THE CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN SUBJECTIVISM

(A HEIDEGGERIAN PERSPECTIVE)

ABSTRACT

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SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

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BY

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UNDER THE SUPERVISION

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ABSTRACT
THE CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN SUBJECTIVISM
(A HEIDEGGERIAN PERSPECTIVE)

The Main Aim of This Inquiry

This inquiry follows one main aim and some secondary ones. Its main aim is a philosophical inquiry about transcendence and its intrinsic possibility, i.e., to answer the question whether transcendence is basically possible.

To propound the question of transcendence is indeed an effort to reach a new understanding of the universe, the human being, and the relation between them, and to find an alternative view of the meaning of truth to the traditional one found in the history of metaphysics.

If not throughout the history of western thought, at least in our time, no thinker brings up the question of transcendence fundamentally and radically as well as Heidegger. Hence, our inquiry about transcendence and its intrinsic possibility will be carried out in the framework of Heidegger's thought. Our justification for this aim is our view that the essence of Heidegger's thought is nothing other than the demonstration of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence. According to him, not only transcendence is possible, but also human existence and its truth is transcendence itself.

The Term 'Transcendence', along with the other forms of the word, such as 'the transcendent', 'transcendental', and 'transcendentalism', have been used in a number of ways with a number of distinct interpretations, in different
branches and during different periods of philosophy, and in various schools of theology, mysticism, and anthropology. That is why the introduction to thesis contains a brief and preparatory account of the meaning of 'transcendence' in the history of metaphysics as a point of departure for the inquiry into the Heideggerian sense of the term.

Heidegger maintains that the history of metaphysics is the progressive domination of subjectivism, and we see the culmination of subjectivism in modern philosophy and in Descartes so far as the meaning of 'thing' is identified by him with 'to be perceived', and the truth of human being with 'to be a subject'. According to Heidegger's interpretation, because of his failure in freeing himself from Cartesian subjectivism, Kant was defeated in his effort to lay the foundation of metaphysics. Here it must be mentioned that the application of the term subjectivism by Heidegger is by no means in the same sense that is often given to it. Therefore we must distinguish between Heideggerian and none-Heideggerian senses of subjectivism; otherwise we will confront many misconceptions. Thus, when we speak of Kantian subjectivism in the frame of Heidegger's thought we must by no means suppose that Kant is a subjectivist in an ordinary and current sense of the term. But what does Heidegger mean by subjectivism whose progressive domination he conceives as constituting the history of metaphysics?

A part of the introduction to the inquiry is devoted to the answer to the question and the clarification of the Heideggerian and non-Heideggerian senses of subjectivism.

In the author's opinion, in the history of metaphysics subjectivism is the main obstacle to the understanding of transcendence in the Heideggerian sense. Therefore, without the critique of subjectivism understanding transcendence is not possible. Understanding Heidegger's critique of subjectivism and understanding his conception of 'transcendence' are indeed identical.
Due to Heidegger’s unfamiliar language, which indicates his unusual thought, in this inquiry we have tried to use the language and framework of more familiar thought in order to explain the Heideggerian sense of transcendence. In our view, in the history of western metaphysics, such a familiar language and framework, which can facilitate an approach to Heidegger’s thought, is the language and conceptual framework of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It is by no means accidental that after Being and Time, Heidegger’s most original and important work—a considerable part of his books and lectures—is devoted to Kant and an interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. But it does not at all mean that Heidegger is a Kantian thinker who thinks within the boundaries of Kantian philosophy. Rather, as Heidegger himself points out, he seeks to forge a dialogue between his own way of thinking and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. One of the aims of this inquiry is to understand this dialogue between Kant and Heidegger. In order to realise these objectives we have made an effort to give a detailed discussion on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant—indeed this part will constitute the heart of the thesis—along with a comparison between Being and Time and the Critique of Pure Reason, to show the convergence and divergence of the ways of thought of these two seminal thinkers.

But, like his other views, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is so controversial that some Kantian scholars have strongly criticised him, and a reader of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is always suspicious whether it is truly an interpretation of Kant or whether Heidegger uses Kant’s transcendental philosophy only as a pretext to repeat the content of his own work, Being and Time. On the other hand, if we accept Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, other interpretations of Kant, especially neo-Kantian epistemological ones, will appear to us as a caricature of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Hence, part of our task is to examine the validity of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant.
In opposition to most of Kant's interpreters, Heidegger believes that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is by no means a book on epistemology or the theory of knowledge, or at least we can certainly say that epistemological discussion in this work has a subsidiary and secondary role, and what constitutes its main objective is not the rejection of the possibility of metaphysics, but the endeavor to lay the foundation of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, Kant, however, could not succeed in his aim, and the reason for his failure was that he too could not free himself from the captivity of latent subjectivism in the tradition of metaphysics.

**The Organisation of the Inquiry**

As it has already been stated, this work follows a main aim and some secondary and subsidiary ones. Its main aim consists in the attempt to understand the meaning of transcendence and its intrinsic possibility on the basis of Heidegger's thought. Thus, the first chapter, 'Heidegger's Project: The Demonstration of the Intrinsic Possibility of Transcendence', has tried to briefly clarify Heidegger's main project through his works, chiefly *Being and Time*.

Moreover, in order to approach the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger's thought, this work seeks the help of Kant's transcendental philosophy. For this reason, the second and third chapters of the inquiry are relative to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the second chapter, 'The Main Characteristics of Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant and its Validity', we have glimpsed at the general characteristics of Heidegger's interpretation and its validity. The third chapter, 'Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on the Axis of Transcendence', is a somewhat detailed explication of those of Heidegger's books which are especially devoted to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. In fact this chapter is the main part of the thesis and thus disproportionate to the other, subsidiary chapters.
Too briefly, in terms of Kantian philosophy, we can define Heideggerian transcendence as 'the essential unity of intuition and understanding', which Heidegger endeavors to demonstrate in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Put more clearly, as we all know, Kant believes that there are two main basic sources for human knowledge, which are not reducible to each other, i.e., intuition (the receptivity of our cognitive faculty) and understanding (the spontaneity of our cognitive faculty). That is why Kant divides the *Critique of Pure Reason* into two main basic parts, 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Logic', which inquire intuition and understanding respectively. But through his inquiry into the essence of synthetic a priori knowledge Kant realised that in order to show the objectivity of knowledge in general and the objectivity of pure concepts of understanding (categories) in particular he must bridge the gap between these two separate faculties, intuition and understanding. Kant delegates such a task to 'The Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding'.

In 'The Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding' Kant tries to show that there is 'a pure synthesis', which underlies our knowledge, which provides the objectivity of knowledge. According to Heidegger, this essential synthesis that Kant conceives as the origin of the objectivity of our knowledge, is in fact, in Heidegger's own terminology, *Dasein*'s ecstasy toward the *essents*. This ecstasy toward the *essents* is both a free, spontaneous act and at the same time a passiveness and receptivity to the manifestation of the *essents*. This ecstasy or *ex-sistence* (existence) of *Dasein*, or according to Kant's own terms this (essential) synthesis, is reducible neither to sense and intuition nor to understanding and thought, but is the origin of both of them. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* this origin is termed as *imagination*.

In his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to show that although Kant, in the direction of his inquiry, approached the role of the faculty of transcendental imagination in the formation of ontological knowledge, again, because of his
tendency to follow his predecessors, he could not properly realise the importance of transcendental imagination as the formative center of ontological knowledge. According to Heidegger, because of the influence of the metaphysical tradition, Kant conceives transcendental imagination as a lower faculty in relation to understanding, and gives main importance to the latter. Heidegger holds that the truth of human being is rooted in transcendental imagination— and transcendental imagination in Kant’s language is the fact that is expressed by *temporality* in Heidegger’s terminology. According to Heidegger, it is transcendental imagination which forms the horizon of objectivity without which objective experience would be impossible. He tries to show that temporality, i.e., the threefold ecstasy of human existence, is the ground of what is called transcendental imagination by Kant. It is also the basis of the ‘selfhood’ of the self, pure practical reason as well as intuition, and understanding.

Moreover, It may be said that, besides transcendence, Heidegger’s entire interpretation of Kant is centered around two other main themes, truth, and freedom. Of these themes, for Heidegger, like Kant, transcendence and truth are, throughout, the more relevant aim. In Heidegger’s interpretation the theme of freedom is very essential, although it does not at first sight seem so. He endeavors to demonstrate how our receptivity has an element of spontaneity, while our spontaneity has an element of receptivity. The discussion of freedom here refers to the element of spontaneity in our cognitive faculties.

Kant was very careful to demarcate sensibility and thought, i.e., the functions of spontaneity and receptivity, in order to leave open the possibility of human freedom from being subject to sensibility and natural determinism. For Kant since thought is a faculty distinct from sensibility, it can in some respects function on its own way without the limitations of sensibility. Kant holds that the ability of thought to function apart from sensibility (although not for
theoretical knowledge) leaves open the possibility of thinking a moral realm that is not subject to natural determinism.

But Kant believes that the possibility of freedom is thinkable, although we can know nothing of it. Kant is satisfied with this merely negative description of freedom, and indeed thinks that no further determination of it is possible for speculative reason. For Kant, the essence of moral freedom lies in the denial of the claims of sensibility on the noumenal self. It is our ability to think without the constraints of sensibility that ensures the possibility of freedom. In contrast, Heidegger seeks to show that freedom is possible without severing the bond to intuition, and indeed that sensibility has its own kind of freedom. Indeed, according to Heidegger, transcendence is best understood in the light of freedom.

Heidegger believes that transcendence, the possibility of the experience of binges, should be understood as a kind of freedom. Heidegger wants to provide a new conception of freedom that, unlike Kant’s account of the moral freedom, which is a negative explanation, is positive. Heidegger intends to consider freedom as an essential element in transcendence itself. In order to affirm this freedom, Heidegger stresses the power of imagination as a unitary source for our receptivity (finitude) and our spontaneity (freedom). Heidegger attempts to show that our faculties, which underlie truth, logic, and science, are founded in a radical freedom. According to Heidegger, Dasein is transcendence, and transcendence is the same as freedom, i.e. self-commitment or self-binding to what-is. Here, this last sentence must not be understood as a kind of ethical realism or resigning ourselves to present realities. Here what-is refers to Being as the origin of truth and objectivity.
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2001
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis THE CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN SUBJECTIVISM: A HEIDEGGERIAN PERSPECTIVE submitted by Mr. Bijan Abdolkarimi for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, is a record of bona fide research work carried out by him under my supervision and guidance. It has not been submitted to any other university or institute for the award of any degree or diploma.

20th May 2001

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Bijan Abdolkarimi
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Bibliography 1
Abbreviations

Kant's works


PFM  Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, Translated from German to English by Peter G.Lucas, Manchester University press, UK, second Impression, 1959.

Heidegger's works:

Books:

BPP  The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Translated from German to English by Albert Hafstadter, Indiana University press, Bloomington, USA, 1982.


IM  An Introduction to Metaphysics, Translated from German to English by Ralph Manheim, New Havan, conn: Yale University press, USA, 1959.

KPM  Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Translated from German to English by James Churchill, Bloomington: Indiana University, press, USA, 1962.
PIC  Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Translated from German to English by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1997.


WT  *What Is A Thing?* Translated from German to English by W.B Barton, and Vera Deutsch, Gateway Editions, Ltd. USA, 1967.

**Articles:**


Indications

{ } Added to Kant’s texts for more clarification by Heidegger

[ ] Added to Kant’s, Heidegger’s, or others’ texts for more clarification by the author

Italics The writers’ own emphasis

Arabic Numerals The numbers of the endnotes
Introduction

1) The Understanding of Transcendence and its Intrinsic Possibility as the Main Aim of This Inquiry

This inquiry follows one main aim and some secondary ones. Its main aim is a philosophical inquiry about transcendence and its intrinsic possibility, i.e., to answer the question whether transcendence is basically possible.

To propound the question of transcendence is indeed an effort to reach a new understanding of the universe, the human being, and the relation between them, and to find an alternative view of the meaning of truth to the traditional one found in the history of metaphysics.

If not throughout the history of western thought, at least in our time, no thinker brings up the question of transcendence fundamentally and radically as well as Heidegger. Hence, our inquiry about transcendence and its intrinsic possibility will be carried out in the framework of Heidegger's thought. Our justification for this aim is our view that the essence of Heidegger's thought is nothing other than the demonstration of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence. According to him, not only transcendence is possible, but also human existence and its truth is transcendence itself.

Undoubtedly, unless the meaning of transcendence becomes clear, the objective will not be clarified. But the clarification of the concept of transcendence will be the result of our inquiry, and not our starting point. Nevertheless, it is impossible to search for an absolutely
unknown entity. We must have some conception of the entity that is sought at the very outset. It means that we must tentatively answer the question what we mean by transcendence.

2) The Meaning of Transcendence

The word 'transcendence' means to go beyond or rise above something. It is often understood figuratively. The term in European languages (Transcendence in English and French and Transzendence in German), from Latin origin Transcendere, means literally to climb over, surpass, go beyond, and 'transcendent' in English and French (and Transzendent in German) means what lies beyond. The opposite of this word is 'immanent'. The Term Transcendence, along with the other forms of the word, such as the transcendent (le transcendent / das Transzendent) usually in substantive form, transcendental (Transzendentale) in adjectival form, and transcendentalism, have been used in a number of ways with a number of distinct interpretations, in different branches and during different periods of philosophy, and in various schools of theology, mysticism, and anthropology.

Pythagoreanism emphasised the transcendence of God, and this idea influenced Plato and his followers and also the Neo-Platonists. Philo Judaeus, Jewish theologian and philosopher (about 20 BC. - 50AD.), gave early expression to this conception. God as transcendent stands in contrast to notions of divine immanence, found, for example in Stoicism and pantheism. In Scholasticism, the transcendence of God means His perfection, i.e., being beyond limitation or imperfection, whereas in negative theology and in some currents of mysticism it means that the essence of God is incomprehensible and that we are aware only of its existence. The transcendence of God also means that God is remote from nature, outside or beyond the world. Some thinkers, particularly some Christian theologians, tried to combine God’s transcendence with His immanence, or His existence in the world. Also in scholasticism, for example in Thomas Aquinas’s thought, the idea of transcendence is attached to certain terms called 'transcendentals', which cannot be subsumed under Aristotelian categories and apply to everything and are hence beyond definition by genus and differentia. In scholastic philosophy the list of transcendentals varies somewhat. The four most commonly listed are Being (ens), unity (unum), truth (verum), and goodness (bonum). To these are often added thing (res) and distinction (aliquid), but these terms seem to have had a later origin. Beauty (pulchrum) is some times considered one of the transcendentals as well.
The term ‘transcendental’ finds an absolutely new sense in Kant. Kant himself uses the term in two senses, which are distinct. In other words, he distinguishes a good or legitimate sense of ‘transcendental’ from a bad or illegitimate sense of the term. For this reason he calls both his own critical philosophy and the dogmatic philosophy which he seeks to criticise radically and to pass beyond, ‘transcendental philosophy’. What the term ‘transcendental’ means exactly in Kant is a question that we will take up in detail. But here we mention only that the term, in its positive and legitimate sense, applies to the a priori and necessary elements of experience. They go beyond experience in the sense that they are not derived from it empirically, but they make experience itself possible. Yet they do not go beyond experience in the sense of giving us any insight concerning a supra-temporal realm. This is the sense in which he uses the terms Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic. According to Kant the attempt to extend beyond experience the concepts like substance or causality, which are legitimate only within the realm of experience, is an illegitimate, negative sense of transcendence, i.e., going beyond the boundaries of possible experience. Kant designates the content of all previous dogmatic philosophies as ‘transcendental philosophies’ in the illegitimate, negative sense of the term. In this negative sense, whatever is beyond possible experience is transcendent, and hence unknowable.

After Kant, the term transcendentalism is popularly used in a pejorative sense for designating all thought that believes in a kind of rational intuition of the universe, i.e., the same thought that Kant rejects absolutely. In addition, the term is used for all doctrines that emphasise the transcendent, for example German Post-Kantian idealism that believed in the immanence of the absolute in the finite. Following the Kantian approach to ‘transcendentalism’ in its negative sense, today it has become synonymous with any view that is ‘enthusiastic’, extravagant, impractical, ethereal, supernatural, vague, abstruse, lacking in common sense.

Another meaning of the term ‘transcendental’ is ‘trans-historical’. This sense is considered when the term transcendental combines with the word ‘historicism’ and make together the term ‘transcendental historicism’. Transcendental historicism is understandable in contrast with historical relativism. According to historical relativism “all values and interpretations are seen as embedded in the historical epoch in which they emerge, so that no trans-historical judgments are possible. Each historical period is unique and can be evaluated only in terms of the values immanent in that period.” “Therefore all possibilities of understanding are embedded in history and there is no tribunal of reason that can ultimately ground and legitimate those possibilities.”
But transcendental historicism contends that although all values and interpretations are historical and there is no tribunal of reason that can ultimately ground and legitimate those possibilities, beyond the flux of history there are fundamental possibilities that are the ultimate ground and foundation of all understanding and activity." In other words, although transcendental historicism shares with historical relativism the belief that the human world is in a constant state of flux, and that human phenomena are historically determined, it emphasises that the individuality of agents, periods, and epochs gains its meaning only within a greater totality. More simply, they both believe that all understanding, interpretations, and activities are historically determined, but transcendental historicism claims to discover and understand the general framework of all interpretations and activities. According to Guignon, what Heidegger terms ‘fundamental ontology’, as distinct from ontology in the ordinary sense, is nothing but an effort to understand the general framework of all kinds of ontology, i.e., all understanding and interpretations of Being.

It is worth mentioning that Heidegger himself is attentive to this problem and tries to resolve it in his own way. On the one hand, Heidegger believes that Being and Time does not present an interpretation of Being or entities but seeks to show the fundamental framework for any kind of interpretation of Being and the essents. He also believes that through gaining authenticity, rescuing itself from inauthenticity, Dasein can free itself from the captivity of tradition and historical conditions, and this way it can achieve an authentic understanding of Being and essents. But this must be considered: Firstly, all interpretation of the fundamental frameworks of understanding is itself a kind of understanding, and all interpretation of interpreting is itself an interpretation, and consequently subject to the same laws to which understanding and interpretations at the first level are subordinate. In other words, Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ is itself a historical fact and we cannot consider it as an absolute truth. Secondly, since, according to Heidegger, Dasein is essentially historical, its authenticity too is naturally historical. Basically conceiving authenticity as a free point beyond tradition contradicts Heidegger’s own description of human being as being-in-the-world. The effort to go beyond socio-cultural, historical, linguistic boundaries too is an absurd desire that is the result of a human being’s will to power. Heidegger himself criticises philosophy because it absurdly seeks to reach the absolute, unchangeable, eternal truths and, according to him, there are no such truths. And all understanding and interpretation of Being and of things is formed in a historical context of a pre-understanding and pre-interpretation in a culture and tradition. According to
Heidegger we cannot dominate the ultimate origin of facts and grasp it. The origin is something that only is and remains necessarily unintelligible. Therefore we must accept that, even according to Heidegger himself, transcendental historicism is self-contradictory.

But none of the above-mentioned senses of transcendence is in agreement with what we mean by transcendence in the context of Heidegger’s thought.

Perhaps, we can approach to some extent the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger’s thought through the sense of ‘transcendental’ in epistemological dualism and in phenomenology. Epistemological dualism holds that the real transcends the apprehending consciousness, i.e., is directly inaccessible to it. But this is what Heidegger challenges, and our understanding of transcendence on the basis of Heidegger’s thought is exactly the opposite of it. In other words, Heidegger tries to present a conception of human being’s constitution, its ontological structure, and its relation to the world in terms of which not only the real is accessible to consciousness but also human existence is nothing other than direct accessibility to the world.

In phenomenology it is held that consciousness is essentially self-transcendent, and it means that all consciousness essentially involves reference beyond itself, which is characterised by the terms ‘transcendental reference’ or ‘intentionality’. The phenomenological sense of transcendence is to some extent close to the Heideggerian sense of the term, but they are not exactly identical. Because, phenomenology, in the Husserlian sense, is in continuation with the Cartesian dualistic tradition, and, as we shall explain in detail, Cartesian tradition and its dualism is the object of Heidegger’s critique.

What we mean by transcendence, in the Heideggerian sense, is not a kind of mystical enthusiasm or ecstasy in a supernatural mode of consciousness beyond the ordinary consciousness and common sense, or becoming pensive in vague abstruse thought. Nor does it mean a sort of rational intuition by which one can gain some certain knowledge about the universe or can unify himself with the ultimate ground of the world. What we mean by transcendence, is a very simple but at same time very fundamental fact. We mean by transcendence the fact that human being is the (Mily being which can understand things in their openness and disclosedness. The profundity and importance of this seemingly simple view does not show itself unless we consider it in its main context, i.e., in contrast with hidden subjectivism that is involved in modern philosophy following Cartesian tradition.

Let us remind ourselves that according to Descartes, besides creative substance (God), there are two completely independent substances: mind, whose main attribute is thinking, and body or
matter, whose main attribute is extension. The explanation of the relation between mind and body is one of the most basic problems in Cartesian philosophy. Modern philosophy which basically followed the Cartesian tradition, framework, presents us with seemingly irresolvable theoretical problems. The proof of the existence of the external world, the explanation of the relation between mind and the external world, the proof of the existence of other minds, and some other ontological and epistemological questions are the most important problems in modern, Cartesian philosophy, all of which, according to Heidegger, are basically illegitimate, because they are all products of Cartesian dualism. On the basis of this dualism, human being, as subject, and thing, as object, are in opposition to each other in two completely separate poles. Heidegger’s endeavor is to overcome the subject-object dichotomy. This endeavor is made in two directions. On the one hand, Heidegger tries to make a distinction between thing and object. In modern philosophy, according to Heidegger, the thing is conceived as an object, i.e., as that which is subsumed under the subject’s concepts and categories. But following the early Greek thinkers Heidegger holds that the essential attribute of thing or being is not being perceived by or an object for a subject, but is its manifestation, openness, and presence. On the other hand, he endeavors to demonstrate that human being is not merely a subject or agent of consciousness. The implication here is not that human being has other faculties and dispositions such as will or emotions, but that more than being a subject and before everything, he is in the world and has a relation with entities and the Being of entities.

Heidegger terms this ontological aspect of human being as being-in-the-world. He does not mean by the use of this term to make the trivial point that man is in the world, but rather that human being is the same as being-in-the-world, i.e., human being and being-in-the-world are identical. Put more clearly, unlike the picture of human being in Cartesian philosophy, man is not an isolated substance which exists within another independent substance called ‘the world’. According to Heidegger, such a picture of man isolated, independent from the world is an illusion, and man and the world are existentially inseparable.

According to Heidegger this very characteristic of human being, as being-in-the-world, is what makes any cognitive relation between man and the world and entities, even the relation between man and himself, possible. More simply, all our relations with the world are not dependent on our cognitive relation with the world and with entities; on the contrary, our cognitive relation with the world and things is grounded in our non-cognitive, existential relation with the world and entities. However, Heidegger’s entire endeavor is to show that human
being’s most fundamental ontological characteristic is a certain relationship between him and the world in which there is no subject and object. But it must be said that this relationship is a sort of unity and togetherness. Heidegger claims that his conception of the ontological truth of human being and his relationship with the world is derived from early Greek thinkers.

Heidegger believes that human being is distinguished from all other entities by the fact that he understands Being, and for him the understanding of the meaning of Being as such is possible inasmuch as human existence is the very openness to it.19

The traditional ways of speaking about man in terms of consciousness, subject, I, and the like are absent in Being and Time. The term Dasein, that is being-there, is used instead. It must be admitted, though, that this way of putting it is misleading. It is not a matter of substituting one expression for another and leaving everything else as it was. On the contrary, the change in terminology signifies a change in the way of seeing, of comprehending and, hence, of thinking. The term Dasein is meant to announce that here man is regarded from a specific point of view, as a being who is distinguished by his relationship to Being.20 “The concept of Dasein is not just another term for the subject. Dasein is conceived, rather, as being in the world. The starting point is never the isolated subject, from which then the transition to the transcendent has to be made. Rather, from the very beginning being-in-the-world is comprehended as a fundamental structure and it is shown what this fundamental structure includes, which are the existentialia... These are genuine insights, formerly nonexistent.”

It is we ourselves who exist as Dasein.21 We always move within a specific comprehension of Being, which belongs to our being itself, and this is what here we call transcendence.

Unlike the definition of man in the tradition of metaphysics as a substance, Dasein is not a substance that has the disposition of perception and thinking, but is understanding itself, provided that we conceive of understanding, not as a relation between subject and object, but in the Heideggerian sense, i.e., as a sort of transparency or Dasein’s openness to entities which is the result of or, more accurately, which is identical with human existence, being in the world, and his openness to the world. In other words, all the expressions ‘understanding’, ‘our openness to the world’, and ‘being-in-the-world’ are different terms which signify the same fact, namely, human existence. The concept of transparency in Heidegger’s view will be further clarified in contrast with a given interpretation of phenomenal knowledge in Kant. According to this interpretation, it is as if there is an obstacle between the subject and the world and its entities, and hence we cannot have access to things in themselves, things as they are, rather we can know only phenomena, i.e., the things which are filtered by the mind and then appear to us. But in Heidegger’s conception there is neither such a dark obstacle between subject and thing nor such a distinction between thing-in-itself and phenomenon, and knowledge is the result of, or identical with, the very transparency which exists in Dasein’s openness to the world.
Following Heidegger’s thought, our position is no longer that we conceive human being as a subject who renders the different possible interpretations of what is. Rather we move in an entirely different direction in which an attempt is made to conceive of human being’s nature in terms of Being and its relationship with Being.

Ortega Y. Gasset, Spanish existentialist philosopher, holds proper transcendence to be the achievement of authenticity. But according to Heidegger, all modes of human existence are the result of transcendence. Because human being is human being only his mode of existence is transcendence. Francisco Romero (1891-1962), Argentine philosopher of transcendence, whose slogan exactly indicates our interpretation of Heidegger’s view of man: “To be is to transcend”.

3) Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy and the Meaning of Transcendence in Heidegger’s Thought

But we have not fully grasped the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger’s thought yet, and what we have said is only a brief and introductory account as a point of departure for our inquiry.

Every original thinker, in order to express his thought, must invent a new language and terminology which first appears difficult, unfamiliar, and unintelligible. Heidegger is also an original thinker who “seeks, by way of thinking the tradition, to lay open its happening and at the same time to see through its limited character”. That is why he gradually abandoned the language of the tradition of metaphysics and tried to invent another language.

Due to Heidegger’s unfamiliar language, which indicates his unusual thought, no thinker has been interpreted in so many different, and even contradictory, interpretations as much as Heidegger and no thinker has been accused of writing in an abstruse style as much as him, to such an extent that some believe that “he is fond of vertiginous plays on words which make Hegel seem child’s play”.

For this reason, in this inquiry we shall try to use the language and framework of more familiar thought in order to explain the Heideggerian sense of transcendence. In our view, in the history of western metaphysics, such a familiar language and framework, which can facilitate an approach to Heidegger’s thought, is the language and conceptual framework of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It is by no means accidental that after Being and Time, Heidegger’s most original and important work— a considerable part of his books and lectures—is devoted to
Kant and an interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. But it does not at all mean that Heidegger is a Kantian thinker who thinks within the boundaries of Kantian philosophy. Rather, as Heidegger himself points out, he seeks to forge a dialogue between his own way of thinking and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. One of the aims of this inquiry is to understand this dialogue between Kant and Heidegger. In order to realise these objectives we will make an effort to give a detailed discussion on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant—indeed this part will constitute the heart of the thesis—along with a comparison between *Being and Time* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to show the convergence and divergence of the ways of thought of these two seminal thinkers.

But, like his other views, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is so controversial that some Kantian scholars have strongly criticised him, and a reader of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is always suspicious whether it is truly an interpretation of Kant or whether Heidegger uses Kant’s transcendental philosophy only as a pretext to repeat the content of his own work, *Being and Time*. On the other hand, if we accept Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, other interpretations of Kant, especially neo-Kantian epistemological ones, will appear to us as a caricature of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Hence, part of our task is to examine the validity of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant.

In opposition to most of Kant’s interpreters, Heidegger believes that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is by no means a book on epistemology or the theory of knowledge, or at least we can certainly say that epistemological discussion in this work has a subsidiary and secondary role, and what constitutes its main objective is not the rejection of the possibility of metaphysics, but the endeavor to lay the foundation of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, Kant, however, could not succeed in his aim, and the reason for his failure was that he too could not free himself from the captivity of latent subjectivism in the tradition of metaphysics.

Heidegger maintains that the history of metaphysics is the progressive domination of subjectivism, and we see the culmination of subjectivism in modern philosophy and in Descartes so far as the meaning of ‘thing’ is identified by him with ‘to be perceived’, and the truth of human being with ‘to be a subject’. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, because of his failure in freeing himself from Cartesian subjectivism, Kant was defeated in his effort to lay the foundation of metaphysics. Here it must be mentioned that the application of the term subjectivism by Heidegger is by no means in the same sense that is often given to it. Therefore we must distinguish between Heideggerian and none-Heideggerian senses of subjectivism;
otherwise we will confront many misconceptions. Thus, when we speak of Kantian subjectivism in the frame of Heidegger’s thought we must by no means suppose that Kant is a subjectivist in an ordinary and current sense of the term. But what does Heidegger mean by subjectivism whose progressive domination he conceives as constituting the history of metaphysics?

4. Subjectivism as the Main Obstacle to the Understanding of Transcendence

In Heidegger’s thought, subjectivism finds a new sense. So, it would be useful to clearly distinguish the concept of subjectivism in the ordinary sense and in the Heideggerian sense.

4-a) Subjectivism in the Ordinary Sense

According to the ordinary meaning of the term, subjectivism is the believe or theory that everyone has his or her own perception or viewpoint which differs that of others from another’s on the basis of individual interests and tastes. In other words, according to this ordinary sense, subjectivism consists in any philosophical view that attempts to treat as subjective what at first glance would seem to be a class judgements that are objectively either true or false independently of what we believe, want, or hope. According to the ordinary, general meaning of subjectivism, there are two ways of being a subjectivist. In the first way, one can say that the judgements in question, despite first appearance, are really judgements about our own attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. In second way, one can deny that the judgements are true or false at all, arguing instead that they are disguised recommendations or expressions of attitudes. In the first way one accepts the judgements are true or false, independently of us, but we judge about the facts on the basis of our interests and tastes. Whereas in the second way, one basically denies the truth or falsehood of judgements and considers them as the expressions of our inner attitudes. But they both agree that the judgements in question eventually return to one’s interests, tastes, and attitudes. This definition of subjectivism is discussed more in the fields of ethics and aesthetics, according to which all moral or aesthetics value finally originates from individual attitudes.

Considering the ordinary sense of subjectivism, Kant is not a subjectivist. It is therefore necessary to begin with a more inclusive notion of subjectivism. Although the restricted notion of subjectivism is the consequence of the more general sort of subjectivism that Heidegger considers.
4-b) Subjectivism in the Heideggerian Sense

In the Heideggerian sense, subjectivism consists in the belief that the truth and the essence of human being is consciousness and that 'to be a subject or rational agent' is what distinguishes man from other entities.

However, in Heidegger's critique of subjectivism, the main issue is not whether human being should be conceived as rational and the possessor of consciousness, rather Heidegger's statement is that during the history of metaphysics 'to be a subject' has been supposed to be human being's most fundamental *differentia*, and his cognitive relation with the world has been conceived as the foundation of any relation between him and the world, the entities, other human beings, and even himself. Of course, in modern philosophy, subjectivism becomes more clear in Descartes, as far as he conceives 'to be a subject' as the essential attribute of the soul, and conceives 'to be perceived' as the essential attribute of entities.

Unlike subjectivism in the ordinary, general sense, subjectivism in the Heideggerian sense is not opposed to objectivism according to which all judgements, including moral and aesthetic judgements are true or false objectively and independently of our inner attitudes, but is opposed to the belief about transcendence as the most fundamental characteristic of human being's ontological structure. Concerning this point, that is, the denial of transcendence as the most fundamental attribute of man's ontological structure, according to Heidegger, there is no basic difference between subjectivism and objectivism. For both, despite some differences, reduce the truth of human being to a cognitive relation with the world and both of them are unable to understand transcendence as the most fundamental attribute of human being. For this reason, even a thinker like Kant, considered as an objectivist in the ordinary, current sense of the term, could not free himself from the captivity of subjectivism in Heideggerian sense. More simply, through his transcendental philosophy, even Kant could not realise the truth of human being, i.e., being-in-the-world, and that we always move within a specific comprehension of Being— which belongs to our being itself— through our openness to Being. In other words, even Kant could not distinctly and clearly find that the truth of human being consists in transcendence.

In the Heideggerian view, the concept of subjectivism indeed becomes equal to the concept of metaphysics as far as we can consider the history of metaphysics as the history of the development of subjectivism which was latent in the thought of the founders of philosophy, namely Socrates and Plato, and culminated in Cartesian tradition.
Heidegger argues that even Kant inherits the above mentioned tradition, because he accepts the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy and all of its implications. Kant also believes that our being is the same as consciousness, which is aware of both things and itself. In addition, he also accepts that thing or essent means that which can be perceived, namely, what is understood by the subject. This is the bias which Heidegger calls subjectivism.

5) The Organisation of the Inquiry

As it has already been stated, this work follows a main aim and some secondary and subsidiary ones. Its main aim consists in the attempt to understand the meaning of transcendence and its intrinsic possibility on the basis of Heidegger’s thought. Thus, the first chapter, ‘Heidegger’s Project: The Demonstration of the Intrinsic Possibility of Transcendence’, will try to briefly clarify Heidegger’s main project through his works, chiefly Being and Time.

Moreover, in order to approach the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger’s thought, this work seeks the help of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. For this reason, the second and third chapters of the inquiry are relative to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In the second chapter, ‘The Main Characteristics of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant and its Validity’, we will glimpse at the general characteristics of Heidegger’s interpretation and its validity. The third chapter, ‘Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on the Axis of Transcendence’, is a somewhat detailed explication of those of Heidegger’s books—except one of them— which are especially devoted to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. In fact this chapter is the main part of the thesis and thus disproportionate to the other, subsidiary chapters.

As it has already been pointed out, a considerable number of Heidegger’s works are devoted to Kant and the interpretation of his transcendental philosophy. Chronologically these works are:

1) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
2) The Basic problems of phenomenology
3) Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
4) What is a thing?
5) ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’
6) History of philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant

Among these works, the first and the third are particularly related to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. For this reason, the third chapter has been
written chiefly on the basis of these two works, namely, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, and with reference to other works of Heidegger relating to Kant, except the sixth one, and also on the basis of the comparison between Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and Heidegger’s own ideas in *Being and Time*. The sixth work is Heidegger’s unpublished lecture course text, *Geschichte der philosophy von Thomas Aquinas bis Kant*, scheduled to appear in volume 23 of the complete edition, (which, so far as I know, has not been, at least in the English language, published yet.

Among Heidegger’s two works, devoted to the interpretation of Kant, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, the former is too condensed and for this reason the understanding of some parts of it is quite difficult. In this work, Heidegger assumes that the reader is conversant with the minutiae of the Kantian text. The second work, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, on the other hand, has very detailed explications, and thus easier to follow. For this reason, before the publication of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger’s main purpose of his interpretation of Kant had remained in darkness and obscurity. That is why, despite my attempt to follow both Heidegger’s interpretations parallel to each other, the text of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, eventually constitutes the main text in this work.
Chapter One

Heidegger's Main Project:
The Demonstration of the Intrinsic Possibility of Transcendence

1) Heidegger's Project

In this chapter we seek to explain very briefly Heidegger's main project, i.e., to answer the questions that constitute Heidegger's main problem and the basis on which he tries to answer it.

We can speak of Heidegger's project from two perspectives: 1) from an inner perspective, i.e., according to Heidegger's own framework, 2) from an outer perspective which is neutral in respect to Heidegger's central assumptions.

From an inner perspective and according to Heidegger's own words, it may be said that reawakening the question of Being is the most important task which Heidegger's thought has undertaken. From an outer perspective conforming to our interpretation of his thesis, the demonstration of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is the most basic idea that exists in Heidegger's thought. Certainly, all interpretation, including ours, must always conform to the interpreted text as far as possible.

2) Reawakening the Question of Being or the Demonstration of the Intrinsic Possibility of Transcendence

The question that fascinated Heidegger throughout his long philosophical career, which lasted more than six decades, can be stated simply: 'What is the meaning of Being?'

We all understand the meaning of being or existence and all of its derivatives like 'am', 'is', 'are', 'to be', and 'existent'. Moreover, all of us understand the verbs 'there is' or
'exists' and 'is', by which we understand all propositions, including existential judgements, like 'there is a God', and predicative judgments, like 'the fire is warm'. We all understand the meaning of the sentences such as 'there exists a tree there', 'there is a chair in this room', 'God exists', and so on. There are many things that we call 'existent'. Basically, whatever we talk about, whatever we represent, is an 'existent', just as we ourselves are existents. Along with whatever we confront with, or even along with whatever we represent, we understand the meaning of Being in so far as we can say that we always live within an understanding of Being, and all actions and thought occur within an understanding of Being. Heidegger undertakes the task to show that there is a meaning of Being of all beings (entities), which underlies all our understanding of the reality and all activities. In his interpretation of the Critique of Pure reason, Heidegger attempts to show that the a priori in Kant's philosophy, i.e., what makes any experience possible, is nothing other than our precursory understanding of Being.

Yet, when we face the question 'what is Being?' or 'what is the meaning of Being?' we become perplexed and are confronted with a great secret.

But, the question of this Secret has not been begun by Heidegger. In Being and Time, by quoting some sentences from Plato's Sophists, Heidegger shows how Being has been a 'question' since those times: "For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed".

Heidegger holds that in our time we have forgotten the question of Being. Therefore, awakening anew the question of the meaning of Being constitutes Heidegger's main task.

When Heidegger was still a high school student, his teacher gave him Franz Brentano's book, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. This book influenced Heidegger considerably. Even Being and Time, written two decades later, shows its influence. Brentano's book helped Heidegger understand Aristotle. It was a brief summary of the history of Aristotelian ontology and its traditional ramifications. Heidegger, influenced by that book, concludes that the meaning of the question of Being must be revived. In the Greek language there is a clear linguistic distinction between the different senses of Being. Ta onta refers to beings (entities), and einia means the verb 'to be', and ousia signifies the abstract noun 'being' (the nature of beings). But, unlike the Greek language in which these linguistic distinctions were natural, in European languages, including English and German, a contrived effort is needed to render these distinctions. "Once a certain level of abstraction and conceptual reflection was reached, it became only natural to raise the question whether there
is a unified meaning of being that accrues to all beings (in contradistinction to 'what is not') or whether being has irreducibly many different meanings that fall into different categories, depending on the kind of entity that is under investigation. It became natural to ask whether there is a unitary meaningful concept that demarcates the realm of being as such. Plato was the first to raise this question explicitly in the *Sophist*; he calls the problem of being a *gigantomachia*, a ‘battle among giants’ that has to be settled if there is to be any chance of solving problems about the meaning of not-being”.¹

In *what is metaphysics?*, Heidegger also returns to this sentence of Plato, i.e., he too believes that the understanding of the meaning of Being is dependent on thinking on ‘Nothing’ so far as he conceives inquiry on ‘Nothing’ as the most fundamental task of metaphysics. “Assuming that the question of Being as such is the encompassing question of metaphysics, then the question of the Nothing proves to be such that it embraces the whole of metaphysics”. But it must be understood that the concept of Nothing in Heidegger’s thought is by no means in the sense of ‘absolute Nothing’. Heidegger expressly states: “‘Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same’. This proposition of Hegel’s (*Science of logic*, Vol. I werke III, 74) is correct”. Heidegger means by ‘Nothing’ that which is not itself an entity or thing but acts like Being, i.e., as “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood”.

Heidegger was well aware of Plato’s struggle with this problem, for this reason he used the above-mentioned passage from the *Sophist* as his point of departure in *Being and Time*. Nevertheless, whatever Plato may have thought about the ‘unity of being’, it was the Aristotelian doctrine of a manifold of meanings of being that came to dominate the history of western metaphysics. It is Aristotle’s doctrine of the *categories* of beings that Heidegger refers to when he presents his view of the historical development of western thought that ended in complete ‘forgetfulness of the question of being’.

According to Heidegger, there are very firm connections between Aristotelian theory about the manifold of meanings of being along with his theory about categories on the one hand and his concept of substance on the other hand:

Aristotle distinguished as many meanings of ‘being’ as there are categories of entities. There is the primary category of *substance*, designating natural ‘things’ that exists in their own right, while all other entities are *attributes of substances* either inhering in them or standing in some other relation to them (quality, quantity, relation, place, time, action, affection, possession, position). Although it is not entirely clear how Aristotle arrived at his list of categories of all the things there are, it is fairly obvious that he used linguistic criteria as one of his guides. Thus, when we take a naturally existing independent object (e.g. a stone) and try to determine what predicates we assign to it, what characteristics it has, we get different types of answer about its
nature in all its respects (its quantity, qualities, place, time, etc). That the way we speak about entities provides the guideline for their classification does not imply, however, that Aristotle regarded his system of categories as a man-made conceptual scheme. He regarded the categories as distinctions contained in the nature of the things; they are read off nature and are not schemes read into or imposed on nature by us. Aristotle therefore remained a metaphysical realist with respect to his ‘discovery’ of the natural structure of reality. This structure is based on the primacy of substances, naturally existing independent entities that form the building blocks of Aristotle’s universe. Substances are the only entities that can exist in their own right, while all other entities are attributes that need substances as the substrate for their existence. ‘To be’ then means either to be a substance or to be (one of the nine other kinds of) attributes of a substance. And since the being of a substance, a quality, a quantity, or other attributes are irreducibly different, there is no unified sense of ‘being’ that could be predicated of items in all categories. There is only an ‘analogy of being’ that has in recent years been dubbed ‘focal meaning’ to indicate the centrality of the substance, without permitting a univocal definition of the term ‘being’. Since this focus of the conception of being on substantiality determined the future development of metaphysics, not only in later antiquity but through the middle Ages into the modern age, ‘substance’ remained the central term in traditional ontology, and substances or ‘things’, natural entities with attributes and the capacities to interact causally with one another, remained the building blocks and became Heidegger’s main challenge.4

In the current tradition of metaphysics, according to Heidegger, Being unreflectively becomes identical with thinghood or reality derived from the Latin word ‘res’ (the same etymology applies to the German term Realitat). In this tradition, a thing is conceived as an indifferently occurring independent entity or a carrier of attributes. It is the main point of criticism of traditional ontology in Being and Time.15 It is in this sense only that Heidegger refused to be called a ‘realist’.16

Heidegger considers this ontology, which can be call ‘substance ontology’, mistaken. But we must find out what Heidegger considers wrong in ‘substance ontology’ and what solution he presents for it. On the one hand, substance ontology denies the unitary sense of being. On the other hand it separates human being as a substance from nature posited as another substance, making their relation and interaction a problem, as we see in Cartesian dualism, because substances are essentially and irreducibly different. The other point is that in this ontology, being become identical with thing and thinghood.

Heidegger frequently emphasises that what he searches is Being in itself, and Being is not itself an entity, but the origin of entities, and for this reason the meaning of Being as such cannot be conceived as identical with thing and thinghood. Heidegger states: “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood.... The Being ‘is’ not itself an entity”.17 “...Any way of composing oneself towards entities as entities— there lies a priori an enigma”.18
In his *Republic*, through the famous analogy of the cave, Plato shows how men are the prisoners of darkness deprived of seeing the sun of truth, and how they need to return to the light of the sun in order to face the truth. Indeed, in his works, Heidegger too invites us to revert our gaze from entities toward Being in itself.\(^9\) The search for a unitary sense of Being is indeed a preparation for this return.

Here, there is a point that is very important for understanding Heidegger’s main project. According to Heidegger it is true that we intend to inquire about the general meaning of Being and hence we ask what the meaning of Being as such is, yet any human activity, including the very inquiry about Being, is done on the basis of an understanding of Being, which we always already have. What we seek, although we cannot grasp it, yet is not absolutely unfamiliar, and we have a vague, average understanding of Being, since otherwise it would not be possible for us to engage in any activity, thinking, or speaking. However, what is important here is that the very vague, average understanding of Being is constituted in a culture and tradition and under the influence of the traditional conception of Being. “This vague average understanding of Being may be so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood”.\(^9\) Unlike all previous philosophers who conceived the meaning of Being as self-evident, Heidegger does not believe in such a self-evident understanding of Being and holds that the understanding of Being is a historical fact which is constituted under the influence of current culture. One of the consequences of the idea that there is no such thing as a self-evident understanding is that all understanding is historical.

To show the historical origins of our current understanding of Being and criticising them is a part of Heidegger’s plan that he himself calls ‘destroying of the history of ontology’.\(^21\)

Apart from criticising the neglectfulness of the question of Being, Heidegger’s second most important criticism of the history of ontology can be stated in this way: In the tradition of metaphysics and in the history of ontology, the inquiry into the meaning of Being took the wrong path because, to begin with, a wrong point of departure was adopted. We shall try here to clarify the precise meaning of this criticism.

3) The Determination of an Appropriate Way for an Encounter with Being in Itself

Where must we begin to prepare for an encounter with Being in itself, and not with entities? What is our point of departure for inquiring into Being in itself? Is our point of departure in this inquiry an arbitrary one or, on the contrary, is there a given point, or, more accurately, is there a given entity, from which we must start our investigation of the meaning
of Being? “But there are many things which we designate as ‘being’, and we do so in various senses. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being, what we are is being, and so is how we are.... In which entities is the meaning of being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of Being to take its departure?”

Heidegger holds that since it is not possible for us to inquiry about Being in itself immediately, we are always obliged to select an entity as our pattern in our inquiry about Being, and any ontology, in its understanding of Being, takes its point of departure from the very entity which it has adopted as its pattern. Now, in his basic critique of the tradition of metaphysics entitled ‘destroying the history of ontology’. Heidegger states that in traditional ontology, philosophers have taken non-human entities as their ideal being, as their pattern, in their conception of Being. These non-human entities have some attributes that are called ‘categories’ in logic. Heidegger’s criticism of the domination of logic in previous ontologies, and his belief that logic is an inappropriate organ for inquiring about Being in itself can be interpreted in this sense that logic is dependent on a given ontology in which some kinds of entities, i.e., non-human beings or nature, have been taken as its pattern and model of being, in its understanding of Being.

But in his inquiry about Being in itself, Heidegger suggests human being or, to use his own especial term, Dasein, as the ideal being and as the point of departure for ontology, and he emphasises that Dasein’s, i.e., human being’s, characteristics, unlike the attributes of other entities, are not in such that we can subsume them under pre-determined categories. Another justification for taking inquirer’s being, i.e., human being, as our ideal being and point of departure for our inquiry into Being as such is that human existence is the closest being that we have access to. This, however, does not imply that we are necessarily justified in taking the characteristics of human being’s ontological structure as an ideal and a model for understanding Being in itself. Further, as Heidegger himself admits, Being is the origin of everything including human and non-human entities. So, there appears to be no prima facia reason why non-human entities cannot be regarded as the manifestations of Being in itself as much as human being.

Undoubtedly, Heidegger does not mean that we can assign human being’s ontological attributes to Being in itself, tending towards a kind of anthropomorphic ontology. Heidegger’s point is that, taking entities as a model of Being, as traditional ontology does, involves certain fallacious steps. For example, in traditional ontology, Being has been often interpreted as presence and constancy and in this ontology there is a firm connection between
the interpretation of Being as presence with the concept of substantiality which signifies a kind of constancy and unchanged ability. According to Heidegger, under the influence of Aristotelian concept of substance, ontology came to be grounded in a denial of the unitary sense of Being in itself. Heidegger holds that the result of this sort of ontology is to identify the meaning of Being with reality (in the original, Latin sense) or thinghood, and it is this interpretation of Being in previous ontologies that Heidegger wishes to criticise.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger intends to lay a foundation for the ontology that reverts its gaze from things to human being and takes its point of departure from *Dasein* and tries to investigate Being in itself in terms of human being’s basic characteristic, which, according to Heidegger, is ‘temporality’. In following pages, we will discuss temporality and its meaning in Heidegger’s thought.

4) The Analysis of Human Being as a Preparation for Answering the Question of Being

In Heidegger’s thought the inquiry of the meaning of Being is not independent of the inquiry of human being and these two inquiries are inseparable. According to Heidegger, to work out the question of Being and the attempt to clarify it, is itself a kind of activity and thus a mode of the Being of human being. This point obliges us to analyse human existence or *Dasein*, for “the very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being”.

In other words, asking the question of Being, like any other inquiry such as those in science, philosophy, art, etc, is a kind of human activity. Therefore, in order to clarify the inquiry about Being, we must analyse the mode of being of the inquirer itself in order to step in lighter horizon to think about our main question of Being. Basically all understanding is dependent on us, hence the understanding of Being cannot be investigated independently of human being and his understanding. For this reason, the question of Being is inseparable from the question of human being.

Heidegger maintains that human being is the only entity that asks about Being, and it is only for him that Being is disclosed through his mode of being. Existential-ontological analysis of *Dasein* provides a background for finding a foundation for the understanding of the meaning of Being. But, on the other hand, in order to understand human being’s ontological constitution we need an understanding of the meaning of Being. Hence the understanding of the meaning of Being and the analysis of human being are mutually independent. But is it a vicious circle? Heidegger’s answer to this question is negative. A
vicious circle is obtained when we want to argue about something that the argument already assumes. But here we do not seek to argue for something, but to understand a fact. "There is no circle at all in formulating our question as we have described.... Such 'presupposition' has nothing to do with laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions is deductively derived. It is quite impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' in formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one of grounding something by such a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them. In the question of the meaning of Being there is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity." Heidegger calls this mode of affairs, 'hermeneutic situation'.' This situation is true not only in the case of Being but in the case of any ultimate horizon. For example, language is an ultimate horizon and we can never pass beyond it. In order to understand the phenomenon of language we need the help of language, and that is not a circle. To say that we are not right to use language for understanding language because it involves a circle, is to display a lack of understanding of the hermeneutic situation. In order to understand the meaning of Being we cannot pass beyond the horizon of Being, and the inquiry about Being itself is a kind of activity and, hence, a mode of Being. Thus the inquiry on Being, itself leads us to the inquirer himself and his mode of Being as a way of Being.

Briefly in Being and Time, and later in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger endeavors to lay a foundation for metaphysics and ontology through his analysis of human existence. He calls his own analysis of the basic ontological structures of human being 'fundamental ontology'. He means by 'fundamental ontology' an existential-ontological analysis of human existence in order to provide the possibility of laying the foundation for answering the question of Being, i.e., the possibility of metaphysics and ontology, namely to answer this question whether human being can basically attain an understanding of Being as such. Heidegger holds that it is human being that comprehends Being by his consciousness. But to avoid a misinterpretation of Heidegger's thought, two points should be mentioned here: Firstly, it is true that we comprehend Being by our consciousness but it does not mean that Being is something that is perceived. Secondly, although for Heidegger the question of the constitution of human being and the inquiry about his ontological structure has a kind of priority, we should not suppose that for Heidegger, as for the existentialist philosophers, human existence, is the most basic and fundamental fact that must be questioned. This is why
he frequently mentions that his inquiry is very different from the existentialists' investigations, since, unlike existentialistic philosophy, "so far our [his] discussion has not demonstrated Dasein's priority, nor has it shown decisively whether Dasein may possibly even necessarily serve as the primary entity to be interrogated". Because for Heidegger what constitutes the fundamental question is not human existence but Being in itself, for "even the possibility of carrying through the analytic of Dasein depends on working out beforehand the question about the meaning of Being in general". In other words, the very ontological analytic of human existence always requires that its existentiality be considered beforehand. By 'existentiality' Heidegger understands "the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exists". Existentiality is what makes human existence possible and therefore, according to Heidegger the investigation into existentiality is more basic and fundamental than the inquiry about existence itself. That is why Heidegger rejects the title of existentialist for himself and prefers to be called an ontologist. Because, as we shall explain in the following pages, Heidegger holds that in the discussion of human being's fundamental structures, the existentiality of human being is nothing save Being in itself and his relationship with it, termed in Heidegger's terminology as 'being-in-the-world'. In saying that the truth of human being is being-in-the-world, what Heidegger means is that human existence is the same as being-in-the-world, and the very attribute, being-in-the-world, makes any human being's relation with the entities, with others, and even with itself possible. However, Heidegger attempts to show that human being's ontological structure is in such a mode that has a relationship with the world in which there are no subject and object, but which constitutes a sort of unity and togetherness. In other words, entity is the same as manifestation, appearance, disclosedness, and presence; and human being is open to this manifestation and disclosedness. This unity between human being and Being and their togetherness is the same fact that is termed transcendence here.

Heidegger declares that his conception of human existence and its relationship with Being is adopted from the early Greek thinkers' view. He remarks that none of our experience occurs except in a profound horizon in which we confront entities and other human beings and even with ourselves. He terms this profound horizon as the world and for this reason he conceives human being as being-in-the-world.

In Being and Time, Heidegger's investigation of existentiality, about the transcendental which makes human existence possible, is very similar to Kant's transcendental inquiry in the Critique of Pure reason, i.e., the question of the transcendental which makes basically any knowledge possible.
5) The Existential, Ontological Analysis of Human Existence

5-a) Transcendence as the truth of human existence

Heidegger avoids of the traditional ways of speaking about man in terms of consciousness, subject, I, self, spirit, and the like. Instead, he uses the term Dasein. Dasein is a German word that means in an ordinary and current sense ‘being or existence, presence, and survival’. This word is composed from Da and Sein. In German language Da means ‘be there and here’, and Sein, in a substantive sense, means ‘being’ or ‘existence’, and in a verbal sense means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’. Hence, the term Dasein literally means ‘being-there’, ‘presenting there’, or ‘presence-there’.

By using the term Dasein for human being, Heidegger intends to points out two very important facts: Firstly, human existence is not self-grounded, and its existence is constituted by its relationship with the transcendent. The component Da in the composition of Da-sein points to this fact. Human being is a mode of being (sein) which stands in there (Da), i.e., in the transcendental; and the transcendental (Da) is the dwelling of the being (sein) that we call human being. We must note that, according to Heidegger, Dasein or being-there is not an entity that stands ‘there’, i.e., ‘outside’, and it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is ‘outside’, alongside entities which it encounters. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always already beyond itself (out there). More simply, in Heidegger’s conception, human being is interpreted no longer as an independent substance whose most basic attribute and its differentia from other entities is ‘to be a subject’, but as an entity whose fundamental ontological characteristic is transcendence to Being and relation with Being.

Secondly, by using the term Dasein, Heidegger means to declare his intention to destroy the Cartesian conception of the world and man and their mutual relation.

Concerning the problem of the existence of the external world, which is one of the consequences of the Cartesian conception, Kant says; “It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us must be accepted merely on faith [and not on a rational proof], and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof ”. But Heidegger’s response to Kant is: “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again”.
Does Heidegger seek to return us to common sense by saying that such proofs for the existence of the external world are not necessary? Not at all. Rather what Heidegger means is that the point of departure in a philosophical inquiry must be Being itself and not a subject, and through this new point of departure, he endeavors to demonstrate that the traditional, metaphysical conception of human being and his relation to the world on the basis of subject-object dichotomy is not the only way of understanding human being and we can, and must, understand man and his relation to the world in some other way:

The real scandal of philosophy is the unquestioned centrality and sovereignty of epistemology in recent philosophy. The theory of knowledge is supposed to be critical in the sense of providing the grounds and limits for metaphysics. But Heidegger thinks that the theory of knowledge is itself shot through with dogmatic metaphysical assumptions. It is taken as obvious and beyond question by Kant and others that we can draw a clear distinction between the inner experiences or consciousness that are in the mind on the one hand, and things or objects in the external world on the other. Given this unchallenged metaphysical assumption, the natural question to ask is how we can ‘transcend the sphere of immanence’ of our minds to gain knowledge of the external world.\(^5\)

Heidegger holds that “subject and object do not coincide with \textit{Dasein} and the world’,\(^6\) and the knowledge of the world is a founded mode and is dependent on the other existential, ontological relationship between human being and the world, which is not a sort of cognitive relation between subject and object. Heidegger names this basic, non-cognitive relation between \textit{Dasein} and the world, ‘being-in-the-world’.\(^7\)

This point, that is, the priority of the non-cognitive relationship between human being and the world over consciousness, leads us “to the heart of an old problem, namely, the question as to how the subject can step out of its inner sphere in order to reach the object ‘out there’. Heidegger cuts this Gordian knot starting from the principle that \textit{Dasein}, as being-in-the-world, is always already out there- with the familiar world’.\(^8\)

In this case Heidegger himself says:

\begin{quote}
When \textit{Dasein} directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. …And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the cabinet of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the \textit{Dasein} which knows remains outside, and it does so as \textit{Dasein}.\end{quote}

In other words, according to Heidegger, philosophy in the Cartesian-Kantian subjectivist tradition suffers from two basic problems, and for this reason it has been unable to solve a
number of problems, like the problem of the proof of the existence of external world, that of other minds, and the problem of the relation between mind and the external world. Heidegger holds that all these epistemological problems are illegitimate because they are the result of basic errors such as subject-centered and the subject-object polarity. Heidegger endeavors to rectify these errors. This endeavor is made in two directions: 1) to show that ‘thing’ is not identical with ‘object’. A thing becomes an object only when it is subsumed under the subject’s concepts and categories. But according to Heidegger, as early Greek thinkers realised, the main attribute of a thing or being is not ‘to be an object’, i.e. ‘to be perceived by a subject’, but manifestation, disclosure, and presence. 2) The second direction of Heidegger’s endeavor is to show that human being is not merely a subject. The point here is not that man has other faculties and dispositions such as will, feelings, and emotions, but that the ontological truth of human being, before being a subject and more than being a subject, consists in that it has a relationship with Being, with beings and with the world.

In other words, according to Heidegger, in the Cartesian, subjectivistic tradition, human being is conceived as a substance existing independently of the world. As per Heidegger’s interpretation, most philosophers, including Kant and Husserl, could not free themselves from the domination of this tradition. In this tradition, there are basically two separate substances or entities, subject and object, that occur side by side, then the question is how the contact between the thinking subject and the independently existing object is possible. But Heidegger believes that human being is by no means a separate, worldless mind, but an existent constituted in its very essence by its world. In the contrast to the Cartesian model, Dasein “no longer appears as a worldless subject which then has to get hooked up with a world. On the contrary, the self becomes a self only through the total context of the world”.

