proposals further included certain provisions - anti-terrorist action and criminal arrests would be taken by the local police only, Israel would have to obtain the approval of the self-governing authority for the locations of its forces during the interim period, as well as for the size and weapons of these forces and for military movements in the territories; the Israeli forces would not be allowed to intervene in or stay near, the populated areas, and at the end of the interim period Israel would withdraw completely from the autonomous territories, the Israeli settlements, being "illegal and provocative"would be dismantled except for those which were needed for security, but would have to be approved by the permanent committee; the US should be invited to participate in implementing the autonomy plan.

Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n. 22, p. 123.

Ibid.
communique expressed the agreement to continue negotiations over security issues by the Egyptians and Israelis and thus, a showdown had been averted.75

On May 8, 1980, after the conclusion of the Herzliyya talks, Sadat asked that the meeting scheduled to take place on May 12, would be postponed in order to give him ample time to reassess the situation and the talks. This was considered by the Israelis as pressure tactics on the eve of the target date. They found Egypt's unilateral decision to postpone the forthcoming meeting as regrettable and announced the suspension of the deliberations of the working groups.76

President Sadat in his speech to the People's Assembly on May 14, 1980, expressed that:

"It is obvious that by May 26 we shall not reach definite results and I consider this very dangerous ... It is our responsibility to complete the work of Camp David".77

He further declared that the Israeli settlements were illegal, that the Jerusalem was a part of the West Bank, and that bringing any change would be illegal.78

75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., p. 124.
78. Ibid., p. 6.
The following day, the Israeli Knesset passed a bill introduced by Geula Cohen, a Likud member, which affirmed that the Jerusalem would forever remain undivided as Israel's capital. President Sadat reacted by suspending the talks and he regarded the Knesset action as an Israeli ploy to keep the issue of Jerusalem out of the autonomy talks, even though the predominantly Arab eastern sector of the city was occupied along with the West Bank and Gaza Strip during 1967 war. 79

Meanwhile, President Sadat sought to concentrate on his domestic problems and he reshuffled his cabinet and accepted the resignations of all 31 ministers including prime Minister Mustafa Khalil. Further, Kamal Hassan Ali was entrusted the charge of Foreign Ministry and the chief negotiator in any future autonomy talks. 80

Egypt's 2.5 million coptic christian minority and muslim fundamentalists had risen arms against each other. President Sadat banned the ecclesiastical groups that sought "to spread political dissension". The whole political upsurge was due to the culmination of peace treaty with Israel and the presence of deposed Shah of Iran in Egypt. 81

79. Ibid.
81. Time, n. 77, p. 7.
On the other hand, the Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman resigned on May 25, 1980, over Prime Minister Begin’s settlement policies and Palestinian autonomy talks. The May 26, 1980 deadline set for the Palestinian autonomy talks, passed without results and virtually the talks failed. In fact, in the autonomy talks not only the key Palestinians party was absent but the Palestinians also expressed their strong opposition to such talks. This was substantiated not only by the PLO and the Palestinian diaspora but by a series of events in Hebron and the strife-torn West Bank and Gaza strip as well.

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82. Former Defense Minister Weizman had long opposed the government’s policy on settlements. However, his actual resignation was provoked by government’s effort to cut the defense budget. Weizman had lost most of his Herut party’s support when he called publicly for new elections in a move to unseat Begin. Weizman in his open letter of resignation on May 27, accused Begin of bringing Israel to "the nadir of disappointment" and of missing "a rare opportunity" to press for peace. Weizman expressed that "Instead of taking measured and determined steps towards a comprehensive and, stable peace, we are treading in place". At the same time, Begin called Weizman’s charges "amazing" and accused him of "maddening ambition".

Middle East Monitor (New Jersey), Vol. X, No. 9, June 1, 1980, p. 2.


