AMERICAN THINK TANKS AND FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

ABSTRACT

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

MD. RAHAT HASAN

Under the Supervision of

PROF. MIRZA ASMER BEG

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)

2008
ABSTRACT

Public policy decision-making refers to actions taken within governmental settings to formulate, adopt, implement, evaluate, or change policies. In this growing interdependent world, the process of foreign policy formulation is becoming more and more complex in which, besides formal actors, informal actors play an increasingly important role. The US is no exception to this rule. Therefore, in addition to the executive and legislative branches of government that remain the principal initiator of American foreign policy, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. These include multitudes of lobby groups, business interest, trade union, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media, public opinion, think tanks and the like.

The modern states depend on experts whose views on issues can provide the theories and rationale for policy and legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only sources of policy innovations as there is a need to consult other interest for information. Think tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying problems. They are increasingly a mechanism for refining and presenting knowledge and expertise in a relevant and usable manner.

Britain's American colonies broke with the mother country in 1776 and were recognized as the new nation of the United States of America following the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Sustained by victories in World Wars I and II and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US remains the world's most powerful nation state. The economy is marked by steady growth, low unemployment and inflation, and rapid advances in technology. Given the importance of the US in the world affairs it is important to understand how the debate on the global role of the US is evolving, how foreign policy decision are made, what US priorities are and how the US exercises its power and influence on the world stage.

Foreign policy generally refers to how the government of the state acts
in relation to other states. It can also refer to what government do in relation to international organizations, multinational corporations, political and military organisations that are not state actors, and sometimes even prominent individuals.

There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational organised crime and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of issues associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity – since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant US foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are wide ranges of issues – sustainable development, pandemic disease control, international resource management, and democratisation – that are important general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.

Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different types of decision and actors. The policy process is conventionally
analysed in relation to stages of policy development. Think tanks, experts and expertise generally become important and influential at different points in the policy process.

The relationship between political leaders and those who advise them is critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. Knowledge is the central aspect of power. In this increasingly complex, interdependent and information rich world, government and individual policy makers face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in the governmental decisions making. Policy-makers need basic information about the world and the societies they govern, how current policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely costs and consequences. As a matter of fact, in both information rich and poor societies policy makers need informations that are understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful.

By providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and the bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting ideas into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United States continue to solicit the advice of experts in universities, interest groups, professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and consulting agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy ideas. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organisational forms devoted to policy research, and they are often amongst the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making.

The literature on American foreign policy making continue to grow, but only recently has the participation of think tanks in the policy formation process been discussed. The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy making process requires scholars to reevaluate various models and theories developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. This is not to suggest that contemporary theories and models of foreign policy decisions making need to be supplemented, but rather that their parameters should be expanded to take
into consideration how think tanks identify and shape policy issues and problems. By treating think tanks as an important input into the policy making process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors competing for power in the political arena.

The term ‘think tanks’ was employed originally in the United States during World War II to refer to a secure room or environment where defense scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategies. This rather narrow usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 1500 US-based organisations that engage in policy analysis and approximately 2,500 other similar institutions worldwide.

Think tanks are largely twentieth century inventions. But the expert advisor and the intellectual working in the shadows of power have had a role in the political life for more than two millennia. Political advising in the west began with famous teachers who tutored young princess and prepared them for leadership. Aristotle tutored the young Alexander. Some leaders have found themselves turning to books for solitary counsel. For example, Niccolò Machiavelli’s book ‘Prince’ has served as a practical manual for many generations of aspiring politicians.

Defining think tanks, and establishing clear boundaries as to which organisations fit within the categories, is one of the most conceptually difficult tasks in analyzing these organizations. At the broadest level, one can say that think tanks are institutions that provide public policy research, analysis, and advice. However, this definition casts the net very broadly. Many interest groups, university research centres and other civil society organisations carry out policy research and advice as one of their activities, if not the central one. Many government agencies also offer policy research and advice as a major function.

To overcome the difficulty, we generally accepted the core definition of think
tanks as policy research organisations that have significant autonomy from government and from societal interest such as firms, interest group, and political parties. However, we also recognise that autonomy is a relative rather than an absolute term, and that the operational definition of think tanks must differ from region to region.

These public policy research organisations first appeared in the US and Europe at the turn of 20th century when organisations such as the Brooking Institution (1916), the Carnegie Endowment for International peace (1914) the Kiel Institute of World Economics (1914) and Royal Institute for International Affairs (1920) were established. After the World War II, the term was applied to contract researchers, such as RAND Corporation, that did a mixture of deep thinking and programmes evaluation for the military. The use of the term expanded in the 1960 to describe other groups of experts who formulated various policy recommendations, including some quasi-academic research institutes concerned with the study of the international relations and strategic question. By 1970, the term think tank was applied to institutions focusing not only on foreign policy and defence strategy, but also on current political, economic, and social issues. At the dawn of the 21st century, more than 1,200 think tanks dot the American political landscape. They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in scope, funding, mandate, and location. McGann classifies think tanks into five types:

- Independent civil society think tanks established as non profit organizations;
- Policy research institutes located in or affiliated with a university;
- Corporate created or business affiliated think tanks;
- Governmentally created or state sponsored think tanks;
- Political party (or candidate) think tanks.
While think tanks in recent years have become a “global phenomenon”, U.S. think tanks are distinguished from their counterparts in other countries by their ability to participate directly and indirectly in policy making and by the willingness of policy-makers to turn toward them for policy advice.

With an expanding market for ideas and their legitimacy established, think tanks still require money to operate. Policy research institutes cannot rely on membership dues to cover operating costs. Nor can they rely upon the sales of publications and services. Therefore, philanthropy and corporate support are essential to their survival.

The majority of think tanks in the United States are composed of a group of intellectuals dedicated to solving the most challenging economic, social, and political problems confronting the nation. They also maintain staffs consisting of researchers, administrators and individuals offering technical support. Indeed, it is often expected that the staff at think-tanks perform a variety of functions ranging from writing and researching papers, to editing volumes and newsletters or magazines, to organising conferences and seminars, and to fund raising and preparing news releases.

Most think tanks share common objectives of shaping and moulding public opinion and public policy. As the United State prepared to assume the role of a hegemonic power in the aftermath of the World War II, a number of think tanks were making their presence felt in the policy making circles. Through their publications, conferences and meetings with members of the Executive, Congress, and a host of government departments, boards, and agencies, think thanks were able to develop and expand their network of influence throughout Washington.

Yet, despite their appeal, only a fraction of the estimated 1,500 think tanks in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-making circles. The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise
Institute, Rand and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently referred to in the media. The desire for policy influence is one major aspect of think tank activity. Their increasingly active involvement and influence in the policy-making process came as no surprise to the scholars. However, the questions that scholars continue to struggle with are how much of an impact and in what specific ways?

Think tanks are in the business of developing, refining, repacking, and most importantly, marketing ideas. To this end, they employ a number of strategies to convey their thoughts to policy makers and to the public. These range from testifying before Congressional Committees and submitting editorial pieces to major newspapers, to inviting elected officials to participate in think tank sponsored seminars.

However, rarely there is a one-to-one correspondence between a book or a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous intervening forces that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud any cause and effect relationship that may exist between policy institutes and government decision making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof of it is elusive and, at best, unreliable. Think tanks indicators such as media citations or appearances of staffs before Congress and various committees merely signify that think tanks have attracted the attention of the media and politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or perceptions of the public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy initiative or reform has resulted. Asking the question, ‘How do you measure the influence of independent policy research institution?’ misses the point. It is more important to ask first, what they do that is relevant, and how? In a nutshell, while it is difficult to accurately measure the extent to which think tanks influence specific policy decision, it is possible to identify the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power.
By doing so, one can begin to observe how and to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in Washington’s decision making network.

Think tanks affect American foreign policy-makers in five distinct ways: by generating original ideas and options for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in government, by offering venues for high level discussions by educating the U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to mediate and resolve conflict. However, it is not easy to grab the attention of busy policy makers already immersed in informations. To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple channels and marketing strategies- publishing articles, books, and occasional papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages and newspaper interviews. Congressional hearings provide other opportunities to influence policy choices.

Think tanks are hidden participants in policy, whereas decision making in the formal political arenas by political parties, legislature and executive is a more transparent process. While think tanks do not have a clear consistent or legally designated route to policy influence, their policy entrepreneurships in policy and epistemic communities provides informal but haphazard access and opportunities for agenda setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental creep of new ideas into prevailing thinking.

This study focuses on key issues of foreign policy strategy of the US and policies that serve it best, and key questions of foreign policy politics, regarding institutions and actors within the American political system as their roles and the influence they exercise. However, the main focus of this study is on analyzing how and to what extent think-tanks have become involved in the political arena in America and to highlight the various governmental and non-governmental channels they rely on to participate in the policy making process since World War II. By analysing so, a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic sources of public policy would be possible.
The study is based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources incorporate government documents, reports, Presidential speeches and think tanks annual reports. A number of tables, figures, books, articles and website bibliography linked to the topic provide a helpful guide for research. The approach to this study is qualitative, historical and analytical. The work is divided into five main chapters. The plan of the work is as under:

**Chapter one** provides the comprehensive theoretical aspect of American foreign policy making process keeping in mind the determinants, implementation process and related issues. It, then, identifies the different actors involved in foreign policy making in America. However, a large part of it is devoted to analyse the growing involvement of think tanks in the policy making process. In brief, it also examines the several contemporary theories often employed by scholars to explain how foreign policy is made. By exposing some of the inherent limitations of several theories and models, it attempts to highlight that it is necessary to expand the parameters of the study of foreign policy decision making in order to take into account the growing involvement of think tanks in the policy formulation process.

**Chapter two** discusses the importance, aims and objectives of American foreign policy. Moreover it, examine the various issues that emerge or reemerge in the US foreign policy and on which decision makers seek views of experts. It, then, discusses the slow but steady rise of the US global power. A brief historical review highlights some of the issues that have charcterised American foreign policy since the founding of the republic. Further it examines the domestic and external pressures that propelled the US to intervene in two World Wars and after 1945, to establish a world wide network of alliances and military bases to fight the Cold War. The record of three Presidents in the office after the end of Cold War and how they attempted to define a new post- Cold War paradigm for American foreign policy is also discussed.
Chapter three evaluates the dilemma of defining think tanks. Further, it, looks at the typology and changing role of American think tanks. Although a think tanks boom has occurred internationally, the political, legal and cultural condition in the US presents a more fertile environment for think tanks growth. Accordingly, it shows up the factors responsible for the exceptional growth of think tanks culture in America since World War II. Different from both public and private sector organisation, they face a set of problems peculiars to the non-profit organisation.

Despite the central role of think tanks in the US have made their presence felt in the key policy making circle. Therefore, Chapter four, looks at the organisation, management and influence of three major think tanks, keeping in mind their size, funds, area of specialisation and media citations. It, then, identifies the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. By doing so, it observes how to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in American decision making networks.

The concluding Chapter discusses why it is necessary to devote greater attention to the role think tanks play in the foreign policy making process and also to provide more comprehensive approach to the study of American foreign policy making. While it is important to identify the psychological and bureaucratic constraints, which influence decision makers, it is equally important to examine other domestic inputs, which may influence the behavior of American decision makers.
AMERICAN THINK TANKS AND FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

THESIS
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
MD. RAHAT HASAN

Under the Supervision of
PROF. MIRZA ASMER BEG

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH (INDIA)

2008
Certificate

This is to certify that Mr. MD. Rahat Hasan has prepared his Ph.D. thesis entitled "American Think Tanks and Formulation of US Foreign Policy Since World War II" under my supervision.

To the best of my knowledge this thesis is a bonafide work and is in my opinion suitable for consideration for the award of Ph.D. degree in Political Science.

Prof. Mirza Asmer Beg
(Supervisor)
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements i-ii
Preface iii – vi
Abbreviations vii
Tables and Figure viii

Chapter I
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY : A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 1-46
• Foreign Policy : A Theoretical Framework
• Foreign Policy Politics
• Models of Decision Making and Involvement of Think Tanks
• Conclusion

Chapter II
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY : BASES AND DYNAMICS 47-90
• Needs of Foreign Policy Today
• Aims of American Foreign Policy
• American Foreign Policy: From Isolation to Internationalism
• American Foreign Policy: the Cold War Context
• American Foreign Policy in a New Era
• Foreign Policy Approach: Unilateralism versus Multilateralism
• Achievements of United States Foreign Policy
• Failure of United States Foreign Policy

Chapter III
THINK TANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
MAKING PROCESS 91-148
• Identifying Think Tanks: Unique Feature
• Typology of Think Tanks: Differentiation and Specialization
• Wave of American Think Tanks: A Brief History
• The American Think Tanks: Explanation for the Proliferation
• Think Tanks: Institution and Operation

Chapter IV
MAJOR THINK TANKS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 149-209
• Major Think Tanks in Foreign Affairs
• Practice of Influence
• Policy Effectiveness: Networks for Affecting Policy Making

Chapter V
CONCLUSION 210-229
• Decision Influencer: U.S. Foreign Policy and Think Tanks
• Assessment of Policy Research

BIBLIOGRAPHY 230-251
Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to my research guide, Mirza Asmer Beg, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, who inspired me to undertake this study. He has been a source of great encouragement and has been a guiding force in my moment of doubts and uncertainty. His valuable suggestions and ideas on the subject were stimulating and helped me to crystallise my views on the topic. Despite his busy schedule whether in India or abroad, he has made all efforts to go into the minute details of every chapters of my thesis. Once again I express my thanks to him.

I would like to thank, Naheed Murtaza Khan, Chairperson, Department of Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, for her encouragement throughout the process of getting this work completed. I owe special debt of gratitude to Prof. Murtaza Khan, who continuously motivated and encouraged me to complete my work on time. I would fail in my duty if I do not mention the names of my teachers, namely Prof. Arif Hameed, Dr. Mohd. Abid (Reade), Dr. Iftekhar Ahmad (Reader), Dr. Nafees Ahmad Ansari (Reader), Dr. Aftab Alam (Reader), Dr. Arshi Khan (Reader), Dr. Upendra Choudhari, Dr. Nasim Ahmad, Dr. Khurram, Mr. Mohibul Haque, Mr. Mohd. Aftab, Dr. Farhana Kausar, and Dr. Rachna Kausal, for their steady encouragement and appreciation over the last five years.

I have immensely benefited from my discussion on my research topic, inter alia under Lok Sabha Internship Programme (2008-09) with Mr. Hamid Ansari, Vice President of India, Somnath Chatterjee, Lok Sabha Speaker, Parliament of India, Members of Parliament of India, Chairmen of Parliamentary Committees including Departmentally Related Standing Committees, Mr. P.D.T. Achary, Secretary General of Lok Sabha Secretariat, Parliament of India, Mr. Vivek Kumar Agnihotri, Secretary General of Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Parliament of India, Officers in Secretariat, Parliament of India, and intellectuals from India and abroad who visited the Parliament of India for trainings and delivering lectures.

I appreciate the inputs I got from the director and Staff of think tanks in India, namely Indian Institute of Public Administration, Indian Defence and Strategic Analysis, Indian Council on Foreign Affairs, Observer Research
Foundation, International Peace and Conflict, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) all in Delhi.

I am indebted to the Western Regional Center, Mumbai, of Indian Council of Social Science and Research, (ICSSR) for its ‘study grant’ for library visit. I am also thankful to University Grant Commission (UGC) for its financial assistance during writing and research, which had made this work possible.

I acknowledge the facilities which I have used during the course of my research work, which were offered to me by the staff of the Mualana Azad Library, AMU; American Resource Centre, New Delhi; Parliament Library, New Delhi; Indian Defence Strategic Analysis Library, New Delhi; Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Sapru House; New Delhi, the Library of the Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi; the NASSDOC and ICSSR Library, New Delhi; Tata Institute of Social Science Library, Mumbai; and Jawaharlal Nehru Library, Mumbai University.

I also duly acknowledge the encouragement and support of my seniors and friends.

I am ever grateful to my family, who has been a constant source of inspiration, especially my parents, who have stood by me in my pursuit of higher studies.

Finally, I am thankful to Mr. H.K. Sharma, for his trustworthy helpfulness in typing this thesis skillfully.

The responsibility for the contents, conclusion, errors and omissions is solely mine.

August 2008

MD. RAHAT HASAN
PREFACE

After casting aside the isolationist policy to assume the global responsibilities of a hegemonic power after World War II, the United States had to rely increasingly on policy analysts for advice on how to conduct its foreign relations. Moreover, as the American bureaucracy significantly expanded after the war, in response to growing domestic and foreign concerns, so too did the opportunities for policy experts to share their insights with government officials. Through their publications, conferences and meetings with members of the Executive, Congress and a host of government departments, boards and agencies, think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and Rand Corporation have been able to develop and expand their networks of influence.

Given the importance of the US in world affairs it is important to understand how the debate on the global role of the US is evolving, how foreign policy decision are made, what American priorities are and how the US exercises its power and influence on the world stage.

The fact that the US is a democracy, influences every aspect of the process, method, personnel, speed and ultimate success of its foreign policy. It means that many departments of the government, private groups, and persons are involved and that, in most cases foreign policy operates before the public eye. In flow charts and diagrams outlining the foreign policy-making process, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, Congress, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other decision influencer like media and public opinion are clearly defined. However, the role and function of think tanks in the foreign policy-making process has largely been ignored.

While policy makers in the United States continue to solicit the advice of experts in Universities, interest groups, professional and business
associations, corporations, law firms and consulting agencies, they rely increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy ideas.

Therefore, this study focuses both on key issues of foreign policy strategy, of what the US national interest is and which policies serve it best. Also the key questions of foreign policy politics, which institutions and actors within the American political system play what roles and have how much influence. However, the main spotlight of this study is to analyse how and to what extent think-tanks have become involved in the political arena in America and to highlight the various governmental and non-governmental channels they rely on to participate in the policy making process since World War II. By analysing so, a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic sources of public policy would be possible.

The study is based on both primary and secondary source. The primary sources incorporate government documents, reports, Presidential speeches and think tanks annual reports. Tables, figures, books, articles and website bibliography linked to the topic provide a helpful guide for research as secondary sources. The approach to this study is qualitative, historical and analytical. The work is divided into five main chapters. The plan of the work is as under:

Chapter one provides the comprehensive theoretical aspect of American foreign policy making process keeping in mind the determinants, implementation process and related issues. It, then, identifies the different actors involved in foreign policy making in America. However, a large part of it is devoted to analyse the growing involvement of think tanks in the policy making process. In brief, it also examines the several contemporary theories often employed by scholars to explain how foreign policy is made. By exposing some of the inherent limitations of several theories and models, it attempts to highlight that it is necessary to expand the parameters of the
study of foreign policy decision making in order to take into account the
growing involvement of think tanks in the policy formulation process.

Chapter two discusses the importance, aims and objectives of American foreign policy. Moreover it, examine the various issues that emerge or reemerge in the US foreign policy and on which decision makers seek views of experts. It, then, discusses the slow but steady rise of the US global power. A brief historical review highlights some of the issues that have characterised American foreign policy since the founding of the republic. Further it examines the domestic and external pressures that propelled the US to intervene in two World Wars and after 1945, to establish a world wide network of alliances and military bases to fight the Cold War. The record of three Presidents in the office after the end of Cold War and how they coped in attempting to define a new post-Cold War paradigm for American foreign policy is also discussed.

Chapter three evaluates the dilemmas of defining think tanks. Further, it, looks at the typology and changing role of American think tanks. Although a think tanks boom has occurred internationally, the political, legal and cultural condition in the US presents a more fertile environment for think tanks growth. Accordingly, it shows up the factors responsible for the exceptional growth of think tanks culture in America since World War II. Different from both public and private sector organisation, they face a set of problems peculiar to the non-profit organisation.

Yet, not all think tanks in the US have made their presence felt in the key policy making circle. Therefore, Chapter four, looks at the organisation, management and influence of three major think tanks, keeping in mind their size, funds, area of specialisation and media citations. It, then, identifies the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. By doing so, it observes how to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in American decision making networks.
The concluding Chapter discusses why it is necessary to devote greater attention to the role think tanks play in the foreign policy making process and also to provide more comprehensive approach to the study of American foreign policy making. While it is important to identify the psychological and bureaucratic constraints, which influence decision makers, it is equally important to examine other domestic inputs, which may influence the behavior of American decision makers.
### ABBREVIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>American Enterprises Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Security and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPRI</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Institutes for Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Russell Sage Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti Ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRC</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Principal Foreign Policy Provisions of the Constitution</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>The Foreign Affair Bureaucracy</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>A Typology of Foreign Policy Interest Group</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>A Foreign Policy Strategy Typology</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>A Selected Profile of American Think Tanks</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>A Typology of Think Tanks</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Think Tanks and Their Organisational Siblings</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Funding Sources for Selected U.S. Think Tanks</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>U.S. Foreign Policy Making</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Changing Primary and Scope of Core Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter – I

U.S. Foreign Policy:
A Theoretical Framework
Chapter – I

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The foreign policy of a state is what it actually does in its relations with other states. Whatever else may be said about American foreign policy making since the end of the Second World War, there can be no doubt that tremendous academic attention has been focused on it. For more than forty year, the policy-making process has attracted a seemingly endless flow of studies. Many of them examining at a micro-level the broad range of relevant political and governmental institutions and processes. Some providing detail case studies of particular decisions or crises and a relative handful setting forth conceptual frame working or theories for the more illuminating study of the phenomena.¹

Foreign Policy is more than history and the events, personalities and decisions that comprise it. The modern era, brought a new complexity to the conduct of foreign affairs. American foreign relations are determined through a series of complex policy making decisions. Foreign policy became a melange of agencies, institutions, and specialties. Perhaps the most important dimension of American foreign policy which brought a whole new groups of actors and institutions into the foreign policy field--scientists, academicians, journalists and of course, policy research institution or think tanks.²

Of many influence on the US foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and highly appreciated. A distinctively American phenomenon, think-tanks affect American foreign policy makers in five distinct ways: by generating original ideas and options

² Priya Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel Domestic Influences (Kolkata: Mulana Abul Kalam Azad, Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p 3
for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in government; by offering venues for high level discussions; by educating US citizens about the world; and by supplying official efforts to mediate and resolve conflicts.³

Their greater impact is in generating ‘new thinking’ so that US decision-makers better perceive and effectively respond to various issues and challenges. Original insights can alter conceptions of the US national interest, influence the ranking of priorities, provide road maps for action, mobilize political and bureaucratic conditions, and shape the design of lasting institutions. It is not easy, however, to grab the attention of busy policy makers already immersed in information. To do so, think-tanks need to exploit multiple channels and marketing strategies publishing articles, books, and occasional papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages and newspapers interviews. Congressional hearings provide another opportunity to influence policy choices.⁴

The US occupies a unique position in world affairs. Never in history has a country dominated the international scene to the extent that the US does today. No matter what the indicator- military power, economic strength, political influence, technological powers, cultural model- the US is in a league of its own. It is the only nation on earth able to project power in every part of the world and since 1990, it has been involved in resolving conflicts on every continent. As Secretary of state Madeleine Albright, stated in 1996, to the consternation of some diplomats in Washington, “the US is the indispensable nation whose work never stops”⁵.

---


⁵ Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? (New York: Routledge, 2002), p xv.
Being global leader, the United States of America is concerned about the issues like world democracy, eradication of world poverty, global warming and health issues (HIV). However, proliferation of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear technology in the hand of rough states and issue of Terrorism are top priorities on the US foreign policy agenda. In a world shadowed by the threat of nuclear holocaust, continually plagued by limited conflicts around the world and the attacks on the world Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 proved that we live in truly interconnected global era. The Watchwords of all these events are speed, communication networks, interdependency and risk.

Although there is no significant threat to the US (apart from terrorism) it has had to confront with a number of difficult issues in the post-Cold War World. How is the US to relate to a world that is no longer bi-polar, but increasingly complex? How is the US to meet the new security threats, including terrorism? How does it deal with failed states? Under what circumstances should it intervene overseas? When should it act alone, and when with allies? How does it deal with the rapid pace of globalisation.

Understanding the decision-making process in the U.S. foreign policy depends first on knowing that the policy making process begins with recognition that an issue is worthy of attention from political leadership. This process of issue recognition potentially involves the direct collection of information by governmental sources along with the impact of information from and other Lobbying efforts by concerned interest groups, both domestic and international. Once an issue is elevated to a position on the foreign policy agenda that issue is subject to interpretation by the bureaucracy, the Congress, and the President and members of his staff. Based on these varying interpretations of the issue, policy makers, interact, each attempting convince the other participants of the validity of their interpretation of the problem presented by the issue and the most
appropriate solution for the United States to adopt in addressing that issue. In formulating their arguments, decision makers are often well aware of the desire of the American public and relevant interest groups both domestic and foreign. As a matter of practice, participants in the policy making process tend to be more responsive to the concerns of domestic interest groups, particularly those interest groups with whom they interact most frequently. Once some form of consensus – even a marginal consensus – is achieved, then the administration proceeds to formulate and implement an agreed upon policy to address the issue in question. Although policy implementation is usually assigned to a lead agency, in practice many departments and agencies of the U.S. government co-ordinate their efforts to implement a policy.7

The conduct of foreign affairs is divided into formulation and execution of policies. Since the emergence of the national states, these two branches have been recognised and institutionalised by all sovereign nations. American foreign policy is not created in a vacuum as some sort of indivisible whole with a single grand design. Rather, mixing foreign policy is a prolonged process involving many actors and comprising dozens of individual policies towards different countries regions, and functional problems. The complex process of determining foreign policy makes it difficult to decide who should be credited with initiating or altering any particular foreign policy.

In flow charts and diagrams outlining the foreign policy-making process, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, Congress, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gathering agencies are clearly defined. However, the role and function of think tanks in the foreign policy-

6. Ibid., p. XVI.
making process has largely been ignored. The George W. Bush administration drew heavily on people working in the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and other Pro-republic think-tanks when it took office in January 2001. Similarly many people who had worked in the Clinton administration were hired by think-tanks e.g. James Steinberg went to head the foreign policy programme at Brooking.

The relationship between political leaders and those who advise them is critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. By providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and the bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting ideas into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United States continue to solicit the advice of experts in Universities, interest groups, professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and consulting agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy ideas.8

In this increasingly complex, interdependent, and information rich world, governments and individual policy makers face the common problem of bringing experts knowledge to bear in governmental decision-making policy makers need basic information about the world and the societies they govern, how current policies are working possible alternates, and their likely costs and consequences.9

For policy makers in many countries it is not a lack of information that politicians and government officials are confronted with but an avalanche of information and paper. Indeed, policy-makers are frequently beseiged by more information than they can possibly use: complaints from constituents, reports from international agencies or civil society

organisations, advice from bureaucrats, position papers from lobbyists and interest groups, and exposes of the problems of current government programmes in the popular or elite media. The problem is that this information can be unsystematic, unreliable, and/or tainted by the interests of those who are disseminating it. Some information may be so technical that generalist policy-makers can not understand it or use it. Some information may be politically, financially, or administratively impractical, or contrary to the interests of the policy maker? Who must make decision based on information that they often feel is less than adequate. Other information may not be useful because it differs too radically from the world view or ideology of those receiving it. In developing and transitional countries, the basic data needs to make informed decisions often does not exist and must be collect and analysed and put into a form that is usable by parliamentarians and bureaucrats.¹⁰

In politics, information no longer translates into power unless it is in the right form at the right time. Governments and policy-makers are often moved to seize the moment because the right social and political forces are in alignment or because a crisis compels them to take action. In either case, they often move quickly and make decisions based on available information, which does not always lead to the most informed policy. In short, policy makers and others interested in the policy-making process require information that is timely, understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful.¹¹

There are many potential sources for this information, including, government agencies, university, based scholars, research centers, non profit consulting firms, and international agencies. But in countries around the world, politicians and bureaucrats alike have increasingly turned to a

---


specialised group of institutions to serve their needs. Independent public policy research and analysis organisations commonly known as ‘think tanks’ ‘have filled policy-makers insatiable need for information and systematic analysis that is policy relevant.\textsuperscript{12}

Think-tanks may be defined as independent, non-interest based, non-profit organisation that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy making process. The term ‘think-tanks’ was employed originally in the United States during World War II to refer to a secure room or environment where defence scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategy.\textsuperscript{13} UNDP defines think-tanks as organisation engaged on a regular basis in research and advocacy on any matter related to policy. They are the bridge between knowledge and power in modern democracies.\textsuperscript{14}

These public policy research organisations had first appeared in the U.S and Europe at the turn of 20\textsuperscript{th} century when organisations such as the Brooking Institute of World Economics (1914), the Royal Institute for International Affairs (1920) were established. After World War II, the term was applied to contract researchers, such as RAND co-operation that did a mixture of deep thinking and programme evaluating for the military. The use of the term expanded in the 1960s to describe other group of experts who formulated various policy recommendations, including some quasi-academic research institutes concerned with the study of the international relations and strategic question.\textsuperscript{15} By 1970s, the term think-tanks was applied to institutions focusing not only on foreign policy and defence strategy, but also on current political, economic, and social issues’. At the

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textsuperscript{12} & James McGann and Kent Weaver, ed, \textit{n. 10}, pp. 2-3.  \\
\textsuperscript{14} & UNDP, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable: From Thought to Policy. The Role of Think Tanks in Shaping Government Strategy: Experience from Central and Eastern Europe’, Brastevala, \textit{UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independence States}, 2003, p. 6.  \\
\textsuperscript{15} & James Smith, \textit{n. 13}, pp. 13-14. \\
\end{tabular}
beginning of the 21st century, more than 1,500 think-tanks dot the American intellectual landscape. They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in scope, funding, mandate and location.\(^{16}\)

The term ‘think tanks’ was employed originally in the United States during World War II to refer to a secure room or environment where defence scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategy. This rather narrow usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 2000 US based organisations that are engaged in policy analysis and approximately 2,500 other similar institutions worldwide.\(^{17}\)

But why did such a massive proliferation of the think tanks take place following World War II? More specifically, why did so many think tanks specialising in foreign policy emerge? A number of explanations are worth exploring. First, as a result of casting aside its isolationist shell to assume the global responsibilities of a hegemonic power after World War II, the United States may have had to rely increasingly on policy analyst for advice on how to conduct its foreign relations. Moreover, as the American bureaucracy significantly expanded after the war, in response to growing domestic and foreign concern, so too did the opportunities for policy experts to share their insights to with government officials. According to Dennis Bark, a senior fellow and co-coordinator of the National Security Affairs Programme at the Hoover Institution, the combinations of these factors permitted such think tanks as the RAND Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to have ‘an enormous impact on US foreign policy’ during this period.\(^{18}\)

The considerable access these and other think tanks hade to policy-makers during the first half of the twentieth century may very well have inspired the creation of the research institutions determined to leave their mark

---

\(^{16}\) Richard Hass, *n. 3.*

\(^{17}\) James Smith, *n. 13*

\(^{18}\) Abelsohn, *n. 4,* p50-51, ref)
on US foreign policy. However, since many of the most prominent foreign policy advisers to presidents following World War II, such as George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brezeninski, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk, to name a few, gained national prominence while they were employed in universities or in the foreign services, it is difficult to argue that their success alone was the sole motivating factor for individuals to create dozens of think tanks in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{19}

The impact of anti-war and civil rights movements in awakening the public conscience to political and social turmoil at home and abroad may have also contributed to the proliferations of think tanks. Not unlike interest group mobilising popular support against the war, may so called ‘liberal think tanks’ though no means to limited to, the institutes for policy studies, were created to provide scholars with an opportunity to challenge many of the underlying motivations of Americans domestic and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{20}

Similarly, during the 1960s and early 1970s, as several conservative academics were becoming increasingly disillusioned with what they considered to be a growing liberal bias among the faculty at American universities, an increasing demand for autonomous research institutions emerged. Dr. Thomas Henriksen, Associate Director of the Hoover Institution, maintains that think tanks such as the Institute for Contemporary Studies (1972), the Heritage Foundations (1973), and the Cato Institutes (1977) were founded to allow conservative academics to pursue their research institutes in a more congenial environment.\textsuperscript{21}

Generous corporate financing and tax-exemptions for non-profit organisations also appears to have provided an impetus for policy entrepreneurs, political leaders and aspiring office holders to create their own think tanks. By establishing private think tanks as non-profit organisations and employing sophisticated direct mailing techniques, founders of policy research

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, pp50-51
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, pp.50-51
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, pp 50-51
institutions could, with the assistance of prominent political leaders, encourage corporations, philanthropic foundations and private citizens to contribute thousands of dollars to support and advance particular ideological and political perspectives on domestic and foreign policy issues. Contributing to the coffers of think tanks could also, according to some fundraising letters, provide corporate and private citizens with increasing access to decision-makers.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to various tax loopholes and the growing desire of policy experts to peruse their research in a more hospitable environment, the proliferations of think tanks can also be attributed to the declining role of political parties in the United States. As Kent Weaver of the Brookings Institutes point out:

Weak and relatively non-ideological parties have enhanced think tanks role in several ways. The most important effect of the US party system is that parties have not themselves taken a major role in policy research arms of their own. Think tanks have helped fill this void.\textsuperscript{23}

Unlike Germany or else, where political parties have created their own political foundations to conduct policy research, in the United States, decision-makers in the White House and on Capitol Hill do not draw on the expertise of a party-based foundation, but actively solicit policy advice from multiple sources. The absences of party research institutions and the decline in importance of political parties in the United States, combined with a highly decentralised political system, have provided think tanks with considerable opportunities to market their ideas. Moreover, the willingness of the civil service to rely on contract research institutions to advise policy-makers on issues ranging from the economic implications of deregulating the airline industry to the utility or futility of developing and deploying a space-based defence system have also enable think tanks offering specialising expertise to fill an important void in the policy making community.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22.} Ibid, pp. 50-51
\item \textsuperscript{23.} Ibid, pp. 50-51
\item \textsuperscript{24.} Ibid, pp. 50-51
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In the early 1900s, the major industrialists set up philanthropic foundations to protect their money from taxation and to craft their legacy for generations to come. Later on, these magnates used their foundation to finance research institutions to play a role in the debates over policy. 25

Given the extensive ties between think tanks and government departments and agencies, as well as the frequency with which their members are appointed to higher level government positions, one cannot afford to disagree their growing involvement in the policy-making process. Through publishing brief and full length studies on a wide range of policy issues inviting decision-makers to conferences and seminars, providing commentaries on network newscasts, establishing liaison offices to develop and maintain contact with members of Congress and the Executive, serving on various Presidential boards, commissions, election task forces and transition teams and giving testimony before congressional committees and subcommittees, think-tanks have become permanent fixtures in the policy formation process. 26 Though not generally considered to be part of the formal structure of the American government 27 for decades think tanks have managed to operate effectively within its parameters. 28

By the mid 1990s, there was little question as to which think-tanks decision-makers turned to for advice. On domestic policy, the Brookings Institution had few rivals. On questions of foreign policy, members of the Council on Foreign Relations the Carnegie Endowments for International Peace and the Hoover Institution were frequently consulted. Yet by the early 1970s, this elite group of think tank could no longer monopolize the policy research community. As dozens of research institutions emerged in and around Washington in the decades following world Wart II the composition of the policy-making community began to change. Determined to influence

a wide range of economic, social and political issues, a new generation of think-tanks sought to be more actively involved in the policy-making process.\textsuperscript{29}

The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy-making process requires scholars to re-evaluate various models and theories developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. The black box of decision-making continues to conceal the inner working of the governmental process, however, a closer look at the behaviour of think-tanks will allow to peer a little further inside. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse how and to what extent think-tanks have become involved in the political arena in America and to highlight the various governmental and non-governmental channels they rely on to participate in the policy making process. By analysing so, a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic sources of public policy would be possible. Further this study also deals with the key issue of foreign policy strategy i.e., what the U.S. national interest is and which policies serve it best.

**FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

Foreign policy refers to a consistent course of action followed by one nation to deal with another nation or region, or international issues. A country’s foreign policy is usually based on values (such as democracy, rule of law), interests (such as defence of or expansion of territory), and may reflect broad national objectives or be a very specific response to a particular situation. A country can achieve its foreign policy goals by employing a variety of instruments ranging from political, diplomatic, and military to economic, social, and cultural. Foreign policy is often influenced by many different variables; including a country’s historical ties to other nations its culture, type of government, size, geographic location, economic strength, and military power. A country’s foreign policy is usually aimed at

\footnote{29. \textit{Ibid.}}
preserving or promoting its economic and political interests abroad and its position in the world.\textsuperscript{30}

It is one of the truisms of Political Science that every state has a foreign policy. Each sovereign political unit can not escape having some kind of relations with them. These relations should be ordered and governed by some more or less national plan. Therefore, foreign affairs always one of the major fields of government actions, has grown in importance under the conditions of modern technology. So that today it is the principal concern of many states and is of primary significance to all. It is also because:\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{itemize}
  \item it seeks to protect the territorial integrity of the country and protect the interest of its citizens, both within and outside the country.
  \item the objective of foreign policy is maintenance of link with other members of international community and adoption of policy of conflict or co-operation towards them with a view to promote its own interest.
  \item the primary interest of each state is self preservation, security and well being of its citizens.
  \item the foreign policy aims at enhancement of the influence of the state either by expanding its area of influence or reducing that of other states to the position of dependency.
\end{itemize}

The study of foreign policy is not an easy task. And this task has been rendered even more difficult by the new perspective which has been provided by the behaviouralist in recent years. This perspective has given rise to the fundamental question as to what should be the focus of our inquiry in the study of foreign policy. Traditionally one of the approaches which dominated the studying foreign policy has been historical or descriptive. This approach\textsuperscript{26} is based upon the idea that we should study

\textsuperscript{30} Frasser Cameron, \textit{n. 5}, p. xvi.
\textsuperscript{31} M. Kumar, \textit{Approaches, Theoretical Aspect of International Politics}, (Agra: Shivalal Agarwala & company), pp.323-329
diplomacy with as much accuracy as possible. Those following this approach are not interested in formulating general laws or constructing special scheme of international behaviour. They are reluctant to deal with contemporary events. The main weakness of this approach is that it underestimates the relationship between political power and interests of foreign policy. The second traditional approach to the study of foreign policy has been ideological. It insists that the various general ideologies should be applied to an understanding of the international community.  

The behaviourists view both these approaches as inadequate. They proceed with the assumption that nations have a complex pattern of interest which provides a general framework for the policy makers to formulate and implement their policies. Then the various patterns of interests have to be classified in accordance with their comparative significance. One of the most important tasks of the policy makers is to establish a hierarchy of interests and to relate them to the interests of other nations or of the whole world community. The policy-makers are also expected to develop a community of interests. Thus the behaviourists insist on an analytical approach which emphasizes that we should be interested more in the study of foreign policy processes rather than in that of the actual narration of foreign policies registered in the past. Thus the focus of the analytical approach is on those factors which determine the nature of the international environment.  

It is this approach which has set some writers to examining the question of the frontier of foreign policy. These writers have brought some fresh insights into our study of foreign policy. They insist on going beyond the apparent content of foreign policy and reach the indirect factors

---


influencing foreign policy decisions and to approach the analysis of foreign policy behaviour in a scientific manner\textsuperscript{28}. By being scientific is meant striving for objectivity and precision and for valid generalizations. James Rosenace is for most among those who have argued for recognizing the need for bringing about scientific precision in our study of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{34}

Foreign policy is conceived as a social and political process. It is on-going affairs, not one that may be seized and studied in all its ramifications at a particular moment in time. Dynamism is the Keynote of all international relationship, and our analysis should be so oriented as to take account of unceasing evolution and change. Only by devising techniques that encompass the notion of process can we develop a picture of foreign policy that is at all relevant to reality. We can list the steps of the process as follows\textsuperscript{35}:

- the establishment of the criteria;
- the determination of the relevant variables in the situation;
- the measurement of the variables by criteria;
- the selection of a goal;
- the elaboration of a strategy to reach the goal;
- the decision to act;
- the action itself;
- the evaluation of the results of the action in terms of the original criteria.

The makers of foreign policy act in accordance with the instruction of the community which they represent and on whose behalf they speak and act. The policy makers are an essential component of the process of foreign policy. In shaping the foreign policy on behalf of the community, they have to operate at two levels with the community which gives them instructions and supplies the resources with which to carry out their functions, and with

\textsuperscript{34} Mehendra Kumar, \textit{n.31}, pp. 323-329

other states whose behaviour the policy makers try to change or regulate. George Modelski calls the flow of actions from the community towards the policy makers the "input" and the actions of the policy makers towards other nations the "output". Thus the task of policy makers is to transform inputs into outputs.\textsuperscript{36}

Foreign policy can not exist in a vacuum. It can function only in the context of interest, and objectives. State action in pursuit of an objective may assume any of a great variety of forms. Modern technology has added greatly to the supply of foreign policy techniques available to the statesman. Despite their increased number, however, they all fall into one of the four traditional categories of tool and techniques, the four channels of state action. These four are: Political action, through the mechanism of diplomatic representation; economic action, through the productive and destructive system of the state; psychological action, through the techniques of mass persuasion, Military action: through armed forces. From among these four types a statesman chooses in such combination as seems to him to be best suited to the particular purpose he has in mind.\textsuperscript{37}

Although the formulation of a foreign policy may be caused by a variety of elements, policy maker can attempt to proceed without keeping in mind some basic factors that impose limitations upon his planning and to a considerable extent, predetermine his course of action. These factors are partly measurable in scientific terms, partly imponderables full of uncertainty.