The model of ‘being-in-the-world’ that emerges in Heidegger’s interpretation of man has important consequences for both the conceptions of the subject and of objectivity that are the metaphysical underpinnings of Cartesianism. First, the idea of a ‘worldless subject’ encountering a world of objects is overcome. According to Heidegger, not only is the Being of entities determined by the relevance conditions originating in the self-understanding of Dasein, but the Being of Dasein itself is circumscribed by the world in which it is involved.

Heidegger holds that “self and world are not two beings like ‘subject’ and ‘object’ or ‘I’ and ‘Thou’, rather self and world are the basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of Being-in-the-world”. According to him, ‘worldhood’ is an existentiale or essential structure of Dasein, not a categorical determination of things, and this refers to the
inseparability of Dasein and the world and to the denial of the subject-object dichotomy. This is why Heidegger says that "Dasein is its world existingly".\textsuperscript{44}

In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger discusses in detail Dasein's ontological structure and its basic attributes, which he terms existentiale. To set forth all of them are beyond the scope of this work, but considering the understanding of Heidegger's general project, what is important is what constitutes the existentiality of human existence. According to Heidegger, the existentiality of human existence, i.e., what constitutes human existence, is the same as our precursory comprehension of Being: "By ‘existentiality’ we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea of such a constitutive state of Being, the idea of Being is already included".\textsuperscript{45}

Because of the very basic connection between the question of Being and the question of human being, Heidegger eventually seeks to demonstrate the understanding of Being, not as a theoretical activity that is the result of philosophical disputations but, as a fundamental fact which constitutes human being's constitution: "But in that case, the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself— the pre-ontological understanding of Being".\textsuperscript{46}

The very precursory understanding of Being or what Heidegger expresses as "an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself", is what we term transcendence in our interpretation of Heidegger's thought.

But we must note that by the precursory comprehension of Being or by Dasein's essential tendency-of-Being, Heidegger does not mean understanding and perception in an ordinary sense, the relation between a subject and an object. In other words, the precursory comprehension of Being, or transcendence, is not a cognitive relation but the ground of any cognition. The relation between Dasein with Being, which Heidegger conveys by different expressions such as 'Being-in-the-world', 'disclosedness to Being', 'stands within truth', or 'transcendence', is not merely a cognitive relation between subject and object, but is prior to and is the ground of it, and is basically the ground of any activity, representation, or viewing. We may approach the meaning of human being's relation with Being in Heidegger's thought, which is sometimes expressed as 'the precursory comprehension of Being', through a comparison with the concept of phenomenal knowledge found in neo-Kantian interpretations of Kant. On this kind of interpretation of Kant, our knowledge is always phenomenal, which means that we view the world from behind the spectacles of our minds and we do not have access to the things in themselves but only to phenomena (appearances). According to this neo-Kantian interpretation, it is as if there is an obstacle or a dark wall called mind between
the things-in-themselves as they are, and phenomena as appearances or as they appear. But in Heidegger's view, there is by no means such a dark wall between Dasein and the things in the world, and understanding is the result of the transparency that exists in Dasein's disclosedness to the world. Therefore, according to Heidegger, human existence is Being-in-the-world as well as the disclosedness and transparency to the Being of entities, and understanding is the result of the very disclosedness and transparency.

Heidegger holds that man's substance is existence. This mode of being of man, i.e., existence is distinguished from all other entities by the fact that he builds up a certain relationship to himself. This ability to have an attitude toward oneself, to understand oneself in regard to the possibilities of one's being and indeed to be under the necessity of seizing hold of these, is the distinctive mark of an entity which is characterized by existence. 'Existence' is a term employed exclusively for man. The structural determinations of man, the existentialia, are to be clearly distinguished from the basic determinations of entities other than men, which are called categorical determinations by Heidegger. This is a fundamental distinction. The non-human entity is, but does not exist; for it, there is no possibility of having any relationship to itself.  

Heidegger employs the term 'existent' exclusively for man, and holds that only human being has existence, while any entity other than man is, but it does not exist. The term 'existent' is originally a Latin word composed from two components Ex (out) and sistent (standing). Hence the word existence literally means 'standing out of itself', and is technically applied for the mode of being that can stand out of itself. Therefore, to allocate the term existent exclusively to man means that human being is the only being that has existence or, in other words, can be an ex-sistent (it can stand out of itself).

We must note that to be an ex-sistant or having existence in Heidegger's thought does not carry the same sense as it does in existentialistic philosophies, i.e., in the same sense that a human being can determine his selfhood through his endeavors and by projecting himself on the possibilities which are in front of him. Rather, to be an ex-sistant, in Heidegger's sense, is to be in the mode of being that already stands out of itself, 'there' (Da), i.e., in the world. As we already mentioned, the terms 'there' (Da) and the world in Heidegger's thought refer to the transcendent that constitutes the existentiality of the existence and makes the very existence possible. More simply, according to Heidegger's conception, human being is a being which is defined by his relationship with Being, i.e., he is a being that stands out of himself and dwells in the house of Being, and it is for this reason that he understands Being.

Heidegger's entire famous essay, Letter on Humanism, revolves around the ex-sistense of man, that is around the attempt to understand human being, not as one living entity among
others but, as the being distinguished from other entities due to its relationship with Being. The topic placed at the center of Heidegger's account in the essay is how the humanity or the humanness, of man is to be considered.

In Paris there had appeared Sartre's short work, *L'Existentialism est un-humanism* [Existentialism is Humanism], in which Sartre, arguing against the Marxists' claim to represent humanism, aimed at setting forth existentialism as the true humanism. The question Beaufret put to Heidegger is: How can a new meaning be given to the word 'humanism'? Heidegger poses the counter question: Is that necessary? With this, we are placed directly within the discussion as to the manner in which the nature of man is to be conceived.

Heidegger's very profound and negatory response to Beaufret's question, i.e., whether it is necessary to present a new sense of humanism, whether a humanistic interpretation of everything is the only way of understanding or whether there is no other, non-humanistic interpretation of man, exactly expresses the nub of Heidegger's thought and the essence of his entire philosophical endeavor. Through his negatory response to Beaufret's question, Heidegger seeks to state the fact that the humanistic approach to man, carried out on the basis of metaphysical thought, is by no means the only way of understanding and we can have other ways of interpreting the world, man, and the relation between them. In other words, "what, however, is fundamentally questionable for Heidegger is the attempt to define the nature of man from the point of view of humanism." In opposition to the current metaphysical tradition which presents a mind-centered conception of the world and a self-centric, self-grounded conception of man, Heidegger attempts to put the transcendent in the center of thought and of the interpretation of the world and man, and to give an ex-centric conception of human being, i.e., to show that human being is not a self-grounded entity, and that the mode of his being is dependent on Being and his transcendence to Being. "In this manner, man now is in fact invested with a dignity which surpasses every form of humanism, in so far as the latter puts man in the center." Here, the humanity of man is viewed in terms of "the nearness of Being".

But what does this dignity mean? Heidegger maintains that the place where the truth of Being finds expression, where it, so to speak, installs itself, is *Da-sein*, ex-sistence: "The standing in the clearing of Being I call the ex-sistence of man. Only man has this way to be.... Ex-sistence is that, wherein the essence of man preserves the source that determines him." Then the dignity of human being is the preservation of the clearing of Being.

But what is *Dasein*'s ontological structure? As it was said above, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses *Dasein*'s ontological structure and analyses its basic elements and its
main attributes. Here we shall not discuss all the attributes of Dasein’s ontological structure, but focus only on those attributes which have a bearing on Heidegger’s critique of Kant, which are: temporality and historicity.

5-b) Temporality

It may be said that the most important of Dasein’s differentia with other entities is temporality. It is so basic a feature that we may go so far as to say that Dasein is the same temporality. In fact Heidegger attempts to interpret all ontological structures of Dasein in terms of temporality. Temporality, however, is not time in the ordinary sense. Heidegger holds that temporality, as one of basic attributes of existential structure of human being, makes time, in the ordinary sense, possible:

[It] requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be distinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later. Here we must make clear that this conception of time and, in general, the ordinary way of understanding it, have sprung from temporality, and we must show how this has come about.

Some philosophers, like Aristotle, believed in a kind of objectivity for time, and conceived time as the product of the motion and change of things. Plato, Plotinus, the neo-Platonists, and Augustine believed that time has a relation with the soul, and it is in the soul. The Stoics conceived time as subjective, that is, as something that originates from the subject itself. But Heidegger endeavors to show that neither Dasein is in time, nor time is in Dasein, rather Dasein is itself temporal, and temporality is the most important existential attribute of Dasein. According to Heidegger there are two kinds of time: Inauthentic and authentic. And he remarks that we must move from inauthentic time towards the understanding of the authentic one. Bergson also distinguished between inauthentic or spatial time and real time or duration. The first is the time which the clock tells us and is nothing save the replacement of the hands of clock on its surface, which is indeed space. Of course this expression of time or the change of time to space is necessary for the arrangement of our everyday-life and individual and social activities, but we must note that this mechanical or spatial time is not authentic time. Authentic time is one which returns to our inner moods and to the time of our sadness, happiness, sufferings, pleasures, desires, fears, and expectations. Heidegger believes that our everyday-life time is basically a time for supplying our practical needs and he terms it ‘time-for’. The sun, ‘the natural clock’, constitutes this time, and any artificial clock, more
or less, is directly regulated in terms of ‘the natural clock’ (the motion of earth and position of the earth in relation to the sun). Scientific time too is time-for or inauthentic time in which the content of real (authentic) time, which is constituted of heterogeneous units of our inner moods, that is, the time of our sadness, happiness, sufferings, pleasures, and so on, is abandoned and only the form of time is kept, which is formed by the homogeneous units.

By authentic time or temporality Heidegger does not mean that we are, as are all other things, confined to time, or that we have a sense of time, but rather that we exist as three temporal dimensions at once. These three temporal dimensions, i.e., future, past, and present, are nothing other than Dasein’s three modes of ecstasy. In other words, the mode of the being of Dasein is existence, it is ex-sistent and has three modes of ecstasy. These three modes of the ecstasy of Dasein, that Heidegger terms temporality, are the three modes of being of Dasein and the ground of the three dimensions or three moments of time, in the ordinary sense. Hence future, past, and present are the three ecstasies of human existence, which we conceive as three dimensions of time under the influence of the ordinary sense of time. For Heidegger the ordinary, current conception of time is a sign of the fact that under the influence of culture, language, and tradition we have become used to understanding the mode of our own being in terms of those concepts and pattern derived from non-human (non-Dasein) entities, which have categorical attributes but no existence nor existential attributes. According to Heidegger, we have also become used to conceiving human being’s existential characteristics like the categorical attributes of things. This is why we conceive Dasein’s temporality, that is a non-categorical (existential) characteristic of our existence, as time in the sense of a category and a categorical fact. Temporality consists in “being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our past, while being concerned with the present that constitutes our being.”

Put more clearly, according to Heidegger, all entities, in contrast to man, in respect of the mode of their being, are accomplished, fulfilled beings, and Heidegger calls them present-at-hand, namely, those beings which are ready, present, and accomplished. But the mode of the being of Dasein, i.e., existence, unlike other entities, has no complete, fulfilled essence and we can conceive the mode of the being of Dasein as a mode of being which must be realised. For this reason, Heidegger names the mode of the being of Dasein, potentiality-for-being. The existentiality of existence consists in that from the beginning Dasein is moved by a potentiality-for-being that must be realised. Existence is conceived, not only as what is,
but as what must be realised. Heidegger summarises this characteristic in the term of 'to-be' (it has to be) and conceives it as a basic attribute of Dasein: Dasein “is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-being, is, not yet”. Dasein’s being is a task imposed on it.

But Dasein, that must realise itself, always already finds itself among some possibilities. Heidegger expresses this characteristic of Dasein by different terms like ‘already-being-in’, ‘thrownness’ or ‘facticity’:

Dasein has a mode of Being in which it is brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in its thrownness. But thrownness, as a mode of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in terms of them, projecting itself upon them.

The thrownness or facticity of Dasein means that Dasein always finds itself among some pre-determined possibilities into which it has been thrown. We find ourselves thrown in the world in which we are already involved. We find ourselves in pre-determined ways along which we must move. Heidegger calls these pre-determined aspects ‘thrownness’ or ‘facticity’. Unlike other entities, Dasein is a given mode of being that has already been before its being. My existence does not begin with myself and with my birth rather it is in the continuation of the history, the culture and the tradition in which my existence has been thrown or posed. “As already located in a world, Dasein has a capacity for Being, or ability-to-be which it must realise and bring to completion. … At the same time we find ourselves as already ‘in play’. We are engaged and involved in the task of living and have already made choices that provide a basis for our future actions”. “As essentially situated, Dasein has always already gotten itself in definite possibility”, and these choices shape our facticity and limit our freedom. The very thrownness or facticity is the ground of what we express by the term past. The past is the product of Dasein’s thrownness or facticity.

On the other hand, the mode of the being of Dasein is not entirely confined to thrownness or facticity. It is not that Dasein must move only in pre-determined ways. Dasein is the potentiality-for-being that the mode of its being has left to itself. Dasein itself must realise the mode of its being through the projection which it itself has projected for its own being as a whole. Dasein takes the meaning of its life only from its projection. As a potentiality-for-being, Dasein is always already-being-in and at the same time Dasein’s existence, as a projection onto its completion, is always beyond itself in relating itself towards its defining possibility of being something or other in the end. Dasein is defined as a “self-projective Being toward its-ownmost-potentiality-for-being”. As the past is the product of
Dasein’s facticity, the future is the area of possibility and the result of the mode of being of Dasein for choosing the many possibilities that are in front of it.

Heidegger conceives existence and understanding, which for him are the same, as identical with projection: Because “understanding has in itself the existential structure that we call ‘projection’.” In understanding, Dasein opens up its own space for the free play of its existence as well as the free space for the play of entities which become available to it within the world. The two go together. It is worth mentioning that in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant Dasein’s projection and its free play to present entities which are confronted with itself, conform to the faculty of imagination in Kant’s philosophy, i.e., to the faculty which, unlike sense and understanding, freely synthesises representations. In the next chapters we will discuss this point in detail.

Heidegger holds that the present is the unity of the past and the future, i.e., the unity of thrownness or facticity with Dasein’s projection on many possibilities that are in front of it. The unity of our thrownness (the past) and our projection on the possibilities which are in front of us (the future) together forms our confrontation and dealing with present things. The very confrontation and concerning with present things constitutes the ground of the present.

Thus, according to Heidegger, the phenomenon of time is neither in things themselves and their motion or change, nor in the earth’s rotation around the sun and the motion of stars, rather it originates from human existence that can be defined as being-towards-death.

5-c) Historicity

We said above that according to Heidegger, temporality is one of the most important attributes of Dasein’s ontological structure. But if temporality is the basic attribute of Dasein’s ontological structure, it implies that Dasein’s existence is essentially historical. Here by the term ‘history’ Heidegger does not mean a series of events that occurred in the past, but one of the existential attributes of Dasein’s own ontological structure. Here historicity is not synonymous with history, although Heidegger holds that what is conceived as history is rooted in Dasein’s historicity. Hence, temporality and historicity, according to Heidegger, are identical and both of them equiprimordially constitute Dasein’s ontological structure.

In the previous pages we explained that Heidegger believes that the meaning of Dasein’s existence is temporality, which means that human being is the mode of being which is essentially unaccomplished, unfulfilled, and is only a potentiality-for-being that is being in
already-being-in and it must realise itself by its projection (by its being-ahead-of-itself) on
the possibilities which are in front of it. These two characteristics, in-already-being-in
(thrownness or facticity) and being-head-of-itself (projection) make Dasein’s confrontation
and dealing with entities (being forfeited or fallen) which is a constitutive element for its
being possible. The terms ‘being forfeited’ and ‘fallen’ point to the fact that Dasein
“understands itself in terms of just that which it is not and abandons itself to the realm of
entities familiar to it”. Heidegger seeks to interpret the mode of the being of Dasein in its
wholeness and totality. For this reason he believes that the above mentioned attributes of
Dasein, or in other words, the three ecstasies of Dasein which are the ground of the three
moments of time, are not separate facts, but have a unitary structure. Care is the concept
through which Heidegger attempts to show Dasein’s ontological structure in its wholeness
and totality.

Heidegger holds that, as the future, the past, and the present combine in a unity of time,
the attributes or the ecstasies of Dasein unify in the characteristic of care. Care does not mean
‘to be worried or anxious’, rather it should be understood in the sense that it concludes
Dasein’s threefold structure. This threefold structure consists in: 1) Being-ahead-of-itself
(projection), 2) in already-being-in (thrownness or facticity), and 3) as being-beside (being
forfeited or fallen).

According to Heidegger, “the Being of Dasein itself is to be visible as care”. ‘Care’ is
the English translation of the German word sorge and sorgen. Heidegger uses this word
‘care’ in a shorthand expression for the meaning of Dasein’s existential, ontological structure
in its unity. The reason why Heidegger prefers the term surge (care) for the expression of his
conception of Dasein’s ontological structure is probably his concern with ancient Greek
culture. In order to confirm his interpretation of the meaning of the being of Dasein,
Heidegger calls to witness the ancient Greek culture, and he shows that in a fiction which
Herder narrates about the truth of the being of man, human being is conceived as cura, i.e.,
care", and this fiction is repeated in Goethe’s Faust in other words. However, whatever the
reason for the employment of the term, we should ask what Heidegger means by it.

We said that according to Heidegger Dasein is care. The meaning of care in Heidegger’s
thought may be expressed by the following expression in English: “Ahead-of-itself-Being-
already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)”. What it means is that Dasein is a being-ahead of-itself and it means that human being,
unlike other entities, is not an accomplished, fulfilled or, in Heidegger’s own words, a
present-at-hand thing, rather the mode of the being of human being is a potentiality-for-being.
Being-ahead-of-itself is another expression for existence, i.e. for the mode of being for which its own being is an issue, and it means that this mode of being must realise its own being through its projection. Hence, since Dasein is not a present-at-hand thing but a potentiality-for-being and because it is itself a projection on the mode of its being, Dasein is always a being-ahead-of-itself.

But the mode of being of Dasein, i.e., what is being-ahead-of-itself, is also at the same time an already-being-in (the world). Here the word ‘already’ points to this meaning that Dasein has existed in its history, culture, and tradition before its being. The concepts of existence and existentiality in Heidegger’s thought tell us that Dasein possesses the mode of being by which it can choose the possibilities which are in front of it so that it can realise itself on the basis of its choice. But the mode of the being of Dasein is such that it is always among some definite, pre-determined possibilities without which it cannot be realised. This characteristic of Dasein is what Heidegger calls ‘facticity’, which is Dasein’s throwness into the world, and this world for Dasein is always a socio-historical-cultural-linguistic one. When Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s historicity, he means the very characteristic of Dasein’s ontological structure. The expression ‘being-alongside-entities’ points to another attribute of Dasein, which Heidegger also calls being ‘forfeited’ or ‘fallen’. The concept of being forfeited or fallen in Heidegger’s thought refers to human being’s absorption in his relations with things and his being influenced by a kind of publicity which Heidegger terms anyone or the they. Then ‘care’ is indeed the unity of Dasein in its existentiality, facticity, and fallenness.

However, Heidegger conceives historicity as one of the most basic characteristics of the mode of the being of man. According to Heidgger’s analysis, Dasein is in the depth of its being historical, and inasmuch as “Dasein is in itself historical”, any activity of Dasein, including understanding and thus science and philosophy, are relative to Dasein and hence historical.

Any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was. It is its past, whether explicity or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along ‘behind’ it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, .... Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past— and this always means the past of its ‘generation’— is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it. This elemental historicality of Dasein may remain hidden from Dasein itself.
Since *Dasein* is essentially historical, and thus any activity of it, including its understanding, is historical too, consequently we cannot conceive *Dasein*’s understanding of Being, i.e., the main question in Heidegger’s inquiry, as a self-evident, unhistorical understanding, and we cannot suppose that Being is an immediately given. For this reason Heidegger believes that *Dasein*’s “ownmost ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an ‘historical’ interpretation.” Basically, for Heidegger “what is given immediately and self-evidently is often an illusion mediated by the historical epoch in which the self-reflection occurs.” By his existentialistic analysis of our everyday-life, Heidegger intends to show that we must understand ourselves as ‘contextualised’ in a world and in a history. “From this standpoint it will appear that the Cartesian ideal of finding absolute grounds and foundations is out of order and based on a false idea of the conditions for intelligibility. Our interpretations are always finite and rooted in the context of the world in which we live”\(^5\), and our understanding is always in a socio-historico-cultural-linguistic context.

But, as some critics of Heidegger point out, it seems that Heidegger’s historicism and his emphasis on *Dasein*’s historicity leads to a very profound historical relativism from which it is impossible to be released. Because if *Dasein* is in itself and essentially historical and if any understanding and activity of *Dasein* originates from a socio-historico-cultural context (from what Heidegger calls tradition) and even from language in which we are immersed, then there will be no way we can conceive Heidegger’s own thought as a meta-historical thought independent of its tradition and his own world-history. We can resolve the problem of historical relativism only when we gain a unique viewpoint in which we are able to free ourselves from our current involvement in the world, tradition, and socio-historical-cultural situation. But, according to Heidegger’s own definition of human being as being-in-the-world, such an escape from the world, including soci-historical-cultural world, in order to reach a meta-historical, transcendental position, is not possible. In other words, historical relativism, just like any other relativism and scepticism, is a self-contradictory position, since this thesis must place itself in a position from which it can choose an interpretation among other interpretations. Heidegger’s critics truly declare that Heidegger’s conception of the relation between understanding and its presuppositions grounded in history, culture, language (tradition) show that his own interpretation of *Dasein* and Being takes place in the framework of an *a priori* structure of presuppositions.

But, as we mentioned in the introduction, we may think about the problem of historical relativism on the basis of Heidegger’s thought from another point of view. It can be said that any effort to transcend socio-historico-cultural-linguistic limitations, is an absurd desire
which is the result of the will to power of man. Heidegger criticises philosophy for this reason that it vainly seeks to gain the ultimate, absolute, unchangeable, eternal truths, and according to him there are no such absolute truths, and any understanding and interpretation of Being and entities are always formed in a context of pre-understanding of Being and things, which exists in a history and culture.

Now, we have to some extent become acquainted with Heidegger's main project and his general idea. Hence, we are in better position to understand Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy, and now we can ask whether Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's Critique of pure Reason is a commentary of it or it is his own theory projected on Kant's transcendental philosophy. In the next chapter we should try to answer this question and to understand Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, and thereby to understand the thought of these two great thinkers of the history of western thought.
Chapter Two

The Main Characteristics of
Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant and its Validity

1) The Main Characteristics of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant

Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, like all of his ideas, has excited many critics and followers. We cannot expect from a thinker like Heidegger— who seeks to criticise and examine the entire history and tradition of metaphysics and invites us to overcome metaphysical thought— that his interpretation of another great philosopher like Kant would be in accord with current interpretations.

Most current interpretations conceive the main aim of Kant’s critical philosophy to be the denial of the possibility of metaphysics and affirming and strengthening the foundations of natural science, and take the Critique of Pure Reason as the most important book in modern period on epistemology and the theory of knowledge. But Heidegger holds that the main aim of Kant’s transcendental Philosophy is the demonstration of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysical knowledge and laying a foundation for metaphysics (and not for natural science), and that the Critique of Pure Reason must be conceived as a book basically on ontology, and not epistemology, 1 and that its epistemological aspect has only a secondary, subsidiary role, and its main issue is ontology. 3 Hence, Heidegger explicitly says. “The task of the following investigation [i.e., Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics] is to explicate Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics”. 3 But we know well
that Heidegger himself had already undertaken such a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger is the first to present an ontological, rather than an epistemological, interpretation of Kant’s most important work, *the Critique of Pure Reason*.

According to Heidegger, in the history of western philosophy Kant has an important place. Heidegger maintains that the main aim of any philosophical thought is the understanding of Being, even though the philosopher himself is not clearly and properly conscious of his interpretation of Being. Heidegger believes that in Kant the question of Being is set forth in a given way for the first time. In *the Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant is engaged in a transcendental inquiry into the intrinsic possibility of ontology. In other words, *the Critique of Pure Reason* is not an ontological book in an ordinary sense of the term, and Kant does not seek to present an ontological system besides other ones. Rather he inquiries into the intrinsic possibility of ontology itself, i.e., whether or not ontology (and ontological knowledge) is, despite its different forms, basically possible. For this reason Heidegger calls Kant’s transcendental inquiry fundamental ontology in order to distinguish it from current ontological systems. Fundamental ontology does not seek to establish and present an ontological system but to examine the intrinsic possibility of the establishment and presentation of such systems. But we must not forget that Heidegger terms his inquiry in *Being and Time* as fundamental ontology too. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger intends eventually to posit human existence as a foundation for metaphysics. And in his interpretation of Kant again he seeks to show that Kant also conceives the analytic of the mode of being of man as a preparation for answering the question of metaphysics and its intrinsic possibility. This is why, according to Heidegger, to inquire about the question of metaphysics for Kant has been constituted in the form of *the Critique of Pure Reason*. As we already said, Heidegger’s entire interpretation of Kant is based on the belief that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an effort to lay a foundation for metaphysics. But, according to Heidegger, Kant realises that laying a foundation for metaphysics, and answering the question whether or not metaphysical knowledge is essentially possible, is dependent on a preparatory analysis of human being’s ontological structure. For this reason, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, laying a foundation for metaphysics in Kant is made up in the form of a critique of pure reason and this critique of pure reason indeed means an ontological analysis of man and the conditions which constitutes human being’s knowledge. Heidegger holds that it is Kant himself who sets forth the question of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics in the form of fundamental ontology, i.e., in the form of an ontological analysis of man, and in the pattern of a critique of
pure reason. But, on the other hand, we know well that in *Being and Time* Heidegger himself presents the problem of the intrinsic possibility of ontology, and the understanding of the meaning of Being in itself, in the form of an existential, ontological analytic of *Dasein*. Due to this, some people believe that in his interpretation of Kant Heidegger has endeavored to impose his main project of *Being and Time* onto Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

But why does Heidegger conceive Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as laying a foundation for metaphysics and ontology? The answer to this question is that for Heidegger ontological knowledge means the precursory comprehension of Being of essents, and according to him the very ontological knowledge or the precursory comprehension of the Being of essents is that which makes ontic (empirical) knowledge of the beings possible. Kant also sets forth the question as to what makes our knowledge of beings, our ontic (empirical) knowledge, possible. In other words, Kant's main question is what constitutes the ground of the objectivity of empirical knowledge. According to Heidegger, these questions, i.e., the question of the ground of the objectivity of objective knowledge, and what makes knowledge itself basically and essentially possible, are ontological, and not epistemological. Hence Kant discusses what makes ontic (objective) knowledge possible and this is nothing but ontology. But there is an important difference between Kant's work and others, and it is that Kant sets forth a fundamental ontology, i.e., the discussion of the intrinsic possibility of ontology, and this is what makes it difficult to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an ontological work. "As ontology is an inquiry concerned with the Being of things, so 'fundamental ontology' is an inquiry concerned with the possibility of ontology".

According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's main aim is to work out the problem of the possibility of *metaphysica specialis* (the knowledge of God, soul and the World), i.e., to answer the question whether or not we can gain any knowledge about God, the immortality of soul, the world, etc. Indeed it is on the basis of this aim that *Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason* is formed. But during his investigation, Kant realised that answering the question of the intrinsic possibility of *metaphysica specialis* (the knowledge of God, soul, and the World) is dependent on the solution to the problem of *metaphysica generalis* (the knowledge of Being and its essential attributes). In other words, answering this question whether or not *metaphysica specialis* is essentially possible "is thrown back upon the more general question of the intrinsic possibility of the manifestation of the essent as such". More simply, the answer to the question whether or not we can know essents such as God, soul, the world and so on is dependent on the solution to the problem whether there is "a comportment with regard to the essent, a comportment in which the essent reveals itself in
itself so that all statements relative to it become verifiable." Through these questions Kant confronts the problem whether or not our knowledge basically belongs to reality as such. According to Heidegger, the inquiry about the ground of knowledge and about what makes our knowledge basically possible is nothing other than ontology, and investigating whether or not our knowledge belongs to Being or reality in itself is indeed the inquiry of the intrinsic possibility of ontology. This is why, according to Heidegger, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the 'Transcendental Analytic', which discusses the pure concepts of understanding or categories (ontological concepts), i.e., the intrinsic possibility of ontology or metaphysica generalis, according to Heidegger's interpretation, is prior to the 'Transcendental Dialectic' in which Kants discusses the essential possibility of metaphysica specialis.

In chapter One we mentioned that in Being and Time Heidegger endeavors to show that along with whatever we confront with, or even along with whatever we represent, we understand the meaning of Being so far as we can say that we always live within the understanding of Being and all actions and thought occur within the understanding of Being. Heidegger undertakes the task of demonstration that there is a meaning of Being of all essents, which underlies all our understanding of reality and all our actions and activities. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tries to show that we have a priori knowledge which makes any experience of entities possible. Now the question is: What is this a priori knowledge and what is its source? Can we conceive a priori knowledge in Kant's philosophy as innate knowledge as, for example, Descartes and Leibniz believed in the existence of some innate ideas? Kant himself explicitly rejects such a conception of a priori knowledge.12 Certainly it is not the product of experience because it is itself the condition of any experience. The answer to the question what a priori knowledge is and what its source is, involves the controversy between the current epistemological interpretations of Kant and Heidegger's interpretation. In the epistemological interpretations of Kant, it is said that a priori knowledge belongs to the mind and its structure. In other words, a priori knowledge, pure concepts or categories, are the products of logical fuctions of understanding. But in his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger tries to show that a prior knowledge in Kant, i.e., what makes any experience possible, is nothing other than our precursory comprehension of Being, and our precursory comprehension of Being or ontological knowledge is the ground of any knowledge and experience of essents.13 It means that before we can experience an essent, we must first know the Being of it, i.e., we must find out that the object of our experience exists. In other words, unless the essent does not show itself to us we cannot know or experience it. In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger seeks to show that
encounter with Being is indispensable and any ontic (empirical) knowledge is based on our ontological knowledge and our precursory comprehension of Being. According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant seeks to demonstrate that unless the essent appears and shows itself to us, no knowledge of it is possible.

Heidegger attempts to show phenomenological traits in the Critique of Pure Reason, and for this reason the title of one of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Heidegger expressly says: "In its basic posture the method of the Critique is what we, since Husserl, understand, ...as phenomenological method. That is why a phenomenological interpretation of the Critique is the only interpretation that fits Kant's own intentions, even if these intentions are not clearly spelled out by him". In following pages we shall explain in greater detail about the phenomenological traits of the Critique of Pure Reason according to Heidegger's interpretation.

However, Heidegger believes that Kant, in his main aim of laying a foundation for metaphysics, fails. According to Heidegger, the reason for the failure is to be sought in the subjectivism involved in Kant's thought or, in Heidegger's own words because, Kant "'recoiled from' [the logical conclusion of his argument] because he was too much a prisoner of tradition". Heidegger holds that in the history of metaphysics a great split between subject and object has been created. Now we attempt to heal this split, but we cannot. In Being and Time, and also in his interpretation of Kant, one of Heidegger's aims is to fill the created subject-object gap and to present a non-subjectivistic understanding of man and the world. In the history of metaphysics, according to Heidegger, there have been created two completely separate realms, i.e., the realms of subject and object. The realm of subject increasingly has come to dominate the realm of object in so far as reality, without the consciousness of subject, has lost its sense, and the meaning of Being has changed to 'being perceived', and reality to 'the possibility of being experienced'. In Descartes' philosophy, i.e., in the culmination of subjectivism, 'thing' entirely converts to 'object' or, rather to 'subject's representation'. Hence, according to Heidegger, "the history of metaphysics has been that of the progressive domination of the object by the subject". Since in the history of metaphysics, understanding of Being has not been a return to Being itself but to the object and to the transcendental horizon of consciousness.

Heidegger's interpretation of Kant may be conceived as an endeavor in an opposite direction of the subjectivism, i.e., to extend the realm of Being in the realm of subject in so
far as Being and human being's relation with Being (transcendence) is the most fundamental constitutive component in human existence.

Heidegger maintains that, despite the fact that "with Kant, the 'question of Being' is at a particularly crucial crossroads, and Kant opens the possibility of 'transcendental inquiry' into the fundamental 'ground' of Being," he has not succeeded in penetrating more deeply than the ancient subject-object split itself, and he has not plunged through to the authentic moment beyond the subject-object dichotomy, in which Being and human existence meet. 18

In his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to show that although Kant, in the way of his inquiry, approached the role of the faculty of transcendental imagination in the formation of ontological knowledge, again, because of his tendency to follow his predecessors, he could not properly realise the importance of transcendental imagination as the formative center of ontological knowledge. 19 According to Heidegger, because of the influence of the metaphysical tradition, Kant conceives transcendental imagination as a lower faculty in relation to understanding, and gives main importance to the latter. 20 According to Heidegger's analysis, Kant, having found the importance of transcendental imagination in formation of ontological knowledge in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, withdraws from this progress and reduces the basic, independent function of transcendental imagination to the function of understanding in the second edition of the Critique. On the basis of this argument, Heidegger offers his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason based on its first edition treating it as more authentic than the second edition. Of course, in Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger pays attention to both editions, 21 but in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics he bases his interpretation chiefly on the first edition. According to Heidegger's interpretation, in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays aside transcendental imagination in favour of understanding. In the second edition, Kant omits two passages in which he had spoken of the faculty of imagination as the third original faculty besides sense and understanding, and substitutes a critique of the empiricist analysis of understanding for the first passage, and places a new expression of the entire of transcendental deduction in the place of the second passage. But Heidegger believes that the two omitted passages are very important. Because, as we shall explain in the following pages, Heidegger holds that the truth of human being is rooted in transcendental imagination—and transcendental imagination in Kant's language is what is expressed by temporality in Heidegger's terminology. According to Heidegger, it is transcendental imagination "which forms the horizon of objectivity without which objective experience would be impossible". 22 He tries to show that temporality, i.e., the three fold ecstasy of human
existence, is the ground of what is called transcendental imagination by Kant. It is also the basis of the 'selfhood' of the self, pure practical reason as well as intuition, understanding, and the imagination. Heidegger attempts to show that the discussion of temporality, which had been earlier explained in detail in Being and Time as the main characteristic of Dasein's ontological structure, is present in all parts of Kant's thought, and this is what none of Kant's interpreters and critics have observed.

Before beginning our discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason on the basis of his main project, i.e., proving the intrinsic possibility of ontology or, in our expression, proving the essential possibility of transcendence, let us discuss by way of an introduction the validity of Heidegger's interpretation.

2) The Validity of Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant

As it has been said, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is controversial and has been criticised by many commentators of Kant. This criticism was initiated most notably by Ernst Cassirer in his review of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysic: “Here Heidegger speaks no longer as a commentator, but as an usurper, who as it were enters with force of arms into the Kantian system in order to subjugate it and to make it serve his own problematic”.

According to Karl Löwith, there is very little of Kant in Heidegger's interpretation and he accesses it in this way:

The self-interpretation in the text of another is explicitly accomplished in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's ground-laying of metaphysics. This is indeed supposed to help itself to its own 'more original possibility', but rather in fact Heidegger helps himself to the questioning of Being and Time in order to confirm historically what Kant perhaps had wished to say, and to shove aside all previous understanding of Kant as not original.

Another critic of Heidegger, Marjorie Grene, says:

For despite his genuine insight into the structure of Kant's greatest work, it must be admitted that the 'time' and the 'creative imagination' Heidegger finds in the Critique of Pure Reason are in large part grafts from his own thought.... Of the smoothly flowing, scientific time of the critical philosophy he has made an inward, existential temporality; and the productive imagination, which is limited by Kant to a purely theoretical task, he identifies, in a most unjustifiable way, with the whole of human spontaneity; with the will of the Practical Reason itself. This is at odds, .... with the whole purpose and scope of Kant's philosophy.

Conversely, some others believe that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is not an interpretation in the current, ordinary sense, but that in fact, through this interpretation we
gain entire new philosophical insights behind the horizon of Kant's critical philosophy. Charles Sherover holds that Heidegger's project is exempt from the usual textual criticisms. Because what is important regarding Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is “Whether significant philosophic insights emerge, or new directions for philosophic development are brought forth, from such an encounter between two thinkers”.

William J. Richardson, the famous interpreter of Heidegger, also thinks in this way.

However, the persons who after reading *Being and Time*, Study Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in works like *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, expressly raise this question whether in these works Heidegger is concerned to interpret Kant's own philosophy, or Kant's transcendental philosophy is only a pretext for him to restate what he has already set forth in *Being and Time*.

Many, like Thomas Langan, believe that in his interpretation, “Heidegger is not, then, trying to say what Kant ‘really said’, nor what he ‘meant’ to say. Rather, in this work we simply witness Heidegger in the very personal act of nourishing the enterprise of fundamental ontology on the wine of the first pressing of the *Critique*”.

Heidegger himself confesses that his interpretation provides justified grounds for the critics to object to the violence of his interpretation of Kant. But he asserts that a dialogue between thinkers is bound by other laws:

My critics have constantly reproached me for the violence of my interpretations, and the grounds for this reproach can easily be found in this work [Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics]. From the point of view of an inquiry which is both historical and philosophical, this reproach is always justified when directed against attempts to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers. In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own problem, a dialogue between thinkers is bound by other laws. These laws are more easily violated, the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings more frequent. The extent to which I have gone astray in the present endeavor and the shortcomings thereof have become so clear to me in the period of time since its first publication that I refrain from making it a patchwork through the addition of supplements and postscripts. Through their shortcomings, thinkers learn to be more perceiving.

With reference to these statements, Martin Weatherston concludes that Heidegger himself believed that his interpretation was full of errors. But this conclusion, though Heidegger himself also confesses to his errors and shortcomings in his interpretations of Kant, is due to a misunderstanding of Heidegger's above-quoted sentences. Particularly, we must pay attention to why Heidegger, despite his apparent confession of his many errors and shortcomings in his interpretation of Kant, does not modify it by any serious alteration in his
texts and in their frequent publications, published in his time, which seems very odd in an accurate thinker like Heidegger. In my opinion, the meaning of Heidegger’s above-mentioned sentences should be understood in another context. Basically, self-destroying, not having absolute trust to his findings, and always finding himself in the way, are the main traits of many authentic thinkers. According to Heidegger, “in any investigation in this field [i.e., in the field of the question of Being], where [as Kant says] ‘the thing itself is deeply veiled’ one must take pains not to overestimate the results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question ‘what is Being?’”

Heidegger always sought to discover more primordial and newer horizons for the basic problems of metaphysics and to radicalise his investigation. For this reason, in another short interpretation of Kant, *Kant's thesis about Being*, Heidegger endeavors to view to Kant’s philosophy from another horizon. In this article, through a radicalisation of the discussion of transcendence in Kant, Heidegger intends to show that Kant’s thesis about Being, that “Being is obviously not a real predicate”, and that Being is ‘merely the positing’, is close to Parmenides’ view about being according to which “there is, namely, Being”, “there is present, namely being present”, and Kant’s thesis about the unity of transcendental apperception is close to Parmenides’ idea about the relation between Being and thought, i.e., “thinking and Being are the same”. It is in relation to the discovery of newer horizons and more primordial possibilities that Heidegger conceives, not only his interpretation of Kant but his entire thought during more than six decades of philosophical thinking, as unaccomplished, imperfect, and even occasionally going astray.

We must distinguish between commentators of a text and other original thinkers engaging with a text. A commentator merely tries to clarify some difficult terms and obscure sentences in the text, but in a dialogue between thinkers each of them has his own position and his own way of thinking, which leads to more authentic and more profound understanding of the issue through finding convergences and divergences. Karl Jaspers holds that Kant is in a high position in comparison with all his commentators and interpreters. But this statement of Jasper is by no means true about Heidegger, who is an original thinker himself. In order to show the difference between ‘a dialogue between thinkers’ and ordinary commentaries, customary among the historians of philosophy, and in order to show that his interpretation of Kant is not an arbitrary one, Heidegger invokes Kant’s own words at the end of his reply to the critique of the Leibnizian, Eberhard. In this reply Kant answers Eberhard that although
the *Critique of Pure Reason* may well be the real apology for Leibniz, even in opposition to his partisans whose words of praise hardly do him honor. It can also be an apology for many older philosophers about whom certain historians of philosophy, for all the praises they bestow, speak the purest nonsense. They do not understand the intentions of these philosophers when they neglect the key to all explication of the works of pure reason through concepts alone, namely the critique of reason itself (as the common source of all concepts), and are incapable of looking beyond the language which these philosophers employ to what they intended to say.*

Kant also says, “some historians of philosophy cannot see beyond the etymologies of what ancient philosophers have said to what they wanted to say [but they could not]”. By invoking these assertions of Kant, Heidegger intends to reply to his critics, such as Cassirer, in this way:

It is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that which these words ‘intend to say’, every interpretation must necessarily resort to violence. This violence, however, should not be confused with an action that is wholly arbitrary. The interpretation must be animated and guided by the power of an illuminative idea. Only through the power of this idea can an interpretation risk that which is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the secret élan of a work, in order by this élan to get through to the unsaid and to attempt to find an expression for it. The directive idea itself is confirmed by its own power of illumination.*

In the first sentence of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, a lecture course delivered in the winter semester of 1927-28, Heidegger says: “the intention of this course is to achieve a philosophical understanding of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that means to learn how to do philosophy”.* Also in its introduction, he reminds his audience: “The following phenomenological deliberations are of fundamental importance for grasping the interpretation of the *Critique* as well as for grasping this interpretation itself, i.e., for grasping philosophy as such”.* Then Heidegger remarks that this interpretation concerns problems which neither any interpretation of Kant nor basically any philosophy during the history of western thought has penetrated: “These deliberations concern problems which seem trivial but which philosophy has by no means yet thoroughly penetrated”.* In fact, through his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger seeks to reveal the spirit of philosophy which, according to him, is nothing save inquiring about the question of Being. As the English translators of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* correctly point out, “this work is not a commentary, the title *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* is a modest one. Instead of taking the role of a scholar showing his students the way through a difficult masterpiece of western philosophy by writing a commentary on it, Heidegger places the Kantian *Critique* in the domain of the
question of being—a domain which nurtures him as a philosopher and ultimately allows him to fulfill his philosophical mission".48

In Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger again cites another sentence of Kant in order to show how it is possible that the actual ground of the thought of a thinker may be different from what is rendered visible by the first description.49 Kant himself, with regard to his interpretation of Plato's doctrine of ideas, says: "I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thought which an author has expressed with regard to his subject... to find that we understand him better than he understood himself, in that he has not sufficiently determined his concept and therefore has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention".50 Now, Heidegger wants to restate the same point in relation to his own interpretation of Kant. He expressly remarks: "Thus our intention and task, in properly understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, necessarily includes the claim to understand Kant better than he understood himself".51 But is not Heidegger's claim to understand Critique of Pure Reason, better than the author of the work, i.e., Kant, a presumptuous one? Heidegger himself responds to the question:

When we comprehend properly what 'understanding better' means, we realise from the first that such understanding is possible and meaningful only where something intelligible is already there which contains in itself the possibility of being traced back to its foundations. In saying that there is something that we intend to understand better, we are saying that it contains within it a content in which we ourselves can grow. By contrast, everything which drifts on the surface and, on the basis of its trivial and vacuous character, gives no clue to an interpretation, can also not be understood better .... 'Understanding appropriately' as 'understanding better' is no mere rejection of what is understood, but rather is giving it 'validity'.52

Heidegger himself admits that it is possible that Kant himself does not aspire to such an aim in the Critique of Pure Reason as he presents, and Kant, indeed, has not sought to lay a foundation for metaphysics and to prove the intrinsic possibility of ontology. But Heidegger holds that it is not important, what is important is that Kant's thought has proceeded in this way, whether consciously or unconsciously: "Whether Kant himself ever became perfectly clear with respect to this problem [laying the foundation of metaphysics] remains a subordinate question. It is enough that he recognised the urgency of the problem and, above all, that he presented it".53

The other point, related to the validity of Heidegger's interpretation, is that, as Heidegger himself, in reply to his critics, emphasises, wherever he has actually added to Kant, he has explicitly clarified that Kant has not posed the question so explicitly as he himself has
presented it. Heidegger frequently emphasises that whatever he has added to Kant, he has done, not arbitrarily but, on the basis of the philosophical interpretation. In his philosophical interpretation, Heidegger, indeed, attempts to radicalise Kant's inquiry, and this very trait of his method in interpretation, i.e., radicalisation and pursuing the question up to the foundation, distinguishes his interpretation from others.

The other point, related to the validity of Heidegger's interpretation of *the Critique of Pure Reason*, which is worthy of mention is that even considering philological, historical criteria and with regard to the meaning of interpretation in the ordinary sense of the word, Heidegger's interpretation is unique and matchless. Throughout *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* are full of references to Kant's works, of citation from them, and subtle comparisons, even word by word, between the first and the second editions of *the Critique of Pure Reason*. Frequently references to Kant's pre-critical works and even to his unpublished manuscripts, the etymological discussions of Kant's own terminology with regard to the Latin origins of Kant's terms, and extraordinary meticulousness in considering the employment of even prepositions by Kant, are some of the significant characteristics of Heidegger's interpretation, which are rarely found in the interpretations of texts.

However, how must we judge Heidegger's interpretation of Kant? Must we say that all epistemological interpretations of Kant, which have been rendered yet, have gone astray, or conversely, must we believe that, as Cassirer held, Heidegger puts his words in Kant's mouth by force and violence, and hence his ontological interpretation lacks any validity? It seems that we can judge in another way about the possibility of both epistemological and ontological interpretations of Kant. According to our judgement, any authentic thinker's thought has many possibilities in its heart, and thus epistemological and ontological interpretations of *Critique of Pure Reason* show two different possibilities which exist in the heart of Kant's own thinking.

In the epistemological interpretations of Kant, there is greater emphasis on the problem of the objectivity of empirical knowledge, laying of the foundation of modern science, and denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in critical philosophy. But, in Heidegger's ontological interpretation of *the Critique of Pure Reason*, the emphasis is more on Kant's attention to the question of Being, the grounds of objectivity, the ontological foundations of knowledge, and above all, the existential, ontological conditions of man's own existence. It is possible that, due to the predominance of epistemological interpretations of Kant, our minds find it difficult and uneasy to understand and accept Heidegger's interpretation.
However, Heidegger himself admits that his interpretation of Kant is not interpretation in the ordinary sense, but it must be conceived as a dialogue between him and Kant. In Thomas Langan's words this dialogue between Heidegger and Kant is "a collision of the vision of Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] with the vision of the Critique of Pure Reason, the latter a vision without which Sein und Zeit would not have been possible, but one which Sein und Zeit had to transcend, giving the Critique in that very act its ultimate sense". In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gave this new insight to us that always we have a priori knowledge of entities, and this a priori knowledge constitutes and determines the objects of our experience and knowledge. In Being and Time, and then in What is a Thing? Heidegger transcends the Kantian vision and gives us a new insight that Kant could not discover. Heidegger's new insight is that Kantian a priori knowledge, eventually returns to Dasein's history, culture, language, or, in a word, tradition.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant truly shows the human being's role in the constitution and determination of entities and objects. First in Being and Time, and then in What is a Thing?, Heidegger properly clarifies the interplay between Being and Dasein in the constitution and determination of the thing. But without Kant's vision of human being's role in constitution of objects, the emergence of the latent insight of Heidegger's works, i.e., the interplay between Being and Dasein in the constitution and determination of things would not have been possible.

But, dispensing with the criticisms relating to the validity of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant found in Kantian studies circles, we may also confront this question in Heideggerian studies: considering that Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1925-26) and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1927-28) belong to the early Heidegger's thought, and not to the later Heidegger, can we conceive them, after Heidegger's thoughtful turn (during 1936-1946), as valid, considerable works? More explicitly, Heidegger's entire interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is on the basis of the effort to lay a foundation for metaphysics and to prove the intrinsic possibility of metaphysical knowledge, but after his thoughtful turn Heidegger seeks to pass beyond metaphysics and to overcome metaphysical thought, namely to access another way of thinking that he himself calls 'no-longer-metaphysical-thought'. Therefore, from the perspective of 'passing beyond metaphysics' and 'overcoming metaphysical thought', we face the question whether we can still conceive Heidegger's interpretation of Kant as valid and considerable.

In order to answer the question, it would be necessary fully explain the meaning and content of Heidegger's turn and discuss the differences between the early Heidegger's
thought and the later Heidegger's thinking, and see whether in the evolution of his thought there are breaks or we can find, despite the existence of some different steps, a kind of unity.\textsuperscript{55}

For lack of space, here we shall confine ourselves only to say some points relating to this issue.

Generally, that Heidegger's turn is a radical shift away from his main project in \textit{Being and Time} can be doubted with good reason. We can see, despite the existence of some different steps in his thought, a very basic and essential unity in the way of his thinking. In his preface to the seventh edition of \textit{Being and Time} (1953), Heidegger reaffirmed that "the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our \textit{Dasein} is to be stirred by the question of being".\textsuperscript{56}

Kant's philosophy is important for Heidegger's thought with regard to certain considerations: Firstly, as Langan remarks, the dialogue between Heidegger and Kant "is a model for the long series of dialogues with the leading thinkers of the western tradition".\textsuperscript{57} Secondly, as it was explained, certain basic latent insights in Heidegger's works, emphasised even in the later Heidegger's works, like the interplay between Being and \textit{Dasein}, would not be possible without Kant's philosophy, and hence a proper understanding of these insights is also impossible without a profound study of \textit{the Critique of Pure Reason} and Heidegger's interpretation of it.

However, it may even be said that, in one sense, the later Heidegger, in comparison with the early Heidegger, is closer to Kant. Kant believed that "metaphysics actually exists, if not as a science, yet still as natural disposition".\textsuperscript{58} According to Kant, theoretical metaphysics is not possible. In \textit{Being and Time} and in his interpretations of \textit{the Critique of Pure Reason} the early Heidegger challenges Kant and seeks to prove the possibility of metaphysics. But the later Heidegger, like Kant, comes to the conclusion that metaphysics, as the knowledge of the truth of Being, is impossible.

As we know, Heidegger's complete plan for \textit{Being and Time} was never fulfilled. In the introduction of \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger had divided the work into two main parts. The title of the first part is: 'The interpretation of \textit{Dasein} in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental Horizon for the question of Being'.\textsuperscript{59} This part was to include three divisions: "1) The preparatory fundamental analysis of \textit{Dasein}; 2) \textit{Dasein} and temporality; 3) Time and Being".\textsuperscript{60} Out of these three divisions, only the first two were published, and part Two and the third division of \textit{part One}, titled 'Time and Being', never appeared.
Heidegger conceived his later Marburg lectures (1927) as 'a new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 of Being and Time' (the division titled Time and Being), and decided to publish it. But after a conversation with Jaspers, he was convinced that this part of the work was not yet intelligible. Only after almost half a century did Heidegger permit the text of the course to be published under the title The Basic problems of phenomenology.

The title of the second part of Being and Time was: 'Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of temporality as our clue'. This part, like the first one, was to include three divisions as follows: 1) Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporality; 2) the ontological foundation of Descartes' 'cogito sum', and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the 'res cogitans'; 3) Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and limits of ancient ontology.

The whole of second part of Being and Time too was not published. Hence, Being and Time is, in fact, two out of six divisions which were originally planned by Heidegger. Nevertheless, Heidegger's interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1925-26) and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1927-28), delivered right after the Marburg University lectures (after The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) must be located among Heidegger's later Marburg lectures and conceived as complementary divisions of Being and Time and a substitute for the third division of the first part, 'Time and Being'. For the first division of the second part ('Kant's doctrine of schematism and time...') Heidegger needed to find a language for expressing the third division of the first part of Being and Time (Time and Being). He found this language in phenomenological experience and through Kantian concepts, i.e., he attempts to make effable the unpublished part of Being and Time, (Time and Being) through the phenomenological concepts and the terminology of Kant's transcendental philosophy. In his preface to the first edition of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger himself says: "This interpretation of The Critique of Pure Reason arose in the course of the elaboration of the second part of Sein und Zeit", i.e., in the course of the part which never appeared. Therefore, an understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant may help us in the reconstructing the unappeared part of Being and Time.

In 1963 (in the period designated as the later Heidegger) Heidegger published an article, entitled Kant's thesis about Being. In this article, although Heidegger no longer speaks of "laying the foundation of metaphysics", he radicalises some of his latent ideas in his
interpretations of Kant, specifically his own insights about Being or transcendental truth, the original dimension of mind or transcendental subjectivity, and about the constitution of the unity of transcendental apperception. In this article he attempts to show that Kant’s thesis about transcendental truth or Being is close to the early Greek thinkers’ in particular Parmenides’ conception of Being as manifestation and disclosedness, and his view about the constitution of Transcendental apperception and the relation between “Being and Thought” approaches Parmenides’ idea about the identity of Being and thought.
Chapter Three

Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on the Axis of Transcendence

Section one: Generalities

1) The Comparison between Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

As it was said in introduction, this chapter will be devoted to an exposition of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason considering chiefly Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. But sometimes Heidegger’s interpretations in these two works are not the same. The main differences between the two works consists in: Firstly, as Heidegger himself points out, his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, particularly in the discussion of transcendental deduction, is based on the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, whereas Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason considers both editions of Kant’s first Critique. The other difference is that Heidegger’s presentation in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, in contrast with Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, is too brief and dense. In Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason more of an interpretation of Kant, and in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, especially in the sections relative to phenomenological interpretation of ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and of the first
book of ‘Transcendental Analytic’, more of Heidegger’s own point of view are involved. In *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, through presenting some sentences from other works of Kant, pre-critical as well post-critical, Heidegger attempts to clarify those concepts and discussions that are not sufficiently clear. But such an attempt is not seen in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Moreover, in the introduction of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, there are two sections, entitled “General Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science” and “The Relation Between the Founding of Science and Philosophy”, which are not seen in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In this chapter we will try to follow Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as obtained in both works as far as possible. In addition, wherever the modes of Heidegger’s interpretations become different, we will try to reconcile them so far as possible. Furthermore we shall endeavor to consult the other works of Heidegger, in particular *Being and Time*, in order to understand his interpretation and to compare his way of thinking with Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

2) Heidegger’s Main Idea in His Interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*

In the introduction of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger expresses his aim in interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason* in this way: “The task of the following investigation is to explicate Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in order thus to present the problem of metaphysics as the problem of a fundamental ontology”. But what does Heidegger mean by this sentence?

‘The problem of metaphysics’ means the question of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics, namely, whether or not metaphysical knowledge, is possible. But the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, i.e., to gain the knowledge in different branches of metaphysics such as theology (the knowledge of God), anthropology, (the knowledge of the soul), cosmology (the knowledge of the universe) and even epistemology (the knowledge of knowledge itself) are all dependent on the possibility of metaphysica generalis or ontology (the knowledge of Being and its essential attributes). In other words, the possibility of the knowledge of the realities and truths “is thrown back upon the more general question of the intrinsic possibility of the manifestation of the essent as such”. More simply, metaphysics claims to gain the knowledge of things in themselves, but the possibility of the attainment of metaphysical knowledge and knowing the things in themselves is dependent on answering the questions whether the knowledge of the thing in itself is essentially possible for human being, and whether basically “the essents reveals itself in itself so that all statements relative to it
become verifiable". In fact, Kant throws back the problem of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics to the question of the manifestation of the essent as such, and, according to Heidegger, the answer to this question is nothing other than ontology.

But Heidegger holds that the problem of ontology, whether or not the knowledge called ontology is essentially possible, is itself relative to the existential analysis of the ontological structures of human existence, because any understanding is relative to human being and thus the understanding of Being cannot be investigated independently of man and his understanding. For this reason, the question of ontology is intermingled with the analysis of fundamental structures of human existence, and the question of ontology and the question of man, 'what is man?', in a given sense, are related together and can be discussed only on the basis of each other. Let us remember that the relation between the question of Being (ontology) and the existential, ontological analysis of Dasein is what Heidegger had already set forth in Being and Time, and he had based his own main project on this relation.

By the analysis of ontological structures of Dasein, Heidegger remarks that he does not mean anthropology in an ordinary sense, and we should not identify it even with philosophical, rational anthropology or ancient anthropology. This existential, ontological analysis of human being is engaged in as a prerequisite to answer the question of the intrinsic possibility of ontology. That is why Heidegger calls this existential, ontological analysis of man 'fundamental ontology' in order to distinguish it from other anthropologies in the current sense. In fundamental ontology we do not seek, unlike other experimental anthropologies such as psychology, sociology, biology, and so on, to study some of human being's characteristics and attributes, nor even do we intend, like philosophical, rational anthropology, to answer the question what man is or what his faculties are. Fundamental ontology, i.e., the existential, ontological analysis of human existence, is the inquiry about human being with regard to the question whether or not this essent, i.e., human being, has a possibility of the attainment of the knowledge of Being, namely, the possibility of ontology.

Considering the explanations, now we can well understand the meaning of Heidegger's main idea in his interpretation of Kant. In this interpretation he intends to show that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant seeks to lay a foundation for the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics. According to this interpretation, in the first Critique Kant attempts to gain a ground on which the possibility of the attainment of metaphysical knowledge is to be proved. This is why Kant sets forth the problem of the possibility of metaphysics in the form of a fundamental ontology. It means that in order to reach a foundation for metaphysics, Kant had to answer the question whether we can basically attain the essent in itself, and it is the same
question of the possibility of ontology, and in order to answer this question Kant realises that
he must first analysis the mode of being of man with regard to the attainment of the
knowledge of Being (ontology). Heidegger calls such an analysis of human existence with
regard to the understanding of Being, ‘fundamental ontology’.