The growing resistance of West Bank Palestinians to the Israeli occupation had caused a harsh clamp-down by the Security forces. The latest spate of resistance disturbances was a revolt which was in fact, orchestrated by the National Guidance committee Lajnat al-tawiib al-watani (NGC) formed at a public meeting in the East Jerusalem suburb of Beit Hanina on October 1, 1978, to co-ordinate opposition to the autonomy plan of the Camp David Accords. It involved strikes in schools and business premises, as well as violent resistance in which stones and molotov...
Despite the unfavourable situation, an intensive efforts was made to resume the talks which was finally materialised on June 2, 1980, in Washington. President Carter talked to the leaders of Egyptian and Israeli delegations separately and urged them to make their best efforts to complete the autonomy negotiations. The US delegation's proposals for setting up the autonomy institutions, however, were rejected by both the leaders and finally the communiqué merely expressed that the parties had agreed to resume the negotiations.84

In fact, both Egypt and Israel were unwilling to resume the negotiations because of several reasons like the forthcoming elections in America and Israel, the unfavourable political climate globally and regionally, the decline in the mutual trust between Egypt and Israel, and pessimism about the possible
contd....

cocktails were used and which may include full scale guerrilla operations such as the recent attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron. The military government admitted that there was a greater willingness on the part of the Palestinians to confront Israeli troops than ever before. According to the Israeli Reserve General Mattityahu Peled, the military government's actions in Hebron during the curfew verged on "crimes against Humanity".

Middle East International (London), No. 125, May 23, 1980, p. 3.

success of the talks.85

Despite the opposition from the American and Egyptian authorities, the Menachem Begin Government finally enacted the bill in Knesset on July 30, 1980, approving the entire Jerusalem city as a permanent capital of Jewish State. There was, however, the opposition for approving the bill in the Knesset itself. But it was ultimately approved as no member of Knesset was willing to stand against the national consensus. Begin himself was known to have told his colleagues that in the midst of delicate negotiations with Egypt that he did not seek the bill but he could not afford to oppose it because of its national importance. Even the opposition Labour Party leader, Shimon Peres, who usually voted automatically against Likud supported legislation, expressed that:

"I was against the bill being introduced, but I can't vote against it because I'm basically in favour of it".86

On August 2, 1980, President Sadat despatched letters to both President Carter and Prime Minister Begin in which Sadat demanded that in order to continue the autonomy talks with Israel, the sovereignty over Jerusalem should remain part of the discussion.

85. Ibid., p. 125.
despite the new Israeli law, declaring it as Israel's eternal capital. 87

On the same day, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali, announced that Egypt had informed Israel not to send the Israeli delegation to Alexandria on August 3, for the new round of autonomy talks until the appropriate reply were received from Carter and Begin. This action was however, considered by the Israelis as another suspension of the talks. 88

It was on December 14, 1980 that Sol. Linowitz, President Carter's special envoy to West Asia, arrived in Cairo and met with President Sadat then he flew to Israel on December 16, 1980, for talks with Begin. Following his visit, Sadat and Begin published a communique which said that they made "important progress" in the talks with the US as its full participant and they further affirmed that the Camp David Peace process was the

87. Sadat's demands appeared to be a compromise between his desire to avoid breaking off the talks altogether and his need to demonstrate Egyptian displeasure at the Jerusalem law.

Ibid.

88. Begin warned that this time, their resumption would not automatically take place whenever the Egyptians felt they were ready to resume them.

Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n. 22, p. 125.
only viable way for the comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. They also thanked President Carter for his help and expressed their gratitude to the President elect Ronald Reagan's affirmation that "the United States would remain committed to the Camp David process". 89


But the new administration's gesture reflected that it gave the autonomy talks rather a low priority.

CONCLUSION

The United States policy towards West Asia was primarily motivated by significant factors like the thrust to contain communism in the region, to exploit the Middle East oil economy, and to safeguard the state of Israel as the US natural ally against the Palestinian Arabs who were deprived of their lands as a result of the partition plan and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel in 1947 and 1948 respectively.

With the establishment of Jewish state during the 1940s the American foreign policy perception and approaches towards the Middle East changed dramatically as the state Department officials gradually emphasised on maintenance of harmonious relations with the Arabs for two important reasons: firstly, the demand for oil was rising domestically in the United States; secondly, the region was becoming viable commercially. The US authorities adopted a policy of reconciliation and compromise both with the Israelis and the Arabs in looking at the Palestinian issue because the US national interests were also involved in the region.