Academics have sought to describe and explain US foreign policy through a variety of factors. Some of these factors involve the nature of the world faced by the United States as it formulates policy. Other factors relate to physical and fiscal (available dollars) capacities of the United States to

\textsuperscript{36} See F. Jones, \textit{Analysis Foreign Policy}, (London, 1970).
develop and implement policy on a regional or global scale. Further sources of US foreign policy relate to the norms, historical experience, ideological preferences, and perceptual biases of US policymakers and the US public (or at least the informed and politically active Sectors of the US public). The mix and relative power of the interest groups seeking to influence US policy on any given issue represent yet another important determinant of U.S. foreign policy. Finally, US foreign policy is in some way a product of the decision-making process itself.\(^{38}\)

The analysis of U.S. foreign policy has changed over time. Initially, analyses resembled diplomatic history in which specific policy events were described in great detail but largely devoid of overall theoretical grounding. By 1960s, analysts increasingly attempted to identify patterns and regularities in factors influencing policy formulation. The eventual emergence of a more structured analysis of U.S. foreign policy owes a great debt to James Rosenau and his development of a pre-theory of foreign policy.\(^{39}\) This multicausal pre-theory postulated that American foreign policy, like any other country's foreign policy, was a product of five general factors. The first of these factors is the nature of the international system. Included in this factor are geographic realities, the basic configuration of power in the international system, the level and dispersion of technological capabilities among the states and non-state actors in that system. The second factor identified is the nature of U.S. society. It includes the value system driving the society, the relative variety of interest groups in U.S. society at a given point in time, and the economic condition of the United States. The nature of the U.S. governmental system represents the third influence on U.S. foreign policy development. This factor includes the influence of basic Executive Legislative relations in the United States, as well as the capacities of the U.S. bureaucracy, both civilian and military. Role factors, as fourth

---

\(^{38}\) Mahendra Kumar, \textit{n. 31}, p. 323.

\(^{39}\) Charles O. Lerche Jr., \textit{n. 37}, p. 8.
factors, concern the influence of existing norms of behaviour for U.S. leaders as well as precedents of proper behaviour established by the action of past U.S. leaders. These norms and behavioural precedents established by past US leadership to some degree establish the proper role and relationship of the various governmental actors involved in the policy process. Finally, Rosenau proposed that the personality (including the personal preferences and perceptual biases) of the specific US decision makers, such as the President and his key advisors, could shape US foreign policy responses. These are called idiosyncratic factors.

Various contemporary analysts of US foreign policy including Kegley and Wittkopf, Rosati, Hastedt and Snow and Brown – either explicitly or implicitly apply Rosenau's framework as they provide detailed analyses in their texts of the actors and processes involved in the formulation policy. Although these and other texts on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy differ to some degree in how they address the impact of systemic, societal, governmental, role, and idiosyncratic factors, they all recognize the importance of these five categorical factors in shaping policy. 40

Therefore, in approaching American foreign policy, there over a dozen different categories of data on which enquiry should be based. Each of them has some relevance to the foreign policy the United States is conducting. Each has a place in the model of American foreign policy process. Each, therefore, forms part of the American foreign policy. The list that follows may includes 13 separate components. 41

1) The national interest of the United States as tradition and concept.
2) Specific formulations of the national interest.
3) The historical background of American foreign policy.

4) The mechanism and procedures for making and executing American policy.
5) The international milieu in which United States is acting.
6) The policies of other states to which the United States must react.
7) The capabilities of the United States, general and specific.
8) The general international action pattern of the United States.
9) The specific objectives sought by the United States.
10) The courses of action taken by the United States to attain its objectives.
11) The evaluation of the policies of the United States.
12) The unresolved issue remaining in American foreign policy.
13) The probable future course of American foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY POLITICS:

Foreign policy politics is the "process of choice", the making of foreign policy through the political institutions and aimed at societal influences of the American Political System.\(^{42}\)

In addition to the executive and legislative branches that remain principal initiator of American foreign policy, there are now more relevant players, more issues, and more pressures. Single issue interest groups have proliferated, professionalised and now regularly promote their policy goals within the legislative and executive arenas. The explosion of group activity has been particularly evident in the foreign policy realm, which had been relatively free of strong, broad-based group pressures. Add to these multiple and increasingly powerful organizations a much larger pool of academic and policy experts in foreign and military affairs who go in and out of government and who also represent many international interests. Today most multinational companies and even foreign government hire Americans with legislative and executive experience and "contacts" to represent them

---

on pending issues in which they have an interest. Foreign policy has become more people's business, debated and conducted for the most part by more people with substantive training and experience in foreign affairs from both the public and private sectors.\textsuperscript{43}

President and Congress:

The US system of government is characterized by a strongly functioning separation of powers. The constitution states that power is shared between the presidency and a bicameral congress plus a Supreme Court. The constitution of the United States did not expressly delegate authority for the conduct of foreign affairs to any specified agency. However, the President is the most important actor in the foreign policy decision making process. The famous inscription on President Truman's desk "The Buck stops here". Remain true today.\textsuperscript{44} If the Executive branch of the government speaks with several voices on foreign affairs, the problem becomes still more complicated when congress gets involved. All the Presidents have needed to use congress to ratify their foreign policies. Therefore, executive and legislative branches each play important roles that are different but that often overlap.\textsuperscript{45}

One of the oldest conflicts in the American system of government is that between congress and the President over the right to formulate and implement foreign policy. Is the President solely responsible for the conduct of external relations? Is the Congress an equal partner? Or does Congress have the right to shape U.S. policy by enacting legislation which prescribes a President's flexibility?\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{42} Christopher Herrick and B. McRae, \textit{n 7}, p. 7
\item\textsuperscript{43} Bruce W. Jones, \textit{American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in 21st Century}, (New York W W Norton & Company, 2004), p. 9
\item\textsuperscript{44} Stephen J Wayne, "The Multiple influences on U.S. Foreign Policy-making", \textit{International Information Programme, Electronic Journal of US Department of States}
\item\textsuperscript{45} Frasser Camron, \textit{n 5}, p. 38
\item\textsuperscript{46} John G. Tower, Congress Vs the President: "The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Winter, 1981/2,
\end{itemize}
When people think of foreign policy-making in the United States, they usually think of the President. After all, President has been the chief architects and implementer of American foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic. The framers of the Constitution were mindful of the advantages that the Presidency brought to this endeavour: a hierarchical institution with a single head, the one institution that would be in continuous tenure, and the one that could act with greatest “energy, dispatch, and responsibility, “to quote James Wilson, one of the delegates at the Constitutional convention.\textsuperscript{47} Robert Dahl wrote in 1950 that “perhaps most important fact about Congress and its role in foreign policy therefore, is that it rarely provides the initiatives”.\textsuperscript{48}

But the framers also were fearful of arbitrary and irresponsible actions by a chief executive. To reduce the likelihood that a President might engaged in activities that would be harmful to the national interest, the Constitution imposed checks on a range of executive powers, particularly those of war and peace. Treaties were subject to Senate ratification by a two-third vote, while executive appointments, including those of ambassadors, required concurrence by a majority of the Senate. Also vested in Congress was the authority to regulate foreign Commerce, declare war; raise, maintain, and make rules for a standing army and navy; call up the militia, and appropriate money for the operations of government and conduct of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{49} So, these are five specific powers related to foreign policies are given to Congress in the American constitution. These are\textsuperscript{50} –

- Congress is given the power to regulate trade.
- The Senate must pass a declaration of war by a 2/3 majority.

\textsuperscript{47} Stephen J. Wayne, \textit{n. 39}.
\textsuperscript{49} Stephen J. Wayne, \textit{n. 39}.
\textsuperscript{50} Frasser Camron, \textit{n. 5}, p. 70.
The Senate must give “advice and consent” to the President’s cabinet including all political appointees ambassadors and senior military appointments by a simple majority.

The Senate must pass all treaties negotiated by the President by 2/3 majority.

Congress must also approve or “appropriate”

**Table 1.1 Principal Foreign Policy Provisions of the Constitution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power granted to:</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War power</td>
<td>Commander in chief of armed forces</td>
<td>Provide for the common defense; declare war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties</td>
<td>Negotiate treaties</td>
<td>Ratification of treaties, by two-thirds majority (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointments</td>
<td>Nominate high-level government officials</td>
<td>Confirm President’s appointments (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign commerce</td>
<td>No explicit powers, but treaty negotiation and appointment powers pertain</td>
<td>Explicit power “to regulate foreign commerce”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General powers</td>
<td>Executive power; veto</td>
<td>Legislative power; power of the purse; oversight and investigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Congressional committees are powerful bodies that provide oversight of the executive branch and hold hearings. Where government officials and experts testify about all aspects of US foreign policy. Staffs play a vital role in preparing briefing papers and speeches for Congressmen. Furthermore, divided partisan control of government contributed to the closer scrutiny that Congress gave to Presidential foreign policy initiatives and matters of implementation. The party that controlled one or both houses of Congress, but not the White House, gained political advantage from investigating irregularities, mismanagement, and failures in the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch as is the case of Iraq.

51. Bruce W. Jentleson, *n.43*, p. 34.
52. Stephen J. Wayne, *n. 44.*
On the other, President’s power much depends on the political landscape in which he operates as well as the personality and political skill. The qualities needed to ensure an effective presidency includes the ability to communicate, persuade and rally public support. An important aspect of the President’s power is his ability to set the agenda and to use the prestige of the office as a “bully pulpit” to explain and seek public support for his policies. It has been shown how President Wilson failed to persuade Congress of the merits of the League of Nations while President Roosevelt was able to win a huge majority to support US membership of the United Nation.53

Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of Presidential and Congressional dominance in making foreign policy, variously defined by different scholars. One study classified the period 1789-1829 as one of Presidential initiative; 1829-1898 as one of Congressional supremacy, and 1899 through the immediate post World War II period as one of growing Presidential Power.54 Another study defined three periods of Congressional dominance 1837-1861, 1869-1897 and 1918-1936, with a fourth one beginning towards the end of Vietnam War in 1973.55 During the Reagan and Bush Administrations the Pendulum swung back towards Presidential dominance, reaching its height in 1991 during operation Desert Storm against Iraq.56 In the post-Persian Gulf war era, both President and the Congress are confronted with issues in foreign policy that may well define which branch of government will play the dominant role during the first decade of the twenty first century. But cooperation between the two branches is necessary for a strong and effective U.S. foreign policy.57

57. Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, CRS Report to Congress, United States Information agency, Foreign Press Centre, H:/CRSReport to Congress.htm.
President’s Advisors: Big Fours

In the post Cold War World, there is an increasing number of foreign policy actors involved in the executive branch. As foreign policy has become more of a political football, the President has come to depend more and more on his closest advisors in the white House and National Security Advisor.

The National Security Council (NSC) operating under the direct authority of the President has steadily increased its authority in recent years and the NSC advisor has become the key figure in the US foreign policy machine. The National Security Act was passed in 1947 to establish a National Security Council. The formal NSC comprises the President’s main external relations advisers including the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defence the Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff, the Director of the CIA, and the National Security Adviser. It is the NSC staff, however, that provide the steady stream of briefing papers for the President. The National Security Adviser is the hinge between the formal NSC and the working machine. Over the past few decades, the National Security Adviser has often emerged as the most important foreign policy aid to the President. The National Security Adviser has a number task including advising and briefing the President, managing the decision-making process and explaining and defending the policies of the administration in public. A piano-playing-child Prodigy, Condoleezza Rice, had a role in the George W. Bush administration going beyond foreign policy.58

Constitutionally, the State Department is the lead executive agency for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, a mission based on the role of the Secretary of State as the President’s principal foreign policy adviser. In fact, Secretary of State is the first cabinet officer in line to succeed to the Presidency (The succession starts with the Vice President, the speaker of the

58 Frasser Camron, n. 5, pp. 41-44.
House, the President of the Senate, and the Secretary of State). The State department has the primary role in leading and coordinating US representation abroad.

- Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties.
- Managing the international affairs budget.
- Coordinating and supporting international activities of other US agencies.

Several Secretaries of State, John Hay, Evans Hughes, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, James Barker, Madeline Albright, and Collin Powell have a record of achievements. In constitutional terms, the Department of Defence (DOD) is responsible for the formulation of general defence policy, in particular the military strategy and the definition of the “mission Statement of the armed forces. In terms of defining an overall approach and policy regarding national security issues, however, the DOD is but one actor and the NSC has increasingly taken lead in defining the overall national security strategy.

Apart from its seat on the NSC, the Pentagon also plays an important role in US external relations through its foreign bases its training and assistance programmes and its regional military commanders. Because of its size and enormous resources the Pentagon plays an increasingly important role in the formulation of US foreign policy.

The intelligence community – The US has the largest intelligence apparatus in the world with the various agencies making a round the clock input into the formulation of US foreign policy. The Director of the CIA is simultaneously director of the intelligence community, of which CIA is but one component. President expect that, for what they spend on intelligence, the product should be able to predict coup, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. President and his national security team usually are ill informed about intelligence capabilities.

59 Ibid, pp. 44-46.
60 Ibid
61 Ibid, pp. 53-54.
Therefore, they often have unrealistic expectations of what intelligence can do for them. Oversight of the intelligence community is exercised by the NSC and the President’s foreign intelligence advisory board. There are also two congressional oversight committees that have a remit to review operations and the senate must approve the director of intelligence.\(^{62}\)

**Department of Homeland Security** – Among the most significant responses of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have been its incremental steps to establish the Department of Homeland Security (DOHS). The establishment of the DoHS brought a variety of governmental functions and agencies into a single cabinet level department in order to move effectively against the threat posed by domestic and international terrorism.\(^{63}\)

As American foreign policy has grown increasingly complex, foreign policy politics in the executive branch do not occur only at the senior advisory level. As table below shows, the foreign affairs bureaucracy is vast and complex.

**Table 1.2: The Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy\(^{64}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Economic Policy</td>
<td>Commerce Dept.</td>
<td>Treasury Dept.</td>
<td>Agriculture Dept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau of Economic Affairs (State Dept.)</td>
<td>U.S. Trade Representative</td>
<td>International Trade Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Democratization, Economic Development</td>
<td>Agency for International Development (AID)</td>
<td>Bur. of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (State Dept.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Agencies</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalized Domestic Policy</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
<td>Office National Drug Control Policy</td>
<td>Bur. of International Labour Affairs (Dept of Labor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

62 Ibid., pp 61-65
63 Office of the Counter Terrorism of the US Department of State, 30 September, 2001.
64 Bruce W. Jentleson, n 43, p 48
MAJOR DECISION INFLUENCERS:

In addition to the executive and legislative branches of government, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. These include a multitude of lobby groups, business interests, trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think-tanks and international organization.

Interest Groups: These are formal organisation of people who share a common outlook or social circumstances and who band together in the hope of influencing government policy.\textsuperscript{65} There are five main types of foreign policy interest groups based on differences in the nature of the interests that motivate their activity and their forms of organization.\textsuperscript{66}

Table 1.3. A typology of foreign policy Interest Groups\textsuperscript{67}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>General Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic groups</td>
<td>Organisations of trade unions, national associations of manufactures, consumer federations of America,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity groups.</td>
<td>Jewish Americans, Cuban Americans, Greek Americans,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political issue groups</td>
<td>Refugee internationals, committee on present dangers world wild life fund,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state and local government</td>
<td>Local elected officials for social responsibilities, California world trade commissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign governments.</td>
<td>Washington law firms, public relations companies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic Interest Groups includes Multination Corporations (MNCs) and other businesses labour unions, consumers whose lobbying is motivated principally by how foreign policy affects the economic interests of their members. Identity Groups are motivated less by economic interests

\textsuperscript{65} Larry Barman and Bruce Murphy, \textit{Approaching Democracy} (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), p 408.

\textsuperscript{66} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n 4 3}, pp. 49-58.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid}, p 50.
than by ethnic or religious identity. Ethnic identity groups have sought to
influence U.S. relations with the country or region to which they trace their
ancestry or heritage. Political Issue Groups include groups that are organised
around support or opposition to a political issue that is not principally a
matter of their economic interests or group identity. These are anti war
groups, Environment group etc. State and local Governments, although they
do not fit the term interest groups in the same way, increasingly seek to
influence foreign policy as it affects their interest.\(^{68}\)

Interest groups seek to influence foreign policy according to many
different strategies aimed at the various foreign policy actors. To influence
Congress, lobbyists regularly meet privately with Senators and
representatives who are allies to set strategy, count votes and in some cases
even to help write the legislation and financial contribution at the of
election. Interest groups also try to influence directly executive branch
departments and agencies as they formulate and implement foreign policy
on day-today basis. Groups also take their efforts to influence foreign policy
outside the halls of Congress and the executive branch, mobilising protests
and demonstration to show “shoulder to shoulder” support for there causes.
Especially in recent years, foreign policy interest groups have become quite
astute at using the media as a magnifying glass to enlarge their exposure and
as a megaphone to amplify their voice.\(^{69}\) Samuel Huntington has noted that
for an understanding of American foreign policy, it is necessary to study not
only the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but
rather the play of economic and ethnic interest in American domestic
policies.\(^{70}\)

**News Media:** Despite the declining coverage of foreign policy, prior to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, one can not ignore its presence. Nearly

---


all government and congressional offices have a television screen, usually tuned to CNN. And thus have instant access to news from around the world. Other than CNN for coverage of foreign policy, first rank still goes to major newspapers (such as: New York Times and Washington Post) major television networks (ABC, NBC and Fox News) and major news magazine (Times, New Week). The internet also has substantially enhanced the capacity of NGOs, think tanks, and others to become independent sources of information, analysis and advocacy.\footnote{71}{Bruce W. Jentleson, *n.* 43, pp. 61-62.}

The manner in which television and print media cover news stories influences public perception of events and subsequently, their political attitudes. This in turn, influences the actions of the policy makers themselves. Administration, spokesmen, Congressmen, think tanks specialists and other pundits are rarely absent from the screen, usually offering instant comment and analysis on the latest developments in a crises.\footnote{72}{Ibid., pp. 61-62.}

Television in particular has a major agenda-setting impact. Studies by media scholar Shanto Iyenger and other shows that when people are asked to identify the most significant problem facing the nation, they name something that has been on television news recently. The media also influence the relative priority the public gives to one issue over another, as well as the criteria by which the public makes its judgment about success or failure. These framing and priming effects occur both directly through the general public’s own exposure to the media and indirectly through “opinion leaders” – political, business community, educational and other leaders to whom the public often looks for cues. Another type of influence is directly on policy-makers”. What will the press thinks? Is common question inside the White House and the State Department. It is asked in an anticipatory manner and thus can affect policy as it is formulated. In a more informal sense, policy makers draw on dispatches and analyses by the more
prominent foreign affairs journalists as additional and independent source of information to supplement even their own intelligence sources.\textsuperscript{73}

**PUBLIC OPINION:** Public opinion also exercises profound influence on the foreign policy of America. Public opinion influences American foreign policy in many ways. First by parameter setting which means that public opinion imposes limits on the range of President’s policy options. Public opinion influences the President through Presidential election. Voting analysts identify three factors as key to attributing significant electoral impact to a foreign policy issue: the issue must be demonstrated through survey question to be highly salient, there must be significant differences between the positions of the Republic and Democratic candidates; and the public’s awareness of these differences must be evident. Public opinion also has its impact on Congress. Congress is very responsive to the public opinion on foreign policy. It responds both to polls on specific issues and to more general assessment of whether the public really cares much about foreign policy at all. Often this translates into Congress’s paying the most attention to the groups that are the most vocal and the most politically potent.\textsuperscript{74}

President wants to be liked by the public because the level of their popularity with the American people affects their ability to work with Congress and achieve policy goals. The more popular president’s are domestically, the more they are free of constraints to do as they wish abroad.\textsuperscript{68} Every four years the Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press does a survey on what Americans think about their country and its place in the world. In November 2005 survey, it polled decision makers, from the media, covering newspapers, magazine, television and radio, the foreign policy and security elites, a sample of governors of Americans states and mayors of majority cities, the head of think tanks and leaders of universities, religious leaders, scientists and engineers, the military, along with the public. It contained a wealth of materials about the present moment and long term trends.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, pp 61-62.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, pp 67-68
The news survey found that about 2/3 of Americans were dissatisfied with the way things are going in their country today, while 29% were satisfied. The report notes that this “the most negative national assessment in nearly 10 years”. They have different priorities from the Bush administration. There are signs of a growing isolationist sentiment. An important part of this unease is the sense Americans have of the current standing of their country in the world. 2/3 of them say the US is less respected by other countries than in the past. An overwhelming majority of Americans (71%) and opinion leaders (87%) believe the war in Iraq is a major factor for this.  

It is clear that the number of actors involved in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy has steadily increased since II world war thus limiting the executive’s freedom of action to decide and implement policy.

Far from operating in a vacuum, think tanks participate in the policy process alongside a range of resources of research that also include academics, private sector consulting firms, interest groups, and government bureaus. Think tanks are most numerous organisational forms devoted to policy research and they are often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making.

Figure 1.1: US Foreign policy making

---

75. Zia Mian, How American See the US, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), June, 2006.
76. Frasser Cameron, n. 5, p. 37.
MODELS OF DECISION MAKING AND INVOLVEMENT OF THINK-TANKS

The literature on American foreign policy-making continues to grow, but only recently has the participation of think-tanks in the policy formulation process been discussed. Contemporary models and theories of foreign policy-making need not be supplanted to account for the increasingly active involvement of think-tanks in the policy-making process. Rather, their parameters simply need to be expanded to take into consideration the changing role of policy research institutions in the United States. By treating think-tanks as important inputs into the policy-makers process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors competing for power in the political arena.77

The Rational Actor Model:

One of the most popular of the simplified models is the black box or the billiard ball model. This notion has termed as the “strategic model” by Roger Hilsman.78 It derived directly from the theories of realism as propagated by the Hans Morgenthou, Kenneth Waltz, etc. This model was termed as the Rational Actor Model by Allison. The rational actor model assumes that the state acts as rational, unitary decision-makers, and can identify and select a course of action which will maximise its strategic goals and objectives.79

However, while the rational actor model provides international relations theorists with a relatively straightforward explanation as to how states are supposed to make foreign policy decisions, the assumption on which the model is based are problematic. To begin with, it is unrealistic to

77 Donald E. Abelson, n 4, pp. 117-118
assume that states behave as unitary decision-makers. In highly decentralised political systems like the United States, where non-governmental organisations representing a multitude of political and economic interests have innumerable opportunities to reach decision-makers\textsuperscript{80} the government rarely has the luxury of speaking with one voice.

According to Herbert Simon, a renowned authority on organisational behaviour\textsuperscript{81}, the efforts of leaders to reduce the requirement for information in part explains why states often make irrational decisions.

Most theories of individual and organisational choice employ a concept of "comprehensive rationality" according to which individuals and organisations choose the best alternative taking account of consequences, their probabilities and utilities.\textsuperscript{82} However Simon argues that the concept of 'bounded rationality' more accurately reflects how individuals and organisations process information. In short, Simon theory of bounded rationality states that "The physical and psychological limits of man's capacity as alternative generator, information process or, and problem solver constrain the decision-making processes of individuals and organisations. Because of these bounds, intendedly rational action requires simplified models that extract the main features of a problem without capturing all of its complexity.\textsuperscript{83}

Simon's theory of bounded rationality only sheds light on the limitations of the rational actor model, but more importantly, helps explain why leaders often fail to fully explore the potential consequences of their actions. Unable to rely on perfect information particularly during periods of crisis, policy-makers have few alternatives but to speculate on the outcome.

\textsuperscript{82} Graham Allison, \textit{The Essence of Decision: Explaining, the Cuban Missile Crisis} (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 71.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid}, p. 71.
of their decisions. At times the consequences of their foreign policy decision are favourable. At other times, they can prove to be catastrophic.\textsuperscript{84}

The rational actor model provides a useful point of departure to examine how think-tanks can be integrated into formal theories of foreign policy decision-making. Assuming, as proponents of the rational actor model do that decision makers acting on behalf of the state assess the advantages and disadvantage of pursuing certain courses of action before making a policy decision, one would expect leaders to rely on various sources of policy advice. Since few decision-makers possess expertise in every policy area, it is not surprising that they frequently turn to their inner circle of policy advisers for guidance. Moreover, as discussed throughout this study, Presidents and Presidential candidates, not to mention members of Congress and their staff, often solicit the input of think-tanks scholars in the process of developing and shaping specific policies.\textsuperscript{85}

However, while the rational actor model provides scholars with a relatively straight forward, if not simplistic explanation of how states make foreign policy decisions, its proponents have paid little attention to how over one thousand think tanks attempt to provide policy advice to decision makers. By examining how think-tanks formulate and transmit ideas to decision-makers, theorists employing the rational actor model could, at the very least, evaluate an important source of policy information. Since think-tanks constantly provide decision-makers with information and advice on a wide range of issues through seminars, publications and other channels, their contribution to important policy debates should not be overlooked. Even those scholars who have sought to develop more sophisticated theories about the nature of foreign policy-making have failed to take into consideration how policy research institutions participate in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{84} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n 4}, p 105
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, p 106
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p 106
\end{flushleft}
Bureaucratic Models of Decision Making:

Graham Allison, in his study, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile crises, reveals the inherent weakness of the rational actor model by constructing two alternative paradigms to explain how foreign policy decisions are made; the organisational process models and the government (bureaucratic) politics model. For Allison, proponents of the rational actor model overlook two important features of the policy-making process; the extent to which bureaucratic departments limit the policy options available to political leaders and the intense competition between government officials to advance their political and personal interests. The Bureaucratic politics model views the policy-making process as a game involving players competing for high personal and political stakes.

Although flow charts of the foreign policy making process illustrate how the executive and legislative branches of government share responsibilities in international affairs they rarely reveal the political bargaining which takes place among key players in the white House and on Capital Hill. For Allison, unless foreign policy observes pay attention to the political struggle among high-level decision-makers to promote their institutional and personal interests, they cannot possibly paint an accurate portrait of the decision-making process. Allison’s governmental (bureaucratic) politics model focuses on the competition between decision makers to promote their political and bureaucratic objectives. By identifying key players in the policy-making process and the importance they assign to a particular issue, the bureaucratic politics model attempts to explain what motivates certain individuals to influence the outcome of policy debates.

---

88 Donald E. Abelson, n 5, p 107
89 Priya Singh, n 2, p 108
90 Donald e. Abelson, n 4, p 108
According to Allison the Governmental politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players-players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organisational and personal goals, players who make government decisions not by a single rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.91

By reviewing the decision-making process as a policy game Allison attempts to demonstrate how government officials throughout the bureaucracy rely on various tactics to assert their influence in major policy debates. Although the extent to which policy-makers influence key decisions is difficult to quantity, Allison argues that their success in the policy making arena ultimately depends on a number of factors including the importance of their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the amount of expertise they possess in a particular issue area and their ability to persuade colleagues to support their position.92 The policy positions individual leaders advocate is not difficult to predict. According to Allison, ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.93

The organisational process and bureaucratic politics models focus on important aspects of the policymaking process, that it is to say, how individual leaders and departments attempt to advance their interests in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Nonetheless, they virtually ignore the individuals and organisations operating outside the formal parameters of government who also have a vested interest in influencing decisions at the highest levels of government. As organisations committed to influencing public policy and public opinion, think-tanks have made a concerted effort to expand their lies throughout government. By developing, their own areas of expertise and

91. Allison, p 87, p144
92. ibid, p.169
93. ibid.176
establishing contacts with officials in various departments and agencies, think-tanks have attempted to ensure long-term access to decision-makers. Some think-tanks such as the Rand co-operation the Hudson Institute and the Urban Institute, by virtue of their contractual relationship with particular federal departments, considerable access to key government officials. On the other hand, think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Institute for policy studies which do not solicit government contracts must employ a number of other strategies to capture the attention of decision-makers.94

Consequently, both the organisational and bureaucratic models of decision-making neglected to explore in any detail the relationship between bureaucratic departments and think-tanks. Despite this oversight, the involvement of think-tanks in the policy-making process could easily be incorporated into the parameters established by the organisational process and bureaucratic politics models.95

Since many high-level government officials come from or return to think-tank after leaving office, it is possible to comment further on the political motivations of decision-makers. For instance, Edwin Meese’s fund raising efforts for the Heritage Foundation, could explain why he was offered a position at the Washington-based think-tanks after leaving the Reagan administration. In other words while the bureaucratic politics model examines how and why leaders attempt to advance the interests of the departments they represent, it could also take into consideration the benefits high-level officials derive by promoting positions supported by prominent think-tanks. The appearance of cabinet officials and members of Congress at think-tanks seminars and lunches may enhance the visibility and prestige of research institutions but it also provides government officials with an opportunity to solidify their ties to potential employers.96

94. Donald e. Abelson, n. 5, p 109
95. Ibid. p.110
96. Ibid. 110
Although the rational actor model assumes that states select a course of action which will maximise their objectives, Allison argues that the inability and unwillingness of bureaucratic departments to perform certain tasks constrains the policy alternatives available to decision-makers. According to Allison’s organisational process model, since individual departments are required to adhere to standard operating procedures (SOP), they may also have the flexibility to alter their behaviour in such a way as to satisfy the objectives and preferences of decision-makers. As Allison points out in his analysis of the events which led to the decision of Kennedy’s Executive Committee\textsuperscript{97} to order a naval blockade around Cuba, Decision-makers strongly favoured an air strike but were forced to reconsider this option when high ranking officials in the US Air Force expressed reservations about the success of such an operation. In other words Allison argues that while political leaders may prefer to adopt a particular strategy, bureaucratic constraints may compel them to pursue alternative courses of action.\textsuperscript{98}

**PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKING:**

According to Steinburner, policy-makers do not engage in sophisticated mental calculations before making value maximising decisions as the rational actor model suggests. Rather, he argues that political leaders instinctively rely on survival mechanisms to resolve policy problems. Bombarded by information from multiple directions and sources, policy makers can possibly digest all pertinent data before making critical decisions. As a result, Steinburunber argues that they must develop a highly structured and stable environment in which to address and examine policy issue.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid.} 107
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 107.
Steinbruner’s cybernetic theory of decision making is useful in explaining how decision-makers attempt to reduce uncertainty in their environment by screening out certain types of information. However, his contention that policy decisions are the result of programmed responses requires closer scrutiny. Although individual leaders may attempt to immerse themselves in stable and protective environments, the views they promote and the ideals they embrace may be influenced by a multitude of factors. For instance, surrounded by political advisers and policy experts from various government departments and think-tanks, decision-makers may be forced to alter their most preferred course of action, despite having previously processed highly selective information.¹⁰⁰

Recognising that decision-makers rarely have the time to digest all information necessary to make rational policy decisions, several think tanks have attempted to provide them with concise analyses of major domestic and foreign policy issues. The Heritage, RAND Corporation, Carnegie etc are most effective think tanks at inundating members of Congress and the executive with synopses of domestic and foreign policy issue. By providing elected officials and their staffs with information that can easily be incorporated into briefing notes, memos, and speeches, think-tanks have in some respect helped reduce uncertainty in the decision-makers environment. This is not to suggest that think-tanks directly influence specific policy decisions but rather that they provide a valuable source of policy information and advice which can help shape the environment in which leaders make decisions.¹⁰¹

In this way, Steinbruner’s framework provides additional opportunities to observe how think-tanks attempts to shape the policy environment in which political leaders make policy decisions.

¹⁰⁰ ibid. p. 112
Elite and Interest Group Models of Decision-Making:

By examining the formulation and conduct of policy elites, Robert Dhal and C. Wright Mills among others, have provided much-needed insight into how elites in different policy-making circles attempt to influence the content and direction of public policies. Moreover, David Truman among others, has written extensively on how interest groups in pluralistic societies immerse themselves in policy debates.¹⁰²

Contrary to the assertions of some theorists who argue that the political process is controlled by a group of elites committed to the promotion of corporate interests, Dahl's¹⁰³ research indicates that leaders responsible for overseeing important community issues do not necessarily share the same goals and objectives. In fact, as his study demonstrates, groups or organizations often engage in a bitter competition to advance their institutional interests. Dahl's observations about the presence of multiple elites and their participation in the policy making process shed additional light on the domestic sources of public policy. Sections are often unable to monopolize the attention of government officials in every conceivable policy area. The presence of several hundred policy research institutions competing for power might give the impression that think-tanks are influential players in the policy-making process.¹⁰⁴

C. Wright Mills¹⁰⁵, in Power Elite, argues that the American political process is dominated by what is commonly referred to as the military-industrial complex. Political leaders, in cooperation with the military and defense contractors, formulate and implement domestic and foreign policies which will further promote their common interests. Mills study presents a rather conspiratorial view of the political system, yet his

¹⁰² Donald E. Abelson, n 5, P 113
¹⁰⁴ Donald E. Abelson, n 5, P 114
insight into the intimate relationship between the military and defence contractors can not be casually dismissed. Similarly the relationship between the military and individual think-tanks must be taken into account, the reliance of the military on such think-tank as the Rand Corporation and the Hudson Institute provides policy research institutions with considerable opportunity to help shape vital national security policies.\(^{106}\)

William Domhoff\(^{107}\) and Thomas Dye\(^{108}\) contend that non-military focused think tanks also form an integral part of a more extensive institution in the United States called the ruling elite. As institutional composed of academics whose research is supported by corporations philanthropic foundations thin tank such the Brooking Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, play a vital role in furthering corporate interests in the US. Still, it is difficult to argue that the sole objective of think tanks is to advance the economic interests of their clients. Since think tanks differ significantly in size, scope, and political leavings, their agenda are often influenced by multiple concerns.\(^{109}\)

The intense competition between think-tanks for influence in the market place of ideas has led some scholars to treat policy research institutions as another type of interest group committed to influencing public policy. However, by reviewing the group theory approach to decision-making the fundamental differences between think-tank and interest or pressure groups can be revealed.

Contrary to Truman’s assumptions, the government or for that matter decision-makers, do not simply behave as referees moderating between competing interests. In developing and formulating policy ideas, decision-makers do not simply await the views of interest groups, but

\(^{106}\) Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.5}, P 115
\(^{108}\) Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.5}, P 115
actively draw on and solicit the opinions and advice of a wide range of individuals and organisations. As a result while think-tanks could be incorporated into studies on interest group behaviour, their active involvement in the policy formulation process distinguishes them from the thousands of other organisations which may have a more visible presence in the public arena, but whose access to decision-makers is for more limited. Similarly, thousands of interest groups lobby decision-makers to introduce legislation which is compatible with their institutional interests, very few are actually called upon by the Executive or Congress to develop and shape policy ideas. Although members of interest groups often give testimony before Congressional committees and subcommittees, they rarely provide decision-makers with detailed blueprints on how to develop a particular policy idea. Think-tanks, on the other hand, are approached by decision-makers to provide them with practical advice on how to develop and implement domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore during Presidential elections and the transition period that follows, Presidential candidates have surrounded themselves with advisers from think tanks. While the positions of influential interest groups are often taken into consideration in developing election platforms and in shaping public policies, think tank scholars, not interest group representatives are called upon to advise political leaders on how to govern effectively.\textsuperscript{110}

CONCLUSION: The recent decades have witnessed much progress in the study of foreign policy, particularly of American Foreign policy. One of the consequences of this renewed interest in foreign policy analysis has been the emergence of conflicting opinions regarding the understanding of a country's foreign policy. One of the primary assumption which is now commonly shared by most foreign policy experts is that foreign policy is not an independent variable and as such is conditioned by several factors, While it is universally accepted that a states external behaviour is, definitely,

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. pp. 116-117.
conditioned by the international environment, it is equally true that the goals, contents and conduct of that behaviour are also to a significant extent shaped by the domestic context out of which it arises. As the saying goes, "foreign policy begins and ends at home."111

The promise and peril of globalisation has transformed how we view international relations and opened the policy-making process to a new set of actors, agendas, and outcomes. International relations was once the exclusive domain of diplomats, bureaucrats, and states, but today policymakers must consider a diverse set of international actors when formulating foreign policy that includes CNN, ASEAN, etc. While these actors were not born of globalisation, they have been empowered by it. Consider the simple fact that in 1950 there were only 50 nation states and a limited number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations operating in the world and one begins to understand the complexity and unique challenge policymakers face when trying to fashion an effective foreign policy. The challenges for U.S. policymakers are even more daunting given America's super power status, global commitments and the range of transnational actors and issue it must confront on a daily basis.112

Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different actors and different types of decision.

In addition to the executive and legislative branches of government and the media, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. These include a multitude of lobby groups, business interests, trade unions non-governmental organisation (NGOS), think-tanks, foreign governments and international organisation. Far from operating in vacuum, think tanks participate in the policy process along side a range of

111. Nalini Kant Jha, Domestic imperative in India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 2002), p. 1.
other source of information and influence. But think-tanks are among the most numerous organisational forms devoted to policy research and they are often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making. \textsuperscript{113}

Since 1900s, most officials and non-officials in charge of setting American foreign policy have consistently sought to engage the United States deeply in political and economic affairs beyond the water's edge. At the start of twenty-first century, the United States is the World's only "superpower, or "hyper power" as French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, famously described it. The use of "hyper power aroused considerable controversy in the U.S. in the "new era of globalisation there is a real sense of uncertainty among many analyst today, even leading some to speculate, that the American century is giving way to the era of American decline.\textsuperscript{114}

But on the other hand many like the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice do not believe in that and are very optimistic about American future. She argued that the US will continue to use free trade, foreign aid and all elements of its power to promote an open international order based on political liberty, free markets, self determination and nation of sovereignty. This is not a status quo objective. But that does not make it impractical. Indeed, helping states to transform themselves, to improve themselves, is the most realistic approach to the problems the America is now facing", Rice said.\textsuperscript{115}

The recent Russia-China-India meeting in New Delhi (Feb, 2007) of the three Foreign Ministers, therefore, assumes a heightened significance. It is still early days to predict where this dialogue is headed because each country of this evolving triangle seeks better relations with the US.

\textsuperscript{112} McGann, \textit{n. 9}
\textsuperscript{114} Frasser Cameron, \textit{n. 5}
\textsuperscript{115} Arun Kumar, \textit{Hindustan Times}, 10 June, 2007, p. 17.
Nevertheless, the idea also is to counter US unipolarity and unilateralism through a loose tripartite arrangement seeking to build a more balanced multi-polar world. The fact that these three countries, together, account for 2/5 of the world’s population, 1/5 of the economy that is growing rapidly to reach 2/5 in the decades ahead, the largest armies in the world and are nuclear armed would not be lost on commentators and strategic planners. A strategic reorientation may be taking place.\textsuperscript{116}

Like all other countries the US has always acted in defence of its national interests but a continuous threat of idealism has also found a place in American foreign policy. Throughout its history the US has viewed itself as having a unique mission in the world, to promote its values of freedom, independence, and democracy\textsuperscript{118} and its market economy or capitalist economic system. Other countries, including all other permanent member of UN Security Council, (UNSC), France, the UK, Russia and China, share their own messianic vision. Few have been in a position to promote their values abroad to the same extent as the US, especially in the later half of 20\textsuperscript{th} C. The 1990s were the Climax of “the American century”. Not only had the US won the Cold War but its economy raced ahead of other industrial nations and its culture and technology had spread to every corner of the globe.\textsuperscript{117}

Of course, even its geographical advantages cannot protect the US from terrorist attacks, but the enormous size of the US, plus its population and economic base, gives its unique position in the world. True, there are countries larger in size (Russia, Canada) and population (China, India) but no other country enjoys the panoply of resources that benefit the term “super power” or “hyper power”.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{flushright}
117. Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. 5}, p. 3.
\end{flushright}
The main conclusions from these scenarios can be summed up as follows:\(^{119}\)

- Most likely for the next decade or two is a continuation of the present polarity structure of one superpower and several great powers.

- It is unlikely during the next 25 or 80 years that the US will face other powers actively seeking to assert super status. The EU & China are the most plausible candidates but both have much to do before they could qualify. China has further to go in material terms than EU, but is probably more plausible on political grounds than EU.

- It is by no means impossible that the US could step down from its superpower role, producing a world with no superpower and a set of great powers. This is perhaps not likely any time soon unless the ‘War on terrorism’ produces such negative consequences as to precipitate a major rethink of American foreign policy along the lines of withdrawal from forward defence and global engagement.