Of course, as we mentioned in the last chapter, in *Being and Time*, and also in his
interpretation of Kant, Heidegger employs the expression ‘fundamental ontology’ in a
twofold sense, and we pointed out that in Heidegger it is not clear whether existential,
analysis of *Dasein* is the same as fundamental ontology or is a prerequisite for it. Because
sometimes Heidegger terms existential, ontological analysis of *Dasein* as fundamental
ontology and sometimes conceives this analysis as a prerequisite for fundamental ontology.
In the latter option, fundamental ontology is an inquiry about the meaning of Being as such.¹²
In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger again employs the expression ‘fundamental ontology’
in a twofold sense and, here according to him, the aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with
regard to both senses of the expression, is “to present the problem of metaphysics as the
problem of a fundamental ontology”.¹³ Heidegger believes that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is
not a work on ontology in the ordinary sense and according to the ancient tradition, but is
rather an effort to present the problem of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics on the basis
of an existential, ontological analysis of human existence. And this analysis is what
Heidegger terms fundamental ontology. Heidegger terms the existential, ontological analysis
of human existence as fundamental ontology because without such an analysis it is not
possible to offer the solution of the problem of metaphysics and answer the question of the
intrinsic possibility of ontology, i.e., answer the question whether or not the attainment of an
understanding of Being is essentially possible for human being. Hence, a critique of pure
reason, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, means to analysis the mode of being of man
in order to answer the question whether or not he can attain knowledge of the reality in itself
and of the things as such.

Heidegger also uses the expression ‘fundamental ontology’ in other sense. In order to
understand this second sense of the term we must have a conception of one of Heidegger’s
aims in *Being and Time*. Heidegger himself explains this aim as follows: “The question of
Being aims therefore at ascertaining the *a priori* conditions not only for the possibility of the
sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already
operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies
themselves which are prior to the ontical [empirical] sciences and which provide their
foundations”.¹⁴ In this sentence, Heidegger explicitly says that the aim of his own inquiry is
not only to ascertain the *a priori* conditions which make the sciences possible—and we have already mentioned that the most fundamental *a priori* condition of the foundation of all sciences and basically of any knowledge or activity, according to Heidegger, is the precursory comprehension of Being (ontology)—but his aim is also to inquire into the *a priori* conditions that make the very ontologies possible. Therefore, *Being and Time* is not an ontological work in the ordinary, traditional sense, rather it is a work that seeks to reach a kind of *ontology of ontologies*, i.e., to answer the question in what conditions different ontologies are themselves formed. In this sense, Heidegger’s inquiry in *Being and Time* is not an ontology but fundamental ontology.

Heidegger restates the same point in his interpretation of Kant. We know well that Kant employs the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ in two somewhat different senses i.e., in a negative sense and in a positive one. Already, in the introduction, we pointed out that Kant terms previous dogmatic philosophies—which he wanted to criticize—as ‘transcendental philosophy’ (transcendental in a negative sense). Kant also calls his own critical philosophy ‘transcendental philosophy’ (transcendental in a positive sense) and in order to distinguish them from each other, he dubs previous dogmatic philosophies as “the transcendental philosophy of ancients”, and keeps the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ for his own critical philosophy.” Kant uses the term ‘transcendental’, in the positive sense, in different ways, all of which, in terms of Heidegger’s interpretation, we will mention. But here what is required to be pointed out is that the aim of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is not to present a metaphysical system beside other ones, but an inquiry about the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics itself. Therefore, Kant’s transcendental philosophy must be conceived as the metaphysics of metaphysics or the philosophy of philosophies. Furthermore, it was said that, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant throws back the problem of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics to the question whether or not for man the *essents* reveals themselves in themselves. Therefore Kant’s philosophy is nothing except ontology. But what makes the understanding of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an ontological work difficult is that in that work Kant does not seek to establish an ontological system beside other existent ones, but tries to work out a transcendental investigation on the essential possibility of ontology itself. This is why Heidegger calls Kant’s transcendental investigation and his philosophy, like his own inquiry in *Being and Time*, ‘fundamental ontology’.
3) Kant's Point of Departure in Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics

In the last chapter we pointed out Heidegger's historical thought and said that historicity, according to Heidegger, is one of most primordial characteristics of the ontological structure of *Dasein*, so we can say that the mode of the being of *Dasein* is essentially historical. It means that *Dasein* already exists in its culture, history, and tradition. On the basis of this way of thinking, any understanding and activity, inasmuch as it belongs to *Dasein*, is historical. Consequently, science and philosophy are also relative to *Dasein* and thus historical in nature. It means that science and philosophy also take place in a culture, history, and tradition. Moreover it was said that human being, according to Heidegger, is not a substance independent, isolated of the world. He is essentially defined on the basis of the very characteristic of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger maintains that this 'world' is always a socio-historical, cultural one and it is impossible to get free from it in order to reach a super-historical, transcendental position. Heidegger applies this historical thinking of his own everywhere including in his interpretation of Kant.

It was said that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant, in terms of Heidegger's interpretation, seeks to lay the foundation of metaphysics. Now Heidegger asks where Kant's point of departure is and whence he begins his attempt for laying the foundation of metaphysics. More explicitly, according to Heidegger's historical thought, philosophy is human being's activity and belongs to human existence, "hence, a specific laying of the foundation of metaphysics [including Kant's endeavor] never arises out of nothing but out of the strength and weakness of a tradition which designates in advance its possible points of departure". Therefore, to examine Kant's attempt for laying the foundation of metaphysics, we should return to the tradition in which Kant thought. We can express this point in another way: If, according to Heidegger's interpretation, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant intends to lay the foundation of metaphysics, it is Heidegger's task to show why for Kant the laying of the foundation of metaphysics takes the form of a the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger believes that "the answer [to this question] must come forth through a discussion of the following three questions: 1. What concept of metaphysics did Kant inherit? 2. What is the point of departure for the lying of the foundation of this traditional metaphysics? 3. Why is this laying of the foundation a *Critique of Pure Reason?"
3-a) What Concept of Metaphysics did Kant Inherit?

If we accept that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an attempt to lay the foundation of metaphysics, we must answer the question for what concept of metaphysics Kant intended to lay a foundation, and what he meant by metaphysics and metaphysical knowledge. Heidegger holds that the answer to this question is quite obvious: *The traditional concept of metaphysics*. According to Heidegger, Kant inherited both the traditional concept of metaphysics and its Cartesian interpretation. It means that Kant understood metaphysics as it was conceived in the tradition of metaphysics. Now we must answer the question what the traditional concept of metaphysics, on the basis of which Kant attempts to lay the foundation of metaphysics, is.

3-b) The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics

In order to clarify the traditional concept of metaphysics, Heidegger gives a short history of the meaning of metaphysics in the history of philosophy. According to it, as we all know, at first the word ‘metaphysics’ was employed for naming those treatises of Aristotle which belonged neither to physics nor to mathematics or logic, classified as the ones to follow those belonging to physics. But what is significant about Heidegger’s view (as well as Kant’s) is that according to him it is by no means accidental that this designation was given to it and that it was accepted by later ages. Rather, there has been a firm connection between this designation and the designated issues. Heidegger maintains that “*meta ta physika* [metaphysics] is thus the title of a basic philosophical difficulty”. In other words, Aristotle left some treatises the classification of which involves a problematic because the question of their inclusion in a particular field is not settled. It itself was a basic philosophical problem. Why? Because the question was as to the issue of the treatises itself. Thinking on this issue was itself a philosophical matter. According to Heidegger, the problem originated from the latent ambiguity in the issues and concepts which Aristotle’s treatises discussed. “In so far as Aristotle expresses himself on the subject, it is evident that there is a curious ambiguity in the definition of ‘first philosophy’. It is knowledge of the *essent qua essent* as well as knowledge of the *highest sphere of essents* through which the *essent* in totality is defined”. In other words, from the beginning of the history of metaphysics and with Aristotle himself there was a curious ambiguity, and metaphysics has always fluctuated between what were later called *metaphysica specialis* (the knowledge of God, the soul, and the universe) and *metaphysica
generalis (the knowledge of Being as such and its inherent attributes). Heidegger maintains that the ambiguity between the issues of metaphysics and the issue that constitutes metaphysics, is itself a very fundamental problem and “nor should one be weakened or rejected outright in favor of the other. Furthermore, we should not be over-hasty in reconciling this apparent duality”. This ambiguity did not first make its appearance for the beginners of Greek philosophy but revealed itself gradually during the history of western philosophy. We should keep in view the ambiguity in the definition of philosophy. Heidegger holds that the whole of the history of philosophy is based on a constant failure in the understanding of the issue of metaphysics. This constant failure in the history of metaphysics is in fact the confusion of Being and being (essent), in terms of Heidegger’s own terminology. According to Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle left the central problem of metaphysics in a doubtful and unsettled state, and this ambiguity remained in all Post-Aristotelian metaphysical systems, including Kant’s philosophy. In Aristotle metaphysics is defined as “the fundamental knowledge of the essent as such in totality”. But Heidegger holds that the definition indicates a real problem. The question is: wherein lies the essence of the knowledge of Being of essents?” In other words, in the beginning of the history of metaphysics, the task of metaphysics was to gain the knowledge of Being as the ultimate ground of beings (essents), but due to the latent ambiguity in basic issue of metaphysics itself, i.e., the concept of Being, and due to the confusion between the concept of Being and the concepts of being (essent) and beingness (to be an essent), the main issue, i.e., the understanding of the meaning of Being, was gradually neglected, and metaphysics occupied more with special metaphysics and with discussions of essents such as God, the soul, and the universe.

How did this change of the issue of metaphysics and the neglect of the main problem, i.e., of Being, take place? In this way that the Greek word meta, which at first in the collection of Aristotle’s treatises meant ‘post’ or ‘following sequentially’, is transformed into trans, which means transcending. Hence metaphysics, which at first meant what is following after physics, is transformed into the knowledge of what transcends physics, i.e., the science of the super-sensible. This is the meaning that Kant understands of metaphysics, which for him too is a science of the super-sensible. Heidegger maintains that the neglect or forgetfulness of Being is seen even in so-called Christian philosophy. In the Christian interpretation of the world, “all that is not divine is created- the totality of creatures defining the universe. …In keeping with the Christian belief concerning the world and existence, the essent in totality is divided into God, nature, and man; each of these realms having a
particular discipline devoted to its study. These disciplines are theology, ...cosmology, and psychology. Together they form the discipline called *metaphysica specialis*. In distinction from this, *metaphysica generalis* (ontology) has as its object the *essent* "in general". It is quite clear how the problem of Being and the relation of Being and beings are neglected in so-called Christian philosophy. Because even in this philosophy, the *essent* is divided into God, nature, and man, and God is only an *essent* beside other *essents*, having this difference that God is a creator *essent*, and the others are creature *essents*. Therefore, even in Christian philosophy Being is not considered as the ground of beings.

As Heidegger also points out, Kant himself attempts directly to define the expression 'metaphysics'. According to Kant, as the expression metaphysics itself show, "it is a science which, being outside the domain of physics, as it were, lies beyond it". According to Kant too, the conformity between the content and the expression of metaphysics is by no means a matter of chance. Kant holds that *physica* means 'nature', and we can arrive at the concept of nature only through experience, and *meta* means *trans*. Then *metaphysica* (metaphysics) means the science whose object is outside of the domain of physics (nature) and its method is other than experience, and in this science "one would like to move beyond all the objects of possible experience (*trans physicam*) with the help of this knowledge, in order, wherever possible, to get to know that which absolutely cannot be the object of this knowledge".

"The other consideration essential to the development of the school [traditional]-concept of metaphysics concerns the mode of knowledge and the methodology involved". In other words, Heidegger holds that in the traditional view, from metaphysics as the science of the highest *essent* and the *essent* in general, it was expected that it be "perfectly rigorous, and absolutely binding". Since metaphysics was conceived as a science of the highest dignity, the 'queen of sciences', consequently it was felt that it must be free from the contingencies of experience. Thus, as per the traditional concept, metaphysics was an *a priori*, pure, rational science free from the contingencies, probability, and relativity of experience.

Kant inherits the concept of such an *a priori*, pure rational science, which seeks to gain a rigorous, absolutely binding knowledge like mathematics, of God, the soul, and the universe. Kant's endeavor is to investigate such a metaphysics, i.e., a metaphysics in which there is a confusion between Being and beings, and *metaphysica specialis* is termed "true metaphysics", "metaphysics in its final purpose". Then Kant sought to investigate the reasons of the constant failure and abortiveness of metaphysics in this sense in contrast to modern science, and why it has never been able to provide a rigorous and binding answer to any of the questions concerning God, the soul, and the universe. For this reason, Kant
believed that any “further attempt to extend the knowledge of pure reason must be held in
abeyance until the question of the intrinsic possibility of this science is settled”. In order to
answer this question, Kant finds himself compelled to determine the essence of metaphysics,
i.e., to answer the question what metaphysics is basically and what its nature, limits and
boundaries are.

4) The Critique of Pure Reason as Fundamental Ontology

We found that Kant’s main aim in the Critique of Pure Reason, according to Heidegger’s
interpretation, is to lay a foundation for metaphysics. Heidegger believes that in order to
attain this aim, Kant found himself compelled to work out more primordial and general
questions that are actually ontological problems. We mentioned that, according to
Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant realised that the answer to the question of the intrinsic
possibility of special metaphysics is dependent on the answer to the more primordial and
general question in the domain of general metaphysics (ontology), i.e., the question whether
or not for human being the attainment to the knowledge of the thing in itself is possible, or
whether the essent essentially reveals itself in itself for human being.* In fact, the question of
intrinsic possibility of metaphysics “is thrown back upon the more general question of the
intrinsic possibility of the manifestation of the essent as such”,** by Kant and, according to
Heidegger, it is nothing except ontology or, more precisely speaking, to set forth the question
of the intrinsic possibility of ontology itself which Heidegger terms as ‘fundamental
ontology’.

But Kant’s task did not end with saying that metaphysics passes beyond experience and
it is merely a random “groping among mere concepts”,*** rather he set forth the questions as to
what experience itself is, and what makes experience and empirical knowledge basically
possible. This is why Kant sets forth the problem of “the manifestation of the essent as such”.****
According to Heidegger, to set forth the problem of the ground of experience, i.e., what
makes experience itself possible, and thus to set forth the question of Being as the ground of
experience, is nothing save ontology. Heidegger holds that with Kant’s transcendental inquiry
“the structure of traditional metaphysics undergoes its first and most profound shock”.*****
Because it is with Kant that the vagueness and obviousness with which metaphysica
generalis was hitherto treated disappears,****** and “for the first time, ontology becomes a
problem”.******* It means that before Kant, the intrinsic possibility of the manifestation of the
essent as such and the possibility of the attainment of the thing in itself was considered self-
evident. But it was questioned and problematised for the first time by Kant.
5) The Method of Modern Science as a Clue for the Solution of the Problem of Ontology

Heidegger maintains that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the main question of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics "is thrown back upon the more general question of the intrinsic possibility of the manifestation of the *essent* as such". In other words, metaphysics is the claimant of the knowledge of the things in themselves. But Kant's question is whether the *essent* basically reveals itself to human being and whether knowing the *essent* in itself is essentially possible for man. According to Heidegger's interpretation,

the laying of the foundation [of metaphysics] is now the elucidation of a comportment with regard to the *essent*, a comportment in which the *essent* reveals itself in itself so that all statements relative to it become verifiable. But what does the possibility of such comportment [in which the *essent* reveals itself in itself] entail? Is there a 'clue' as to what makes it possible? Yes, the method of the scientist.*

Then, according to Heidegger's interpretation, in order to lay the foundation of metaphysics, Kant seeks a mode of comportment in which the *essent* reveals itself in itself. As per Heidegger's interpretation, Kant holds that the method of the scientist in modern empirical science can give us a clue to discover a mode of comportment in which the *essent* manifests itself as such. Kant believes that

a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining.*

Hence, according to Kant, the method of scientists is distinguished from the philosophers' method through this characteristic that scientists are not like newly-born who keep nature's leading-strings for their tottering and move as far as and in the direction which nature leads, rather they are like expert judges who already project a plan on nature and force it to answer their questions on the basis of their own precursory plan. But what is this precursory plan, which reason projects on nature in the scientists' method, which Kant term's *a priori* knowledge? As we mentioned earlier, Heidegger holds that this precursory plan or *a priori* knowledge is the same precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the *essent*, and 'this precursory projection relative to the Being of the *essent* is inscribed in the basic concepts and axioms of the
natural sciences. Hence, what makes the relation to the essen (ontic knowledge) possible is the precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essen, namely, ontological knowledge". Heidegger interprets this to mean that according to Kant any knowledge of things or any inquiry about them is dependent upon our reception and understanding of already-Being of things. Put more clearly, in his inquiry about the possibility of metaphysics as a science, as we shall later elaborate, and in his endeavor to find the reasons for the constant failure and abortiveness of metaphysics in contrast with science, Kant compares metaphysics with modern sciences, and he realises that the sciences do not move in vacuum or in an infinite sphere, but on a precursory ground and within a pre-determined framework of concepts and axioms. These precursory concepts and axioms are not the result of the scientific investigations themselves, because they make any question or investigation in the science basically possible, and the science itself is constituted on the basis of these concepts and axioms. Now the question is what is the ground of the precursory concepts and axioms themselves? Or what is the ground of the a priori knowledge in all sciences? This is the question "for the sake of which alone our whole critique [of pure Reason] is undertaken". According to Heidegger, Kant holds that this a priori knowledge is our "precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essen" which, according to Heidegger, is nothing but ontology. For example, the sciences such as biology, psychology, or history, are, before every thing, based on a comprehension of their object, i.e., the essen called life, psyche, or history. This precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essen inquired in a particular science is not the result of the scientific inquiry in the given science. For instance, our comprehension of the object called history is not the result of historical investigation, but constitutes its very basis. Hence, according to Heidegger, "all science is potentially and in principle philosophy [i.e., ontology]"; it means that any science investigates only the Being of given beings in its research domain. For this reason, Heidegger calls the sciences 'regional ontologies' in order to distinguish them from metaphysica generalis or ontology which seeks to inquire into the meaning of Being as such or Being in general.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant truly realised that in modern natural, mathematical sciences there are series of fundamental connections between ontic (empirical) knowledge and ontological knowledge. What are these series of fundamental connections between ontic and ontological knowledge? Kant says that the Being of the thing is given and is not made by us, and we have a precursory comprehension or a priori knowledge of the given
Being of the thing, which shows itself in the form of basic concepts and axioms of different empirical sciences. For this reason, natural, mathematical sciences and their fundamental connections with their basic concepts and axioms are the clue for understanding the relation between ontic and ontological knowledge.

6) Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant's Copernican Revolution

In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects *a priori*, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.

Kant likens his assumption to Copernicus' primary hypothesis, and, for this reason, the assumption has become celebrated as Kant's Copernican revolution.

Heidegger states that if his interpretation of the main problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, i.e., laying the foundation of metaphysics, is true, and if we accept that Kant found that laying the foundation of metaphysics is dependent upon revealing the intrinsic possibility of ontology, namely upon answering the question whether the *essent* basically reveals to human being, consequently we must conclude that the "sense of that which, [is known] under the heading of Kant's 'Copernican revolution' has been constantly misinterpreted". "When he [Kant] has the objects hinging on knowledge rather than knowledge hinging on objects—this does not mean that real beings are turned upside down in interpretation and get resolved into mere subjective representation". According to the current epistemological interpretation of Kant, the meaning of his Copernican revolution is that in our mind we possess some basic concepts and some universal, necessary principles, which are *a priori*, i.e., prior to experience, which belongs to the structure of mind itself. Hence, if any knowledge of the things is to be possible, on the basis of this interpretation of Kant's Copernican revolution, the things must correspond to these *a priori* concepts and principles. But according to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant, by his Copernican revolution, seeks to state this truth that the *ontic* (empirical) knowledge is not the only possible knowledge, and wherever there is such an *ontic* (empirical) knowledge, there is a precursory comprehension of the Being of the *essent*, i.e., ontological knowledge,
which has made the ontic knowledge possible. Heidegger holds that what Kant calls a priori knowledge is nothing but ontological knowledge, therefore, according to Heidegger, “the only possible sense” of Kant’s Copernican revolution, the assumption that the objects must correspond to our a priori knowledge, is that “ontic knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge”. In other words, the sense of Kant’s Copernican revolution is that the access to beings is dependent upon a priori understanding of Being. Entirely against the consensus Heidegger holds that “the Copernican revolution elucidates for the first time the possibility of access to objects themselves”. And, as we mentioned in the introduction and the first chapter, we know well that immediate access to things, or transcendence, according to Heidegger, is the most important attribute of Dasein. Heidegger maintains that

Kant never meant that, in grasping some object that we come across, for example this chair, the thing called ‘chair’ will correspond to what I determine about the chair in myself. That all perception corresponds to beings is self-evident for Kant, and he never discusses this [because of its self-evidence]. However, what Kant discovers is precisely that underlying this correspondence of experience to object, to beings, there is already an a priori knowledge upon which each empirical measurement depends, i.e., to which this measurement must correspond and conform.

Heidegger holds that “the ‘old’ concept of truth as the ‘adequateness’ of knowledge to the essent, [in contrast to ontology] is so little shaken by the Copernican revolution that the latter presupposes the former, indeed, confirms it for the first time”. Basically, Heidegger does not accept the correspondence as the definition of truth or, more precisely, it must be said that in the definition of truth he emphasises a more primordial step prior to the correspondence of mind and object. Heidegger holds that on that concept of truth, there is no difference between ‘the correspondence of mind with object’ (classical definition) and ‘the correspondence of object with mind’ (Kant’s Copernican revolution), since in both theories correspondence is presupposed. This is why Heidegger says that Kant’s Copernican revolution also presupposes the concept of correspondence (adequateness) in definition of truth. But the question is: What is the correspondence itself? And what must correspond to what? In Being and Time, section 44, Heidegger questions the theory of correspondence and compares it with the understanding of truth as manifestation or disclosedness.

According to Heidegger, in both theories, whether our knowledge corresponds to objects (classical theory) or objects correspond to our knowledge (Kant’s Copernican revolution), this correspondence is possible only when the essents manifest themselves as the essents. In other words, in both theories the manifestation of the Being of things is prior to the correspondence
between the mind and the things. In his discussion of truth, Heidegger’s entire emphasis is on the priority of the manifestation of the Being of the thing and on shifting the centre of gravity of the discussion from the subject to the Being of the *essent* in the meaning and definition of truth. Heidegger emphasises that the revelation of the determination of the thing or *ontic* (empirical) truth is dependent on the manifestation of the Being of the thing or ontological truth. Heidegger maintains that “*ontic* knowledge by itself can never conform ‘to’ objects, because without ontological knowledge it cannot have even a possible ‘to what’ of the conformation”.

In Heidegger’s conception of truth there is the primordial which is the origin of truth, which makes truth, in the sense of correspondence, possible. According to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, the primordial, which is the ground of any truth including (the ground) of empirical truth or objectivity, is what Kant terms transcendental truth. Kant believes that “transcendental truth... precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible”. “For no knowledge can contradict it [transcendental truth] without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth”.

Now, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the only possible sense of Kant’s Copernican revolution is that any empirical (*ontic*) knowledge must conform with our *a priori* knowledge of transcendental truth or, in Heidegger’s expression, our precursory comprehension of the Being of the *essent* (ontological knowledge).

7) The *Critique Of Pure Reason* as Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science

When compared with *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger’s presentation of the main aim and problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to some extent different. According to this way of presentation “the *Critique of Pure Reason* is nothing but laying the foundation for metaphysics as science”, whereas in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, the expression ‘as science’ is not seen. The expression ‘metaphysics as science’ implies that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant’s main aim is the question of the scientificity of metaphysics and laying a foundation for it, and not a question of metaphysics as natural disposition, whose existence is not in dispute. It means that while human beings have always raised metaphysical questions, Kant’s question is whether such a metaphysical knowledge is essentially possible and whether metaphysics as science is possible.
Here, we should mention that for Kant, the word 'science' has by no means a positivistic sense and does not refer only to empirical sciences. In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that metaphysics has not yet followed the secure path of a science, whereas logic has already, from the earliest times, since Aristotle, proceeded upon this sure path. In addition, Kant holds that mathematics, before all sciences, "had already entered upon the sure path of science", and "it is, indeed, only about a century and a half [to the time of Kant himself] since Bacon" that nature sciences have entered upon the sure path of science.

Then, when Kant speaks of the emergence of a branch of knowledge upon "the sure path of science", he means by science, not merely natural sciences, but a discipline of knowledge which inquires into a definite domain of the *essents* systematically, and not in a random way or arbitrarily, in which there are some universal, necessary judgments, which is progressive. In the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger pays more attention to Kant's question of the scientificity of metaphysics, and for this reason, in his presentation of Kant's main aim in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, in contrast with *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*, Heidegger adds the expression 'as science'. This is why in the introduction of the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, regarding the explication of Kant's main problem, i.e., laying the foundation of metaphysics as science, there are two sections entitled "General meaning of laying the foundation of a science" and "The relation between the founding of science and philosophy", which are not seen in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. But since we intend to follow Heidegger's interpretation in both *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, let us briefly explain those two sections.

We already pointed out the meaning of laying the foundation of metaphysics and said that Kant's conception of metaphysics, according to Heidegger's interpretation, is a traditional concept, i.e., a rigorous, binding knowledge of the objects which are out of and beyond the realm of nature, namely, God, the soul and the universe. "What Kant encountered as metaphysics, and wherein he operated for a long time, is a science which would determine the beings to which the mere concepts of reason—such as God and soul—refer by way of a logical analysis of these concepts on the basis of certain principles, like the principle of contradiction". Hence, in Kant's conception, metaphysics is a science which seeks to know some super-sensible *essents* through the mere concepts of reason, and without any objects of possible experience and through the
analysis of those concepts on the basis of certain principles, such as the principle of contradiction.

According to Heidegger,

we can explain Kant by asking: Does this theoretically metaphysical knowledge have a foundation? Can the concepts and propositions of this knowledge of the supersensible be proven by virtue of the supersensible itself? Can this knowledge be confirmed by a direct intuitive experience of these beings? If not, then such propositions cannot be refuted by any experience. Because neither a confirmation nor [a] refutation by experience is possible and because the sole principle of truth is sought in the absence of contradiction among propositions, i.e., in their formal correctness, the metaphysicians continued at all times to anticipate supposedly 'enthusiastic insights'. Metaphysics neglected the inquiry concerning the possibility of such supersensible knowledge; metaphysics was without a critique, was dogmatic. ...Kant's attempts to lay the foundation of metaphysics as science had to come to terms with this traditional theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics. 78

In his interpretation, Heidegger endeavors to show how Kant executes his plan for laying the foundation of metaphysics as science. In order to understand Kant's plan, according to Heidegger, we must at first answer the question what laying the foundation of a science basically means.

In order to answer the question, Heidegger goes beyond the text of the Critique of Pure Reason and engages in some phenomenological deliberations which, as Heidegger himself remarks, may at first seem irrelevant to the interpretation of Kant's philosophy, but we will gradually find out that these phenomenological observations are essential not only for the understanding of Kant and Heidegger's interpretation of him, but also for understanding philosophy as such. 79 These deliberations, as Heidegger himself points out, have by no means yet thoroughly been penetrated in the history of philosophical thought. 80

8) General Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science

It was said that the most primordial aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is to lay the foundation of metaphysics as science. In the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger asserts that for answering the question how Kant embarks on the foundation of metaphysics, we must first come to an understanding of the question what laying the foundation of a science means at all. But this depends on answering other questions as to what science means generally and what a science needs in order to come into existence and found itself. 81
In the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger attempts to expound very briefly the meaning of science through a phenomenological, existential analysis, and it is in fact a summary and repetition of the analysis of science, which was in detail given in *Being and Time* and the lecture given in Tübingen on March 9, 1927, under the title *Phenomenology and Theology*.

9) The Existential Meaning of Science

The question is: What is a science? Heidegger's preliminary definition is that science is "a kind of knowing". But he stipulates that he does not mean knowing in the sense of the known, "but rather as a knowing comportment". It means that science is an activity relative to human existence (*Dasein*). According to Heidegger's conception, we should not suppose that science or the very knowing comportment is a so-called mental or psychic process in a so-called substance named soul or spirit, rather it should be conceived as a mode of existence. This mode of existence means, "to have a relationship with beings that are knowable or known, such as nature, history, space or time". Then knowing the beings means that we have a relationship with them, in which the beings are knowable. According to Heidegger, science or the knowing comportment is a mode of existence which "relates to beings themselves; in fact it is a comportment which reveals the being to which it is related".

As we know, Heidegger calls the mode of the Being of human being 'existence'. He maintains that existence has a revealing comportment toward beings, which occasionally surrounds human *Dasein*. Heidegger believes that human existence possesses a free possibility of revealing comportment toward beings, namely it can know or not know the beings. Hence, science or knowing in general is a free possibility of human existence. Heidegger holds that if we want to explain science and present an existential analysis of it and give a satisfactory answer to the question what is science, we must render a complete explanation of the essential constitution of man. But here, in the answer to the question of the essence of science, Heidegger considers only two essential determinants, which belongs to the existence of *Dasein*: Being-in-the-world and freedom.

Since the understanding of what comes in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* in relation to the existential analysis of science is greatly dependent upon our understanding the main foundations of Heidegger's thought and upon our acquaintance with the parts of *Being and Time* related to the most essential determinant of the ontological
structure of human being, i.e., being-in-the-world, and also upon an understanding of concepts such as ‘being-in’ and ‘the worldhood of the word’, we have to return to Being and Time in order to follow Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as laying the foundation of metaphysics as science.

10) The Essence of Science and Being-in-the-world as Essential Constitution of Dasein

As it was already said, one of Heidegger’s most important aims is to overcome the subjectivism involved in modern philosophy and to present a plan through which we can distance ourselves from the Cartesian model for understanding the world and ourselves. By emphasising being-in-the-world as the most primordial determinant of the ontological structure of Dasein, Heidegger seeks to destroy the Cartesian project in understanding the world, which have been taken as paradigmatic in modern philosophy and traditional epistemology after Descartes including Kant. Unlike the Cartesian project,

in Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world the self no longer appears as a worldless subject which then has to get hooked up with a world. On the contrary, the self becomes a self only through the total context of the world.... Heidegger’s goal in describing being-in-the-world is to recapture a ‘natural conception of the world’ prior to scientific abstraction or philosophical reflection. He tries to lead us away from the concept of the world as a totality of objects or as ‘everything that is the case’.

For him, the world is to be understood as “that ‘wherein’ a factual Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’”.

Heidegger’s project and his conception of being-in-the-world comprehend some important conclusions in the discussion of subjectivity and objectivity. Because in this project, “the idea of a ‘worldless subject’ encountering a world of objects is overcome. According to Heidegger, not only is the being of entities determined by the relevance conditions originating in the self-understanding of Dasein, but the being of Dasein itself is circumscribed by the world in which it is involved”. In other words, Heidegger holds that Dasein and the world are inseparable from each other. “Self and world are not two entities, like ‘subject’ and ‘object’ or ‘I’ and ‘Thou’; rather self and world are the basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world”. As Heidegger himself says “Dasein is its world existingly”. Heidegger believes that the self that Descartes discovers through his methodical doubt is by no means the most primordial one but is a remnant of the collapse of our more primordial Being
as being-in-the-world. In his project and through his criticism of the Cartesian model in the understanding of human being as a subject, Heidegger intends to analyse the structure of scientific activity and theoretical comportment in confrontation with the world, in order to show that theoretical rational comportment, which originates from the sciences, is itself founded on the mode of being-in-the-world; in other words, non-theoretical comportment is prior to the theoretical, rational one and the Cartesian project for justifying all the knowledge is founded on merely contemplative comportment and begins from it. Heidegger attempts to lead “us to see that because the Cartesian model is a founded mode, its enterprise of rationally reconstructing our everyday understanding from theory-neutral ‘units’ is incoherent”. It means that in reconstructing the edifice of knowledge Descartes abrogates the conditions for the possibility of any inquiry whatsoever. In other words, Descartes discusses understanding without having any insight into the precursory conditions of understanding.

According to Heidegger, the theoretical, scientific approach is the result of destroying the non-theoretical, practical comportment with the world in which we are involved, i.e., the result of the destruction of the practice. It is after the destruction of the practice and the non-theoretical, practical comportment with things that things become objects for our theoretical approach.

In Being and Time, in the continuation of the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, some detailed divisions have been allocated to the analysis of the concepts ‘the world’ and ‘the worldhood of the world’, and ‘in-world’. In all the analyses, Heidegger’s main aim is to demonstrate the inseparability of Dasein and the world, and to criticise the Cartesian model in understanding of nature and the human being in order to overcome Cartesian subjectivism. In terms of Heidegger’s analyses,

it is by no means the case that only by first analysing the phenomenon can we arrive at the notion of being-in [-the-world]. On the contrary, it is only because we are already familiar with entities... that we have the capability for a specific mode of cognition, namely that of knowing. Without becoming apparent at first, this leads to a reversal of the prevailing view, according to which knowing constitutes the foundation of every sort of commerce with things. Only because we dwell on or linger over an entity with which we are in some way acquainted, which is at our disposal, which we need and the like, is it possible for us, by adopting a special attitude, to leave behind the attitude of having a practical concern with it, to refrain from such concern and regard it in a purely contemplative manner. The latter attitude is by no means primary. This also implies that a merely epistemological starting point always leaves out of account its own foundation. The primacy of mere knowing is an illusion of the epistemologist. This does not mean that Heidegger intends to relinquish knowledge as such, but only that he seeks to reach down to a deeper foundation from where it can be seen that in pure knowing there is implied something like a shutting out of view of that relation of familiar commerce which knowing always presupposes. In other words, knowing is also a mode of being-with though one in which the usual practical relationship to entities is disregarded."
Hence, according to Heidegger, “it is not through the agent of knowing that the production of a relation to the world is made possible. Knowing always presupposes this relation and is simply a transformation of that relation”.

“In knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of being towards a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself. ...But a ‘commercium’ of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon being-in-the-world”.

Heidegger’s analysis of utensils (Zeug, gear or equipment) is among the best-known passages of Being and Time. What is not equally well known is the import of this analysis ... The aim of the analysis is to make us understand how much prior knowledge and close familiarity must already be there before anything can become accessible to Dasein as a utensil, and how such prior knowledge is not given here in a theoretical attitude. One of the insights of this analysis is the discovery that our way of dealing with utensils has its own ‘Sight’ and that we fail to have in our grasp what is typically utensillike if we start out with a purely theoretical mode of viewing things...As stated already, the purely theoretical way of seeing is by no means the primary one. Rather, in order to arrive at the purely theoretical attitude, we must abandon, jump out of, the specific circumspect way of seeing.

By his analysis of utensils and emphasising the importance of ready-to-hand entities, Heidegger demonstrates the importance of our non-theoretical relation with the things as the ground of any cognitive relation and shows the disclosedness of Dasein to the world and how the world is involved in Dasein itself, i.e., the worldhood of the world is an existentile, namely a characteristic of the Being of Dasein itself.

Most of Heidegger’s different, and sometimes unfamiliar, terms and expressions and the whole of his endeavors is to present a conception of human being, which is different from the picture of man and his relationship with the world found in the metaphysical tradition. In Heidegger’s picture of man, Dasein is not merely and primarily a subject but rather being-in-the-world; it means that the human being— unlike the Cartesian closed ego— is the only entity which is disclosed to the world and is familiar and attuned with it. Familiarity or attunement with the world is not the product of cognition and an attribute of some of our perceptions or moods, rather the ground and a priori condition for any cognition, feeling or mood. In addition, it is not that at first we are situated in the world and then the world is disclosed to us, but being-in-the-world is the same as our disclosedness, and we find out our thrownness in the world by the very being-in-the world and our disclosedness to the world. Therefore, according to Heidegger,
understanding is not an additional attribute of Dasein, but an existentiale and one of the moods of the Being of Dasein itself, i.e., another expression of its very being-in-the-world.

Heidegger believes that in the history of philosophy the study of ontology has been devoted exclusively to the ‘theoretical comportment’ and in it the present-at-hand Being. The non-theoretical comportment— the existential one— has been completely ignored. Heidegger holds that the history of metaphysics is the history of the neglect and forgetfulness of Being and the history of confusion of between Being and beings. According to Heidegger, there should be a reason for this historical forgetfulness and confusion, and he believes that he has discovered the reason and it lies in the ‘theoretical approach as such’. According to Heidegger, these criticisms of the tradition of ontology are also true about Kant’s philosophy.

But why does Heidegger criticise such a theoretical approach and the ontologies based on it? Why does he emphasise the non-theoretical comportment for destroying the history of ontology? From Heidegger’s emphasis on the non-theoretical approach some have inferred a kind of pragmatism but in fact his discussion is not directly related to pragmaticism and the priority of action over theory. According to Heidegger, it is only a thing, which can be an object, and the ontology dependent on the theoretical approach, indeed ends to an ontic understanding, namely a kind of ontology incapable of understanding something which cannot be objectified, i.e., the forgetfulness of Being as such. Hence, the emphasis on non-theoretical comportment and ready-to-hand Being by Heidegger is in fact an introduction to another sort of ontology which does not identify Being with ‘reality’ in the sense of ‘nature and thinghood’.

Now, we return to Heidegger’s existential analysis of science in the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. According to this analysis, “human Dasein is a being which has a world, or to put it differently, the mode of being of Dasein, existence, is essentially determined by being-in-the-world”.

But, what is the ‘world’? According to Heidegger’s conception, ‘world’ is that particular whole toward which we comport ourselves at all times. The personal relation of one existence to another is also not a free floating cognitive relation of an I-self to a thou-self, as if they were isolated souls, but rather each is a factual self in a world, and the being of the self is essentially determined by its comportment to his world. By contrast, a material thing— a rock or any item for use, like a chair— has no world; its mode of being is devoid of any comportment toward a world. This kind of being is merely extant. What is extant is of course one of those beings toward which we can comport ourselves. This being may be extant within our world, it may belong to what we come across in the world and be an innerworldly being; but it does not have to be that way. When we say about a being that it is innerworldly— like nature, for example— this being still does not have the mode of being which comports itself toward a world, it does not have the mode of
being of being-in-the-world. It has the mode of being of extantness to which additionally the
determination of innerworldliness can accrue when a Dasein exists which lets that being be
encountered as innerworldly in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Physical nature can only occur as
interworldly when world, i.e., Dasein, exists.\textsuperscript{105}

It should be noted that Heidegger does not mean that entities cannot exist independently of
Dasein, rather he intends to say that basically because nature and the essents exist in themselves
and independently of Dasein they can be confronted in a world by Dasein\textsuperscript{106}

It is clear now that Heidegger maintains that Dasein is a being which has a world, i.e., it can
establish a relation with the beings which surround it, and can also comport toward itself,
whereas other essents are worldless, i.e., they do no comport toward themselves and their
environment. Human beings are affected by a world toward which they comport themselves. It
may be said that other essents also have some relations. But we should realise that these relations
cannot be conceived as comportment. Because comportment exists where there is freedom. For
this reason, Heidegger believes that “world and freedom as basic determinations of human
existence are most closely related\textsuperscript{107} It means that the human being, as existence, through his
spontaneous ecstasies, i.e., by his freedom, lets being reveal itself to him. This revealing is the
comportment which is most closely related to freedom, i.e., to Dasein’s spontaneity. For this
reason, in Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein as ‘letting-be’, i.e., ‘letting-thing-
reveals-itself’.\textsuperscript{108} “Standing in the realm of the open, he [man] is able to subject himself to what is
manifest and shows itself in it, and to bind or commit himself to it. With this binding, there takes
place a letting-be”.\textsuperscript{109} For Heidegger, ‘Letting-be’ means, “to consent or yield to what-is”.\textsuperscript{110}
Letting-be is not just any activity of man, but is that by virtue of which he becomes Da-sein, an
entity that is defined by its relationship to the open. “Letting-be means participating in the open
and its openness, within which every entity enters and stands.”\textsuperscript{111}

In his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger attempts to show how the
basic difficulties of the Kantian problematic, i.e., laying the foundation of metaphysics as
science, originates from Kant’s failure to recognise the phenomena of the world, to clarify the
concept of the world and to understand the primordial characteristic of Dasein as being-in-the-
world, due to an overemphasis on the theoretical approach, something which neither Kant nor his
successors realised.\textsuperscript{112}

So far, we knew that for an existential analysis of science, i.e., the analysis of science with
regard to the mode of Being of human existence, Heidegger points to two basic determinations of
Dasein: Being-in-the-world and freedom. Dasein is an essent which is always in a world and the
mode of its being is constituted by the very being-in-the-word so far as we can say that Dasein and being-in-the-world are identical. "Dasein exists: It is in a world within which it encounters beings and to which the existing Dasein comports itself. However these innerworldly beings toward which Dasein comports itself are revealed in, through, and for his comportment". Now, the nub of the matter in Heidegger's interpretation is that this comportment towards innerworldly essents, or the confrontation with them is not first of all and more than all a theoretical comportment. Heidegger believes that the predominant comportment whereby we generally discover innerworldly being is application, employment of things for use, dealing with tools of transportation, tools for sewing, tools for writing, tools for working- tools in the broadest sense. We get to know tools primarily by dealing with them. It is not as if we have a priori knowledge of these things, in order then to use them. Rather it is the other way around: Employment as such is the manner in which we get to know these things primarily and appropriately, i.e., a primary and proper way of uncovering innerworldly beings. Likewise we do not reveal nature in its might and power by reflecting on it, but by struggling against it and by protecting ourselves from it and by dominating it...It is in dealing with things that we understand, from the very outset, what something like a tool or things for use generally mean. We do not develop this understanding only in the course of use. On the contrary, we must already understand ahead of time something like tool and tool-character, in order to set about using a certain tool.

According to Heidegger,

this [precursory] understanding of what a tool means opens the horizon for use in advance so that, in using a specific tool, we can comport ourselves toward it.... We understand such things— although at first and to begin with we do not pay attention to such understanding and do not even know that we understand these sorts of things. We are solely occupied with the specific way in which tools interconnect and are stupefied by specific forces.... And not only is this understanding hidden from us, although we constantly exist in it, but that which we understand is concealed, too. Things like tool-character and power are not specifically comprehended in this understanding; nor are they explicitly made an object of reflection, much less the theme of a conceptual knowledge. This understanding of the tool-character and power is hidden from us, is not made thematic, remains non-objectified, and is preconceptual.

What Heidegger seeks in his interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to clarify and demonstrate that which is not the object of our conceptual thinking and can never be objectified and thematised, but is the ground of our experience and thought.
11) The Pre-ontological Understanding of Beings

It has already been stated that the entire of Heidegger's attempt, including in *Being and Time*, is to show how we have a precursory comprehension of the meaning of Being and how any knowledge and activity is grounded in this precursory comprehension of the Being of essents. Heidegger believes that this precursory comprehension of Being is never thematised and objectified.

Now, in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, in a discussion of our dealing with things and our confrontation with nature, Heidegger asks:

What is it which in some way manifest to us in our understanding of the tool character and the power of nature? Dealing with a tool or with nature is comportment toward beings; and what is to some extent already accessible to us in the aforementioned understanding in question is nothing but the manner and constitution of the Being of beings. We can comport ourselves toward a being, e.g., what is extant as such, only if we understand in advance what extantness means. Therefore, we must state generally and fundamentally that with the understanding of the tool-character, which from the beginning elucidates all our dealing with tools, it becomes clear that all comportment toward being carries within it an understanding of the manner and constitution of the Being of the beings in question. We understand something like the Being of beings, but we neither grasp nor know that we understand this Being in a pre-conceptual way or even that it is this understanding of Being that primarily enables all our comportment to beings. Over and beyond our comportment to beings and prior to it and for the sake of it we understand something like Being and the constitution of Being. In this understanding we somehow grasp the Being of the beings which we encounter as to what and how they generally are, and over and beyond beings we already understand Being. To be sure, it is not an explicit understanding of the Being of beings. Understanding of Being is not yet...an ontological comprehension; but it is still an understanding of the Being of beings. Therefore, we call this understanding of Being, which elucidates and guides all comportment toward beings the pre-ontological understanding of Being, because it is pre-conceptual and non-objectified. There is in Dasein's daily dealings with its world already an implicit pre-ontological understanding of Being which is concealed from Dasein.

In the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger himself summarises his discussions concerning the existential analysis of science and the relation of the essence of science with the most important and primordial determinant of the ontological structure of human being. Heidegger holds that Dasein exists and it exists in its being-in-the-world. We must note that this point, i.e., that Dasein and being-in-the-world are identical, is the foundation of Heidegger's thought. Now he attempts to summarise all the discussed points relating to existential analysis of science on the basis of the definition of human being as being-in-the-world:
Now we can summarise the above discussion in terms of this basic definition of existence: First, if \textit{Dasein exists} factically, i.e., \textit{is in a world}, then beings always already lie before \textit{Dasein} as somehow \textit{revealed}. Secondly, \textit{Dasein} comports itself toward the beings, which lie before it primarily and from the beginning in the manner of \textit{practical dealing}, as we have characterised it. Thirdly, the being with which \textit{Dasein} deals (toward which it comports itself), but also itself as an existing being— in short \textit{all} beings that are revealed— are \textit{understood} in advance with respect to their \textit{Being}, though this understanding of Being is still \textit{pre-ontological}. What we have summarized in these three points pertains \textit{essentially} to \textit{Dasein} before \textit{Dasein} ever comports itself scientifically toward world... Now how is the \textit{scientific comportment} (as possibility of existence of \textit{Dasein} as just characterised) related to \textit{dealing} with beings which we characterised as \textit{pre-scientific}? How does this scientific comportment stem from the \textit{pre-scientific dealing with beings}?  

Heidegger's reply to this question is: Objectification.

\textbf{12) Conversion of the Pre-scientific Comportment to the Scientific Comportment through the Basic Act of Objectification}

As it has already been stated, Heidegger holds that due to the most important characteristic of the ontological constitution of our selves, i.e., being-in-the-world, our relations with other beings are not primarily cognitive. We can also establish a scientific, theoretical relation with beings, which is the product of our being-in-the-world and our non-contemplative, practical relation with beings, which Heidegger calls \textit{pre-scientific comportment}. According to Heidegger, any scientific theoretical relation is the result of the conversion of our \textit{pre-scientific comportment} to the scientific one by the basic act of objectification. Objectification is the result of our being cut off from everyday, concrete life and of abstracting an \textit{essent} from the network of its relations with other \textit{essents} and putting it under a formal aspect under which a group of things is considered in each case.

Heidegger explains that of course merely being cut off and desisting from practical relation with \textit{essents} does not mean forming a scientific comportment with them i.e., the absence of praxis is not at all the characteristic of science. Then, what is the characteristic of science and scientific comportment? And what is the basic act which accomplishes the conversion of the \textit{pre-scientific} to the \textit{scientific comportment}? Heidegger's reply to the question is Objectification: "We call \textit{objectification} that comportment whereby scientific comportment as such is constituted".  

But what does objectification mean and what is the basic condition for its being accomplished? According to Heidegger's definition, "objectification means turning something into an object". But he remarks, "only that which already is in advance can become an object."
But in order to be what and how they are, beings do not need necessarily to become an object. Heidegger believes that it is being that becomes an object but it does not mean that through this objectification beings become beings for the first time. Rather, as the beings, which they already are, beings are to respond to the knowing which is making the inquiry. By responding to the question as to what, how, and whence beings are, they stand vis-à-vis the inquiry which reveals them. With objectification we face the task of demonstrating, i.e., determining, being which encounter us from out of themselves, of their own accord as they stand over against us.

Hence, according to Heidegger, objectification thrives on severing a thing from its live context and encountering it in isolation. But here the question that Heidegger sets forth is: what is the basic condition for the actualisation of objectification and what is its primary accomplishment?

We frequently remarked that, according to Heidegger, any understanding and any activity of Dasein and any of its confrontation with beings is grounded in an understanding of the Being of essents and it is the main foundation of Heidegger’s thought. Here, in the discussion of objectification, this main foundation again shows itself. It means that, according to Heidegger: the understanding of the Being of essent is the basic condition and primary accomplishment, which makes the objectification in scientific comportment possible. This is the same thing that Heidegger seeks in his interpretation of Kant. It means that, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant also believes that in modern science, empirical knowledge is grounded in objectification which itself is grounded in a precursory and a priori understanding of the Being of essent. Heidegger holds that “every access to and every dealing with beings reveals them against the background of an at first pre-ontological understanding of being.” But it is not necessary for this understanding of Being, which is the ground of any comportment toward beings (including objectification), to be graspable in terms of theoretical understanding. In other words, the ground of objectification itself is not objectified. This is what which Heidegger, in his article entitled Kant’s Thesis about Being, intends to state. Kant says, “Being is not a real predicate”. It means, according to Heidegger, that Being, as the ground of objectivity, is not laid as a predicate, i.e., is not objectified. Heidegger holds that in the sciences and the scientific comportment we attempt expressly to discover beings and to uncover them through some given determinations. But the realisation of this task depends primarily on the realisation of the basic condition which pertains to all uncovering of beings, i.e., the understanding of Being. Then unless we have an understanding of the Being of essent, the essent is not discovered for us.
Therefore, understanding the Being of *essent* is the basic ground of any manifestation and disclosedness of the *essents* and thus the basic ground of the manifestation and disclosedness of the *essent* in objectification. Consequently, the understanding of the Being of being is the basic ground which makes any activity, including objectification in science, possible. In other words, unless we have an understanding of the Being of *essent* we cannot objectify the *essent*. In science what we do is that we develop our pre-scientific and pre-ontological knowledge of the Being of the *essent* which is inquired. For example, the science of history is grounded in a precursory, *a priori* understanding of the meaning of an *essent* or a mode of Being called history, and "the task of historical objectification of beings as history thus requires in itself an explicit understanding of what belongs to history as such". Also biology or any biological inquiry is necessarily grounded in an understanding of life, the organism, and the like, and in biology we attempt to develop this understanding of the meaning of a mode of Being called life or organism.

Thus, any science is itself in fact a kind of ontology and its development, but only regarding some particular beings. This is why Heidegger calls the sciences 'regional ontology' in order to distinguish it from *metaphysica generalis* which is ontology in general. Here, for understanding this view in Heidegger's thought, i.e., that any science is a kind of ontology, we must note that in the German language and thus for Heidegger, Being does not mean only 'to be', rather also indicates activity, dynamism, motion, possibility, unfolding, refusal, disquietude, and tranquility. This point can help us to understand Heidegger's conception of the sciences as regional ontologies. In fact for Heidegger any science is the study of the manifestation of Being, i.e., the study of the manifestation of Being of beings in a given realm. Any science studies a ray of Being in the mirror of some given beings. In *Being and Time*, in the explanation of the relationship between ontology and science, Heidegger conceives the question of Being as the spur of any scientific inquiry: "Ontology has a goal of its own, even if, beyond the acquiring of information about entities, the question of Being is the spur of all scientific seeking".

Now we can summarise the genesis of a science on the basis of Heidegger's analysis and in his own words in this way:

The genesis of a science originates in the objectification of a *realm* of beings, that is, in the development of an understanding of the constitution of the *Being* of the respective beings. In the development of this understanding of Being, those concepts emerge which circumscribe what is, for instance, historical reality as such, or what basically distinguishes a living being, i.e., the *basic concepts* of the respective sciences. With the development of the basic concepts the respective basis
and ground of a particular science and its realm becomes circumscribed. What is determined thus through objectification as a realm can now, as object become a theme.128

13) The Importance of Natural, Mathematical Sciences for Kant

Heidegger believes that on the basis of his analysis of the genesis of a science, now we can understand why for Kant natural, mathematical sciences are precisely the model of science as such and why these sciences are so important for him. In other words, Kant’s attention to modern natural, mathematical sciences is not due to his positivistic orientation, the attempt to prove the foundation of empirical sciences, and the denial of the possibility of metaphysics, but because these sciences properly show the process of objectification in the genesis of a science and they show more obviously how “this process is nothing other than the development of the understanding of the ontological constitution of beings which must become a theme”.129

14) The Process of objectification in the Genesis of Modern Mathematical Sciences of Nature

The question is why the modern natural, mathematical sciences became for Kant the model of science as such and why they were so important for him? The answer of the question is dependent on understanding the basic characteristic which these sciences have, i.e., understanding that distinguishes modern natural, mathematical sciences of nature from other ones, in particular from ancients’ sciences.

It is usually stated that the distinction between modern natural, mathematical sciences with ancient’s sciences lies in induction, the employment of empirical method, or in employing calculation and measurement in scientific observation. But during a brief discussion in the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Heidegger remarks that none of the criteria which have been used till his time, to distinguish modern sciences from previous ones, nor all of them together, can explain the nub of matter. Because he maintains that ancient sciences, as well as medieval sciences, employed the observation of facts, induction, and even empirical methods, and the ancients were acquainted well with the employment of numbers, calculation and measurement in investigating nature.130 Heidegger believes that what is crucial in the distinction between modern sciences and ancient ones is the fact that scientists like Galileo and Kepler
gave a direction to natural sciences, by asking (when not literally, at least intentionally) how nature as such must be viewed and determined in advance, such that the facts of nature can become accessible to the observation of facts in general. How must nature be determined and be thought in advance, so that the entirety of this being as such can become accessible to calculative knowledge in a fundamental way? The [Galileo’s and Kepler’s] answer is that nature must be circumscribed as what it is in advance, in such a way as to be determinable and accessible to inquiry as a closed system of the locomotion of material bodies in time. What limits nature as such—motion, body, place, time—must be thought in such a way as to make a mathematical determinability possible.

More simply, Galileo’s and Kepler’s main achievement is that “nature must be projected in advance unto its mathematical constitution.” According to Heidegger, the meaning of this projection is nothing other than opening up that constitution which constitutes the being called nature, in the sense of a physical and material being as such. In other words, Galileo and Kepler say to us that in order that nature can be mathematically calculable and measurable, we must first consider nature as a close system of the locomotion of material bodies in time. Then “it is only in light of the mathematical opening and projection of nature, i.e., by delimiting nature through such basic concepts as body, motion, velocity, place, and time, that certain facts of nature become accessible as facts of nature.” It means that through our projection, we ourselves determine what nature must be, and then we conceive some given facts as natural facts on the basis of our own projection. This first projection, according to Heidegger, is nothing other than the precursory understanding of the meaning of Being, and this precursory understanding of Being of being or ontological knowledge constitutes the axioms and basic, general concepts of sciences. Heidegger holds that

what was crucial and consequential about the achievements of Galileo and Kepler was not observation of facts and experimentation, but the insight that there is no such thing as pure facts and that facts can only be grasped and experimented with when the realm of nature as such is [in advance] circumscribed.

What already determines the realm of nature as such is, according to Heidegger, our understanding of the constitution of Being of what we call nature. In other words, “in each investigation of a presumably pure fact, preconceived opinions about the determination of the field within which the facts are to be found are always already lodged. And facts by themselves cannot elucidate the constitution of being as such.” This pre-determined opinion about the determination of the field, within which the facts are, is our precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the beings in our research field. For example, our inquiry about facts within the fields like history or biology is grounded in the characteristic determination of the
fields which we conceive as historical or biological field, and this characteristics itself originates from our precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the beings or the modes of Being which we call history or life. Then any determination of a historical fact must conform with our precursory understanding of the mode of Being of being called history, and any characteristic of living being must conform to our precursory conception of the phenomena of life.

15) The Relation between Science and Ontology

In the previous discussion that the relation between science and philosophy or, more precisely, between science and ontology was clarified. In any science there are basic concepts and principles, which form the ground and foundation of that science. For example, in physics, concepts like body, motion, place, and time are employed. Similarly, in history concepts like history and historical fact, and in biology concepts such as life, living being, or organism, are used. A physicist as such uses the concepts body, motion, place, and time but he never asks: what is motion? Is essentially motion a real fact or is it merely an illusion? Nor does he ever question about the nature of time and its inner possibilities. He only examines some given motions and speaks of the relations between time and motion. It is also true about the meaning of life or history, which is beyond the research fields of a biologist or a historian. It sometimes happens that physicists, biologists, or historians think about the meaning of time, life or history respectively, and even present some definitions of them as the axioms of their knowledge, but these deliberations and presenting these definitions are beyond their methodological limits. It means that the methods of these sciences and their limits do not allow answers to questions like ‘what is time?’ ‘What is life?’ or ‘what is history?’. For instance, the meaning of life is not itself a living being among other ones, nor can we determine the meaning of history through historical methods, philology, or through resorting to historical documents. Therefore there is no secure method for inquiring into what are meant by the basic concepts as such. “Suddenly, there is no ground for demonstrating these basic concepts themselves, i.e., for genuinely grounding these concepts”

Hence, for demonstrating the meaning of the basic concepts and principles of sciences and their various latent possibilities we need another knowledge which is beyond the field of these sciences, and it is noting other than philosophy. Regarding this point, Heidegger holds that “all
science is potentially and in principle philosophy".\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{18} Reflection on the so-called generalities of sciences, i.e., their basic concepts and principles, is the result of the development of the precursory undertaking of the constitution of the Being of the essents investigated in research field of the sciences. But the precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of essents in a certain field like biology, physics, or history, is grounded in the understanding of the meaning of Being in general. According to Heidegger sciences are ontic inquiries which objectify beings. But any ontic inquiry is grounded in an ontological understanding. Regarding this point, as it has already been stated, all science is a kind of ontology.

16) The Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science

Now it seems that the meaning of laying the foundation of a science according to Heidegger should become obvious. Heidegger maintains that “laying the foundation of a science of beings means founding and developing the ontology which underlies this science. In turn, these ontologies are grounded in fundamental ontology.... Every science of beings necessarily contains in itself a latent, more or less developed ontology which supports that science and founds it”\textsuperscript{19}

Now, with regard to the discussion of the relation between science and ontology, and with regard to the meaning of laying the foundation of a science, we can understand the meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution in terms of Heidegger's interpretation. The meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution and the correspondence of thing with mind (\textit{a priori} knowledge) is nothing other than that any determination of thing is in conformity with our precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the thing. In other words, any ontic knowledge, or 'empirical knowledge' in Kant's terminology, is in conformity to our precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of essent (ontological knowledge), or with '\textit{a priori} knowledge' in Kant's language. This is what Kant's treatment of modern natural sciences, as model for science as such, shows. It means that any empirical inquiry about beings in each field of modern sciences must conform to the basic concepts and axioms of the particular science which investigates into those beings. And these basic concepts and axioms are not themselves derived from experience, because they make experience itself \textit{essentially} possible. These basic concepts and axioms are our \textit{a priori} knowledge as to the constitution of the Being of the being investigated.
17) ‘Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science’ as the Critique of Pure Reason

The question is why for Kant laying the foundation of metaphysics as science appears as the critique of pure reason. The answer to this question depends on knowing what pure reason means.

Kant employs the term ‘reason’ in several senses. Generally it can be said that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the term reason sometimes means the general faculty of knowledge, and sometimes a given faculty distinguished from sense and understanding. In Kant theoretical reason is often identified with understanding.\(^{140}\) In another passage Kant says: “By reason here I understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical”.\(^{141}\) “We can say generally that ‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ characterises the ability to think, i.e., to represent something by concepts. Reason as well as understanding is a *faculty of concepts*.