The entrance of the Soviet Union in the Middle East politics as a favourable partner of Egypt and Syria both in peace and war, however, provided an opportunity for the Soviet presence in the region. Thus, both the Americans and the Soviets presented conflicting solutions to the Arab-Israeli issue as they remained far from compromising their national interests.
After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war debacle, in spite of the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser's "war of Attrition" on the Suez front, it yielded no concrete results except the cease-fire in the summer of 1970.

With the assumption of office as the President of Egypt following the death of Nasser, President Anwar Al-Sadat, in order to achieve the Arab lands, occupied by Israel during the 1967 war, sought the "offensive weapons" from the Soviet Union. But the Russians' disinterest to accelerate any war and her quest to continue the process of detente with the United States, prompted the Soviets to abstain from supplying Egypt with the weapons which further resulted in Sadat's apathy towards the Soviet Union and expulsion of the Soviet technicians from Egypt in 1972. At the same time, Sadat's expectations from the US Administration was belied as the Americans themselves did not want to take risks of alienating the most powerful pro-Israeli Jewish lobby and Israeli Government by supplying weapons to Egypt. It was never imagined that a war could be in the offing as the Arabs had not been so much strong to withstand a renewed war in the Middle East and also when the Soviet posture was not congenial. Besides, in view of the process of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, the chances of Arab-Israeli war was quite remote. But Sadat's failure of the "year of decision" and his declining prestige prompted him to launch an
offensive war along with the Syria as a partner against Israel in October 1973. When the war started, the Soviet Union sought to maintain the balance through providing Egypt with certain sophisticated weapons as the Russians did not want to abandon the most significant Arab power in which she had made tremendous investment. On the contrary, the United States, which had already come to rescue Israel as a result of the initial Arab success over the Israeli forces, had to face new emerging problem due to the war - the oil embargo. The war led to the imposition of the oil embargo by the organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting countries (OAPEC) which not only affected the United States but also crippled the world industries and transport. Consequently, the leaders of the European countries and Japan reframed their policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and declared their support to Arab cause.

At the same time, the Nixon Administration had undergone a tough test due to the "Watergate scandal" at the domestic front and it conferred the sole authority on the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to settle the Middle East crisis. The war was contained through the step-by-step diplomacy, played by the Secretary Kissinger. His policy had, however, gone awry in the long run which resulted in the fragmentation of the Arabs.

With the conclusion of the October 1973 war, the Soviet influence in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt was reduced
as a result of President Sadat's inclination towards the United States and the Americans' favourable attitude towards Egypt which eventually became the base for the Russian exit from Egypt and the Middle East as a whole. In fact, the 1973 war had provided an opportunity for the United States to take Egypt in its fold. At the same time, the war had cost the Egyptians and the Israelis heavily and President Sadat was making his efforts to reconstruct the Egyptian economy and obviously, the United States seemed to be the largest financier and aid giving country to Egypt as compared to the Soviet Union. Sadat further thought that his tilt towards the United States would pay rich dividends to Egypt as the Egyptian territories could be brought back from the Israeli occupation only with the American assistance.

After the successful conclusion of the cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel, the US Administration sought to move ahead with the policy to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations and international peace conferences on West Asia. The most important and thorny issue which was the crux of the whole Arab-Israeli conflict was the Palestinian problem. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which was declared by the Arab Summit in Khartoum as the sole representative of the Palestinians did not accept the US contention to scrap the PLO's declaration of liquidating the state of Israel whereas the US Administration declined to modify the United Nations Resolution 242 which had treated the Palestinian as refugees instead of providing
their Right to Self-determination. This, according to the Israelis only meant to set up a Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip.

Israel's persistent refusal to allow the PLO's participation in the international peace conference and the differences of approach among the Arab countries on the one hand and Arabs and Israelis on the other, was felt by Sadat as undermining his interest to restore the Sinai Peninsula from Israelis. Finally, President Sadat took a historic step to visit Israel and to demonstrate his interest also to solve the Palestinian imbroglio. His visit shook the Arab world's confidence in general and the Palestinians in particular. Sadat's visit to Israel, however, was conducive to the Carter Administration to start the negotiations with both the Arab and Israeli leaders in order to achieve a breakthrough to solve the Arab-Israeli problem amicably.