At the start of a new millenarian, with a new administration taking over in Washington, there were many debates on the future direction of American foreign policy. This changed, however, in the aftermath of the 9/11 Sept. 2001 terrorist attacks on US. Throughout its history, the US had veered between isolationism and internationalism, between idealism and realism, between protectionism and free trade. A host of reports poured out of Congress, think-tanks, and various national commissions seeking to define American external interests and priorities. Given the importance of US in World affairs it is important to understand how the debate on the global role of the US is evolving, what US priorities are and how the US exercises its power and influence on the World stage. The coming chapter would discuss these in detail.

---

Chapter – II

American Foreign Policy: Bases and Dynamics
Chapter – II

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASES AND DYNAMICS

NEEDS OF FOREIGN POLICY TODAY

The US moved from being a British colony to being a major international actor in less than a century. After a further fifty years in which the US played a decisive role in securing allied victories in two world wars, the new republic was the number one power in the world. Unlike post 1981, when it turned its back on the world, the US became actively engaged in world politics after 1945. It became the principal opponent of communism, engaged in a continuing ideological battle with the Soviet Union (and communist China) and built up a massive national security apparatus to deal with the threat. With the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the US had clearly won the Cold War. One era and one century ended; a new era and new century have begun. But could it change the mindset developed during these four decades? What kind of world would wait the sole remaining super power? Would the end of Soviet threat usher in a “new world order” or would the end of bi-polarity lead to more conflict in the world? All three post Cold War Presidents found it difficult to articulate a new strategy for the US. The differences and debates that may be observed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as regards idealism vs. realism, unilaterism vs. multilateralism are still on display today and it is unlikely that they will be resolved quickly.¹

The remarks and future objective of American foreign policy by three Presidents after Cold War are different and reveal the fact that US struggles to find a set of guiding principles for its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. George H.W. Bush (1993) in his speech stated:

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 33.
Our objective must be to exploit the unparalleled opportunity presented by the Cold War's end to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant and economically free at home and committed abroad to setting differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force.²

William Clinton's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 1994³

The dangers we face are less stark and more diffuse than those of the cold war, but they are still formidable – the ethnic conflicts that derive millions from their homes; the despots ready to repress their own people or conquer their neighbours, the criminal syndicates selling those arms or drugs or infiltrating the very institutions of a fragile democracy; a global economy that offers great promise but also deep insecurity and, in many places, declining opportunity, diseases like AIDS that threaten to decimate nations, the combined dangers of populations explosion and economic decline..., global and local environmental threats that demand the sustainable development becomes a part of the lives of people all around the world, and finally, within many of our nations, high rates of drug abuse and crime and family breakdown with all their terrible consequences. These are the dangers we face today.

George W. Bush, address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people (2002)⁴:

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorist to justice. And second, we must prevent the terrorist and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the World. States like these (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) and their terrorist allies constitute an exist of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world

---


Just as each of three most recent Presidents has given different emphases to the U.S. role in this new era, so too have prominent scholars and analysts offered a range of views on the nature of this new era. Back 1989 amid the sense of political and ideological triumph over communism, the conservative intellectual Francis Fukuyama envisioned “the end of history… and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”\(^5\). A few years later Harvard University professor Samuel Huntington offered a much less optimistic view of a “Clash of civilizations”, particularly between the West and Islam, with prospects for political and military conflicts\(^6\). New York Times Columnist Thomas Friedman pointed to economics as the driving dynamic, to liberalism, clashing civilizations, and power politics as “the old system”, and to globalisation as “the new system.”\(^7\) Colombia University professor Richard Betts was stressing the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, including those in the hands of terrorists.\(^7\) The Rockefeller Brothers Fund stressed the importance of non-military threats to peace and security”, especially global poverty and environmental degradation.\(^8\)

Whatever the differences among these perspectives, they all share a common view of the importance of foreign policy. For too long too many voices have been claiming that the United States can and should turn inward and can afford to be careless about and do less with the rest of the world. But for five fundamental reasons, the importance of foreign policy must not be underestimated.\(^9\)

\(^5\). Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989), p. 3.
First, the security threats. September 11 drove this home all too dramatically. No longer was the threat “over there” in some distant corner of the globe; it had arrived right here at home. Moreover, regions such as the Middle East, South Asia (India, Pakistan), East Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan) in which the U.S. still has significant interests and longstanding commitments to allies, are still at serious risk of war.

Second, the American economy is more internationalized than even before. Whereas in 1970, foreign trade accounted for less than 15% of the US gross domestic product (GDP), it now amounts to more than 30%. Exports fund a larger and larger number of American jobs. When the Federal Reserve Board sets interest rates, in addition to domestic factors like inflation, it increasingly also has to consider international ones, such as foreign currency exchange rates and the likely reactions of foreign investors. Private stock markets also have become increasingly globalised.

Third, many other areas of policy that used to be considered "domestic" also have been internationalized. The environmental policy agenda has extended from the largely domestic issues of the 1960s and 1970s to international issues such as global warming and biodiversity. The “Just say no” drug policy of the 1980s is insufficient as a policy when thousands of tons of drugs come into the United States every day from Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. Public health problems like the spread of AIDS have to be combated globally. In these and other areas the distinction between foreign and domestic policy have become increasingly blurred, as international forces impact in more and more ways on spheres of American life that used to be considered domestic.

Fourth, the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the American people has produced a larger number and wider range of groups with personal bases for interest in foreign affairs. Some forms of “identity politics” can be traced all the way back to the nineteenth century, and some were quite common during the cold war. But more and more Americans trace their ancestry and
heritage to different countries and regions and are assessing their interests and seeking influence over foreign policy towards those countries and regions.

Fifth, it is hard for the United States to uphold it’s most basic values if it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national borders. It is not possible to claim to stand for democracy, freedom, and justice, yet say “not my problem” to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. Therefore, the choices it poses are just as crucial for the twenty first century as the cold war choices were for the second half of the twentieth century.

AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Since the US Policy has been changing in the light of new meaning given to its national interest by its leadership from time to time, some critics have remarked that America lacks any serious tradition to guide its foreign policy. The change in American foreign policy orientation from isolationalism to total involvement and from ‘non-entangling alliances’ to alignments galore in the post-45 period lend some support to their observation. Priestly maintains that “most powerful nation on earth seems to have no continuing foreign policy to guide it”. But it is just a superficial view. Rather, it is more correct to say that “throughout its history the United States has pursued a constant foreign policy”. Generally speaking, physical security, material wealth, international prestige – these and other tangible and intangible values actuate all foreign policies and so is the case with American foreign policy.

Action by the government of the United States in the conduct of the nation’s foreign relations takes place within a framework of broad aims of policy and principles of international behaviour. Some of the aims and principles are traditional; others are relatively new. Some have been formulated and declared, while some are apparent only from official actions. All of them, however, reflect the present beliefs of the American people regarding the kind of world they want to live in and the conditions that are most likely to assure
their security and well being. It is within this frame of reference that the specific policies that govern the current action of the United States in world affairs are determined.\textsuperscript{11}

The foreign policy of any nation comprises the objective that it seeks in its international relations and the means and the methods by which it pursues them. In the study of a nation’s foreign policy, therefore, it is of basic importance to know what the nation’s objectives are in its relations with its neighbours.

If the United States grew to maturity in happy era, it nevertheless passed its infancy amid scenes of turmoil and violence. Emerging as a nation from the throes of one major European war, it enjoyed a scant ten years of peace before the opening of another, which lasted more than two decades. Small in numbers, poor in liquid wealth, weak in military power, the United States had perforce, in those years of international disorder, to direct much of its attention to its own security. In the long run, the European wars of century and a half ago worked to the advantage of the United States. This is a fact that is clear enough to historical students today; it was less clear to Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, the Presidents who piloted the young nation through those perilous years. They had sufficient cause to worry over threats to the security and the vital interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{12} Objectives of American foreign policy may be listed in the early twentieth century as follows:

1. To secure independence with satisfactory boundaries-boundaries that would contribute to the national security.

2. To extend those boundaries in the interest of security, navigation and commerce, space for a growing population, and the spread of democracy.


\textsuperscript{11} Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, \textit{The Brooking Institution}, 1949-1950, p. 21
3. To promote and protect the rights and interests of American citizens in Commerce with and investments in, foreign lands; to safeguard trade on the high seas, in peace and war; and as a special application of this aim in the nineteenth century, to open the Far East to American trade and American influence.

4. To preserve neutrality and peace to keep out of wars of Europe (and Asia) as long as non-participation is compatible with preservation of American security and vital interests and to devise means for the peaceful settlement of all international controversies.

5. To prevent the powers of Europe (and later of Asia) from further colonizing in the Western hemisphere and from interfering in the affairs of the United States and of the America in general. In the twentieth century this has involved the maintenance or the restoration of the "balance of power" in Europe, even by the throwing of American weight into the scales. In 1940s the effort to protect the American from the spread of totalitarianism in its Nazi form involved a struggle to protect all western civilization from the same peril.

6. To these fairly specific objectives of American foreign policy may be added one more general and pervasive-humanitarian desire to do good in the world; to spread democracy to put an end to the slave trade, to halt the massacres or persecutions of racial and religious minorities, to relieve the victims of flood, fire, earth-quack, famine, and civil war to raise standards of living in backward countries. Yet they have, from time to time, deeply influenced that policy – upon occasion with important consequences. In the 1950s, the government itself entered the international campaign against poverty, ignorance, and disease as a means of combating communism.\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 3-4.
The events of the Second World War, especially the development of air power, forced the American people to realize that the United States is no longer immune from attack. Moreover, the war and the subsequent developments have also forced them to realize that any serious controversy or disturbance anywhere in the world inevitably concerns the United States from the viewpoint of its own peace and security. These changes have profoundly affected the attitude of the American people toward world affairs. They have come to understand that political isolation from Europe and Asia is no longer possible. They have accepted the fact that the immense power and influence of their country involve it in responsibilities of world leadership, which it must exercise in its own best interest.  

The broadest aim of United States foreign policy is the maintenance of enduring peace, provided that the peace is based on justice and is achieved through the orderly accommodation of differences among nations. In pursuit of this aim, American policy and action have been directed toward the attainment of a peaceful world order, the establishment and preservation of democratic institutions throughout the world, and the promotion, through international cooperation, of a thriving and expanding world economy. Before the Second World War, the prevailing American view did not regard an international organization as necessary to the maintenance of peace. An overwhelming majority of the American people were convinced by the Second World War that a peaceful world order was possible only if it was based on a world organization of states (UN). And US government therefore became the leading advocate of an organized system of international relations. It was the United States, more than any other country, which saw the world in these terms and rushed for the creation of the UN. It was in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, that the UN charter was signed with 51 original signatories.

14. Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, n. 11, p. 20.
15. Ibid., p. 20.
The early Cold War Years were a period of crucial choices for American foreign policy. During the World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been allies yet, fundamentally, the American Soviet Wartime alliance was based on the age-old maximum that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. "I can't take communism", was how FDR put it, "but to cross this bridge I'd hold hands with the Devil". The end of the Second World War brought in train a new perspective. The world was almost bifurcated into two concerted blocs of states presided over by two powers – the USA and the Soviet Union, rightly called the super powers. The strained relations which steadily developed between the super powers in the aftermath of the Second World War are known as cold war in international Relations. The policies pursued in these years not only addressed the immediate issues, they became the foundations and framework for the decades that followed containment and nuclear deterrence were the central foreign policy doctrines by which American power was exercised. The United Nations was the main political diplomatic institutional structure for the pursuit of peace. The liberal international economic order (LIEO) was the main institutional structure for the international economy and the pursuit of prosperity. Anticommunism was the dominant set of beliefs by which American principles were said to be manifested.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, no country could match or balance the United States. It had unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural power. But American was largely indifferent and uncertain about how to shape a foreign policy to guide this power. As a global power with global interests, it was the United States that stood to lose the most if they retreated. Only the United States had the capacity and the vision to consolidate these gains as long as American remains engaged, and lead. American had begun to reshape Europe's security architecture. Brought the Middle East closer to a comprehensive peace. Set up the framework for the most open global trading

17. Bruce W. Jentelson, n 8., p.142
system in history – through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs trade (GATT) and the new World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and helped secure democracy from central Europe to Asia, and from Southern Africa to Haiti and the Americas. After the September 11, the war on Terrorism became that defining issue for the Bush administrations foreign policy. America had to deal with both the September 10 agenda and the September 11 one.18

American Strategy for foregoing a world in which America can thrive is guided by four main principles. First, America leads. Second, must seek to maintain productive political and economic relations with the world’s most powerful states. Third, must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance cooperation. Fourth, must support democracy and human rights to advance our interests and our ideals.19

Whatever the issue, and whether past, present, or future, American foreign policy has been, is and will continue to be about the dynamics of choices. The core goals of American foreign policy in different phase of time may be defined as power, peace, prosperity and principles (4 Ps).20 The 4 Ps frameworks helps to see the complexity and to analyse how priorities get set and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is and what it should be.

The “Four Ps” framework indicates the major “School” of international relations theory to which each is most closely linked. These distinctions are not strict categories in which this policy goes in one box and that one in another. The national interest almost always combines one or more of the 4 Ps. Indeed, although sometimes all four core goals are complementary and can be satisfied

18. Ibid.
through the same policy, more often they pose trade-offs and tensions, and sometimes fundamental contradictions.21

Power:

Power is the key requirement for the most basic goal of foreign policy, self-defence and the preservation of national independence and territory. It is also essential for deterring aggression and influencing other states on a range of issues. Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests, professor Samuel Huntington states, "in particular it enables a state to protect its security and prevent, deflect or defeat threats to that security".22 Realism is the school of international relations theory that most emphasizes the objective of power. International relations is a "struggle for power" the noted Realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote.23 The principal foreign policy strategies that follow from this line of reasoning are largely coercive ones. The ultimate coercive strategy of course is war. Starting with its own Revolutionary War and then through the nineteenth century (e.g. the war of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the civil war the Spanish-American war) and the twentieth century (e.g., World War I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War) and into the 21st century with the War on terrorism, the Wars fought by the United states have had varying success in achieving the Clausewitsian objective of "compel opponent to fulfil will". Military interventions are the "Small Wars", the uses of military force in a more limited fashion, as in the overthrow of governments considered hostile to U.S. interest and the protection or bringing to power of pro U.S. leaders, of which there also are numerous historical as well as contemporary examples.24

24. Bruce W. Jentleson, n.8, p. 15.
Power is also a key to maintaining a strong defence and credible deterrence. The particular requirements to provide the United States with defence and deterrence have varied dramatically over time with changes in the identity of the potential aggressor—Great Britain in early U.S. history, Germany in the two World Wars, the Soviet Union during the cold war, and terrorism today. But the basic strategy always has been essentially the same to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to ensure the defence of the nation.²⁵

Alliances against a mutual enemy is a key component of both defence and deterrence strategies. For most of American history, alliances were formed principally in war time: for example, with Britain and France in World War I, with Britain and Soviet Union in World War II, with twenty-six other nations in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War; with an even wider coalition in the 2001 Afghanistan war; but with a less broadly based coalition in 2003 Iraq War. During the Cold War the United States set up a global network of alliances, including multilateral ones like the North Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO).²⁶

Peace:

The certain sense, all four of the national interest ultimately are about peace for that is what power is supposed to safeguard, what prosperity is supposed to contribute to, what principles are supposed to fix. But in this particular analysis category, the study has specifically in mind theories of International institutionalism and two types of foreign policy strategy. International Institutionalism views world politics as "a cultivable garden", in contrast to the Realist views of a global "Jungle".²⁷ International institutions may be formal bodies like United States, but they also can be more informal, in what are often called "international regimes". Keohane defines international institutions both functionally and structurally, as those rules that govern

---

elements of world politics and the organisation that help implement those rules.\textsuperscript{28} This definition encompasses norms and rules of behaviour, procedures for managing and resolving conflicts, and the organizational bases for at least some degree of global governance, albeit well short of full global government.

We can identify five principal types of international institutions\textsuperscript{29} (a) global, such as the league of Nations and United Nations, (b) regional such as the Pan American Conference of the late century; (c) international Legal, such as the International Criminal Court; (d) arms control and non-proliferation, such as the international Atomic Energy Agency (e) economic, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In none of these cases has the United States been the only state involved in establishing the institutions and organizations. But in most, if not all, the United States has played a key role.\textsuperscript{30}

The other type of foreign policy strategy that fits here is the “peace broker” role the United States has played in wars and conflicts to which it has not been a direct party.\textsuperscript{31} Familiarly contemporary examples include the 1973-75 “Shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East by Henry Kissinger, the 1978 Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel brokered by President Jimmy carter.

**Prosperity:**

Foreign policies motivated by the pursuit of prosperity are those which place the economic national interest above other concerns. They seek gains for the American economy from policies that help provide reliable and low-cost imports, growing markets for American exports, profitable foreign investments, and other international economic opportunities. Some of these involve policies that are specifically foreign economic ones, such as trade policy. Others involve general relations with countries whose significance to U.S. foreign

\textsuperscript{28} Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Independence Work?” *Foreign Policy* 110, (Spring 1998), p. 82,

\textsuperscript{29} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 17.
policy is largely economic, as with an oil rich country like Saudi Arabia. Most
generally they involve efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of
the international economy.\textsuperscript{32}

Among those theories that stress the economic factor in American
foreign policy, there are two principal schools of thought. These schools share
the emphasis on economics but differ on whether the prime motivator of policy
is to serve the general public interest or the more particular interests of the
economic elite. The first school of thought, often referred to as economic
liberalism, emphasizes the pursuit through foreign policy of general economic
benefits to the nation: a favourable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a
healthy macro economy.\textsuperscript{33} Radicalism includes a number of theories most
notably theories of imperialism and neo-colonialism, that see such policies as
dominated by and serving the interests of the capitalist class and other elites,
such as multinational corporations and major Banks.\textsuperscript{34}

In sum their differences notwithstanding, Economic liberalism and
Radicalism share an emphasis on economic goals as driving forces behind U.S.
foreign policy. They differ over whose prosperity is being served, but they
agree on the centrality of prosperity among the 4 Ps.\textsuperscript{35}

Principles:

The fourth goal, principles, involves the values ideals, and beliefs that
the United States has claimed to stand for in the world. As a more general
theory, this emphasis on principles is rooted in Democratic idealism.
Democratic idealist hold to two central tenets about foreign policy. One is that
when trade-offs have to be made, “right” is to be chosen over “might”. We find

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p 18
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p 18
\textsuperscript{33} See Joan E Spero and Jeffery A Hart, \textit{The Politics of International Economic Relations} (New
York St Martin's, 1997), and Richard N Gardner, \textit{Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy The Origins and
\textsuperscript{34} See, V I Lenn, Imperialism \textit{The Highest Form of Capitalism} (New York International
Publishers, 1939), and Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muller, \textit{Global Reach The Power of the
Multinational Confrontations} (New York Simon and Schuster, 1974)
\textsuperscript{35} Bruce W Jentleson, \textit{n 8}, p 20
assertions of this notion of “American exceptionalism” throughout U.S. history. President Woodrow Wilson’s famous declaration that U.S. entry into World War I was intended to make the world safe for democracy”. Idealism was also claimed by many a Cold War President from Democrats such as John Kennedy with his call in his inaugural address to “bear any burden, pay any price” to defend democracy and fight communism, to Republican such as Ronald Regan and his crusade against” the evil empire”. It also was part of President George W. Bush’s launching of the war on terrorism as not only a matter of security but also a war against “evil…. The fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom”.

The other key tenet of Democratic idealism is that in the long run “right makes for might”, that in the end interests like peace and power are well served by principles. One of the strongest statements of this view is the democratic peace theory, which asserts that by promoting democracy we promote peace because democracies do not go to war against each other. Given its strong and exceptionalist claims to principles, American foreign policy often has been criticised at home and abroad for not living up to these values. We are seeing this in the post September 11 “why do they hate us?” debate over America’s image in the Muslim world.

Table: 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core national interest goals</th>
<th>International relations theory</th>
<th>Conception of the International system</th>
<th>Main types of policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Competition for power</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>International Institutionalism</td>
<td>World order</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Economic Liberalism, Radicalism</td>
<td>Global capitalism</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Democratic Idealism</td>
<td>Global democracy</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Burce Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choices in the 21st Century, p. 22.

---

36 Ibid, p. 20.
The table 2.1 summarise the 4Ps of foreign policy strategy, highlighting differences among core national interest goals, school of international theory, principal conception of international system, and principal types of policies pursued. It is important to emphasise again that these are distinctions of degree and not inflexible one-the-other categorisation. They provide a framework for analysing foreign policy strategy in a ways that push deeper into general conceptions of the national interest and get at the “essence of choice” over what Americans foreign policy is and should be.\textsuperscript{39}

The alteration of the position and interpretations of these goals over different times may be summarised as in fig: 2.1. To represent the smaller number of issue in the earlier time periods, the rectangles for security, prosperity, and moral principles are small. The larger size of the rectangles in later time periods reflects the expanding number of issues affecting these goals during these periods. The number of U.S. security interests and concerns has increased since the 1840s. In addition, the relative priority assigned to some issues, which we would generally consider to be security issues, has changed. Certain issues that might be considered prosperity issues are now of equally high priority. For example, unimpeded access to important markets for U.S. products has become an increasingly important consideration for U.S. policy makers. In the post-world war era, the number and priority issues affecting the prosperity goals of U.S. foreign policy expanded as policy makers perceived that domestic prosperity was becoming increasingly linked to the health of the international economic system. Successive U.S. administrations believed that government should more actively promote the development of an international economic system.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{40} Christopher Herrick and P.B. Macrae, Issues in American Foreign Policy (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 5.
Figure 2.1 Changing Primacy and Scope of Core Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

*MP = Moral Principle

Figure 2.1 also indicates the increasing overlap between security and prosperity foreign policy goals or interests of the United States since 1940. Finally it illustrates perceptions of the extent to which issues facing the United States have had a meaningful impact on moral principle goals and interests in U.S. foreign policy over more than two centuries. It also shows the somewhat increased overlap of moral principles U.S. foreign policy goals and core interests with core security and prosperity goals and interests.\(^{41}\)

At any given time, specific issues may be identified as having a significant impact on one more of the basic, or core goals, of security, prosperity and moral principles. When this occurs, those issues begin to move onto the U.S policy agenda.\(^{42}\)

**America Foreign Policy: From Isolationism to Internationalism**

American foreign policy has a history and a long and complicated one at that. Present day Americans are in large measure the heirs of the record, good or bad, made by their ancestors.

In studying history, change often is more readily apparent than continuity. In so many ways the twenty first century and its foreign policy challenges are vastly different from those of even the recent past, let alone those of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Yet many of foreign policy choices we debate today, at their core, are about the same fundamental questions that have been debated over two centuries of U.S. history. Can the U.S. best fulfil its national interest in all its components through isolationism or internationalism? How big a military and how much defence spending are needed to ensure U.S. power and assure the peace? How true to its democratic principles does U.S. foreign policy need to be? Are those who criticize U.S. foreign policy as imperialistic right? How is the record of relations in such major regions as Latin America and Asia to be assessed?

\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 5-6.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Every one of these questions of foreign policy strategy has a long history that provides important context for current foreign policy choices. It is, therefore, crucial that as American considers the foreign policy challenges today, they not only seek to understand what is new about world, but also seek to learn from the prologue that is the past.

Britain's American Colonies broke with the mother country in 1776. They were recognised as the new nation of the United States of America, following the treaty of Paris in 1783. During the 19th and 20th centuries, 37 new states were added to the original 13 as the nation expended across the North American continent and acquired a number of overseas possessions. The Spanish in Florida, the French in Louisiana, and the Mexicans in the southwest became citizens on equal terms with the citizens of the original States. Sovereign states were organised in the newly acquired regions and admitted to equal partnership in the Union.43

The US was not always keen to play a global role. After gaining its independence from Britain, the US sought to limit its involvement in international affairs and avoid competition with foreign powers. In particular, a clear majority of the Founding Fathers of the new Republic insisted that America should avoid involvement in the political intrigues and power rivalries of Europe (one can imagine how shocked they would be today to learn of the global environment of the U.S. from Afghanistan to Argentina from Kosovo to Korea).44 In his farewell address in 1996, President George Washington, set out guidelines for American foreign policy that found widespread approval “The great rule of conduct for US in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations but to have with them as little political connections as possible. It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”45

44 . Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 4.
By 1823, the policy of non-intervention moved a step further it was based on the Monroe Doctrine.\(^\text{46}\) The Doctrine established a fundamental principle of American policy-implying two aims: (i) No territorial aggrandizement on American Soil will be allowed and (ii) No intervention in European Politics. The ulterior motive behind this Doctrine, however, was to serve a warning to European powers that the American Continents are henceforth not be considered as subject for colonisation and to assert hegemony over the whole western Hemisphere. The Doctrine gave the US a vast hinterland in control and South American bloc served both as a source of raw material and a captured market. With such ‘natural colonies’ the US had so little interest outside America. American isolationism was thus the political reflection of economic self-sufficiency. From its original concept the Monroe Doctrine was essentially defensive. But it became expansionist by 1840s, when the US became strong enough to implement it. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine became the corner stone of American foreign policy.

Throughout the nineteenth century the US continued to proclaim that its ideas were universal but did little to export them to other countries. This would change in the twentieth century; President Theodore Roosevelt was the first occupant of the White House to acknowledge the importance of the balance of power and a keen proponent of a more robust American approach to world affairs.

The reasons for this change in policy were complex. For some American, it was simply time for their country to enjoy the fruits of being a great power. The US had developed a strong economy; it should therefore have an international voice commensurate with its new status. Others argued that this was the spring time of open door” and manifest destiny” which involved a moral mission to promote liberty and democracy around the world, and to protect Latin America from European imperialism.\(^\text{47}\) The increased power of


\(^{47}\) Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 5.
the federal government after the upheaval of the civil war also played a role. National leaders were able to allocate more resources to support the military, a necessary buttress to a more assertive foreign policy.\(^48\)

With the outbreak of the World War I, President Wilson’s initial response was to remain neutral. However after German submarines began sinking American merchant ships, the President did not however, seek to win support for the war by appealing to American national interests. Rather he sold the war to the American public in idealist terms, speaking of the US” making the world safe for democracy”\(^49\). America was unlike other powers pursuing narrow national interests. Wilson saw the war as an opportunity “to end the failed balance of power system and replace it with a community of power and an organized peace”\(^50\). Wilson made much of America's idealist traditions setting out in 1918 “fourteen points” or principle that should guide US policy. These included a call for open diplomacy, self-determination, general disarmament, and the abandonment of the balance of power principle in favour of a system of collective security. Once an allied victory appeared inevitable, Wilson devoted his presidency to negotiating the Versailles peace treaty and designing the League of Nations, the organization that he hoped would ensure America’s permanent involvement in safeguarding global stability. Despite his huge personal efforts Wilson was unable to convince the senate or a majority of Americans. His opponents argued that the US should look after its own interests and not become involved in settling disputes around the world. The interwar years saw the US retreat into an isolationist and protectionist stance. America Largely turned its back on the world and raised tariffs to protect its own industries from foreign competition.\(^51\)

Twenty-five years after rejecting the League of Nations, the US Senate ratified almost without objection (89-2 votes) America’s entry into another


\(^{50}\) Fraser Cameron, *n. 1*, p. 6.

global collective Security organization, the United Nations (UN). This striking turn about in American policy was the product of years of careful planning and shrewd political maneuvering by President Franklin Roosevelt to build domestic support for America's participation in a post-war security system. The US had again remained neutral at the onset of the Second World War but Roosevelt made clear his sympathy for Britain and its allies fighting against Nazi Germany. It was not until the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941, however, that the US was able to join the hostilities. Surprisingly it was Hitler that declared war on the US and thus made his own defeat inevitable. The US dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, thus ensuring Japan's defeat.  

From late 1943 until the end of the war, the administration carefully mapped out detailed plans for the UN, involving a restricted security council of the major powers and an American veto, while working to strengthen the bipartisan consensus supporting US participation. The President's clever political and public relations campaign resulted in overwhelming public and congressional support for American participation in the U.N. support for US engagement was helped by the fact that America had become such a dominant political, military, and economic force in the world. In global affairs, most nations now looked to Washington first.

**AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE COLD WAR CONTEXT**

Different views are reflected in the debate over origins of the Cold War. This debate is marked by two main schools of thought, the orthodox and the revisionist. In the orthodox view principal responsibility is put squarely on the shoulders of Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union.  

"We know", historian John Lewis Gaddis contends, that "as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, a cold war was unavoidable". The Soviets used the Red Army to make

---

Eastern Europe their own sphere of influence. They supported communist parties in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and within Africa anticolonial movements' indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of Soviet communist ideology was to aid revolution everywhere. And in the United States they ran a major spy ring trying, among other things, to steal the secret of the atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{55}

In the revisionist view of the origin of the cold war the United States bears its own significant share of the responsibility.\textsuperscript{56} Some revisionists see the United States as seeking its own empire, for reasons of both power and prosperity. Its methods may have been less direct and more subtle, but its objectives nevertheless were for domination to serve American grand ambitions. In citing evidence for U.S. neo-imperialist ambitions, these critics point as far back as the 1918-19 U.S. "expeditionary force" that, along with European forces, intervened in Russia to try to reverse the Russian Revolution. Other revisionists see the problem more as one of U.S. miscalculation. They maintain that the Soviets were seeking little more than to assure their own security by preserving Poland and Eastern Europe as a cordon Sanitaire to prevent future invasions of Soviet soil. What transpired in those early post World War II years, these revisionists argue was akin to the classic "security dilemma", often present in international politics, in which both sides are motivated less by aggression than by the fear that the other side cannot be trusted and thus see their own actions as defensive while the other side sees them as offensive. Had U.S. policy been more one of reassurance and cooperation, rather than deterrence and containment, there might not have been a cold War.\textsuperscript{57} With this debate in mind, this study now analyse the dynamics of foreign policy choice for the United States as played out during the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{55} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{56} Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: From Truman to Regan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
\textsuperscript{57} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 110.
After a century and half, the US had finally committed itself to play a continuing role on the world stage. But now it was faced with the challenge of communist expansion. As the Soviet Red Army moved toward Berlin in the spring of 1945, it liberated Eastern Europe from the Nazis and became the dominant power factor in the region. Poland was the traditional invasion route to Russia; Stalin had no intention of allowing Western-style democracy to take root in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere else under his control. Partly as a result of Winston Churchill’s warming in 1946 of an “Iron Curtain” descending in the middle of the European continent, the US became increasingly concerned at the prospect of a communist takeover in Western Europe as well as Eastern Europe. These rival views about the future of Europe led to confrontation between the US, which was in the midst of a massive demobilization of its armed forces, and the Soviet Union, which had maintained its huge army, and which would also soon possess the atomic bomb. This confrontation led to an unprecedented arms race between the US and the Soviet Union that would lead to a fundamental change in American foreign policy.

In that circumstances, the policy makers put forwarded the idea that the US should pursue a patient, but firm, long term policy of containment of Soviet power. The containment strategy of America was designed to destroy Soviet communism over time, by isolating it and exposing its economic and social weakness. President Harry Truman took up the containment idea. In a speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, the President laid down the policy that became known as the “Truman Doctrine”.

It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom.... If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our nation.

This was a blanket commitment by the American President that would define US foreign policy for the next forty five years. For the first time in its history, the US had chosen to intervene in peace time outside the Americas. In May 1947, Congress approved $400 million in assistance for Greece and Turkey, the two countries perceived as most threatened by communism. The following month, Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced that the US was also ready to supply Western Europe with economic and financial assistance (the Marshall Plan) in order to help economic recovery and thus slave off the communist threat. Marshal state:

It is logical that the United State should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. It purposes should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

American aid had also been offered to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but Stalin had rejected the offer. The US also moved decisively away from its protectionist trade policies of the inter-War years and helped to establish international organizations aimed at promoting free trade.

In July 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which provided for a single Department of refuse to replace the three independent services and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act also created the National Security Council (NSC) to advised the President, and set up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather information and to collate and evaluate intelligence activities around the world. Truman further extended US commitments with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) in 1949, and sent troops to fight in the Korean War in 1950. The US

59. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 8.
61. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, pp. 8-9.
was able to gain UNSC approval to repel the communist, North Korean invasion of South Korea as the Soviet Union was then boycotting UN meetings. Truman worked closely with the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Arthur Vandenberg, to secure bipartisan support for his radical new departure in foreign policy. The President’s achievements were remarkable, when Truman became President in 1945 he led a nation anxious to return to peace time pursuits and non-involvement in global affairs. When he left office eight year later, his Legacy was an American presence on every continent, an unprecedented number of alliance commitments, and an enormously expanded armaments industry. The basis for the militarization of US external policy can be found in NSC 68, a famous memorandum of April 1950, stressing the importance of a strong global military posture.  

The Cold War dominated American foreign policy for the next four decades. Leaders of both parties (Republican and democrat) supported the containment strategy and a special American leadership role in world affairs. Eisenhower, in a message to the Congress on 5th January 1957, announced the U.S policy for the Middle East known as the Eisenhower doctrine. This doctrine proclaimed the American intention to use armed forces against any communist aggression in the region. In fact, it was directed against any intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Speaking at his inauguration in January 1961, President John F. Kennedy stated that the US “would pay any price and bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foes” to keep the world free from communism. President Jimmy Carter reiterated Wilsonian idealism in proclaiming that the US “ought to be a beacon for nations who search for peace, freedom, individual liberty and basic human rights”. His successor, Ronald Reagan, was equally eloquent asserting that “the US was by destiny rather than choice the Watchman on the walls of world freedom”.  

62. Ibid., p. 9.
After 1947, opposition to communism thus became the guiding principle of American foreign policy and although there were substantial differences over the conduct of the Vietnam War, there was no serious opposition to the containment strategy that the US followed from the late 1940s until the end of the 1980s. During this period, the US developed into a global superpower, unlike any other in history. It established over 200 military bases around the world and committed several hundred thousand troops overseas to defend both Europe and Asia. It also engaged in a public relations and clandestine battle with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the third world spending huge sums in the process. The defence and intelligence agencies expanded enormously and became important players in the formulation as well as the execution of US foreign policy. They also had a major impact on domestic policy, not least because of the number they employed.64

There were various stages of the cold war that resulted in periods of high tension and periods of détente between the US and Soviet Union. One of the most dangerous periods was the “thirteen days” of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when President Kennedy faced down the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, over the issue of soviet missiles being installed in communist Cuba.65 One of the most significant periods of détente was during Richard Nixon’s presidency when the US engaged in several rounds of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave rise to a further period of confrontation with the US supporting groups in Afghanistan fighting to restore the country’s independence.66

In 1985, however, the accession to power in Moscow of Mikhail Gorbachev opened the prospect for an end to the cold war. He withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, stated that Moscow would not use the Red Army to

64 . Fraser Cameron, n. i, p. 10.
65 . Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn,( New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999.)
66 . Fraser Cameron, n. i, p. 10.
support communist government in Eastern Europe; and his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic reform) led to fundamental changes in the Soviet Union. President Reagan, who contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system by being ready to launch a new space arms race (star wars), something he knew that the bankrupt soviet economy could not afford.\(^67\) Strangely, the US was not directly involved in any of the seminal events that led to the end of the cold war, the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, the "velvet revolutions" in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet system in 1990-91. The end of the cold war was a demonstration of the new found importance of "people power". Indeed the US, and its huge expensive intelligence agencies, had failed to predict the sudden collapse of communism.\(^68\)

Many wondered how the US would react after it was suddenly deprived of the enemy that had dominated US foreign policy thinking and structures for over forty years. Perhaps because the collapse of communism came so quick and perhaps because President George H.W. Bush was such an establishment figure, there was no questioning of the containing rationale for the cold war national security structures that had been established back in 1947. Even the think tanks found it difficult to adjust to the new world that was no longer black and white but different shade of grey.\(^69\)

**AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A NEW ERA:**

The end of cold war did not lead to any rejoicing in Washington. There were no victory speeches, celebration?, or models. A certain justified, quiet satisfaction was apparent, but President George H.W. Bush rightly held that there was no need to rub Soviet faces in the mud, particularly as there were many daunting problems to overcome. President Bush was delighted at the military success in the gulf, believed that the Vietnam syndrome had been

---

68. Fraser Cameron, *n. 1*, p. 11.
buried in the desert sands, and considered that the world was on the verge of a new era. In his state of the union address in January 1991, the President proclaimed that:

There was the very real prospect of a new order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong ... a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations... a world in which the United Nations – free from Cold War statement – is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. In the wake of the Cold War, “as the remaining super power, it is our responsibility - it is our opportunity - to lead.”

The international system in which U.S. foreign policy operates is being shaped by five sets of broad historical forces: (i) the geopolitics of the end of the cold war; (ii) the “politics of identity” of ethnic, religious and related conflict; (iii) globalisation; (iv) global democratization and human rights; and (v) terrorism as a strategic threat in the wake of September 11.

(i) Post cold war Geopolitics: Relation with other major powers and persisting regional conflict: The cold war defined the international system and dominated American foreign policy for most of the half-century following the end of World War II. The structure of the international system during this time was bipolar, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers at each of the poles. U.S. relations with most other countries in the world were based in large part on this bipolarity. With the end of the cold war the alignments and dynamics of major power geopolitics were put in flux. We see this today in U.S. relations both with its former adversaries Russia and China, and with its major allies, the countries of Western Europe and Japan. In sum, the end of the cold war has forced adjustments and in some instances fundamental changes in U.S. relations with the other major power. Yet, there is much ‘old’ in the geopolitics, notably three regional conflicts that persist from the cold war era and that still carry the potential for major war: India and

---

Pakistan, North and South Korea, and the Middle East. Making matters worse than before is the danger that the next war in any of these regions could be a nuclear one, since one or more of the parties to each of these conflicts now possesses nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{The Politics of Identity:}

Whereas many of the wars and other violent conflicts of the cold war were driven in part by differences in ideology, the post Cold War world has been driven more by differences of identity. The politics of "identity about" are about who I am, who you are, and what the differences are between us. Although the politics of identity extend far back in history and were at work in the cold war as well, extreme mass violence has especially characterised it in post-cold war era. The break up of Yugoslavia and the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the decade that followed left close to a million people dead or wounded and almost two million displaced, and added a new term, ethnic cleansing to the lexicon of warfare. In Rwanda, for all the semantic hoops that the Clinton administration and other international leaders jumped through trying not to use the "g" word, there was no denying that genocide occurred. In just one month in April 1994, rival ethnic Hutus killed over 700,000 ethnic Tutsis. The politics of identity also fuelled deadly conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Iraq, Kashmir and other world hot spots.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Globalisation:}

Globalisation is not the only thing influencing events in the world today, but to the extent that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping force, it is this system.\textsuperscript{74} Globalisation can be understood in terms of its dynamics, its dimensions, and its dilemmas. The basic dynamics of
globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness across national boundaries interconnections that affect governments, businesses, communities, and people in their everyday lives. Before even getting into whether globalisation is good or bad in policy terms, the analytic reality that globalisation exists has to be recognized. Policies can shape it, but they cannot stop or reverse it.

One key consequence of this reality is the broadening of the foreign policy agenda through the internationalization of many issues traditionally considered domestic. For example, the environment. Environmental issues are now part of the international agenda because, when it comes to problems such as global warming, neither the United States nor any other single country can resolve the issue on its own, and environmental problems arising in one country do not stop at that country’s borders. The same point applies to other issues that have a global dimension, such as AIDS and other global public health issues.75

This dynamic is further impetus for the rethinking of traditional concepts of state sovereignty. States are not as insulated or self-contained as traditional conceptions of state sovereignty presume. Even in an economy as large as that of the US, when the Federal Reserve Board sets interstates it has to give greater weight to international factors such as exchange rate etc. For smaller economics, the external pressures are even greater, often including requirements imposed by the International Monetary Fund or other international institutions. Globalisation also features technological, cultural, political, and human dimensions. Communications technologies bring news instantaneously from one end of the world to other, be it through the BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera or internet. Cultural influences intermix across the globe. American culture at times seems omnipresent.76

75. Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 295.
76. Ibid., p. 295.
Global Democratisation and Human Rights:

The Berlin Wall, that starkest symbol of the cold war, crumbled as young Berliners from East and West danced on it. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for almost thirty years by the apartheid government of South Africa, was set free, and four years later he was elected President of a post-apartheid South Africa. A coup attempt in the Soviet Union was put down by the Russian people. Amid these and other events there was a sense that the world was witnessing "end of history", as scholar Francis Fukuyama termed it not just the end of cold war but" the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government".77

A very different view from Fukuyama’s was offered by Harvard’s Professor Samuel Huntington in his 1993 article “The clash of Civilization”. Huntington wrote, that

the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be not be primarily ideological or primary economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.... The paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest."78

All told, as the World entered what had been proclaimed as the “democratic century”, the record was more mixed and the outlook less clear than it had seemed in those heady days of 1989. The policy choices facing the United States thus were more complicated than they had seemed. At one level the issue was how much priority to give to democracy promotion and human rights protection in defining the U.S. national interest. Even to the extent that principles were given priority, the next issue was how to ensure that policies aimed at democracy promotion and human rights protection were effective. The holding of free and free elections in countries that had never or rarely had them before clearly was an important goal. But the consolidation and

77 . Francis Fukuyama, n. 5, p. 3.
78 . Samuel Huntington, n. 6, pp. 22-25.
institutionalisation of democracy and human rights were broader and long-term challenges.\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{September 11 and Terrorism:}

It is true that terrorism goes way back in history, “as far back as does human conflict itself,” as historian Caleb Carr has written.\textsuperscript{80} It is also true that terrorism has been part of the contemporary U.S. foreign policy agenda since at least the early 1970s. In the 1990s, although terrorism overall declined, the percentage of incidents involving the United States and its citizens increased. Still, most of US always will remember the shock of the crashing twin towers and the gashes in the walls of the Pentagon – seared deeply into the American Psyche. Beyond the immediate shock and crisis, September 11, affected U.S. foreign policy strategy in four fundamental ways.\textsuperscript{81} First, more than ever before in its modern history, the United States was proven vulnerable right at home. Second, the dangers for the futures are even more ominous. Government and non-governmental experts alike increasingly assess the terrorist use of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear, chemical, or biological – as matter of when, not if. Third, terrorism shifted from being a problem that came and went with this or that incident to becoming the top strategic priority for U.S. foreign policy. Fourth, was a major shift in doctrine on the use of force from an emphasis on deterrence to one on pre-emption. Since terrorist did not have capitals, regular military installations or major population centres against which to threaten retaliation, there could not be the same confidence in deterrence.