According to Kant, a concept is ‘a general representation’ and insofar as a concept contains something general, it contains in principle the rule for thinking when determining the individual cases which are subsumed under the concept. Therefore reason or understanding can also be characterised as the *faculty of rules*. But every rule has its ground or principle according to which the rule rules. Therefore reason becomes the *faculty of the principles of rules*. Over against sensibility, reason is the higher faculty of knowledge”,\(^{142}\) so that Kant says: “reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of *a priori* knowledge”.\(^{143}\)

But what does *a priori* knowledge mean?

*A priori* knowledge means knowledge gained from concepts; it is a knowledge which the ‘thinking I’ achieves by itself and in advance, through rational thinking, without the assistance of experience. Everything that is obtained by and made accessible to thinking as such, in terms of knowledge, is called *a priori*. ...Kant uses the term *a priori* both in a wide as well as in a narrow and strict sense. As an example of *a priori* knowledge, i.e., knowledge from mere concepts, theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics is mentioned. On the one hand this metaphysics does not exclude— and even considers as normal— that its concepts of the world and of the soul are to some extent determined by a knowledge from experience, i.e., these concepts are not *speculated* by a pure thinking that is free from experience. On the other hand, dogmatic metaphysics does proceed in such a way as to try to advance in knowledge purely rationally, by mere logical *analysis* of these concepts [derived from experience]. *This a priori* knowledge is one which is not entirely pure, because in obtaining the concepts, experience grants not only the inducement but also the content.\(^{144}\)

This is *a priori* in the wide sense. But by contrast, there is a completely *a priori* knowledge in the narrow and strict sense, which can be called pure *a priori* knowledge. “Any knowledge is called pure if it be not mixed with anything extraneous. But knowledge is more particularly to be called absolutely pure if no experience or sensation whatsoever be mingled with it, and if it be
therefore possible completely a priori". By these explanations now we can realise the other meaning of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. To belong to reason, according to Heidegger, means, “knowing a priori”.

“Because reason is the faculty of concept or knowledge a priori and simultaneously the faculty of rules, reason can be defined as ‘the faculty of the principle of knowledge a priori’. In another passage Kant explicitly and directly calls reason ‘the faculty of principles’.”

Hence, the meaning of pure reason becomes more clarified. Kant defines pure reason in this way: “Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely a priori”. This pure a priori knowledge, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, is nothing other than ontological knowledge of the constitution of the Being of essents, which says something about the determination of objects, whereas this pure a priori knowledge is not dependent on and derived from experience but makes experience basically possible. As we already stated, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the main problem of the Critique of Pure Reason is laying the foundation of metaphysics as science. For the solution of the problem, Kant confronts with the question as to what makes laying the foundation of a science basically possible. Heidegger shows that laying the foundation of a science is fulfilled on the ground of ontological understanding or precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent inquired in the science, and the ontological understanding or the precursory comprehension itself is grounded in a more general and basic understanding of the meaning of Being as such, i.e., fundamental ontology. This is what, according to Heidegger, Kant intends to say, i.e., in the ground and foundation of any science there is an a priori knowledge of the constitution of the Being of the being investigated in that science. Kant calls the faculty which obtains this a priori knowledge pure reason. This is why for Kant laying the foundation of metaphysics as science takes the form of the critique of the faculty, which obtains the a priori knowledge which exists in the ground and foundation of any science. The critique of this faculty of a priori knowledge is the critique of pure reason.

Put more clearly, whereas in most of the current epistemological interpretations of Kant the term ‘pure reason’ in the expression ‘the critique of pure reason’ is meant in a negative sense, i.e., in the sense of “knowing a priori” and knowing through the logical analysis of mere concepts, as practiced uncritically in dogmatic theoretical philosophies, Heidegger interprets pure reason in a positive sense, i.e., as the faculty of absolutely a priori knowledge of things. For this reason, in the current epistemological interpretation the expression ‘the critique of pure
reason' has an anti-metaphysical echo and means to criticise the ambition of dogmatic metaphysics which makes an effort to know the truths of the world by pure reason itself independently from experience, whereas for Heidegger the expression 'the critique of pure reason', has by no means an anti-metaphysical echo but means to examine the faculty by which we possess ontological knowledge.

18) Kant and Synthetic A priori Judgments

According to Heidegger's interpretation, "Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to the question: 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?'". Kant himself expressly states that the solution of the problem of the possibility of metaphysics is grounded in the solution of the problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. But why? Namely, why, for Kant, does answering the question whether or not ontology is possible transform into the question whether or not synthetic a priori judgments synthetic a priori judgments are possible? And why is Kant compelled to examine synthetic a priori judgments for answering the question of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics?

The answer to the question is that, following the previous tradition, even for Kant, knowledge means only judgement. It means that for Kant if a comprehension does not reveal itself in the form of a judgement, it is not knowledge. Then if metaphysica generalis, ontology, is to be possible, and if it is to gain knowledge, this knowledge must appear in the form of judgement.

In addition, if ontological knowledge is to add something to our knowledge, it must be a synthetic knowledge. But Heidegger presents a different interpretation of the meaning of 'synthetic' in the expression 'synthetic judgements'. Heidegger maintains that "knowledge that brings forth the quiddity of the essent, in other words knowledge which reveals the essent itself, Kant calls synthetic". Heidegger believes that since in ontology we synthesise an essent and Being, ontology, i.e., the comprehension of the Being of an essent, is synthetic judgement. More simply, for example, when we say "there is a table here" or "a man exists in that room", they are synthetic judgements. Because we do not find out the Being or existence of the table or of the man through analysing the concept of table or man, rather we synthesise these concepts with Being or existence and then judge that this table or that man exists. Therefore judging about the Being or existence of any thing is a synthetic, and not an analytic, judgement.
Moreover, the knowledge of the Being of a thing is not derived from experience itself, but precedes it. In other words, unless we have any comprehension of the Being of a thing, we will not be able to deal with and experience the thing. For this reason, any ontic knowledge, or empirical knowledge in Kant's terminology, is grounded in the precursory comprehension of the Being of thing, i.e., in ontological knowledge in Heidegger's terminology. But this precursory comprehension or understanding of the Being of thing, or ontological knowledge, cannot be grounded in experience, but must be prior to experience, since this precursory knowledge is what makes experience itself essentially possible.

Then if ontology is to be possible, it must appear itself in the form of a priori, synthetic judgements. Therefore, for examining the intrinsic possibility of ontology, the essence of a priori synthetic judgements and its intrinsic possibility must be investigated. For this reason in Kant the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics and the question whether or not ontology is possible are reduced the question: 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?'

Now we can better understand the importance of synthetic a priori judgments for Kant. In the introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that this is a priori synthesis "for the sake of which alone our whole critique is undertaken". In synthetic a priori judgments something is stated about a thing, which is by no means derived from experience and is prior to it and what is stated in these judgments has an essential, primordial importance in knowledge. According to Heidegger's interpretation, this primordial ground, on which our all knowledge is dependent, is our precursory, a priori, knowledge of the Being of the thing, and synthetic a priori knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason is nothing other than ontological knowledge.

19) The Meaning of Synthesis in ‘Synthetic A priori Judgments’

Now that it has become clear that the main problem of the Critique of Pure Reason is laying the foundation of metaphysics as a priori synthetic judgements, it is required to know the meaning of synthesis. In the Critique of Pure Reason the term synthesis has many meanings which are often intermingled with each other. Therefore it must be clarified which meaning of the many senses of 'synthesis' is meant in this context.

Heidegger holds that we have several kinds of synthesis in judgement as follows:

1) Every judgement is an 'I connect', namely, I connect subject and predicate. Even analytic judgements are synthetic because in them a subject and a predicate are synthesised together.
Then judgement as such is a synthesis. Heidegger calls this synthesis *apophantic* synthesis, because this is the synthesis which is attributed to values true or false.\(^\text{153}\)

2) Synthetic judgements are in fact ‘synthetic’ in a double sense. They are synthetic, as judgements, i.e., because of synthesising a subject and a predicate. But synthetic judgements are synthetic in a second sense, “so far as the legitimacy of the ‘connection’ (synthesis) of the representations is ‘brought forth’ (synthesis) from the *essent* itself with which the judgement is concerned”.\(^\text{154}\) For example, this body is extended, heavy, colored and it has other attributes. These attributes are synthesised in one external thing. We show this synthesis by synthesis in representations as, for example, when we say “this body is heavy”. Heidegger calls this synthesis between different representation, in one judgement, like the synthesis of body and heavy in the judgement, predicative synthesis.\(^\text{155}\)

But there is a third type of synthesis concerned with the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgements. This synthesis is that which has a very essential importance in our knowledge and it is the determination of the Being of the *essent* which becomes the object of our experience. Through experience we do not objectify things, because before the possibility of the experience of a thing, the thing must first become an object for our experience. Let us remind ourselves of the concept of intentionality in Husserl’s phenomenology according to which consciousness is always a ‘consciousness of...’. It means that in any consciousness there is always a ‘reference-to...’ which is not derived from experience, but in which experience is always grounded. Now, according to Heidegger, this ‘reference-to...’ itself is a ‘synthesis’, i.e., it is not the result of the analysis of the concepts or the representation of the thing. This synthesis or ‘reference-to...’ means that the thing says “I am here”, “I exist”. Heidegger calls this synthesis ‘veritative synthesis’ or ‘true- (manifest-) making synthesis’. This veritative synthesis, as we will later explain,\(^\text{156}\) is the result of the unity of intuition and understanding, and it is the ground of the objectivity of our knowledge. This last synthesis is that which makes our judgement true.\(^\text{157}\)

In the discussion of the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgements it is the essence of the last synthesis that should be clarified, i.e., the essence of that which in this study we called ‘transcendence’ or “*Dasein*’s ecstasy”. Kant calls the investigation of the last synthesis, ‘transcendental’.\(^\text{158}\)

In *phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's the Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger explains the relation between the problem of the possibility of ontology and the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgements in another way. For further clarifying this relation, Heidegger
refers to Kant’s pre-critical writings. In February 21, 1772 nine years before the appearance of
the Critique, (1781), in a letter to his friend Markus Herz, Kant says about the Critique of Pure
Reason that if the problem of the Critique is discovered, it will for the first time shed light on
metaphysics. What was the problem? In the letter Kant answers the question: “I asked myself
the following question: What is the ground of the relationship between what is called in us
representation and the object?” This is in fact the question of the ground of the relationship
between mind and object or, in other words, of the possibility of transcendence, i.e., whether or
not it is essentially possible for human being to transcend his mind and to access the thing itself.

20) The Meaning of Transcendental Philosophy

Kant calls any investigation concerned with the essence of a priori synthesis whatsoever,
‘transcendental’, and says: “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so
much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of
knowledge is to be possible a priori”. Thus, according to Heidegger, “transcendental
knowledge does not investigate the essent itself but the possibility of the precursory
comprehension of the Being of the essent. It concerns reason’s passing beyond (transcendence)
the essent so that experience can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible object”. To
set forth the intrinsic possibility of ontology as a problem in Kant means “to inquire into the
possibility, i.e., into the essence, of this transcendence which characterises the comprehension of
Being”. Heidegger strongly believes that “with the problem of transcendence, Kant does not
replace metaphysics by a theory of knowledge but brings into question the intrinsic possibility of
ontology”, i.e., the question whether or not ontology is essentially possible. This question
itself is nothing other than the question of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence; and
answering this question is the main task of Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

21) The Essence of Knowledge

Hitherto, the horizon of inquiry of the Critique of Pure Reason according to Heidegger has
been clarified. On the basis of this interpretation, the Critique of Pure Reason seeks to lay the
foundation of metaphysics and ontology. Moreover, according to Heidegger’s interpretation,
Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to the main question: “How are
synthetic a priori judgements possible?” For answering the latter question, Kant finds himself
compelled to investigate the essence of knowledge. In other words, for answering the question
whether or not metaphysical knowledge is basically possible, Kant became compelled to set forth the question as to what metaphysical knowledge is essentially, and for answering this question, he was compelled to set forth more primordial questions such as what is knowledge essentially and what makes knowledge possible, and what basically constitutes the ground of knowledge and its objectivity.

We can explain the inner movement of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, according to Heidegger's interpretation, in another way. On the basis of this interpretation, Kant sought to lay the foundation of metaphysics as science. But for this he faced the problem as to what laying the foundation of a science basically means. Kant realised that in the ground of any science there exists *a priori* knowledge of the constitution of the Being of the essent which is inquired in the science. This *a priori* knowledge shows itself in the form of the basic concepts and axioms of the science. According to Kant's analysis, this *a priori* knowledge, which constitutes the ground of the science, is not analytic, i.e., the result of the mere analysis of the concepts, but develops our knowledge of the essents, and basically determines the direction of our inquiry, and thus are synthetic. On the other hand, our *a priori* knowledge of the constitution of the Being of the essents cannot be derived from experience, because experience itself is essentially grounded in *a priori* knowledge. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge had greatly impressed Kant. According to Kant, as compared to synthetic *a priori* judgments, empirical judgements are much less problematic. For example, we say "this board is black". The origin of this kind of *a posteriori* and empirical judgement is experience and the impression of our senses of the object of experience. Also in the case of analytic judgements there is no problem, because these judgements are the result of the mere analysis of concepts, and reason by itself and independently from experience can judge them only on the basis of the principle of contradiction. But Kant realised that synthetic *a priori* judgements, like "everything is caused", which are the ground of any science, are like neither empirical judgements whose basis of objectivity is experience, nor analytic judgements which are the result of mere analysis of concepts, whose basis of objectivity is only the principle of contradiction. Then Kant was confronted with the problem as to what the origin of the formation of these synthetic *a priori* judgements is and what their basis of objectivity is. Kant believes that since synthetic *a priori* judgements are not derived from experience, their origin must be found in pure reason itself, i.e., in reason independent from experience.

Now we must understand what constitutes the essence of pure reason according to Kant. The question of the essence of pure reason is in fact the question of human reason in general and
of the essence of human knowledge. Heidegger believes that this question is indeed the question of the truth of man: "The reason of pure knowledge a priori, which constitutes the problem and the theme [of the Critique of Pure Reason], is our reason, human reason... . The general horizon of the problematic of the critique is, according to our interpretation, human Dasein with respect to its understanding of Being".\(^{164}\)

According to Heidegger, Kant believes that the essence of human reason or the essence of knowledge lies in its essential finitude. It means that absolute or divine knowledge is a knowledge which can create its object, whereas human, finite knowledge is not able to create its object but is dependent on the given.\(^{165}\) Kant’s astonishment concerning the origin of synthetic a priori judgements was because the objects of these judgements are not empirical or the product of our impression of empirical facts, nor are these objects the creation of human being because only God or absolute, divine knowledge possesses such an attribute of creation. Then what can be the origin of these a priori synthetic judgements? For the answer of this question Kant attempts to explain the general essence of knowledge.

Then, the fundamental source of synthetic a priori judgements, or ontological knowledge of the Being of essents in Heidegger’s terminology, is human pure reason. It is the human characteristic of reason, i.e., its essential finitude, which has a fundamental importance for the problem of the origin of synthetic a priori judgements, or the problematic of laying the foundation of metaphysics and ontology. Grasping the meaning of the essential finitude of human reason is very important for understanding the Critique of Pure Reason and Heidegger’s interpretation of it. Heidegger holds that “the finitude of human reason by no means consists merely and primarily in the fact that human knowledge exhibits many shortcomings: that it is unstable, inexact, liable to error, and so on. This finitude, rather lies in the essential structure of knowledge itself. The factual limitation of reason is a consequence of its essence”.\(^{166}\) For better understanding the meaning of the finitude of human knowledge, we must note to two points. Firstly, in the current, epistemological interpretation of Kant, it is often said that according to Kant the finitude of human knowledge is not quantitative, accidental but qualitative and essential. It means that our knowledge is always phenomenal, and phenomenon is essentially different from noumenon or thing-in-itself. But, as we will explain in following pages, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, this conception of the meaning of the finitude of human knowledge in Kant’s philosophy is by no means correct. This finitude means that human, finite knowledge is always dependent on its object and the object must already exist and be given.
Secondly, in Kant’s philosophy the comparison between human knowledge and divine knowledge is by no means due to theological reasons, but is only a pattern for explaining the essence of human knowledge, a pattern which Kant inherits from scholasticism.

Now that it has become obvious that the essence of human knowledge lies in its essential finitude, we must characterise the essence of human, finite knowledge, and answer the question: What constitutes the essence of human, finite knowledge?

22) The Essence of Finite Knowledge

The first sentence of the thematic discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to Heidegger, properly characterises the essence of human, finite knowledge. Heidegger remarks that in the current interpretations of Kant, this sentence “is usually regarded all too lightly”, whereas the proper understanding of the Critique of Pure Reason is dependent on the proper understanding of it. In the sentence in question Kant says: “In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them and from which all thought gains its material”.

On the basis of this sentence, Heidegger concludes that according to Kant “cognition is primarily intuition”, and intuition is the basis of knowledge. It may be said that Heidegger’s entire interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason is the hammering and elaborating of this sentence and in around the axis of this principle, i.e., “cognition is primarily intuition”. It is worth mentioning that Heidegger’s emphasis on intuition, i.e., on immediate relation with things, as the basis of knowledge, is completely in agreement with his conception of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Moreover, here we can determine the main dispute between Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason and other epistemological ones. Heidegger holds that the interpretation of knowledge as judgment (thought), as we see in epistemological interpretation of Kant, is a great obstacle to the understanding of Kant’s basic problem.

But what does intuition mean? Heidegger maintains that generally in philosophical discussions, including in the Critique of Pure Reason, terms such as intuition, perception, sensation, representation, and knowledge are obscure and ambiguous, because they have a twofold sense. “On the one hand they indicate a comportment (comporting oneself to what is intuited, perceived), intendere, and on the other hand they indicate what is intuited itself”. More simply, the term intuition, for example, means both ‘the act of intuiting’ and ‘the object of intuition or what is intuited’. According to Heidegger, even “Kant does not make this distinction
explicitly."172 For this reason Heidegger explains the sense of intuition more explicitly. Intuition consists in immediate relation to a single, particular object.173 For Kant intuition “takes place only insofar as the object is given to us”.174 And Heidegger interprets this as: “Intuition means the manner by which something is represented to me concretely as something. To interpret it briefly, to intuit means to allow something to give itself as the concrete thing that it is; to intuit means to let a being be encountered in its immediacy”.175

But if, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant maintains that knowledge is primarily intuition, then what is thought? According to Heidegger, “thinking is simply in the service of intuition. It is not something which exists merely beside and in ‘addition to’ intuition, but by its intrinsic structure serves that to which intuition is primarily and constantly directed”.176 Heidegger holds that this point, i.e., to believe that knowledge is primarily intuition and thinking is only in the service of intuition and that it is intuition which primarily and constantly directs thought, is the fundamental phenomenological orientation which is obvious in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and apart from Kant, is exactly that on which Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, emphasises.177 Now it becomes clear as to what Heidegger means by ‘phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*’. By the expression ‘phenomenological’ Heidegger means to emphasise the intuitive character of knowledge.178

For explicating the relation between intuition and thought, Heidegger explains:

If thinking is so essentially relative to intuition then both intuition and thinking must have a certain affinity which permits their unification. This affinity, this descent from the same genus, finds expression in this: that both may be termed ‘representation’. Representation here has at first the broad, formal sense, according to which something indicates, announces, gives notice of, or presents something else. This act of representation can be such that it takes place ‘with consciousness’. It is characterised by an awareness that something announces itself and is announced.179

Hence any representation has two characters, one announcing something, and the other announcing itself. The representation of a given cherry tree, for example, indicates both that given cherry tree and itself, i.e., a representation called cherry tree.

Now, if in the act of representing something by something else, not only this act but also that which represented in it is represented as such, i.e., ‘consciously’, then such an act of representation refers to that which is presented in that act as such. Thus understood as ‘objective perception’, knowledge is an act of representation. Knowledge as representation is either intuition or concept.180

If knowledge is primarily intuition, then what is the difference between intuition and concept (thought)? Kant himself answers the question: “The former relates immediately to an
object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common".\textsuperscript{181}

As Heidegger interprets the first sentence of the thematic discussion of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, quoted above, "Knowledge is a thinking intuition. Thought, i.e., the act of 'representation in general', serves only to render the singular object, i.e., the concrete essent itself, accessible in its immediacy and for every one".\textsuperscript{182} According to Kant, "Each of these two (intuition and thought) is certainly representation but not yet knowledge".\textsuperscript{183} Thought is the act of representation in general, in which the concrete particular essent, which is accessible in its immediacy for every one, is itself represented. Then in any general representation (concept), the particular essent is presented.

Heidegger holds that from Kant's sentences, one may conclude that there is a mutual relationship between intuition and thought and hence he may conceive knowledge as intuitive thinking and not thinking intuition, and understand knowledge in principle, despite every thing, as judgment, i.e., the act of thinking. This is the conception present in the current, epistemological interpretation of Kant. But Heidegger strongly denies this interpretation of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} and emphasises that according to Kant the essence of finite knowledge is thinking intuition, and "intuition defines the true essence of knowledge, and that, despite the reciprocity of the relation between intuition and thought, it is in the first that its true center of gravity is to be found".\textsuperscript{184} Heidegger argues that his own interpretation of Kant is preferable and acceptable for two reasons. Firstly, Kant himself underscores the word 'intuition' in the statement, quoted above. Secondly, only through this interpretation is it possible to grasp what is essential in the definition of the finitude of knowledge in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}.\textsuperscript{185}

But according to Heidegger what is very important is that "the first sentence of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} is, indeed, no longer a definition of cognition in general but the real definition of human knowledge".\textsuperscript{186} This is why Kant says: "On the other hand, in that which concerns man (in contrast to 'God or any other higher spirit') all knowledge consists of concept and intuition".\textsuperscript{187} Attention to this point, that is the first sentence of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, is not a definition of knowledge in general, but of human, finite knowledge, will help us to realise the true meaning of the concepts like appearance, thing-in-itself, and phenomenal knowledge in Kant's philosophy, and to avoid many misunderstanding in the interpretation of these concepts.
23) Human and Divine Knowledge

We said that, in following scholasticism, Kant takes as a pattern the comparison between divine and human knowledge, on the basis of which he explains the essence of human knowledge. According to Kant, as Heidegger shows, “the essence of finite human knowledge is elucidated by contrasting it with the idea of infinite, divine knowledge, i.e., “intuitus originarius”, original intuition. Divine knowledge as knowledge, not as divine, is also intuition. The difference between infinite and finite intuition consists only in this, that the former in its immediate representation of the individual, that is, the singular and unique essent taken as a whole, first brings it into being, that is, effects its coming forth (origo). Absolute intuition would not be absolute if dependent on an essent already on hand in adaption to which the object of intuition first became accessible. Divine cognition is that mode of representation which in the act of intuition first creates the object of intuition as such”.

Kant believes that the other essential factor which distinguishes finite, human knowledge from infinite, divine knowledge is the existence of thought in human knowledge, whereas divine knowledge has no need of thought at all. Divine knowledge is “intuition, for all its knowledge must be intuitive, and not thought, which always involves limitations”. Then, as Heidegger stipulates, “seeing right through the essent in advance, such cognition intuits it immediately and has no need of thought. Thought as such, then, is in itself the seal of finitude”.

The infinite intuition as intuition is the origin of the Being of what is intuited; this being originates from intuiting itself. By contrast human knowing is finite intuiting, i.e., an intuiting which as such does not create or produce what is intuited, but just the opposite... . Thus the finitude of human knowing does not lie in human’s knowing quantitatively less than God. Rather it consists in the fact that [in human knowledge] what is intuited must be given to the intuition from somewhere else—what is intuited is not produced by intuition.

If we intend to express the finitude of human knowledge in terms of Heidegger’s terminology we must say that “the finitude of human knowing consists in being thrown into and onto beings”, and, in other words, in our being-in-the world.

For further clarification of the essence of finite, human knowledge in Kant’s thought, Heidegger again employs the comparison between human and divine knowledge as a model, and remarks that the difference between infinite, divine knowledge and finite, human knowledge does not lie in the fact that the former is merely intuition and the latter is thinking intuition, i.e., their difference is not that human knowledge, unlike divine knowledge, has the factor of thinking besides intuition. Rather “the essential difference between these two types of knowledge lies
primarily in intuition itself....That a finite being must ‘also’ think in order to possess knowledge is an essential consequence of the finitude of its intuition". Put more clearly, the difference between infinite, divine knowledge and finite, human knowledge lies in the fact that the former is absolute intuition, whereas the latter is finite intuition. In fact, Heidegger tends to say that knowledge or cognition “is intuition. The finitude of human knowledge must first of all be sought in the finitude of the intuition proper to it". What is the result of this discussion for the explanation of the essence of human knowledge? The result of the discussion is that, Kant, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, conceives knowledge primarily as intuition, and believes that thought, in contrast with intuition, has a subsidiary role in knowledge. Therefore, unlike the current, epistemological interpretations of Kant, we cannot reduce knowledge to thinking and the act of understanding, and we cannot conceive thought, in contrast with intuition, as the primordial, essential element in knowledge.

24) The Essence of Finite Intuition

It has been stated that, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant holds that knowledge is primarily intuition and this intuition, in contrast with absolute, divine intuition, is a finite intuition. We can define finite, human intuition, negatively and in contrast with creative, divine intuition, as non-creative intuition. It means that human intuition, unlike divine intuition which creates its own object, cannot create its object, but is dependent on what already exists and is presented to it in the act of intuiting. For this reason, Kant says that “intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us". Then, the most important characteristic of finite intuition is that its object in itself must be already on hand, which means that receptivity is the essence of finite intuition. “Finite intuition cannot receive anything, however, unless the latter announces itself, that is, the essence of finite intuition is such that it must be solicited or affected by a possible object”. And this is in fact what phenomenology seeks to demonstrate.

But, if the essence of human intuition is receptivity, then there must necessarily be some organs capable of being affected— the organs of sense. But the important point is that, according to Heidegger, “human intuition, therefore, is not ‘sensible’ because its affection takes place through ‘sense’ organs. Rather, the converse is true: it is because our Dasein is finite— existing in the midst of the essent which already is and to which our Dasein is abandoned— that it must of necessity receive the essent”. More simply, our intuition is not the product of our sense organs, but our sense organs are the result of the finitude of our intuition. In other words,
Heidegger holds that it is not our sense organs which make our intuition possible, rather our intuition is the result of the mode of the Being of our Dasein and of the openness of this mode of Being to essents, and if we were not disclosed to essents, the functioning of our sense organs would be impossible and their existence would be useless.

Heidegger believes that “Kant was the first to arrive at an ontological, non-sensuous concept of sensibility”\(^\text{202}\) and spoke of the possibility of a non-sensuous sensibility, i.e., receptivity. Kant believes that “sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time”\(^\text{203}\). Then, according to Kant, we have two kinds of intuition: 1) pure intuition which makes sensuous empirical intuition possible; 2) sensuous, empirical intuition, i.e., intuition through sense organs. Now, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the idea of the existence of a kind of non-sensuous, non-empirical intuition, called ‘pure intuition’, in Kant’s philosophy, signifies that Kant believes in an ontological, non-sensuous concept of sensibility. This is the pure intuition, or the ontological, non-sensuous concept of sensibility, i.e., the receptivity of our intuition, which is expressed as Dasein’s disclosed to the world in Heidegger’s thought. For Kant pure intuitions, space and time, are not derived from sense experience, rather make sense experience possible. This point is expressed in the framework of Heidegger’s own thought in this way that the mode of the Being of Dasein is disclosed to the world and this disclosedness is not derived from sense experience but is its ground. In other words, if the mode of our existence were not disclosed to the world and essents, the existence of sense organs would be useless. Hence, intuition is a non-sensuous act and is the result of the ontological structure of our existence, and is what makes experience possible.

25) The Relation between Intuition and Thought in Finite, Human Knowledge

As already stated, according to Kant, the other fundamental factor which differentiates finite, human knowledge from absolute, divine knowledge is thinking. Finite knowledge involves thinking, whereas absolute, divine knowledge has no need of thinking. Why? Because if knowledge is primarily intuition and if finite intuition is to be knowledge, then “it must be able to make the essent itself, insofar as it is manifest, accessible with respect to how and what it is to everyone and at any time”.\(^\text{204}\) In other words, it has been said that intuition consists in an immediate relation with a particular, single thing. Therefore, on one hand, so long as intuition is in its immediate relation with a thing, it is dependent on its concrete, particular object, and as
soon as it cuts its immediate relation with its object, our intuition, i.e., our impression, will be removed. On the other hand, a particular intuition of a particular thing, as particular intuition, is obtained only by an individual and cannot be accessible for other finite intuitions which are not in an immediate relation with that thing. For this reason, although knowledge is primarily intuition, intuition as such is not yet knowledge and it is the task of thought to determine the finite intuition which is indefinite and obscure.

We need concepts to convey our immediate intuitions to others. We need concepts in order that a thing is accessible, not only for a particular individual who is in an immediate relation to it but also for the intuitive subjects who are not in an immediate relation to that thing. This is why Heidegger says:

Finite beings capable of intuition must be able to agree in the actual intuition of the essent. But finite intuition as intuition is, at bottom, always bound to the particular which is being intuited at any given moment. However, that which is intuited becomes an object of knowledge only if everyone can make it intelligible to himself and to others and in that way communicate it. So, for example, this intuited particular, this piece of chalk, must admit of being determined as chalk or as body in order that we may be able jointly to know this essent itself as the same for each of us.°°

A finite intuition acquires the status of knowledge only when that individual intuition becomes independent of its immediate relation to a particular thing and is accessible and communicable to everyone any time, and others may also be able jointly to reach an agreement about whatness and howness of what is intuited. In other words, all experiences are individual and particular, and for the conversion of individual, particular experiences to knowledge, i.e., general, public concepts, finite intuition must be determined, and Kant assigns this important task to understanding. Thus, finite intuition needs a faculty which determines and defines it, i.e., understanding or the act of thinking, and this is a sign of finitude of human intuition. For becoming knowledge, finite intuition always needs to be determined as this or that, for example this chalk or that tree. Our intuitions of essents are undetermined and indefinite and in order to be determined and made definite, these intuitions must be determined and defined as this or that thing to be known by us. Undetermined, indefinite intuitions are determined by concepts, for instance the concept of chalk or of tree. Concepts consist in the general and common features of things, i.e., those features which a thing has jointly with other things in general. For example, we call some general and common features of things, 'body' or 'corporeality', and some other general and common features, 'animality', and so on.
But here, according to Heidegger, there are a few basic points: Firstly, neither intuition nor understanding (thought) are original and can create their objects. Secondly, in the formation of concepts, it is again intuition which has a primordial and basic role, and Heidegger emphasises that intuition itself has already the general, common features of thing, on the basis of which the concept is formed. But these general, common features are not represented in intuition thematically. It is understanding which represents these features, which are already present in intuition, thematically. But in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s explanation of the process of conceptualisation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as we already said, the main point is the emphasis on the fact that it is intuition which directs the process of conceptualisation. In other words, a concept or general representation, which is an immediate representation of thing, is always in the service of intuition which is an immediate representation of the thing and has an immediate relation with it. Intuition is the primary constituent of a concept, because concept is indeed the representation of a representation, i.e., the representation of what has already been represented by intuition. All these explications are the interpretation of this well-known sentence of Kant: “Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content [of intuition] are empty, intuitions without [the determinations of] concepts are blind”. Then, “Only through their union [understanding and sense] can knowledge arise”. “Without intuition an object is ‘merely thought’ and not yet known, just as little as an object is already known when it is merely intuitable. At the same time we must note that, not only is intuition a basis for thinking, but also that thinking only has the function of determining intuition”.

Corresponding to the two fundamental elements of knowledge, i.e., intuition and thought, or sense and understanding, the inquiry into the fundamental elements of knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason* has two main parts: ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, i.e., inquiry about sense and intuition, and ‘Transcendental logic’, i.e., inquiry about understanding and thought.

26) The Essential Unity of Intuition and Thought

It has already been stated that finite knowledge is thinking intuition, and intuition (sense) and thought (understanding) are two primordial elements of finite, human knowledge. There is a reciprocal relation between intuition and thought. Intuition puts the object of thought at the disposal of understanding and grants content to thought, and reciprocally understanding determines intuition. Now the question is: Are intuition and thought two completely independent
faculties? Are these two faculties only side by side together or rather, must there be an essential unity between them?

According to Heidegger, if thought is essentially directed toward intuition, "thinking is always united with intuition in order to serve it". Therefore, it is not that intuition and thought, sense and understanding, are two completely separate and independent faculties, rather there is a basic, original union between them. According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant calls this basic, original union 'synthesis' and, as we already mentioned, it must be distinguished from two other apophantic and predicative syntheses. Heidegger terms this basic synthesis veritative, or true-making, or manifest-making, synthesis. "Through such a union (synthesis), thought refers mediately to the object which in the unity of a thinking intuition becomes manifest (true). In this way, the synthesis of thought and intuition affects the manifestation qua object of the essent encountered". Heidegger believes that it is veritative synthesis that is the main theme of Kant's transcendental inquiry. In fact, as we will see later, according to Heidegger, this synthesis is the main essence and basis of transcendence, i.e., Dasein's 'ecstasy' toward the world and things. Through this basic synthesis (union) between intuition and thought, which is human being's transcendence, thing as an existent becomes the object of our experience and we gain a precursory comprehension of the Being of the thing and comprehend that 'the thing is'. This synthesis is in fact the ground of our knowledge and its objectivity. But as it was already stated, this veritative or true- (manifest-) making synthesis must be distinguished from two other syntheses which are, as judgment, the functions of understanding. Kant holds that the main function of understanding is unification and a judgment is a 'function of unity'. "A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or the representation of the relation between them as far as they form a concept". For instance, we gain different representations, such as globosity, yellowness, and sourness, and so on of a thing through different impressions, i.e., sense intuition. But it is understanding which unifies this multiplicity in a unitary representation as orange. Heidegger calls this unification (synthesis), i.e., the synthesis of different impressions in a unitary representation 'predicative synthesis'. There is another unification (synthesis) in which it is unified (synthesised) subject and predicate in a judgment, like the synthesis of the Earth and roundness in the judgment "The Earth is round". Heidegger terms the synthesis of subject and predicate in a judgment, which is attributed the values of true or false, as apophantic synthesis. According to Heidegger, the basic synthesis of intuition and thought, which constitutes the essence of transcendence as well as the essence
and the ground of human knowledge is veritative synthesis. Heidegger believes that when Kant speaks of synthetic a priori judgments he has in view veritative synthesis, which must not be confused with two other syntheses, i.e., predicative and apophantic syntheses. For Heidegger it is the veritative synthesis in which predicative and apophantic syntheses are necessarily joined together in a structural unity of syntheses.  

Heidegger holds that "if one asserts that, according to Kant, the essence of knowledge is 'synthesis', this assertion says nothing as long as the term 'synthesis' remains indeterminate and ambiguous."  

In addition, according to Heidegger, it is correct to say that knowledge is judgment and judgment is the function of understanding, because predicative synthesis and apophantic synthesis are rooted in veritative synthesis which determines the essent as essent. As we stated, this veritative synthesis is the main essence of transcendence, the ground of human knowledge and the major theme in Kant's transcendental inquiry.

27) The Main Characteristic of Understanding in Finite Knowledge

Already we spoke of the essence of finite intuition. Now, it is required that we briefly explain the metaphysical essence of the second basic element of finite, human, knowledge, i.e., understanding. It has been said that since finite intuition is in need of determination, it is dependent on understanding. But understanding itself, like intuition has a limitation and we can even say that understanding, in contrast to intuition, has a greater limitation, because understanding lacks the immediacy which finite intuition has in its relation with a thing. The mode of representation of understanding, in contrast with the mode of immediate representation of intuition, is mediate. "This detour (discursiveness), which is essential to the understanding, is the clearest index of its finitude".

Just as the metaphysical essence of finite intuition was described by receptivity, we can determine the essence of understanding as a kind of creativity or spontaneity. Of course even understanding, which is dependent on intuition, like finite intuition, cannot be creative. In other words, the creativity or spontaneity of understanding is by no means the same as creativity or spontaneity of absolute, divine, knowledge. Nevertheless, because of its distinction with intuition whose essential characteristic is receptivity, understanding can be described as creative in a certain sense.

Conceptualisation is the function of understanding and it is understanding which subsumes particular, single things intuited under a general character. We do not have any general character
as such in the external world, and general character as such is the product of the creativity of understanding. But we should note that the content of concepts, i.e., the content of the general character by which the intuited is represented conceptually, is adopted from the object of intuition. But “only the way in which this content as an inclusive unity applies to the many is the work of the understanding”.

According to Kant’s own terminology, we can say that the matter of knowledge (concept) belongs to intuition, and only the form of knowledge (concept) is the work of understanding.

28) Appearance and Thing-in-itself

Let us remind ourselves of the main thrust of our discussion. It has been said that in Heidegger’s interpretation, the main aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is laying the foundation of metaphysics as science, and we have stated, for laying this foundation, Kant became compelled to explain the essence of human knowledge. In this direction, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the concept of finitude finds a very important role in Kant’s laying the foundation of metaphysics. In other words, Kant interprets the essence of human reason or the essence of knowledge on the basis of its essential finitude. This finitude means that human knowledge is not able to create its object, but is always dependent on a given. According to this conception, finite intuition constitutes the ground of finite, human knowledge, and receptivity is the most important characteristic of finite intuition. Now the question is what is knowable in such a finite knowledge. Kant’s answer to this question, on the basis of Heidegger’s interpretation, is: “If finite knowledge is receptive intuition, the knowable must show itself by itself. What finite knowledge is able to make manifest, therefore, must be an essent which shows itself, i.e., which appears, an appearance”.

But what does appearance mean? Heidegger’s answer to the question is quite different from the conception of the term in current, epistemological interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason. Heidegger holds that in Kant’s view “the term ‘appearance’ refers to the essent itself as the object of finite knowledge”. In other words, appearance is the thing-in-itself only as the object of finite knowledge.

Appearance is the thing which can be an object. Heidegger believes that the meaning of appearance in the Critique of Pure Reason will be revealed when it is contrasted with its opposite concept. The term ob-ject is the literal translation of the German word Gegenstand, and it means ‘that which stands opposite to’. For a more proper understanding the meaning of ob-ject
(Gegenstand), it must be contrasted with German term Entstand, which literally means ‘that which stands forth’. The German term Ent-stand is translated into e-ject in English, with this difference that Ent-stand has a substantive sense whereas e-ject is a verb. The German prefix ent has “the meanings ‘forth’, ‘from’, or ‘out of’. Although the English prefix ‘e’ does not have exactly this meaning, nevertheless, its meaning is close enough to that of the German ent to support the analogy—object: e-ject: Gegenstand: Ent-stand”.

Heidegger holds that with the help of the terms object and e-ject, and on the basis of the contrast between finite, human knowledge and absolute, divine knowledge, we can approach the meaning of the concepts of appearance (phenomenon) and thing-in-itself (nomenon) in Kant’s views. As it has been stated, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, finite knowledge is the knowledge which cannot create its object, and this knowledge must be exposed to the thing which already is and is presented to it. It means, absolute, divine knowledge need not conform to anything other than itself, whereas finite knowledge must conform to its object in order to be correct. Such a ‘conforming-to...’ is a ‘dependence on...’, and consequently, a form of finitude. “Absolute cognition itself reveals the essent in the act of letting it come forth and possesses it ‘only’ as that which arises from this very act, i.e., as e-ject”. The object of absolute knowledge is the essent as essent in itself, i.e., not as object”. Thus, properly speaking, absolute, divine knowledge has no object. It is only finite knowledge which has an ob-ject, and in the case of absolute, divine knowledge we must speak of, not ob-ject but e-ject. The conclusion which Heidegger draws from the discussion is that the opposition between appearance or ob-ject and thing-in-itself or e-ject is only with regard to the contrast between finite knowledge and absolute knowledge, otherwise such an opposition is, at least in Kant’s philosophy, meaningless. For absolute knowledge there is only thing-in-itself and it has no ob-ject. Object belongs only to finite, human knowledge. Therefore it is not the case that we have two things, thing-in-itself and appearance. Thing-in-itself and appearance are one and the same thing which is called thing-in-itself with reference to absolute, divine knowledge, and appearance with reference to finite, human knowledge. Essent as appearance, i.e., as what appears, is the same as thing-in-itself. Only for finite intuition or finite knowledge can essent become an object or appearance. For a finite intuition or finite knowledge essent cannot be something other than an ob-ject or appearance. For absolute knowledge essent cannot be an ob-ject or appearance, because for absolute knowledge essent does not appear or show itself but it originally comes to existence through absolute, divine knowledge.
Thus, according to Heidegger's interpretation, it is a very fundamental misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Kant's philosophy to say that appearance is something different from the thing-in-itself. "Appearances are not mere illusions but the essent itself. And the essent, on its side, is nothing other than the thing 'in itself'".\textsuperscript{228} That we do not have access to thing-in-itself only means to deny the assumption that finite, human knowledge can know essents in a way that absolute, divine knowledge can know. In other words, due to the essential finitude of our knowledge, in the sense mentioned here, we can never possess any conception of the object of an absolute, divine, knowledge, i.e., e-ject, or, properly speaking, absolute, divine, knowledge has no object. Kant himself, in his postumun, states that thing-in-itself is nothing other than appearance: "The distinction between the concept of thing-in-itself and that of appearance is not objective but merely subjective. The thing-in-itself is not another object but another aspect of the representation with regard to the same object".\textsuperscript{229}

Thus, according to Heidegger's interpretation, the term 'pure appearance' also in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} "does not refer to mere subjective products to which nothing actual corresponds. Appearance as appearance or object does not need at all still to correspond to something actual, because appearance itself is the actual. The term 'mere' in the expression 'mere appearance' does not negate the actuality of the thing. Rather it negates [for human being the possibility of] the absolute intuition of objects which produces them, which is not possible for us as finite beings".\textsuperscript{230}

According to Heidegger, "if it is true that in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, finitude becomes the basis of all the problems relative to the laying of the foundation of ontology, then the \textit{Critique} must lay special emphasis on this distinction between finite and infinite knowledge".\textsuperscript{231} That is why appearance and thing-in-itself are fundamental concepts for the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}.

\textbf{29) A Review of the General Direction of Heidegger's Interpretation}

Now, we can have a look at what we have traversed and determine the route which Heidegger will take in the reminder of his interpretation in general.

As it has been already stated, according to Heidegger's interpretation, in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant seeks to lay the foundation of metaphysics as science. Then Kant sets forth the question what the laying of the foundation of a science basically means. For Kant laying the foundation of a science means to have a precursory understanding of the constitution of the
Being of the *essent* which is inquired in that science, and this precursory understanding shows itself in the form of some *a priori* synthetic judgments which constitutes the basic concepts and axioms of the science. In order to investigate the essence of the foundation of sciences, i.e., the essence of the very *a priori*, synthetic judgments, Kant became compelled to inquire into the essence of human knowledge. For explaining the essence of knowledge, following scholastic philosophy as a pattern, Kant compares finite, human knowledge with absolute, divine knowledge and concludes that finite, human knowledge has two essential components: Intuition (sense) and thought (understanding). Intuition is determined through thought, and thought adopts its content through intuition.

In the next step of his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to show that two essential components of human knowledge, intuition and thought (sense and understanding), have a common root. Heidegger holds that although Kant approached this common root but failed to discover it. The issue of a common root of intuition and thought is crucial to the explanation of the mode of the Being of human being. Heidegger believes, as we already explained, that the mode of *Dasein’s* Being is temporality and with regard to its ecstasies, this mode of Being can be called existence, which can access *essents* through its ecstasies, and transcendence or ecstasy is the same mode of Being of *Dasein* or existence.²² Now, in his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger contends that Kant did make an attempt to understand human being as temporality through his inquiry about time, but he could not fully grasp the different dimensions of temporality because of his captivity in the tradition of metaphysics of his predecessors. In addition, Heidegger endeavors to show that the common root of intuition and thought is nothing other than transcendental imagination, and also what constitutes transcendental imagination is time (in terms of Kant’s terminology) or temporality (in terms of Heidegger’s own terminology). In other words, one of Heidegger’s main attempts in his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to show that the significance of pure intuition, time, in Kant is nothing other than temporality, as existential attribute of *Dasein* itself.²²²

According to Heidegger, this is the common root of intuition and thought, i.e., transcendental imagination, which provides transcendence, and thus encounter with Being and the possibility of a precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of *essent*, or in terms of Kant’s own words, the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments. So, if we want to conceive the existence of a kind of ontology and lay the foundation of metaphysics and ontology, then we must before everything prove the possibility of transcendence on the basis of the human
existence. Put more simply, the nub of matter in Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to prove the intrinsic possibility of ontology on the basis of the transcendence of human existence, i.e., to prove that human being not only can transcend beyond himself and towards *essents*, rather also, according to Heidegger's conception, the mode of the Being of human being is the very transcendence and encounter with Being and an understanding of it. This is the same aim that Heidegger already had sought in *Being and Time*. Heidegger maintains that the understanding of the transcendence of human being is dependent on the existential understanding of human existence and as long as we attempt to interpret the mode of the Being of human being on the basis of the pattern of the mode of the Being of other non-*Desein* entities, i.e., through the categories and not through existential characteristics, we will never be able to realise the transcendence of human existence and its ecstasies. Heidegger's main criticism of Kant is that although he approached an existential understanding of *Dasein* and its transcendence, he could not quite attain to this kind of understanding because of his captivity in the metaphysical tradition, i.e., understanding of human being on the basis of categories and the pattern derived from other non-*Dasein* entities. What will follow is the development of what we have briefly pointed out here.

### 30) The Common Root of Intuition and Thought

It has been said that according to Kant, human knowledge has two essential components: Intuition and thought. Intuition is determined through thought and thought adopts its content through intuition. Then, in relation to the essential elements of human knowledge, Kant speaks of two realms: Sense intuition, which is receptive, and understanding, which, in a restricted sense and in contrast to receptive intuition, is creative and active. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant often speaks of two branches of knowledge. In the introduction to 'Transcendental Logic', he states: “Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind". In the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says: “there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding” and then he adds: two stems “which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root”.

As it has already been mentioned, Heidegger endeavors to show that two essential elements of finite, human knowledge, i.e., intuition and thought have a common root, Heidegger believes that although Kant approached an understanding of this common root, he could not quite realise it. Heidegger's essential criticism of Kant is this very lack of understanding of the common root
of the two essential elements of finite knowledge. According to Heidegger, it is dependent on understanding the very common root, the solution of the problem of transcendence, the solution of the problem of understanding the Being of essents, the precursory understanding of it as the foundation of sciences, and answering the question of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments.

It has been said that finite knowledge is thinking intuition, and intuition (sensibility) and thought (understanding) are two essential elements of human knowledge. There is a reciprocity between intuition and thought. Intuition presents to understanding the object of thought and grants content to thought, and in return, thought determines intuition. Now, the question is: Are intuition and thought completely separate? Are they only side-by-side or is there an essential union between them? As it has already been stated, Heidegger believes that intuition and thought are not two completely separate faculties, rather there is a basic, essential unity between them.\(^{236}\)

According to Heidegger's interpretation, this essential unity of intuition and thought arises from the fact that they both originate from a common root. In fact, as we will explain in following pages, Heidegger holds that this is the common root which makes human being's transcendence, i.e., his ecstasy towards the world and his encounter with Being, possible. In the framework of Kant's transcendental philosophy, according to Heidegger, this common root is transcendental imagination.

Towards the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says: "We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to outline the architectonic of all knowledge out of pure reason, and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is reason".\(^{237}\) From this sentence, Heidegger concludes that "Kant deliberately refrains from radically inquiring into the radix of the two stems",\(^{238}\) and remarks that although Kant himself has not presented further inquiry about this common root,\(^{239}\) he (Heidegger) will carry on the inquiry, because how intuition and thought stem out of this root is a crucial problem for him.\(^{240}\)

Heidegger believes that 'Transcendental Deduction' is the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason, and just here, in 'Transcendental Deduction', i.e., where the problem of the ground of the objectivity of ontological concepts (pure concepts of understanding or categories) is investigated, suddenly Kant speaks of three fundamental sources of the mind instead of two, and introduces another third faculty, which mediates between sensibility and understanding, i.e., the power of imagination.\(^{241}\) He says: "There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the
soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, sense, imagination, ad apperception. In his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to show that this third fundamental faculty, the power of imagination, is not like a third branch besides the other two, and it must not be conceived as an intermediate between the other two faculties. Through his analyses, Heidegger seeks to prove that the faculty of imagination is itself the common root of sensibility and understanding. Furthermore he attempts to prove that this common root, i.e., transcendental imagination, is nothing other than time, provided that time is understood not in the ordinary sense, as a category and an attribute of things, i.e., physical, mechanical time, but in the sense of an existential fact, i.e., in the sense of threefold ecstasy, which originates from human existence, which corresponds with threefold moments of time. More simply, if we understand time in the sense of temporality, which is, according to Heidegger, the most important characteristic of the ontological structure of Dasein, then we will be able to realise how in Heidegger's interpretation transcendental imagination is nothing other than temporality. By the explication of transcendental imagination, as the common root of intuition and thought, and by interpreting it as temporality, Heidegger attempts to clarify the crucial problem of transcendence.

Kant realised the role of transcendental imagination in the route of his inquiry about the mode of the formation of a priori synthetic judgments or ontological knowledge.

31) The Mode of the Formation of Synthetic A Prior Judgments (Ontological Knowledge)

As it has already been explained, according to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant believes that the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics as science, i.e., the problem of intrinsic possibility of ontology, is grounded in the essential possibility of a priori synthetic judgments. It means that the answer to the questions whether or not ontology is essentially possible and how the foundation of metaphysics as science can be laid are dependent on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and on the explanation of the essence of these judgments. Moreover, as it has been stated, Kant holds that all empirical knowledge is dependent on a priori, synthetic knowledge and, for Heidegger, it means that all ontic knowledge is grounded in ontological knowledge.

In addition, in the explanation of the essence of finite, human knowledge, it was said that this knowledge is constituted of two essential elements intuition and thought (sensibility and
understanding). This knowledge, as finite, is always dependent on the given and is never able to create its object. Moreover, it has been stated that intuition is determined through thought, and thought adopts its content through intuition.

Now the question is regarding the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge concerning the essence of finite knowledge, i.e., with regard to its essential finitude and its dependence on the given. Put more clearly, ontological knowledge, synthetic a priori knowledge, is the knowledge which is prior to and independent of any experience and thus is not dependent on the given. Now the problem arises with regard to finite knowledge which is always dependent on the given. One wonders how synthetic a priori knowledge which is not dependent on any given be possible about finite knowledge which presupposes a given. In synthetic a priori knowledge, before the essent as such becomes the object of our experience, we have a precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of essent, which makes the experience of the essent basically possible. But the question is: How is this precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of essent possible before the essent is given? In Heidegger’s own words: “How can a finite being which as such is delivered up to the essent and dependent on its reception have knowledge of, i.e., intuit, the essent before it is given without being is creator?” This problem leads us directly to an analysis of the mode of the Being of human being and to the heart of the problem of transcendence. In other words, the question is ontologically which mode of Being human being has, or how human existence has been constituted, with respect to his synthetic a priori knowledge. “Otherwise expressed, how must this finite being be constituted with respect to its own ontological structure if, without the aid of experience, it is able to bring forth the ontological structure of the essent, i.e., effect an ontological synthesis?” Hence, the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge (ontological knowledge) is relative to the analysis of the essential ground of human being’s transcendence proper to the precursory understanding of Being. Therefore, we can again put the main problem of the Critique of Pure Reason in this way: “How must the finite essent that we call man be in his inmost essence in order that in general he can be open to the essent that he himself is not, which essent therefore must be able to reveal itself by itself [for man]?”

In this stage of his interpretation, besides the syntheses already pointed out, Heidegger speaks of another synthesis which, according to him, is more primordial than other syntheses and the ground of all of them. Till now it has frequently been said that all empirical (ontic) knowledge is grounded in an ontological knowledge, i.e., an understanding of the constitution of
the Being of essent, and we mentioned that, according to Heidegger's interpretation, the meaning of synthesis in the expression 'synthetic a priori judgments' is the synthesis in which essent is determined as essent, i.e., essent is presented as a given, and we find out that 'the essent is'. This synthesis, which Heidegger calls 'veritative synthesis', is the product of the unity of intuition and thought, and the ground of objectivity of our experience. This synthesis means that before we can experience an essent and make a judgment on it, we must before hand find out that the essent is, i.e., the essent must be a given. Since the judgment 'the essent is' is not derived from the concept of the essent and through the analysis of the concept, we must conceive the judgment as synthetic.

But Heidegger believes that there is another synthesis which is more primordial, more essential than even the veritative synthesis and prior to it. Veritative synthesis consisted in the determination of essent as essent, thus, this synthesis was relative to the Being of essent, i.e., the precursory understanding of 'the essent is'. This synthesis is the product of the unity of sense intuition and ontic (empirical) concepts. But before this synthesis, i.e., the precursory comprehension of the Being of essent, can be taken place, finite knowledge, i.e., man, must have a precursory understanding of the meaning of Being as such. Heidegger calls this precursory understanding of Being as such and in general, pure veritative synthesis, and conceives it as more primordial, more essential than and prior to all syntheses including veritative synthesis. In the explication of the meaning of synthesis in the expression 'a priori synthesis judgment', we already stated that all experience is grounded in our concern and reference to the thing, and this is the same fact which is expressed by the term 'intentionality' in Husserl's phenomenology, and Heidegger terms it veritative synthesis. But we can set forth a more profound question: What makes the very reference to essent possible? Heidegger maintains that it is our openness to Being itself which constitutes the ground of our reference to essent, and he terms it, in the framework of Kantian thought, as 'pure veritative synthesis'. Heidegger holds that what Kant calls transcendental synthesis is nothing other than the very pure veritative synthesis, i.e., our precursory comprehension of Being as such or Being in general.

Hence, in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, the different expressions 'a priori, synthesis knowledge', 'transcendental synthesis', 'veritative synthesis', 'pure veritative synthesis', 'pure knowledge', and 'ontological knowledge' all refer to a unitary meaning, i.e., the precursory comprehension of Being, including Being of essent and Being in itself.
In synthetic a priori knowledge, we deal with a knowledge which is not derived from any experience but is prior to all experience and constitutes its ground. Synthetic a priori knowledge (ontological knowledge), according to Heidegger's interpretation, inasmuch as it precedes all experience, is called 'a priori', and inasmuch as it lacks any matter of knowledge and is independent of any experience, is called 'pure knowledge'. Because here, in pure knowledge, we are not talking about the determinations of essent but our reference to essent itself. Now, for answering the question of the intrinsic possibility of ontology we must explain the essence of a priori, synthetic knowledge, i.e., of pure knowledge, and its possibility. It has already been said that finite, human knowledge is constituted from two essential elements: intuition, which is receptive and renders the object of knowledge, and thought, which is active, spontaneous, and which determinates intuition. Thus, pure knowledge, since it is a human knowledge, must be constituted from two elements, i.e., intuition and thought. But, since it is a pure knowledge, i.e., free and independent of any experience, its constitutive elements must also be pure. Then the constitutive elements of pure knowledge, i.e., ontological knowledge, consist in pure intuition and pure thought. Now, the problem is to elucidate the character of these pure elements and their primordial, essential unity.

The elucidation of the intrinsic possibility of pure veritative synthesis (ontological knowledge) and its constitutive element will determine the constitution and ontological structure of human being and its transcendence, and also clarify the essence of ontological knowledge.

32) The Essential Elements of Pure Knowledge

The essential elements of pure knowledge, (ontological knowledge) consist in pure intuition and pure thought. This is why the Critique of Pure Reason, as an inquiry about ontological knowledge (pure knowledge), is constituted from two main parts, 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Logic'. The former is an inquiry about sense and intuition, and the latter an inquiry about understanding and thought. For this reason pure intuitions, which, according to Kant, are space and time, are discussed in 'Transcendental Aesthetic', and pure thought, i.e., pure concepts of understanding (categories) are examined in 'Transcendental Logic'. Hence pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) is constituted of pure intuition (space and time) and pure thought (pure concepts of understanding or categories).
Section Two

Heidegger’s Interpretation of ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’

1) Space and Time as Pure Intuitions

It has been stated that we seek to explain the essence of ontological or pure knowledge, the knowledge which is independent of all object, i.e., the knowledge which is prior to all experience and provides the possibility of reference to an essent and the possibility of its givenness and of being experienced. Pure knowledge, following the general essence of human knowledge, must be constituted of two essential elements, pure intuition and pure thought. Now the question is whether there is something as pure intuition and pure thought, i.e., intuition and thought without any object. Here, we first concentrate on pure intuition and then, in the next section, following Kant, who discusses pure thought in ‘Transcendental Logic’, we will also discuss pure thought and its role in ontological knowledge according to Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘Transcendental Logic’.

Then, in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant’s problem, as Heidegger formulates it, is: “Can such a thing as an act of pure intuition be found in the finite knowledge of the essent? What is sought is the possibility of the immediate, although experience-free, encountering of something singular.” Why do we seek a non-empirical, pure intuition? Because we intend to explain the knowledge which is prior to experience and makes experience basically possible. “To be sure, as finite, the act of pure intuition is an act of representation that is receptive,” because, as finite, it cannot create its object. But, on the other hand, it has also been said that pure intuition, as pure, has no object, because it is the knowledge which makes our encounter with the object possible. Then, as pure and lacking any object, pure intuition must be creative in a certain sense. It means that pure intuition must be both receptive and at the same time creative. It has already been stated that knowledge is either creative (absolute, divine knowledge) or non-creative (finite, human knowledge). Creative knowledge is the knowledge
which creates its object and, in the contrast to it, non-creative knowledge is the knowledge to which the object must be given. But in order that the object is given to finite knowledge, i.e., in order that the experience becomes possible, we need a non-empirical, pure knowledge which makes experience and the encounter with the given possible. Then pure intuition in pure knowledge must be creative in a certain sense, because it is prior to any givenness.

Kant holds that space and time are the pure intuitions which we are seeking. But, before starting the discussion of Kant's view of the essence of pure intuitions—space and time—let us examine the necessity of the concept of pure intuition itself.