After a prolonged and a series of negotiations, conducted by the United States, President Carter ultimately succeeded to frame the Camp David Accords which was signed in 1978 between President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel. The two Accords -"The Framework for peace in the Middle East" and the "Framework for the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel" was considered to be the triumph for both the United States and Israel. President Sadat was vehemently condemned by the Arabs as a traitor and betrayed the Arab cause. Equally, the
Soviet authorities condemned him for having negotiated the Camp David Accords with Israel. The accords which ignored the Syrian losses in the October 1973 war, led the Syrians to oppose Camp David Accords whereas the PLO strongly condemned and rejected it. Both Syria and the PLO found it contributory to spread the anti-Camp David climate in the West Asian politics in view of the fact that Egypt surpassed the Arabs consensus against the settlement with Israel.¹

It may be pointed out that during the Camp David negotiations President Sadat had to make certain concessions as he sought to achieve a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict and further his credibility at the domestic front was at stake. In an interview to the Journal of Palestine Studies, Eric Rouleau, the Middle East editor of Le Monde, a French newspaper, expressed that: “Begin wasn’t threatened if Camp David failed on the contrary, he could go back and say to the Israelis that they were trying to force him into a settlement jeopardising the security of the state of Israel. And few Israelis would have then turned against Begin. The person who was really threatened by the collapse of Camp David was Sadat. He had promised his people that if his initiative failed he would resign. Failure would have put him in a very difficult position. And if he did not want to resign he could have put up

a show by saying that he was now going to try other means - in other words go back to the Arab fold, to Syria and the PLO and especially the allies of those people, the Soviet Union for which he has an allergy". 2

The most crucial moment came in March 1979, when the treaty for peace between Egypt and Israel was concluded. President Carter was also a signatory as a witness to the treaty. The treaty primarily provided for the recognition of Israel by Egypt and the restoration of Israeli occupied Sinai to Egypt. Massive American aid to both Egypt and Israel was promised by the Carter Administration as a reward for signing of the treaty. The Egypt-Israeli peace Treaty generated a world wide reaction, particularly from the Palestinians whose cause were undermined by the treaty. The Arab summit Conference passed the resolution for the political and economic sanctions against Egypt but the Conference also exposed the differences between the hardliners and the moderates. Finally, Sadat's stubborn attitude towards the Arab States led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

On the contrary, the Soviet Union strongly supported the PLO cause in order to re-enter the Middle East region. The Soviets

however, also had to lose their prestige in the Middle East as a result of their intervention in Afghanistan and they could not evoke a considerable response due to the fact that the Soviet Union was an atheism oriented state and most of the Arab countries had inherent xenophobia of such a state.

Although, Egypt had succeeded in its goal to achieve the Sinai area and the massive economic aid from the United States yet, she was the greatest loser of her prestige in the Arab world and she ceased to be the leader of Arabs as well. After the treaty, one of the most significant issues cropped up in the midst of the talks, was to grant autonomy to the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza strip. In fact, the Israelis were in no mood to grant the full autonomy to the Palestinians not only because they feared a militant Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza but they also sought to preserve their settlements which were being increased by the Begin Government. Apart from the Egyptians, the Israeli settlement policy also perturbed the Americans as it was one of the main obstacles in the way of the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel. But the US Administration could not stop the Government to pursue the policy of settlements as it had to bow to the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby which not only played a significant role in the US Administration but also influenced the American mass media and the socio-economic and political spheres in that country.
What really lacked in the autonomy talks was that the negotiations were being conducted between the Egyptians and the Israelis along with the Americans but they were not participated by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza strip who never conferred the authority on Egyptians to negotiate on their behalf. The autonomy talks, however, failed to evoke any viable results and its failure was due to the fact that the Camp David Accords had not adequately provided solutions to solve the Palestinians issue. Further, the Israelis never cared for the settlement of the Palestinian problem but to lurk the talks whereas Egypt's attitude was also meek and mild towards the solution of the Palestinian imbroglio, partly because of her desire to early retention of the Sinai and the oil fields and partly to emerge as a champion of Palestinian cause. At the same time, the rapprochement between the two countries was initiated with enthusiasm and the growing friendship was further strengthened by mutual co-operation between Egypt and Israel despite the failure of the autonomy talks.