The U.S. doctrine on using force, therefore, would have to shift from relying on after the incident retaliations to pre emptive action. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long...” Our Security will require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be reedy for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n 8}, p 300
\textsuperscript{81} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n 8}, p. 301-304.
The challenge facing the United States today is dealing with both the September 10 agenda and the September 11 one. The new era as among the most complex that the United States ever has faced. The paradox of the post-cold war era is that international affairs affect America and Americas at least as much, if not more than, during the cold war. It is because of many reasons.\(^83\)

The United States still faces significant potential threats to its national security.

- The US economy is more internationalised than ever before.
- Many other areas of policy that used to be considered “domestic” also have been internationalised.
- The increasing ethnic diversity of the American people makes for a larger number and wider range of groups with personal bases for interest in foreign affairs.
- It is hard for the US to claim to be true to its most basic values if it ignores their violation around the world.

Although there was some basic agreement on foreign policy between the mainstream forces in the Democratic and Republican parties, the Clinton and Bush administrations placed different emphasis at different time on various countries, regions, international organisation, global issues as well as missile defence. Under Clinton, the US became closely involved in a new global agenda even if he was unable to persuade Congress to ratify agreements on arm control, climate change, and the creation of the ICC. George Bush was less keen on this global agenda but under prodding from Collin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, his administration slowly began to re-engage in multilateral for, a process that was accelerated after September 2001. External spending has focused more on the military than non-military programme. Under Clinton, Europe was perhaps the top priority given the importance of issue such as NATO enlargement and Balkans. Clinton also devoted considerable attention to the Middle East and paid more consistent attention to Africa than any

\(^{83}\) Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n. 8}, p. 316.
previous President. When Bush came into office in January 2001 he declared that missile defence and the Western hemisphere would be his top priorities. His defence officials also made no secret that Asia would be a greater priorities than Europe in terms of Security issues.\(^8^4\)

Clinton's informal campaign slogan was: "It is the economy - Stupid". Clinton had also sniped at the Republicans for failing to do more on the human rights front in China and in the Balkans but in reality there were no major foreign policy differences between Clinton and Bush Sr. Perhaps as a sign of the public's lack of interest in foreign affairs. American were worried about the economic challenge from Japan. These were, however, numerous foreign policy challenges awaiting Clinton, including the spreading conflict in the Balkans, the economic collapse in Russia, the breakdown of law and order in Haiti, several 'rogue states' attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and rising tension in the Middle East. Clinton elaborated on these challenges and introduced globalisation and cyberspace as two central features of his foreign policy.\(^8^5\) The President said that his priorities would be\(^8^6\):

- To restore the American economy to good health, as essential prerequisite for foreign policy.
- To increase the importance attached to trade and open markets for American business.
- To demonstrate US leadership in the global economy.
- To help the developing countries grow faster.
- To promote democracy in Russia and elsewhere.

The President also acknowledge the other challenges like ethnic conflict, drugs, crime, AIDS and the environment for good measure.

\(^8^4\) Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. 1}, pp. 150-151.
\(^8^5\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 18.
\(^8^6\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 18-19.
Clinton could claim a number of successes on the international economy front. Apart from leading the rescue of Mexico after its financial crisis and securing passage of NAFTA through Congress, Clinton oversaw the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, moved China closer toward membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), negotiated new trade deals for African and Caribbean States and supported debt relief for poor countries.

Clinton supporters would also claim many other achievements for his presidency. On the European front, the President had upgraded relations with the EU, re-vitalised, adapted and expanded NATO, and led the alliance in military operations to end the killing in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Asia, the President had reduced the North Korean threat through a mixture of deterrence and diplomacy and helped bring China into global mainstreams. As regards Russia, Clinton had supported its transition to a market economy and its membership of the G8 and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC), and helped it establish a new relationship with NATO. Clinton also helped secure the removal of nuclear Weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Clinton also made major efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, the Balkans, North Ireland, East Africa as well as tackling a host of new international issues. A President’s national security adviser contrasted the concerns about America’s place in the World in 1992 with the situation in 2000 when the US:

Was not only the unrivalled military and economic power in the world, but was also a catalyst of coalition a broker of peace and a guarantor of financial stability. Furthermore, the US was widely seen as the country best placed to benefit from globalisation.\(^{87}\)

Clinton, however, deserves mixed marks for his conduct of US foreign policy. This was clear from the vote to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to withhold American UN dues and to micro-manage Balkan

\(^{87}\) Ibid, p. 23.
policy. His administration was divided on the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse
gas emissions with the result that it never reached the Senate for approval, and
it was reluctant to sign up to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the
land mines convention.\textsuperscript{89}

The September 11 attacks changed priorities overnight for the US and
led to a solid bipartisan front in the effort to combat the terrorist threat. Immediately, State were judged on how they responded to the Call for
international co-operation to fight terrorism. In the weeks and months after
September 2001, attention was focused more on the Middle East, Persian Gulf,
and South Asia at the expense of Europe, Latin America, and Africa. This was
likely to continue for some time. According to one NSC Staffer, the next
decade would see the US focusing on the “arc of crisis” from the Middle East
and Caucasus to the Gulf and South Asia. As the US continued to debate its
foreign policy priorities, there was a parallel debate on the extent to which the
US should engage with the outside world.\textsuperscript{90}

Up until September 11, 2001, the post-cold War foreign policy agenda
had a long list of issues but no single definition one like anti-communism
served as during the Cold War. The war on terrorism became that defining
issue for the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Foreign policy shift from
ABC (any thing but communism) to ABT (any body but terrorist).\textsuperscript{91}

The Iraq war was the first major application of the Bush Doctrine. The
rationale was the anticipatory Pre-emptive one. Some allegations were made of
Iraqi connections to Al-Qaida, but the main contention was that if Saddam
Hussain were not soon disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction.(that
proved wrong), and if he were not removed from power, the threat he posed
would escalate from potential to actual. Pre-emption means striking first based
on credible evidence that the adversary is likely to attack you.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{89} Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. 1}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{91} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n. 8}, p. 570.
\textsuperscript{92} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n. 8}, pp. 308-401.
No strategy links means to ends, designing tactics capable of achieving goals. Bush’s foreign policy is vulnerable to criticism not because it departs radically from previous administrations but because it can not succeed. The goals are unachievable because the means and ends are out of sync.

Condoleezza Rice says the Bush administration’s strategy rests on three pillars: First, thwarting terrorist and rogue regimes; second, harmonizing relations among the great powers; third, nurturing prosperity and democracy across the globe. But the effort to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes through pre-emption, hegemony, and unilateralism shatters great power harmony and diverts resources and attention from the development agenda. An effective strategy can not be sustained when the methods employed to erect one pillar drastically undermine the others.93

Consider, for instance, Bush’s quest for a democratic peace. He says that peoples everywhere, including the Middle East, yearn for freedom and coexistence. The democratic peace theory, which postulates that democratic societies do not wage war against one another, is appealing. But the war on terrorism, as presently conceived makes it more difficult to democratize the Arab World. Waging preventive wars required basing rights throughout the Middle East and central Asia. To satisfy its military needs, the United States must sign agreements with a support repressive, even heinous, regime that despise democratic principles.94

Democratizing the Middle East is a noble goal, but it is one unlikely to be achieved through unilateral initiatives and preventive war. Democratisation required far more resources, imagination, and patience than the Bush administration, or perhaps any US administration, is willing to muster. The ends of Bush’s foreign policy can not be reconciled with domestic priorities that call for lower taxes. A recent Rand Co-operation study concludes that the

93 . Melvyn P. Leffler, Bush’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, (September-October 2004), pp. 22-28.
94 . Ibid., pp. 22-28.
most important determinants of a successful occupation are related to the "level of effort measured in time, man power, and money". Bush's domestic agenda simply does not allow for this level of effort, and he shows no inclination to alter his programme at home in order to affect his strategic vision abroad.\(^{95}\)

**Foreign Policy Approach: Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism:**

The debate about the US role in this changing world often is cast in terms of Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism. Unilaterism can be defined as an approach to foreign policy that emphasizes actions taken by a nation largely on its own, or acting with others but largely on its own terms. Multilateralism emphasizes acting with other nations through processes that are more consultative and consensual as structured by international institutions, alliances, and coalitions.\(^{96}\) Although the distinction is one of degree and not a strict dichotomy, this contrast helps frame the debate over how to define the US role in the world.

The contrast also concern through in comparing the foreign policies of the Clinton and second Bush administrations. The Clinton approach was largely multilateralism whenever possible and unilateral only when necessary whereas the Bush approach is largely unilateralist whenever possible and multilateral only when necessary.

There is, however, no simple inter-party split on foreign policy. There are unilateralists and multilateralists in both major parties but on the whole there are more unilateralists in the Republican ranks and more multilateralists within the Democratic Party. Unilateralists, a different breed from isolationists, may be divided into two schools. The first school (neo-isolationists) advocates a fundamental retrenchment and a limited balancing role for the US. The second, and larger, school (Primacists) seems to preserve America’s current

---

95. Ibid., pp. 22-28.
96. Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 305.
hegemony and prevent any challenges from arising. Neither school sees any real gains from security co-operation.97

There was considerable speculation following the September 2001 terrorist attacks that the US would be a convert to multilateralism. Now that it had seen the benefits of international co-operation, it was argued, the US would change its approach on other issues. There was little evidence, however, of the Bush administration changing its policies on any of the other issues of major concern to the international community such as Kyoto, the ICC, the CTBT and other arms control treaties. Indeed, in the midst of the campaign against the Taliban, Bush announced a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty. An apt description of the Bush approach to international co-operation might to “unilaterian multilateralism”. In other words, the US would be prepared to work with other countries if necessary to achieve a US foreign policy goal, but the general preference would be to operate without any international constraints.98

As the top dog in the international arena, the US has no wish to see radical changes in international relations. It prefers the status quo, hence no tempering with its alliance system or the international financial and economic mechanisms that it helped establishes. The US feels comfortable operating through NATO, the UNSC, the G8, IMF, World Bank and, for most of the time, the WTO.99

ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The twentieth century saw the United States rise to become one of many great powers; then one of two superpowers; and finally, the sole superpower – the global hegemon. Americans leaders and followers, in and out of government, in groups and as individuals achieved a dozen fundamental successes in the twentieth century world.100

---

97. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, pp. 176-177.
98. Ibid., p. 178.
99. Ibid., p. 185.
1. Force: The United States and its partner prevailed in both world war and ensured peace in different part of the world including, Korea, Kuwait and Afghanistan.

2. Governance: Americas helped forge institutions and habits of collective security and strengthened world order.

3. Interdependence: They helped rebuild Europe and Japan and formed a trilateral community for trade and security.

4. Containment: They won the cold war without a US-Soviet hot war and handled crises such as the Cuban confrontation without suffering a defeat or a major loss of life.

5. Conflict control: They learned, with the USSR and communist China, how adversaries can mitigate conflict and collaborate for parallel objectives.

6. Arm and arm control: They developed the world’s most powerful armed forces but also made arm control an integral part of security planning.

7. Peacemaking: They mediated the peaceful settlement of other’s disputes and contributed to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

8. Free trade and economic development: They promoted free trade and institutions fostering economic development and financial stability.

9. Modelling a third way: Their market based liberal democracy served as a model not just for many former communists but also for statistics in Japan and Europe.


11. International Understanding: They promoted international exchanges – in science, in culture, and other realms – and open communication.

12. Dependability: They forged a strong reputation for reliability as allies.
Americans learned how to cope with complex challenges at home and abroad, with globalisation and the information age, meeting these challenges mainly by self-organisation. U.S. successes in world affairs demonstrated that value creating strategies for mutual gain enhance the deep, long term interests of all parties’ more than value-claiming exploitation for one-sided rewards.

**Failures of United States Foreign Policy**

Successes and failures often overlapped and fed one another.

1. Force: Washington sometimes resorted to force too early without good cause or too late. America’s Indochina adventure and Iraq crisis became its greatest debacle in world affairs. But a stronger U.S. stance might well have prevented or limited some wars.


3. Interdependence: Stalin’s USSR and Boris Yeltsin’s post-Soviet Russia did not join the first World.

4. Containment: The strategy to contain Soviet expansion became a global crusade against leftists or nationalists posing little challenge to U.S. interests.

5. Conflict control: Washington failed to explore some opportunities to reduce tensions with Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and other adversaries.


7. Mediation and peacekeeping: Washington should have acted earlier and more forcefully to curtail conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere.

8. Free trade and economic development: America’s trade and aid policies did little to help Third World development.

9. Modelling a Third way: A rising GDP and stock market left the United States with severe domestic problems.

11. International Understanding: Most Americans remained apathetic to the world, while many U.S. cultural exports gave an unbalanced picture of American life.

12. Dependability: Some U.S. leaders weakened the country's reputation for honesty, integrity and dependability. America's credibility suffered greatly when Woodrow Wilson could not win senate approval for the Versailles treaty and eighty years later when William J. Clinton failed to win senate approval for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.¹⁰¹

There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of issues associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity – since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant US foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are wide ranges of issues – sustainable development, pandemic disease control, international resource management, and democratization – that are important general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 61-62.
US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.  

Making policies about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different actors and different types of decisions. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organizational forms devoted to policy research, and they are often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making. The focus of this study, therefore, is that how think-tanks generally become important and influential at different points in the policy process. Besides obtaining visibility with Congress and Journalists, expertise is understood to play active, important but quite different roles in each stage of the policy process. What policy research institutes are, what they do, why they have proliferated and how they makes ideas matter in policy circles are aspects that would be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter – III

Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy Making Process
Chapter – III

THINK TANKS AND US FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS

In the process of revealing the inner workings of the decision making process to explain why rational leaders often make irrational policy decisions, observers of foreign policy have paid little attention to the role of think tanks in the policy making process. In part, this may be attributed to the growing tendency of political scientists to concentrate more on explaining policy outcomes than evaluating policy inputs. As Joseph Peschek points out, since political scientists have a propensity to explain policy decisions as an outcome of a host of intergovernmental processes, they tend to overlook the vital contribution think tanks make to the development and refinement of policy ideas. He notes:¹

The acceptance of a split between ‘private and public’ uses of power may help to account for this dismissive attitude. Political scientists who examine policy as the outcome either of intergovernmental process or of overt interest group pressure from outside the government will miss the significance of policy planning groups in the political process, for it is at the more subtle levels of identifying and defining problems, shaping public understanding of issues, and constructing a political agenda that their impact is felt.

Ideas matter. At the same time, ideas need organisations that propel them within the hearing range of decision-makers. Organisational infrastructure plays a significant role in the influence of ideas alongside the individual agents of ideas-scholars and intellectuals. Accordingly, the independent policy research institution-better known as think-tanks, have become increasingly visible policy actors. They attempt to participate directly in policy-making through the provision of analysis for policy makers and more indirectly by fashioning ideas in ways to mould public understanding of issues and problems.²

¹ Donald, Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: St. Martins Press, 1996, 81
Think tanks may be defined as independent, non-interest based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy making process. Operationally, think-tanks are non-profit organizations that conduct and disseminate research and ideas on public policy issues. Politically, think tanks are aggressive institutions that actively seek to maximise public credibility and political access to make their expertise and ideas influential in policy making.\(^3\)

As the consequences of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, began to unfold, network executives and journalists in the United States scrambled to find policy experts capable of answering two critical questions: why were two of America’s greatest symbols of economic and military installations - the World Trade centre and the Pentagon- attacked? And who ultimately was responsible for orchestraking and coordinating these heinous acts?\(^4\)

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the researchers have refocused to concentrate on generating ideas and insights that will lead to the development or revision of policies concerning relations between the West and Muslim World; the proper balance between vigilance against terrorism and protection of civil liberties; the conflict between Israel and Palestine; the need to adjust traditional state diplomacy to take into account the rise of non-state actors; the development of a long- term international security strategy for the Post-Cold War period; the future of arms control; the case for a missile defence system etc.\(^5\)

\(^3\) Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise*, New York Cambridge University Press, p 11

\(^4\) Donald Abelson, “Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy A Historical View”, *US Foreign Policy Agenda International Informations Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department of states* 7(3), November2002

To provide millions of viewers with answers to these and other questions, journalists quickly flipped through their rolodexes to locate policy experts at dozens of American think tanks. Their frantic search soon paid off. Indeed, even before the initial shock of what had transpired sunk in, policy experts from some of America's leading foreign and defence policy think tank began to appear on the major television networks to share their insights.

The willingness of think tanks to participate in the media frenzy surrounding September 11 came as no surprise to scholars who have witnessed their increasingly active involvement in the policy making process. Since think-tanks are in the business of developing, repackaging, and marketing ideas to policy-makers and the public, they could hardly pass up an opportunity to comment on one of the most tragic days in contemporary American history.6

In March 2003, the journalist Jochen Bolsche wrote an article in the German news magazine Der Spiegel entitled "the war designed in a think tank". Bolsche pointed out that the blueprint for the war on Iraq had been written not after 9/11 or even after the showdown between the chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, the United States Department and the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, but in 1998. Only a year old, a U.S. think tank, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), sent an andacious letter to President Bill Clinton to advise him to change the country's course on Iraq. No longer should the U.S. "contain" the Saddam Hussein regime, it asserted, but it should now seek to overthrow it. Why? Because "if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard".7 The argument from 1998 now appears verbatim from the George W. Bush administration.

6 Donald Abelson, n.4
7 Vijay Prasad, The Think Tank War Machine, Frontline, May, 21, 2004, p.64
The modern state depends on experts whose views on issue can provide the theories and rationales for policy and legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only source of policy innovation as there is a need to consult other interests for information. Think-tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying problems. Policy research institutions are most likely to inform policy when they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy community or discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned with agenda setting, networking, research brokage and the ways in which policy actors operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of problems and policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and shared values among experts and opinion leaders through their conference, workshops and study groups and thereby help determine the ubiquitous climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think-tanks influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input of some of these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other words, power is structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision making.\textsuperscript{8} Through both informal and formal avenues, think-tanks become linked to centre of powers such as the state or the cooperate sector.\textsuperscript{9}

Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different types of decision and actors. The policy process is conventionally analysed in relation to stages of policy development.\textsuperscript{10}

Think tanks, experts and expertise generally become important and influential at different points in the policy process. Besides obtaining visibility with congress and journalists, experts are understood to play

\begin{itemize}
\item 8 James Smith, \textit{The Idea Brookers}, (New York: The Free Press, 1999), p.74
\item 9 Diane Stone, \textit{n. 2}, pp.219-220
\end{itemize}
active, important but quite different roles in each stage of the policy process. During agenda setting, expertise is useful as warning to policy makers of impending problems and as guidance to decision makers on how to revise policy.\footnote{11} Expertise, at this point, can “alter people to the extent a given situation affects their interest or values”.\footnote{12} As Rochefort and Cobb point out, policy research can help to define the boundaries of problems and the dimensions of interventions before issues even receive serious debate.\footnote{13}

Once an issue is under deliberation and handed towards policy enactment, from the point when policy makers are collectively involved until final decisions are imminent, elected officials are positioning themselves on issues, and expertise becomes valuable as ammunition in policy battles and as support for policy makers, already developed views.\footnote{14} At this point, policy research often plays little substantive role, but it is not unimportant either. As Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier observes, policy makers “can seldom develop a majority position through the raw exercise of power. Instead, they must seek to convince other actors of the soundness of their position concerning the problem and the consequence of one or more policy alternatives”.\footnote{15} Policy research, as they point out, is useful often vital in this process.\footnote{16}

Finally, when issues are resolved and especially after new programmes have been created, research becomes useful for those implementing policies and programmes. At this stage, policy research can serve as assessment and further guidance.\footnote{17}

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\footnotesize
\footnotesize
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{14} Andrew Rich, n.3, p.108
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{15} Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, \textit{Policy Change and Learning}, p.45
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{16} Andrew Rich, n.3, p.108
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{17} Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, \textit{Implementation and Public Policy}, (Lanham: University Press of America,1989),
\end{flushright}
point to desirable adjustments to the administration of programmes. This work directs policy and guides policy actors towards new issues. Research at this point provides substantive guidance on where and how policy makers might proceed next.  

Think tanks are an increasingly noticeable mechanism for refining and presenting knowledge and expertise in a relevant and usable manner. Yet, the study of think tanks is not as extensive as the impact and the proliferation of labels. Although the Japanese government deemed Washington think-tanks to be so influential that it appointed a diplomatic official to monitor their activities, most observers are more doubtful of the policy impact of think-tanks. The prevalence of such skepticism is because think-tanks are ‘hidden participants’ in policy, where decision making in the formal political areas by political parties, legislatures and executive is a more transparent process. While think-tanks do not have a clear, consistent or legally designated route to policy influence, their policy entrepreneurship in policy and epistemic communities provides informal but haphazard access and opportunities for agenda-setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental creep of new ideas into prevailing thinking. Despite the absence of proof, the impact of many institutes in helping to forge a consensus on foreign policy, raising consciousness about environmental, social and other problems, or reasserting liberal ideas of free markets, has been and remains pervasive. Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. 

Think tanks are an organisational expression of the blending of ideas and policies outside formal political arenas. The confluence of these elements in institutions other than the executive and legislative warrants further investigation. The separation of the public and the private in many standard political analyses undermines the requirement to address the role played by these non-government organisations which occupy an ambiguous

---

19 Diane Stone, n.2, pp.218-219
position between the market and state. Policy institutes are on the margins of government but not in government. There is enormous scope for the investigation of the mechanisms that connect organizations on the margins of government with the conventional structures of government. While the approval of public policy remains with elected representatives and appointed officials, governments draw upon outside sources of advice and information. Think-tanks highlight new problems in need of policy attention and then seek to gain legitimacy for such issues on public and governmental agendas. Aside from their best efforts to influence policy, think-tanks perform other educational and technical role.20

There is a body of literature which discusses a group of organisations variously known as ‘imperial brain trusts’, ‘public policy research institutes’, ‘policy discussion groups’, and ‘research institutes’ and ‘policy planning organisation’, ‘independent public policy institutes’. More often than not they called ‘think-tanks’. Yet, the study of think-tanks is not as extensive as the proliferation of labels. In the literature that does exist there are different disciplinary approaches, differences of opinion on their role as well as a lack of definitional clarity and agreement as to what is think-tank. The term is problematic. ‘think-tanks’ was first employed as a nickname in the 1940s for the brain – ‘brain box’. However, James A. Smith reports in his “the idea Brookers”, the term ‘think tanks’ came from World War II military slang, when it was used to indicate to a secure room or environment where defence scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategy. 21

In 1939, chief of the Army Corps H.H. Arnold got involved in a discussion with the War Department and with aeronautics faculty members at private universities. The consensus among them was the need for the creation of an applied aeronautical research laboratory. Arnold’s note

20 Ibid, pp.2-3
21 James Smith, The Idea Brookers, n.8, pp.xiii-xiv,
emphasized the need for co-ordination between the academics, industry and
the government. The first money for rocket research went to one such
partnership, between the California Institute of Technology and the
Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, which successfully developed
techniques for liquid and solid propellants. After the war, Arnold returned
to that theme, writing to the Secretary of War that the U.S. government must
create the framework for "teamwork among the military, government
agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in
advance of the actual research and development work". Arnold's idea for
think tanks grew out of the experience he had, doing planning work for the
military in the Second World War. An immense amount of strategic and
logistical planning came before troops went out into the battlefield. The
battle tank, in sum, followed the think tank. This approach to warfare
enabled the troops to be on the ground with maximum efficiency. To do that
sort of planning, the U.S. government called upon mathematicians and
engineers and psychologists and an anthropologist to think "outside the box"
and to devise strategic visions. These ideas, the software of U.S. strategy,
then had to find their corresponding hardware from the engineers and
aerodynamicists. Arnold wanted such an entity to survive the end of the
war.

What Arnold had in mind was far from the ordinary private research
institutions that predate the two wars. In the early 1900s, the major
industrialists set up philanthropic foundations to protect their money from
taxation and to craft their legacy for generations to come. Ford and
Rockefeller are the best examples of such foundations. In addition, these
magnates used their foundations to finance research institutions to play a
role in the debate over policy. The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (1910), the Institutes for Government Research (1916), The Hoover

22 Vijay Prasad, n.7, p.64
23 Ibid., p.64
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (1919), Council on Foreign Relations (1920), The Brooking Institution (1927), and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1943), emerged to influence the Debates of the day with privately funded research but not work as an adjunct to the government. In the early years of Cold War, even these groups became “think-tanks”. They remained eager not only to influence debates, but also to work for the government as contractors and to craft policy documents that would go on to become laws. This rather narrow usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 2,000 US-based organisations that are engaged in policy analysis, and approximately 2,500 other similar institutions worldwide.

As the United States prepared to assume the role of a hegemonic power in the aftermath of World War II, a number of think tanks were making their presence felt in key policy-making circles. Through their publications, conference and meetings with members of the Executive Congress and a host of government departments, boards and agencies, think tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations were able to develop and expand their networks of influence throughout Washington. By the end of the twentieth century think tanks were ubiquitous in American policy making. As their numbers grew, think tanks came to vary substantially in size and specialisation. Many new think-tanks identified with political ideologies – broadly conservative, liberal, or centrists. Many relied on aggressive, marketing oriented strategies to promote their products and points of view. Think tanks staff often became active and visible participants in deeply partisan and divisive political debates.

24 Ibid., p.64
25 Donald Abelson, n.4.
26 Donald Abelson, n. 1, p.65
27 Andrew Rich, n.3, p.204
The trend of think-tanks to become both more ideological and more aggressively marketing-oriented is rooted in ideological and institutional changes in American politics. The first think-tanks, which formed during the progressive era, embodied the promise of neutral expertise. Through the first half of the twentieth century, new think tanks largely sought to identify government solutions to public problems through the detached analysis of experts. Think tanks scholars write on topics relevant to policy makers but typically maintained a distance from the political bargaining in the final stages of the policymaking process. This analytic detachment was behaviour to which researchers held fast and upon which they prided themselves. It was a behaviour that fostered an effective relationship between experts and policy makers. Between 1910 and 1960, think-tank experts often influenced how government operated. The Brooking Institution informed the creation of the Bureau of the Budget at the beginning of the century. The RAND Corporation developed applications of systems analysis for the Department of Defence at mid-century. In these cases, the influence of think tanks was significant, and their research served political purposes. But the policy process did not typically compel experts to become directly involved in high profile partisan battles. Experts were mobilised by policy makers to prescribe possibilities for change.  

Beginning in the 1960, the political environment changed, and the forms of and expectations for think tanks evolved substantially. Until the 1960, large private foundation like the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, in combination with the government, had been the principal sources of support for think tanks, these were patrons that appreciated, even encouraged, the detached and neutral efforts of think-tanks. In the last decades of the twentieth century, however, these traditional sources of support were partially displaced by individuals, corporations, and smaller, more ideological foundations. These new patrons often preferred think tanks that

---

28 Ibid, p.205
promoted consistent points of view through highly visible, sometimes partisan activities. Moreover, in a political environment increasingly dominated by anti-government conservatives who posed an effective challenge to the statist status quo, the leaders of ideologically consistent, particularly conservative think-tanks found an increasingly engaged, attentive and reactive audience among policy makers.\(^{29}\)

The opportunities vary, but overall the institutional profile of think tanks at the beginning of the twenty-first century looks quite different from that of half a century before. Experts behave quite differently from the detached, long-range oriented research of previous decades. Present day experts, particularly those at think tanks, are often aggressive advocates in the hard-fought battles of the policy process.\(^{30}\) The role of experts changed, and the good news for think tanks is that marketing along with other international behaviours by experts matters for the degree of exposure their research attracts in policy making. So long as these behaviours matters, think-tanks have something of an advantage with policy makers. Think tanks can be sleekly styled marketing machines.\(^{31}\)

Public policy research organisations, or think tanks, have played a significant role in policy-making process and have served as catalysts of ideas, innovations and actions.\(^{32}\) Their greater impact is in generation 'new thinking' so that as decision-makers better perceive and effectively respond to various issues and challenges. Original insights can alter conceptions of the US national interests, influence the ranking of priorities, provide roadmaps for action, mobilise political and bureaucratic coalitions, and shape the design of lasting institutions.\(^{33}\) Think tanks play a number of critical roles, including: (i) playing a mediating function between the

\(^{29}\) Ibid, p.205

\(^{30}\) John W. Kingdon, \textit{n.10}, p.228

\(^{31}\) Andrew Rich, \textit{n.3}, p. 208

government and public; (ii) identifying, articulating, and evaluating current or emerging issues, problems or proposals; (iii) transforming ideas and problems into policy issues; (iv) serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; and (v) providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process.34

To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple channels and marketing strategies – publishing articles, books and occasional papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages and in newspapers interviews. Congressional hearings provide another opportunity to influence policy choices. Through various institutional channels, think tanks have become actively involved in the policy-making process. Whether by inviting members of Congress and the Executive to seminars and conference or by accepting high-level government or advisory positions, think-tanks scholars have established extensive ties to key policy makers.35

Studies on the growth and development of American think-tanks reveal that the highly decentralized nature of the American political system, combined with the lack of strict party discipline and the large infusion of funds from philanthropic foundations have contributed generally to the proliferation of think-tanks in the last quarter of the twentieth century.36 Once found almost exclusively in the advanced industrial democracies of the west, think tanks now provide information and advice to policy-makers and civil society representatives in countries as diverse as India, Lebanon, Chile, Bulgaria, Germany, Senegal, and Thailand. Today there are more than three thousand think tanks around the world, in almost every country that has

34 McGann and Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action, New Brunswick, Transaction Publications, 2000, p.3
35 Donald Abelson, n.1, pp.65-78
36 Donald Abelson, n.4
more than a few million inhabitants and at least a medium of intellectual freedom.\textsuperscript{37}

While think tanks in recent years have become a global phenomenon, US think tanks are distinguished from their counterparts in other countries by their ability “to participate directly and indirectly in policy-making” and the willingness of policy-makers to turn to them for policy advises.\textsuperscript{38}

**IDENTIFYING THINK TANKS: UNIQUE FEATURE**

Defining think-tanks and establishing clear boundaries as to which organisation fit within the category, is one of the most conceptually difficult tasks in analysing these organisations.\textsuperscript{39} At the broadest level, one can say that think tanks are institutions that provide public policy research, analysis, and advice. However, that definition casts the net very broadly. Many interest groups, university research centers, and other civil society organisation carry out policy research and advice as one of their activities, if not the central one. Many government agencies also offer policy research and advice as a major function.\textsuperscript{40} In fact, as interest groups have attempted to acquire greater policy expertise to enhance their status in the policy making community and as think tanks have looked to interest groups to learn more about lobbying strategies, the institutional differences between think tanks and interest groups have become increasingly blurred.\textsuperscript{41}

Samantha Durst and James Thurber identify traits that are attributable to policy research institutes but not to other research organisations, thereby adding more details to the character of independent

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{37} James McGann and Kent Weaver, \textit{n.34}, pp.13-14
\bibitem{38} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.4}
\bibitem{40} James MaGann, \textit{p.34}
\bibitem{41} Donald E. Abelson, “Think Tanks in North America,” in McGann and Weaver, \textit{Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action}, New Brunswick, Transaction Publications, 2000, p.38
\end{thebibliography}
policy research institutes. They note, first, that the majority of them are non-profit organisations. Second, these think-tanks have minimal levels of government funding. Third, the primary orientation of these organisations is research. Fourth, unhindered research requires independence. Fifth, they stress a strong scholarly or analytic orientation. Yet, Durst and Thurber’s framework would not meet the satisfaction of all. While some institutes are highly academic, not all are ‘real researchers’ but act as ‘policy boutiques’. Many think-tanks regurgitate research conducted elsewhere in a simplified form. Similarly, it is not clear that policy research institutes function more independently with low proportions of government funding. Diverse funding sources may well enhance the legitimacy of research result but it is also commitment to professional standards that ensures the standing of research. Although their study indicates that Washington DC think-tanks do not have significant government funding in practice and generally as policy, it does not mean that this has always been the case or that it is applicable outside the USA.42

Other analysis of think-tanks avoid the dilemmas of models or formal typologies by limiting their definition to one or two sentence description. James Smith refers to American think tanks as ‘private, non-profit research groups that operate on the margins of ... formal political processes.43 John Gaffney defines the essence of think-tanks as ‘intellectually informed policy proposal structures with the express intention of gaining direct access to government. While avoiding the problems of categorization, such definitions do not help in establishing the boundaries between independent policy research institutes and other organisation.44

In order to narrow the scope of inquiry, the term has frequently been limited (especially in British & American usage) to policy research organisation that: (i) are independent of government and universities; (ii)
operate on a non-profit basis. This definition, however, has been criticized as far too narrow. Dian Stone and Marx Garnett argue that “the notion that a think tank requires independence or autonomy from the state and private interests in order to be ‘free-thinking’ is a peculiarly Anglo-American predilection that does not travel well into other cultures”.  

Certainly organisations that are almost totally dependent upon government contracts for their revenues, as are many organizations to which the think tanks label is routinely applied, cannot be considered fully autonomous. In some continental European countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands, think tanks frequently have close financial and personnel ties to political parties. Moreover, in countries where sponsorship by a government ministry is a legal necessity for a think tank to exist, excluding organisations with an organisational link to government would convey the misleading impression that those regions host no think tanks at all. Similarly, in regions where resources for policy research are extremely scare, linkage to university or contracting relationship with the private sector may be the only way to cover a research institute’s core personnel and facilities costs.

Therefore, it would better to pursue a middle course in defining think-tanks. Beginning with the core definition of think tanks as a policy research organisation that has significant autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firm, interest groups, and political parties. However, it is also recognisable that autonomy is a relative rather than an absolute term. And operational definition of think tanks must differ from region to region.

In September 27, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked on Brookings Institution that:

---

44 Diane Stone, n.2, pp.11-12
45 Diane Stone and Garnett, n.39, p.3
46 James McGann and Kent Weaver, n. 34, p.5
47 Ibid, p.5
The men of the [the] Brooking [Institution] did it by analysing, by painstaking research, by objective writing, by an imagination that questioned the "going way of doing things, and then they proposed alternatives... After 50 years of telling the Government what to do, you are more than a private institution .. you are a national institution so important .. that if you did not exist we would have to ask someone to create you. 48

Speaker of the House, New Gingrich said on Heritage Foundation in November 15, 1994 that:

[The Heritage Foundation] is without question that most far reading conservative organisation in the country in the war of ideas, and one which has had a tremendous impact not just in Washington, but literally across the planet. 49

These tributes by a President and a speaker of the House more than twenty-eight years apart are high praise for two organisation that are both commonly known as think tanks. Yet, in their praise, Johnson and Gingrich characterize the accomplishments of these organizations in notably different terms. Brooking for its "painstaking research" and "objective writing", Heritage for its "far-reaching" efforts in the "war of ideas". These characterisation evoke two quite different images and suggest quite different understanding of the role of think-tanks in American politics. 50

Most think tanks share a common objective of shaping and molding public opinion and public policy. However, they vary considerably in terms of size, resources, area of expertise and the quality and quantity of the publications they produce. Another critical set of choices for think tanks concerns the breadth of their research agendas. Some institutions define their research agendas very broadly to include a range of both domestic and international issues, while others confine themselves to one of the two, or to a narrower policy sector within domestic or international policy. A broad research agenda gives think tanks maximum flexibility to survive changes in

50 Andrew Rich, n 3, p.1
the national political agenda and in the interests of funders. At the same
time, however, lack of specialisation may make it difficult to attract funding
and attention from donors, the media, and policy makers. Particularly in
smaller institutions, a broad research agenda may mean that staff lack a
sufficient critical mass of expertise to undertake large, specialised research
projects. Moreover, the staff members may not have enough in common to
benefit from each other’s experience.

Besides focusing on different policy making venues, think
tanks vary in the scope of their research missions – whether they seek to
produce research on one, several, or scores of issues. While some think
tanks, like the Hudson Institute and the Manhattan Institute, spend between
$7 and $10 million a year to influence broad-ranging policy debates in
multiple-issue domains, others spend similar amounts but have far narrower
focuses. Organisations like the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies and Resources for the Future, for example, are of similar size but
concerned only with issues affecting African-Americans and the
environment, respectively.\textsuperscript{51}

Nationally focused think tanks fall into three categories with regard
to the breadth of their research interests. “Full service” think tanks produce
research and studies that span the broadest array of issue domains, including
both foreign and domestic policy topics. “Multi-issue” think tanks have an
identifiable interest in a variety of subjects concerning more than one policy
domain (e.g., health care and the environmental) but not including all (or
most) subject areas. Finally, “single issue” organisations, as the label
implies, limit their focus to only one category of issues (e.g., women’s rights
or low-income housing).\textsuperscript{52}

Amid the growing number of think tanks, no change has been more
remarkable at both the state and national levels than the association of many

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, p.17
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p.17
new think tanks identifiable ideologies. The emergence of avowedly ideological think-tanks, particularly conservative think-tanks, has been much remarked upon by journalists and researchers. Yet it is difficult to make clear judgement about the presence and nature of organisational ideologies. Andrew Rich in his \textit{Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Experts}, classified think tanks as broadly conservative or liberal or as organizations with “centrist or no identifiable ideology”, based on key words and phrases in their mission statements and/or annual reports associated with the general, if not always consistent, concerns of conservative and liberal ideologies. In classifying conservative organisation, he looked for references to promoting the free market system, limited government, individual liberties, religious expression, and traditional family values, or to eliminating racial or ethnic preferences in government policy. He classified organizations as liberal when they expressed interest in using government policies and programmes to overcome economic, social or gender inequalities, poverty, or wage stagnation. He also further classified calls for progressive social justice, a sustainable environment, or lower defence spending as signals of liberal organisations. Finally, Rich classified a think tanks as liberal or conservative if its mission was defined as aimed at rebuking a counter ideology. Those organisation whose published statements either did not readily place them in either broad ideological category or qualified them in both categories make up the third group of think tanks with centrist or no identifiable ideologies.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p.p.18-19}
Table: 3.1

A Selected Profile of American Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tanks</th>
<th>1996 Budget</th>
<th>Staffs</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Research scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>$117,606,889</td>
<td>525 FTR; 425 S</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Defense, domestic, &amp; international, mostly government contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
<td>$21,944,000</td>
<td>80 FTR; 140 S</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Economic, social, political and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>$16,930,225</td>
<td>75 FTR; 75 S</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Foreign policy and International relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
<td>$14,687,697</td>
<td>80 FTR; 60 PTR; 75 S</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Foreign policy and International relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>$24,195,189</td>
<td>80 FTR; 40 S</td>
<td>Conservative Cluster</td>
<td>Economic, social, political and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoover Institution</td>
<td>$19,500,000</td>
<td>80 FTR; 30 PTR; 200 S</td>
<td>Conservative Cluster</td>
<td>Economic, social and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson Institute</td>
<td>$9,312,850</td>
<td>66 FTR and S; 10PTR</td>
<td>Conservative Cluster</td>
<td>Economic, social, political and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cato Institute</td>
<td>$11,264,791</td>
<td>17 FTR; 20 S</td>
<td>Conservative Cluster</td>
<td>Economic, social, political and international policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Reproductive Law and Policy</td>
<td>$2,782,686</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Cluster</td>
<td>Reproductive rights and health, domestic and international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Watch Institute</td>
<td>$2,171,743</td>
<td>16FTR;16S</td>
<td>Liberal Cluster</td>
<td>Environmental Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Defence Information</td>
<td>$1,629,387</td>
<td>18 FTR; 7S</td>
<td>Liberal Cluster</td>
<td>Defence policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


FTR – Full time researcher; PTR – Part time researcher; S – Support staff
Think tanks differ in other important respects as well. Perhaps one of the most obvious differences between think tanks is the priority they place on research. As research institutions specialising in domestic and foreign policy issues, think tanks have often been regarded as disinterested observers of political affairs. Committed to scholarly research and determined to provide their expertise to decision-makers, early twentieth century think-tanks such as the Brooking Institution, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were rarely viewed as organisations engaged in partisan politics. But think tanks have undergone a fundamental transformation in the decades following World War II, from institutions that were primarily committed to providing impartial advice to government officials in order to enhance decision making, to organisation that have in effect become lobbyists for a multiplicity of domestic and foreign causes. In other words, while think tanks may be regarded as ‘ivory tower’, where scholars can pursue their research in relative isolation, that is, in an environment free from the administrative and teaching constraints endemic to a university setting, it does not appears that these organisation are committed to insulating themselves from the policy-making community. On the contrary, though many of the studies produced by think-tanks may appears to be divorced from reality, individuals affiliated with these institution are actually aware of their role in the policy formation process. While some think tanks located outside of Washington such as the Hoover Institution may prefer to distance themselves from the vicissitudes of American politics, others have willingly descended the ivory tower to assume a prominent position in Washington’s decision-making network. For instance, while the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Brooking Institution spent 93% and 60% respectively on research in 1989, the Heritage Foundation spent 15.3%. The

55 Ibid., p.5
institute for policy studies, on the hand, did not allocate any of its 1989 budget to research. Consequently, while some think tanks continue to see themselves mainly as research institutions others have assumed different roles in the policy-making process, all of these organisations are commonly referred to as think tanks.  