It has been stated that finite, human knowledge is primarily intuition, and the essents become accessible to this knowledge, i.e., for man, through sense, empirical intuition. Kant calls these essents presented through sense intuition, 'appearance' or 'object'. But these essents or appearances are only the objects of intuition and cannot primarily constitute sensibility or intuition itself, because in order that the essents can be intuited, there must already be an intuition or receptivity, to encounter the essents. Now the question is what this pure receptivity, i.e., pure intuition is itself and what constitutes its content. In other words, the question is what human being is, as the being which encounters the essents. Hence, the discussion of pure intuition is in fact the discussion of the subjectivity of subject and the truth of man. So that Kant conceives space and time as pure intuitions, means that, according to him, what constitutes sensibility and pure receptivity of the cognitive power of man are space and time. But here we must remark that, for Heidegger, of the two pure intuitions, space and time, it is time which has priority or, put differently, we can say that space and time have an essential unity and space is reducible to time. More simply, according to Heidegger, the truth of Dasein or, in other words, the subjectivity of the subject is time or, in terms of Heidegger's own terminology, temporality.

But what are pure intuitions, space and time, according to Kant? When we encounter a thing or, as Kant says, an appearance, like a table, there are manifest to us some attributes, such as a certain color, hardness, impenetrability, etc. These attributes are given to us in intuition via the sense. “What corresponds to sense data in the appearance, in the object itself,... Kant calls 'the matter of appearance or object'. But matter does not mean what is material. ...Rather, matter here means the what-content or the real. This matter is a manifold which, nevertheless, we encounter in the empirical intuition, not as a confused muddle but in a certain order”, i.e., in certain spatial and temporal relations. For example, we perceive this table here, beside and below other things, and also now, prior to, after, or coincident with other things. Now, Kant intends to say that these spatial and temporal relations are not
objective determination of things, like color, hardness, or impenetrability. It means that these relations do not belong to matter, the real, in Heidegger’s terminology, what-content of appearances, and they are not the object of any of our senses, yet we understand things in these spatial and temporal relations. Now the problem is what these spatial and temporal relations are and whence they come. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, through the analysis of these relations Kant seeks to show that in all intuition, there is something more than the manifold given in sensation. In other words, “intuition as sensibility is not characterised by the function of the sense organs nor by sense-date”, rather the matter of appearances, i.e., the matter of intuition, is always organized in such spatial and temporal relations. Kant believes that these relations cannot in turn be sensations, otherwise, they themselves would need again relations of possible order and, hence, we would be involved in an infinite series. Kant concludes that these spatial and temporal relations, which do not belong to affections, must originate from ‘I’ myself, from the mind, i.e., must “be ready, a priori in the mind”.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, and also to some extent in prolegomena, Kant discusses pure intuitions, space and time in detail. In his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, both in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and in Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger also extensively explicates all the subtleties of Kant’s discussion of space and time, the ambiguities which exist in Kant’s own explanations of pure intuitions and also the misunderstandings found in some interpretations of Kant, which conceive space and time as the categories of understanding and not as the forms of intuition. But here, because of the limitations of space, we cannot explicate all of them. We can summarise Kant’s ideas on pure intuitions, space and time, in terms of Heidegger’s interpretation, as follows:

1) Space and time are not empirical concepts, i.e., are not abstracted from external experiences. In Heidegger’s interpretation it means that, according to Kant, space and time are not something extant among other extant things. Why? Because if space were something extant among other extant things, then space would necessarily be somewhere among the rest of what is extant— next to it, under it, or above it. Space could be this only if space was in space. Whatever is extant is from the beginning already in space. Space is the basis for what is extant and therefore cannot be found within what is extant.

The same can be said about time. Time is not something which would exist, for example, at the same time as, or sequential to, other things. Thus time is not something extant but is at the basis of what is extant, i.e., all extant is in time.
2) Space and time are necessary representations *a priori*, i.e., they are the representations "which emerges from the mind itself independently of experience. This means primarily that space is not only not something extant, but also does not depend on something extant". Kant illustrates this as follows: "We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent of them." Space must exist and is independent of this or that object’s being extant, independent of the senses. For Heidegger “this means simultaneously that space does not belong to the realm of the extant— as property, accidents, or as itself extant”.

It is also true about time. “Although one can remove appearances from time, one cannot— considering appearances as such, remove time itself.— Time is given *a priori*. ‘All reality’ of appearances is possible only ‘in time’.”

3) Space and time are not discursive, namely they are not general concepts. “Space and time lie at the ground of, and determine, what is extant; thus in a certain manner they are something universal.” But are they universal in the sense that they are general concepts? Kant holds that space and time are not general concepts because the relation between individual spaces, for example a room or the space which is taken up by a table, and universal space— also the relation between individual times, like one second or one hours, and universal time— is not similar to the relation between individuals and the universals. For example, there are many tables all of which are an instance of the general concept of table. But there is only one space or one time. Any part of space or of time is a part of an infinite, singular space, or of an infinite, singular time, whereas every table, for example, is not a part of an infinite, singular table. Space and time encompass their parts *in themselves*, and they are not like an abstract and common notion which holds parts as contained *under itself*. Space and time are not concepts, and thus they are not also categories.

4) Space and time are infinite magnitudes which are *given*. That Kant says space and time are magnitudes does not mean that they have some extension, or they are an amount of something; even it does not mean that space and time are infinite extensions or infinite quantum. Rather, here magnitude means a largeness (*Großeit*), i.e., that which provides the ground in general for whatever is specifically so and so big (in the case of space) or for whatever is specifically so and so long (in the case of time) as the specific large thing’s possibilities. That for Kant space and time are infinite magnitudes does not mean something endlessly big in measuring which we can never arrive at an end, or does not mean that they are bigger than any other amount, but it means that they are neither big nor small, thus
basically also not without end. Every part of space or time is, as part of the whole of space or
time, never quantitatively different from the whole, but always essentially, i.e., infinitely
different.16

The summary and conclusion of Kant’s discussion of space and time, according to
Heidegger’s interpretation, is that space and time are neither the entities among other entities
nor are the concepts abstracted from essents and their properties and accidents by
understanding. They are pure intuitions which make any encounter with objects possible.

For this reason, i.e., because of being pure intuitions, according to Heidegger’s
interpretation, space and time are the essential elements of pure knowledge, i.e., of
ontological knowledge ad precursory comprehension of the Being of the essents, the
knowledge that makes any ontic knowledge possible.17

2) Time as Universal Pure Intuition

So far it has been stated that ontological knowledge, or the same pure knowledge, is
constituted of two essential elements, pure intuition and pure thought, and that according to
Kant, space and time are pure intuitions. Now, Heidegger raises the question as to the priority
of one of the two pure intuitions over other one. In other words, so far, following Kant, we
were speaking of space and time as pure intuitions equiprimodially and without giving any
priority to one of them. But Heidegger attempts to show that in the Critique of Pure Reason
and in all its essential doctrines it is exactly time, and not space, which plays the essential
role and constitutes the primordial element of pure intuition and thus of the subjectivity of
subject, and consequently time is the key concept for the solution of the problem of
transcendence and ontological Knowledge. Remember that in Being and Time Heidegger
himself attempts to explain the existential structure of Dasein on the basis of time or, more
precisely, temporality.18 In other words, as we have frequently pointed out, in his
interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger endeavors to show that the meaning
of time in Kant is the same as what in Being and Time he himself terms as ‘temporality’.

It has been said that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant conceives space and time as
pure intuitions. According to him, space and time are pure forms and the conditions of the
possibility of experience, and they refer to two domains of experience, namely, outer
experience and inner experience. “Space is the formal condition of the physical. This means
that space enables in advance the encounter with the extant which becomes accessible in that
intuition which is not directed to us but away from us. Kant calls this intuition, which allows
beings other than ourselves to be encountered, outer intuition. Accordingly, space is the pure form of outer intuition".  "Space as pure intuition merely gives in advance the totality of those relations by means of which what affects the external sense is ordered. At the same time, however, we find 'givens' of the 'internal sense' which exhibit neither spatial forms nor spatial relations but manifest themselves as a succession of mental states (representations, drives, moods). That which in experiencing these phenomena is held in view from the first,...is pure succession". Therefore, time is "the form of inner sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves and of our inner state".

Now the question is whether we can find one pure intuition which is constituting for pure knowledge, i.e., for ontological knowledge, and on the basis of which we can formulate the problem of ontological knowledge in universal terms. Heidegger holds that in the Critique of Pure Reason it is time which, in contrast with space, constantly and step by step finds the more essential, primordial role. Immediately after having assigned both pure intuitions to two regions of phenomena, Kant states the following thesis: "Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearance whatsoever". Heidegger holds that on this thesis of Kant, "time takes precedence over space. As universal pure intuition, it must be the dominant and essential element of pure knowledge and hence of transcendence as well, since it is pure knowledge which makes transcendence possible".

But how does Kant justify the priority of time as universal pure intuition? Before answering this question, and in order that we can realise the significance of time as universal pure intuition of all phenomena, including the outer and external, it is necessary to remove the traditional concept of time. It means that we must not conceive time as a product of physical and astronomical phenomena, such as the motion of the stars or the natural events. According to Heidegger, with the conception of time as pure intuition, i.e., the a priori which is not derived from experience but already belongs to the mind itself, "Kant questions the role of external phenomena in the determination of time". Nevertheless, Heidegger frequently remarks that even Kant could not free himself from the domination of the traditional concept of time, i.e., the conception of time as the product of external phenomena, and could not completely realise the inner possibility of time, as the constitutive determination of the ontological structure of Dasein.

Kant states two seemingly contradictory theses about time. On the one hand, he holds that time is the pure form of inner, and not external, phenomena. But, on the other hand, he believes that time is universal pure form, i.e., the pure form of all phenomena, including the inner and the external. How is it possible to unite these two seemingly contradictory theses?
According to Heidegger's explication, Kant maintains that time is not immediately a determination of outer appearances. This is why Heidegger believes that Kant rejects the role of external phenomena in temporal determinations. But since all phenomena, both the outer and the inner, appear in us in the form of representations, and also time is the pure form of inner phenomena, then, time is indirectly, i.e., by the mediation of representations, the pure form of outer phenomena too.²⁸ Heidegger concludes that Kant, with his understanding of time as the form of inner sense, makes it to a certain extent more subjective than space. “Consequently, Kant takes time to be more originally bound to the subject, to the I, to human Dasein, than space”.²⁹ Heidegger holds that Aristotle has the same view about time and quotes this statement of Aristotle: “It is also worth considering more closely how time is related to the soul”.³⁰³¹ That is why “Aristotle asks whether time would cease to be if there would be no soul and he [himself] answers, time is impossible without the existence of the soul”.³² We must mention that according to Heidegger Aristotle’s view about time is entirely ambiguous,³³ and Kant could not completely realise the implications of his view about time or temporality as the most important characteristic of the ontological structure of the subject or human Dasein.³⁴

Heidegger maintains that if we are to be able to answer the question of the possibility of ontological, i.e., of pure knowledge, and if pure intuition is one of essential elements of pure knowledge, then we must show that time is more originally related to the subjectivity of the subject and Dasein’s transcendence, in other words, show that there is a firm connection between time and the I or, according to Kant’s own terminology, time and the unity of apperception. This task will be realised when we also reveal the second essential element of pure knowledge, i.e., pure thought.

It has been stated that ontological, i.e., pure, knowledge is constituted from two essential elements, pure intuition and pure thought. Pure intuition is discussed in the first main part of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, and pure thought is examined in the second main part of the Critique, ‘Transcendental Logic’. Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, i.e., his interpretation of pure intuition, space and time, was discussed in the previous pages. Now we must see how Heidegger interprets the second main part of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Transcendental Logic’, which is an inquiry about pure thought.
Section Three

Heidegger's Interpretation of Transcendental Logic

1) The Significance of Transcendental Logic

In *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger begins his interpretation of 'Transcendental Logic' through this preamble that the second main part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'Transcendental Logic', in contrast with its first main part, 'Transcendental Aesthetic', is disproportionately larger. This leads some to suppose wrongly that the center and heart of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the very 'Transcendental Logic' and the inquiry about thought and judgment, and not 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and inquiry about intuition. To explain the disproportionate volume of 'Transcendental Logic', compared with 'Transcendental Logic', Heidegger offers two reasons. The first reason is that in 'Transcendental Logic', through a relatively long introduction, Kant explains what the distinction between transcendental logic and logic in its traditional sense, i.e., general (formal) logic, is. Whereas, such an introduction was not required in 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. Heidegger holds what Kant calls 'transcendental logic' is nothing other than ontology. The second reason is that the part comprising 'Transcendental Logic' is not in conformity with the general arrangement of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. More explicitly, as has been stated, according to Heidegger, the main aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is inquiry about the possibility of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). The aim was to work out the two essential elements of pure knowledge, pure intuition and pure thought respectively in its two main parts, 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Logic'. But Heidegger believes that the major part of 'Transcendental Logic' is the discussion which is related to neither transcendental aesthetic and the inquiry about intuition nor to transcendental logic and the investigation on understanding, rather this
discussion or, more strictly speaking, the division of the ‘Analytic of Principles’, is related to the unity of pure intuition and pure thought.

2) The Distinction between Formal Logic and Transcendental Logic

In the introduction of ‘Transcendental Logic’, Kant again reminds us that due to the existence of two main sources of knowledge, intuition and understanding, his inquiry about them also is undertaken in two separate parts, ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and ‘Transcendental Logic’. In this introduction, in order to distinguish his investigation on thought (the spontaneity of understanding) from formal logic Kant explains the task of logic in this way: “We therefore distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding in general, that is, logic”. But the investigation of the rules of understanding is done in general (formal) logic too. Now the question is, what differentiates transcendental logic from general (formal) logic.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant believes that thought or understanding has two basic characteristics: Firstly, thought is, like intuition, an act of representation, with the difference that intuition is an immediate representation of the thing, whereas thought is a mediate representation of the thing. However, what is worth emphasising here is that, understanding or thought, although mediately, is related to its objects. This point, i.e., relatedness to object, is the first and primordial characteristic of understanding. Furthermore, we know that while intuition is an immediate relation to its objects, understanding or thought is in relation to the objects through concepts. Intuitions, sense data, rest on affections or impressions, but concepts rest on the spontaneity of understanding. The concepts of understanding, as mediate representations, do not refer to the essents directly rather as far as the essents are given to us through immediate representations, i.e., through intuition. Thus conceptual representation means that we subsume intuitive data under some general representations (concepts) and this subsumption is the same act of judging and unification. As Kant states, judging is the function of “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation”. Understanding, as the faculty of thought, is the faculty of judgment and, as Aristotle points out, “all judgments are functions of unity amount our representations”; understanding or thought brings nothing to existence but only determines what is given through intuition. In other words, the function of understanding is to synthesise the givens and unify them. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant believes that the very act of unification is the second basic characteristic of understanding.
Now, according to Kant, on the basis of these two basic characteristics, understanding is in need of double inquiry or, in other words, understanding can be investigated with regard to two aspects. General, formal logic is the science which concerns the characteristic of the unification of understanding, whereas Kant intends to present other inquiry about understanding and thought. Kant calls his inquiry about object-relatedness of understanding 'transcendental logic'. This inquiry is called 'logic' as far as like traditional (formal) logic it concerns the investigation of understanding and its rules, but is called 'transcendental' because it concerns the transcendence of thought, i.e., the phenomenological aspect of thought and the object-relatedness of understanding.

In 'Transcendental Aesthetic' we found that, according to Kant, besides empirical intuition, there is another kind of intuition that is non-empirical and makes empirical intuition basically possible. Kant calls this kind of non-empirical intuition 'pure intuition'. In 'Transcendental Logic', we deal with the question whether there is any pure thinking, i.e., non-empirical, pure object-relatedness of thinking. "Obviously Kant must say so, because the transcendental logic as well as the transcendental aesthetic are equally in service to working out the elements which belong to pure synthetic a priori knowledge as such".

Thus, in 'Transcendental Logic', Kant seeks to inquire about pure thought. But there is the question whether formal logic does not concern with pure thought. Then what is the distinction between formal logic and transcendental logic?

General, traditional logic is a formal logic, and it means that in this logic we deal only with the form of thought, i.e., with the modes of unification of representations, and do not consider the content of thought. In other words, in formal logic we observe thought without assuming any object and examine the thought by setting aside thinking's reference to specific objects. In formal logic we focus only on the function of unification as such with respect to its possible ways of unification and its rules. "General logic,... abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the ob-ject, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge, that is, it treats of the form of thought in general". In this logic "it makes no difference which object is thus being thought and...we do not need to pay attention to thinking's relation to objects". Then in formal logic pure thought, i.e., thinking despite its any relation to the object, is observed, and in this logic object-relatedness of thinking is not considered. But it is exactly the very relation to the object that is the main issue of inquiry in transcendental logic.

Formal logic "considers only the rules and laws according to which understanding employs representations in their relation to one another and not in relation to objects meant
by these representations". The theme of formal logic is not representations in their relation with objects but in their relation with themselves. But thinking is not confined to the relations among representations themselves and while not considering the object-relatedness of thinking, the relation among representations itself is not crossed out.

The other distinction between formal logic and transcendental logic is that the rules of formal logic are relative only to the form of thought as such. These rules tell us how thought can agree with itself. In other words, logical rules belong to formal (logical) correction of knowledge. But “following these formal rules does not yet determine whether a thinking which is correct in that manner [i.e., in agreement with itself] is also suited to objects”. In other words, the thought which is logically correct, i.e., “is in agreement with itself may very well go against objective circumstance and be false. Accordingly, the correctness of thinking is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the truth of a thinking intuition, i.e., of a knowledge”. Because following the traditional concept of truth, for Kant truth is “the agreement of knowledge with its object”, then in transcendental logic what is problematic for Kant is not the discovery of the rules of formal correction of knowledge, rather answering the question “what makes up the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge”. Therefore, we can say that formal logic is the logic of correction, whereas transcendental logic is the logic of truth.

“Now Kant shows that a general criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge is an absurd concept because it runs contrary to the central character of truth as agreement with the object”, because any knowledge, dependent on its given object, requires a specific criterion. A knowledge as such is always directed to a definite object and is tailored to this definite object. This definite object with this factuality and this kind of being is the only possible criterion for matching knowledge to the object’. Accordingly, the concept of a general criterion of truth by its very nature is a self-contradictory concept. Because truth, as agreement with the object, is always guided by the very object, and a thinking which is conceived only as one that is not related to definite objects, i.e., the thinking that is conceived in formal logic, cannot be the criterion of truth, but only of formal correctness.

But Kant’s “transcendental logic considers as its primary and unique problem precisely the relation of thinking to objects”, Which has been always taken for granted in all philosophies in the history of metaphysics.

In ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ Kant endeavors to show that beside empirical intuition there are pure intuitions a priori which make any empirical intuition essentially possible. Here Kant attempts to inquire about pure thought, i.e., to explain those relations which are
between understanding or thought and the things, which determine in advance any object, and which constitute the grounds of any objectivity and any truth of empirical knowledge. According to Kant there exists a primordial original truth which "no knowledge can contradict...without at once losing all content". Kant call this original truth, 'transcendental truth', to which all empirical knowledge must be conformed. According to Heidegger's interpretation, what Kant calls 'transcendental truth' or sometimes 'objective reality' is nothing other than ontological truth, i.e., Being.

3) The Pure Concepts of Understanding

If it is to be a pure knowledge, i.e., an synthetic a priori knowledge (ontological knowledge) that provides a precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent, independently from experience, then this knowledge must be a pure intuition that is determined through pure concepts. In previous pages it was stated that Kant holds that pure intuitions are space and time. But if the complete essential structure of pure knowledge is to be explained, the essence of pure thought (pure concepts) must be exhibited.

But the question is whether such concepts basically exist. What we here look for is the existence of certain concepts whose contents, unlike the contents of ordinary concepts such as tree, table and so on, are by no means derived from the experience of phenomena themselves, rather these concepts, which Kant calls 'pure concepts of understanding' or 'categories', are those concepts which are attainable a priori. But the question is: Are there pure concepts which exist a priori in human understanding? How can human understanding create the content of these pure concepts independently from experience and from any given, whereas human understanding, as a finite understanding, is always dependent on the intuition that must render any content, as the given, in disposal of understanding? In other words, in 'Transcendental Logic', Kant seeks to inquire whether all of our concepts are grounded in experience or there are certain concepts that are not grounded in and derived from experience, but are originally and a priori in the mind itself.

It has already been stated that the function of understanding is conceptualisation. But understanding makes only the form of a concept, and the content of a concept is the result of intuition. But if pure knowledge and thus pure thought (pure concepts) are to be possible, i.e., if the existence of pure concepts whose content are not derived from experience and empirical intuitions is to be possible, then these pure concepts must be the concepts not only whose form
but also whose content is the product of the function of understanding itself. More simply, in order to find the ground of the pure concept of understanding we must look for them in understanding itself and not outside of it. Kant, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, attempts to show that pure thought (pure concepts of understanding) is necessarily and originally grounded in pure intuition, i.e., in time.

Heidegger remarks that in the part ‘Transcendental Logic’ there is a very small section of eleven pages, entitled ‘The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’ which is the heart of ‘Transcendental Logic’ and the actual core content of the Critique of Pure Reason. But why does Heidegger conceive this very small section as the heart of ‘Transcendental Logic’ and the actual core content of the Critique? Because, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, on the one hand, the main problem of the Critique of Pure Reason is laying the foundation of ontology, and this laying the foundation is possible only on the basis of an existential, ontological analysis of human existence. Put more clearly, the solution of the problem of intrinsic possibility of ontology depends on the solution of the problem of transcendence. In the framework of Kant’s thought, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, transcendence is another expression of the essential unity of intuition and thought. And the discussion of schematism is precisely the part of the Critique of Pure Reason, which works out this essential unity, i.e., to transcendence.

On the other hand, it is in the section ‘schematism’ that Kant endeavors to show that time is the pure intuition on which all the pure concepts of understanding (categories), which, according to Heidegger, are nothing other than ontological predicates, must be grounded. This point is exactly in agreement with Heidegger’s own attempt in Being and Time. In the introduction of Being and Time, Heidegger describes the main aim of the work in this way: “Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being”. Now according to Heidegger’s interpretation, that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant endeavors to show time as the ground of the formation of all pure concepts of understanding, i.e., of all ontological predicates, exactly proves that time, more precisely, temporality or Dasein’s existence, is the horizon in which any understanding of Being is formed. In further pages we will return to this discussion in detail.

“Corresponding to the division of general logic, Kant divides the transcendental logic, too, into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic”.

Transcendental analytic “treats of knowledge and truths to which all empirical determination of objects must conform”. In other words, transcendental analytic, as the science
of pure thought, consists in the "dissection of all our a priori knowledge (i.e. of the possibility of experience) into the elements of knowledge that pure understanding yields".\textsuperscript{34}

As it has already been said, in transcendental deduction and in schematism Kant attempts to show that the pure a priori knowledge is grounded upon the pure intuition, time. But if pure thought can determine objects,

without any grounding in pure intuition, then empty sophistries give way to concepts of understanding which have no truth. Thus an illusion will be produced in transcendental knowledge—an ostensibly or seemingly ontological knowledge— which dares synthetically to judge and to determine objects on the basis of pure understanding alone. In this case the employment of pure thinking would be dialectical. This transcendental analysis needs likewise to be supplemented and secured by a critique of transcendental dialectical illusion.\textsuperscript{35}

Heidegger holds that 'Transcendental Analytic' is the positive fundamental division of 'Transcendental Logic', and 'Transcendental Dialectic' is the critical, negative segment of 'Transcendental Logic',\textsuperscript{36} and it is the positive division of 'Transcendental Logic' in which Kant pursues his main aim, i.e., the laying the foundation of metaphysics. For this reason, in both of his commentaries, i.e., in \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics} and in \textit{Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason}, Heidegger interprets only the positive segment of Transcendental Logic', i.e., 'Transcendental Analytic'. Regarding 'Transcendental Dialectic', Heidegger only remarks that this division of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reasons}" is nothing other than an ontological interpretation of natural metaphysics, i.e., an interpretation of the basic structure of that which we call human beings' natural view of the world".\textsuperscript{37}

We know that formal logic is divided into the doctrine of concepts, the doctrine of judgment and proposition, and the doctrine of conclusion. Correspondingly Kant divided his transcendental logic too in the same way. Thus the divisions 'The Analytic of concepts' and 'The Analytic of principles', are respectively the doctrine of concepts and the doctrine of judgment in Kant's 'Transcendental Logic', and 'Transcendental Dialectic' in Kant's logic corresponds to the doctrine of conclusion in traditional, formal logic.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, in the positive segment of 'Transcendental Logic', i.e., in 'Transcendental Analytic', Kant works out two main discussions. The discussion of pure thought (pure concepts) as the second essential element of pure knowledge (in the 'Analytic of Concepts') and the discussion of the essential unity of two main sources of pure knowledge (in 'The Analytic of Principles').\textsuperscript{38} But Heidegger criticises Kant for his division of 'Transcendental
Analytic’, following traditional, formal logic, into the analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles. Heidegger holds that we can by no means separate concept and judgment from each other, because all judgment is constituted from the concepts and reciprocally every concept is as a subject or predicate in a judgment. That is why “under the title ‘Analytic of Concepts’ Kant also deals with pure judgment of understanding. And, vice versa, under the title ‘Analytic of Principles’ the actual theme is pure concepts of understanding”.* As we will see later, Heidegger’s very criticism of Kant leads to many conclusions in relation to the analysis of the subjectivity of the subject and the analysis of the ontological structure of human being.

4) The Analytic of Concepts

As we explained the second characteristic of finite, human knowledge is being in need of understanding and thought. Finite intuition, as intuition, is not knowledge, because it is ambiguous and undetermined, and it is the task of thought to determine finite intuition. We need concepts in order that a thing is accessible, not only in an immediate relation with individual but for other finite intuitions and at any time. Then finite, human knowledge is the knowledge that is in need of concept. Kant expressly states: "Thought is knowledge by means of concepts".* But what is a concept?

A concept is the general, common traits of a thing, i.e., those characters which the thing has jointly with other things. The object of an intuition, which is always a particular, is determined through concepts, i.e., through a general representation, as a definite thing, like this tree or that table. More explicitly, when one represents something, for example an apple tree, the singular, intuited thing is determined as this or that definite thing, for example this apple tree or that linden tree, through reference to that which ‘applies to many’, like the concept (general representation) of a tree, an apple tree or a linden tree. Then without having general concepts we would have an ambiguous, indefinite intuition of particular things and we cannot say that we gained knowledge of them. Universality, i.e., ‘being-common to’ or ‘applying to many’ is the main property of a concept as far as, as Kant truly states, “it is a mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts”. But Heidegger believes that “although this property of ‘applying to many’ describes a representation insofar as it is a concept, it does not characterise the primordial essence of the latter. The property of ‘applying to many’ as a derived character is itself based on the fact that in every concept there is represented one element in which the several particulars agree”.* In other words, as it has frequently been pointed out, according to
Heidegger, knowledge is primarily intuition and it is intuition that is the ground of knowledge. This Heideggerian principle, and according to his interpretation likewise a Kantian one, is repeated in the discussion of the essence of concepts too. It means that the trait in a concept, which applies to many, is not the product of the act of understanding itself, rather in the particular, intuited things themselves there is a trait which is common to all of them. In finite knowledge, neither intuition nor understanding (thought) can create its object. For this reason, in order to show the main, basic role of intuition in knowledge, Heidegger emphasises the point that intuition itself composes the general, common traits of the things, on the basis of which the concept is constituted. But these general, common traits are not represented in intuition thematically, and it is understanding that represents thematically the traits of the thing, presented already in intuition. This act of understanding is expressed by the term 'conceptualisation'. The form of a concept is the product of the act of the unification of understanding, which is a spontaneous and, in contrast with the receptivity of intuition, creative function. But the content of this form of unification in the concept is the result of intuition. The main, basic point in Heidegger's analysis of the essence of concept is to emphasise that it is intuition which guides the formation of a concept. In other words, a concept, i.e., a general representation, which is a mediate representation of the thing, is in the service of the intuition which is in immediate relation to the thing, and it is intuition that guides the concept. Since a concept is in fact the representation of a representation, i.e., the representation of what is in advance represented through intuition, thought is necessarily grounded in intuition."

But, according to Heidegger's interpretation, the basic question in the Critique of Pure Reason is not knowledge in general but the pure knowledge that is the ground of any knowledge of the essents, i.e., ontological knowledge or, in terms of Kant's own terminology, a priori synthetic knowledge, namely the knowledge which is prior to any experience and makes the encounter with the essents possible. Then, according to this interpretation, Kant's main aim in the Critique of Pure Reason is investigating the possibility of such an ontological knowledge and laying its foundation.

The analysis of the essence of a concept in general provides the background to answer the question of the essence of the pure concepts of understanding, or ontological concepts in terms of Heidegger's interpretation. Now the question is what constitutes the content of pure thought, i.e., the content of the pure concept of understanding or ontological concepts. Thus in the 'Analytic of concepts' and the 'Analytic of Principles', Kant's aim is the investigation of the origin of the
pure concepts of understanding (categories) or ontological concepts, but not the origin of the form of these concepts, which is dependent on the function of unification of understanding rather the origin of their factual content. “Content of the concept is that on the basis of which the concept has a definite relation to the factual content of objects. Content of the concept is the reality of the concept. On the basis of this reality the concept has a possible relation to the object, to the object, and on the basis of this relation concepts may have objective reality and belong to an object as a factual determination.” Now regarding the origin of our knowledge, ontological knowledge, there is the question: Are there certain concepts that, in terms of their contents, originate prior to all experience and determine the objects a priori?

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, “to relate a priori to objects means [to be] transcendental or ontological.” Thus, in ‘Transcendental Analytic’ and particularly in the ‘Analytic of concepts’, in the part of ‘Transcendental Logic’, Kant’s main question is whether there are concepts which are transcendental or ontological. Or briefly, are there certain ontological concepts and if yes, what is their factual content? How can these ontological concepts have a reality which does not depend on the empirical intuition of objects? Here Kant seeks the concepts which entirely stem from understanding itself and at the same time have objective reality. Kant calls these concepts, the pure concepts of understanding or categories.

5) The way of the Discovery of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

It has already been said that if pure knowledge, i.e., ontological knowledge, is to be possible, such a knowledge must be constituted from two essential elements, i.e., pure intuition and pure thought (pure concepts). Now, if the complete essential structure of pure knowledge is to be secured, then the pure concepts of understanding must be explained. Of What kind are the pure concepts of understanding? Before discussing how Kant discovers the pure concepts of understanding, it is required that we clarify for ourselves what the expression ‘pure concept’ exactly means, what these pure concepts are, and what the distinction between them and other concepts is.

It has been stated that all concepts are general, and generality, i.e., ‘applying to many’, is one of the main characteristics of any concept. But Kant, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, believes that the generality of ‘applying to many’ does not determine the primary essence of concept. Because the general character of a concept, i.e., its ‘applicable to many’, is a derived character. It means that concept has other more basic, primordial feature from which the
character of generality or being 'applicable to many' is derived. This more basic, primordial character of the concept consists in that all concepts are related to intuition, and that intuitive data derive their content from the intuition and from what is represented in intuition. In all concepts, through intuition, there is represented one element in which several particulars agree. If there were not this element represented through intuition, the concept would not be able to adopt its character of generality and its 'applicability to many'. Therefore, in the act of conceptualisation, understanding must keep in view the one (unity), as a criterion, in which the many can agree, in order to make a concept by which understanding determines the many. For example, why does understanding apply the concept 'tree' to the multiplicity of apple tree, linden tree, and beech tree, but not to the clove bush? Because all trees agree in the one (a unity), like trunk, thick branches, and so on, and this 'one' must first be represented through intuition in order that understanding can form the concept 'tree' through conceptualisation. Kant terms this basic act of conceptualisation, i.e., this keeping in view of the one in which the many can agree, which is represented by intuition, as 'reflection'. For this reason, concepts can be called 'reflective representations'\(^5\), namely the concepts which arise from reflection. These reflective representations (concepts) adopt their contents, for the most part, from an empirical intuition. Thus the origin of such concepts is not problematic.

But, here, regarding pure concepts, we are looking for 'reflected concepts' whose contents are not derived from experience and phenomena. Therefore, the contents of these pure concepts must be attainable a priori. Kant terms those concepts whose contents are not derived from experience and reflection on the data of empirical intuition, as 'the pure concepts of understanding' or 'categories'.

It has been said that the logical function of understanding is unification, in contrast with the transcendental function of understanding, i.e., being related to-object.

Now, in Kant's view, if we consider pure understanding itself, dispensing with any relation to intuition and empirical objects, and examine merely the logical function of understanding, then we will find that in the logical function of understanding, i.e., in the act of unification, there are various ways of unification. Kant believes that these various ways of the act of unification can help us to understand the pure concepts of understanding. In other words, the pure concepts of understanding are the various ways of the unification of understanding.\(^6\)

With reference to some of Kant's writings other than the *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically *Reflexionen*, Heidegger tries to clarify further the meaning of the pure concepts of
understanding. In *Reflexionen*, for explaining the pure concepts of understanding, Kant uses the term 'concepts of reflection'. This term is not seen in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It has been stated that Kant holds that all concepts are 'reflective representations'. It means that all concepts are the result of the reflection on intuitive data. But, according to Kant, there are other concepts whose contents are nothing other than 'this or that reflection'. Kant calls these concepts, 'the concepts of reflection', i.e., the concepts whose content is merely the unity relative to a possible way of reflection. More simply, most of the concepts are reflective concepts, i.e., the result of reflection on empirical data, but there are certain concepts which are, not reflective concepts but the concepts of reflection, or, more precisely, reflecting concepts, that is concepts which make the act of reflection itself, i.e., the act of unification, possible. Now, according to Heidegger's interpretation, in Kant's view the pure concepts of understanding are reflecting concepts which make any unification, i.e., any conceptualisation and any judgment, possible. These reflecting concepts adopt their contents, not from experience, but, from the act of pure understanding itself, i.e., from the various ways of the unification of understanding *a priori*.

In fact it may be said that in the light of the discussion of the pure concepts of understanding Kant seeks to discover the more profound layer of understanding. Let us remind ourselves that 'the pure concepts of understanding' (pure thought) constitute the second essential element of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). Now, the question is: How can we discover the pure concepts of understanding?

6) The Logical Table of Judgment as the Method of Discovering the Pure Concepts of Understanding

It has been stated that the function of understanding is unification. This unification appears both in conceptualisation, i.e., in unifying a many particulars in one general representation, and in judgment, i.e., in unifying subject and predicate in one judgment. Since there are too many concepts all of which we cannot examine, we will investigate the various forms of judgments and different ways of judgments in order to discover the pure concepts of understanding. This is the very way that Kant followed: "The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered completely if we can give an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgment".

Heidegger believes that "Kant simply confronts us with the finished table of the forms of judgment". Kant's table of judgments, on the basis of four points of view to judgments, i.e., quantity, quality, relation, and modality, is divided into four groups. Each of these groups is
again divided into three, so that the table contains twelve different forms of judgment, which show twelve ways of unification, and thus twelve categories or pure concepts of understanding. Heidegger strongly criticises Kant’s table of judgments. Heidegger holds that “Kant offers no information whatsoever as to why possible inflections of the function of judgment as such are to be presented from four points of view and why precisely from these four. Thus he leaves us entirely in the dark as to how these four principles of division of the totality of the forms of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, modality) are all co-originally intertwined with the essence of judgment as such and how they are connected with one another”.

Kant only states: “if we abstract from all content of a judgment and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments. They may be conveniently represented in the following table”.

After this sentence, it is followed by the table of the forms of judgment. But, according to Heidegger, “it is not clear at all that, if we ‘consider’ the mere form of judgment as such, we will ‘find’ something like that table”.

But Heidegger’s more important and more basic criticism of Kant’s table of judgment is that this table by no means reveals the origin of the pure concepts of understanding, rather it is only a method for discovering categories. According to Heidegger, Kant’s table of judgment cannot succeed even in this limited function of the systematically discovering pure concepts of understanding.

Heidegger maintains that categories or the pure concepts of understanding are ontological predicates, i.e., they assert something about the Being of the essent. Therefore, we cannot seek the origin of these ontological concepts only by reference to judgment. But Kant grounds the pure concepts of understanding in the logical table of Judgments, and thereby he reduces categories, which are, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, ontological predicates and a priori determinations of the Being of the essents, to the logical functions of understanding.

In other words, Heidegger’s question to Kant is: what character does his table of judgments have, ontological or logical (epistemological)? Put differently, are the pure concepts of understanding the determinations of the Being of the essents or only the logical functions of understanding? According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant is himself unsure of the nature of his table of judgments. For this reason, Kant call this table at one place a “logical table of judgments”, and at another place a “transcendental table”, and, according to Heidegger’s
interpretation, the characteristic ‘transcendental’ means to nothing other than ‘being related to-object’ or ‘being ontological’.

Of course, Heidegger quotes some sentences from Kant’s lecture on logic in which Kant conceives quantity, quality, relation, and modality, as the determinations of the form of judgments. But Heidegger believes that in that case it is not clear why Kant calls his table of judgments, ‘transcendental table’. Heidegger holds that Kant, following traditional logic, considers these four points of view as formal characteristics of judgment, but it is itself quite disputable whether or not we can attain a completely formal logic and to fully formal characteristics of judgment. According to Heidegger, despite its claim on being formal, logic has been always dependent on certain ontological foundations.

Thus, if Kant’s table of judgments does not explain the origin of the pure concepts of understanding (ontological concepts), and if this table is not at all a clue for discovering the origin of these concepts, then how must we explain the origin of the pure concepts of understanding and how must derive these concepts?

Heidegger believes that Kant cannot derive categories or the pure concepts of understanding from his table of judgments. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s essential problem in his inquiry about the pure concepts of understanding is that he examines the elements of pure knowledge, i.e., pure intuition and pure thought, separately and in isolation. In Heidegger’s view, “the property of being dependent on intuition is not an accidental and superficial characteristic of pure thought but an essential one”. For this reason, “as long as pure understanding is not considered with regard to its essence, i.e., its pure relation to intuition, the origin of the notions [pure concepts] as ontological predicates cannot be disclosed”.

According to Heidegger, Kant simply puts the table of pure concepts of understanding next to the table of judgment, while there ought to be yet something else between them—“something quite crucial—in terms of which the table of judgments as well as categories must be understood”. Heidegger holds that the understanding of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure understanding are necessary to explain the pure concepts of understanding as ontological concepts and to understand the intermediate which is placed between the table of judgment and the table of categories. Put differently, it has been stated that the essential function of understanding is unification, and the pure concepts of understanding were described as the various ways of the unification. But Heidegger believes that as long as the meaning of this unification has not been clarified, we cannot speak of the essence and the origin of the pure
The meaning of Heidegger's discussions on Kant's table of judgments and of his criticisms of it is nothing other than the conception of the pure concepts of understanding as mere logical function of understanding, and emphasising the logical table of judgments for discovering pure concepts, are the result of the conception of human being as a subject. In such a conception of human being the more essential aspect of the truth of human being, i.e., his transcendence, is ignored. Heidegger's expressions like 'the essential unity of pure intuition and pure understanding' and 'pure veritative synthesis' in fact refers to human being's transcendence. Therefore, Heidegger believes that as long as we do not quite understand human being's transcendence, i.e., the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought (pure concepts), we will not be able to understand the essence and the origin of the pure concepts of understanding (ontological concepts).
Section Four

The Essential Unity of Pure Intuition and Pure Understanding

Heidegger explains to us that Kant begins his discussion on the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought in ‘Transcendental Logic’, from the third section of the first chapter of the ‘Analytic of Concepts’, or more precisely, in the part that is headed ‘The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories’.

However, understanding this part of Kant’s work and subsequent discussions, more precisely, understanding the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding, and in particular the schematism, and likewise Heidegger’s interpretation of above-mentioned sections involves some explanation concerning imagination and its functions.

1) Imagination and its Functions

Let us begin our discussion on imagination first through an explanation of the relation between time and perception, and of the temporality of perception. In ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, it was already said that time, beside space, is pure intuition. It means that all empirical intuition is in advance and a priori in certain temporal relations, such as before, after, or coincident with other things. Kant believes that these temporal relations are not derived from intuition and sense experience, rather all intuition and sense experience occur in such temporal
relations and time is the a priori condition of the actualisation of all intuition and experience, including outer or inner.

But perception is temporal from another angle too. Remember that it has been stated that human knowledge, as finite knowledge, always gains its object through intuition. But intuition, as the immediate relation to object, puts before us only what is present, whereas our knowledge also belongs to what is not present. This trait shows itself in concept. A concept is that which applies to each of its instances, which is (now), has been (past), and is not but will be (future). This is what we express by ‘the temporality of perception’. From this point Kant concludes that we must have a disposition to reproduce what was already presented by intuition but it is not itself present now. Kant calls this disposition ‘imagination’. Kant defines imagination in this way: “Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present”.

For Kant, following the traditional conception of imagination, imagination means memory. According to Kant, imagination is one of the essential elements of knowledge. His conception of this faculty is influenced by earlier theories, particularly that of Hume. Hume is the representative of the view that imagination is both a hindrance to and a necessary element of, knowledge. Hume says: “nothing is more dangerous to reason than flights of imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers”. Yet in the same place he writes of understanding as “the general and more established properties of imagination. The fancy, the power of the imagination to combine idea in fantastical ways, is to be avoided, but nevertheless is vital to knowledge”.

Kant connects himself to a philosophical tradition in which imagination has a basic role. But Kant severed the imagination from this tradition, because in this philosophical tradition imagination is primarily a passive faculty whose function is restricted only in the reproduction of what was already experienced, whereas Kant grants a more significant status to imagination and gives it a power of creativity and activity. For example, Hume says that we can represent the impression of sense intuition. This representation, if the impression is strong, occurs by memory, otherwise, if it is weak, through imagination. But Kant believes that imagination is an essential ingredient of experience.

In the Critique of Pure Reason imagination finds its most development, where it is described as “a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious”. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant delegates various functions to imagination. But, before briefly explaining the
various functions of imagination in Kant’s philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of the functions of imagination, i.e., empirical employment and transcendental functions. ‘Transcendental’ means what concerns the form of the sense and thought alone. Transcendental function is in contrast with empirical function which concerns the matter of knowledge. Empirical function is a posteriori but transcendental function is a priori. Empirical function is what appears sometimes in the form of fancy and sometimes in the form of association. This function is the result of the free combination of the representations that experience has already put at our disposal (fancy) or the result of remembering the representation which has always been along with—or has followed—other representation (association). But it is for the sake of transcendental, and not empirical, functions of the faculty of imagination that Kant conceives this faculty as one of the essential elements of knowledge, in so far as he holds that imagination makes knowledge and experience essentially possible. But what are the transcendental functions of imagination?

The first transcendental function of imagination is to unify the necessarily fragmented sense data. Concerning this point, Kant himself says: “Since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold [of sense perceptions]. To this faculty I give the title, imagination”. Put more clearly, we have sense intuition 1 of the object in time 1, and sense intuition 2 in time 2,…. But when we attain sense intuition2 in time 2, sense intuition 1 in time 1 disappears in us, unless there exists in us a disposition which retains the manifold of sense intuitions in the manifold of time. Kant call this disposition, ‘imagination’, and terms this unification as its ‘transcendental function’, because this unification is not derived from experience but all experience is dependent on the existence of such a priori unity in the object of experience. According to Kant, “experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearance”.” “There must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible”. Kant maintains that what provides a priori ground to the synthetic unity of appearances is nothing other than imagination. Kant expressly states:

that the affinity of appearances and with it their association, and through this, in turn, their reproduction according to laws, and so [as involving these various factors] experience itself, should only be possible by means of this transcendental function of imagination, is indeed strange, but is
none the less an obvious consequence of the preceding argument. For without this transcendental function no concepts of objects would together make up a unitary experience.10

Kant emphasises imagination so far as he conceives it as one of the essential elements of knowledge and delegates it all syntheses which constitute knowledge. Kant believes that “synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) is what gives rise to knowledge.... Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to [form]11 certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge”.

Kant says in the same place:

By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of]12 knowledge. Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is not empirical but is given a priori as is the manifold in space and time.... Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination.14

But the point that we must note here is that Kant not only conceives all synthesis of impressions and sense intuitions as a function of imagination due to the temporal character of perception, rather the more important point is that he also assigns the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition (space and time) itself to the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This is why Kant also assigns pure synthesis to imagination. Pure synthesis consists in the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuitions (space and time) in one knowledge.15 But what does the pure synthesis of the manifold of space and time means?

The main function of imagination is first to make space and time representable through its transcendental synthesis. Hence, it is through the representation of space and time that any possible object of human knowledge becomes representable. Imagination provides the necessary unity for the establishment of the flux of time. More explicitly, for the ancients memory or imagination represented only what was within time and belonged to the past, but for Kant imagination makes not merely the things within space and time but time and space themselves representable; and it is through the representation of space and time that all possible object of human knowledge becomes representable. That is why Kant says that it is the transcendental synthesis of imagination, which makes experience and knowledge possible.

Moreover, as Henry Allison says:

The ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ showed that each extent of time is represented as a determinate portion of a single all-inclusive time, which is itself characterised as an infinite given magnitude. It
follows from this that the actual awareness of a given portion of time, for example, the present time, involves the awareness of it as a portion of this single time. As we have already seen in the case of space, however this whole is not itself actually given in intuition as an object. In the case of time, we could say that it is given only one moment at a time. Nevertheless, in order to represent the particular portion of time...I must be able to represent times that are not 'present', and ultimately the single time of which all determinate times are parts. This is what the imagination enables me to do. Similar considerations apply to space. In order to represent a determinate portion of space, such as a line, I must represent it as a determination of a single, all-inclusive space which is itself not given as such. This likewise requires an imaginative capacity, and this capacity is presupposed by the thought of the infinite extendibility of a straight line.

It means that we imagine an infinite extension. This is only an imagination and is not derived from any experience. Then there must exist in us a capacity which imagines this imaginary line of time. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason reproduction is regarded as a fundamental activity of imagination. Kant contends that without this activity ‘not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time could arise’.

"Kant illustrates the claim with regard to both space and time. The attempt to draw a line in thought or to think the time from one noon to the next obviously requires the successive apprehension of the component parts of the line or the time". Kant maintains that “if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representation (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period...), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained". Then Kant concludes that his argument warrants the inclusion of reproduction “among the transcendental acts of the mind”.

Put more clearly, for having the representation of space and time, we need imagination; for example we imagine time in the form of an extension or line, but with only one dimension or direction.

"Finally, since the determinate representation of time is a product of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, it follows that this synthesis is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of such a representation".

Kant delegates another very fundamental task to imagination, without which knowledge is not possible. Let us first remember that any sensation, any perception, or any experience is always the sensation, perception, or experience of a mind or a subject which unifies the manifold of perceptions into consciousness. Kant contends that this mind or subject, which he calls ‘apperception’, is the subject’s cognitive apprehension of its inner modes. Kant distinguishes between empirical apperception, which is the consciousness of the ordinary and changing self or the I, and transcendental apperception. Transcendental apperception consists in the inner,
constant, unchangeable, fundamental, and therefore ‘transcendental’ unity of consciousness that unifies experience as that of one subject, and for this reason it is the ultimate ground of all possibility of experience and thinking. According to Kant, the unity of apperception is an a priori, transcendental consciousness that is the foundation of any perception and makes any knowledge and the inner order and the meaning of the data of perception possible.\(^\text{22}\)

“Transcendental apperception consists of the ideas of space and time, which are not the objects of perception but modes of perceiving, and a number of categories which Kant orders under the headings of quantity, relation, and modality”.\(^\text{23}\)

However, Kant was the first to face the difficulties involved in the explanation of the consciousness of the self as a definite individual. Assuming that there is a distinct individual who is himself, leaves this question what the individual could be, who he is conscious of himself as an individual.

Here the main point is that Kant again assigns this transcendental unity of apperception to imagination and conceives imagination as the faculty that constitutes the unity of a person: “The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge.... Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience”.\(^\text{24}\) Then, according to Kant, the unity of apperception, itself, i.e., the unity of the self or the I, is grounded in transcendental synthesis of imagination. “Since this unity of apperception underlies the possibility of all knowledge, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge”.\(^\text{25}\)

2) The Relation between Pure Synthesis of Imagination and Pure Concepts of Understanding

It has been stated that Kant assigns all synthesis of manifold in knowledge to imagination (be this manifold given empirically or a priori),\(^\text{26}\) and also that if the manifold is not empirical but is given a priori, as is the manifold of space and time, Kant calls this synthesis, ‘pure synthesis’.\(^\text{27}\) Thus, pure synthesis means the synthesis of the manifold of our intuitions (space and time) in one knowledge. Kant maintains that “pure synthesis, represented in its most general aspect, gives us the pure concept of ...understanding”.\(^\text{28}\)
Pure synthesis consists in the synthesis of the manifold of the given *a priori* (space and time) in one pure concept. This pure concept is the same as category. In "The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" Kant's aim is to show how imagination forms the categories of understanding through its pure synthesis of the manifold of time. In other words, schema is itself always the product of imagination. This pure synthesis gives us two things: The unity of time, and the categories of understanding; both of them are the product of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

3) The Conversion of the Form of Intuition to Formal Intuition

The other function of imagination, according to Kant, is that it can change the form of intuition, i.e., space and time, which are general and single, to formal intuition.\(^{29}\) Formal intuition means the unity of space and time as the object of an intuition. Put more clearly, formal intuition is that which seemingly seems to be an intuition but is not so in fact. Formal intuition points to the objects of geometry and mathematics, i.e., shapes and numbers, which are the result of the conversion of the form of intuition (space and time) to formal intuition (shapes and numbers). The objects of these two sciences, geometry and mathematics are apparently the result of an inner intuition, whereas they are indeed the products of the synthesis of imagination.\(^{30}\)

4) Imagination as the Bridge between Sense and Understanding

It has already been said that finite knowledge consists of two essential elements: Intuition (sense) and thought (understanding). The essence of our knowledge is dependent on the unity of intuition and thought. Kant conceives this unity as a kind of synthesis. The structure of the synthesis which constitutes the essence of our knowledge, i.e., the structure of the unity or the synthesis of intuition and thought, is dependent on imagination. Kant believes that

while concepts... belong to the understanding..., it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition. A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination.\(^{23}\)

For the explanation of the essence of knowledge, Kant needs such a transcendental synthesis of imagination, because without such an explanation, two independent sources of human
knowledge, i.e., sensibility and understanding, never achieve an essential connection with each other, and thus the foundation of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment will collapse.

In 'Transcendental Deduction' Kant’s main aim is to establish such a connection between the two independent sources of human knowledge, i.e., sense and understanding, in order that through this connection the essential unity between two essential elements of knowledge, i.e., sense and understanding is established, and in this way the objectivity of the categories of understanding, through their connection with intuition, is proved. Kant believes that while empirical intuition is given in sensibility, it is unified in understanding, and in understanding its manifold changes to unity. According to Kant, this unity is nothing other than a category. It means that categories are that which make the unity of the manifold of intuition possible, i.e., it is by the help of a priori categories of understanding that the unity of the manifold of intuition is formed. Then, the function of the categories is the unification of the manifold of intuition. Categories provide the possibility of a priori knowledge of the things, but they do not crate the intuition itself, but they, as the form, only cause the unity of intuition. Thus, categories are the laws of the combination of the manifold, and for this reason, as it were, the laws of nature, and even they make the nature itself (in the sense of the total of appearances) possible.32

As it has been said, Kant endeavors to connect categories (the pure concepts of understanding) and experience, i.e., what is given in intuition, in order to prove the objective reality of categories, and this is the main aim of transcendental deduction. In the way of proving the objective reality of categories and in the way of connecting empirical intuition and categories, i.e., in the way of transcendental deduction, Kant’s discussion has two steps, which are differentiated from each other by an important discussion about the distinction between inner sense and apperception: a) In the first step, Kant connects the unity of apperception and time (the universal form of intuition). In this step, Kant shows that original synthesis of the unity of apperception is the condition of the possibility of the unity of intuition. The synthetic unity of apperception is exactly the unity which subsumes the manifold of the given intuition under categories. In this step, Kant emphasises the relation between sensibility and understanding. b) In the second step, through the very unity of apperception, Kant connects categories and time (the form of sense intuition), this is the content of schematism.

But it is the second step that constitutes the main aim of transcendental deduction, proving the objective validity of categories and the relation between categories (the pure concepts of understanding) and sense intuition, i.e., proving the necessary connection between categories and
the forms of human sensibility (space and time). Here, the role of transcendental synthesis of imagination is revealed, and this disclosure is the core of transcendental deduction. The aim of transcendental deduction is to prove the objective validity of pure categories of understanding. According to Kant, categories are not given to us by sense intuition, but belong to understanding. But whence do they gain their validity? How do they relate with intuition and the object of intuition? The relation between categories and the object of intuition is through the forms of intuition (space and time), and transcendental synthesis of imagination is intermediate between categories, and pure intuitions (space and time).

This relation between time and the unity of apperception and also the connection between time and categories, are the results of the relation between them, i.e., the relation of the unity of apperception and time, with the transcendental unity of imagination. This unification is a synthesis through which space and time are unified and determined.

The...most problematic aspect of Kant's doctrine is the claim that the imaginative synthesis is governed by the categories. Why, after all, should the imaginative activity have anything to do with the logical functions of judgment [categories]? ... [Because] only by establishing such a connection can Kant demonstrate the connection between the categories and human sensibility that is needed for the explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The issue is thus central to the whole program of the critique. Unfortunately, Kant seems to beg rather than to answer this question. Instead of providing an argument, he simply claims dogmatically that the imaginative synthesis is an expression of the spontaneity of thought [understanding], that it [imaginative synthesis] determines inner sense a priori in respect of its form [time], and that this determinations is in accord with the unity of apperception. Although we cannot argue directly from the unity of apperception to the unity of time (which would make the former a sufficient condition of the latter), we can make the reverse move from the representation of the unity of time to the unity of apperception, and by this means we can connect the transcendental synthesis of the imagination with apperception and categories. In order to do this, we need only combine the results of the first half of the deduction with the doctrine that the unification or determination of time is produced by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination."

According to Kant, the unity of time is the necessary condition of the possibility of human experience, and this unity is the result of transcendental imagination. Kant puts an intermediate between categories (the pure concepts of understanding) and the forms of human sensibility (space and time) and connects both of them, i.e., both understanding and sense, with the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Thus, imagination is the intermediate between sense and understanding or between ‘space and time’ and categories. In his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to show that imagination is the common root of sense and understanding (time and categories), and not merely an intermediate between them.
5) Kant’s Hesitation in Explaining the Relation of Imagination and Understanding

A kind of hesitation is seen in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as to what the relation between imagination and understanding is and whether imagination must be conceived as an independent faculty from understanding or as a function of the latter. This becomes particularly obvious when we compare the first and second editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the introduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant first speaks of two main and essential sources of knowledge, i.e., sense and understanding,44 and for this reason, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is planned in two general parts: ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ (the discussion of sense) and ‘Transcendental logic’ (the discussion of understanding). But in the course of his inquiry, Kant realised that in order to establish a connection between these two main sources of knowledge, another faculty is needed, and for this reason, he introduces a third faculty called ‘imagination’.45 Here, Kant lines up imagination on the same level as understanding and intuition, but distinguishes it from understanding. Yet, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he introduces a change by writing ‘understanding’ in place of ‘soul’, i.e., imagination is called a ‘function of understanding’, but leaves everything else unchanged.46 In this latter formulation, Kant assigns the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, which had been earlier assigned to imagination, to understanding.

In general, among the interpreters of Kant, there are a number of views as to the relation between imagination and understanding in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: 1) Some interpreters believe that Kant finally rejects the distinction between imagination and understanding. Thus, imagination is the other name for understanding.47 2) Some hold that imagination and understanding both are the functions of one faculty.48 3) Heidegger’s view is that Kant hesitates as to the relation between imagination and understanding.49 According to Heidegger’s interpretation, in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant conceives imagination as an independent faculty from understanding but in the second edition of the *Critique*, he attempts to reduce the role of imagination in favor of understanding. According to this interpretation, in terms of its main aim, i.e., inquiring the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge or the possibility of transcendence, and with regard to the emphasis on the role of imagination as an independent faculty which unifies two other faculties, sense and understanding, the first edition of the *critique*, is more authentic and more original compared to the second edition. This is why Heidegger bases his own interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* on the first edition. By
pursuing Kant’s inquiry up to ultimate foundations, Heidegger endeavors to show that imagination is neither a function of understanding nor an independent faculty beside sense and understanding, rather it must be conceived as the common root of sense and understanding.

Now, since the importance of imagination and its various functions, in particular its role in the unification of intuition and thought, have been somewhat clarified we can return to the main thrust of our discussion, i.e., Heidegger’s interpretation of the discussion of the essential unity of the basic elements of pure knowledge, i.e., Pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

6) The Essential Unity of Pure Intuition and Pure Thought

The explanation of the essence of finite, human knowledge and its comparison with infinite, divine knowledge shows that human knowledge consists of two essential elements: Intuition and thought. Thus, it has been stated that pure knowledge, i.e., ontological knowledge of the Being of the *essent*, which makes our orientation towards the *essent*, objectification of it, and hence, all experience of it, possible, is also constituted from two elements, pure intuition and pure thought (categories or the pure concepts of understanding).

In pursuing the Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we reached the step where we seek to explain the origin of the pure concepts of understanding, or of ontological predicates, as the second element of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). But Heidegger remarks that Kant’s logical table of judgments by no means presents any explanation of the origin of the pure concepts of understanding, and we can conceive it as the method of discovery of all pure concepts of understanding.

Heidegger maintains that “the property of being dependent on intuition is not an accidental and superficial characteristic of pure thought but an essential one”. For this reason, as long as we do not consider pure thought in its essential relation with pure intuition, we can by no means clarify the origin of pure concepts, as ontological concepts. According to Heidegger, we can properly explain the origin of the pure concepts of understanding only when we clarify the problem of the essential unity of the two essential elements of pure knowledge, i.e., the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought. But since Kant attempts to explain this essential unity through imagination we had to briefly discuss the place and importance of imagination and its various functions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. 
The explanation of the essence of finite knowledge and the essential independence of intuition and thought from each other, according to Heidegger, lies in the fact that the essence of our knowledge is grounded in the unity of intuition and thought (sense and understanding). It means that in finite, human knowledge intuition without thought, and thought without intuition are not possible, because understanding (thought) gains its object through intuition, and conversely it is understanding (thought) which determines the ambiguous, obscure object of intuition. Kant conceives this essential unity of intuition and thought and their essential dependence on each other as a kind of synthesis. The synthesis of intuition and understanding is in fact what can be here expressed as 'the transcendence of knowledge' or 'human being's transcendence' in general. Thus, in the discussion of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, Heidegger seeks to explain the structure of pure knowledge, i.e., ontological knowledge, and thereby this explanation to demonstrate human being's transcendence.