Initially, the Carter Administration sought to achieve a comprehensive peace and repudiated the former Secretary of State Kissinger's step-by-step approach but soon Sadat's Jerusalem visit and the opposition by the Arab states prompted the US Administration to follow step-by-step approach which eventually led to the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and it was in fact, a separate deal. The United States had presumed that the accords and the subsequent peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel, would lead to a permanent peace in the region. But the accords were outrightly rejected by the entire Arab world on the ground that it did not build up any premises for ensuring the lasting solution to the Palestinians nor accorded authority to the PLO even to demonstrate the right of self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The accords, however, had contained the war to some extent as 1973 war was the last Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Egypt was adversely affected both in economic and political spheres after having signed a separate peace treaty with Israel as Egypt was isolated by the Arabs, economic sanctions were imposed and the Egyptian goods were boycotted, apart from condemning Egypt in international forum. Even some of the Arab chauvanists advocated that Egypt should be expelled both from the Arab League and organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). In fact, Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty divided the Arabs and Jeopardised the chances of restoring peace in the Middle East as the Arabs raised arms against themselves and the US Administration lost its credibility and prestige instead of exerting influence among the Arabs. At the same time, the legitimacy of the Palestinians to create a separate state in the West Bank and Gaza strip was recognized by the world community. The accords and the subsequent peace treaty assumed the great importance from the Israeli viewpoint that she got the recognition of a potential Arab State - Egypt and established its permanent credentials in the region.
Palestinian issue which is characterized as the bone of contention and the crux of the whole Arab-Israeli conflict, must be solved in order to reduce the tension in West Asia and certain measures may be suggested for the same.

(a) At the first instance, Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip and the UN Force should replace the Israeli forces as a prelude to the Palestinian state in return to the PLO’s commitment to repudiate its preamble to liquidate Israel as Israeli existence is now a reality. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces was also justified by the former US President Richard Nixon, who has expressed in his book *1999: Victory Without War* that "... the peace process must focus on the future of the West Bank and the riot-torn Gaza strip ... Israel’s interests require a peace settlement for the land occupied in 1967. If Israel annexes these lands, it will become a binational garrison state, with disenfranchised Arabs composing about half its population. Moreover, given the high birth rates of the Palestinian people, Jewish people will soon be a minority in the Jewish state. If, it continues its military occupation and gradual colonisation of these territories, it will eventually bring about a United Arab world hostile to Israel, with greater opportunities for Moscow to enter the region than ever before".  

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Both the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance have expounded the similar points in their Joint article in *Foreign Affairs*. They pointed out that: "Israel should not and cannot stay when it is in the occupied territories. The demographic trends there are running against Israel; the militancy of a hostile population will increase, radicalism will grow in the rest of the Arab world... The Palestinians have legitimate rights which should be recognized, provided they in turn unambiguously recognize the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries".  

(b) Secondly, the Arab States should negotiate with the United States to persuade the Israelis for the Palestinian homeland in West Bank and Gaza. In fact, the United States is the only country which is politically, economically and militarily close to Israel and capable of admonishing Tel Aviv to accept the legitimacy of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

(c) The Israeli public opinion should be mobilised through the various organisations and movements like the Peace Now movement which aimed to maintain the public pressure on the Israeli Government through urging them "to initiate moves, actively and constantly"

to achieve a peace between Israel and its neighbours. In fact, the Peace Now movement has been playing an important role in moulding public opinion in Israel since 1979. It should further pressurise the Israeli Government to adopt a policy of amicable settlement of Palestinian issue. Moreover, it also has the support of world Jewry, which in turn can influence the Jewish lobby in America.

(d) In order to solve the Palestinian imbroglio, all the powers which had been contributory to the creation of the state of Israel should negotiate with the Israelis and even use pressure tactics like economic, military and political sanctions, particularly by the United States. This can only be materialised if all the Arab States seriously take interest in quest for the Palestinian solution and generate a public opinion all over the world for convening international conference under the aegis of United Nations to establish a separate Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Unanimous world opinion alone can create a separate state for Palestinians and thus pave the way for restoration of permanent peace in the Middle East otherwise, the Palestinian issue would become intractable and the US Administration may always insist on the Camp David Accords whenever the issue is raised at the international fora.