The organisational features of independent policy research institutes are too diverse and constantly evolving to be so precisely defined. A flexible model that recognizes diversity among policy research institutes would seem more appropriate. One way to conceptualise this body of organisation is to determine from the outset what they are not. Once the distinctiveness of think tanks from other research related bodies is established, then it is possible to outline a set of features that characterise the organisations under analysis.  

Independent policy research institutes are not interdisciplinary units of the type that are found in universities although they have been referred to as 'universities without students by scholars like Gray, Critchlow, Weaver and Ricci. While think tanks are engaged in research and other scholarly activities they do not mimic the universities. They are not involved in undergraduate teaching and do not have the same disciplinary range. Research fellows are employees and not free to 'follow their intellectual priorities without constraints' but are required to pursue organisational objective. Policy research institutes are also distinguishable from philanthropic foundations which tend to fund research rather than do it themselves. 'Operating foundations' such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) are different from foundations that make grants as they use their own funds to conduct policy analysis and research. Although consultancies conduct policy research they

---

56 Donald E. Abelson, *n. 1*, p.4
57 Diane Stone, *n. 2*, p.12
operate on a ‘for-profit’ basis. The primary motivation of the policy research institute is research not profit.\(^5^9\)

They are also very different from advocacy groups, interest groups and lobbies. As Carol Weiss notes, while many of these groups undertake extensive analysis, it is intended primarily to advance the cause of the association and to give them ammunition to use in the policy wars.\(^6^0\) Nevertheless, policy research institutes are similar to some public interest groups that have a research component to their activities and it can be difficult to distinguish between the two types of organisation. However, there are still some noticeable differences between thin-tanks and public interest groups. The public interest group is more interested in grass-roots activity and advocacy whereas the policy research institute is first and foremost a research outfit.\(^6^1\) Moreover, unlike single or multiple issue-oriented interest groups which encourage individuals to coalesce around a particular cause, think-tanks perceive themselves as having a much broader mandate. While members of think-tanks may embrace a specific concern such as the prevention of nuclear war or the protection of domestic industries from foreign competition, their interaction with public is far less direct. Through their publication and frequent appearances on American network newscasts, members of think-tanks attempt to inform the public about the potential repercussions of various government policies. However, unlike interest groups, think tanks do not encourage mass political participation. For instance, while members of Greenpeace and the American Medical Association periodically hold protests and demonstrations to awaken the public conscience about various concerns, it is doubtful that policy analysts from the Brooking Institution or the Council on foreign Relations would resort to the same type of political behaviour to accomplish

---

59 Diane Stone, n. 2, p. 13
61 Diane Stone, n. 2, p.13
their objectives. In short, since the priority of most interest groups is to influence the political agenda by taking an aggressive stand on a particular issue, instead of producing scholarly statics, it would be misleading to regard them as think tanks. Yet, given the frequency with which some think-tanks have become involved in domestic and foreign policy debates, even this distinguishing feature is becoming increasingly blurred.62

Think-tanks are also unlike government advisory organisations such as policy units, task forces and commissions of inquiry. These government bodies often have short life spans and are established at the behest of government for the purposes of solving a specific problem. Government research bureaus, while they may have some independence, remain tied to government objectives and dictates and, hence, can be regarded as part of the bureaucratic machinery.63

In sum while think-tanks have many features in common with other research organizations, they are different from university centers, government agencies, consultancies and interest groups. Accordingly, a number of criteria are outlined below as defining characteristics of independent policy research institutes. Although, none of the following criteria are sufficient in themselves but they provide a guide to some of their predominant features and distinguish them from other policy-oriented research bodies.

(a) Organisational Independence and Permanency:

Policy research institutes usually have formal legal status as an entity outside the public sector and independent from corporate and other interests. Independence can be determined from their status as a charity or non-profit organisation. Generally, they are established on a permanent footing. An obvious consequence of their independence is that they have no responsibility for the implementation of government policies. Additionally,
think tanks have some measures of detachment from government and partisan political debate.  

(ii) Self Determination of Research Agendas

Think-tanks do not have a fixed or dependent policy position – they are intellectually independent. The nature of their work is determined by the institute rather than any specific interest. "The research activities and quality of work is not controlled by founders or think-tanks managers but by internationalized professional standards similar to those of the university setting". Towards this end, think tank managers often require that funding be united so that they may be free in determining the questions they address and in arriving at their findings.  

(iii) Policy Focus:

Independent policy institutes are typified by a desire to inform the policy process. Their research is not disinterested. They seek some involvement with government. Their primary ethos is to establish a dynamics between knowledge and policy-making through policy relevant analysis. Their strong policy focus differentiates them from university research which is often more academic, theoretical and less amenable to general consumption. This interplay of knowledge and policy is complemented by strategic practices to develop advisory ties to government, industry or the public.  

(iv) Public Purpose:

Think tanks are characterized by public spirit or, at least, the rhetoric of contributing to public debate and educating the community. A  

63 Ibid., p.14  
64 Ibid., p 15  
66 Diane Stone, n 2, p 15.  
67 Ibid., p15.
consistent claim is that they do not represent the interests of any rent-seeking group but that they desire to conduct research for the sake of building a body of knowledge and improving policy. As a consequence, think-tanks often have a longer term focus of inquiry than is available to policy-makers who must deal with immediate events. One feature of their public interest motivation is a heavy emphasis on communication, that is, on public, not private inquiry. Publications and research are accessible to the public and a premium is placed on plain and concise English, executive summaries and practical policy recommendation.

(v) Expertise and Professionalism

Staff or scholars are usually trained in the policy and social sciences or have considerable first hand experience from careers in government service. Their academic credentials, technical skills and methodological approaches are not only the intellectual resources of staff but also a source of legitimacy for their research findings and recommendations. Research staffs are engaged in the intellectual analysis of policy and are concerned with the ideas, concepts and assumptions that inform policy.

(vi) Organisational yield:

The primary products of think tanks are research, analysis and advice. Policy advice comes in a variety of formats ranging from the multiple messages of books, journals, newsletters, magazine stories and op-ed pieces to tapes, videos, radio and television programming. More informal but equally important think-tanks activities such as seminars, workshops and conferences, social meetings and fund raising functions as well as carefully nurtured networks provide the medium for interaction of scholars with decision-makers, opinion leaders and sponsors. Additionally, think-tanks produce human capital in the form of policy analysts who go into

---

68 Wesis, n. 60, p.ix
69 Diane Stone, n. 2, p.15
70 Ibid., p.16
journalism, government or business with think tank experience and, in the case RAND, even Ph.D. graduates. Just as the product is diverse, so are the forms of conveying the message.71

In summary, independent policy research institutes are usually non-profit organisations engaged in the analysis of public policy issues independent from government, political parties and interest groups. Sources of funding may come from government but these institutes maintain their ‘academic’ or research freedom and are not beholden to any specific interest. They attempt to influence policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than lobbying. They are public spirited in the sense of seeking to inform and improve policy, and profess to educate the community and act in the public interest. While commonly displaying a high level of social scientific expertise and/or familiarity with governmental structures and processes there is considerable diversity in style and output of think tanks.

The above sets of characteristics do not add up to create an ideal. Institutes do not need to display such characteristics in equal measure. Some are more academic than policy oriented while others are more accessible to the general public compared with relatively exclusive establishments like the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Atlantic Council. Involvement with government will not only vary from think-tank to think-tank but also from one country to another. After the World War II the number of new American research centers and policy institutes increased dramatically and, especially since the 1970s, numbers have boomed.72

TYPOLOGY OF THINK TANKS: DIFFERENTIATION AND SPECIALISATION

While it may not be possible to accurately define think-tanks, it is useful to establish typologies which classify policy research institutions

71 Ibid, p.16
according to their research agenda, staff composition and main institutional goals. Two of the most frequently cited classifications of think tanks were constructed by Kent Weaver and James McGann. According to Weaver, there are three main types of think-tanks in the United States which he refers to as: universities without students, contract research organisations and advocacy think-tanks. McGann however, identifies seven types of think-tanks: academic diversified, academic specialised, contract/consulting, advocacy, policy enterprise, literary agent/publishing house and state-based. Dian Stone identified five types of think-tanks. These are–

(i) Corporate or business affiliated think tanks’
(ii) Governmentally created or state sponsored think tanks;
(iii) Political party (or candidate) think tanks;
(iv) Independent civil society think tanks established as non-profit organization?
(v) Policy research institutes located in or affiliated with a university.

Yet, even Weaver and McGann acknowledge that these types of classifications do not account for every type of think-tank in the United States. University-affiliated and vanity think-tanks could also be added to this growing list.

72 *Ibid*, pp16-18
73 Kent Weaver, *The Changing World of Think Tanks*, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 22(3), 1989, pp.563-78
74 James McGann, *The Competition for Dollars, Scholar and Influence*,
76 Donald E. Abelson, *Ibid*, pp.4-5
Table 3.2: A Typology of Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank Types</th>
<th>Major Characteristics and Products</th>
<th>Subtypes</th>
<th>Facilitating Conditions</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic/University Without Students</td>
<td>Focus on staff with strong academic credentials and muted ideology</td>
<td>Primarily foundations, corporations, individuals</td>
<td>Agenda set primarily by researchers and foundations</td>
<td>Academic monographs and journal articles in objective nonpartisan style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Researcher</td>
<td>Focus a staff with strong academic credentials, muted ideology and objective, nonpartisan research</td>
<td>Primarily government agencies</td>
<td>Agenda set primarily by contracting agency</td>
<td>Reports for government agencies and other clients in objective nonpartisan style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy Tank</td>
<td>Focus on staff with political or philosophical/ideological credentials</td>
<td>Primarily foundations, corporations, individuals</td>
<td>Agenda set by organization leaders</td>
<td>Brief papers typically focused on currently topical issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Think Tank</td>
<td>Focus on party members and party loyalty</td>
<td>Primarily party and government subsidies</td>
<td>Agenda closely tied to party platform</td>
<td>Varies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While think tanks may perform a number of roles in their host societies. However, no all think tanks do the same things to the same extent. Over the last eighty-five years, several distinctive organizational forms of think tanks have come into being that differ substantially in terms of their operating styles, their patterns or recruitment, and their aspirations to academic standards of objectivity and completeness in research. A number of different typologies of think tanks have been offered by analysts. McGann and Weaver argued that most think-tanks can be understood as variations on one or more of four basic ideal types: academic (or university without students), contract researchers, advocacy tanks and party think tanks.\textsuperscript{77}

**Academic and Contract Research Think Tanks**

The first two types, academic and contract research think tanks, have strong similarities. Both tend to recruit staff with strong academic credentials such as PhDs from prestigious universities, and both tend to put a strong emphasis on the use of rigorous social science methods and strive to have their research perceived as objective and credible by a broad audience. They differ largely in their funding sources, agenda setting, and outputs. Academic think tanks are typically funded by a mixture of foundations, corporations, and individuals. Their agenda is usually set internally, and at least in part through a bottom-up process in which the researchers themselves play an important role. However, funders are increasingly playing an important role in agenda setting, even at academic think-tanks. Reflecting the academic training and orientation of their staffs, the research outputs of academic think tanks most often take the form of academic monographs and journal articles. Contract researchers, on the other hand, are usually funded in large part by contracts with government agencies. The funding agencies typically play a very large role in setting the agenda, and outputs often take the form of reports to those agencies rather than publicly circulated books and articles.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{77} McGann and Weaver, \textit{n. 34}, pp7-8
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p.7
Advocacy Think Tanks and Party Think Tanks

The other two types of think tanks also have a family resemblance to one another. Advocacy tanks, while maintaining formal independence, are linked to particular ideological groupings or interests. They tend to view their role in the policy making process as winning the war of ideas rather than as a disinterested search for the best policies, and they are more often than not staffed by nonacademics that are less interested in basic research. They frequently draw their resources disproportionately from sources linked to those interests, for example, corporations for conservative think tanks, and labour union for liberal ones. Their staffs typically are drawn more heavily from government, political parties, and interest groups than from university faculties, and are less “credential” in term of social science expertise. Their research products are likely to be closer to brief advocacy pieces than to academic tomes. Political party think-tanks, similarly, are organized around the issues and platform of a political party and are often staffed by current or former party officials, politicians, and party members. The agenda is frequently heavily influenced by the needs of the party. This brand of think tanks is most prevalent in Western Europe, particularly in Germany.  

Each of these ideal types of think tanks has distinctive advantages in its efforts to “speak truth to power”, but each also has particular challenges and tensions. Academic think tanks, for example, precisely because they place a strong emphasis on scholarly objectivity and social science credentials for staff, face a particularly strong tension between the objectives of scholarly objectivity and completeness in research, on the one hand, and policy relevance on the other. Academic authors generally favor the former, while policy makers prefer findings that are brief, clear, and free of the qualifications and fence-sitting with which scholars normally cover their conclusions.

Contract researchers clearly have an advantage over academic think tanks in terms of policy relevance, since the policy makers often have

79 Ibid., p.7
80 Ibid., p.8
outlined in fairly specific terms what types of questions they want answered. Their tension is likely to be primarily between the objectives of scholarly objectivity and the policy preferences of their clients, especially if they are heavily dependent on a particular client. When the funder-client of research has clear preferences, there is a risk that the funder may try to influence, there is a risk that the funder may try to influence the results of research or refuse to release research that does not match those preferences. At a minimum, this tension may pose a threat to the perceived objectivity of that research.  

Advocacy tanks, which tend to have strong value positions and often take institutional positions on particular policy issues, face a tension between maintaining consistent value positions and perceptions of objectivity and completeness; to the extent that their messages are perceived to reflect inflexible values rather than objective analysis, they may simply be ignored by a large part of their potential audience. Similarly, the party affiliation of think-tanks limits their objectivity, credibility, and independence; when their party is not in power, their access to policy makers and influence on policy makers is likely to be quite limited.

These ideal types of think tanks have served as models for new organizations being established or as points of departure for existing institutions that wanted to reinvent themselves. It is also important to keep in mind several caveats about these categories. First, most think tanks do not fit neatly into one category, but share the attributes of several. The barriers are increasingly being challenged as, for example, academic think tanks try to imitate some of the marketing savvy of advocacy tanks, while advocacy tanks try to bolster their credibility with longer, more carefully researched studies.

Second, hybrids are increasingly common between think tanks and organisational siblings that have some similarities to think tanks but stand outside the narrow definition of those organisations. These organisational hybrids are especially common in the developing and transitional economies.

---

81 Ibid., p.8
82 Ibid., p.8
83 Ibid., p.8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think tank type</th>
<th>Organizational sibling/ functional substitute</th>
<th>Formal differences</th>
<th>Informal differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic Think Tank</td>
<td>University research center</td>
<td>Formal Independence from University</td>
<td>Degree of research center autonomy in financing, agenda setting and staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government research agency or bureau</td>
<td>Formal independence from government</td>
<td>Degree of autonomy in agenda setting, funding, and dissemination of research results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Researcher</td>
<td>For profit consulting firm</td>
<td>Formal nonprofit status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary government investigative commission</td>
<td>Presumption of perpetuity in organizational operations, formal independence from government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy Tanks</td>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>Formal status as a nonprofit tax exempt organization</td>
<td>Percent of resources devoted to research; use of objectivity and completeness criteria in performing and reporting research results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Interest nongovernmental organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of resources devoted to research; use of objectivity and completeness criteria in performing and reporting research results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party think tank</td>
<td>Research arm of political party</td>
<td>Formal structural separation from associated political party</td>
<td>Organizational autonomy in setting agenda and drafting policy conclusions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3, shows the organisational siblings for each of the four types of think tanks noted above: university research centers for academic think tanks; for profit consulting agencies, government research organizations, and temporary government commissions for contract researchers; interest groups and public interest lobbies for advocacy tanks; and party research departments for party think tanks. This table suggests, going back to the earlier discussion of think tank definitions, that there is not a rigid distinction between organisations that are think-tanks and those that are not. Instead, there is a continuum between think tanks and their organizational siblings. Where the dividing line is set along that continuum is somewhat arbitrary. Many organisation stand astride the division between the narrow definition of think tanks and their organisational siblings.\textsuperscript{84}

Table 3.3 also suggests that the characteristics that separate think-tanks from their organisational siblings concern informal characteristic of financing, agenda setting, staffing and so on as well as formal structural attributes. Many research centers, for example, have close financial and staffing linkages with universities, but maintain significant independence in their governance, financing, and agenda setting as well.

Finally, the table suggests that organisational siblings of the various types of think tanks may also be functional substitutes for them: in other words, if a society seems to have an unusually low number of academic think tanks and contract researchers in comparison to similar societies, it may be because it is rich in university research centers, government research agencies, and for-profit consulting firms that are performing the same tasks while falling outside the formal definition of think-tanks. Similarly, some countries may have a political tradition of utilizing temporary government research commissions, established by and reporting to government, but operated independently of government, to perform many of the programme

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. p.9
evaluation and fundamental policy rethinking roles that in countries like the United States might be performed by contract research think tanks.\textsuperscript{85}

**WAVE OF AMERICAN THINK TANKS: A BRIEF HISTORY**

Public policy research institutes are twentieth century phenomenon that has their origins in the advanced industrial democracies in United States and Western Europe. The rise of modern think tanks parallels the rise of the United States.\textsuperscript{86} Rooted in the social sciences and supported by private individuals and foundations, think tanks began to appear around 1900 as a part of a larger effort to bring the expertise of scholars and managers to bear on the economic and social problems of this period. The growth of think tanks since that time appears to be at least partially tied to a series of major political, social, and economic events that shattered the conventional wisdom of the period and forced policy makers and the public to find innovative solution to complex policy problems.\textsuperscript{87}

In the early part of this century, the challenges of managing an advanced industrial economy and increased commitments abroad created a demand to bring science and reason to government. The earliest wave of think-tanks shared this objective of bringing expert, nonpartisan, disinterested advice to governments. The period following World War II saw an increased demand for defence experts and technocrats to help manage the defence establishment and its new security arrangements around the world. In the United States, the RAND Corporation, along with many other research organisations, provided a ready supply of what have become known as ‘defence intellectuals’ to help develop the defence hardware and systems that were put in place after World War II.\textsuperscript{88} They served as the models for a new generation of contract research think-tanks. The social turmoil of the 1960s and its attendant political pressures provided the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p.9
\textsuperscript{86} Richard Hass, n. 33, iip
\textsuperscript{87} McGann and Weaver, n. 34, p12
\textsuperscript{88} Smith, n. 8.
impetus for the creation of the Urban Institute, and many other organizations that were the architects of social and environmental programmes during this period. More recently, crises of the welfare state, a collapse of the Keynesian consensus on macroeconomic management, and the rise of a worldwide conservative movement has contributed to the rapid expansion in advocacy oriented think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation from which have organized in order to advance a particular philosophy or issue.\textsuperscript{89}

The end of the Cold War and the political and economic reforms that it unleashed created another wave of new institutions, which were created to provide intellectual and political muscle for the transition taking place in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{90}

Breaking with the tradition established by Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie and the other founders of early twentieth century think tanks who were determined to insulate their scholars from partisan politics, several contemporary research institutions often described as ‘advocacy think tanks’\textsuperscript{91} because of their ideologically derived policy agendas, have consciously avoided erecting a barrier between policy research and political advocacy. Rather than promoting scholarly inquiry as a means to better serve the public interest, a goal embraced by think-tanks in the progressive era,\textsuperscript{92} advocacy think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the institute for Policy Studies have come to resemble interest groups and political action committees by pressuring decision makers to implement policies compatible with their ideological beliefs and those shared by their generous benefactors. No longer content observing domestic and foreign affairs from the comfort of their book-lived offices, think-tanks have made a concreted effort to

\textsuperscript{89} McGann and Weaver, n.34,p.12
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 12
\textsuperscript{91} R.Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks” \textit{PS: Political Science and Politics}, 22(3), 1989, p.567
become part of the political process.\textsuperscript{93} Change in the ideological and funding environment since the 1960s have stimulated the growth in number of more ideological and marketing oriented think-tanks.\textsuperscript{94}

Think tanks that formed at the beginning of the twentieth century reflected an ideological environment that valued neutral expertise and believed in its potential for devising rigorous solutions to public problems. Those who supported the first think-tanks valued their capacity for producing credible research that attracted the interest of policy makers without involving the experts or organisations directly in high profile controversies or ideologically changed political debates. Sources of support for think-tanks changed somewhat through the first half of the century and confidence in social science expertise evolved, but until the 1960s, think tanks generally emerged in a political environment that encouraged and fostered a balancing of organizational credibility and political access.\textsuperscript{95}

As the number of think tanks has grown, they have become notably more diverse with regard to their size, scope of research and intended policy making audiences.

There is little consensus on when the first think tank was created in the USA. While some maintain that the proto-typical think-tanks were established during the early 1990s, others contend that the seeds of contemporary think-tanks were planted well before the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{96} According to Paul Dickson, who wrote the first major study on the think tanks in 1970s,\textsuperscript{97} there is evidence to suggest the research institutions began to advise the US government as early as the 1830s. Dickson maintains that the relationship between think tanks and government started in 1832, when the Secretary of the Treasury, confronted by pesky steam boilers that

\textsuperscript{93} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.l.}, p.3
\textsuperscript{94} Andrew Rich, \textit{n.3}, p.72
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. p.72
\textsuperscript{96} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.l.}, p.23
\textsuperscript{97} See, Paul Dickson, \textit{Think Tanks}, (New York: Atheneum), 1970
kept exploding in American steamboats, contracted with the Franklin
Institute of Philadelphia for a study of the problem. Since then, the
government has been paying for more and more outside brainpower each
decade. Dickson selected 1832 as his point of departure to study the
government’s growing dependence on think tanks to resolve various
political, economic, social, technical and security problems. Yet fails to
offer any justification for beginning his analysis on this particular date.
Moreover, since Dickson neglects to provide any documentation to support
his chronology of the earliest think-tanks, it is questionable whether the
Franklin Institute was the first organisation which provided scholars with an
opportunity to share their research finding with government officials.

The development, refinement and dissemination of ideas did not
begin with the creation of the Franklin Institute as Dickson argues but
preceded the founding of the American Republic. However, like many
studies which followed the publication of his pioneering work, Dickson
devotes only passing reference to the historical evolution of think-tanks
before proceeding to analyse in detail such high profile research centers as
the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute. Yet, while it is difficult to
determine with any degree of certainly which organisation, association, or
political movement deserves to be regarded as the first think-tanks, it is
nonetheless possible to shed light on those organisations which may have
served as models for such venerable policy research institutions as the
Brookings Institution and the Council on foreign Relations.

Published two decades after Dickson’s sweeping over view of
American think-tanks, James Smith’s informative study on the emergence of
policy experts in twentieth-century America fills in many of the historical
gaps left by his predecessors. Through Smith agrees with Dickson that the
origin of contemporary think tanks can be traced to the nineteenth century,
he argues that it was not until six months after the civil war ended that academics began to take the first steps toward creating independent research organizations. According to Smith, when approximately one hundred people, including writers, journalists, educators, scientists and government officials, met at the Massachusetts state House in Boston in October 1865 to discuss ways to improve the economic and social well-being of individual states slowly recuperating from the ravages of war, intellectuals began to recognize the benefits which could be derived by sharing their expertise.  

For William Domhoff, the author of several books on the formation and composition of policy elites in the United States, the creation of professional associations played an important role in fostering closer ties between social scientists however, he argues that it was the establishment of two business reform organizations near the turn of the twentieth century that enabled research institutions to gain access to the policy-making community. According to Domhoff, the Chicago Civic Federation (CCF) founded in 1894 and its successor, the National Civic Federation (NCF) established in 1990, were among the first research institutions to establish formal institutional links with local, national, federal government departments.

While the activities of the NCF, the CCF and several other smaller research institutions deserve to be recorded in the early history of American think-tanks, it was during the first two decades of the twentieth century that the impact of policy research institutions began to be felt. Five think-tanks in particular left a lasting impression on domestic and international politics prior to and in the aftermath of World War I: The Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910),

---

100 Ibid, p.24
101 James A. Smith, n. 8, p.24
102 Donald E. Abelson, n.1, p.25
the Institute for Government Research (1916), the Hoover Institute (1919) and the Council on foreign Relations (1921).  

THE FIRST GENERATION: Think Tanks as Policy Research Institutions

The first major wave of foreign policy think-tanks in the United States began to emerge in the early 1990s, largely as a result of the desire of leading philanthropists and intellectuals to create institutions where scholars and leaders from the public and private sectors could congregate to discuss and debate world issues. Five institutions in particular began to make their presence felt in the first decades of 20th century, Carnegie Endowment for Internationals Peace (1910), established by Pittsburg Steel baron Andrew Carnegie; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (1919), created by former President Herbert Hoover, and the Council on Foreign Relations (1921), an institution which evolved from a monthly dinner club to become one of the most respected foreign affairs institutions in the world. Two other think tanks, the Institute for Government Research (1916), which later merged with two other institutes to create the Brookings Institution (1927), a Washington icon, and the American Enterprise Institute for public Policy Research (1943), a highly respected conservative think tank, would in time begin to focus considerable attention on a wide range of foreign policy issues.

These and other organisations were established under different and often unusual circumstances. However, each was formed for the purpose of providing an atmosphere in which to encourage scholars to investigate social, economic and political issues. These public policy research institutes are committed to applying their scientific expertise to a host of policy issues. Functioning, in the word of Brookings scholar Kent Weaver,

---

104 Donald E. Abelson, n. l, p.227
105 Donald E. Abelson. n.4, iiip
106 Donald E. Abelson. n. 1, p.28
as "universities without students", think tanks like the Carnegie Endowment and Brookings assign the highest priority to producing quality academic research. They publish books, journals, and other material that is intended for different target audiences. Although scholars from these institutions occasionally provided advice to policy makers when they were first established, their primary goal was not to directly influence policy decisions, but to help educate and inform policy-makers and the public about the potential consequences of pursuing a range of foreign policy operations. In part, the willingness of policy research-oriented think tanks to remain detached from the political process stemmed from their commitment to preserving their intellectual and institutional independence, something many contemporary think tanks have been prepared to sacrifice.  

The Second Generation: The Emergence of Government Contractors

In the aftermath of World War II, the need for independent foreign policy advice became even more critical for American policy-makers. Faced with the increased responsibilities of becoming a hegemonic power in a bipolar world, decision-makers in Washington required the insight and expertise of think-tanks that could help them develop a coherent and sound national security policy. By 1948, policy-makers knew where to turn. The RAND Corporation was created in May 1948 to promote and protect U.S. security interest during the nuclear age.  

In addition to filling a void in the external policy research community, RAND ushered in a new generation of think-tanks government contractors - policy research institutions largely funded by government departments and agencies whose research was intended to address specific concerns of policy makers. While philanthropic foundation, corporations and private citizens played an integral role in establishing and supporting

---

107 Donald E. Abelson, n. 4.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
many of the earliest think-tanks, following World War II, the US. Acknowledging the invaluable contribution of defence scientists during the war, the American government recognized the enormous benefits that could be derived by continuing to fund private and university based research and development centers. My tapping the expertise of engineers, physicists, biologists, statisticians and social scientists, government officials hoped to meet many of the new challenges confronting the United States as it assumed the role of a global hegemonic power. Leading the new generation of think-tanks or government contractors was the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California having branced office in Washington D.C.\(^\text{110}\) In the ensuing years, RAND would inspire the creation of several other government contractors including the Hudson Institute (1961) and the Urban Institute (1968).\(^\text{111}\)

**The Third Generation: The Rise of Advocacy Think tanks**

The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relation and several other research institutions continued to devote considerable resources to examining public policy issues in the decades following the war. However, it soon became apparent that their desire to provide impartial policy expertise to government officials in order to serve the public interest, would not to be inherited by the next generation of think-tanks. Indeed, while many of the newly emerging think-tanks established legitimate research programmes, their primary goal was not to pursue social science research, but to advance their ideological agenda in the political arena. By relying on a variety of lobbying techniques to market their ideas, advocacy think-tanks began to take root in and around the nation’s capital.

The virtual explosion of advocacy think-tanks since the early 1970s has not only contributed to the politicisation of policy expertise, but perhaps more importantly, it has altered the relationship between think-tanks and

---

\(^{110}\) Donald E. Abelson, *n. i*, p.47

\(^{111}\) Donald E. Abelson, *n. 4.*
government. As more think tanks began to participate in the policy-making community, the strategies they employed to increase their visibility changed dramatically. Not other type of think tank has generated more media exposure in the last three decades than the so-called advocacy think-tanks. In an environment where think tanks now had to “compete for ideas”, in the political arena, their priorities began to change. Providing decision makers with timely and policy relevant advice, rather than engaging in long-term scholarly research, became the primary concern for many new think-tanks. Combining policy research with aggressive marketing techniques, a function they share in common with many interest groups, advocacy oriented think tanks have fundamentally altered the nature and role of the think tank community. Unlike think tanks in the early part of the 20th century that were reluctant to become embroiled in policy debates, advocacy think tanks including the center for strategies and International studies (1962), and the Heritage foreign policy. As the US think tanks industry has become more competitive, most think tanks have come to realise the importance of capturing the attention of the public and the minds of policy-makers.

The Fourth Generation : Legacy-Based Think Tanks

The newest type of think tank to emerge in the foreign policy-making community is what some have referred to as “Legacy-based”. Although they may not truly constitute a new wave, they nonetheless represent a new and interesting development. Created by aspiring office holders (or their supporters) and by former Presidents intent on advancing their political and ideological beliefs well after leaving office, these think tanks are beginning to attract some attention in the policy making community. While legacy-based think-tanks such as the (Jimmy) Carter

112 Donald E. Abelson, n.1, p.52
113 Ibid. p.52
114 Donald E. Abelson, n. 4.
center and the (Richard) Nixon Centre for Peace and Freedom have developed a wide range of research programmes, some vanity think tanks appear more concerned with engaging in political advocacy. Vanity think tanks are particularly interested in generating or at the very least repackaging ideas that will help lend intellectual credibility to the political platforms of politicians, a function no longer performed adequately by mainstream political parties. As the U.S. think tanks industry has become more competitive, most think tanks have come to realise the importance of capturing the attention of the public and minds of policy-makers.

THE AMERICAN THINK TANKS: EXPLANATION FOR THE PROLIFERATION

The American political system has provided a fertile environment for the establishment of think tanks. American writers often assert that independent policy research institutes are unique to their political system. Think-tanks are often portrayed as a ‘quintessentially American institution’. Many go so far as to say they are ‘unique’ to America. Dror describes think tanks as an ‘invention’ emerging from the peculiarities of the American political system. Studies on the growth and development of American think-tanks reveal that the highly decentralized nature of the American political system, combined with the lack of strict party discipline and the large infusion of funds from philanthropic foundations have contributed generally to the proliferation of think tanks in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Carol Weiss has developed the most comprehensive set of explanations for the proliferation of policy analysis organisations in the

---

117 Donald E. Abelson, n.4.
118 Diane Stone, n. 2, p.50
USA.\textsuperscript{120} It is on these points that some American discussants of think tanks base their claim that they are unique or peculiar to America.

The first and probably most important reason that Weiss offers is the fragmentation of the US governmental system. The separation of powers allows both Congress and the President to initiate legislation. A divided government with neither the Republicans nor Democrats controlling both the White House and Congress for much of the past 25 years – has fuelled demand for intellectual ammunition on both sides. Executive branch departments are also fragmented. They are ‘made up of strong component agencies, each with its own interests, client and policy preferences’.\textsuperscript{121} These circumstances mean that secretaries have difficulty controlling their ‘Balkanised’ departments. Additionally Congress is fragmented. Both the Senate and House of Representatives operate independently when fashioning legislation. Power is dispersed over a large number of committees and sub-committees. As party discipline is weak, members of Congress formulate many of their own policy priorities and pursue their agendas with considerable independence. The final point of fragmentation in the USA system is the division of powers between the state and federal governments. The consequence of fragmentation for policy institutes is two fold. Numerous policies are created and demand from several audience for policy analysis and research has grown in what McGann calls the ‘hyper pluralistic nature of American society’\textsuperscript{122}

Second, Weiss argues that few bodies aggregate interests in the American political system. Political parties have not played as preeminent a role in policy development as in other countries. There are few sanctions with which American parties can control their members and force adherence to party platforms. Nor are there strong corporatist structures and peak

\textsuperscript{119} Donald E. Abelson, n.n.
\textsuperscript{120} Weiss, 1992, n. 60, p.6
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p.6
\textsuperscript{122} Diane Stone, n. 2, p.40.
associations representing sectors of society such as labour, business and other interests that are evident in some European countries. As a consequence, there are no formal mechanisms to bring these sectors into negotiation with government over policy.123

Weiss's third point also identified by Dror Marsh and Ricci is the increasing complexity of government. Policy problems cannot be treated in a vacuum as they are interconnected with other issues. Furthermore, 'finding an appropriate expert or consultant has become difficult because problems do not present themselves in configurations that match the specialisations of the academic disciplines.'124 Policy-makers are frequently encountering situations in which uncertain conditions prevail. Big government, globalisation and the flood of information from interest groups, industry and new government programmes mean that think-tanks become one source of expertise able to explain the nature, causes and remedies of problems. They can be functional for governments and bureaucracies in conditions of cabinet and ministerial overload. They augment in-house research capacities, circumvent time and institutional constraints and alert elites to changing global circumstances.125

Fourth, the executive branch of government draws on unelected officials to staff many policy-making positions which weakens the 'prerogatives, privileges and power of the bureaucracy'.126 Appointed administrators have turned away from the bureaucracy for alternative sources of advice.127 In a similar vein, Nelson Polsby128 argues that the growth of policy research institutes has been the result of 'certain characteristic of American Government, most notably its permeability'. Polsby was referring to a continuous reciprocal flow of senior staff in and

123 Ibid., p.41.  
124 Weiss, n. 60, p. 7.  
125 Diane Stone, n. 2, p. 41  
126 Weiss, n. 60, p.8.  
127 Smith, n. 6, pp. 180-81.  
128 Diane Stone, n. 2, pp. 40-41.
out of government service. The policy institute ‘acts as a revolving door for individuals to come and go from administrative agency to think-tanks to agency, to media, back for a Sabbatical at [the think-tanks] and finally into a high level policy making position in a sympathetic administration’. Alongside the propensity of US government to contract out research, permeability also encourages a dependency on outside organisations for intelligence, advice and analysis.

Fifth, the openness of the American system to external sources of advice has evolved over the last half century. The Presidency became increasingly institutionalised under Truman and Eisenhower when many positions of a policy advisory nature were created in bodies such as the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Council of Economic advisers and in the State Department. After the World War II, Congress expanded existing bodies such as the Congressional Research Service or created new bodies like the congressional Budget office. Far from displacing advisers outside government in universities and think-tanks, the institutionalisation of advice presented new opportunities. The new advisers, often with academic backgrounds, and put in command of large financial resources, expanded links to think-tanks and universities. The Johnson Administration’s Great Society programmes, for example, generated contract research work for the urban and social policy think tanks on poverty and racial issues. The Urban Institutes, in particular, was set up by seven individuals handpicked by President Johnson, to study the needs of US cities. The new think-tanks mirrored the rise of a new managerial, expert or technocratic class in areas such as health, finance, the environment, defence, intellectual property, trade, communications and transport. Keynesian-inspired public spending and technocratic prescriptions spurred government involvement in and

129 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
130 Ibid., p.41
131 Smith, n. 8, pp. 113-116
responsibility for these increasingly technical fields of public policy.\footnote{132}{Diane Stone, n. 2, pp. 40-41.} With increasing industrialisation, economic interdependence and government intervention, there was, and remains, a greater role for the creation and dissemination of knowledge.\footnote{133}{Ibid., p. 41.}

The American think-tanks industry is not unique. Admittedly, the scale of think-tanks development is extensive and there is greater diversification. This may be as much the consequence of extensive grant giving by American foundations as the more permeable character of, and points of access into, the US governmental system. However, just as the American system of think tanks has grown and evolved so this is occurring in Britain, albeit slower and on a smaller scale. Assertions of American exceptionalism do not explain the presence of many well established policy institutes outside the USA, nor account for the significant growth in the number of policy research institutes in other countries. Such arguments detract attention from the requirement for comparative study and neglect the emerging international networks among think tanks.\footnote{134}{Ibid., pp. 41-42}

Once found almost exclusively in the USA and Europe, think tanks now provide information and advice for policy makers around the world. As think tanks have expanded geographically, they have had to adapt to new conditions. Think tanks have faced different challenges that have forced them to develop innovative ways to maintain their operations. Outside US, most countries do not have strong philanthropic tradition or tax laws that encourage private philanthropy; therefore, think tanks in these countries are primarily funded by governments, political parties, or international donors. This makes these institutions particularly dependent on sources of support that may be very unstable. The lack of independence support also raises questions about both the long-term validity of these institutions and their
ability to provide truly independent research and analysis. Nevertheless, many think tanks in these regions have attained a highly visible presence and participate actively in their countries' policy debates.\textsuperscript{135}

The growth of public policy research organizations over the last two decades has been nothing less than explosive. Not only have these organizations increased in number, but the scope and impact of their work has expanded dramatically. Still, the potential of think-tanks to support and sustain democratic governments and civil societies around the world is far from exhausted. The challenge for the new millennium is to harness the vast reservoir of knowledge, informations, and associational energy that exist in public policy research organisation in every region of the world. It is essential that the US state Department and other international agencies of the US government take immediate steps to work with, and through think tanks, to help develop and sustain a global network of policy institutes that will span physical, political and disciplinary boundaries in the pursuit of solutions to some of the emerging and enduring policy problems of US.\textsuperscript{136}

THINK TANKS: INSTITUTION AND OPERATION

The effectiveness of independent policy research institutes is dependent on the way they are managed and adjust to change. The health of a think tank affects its ability to innovate and respond to changed external conditions. To know the effectiveness of different think tanks, investigation about their funding, leadership, staffing, research and publication policies are desirable. Some institutes are shown to be better equipped than others by virtue of an activist director, financial security or specialisation to succeed in the market place of ideas.

\textsuperscript{135} James McGann and Kent Weaver, \textit{n. 34}, p.3
Funding:

With an expanding market for ideas and their legitimacy established, think tanks still require money to operate. Policy research institutes cannot rely on membership dues to cover operating costs. Nor can they rely upon the sales of publications and services. Philanthropy, corporate supports are essential to survival. Attracting money has always been difficult. In United States, many prominent think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute not accept government funding; foundation, corporate, and individual donations represent major source of funding. A select group of think tanks, including the Brooking Institution, the Hoover Institution, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Russell sage Foundation, are the beneficiaries of sizeable endowments.

Table 3.4 provides the funding profiles of selected think tanks. It is evident that only in a few cases are institutes reliant on a single source of funding. In the main cases, institutes tap several different sources to promote financial stability. Unsprisingly, the corporate sector is a significant source of financial assistance. But as a proportion of think tank income rarely does it rise beyond one-third.