7) Imagination as the Basic Element in the Essential Unity of Intuition and Thought

According to Heidegger, Kant believes that the structure of the synthesis which constitutes the essence of our finite knowledge, i.e., the synthesis of intuition and thought, is dependent on imagination. Heidegger frequently emphasises that the basic question in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the explanation of pure knowledge or pure synthetic knowledge, i.e., knowledge which is not derived from experience but which makes experience possible. This pure knowledge consists of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories). Imagination is the faculty that provides the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, i.e., of time and categories. According to Kant, imagination is the intermediate between intuition and thought.

As Heidegger truly remarks, reflection on the essence of human knowledge and the reciprocal dependence of intuition and thought shows that we do not have two independent elements apart from each other in our knowledge, called intuition and thought. It means that we do not first intuit a thing in one step, and then through concepts we think about what we intuited, in another step. Rather in the very act of intuiting the thing, i.e., in our immediate relation with it, for example a tree, we intuit it as an instance of a concept, for example as a tree. Thus, the unity of intuition and thought "cannot be 'later' than the elements themselves but must be established 'earlier' in them and serve as their foundation. This unity unites the elements in so original a way that they first arise as elements in this unification and are maintained in their unity by means of it". Heidegger believes that, despite the fact that Kant begins with isolated elements, intuition
and thought, and investigates two essential elements of pure knowledge in the two main parts of
the *Critique of Pure* separately, we must see to what extent Kant succeeds in making this
primordial unity visible. Because, in fact, without demonstrating this unity between these two
essential sources of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, Kant's philosophy will suffer from
a great gap between them. This is a problem of which Kant was well aware, and this is why in
the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant introduces the third faculty called imagination, beside two
previous sources, sense and understanding, in order to bridge the gap between two essential, but
isolated, elements of knowledge.

According to Heidegger, Kant believes that if we separately consider the elements of pure
knowledge, i.e., pure intuition and pure thought, they consist in time and categories. But, with
regard to the essential unity of intuition and thought, if we consider pure intuition and pure
thought separately, they cannot be properly understood, and even their unity cannot be derived
from an accidental combination of these isolated elements. It means that pure intuition (time) and
pure thought (categories) do not independently exist and then combine together, rather they come
into existence in a unity. The primordial essence of pure intuition (time) and pure thought
(categories) is dependent on their unity. Without this unity there is neither pure intuition nor pure
thought. We must note that, according to Kant's conception of the essence of finite knowledge,
since no concept can be formed without intuition, categories (the pure concept of understanding)
cannot also come into existence independently from pure intuition (time). Moreover, since in
finite knowledge pure intuition is in need of understanding for its determination, pure intuition,
i.e., time, is also in need of pure thought (categories).

Heidegger holds that we must not remain satisfied with the negative consideration that this
unity cannot be merely a subsequent bond linking the two elements, but show this essential unity
positively. But, before explicating Kant's view as to the essential unity of pure intuition and
pure thought, first the question itself must be made more precise, namely we must answer the
question: What does the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought mean?

We have already stated that Kant calls the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought,
'synthesis'. But there are many syntheses in the complete structure of finite knowledge, which
are necessarily intermingled. These syntheses consist in *apophantic* synthesis, i.e., the synthesis
of subject and predicate in a judgment, *predicative* synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of different
impressions in one representation, and *veritative* synthesis, i.e., the determination of the *essent* as
the *essent*, or the very essential synthesis (unity) of intuition and thought. Now, when we speak
of the essential unity (synthesis) of the elements of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge), which one of these syntheses is meant? Apparently, it is veritative synthesis, because it is this synthesis which belongs to the unity of intuition and thought.

But Heidegger believes that there is an even more essential and more primordial synthesis than the veritative, which constitutes all previous syntheses and unifies all of them in a unitary structure. This is the synthesis which unifies pure intuition and pure thought, which Heidegger calls 'pure veritative synthesis'. This is the same as what Kant designates 'pure synthesis'. Does Heidegger here only play with words and invent new and complex terms without revealing any new philosophic insight?

Undoubtedly, it is not so. We already said that, with regard to the essence of human knowledge and its essential finitude, i.e., with regard to the fact that human knowledge is always dependent on the given and can never create its object, the object of finite knowledge must be given through intuition. But, on the other hand, for its determination, intuition is in need of understanding. Thus, the synthesis (unity) of intuition and understanding, i.e., the veritative synthesis or the determination of the essent as the essent, namely comprehending that there is such an essent, before its becoming the object of our experience— is the ground of our knowledge and its objectivity. But here, in the discussion of pure veritative synthesis, the question is how the very knowledge of the existence of an essent is possible. In other words, in veritative synthesis the question is as to the encounter with the essent, but in pure veritative synthesis, the question is as to the encounter with Being in general as the ground of our comprehension of the Being of the essent.

The problem of pure veritative synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of the elements of pure knowledge, eventually consists in the question of the unity of the universal pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories). This synthesis must belong neither to intuition (sensibility) nor to thought (understanding), but must be the origin of both of them. According to Heidegger, in Kant's view this essential synthesis belongs to imagination, and, therefore, the task of the essential unification of the elements of pure knowledge is delegated to this faculty.

Heidegger calls the synthesis which unifies intuition and understanding 'pure veritative synthesis'. This synthesis is called 'veritative' because it belongs to the synthesis of intuition and understanding and all knowledge of the essent derives its truth and objectivity from this synthesis. Also it is a pure synthesis since it concerns pure knowledge, which is prior to all
experience. This pure veritative synthesis is a synthesis that unifies both pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories).

Moreover it has been stated that in ‘The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’ Kant’s aim is to prove how imagination forms the categories of understanding through the pure synthesis of the manifold of time. In other words, schema is in itself a product of imagination. This pure (veritative) synthesis gives us two things: both the unity of time itself, and the categories of understanding, and both of them are the result of transcendental (pure) synthesis of imagination. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant attempts to explain the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) in pure knowledge through the transcendental function of imagination, and for him imagination is the faculty that unifies pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories); and at the same time pure intuition and pure thought, i.e., time and categories, are formed through the pure synthesis of imagination.

Thus, pure knowledge, or ontological knowledge according to Heidegger’s interpretation, consists of three parts. Kant himself enumerates the essential parts of pure knowledge in this way:

What must first be given— with a view to the a priori [pure] knowledge of all objects— is the manifold of pure intuition [time], the second factor involved [in pure knowledge] is the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, [i.e., categories] furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object, and they rest on the understanding.

Thus, pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) consists of three parts: 1) the manifold of pure intuition (time), 2) the pure synthesis of the manifold of time, which is brought about by imagination, 3) the pure concepts of understanding (categories, or the ontological concepts, according to Heidegger interpretation), which are the representation of the synthesis of the manifold of time.

But Heidegger emphasises that “of these three elements, the pure synthesis of imagination holds the central position. This is not meant in a superficial sense, as if in the enumeration of the conditions of the pure knowledge the imagination simply fell between the first and the third. Rather this central position has a structural significance”. In the Critique of Pure Reason imagination is the faculty which constitutes the elements of pure knowledge such that it creates these elements at the same time as it unifies them.
It has already been said that pure (veritative) synthesis is one of the most important transcendental functions of imagination. This pure (veritative) synthesis, according to Heidegger, is the origin of any other synthesis, including, apophantic, predicative, and veritative Syntheses. Thus, according to Heidegger, now for the first time, we find that the problem of laying the foundation of ontological knowledge, or in other words inquiry into human being’s transcendence, i.e., the problem of the encounter with Being and the comprehension of the Being of the essent, is transformed into revelation of the origin of pure (veritative) synthesis, i.e., of the unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories).

8) The Problem of Categories and the Role of Transcendental Logic

Heidegger contends that if we accept the essential unity of intuition and thought (understanding) as essential finitude of human knowledge, and if we accept that intuition and thought are not two separate, independent elements, but have an essential unity and interdependence, then we must accept that the categories of understanding cannot be merely assertions or judgments, i.e., only the logical function of understanding. Rather, categories must involve something about the Being of the essent, because, through intuition, which is an immediate relation to the essent, something about the Being of the essent is communicated to categories, which have an essential unity with intuition. In other words, categories are not merely the logical functions of understanding but are ontological predicates, i.e., they are concepts which contain a knowledge of the Being of the essent. But, put differently, if we seek to prove the objectivity of categories, we must show the intuitive character of categories by proving their essential unity with intuition, and this is the aim that Kant pursues in ‘Transcendental Deduction’. In other words, according to Heidegger, eventually the problem of categories contains the problem of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, which is another expression of the phenomenon of transcendence.

Heidegger believes that in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant discusses the first element of pure knowledge, i.e., pure intuition, and relegates the discussion of the second element of pure knowledge to ‘Transcendental Logic’. But the problem of the essential unity of these two elements belongs neither to ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ nor to ‘Transcendental Logic’. Yet, Kant discusses the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought in ‘Transcendental Logic’ and, as it has already been mentioned, this is one of the reasons for the voluminousness of ‘Transcendental Logic’, in contrast with ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. The voluminousness of this
part misguides many to suppose that it is ‘Transcendental Logic’, and not ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, which constitutes the heart and the core of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger holds that by relegating the discussion of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought to ‘Transcendental Logic’ (in division ‘Analytic of concepts’), Kant in fact gives priority to understanding and logic, in contrast with intuition and aesthetic, while, as Kant himself says, it is intuition, and not understanding, which constitutes the primary element of knowledge as a whole. This fact, i.e., giving priority to understanding and ‘Transcendental Logic’ causes many misunderstanding about the main aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Heidegger points out two major reasons why Kant gives priority to ‘Transcendental Logic’ over ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. The first reason is that in ‘Transcendental Logic’ and in the discussion of the essence of the pure concepts of understanding (categories) Kant correctly refers to the intuitive character of pure concepts. According to Heidegger, Kant’s reference to the intuitive character of categories in ‘Transcendental Logic’, and not in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, if properly understood, in fact by no means effects a diminution of the role of the transcendental aesthetic, because in ‘Transcendental Logic’ Kant tries to show that pure thought, as thought, is in the service of intuition, and the essence of pure concepts lies in their dependence on intuition. Rather, with regard to Kant’s reference to the essential dependence of categories on intuition, the seeming priority of logic over aesthetic, or the seeming priority of thought over intuition, disappears, not to the benefit of ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ but to the benefit of a new and more original formulation of the question of the essential unity of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). In other words, in ‘Transcendental Logic’ Kant formulates anew the problem of the essential unity of the main elements of ontological knowledge (pure knowledge). But in this new formulation Kant takes thought, and not intuition, as his point of departure. That is why in the *Critique of Pure Reason* categories, which eventually contain the problem of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, are always presented under the title ‘the pure concepts of understanding’. In other words, the fact that Kant calls categories, ‘pure concepts of understanding’, shows that in setting forth the problem of the essential unity of pure knowledge he takes thought, and not imagination, as his point of departure. Whereas, as we will explain below, according to Heidegger, categories are not the pure concepts of understanding but must be conceived as the product of the pure synthesis of imagination.

The second reason for the priority of ‘Transcendental Logic’, in contrast with ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, according to Heidegger, is that
Kant’s inquiry about the essence of pure knowledge had no precedent and Kant hence did not have a readily available framework in which he could conduct his inquiry, and traditional logic provided him with such a framework.*

9) The Aim of Transcendental Deduction: Proving the Intrinsic Possibility of Transcendence

Heidegger believes that Kant’s main aim in transcendental deduction of categories is the analysis of the essential structure of pure (veritative) synthesis,* i.e., to show the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought in pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). In other words, the basic aim of transcendental deduction is to explain the transcendence of finite, human reason or the transcendence of human being in general.** Therefore, contrary to the current epistemological interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason, the aim of ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is not an inquiry about judgment.* According to Heidegger, Kant himself hesitates in the determination of the task of transcendental deduction. The reason for this lies in the very strong influence of traditional logic on ontology and the fact that Kant attempts to present the problem of the possibility of ontology, which was the result of his own new insight, on the basis of logical frameworks. That in Kant logic connects with ontology shows itself in the hesitating term ‘transcendental logic’.***

However, what is important is that Kant’s transcendental logic is not logic in the current sense of the term, i.e., the inquiry into the forms of judgments (thought), dispensing with their relation to the matter of knowledge, but it is exactly the very transcendental character of thought, i.e., thinking’s relatedness to an object, which is the theme of inquiry in transcendental logic. More simply, transcendental logic and transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason are a kind of anthropology, in the sense of the ontology of Dasein’s transcendence.***

10) The Relation of Transcendental Deduction to Transcendence

According to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, as a finite cognitive being, human being cannot create his object but only relates himself to it. But this relation takes place only when a human being already has an encounter with his object. “However, in order that this essent can be encountered as the essent that it is, it must be recognized in advance as essent,
i.e., with respect to the structure of its Being”. In other words, the finite knowledge must in advance know that basically ‘this essent is’. Therefore, the knowledge of an essent always presupposes its Being. But the recognisation of the Being of the essent, on one hand, implies that an essent must be such that it can be confronted by finite knowledge, and, on the other hand, that finite knowledge must have the basic ability to confront the essent, i.e., and let it become an object for itself. Heidegger describes this ability of finite knowledge “as a turning toward...which lets something become an object”. Put more clearly, the essence of finite knowledge is dependent on a correspondence between the essent and human being. This can be expressed as ‘the transcendence of finite knowledge or of human being’. The character of the transcendence of finite knowledge is the immediate consequence of the finitude of finite knowledge.

According to Heidegger, “in this primordial act of orientation [toward the essent], the finite being first pro-poses to itself a free-space within which something can ‘correspond’ to it. To hold oneself in advance in such a free-space and to form it [i.e., to form this free-space] originally is nothing other than transcendence which marks all finite comportment [verhalten] with regard to the essent”.

Heidegger tries to conform his own phenomenological interpretation of the essence of finite, human knowledge to Kant’s transcendental deduction. It has already been said that, according to Heidegger, all ontic (empirical) knowledge is dependent on ontological knowledge. It means that before we gain any knowledge or experience of the essent, we must already recognize the Being of it, i.e., recognise that ‘it is’. This precursory knowledge of the Being of the essent, ontological knowledge in Heidegger’s term or a priori synthetic knowledge in Kant’s terminology, which is, on the basis of Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis, the result of human being’s transcendence, is the ground of any knowledge. Since this precursory knowledge of the Being of the essent, is pure, i.e., free from and prior to any experience, Kant calls it ‘pure knowledge’. And since all knowledge in a finite being consists of two elements, intuition and thought, pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) also consists of two elements intuition and thought, and this knowledge, as pure, is constituted of pure intuition and pure thought. Thus, according to Heidegger’s analysis, in the Critique of Pure Reason the possibility of ontological knowledge (a priori synthetic knowledge) is dependent on pure synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories). But, as the phenomenological analysis of human knowledge shows, ontological knowledge, i.e., the recognisation of the Being of the essent, is the result of
transcendence of finite knowledge. Hence the inquiry about the possibility of pure synthesis is in fact an inquiry about the possibility of transcendence and clarifying its essence. With this interpretation, Heidegger believes that Kant’s main aim in transcendental deduction, which is an effort to prove the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) and to show the essential possibility of pure synthesis, is nothing other than revealing the essential structure of transcendence.

11) Transcendence

Now, let us briefly further explicate the structure of pure knowledge. Given that finite knowledge is a receptive intuition, the question is: What does the possibility of this receptive intuition which can receive the essent entail? Heidegger answers this question by saying that the possibility of the receptive intuition of finite knowledge obviously requires that “the essent by itself can come forward to be met, i.e., appear as objective.”

Now Heidegger sets forth this very profound question: “what is it that we, by ourselves, let become an object?” In other words, it was said that in order that the essent can become an object through the act of objectification, it must always have the possibility of becoming an object. Now the question is: What constitutes this possibility? What is the constituent of this possibility of becoming an object for the essent? According to Heidegger, that by which we let something become an object for ourselves, itself cannot be an essent, in the sense of an object. But why cannot it be an essent, in the sense of an object? And if it cannot itself be an essent, what is it?

Heidegger’s answer is: “If [it is] not an essent, then [it must be] a Nothing.” Only if the act of objectification is a holding oneself into Nothing can an act of representation within this nothing let, in place of it, something not nothing, i.e., an essent, come forward to be met, supposing such to be empirically manifest”. This Nothing is the horizon or free-space in which man encounters the essent, which the later Heidegger calls ‘the open’. But, as we already mentioned, we must note that the Nothing is not absolute nothing, but is Being itself which seems nothing since it cannot be the object of finite knowledge. Heidegger himself explicitly remarks: “ Naturally, this nothing of which we speak is not the nihil absolutum [absolute nothing]”. But what is the content of this discussion and of Heidegger’s analysis of the act of
objectification and its relation with nothing? Does Heidegger, as many suppose, play on words, without rendering any new philosophic insight?

Our answer to the question is: By no means. In fact Heidegger seeks to open our eyes to more profound layers of so-called reality or the universe. According to Heidegger, what is usually called 'objectivity' or 'reality' is grounded in a certain conception of Being, according to which the meaning of Being is reduced to the meaning of 'thinghood'. In modern philosophy, as Heidegger interprets, objectivity or reality means to be an object. But Heidegger sets forth the question of the possibility of objectivity or objectness, itself. For Heidegger what is usually called 'reality' does not terminate in objectivity, objectness, because we can ask what makes this objectivity itself possible. Here is exactly the point where Heidegger's thought differs from others', i.e., the belief that there is a truth beyond reality (in the sense of thinghood or objectivity), i.e., objectness, which is the origin of the possibility of the reality and objectivity, which is not itself objective, in the sense that it cannot be the object of our knowledge. This is what Heidegger expresses by 'Being', and, in his latter works in a figurative language, by such terms as light, enlightenment, sight, disclosedness, aletheia, the opening, and free gift.

Now the question that Heidegger attempts to answer is: what does this Being or nothing do with the act of objectification in finite knowledge (man)? Heidegger holds that a consideration of the essence of the finitude of human knowledge, i.e., a consideration of the fact that the object of this knowledge must be always given, forces us to ask this question: what conditions make the precursory orientation toward the object possible? What is the nature of the ontological turning toward the object? These are exactly the questions about the conditions and the constitution of human being's transcendence toward the Being of the essent. Here, Kant's own expression, in contrast with Heidegger, may be clearer. 'In transcendental Deduction', for the first time Kant questions what seemed for all a self-evident truth, and asks a very profound question: "At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations'". According to Heidegger, this question is about the nature of that which confronts us in the act of objectification. In other words, this question is about the constitution of the Being or the nothing which we encounter in the act of objectification. On the basis of this interpretation, Heidegger maintains that the main aim of transcendental deduction is not the explanation of the essence of judgement but the clarification of the intrinsic possibility and the essence of ontological knowledge, i.e., our precursory, a priori comprehension of the Being.
Kant’s reply to his question, i.e., the question what the meaning of ‘to be an object of representations’ is: “Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; [due to this element of necessity] the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion.” Heidegger believes that this element of necessity, to which Kant points out, is the Being or nothing which we have already to some extent discussed. It has been said that according to Kant it is synthetic a priori knowledge that in advance and a priori determines objects. Now we can understand the meaning of it better. Synthetic a priori knowledge means the relation to the element of necessity which determines our modes of knowledge a priori in some definite fashion.

Kant refers a resistance of object. Heidegger explains that the term ‘resistance’ in this context does not mean a physical one inherent in the essent or the pressure of sensation on us, but Kant means by this resistance “the precursory resistance of Being”, against our will. It means that finite knowledge does not create its object and there is always a necessary, binding element in the object, which determines the way of our knowledge. This necessary, binding element is Being, which makes any encounter with the essent possible and with which any knowledge of the essent must be in accord.

This necessary, binding factor, or Being, which carries with it the objectivity of objects, is a constant unifying element which pro-poses unity. The unity that is the result of the very necessary, binding element, i.e., Being, is represented in concept by understanding. That is why in ‘Transcendental Logic’, whose aim is to inquire about the second factor of pure knowledge, i.e., pure thought or categories (pure concepts of understanding), Kant discusses the essence of concepts in general in order that it may provide a background for the discussion about the essence of ontological conceptualisation, i.e., the discussion of pure concepts of understanding (categories or ontological concepts). According to Heidegger, in ‘Transcendental Logic’ through his investigation of the essence of concepts in general, as an introduction to transcendental deduction, and then through a discussion of transcendental deduction of categories, Kant gives us a new and clear insight on the structure of thinking. As we already said, according to Heidegger, Kant’s main aim of transcendental deduction of categories is to reveal the structure of thinking and the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought in pure knowledge (ontological knowledge), which is in fact an explanation of the transcendence of human reason or of human being in general."
12) The Essence of Concepts in General

Already, in the introduction of his interpretation of Kant’s transcendental logic, Heidegger offered a brief discussion on the essence of concepts and the act of conceptualisation, in order to clarify the theme and content of ‘Transcendental Logic’ and to explain the differences between pure concepts and concepts derived from experience.

In this part of his interpretation, i.e., in his interpretation of ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding’, Heidegger again returns to the discussion of the essence of concepts and this time endeavors to clarify the main significance of transcendental deduction of categories and consequently the essential structure of thinking, and, thus, the transcendence of mind (human being). We already said that transcendental logic seeks to inquire about understanding as the second essential element of finite knowledge, and this inquiry about understanding, is the common point of transcendental logic and traditional logic. But there are some basic differences between these two kinds of logic, the most important of which consists in that

general pure logic investigates thinking as the faculty of spontaneity of understanding, which is essentially different from intuition, merely in terms of its most general structure, without consideration the particular relatedness of thinking to determine objects in each particular case. The theme [of general logic] is not representations in their relation to objects, but their relation among themselves. While not considering the ‘relation-to’ [object] this relation [among the concepts themselves] is not crossed out. Thinking is not curtailed around this structure, [of the relation among concepts], for it [i.e., the relation to object] remains fundamentally attached to thinking, without being thematically focused upon."

We already explained that thought and intuition share the common characteristic of representing, of relating to something. Intuition is immediate representation of the thing, whereas thought is mediate representation of the thing. In addition, it has been said that thought cannot immediately relate to the thing, but detours the representation derived from intuition. Thus concepts are the representation of a representation, and as long as we do not clarify the meaning of ‘the representation of a representation’ the meaning of concept, and thus the meaning of the pure concepts of understanding, will not be definite.

Heidegger contends that “thinking’s necessary groundedness in relatedness to intuition is what makes thinking what is: a determining. But insofar as thinking is not directly related to objects— as is intuition— thinking by means of concepts cannot be a single representation, or a representation of individual things. Rather, the concept is ‘a general… or a reflected
representation’, a representation of something general. The concept is a representing, not on the
basis of affection [of intuition], but as spontaneous reflection [of understanding]. The concept is
... a discursive representation. The concept or the grasping by means of a concept is a
representing of the general which is enacted in the manner of reflection”.94

But what does ‘general representation’ mean? Kant holds that concept “is a general
representation or a representation of what is common to several objects”.93 Heidegger believes:

Thus when we represent such a common thing, there is, explicitly or not, a relation here to several
objects, that is correspondingly, to several related intuitions or representations of individual
things”.95 But what Heidegger emphasises is: “In a conceptual representing...we do not simply
represent a plurality of objects, but rather what is common to this plurality—common in spite of
other differences in the objects. What is common to them—an must be capable of being common to
them—must be such that in it individual objects agree with one another, in spite of their differences;
it must be something with reference to which these objects are unified. This something wherein
several objects become one, this one, is thus the determination of any one of several objects.”

Kant believes that what is represented in conceptual representation is “a representation
insofar as it can be contained in several different things”.98 According to Heidegger, what is
common to objects “is not as if something is simply being represented which in the end can be
attributed to other objects and about which we do not need to have a knowledge now. Rather the
concept represents something precisely insofar as this something [i.e., this common thing] is
contained in others”.” Therefore, when it is said that ‘the concept is a general representation’, it
means that the concept “is representing something in the sense of a one which is common to a
plurality of things”.100 Heidegger holds that “the term like generality and general are misleading;
for they do not explain clearly that with them we must think of that in which several things
become one, the one which at the same time is common to many. Hence it is more accurate to
speak of the character of commonness of the concept”.101 More simply, the concept is not
something general that does not exist in instances and is formed only in the subject through the
act of abstraction, rather it exists in all instances commonly.

But, as it has been said, what is common to several objects is not the product of only the
function of understanding and spontaneity of thought, which exists only in the subject, but it has
an objective content. Therefore, as Kant says, “We must distinguish in each concept between
matter and form. The matter of the concept is the object, while its form is generality”.102 The
form of the concept is the generality or commonness as Heidegger terms. But besides the form
each concept has a matter, i.e., a factual content or whatness.
Here, we must note that all the above-mentioned points regarding the essence of concepts in general are an introduction for explaining the essence of the pure concepts of understanding (categories). Therefore, if we accept that understanding has an essential unity with intuition and a concept is not merely a subjective, abstract universal, but has a factual content, it follows that the pure concepts of understanding or categories are not the result only of the logical function of understanding and the act of abstraction, but must be in related to intuition too, though they are related to pure intuition. But the point which Heidegger emphasises is that the act of thinking as the spontaneous act of understanding, is grounded in intuition and the given. Thus, the commonness, i.e., the form of the concept, is grounded in the unifying which constitutes the content of the concept. According to Heidegger,

this unity as such does not already exist in the individuals who make up the many of the objects thematically. Rather this unity, as containing commonness, must, so to speak, be made transparent in individual objects and first be brought into view and held therein. This primary making transparent and bringing into view of the unity which contains commonness as the form of the concept, is the ownmost inner possibility of the act which Kant calls 'reflection'. He describes it as follows: Reflection is "the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness"\(^{103}\), i.e., reflection is meditation on that which can unify various things, it is making transparent a possible unity which contains a commonness. Accordingly, reflection is the decisive act of concept-formation. However, in an essential sense, certain acts precede reflection, while others follow it.\(^{104}\)

Under the influence of Aristotle's theory of abstraction, concerning conceptualisation and the role of the acts of understanding, i.e., comparison and abstraction in it, it is often supposed that we first compare certain things and find that they are similar in certain aspects and different in others, and then we abstract these common aspects from the different ones. Hence, on the basis of the very common aspects, our mind forms what is called 'concept'. Kant also has the same conception of the conceptualisation. But Heidegger believes that "this is certainly a naive and rough description of how a concept is formed".\(^{105}\) Because, according to Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of the act of conceptualisation, before we can compare things and abstract certain aspects of them, these things must be given. In order to consider the differences we must in advance view the different things. For example, before we can compare the sizes, shapes, leaves, and branches of trees and then abstract some common features of them, the things, which we call 'trees', must be given to us. "Any comparison, however immediate and rough it may be, presupposes a priori bringing into view of that with respect to which we compare. Hence we need not be at all explicitly conscious of the occurrence of this bringing into
view, nor are we conscious of it, because we constantly and always already reside in such prior viewpoints".\textsuperscript{106} Kant believes that in conceptualisation we do not want simply to state the difference among things through the act of comparison, rather, "as the next step, we want to reflect on what they have in common".\textsuperscript{107} Then, according to Kant’s analysis, “in order to make concepts out of representations, one must be able to compare, reflect, and abstract. For these three logical operations of understanding are central and general conditions for the production of each and every concept”.\textsuperscript{108} Heidegger holds that “of these three acts, reflection has a crucial and leading role; and comparison and abstraction are at the service of reflection. For prior to every thing else there is an advance bringing into view that in reference to which an intuitively extant many is to be noted as difference”.\textsuperscript{109} This is in fact the application of the principle that ‘knowledge is primarily intuition’.

Further, Heidegger attempts to show that not only act of conceptualisation but also judgement is grounded in reflection, i.e., in bringing into view of what is already presented by intuition. Basically conceptualisation and judgment are the same, and we can subsume these two functions of understanding under the title ‘unification’. Thought, as the function of understanding, consists in the unification that appears in the form of conceptualisation and judgment. But why are conceptualisation and judgment the same? Because every concept is a possible predicate in a judgment, and conversely any judgment is constituted by the concepts which are applicable to many. Therefore we cannot separate concept and judgment from each other. For this reason, Heidegger believes that “reflection or the function of unification is nothing other than judgment, that is, the same understanding again, which is characterised sometimes as the faculty of concepts and sometimes as the faculty of judgments. Inversely, there is in each judgment a concept which applies to many representations”.\textsuperscript{110}

Now, this analysis of the essence of concept and the act of conceptualisation in general must help us in understanding the essence of the pure concepts of understanding (categories) as the second element of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge).

13) The Transcendental Analysis of the Pure Concept of Understanding

The task of ‘Transcendental Logic’ is an inquiry about thought and concepts, as ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ was an inquiry about sensation and intuition. The first section of
'Transcendental Logic' is 'Transcendental Analytic'. The aim of 'Transcendental Analytic' is to reveal the origin of pure concepts of understanding.

We must note that in general every concept has two origins: One is the logical origin of the concept, which is relative to the form of the concept, i.e., the commonness of the concept, which is the product of the logical functions of understanding, i.e., reflection, comparison, and abstraction; and the second origin is the transcendental (ontological) origin of concept, i.e., the matter of the concept, which is relatedness to an object and constitutes the objective reality of the concept. Now, in transcendental analytic of the pure concepts of understanding we are concerned with both origins of the pure concepts of understanding (categories), logical as well as transcendental. In other words, here our question is, what constitutes the content of pure concepts (categories). The "content of the concept is that on the basis of which the concept has a definite relation to the factual content of objects. [The] content of the concept is the reality of the concept. For this reality does not mean how a concept is found but its what-content [Wasgeheit]. On the basis of this reality the concept has a possible relation to the object, to the object, and on the basis of this relation concepts may have objective reality and belong to an object, as a factual determination."

Now, regarding the pure concepts of understanding, the problem is that we deal with concepts for which we cannot find any object in experience, which are rather prior to all experience, and originate from pure thought, and in advance determine the things as the objects of experience. The problem here is how it is possible that there are pure concepts that, unlike the other concepts, derive not only their form but also their content independently of experience, from the pure thought itself. "Are there such concepts which according to their content originate a priori and relate a priori to objects as their determination?" According to Heidegger, "to relate a priori to object means [to be] transcendental or ontological", The question, then, is: "Are there...concepts which have transcendental or ontological content?" The task of 'Transcendental Analytic' is to show how the pure concepts of understanding must be manifest in their origins and how these concepts can have a transcendental content. Heidegger further explains the problem and adds that since the content of a concept, its factual content, is also designated as reality, then the problem of the pure concepts of understanding consists in: How is it possible that there are concepts which have a reality, but not in the sense of empirical reality rather in the sense of having a content, which does not depend on any empirical intuition of objects?"
Therefore, in order to reveal the origin of the pure concepts of understanding we must investigate the pure thought (understanding) itself independent from all experience. If these concepts are to have a reality, they must be related to \textit{something}. Then here we seek to inquire about pure thought (understanding) that is related to \textit{something a priori}.\textsuperscript{130}

Here, in order that we do not forget the main thrust of our discussion, let us bring into view the main direction of the inquiry again in Heidegger's own words:

The problem of the \textit{Critique} concerns the possibility and grounding of ontological knowledge, that is, a knowledge which knows beings' constitution of being prior to and for all experience of beings. The problem is a synthetic knowledge which is \textit{a priori} and which has a factual content. Knowledge with a factual content depends upon the interconnection of intuition and thinking. Thinking is knowledge by means of concepts, in fact in such a way that these concepts determine intuition itself and render it intelligible as the underlying ground. Pure knowledge which has a factual content depends on the togetherness of pure intuition and pure thinking by means of concepts. Thus the question concerning the origin of concepts, which have a transcendental content, is the question concerning the second basic element of synthetic knowledge \textit{a priori}.\textsuperscript{121}

In this part of his interpretation, Heidegger again points out Kant's method of discovering the pure concepts of understanding by his table of judgments, and how, according to Kant, every judgment is an instance of the act of the unification of understanding, and thus the representative of a pure concept of understanding.\textsuperscript{122} Heidegger also points out that pure concepts are the concepts of reflection or reflecting concepts, which are different from the reflective (empirical) concepts that are the result of reflection,\textsuperscript{123} and in order to avoid of prolixity we refrain of the repetition of them.

14) The Necessary Relatedness of Categories to Time

The general route of Kant's transcendental deduction according to Heidegger's interpretation, can be stated in this way: The analysis of 'concept' shows that the essence of a concept essentially and primordially lies in being related to an object, and this is the repetition of the principle that 'thought (concept) is dependent on intuition'. Then the pure concepts of understanding (categories) or the concepts of reflection (reflecting concepts), as concepts, must be also in relation to intuition, i.e., they necessarily carry within themselves a reference to intuition, from which they primarily obtain their content. But this intuition must be pure, because we are dealing with pure thought, which is prior to and independent from all experience. Since the pure concepts of understanding are the concepts which must determine any object as such \textit{a priori}, 'then pure intuition, to which objects originally owe their content, must be the horizon
wherein all empirical objects, all appearances are viewed in advance. However, this pure intuition, in whose horizon all extant beings—physical or psychic—are encountered and manifest, is time. Consequently, the pure concepts of understanding (categories) must be related to the pure intuition, time, because time is the universal pure intuition that is the form of all intuition, including inner or outer. This is why in "The Schematism of the Pure Concept of Understanding" Kant attempts to show that all pure concepts of understanding, as the various modes of unification of understanding, must be related to and dependent on time. Kant himself says:

The concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and therefore of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule. But, on the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with appearances, in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, by attempting to show the essential relation between categories, or the functions of unification of understanding and time, Kant in fact puts at our disposal a basis for uncovering the origin of the pure concepts of understanding in terms of their content from pure thought. It means that Kant shows that "the place of origin of concepts cannot only and primarily reside in understanding as such, but in an understanding which is grounded in and guided by intuition." In other words, categories are primarily rooted in pure intuition. Therefore, categories are not the product of merely the logical functions of understanding, namely they are not pure logical concepts, but are the concepts which are related to intuition, i.e., to the determinations of the Being of the essents, and thus they are ontological concepts.

But when Heidegger says that pure thought (the pure concepts of understanding) as thought (concept), must be related to intuition, we must note that since time, as pure intuition, is not an empirical, sense intuition, the object to which pure concepts are related is not an object in an ordinary sense, i.e., empirical one. Rather, when Heidegger speaks of the object of pure thought (pure concepts), provided that regarding pure thought the employment of the term 'object' is allowable, he means something to which the pure concepts of understanding are related. Although this something is the origin of all experience and determines the object of all
experience in advance, cannot be objectified and cannot be an object of our experience. This is why Heidegger believes that this *something* is a *Nothing*, although not an absolute nothing.

However, it has been said that categories, according to Kant, are the functions of unification (synthesis) of understanding. Now Heidegger endeavors to clarify this unification which underlies the categories.

### 15) The Synthesis Underlying the Categories

Heidegger frequently points out that Kant puts the various meanings and the different modes of unification under the title 'synthesis', and he does not always mean by synthesis the synthesis of subject and predicate in a judgment as a logical function of understanding. Now in this part of his interpretation Heidegger attempts to show which synthesis or which sense of synthesis, according to Kant, underlies the categories. Heidegger endeavors to prove that the synthesis underlying the categories, according to Kant, is by no means the logical function of understanding or a combination of various representations in a judgment. Eventually, the synthesis underlying the categories, according to Kant, as Heidegger interprets, is the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) or, in other words, the transcendence of mind, namely the ecstasy of understanding and its encounter with Being. Let us follow Heidegger's interpretation here step by step:

It has frequently been pointed out that in finite knowledge, thought cannot create its object. The function of thought (understanding) is to determine intuition. Thought is essentially related to something determinable. In Kant's words, thought always "looks to some other source", "Because it is essential that thinking awaits something somehow determinable, to determine it conceptually. Here it is totally unimportant from where [things] are given, how they are given, and with what content and what objects we are dealing". Regarding the explanation of the origin of the categories, the conclusion of this discussion is that concepts, empirical and pure both, are in need of what is given by intuition. Kant says: "General logic...abstracts from all content of knowledge.... Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has laying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility [space and time] presented by the transcendental aesthetic, as material for the pure concepts of understanding. In the absence of this material, those concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty". Thus, in empirical thought, understanding synthesises the representations derived from empirical intuition, whereas in pure thought (in categories or pure concepts) understanding synthesises the manifold of pure intuition; and, as
without what is given by intuition all concepts would be without content, without the manifold of pure intuition pure concepts would also be without content.

Since in finite knowledge thought cannot create its object, understanding (thought) only analyses, abstracts, and unifies the representations which are given by intuition, and it cannot add anything to these data with regard to their matter. Accordingly, with regard to their content, the pure concepts of understanding too are not the product of merely understanding, and understanding cannot add anything to their content, but they are the products of the understanding’s analysis of the manifold which is given by pure intuition.\textsuperscript{111}

16) The Relation of Time to Apperception

Here, we must mention the point that is extremely important to understand the Critique of Pure Reason as well as Heidegger’s interpretation of it. In ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, time is conceived as pure intuition and, on the basis of this conception, in ‘Transcendental Logic’ pure thought (categories or the pure concepts of understanding) is interpreted in relation to pure intuition (time). But we must note that the ordinary conception of time as an objective reality which is in things themselves and their motion and change, or in the earth’s rotation around the sun and the motion of stars, do misguides us and through this misunderstanding the understanding of the discussions becomes unintelligible. In the Critique of Pure Reason time is conceived as pure intuition. Intuition means affection and receptivity of mind, in contrast with thought (understanding) which is the spontaneity of mind. Thus, pure intuition means pure affection or pure receptivity.

Time, as pure intuition, is pure affection or pure receptivity. This conception of time is very important for Heidegger, because it means that pure affection, i.e., time, is the same self-affection, i.e., the same self, the I, or apperception. This conclusion, the identity of pure affection and self-affection, namely time and apperception, in the Critique of Pure Reason is in fact a confirmation of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as temporality in Being and Time.

But beside intuition and pure affection, our mind has also an ability of free activity and spontaneity, which Kant calls ‘understanding’. The function of understanding is to determine the intuitively given. Heidegger maintains that Kant points out something about the spontaneity of thought (understanding) which so far seems not to have been touched upon. Kant says:

\begin{quote}
Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects,
\end{quote}
and which therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this manifold is to be Known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant intends to say that “the manifold, which thinking is supposed to determine as given to thinking, be prepared in certain ways and, as it were, be preformed for the actual act of determination. Thinking is conceptual determination. Prior to conceptual unification the manifold must be ‘gone through, taken up, and connected’.” According to Heidegger, “obviously, here we are talking about a special taking up and gathering of the manifold, i.e., an activity which is neither intuition nor thinking but lies, as it were, between both and thus brings about the connection between intuition and thinking, their unification, to full knowledge.” Kant calls ‘this act of taking up and gathering of the manifold’, ‘synthesis’. Now Heidegger attempts to clarify this synthesis which, according to Kant, is underlying our knowledge.

### 17) The Synthesis Underlying Knowledge

In order to clarify the meaning of the synthesis which underlies our knowledge including the categories, Heidegger directly refers to a statement of Kant himself:

> By *synthesis* in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold of space and time. Before we can analyse our representations, the representations must themselves be given in advance; and therefore as regards content no concepts [including empirical and pure] can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge and unites them to [form] a certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.

Then, here Kant says that there is a synthesis which is the origin of our knowledge. Now the problem is: which synthesis is the origin of our knowledge? Heidegger again emphasises that Kant puts various items under the title of synthesis. What Kant here conceives as the origin of our knowledge is not synthesis in the sense of the logical function of understanding or synthesis of concepts in a judgement. In the following pages we will show that Heidegger’s entire effort is to prove that by this synthesis Kant means the essential unity of intuition and understanding, i.e., the transcendence of mind. This unity, i.e., the unity of intuition and understanding or, more
clearly, the transcendence of mind (human existence) is exactly what Heidegger seeks in the prolix discussions that have taken place in his interpretation of ‘Transcendental Logic’. Of course it must be mentioned that Heidegger holds that although Kant clearly finds the necessity of such an essential synthesis (unity) of intuition and understanding to be the origin of knowledge, for Kant the essence of this unity and the understanding of it as the transcendence of mind is unclear and ambiguous, and for this reason Kant’s words about the essence of this synthesis are obscure and fluctuating.\textsuperscript{139}

Hitherto we have said that the form of a concept is dependent on the logical function of reflection, and the content of a concept must be derived from intuition. But, according to Heidegger, now Kant emphasises the synthesis which is even prior to intuition and brings forth the content of knowledge. This synthesis, which is the origin of our knowledge, belongs neither to intuition nor to understanding, because, as the origin of knowledge, it is beyond the structure of knowledge. This essential synthesis does not belong to intuition, because it is prior to the givenness of the given. Intuition is an immediate relation to the given, but here, in relation to this essential synthesis, we are talking about what makes the givenness of the given possible. The function of understanding begins after intuition, namely intuition must put representations at the disposal of understanding in order that understanding is able to analyse or synthesise them. But understanding’s analysis or synthesis comes after the act of conceptualisation, whereas our question, i.e., what makes the givenness of the given for intuition possible, concerns the step which comes before conceptualisation and prior to the givenness of manifold.\textsuperscript{140}

Let us remember the aforesaid example. We see a linden, a beech, and a fir, and then through the logical function of understanding and through the analysis of their common traits and their distinctions we conceptualise. But before we can begin the logical function of understanding and conceptualisation, those linden, beech, and fir must have been intuited. Now the question is: How is this manifold presented to intuition? According to Heidegger’s interpretation, the synthesis of which Kant speaks as the origin of knowledge is prior to intuition and constitutes the intuition itself, i.e., makes the givenness of the given to intuition, itself possible. Then this synthesis cannot be the logical synthesis which occurs after the reception of the manifold.\textsuperscript{141}

In the statement cited from Kant concerning the primordial synthesis of knowledge, he spoke of \textit{one knowledge}. This primordial synthesis is “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one knowledge”.\textsuperscript{142} Heidegger seeks to
interpret the meaning of this ‘one knowledge’. He believes that “this ‘grasping in one’ [knowledge] cannot at all be identical with bringing pre-given representations together by viewing the ‘unity of concept’.” It means that this essential synthesis is not identical with conceptual synthesis and logical function of understanding. “This ‘grasping in one’ is by no means the logical act of concept-forming reflection, but rather is the act of the same synthesis on the basis of which a many is pre-given as a many for a thinking seeing. I see a pine, and a willow tree, and a lime tree. I do not see them successively by losing sight of the one seen before”. It is in the unity of one knowledge that the reflection and other logical functions of understanding, i.e., comparison and abstraction, take place. Now we must further explain the essence of this ‘one knowledge’. “This many must be given to me in one so that I have a dimension within which I can move while comparing. What encounters [me] must in a certain way belong to me, must lie before me in a surveyable zone. The unity of this zone, which, so to speak, antecedently holds the manifold together in advance, is what is ultimately meant by ‘grasping in one’.”

According to Heidegger, this synthesis that Kant conceives as the origin of knowledge “is indeed an act”. But why does Heidegger employ the word ‘act’ for describing this essential synthesis? Because here we are not dealing with a contemplative, theoretical relation to things, but with a primordial step prior to any contemplative, theoretical relation to things, which makes any kind of relation possible. This synthesis “is precisely that which is capable of first giving the manifold in one act. The questionable synthesis is an act, is spontaneous”. But this synthesis underlying knowledge, the synthesis that makes any givenness to intuition possible, cannot be merely a free act and a product of the spontaneity of mind. Because it is only infinite, divine knowledge that can create its object in a creative, spontaneous act. Therefore this essential synthesis is receptivity at the same time that it is a free, spontaneous act. This is why Heidegger says: “the questionable synthesis is an act, is spontaneous, and is still in a certain way an intuitive giving. This synthesis is something like a spontaneous thinking [at the same time] and something like giving of an intuition, while being neither the one nor the other”.

Heidegger believes that this synthesis underlying our knowledge is neither intuition nor thought, but it is simultaneously both a receptive and a free, spontaneous act. This synthesis cannot be reduced to either of these two sources of knowledge, intuition and thought, while it contains something from both of them. Then what is this synthesis in a positive sense?

This essential synthesis that Kant conceives as the origin of knowledge, is in fact, in Heidegger’s terminology, Dasein’s ecstasy toward the essents. This ecstasy toward, the essents is
both a free, spontaneous act and at the same time a passiveness and receptivity to the manifestation of the *essents*. This ecstasy or *ex-sistence* (existence) of *Dasein*, or according to Kant's own terms this (essential) synthesis, is reducible neither to sense and intuition nor to understanding and thought, but is the origin of both of them. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* this origin is termed as imagination. Let us remember that in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant speaks of two main sources of knowledge, sense and understanding, but he points out that they may stem from a common but unknown root. The route of Kant's inquiry into the ground of synthetic *a priori* knowledge forces him to introduce imagination in his discussion as the third source of knowledge. But, as we already pointed out, we must note that although Kant employs the term 'imagination' following previous philosophical tradition, he does not mean by imagination only the faculty of fancy. In order to prevent such misunderstanding, Kant distinguishes between the empirical and transcendental function of imagination. Thus, in the discussion on the primordial synthesis of knowledge and the essential unity of intuition and understanding, what is meant by imagination is the transcendental function of imagination. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* transcendental imagination refers to the same fact that in *Being and Time* Heidegger terms as existence or care. Heidegger himself says about this point that whoever thinks that the discussion of imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a subsidiary, unnecessary or surplus one, or is related to psychology, and not philosophy, "is stuck with the words and is blind to the dimension of human *Dasein*".

### 18) Imagination as the Source of the Synthesis Underlying Knowledge

We have already pointed out that in the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Heidegger endeavors to show that the common root of intuition and thought is nothing other than transcendental imagination, and that what constitutes transcendental imagination is time or temporality.

Heidegger maintains that it is transcendental imagination which provides transcendence, and thus the encounter with Being and the possibility of a precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the *essent* or, in terms of Kant's own terminology, the possibility of *a priori* synthetic knowledge. Then, if we want to lay a foundation for ontology and metaphysics, we must before everything demonstrate the possibility of transcendence on the basis of human existence which Kant approached but withdrew from. More clearly, the nub of the matter in Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to prove the intrinsic possibility of
ontology on the basis of the transcendence of human existence, i.e., to prove that human being can transcend beyond himself and towards essents, and this is the same aim that Heidegger had already sought in Being and Time. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, threefold temporal transcendental syntheses, i.e., the synthesis of identification, the synthesis of reproduction, and the synthesis of recognition, about all of which we will explain in the following pages, are the same temporal ecstasies of Dasein, which constitute Dasein’s transcendence.

But, in this part of the discussion, we stated that, according to Kant, there is a synthesis which is the underlying of our knowledge, which makes any givenness of the given possible. What can we say about this synthesis positively?

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, that Kant conceives the synthesis underlying our knowledge as “the mere result of the power imagination”153, means that “this synthesis is the pure effect of that power, that this synthesis comes purely from the power of imagination”. Heidegger explains that Kant did not intend to introduce the imagination as an independent faculty in his discussion, because it did not fit into his first plan of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was dependent on the theory of two stems of knowledge, but he became obligated to introduce this power as an independent faculty in his inquiry under the pressure of the phenomenon that is neither intuition nor thinking.155

As we have already stated, Kant defines imagination as “a faculty of intuitions even without the presence of the object”.156 Then this power, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, has two essential features: In the first place, it “has the character of intuition, of giving to oneself, of letting-be-given”.157 Because imagination, like intuition, cannot create its object, and the object must be always presented to it. But, on the other hand, it is at the same time, like understanding, creative and spontaneous, because it can present the object to itself without the presence of the latter. Consequently, the power of imagination is neither a mere affection nor a mere function, but in a way intuition as well as thinking.158

With regard to its very twofold character, i.e., receptivity and spontaneity, affection and function, imagination is a special, unique faculty that is the source of the original synthesis that is prior to any intuition and thinking.

19) The Relation of Imagination to Understanding

Heidegger believes that in the above-mentioned statement of the Critique of Pure Reason, "Kant not only introduces the power of imagination as a peculiar function of the soul, or the
mind; but he also explicitly distinguishes this power from understanding". This statement also shows that according to Kant synthesis springs purely from the power of imagination. "But this power can be brought to concept; and this bringing to concept of synthesis, which springs from the power of imagination, is a function of understanding. And by way of this 'bringing to concept' of synthesis, understanding obtains 'knowledge properly so called'. Heidegger holds that this 'bringing to concept' "can only mean that knowledge which is primarily intuition and imaginative synthesis is enacted only with this 'bringing to concept'".

We can explain Kant's purpose in using the expression 'bringing this synthesis of imagination to concepts by understanding', in other words. The essential synthesis of imagination, which is the origin of our knowledge is a pre-cognitive relation to the objects and this relation converts to a cognitive relation. Put more clearly, according to Kant, there is a non-conceptual relation between us and the essents through imagination and it is the task of understanding to convert this non-conceptual relation with the essents to a conceptual one, and this is the function of conceptualisation of understanding.

So far, according to Heidegger's interpretation, we were dealing with synthesis as such underlying all knowledge, including empirical and a priori, which provides the content of knowledge in general, which makes the givenness of the given to intuition possible. But we are aware that the main question of the Critique of Pure Reason, as Heidegger interprets it, is not knowledge in general but pure, i.e., ontological, knowledge. For this reason, here we are seeking an origin for the pure concepts of understanding (ontological concepts or pure thought) as the second essential element of the pure knowledge (ontological knowledge). That is, here our question is how categories or the pure concepts of understanding can obtain their content. In other words, in this part, the theme of our inquiry is the pure synthesis of imagination and not its synthesis in general.

20) The Pure, Imaginative, Time-Related Synthesis as the Source of Pure Concepts of Understanding

Let us once again consider our situation and see what we are seeking here. In this part, following Heidegger, we intend to understand 'Transcendental Logic' in the Critique of Pure Reason and Kant's analysis of the pure concepts of understanding.

In the first main part of the Critique of Pure Reason, 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant showed that pure intuitions are none other than space and time. But gradually in the course of the
inquiry, space gives its place to time, because time is universal pure intuition, i.e., the form of
experience whatsoever, including outer or inner, then, in fact, according to Heidegger’s
interpretation, pure intuition is nothing other than time. Now, in the second main part of the
Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Transcendental Logic’, Kant’s attempts to explain the second essential
element of pure knowledge, which is the constituent of synthetic a priori knowledge or
ontological knowledge. This second element is pure thought or the pure concepts of
understanding (categories).

In order to explain the origin of the pure concepts of understanding Kant first analyses
‘concept’ in general. The analysis of concept in general showed that all concepts as such have
two essential characters or, in Heidegger’s language, two origins. The first character or origin
consists in the generality of concept. In terms of the second essential character of concepts all
concept as such must be relative to intuition. This is the repetition of the same point that ‘thought
is primarily intuition’ and only in the service of intuition. It means that for its content thought is
in need of the intuition to which it is relative. Now the question is what the content of the pure
concepts of understanding is. In other words, to what are the pure concepts of understanding
related through pure intuition, which is time?

On the basis of the second character or origin of concepts, i.e., relatedness to an object
through intuition, Heidegger believes that categories (pure thought), as the second element of
pure knowledge (ontological knowledge), cannot be only logical forms and the product of merely
the logical function of understanding, i.e., logical forms which are empty of any content.
Because, according to Heidegger, all concepts as such, including pure concepts, must be relative
to an object through intuition. Put more clearly, the pure concepts of understanding or categories,
unlike what most Kantian and neo-Kantian schools suppose, are not mere logical concepts or
mere forms of judgments, that are the product of free, spontaneous acts of understanding. They
are ontological predicates, namely, they say something about the determinations of the Being of
the essents and have a real content. It is said that the second origin of concepts is relatedness to
an object, and that for adopting their content concepts as such must be related-to an object. But
what is the object of pure concepts of understanding?

In fact, in relation to the pure concepts of understanding, instead of relatedness to an object,
we must speak of relatedness to a pure object. But what is this pure object? Pure object is an
object that is not an object. But is not this an evident contradiction? We may say that basically
the entire mission of Heidegger’s thought is to call for thinking about this very contradiction, i.e.
for thinking about something that is No-thing. In relation with the object of the pure concepts of understanding or categories, Kant himself uses the term 'object in general' but sometime substitutes the word 'something' instead of the term 'object in general'. Now the problem is what this 'object in general' or 'something' can be. According to Heidegger's analysis, the object of the pure concepts of understanding or, in terms of Kant's own term, 'object in general' is in fact Being which makes the objectness of objects possible. According to this interpretation, the pure concepts of understanding or categories are related to Being, and Being is not an object and is not basically objectifiable. Rather Being is what makes the objectness of objects possible. For this reason, the pure concepts of understanding or categories contain certain determinations of the Being of the thing, which make the objectness of it essentially possible.

In addition, the analysis of the concepts in general showed that through the act of reflection on the manifold given by intuition, understanding makes a unity in this manifold, and it is this very unity which makes the unification of understanding, the 'applicability to the many', of a concept possible. But what can we say in relation to the pure concepts of understanding?

It has been stated that the pure concepts of understanding are not related to the manifold given by sense intuition, but with the manifold of pure intuition, i.e., with the manifold of time. Kant believes that this is pure, imaginative synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of the pure manifold of pure intuitions (space and time), which forms the pure concepts of understanding. For this reason, Heidegger criticises Kant that categories cannot be conceived as the pure concepts of understanding and hence without any real content, because these concepts are not the product of understanding but the result of the pure synthesis of imagination. In other words, categories are not logical concepts but ontological predicates.

Now, if all concepts are constituted by the unity existent in the manifold, and this unity becomes revealed by the act of reflection, what constitutes the content of this unity in categories? All concepts are the representations of a unity of the manifold, and this unity makes the unification of any concept possible. But what does this unifying mean in categories?

We know that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant presents different definitions of understanding, including the definition of understanding as 'the faculty of concepts' and as 'the faculty of rules'. Of course, all these definitions have a firm connection to each other. we are familiar with understanding as the faculty of concepts. But understanding is at the same time the faculty of rules in the sense that the act of conceptualisation in understanding is not a free, spontaneous, arbitrary activity. Understanding always conceptualises on the basis of the
discovery of a general rule, i.e., the discovery of a unity in the manifold. In other words, in the objects and in what is intuitively given there is always the necessary, binding, unifying element which understanding discovers as a rule, under which the act of conceptualisation takes place.\textsuperscript{170}

Kant believes that pure knowledge, or ontological knowledge in Heidegger’s words, is dependent on the pure synthesis of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (the pure concepts of understanding or categories), and this synthesis is the function of imagination. Kant himself enumerates three sources for pure (ontological) knowledge in this ways:

What must be given— with a view to the \textit{a priori} knowledge of all objects— is the manifold of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the \textit{synthesis} of this manifold by means of imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give \textit{unity} to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding.\textsuperscript{171}

Then the essential sources of pure knowledge, i.e. of the precursory understanding of the constitution of the Being of the \textit{essent}, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, are three elements:

1) The manifold of pure intuition— or to put it briefly, time. For Kant explicitly speaks of knowledge of all objects, physical as well psychic; and the \textit{universal a priori} of intuition is time. 2) Pure synthesis through the power of imagination, i.e. imaginative synthesis related \textit{a priori} to the manifoldness of time. 3) Concepts which always have as their content the unity which always underlies such a time-related imaginative synthesis.\textsuperscript{172}

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, it means that pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) is the result of the pure synthesis of imagination,\textsuperscript{173} i.e., the result of the faculty that is the common root of intuition and thought. It must be mentioned that in Heidegger’s interpretation, imagination has the same role that the concept of existence or care plays in \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{174} In pure knowledge something necessary, binding, and unifying in pure intuition (time) imposes itself on pure concepts, and the very necessity and unity in the pure concepts of understanding show itself, as the foundation and principles of any empirical knowledge, through the pure concepts in synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments. This is the very the necessity, biding and unifying, which was already expressed by the term ‘resistance’,\textsuperscript{175} which Heidegger expresses by the term ‘Being’. What Kant terms the pure synthesis of imagination, i.e. the unity of pure intuition (time) and the pure concepts of understanding (categories), for Heidegger means that the necessary, binding and unifying element, i.e. Being, manifests itself in the horizon of pure
intuition, i.e., time. This what Heidegger means by the title of his most original work, *Being and Time*. In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses the aim of its project in this way: “our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.” “Time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” means that Being manifests itself in the horizon of time or, more precisely, temporality, i.e., in the horizon of pure intuition, in Kant’s terminology.

In the following pages we will further explain how according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is exactly *Dasein’s* transcendence. It means that it is through the pure (non-empirical) synthesis of pure intuition (pure receptivity) and pure thought (categories) that we encounter the necessity binding and unifying, i.e., Being.

According to this interpretation of Kant, the encounter with Being is not only possible, but inevitable, and all knowledge or, as Heidegger says, basically all activity of human being, is ground in the pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis, i.e., in our encounter with Being.

However, we must note that the interpretation of the pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis as *Dasein’s* transcendence, which Heidegger presents, is no longer explicitly in conformity with Kant’s own intention, yet we can find the roots of such an interpretation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We have already stated that, according to Heidegger, in the explanation of the relation between imagination and understanding Kant has a hesitation. Here Heidegger again points out that on the one hand, Kant endeavors to show that it is the synthesis of imagination, as an imaginative, time-related synthesis, which primarily brings forth the content of the pure concept of understanding, and this is in agreement with Heidegger’s own view. But in some passages of ‘Transcendental Logic’ it seems that, as Heidegger says, Kant “destroys everything”, reduces the pure concepts of understanding to logical functions of understanding. But Heidegger believes that pure concepts are ontological categories and not mere logical concepts. According to him, the designation of categories as ‘the pure concepts of understanding’ by Kant is a sign of the primacy of understanding over imagination and also a sign of the constant battle between understanding and imagination in Kant for priority as the basic source of knowledge.
21) The Twofold Character of Categories as Basic Determinations of Being and Judgment

Heidegger seeks to show that categories (pure concepts) have both a logical and an ontological function. It means that categories are forms of judgments, i.e., the basic determinations of judgments, on the basis of which all judgment occurs, without which judgment is impossible; yet they are at the same time ontological predicates, i.e., the determinations of the Being of things, which make things what they are for us.