APPENDIX - I

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID,

17 SEPTEMBER 1978

Muhammad Alwar-al-Sadat, President of Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter President of the United States of America, at Camp David from 5 September to 17 September 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

PREAMBLE

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birth place of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for co-existence and cooperation among nations.

- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament,
government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy non provided accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and the principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.
FRAMEWORK

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognise that, for peace to endure, it must deeply affect by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework is appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. WEST BANK AND GAZA

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representative of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

   (a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of
self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but no later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate
the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations will be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1. The negotiation among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2. Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with each other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. EGYPT-ISRAEL

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any dispute shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith. With a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to state at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

(a) full recognition;
(b) abolishing economic boycotts;
(c) guaranteeing that under this jurisdiction the citizens of other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the time table for the carrying out of the obligation of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

Muhammad Alwar-al-Sadat
Menachem Begin
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework of a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized borders between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Rasen Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purpose only including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be
open to all nations for unimpeded and non suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elath with guaranteed free and peaceful passages by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

STATIONING OF FORCES

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within area lying approximately 50 kilometres (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km to the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the
Straits of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

INTERIM WITHDRAWAL

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

APPENDIX - II

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

All letters from President Jimmy Carter are dated 22 September 1978, all other letters from President Anwar Al-Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin are dated 17 September 1978.

The President
Camp David
Thurmont, Maryland

17 September 1978

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, 'are you in favour of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and Southern Sinai areas or are you in favour of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?'

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual parliamentary party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both of the Government and the opposition benches, will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,

Menachem Begin
His Excellency
Anwar El-Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo.

22 September 1978

Dear Mr President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime
Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the
issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's
decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that
Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai
according to a timetable within a period specified for the imple-
mentation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotia-
tions on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:
Letter from Prime Minister Begin

His Excellency
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States

17 September 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the 'Framework for a settlement in
Sinai' to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the
position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the
settlements.
1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a pre-requisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the 'framework' shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat

His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel

22 September 1978

Dear Mr Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of 17 September 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:
Letter from President Sadat
His Excellency 
Jimmy Carter 
President of the United States 

17 September 1978

Dear Mr President:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem.

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy the free exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the city shall be undivided.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat
Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: 'the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the Jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel Palestine), as stated in that decree'.

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Menachem Begin

His Excellency
Anwar El-Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of 17 September 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General

Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.

His Excellency
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

17 September 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the 'Framework for peace in the Middle East', I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to this implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representative of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat
His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel

22 September 1978

Dear Mr Prime Minister;

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A. In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions ‘Palestinians' or Palestinian people are being or will be construed and understood by you as 'Palestinian Arabs'.

B. In each paragraph in which the expression 'West Bank' appears it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

APPENDIX - III

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL, WASHINGTON, 26 MARCH 1979

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;

PREAMBLE

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

Reaffirming their adherence to the 'Freedom for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David', dated 17 September 1978.

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspect;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;
Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the 'Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel'.

ARTICLE I

1. The state of war between the parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty;

2. Israel will withdraw all its forces and civilian from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided for in the annexed protocol (Annexure-I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

ARTICLE II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza strip. The parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.
ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

(a) they recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

(b) They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;

(c) They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence againsts the other Party anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them include full recognition diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment of citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).
ARTICLE XIV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited forces zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to mature and training in Annex I, and security arrangements the parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five permanent Members, unless the parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE XV

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight.
Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' will be established and inaugurated one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will then be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing authority, as specified in the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East'. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.

Sincerely yours,
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat
Menachem Begin

Dear President Carter,

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on 17 September 1978, the annexed documents entitled 'A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David' and Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel'.

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned Framework, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty. In accordance with the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East', the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed.

The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree prior to the elections on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (Administrative Council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Israel and Egypt.

The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.
ARTICLE VIII

The parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March 1979, in triplicate in the English Arabic and Hebrew language, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of the appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.
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