138 Donald E. Abelson. n. 1, p.51
139 Ibid, pp.53-54
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Operating expenses (thousands of US$)</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Foundations</th>
<th>Corporations</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Endowment, Investment Income</th>
<th>Publications, Sales, etc.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Enterprise Institute(^1)</td>
<td>$14,060</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
<td>$22,801</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies(^2)</td>
<td>$16,413</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>$26,620</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoover Institution</td>
<td>$20,800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2(^{\text{III}})</td>
<td>21(^{\text{IV}})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson Institute</td>
<td>$7,342</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92(^{\text{V}})</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual reports and Internal Revenue Service Form 990s.

\(^1\)Funding sources are for 1998 fiscal year.
\(^2\)Funding sources are for 1995 fiscal year.
\(^{\text{III}}\)Publications and miscellaneous
\(^{\text{IV}}\)15% Stanford University operating funds for Hoover Library and Archives and 6% encumbered funds and other transfers
\(^{\text{V}}\)23% unrestricted grants and donations and 69% restricted grants and other contracts.
Foundations are a major source of support, especially for the American Institutes. In many cases, it is more important than corporate support. In the case of American institutes, support from any single foundation is highly unlikely to exceed 33% of its income. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a foundation providing more than a third of an organizations budget is subject to ‘expenditure responsibility’. This not only involves increased reporting obligations for both the grant giving and recipient organisations, it may also involve the foundation in legal liability for the actions of think tank.\footnote{140} Foundations have been major forces in the establishment of think tanks, providing ‘bricks and mortar’ grants to assist in capital projects and general support. As there is now no shortage of policy research institutes in the USA, American foundations are more inclined to fund specific projects directed towards immediate ends rather than provide capital grants. They also show greater interest in the outcomes of research and its public impact.

Individual sifts, fees and donations also represent a sizeable portion of income. The contributions of individuals are highest in organisations that are membership bodies. Endowment funds are a significant factor in the financial security of only a small number of policy institutes. Aside from Heritage, it is the old guard institutes that have endowments. The Carnegie Endowment draws most heavily on its assists, and along with Russell sage, has a degree of financial independence that is atypical. For more than half of the institutes endowment funds represent less than fifteen percent of revenue. Endowments often afford greater research flexibility.

Ownership of facilities provides long-term security for an institute as well as cultivating an image of stability and security. Again, it tends to be the old guard institutes that possess land and buildings whereas the newer institutes occupy leased offices.

\footnote{140} Diane Stone, n. 2, p.54.
As the figures for publications, conferences and sales reveal, think tanks can not survive from the sale of their services and product. Policy research is not a profitable endeavour. For none of the organisations tabled does such income rise beyond one third of total income. For most institutes, such income is less than 10 per cent.

Many institutes are reliant on voluntary labour in the absence of adequate funding. In the USA the well-established student intern system provides a stream of volunteer labour. Another avenue of support is cross subsidisation from universities. Some institutes, such as CSIS have been located on or affiliated with a university, sometime receiving free office space and secretarial support if not academic support by association. It is also accepted practice for academics to write for a think tank while in university employ. Other forms of support come from the business sector which might provide services free of charge or on a cost basis only. While difficult to quantify, such forms of support are essential to the survival of many organisation.\(^\text{141}\)

To minimise the impact of the loss of foundation, individual or corporate support, it is in the interests of policy centers not only to build numerous supporters but also a mix of different kinds of financial support.

**Management and Leadership:**

Leadership is a vexed issue but of critical importance to policy institutes. A significant number of institutes are dominated by charismatic personalities. Ideally, a director of a policy institute is one with a blend of academic and practical experience, a potent public speaker and fund raiser, comfortable with the media and able to project a reputable image for the institute. The person needs the necessary managerial acumen to deal with trustees and staff while directing research activity, outreach and committee

\(^{141}\) *Ibid*, pp.60-61
work. In short, institutes require strong leadership or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ at the helm.\textsuperscript{142}

Boards of trustees have the power to temper and moderate the control of executive of directors. The conventional wisdom on non-profit boards is that they are: (i) policy-making and monitoring entities; and (ii) build a partnership of mutual trust and communication with management.\textsuperscript{143} In theory, trustees are responsible for hiring directors determining operating policies, budgeting and fiscal control, fund-raising, recruitment, public outreach and resolving internal conflicts. Practice often falls short of theory. The larger the board the less likely it is to meet. If trustees are geographically dispersed, as is often the case with federally structured or international institutes, it is all the more expensive and difficult to bring the board together. A disincentive also operates against trustees becoming closely involved in the affairs of an institute as they usually serve on a voluntary basis with, at most, an honorarium as recompense.\textsuperscript{144} Boards of trustees are not subject to the test of the market, they are not answerable to Congress, and the public is relatively unaware of them. Hence, a properly functioning board is very important in establishing credibility for the organization and as the guardian of its philosophy.\textsuperscript{145}

Ideally the relationship between executive and trustees is harmonious but tension can be the norm. Different conceptions of the ‘philosophy’ of an organisation create conflict between the board and the executive. Raising basic questions of organisational mandate, character and identity can provoke internal disunity. A financial crisis can have the same effect as conflict over organisational mission. It is during crises that boards intervene.

\textsuperscript{142} Diane Stone, n. 2, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p.62
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., pp.62-63
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p.63
At some point in their existence, most organisations face crises or divisive internal disputes. The difficulties can often be resolved by splits or mergers, sacking directors and appointing new personnel or by redefining organizational mission to suit contemporary circumstances. When funding problems and feuding are more intractable, then an institute is likely to close.146

**Personnel:**

The nostalgic vision of think tanks as composed of an elite group of intellectuals dedicated to solving the most challenging economic, social, and political problems confronting the nation differs profoundly from reality. A small group of think tanks in the United States have the staffing and financial resources to sustain organisations engaged in long-term strategic thinking. The majority of think tanks in the United States, however, maintain relatively small staff consisting of researchers, administrators and individuals offering technical support.

The staffs of an institute are its strength. It is paramount that an institute maintains its financial stability and credibility so that the future career prospects of its staff are not endangered, hence triggering a flight of intellectual resources. Staffs are generally attracted for reason, other than pecuniary reward. The incentive are intangible the chance to participate in policy politics, the possibility of media exposure, the opportunity to see ideas translated into policy and working with people who share the same principles. People do not work for the salaries but because of commitment to the values represented by the organisation.147

Unlike universities the older institutes also display a mix of personnel. Fellows come from universities, the business community, and overseas. The previous work experience of former senior public servants or

146 Ibid, p.64
147 Ibid., p.66
retired politicians is used to enhance the analytic skills of the institute. As they are often stepping stones in people's careers, think tanks occasionally experience fluctuations in staffing. In some instances these fluctuations can be a positive force of 'cross-fertilisation of people among like minded organisations. However, high turnover of staff brings instability in an organisation.

**Output: Studies, Meetings and Networks**

Depending on the states of their funding, as well as the talents of their staff, the quantity and quality of the outputs think tanks market vary enormously. Nonetheless, the basic types of products distributed are very similar. Think tanks generate books, newsletters, conference reports, working papers, and brief commentaries for elected officials.

What distinguishes one think-tank from another, in addition to the nature of the outputs produced, are the values and priorities they assign to performing particular functions. If, for instance, think tank seeks to influence public opinion and public policy in the United States, it may develop a strong research programme and invite policy manners to participate in regular policy seminars, rather than to try to reach them through opinion magazines. Conversely, for those think tanks that are less concerned about having a long-term impact on the national agenda, creating and sustaining a research programme may be less important. In other words, each think tank must, in the increasingly competitive and crowded policy research community, locate its specific niche. It must determine who its target audience is and over what time horizon it is seeking to make an impact.

The research and publications is the most tangible product of think-tanks. Books are emblematic of the old guard institutes and endowed both the author and the institute with credibility. While an important symbol,
book requires long term financial investment which may or may not pay off in the bookshops. Some small institutes do not produce books because it is too expensive. Institutes are pursuing more economical and immediate avenues of diffusion through television interviews, opted pieces and newsletters.  

Journalists are significant source of demand and contact think tanks for three reasons: information; a source of opinion; and a credible source for independent analysis that a lobby or political party does not possess. Think tanks make the jobs of journalists easier. Most institutes issue press releases, some arrange press conferences for major reports as well as produce registers of public experts that journalists can contact. Think tanks scholars act as a ‘bridge between political journalists and political science’.  

At the dawn of the 21st century, more than 1,200 think tanks dot the American political landscape. They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in scope, funding, mandate, and location. Think tanks have emerged as visible and, in many respects, important players in the policy-making community. Think tanks are in the business of developing and promoting ideas, and like Corporations in the private sector, they devote considerable resources to marketing their product. Unlike corporations, however, think tanks measure success not by profit margins (after all, they are registered as independent non-profit organisations) but by how much influence they have in shaping public opinion and policy. In this sense, think tanks have come to resemble interest or pressure groups that compete among other non-governmental organisations for political power and prestige.  

Publicly, think tanks those only on a host of strategies to convey their views to policy makers and the public. These may include: holding public conferences and seminars to discuss various foreign policy issues;  

149 Ibid., p.68  
150 Ibid., p. 72  
151 Richard Hass, n. 33,  
152 Donald Abelson, n. 1.
encouraging resident scholars to give lectures at universities, rotary clubs, etc., testifying before legislative committees, enhancing their exposure in the print and electronic media; disseminating their research; and creating web pages on the internet.\textsuperscript{153}

Privately, experts at think tanks may seek to become involved in foreign policy by accepting cabinet, sub-cabinet, or other positions in the federal government (following government service, many policy-makers return to or take up residence at a think tank); serving as advisers during presidential elections, on transition teams, and on Presidential and Congressional advisory boards; inviting selected policy-makers from the Department of Defence, the State Department, the National Security Council, the CIA, and other intelligence gathering agencies to participate in private workshops and seminars; and by providing policy-makers in Congress, the Executive Branch and throughout the federal government with policy briefs and relevant studies on current foreign policy issues – the trademark of the Heritage Foundation, known as the quintessential advocacy think tanks.\textsuperscript{154}

The close ties that have been established between several think tanks and recent administrations raise several interesting questions regarding the role and influence of think tanks in American politics. Among other things, it begs the question of why some think tanks succeed and others fail in exercising policy influence.

By undergoing a transformation from organisation, committed to providing government officials with impartial policy advice to institution, dedicated to advancing their own political mandate, think tanks have become active participants in the policy-making process. Through various governmental and non-governmental channels, think tanks have been able to expand their networks of influence throughout the policy making

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
community.\textsuperscript{155} As the following chapter will show, while it is difficult to accurately measure the extent to which think tanks influence specific policy decisions, it is possible to identify the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. By doing so, one can begin to observe how and to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in Washington's decision-making network.
Chapter – IV

Major Think Tanks and Their Strategies
CHAPTER – IV

MAJOR THINK TANKS AND THEIR STRATEGIES

Jimmy Carter, Ronald Regan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush shared much in common before entering the Oval office. Besides having served as state governors, each assumed the Presidency with little experience and especially in Clinton’s case little interest in foreign policy. To remedy this, they relied in varying degree on a select group of think tanks, for policy advice and on their personnel to fill key posts in their administration.¹

Amid the galaxy of think tanks in and around Washington, Carter turned to the Trilateral commission, the Brookings Institution and the Business Roundtable, to name just a few, for advice and guidance. He paid special homage to the Trilateral commission by noting in his autobiography that the “commission has provided me with a splendid learning opportunity, and many of the members helped me in my study of foreign affairs.”²

His successor also acknowledged the invaluable contribution several think-tanks made to his 1980 election victory and to his administration. President Regan stated that he called on more people from the Hoover Institution to help in his campaign and in the transition than from any other institute. Several other think tanks including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Committee on the Present Danger have also been credited with helping Regan bring about America’s rightward turn.³

President Clinton appeared less confused about which think tanks were helping to prepare him to govern, indeed, to remind himself that the Progressive policy Institute (PPI), the policy Arm of the Democratic Leadership Council, which he chaired from 1990-91, was advising him on a

² Ibid. p.1
³ Ibid. p.1
host of domestic and foreign policy issues, he publicly endorsed Mandate for change, PPI’s blueprint for changing America. There are unusual bodies of people behind many of George Bush’s ideas. Their influence is partly a matter of ideas. Two of the brainwaves of the 1990s—welfare reform and zero-tolerance policing—were incubated in conservative think-tanks. The Cato Institute has been arguing for privatising Social Security reform for years; the AEI was protesting about rogue states long before anybody had heard of Osama bin Laden. But it is also a matter of people. Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice are both Hoover veterans. Dick Cheney and his wife have a longstanding relationship with the AEI.

Think tanks are appealing to policy makers for three main reasons. First, unlike university professors—who are often engaged in esoteric research with little relation to policy think tanks, are in the business of providing policy-relevant expertise to elected officials. In short, think-tanks perform an educational function. Second, think tanks, especially those with ideologically-driven policy agendas, can offer intellectual reinforcement and indeed promote the political platforms of aspiring office holders and elected officials. And third, several prominent think tanks can provide talent pools of scholars and former government officials for incoming administrations to draw on, and can also serve as retirement homes for high level policy makers after they leave public office.

To varying degrees, think tanks in the United States rely on some, and at times all, of the following strategies to enhance their presence on the political landscape. They hold open public forms and conferences to discuss key policy issues and encourage their scholars to give lectures at universities, service clubs, and other civic organizations. Many of these lectures are broadcast to viewers via satellite. Think tanks scholars also testify before committees and subcommittees of Congress and frequently

---

4 Ibid. p.1
5 http://www.hoover.org/about/report/18978274.html
submit op-ed articles to major American and international newspapers. If they are too preoccupied with their own research, think-tanks have been known to hire ghost writers to write up-ends on behalf of certain scholars.\textsuperscript{7}

Think tanks also concentrate on gaining access to the broadcast media, especially to network newscasts and political talk shows. If viewers happen to miss an on-screen appearance of their favourite think tank personalities they can usually discover what was said by accessing the institute’s web site. Dozens of think-tanks have created websites in recent years, complete with photographs of think-tanks scholars and information on their recent publications and speeches. American interested in being indoctrinated on their way to work can even pop audio taps into their cassette players and listen to the wisdom of leading political pundits from Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute. For policy makers and members of the attentive public who can get along without briefing tapes but are still interested in what think-tanks say, copies of institute publications can be readily obtained. Depending on the state of their financial resources and the talents of their staffs, think tanks may produce a variety of publications ranging from books, Journals, and opinion magazines to conference papers and newsletters.\textsuperscript{8}

Think tanks with some degree of expertise in foreign and defence policies rely on several strategies to convey specific recommendations to high level policy makers. The best opportunity for think tanks to influence US foreign policy is during a presidential election and the transition period that follows. If "people are policy", as Edwin Feulner, the head of Heritage likes to say, then the think tanks are becoming America's shadow government.\textsuperscript{9}

The think-tanks' influence is partly related to the intellectual barrenness of America's two main parties. The Democrats and Republicans are little more

\textsuperscript{6} Donald. E. Abelson, \textit{n. l.}, pp.1-2
\textsuperscript{8} Donald. E. Abelson, \textit{n. 1.} p.3
than vehicles for raising and distributing campaign contributions. They have no ability to generate ideas of their own, and little control over individual politicians trying to burnish their reputations with new thinking. For instance, in the week and days leading up to the 1992 Election, dozens of articles outlining the individuals and organizations, who assembled to advise the then Governor Clinton appeared throughout major American newspapers and opinion magazines. Moreover, on several network newscasts and political talk shows, individuals advising Clinton on various economic, social and security issues were invited to share their insights on what a Clinton administration would mean for America.¹⁰

By serving on foreign policy task forces think tanks scholars are well positioned to be recruited into high-level foreign policy posts in the new administration, a development that usually allows them to further extend the influence their institute. Several think tanks scholars have taken this route, including Jeanne Kirkapartrick (AEI), Richard Allen (Hoover Institution), Zbigniew Brzezinski (CSIS), and Madline Albright (CSIS). Other think tanks scholars have been asked to serve on important advisory boards such as President’s Intelligence oversight Board (PIOB) and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which provide the President with long term strategic advice on foreign policy and defence issues. The transition period following the election also offers think tanks on opportunity to influence those in positions of authority. The Washington based CSIS, home to such luminaries as Zbigiew Braezinski, Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Admiral William Crowe, has organised transition seminars for several incoming administrations. The Heritage Foundation also offers seminars to newly elected Congressmen and Senators.¹¹

---

9 Ibid., p.3
10 Donald.E. Abelson, n.7, p.122
11 Donald E. Abelson, n.1, p.
The efforts of think tanks that hope to influence policy makers do not stop there. Some, including the Hoover Institution at Stanford University invite members of Congress and Congressional Committees and their staffs to attend the Washington seminars run by the institution’s staff since 1980 to educate and inform participants on domestic and foreign policies. The Heritage Foundation has even taken steps to guarantee private donors assess to the President and to senior members of the administration. Several think tanks, including Heritage and CSIS have relied on other channels to establish close ties with key departments engaged in foreign policy. Through the Diplomat in Residence Programme, overseen by the State Department, several ambassadors have gone to think between assignments, to conduct research. At times, state department officials have even been sent to think tanks to help improve relations between the administration and think tanks overly critical of white House policies. This occurred, for instance, when Secretary of State George Shuttz directed one of his staff to go to the Heritage Foundation to mollify some of its more vocal cities of US foreign policy.12

The ones that emerged in the first decades of the 20th century were committed to bringing scientific expertise to bear on public policy issues. The advancement of knowledge for the purpose of improving governmental decision-making was their main priority. Much has changed however. Many think-tanks have become more committed to influencing policy than to improving it. They are run like business whose performances are measured on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. However, only these think-tanks that maintain a healthy balance between scholarship and aggressive Salesmanship will remain well entrenched in the policy-making process.13

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p.4
MAJOR THINK TANKS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Most think tanks share common objectives of shaping and moulding public opinion and public policy. As the United State prepared to assume the role of a hegemonic power in the aftermath of the World War II, a number of think tanks were making their presence felt in the policy making circles. Through their publications, conferences and meetings with members of the Executive, Congress, and a host of government departments, boards, and agencies, think thanks were able to develop and expand their network of influence throughout Washington.\(^\text{14}\)

By relying on various governmental and non-governmental channels, think-tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the political process, have attempted to influence the content and outcome of majority policy initiative.\(^\text{15}\)

Yet, despite their appeal, only a fraction of the estimated 1,200 think tanks in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-making circles. The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, Rand and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently referred to in the media.\(^\text{16}\) For example, the media watchdog group *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting* (FAIR) released a report in 2006 which listed the 25 think tanks which were mentioned most often in the mainstream media news in 2005. The most-mentioned think tank was the center-left Brookings Institution. The next two most-mentioned think tanks—the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, are center-right while the fourth, the Cato Institute, is libertarian. Of media citations, a plurality, 47% were centrist, while 40% were conservative and 13% were progressive.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{14}\) Donald E. Abelson, *n. 7*, p.65
\(^\text{15}\) Ibid., *n. 7*, p.90
\(^\text{16}\) Donald E. Abelson, *n. 1*, p.4
\(^\text{17}\) Fairness and Accuracy Reporting, Media Watch Dog Group, Report 2006
Among those concentrating on foreign policy, is the Council on Foreign Relations. The CFR is non-partisan and regarded itself as the most prestigious and influential think tanks. The Brooking Institution pursues a liberal research agenda and hosts regular seminars and working lunches to discuss foreign policy issues. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is also non-partisan but regarded as leaning centre right. RAND built its reputation in defence policy research for the US air force but now covers a wide range of domestic issues in addition to national security themes. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Institutes of Peace, and Woodrow Wilson Center, are leading liberal think tanks with a strong focus on conflict resolution issues. On the right of the political spectrum are the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Nixon Centre. Other more specialist think tanks include the Atlantic Council of the US, the Centre of Defence Information, and the Institute for international Economics, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Middle East Institute.18

The following U.S think tanks have been selected to show a representative range of views, with budget, staffs size, reputation for doing high quality research analysis and frequent media citation.

**BROOKING INSTITUTION:**

Of the 200 most prominent think tanks in the U.S., the Brookings Institution's studies are the most widely cited by the media, and the third most-cited of all public policy institutes by Members of Congress. In a 1997 survey of congressional staff and journalists, Brookings ranked first in credibility among 27 think tanks. It stated principal purpose is "to aid in the development of sound public policies and to promote public understanding of issues of national importance".19 Strobe Talbott, the President of Brooking Institution stated that:

---

The goal of The Brookings Institution, and all other think tanks, is "to provide the policy community with analysis and conclusions to use as the basis for developing new policies, and for modifying or retiring existing policies," says Brookings President Strobe Talbott. "One of our most challenging tasks," he says, "is to identify early on the new and important issues our nation and the world will confront in the future" and bring them to the attention of policy-makers and the public.20

The Brookings Institution is one of the oldest think tanks in the United States. The precursor of the present-day Brookings — the Institute for Government Research — was established in Washington in 1916 by a St. Louis businessman and philanthropist named Robert Brookings. He later set up two related organizations, the Institute for Economics and the Graduate School of Economics and Government.21

Robert Brookings established these organizations because he saw that businesses in the early part of the 20th century were benefiting from the relatively new disciplines of economic research and organizational management, and he believed that government also could benefit. The three research organizations were combined in 1927 to form the Brookings Institution, Which initially focused on domestic social and Economic policy. International studies were no added to the Brookings research agenda until after World War II.22

Brookings is organized into three major research areas: Foreign Policy Studies, Economic Studies, and Governance Studies, though those departmental distinctions are increasingly blurred as the Institution takes on the cross-disciplinary issues that define globalized world. It's organizational structure also includes several research centers, focused on areas such as the Middle East or functional issues such as education policy.23 Strobe Talbott became president of Brookings in 2002. Shortly thereafter, Brookings launched the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the John L. Thornton China Center. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was founded by a grant from

21 ibid
22 Brookinig Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/about/History.aspx
Mr. Haim Saban in 2002.\textsuperscript{24} The Saban Center has helped the Brookings Institution to dramatically expand its research and analysis of Middle East policy issues. In September 2006, Brookings announced the founding of The John L. Thornton China Center, a major new center focused on the study of Chinese politics and policy. In November 2006, Brookings announced the opening of its first-ever overseas center, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.\textsuperscript{25}

Robert Brookings once said, "Underlying all Brookings activities is a belief in the necessity of framing issues accurately and impartially, of presenting ideas without ideology." Since its earliest days, Brookings has provided policy-makers and the public with timely, applied research that is aimed at finding solutions to America's most complex policy challenges. Over the decades, ideas emanating from Brookings played a key role in the mobilizations for World Wars I and II; the creation of the Federal government's budget process, civil service system, and Social Security; the development of the Marshall Plan; the imposition of price controls during World War Two; the use of sanctions to punish and influence rogue states; the organization of the National Security Council and other foreign policy and defense structures; the commitment to promote development in poorer countries; the evolution of U.S. policy toward post-Soviet Russia; and many other policies.\textsuperscript{26}

Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the research here has been refocused to concentrate more intently on generating ideas and insights that will lead to the development or revision of policies concerning relations between the West and the Islamic world; the proper balance between vigilance against terrorism and protection of civil liberties; the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; the need to adjust traditional state-to-state diplomacy to take into account the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 23 Brooking Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/about/Research.aspx
\item 25 Ibid.
\item 26 Strobe Talbott, n.20
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
rise of non-state players; the debate over preemptive or preventive warfare to counter threats from terrorists and terrorist-supporting states; the development of a long-term international strategy for the post-Cold War world; the future of arms control; and the case for a missile defense system.\footnote{Ibid}

Brookings is often referred to as “a university without students.” Many of our 75 senior scholars have advanced degrees, and quite a few come from university faculties. Their research and writing is subject to scholarly review. Some of the Brookings Fellows are what we call “scholar practitioners.” This description applies to researchers who periodically accept positions in government where they can test their academic conclusions in real-world circumstances, and to former officials who come to Brookings after a period of public service and use their government experience to add a practical viewpoint to our academic research.\footnote{Ibid} For example, more than a dozen Brookings “scholar practitioners” have served in the State Department or on the National Security Council, including James Steinberg, the Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings (former Deputy National Security Adviser at the White House and Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department); Helmut Sonnenfeldt (National Security Council senior staff member in the Nixon administration and former director of the State Department Office of Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); and Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy (former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and twice U.S. ambassador to Israel). Brookings also has expertise from all the other branches of government, such as former Congressman Bill Frenzel (Republican-Minnesota), one of their resident experts on taxes, free trade, and budget policy.\footnote{Ibid}

Dissemination of policy analysis and recommendations from Brookings takes a number of forms. The conclusions of many research projects are
presented in books and reports. However, a few years ago, when it was realized that policy-makers and their staffs don't always have time to read books and lengthy reports, Brookings also began publishing its findings additionally in shorter, more accessible papers called Policy Briefs. Other think tanks have followed suit.\textsuperscript{30} Scholars at Brookings often communicate their conclusions more directly to policy-makers through Congressional testimony, private consultations, and meetings with Congressional and executive branch staff members, and to interested non-governmental audiences through forums, roundtable discussions, and other public events.\textsuperscript{31} Policy-makers are often influenced by public opinion, and public opinion is often influenced by coverage in the news media. Additionally, much of what policymakers, their advisers, and the public know about policy issues they learn through the news media. Therefore, it's not surprising that many scholars at Brookings and other think tanks devote a good deal of effort to presenting their ideas and findings through the news media. This takes the form of interviews on television and radio and in print, opinion articles for the op-ed pages of newspapers, press briefings, public speeches, and articles for scholarly journals. More than a year ago, Brookings built its own TV and radio studio to facilitate media interviews. Brookings and other think tanks also publish "media guides" to help reporters locate and interview scholars with specific expertise on the policy issue a journalist is writing about.\textsuperscript{32}

The budget to fund all this research, analysis, dissemination, and outreach — and the necessary staff — runs approximately $40 million a year at Brookings. The money comes from an endowment which was originally established by founder Robert Brookings; from grants and donations by foundations, corporations, and individuals; and from such revenue sources as the Brookings Institution Press, which publishes more than 50 books a year, and the Center for Public Policy Education, which runs executive education

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
seminars for government and corporate managers. Elaborate rules are in place to guarantee that financial providers have no influence over the design and outcome of Brookings research.\textsuperscript{33} One of the most challenging tasks of Brookings is to identify early on the new and important issues America and the world will confront in the future. Then, in the Brookings tradition, it focuses scholarship on bringing those issues to the attention of the policymakers and the public, providing solid research and analysis, informing the debate, and offering constructive ideas and recommendations. Busy government policymakers have noted the value added in Brookings' ability to combine the analysis of long-term trends with the recommendation of short-term policies.\textsuperscript{34}

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATION:

The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries since its founding in 1921.\textsuperscript{35} It is based at 58 East 68th Street (corner Park Avenue) in New York City, with an additional office in Washington, D.C. A central aim of the Council, it states, is to "find and nurture the next generation of foreign policy leaders." It established "Independent Task Forces" in 1995, which encourage policy debate. Comprising experts with diverse backgrounds and expertise, these task forces seek consensus in making policy recommendations on critical issues. Through its membership, meetings, and studies, it has been called the most powerful agent of United States foreign policy outside the State Department.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid
\textsuperscript{34} Brookings Institution, Annual Report 2007. n.24
\textsuperscript{35} Council on Foreign Relations, \url{http://www.cfr.org/about/}
\textsuperscript{36} Council on Foreign Relations, \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations}
The Council carries out its mission by:  

- Maintaining a diverse membership, including special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders;

- Convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials, members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with Council members to discuss and debate major international issues;

- Supporting a Studies Program that fosters independent research, enabling Council scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold roundtables that analyse foreign policy issues and make concrete policy recommendations;

- Publishing *Foreign Affairs*, the preeminent journal of international affairs and U.S. foreign policy;

- Sponsoring Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both findings and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and

- Providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website, CFR.org.

The David Rockefeller Studies Program — the CFR “Think tank” — is the Council’s “think tank.” It is an important part of the Council’s mission to produce and disseminate ideas so that individual and corporate members, as well as policymakers, journalists, students, and interested citizens in the United States and other countries, can better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other governments. They do that by thinking, writing, and speaking about a broad range of foreign policy issues.  

---

38 Gary Samore, Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair, *Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/*
The Studies Program is home of scholars, called fellows. In addition, the Studies Program hosts scholars through visiting fellowships at the Council. Taken together, the fellows' expertise covers nearly every issue related to international relations. Some fellows are experts on specific countries such as China and Egypt or geographical regions like Europe and Latin America. Others are experts on functional topics such as global health, homeland security, international finance, nuclear proliferation, and trade. They write books, articles, and newspaper op-eds on issues in their areas of expertise. They also share their expertise with local, regional, national, and international media, and they are frequently called upon by government policymakers for advice. The Studies Program has three interdisciplinary centers. The Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies works to promote a better understanding among policymakers, educators, and the interested public of how economic and political forces interact to influence world affairs. The Center for Preventive Action works to prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world by addressing the systemic and structural causes of discrimination, disenchantment, and political turmoil that are likely to provoke armed conflict. The Center for Universal Education focuses exclusively on the provision of quality, universal basic education among the world's poorest children. These centers seek to accomplish their goals by producing and disseminating original research; bringing policymakers, experts, and journalists together to address critical issues; and informing the broader public about important issues through media interviews and public speaking.39

➢ Council fellows write books on timely and important policy issues, which may be published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Press or by other trade and academic publishers. Critical Policy Choices are books designed to foster debate on key international issues by making the best case for each policy alternative in the form of a U.S. presidential speech.

39 Ibid
The Council on Foreign Relations Press publishes a variety of reports each year:

Independent Task Force Reports are consensus documents on U.S. foreign policy developed through private and nonpartisan deliberations.

Center for Preventive Action Commission Reports are consensus documents that offer recommendations with incentives—“carrots and sticks”—to unite stakeholders and modify the behavior of key local leaders when an armed conflict or a potential conflict arises.

Council Special Reports are concise policy briefs, which provide timely responses to developing crises or contributions to current policy dilemmas.

Council fellows and research staff produce analysis and commentary:

Articles and Op-eds are published in a variety of newspapers, magazines, and journals.

Testimony before Congress on specific U.S. foreign policy issues, often relating to the findings and recommendations of a Council report or paper.

Foreign Affairs offers numerous resources online, including an archive of articles dating back to 1973. With a circulation of 160,000, the bimonthly journal is available by subscription and at bookstores and newsstands. The Foreign Affairs Academic Resource Program produces customized textbooks and anthologies compiled by the editors of Foreign Affairs for classroom use.40

From its inception the Council was non-partisan, welcoming members of both Democratic and Republican parties. It also welcomed Jews and African Americans, with only women initially barred from membership. Its proceedings were almost universally private and confidential. It has exerted influence on U.S. foreign policy from the beginning, due to its roster of State Department and other government officials as members; as such, it has been the focus of many conspiracy theories (Perloff 37, et passim). A study by two

---

critics of the organization, Laurence Shoup and William Minter, found that of 502 government officials surveyed from 1945 to 1972, more than half were members of the Council.\textsuperscript{41}

Today it has about 4,300 members (including five-year term members), which over its history have included senior serving politicians, more than a dozen Secretaries of State, former national security officers, bankers, lawyers, professors, former CIA members and senior media figures. Seven American presidents have addressed the Council. As a private institution however, the CFR maintains through its official website that it is not a formal organization engaged in U.S. foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{42} In 1962, the group began a program of bringing select Air Force officers to the Harold Pratt House to study alongside its scholars. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps requested they start similar programs for their own officers.\textsuperscript{43}

Journalist Joseph Kraft, a former member of both the CFR and the Trilateral Commission, said the Council "comes close to being an organ of what C. Wright Mills has called the Power Elite – a group of men, similar in interest and outlook, shaping events from invulnerable positions behind the scenes."\textsuperscript{44}

In 1944 and in 1948, the Republican candidate for President, Thomas Dewey, was a CFR member. In later years, Republicans Eisenhower and Nixon were members of the CFR, as were Democrats Stevenson, Kennedy, Humphrey, and McGovern. The American people think that they have a choice when they vote for a President, but the truth of the matter is, with few exceptions: Presidential candidates for decades have been CFR members.\textsuperscript{45}
In one of the CFR's annual reports, published in 1978, it listed a membership of 1878 members. Eleven of its members at this time were United States Senators, with even more Congressmen belonging to the organization. 284 of its members listed in this report were United States Government officials.46

The CFR not only has its members in the United States Government, but its influence has also spread to other vital areas of American life. According to Newell: "Its members have run, or are running, NBC and CBS, 'The New York Times', 'The Washington Post', 'The Des Moines Register', and many other important newspapers. The leaders of 'Time', 'Newsweek', 'Fortune', 'Business Week', and numerous other publications are CFR members. The organization's members also dominate the academic world, top corporations, the huge tax-exempt foundations, labor unions, the military, and just about every segment of American life."47

The earliest origin of the Council stemmed from a working fellowship of about 150 distinguished scholars, called "The Inquiry," tasked to brief President Woodrow Wilson about options for the postwar world when Germany was defeated. The team produced more than 2,000 documents detailing and analyzing the political, economic, and social facts globally that would be helpful for Wilson in the peace talks. Their reports formed the basis for the Fourteen Points, which outlined Wilson's strategy for peace after war's end.48

These scholars then traveled to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 that would end the war; it was at one of the meetings of a small group of British and American diplomats and scholars, on May 30, 1919, at the Hotel Majestic, that both the Council and its British counterpart, the Chatham House in London,
were born. Although the original intent was for the two organizations to be affiliated, they became independent bodies, yet retained close informal ties. 49

In an anonymous piece called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1947, CFR study group member George Kennan coined the term "containment." The essay would prove to be highly influential in US foreign policy for seven upcoming presidential administrations. William Bundy credited the CFR's study groups with helping to lay the framework of thinking that led to the Marshall Plan and NATO. 50

Dwight D. Eisenhower chaired a CFR study group while he served as President of Columbia University. One member later said, "Whatever General Eisenhower knows about economics, he has learned at the study group meetings." The CFR study group devised an expanded study group called "Americans for Eisenhower" to increase his chances for the presidency. Eisenhower would later draw many Cabinet members from CFR ranks and become a CFR member himself. His primary CFR appointment was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. 51

On 24 November 1953, a study group heard a report from political scientist William Henderson regarding the ongoing conflict between France and Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh forces, a struggle that would later become known as the First Indochina War. Henderson argued that Ho's cause was primarily nationalist in nature and that Marxism had "little to do with the current revolution." Further, the report said, the United States could work with Ho to guide his movement away from Communism. State Department officials, however, expressed skepticism about direct American intervention in Vietnam and the idea was tabled. Over the next twenty years, the United States would find itself allied with anti-Communist South Vietnam

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
and against Ho and his supporters in Vietnam War. 52 The Council served as a "breeding ground" for important American policies such as mutual deterrence, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation. 53

A four-year long study of relations between America and China was conducted by the Council between 1964 and 1968. One study published in 1966 concluded that American citizens were more open to talks with China than their elected leaders. Henry Kissinger had continued to publish in Foreign Affairs and was appointed by President Nixon to serve as National Security Adviser in 1969. In 1971, he embarked on a secret trip to Beijing to broach talks with Chinese leaders. Nixon went to China in 1972, and diplomatic relations were completely normalized by President Carter's Secretary of State, another Council member, Cyrus Vance. 54

The United States faces multiple challenges in the Post Cold War era. All of this makes for a unique moment for the Council. It trying to meet opportunities and obligations alike by being a trusted, smart, relevant, independent, and nonpartisan resource through an extraordinary meetings program, the top website devoted to U.S. foreign policy, the leading magazine in the field, and a think tank—the David Rockefeller Studies Program—that is producing and disseminating much-needed analysis and ideas. Events for Council members remain an institutional priority. Member programming is increasingly organized by series that span New York City and Washington, DC, as well as twelve other cities. 55 It's "Lessons Learned" series brings together small groups of younger members for intimate discussions with distingue leaders, and the HBO-sponsored History Makers series focuses on the contributions made by a prominent individual at critical junctures in international relations. 56 It's popular "Daughters and Sons" events invite high

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid. p.10
school- and college-age children and grandchildren of members for special meetings with high-profile speakers. In the past year it have held full- and half-day symposia on Iraq, making New York safer, Latin America, alternative energy, and Nigeria. The annual Term Member Conference brought to New York many of our almost 500 term members from across the country. It’s National Conference attracted 350 participants from around the country and the world. And Corporate Program, which encompasses over 240 member companies, held 70 events and 30 conference calls on topics such as geopolitical risk, climate change, and the competitiveness of global capital markets.

Another element of the Council’s mission is to serve as a resource for traditional constituencies, such as officials in the executive branch, members of Congress, and the media. But it is never enough just to produce good work; it needs to make sure it gets read and heard. In 2006, Council fellows and staff have briefed government officials more than 250 times and have testified 22 times before Congress. Members of the Independent Task Force on U.S.-China relations briefed U.S. government officials, including Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte, as well as China’s ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong. The Council’s Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy Program held over fifteen meetings with new members of Congress and their staffs. It also held eleven briefings with journalists from news outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and Los Angeles Times, and fellows and staff have been interviewed on Meet the Press, in 2006.

The Council’s mission also includes reaching a broader range of citizens beyond it’s membership. It’s overall objective is to connect the Council with—and make it a resource for—voices that are increasingly important to the

---

57 Ibid, p.10  
58 Ibid p.10  
59 Ibid pp.10-11
national foreign policy debate, including those of students and teachers, religious and congregational leaders, state and local officials, and community leaders. To date, the Academic Conference Call series has engaged more than 90 distinct colleges and universities. It held 12 sessions of the Religion and Foreign Policy Conference Call series, and 155 state and local officials from around the country viewed the webcast of a meeting on the threat of pandemic flu. The Council’s website, CFR.org, is an important medium for bringing analysis and ideas to a broader audience. It is using new technology to its advantage. To take one example, CFR.org has launched a series of multimedia Crisis Guides—an innovative educational series that offers viewers ready access to the current and historical context of the world’s major trouble spots and challenges. It’s first two Crisis Guides were on the Korean peninsula and Darfur, and it plan to produce at least ten additional Crisis Guides over the next year on such topics as Kashmir, China and Taiwan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, climate change, and the United States and Cuba. Ultimately, the Council’s initiatives translate into impact.  

In 2006 Foreign Affairs was again ranked the most influential magazine in a survey of policymakers. It also hit an important milestone, with paid circulation topping 155,000. CFR.org now regularly draws a monthly audience of over 300,000 unique visitors.  

Two Council fellows visited and briefed the Multinational Force, Iraq’s commanding general David H. Petraeus, and the 2006 Council Special Report U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation was cited in debates on Capitol Hill when members of Congress were voting on the nuclear pact with India.  

The David Rockefeller Studies Program has been strengthened year by year, with additional focus on the greater Middle East and Asia. Council fellows are studying global issues, from climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and trade to worldwide terrorism, homeland security, and
global health. And finally, it has assembled a talented group of foreign policy generalists who are working on the broader means and ends of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, it continues to cover Russia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa. 63

The Council expects to play a large role during the 2008 presidential campaign. They host each of the presidential candidates and have kicked off this initiative with an event featuring former senator John Edwards. It is offering the Council to each candidate not only as a venue but also as a resource on a broad range of foreign policy issues. Fellows and staff have briefed Joseph Biden, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Christopher J. Dodd, Rudolph Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, Dennis Kucinich, John S. McCain, and Barack Obama. 64

The Council will also serve as a resource for the public at large during the campaign, with a special section of CFR.org delivering up-to-date information on candidates' views and positions. In short, the Council is doing a good many things to sustain its role as the leading foreign policy organization in the world.

RAND CORPORATION:

The RAND Corporation (Research and Development) is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to the United States armed forces. The organisation has since expanded to working with other governments, private foundations, international organisations, and commercial organisations. It is known for rigorous, often-quantitative, and non-partisan analysis and policy recommendations. Its self-declared mission is "to help improve policy and decision making through research and analysis", using its "core values of quality and objectivity." 65

63 Ibid., pp12-13
64 Ibid., p.13
65 Rand Corporation, History and Mission, http://www.rand.org/about/history/
From the beginnings of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), think tanks have worked closely with both the civilian and military leadership on a wide range of issues, from new technologies to military planning and operations, to help better protect American interests from ever evolving threats. Like the DOD civilian leadership, the uniformed military services require high-quality, objective research on geopolitical trends and the implications of different foreign policy options. Among other things, such research is necessary for realistic scenarios to guide planning and program evaluations, and to develop an understanding of probable constraints on operational flexibility. To their credit, the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have used and nurtured a large array of sources for that research, ranging from small institutes, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Lexington Institute, funded primarily with corporate or individual donations, to larger policy research organizations such as the Institute for Defense Analyses under contract to the DOD. The oldest and largest of these research organizations is RAND, which was established with private capital as a non-profit corporation in 1948. About half of RAND's current work deals with national defense while the rest deals with a wide range of domestic policy issues.66

RAND publishes *The RAND Journal of Economics*, a scholarly peer-reviewed journal of economics. RAND has approximately 1,600 employees and four principal locations: Santa Monica, California (headquarters); Washington, D.C. (currently located in Arlington, Virginia); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (adjacent to Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh); and Cambridge, United Kingdom (RAND Europe). RAND has several smaller offices in the United States as well, including the RAND Gulf States Policy Institute in Jackson, Mississippi and New Orleans, Louisiana. In 2003, it opened the RAND-Qatar Policy Institute in Doha.67


RAND is also the home to the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School, one of the original graduate programs in public policy and the first to offer a Ph.D. The program is unique in that students work alongside RAND analysts on real-world problems. The campus is at RAND’s Santa Monica research facility. The Pardee RAND School is the world’s largest Ph.D.-granting program in policy analysis.