Heidegger holds that Kant shows the relation between the forms of judgments and the pure concepts of understanding through his logical table of judgments. But Kant at the same time identifies the pure concepts of understanding with categories. Kant says: "These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, for our primary purpose is the same as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of execution". But what does Kant mean when he says that his primary purpose is the same as Aristotle's? And why does Kant follow Aristotle in calling the pure concepts of understanding categories? Because, according to Heidegger's interpretation, for Kant, like Aristotle, the pure concepts of understanding are not the mere logical functions of understanding and mere determinations of judgments, but ontological concepts, namely determinations of the Being of the objects:

According to Kant these [pure] concepts relate to objects of pure intuition as a priori determinations; they determine a priori that which makes objects into objects and constitutes their object-character. But appearances are objects, i.e., the extant as we encounter it in experience. Hence pure concepts of understanding are determinations which determine a priori what is extant in its extant character. Or to put it more generally, since extant means the same as a being, these concepts are determinations which co-constitute the Being of beings, and are thus the theme of ontology.

But the pure concepts of understanding or categories are at the same time the forms, i.e., the determinations, of judgments, because judgments are propositions relative to beings. "In Kant's language, as constitutive determinations of the object-character of objects, they [categories] are connected to the proposition, to judgment, and to understanding". As the Greek origin of the word 'category' shows, there is a connection between proposition, in the sense of 'stating something about something' and category, in the sense of the determination of the Being of beings. Every judgment, as a proposition, states something about beings, and absolute nothing cannot be the subject of any proposition. The variety and multiplicity of propositions, indicates
of the variety and plurality of the Being of beings which are the subject of the propositions.\footnote{148} “This should be enough to indicate that already in Aristotle, just as in Kant, there is a connection between the most general determination of the Being of beings and the proposition judgment, or understanding”.\footnote{145}

22) The Impossibility of a Real Definition of Categories as Pure Concepts of Understanding

Let us again remember that, according to Heidegger, concepts as such have two origins; the formal origin of concepts, which is the character of generality, commonness, or ‘the applicability to many’, and the real origin of concepts, which consists in being related to something. The relatedness to something is what constitutes the content of a concept. Now the problem is to what, as concepts, the pure concepts of understanding or categories are related through pure intuition. Put more clearly, what constitutes the content of the pure concepts of understanding or categories?

In the first part of “Transcendental Analytic” Kant considers it an unimportant task to carry out an explanation of the origin of categories, and in fact he makes no attempt to discover the origin of any of categories.\footnote{146} He even says: “In this treatise, I purposely omit the definitions of the categories, although I may be in possession of them”.\footnote{147} But, later in the discussion of ‘noumenon and phenomenon’ Kant himself confesses that there is a deeper reason for not discussing the origin of categories: “we realise that we are unable to define them even if we wished”.\footnote{148} Heidegger maintains that not only Kant but none else in the history of philosophy has ever discussed the origin of categories.\footnote{149} Heidegger holds that Kant’s refusal to offer a definition of categories and to discuss their origin is because of a rather “fundamental embarrassment in the face of the possible resolution of the problem”.\footnote{150} However, because of his sincerity, Kant later admitted that although he has not worked out the problem of the origin of categories, it does not mean that the problem lacks any importance. Kant himself confesses: “we cannot define any one of them [categories] in any real fashion”.\footnote{151}

But what is Kant’s purpose in saying that he “cannot define any one of them [categories] in any real fashion”? Kant himself explains: It means that we cannot “make the possibility of their object understandable, without at once descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearance”.\footnote{152} We can interpret Kant’s statement to the effect that according to him the truth to which categories are related and from which they adopt their content and reality is not
intelligible for us, and whenever we make an effort to make it intelligible we descend to the realm of appearance. If we want to restate the point in Heidegger’s language, we must say that Being is not intelligible and whenever we endeavor to make it intelligible we fall into the realm of beings.

With regard to the problem of the origin of categories, however Heidegger’s main point is that “as concepts categories have a content which cannot be provided for by the logical function of understanding as such.” For the explanation of categories we cannot limit ourselves to an elucidation of words, rather we must explain them, as Kant says, “in real fashion”. A real explanation of categories means showing their relation to something as the origin of their content. About this point Kant himself says: A “real explanation [of category] would be that which makes clear not only the concept but also its objective reality.” Now Heidegger’s point is that Kant could well show the place of the origin of the pure concept of understanding (categories), i.e., he could show that pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis is the place of origin of categories. But Kant never worked out the origin itself and to the truth that reveals itself as the origin of the reality of categories and as the source of their content, in pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis. More simply, according to Heidegger’s own terminology, Kant shows us that pure, imaginative, time-related synthesis is the transcendental character of our mind, through which we encounter Being, but he never clearly works out the problem of transcendence and our encounter with Being as the objective reality of categories.

Heidegger believes that the aim of ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’ is to reveal the ontological essence of categories. Yet Kant himself has some hesitation in determining the aim of transcendental deduction as the disclosure of the ontological essence of categories. Heidegger endeavors to point out this hesitation and uncertainty in Kant through a reference to Kant’s own sentences. According to Heidegger’s analysis, the major reason for Kant’s hesitation in the determination of the main aim of transcendental deduction is that for Kant himself it is not clear whether categories are the determinations of the Being of the beings, i.e. ontological concepts, or we must conceive them as the product of the acts of unification of understanding, and thus as mere logical concepts. Heidegger believes that concerning the content of transcendental deduction, i.e., the discussion of the origin of categories, Kant vacillates between psychology and logic, and eventually he makes an unclear combination of them.
23) Kant and Changing the Problem of Transcendental Deduction

Heidegger holds that the task of 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of understanding' ought to be the disclosure of the ontological essence of categories. But in transcendental deduction, instead of pursuing this task, Kant discusses the objective validity of categories.

More explicitly, in 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of understanding' Kant ought to answer these questions: How are these categories, as ontological concepts, possible? What constitutes their ontological nature? What is the origin of categories? To what are these categories as concepts, related? And from what do they obtain their content? But instead of answering these questions Kant changes the route of the discussion and sets forth the problem of categories (the pure concepts of understanding) in another way.

According to Kant, concerning empirical concepts and their objective validity we have no problem because the experience is accessible. We are always in principle able to examine the empirical claims. But "among the manifold concepts which from the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction". As Heidegger explains:

There are concepts which are essentially not derived from experience and nevertheless claim to be constitutive of objects or ob-jects, i.e., pure concepts of understanding. It is obvious that such concepts require a fundamental demonstration of their claim to legitimacy, a demonstration which cannot go back to experience as the authority for legitimation. Essentially, these concepts can never be empirically demonstrated from experience.

Therefore Kant concludes: "Their [i.e., categories'] right to be so employed always demands a deduction". But Heidegger believes that before we discuss the warrant of the application of categories, and before we answer this question whether or not the application of categories is justified, we must clarify the essence of categories and set forth this question: "what kind of concepts are these concepts [categories] that they can have a priori objective reality?... In other words, the issue which is to be dealt with in transcendental deduction presupposes the radical inquiry into the originally ontological essence of these concepts", on the basis of which they can constitute experience. But instead of clarifying the origin of categories Kant discusses the legitimacy and validity of their application.
Heidegger holds that the reason for the change of the problem of transcendental deduction is that Kant conceives categories only as pure concepts of understanding, i.e. as concepts independent from intuition. Kant "takes pure concepts of understanding, as pure notions, as belonging exclusively to thinking", and not to imagination. This is why Kant asks: "How can these pure thought contents have an a priori relation to objects?" how can "subjective conditions of thought... have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects?" In this passage, Kant, according to Heidegger's interpretation, conceives the pure concepts of understanding as independent from any relation to pure intuition (time).

Heidegger believes that Kant's conception of categories, as pure concepts of understanding and as the concepts independent from any intuition, is quite opposed to his own basic principle according to which thought (concept) is always relative to intuition and is in the service of intuition. But Heidegger adds that the relation of categories, as concepts, with pure intuition, however, imposes itself on Kant "when he says that intuitions by themselves already yield objects". Thus Kant acknowledges this problem that "it is unintelligible why nevertheless determinations of thinking should still be related a priori to objects", which are presented by intuition. In other words, before working out transcendental deduction, and before heeding the necessity of introducing the third faculty called 'imagination' as the intermediate between intuition and thought Kant understood these two faculties (intuition and thought) as two separate faculties.

24) Transcendental Deduction and Transcendence-Structure of Dasein

Heidegger holds that what makes the understanding of the transcendental deduction of categories in the Critique of Pure Reason difficult, as it has already been said, is Kant's hesitation as to the essence of categories, whether they are ontological concepts, i.e., the determinations of the Being of the things, or logical concepts that are the product of mere logical functions of understanding. But the other basic reason of this difficulty "in the end is Kant's conception of the a priori, which already in the transcendental aesthetic left behind a crucial obscurity".

For Kant, according to Heidegger's interpretation, "a priori is that which belongs to the subject, lies in the mind, and is accessible therein prior to any move to the objects. A priori is that which is initially accessible in the sphere of the pure subject". On the basis of this
conception, *a priori* is that which belongs to the structure of the mind itself. "*This fundamental comprehension of the a priori now covers pure concepts of understanding.* They belong to the activities of the subject; they are, so to speak, extant in the subject and only in it". Thus for Kant the problem of transcendental deduction consists in this question: How can the pure concepts of understanding which belong only to the subject, be the determinations of the Being of the things and how can these subjective categories be a ground for experience and its objects? In brief, how can this subject element (pure thought or category) has validity for what is objective?

Heidegger believes that

there are basically three moments which confuse the inquiry of the transcendental deduction: (1) cutting off the categories from their crucial relation to pure intuition, (2) the opinion that pure intuition alone [independent from pure thought] can yield objects (an opinion which otherwise opposes the stated thesis that intuitions without concepts are blind), and (3) the comprehension of the *a priori* as what resides in the isolated subject, which (subject) thus is given initially and prior to any relation to an object. Put briefly, what confuses the inquiry of the transcendental deduction is the comprehension of an *a priori* freed from transcendence. All three moments are ultimately grounded in the *fundamental and crucial deficiency in Kant’s posing of the problem of categories in general, in misconstruing the problem of transcendence— or better said, in failing to see transcendence as an original and essential determination of the ontological constitution of Dasein.*

Kant’s failing to see human being’s transcendence is what in the introduction to this work we have called ‘Kantian subjectivism’. This subjectivism is what, despite Kant’s effort to understand human being’s transcendence keeps him in the dualistic-subjectivistic, Cartesian framework.

In opposition to this Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, which is basically rooted in the entire history of metaphysics, there is other picture of human being, presented by Heidegger. According to this picture, “insofar as it factually exists, *Dasein* is precisely not an isolated subject, but a being which is fundamentally outside itself. And because *Dasein* is fundamentally outside itself, it can return to itself and in a certain way remain with and in itself. Transcendence is the presupposition for the possibility of *Dasein’s* being itself." Heidegger maintains that Kant could not direct his main problem, i.e. the problem of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics and laying the foundation of ontology, toward the fundamental phenomenon of transcendence, and he never attempted to offer an ontology of *Dasein* and did not realise the tasks and methodical peculiarity of such an ontology. According to Heidegger, “Kant failed to see the fundamental constitution of *Dasein*, i.e. transcendence.
Hence, the notion of the transcendental and of transcendental method— and thereby the notion of transcendental philosophy and transcendental ontology— remains in confusion."  

Heidegger believes that although in ‘Transcendental Deduction’, Kant again begins his deliberations from new perspectives, all of which refer to the same problem, i.e. circle around the problem of transcendence, 219 there is a hesitation in Kant’s words. Occasionally it seems that he believes in the phenomenon of transcendence but then the section which follows shows that everything is in confusion. 220 In other words, sometimes Kant conceives the power of imagination, i.e. the power which constitutes the transcendence, as the third basic source of knowledge, but sometimes, particularly in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he reduces the functions of imagination to the functions of understanding. In addition, Kant conceives categories sometimes as the determinations of the Being of things, and sometimes only as the logical functions of understanding. 221

25) The Relation between the Problem of Transcendence and the Problem of Categories

Due to the subjectivistic-dualistic, Cartesian framework, the problem of transcendence in Kant also begins with the notions that the subject is an entity which has representations in itself. “The problem now is the following: How can representations in the subject ‘come together’ with their objects?” 222

According to the subjectivistic-dualistic tradition, and as Kant himself states, in order to enable such an encounter between subject and object, “there are only two possible ways”: 223 “Either the object alone makes the representation in the subject possible, or representation in the subject alone makes the object possible”. 224 But Heidegger accepts neither of the two options. He holds that the subjectivity of subject or Dasein’s existence is the same relation to things, and there is no subject and even no object independent from this relation. We say ‘no object’, and not ‘no thing’, because things ontologically exist independent of Dasein, but they cannot be as objects, i.e., as what stand over against us, independent of Dasein.

Further, in the framework of Kant’s philosophy, in either option, we confront to difficulties. Because if, as the empiricists say, it is the object which makes the representation in the subject possible, the whole of our knowledge would be empirical. But, according to Kant’s philosophy, we have pure knowledge and synthetic a priori judgments which are not derived from experience. On the other hand, if we accept the second option, that the representation in the
subject makes the object possible, then we must accept that it is our will which is the cause of
(the possibility of) the object, and this is an assumption that Kant obviously rejects. Because our
knowledge, as finite knowledge, can by no means create its object. Thus, according to Kant,
representation is always as representing the given.

But, according to Kant, if synthetic a priori knowledge, i.e., pure (ontological) knowledge,
is to be possible, then there must be something as pure thought (pure concepts), because pure
thought along with pure intuition constitutes pure knowledge. Now, if there is a pure intuition,
then there must be a pure thought (pure concepts) which determines this pure intuition. In
‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant shows that there is something as pure intuition. In
‘Transcendental Logic’ it must also be proved the existence of pure concepts (pure thought). But
these pure concepts spring from the subject itself. But Kant himself asks how the concepts which
spring only from the subject can a priori and in advance indicate the determinations of the
object.

Then what does Kant mean when he speaks of categories or a priori notions which spring
from the subject itself and make the object possible?

Kant explicitly says that this enabling the object by the subject has nothing to do with
producing the object according to existence: “Representation in itself does not produce its object
in so far as existence is concerned. None the less the representation [category] is a priori
determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to
know anything as an object”. 225

Heidegger asks: “In what situation does a subject’s representing... enable the object by
itself alone?”226 Then he himself answers the question: “obviously when the content which
resides in the subject itself and springs from the subject alone is such that what it, as it were,
thinks from out of itself toward the object exhibits a determination which first of all enables
knowing something as object”. 227 In other words, pure representation, which does not spring from
experience but from the mind itself, before everything determines the objectness of the object for
us. It means that before we can obtain any knowledge of the thing, the existence of the thing
must be first ascertained as the object of our knowledge. Then, categories, or a priori, pure
concepts of understanding, enable not the existence of the thing but its objectness, namely they
ascertain the Being of the essent as the object of our knowledge, and it is nothing other than the
transcendence of the mind.
The pure concepts of understanding (categories) constitute the objectness of something as the object, which means that only in conformity with the categories, can everything be an object of thinking. According to Kant “all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such [pure] concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience”. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, this statement of Kant is nothing other than the intimation of the existence of a transcendental truth. Because this expression that “all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such [pure] concepts” means that categories are non-empirical, transcendental knowledge which represent a transcendental truth to which all empirical knowledge must conform. This means that the adequacy... of empirical knowledge with regard to pure ontological knowledge is the presupposition of empirical truth. We can specify this connection by saying that what is encountered must be thought in advance with regard to its objectness as such, in order to be able to be encountered; that is, in order to be encountered as objects, objects that are encountered must be directed in advance toward objectness, i.e., toward a priori determinations that are thought toward [objects] according to pure concepts. Only when objects as objects are directed toward objectness can empirical knowledge be directed to objects. [In other words] ontic truth presupposes ontological truth.

26) The A Priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience

According to Heidegger, all of Kant’s deliberations in ‘Transcendental Deduction’ circle around the problem of transcendence. The second section of ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’ in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is headed ‘The A priori Ground of the Possibility of Experience’. Heidegger believes that although this section is not still the direct entrance to the deduction of categories, it is a concrete working out of the original dimension of transcendental deduction. For this reason it is necessary to understand this section properly. According to Heidegger, Kant’s purpose of 'the a priori ground of the possibility of experience' is nothing other than the transcendence of the subject.

In this section, Kant defines experience this way: “Experience is an empirical knowledge which determines an object through perceptions”. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, for Kant “experience as knowledge means a determining of an object”. But, on the basis of the previous explanations of the essence of the two essential elements of human knowledge, intuition and thought, we know that thought always needs a given, a determinable, which is presented through intuition, and determining the given is the function of thinking. ‘Then experience is the determination according to thinking of what is...given. Thus experience is not identical with
perception of with a rhapsody of perceptions. Rather perception is only a core part of experience, while experience always primarily means a mode of determining thinking. Experience is determining, according to thinking, something which is given in the way of perception, unto a determined objectness.

But what does Kant mean by the term the ‘possibility of experience’? Regarding this term Kant himself says: “The possibility of experience is, then, what gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge.” In a later passage, after the above statement, Kant says: “the possibility of experience as a knowledge wherein all objects— if their representation is to have objective reality for us— must finally be capable of being given to us”. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, these statements of Kant well show the connection between the possibility of experience and objective reality. But what does Kant mean by this statement or, put differently, by the connection between the possibility of experience and objective reality? Does he mean that experience, as what is determined through perception and at sense affection, relates the object to the subject’s representation? More simply, does Kant mean by ‘the possibility of experience’, the same sense experience? But Kant conceives the possibility of experience as the origins of a priori, and thus pure, knowledge. So, for Kant the possibility of experience cannot means sense experience because he speaks of the possibility of a priori knowledge and, thus of a step prior to experience and sense affection. According to Kant, the objective reality of categories or of a priori (pure) knowledge is derived from the possibility of experience. Thus, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, unlike the current interpretations of Kant, the possibility of experience does not indicate a faculty for sustaining affections and accomplishing perceptions. In this context ‘possibility’ means the same as ‘enabling’; and ‘possibility of experience’ means the range of the conditions, which belong to the essence of the experience of a finite knower as such. Possibility, … and essentia [essence] mean here the same; thus possibility of experience means the core part of what makes up the inner possibility of experience. Correspondingly, the phrase ‘a priori grounds of possibility’ does not mean motives and causes which determine the faculty of experience, but rather it means ground, basis, and foundation.

More simply, as Heidegger interprets, the expressions ‘the possibility of experience’ and ‘the a priori ground of the possibility of experience’ in the Critique of Pure Reason do not mean the faculty and motives of sensation, which enable any sense affection and experience possible, rather these phrases refer to a fact which resides in the ontological structure of human being, i.e., to Dasein’s transcendence as the ground of experience. ‘A priori grounds’ means the grounds
residing in the subject itself as such, and the 'possibility of experience' means the essential structure of experience. Thus, 'the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience' means those grounds which make the structure of experience essentially possible, which reside in the subject itself. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, these a priori grounds indicate the transcendence-structure of the subject.

27) The Inquiry into the A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience as Inquiry into the Transcendental Constitution of the Subject

The Second section of 'Transcendental Deduction', in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is titled 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience'. Kant here states: "If we can prove that by their means alone {the categories} an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them {the categories} and will justify their objective validity". Heidegger maintains that in this section, a genuine inquiry into the origin of categories, i.e., a phenomenological inquiry into them, is entangled with a logical discussion about the validity of categories.

Kant then, after the above-mentioned statement, continues: "But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of knowledge that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, thus we must first of all consider the subjective sources which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution".

Hence, Kant here says that the faculty of understanding, must be explained in terms of the possibility of its relation to object, and Heidegger stipulates that this investigation must be not an empirical but a transcendental inquiry into the constitution of understanding. We must note that the very possibility of the relation of understanding to the object is what Heidegger calls the 'subject's transcendence'. Thus Kant’s above-mentioned statement shows that the inquiry into pure thought and the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience is nothing other than the inquiry into the subject's transcendence.

The statement of Kant, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, also states that the a priori, pure thought must not be conceived as a logical act of understanding, because in pure thought other subjective sources besides understanding, i.e. intuition and imagination, are involved. In Kant’s view, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, all these faculties, i.e. intuition,
understanding, and imagination, and their inter-connection that must be disclosed in advance as the ‘subjective sources’ which form the a priori ground of the possibility of experience. These ‘subjective sources’ are what provide the possibility of thinking an object as such, i.e., the possibility of our encounter with the thing as an object. Heidegger holds that the explanation of the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience in fact means clarifying the essential ontological structure of Dasein, and to present a phenomenological analysis of the subject’s transcendence.

Now this phenomenological analysis of the transcendental constitution of the subject “should make understandable how the categories, in their structure and functional connection, are essentially caught between pure intuition; pure power of imagination, and pure thinking and how these three basic sources are centered in the pure power of imagination insofar as precisely this power renders intuition as well as understanding possible.

Kant holds that categories as concepts must be related to intuition, and since the synthesis of the manifold of intuition is the function of imagination, then categories, as the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition, must be related to imagination.

So, what is the task of the second section of ‘Transcendental Deduction’, i.e. the section ‘The A priori grounds of the Possibility of Experience’, in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, regarding the main problem of transcendental deduction? Heidegger maintains that the main problem of transcendental deduction “consists in illuminating the ontological essence of categories, that is, the a priori determinations which, as thought-determinations grounded in intuition, constitute generally something like an object, so that what is empirically given is first of all something objective." Put more clearly, Kant’s aim in the mentioned section is to clarify the essence of categories, and in his view categories are the pure concepts derived from pure thought, without any reference to experience, which are at the same time the determinations that determine the things as our object. Kant holds that in order that something becomes the object of our knowledge, before everything it must conform to categories, i.e. with the determinations derived from pure thought. Put differently, we can say that categories before everything provide the object for intuition. But how is this possible? That is how can pure thought, as thought, provide the object of intuition? We have frequently remarked that finite thought, as finite, can never create its object or the object of intuition, and the object must be always given. But now Kant’s inquiry shows that these categories make it possible for something to become an object for us. Obviously the act of pure thought does not bring forth the essents into existence. As
Heidegger interprets, "what is meant [by Kant] is this: \emph{it is on the basis of a thinking which is in itself related to intuition that what is intuitively given first of all receives the possibility of standing over against what it is}.\textsuperscript{249} This means that the object of intuition is determined through and on the basis of pure thought (categories) which is in itself related to intuition, and with this determination we can receive the objectness of the object. Thus we can conclude that intuitively given is before everything a possibility of objectness, i.e., it \emph{can} stand over against an intuition. Put more clearly, extantness does not mean, and is not identical with, objectness of perception, but being is what \emph{can be} encountered with a subject. Then extantness of the being is a \emph{possibility of objectness}, and this is pure thought (categories) or pure knowledge in general which actualises this possibility, i.e., makes the being an object. This is \emph{essential} act of objectification, which is facilitated by categories and pure thought.\textsuperscript{250}

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, in Kant’s view “experience is a thought-oriented determination of what is given in terms of perception to a definite objectness”.\textsuperscript{251} Then briefly, on the basis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s view, experience consists in that we orient the given toward a definite objectness, i.e., toward being a definite object, through certain determinations derived from thought itself. The perception of a definite object, i.e. \emph{ontic} experience, is grounded in precursory determinations that we grant in advance to the given. Here precursory determinations mean pure thought or categories. These categories or precursory determinations constitute a closed system, in which everything must be put if it is to be an object. For this reason, Heidegger says:

\begin{quote}
What renders this \emph{ontic} experience possible is a self-enclosed whole of \emph{pure ontological knowledge}, in which something like a possible object of experience is constituted in advance. \emph{This whole of a priori enabling of experience as a priori}, i.e., occurring in the subject— \emph{must itself be founded upon the basic comportments of the subject}. Hence these comportments first render possible something like the ‘standing over against’ of an object, or the relation of intuition to what is intuited as object.\textsuperscript{252}
\end{quote}

This is why the second section of ‘Transcendental Deduction’, according to the first edition of the \emph{Critique of Pure Reason}, ‘The A priori, Grounds of the Possibility of Experience’ “deals with primordial activities of the subject [,] which are relative to pure intuition, that is, to time, and in which \emph{essential} the ‘standing over against’ of an object, as well as the relation to an object of what is intuitively given is first of all constituted”.\textsuperscript{253}

Heidegger contends that “thus if categories first of all make up what belongs to an object as object, then, before \emph{individual} categories are disclosed in their object-constituting function, it
must be shown how something like relation to the object or the 'standing over against' of an object is constituted in general and wherein something like this is grounded and has its inner possibility. ...Here we are dealing again with the problem of transcendence (which is hidden from Kant)—and certainly not with the problem of ontic transcendence as a certain relation of a factual subject to a definite extant thing. We are dealing with the relation of subject or Dasein to beings in general, with Dasein's relation to Being. We are not dealing with ontic transcendence but with ontological transcendence which first of all makes ontic transcendence possible".254

Thus the main problem in 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience' is': What are the primordial activities of the subject which provide something like the object's 'standing over against', and make the relation to the object possible? We know that this relation to object is what is called 'transcendence'. Then, according to Heidegger's interpretation, here Kant in fact seeks to explain the transcendental structure of man through an analysis of the components of understanding.

Hence, here we are dealing with this problem: What constitutes the component of understanding in such a way that understanding can make experience possible, i.e., understanding or pure thought can a priori provide for intuition something like an object and the relation to it?255


We have again and again repeated that in finite knowledge, thought cannot create its object. The function of thought is to determine the given. Thought is essentially related to the determinable. Thought, as Kant says, "looks to some other source",256 because "it is essential that thinking awaits something somehow determinable, to determine it conceptually. Here it is totally unimportant from where [things]257 are given, and with what content and what objects we are dealing".258

Heidegger maintains that Kant points out to something about the spontaneity of thought (understanding) which so far seems not to have been touched upon. Kant says that "the manifold, which thinking is supposed to determine as given to thinking, be prepared in certain ways, as it were, be preformed for the actual act of determination. Thinking is conceptual determination. Prior to conceptual unification the manifold must be 'gone through, taken up, and connected'".259 According to Heidegger, "obviously, here we are talking about a special taking up and gathering
of the manifold, i.e., an activity which is neither intuition nor thinking but lies, as it were, *between* both and thus brings about the *connection between intuition and thinking*, their *unification*, to full knowledge. Kant calls this act of taking up and gathering of the manifold, ‘synthesis’.

It was said that, according to Heidegger’s analysis, in Kant’s view, this synthesis underlies our knowledge, and is in fact the same as our mind’s transcendence. Kant believed that the content of thought or, in his own words, the matter of thought, must be always derived from intuition. But in the course of his inquiry Kant realised that there is a synthesis even prior to intuition itself as the *essential* origin of knowledge which provides the content. He calls this synthesis ‘pure synthesis’ of thought. This synthesis underlying our knowledge belongs neither to intuition nor to understanding because as the origin of knowledge, it is out of the structure of knowledge. We said that this synthesis does not belong to intuition, because it is relative to a step prior to the givenness of the given. Intuition consists in an immediate relation to the given. But here, in pure synthesis, we are dealing with the question as to what makes the very givenness of the given to intuition possible. This pure synthesis does not also belong to understanding, because the logical functions of understanding, i.e., reflection, comparison, and abstraction, always occur after the givenness of the manifold and the representations. But Kant speaks of a pure synthesis which makes the givenness of manifold first for intuition and then for thought possible. On the basis of Heidegger’s interpretation, the pure synthesis of which Kant speaks is prior to intuition and constitutes intuition itself, i.e. which makes the givenness of the manifold to intuition possible. Then this pure synthesis cannot be a logical synthesis which occur after the reception of the manifold.

But the pure synthesis underlying our knowledge, or the subject’s transcendence in Heidegger’s terminology, is the function neither of sense intuition nor understanding or thought, but the function of the power which is the root and origin of both of them, i.e. imagination. Then the power of imagination is the source of the *essential* pure synthesis underlying our knowledge.

Thus, we are here seeking to clarify how imagination, besides intuition and understanding, as Kant says, makes any givenness of the given to intuition possible. In other words, here our problem is how the manifold become ready and accessible first for intuition and thus for the act of determination of understanding. This is the repetition of the question how a thing converts into
an object for us. In this relation, Kant explicates those transcendental functions of the subject, which make the givenness of the given to intuition and the objectness of an object possible. The transcendental functions of the subject, which, according to Kant, make any encounter with the essents possible, consist in: 1) The synthesis of apprehension in intuition, 2) the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, 3) the synthesis of recognition in understanding. We see that among these three syntheses, which indeed constitute one threefold synthesis, Kant delegates only one of them, i.e., the synthesis of reproduction, to imagination. But in his interpretation, Heidegger endeavors to show that all the three transcendental syntheses of the subject are relative to pure intuition, time, and thus to transcendental imagination. In other words, all transcendental syntheses, according to Heidegger, are the result of the power of imagination. We shall further explain this point.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's entire investigation of the threefold synthesis, is in fact an inquiry into the pure synthesis of imagination underlying our knowledge, namely an analysis of the ontological syntheses and our precursory, a priori comprehension of the Being of the essent, and thus an explanation of the transcendental constitution of Dasein. But Kant does not realise the transcendental constitution of Dasein, and does not secure in advance the course of his investigation through an understanding of Dasein's transcendence. "Rather, without any central direction and starting from psychological phenomena, he tried to jump over into the phenomenological, ontological analytic of Dasein, as the case may be." As we already explained, and we shall again further explain, the time-related, transcendental synthesis of imagination, i.e., the

29) The Preliminary Characterization of the Idea of 'Object in General'

Before working out Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's investigation of the transcendental synthesis of imagination and its functions in making the givenness of the given to intuition possible, i.e. in providing the possibility of the encounter with the essents or the objectification of the object, and thus in making experience in general possible, let us explicate the sense of one of the terms of Kant, i.e., 'object in general'. Then we shall return to the threefold, transcendental synthesis of imagination.

Heidegger himself explicitly stats that his main goal of the interpretation of the three transcendental synthesis of imagination consists in "displaying the basic structure of time-related synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination as in fact the foundation of the enabling of a priori relation to objects in general". As we already explained, and we shall again further explain, the time-related, transcendental syntheses of imagination, i.e., the
syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition in Kant, are exactly what Heidegger means by the expressions 'Dasein's transcendence' and 'the ecstasies of existence'. In addition, according to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's 'object in general' is the same as Being. Therefore, Heidegger's goal of the interpretation of the three transcendental syntheses of imagination is to show our relationship to Being and our precursory comprehension of Being, as what makes experience possible.

Already in the discussion of the pure concepts of understanding, we said that these pure concepts, as concepts, must be related to an object, but since the pure concepts of understanding are pure, i.e., non-empirical, then their object cannot be an empirical one. Thus the pure concepts of understanding (categories) must be related to a pure object, or, as Kant says, to 'object in general' or, in terms of Heidegger's terminology, to a No-thing (being). Now Heidegger attempts to show that in Kant the idea of 'object in general' is the same as noumenon and both of the them refer to Being as such.

As Heidegger explains, before the discussion of transcendental synthesis of imagination, the concept of object emerged in the discussion of 'appearance'. Appearance "is the title for things themselves as they manifest to us for our representing, intuiting, and intuitive thinking. The appearances are the objects. The concept of appearance is quite clear in this respect". Heidegger says that, unlike Kant, he prefers to call this meaning of 'appearance'— that is, appearance in the sense of thing itself— 'the objective concept of appearance'. In other words, for Heidegger the word 'appearance' indicates besides the extents also the manifestation and disclosure of Being itself. Being is the most original appearance, because appearance is that which reveals itself. This self-showing or self-disclosure is the characteristic of Being. This conception of appearance in Heidegger's thought is that what differentiates Heideggerian phenomenology from Husserlian phenomenology phenomenology. Put more clearly, for Heidegger everything is the manifestation of the Being of the thing, while Husserl believes that in confronting the thing and in order to understand the truth (essence) of the thing we must put the existence (Being) of the thing in bracket. But Heidegger strongly criticises this Husserlian principle and believes that Being is not something that we can put in bracket.

However, Heidegger holds that Kant too approached this more original sense, i.e., a non-objective sense, of appearance, but because of his failure in gaining an explicitly clear understanding of the transcendence of the subject, he could not grasp this more original sense of appearance. Heidegger believes that Kant uses the concept of appearance in two ways: As in an
objective concept and as in a subjective concept. According to this view, the objective concept of appearance means what manifests to us, for our representing, intuiting, and intuitive thinking. It in fact indicates the extant as such. But the "subjective concept [of appearance] indicates representations, as psychic states of the subject, as states of representing which as representing states have indeed what they represent, but which Kant pulls into the subject. Appearances [in this subjective concept] are psychic states of the subject itself. Kant vacillates between these two concepts of appearance." Heidegger here intends to say that Kant could not attain a conception of consciousness, and essentially of human being, according to which man, as a being-there, is in advance beyond himself, and for this reason can encounter essents. This is why Kant conceives appearances sometimes as objective and sometimes as subjective, and through conceiving appearances as subjective he in fact converts 'the object of consciousness' to 'the object in consciousness'. In other words, Kant's hesitation in the employment of the term 'appearance' shows that he is in fact still the prisoner of subjectivism and the duality of subject-object.

Our present discussion is about 'the object in general'. Since Kant applies the term 'appearance' in a double sense, the meaning of object too becomes unclear and ambiguous. Now the question is what Kant means by the expression 'object in general'? Kant himself answers this question:

All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object, and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to something, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something thus conceived is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something =X, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an object."

"The object to which I relate appearances in general is the transcendental object, that is the completely indeterminate thought of something in general". Heidegger interprets these sentences of Kant in this way:

According to Kant, object in general, or the object character of objects in each case, is not something extant in itself and is not something objective or subjective. It is rather the mere 'X' toward which all determinations converge in thinking determining what is intuitively given. The fundamental characteristic of the object in general is that it is the unity of a manifold of determinations. The idea of 'object in general' is geared toward unification and synthesis.
More simply, the expressions 'object in general', 'the unknown', and 'transcendental object' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, according to Heidegger, all indicate Being, i.e., to something that makes the objectness of the object possible but is itself never objectified. This something is neither objective nor subjective. It means that Being is not an extant or an object among other objects, and we can never objectify it, nor is it subjective, i.e., the product of our mind and the actions of understanding. This, the unknown or transcendental object, i.e. Being, is something toward which all categories converge, and say something of it.

30) The Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition as Modes of the Pure Synthesis of the Power of Imagination

Now, following Heidegger's interpretation, we seek to discuss the three transcendental syntheses, i.e. the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition as the modes of the pure synthesis of imagination. According to Kant, these syntheses make the relation to the objects in general possible, namely they are those transcendental activities of the subject, which make the givenness of any given to intuition, i.e., the objectness of the objects, possible. We may remind ourselves that, according to Heidegger, Kant's entire inquiry into the threefold transcendental synthesis of the subject, for explaining the pure synthesis underlying our knowledge, is indeed an explanation of the pure, ontological synthesis, i.e., of our precursory, a priori, comprehension of the Being of the essent, and thus of transcendental constitution of Dasein. Heidegger explicitly states that in his view the three transcendental syntheses of imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are "the three modes of pure imaginative ontological synthesis". Put more clearly, for Heidegger, the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are the three modes of transcendence and ecstasy of Dasein or the three modes of human being's confrontation Being. Here we may only mention that Heidegger endeavors to conform these three syntheses to Dasein's three ecstasies, constituting the three moments of time, i.e., the future, the past and the present, and thus constituting Dasein's temporality. We shall return to this point.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, the inquiry into the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition is in fact the discussion of the syntheses which constitute the constitution of the subject or the mode of the Being of Dasein. Here, in order to approach Heidegger's conception of the constitution of Dasein as transcendence, we have to explain Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's threefold transcendental synthesis of the subject.
As we have mentioned, among these three transcendental syntheses Kant assigns only the synthesis of reproduction to the power of imagination, and conceives the synthesis of apprehension as the function of intuition, and the synthesis of recognition as the function of understanding. But in his interpretation, Heidegger attempts to prove that all three transcendental syntheses are related to pure intuition, time, and thus the result of the power of imagination.

31) The Possibility of Experience and the Synthesis of Apprehension

Here, according to Kant's own words, we are seeking to investigate 'the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience', i.e., to inquire what grounds are basically in the subject, on which all experience depends. In other words, before any experience we must relate to the object. Now the question is what makes this relation to the object, itself possible, and what enables the objectness of the object. In first section of 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', in 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding', headed 'The Synthesis of Apprehension', Kant discusses the first transcendental synthesis which he calls 'the synthesis of apprehension'. Kant holds that all experience is possible on the basis of this a priori transcendental synthesis.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant takes his departure at first from empirical apprehension and then moves towards corresponding transcendental synthesis. Already in the discussion of the power of imagination and its functions we pointed out that sense data in perception are fragmented and it is the task of transcendental imagination to unify the manifold of sense data, and it is on the basis of this unification that any empirical intuition, and thus any experience becomes basically possible. Regarding this point Kant himself says. “Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination”. According to Heidegger's interpretation, through its three syntheses, which are prior to any experience, i.e., the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, the power of imagination unifies the manifold and fragments of sense intuition and in this way provides the possibility of the givenness of the given, the possibility of the objectness of the object, i.e., the relation to the object, and thereby the possibility of experience. We remarked that Kant assigns only the synthesis of reproduction to
imagination, whereas Heidegger himself conceives all the three transcendental syntheses as the functions of the imagination. Hence, here we are seeking to clarify the first transcendental synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension, and to show that, according to Heidegger, this synthesis is one of essential functions of the transcendental synthesis of imagination, namely it belongs to the essential synthesis which underlies our knowledge.

Regarding the unity of manifold of perception Kant says: "There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perception, I entitle apprehension". Thus Heidegger concludes that apprehension is an activity of imaginative synthesis. In other words, any apprehension of the essents is first the result of the essential synthesis of imagination, i.e., according to Heidegger's interpretation, the result of the subject's transcendence, and not sense intuition.

In the discussion of transcendental aesthetic, it was already said that time, besides space, is pure intuition. It means that all sense intuition in advance and a priori occurs in some temporal relations such as before, after, or coincident to something. Kant holds that these temporal relations are not derived from sense intuition, but all sense intuition is possible only in such a temporal relations, and time is the a priori condition of any intuition and experience, including the outer and the inner. According to Kant, "all our representations, i.e., intuitions and concepts and thus the core ingredients of any knowledge, however they may be accomplished and actually originate, are 'subject to time'". Heidegger believes that "we are dealing with an apprehending synthesis 'in intuition', an apprehending synthesis in relation to what is given in intuition". It means that something is given in intuition and we apprehend it. Thus, apprehension and along with it the power of imagination belong to intuition. Kant believes that all representations, including all intuitions, are subject to pure intuition, i.e., time, and for Kant this means that all representation is 'within time'. It means that all intuition in advance and a priori occurs within some temporal relations such as before, after, or in coincident with, something. Therefore, the synthesis of apprehension and thus the imagination, as relative to intuition, are time-related. It means that the transcendental synthesis of imagination occurs in time.

In his interpretation, Heidegger seeks to go beyond what Kant says, namely to show that not only is transcendental imagination essentially relative to time through its relation to intuition, but also "the power of imagination is possible only as time-related." Put more clearly, unlike
Kant's conception of imagination, for Heidegger the power of imagination, is not 'in time', but is essentially 'time itself'. In other words, for Heidegger the pure synthesis of imagination is 'original time' which he calls 'temporality'.

Heidegger holds that although Kant conceives time as pure intuition, he understands time in an ordinary sense. Pure intuition means pure receptivity. Thus, time, as pure intuition and pure receptivity, signifies the mode of human existence, as the possessor of this receptivity. In other words, according to Heidegger's interpretation, the conclusion of Kant's theory of time as pure intuition is that time is not independent of human existence and is not derived from the changes of things or from the motion of stars, but is an existentiale, i.e., a phenomena which originates from human existence. Yet Kant says that all representations, including intuitions and concepts, are 'in time', whereas Heidegger seeks to prove that the phenomenon of cognition is in itself and essentially temporal and not within time.

The other point is that Kant assigns only one of the three transcendental syntheses, i.e., primarily the synthesis of reproduction, to imagination, which contradicts Kant's other view that all pure synthesis is the function of imagination. But in his interpretation Heidegger attempts to take all the three transcendental syntheses back to the transcendental power of imagination, provided that this power is conceived originally, i.e., as temporality and the transcendence of human being.

Heidegger contends that "for Kant time is the pure succession of the sequence of nows given in pure intuition: now, and now, and now— that is, a constant sequence of nows." But Heidegger asks Kant whence the stretch and duration of these nows, itself originates. In other words, if we cannot throw back this stretch and duration to human being's own existence, it would be arbitrary. This is why Heidegger says that in Kant, the stretch of a now— its duration, in this sequence is arbitrary. Whether a now takes an hour or a second, every now has in its immediate and constant neighborhood a no longer now, a just now, and a not-yet now. *Time as this pure flowing of a multiplicity of nows is the universal form of representing*, that is, time determines in advance all representing as a sequence of occurrence in the subject— now this representation, now that one, afterward that one, and then that one. On the basis of this relatedness to all states of the subject, and phases thereof, to the sequence of nows, we call the interconnection of representations intra-temporal, that is, something which flows 'in time'.

Kant believes that "every intuition contains a manifold". According to Heidegger, "Kant here has in mind the manifold of impressions which are given through sensible affection. 'Every intuition' indicates here also every empirical intuition".
Heidegger continues: “However, that intuition contains a manifold does not yet mean that what is intuited is intuited 'as a manifold'. It means that although our intuition, as a finite intuition, contains a manifold, it by no means signifies that what is itself intuited through finite intuition is also manifold. In other words, the possession of manifold is a sign of finite intuition, whereas infinite intuition has no manifold. In order that finite intuition becomes possible, a manifold of impressions occurs. Then, the content of intuition presents itself to us as a manifold. Unlike infinite intuition, we cannot intuit all things in one moment. In order to approach the ontological constitution of finite knowledge Heidegger asks: “What is the ground for the possibility that what is offered by intuition is offered as manifold?... Where is the ground for the possibility that what is non-objective can offer itself intuitively as somehow objectively intuited? On what basis can intuition offer something objective? It is by no means self-evident that we are offered something like a manifold.”

What is the meaning of these questions? It refers to how ‘object in general’ or ‘the unknown’, or, in Heidegger’s own word, No-thing or Being, i.e. the transcendental truth which makes the act of objectification essentially possible, can be offered as manifold for finite knowledge through intuition? In other words, what is the ground for the possibility that what is non-objective, i.e., Being, can offer itself as objective, i.e., as an essent or object?

Heidegger’s response to this question is: The mode of the Being of finite knowledge itself is temporality. This is the idea of ‘the understanding of Being in the horizon of time’, the clarification of which Heidegger conceives as his provisional aim in Being and Time, i.e., the clarification of how Being reveals itself on the basis of the temporality of Dasein.

Unlike infinite intuition Kant believes that time is universal, pure form of intuition, and this means that “the offering of the manifold as such would not be possible at all” if “the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of one impression upon another”. According to Heidegger’s explication of this view of Kant, “the mind must always already, whether explicitly or not, say now-now-now. Kant describes the factual case as follows. In the sequence of impressions the mind must distinguish time and thus always already relate every impression to a now which must always be said now this, now this”. But this view of Kant is ambiguous. More explicitly, the question is whether we distinguish time from the sequence of impressions or, conversely, all impression is possible only in relation to time. The first option is the non-Heideggerian, i.e., non-existentialistic, conception of time, according to which it is mind that distinguishes the succession of nows by following the sequence of impressions. Through his
phenomenological analysis Heidegger seeks to present an interpretation of Kant according to which:

only on the background of a now which is always already said – only in an advance view of the differentiated succession of nows – can the offer of impressions as a sequence of impressions be made. … It is only on the basis of an advance orientation to the pure succession of nows that the horizon opens up in which a sequence of something like succession as sequence can first of all be offered.\(^{301}\)

Put more clearly, time, i.e. the succession of nows, is not derived from the sequence of impression and representation, but all impressions and representations are essentially possible only on the basis of the a priori horizon of time and in a priori succession of nows. But what is the origin of the horizon of time or the advance succession of nows? Heidegger holds that the mode of the Being of Dasein itself constitutes this origin. It means that the horizon of the advance succession of nows lies in human being himself and in his transcendental imagination. Then all empirical apprehension is dependent on a pure synthesis of apprehension and, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, this pure synthesis of apprehension, i.e., this succession of nows, is one of Dasein’s ecstasies; and Dasein, in Heidegger’s conception is nothing other than time, or, more precisely, temporality.

Kant believes that “each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity”.\(^{302}\) It means that every impression or every representation is contained in a single ‘moment’. Hence, if there would not be a unification and a unifying element, the sequence of our impressions and representations would have been single, isolated, absolutely unique units, i.e. this impression in ‘this time’, and this impression in ‘this time’, and then we would not have been be able even to understand their multiplicity. Now the question is how the unification of the manifold of the impressions in these single, isolated units takes place. What is the unifying element which unifies the manifold of impressions or the successions of nows?

Heidegger’s answer to this question is that “precisely what seemingly isolates each impression, namely the now, is what offers simultaneously the possibility of seeing the many as many”.\(^{303}\) More simply, time and its moments, i.e. the succession of nows, is that what simultaneously both separates the impressions from each other and at the same time unifies these separate impressions. However, Heidegger’s conception of the moments of time, or nows, that is his phenomenological interpretation of time, is to some extent different from others’.
maintains that every now has in itself a capacity for no-longer-now. "Every now is also already a no-longer-now, a just-now, and was earlier a right-now [Sogleich]— that is, now this impression is in itself also already a just-now—that and was before a next-this".\(^{304}\) Put more clearly, Heidegger believes that we do not deal with a succession of single, isolated moments, and then look for something which articulates and unifies the manifold of the moments, but any moment in itself has the possibility of its previous moment, and so the possibility of an articulation of a plurality of the moments. "In the unity of a now we obtain the horizon in which the manifold as such can be offered".\(^{305}\) According to Heidegger, "this kind of unification, in which the many can be traversed and taken together on the basis of directedness to a now, Kant calls \textit{apprehension} or seizing".\(^{306}\)

Kant calls this unification of the manifold of single impressions in individual, isolated moments (nows), 'the synthesis of apprehension'. But as we have frequently stated, Kant subsumes various phenomena under the title 'synthesis'. Therefore, we must not suppose that by synthesis Kant always means the logical function of understanding, i.e., the combination of representations in a judgment. The synthesis of apprehension is a synthesis that makes the unity of the manifold of intuitions possible. This synthesis is prior to all logical functions of understanding. The synthesis of apprehension, according to Heidegger's interpretation, has simultaneously the characters of both receptivity and spontaneity. On the one hand, if something is not presented, the synthesis of apprehension cannot occur, i.e., this synthesis is always the synthesis of something, and it is through this synthesis that impressions are given. Hence, this synthesis is receptive. On the other hand, the synthesis of apprehension is, at the same time, besides being receptive, takes up what is offered. This seizing is a king of spontaneity. Then this synthesis is neither mere a receptivity like intuition, nor mere a spontaneity like thought, but both intuition and thought are rooted in this 'synthesis'.\(^{307}\) According to Heidegger's interpretation, hitherto Kant's discussion was dealing with the synthesis of empirical apprehension. In other words, hitherto Kant discussed the unification of what is offered affectively in sensation. But in the main course of his inquiry, i.e., in his explanation of pure knowledge, he looks for pure synthesis relating to apprehension, a pure synthesis which makes the givenness of the given to intuition, i.e., the objectness of the object, and thus the relation to the object, possible. A pure synthesis is that which \textit{a priori} unifies a manifold. Heidegger showed that "a sequence of impression can be offered to us as a sequence as such only when we first understand something like succession. Were we not to understand something like succession, were we not to comport
ourselves toward a sequence of nows, then we would never be able to grasp something which is offered as following or preceding something else. Is such a pure synthesis of apprehension demonstrable?

We stated that all empirical apprehension, i.e., the synthesis of the manifold of impressions, is grounded in a priori understanding of the succession itself, i.e., of following or preceding itself. Kant calls this pure following and pure preceding of nows, ‘pure intuition’, and Heidegger calls it ‘original time’ or the ‘temporality’ of Dasein:

Time as intuition contains a manifold, and time as pure intuition contains the pure manifold of the pure succession of nows. Therefore, in this pure intuition of time there must already be a pure apprehension. Pure intuition of time is not simply an isolated grasping of a whole lot of nows that simply have no relation to one another. Rather each now as now, in order to be intuited as what it is, requires to be taken together with other nows. This taking together has the character of a unification and in fact in each case unifies the just-now as no-longer-now and right-now as no-yet-now unto a now. This is to say that the phenomenon of time called ‘now’ is as such never an absolute, isolated, simple element, but is in itself a manifold. The pure intuition of time carries in itself an original seizing of the manifold which already belongs to the ‘now’. This pure intuition of time carries in itself the original pure synthesis in the sense of pure apprehension which we just characterised.

Heidegger believes that this pure synthesis of apprehension, which is in advance in pure intuition of time, is a ‘spontaneity of reception’. “In this synthesis of apprehension, there is nothing like a conceptual determination in the sense of comparison, reflection, and abstraction—nothing like the function of understanding”. This pure synthesis of apprehension, as the pure synthesis of the manifold, is a synthesis of imagination. “More precisely, the power of imagination only now develops time as a pure succession of nows. Accordingly, empirical apprehension is only possible on the basis of a pure apprehension, and this is nothing other than a function in which pure intuition of time is constituted a priori”.

What is the point Heidegger intends to make through these complex, abstruse analyses? What Heidegger here seeks is in fact an understanding of the ontological structure of human being. According to Kant, the three transcendental syntheses, i.e. the synthesis of apprehension, which we here discussed, and the two syntheses of reproduction and recognition, which we shall work out in the following pages, are the ground of transcendental apperception (the I or self) and constitute it. But Heidegger believes that it is time which is the ground both of transcendental apperception and the three, above-mentioned syntheses. Then, in the interpretation of the three transcendental syntheses Heidegger intends to pursue the main problem of transcendental philosophy, i.e., the problem of transcendence through the reduction of all the three
transcendental synthesizes to the power of imagination as the formative center of transcendence and ontological knowledge; i.e., to show that it is neither sense and intuition nor understanding and thought, but the power of imagination which makes the objectification of the object and the relation to the object possible. In the following pages we shall again return to the comparison between Heidegger and Kant's philosophy of mind.32

32) The Possibility of Experience and the Synthesis of Reproduction

Following previous discussions, here we are again seeking to investigate some other a priori grounds of the possibility of experience, i.e., to discuss what grounds are a priori and contained in the subject itself, on which all experience is dependent. In other words, before any experience we must related to the object, and now the question is what makes the relation to the object possible and what enables the objectness of the object. Kant believes that among the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience there is other pure synthesis, which is the function of imagination, and calls it the 'synthesis of reproduction'. Heidegger attempts to show that this synthesis, like the synthesis of apprehension, is also related to pure intuition, time, and thus related to imagination. Through this discussion Heidegger intends to prove that the concept of the past is an element of Dasein itself and one of its ecstasies.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, here, in the second part of 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', entitled, "The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination", Kant, again, as in previous discussion, proceeds from an empirical reproductive synthesis and then works out the corresponding pure synthesis, i.e. pure synthesis of reproduction.314

We have stated that human knowledge always obtains its object through intuition which gives us only what is present. But our knowledge also belongs to that which is not present. From this fact Kant concludes that we must possess a disposition for the reproduction of that which is not present in the now as the immediate object of intuition. It is a disposition that retains the manifold of sense intuitions in the manifold of time and unifies (synthesises) them. Therefore, the synthesis of reproduction is a transcendental function, and inasmuch as this synthesis is prior to the givenness of the given to intuition and makes the relation to the object possible, it cannot be derived from intuition. And since the functions of understanding are always dependent on the intuitively given, the synthesis of reproduction is prior to the functions of understanding. Hence the synthesis of reproduction is a transcendental function of imagination.
Kant holds that “experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances”.

"There must be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible". According to Kant, what provides the a priori ground of the a priori synthetic unity of appearances is nothing other than imagination.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, in the empirical synthesis of reproduction we are concerned with a synthesis whose character is reproduction, that is, it brings forth again something which was already once offered. In this synthesis of imagination there is a creative, original aspect, i.e., in the synthesis of reproduction this intuiting of a manifold offers something by itself from out of itself. However, this creativity means only that imagination can represent again, that which was already offered to it, i.e., what was once in an immediate relation to intuition without the presence of the object.

In addition, Kant assigns the act of association to imagination and its synthesis of reproduction. In association, unlike apprehension, we are not concerned with the sequence of isolated impressions and with the apprehension of them in one representation, but we are concerned with the representations of objects, which are brought about from out of mind itself, without the presence of the objects. It means that in association we are concerned with the leap of mind from a representation to another representation. For example, this chalk and this eraser often accompany and are associated with one another. Here, the question is how the mind can leap of the representation of the chalk to the representation of eraser, without the presence of the eraser itself, as the object of intuition. In the case of association, Heidegger again repeats that this fact that mind can transit or leap from a representation (for example chalk) to another representation (for example eraser) is not the result of the invention of mind, but is the result of the togetherness of appearances themselves, i.e., there is a togetherness or necessity which makes association in us possible. Yet the creativity or the free act of the mind is that it can move from a represented thing to another freely and by itself, without in each case having to rely on a direct intuition of objects.

According to Heidegger, what Kant means is that in the case of association the mind has the disposition to bring forth again something which was already once brought-forward. Therefore, mind must be capable of retaining what is represented in order that the mind can bring forth again for itself, i.e., “the mind already has the aptitude of retaining and bringing forth again what mind intuits directly.” Kant argues indirectly:
If what is empirically offered in each case a now would simply slip away with the passing away of the now, then the mind would never have the possibility of reaching out and back for something which has existed already, except when mind intuits the same again. But then in fact mind would intuit the respective thing for the second time but not as the same thing."^{21}

From this argument of Kant, Heidegger concludes that in such a case the "mind would be tied firmly to each phase of the now"."^{32} It means that the mind would be limited to the present and the now, and there would not be the possibility of association. Hence, Kant shows to us that the possibility of experience is dependent on the possibility of association and the disposition of reproduction, i.e., on making present the object of intuition, which is not present at now. It implies that the subject possesses the disposition for going back to what has been already the object of intuition. For Heidegger it means that the subject or Dasein is not limited to the present and the now, but for it there is the possibility of return to what has been already present and the object of intuition. This returning to what has been already intuited, i.e., returning to the past, is, for Heidegger, nothing other than the transcendence or ecstasy of the subject toward what has been already intuited. Put more clearly, Kant shows that the possibility of experience is dependent on the possibility of association and the synthesis of reproduction, and this synthesis is one of "the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience", i.e., one of the grounds existent a priori in the subject itself. From Kant's discussion of the synthesis of reproduction, Heidegger concludes that this synthesis is the ecstasy of human existence toward what has been already offered to the subject. More precisely, there is no "the past" independent of human being, and what is called "the past" is only a mode of the Being of man himself and a mode of the transcendence or ecstasy of Dasein's existence. The past is nothing other than the transcendence and ecstasy of Dasein toward the object already offered to it, but this object is not present in a now.

We have again and again repeated that, according to Kant it is impossible that finite knowledge can create its object. But, according to Heidegger's interpretation, "this actual impossibility does not disprove the existence of a pure reproduction of a now as such which has already been"."^{33} This impossibility, i.e. the impossibility of an original creation for finite, human knowledge, in contrast to infinite, divine, knowledge, "is just a confirmation of the existence of the pure horizon of time in the direction of the past. Precisely in the realisation of the impossibility of bringing it back, we realise that we can move at any time in the horizon of alreadyness. We can place ourselves quite freely at any given point in time"."^{34} It means Dasein's
ecstasy toward the past, and this ecstasy is the result of the transcendental mode of the Being of
*Dasein* itself. Put more clearly, the mode of the Being of *Dasein*, i.e., existence, is in a way that
it can have an ecstasy toward the past, or in Heidegger's term, toward alreadyness. "That is why
for Kant pure intuition is a pure play of the power of imagination". In Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, the power of imagination is the very existence of *Dasein*, and the pure free play of imagination means transcendence or the free ecstasies of existence.

33) The Relation between the Syntheses of Apprehension and Reproduction

According to Heidegger, Kant truly believes that "the synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction". We found that both the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction intervene in objectification. Since the essence of the objectness of the object lies in its unity, these two syntheses, despite the peculiar function of each of them, cannot be separate from each other. The intermediate between these two syntheses is also time, because both of the syntheses are related to time, and pure intuition (time) constitutes both of them. But, Heidegger believes that Kant's opinion as to the relation between the transcendental syntheses and imagination is not totally clear, namely "it is unclear whether this synthesis of pure reproduction is to be the only accomplishment of the power of imagination, or only one mode [of it]". Heidegger believes that if the first option is true, i.e., Kant conceives only the pure synthesis of reproduction, not all the three transcendental syntheses, as the function of imagination, "then the power of imagination here is not yet grasped in its originality".

34) The Possibility of Experience and the Synthesis of Recognition

We are here seeking to understand Heidegger's interpretation of the third part of 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding' titled 'The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept'. According to this explication, there is an essential, firm connection between the transcendental syntheses of apprehension and reproduction in so far as the synthesis of apprehension would be impossible without an essential connection with the synthesis of reproduction. Now Heidegger here attempts to show that the synthesis of reproduction would be also in turn impossible without the synthesis of recognition. Hence, the synthesis of recognition, as the third pure synthesis, besides the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction, is also one of the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience. It means that this synthesis, like two other
previous syntheses, makes the relation to the object and the objectness of the object possible and thus it is one of the constituents of pure knowledge.

We should note that the discussion of the three transcendental syntheses is in fact an inquiry into the grounds which, as the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience and as the transcendental functions of the subject, lie in the subject itself and it is on the basis of these functions, i.e., these pure syntheses, that the ontological essence of categories, as the pure concepts of understanding which provide the possibility of the relation to the object and the objectness of the object, becomes possible.\textsuperscript{331}

In this part, through analysing the synthesis of recognition Heidegger attempts to show that this synthesis is also related to time and the power of imagination, and that the synthesis of recognition, as the future, is itself a horizon in human being and the result of the transcendental being of Dasein itself.