Approximately 1,600 people from more than 45 countries work at RAND, representing diversity in work experience; political and ideological outlook; race, gender, and ethnicity; and academic training. This diversity reinforces RAND’s core values of quality and objectivity by promoting creativity, deepening understanding of the practical effects of policy, and ensuring multiple viewpoints and perspectives.

Providing a Forum for Public engagement, RAND hosted a variety of events in 2007 to inform the public debate on a broad spectrum of top policy problems. Policy Forums in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Pittsburgh brought together RAND experts with prominent local policymakers and preeminent thinkers to discuss and debate nation-building in Iraq and beyond; the impact and promise of the No Child Left Behind Act; strategies for helping youth exposed to violence; America’s obesity epidemic; efforts to sustain the nonprofit arts sector in U.S. urban centers; new responses to homelessness; challenges in funding public transportation; and more. RAND also hosted lectures by visiting dignitaries including Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, who addressed concerns regarding port security and how the service is preparing to deliver effective emergency response in the wake of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.

In 2007, more than 2,700 individual media reports featuring RAND research or researchers were published or broadcast by newspapers,

In 2007, findings from RAND research were made publicly available in more than 1,000 published reports and documents. The majority of these materials, along with over 10,000 other RAND documents published since 1946, are available on RAND's Web site for free download. Altogether, more than four million copies of RAND publications were downloaded from www.rand.org in 2007.

RAND's commitment to making a difference means that the scholarly objectives of expanding knowledge, illuminating issues, and developing new ideas are important means rather than ends. Communicating it's research findings to decisionmakers who can use them is an essential part of RAND's mission. In 2007, its dissemination activities were impressively broad, yet effectively targeted to influential decisionmakers capable of using our findings to inform their decisions and influence positive change.

RAND researchers conducted numerous briefings for top military and civilian leadership on issues of geopolitics and global security; intelligence policy; military force structure; logistics and infrastructure; personnel, training, and health; and acquisitions and technology. In addition, RAND researchers

- briefed White House leadership on findings from a study on counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan;

---

71 Ibid., p.21
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p.20
74 Ibid., p.20
helped senior staff from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other offices and agencies assess the strategic and operational challenges posed by Iran and evaluate options for meeting those challenges;

briefed senior officials in the Department of Homeland Security on issues including passenger rail security;

briefed Department of Veterans Affairs officials on issues related to post-traumatic stress disorder;

made presentations to the Secretary of Education, other U.S. Department of Education officials, and numerous state education officials on the impacts of No Child Left Behind.  

RAND delivers research findings and lends analytical expertise to Congress to help legislators make better-informed decisions about the nation’s many challenges.

RAND researchers testified before Congress on 28 occasions, contributing objective analysis to debates on issues such as the federal role in supporting alternative energy investment, renewal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, and understanding terrorist ideology.

RAND convened dozens of bipartisan briefings to discuss findings on issues at the top of the legislative agenda, including challenges facing the global supply chain, the impact of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program on children’s quality of life, and challenges for U.S.–China relations.

Electronic newsletters customized for a congressional audience are delivered monthly to present research findings relevant to timely policy debates on Capitol Hill.  

---

75 Ibid., p.18  
76 Ibid., p.18
In addition to the outreach conducted by RAND Europe and the RAND-Qatar Policy Institute to brief their respective policy communities on issues of regional importance, RAND staffs regularly engage with senior policymakers outside the United States to lend insights on matters of international interest.

- RAND's acclaimed research on strategies to help a Palestinian state succeed once a final status accord is reached was briefed to former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, now Special Envoy for the Quartet on the Middle East.

- Findings from The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building were briefed to the World Bank and the entire staff of the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and NATO distributed copies of the report to 50 top staff members on the ground in Afghanistan.

- RAND Europe's research on detecting fraud and error in the U.K. social security system formed the basis of a World Bank distance-learning module that is being used to train Bank clients and staff worldwide on social security fraud issues.\(^77\)

The achievements of RAND stem from its development of systems analysis. Important contributions are claimed in space systems and the United States' space program, in computing and in artificial intelligence. RAND researchers developed many of the principles that were used to build the Internet. Numerous analytical techniques were invented at RAND, including dynamic programming, game theory, the Delphi method, linear programming, systems analysis, and exploratory modeling. RAND also pioneered the development and use of war gaming.\(^78\)

RAND operates three DOD-sponsored, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). FFRDCs are research programs operated by private non-profit (non-commercial) organizations under long-term contracts. They develop and maintain essential expertise and capabilities important to

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p.19
\(^{78}\) RAND Corporation, n.67
their sponsors and operate in the public interest, free from real or perceived conflicts of interest. 79

RAND’s creation enabled the Air Force to retain and extend the considerable civilian scientific contributions during World War II. As part of a larger program of research on air power at RAND, the Air Force seeded the development of a path breaking analytical effort aimed at understanding the Soviet Union. Some of RAND’s research addressed the development of Soviet strategy, doctrine, and military systems. The Air Force also requested analyses of the Soviet economy, foreign policy, science and technology programs, among many other topics. Soon the Air Force, and then the Office of the Secretary of Defense, turned to RAND for research on China, Eastern Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Western Europe. Although smaller in scale than the analyses of the Soviet Union, these studies also provided the Air Force — and through RAND’s widely-disseminated published reports, the rest of the U.S. government and the public — with an independent body of research on a broad range of topics. These included economic strength, military capabilities, insurgencies, hegemonic intentions, and leadership succession possibilities in many nations and regions around the world. 80

In fact RAND is doing an increasing amount of work for governments around the world. The pattern of detailed country studies and broader regional analyses has been especially effective in work on Europe. RAND has a substantial presence in Europe, with three offices and research programs in both defense and non-defense fields. A series of analyses of conventional arms control using advanced combat models, and of the related question of limits on air power, had substantial influence on the U.S. position and ultimately on the resulting Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moreover, much of the

79 Michael D.Rich, RAND: How Think Tanks Interact With the Military, The Role of Think Tanks in US Foreign Policy 66 p. 22
80 Ibid, pp.22-23
early thinking about the rationale for alternative paths toward NATO expansion was done at RAND and other think tanks.\textsuperscript{81}

Over time, RAND developed complementary lines of research for the Army, as well as for other federal clients such as the intelligence community. And the DOD steadily increased the number and diversity of its external sources of research, also using others in the growing world of “think tanks” such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution.\textsuperscript{82}

RAND’s federally funded research and development centers have a special role in helping to meet the research and analysis needs of their DOD sponsors. The FFRDCs are: Project AIR FORCE; the Army’s Arroyo Center; and the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which primarily serves the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Each of these centers conducts a broad, integrated program of research that addresses emerging security needs and their implications for the sponsoring organizations: the development of new strategies, doctrines, tactics, and concepts of operations: the application of new technologies; and issues related to logistics, manpower, training, personnel, health care, and systems acquisition.\textsuperscript{83}

For each FFRDC, RAND commits to developing and maintaining a set of specified, “core capabilities.” This is all done with close familiarity with the structure, doctrine, operations, and personalities of the sponsoring organizations. Indeed, one of the strengths of FFRDCs, whether operated by RAND or other non-profit entities, is their stability and long term, strategic, and close-in relationship with their military or OSD sponsors.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid pp.22-23
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid pp.22-24
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid pp22-24
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. pp22-24
The research agenda-setting process is an iterative one that begins with the development of a long-term research plan that is revised annually. Continuous discussions between RAND research leaders and general officers or civilians of comparable rank enable RAND to develop an annual research program of individual studies, which is then approved by a high-level advisory board. In the case of Project AIR FORCE and the Arroyo Center, the advisory boards are chaired by the services' vice chiefs of staff; in the case of NDRI, the chair is the principal deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. Individual studies are typically commissioned by one or more senior officers or officials, who help shape the scope, phasing, and timetable of the research — providing comments, suggestions, and critiques along the way.\(^5\)

Think tanks are now called upon to contribute to a new challenge: the emergence of terrorism as a worldwide threat and of homeland security as a national priority of the highest order. RAND researchers have been studying terrorism for more than 30 years, and are today helping the United States government develop a comprehensive analytical approach to defend against terrorist attacks. Bigger bombs, better guns, and new weapons systems alone are not enough to defeat terrorists, who operate far from traditional battlefields. America also need a better understanding of who terrorists are, how they operate, what motivates them, and what can be done to stop them from expanding their ranks. RAND's research and analysis is playing an important role in helping to improve government policy and decision-making in these vital areas.\(^6\)

Think tanks that work with defense and intelligence agencies once focused exclusively on regional and functional topics, but these organizations are now also being called upon to help the military address the new challenge of terrorism and homeland security, says RAND Executive Vice President Michael D. Rich. RAND researchers, who have been studying terrorism for more than 30 years, are now helping decision-makers develop a comprehensive analytical approach to defending against terrorist attacks and, at the same

\(^5\) Ibid. pp22-24
\(^6\) Ibid.pp.22-24
time, they are doing an increasing amount of research on other issues for governments around the world.\textsuperscript{87}

Current areas of expertise include: child policy, civil and criminal justice, education, environment and energy, health, international policy, labor markets, national security, infrastructure, energy, environment, corporate governance, economic development, intelligence policy, long-range planning, crisis management and disaster preparation, population and regional studies, science and technology, social welfare, terrorism, arts policy, and transportation.\textsuperscript{88}

Since the attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the RAND FFRDCs - like those of the other FFRDCs operated by other institutions, such as the Center for Naval Analyses, that regularly assist the DOD — have been called upon by their sponsors to modify their research agendas. The legacy of past work and resulting capabilities, coupled with the flexibility of the institutional arrangements and close working relationships between sponsors and researchers, operators, and analysts, have equipped the FFRDCs for these new dimensions in the nexus of foreign policy and defense planning. The "old" issues haven't gone away, of course. They have simply been joined and complicated by the more recent ones. RAND's experts on a broad range of national security issues have been helping America's armed forces defend the nation for more than 50 years, dealing both with threats that are now part of history and with threats that will be on tomorrow's front pages.\textsuperscript{89}

PRACTICE OF INFLUENCE:

The administration and Congress rely heavily on the think tank community for a great deal of analytical input and public policy advice. The frequent personnel movement back and forth among the ranks of the administration, Congress, and the think tanks ensures that the input is policy orientated. In addition to a vast output of publications, both of advocacy

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p.22
\textsuperscript{88} RAND Corporation, , Annual Report, 2007, n.69
\textsuperscript{89} Michael D.Rich,n. 79, p. 25
and independent scholarly nature, the think tanks stage a continuous menu of conferences, workshops, seminars, and lectures on a wide variety of foreign and security policy issues. They provide a common meeting ground for frequent interchange of views and networking among policymakers, diplomats, legislators, business, academia, media, and the NGO community.  

Despite relatively low profile, think tanks affect American foreign policy makers in distinct ways. According to Richard N. Hass:

"From the perspective of U.S policy makers, today’s think tanks offer five principle benefits- they generate “new thinking” among U.S decision makers, provide experts to serve in the administration and Congress, give policy-makers a venue in which to build shared understanding on policy options, educate U.S citizens about the world, and provide third party mediation for parties in conflict."  

(1) The idea Factory:

Think tanks have played a substantial role in popularizing and legitimizing ideas about the role of government and the proper organization of society. As one close observer noted as early as 1989, “if there is a new politics of ideas in the United States, these organizations (think tanks) are certainly the primary participant in it.”

There greatest impact is generating ‘new thinking’ that changes the way that US decision makers perceive and respond to the world. Original insights can alter conceptions of U.S. national interests and influence the ranking of priorities, provide roadmaps for action mobilise political and bureaucratic coalitions, and shape the design of lasting institutions. It is not easy, however, to grab the attention of busy policy-makers already immersed in information. To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple channels and marketing strategies. Publishing articles, books and occasional

---

Frazer Cameron, n.18
papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed-pages and in newspapers interviews, and producing reader-friendly issue briefs, fact-sheets, and web pages. Congressional hearings provide another opportunity to influence policy choices. Unencumbered by officials positions, think tanks scholars can afford to give candid assessments of pressing global challenges and the quality of government responses.\textsuperscript{93}

Certain historical junctures present exceptional opportunities to inject new thinking into the foreign policy arena. World War II offered one such instance. Following the War's outbreak, the Council on Foreign Relations launched a massive war and peace studies project to explore the desirable foundations of postwar peace. The participants in this effort ultimately produced 682 memoranda for the state Department on topics ranging from the occupation of Germany to the creation of the United Nations. Two years after the end of the war, the Council's marquee Journal, Foreign Affairs published an anonymous article on "The source of Soviet conduct." The article, which was in fact authored by U.S. diplomat George Kennan, helped establish the intellectual foundation for the containment policy the United States would pursue for the next four decades. Then in 1993 Foreign Affairs published Harvard Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington's "The clash of civilizations" a seminal contribution to the debate surrounding American foreign policy in the post-cold war era. Since September 11, 2001, studies by CSIS, Heritage, and Brooking have all contributed to the discussions within the government over the proper strategies and organizations needed to confront the terrorist threat at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{94}

Presidential Campaigns and transitions are ideal occasions to set the foreign policy agenda. As Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution explains, "It is during these times that presidential candidates solicit the

\textsuperscript{93} Richad N. Hass, \textit{n.91}, p. 4-9.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 4-9
advice of a vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions on a host of domestic and foreign policy issues. Presidential candidates exchange ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign trail. It's like a national test-marketing strategy." The most celebrated case occurred after the 1980 election, when the Regan administration adopted the Heritage Foundation's publication, "Mandate for change", as a blueprint for governing. Another instance was a 1992 report by IIE and the Carnegie Endowment proposing an "economic security council". The Clinton administration implemented this proposal in creating a National Economic Council. 95 Opportunity 08, a project of the Brookings Institution in partnership with ABC News, aims to help Presidential candidates and the public focus on critical issues facing the nation, providing ideas, policy forums, and information on a broad range of domestic and foreign policy questions.96

**Providing Talent:**

Besides generating new ideas for senior government officials, think tanks provide a steady stream of experts to serve in incoming administrations and on congressional staffs. This function is critical in the American political system. In other advance democracies, like France or Japan, new government can rely on the continuity provided by a large professional civil service. In the United States, each transition brings a turnover of hundred of mid-level and senior executive branch personnel. Think tanks help presidents and cabinet secretaries fill this void. Following his election in 1976, Jimmy Carter Staffed his administration with numerous individuals from the Brooking Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. Four years later, Ronald Regan turned to other think tanks to serve as his brain trust. During two terms in office, he drew on 150 individuals from Heritage, the Hoover Institution, and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). 97

95 Jbid, pp 4-9
97 Richard N Hass, n 91, p
The current Bush Administration has followed a similar pattern in staffing the upper echelons of its foreign policy apparatus. Within the state Department, senior officials with think tanks backgrounds include the Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, previously senior Vice-President and director of the Council on Foreign Relations' Washington office; the Under secretary for Arms control and international security, John R. Bolton, formerly Vice President of AEI, the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, James Kelly, previously President of the Pacific Forum of CSIS, and the Assistant secretary – designate for International Organization Affairs, Kim Holmes, formerly Vice President at the Heritage Foundation. At the Pentagon, meanwhile, Peter W. Rodman assumed his position as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs after a stint as director of national security programmes at the Nixon center.98

In addition to supplying experts for incoming administrations, think tanks provide departing officials with institutional settings in which they can share insights gleaned from government service, remain engaged in pressing foreign policy debates and constitute an informal shadow foreign affairs establishment. This “revolving door” is unique to the United States, and a source of its strength. In most other countries one finds a strict division between career government officials and outside analysts. Not so in America. Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell’s Predecessor as Secretary of state, once headed the center for National Policy. Her former deputy, Strobe Talbott, is now President of the Brooking Institution.99

**Convening Professional:**

In addition to bring new ideas and experts into government, think tanks provide policy-makers with venues in which to build shared understanding if not consensus, on policy options among the “foreign policy

---

98 Ibid., pp.4-9
99 Ibid., pp.4-9
public”. The opinion makers and shapers drawn from across the professions.
As a rule, no major foreign policy initiative can be sustained unless it enjoys
a critical base of support within the broad foreign policy community.
Among think tanks, the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations has been
most adept at this convening role, hosting hundreds of meetings annually in
New York, Washington, and major cities around the country. For U.S.
officials, events at major think tanks offer non-partisan settings to announce
new initiatives explain current policy and launched trail balloons. For
visiting foreign dignitaries, the opportunity to appear before prominent think
tank audiences provides access to the most influential segments of the U.S.
foreign policy establishment.100

Engaging the Public:

Even as they convene elites, think tanks, enrich America’s broader
civic culture by educating U.S. citizens, about the nature of the world in
which they live. The accelerating pace of globalization has made this
outreach function more important than ever. As the world become more
integrated, global events and forces are touching the lives of average
Americans. Whether the issue is ensuring foreign markets for farm exports,
tracking the spread of infections diseases, protecting U.S. software from
piracy abroad, ensuring the safety of American tourists overseas, or
safeguarding our ports against terrorist infiltration, the U.S. public has a
growing stake in foreign policy, Eighty world Affairs councils, scattered
around the United states, provide valuable forums in which millions of
adults and high school students can discuss international events. But formal
think tanks, too are increasingly engaging U.S. citizens. In 1999, the Aspen
Institute launched a Global interdependence Initiative, “a 10-year effort to
better inform, and more effectively Motivate, public support for forms of
U.S. International engagement that are appropriate to an interdependent
world”.101

100 Ibid., pp.4-9
101 Ibid, pp.4-9.
Bridging Differences:

Finally, think tanks can assume a more active foreign policy role by sponsoring sensitive dialogues and providing third party mediation for parties in conflict. As part of its congressional mandate, the US institute of peace has long facilitated such informal, “Track II” negotiations, as well as training US officials to mediate long-running disputes. But other, more traditional think tanks have also extended their mandates to participate actively in preventive diplomacy, conflict management, and conflict resolution. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Carnegie Endowment hosted a series of meetings in Washington, bringing together leading South African politicians, clergy, businessmen, labour representatives, academics, and exiled liberation figures, as well as members of Congress and executive branch officials. These gatherings, occurring over eight years, helped establish the first dialogue and built understanding on South Africa’s future during a delicate political transition. Likewise, CSIS has launched projects to improve ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia, to bridge religious-secular divisions in Israel, and to facilitate Greek-Turkish dialogue.¹⁰²

Such unofficial initiatives are delicate undertakings. But they have great potential to build peace and reconciliation in conflict-prone regions and war-torn societies, either as a complement to U.S. government efforts or as a substitute when an official American presence is impossible. In the darkest corners of the world, they can serve as the eyes, the ears, and even the conscience of the United States and international community.¹⁰³

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS: NETWORKS FOR AFFECTING POLICY MAKING

Many think tanks are said to be influential but what is meant by influence is invariably imprecise. Conceptual devices such as policy communities explain the routes of influence but can not quantify the impact.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp.4-9
Think tanks are ‘hidden participants’ in policy. Whereas decision making in the formal political arenas by political parties, legislature and executive is a more transparent process, while think tanks do not have a clear, consistent or legally designated route to policy influence, their policy entrepreneurship in policy provides informal but haphazard access and opportunities for agenda setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental creep of new ideas into prevailing thinking. This process is captured in the quoted statement by Keynes:

Practical men, who believed themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scriber of a few years back.

Think tanks are in the business of developing, refining, repacking, and most importantly, marketing ideas. To this end, they employ a number of strategies to convey their thoughts to policy makers and to the public. These range from testifying before congressional committees and submitting editorial pieces to major newspapers, to inviting elected officials to participate in think tank sponsored seminars.

However, rarely there is a one - to one correspondence between a book or a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous intervening forces that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud any cause and effect relationship that may exit between policy institutes and government decision making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof of it is elusive and, at best, unreliable. Think tanks indicators such as media citations or appearances of staffs before Congress and various committees merely signify that think tanks have attracted the attention of the media and politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or perceptions of the

103 Ibid., pp.4-9
105 Ibid., 219
public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy initiative or reform has resulted. Asking the question, ‘How do you measure the influence of independent policy research institution?’ Misses the point. It is more important to ask first, what do they do that is relevant, and how? In nut shell, while it is difficult to accurately measure the extent to which think tanks influence specific policy decision, it is possible to identify the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. By doing so, one can begin to observe how and to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in Washington’s decision making network.

Think tanks recognise their specific role in the policy making process. Some think tanks find that their utility will be in helping to frame the parameters of public debates. This can be accomplished, as several think tanks have discovered, by appearing as regular guests on network newscasts and political talk shows, publishing articles in newspapers, producing documentaries on cable networks, enlisting the support of high level policy makers to endorse their publications, and sponsoring public lectures and workshops for academics, students, journalists, elected officials, and members of the private sectors. If this is the main objective of some think tanks, then it is possible to assess their relevance and relative influence during the agenda setting stage of the policy making process. Though labour intensive, data on print and broadcast media visibility of think tanks can be obtained. In examining the media visibility of think tanks in the United States, Kent Weaver and Andrew Rich offer some interesting observations about the various factors that may influence a think tank’s media profile. Among other things, they discovered that the size and location of think tanks correlate highly with the amount of media exposure institutions generate. Large think tanks located inside the Beltway receive considerably more

106 McGann, Think Tanks and PolicyAdvice in the US, Foreign Policy Research Institute, August, 2005
107 Diane Stone, n.104, p.219
coverage in major US newspapers, many of which are based in Washington, than smaller think thanks in other parts of the country.¹⁰⁸

Conversely, if some think tanks regard their primary role as influencing Congress, a goal acknowledge by Heritage Foundation President, Edwin Feulner then the performance indicators they rely on to assess their impact and the strategies they employ to improve them, will differ. Convinced that scholarly publications alone could not significantly influence the outcome of policy debates, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation and other advocacy think-tanks began to develop a variety of marketing and lobbying techniques to capture the attention of decision-makers.¹⁰⁹

**Competing in the Market Place of Ideas**

Think tanks vary considerably in terms of size and scope, financial resources and areas of specialisation, yet they appear to rely on similar governmental and nongovernmental channels to enhance their visibility - in the policymaking community. However, the various strategies think-tanks employ to market their ideas may depend as much on the audience they are attempting to reach and the importance they assign to a particular policy issue, as on the financial resources they are able to draw on. For instance, the Heritage Foundation has repeatedly stated that its main target audience is Congress.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, think-tanks, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Brookings Institution, which attempt to reach a more diverse audience including policy-makers, civil servants, academics and university students, assign a much higher priority to producing scholarly analyses than to lobbying members of Congress. As a result, they allocate a considerably higher percentage of their animal budget to research than to marketing.¹¹¹

Recognising that all think-tanks do not share the same commitment to research or the desire to be lured into the political arena, they continue to rely on many channels to transmit their ideas to their target audience. While many of these channels can be pursued. Independently and for a variety of purposes, think-tanks frequently rely on a combination of them in an attempt to influence the content and outcome of key political debates. The 1993 vote in Congress over the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the ongoing discussions in Congress and the Executive over health care reform, are but two examples of when think-tanks have sought to influence important policy issues. It is difficult to measure the extent to which think-tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in policy communities, are able to influence specific decisions in the White House and on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, their efforts to inform policy-makers about the implications associated with a wide range of issues deserve closer attention. 112

Although often overlooked, think-tanks appear to make the greatest contribution to the development and refinement of ideas during presidential elections. As Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution points out:

[I]t is during this period that presidential candidates solicit [the advice of a vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions on a host of domestic and foreign policy issues. Presidential candidates exchange ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign trail. It's like a national test marketing strategy. 113

In several recent elections, presidential candidates have even publicly endorsed blueprints written by think-tanks which outlined the key domestic and foreign policy priorities for the incoming administration. 114

In addition to participating in campaigns and contributing independent studies for candidates to digest, think-tanks depend on a number of other strategies to reach decision-makers. Among the most common methods think-

---

112 Ibid., 66
113 Interview With Dr Martin Anderson, 19 March 1990, Quoted in Donald E. Abelson, American Think Tanks and Their Role in U.S Foreign Policy, pp.66-67
114 Annual Reports 2007 (Brooking Institute, Council On Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation)
tanks employ is to invite members of Congress, the Executive, the bureaucracy and their staff as well as journalists and other opinion leaders to lunches, dinners, seminars and conferences. Since think-tanks are constantly releasing new studies and discussing ongoing research programs with government officials and academics, these forums offer an opportunity for scholars from think-tanks to showcase their ideas.

To reinforce their ideas, some think-tanks offer courses on various aspects of American politics and invite policy-makers to participate in their programs. For instance in 1978, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) established the Washington School to educate policy-makers about a wide range of foreign and domestic policy issues. According to Scott Powell, an ardent critic of the IPS, the organisation created the Washington School to provide a forum for IPS scholars to exchange views with policy-makers.

To facilitate the exchange of ideas between think-tank scholars and Washington policy-makers on critical domestic and foreign policy issues, the Hoover Institution established the Washington Seminars in 1980 under the direction of Associate Director and Senior Fellow Richard T. Burress. According to a Hoover Institution memo circulated in February 1990:

When the seminars first began, one major fact was evident: many of the Washington participants had never met before or were only slightly acquainted. The significance of this point was illustrated by one participant who wrote, 'I found it particularly useful to come to know some of my colleagues from Washington ... a few days together at Stanford did wonders for communication among the Senate staff establishment'.

Since the program started, the Hoover Institution has held over a dozen two-day seminars involving approximately 12 to 15 participants. The seminars, which focus on a specific theme, are led by one or two Hoover scholars.

116 Donald E. Abelson, n 111, p 67
117 Ibid p 67
118 Ibid p 68
Discussions on foreign policy however, are more broad-based. The seminars have been attended by Democratic and Republican members of the House of Representatives and Congressional staff members from the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Budget, Armed Services, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Intelligence, and the offices of the Senate Majority Leader and the House Speaker, Minority Leader and Majority Whip.  

The seminars are usually followed up by meetings in Washington to bring together individuals who have participated in the program, Hoover scholars and other government officials. According to the Hoover Institution, "these meetings and seminars are now playing a critical role in the ongoing dialogue between scholars and policy-makers, which is so important to the effective development and implementation of legislative and executive department policies and programs".  

By presenting lectures at universities; professional and trade associations, government seminars and policy research institutions, think-tank scholars can also showcase their own ideas. As Howard Wiarda, former Director of the Center for Hemispheric Studies at the American Enterprise Institute points out, "at some future time when a policy-maker is looking for someone to give him advice, he [may] call on the speaker he heard at one of these forums".  

Gaining access to various media outlets also provides members of think-tanks with an opportunity to transmit their ideas to policy-makers and to impress potential donors. By appearing as regular guests on network newscasts and a host of political talk shows, think-tank analysts are not only able to enhance their exposure but that of the institutions they represent.  

120 Ibid.  
121 Howard J Wiarda, Foreign Policy Without Illusion: How Foreign Policy Making Works and Fails to Work in the United States (Glenview, Illinois; Scott, Foreman/Little Brown, 1990), p.18  
122 Donald E. Abelson, n.111, pp.68-69  
According to Dr N. Glenn Campbell, former director of the Hoover Institution, think-tanks encourage their scholars to submit op-ed articles to prominent American newspapers on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{124} He states:

In addition to books, a program has been devised to get these ideas before the general public in a timely fashion in daily newspapers throughout the country. We urge scholars to extend their writing beyond books and professional journals into the general public arena. Research results in the form of short essays written by scholars are sent to newspapers for publication on the page opposite the editorial page.\textsuperscript{125}

During their annual fund-raising campaigns, directors of think-tanks often approach corporate sponsors armed with statistics on how many opted articles were written by their scholars in the past year and the number of times their staff members appeared on radio and television talk shows and newscasts. The names of their staff who are currently serving in high level government positions and former officials who are working in their think-tank are also proudly waived before prospective donors.\textsuperscript{126}

Think-tanks are acutely aware of the importance of attracting funding. However, at the same time, they cannot afford to ignore the needs of 'policy-makers, the primary consumers of think-tank knowledge. Since scholars in think-tanks, unlike academics in universities, are expected to produce timely and policy relevant studies, policy-makers are turning increasingly to think-tanks for information and advice. Realising this, some think-tanks have taken additional steps to capture and maintain their attention.\textsuperscript{127}

The American Enterprise Institute was the first think-tank to recognize the importance of providing succinct and informative analyses to policymakers. Yet, few organisations have been as successful in this regard as the Heritage Foundation, the quintessential advocacy think-tank. Specialising in 'quick response' public policy research, the Heritage Foundation can provide each

\textsuperscript{124} W. Glenn Campbell, 'The Role of Think Tanks in Public Policy; An Address to the Tuesday Morning Forum, Los Altos, California, 4 April, 1989, p.6
\textsuperscript{125} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n. 111}, p.69
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, p.69
member of Congress and the Executive with hand-delivered executive summaries of current public policy issues within 24 hours. In their one to two page Executive Memoranda, researchers at the Heritage Foundation outline what they consider to be critical information on issues being considered on Capitol Hill and in the White House. As the Heritage Foundation points out in its 1990 Annual Report, our 'entire communications' strategy is based on a simple premise: that policy-makers usually don't have the time to wade through and interpret long, complex books and reports, let alone much of the legislation they're being asked to vote on'. Since the Heritage Foundation admits that its premise role is to influence the Washington public policy community, it is not surprising that it inundates members of Congress and Executive with its policy views. In addition to the Executive Memoranda, the Heritage Foundation distributes several other brief reports to inform and educate policymakers.130

In the process of increasing their exposure in the policy-making community by relying on the aforementioned channels, think-tank scholars are able to establish valuable contacts throughout government. The presence of former high-level officials at think-tanks also plays a pivotal role in facilitating access to key decision-makers. As former Secretary of State George Shultz notes, 'a prominent political person around a think-tank opens up multiple channels for think-tank specialists'.131 Placing the names of former high level decision-makers on their institutional letterhead also helps think-tanks attract research funding.132

There are several examples of former government officials who have sought refuge in or returned to think-tanks after leaving public office. For

128 Phil McCombs, 'Building a Heritage in the War of Ideas', also see, Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., 'Ideas, Think Tanks and Governments', The Heritage lectures, no.51, 1985.
129 Donald E. Abelson, n.111, p.70
129 Ibid, p.70
130 Ibid, p.70
131 Interview With Secretary of State George Shultz, 19 March 1990, Queted in Donald E. Abelson, n.111, p. 70.
instance, following his defeat in 1976, President Ford established an affiliation with the American Enterprise Institute. Similarly, after completing her responsibilities as US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick returned to AEI. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also joined AEI after President Bush's election defeat. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, accepted a position at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in 1980, joining other such luminaries as Henry Kissinger, Harold Brown, Admiral William Crowe and James Schlesinger. Following the completion of their responsibilities in the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Shultz took up residence at the Hoover Institution, while his colleagues, Richard V. Allen, William Bennett, Jack Kemp and Edwin Meese accepted positions at the Heritage Foundation. Meese and Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's first National Security Adviser, who now heads his own Washington, DC consulting firm, also maintain an affiliation with the Hoover Institution. Some prominent decision-makers in the Bush administration have also established close ties to think-tanks. For instance, following his election defeat, Vice President Dan Quayle discovered that the Hudson Institute in Indianapolis, Indiana provided him with a congenial environment to contemplate his political future.\textsuperscript{133}

Given the amount of expertise available at these and other think tanks, it is not surprising policy-makers frequently turn to them for advice. And in exchange for providing their insight on important policy questions, think-tank scholars are rewarded in a number of ways. On some occasions, they are invited as experts to testify on a wide range of topics before committees and subcommittees of Congress. For instance in 1991, 46 members from the Brookings Institution, 18 members from the American Enterprise Institute and 16 members from the Economic Strategy Institute testified before congressional committees.\textsuperscript{134} Appearing before congressional committees and

\textsuperscript{132} Donald E. Abelson, n.111, p.70
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{134} R.Kent Weaver, Brookings Institution, \textit{Think Tanks the Media}, Table: 12
subcommittees provides think-tank scholars with an important channel through which to comment directly on proposed legislation. It also allows some think-tanks to establish greater credibility in the eyes of decision-makers.  

Moreover, think-tanks serve as 'prime recruiting grounds for new government talent'. As Kent Weaver notes, incoming administrations frequently turn to research institutions to fill vacant posts. He writes:

Think-tanks' role as a supplier of personnel to government is in large measure a result of the permeability of administrative elites. Unlike in most parliamentary systems, cabinet ministers in the United States are not drawn exclusively from parliamentary caucuses, and senior department officials are not drawn primarily from the public service. There are multiple paths to such government posts, a lot of posts to be filled whenever an administration changes, and a lot of ex-government officials who cycle out of government service but want to remain involved in policy formation. Think-tanks fit naturally into this system in the United States.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations relied extensively on think tank scholars to fill high-level posts. As noted, President Carter recruited dozens of members from the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution and a handful of other 'liberal' think tanks to serve in his administration. President Reagan on the other hand drew heavily on the talent pool of scholars available at more conservative think-tanks such as the Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Committee on the Present Danger and the Heritage Foundation to implement his Conservation agenda. During and after his 1992 campaign victory, President Clinton also tapped into the expertise available at some Washington, DC think-tanks. He invited a number of scholars affiliated with a group of Washington-based think-tanks, including the Progressive Policy Institute and the Economic Policy Institute, to occupy high-level positions in his administration.

135 Donald E Abelson, n 111, p 71
136 Howard, Warda, Foreign Policy Without Elusion How Foreign Policy Making Works and Fails to Work in the United states (Glenview, Illinois Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 1990), p 170
137 R Kent Weaver, n 123, p 170
138 Donald E Abelson, n 111, pp 71-72
By serving in the Executive, the bureaucracy or on the staff of congressional committees and subcommittees, think-tank scholars have a unique opportunity to contribute to policy development. Instead of simply commenting on US foreign policy in a scholarly study, they often find themselves in a position to help shape America's role in world affairs. Moreover, once think-tank scholars accept government posts, they are in a better position to recommend their former colleagues for various jobs. \(^{139}\)

Developing and strengthening their ties to government officials is vital for think-tanks. Unless they are able to create an extensive network of contacts throughout the governmental hierarchy, they will have little input into the formulation of policy positions. Consequently, it is not surprising that Washington's leading think-tanks devote so much time and effort to building alliances with members of Congress and the Executive.

**Ties with government officials**

Think Tanks also recognize the importance of solidifying ties to officials in the major institutions responsible for international relations: the State Department, the Defence Department and the National Security Council (NSC). Obtaining access to the various Presidential advisory boards concerned with foreign policy is an additional avenue think tanks rely on to convey their ideas. \(^{140}\)

The State Department does maintain formal ties with several think tanks through its diplomats in Residence programme. Between assignments, diplomats can take up residence at think tanks to write, conduct research and deliver lectures. Diplomats have been assigned to the American Enterprises Institutes, the Hoover Institution, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the RAND Corporation, the council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International peace and more recently, the Heritage

\(^{139}\) *Ibid.*, p.72

\(^{140}\) *Ibid.*, p.72
The State Department usually sends diplomats to think tanks to conduct research. At the Department of Defence, the views of some research institutions are highly valued and acted upon. In a study, the *Wizards of Armageddon*, Fred Kaplan examines in intimate detail how, for over three decades, defence strategies at the RAND Corporation helped develop America’s military strategy. Specialising in the tactics of conventional and nuclear warfare, the RAND Corporation, with the assistance and support of Department of Defence officials, was in effect able to serve as an extension of the Pentagon.

The relationship between the RAND Corporation and the Department of Defence reveals that some contract research institutions have been able to obtain a strong foothold in the decision-making process. Defence strategies at the RAND Corporation helped develop America’s military strategies. Specialising in the tactics of conventional and nuclear warfare, the RAND Corporation, with the assistance and support of the Department of Defence officials, was in effect able to serve as an extension of the Pentagon. The Institute for Naval Analysis, the Hudson Institutes, and the Urban Institute are other examples of contract think tanks which have assigned various government departments formulate policy positions key domestic and foreign policy issues.

In the white house, members of think tanks have several opportunities to contribute to policy development. By participating on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (PEPAB), the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB) and the President’s general Advisory Committee on Arms Control and

---

142 Donald Abelson. n. p. 74
144 Donald E. Abelson, *n 111*, p. 75
Disarmament (GAC), think tanks scholars can have a direct impact on the foreign policy pursued by the Presidents.\textsuperscript{146}

By serving on the PFIAB, policy advisors have access to highly sensitive informations. They are in a position to provide direct input into foreign policy decision made by the President.

Participating on other advisory boards provides members of the think tanks with additional opportunities to become involved in the foreign policy making process. The President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB), which was created by President Ford on the recommendation of the Rockefeller commission, afford think tanks scholars such an opportunity. The purpose of the three member’s board is to monitor the activities of the intelligence community and to advice the President as to the legality and propriety of intelligence activities. In 1981, President Reagan asked W.Glenn Cambell to chair PIOB. Cambell, who was also a member of PIOB, was still serving as director of the Hoover Institution at the time of his joint appointment.\textsuperscript{147}

In addition to these, President receives advice on the wide range of domestic and foreign economic policies from the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (PEPAB). The idea of establishing the PEPAB was conceived by Martin Anderson and modeled after the PFIAB. Convinced that such a body could play a valuable role in assiting him implement his economic agenda, President Reagan announced the creation of the twelve member PEAPAB on 10 februrary, 1981. Other than Anderson, who serves as the Board’s secretary, the PEPAB included a number of economist from prominent think tanks, such as Arthur Bruns (American Enterprise Institute), Milton Fridman (Hoover Institution), Pual McKraken (AEI), Herbert Stein (AEI), and Thomas Sowell (Hoover Institution).\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{146} Donald E. Abelson. \textit{n.111}, p. 75
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, p.77
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, p.78
Through various institutional channels, think tanks have become actively involved in the policy making process. Whether by inviting members of Congress and Executive to seminars and conferences or by accepting high-level government or advisory positions, think tanks scholars have establish ties to key policy makers. Yet, while think tanks continue to devote considerable resources to establishing and strengthening their ties to decision-makers, they are relying increasingly on the media to enhance their visibility in the policy making community.

**Media and Think Tanks:**

The print and broadcast media in the United States have come depend increasingly on a handful of prominent policy specialist to provide succinct and informative analyses of important domestic and foreign policy events. Among those called upon on a regular basis to share their political insights are Secretary of State, National Security Adviser to President, Secretary of Defence and Ambassador to UN and other States. While these individuals have held influential government positions and considered prominent political scientist, they share other common attributes. They are affiliated with prominent Washington think tanks. \(^{149}\)

By relying on policy experts from a number of think tanks to offer commentaries on a host of political issues, the media are attempting to provide their audience with a more comprehensive understanding of complex political issues. Yet, by doing so, they are permitting members of think tanks to gain access to important channels through which to influence and shape public opinion. While it is often difficult to accurately measure the extent to which policy experts can influence and alter public attitude, their willingness to use the media to advance the mandate of the organisations they present can be disregarded. Although the media can often benefit by soliciting the insight of

---

\(^{149}\) *Ibid.*, p.81
policy analyst in think tanks, the consequences of this symbiotic relationship may be less benign.\textsuperscript{150}

The emergence of advocacy think tanks in the late 1960s and early 1970s has had profound impact on the relationship between policy research institution and media. While early research institute were often mention in the popular press, the work they conduct and the government officials they advice were rarely revealed.\textsuperscript{151} However, for many new think tanks, exposing rather than concealing their activities has become a preferred method of operation.\textsuperscript{152}

As think tanks become more active participants in the decision-making process, and as the competitions for corporate funding intensified, directors of research institutions began to recognise the important role the media could play in transforming relatively obscure research organisations into prominent players in the policy making community. Rather than simply exchanging ideas with learned colleagues in a private board room, think tanks began to search for a more divers audience.\textsuperscript{153}

Few think tanks are more acutely aware of the vital role the media can play in transmitting their ideas to the American public than Heritage Foundation. As the foundation’s President, Edwin Feulner, points out, think tanks should skillfully advertise their research products, because like, manufactured goods must be properly marketed to capture the consumer’s attentions.\textsuperscript{154} It does not matters how many books and studies you produce’, you have to got market your product [and] get it off the bookshelf.\textsuperscript{155} Similarly the American Enterprise Institutes, Hoover Institution, Centre for Strategic and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 81
\item \textsuperscript{151} Deniel Guttman and Barry Wilner, \textit{The Shadow Government: The Government Multimillion Dollar Give a Way of its Decision Making Power to Private Management Consultants, Experts, and Think Tanks} (New York: Pantheon, 1976)
\item \textsuperscript{152} Angelia Herrin, ‘ offering the Best Thought: Think Tanks Go After Attention’, \textit{The Miami Herald}, 26 February 1989
\item \textsuperscript{153} Donald E Abelson, \textit{n 111}, p.82
\item \textsuperscript{155} Carol Matlack, ‘ Marketing Ideas’, \textit{National Journal}, 22 June 1991
\end{itemize}
International Studies and other influential think tanks that recognize the importance of attracting media attentions. ¹⁵⁶

In addition to encouraging its scholars to write op-ed articles for prestigious American newspapers and to accept invitations to appear on network newscast and political talk shows, on occasion purchased television time to sponsor programme advocating a political positions. ¹⁵⁷

It is difficult to ignore the vital contribution policy experts can make to increasing public awareness about the political, economic, and social dimensions of American domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, while the journalists will continue to rely on policy experts to provide political commentaries, they should realise that educating the public is not the sole objective of think tanks.

By becoming more aware of what motivates think tanks in the political arena, the American media will be in a better position to determine how and what extent the advice of policy experts should be solicited. In additions, by acquiring themselves with the ideological orientations of various policy research institutions, journalist will be better able to provide their audience with a balanced interpretation of political events. Conversely, if the media are committed to advance their own political and institutional agenda, they may consciously select those experts who will faithfully support their views. In other words, the political positions of policy experts, rather than their ability to provide an informative and quotable ten second bite, may ultimately determine which experts appear regularly on network newscast. ¹⁵⁸

Although network producers and journalist can limit the access of think tanks scholars to various media outlets, it is doubtful that when faced with the constant pressure of deadlines, they will have the ability and willingness to expand their golden Rolodex. As a result, it is unlikely that the

¹⁵⁶ Donald E Abalson, n 111, p 82
¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p 83
¹⁵⁸ Ibid, pp 89-90
small group of policy experts upon which the American media has come to rely will quickly disappear.\(^{159}\)

The increasing reliance of the media on policy experts will not change in the near future. Nor will the political motivations of think tanks. On the contrary, as policy research institutions continue to proliferate and compete for influence and funding in the United States, their desire to gain access to the news media will become even more pronounced. However, in the final analysis, only the media can determine how much exposure these organisations will be granted.\(^{160}\)

By relying on various governmental and non-governmental channels, think tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the political process, have attempted to influence the contents and outcome of major policy initiative. The effort of think tanks to become actively involved in the foreign policy making process has become a characteristic feature of contemporary policy research institutions. Whether on their own or as part of a network of organisations sharing similar concerns, think tanks are committed to influence the political agenda. By assuming the role lobbyist, many think tanks have revealed their primary functions. While some institutions continue to assign the highest priority to the advancement of knowledge, other has redefined their role in American politics. Rather than remaining disinterested observers of the political process, some think tanks have made a concerted effort to become part of it. Many think tanks have become more committed to influencing policy than to improving it. They are run like businesses whose performances are measured on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. But think tanks that promote a particular ideology, without having the expertise to substantiate their views, will not survive in the increasingly competitive marketplace of ideas; nor will think tanks that sacrifice scholarship for short-term public notoriety. Only those think tanks that maintain a healthy balance

\(^{159}\) Ibid., p.90
\(^{160}\) Ibid., p. 90
between scholarship and aggressive salesmanship will remain well entrenched in the policy-making process.\textsuperscript{161}

The notion that think tanks exercise political influence is easily criticised. Through both formal and informal avenues, think tanks become linked to centre of power. However, this potential is limited to policy innovation and the dissemination of ideas. There are number of reasons why the policy impact of institute is limited. First, outside the formal arenas of politics and without large constituencies, think tanks have little political power other than the intrinsic persuasiveness of their policy analysis. Most politicians and bureaucrats do not have the time or inclinations to read books-length studies or even executive summaries. Furthermore, bureaucrats act as gatekeepers sifting the information that lands on a minister’s desk. They may also present it as their own material. On the other hand, they criticise institutes for their lack of appreciations of the complexities of policy initiation and drafting legislations. Independent research and analysis competes with many other sources of advice which often have more direct routes of access to decision makers. Indeed, it may be that the end result of the interaction among academics, politicians, bureaucrats and other practitioners and experts that think tanks so enthusiastically pursue represents no more than the opportunity to interact.\textsuperscript{162}

While there are occurrences of think tanks being consulted by government, this \textit{ad-hoc}. Furthermore, political influence may be the result of luck or a host of other factors at work. The window of opportunity for think tanks may be greatest just before an election and early in the term of a new government when political executives are still establishing their priorities and think tanks are busy producing transitions documents. While staff of policy institutes can be shown to have a strong desire to influence policy, and while some are in positions of authority and have scope for influence, it is not

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{161} Donald E. Abelson, \textit{n.1}  \\
\textsuperscript{162} Diane Stone, \textit{n.104}, pp.105-121
\end{flushleft}
unequivocal evidence that that influence is exerted. The counter factual argument can be employed to limited degree. If think tanks are of negligible relevance, than they do.\textsuperscript{163}

Second, the commitment of most institutes to be educational, analytical organisations, that adhere to standards of dispassionate and rigorous research limits their political activity and erects professional or scholarly standards that restricts complete identification with the state, political parties or their sectional interests.\textsuperscript{164}

Third, independent policy research institutes are dependent organisation. The interest of funders places limits on the autonomy of institutes and constrains research agendas. Most of the American institutes are sustained in large proportion by foundations. In some, degree institutes are beholden to the funding priorities of foundations. Foundations executives and other sponsors have the ability to define what are emerging policy agendas and to legitimisation particular kinds of professional expertise.\textsuperscript{165} in the interests of continued existence and financial viability, institutes need to accommodate some of the expectations of funders. Institutes are also reliant on the academic world for theoretical advances, for scholars to undertake policy analysis with these new theoretical insights, and for scholarly regeneration. Furthermore, it is the formally defined power holders- legislators, bureaucrats, party officials and the judiciary – who are responsible for the selection and the persistence of ideas in policy and indeed, their incorporation into policy into policy networks. In the last, instance, think tanks are dependent on them for recognition and to see their policy recommendations implemented.\textsuperscript{166}

Perhaps the most demanding indictment of contemporary think tanks is that they are becoming more like interest groups or are being drawn into

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 220
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 220
interest group circles. This is particularly the case with the “think tanks and do tanks”. The majority new institutes do not make pretence of scientific, dispassionate and objective research and are open about their ideological disposition. But they draw a line at declaring an alliance with sectional interests in society. Yet, as think tanks become more penalised in conjunction with the requirement to be adversarial in advocating policy advice and analysis, they appear to be in cahoots with clearly identifiable groups. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy had good reputation for solid analysis on Middle East issues. It also has a clear affinity with the Jewish lobbying Washigton D.C and substantial financial support from the Jewish community.¹⁶⁷

There are systematic difficulties faced by think tanks in their interaction with government that limit their potential for influence. As they operate as ‘ginger groups’ they can be politically and bureaucratically dysfunctional. By elaborating on policy options, increasing the number of alternatives and outlining possible problems, these policy research bodies potentially overload collective decision making process, disrupt established programmes, undermine consensus and question the legitimacy of a government’s chosen policy. They provide the rhetorical weapons for opposition groups. Identifying flaws in policies or promoting superior policy design does not endear these organisations to politicians or bureaucrats. Consequently, ‘think tanks are not easy to integrate in to policy making system’. They question the accepted and debunk the habitual in contradiction to the inbuilt conservatism of bureaucracies. Traditional machineries of government are likely to dismiss their contributions to policy. Admitting this salience of independent policy research tacitly recognizes the flaws in the expertise and authority of bureaucracies. Finally, the desire to maintain their independence and distance from government

¹⁶⁶ Dian Stone, n.104, p.221
¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 225
may result in a self imposed restrain on the impact that independent policy units can have on policy.\textsuperscript{168}

There is multiple source of policy advice competing for the attention of policy makers. Departmental policy advice, from ministers’ office, party political advice, political advice from policy units, the recommendation of Congressional committees and outside advice are all sources of potentially conflicting forms of advice. The favored source of advice is subject to a variety of factors such as a leader’s personal preference to the avenues of access to that leader. Governments can also be characterised by closed advice circuits or group think where advisers and decision makers share values and policy approaches effectively excluding alternatives from consideration. Decision makers do not necessarily have time for think tanks research. As Alice Rivlin notes of Brooklyn scholars, none of us draft legislation, sit in committee markups, or even talk more than sporadically to those who do. President does not call to ask what we should do in Middle East? Or how can we balance the budget? Government officials do not call –at least not very often. Nor is it the case that the decision makers are even aware of think tanks, least of all their current research programmes. Further more, the vast growth of think tanks has not been replicated with super human abilities in decision makers to read and process the information churned out by think tanks and other groups. So, it quite different thing to say that think tanks policy recommendation thereby percolated into actual policy.\textsuperscript{169}

It can not be denied that the impact of even the best known think tanks on policy is modest. Policy making is mainly driven by interest, not by ideas. Despite the absence of proof and criticism, the impact of many institutions in helping to forge a consensus on foreign policy has been and remains pervasive. Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. The modern state depends on

\textsuperscript{168} Dian Stone, p 104, pp 105-106
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid, p 106
experts whose views on issues can provide the theories and rationale for policy legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only source of policy innovations as the there is a need to consult other interests for informations. Think tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying problems. Policy research institutes are most likely to inform policy when they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy community or discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned with agenda-setting, networking, research brokerage and the ways in which policy actors operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of problems and policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and shared values among experts and opinion leaders through their conferences, workshops and study groups, and thereby help determine the ubiquitous climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think tanks influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input of these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other words, power is not narrowly, conceived as behavioral and observable, but that power is structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision making. Through both informal and formal avenues, think tanks become linked to centres of power such as the state or corporate sector.

Policy institutes are on the margins of government but not in the government. There is enormous scope for the investigations of the mechanism that connect organisations on the margin of government with the conventional structures of government. While the approval of public policy remains with elected representatives and appointed officials, governments draw upon outside sources of advice and informations. Think tanks are shown to be a contemporary mode of interaction between the world of scholarship and inquiry and the domain of policy-making. In a world where knowledge,

170 James Smith, Strategic Calling: The Centre For Strategic and International Studies; 1962-92 (Washington, D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1993). P.74
171 Diane Stone, n.104, p.220
172 Ibid., pp.1-2
information and expertise are burgeonising, think tanks are an increasingly important mechanism for filtering and refining such resources in a relevant and usable manner.

The scholars and executive of think tanks act as policy entrepreneurs. Think tanks serve three functions: i, they promote ideas by pushing them higher on the public agenda. ii. they ‘soften up’ the system so that when a policy winded opens, an epistemic community’s ideas meet a receptive audience; and iii, they make the critical coupling of problem, policy and politics when a window of opportunity open.

Research brokerage and networking are the primary means by which think tanks make ideas matters. Research brokerage is a process of conveying social scientific knowledge from universities and research organization to the world of politics and decision making. In this process think tanks are often conceived as a bridge between academia and decision makers. They ‘occupy a space in the intellectual life, a society between universities, with their preoccupation on teaching and research, and the Civil Service with its preoccupation with day to day management of public policy.’ They run by ‘research brokerage’- people of initiative who build institutions where intellectual can work on policy issues- and who could also be called; discourse managers. Brokerage also occurs through the training and development of staffs. Staffs are required from universities, political parties, law firms, interest groups and government. Staffs experience and professional interaction is an important facet of communication. 173

Another form of brokerage occurs when policy institutes act as a forum for discussion and interaction through conferences, workshops, seminars, breakfast and luncheon meetings, television debates, working groups and annual dinners- functions that may be ‘ invite only’ or ‘ members only’, closed to the media or open to the interested public. Both

173 Ibid, pp.122-123
social functions and the more intensive working environment of seminars and meetings serve an intangible purpose of promoting interaction among people from diverse backgrounds who would not ordinarily meet but who have common interests. Importantly, think tanks provide neutral territory where people feel more comfortable and have an opportunity to mingle. Academics can meet practitioners, business people can discuss regularly policy with bureaucrats, and activists can confront politicians. \footnote{Ibid., p.126}
Chapter – V

Conclusion
CHAPTER- V

CONCLUSION

Decision influencers: US foreign policy and think tanks

In the present study an effort has been made to analyse the domestic inputs involved in the formulation of American foreign policy. Further, we have tried to see what are the objective and issues in American foreign policy in which decision makers seek information or think tanks doing research? Having this background in mind this study found that in the formulation of American foreign policy, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, Congress, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department; the Central Intelligence Agency, and the decision influencer like public opinion, Mass media are clearly defined. However, the role and functions of think tanks in the formulations of foreign policy has largely been ignored. Think tanks are an increasingly mechanism for refining and presenting knowledge and expertise in a relevant and usable manner. Accordingly, one of the main objectives of this study was to provide a picture of the independent policy research industry in American foreign policy making. A further objective was to investigate their policy relevance and the strategies by which think tanks hope to sensitize decision makers to change and educate them into specific solutions. This study also tries to see how and why many of these institutions have cast aside their scholarly objectivity to immerse themselves in Washington politics.

By discussing the growing involvement of think tanks in the policy making process and their efforts to shape major foreign policy debates, the literature on foreign policy decision-making can be further enhanced. Moreover, examining the interaction, which takes place between decision-makers and members of think tanks, shed additional light on how information and advice is transmitted to the highest levels of government. Furthermore, by monitoring the career path of think tanks scholars to government posts and of
former government officials to prominent think tanks, it is possible to further elaborate on the networks of influence, which have emerged between policy research institutions and political leaders.

Foreign policy generally refers to how the government of a state acts in relation to other states. It can also refer to what government do in relation to international organizations, multinational corporations, political and military organizations that are not state actors, and sometimes even prominent individuals.¹

Academics have sought to describe and explain U.S foreign policy through a variety of factors. Some of these factors involved the nature of the world faced by the United States as it formulates policy. Other factors relate to development and implementation of policy on a regional and global scale. Further sources of U.S foreign policy relate to the norms, historical experience, ideological preference, and perceptual biases of U.S policy makers and the U.S public. The mix and relative power of the interest groups seeking to influence U.S policy on any given issue present yet another important determinant of U.S foreign policy. Finally, U.S foreign policy is in some ways a product of the decision making process.²

The objective of US foreign policy serves first and foremost to promote the domestic well being of country. First, the country’s domestic well being presupposes its physical survival and that of its population. For this reason, security of population and territory represents one basic goal of US foreign policy. Ensuring the security of the US populations and territory, in turn requires that the United States acquire and maintain the capacity to identify and contain or eliminate threats that undermine the health and survival of the country. Second, the general well-being of the United States as a state depends on the continued economic prosperity of its citizens. In the context of

¹ Priya Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel Domestic Influences (Kolkata: Mulana Abul Kalam Azad. Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), P. 4
² C. Herrick and P.B. McRae, Issue in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Longman, 2003),
foreign policy, prosperity requires the United States to maintain, and where possible, promote the creation of international conditions that will allow the country and its citizenry to prosper economically. Finally, the US citizenry and its leadership have seen themselves as the guardians and promoters of a set of moral principles. These include the promotion of democracy and the respect for law. Through promoting these principles, the United States has expressed its moral values while ensuring its security and prosperity. ³

Understanding U.S foreign policy requires not only knowledge of facts but also knowledge of process. That is, it is not enough to know names and dates, but one must understand the significance of the actors and their place in history as well as the implication of this for the present. In order to understand better the larger foreign policy making process, one needs to focus on its components. Beginning with the centre of foreign policy making the President and the executive, this study gradually broadens the scope to other governmental forces, and then adds the influence of the American public. Finally, included the diverse pluralistic aspect in American society is studied.

The making of American foreign policy is a complex process. Both the legislative and executive branches play important role; the role are different, although frequently overlapping. Both branches have continuing opportunities to initiate and change foreign policy, and the interaction between them continues indefinitely throughout the life of a policy. The President as the chief spokesperson of the nation, directs government’s officials and machinery in the daily conduct of diplomacy, and has the principal responsibility for taking action to advance US foreign policy interest. Congress in its oversight responsibility can affect the course of policy through enactment of legalisation governing foreign relations through the appropriation or denial of funds. Experience has shown that cooperation between the two branches is necessary for a strong and effective US foreign policy.

³ Ibid.
To cope with the difficult task of formulating foreign policy, several government organisations were created after World War II. The departments such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defence Department, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and so forth, as well as the executive office of the President (National Advisor and other white house staffs). This policy-making machinery enhances United States capacity for coping with the complex process of foreign affairs.

This decentralisation of foreign policy making in the United States testifies to America’s expanding international concerns, to the interdependency of world economies, the growth of political and cultural internationalism, and the overlapping of social interests from human rights to the environment, from nutrition and health child labor, from the internet to genetic engineering and hormonal research. The world has gotten smaller and more complex. As a consequence, the pressures and players have multiplied, as has politics.

American foreign policy since the Spanish – American War of 1898 has sought to ensure U.S supremacy in the western Hemisphere. While at the same time asserting American influence widely around the globe. Until 1945, U.S foreign policy makers sought to fashion the United States into a great power, the equal of the major Europeans and contented with the Soviet Union, the other so- called super power. In the decade after the Cold War, it stood at apex of the international hierarchy. The men and women in charge U.S foreign policy have usually based their statecraft on the idea that the United States is in a unique position to provide balance and stability to world politics. In an era of increasing economic and cultural interdependence, or globalizations, the wealth. military power. and cultural diversity of the United States has helped officials promote the United States was bound to lead.4

There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the

---

4 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* (New York : Routledge, 2002)
beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of issues are associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity – since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant to US foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are wide ranges of issues – sustainable development, pandemic disease control, international resource management, and democratisation – that are important general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.\(^5\)

Making policies about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different actors and different types of decisions. In addition to the executive and legislative branches of government and the media, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. These include multitudes of lobby groups, business interest, trade union, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and like.\(^6\)

---

\(^5\) C. Herrick and P.B. McRae, *n.2.*
\(^6\) Fraser Cameron, *n.4.* p.82
Knowledge is central aspect of power. In this increasingly complex, interdependent and information rich world, government and individual policy makers face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in the governmental decisions making. Policy-makers need basic information about the world and the societies they govern how current policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely costs and consequences. As a matter of fact, in both information rich and poor societies policy makers need informations that are understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful.

The relationship between political leaders and those who advise them is critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. By providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and the bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting ideas into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United States continue to solicit the advice of experts in Universities, interest groups, professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and consulting agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy ideas. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organisational forms devoted to policy research, and they are often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making.

Public Policy Research, Analysis and Engagement Organizations (also known as Think Tanks) play a vital role in the political and policy arenas at the local and national level in the United States. Their function is unique, as they provide public policy research, analysis and advice, are non-profit, and operate independently from governments and political parties. While the primary function of these civil society organizations is to help government understand and make informed choices about issues of domestic and international concern, they also have a number of other critical roles, including:7

Playing a mediating function between the government and the public that helps builds trust and confidence in public officials;

Serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; 
Identifying, articulating, and evaluating current policy issues, proposals and programs:

Transforming ideas and emerging problems into policy issues;

Interpreting issues, events and policies for the electronic and print media thus facilitating;

Public understanding of domestic and international policy issues;

Providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process;

Facilitating the construction of “issue networks”;

Providing a supply of personnel for the legislative and executive branches of government;

Challenging the conventional wisdom, standard operating procedures and business as usual of bureaucrats and elected officials.

Among those concentrating on foreign policy, are the Council on Foreign Policy; the CFR is non-partisan and regards itself as most prestigious and influential think tanks. Its headquarters are in New York. But it has offices in Washington D.C and Chicago. The Brooking institution peruses a liberal research agenda and hosts regular seminars and working lunches to discuss foreign policy issues. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CISS). is also non-partisan but is regarded as leaning centre right, RAND has headquarters in Santa Monica, California and office in Washington D.C. it built its reputation in defence policy research for the US air fore but now covers a wide range of domestic issues in addition to national security themes. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Institute of peace, and the Woodrow Wilson centre are leading liberal thinkers with a strong focus on
conflict resolution issues. On the right of political spectrum are the American Enterprises Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the CATO Institute, and Nixon Centre.  

The activities involved in fulfilling these functions involve a balance between research, analysis and outreach. The range of activities that think tanks engage in include: framing policy issues, researching and writing books, articles, policy briefs and monographs, conducting evaluations of government programs; disseminating their research findings and conducting various outreach activities (public testimony before congress, media appearances and speeches); creating networks and exchanges via workshops, seminars, and briefings; and supporting midcareer and senior government officials when they are out of office (what it described as a “Human Resource Tank”).

Think tanks finance their activities by raising funds from private foundations, corporations, individuals and government grants and contracts and endowment income. The mix of funding varies from institution to institution but all institutions strive to have a diversified funding base in order to avoid being overly reliant a single funding stream or donor.

Think tanks are a diverse set of institutions that vary in size, financing, structure and scope of activity. There are currently well over 1,500 think tanks or political research centers in the US, around half of which are university affiliated institutions and approximately one-third of which are located in Washington, DC. Those think tanks that are not affiliated with academic institutions, political parties or interest groups are described as freestanding or independent think tanks.

The 25-30 top think tanks in the US have a highly diversified research agenda that covers a broad range of policy issues on both the domestic and international fronts. However, since 1980 the vast majority of think tanks that have been established in America are specialized. These “Specialty” or

---

8 Cameron Frasser, *n 4*, pp. 102-3
9 James McGann, *n 7*, p.3
“Boutique” think tanks focus their activities on a single issue (i.e. global warming) or area of public policy (i.e. national security).¹⁰

Think tanks often play the role of insiders and become an integral part of the policy process, such as the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute, which provide research and analysis for key agencies within the government, or as outsiders like the Economic Policy Institute and the Heritage Foundation, which attempt to get their ideas incorporated into policy by conducting research and analysis that is then aggressively marketed to policy elites and the public. There is often a clash within these institutions and in the policy community between those who believe that think tanks should be “scholarly and objective” and those who feel they must be “policy relevant” and get their research in the hands of policy makers in order to have any value. This is an age-old tension between the world of ideas and the world of policy. This tension is best expressed by Plato in the Republic when he writes: “There can be no good government until philosophers are kings and the king’s philosophers.” The academic oriented school believes that think tanks should adhere to academic research standards and focus on big picture and longer term issues while the policy relevance school believes that think tanks should be more policy oriented and thus focus more on the needs of policy makers and current policy issues.¹¹

The administrations and Congress rely heavily on the think tanks community for a great deal of analytical input and public policy advice. The frequent personnel movement back and forth among the ranks of the administration, Congress, and the think tanks ensure that the output is policy orientated. In addition to a vast output of publications, both of an advocacy and independent scholarly nature, the think tanks stage a continuous menu of conference, workshops, seminars, and lectures, on a wide variety of foreign and security policies issues. They provide a common meeting ground for frequent

¹⁰ Ibid., p.3
¹¹ Ibid., p.3
interchange of views and networking among policy makers, diplomats, legislators, business, and academia, media and the NGO community.\textsuperscript{12}

The literature on American foreign policy making continues to grow, but only recently has the participation of think tanks in the policy formation process been discussed. The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy making process requires scholars to reevaluate various models and theories developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. This is not to suggest that contemporary theories and models of foreign policy decisions making need to be supplemented, but rather that their parameters should be expanded to take into consideration how think tanks identify and shape policy issues and problems. By treating think tank as an important input into the policy making process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors competing for power in the political arena.\textsuperscript{13}

**Assessment of Policy Research**

Think tanks have a long history of playing an important role in the formulation of domestic and international policy in the US. The origins of think tanks can be traced to America's Progressive-era traditions of corporate philanthropy, its sharp distinction between legislative and executive branches of government (which creates few barriers to entry into the policy making process), the desire to bring knowledge to bear on governmental decision making and inclination to trust the private-sector to “help government think.” As think tanks have grown in number and stature, scholars and journalists have begun to examine more closely the many factors that have led to their proliferation, factors that include a:\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Cameron Frasser, \textit{n 4}, p.98
\textsuperscript{14} James McGann, \textit{n. 7}, pp. 3-5
Division of power between the three branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial) and the levels of government (states and federal government)

Political system that has weak political parties that exhibit little or no party discipline

Highly developed philanthropic and civil culture

Public that has a healthy distrust of government and prefers a limited role for government

Proclivity of citizens to join and support interest groups rather than political parties to represent their interest and express their policy preferences

Political system that has many points of access

Tendency to embrace independent experts over politicians or bureaucrats

Clearly the permeable, decentralized and pluralistic nature of American political culture or what some have described as “American Exceptionalism” is the driving force behind the growth and diversity present among the more than 1,500 think tanks in the US. Think tanks have flourished despite the growth in staff in the legislative and executive branches of government, which has raised questions about what value they add to the thinking being done by the professional bureaucrats and congressional staffers. The perception is that think tanks can often do what government bureaucracies cannot. Specifically, think tanks are:

More effectively future-oriented than government research functionaries, who work in an environment in which efforts at creative disruption are rarely rewarded;

More likely to generate reconfigured policy agendas, while bureaucracies thrive on the security-maximizing environment of standard operating procedures;
And better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of researchers for a common purpose because they have no permanent vested interest in any one domain.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition, think tanks aid the intellectual synthesis that comes from breaking down bureaucratic barriers. They are uniquely suited to do this because they are:

- Better able to disseminate relevant policy research within government than government agencies themselves, for no jealousies attach to proprietary rights;
- And better able to "telescope" the policy function (i.e., from data collection to knowledge to conceiving means of implementation) than government bureaucracies, which may be internally segmented along such lines.\textsuperscript{16}

Yet, despite their appeal, on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated. A distinctively American phenomenon, the independent policy research institution has shaped U.S. global engagement for nearly 100 years. But because think tanks conduct much of their work outside the media spotlight, they garner less attention than other sources of U.S. policy — like the jostling of interest groups, the maneuvering between political parties, and the rivalry among branches of government.\textsuperscript{17}

Policy impact is a difficult task from the margins. Think tanks are not part of government processes. It is impossible to establish a causal link between the activities of think tanks and policy outcomes. A particular policy and its implementation can rarely be attributed to the influence of once organization. There are variety of intermediary forces such as political parties,
bureaucracies, interest group and the media. Furthermore, think tanks are not successful in all their activities or at all stages of the policy process. They have selective impact according to issue and circumstances, and are involved more in the innovation and diffusion of policy ideas than their adoption or implementation by the government. The complexities of the making process create a gap between the inputs of policy institutes and the outputs of policy making. It could also mean that think tanks have zero impact. This hiatus prevents measurement of their impact.\textsuperscript{18}

Moreover, rarely is there a one to one correspondence between a book or a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous intervening forces that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud any cause and effect relationship that may exist between policy institutes and government decision-making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof of it is elusive and, at best, anecdotal. Think tanks indicators such as media citations or appearances of staffs before Congress and committees merely signify that think tanks have attracted the attentions of the media and politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or perceptions of the public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy initiative or reform has resulted. Asking the question, ‘How do you measure the influence of independent policy research institutes?’ Misses the point. It is more important to ask first, ‘what do they do that is policy relevant, and how?’\textsuperscript{19}

The principal task of the large US think tanks is to generate policy relevant knowledge and provide information for political and business elites as well as the public at large. Over the last 20 years think tanks have placed increasing emphasis on disseminating their research, appearing in the media and conducting public outreach programs. Think tanks often employ professionals with experience in marketing and public relations in order to facilitate the dissemination of information. Think tanks employ a wide range of

\footnotesize{18 Stone, Diane, \textit{Capturing the Political Imagination Think Tanks and the Policy Process}, Frank Cass Publication, 2002., p.4
19 \textit{Ibid}, p.238}
methods to accomplish the vital goal of effectively propagating information, including:

**a) Seminars, Conferences and Briefings:** Think tanks make a conscious effort to target their audience with a range of lectures, seminars, conferences, expert meetings, and individual or group briefings. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for example, reports that it stages around 700 events of this kind every year, and the annual report of the AEI generally lists 200 such occasions.\(^{20}\)

**b) Publications:** As a rule, the large US think tanks also operate as highly productive publishing houses, generating both traditional and, increasingly, multimedia publications. In addition to numerous print publications (e.g., Brookings stages press conferences and readings to launch new publications), each think tank today also publishes its very own high-quality journal or magazine several times a year (e.g., the Cato Journal appears three times a year, and The American Enterprise every two months). Such publications also carry work by external analysts and academics (e.g., Foreign Policy from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, or Foreign Affairs from the Council on Foreign Relations). Similarly, institutions often also print a number of quickly and easily produced newsletters and information brochures as well as policy briefs on individual topics. Finally, some think tanks provide special information services via fax or e-mail, which comment on the day’s political and economic developments. Such daily analyses are often sent free of charge to members of Congress, government representatives, and top business executives.

One of the most important tools for any think tank is its website. Today, almost every think tank publishes an extensive range of information online, which serves to reach the public at large. Most think tank websites also carry speeches, commentaries by the fellows, conference reports and programs,

---

\(^{20}\) James McGann, *n. 7*, pp. n. 4-7
synoptic analyses, book abstracts, biographies of their experts, information on events and, increasingly, video and audio clips, all of which can be downloaded free of charge. At the same time, a website will publish information on research topics, research programs, and the think tank’s organizational structure. It will also provides details for contacting specific institution members and offers information for those who wish to apply as visiting fellows, general employees, or interns (e.g. the AEI employs almost 100 interns each year). 21

c) The media: Journalists looking to fill column inches or program slots profit from the expertise of think tank employees. In turn, the think tank and the expert concerned gain a wide forum for the opinion expressed – and sometimes even certain renown as a result of the direct media exposure. Think tank analysts are quoted as experts in the print media and appear on television and radio news programs as well as on talk shows. Numerous think tank experts regularly publish their work, sometimes in their very own newspaper columns, but mostly in the form of op-ed pieces. The large number of online political magazines also represents an increasingly important forum for publication of such contributions. Similarly, other forms of electronic media are also playing an increasingly important role for presenting both the think tank itself and its employees. The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, for example, has a regular radio program called “Dialogue,” which is broadcast by more than 200 stations and already has around 200,000 listeners. The Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation both have their own TV studios and two think tank experts from the AEI each have their very own weekly show broadcast by the US public television station PBS. Many of their think tank colleagues appear several times a week as regular political commentators on CNN and other cable channels. 22

d) Relations with government agencies: The US think tanks are particularly concerned with maintaining lines of communication to members of Congress

21 Ibid., pp. 4-7
22 Ibid., pp. 4-7
and their staff, administration officials, federal judges, and representatives from state and local bodies. Think tank experts regularly testify at Congressional hearings and also hold individual briefings for members of Congress and the administration as well as their staff. In turn, government officials and members of Congress are invited to speak at think tank events, which provide them with opportunities to test out political ideas or initiatives on “neutral ground” in front of an audience of experts. A number of the major think tanks also stage regular meetings and discussion forums in an effort to develop formal networks with government representatives. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations has a Congress and US Foreign Policy Program, which brings together Congressional staff members from both major parties. Additionally, members of Congress also serve on the board of directors of numerous US think tanks. Some US think tanks purposely cultivate close links to political circles, since many of them — most notably the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute — obtain a significant portion of their budget from contract work (research projects, producing studies, preparatory work for legislation) for various US government agencies.  

It can not be denied that the impact of even the best known think tanks on policy is modest. Policy making is mainly driven by interest, not by ideas. Despite the absence of proof and criticism, the impact of many institutions in helping to forge a consensus on foreign policy has been and remains pervasive. Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. The modern state depends on experts whose views on issues can provide the theories and rationale for policy legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only source of policy innovations as the there is a need to consult other interests for informations. Think tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying problems. Policy research institutes are most likely to inform policy when they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy community or discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned

---

23 Ibid., pp. 4-7
with agenda-setting, networking, research brokerage and the ways in which policy actors operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of problems and policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and shared values among experts and opinion leaders through their conferences, workshops and study groups, and thereby help determine the ubiquitous climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think tanks influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input of these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other words, power is not narrowly conceived as behavioral and observable, but that power is structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision making. Through both informal and formal avenues, think tanks become linked to centres of power such as the state or corporate sector.

Given the extensive ties between think tanks and government departments and agencies, as well as the frequency with which their members are appointed to higher level government positions, one cannot afford to disagree their growing involvement in the policy-making process. Through publishing brief and full length studies on a wide range of policy issues inviting decision-makers to conferences and seminars, providing commentaries on network newscasts, establishing liaison offices to develop and maintain contact with members of congress and the Executive, serving on various Presidential boards, commissions, election task forces and transition teams and giving testimony before congressional committees and subcommittees, think-tanks have become permanent fixtures in the policy formation process. Though not generally considered to be part of the formal structure of the American government for decades think tanks have managed to operate effectively within its parameters.

25 Diane Stone, *n 18*, p.220
27 . James A. Smith, *n 24*, p 62
Policy institutes are on the margins of government but not in the government. There is enormous scope for the investigations of the mechanism that connect organisations on the margin of government with the conventional structures of government. While the approval of public policy remains with elected representatives and appointed officials, governments draw upon outside sources of advice and informations. Think tanks are shown to be a contemporary mode of interaction between the world of scholarship and inquiry and the domain of policy-making. In a world where knowledge, information and expertise are burgeoning, think tanks are an increasingly important mechanism for filtering and refining such resources in a relevant and usable manner.

Yet, despite their appeal, only a fraction of the estimated 1,500 think tanks in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-making circles. The Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, Rand, and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently referred to in the media.

In the last twenty years, think tanks have undergone major changes. From institutions committed to scholarly research to organizations largely engage in political advocacy, think tanks have redefined their mission in American politics. Should the trend towards political advocacy continue, the type of think tanks that were created in the early twentieth century would gradually cease to exist? Taking their place will be political research organizations specialising in lobbying members of Congress, the Executive and the bureaucracy.

While policy-makers are often drawn to the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the RAND Corporation Institution and the number of other research institutions because of their expertise in a particular era, some think tanks have had to employ aggressive marketing and lobbying.
strategy to capture the attention of decision-makers. As hundreds of think tanks emerged in around the Washington during and after the World War II, policy research institutions devoted considerable resources to determining the most effective methods to reach decision makers.\textsuperscript{29}

In the early 1900s, it is doubtful that this question would have been posed. In establishing their think tanks, Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie and Herbert Hoover, among others, made a concerted effort to insulate their institutions from partisan politics. Recognizing that the pursuit of scholarly inquiry had to be protected from political interest, founders of early twentieth century think tanks sought to safeguard their institutions from the vicissitudes of American politics. Although the Brooking Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and other think tanks created in the progressive era provided decision-makers with advice on various public policy issues, their primary objective was not to impose their political and ideological agenda on the American public, but to enhance the economic and political interest of the United States.\textsuperscript{30}

However, while few observers of American politics may have pondered such a question in the first half of the twentieth century, it has become a legitimate and important question to ask in light of the changing role of think tanks in the United States. Encouraged by the meteoric success of the Heritage Foundation in capturing the attention of the Regan administrations, advocacy think tanks began to take root in and around the nation's capital. Convinced that scholarly publications alone would not persuade members of Congress and the Executive to implement their policy ideas, the Heritage and other advocacy think tanks began to rely on several strategies to influence the content and outcome of major policy debates. Moreover, as the number of think tanks entering the marketplace of ideas increased, so too did the competition

\textsuperscript{29} Donald Abelson, \textit{n.13}, p.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}
between them to attract the attention of decision-makers and the contributions of potential donors. \(^{31}\)

By relying on various governmental and non-governmental channels, think tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the political process, have attempted to influence the contents and outcome of major policy initiative. The effort of think tanks to become actively involved in the foreign policy making process has become a characteristic feature of contemporary policy research institutions. Whether on their own or as part of a network of organisations sharing similar concerns, think tanks are committed to influence the political agenda. By assuming the role lobbyist, many think tanks have revealed their primary functions. While some institutions continue to assign the highest priority to the advancement of knowledge, other has redefined their role in American politics. Rather than remaining disinterested observers of the political process, some think tanks have made a concerted effort to become part of it. Many think tanks have become more committed to influencing policy than to improving it. They are run like businesses whose performances are measured on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. But think tanks that promote a particular ideology, without having the expertise to substantiate their views, will not survive in the increasingly competitive marketplace of ideas; nor will think tanks that sacrifice scholarship for short-term public notoriety. Only those think tanks that maintain a healthy balance between scholarship and aggressive salesmanship will remain well entrenched in the policy-making process.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.
Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congressional Record, Washington, DC, October, 1983.


U.S. Congress, Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Detente. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., August 15, 20 and 21, September 10, 12, 18, 19, 24 and 25, and October 1 and 8, 1974.


THINK TANKS ANNUAL REPORTS

Brooking Institution, Annual Reports (1999-2007);
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/0408_displacement.aspx

Carnegie and Endowment For International Peace, Annual Reports

Cato Institute, Annual Report, 2007;

Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, (1999-2007);
http://www.cfr.org/about/annual_report/index.html

Hoover Institute, Annual Reports (1999-2007);
http://www.hoover.org/pubaffairs/headlines/19076609.html

Hudson Institute, Annual Reports (1999-2003);
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=annual_report&pubType=HI_AnnualReports

Rand Corporation, Annual Reports (1995-2007);
www.rand.org/about/annual_report

The American Enterprises Institution (2004-2007);
http://www.aei.org/about/filter..contentID.20038142214000053/default.asp

The Heritage Foundation, Annual Reports (2002-2007);
http://www.heritage.org/about/reports.cfm

Urban Institute, Annual Reports, (1998-2007);
http://www.urban.org/about/report/index.cfm

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS


Kiger, Joseph C., Research Institution and Learned Societies, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982


LaFber, W., America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2000, Boston: Mcgraw Hill, 2002


Lindsay, J.M., Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.


M. Kumar, Approaches, Theoretical Aspect of International Politics,(Agra: Shivalal Agarwala & company),


Parsons, D. W., *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of*


Rose, Gideon and Hoge Jr., James F., (eds.), American Foreign Policy: Cases and Choices, 2004,

Rosenau, James J, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy”, in Barry Farrell, ed. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IH: North Western University Press, 1966),


**ARTICLES/PAPERS:**


Howard, M. “What’s in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002.


John G. Tower, Congress Vs the President: “The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, winter, 1981/2


MacGann, James, “Responding to 9/11: Are Think Tanks Thinks Outside the Box?”. Foreign Policy Research Institute: Think Tanks Civil Society Programme, Philadelphia, 31 July 2003.


Rich, Andrew; Weaver, R. Kent. Think Tanks In The U.S. Media *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 5, no. 4, Fall 2000,


Thunert, Martin, “ Players Beyond Borders? German Think Tanks as Catalyst of Internationalisation”, Global Societies: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 14(2), April 2000


Wilentz, Amy, " On the Intelectual Ramparts: New Think Tanks are Advocating as well as Incubating Ideas", Times, September, 1, 1986, p.22

WEBSITES SOURCES AND DIRECTORIES:

Think Tanks Website
American Enterprise Institute; www.aei.org
Brooking Institution; www.brook.org
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; www.ceip.org
Cato Institute; www.cato.org
Center for Strategic and International Studies; www.csis.org
Council on Foreign Relations: www.cfr.org
Foreign Policy Research Institute; www.fpri.org
The Heritage Foundation; www.heritage.org
RAND Corporation; www.rand.org

Executive Website
Central Intelligence Agency; www.cia.gov
Department of Defence; www.defencelink.mil
National Security Agency; http://www.nsa.gov
The President; www.whitwehouse.gov
The State Department: www.state.gov
US Information Agency; www.usinfo.state
Federal Bureau of Investigation; www.fbi.dov

Congressional Website
Senate; http://www.senate.gov
House Committee on Foreign Relations; www.house.gov/international_relations
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; www.senate.gov/-foreign

JOURNALS/MAGAZINES/NEWS PAPERS:
American Journal of Political Science; www.aips.org
American Political Science Review; http://www.apsanet.org
Congressional quarterly
Foreign Affairs; www.foreignaffairs.com
Foreign Policy; www.foreignpolicy.com
International Affairs
International Studies
Journal of Conflict Resolution
ORBIS; http://www.fpri.org/orbis/
Political Science Quarterly; http://www.psgonline.org/
Political Studies; http://www.politicalstudies.org/
PS: Political Science & Politics
Strategic Analysis
The Hindu; http://www.hinduonnet.com/
The Indian Express; http://www.indianexpress.com/
The National Interest; http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Wall Street; www.wsj.com
Washington Post; http://www.washingtonpost.com/
World Affairs; http://www.worldaffairsjournal.com/
World policy;
World Politics;