35) The Problem of the Interrelationship of the Three Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition

Before working out the synthesis of recognition, Heidegger makes some points about interrelationship between the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. In the third part of 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', entitled 'The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept', Kant himself seeks not only to analyse the third transcendental synthesis but also to work out the problem of the ground of the unity of these three transcendental syntheses.

Obviously in encounter with any object we perceive it in its unity, "then the three modes of synthesis must be interrelated regardless of what each is factually capable of doing. And this gives rise to the question: How and where is the interrelationship of the three syntheses organised? What is the transcendental, ontological ground of this necessary interrelationship [among these three syntheses]?"\textsuperscript{332} According to Kant, transcendental apperception underlies the unity and interrelationship of these three transcendental syntheses. According to Heidegger's interpretation, "transcendental apperception is not something standing next to or behind the three transcendental syntheses, but is the unity of that wide-ranging encompassing which as such generally constitutes a dimension of resistance or of what is representable. The unity of the three syntheses is not a composite or sum of a series of acts. Rather, this unity is the subject".\textsuperscript{333}
Since Kant discusses this ground, i.e., transcendental apperception in the part relating to the synthesis of recognition, and not in the parts relating to the analysis of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, Heidegger concludes that then in Kant’s view there must be a special relationship between the synthesis of recognition and transcendental apperception, in contrast with two former syntheses. But this point confronts us with the problem whether Kant conceives only the synthesis of recognition or all the three transcendental syntheses as the constituent of transcendental apprehension. In other words, there is an ambiguity in Kant’s view regarding the essential source of transcendental apperception.

Heidegger explains the essential interrelationship among these three transcendental syntheses in another way. We know that Kant discusses the three syntheses of apprehension, reproductions and recognition in the part ‘The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience’. Then, as we already mentioned, these three syntheses are the grounds in the subject itself, which make any relation to the object and thus any experience possible. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, for Kant ‘the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience’ means “foundations which lie in the subject and which make possible a priori a determination of objects”. Then, by the term ‘experience’ Kant here means ‘the object of experience’. Therefore, these three syntheses, as ‘the a priori grounds of experience’, are pure, a priori syntheses which provide the possibility of the relation to the object and objectness of the object.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, the object of experience in general is the object of a possible knowledge which is based on sense perception. In other words, the object of experience in general “is the nature in the sense of a closed region of beings, namely the realm of the extant. Hence object of experience is this whole in its wholeness”. More simply, according to Kant the object of experience is always an object within nature. Kant defines nature in this way:

By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are certain laws which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori.

In the terms of this definition, it is a priori grounds that make nature, in the sense of the connection of appearances, possible. This nature or the realm of the extent, as the object of experience, has in advance a unity. Then the three transcendental syntheses in their unity and relationship, as ‘the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience’, in the sense of the a priori
grounds of the objectness of the object, must be a ground for the ontological unity of nature or the realm of the extant.\textsuperscript{137} Put more clearly, we do not deal with the separate, isolated things in experience but we confront a whole. In experience we always deal with the thing involved in an unaccountable relation to other things. Then we always confront a closed region of the essents. “The three syntheses in their interrelationship must be the foundation for the total span of this whole of nature in its ontological unity”.\textsuperscript{138} In other words, experience always occurs within a whole called ‘nature’ or, in Heidegger’s own terminology, in ‘the world’. This nature or the world in its wholeness is not an essent among other essents which can be the object of our sense intuition and our experience, but it is a horizon within which all experience takes place, which makes any intuition or experience possible, and for this reason, this whole is the \textit{a priori} ground of the possibility of experience.

Eventually, in Heidegger’s interpretation, this horizon, or the whole (nature or world) is nothing other than Being. The three transcendental syntheses of imagination, in their ontological understanding of Being provide a horizon in its ontological unity for the possibility of experience. More simply, through these three transcendental syntheses we confront Being, and this very encounter with Being and the precursory comprehension of it is the horizon and ground of possible experience.

Heidegger believes that Kant notes the unity of the three transcendental syntheses and attempts to provide a ground of this unity, but he is at the same time the captive of the first twofold divisions of the mind, i.e., the division of the mind into two faculties of intuition and understanding, and for this reason, “in the end he again places intuition on one side and concept on the other”.\textsuperscript{139} In other words, in Heidegger’s view, Kant could not realise the essential unity of intuition and understanding completely.

In addition, for Heidegger the three transcendental syntheses are as the three comportments of the subject, i.e. the three ecstasies of existence corresponding the three moments of time, the future, the past, and the present. But Kant holds that among these three syntheses only the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are respectively the functions of intuition and imagination, and the synthesis of recognition belongs to understanding. For Kant since time is only the pure form of intuition, and since understanding, as the spontaneity of mind, is opposite to intuition, as the receptivity of mind, therefore only the two syntheses apprehension and reproduction are clearly related to time, and the synthesis belonging to understanding, i.e. the synthesis of recognition, is independent of time. Heidegger believes that here, Kant’s philosophy
of mind suffers from a basic rupture. Since, on one hand, the three syntheses constitutes transcendental apperception, but, on the other hand, among these constituents of transcendental apperception, i.e., the three transcendental syntheses, only the syntheses of apprehension ad reproduction belonging respectively to intuition and imagination, are temporal, and the synthesis of recognition belonging to understanding is non-temporal. Therefore, it is not clear whether transcendental apperception is eventually temporal or non-temporal. Yet Kant finally conceives transcendental apperception as non-temporal, and this is exactly the opposite of Heidegger's conception of transcendental apperception (self) as temporal. In his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, through his criticising Kant, Heidegger endeavors to show the relation of all the three transcendental syntheses to time, and thus to transcendental imagination, in order to prove that transcendental apperception is essentially temporal and that transcendental apperception (self) or 'I think' and time or, more precisely, temporality are identical. Heidegger believes that only in this way, i.e., by proving the relatedness to time or the time-relatedness of all the three transcendental syntheses we can make visible the unity of all three syntheses in a unitary ground.

36) The Synthesis of Recognition

The next question is: What does Kant mean by the synthesis of recognition?

Heidegger believes that, as the title of the third part of 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', i.e., 'The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept', shows, the transcendental synthesis of recognition is a synthesis which occurs 'in the concept', i.e., through understanding. According to Heidegger, here we are dealing with a synthesis in concept, which does not belong to the form of concept—i.e., to the unification of the logical actions of understanding (reflection, comparison, abstraction)—but this synthesis belongs to the unification which is related to the content of the object of the concept. It means that in the discussion of the synthesis of recognition the problem is as to what the ground of the unity of the object of a concept is.

We have already explained that according to Kant, in sense perception sense data are fragmented and "each representation, in so far a is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity". It means that each impression is contained in a single 'moment', and if there were no unifying element which unifies the succession of impressions, then there would be only a sequence of separate, isolated impressions in separate, isolated moments, that is,
this impression in this now and this impression in now...without even we could understand their multiplicity. Thus, this sequence of absolutely separate, isolated units would not form any knowledge. Therefore, in order that the givenness of the given to intuition becomes possible, and that an object can essentially stand against over us, we need a transcendental synthesis by which the manifold of the successive impressions in successive nows can be offered to us in a unity. Kant calls this synthesis, the ‘synthesis of apprehension’.

But, intuition, as an immediate relation to the object, represents only what is present, whereas our knowledge also belongs to what is not present in the now. From this fact, Kant concludes that then we must possess a disposition for the reproduction of that which is not present in the now, as the immediate object of intuition. In other words, for to be possible, there must be in us a disposition which retains the manifold of sense intuitions in the manifold of time. Kant calls this act of retaining and unifying the manifold, the ‘synthesis of reproduction’. For Heidegger it means that we possess this ability to go back to already given objects. However, there is a firm connection between the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, because the reproduction of the given is not possible without its prior apprehensions, and if we could not reproduce the given, i.e., go back again to it, we would be always tied to now, and the synthesis of apprehension would be unable to relate to the object as an object, because without the synthesis of reproduction we would have something offered in each now, but only this and not more, and we could not say that this the offered in this now is related to the previous now which has passed away. “What is previously offered must be thus capable of being brought forth again, it must be retainable” or, in Kant’s term, reproducible.

But by the *a priori* transcendental syntheses of apprehension and reproduction we still cannot relate to the object. For relating to the object we need something more, which is a part of ‘the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience’ and which lies in the subject itself, i.e. what Kant calls the ‘synthesis of recognition’. For explaining the synthesis of recognition, in the Kantian sense, Heidegger says: “However, granted the possibility that we can retain all that we previously intuited, what do we gain by this possibility? We could, so to speak, run again and again through the sequence of offers, in the direction of what is past and back to what is just now present. ...But does this mean that we could return to what we previously intuited in the sense of intuiting it again?” Obviously the answer to this question is negative. It means that the synthesis of reproduction and the disposition of going again back to what is already offered to us,
i.e., return to past, in no wise means that we being forth again or create the existence of the object, or return to the existence of what we have already intuited.

But the synthesis of reproduction, in the sense of bringing forth what has been already offered, is possible only if we can recognise what we have previously intuited as the same as what we intuit now. "Re-production is impossible if I cannot reproduce what flows away in the past as the same by recognising it again [as the same]". It means that the synthesis of reproduction is possible only when in the succession of the impressions in the sequence of the nows we can recognise an impression in a now as the same as the previous impressions in the previous nows. Thus the synthesis of apprehension leads to the synthesis of reproduction, and the latter leads to the synthesis of recognition. However, according to Heidegger “the designation ‘recognition’ [by Kant] is quite misleading”, because recognition means to know something again, whereas “the fundamental act which enables that we take what we retain as what we have already intuited and grasp it as the same is the act of identification. Without the synthesis of identification it would be impossible to grasp any objective interrelation”. Thus Kant believes that in the concept there is a recognitive synthesis. It means that in all concepts through imagination we reproduce the object which is not present, and we know it again. Why does Kant speak of the synthesis of recognition? Because, on the basis of Kantian fundamental principles, finite knowledge is always in need of the object and for us a knowledge independent of the given is impossible. Now, where the object is not present imagination reproduces it for us and this reproduced object will be the object of our knowledge, and we must be able to recognise, i.e. to know again, this reproduced object. For explaining the unity of consciousness and the unity of concept Kant needs this synthesis of recognition. But Heidegger says that the term ‘recognisation’ is here quite misleading because here we do not recognise the object but identify this reproduced object is as the same as what had been previously offered to us. Here the replacement of the term ‘identification’ for the word ‘recognition’, as we shall see in following pages, will involve important results.

Here Heidegger gives an example. According to this example, suppose we are in a classroom and somebody intends to describe it for us. He first concretely intuits and apprehends certain things, such as the black board, chalk, eraser, lamp, etc, and describes the class in this way: ‘In this class there is a blackboard’, ‘in this class there is a piece of chalk’, and so on. But when he turns his look from the chalk to the seats existent in the class, then what happens? When he intuits the seats and says ‘in this class there are some seats’, the chalk is no longer the
object of his intuition. Hence, in this moment, when he turns his look from the chalk to the seats, is he right to conceive the chalk as a part belonging to the class? If he looks at the seats, and not at the chalk, is he right to say that ‘that chalk’ i.e. the previous object of his intuition, which is not present now in his intuition, ‘exists in the class?’ When he looks at the seats he visualises the chalk, without intuiting it. Now how can he claim that what he visualises in fact belongs to the class? It will be said that the describer can easily return to the place of the chalk and confirm that ‘that chalk exists in the class’. But Heidegger does not accept this answer. Heidegger believes that the describer, after his return to the chalk, cannot make such a claim. Put more clearly, in his return to the chalk, he can say only that ‘there is a piece of chalk in the class’, and not more, that is, he cannot claim that this chalk is the same as the earlier one. He can say only that he had apprehended a chalk earlier, and apprehends a chalk now. Thus, there must be two chalks. Obviously this answer will be rejected and it will be said that it is self-evident that there is only one piece of chalk in the class. That piece of chalk which I offer to myself again in visualising it is not a second piece of chalk but one and the same piece of chalk. But Heidegger asks: why? Whence does this identity of the object of two intuitions, or the identity the visualised representation and the representation of the intuition, originate? Heidegger concludes that we cannot gain knowledge through the simple apprehending and reproducing, and we here need something more. In other words, if we apprehend something and reproduce it, it does not explain the identity of the apprehended and the reproduced by two syntheses of apprehension ad reproduction, rather we must possess a capability other than the two capabilities of apprehension and reproduction. As Kant says, we need a synthesis of recognition, of knowing-again. But Heidegger believes that the expression ‘recognition’ is misleading because, on the one hand, it cannot refer to a special act which is required to explain this identity and, on the other hand, in the recognition of something, i.e., in knowing again something, we are dealing again with the knowledge which is constituted by the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and the synthesis which Kant wrongly calls ‘recognition’. According to Heidegger, the act that here makes the relation to the object possible is identification and not recognition. Bringing forth again what is previously offered does not help us in relating to the object unless we can identify what is brought forth again with what is previously apprehended. Then, we must already possess the capability of identification.” But what does Heidegger mean by the synthesis of identification? Heidegger himself explains: “Is the issue such that we first take up and apprehend, then reproduce, and then identify what we perceived with what is brought again?
Does this synthesis build upon the first two [syntheses] and, as it were, unify them? Kant's presentation intimates such a conception, although he would contradict it.\(^{350}\)

Heidegger believes that we cannot identify what is brought forth again by the act of reproduction with what is first offered to the act of apprehension, if we do not from the beginning already perceive what is offered to us as one and the same. For example, in the instance of the description of the class, the chalk is one and has duration, and if I return my look from the chalk it will remain the same. It means that we understand the *essent* as such as one and continuous. Without such understanding of the unity and continuity of the thing, the synthesis of recognition in Kant’s terms or the synthesis of identification is not possible. In other words, the identification is dependent on the unity of the thing itself.

In the analysis of the synthesis of recognition, Heidegger calls to attention another very important point. He holds that “what is offered in apprehension shows itself each time already against the background of that which is present to us in advance.”\(^{351}\) It means that when we apprehend a thing, like a chalk, this apprehension always occurs in the context of other things and many relations, like being beside a blackboard, being in a classroom, being in front of some students.\(^{352}\) Heidegger holds that “factually and essentially, we never begin with the simple grasping of something present as though prior to this grasping nothing had been given”.\(^{353}\) This is exactly to imply destroying the Cartesian cogito. On the basis of his methodic doubt, Descartes sought to attain a beginning point of absolute certainty in order that he could justify the entire the edifice of knowledge. According to Descartes’ *Cogito ergo sum*, ‘I think, therefore I am’, is the absolute certain beginning point, but Heidegger maintains that for human being, as the being whose most essential ontological characteristic is ‘being- in- the –world’,\(^{354,355}\) there is no beginning point in understanding and all understanding is dependent on precursory understanding, and all knowledge of the thing is relating to a context of knowledge of other things. According to Heidegger, “we never begin with a now. Rather in beginning, that is, in apprehending, there is already present to us an interrelation of beings which is somehow unified without its unity’s being conceptually clear to us”.\(^{356}\) This is in fact the repetition of what Heidegger had stated in *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time* Heidegger endeavors to show that none of our understanding, our experiences, and our actions occur without a deep horizon in which we encounter the things, others, and ourselves. In this work Heidegger calls this horizon the ‘world’ and in the same place he attempts to show that the encounter with the world is prior to the encounter with things and the persons existing in this world.\(^{357}\) This world in fact refers to
the truth which Heidegger express chiefly by the term ‘Being’ and in his interpretation of Kant following Kant’s own terminology, ‘the object in general’, ‘transcendental object’, ‘transcendental truth’ and ‘the unknowable’, i.e., the truth which makes the objectness of the object possible, which is prior to all encounter with objects, but it is not itself objectified.

In the discussion of Kant’s synthesis of recognition or the synthesis of identification, in Heidegger’s own terminology, Heidegger remarks: “The identification which first enables apprehension— and this in unison with reproduction itself— is not the original act which endows unity”. Heidegger believes that identification is itself grounded in more fundamental unity, and Kant could not understand this unity. “Identification always already makes use of what is given beforehand and what it identifies. All identification presupposes already having a unified interrelation of beings. In identifying— and that means apprehending and reproducing— we are always already awaiting a unity of beings”. It means that for the possibility of relating to the object and thus for the possibility of any experience and knowledge, and also for the accomplishment of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction we need the synthesis of identification. But the transcendental synthesis of identification is itself always dependent on the manifestation and givenness of the unity. This is the unity and identity of the essents, which reveals itself, and on the basis of which we can identify.

Among the three transcendental syntheses Kant puts the synthesis of recognition in the third place after the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. But according to Heidegger: Firstly, the designation of the synthesis of recognition, in the sense of knowing again, is misleading. Secondly, the synthesis which Kant puts in third place, i.e. the synthesis of recognition or identification in Heidegger’s own term, is the primary one, because the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are dependent on identification. Thirdly, identification is itself dependent on the more fundamental synthesis that consists in the opening up and projecting in advance a whole— the whole which is in fact in one way or another disclosable and appropriatable in apprehension and reproduction.

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger does not say anything more regarding this opening up and projecting in advance a whole, but already, in Being and Time, he had explained it in detail. Heidegger means by this whole, which in Being and time, he calls ‘referential totality’ and in Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason terms as ‘regional unity’, that we never encounter single, isolated things but a complex, intricate grid of the interrelations of the things. A thing is always an equipment for using in an activity, something
that is made of other things by some persons, an instrument for actualising and end, and something used by persons. These interrelations of the things constitute a whole which Heidegger calls 'referential totality' or 'regional unity'. For example, the significance of a wrench and our understanding of it is determined on the basis of its relations to a mechanic, the workshop, the purpose or the use of it, like the repair of cars, the place of the wrench in the workshop, and so many other relations. Heidegger believes that all understanding always occurs in such a totality of interrelations, whereas we do not have a conceptual understanding of this totality.

Furthermore, as we pointed out in chapter One, in Heidegger’s view, human being is a potentiality-for-being whose mode of being has left to itself, and it must itself project its being. Dasein takes the meaning of its being only from the plan which it projects for its being as a whole. The being of Dasein, as a project toward its totality, is always beyond itself, in relating itself towards its defining possibility of being something or the other in the end. Dasein is defined as a “self-projective Being toward its ownmost potentiality-for-being”.

Heidegger conceives existence and understanding, which are the same, as identical with projection: “Understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call ‘projection’.” “In understanding Dasein opens up its own space for the free play of its existence as well as the free space for the play of entities which become available to it within the world. The two go together.” In Heidegger’s interpretation the very Dasein’s projection and its free play to present entities which are confronted with itself, conformed to the faculty of imagination in Kant’s philosophy, i.e. to the faculty which, unlike sense and understanding, freely synthesises representation.

According to Heidegger, through its projection Dasein opens up a region of this totality for itself, and Dasein confronts any object in the very totality, and this totality makes the objectness of the object and encounter with it possible.

Heidegger believes that the third synthesis which Kant presents, i.e., the synthesis of recognition, “is understood in terms of this advance waiting of a regional unity of offerable beings”, i.e., advance waiting of the same unity which all synthesis of recognition, or identification, presupposes among the beings in a referential totality or regional unity. Now through this very complex, abstruse analyses Heidegger endeavors to prove a relation between this third synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of recognition, and the future or, more precisely, with the third ecstasy of Dasein, which we express by the term ‘the future’, and to show that the synthesis
of recognition, or identification, as the third transcendental synthesis of imagination, is the ground of the future.

Heidegger believes that for Kant the synthesis of recognition has no relation to time, but in his own view this synthesis, like the two previous transcendental syntheses, apprehension and reproduction, it is related to time, and thus to transcendental imagination. Heidegger remarks that if he wanted to follow Kant’s way in the analysis of the synthesis of recognition, as knowing again, and if he wanted to show the relation of the synthesis of recognition and time in the same way it ought to be said that this synthesis, like the synthesis of reproduction, is again related to the past. Because the synthesis of recognition, according to Kant’s analysis, is always related to the now which is present and sinks into the past, and through Kant’s analysis we would never attain to the synthesis related to the future. But Heidegger believes that through his own analysis of Kant’s synthesis of recognition, i.e. as the synthesis of identification, and through reducing this synthesis to an advance taking [Vorwegnahme] of a unity which manifests itself in a regional totality, a ground for the future is provided. According to Heidegger, “by tracing recognition back to identification and this again back to an advance taking [Vorwegnahme] of a regional totality, it becomes clear by contrast that the moment of time (the temporal moment), to which the synthesis of re-cognition relates, is precisely the future, having in advance”.

As we frequently mentioned, Heidegger maintains that temporality is the most important ontological character of Dasein, and the phenomenon which we call ‘time’ originates from the mode of the being of Dasein itself, and in its temporality. The mode of the being of man is such that it always concerns with present things in its world, and it is never isolated from its world and the things contained in this world. The very confrontation and dealing with the things in the present now constitutes the ground of the present. But the mode of the being of man is in such that it has been in advance thrown among some possibilities, and this is a character which Heidegger calls ‘facticity’. Heidegger believes that human being’s facticity is the ground of the past. Human being can reproduce what he has already encountered. The very possibility of going back to what is already offered, is what we express by the term ‘the past’. But the mode of the being of man has also the capability to project its plan on the possibilities which are in front of it, i.e., the capability which Heidegger calls ‘projection’. According to Heidegger, the future is the domain of possibility and the result of a mode of the being of Dasein for choosing the various possibilities which are in front of it. Our projection on the possibilities which are in front of us, i.e., the future, makes our concern and dealing with the present things, which is the ground of the
present, possible. Thus, in Heidegger’s analysis of the moments of time, the future, which means Dasein’s projection on the possibilities which are in front of it, makes all encounter with things possible, and the future, i.e., Dasein’s projection underlies our understanding. For this reason, in Heidegger’s thought the future, in contrast to the present and the past, has greater priority.

In his interpretation of Kant’s synthesis of recognition or identification, Heidegger remarks that it is more accurate to say that this synthesis is designated the synthesis of ‘pre-cognition’, and by this designation he shows the priority of the synthesis of recognition to the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction.

Thus, Heidegger succeeds in conforming the three ecstasies of Dasein, corresponding three moments of time, to the three transcendental syntheses of the subject in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Through his interpretation of Kant’s three transcendental syntheses, Heidegger seeks to reach a very important conclusion, which was in advance proved for him in Being and Time. Heidegger believes that all the three transcendental syntheses are related to time, and Kant did not realise it. Kant classifies the three transcendental syntheses as the syntheses of understanding. We know that for Kant understanding as the spontaneity of mind is in opposition to intuition as the receptivity of mind, and time as the pure intuition is related to sense and sense intuition, and not to understanding and thought. The conclusion of these premises is that understanding as the spontaneity of mind is independent of time. That is why Kant believes that understanding is independent of time. But by showing the relation of all the three transcendental syntheses to time, Heidegger endeavors to prove that not only understanding is related to time but also it is essentially temporal.

Put more precisely, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, as we shall explain in the following pages, Kant conceives the three transcendental syntheses as the ground of transcendental apperception and its constituents. Heidegger holds that Kant conceives transcendental apperception as related to understanding and thus as non-temporal. But Heidegger himself believes that since all the three transcendental syntheses constituting the transcendental apperception are related to time, the transcendental apperception is also itself temporal.

Heidegger believes that, on the basis of both Kant’s and his own conception, the origin of categories is time. Heidegger argues that, according to Kant, categories are the product of the activity of understanding, and the synthesis of recognition is to be conceived as the activity of understanding. In his interpretation, Heidegger shows that the synthesis of recognition is time-
related. The conclusion of these premises is that categories are time-related. In addition, Heidegger in his interpretation shows that all the three pure transcendental syntheses which make all relation to the object possible, are time-related, then the origin of categories which make the objectness of the object possible, is time itself, i.e., the pure intuition (pure receptivity). According to this argument of Heidegger the task of transcendental deduction, as disclosure of the ontological essence of categories, must primarily be oriented towards the phenomenon of time, i.e. toward pure receptivity (pure intuition).

Heidegger himself confesses that his interpretation, i.e., the conception of time as the ground of categories, may seem a violent, imposed interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, nevertheless Kant's discussion of schematism is nothing other than the explanation of the ontological essence of categories on the basis of their time-relatedness. Regarding schematism, thus Heidegger's interpretation does not seem so violent and imposed.

According to Heidegger's interpretation, the actual task of the part Three of 'A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', i.e., the part 'The Synthesis of Recognition in Concept', "is to explicate the transcendental apperception, and the synthesis of recognition is a transition to this explication. By interpreting transcendental apperception Kant attempts to press forward toward the sustaining ground of all syntheses". Here, Heidegger points out that in his own interpretation of transcendental apperception he emphasises the phenomenon of identification (the synthesis of pre-cognition), i.e., an anticipation of a unity which shows itself in a regional unity, or in other words, awaiting a pre-having of a unity, which has a basic importance.

Heidegger mentions that in the entire tradition of metaphysics, intuition, i.e. the immediate relation to a present object, has always been conceived as the primordial act of knowledge. Since for Heidegger intuition (apprehension) or the encounter with the things is the ground of 'the present', the emphasis on intuition in knowledge in the tradition of metaphysics means an emphasis on 'the present' as primordial moment of time. But in his explanation of time, Heidegger emphasises the advance awaiting of a unity in a certain region or, in accord with what is expressed in Being and Time, Dasein's projection on the possibilities which are in front of it, or on the future as the primordial moment of time, which underlines understanding. Heidegger maintains that precisely since Kant grounds thinking in intuition and places thinking at the service of intuition, therefore, he must necessarily also limit the comportment of understanding to the present and must see the basic function of understanding and the faculty of understanding
itself—transcendental apperception—precisely in the comportment to the present, and it means that Kant, unlike Heidegger, conceives the present, i.e. the encounter with the present things in the present now, as the primordial moment in perception. Kant criticises Kant’s discussion of the synthesis of recognition in various ways. Heidegger believes that Kant describes the character of the synthesis of recognition in a rough sort of way. Unlike his discussions of the two previous syntheses, i.e., the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, Kant “fails to differentiate an empirical from a possible transcendental synthesis of recognition, in correspondence with the analysis of both preceding synthesese.” For Heidegger, it indicates that Kant fails to realise the phenomenon of in advance waiting of a unity which shows itself in a regional totality.

However, Heidegger believes that we do not have any single, isolated understanding of the thing and all understanding of a thing is dependent on an in advance waiting of the region in which the thing belongs. In addition, in the knowledge of an object we do not have any absolute beginning, and all beginning is preceded by the very in advance awaiting. This in advance waiting must not be conceived as a theoretical, conceptual, thematised relation between subject and object. According to Heidegger, “obviously we begin with what is offered in a present. However, all such beginnings are basically and fundamentally a returning from what is taken more or less explicitly in an explicit manner. The formal unity of the concept—respectively, the acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction—are possible only if something like a relation to objects already exists. But this relation depends primarily on taking in advance a sphere of totality of ontological interrelations which is more or less determined. This taking-in-advance of a regional totality makes possible for the first time the identification of individual objects of this region.”

This pure-taking-in-advance, which Heidegger expresses by the words ‘seizing in advance’ or an ‘explicitly taking’ is a non-theoretical, non-conceptual, non-thematised relation which underlies all cognitive, theoretical relations. This relation is the very transcendence of the subject and its relation to the object, which makes the objectness of the object possible. This pure-explicit-taking-in-advance is what in Being and Time Heidegger expresses by ‘being-in-the-world’, and in later works by Dasein’s openness to Being.

Heidegger believes that, this in-advance-seizing, or pure-taking-in-advance, is what Kant seeks in the pure synthesis of recognition. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant holds that the synthesis of recognition also at the same time underlies the unity of the pure syntheses of
apprehension and reproduction. According to this interpretation, Kant relatively clearly saw that the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition must have a unity and this unity is in need of a transcendental ground. Kant put transcendental apperception as the ground of the unity of these three transcendental syntheses, and in his view transcendental apperception is constituted by the unity of these three syntheses. Heidegger maintains that for Kant the synthesis of recognition has no relation to time, and for this reason he could not realise the relation to the future of what he calls the synthesis of recognition and consequently he could not understand the time-relatedness of the ground of these three transcendental synthesis, i.e., the time-relatedness of transcendental apperception originally. Heidegger believes that transcendental apperception has closer relation to the synthesis of recognition in contrast with the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. But in his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger does not present any more explanation about this point, yet, as Jean Wahl remarks, for Heidegger the modalities of the future, the past, and the present are respectively possibility, necessity, and Being. In this way the three categories of modality in Kant are in agreement with the three moments of time. Therefore, Heidegger’s view, that transcendental apperception, has closer relation to the synthesis of recognition in contrast with the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, can be interpreted in this sense that transcendental apperception or Dasein has closer relation to the future in contrast with the past and the present, and this means that the mode of the being of man is primarily a possibility, i.e., freedom, and not a necessity or reality, and this interpretation is in accord with Heidegger’s view in Being and time, that human being is not a present at-hand, i.e., but, accomplished being rather a potentiality-for-being.

Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Kant does not clarify “whether the transcendental apperception is something that is added to these three syntheses, as a unifying link”, or whether since these three syntheses are related to time, and thus are in themselves unified and interrelated, they constitute transcendental apperception, and transcendental apperception is essentially the ground of their unity.

By the following diagram Heidegger intends to contrast the three transcendental syntheses according to Kant, along with their interpretation according to himself.
This diagram shows well the upshot of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's three transcendental syntheses. The summary of this part of Heidegger's interpretation regarding this diagram can be expressed as follows:

1) According to Kant, the mind has two basic faculties, intuition (receptive) and thought (spontaneous), and in order to fill the gap between these two main sources of knowledge Kant was forced to introduce imagination as a link between intuition (sense) and thought (understanding). But for Heidegger the basic constitution of the subject is in a mode that is
essentially, simultaneously receptive and spontaneous. Heidegger expresses this mode of Being by the terms of ‘existence’ and ‘temporality’, which he conforms to ‘imagination’ in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger believes that the power of imagination, according to Kant’s terminology, is the common root of intuition and thought. The power of imagination, in Heidegger’s view is essentially related to time. The pure, time-related a synthesis of imagination is what, in Heidegger’s own terminology, is called ‘temporality’. As we have frequently pointed out, Heidegger holds that temporality is the basic constitution of the subject or *Dasein*.

2) Kant believes that time is pure intuition, i.e., pure receptivity, and is related to only intuition, and not to the two other faculties, imagination and thought. Intuition is itself also the receptivity of the subject, which lies in opposition to thought (understanding), which is the spontaneity of the subject. But according to Heidegger, it is temporality, or the pure time-related synthesis, which is equi-primodially the ground of both time and transcendental apperception.

3) Kant holds that the two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are time-related and time is the ground of the two syntheses. These two syntheses gather in the synthesis of recognition, whereas the synthesis of recognition in itself has no relation to time. But Heidegger believes that all the three syntheses are time-related, and time is the ground of all the three syntheses of pre-cognition, apprehension, and reproduction. Heidegger holds that the term recognition for Kant’s third synthesis is misleading and substitutes it with the expression ‘pre-cognition’.

4) According to Kant, the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, of which only the second one (the synthesis of reproduction) is the function of the power of imagination, are related to the subject through the power of imagination. But Heidegger believes that all the three syntheses of pre-cognition, apprehension, and reproduction, which correspond to the three temporal ecstasies of the future, the past, and present, are the function of the power of imagination due their time-relatedness.

5) Both Kant and Heidegger conceive the three syntheses as the constituents of transcendental apperception with this difference that in Heidegger this point is clearer and more explicit. Moreover, for Kant only the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are time-related whereas the synthesis of recognition is not directly time-related. This, according to Heidegger, causes rapture in Kant’s philosophy of mind regarding whether transcendental apperception is temporal or non-temporal. But Heidegger believes that all the transcendental syntheses are time-related, and thus transcendental apperception is itself temporal.
37) Object-Relatedness as the Main Constituent of the Subject

We are here explicating Heidegger’s interpretation of the second part of ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding’ in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled ‘The *A priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience’. We said that Kant conceives the three transcendental syntheses as the *a priori* grounds, and he also conceives transcendental apperception as the unifying ground in which the three transcendental syntheses are unified. Now we are here seeking to explain the constitution of the transcendental apperception itself according to Kant and Heidegger’s views.

Hereafter, the discussion concerns with the explanation of subjectivity itself, i.e., with the answer to the question what constitutes the subjectivity of the subject as such. In order to more easily understand this part of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, it is necessary to remind ourselves that according to Heidegger, being-in-the-world is the most important ontological characteristic of *Dasein*.

As we stated in chapter One, Heidegger seeks to destroy Cartesian picture of the world, of human being, and of their relation. According to this picture, the essential attribute of mind is thinking and the essential attribute of body or matter is extension. We know that it is one of the problems in Cartesian dualistic philosophy to explain the relation between mind and matter. According to Cartesian dualism-subjectivism, which Kant inherits, it is assumed as self-evident that we can draw a clear boundary between inner experience on one side and the things or the objects in external world on the other side. This seemingly unquestionable metaphysical assumption, however, raises the question as to how we can transcend from the realm of our mind to the external world. Heidegger basically rejects this conception of man, the world, and their relation, and denies the existence a clear boundary between inner and outer, man and the world, or subject and object. Heidegger maintains that “subject and object do not coincide with *Dasein* and the world”, and the knowledge of the world is a founded mode which depends on the existential, non-cognitive, ontological relation between human being and the world, between subject and object. Heidegger calls this essential, non-cognitive relation of *Dasein* and the world, ‘being-in-the-world’, which is a precursory relation and is the ground of any cognitive relation. Heidegger endeavors to show that human being is not merely a subject. What this means is not that human being has other faculties and dispositions, such as will, or emotions, but that the truth of man lies more and before ‘being a subject’, in the fact that it has a comportment.
toward Being, the *essents* and the world. Heidegger maintains that human being, unlike its
picture in the Cartesian subjectivistic tradition, is never an isolated, worldless subject, but a
being essentially constituted through its world. In other words, while in Cartesian subjectivism
the existence of the world and also the relation of man, as a subject, to the so-called external
world, as the object, are irresolvable problematic, in Heidegger’s conception from the beginning
*Dasein* is defined on the basis of its relation to the world, i.e., through being-in-the-world. This
means that self or subject becomes self or subject only if it is within the world and has a relation
with the world.374 Now, Heidegger attempts to apply this conception of *Dasein*, as being-in-the-
world, in his interpretation of Kant, and to show that according to Kant object-relatedness is
what constitutes the subjectivity of subject, and this very relation is the ground of all possible
knowledge and experience.

It was said that Kant conceives transcendental apperception as the ground for the unity of
the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, and among
these three syntheses he gives an outstanding role to the synthesis of recognition in the
constitution of transcendental apperception. It was also said that these three transcendental
syntheses, as the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience, make the relation to the object
essentially possible. Now, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant attempts to explain the
essence of transcendental apperception or ‘I think’ in terms of the essence of the object.385

We already pointed out that Kant is, according to Heidegger, the first to ask a question
which nobody set forth before him, i.e., the question as to what we essentially mean by the ob-
ject of knowledge.

This question may be answered in this way that we deal always with the objects of our
knowledge such as this desk, that chair, and so on. But the problem is that there are some
concepts for which we find no object, and by chance these concepts have a very important,
estential role in our knowledge. We must not forget that we are seeking to understand
Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘Transcendental Logic’ and ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure
Concepts’, and in fact in order to explain these pure concepts Kant sets forth his very crucial
question of what we mean by the object. We possess certain very essential concepts, such as
unity, multiplicity, substance, causality, which make all experience and the objectness of the
object basically possible, without themselves being the object of our experience. Then before
everything we must determine how and whence the meaning of the object and the objectness of
the object essentially originate.
Heidegger believes that "Obviously we cannot obtain the concept of object in general through empirical reflection and abstraction. For if we wish to distinguish through generalisation what in a multiplicity of objects is common to all of them as objects, then upon closer examination we would have to admit that we must already understand something like an object in general, in order to let certain individual objects stand over against us for purposes of generalisation". Put differently, before we can abstract the concept of the object in general from the individual objects, we must already understand the meaning of the objectness of the object or the concept of the object in general in order that we can discern the objectness of the individual objects. According to Heidegger's interpretation, "therefore, Kant concludes that what we mean by 'object in general' cannot be empirically extant, as if there were extant objects and behind them still again something extant, which makes them into objects at all. Thus if the idea of 'object in general' is not to be gotten through observation of objects but is instead already presupposed in every observation, then this idea must be sought in what precedes every ontic grasping of definite objects". In other words, the origin of the meaning of the object in general, as a priori, must be sought in the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience, in the three transcendental syntheses and in their ground, i.e., in transcendental apperception and in the subject itself. In fact Heidegger implicitly endeavors to show that Kant's discussion of the meaning of the object in general corresponds to his own view on Being. Kant believes that 'the object in general', i.e., the objectness of the objects, is not an object in the midst of other objects and it cannot be objectified by us. This corresponds to Heidegger's own view that Being is not a being (entity) midst other beings, and we cannot observe and experience Being as such. Kant holds that the meaning of 'the object in general' is not derived from observation and experience but its origin must be sought in the subject, the transcendental apperception, itself. For Heidegger, this idea of Kant is nothing but an acknowledgement that we possess a precursory comprehension of the meaning of the object in general, i.e., of the meaning of Being as such. Kant believes that this a priori comprehension of the meaning of 'the object in general' or 'objectness of the object', i.e., our precursory understanding of Being, must be sought in the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience, namely, in transcendental apperception itself, and this is, according to Heidegger's interpretation, nothing other than the acknowledgement of the transcendence of transcendental apperception. It is the a priori comprehension of the meaning of the objectness of the object, or the precursory comprehension of Being, which constitutes the transcendental constitution of the transcendental apperception. Put more clearly, on the basis of
the Kantian foundation, we can say that the objectness of the object is a priori and thus belongs to the subject itself, and hence we can define the subject, i.e., human being, as the being which possesses a concept of the objectness of object, and this conception of human being corresponds to Heidegger's endeavor to defend Dasein as the being which possesses a precursory comprehension of the meaning of Being as such, i.e., as the being which understands Being.

According to Heidegger, "Ontological knowledge in Kantian sense aims precisely at this objectness [of the object] itself." More simply, what Kant conceives as the a priori grounds which make the objectness of the object possible, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, is ontological knowledge. Moreover, in Kant’s view the a priori grounds of experience, the three transcendental syntheses, which constitute the objectness of the object, or, in Heidegger’s terminology, our precursory understanding of Being, are also the constituents of transcendental apperception. This view of Kant for Heidegger means that our very ontological understanding of the object is the constituent of transcendental apperception (the subject).

Hitherto, it became clear that the meaning of ‘the object in general’, or Being in Heidegger’s terminology, is not derived from experience, nor it is the product of logical functions of understanding, but it must be sought in the subject (transcendental apperception) itself. But what do we mean when we speak of the object in general? Kant’s answer to the question is: object in general is “that which prevents our mode of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion". Then objectness or object in general means that which prevents our knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary and gives it a priori a kind of binding, necessity, and unity.

Heidegger believes that

in order to present the meaning of objectness, Kant appeals to what is contrary, what shows a peculiar character of resistance. But in fact Kant does not think of an ontic resistance which emanates from a definite, extant object. Rather this resistance has to do with an a priori resistance, with a resistance which is in the subject— a resistance which the subject gives to itself. This resistance, which is in the subject itself, does not mean something against which the subject comes up or into which the subject runs. Rather, this ability to resist manifests itself in a regulating and a binding. Thus in and for the subject itself and for its a priori activities as such, there is a binding which has nothing to do with physical coercion but instead is rooted in the very core of the subject, in its spontaneity— a binding which is essentially freedom. This freedom in itself is the presupposition for the possibility of all a priori necessity of unification of pure synthesis of time."
38) Freedom as One of the Essential Characteristic of Transcendental Apperception

In the course of Heidegger's inquiries, occasionally some concepts are introduced in the discussion, which are at first sight somewhat unexpected, and thus irritating. The introduction of the concept of freedom here is one of these concepts. But what does this "a binding which is essentially freedom" mean?

Definitely, this discussion has some background in Kant himself. Kant holds that all our activities and those of other beings are necessitated. However, only understanding (and the will insofar as it can be determined by understanding) is free and is pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. Without this original and unchangeable spontaneity we would not know anything a priori, for we would be determined in everything and even our thoughts would be subject to empirical laws. The faculty to think and to act a priori is thus the sole condition for the possibility of the origin of all other appearances. [Otherwise] even 'ought' would have no meaning.

Thus, Kant believes that thought as such cannot be necessitated and cannot be subject to empirical laws, because otherwise thinking and the phenomena such as understanding, arguing, discovering, mistaking would be impossible. So, thought is a spontaneous and free activity. But at the same time thought adopts its objectivity from its relation to object, and the very object prevents our thought from being haphazard or arbitrary. Then thought is at the same time bounded and determined. Giving a hint to Heidegger's discussion in On The Essence of Truth, about the relation of freedom and truth, may help us to understand this part of his interpretation. In this treatise Heidegger says: "Truth is freedom." In Being and Time, passage 44, entitled 'Dasein, Disclosedness, and truth', Heidegger questions the ordinary, traditional conception of truth, on the basis of which 'correspondence' is assumed as the characteristic of truth. In the traditional concept of truth, 'correspondence' is the attribute of judgment, and judgment is conceived as the place of truth. But Heidegger asks what 'correspondence' is itself, and what to what must correspond. In replying to this question Heidegger renders his view on the origin of truth. According to Heidegger's view, truth is the manifestation or disclosedness of the thing itself. This means that before we can assign the attributes of correctness or falsehood to judgement, the thing to which the subject of judgment refers must manifest itself to us. Human being is not omnipotent and cannot create the object of its knowledge. Rather the thing itself must reveal itself to us and then we can obtain only from the thing itself a guiding clue by which we are able to utter a true judgment on the thing.
This manifestation of the thing is the unifying, necessary, and binding which, in Kant's words, prevents our knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary. But, on the other hand, Heidegger believes that understanding in itself has an existential structure which he calls 'projection'. On the basis of this structure, "in understanding, Dasein opens up its own space for the free play of its existence as well as the free space for the play of entities which become available to it within the world. The two go together". In this context, freedom means that through standing in the realm of the open, human being is able to subject himself to what is manifest and shows itself in the realm of the open. "Revealing (to Dasein) of entities and binding itself (by Dasein) to entities are not two distinct processes but one and the same. Dasein exposes itself to what-is". Freedom here means: "An 'exposition' into the revealed nature of what-is". According to Heidegger, "in the act of representing, we can let an entity itself lay its claim upon us and become representable. Man establishes, in this way, a bond with beings— because truth in its essence is freedom".

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger restates this conception of Dasein and its free projection as one of the essential characteristics of Dasien, and his understanding of the main role of Dasein's free Projection in constituting the essence of thought, and he seeks to show that freedom is one of the essential characteristics of transcendental apperception and one of the fundamental elements in our encounter with an object and in the act of objectification.

Throughout Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, the role of freedom in transcendence is pursued as a subsidiary issue. It may be said that Heidegger's entire interpretation is centered around three main themes, which consist in order of their importance of transcendence, truth, and freedom. Of these themes, for Heidegger, like Kant, transcendence and truth are, throughout, the more relevant aim. In Heidegger's interpretation the theme of freedom is very essential, although it does not at first sight seem so. Heidegger tries to secure a new basis for the principal concepts of ontology, categories, by seeking their original union with intuition, specifically pure intuition (time). The unity of categories (ontological concepts) or the pure concepts of understanding, and intuition, is due to the very essential unity of our intuition and thought, which is due to the common root of the fundamental faculties of our knowledge, i.e., transcendental imagination. He endeavors to demonstrate this common root of our faculties (intuition and thought) by showing how our receptivity has an element of spontaneity, while our spontaneity has an element of receptivity. The discussion of freedom here refers to the element of spontaneity in our cognitive faculties.
Thought must have two main characteristics. Firstly, it must be related to sensibility (intuition) in order to give us knowledge of the *essents*, otherwise our thought would be without real content. Secondly, thought must be free and not be limited to sensibility, because otherwise it would be impossible to think and act in our own way.

Kant was very careful to demarcate sensibility and thought, i.e., the functions of spontaneity and receptivity, in order to leave open the possibility of human freedom from being subject to sensibility and natural determinism. For Kant since thought is a faculty distinct from sensibility, it can in some respects function on its own way without the limitations of sensibility. Kant holds that the ability of thought to function apart from sensibility (although not for theoretical knowledge) leaves open the possibility of thinking a moral realm that is not subject to natural determinism.

But Kant believes that the possibility of freedom is thinkable, although we can know nothing of it. Kant is satisfied with this merely negative description of freedom, and indeed thinks that no further determination of it is possible for speculative reason. For Kant, the essence of moral freedom lies in the denial of the claims of sensibility on the noumenal self. It is our ability to think without the constraints of sensibility that ensures the possibility of freedom. In contrast, Heidegger seeks to show that freedom is possible without severing the bond to intuition, and indeed that sensibility has its own kind of freedom. Indeed, according to Heidegger, transcendence is best understood in the light of freedom.

Heidegger believes that transcendence, the possibility of the experience of binges, should be understood as a kind of freedom. This conception of the freedom of transcendence is not alien to Kant, for indeed Kant always emphasised the spontaneity of thought. However, Kant does not give this much explicit discussion in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger wants to provide a new conception of freedom that, unlike Kant’s account of the moral freedom, which is a negative explanation, is positive. Heidegger intends to consider freedom as an essential element in transcendence itself. In order to affirm this freedom, Heidegger stresses the power of imagination as a unitary source for our receptivity (finitude) and our spontaneity (freedom). Heidegger attempts to show that our faculties, which underlie logic, truth, science, are founded in a radical freedom. According to Heidegger, *Dasein* is transcendence, and transcendence is the same as freedom, i.e. self-commitment or self-binding to what-is. Here, this last sentence must not be understood as a kind of ethical realism or resigning ourselves to present realities. Here what-is refers to Being as the origin of truth and objectivity.
39) The Explication of Subjectivity on the Basis of Transcendence

Let us again assess our position. Following Kant, in "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding", we were seeking to explain the second element of pure knowledge, i.e., the essence of pure thought (pure concepts) or categories. We know that pure knowledge (pure synthetic judgments) or ontological knowledge in Heidegger's terminology, means the precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent, which makes all experience essentially possible. Since this knowledge is independent of all experience, it is called 'pure knowledge'. We have said that according to Heidegger, Kant's main aim of transcendental deduction of categories is the analysis of the essential structure of the pure veritative synthesis which provides the possibility of all relation to object. This analysis, for Heidegger, is nothing other than the explanation of the transcendence of subject, or human being in general. Heidegger believes that Kant's transcendental logic is not logic in the ordinary sense, i.e., the investigation on the forms of judgments, disregarding all relation to the matter of knowledge, rather in transcendental logic the very transcendence of thought, i.e. the object-relatedness of thought, is inquired. Put more clearly, transcendental deduction in Kant's transcendental logic is a kind of anthropology, in the sense of the ontology of Dasein's transcendence.\textsuperscript{401}

According to Heidegger's interpretation, in the second part of 'Transcendental Deduction', entitled 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience' Kant discusses the a priori grounds, i.e. the grounds which lie in the subject itself, which provide the possibility of experience, that is, the possibility of the relation to object, and for Heidegger, the very relation to object is nothing other than the transcendence of the subject. Kant introduces the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition as 'the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience', which provide the possibility of the relation to object and the possibility of the objectness of object before all experience. Kant believes that these three syntheses are those pure transcendental syntheses which make the relation to object possible, and for Heidegger it means that these three syntheses are the constituents of transcendental subjectivity or the transcendence of the subject. Kant conceives transcendental apperception (subjectivity) as the essential, original power in which these three syntheses are unified, and in which all relation to the object, the objectness of object, i.e. the transcendence of subject—according to Heidegger's interpretation—is constituted. Then the problem of categories, i.e. the explication of those pure concept which make in advance the objectness of object possible, "is
nothing other than just the question concerning the ground of the unity of these syntheses in the
subject", i.e., the question concerning transcendental apperception. Now we are here seeking to
explicate the constitution of the transcendental apperception (subjectivity), i.e., to show its
transcendence, according to Heidegger’s interpretation.

Heidegger demonstrated that all three transcendental syntheses are time-related, thus the
ground of their unity, namely transcendental apperception must also be understood as time-
related. For this reason, the explication of the transcendence of transcendental apperception must
be in its turn conducted on the basis of time or temporality. Heidegger holds that if we
understand transcendental logic and transcendental deduction of categories in a perspective other
than the one he uses in his interpretation, some significant sentences in the Critique of Pure
Reason remain completely enigmatic. Heidegger believes that however little Kant here refers
directly to the transcendental constitution of the subject, but the content of his sentences shows
well that his discussion is centered around the transcendence of transcendental apperception.
Heidegger holds that Kant did not attain a clear, explicit understanding of the problem of
transcendence. That is why in the solution of the problem of transcendental deduction and in the
explanation of the origin of categories instead of directly emphasising the transcendence of the
subject, he tries to resolve the problem of the intrinsic possibility of the relation to the object
through finding a ground for the unity of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension,
reproduction, and recognition. We must not forget that for proving the objectivity of categories
Kant needs to demonstrate the intrinsic possibility of the relation of concepts in general to
objects, in order that he can prove the relation of the pure concepts of understanding (categories)
to objects. As we said, Heidegger believes that Kant’s explanation of the ground of the unity of
these three transcendental syntheses is nothing other than the explication of the ontological
structure of the subject.

Then, as we pointed out, here we are concern with the explanation of subjectivity itself, i.e.
to answer the question as to what constitutes the subjectivity of the subject itself. We also
explained that, according to Heidegger, Kant attempts to explicate the essence of transcendental
apperception, ‘I think’, or the subjectivity of the subject on the basis of a discussion of the
meaning of object in general.

In addition, we clarified that the meaning of ‘object in general’ or, in Heidegger’s
terminology, the meaning of Being, is not derived from observation and experience, and it is not
a product of the logical functions of understanding, rather this meaning must be sought in
transcendental apperception itself. Kant believes that the object in general is ‘that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them \textit{a priori} in some definite fashion’. Then following Kant, we are here seeking the explanation of the essence of transcendental apperception which is the ground of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses which make the encounter with an object essentially possible. Thus transcendental apperception is the ground of all encounter with the \textit{essents} and the ground of the possibility of all relation to the object. According to Kant’s view, ‘object in general’ is the resistant, binding, unifying, regulating element which prevents our knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary. As we said, this general meaning of objectness or object in general, is not empirical because all experience is basically dependent on our precursory comprehension of the meaning of objectness or object in general. Then this precursory comprehension of the meaning of objectness or object in general is \textit{a priori}, i.e. belongs to the subject itself. Now the question is: “What is the subjectivity of the subject itself, that this subject as such makes possible something like a regulating, binding resistance, indeed in such a way that this resistance constitutes ‘standing against something’? What makes this resistance possible, a resistance that, seen from the point of view of the subject, constitutes \textit{what always stands over against me as belonging to me}? In other words, how should we explain the fact that, on the one hand, the meaning of ‘object in general’, i.e., the objectness of the object, is \textit{a priori}, i.e., belongs to the subject itself, and, on the other hand, this ‘object in general’ ‘or the binding, regulating resistance, as object, stands over against the subject. Put differently, according to Heidegger’s own terminology, the question is how to explicate the subjectivity of the subject (\textit{Dasein}) and its relation to the world (Being) such that, on one hand, the worldhood of the world or our precursory understanding of the meaning of Being is existential, i.e. belongs to \textit{Dasein’s} existence, and, on the other hand, this very worldhood of the world is \textit{Dasein’s} object. In other words, how must we conceive the relation of the subject to ‘object in general’ (Being) such that these two are one and at the same time distinct. Through this way of setting forth the problem Heidegger seeks to pass beyond subjectivism, i.e. to reach a dimension which is prior to all cognitive relation between subject and object, which is essentially beyond the subject-object dichotomy.

In the framework of Kantian thought, regarding the main problem of transcendental deduction, i.e., the problem of categories, we can set forth the question of the essence of the subjectivity of the subject in another way. It has already been said that categories are those
concepts which make the objectness of the object possible. In addition, Kant conceives the objectness of the object as the result of the functions of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, which are unified in apperception. Kant relates this apperception to the anticipation of unity, in whose horizon the identification, or in Kant's own terminology, the synthesis of recognition, is made possible. This anticipation of the unity, i.e. the precursory comprehension of the unity, as the horizon in which the object reveals itself, according to Kant, is a mode of consciousness. But this consciousness, i.e. an original knowing of unity, is not the result of the sense intuition, because it is prior to the givenness of all the given, and all givenness to intuition essentially occurs in the horizon of this consciousness of the unity. Thus this consciousness is pre-cognition. But, on the other hand, this consciousness or anticipation of the unity is not the product of the function of understanding and its spontaneity, because any function of understanding follows encounter with the object, whereas here we are dealing with the consciousness of the essential unity which is the ground of the three transcendental synthesis and is pre-receptive, prior to sense intuition, namely we are here concerned with that what makes the objectness of the object essentially possible.

In Being and Time Heidegger's explanation of the subjectivity of the subject on the basis of transcendence and Dasein's relation to the world has more clarity. So, let us have a glimpse at this explanation as set forth in Being and Time. Heidegger holds that while 'I think' gives Kant a genuine phenomenal starting point for analysing selfhood, he cannot exploit it ontologically. Kant emphasises that the 'I' remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them. According to Heidegger's interpretation, this means that for Kant the 'I' is not only an 'I think', rather more than it an 'I think something'. But Heidegger believes that unless the meaning of this 'something' becomes clear, this very 'I' is not still a quite clear, unambiguous point for the explication of the self. According to Heidegger's analysis, this 'something' is an entity-in-the-world. Hence, in thinking about everything the phenomenon of the world is already presupposed. Thus, if self is always determined in the mode of 'I think something', and if in the
meaning of this 'something' the phenomenon of the world is already presupposed, then we can conclude that the mode of the Being of the self and the phenomenon of the world are jointly determined. Heidegger believes that Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world and consequently for him the ‘I’ was again forced back to a subject isolated from the world. But Heidegger himself believes that in saying ‘I’, Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-world. 

40) The Explanation of Transcendental Apperception on the Basis of Existence and Praxis

However, what is the essence of transcendental apperception? Kant holds that ‘man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception, and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses”. According to Heidegger, Kant appears to conceive transcendental apperception as a logical pure consciousness. In §7 of his treatise, entitled Anthropology, Kant says that the term apperception is supposed “to indicate a logical (pure) consciousness”, and for Heidegger this means that this logical consciousness is “a knowledge not of what is empirical but of what is pure, i.e., a knowledge of what is merely subjective, a knowledge of activity itself”.

In this part, with reference to the Latin term ad-percipere (apperception) and through an etymological analysis of it Heidegger attempts to show that, unlike the Cartesian conception of the self, the truth of the ‘I’ is not being an understanding or a consciousness (‘I think’) but is an action or an ability to act (‘I can’). In this way Heidegger endeavors to call for a challenge to the metaphysical tradition in general and the Cartesian tradition in particular, in which the priority of theory over action and the priority of theoretical relation over praxis seems an unquestionable foundation. Thereby Heidegger attempts to show the priority of praxis over theoretical relation, in regard to selfhood. Indeed, Heidegger tries to show that, unlike what Descartes says in his ‘cogito’, the existence of the subject is not the act of thinking, rather existence is prior to thinking, and the existence of the subject is prior to the act of thinking. In other words, before everything, the subject is an ability to think and not thinking itself. “Thinking as such at all times starts ‘from itself’, from the self as itself”, and the self does not start from thinking. Thus, Heidegger believes that for Kant transcendental apperception is ‘I think’ itself. But Heidegger holds that this ‘I think’ is grounded in ‘I am able to think’. More simply, according to Heidegger
Kant, in his explication of the selfhood, could not go forward further than transcendental apperception. In other words, Descartes' 'I think', could not obtain more profound layers of the selfhood. Heidegger believes that 'I can', i.e., the ability-character of my actions primarily determines the mode of being of the subject'. Therefore, the 'I', before being a thinking entity, is an action, i.e., the ability to think. There must be first an ability to think if thinking is to be possible. This conclusion corresponds to Heidegger's discussions of Dasein or existence in Being and Time, according to which Dasein is before everything a potentiality-for-being. Thus, Dasein is prior to thinking. Dasein is, before being a subject, an existence and an ability.

41) The Explication of Transcendental Apperception on the Basis of Possibility

In the passages relating to the interpretation of the second and third sections of 'Transcendental Deduction of the pure Concepts of Understanding', Heidegger endeavors to analyses the essence of transcendental apperception and the subjectivity of the subject. It is not so easy to understand the routes which Heidegger takes in these analyses, but the understanding of the conclusions of these analyses are relatively more visible.

In order to understand Heidegger's approach, let us first have a glimpse of his conception of Dasein as possibility in Being and Time. As we stated in chapter One, Heidegger holds that under the influence of culture, language and tradition we have become used to understanding the mode of our own being, i.e., our existence, in terms of those concepts and patterns derived from non-human entities which have categorical determinations and lack existence and existential attributes. We have also become used to conceiving human being's existential attributes in terms of the categorical determinations of things. During the entire tradition of metaphysics this misconception is seen. One of Heidegger's main aims in Being and Time is destroying the traditional conception of human being and presenting a new understanding of Dasein's existence. Heidegger believes that all entities, with respect of the mode of their being, are accomplished, fulfilled beings which Heidegger calls 'present-at-hand', i.e., those beings which are ready, present and accomplished. But the mode of the being of Dasein (existence), unlike other entities, has no complete, fulfilled essence, and we can conceive the mode of the being of Dasein as a mode of being which must be realised. For this reason, Heidegger names the mode of the being of Dasein, 'potentiality-for-being'. The existentiality of existence consists in that from the beginning, Dasein is moved by an ability-of-being that must be realised. Dasein is its-potentiality-for-being of that what is not yet.
Now the problem is: What does selfhood mean ontologically for Dasein, i.e., for the mode of being which are not ready, present, and accomplished but must be realised? Since a long time ago it has been presupposed that the ‘I’ or the ‘self’ is the unifying ground for the mode of being of man. But this self or ‘I’ has not been ontologically explained, or has always been understood on the basis of the pattern derived from other entities.

We already pointed out that one of Heidegger’s aims in *Being and Time* is to refute what can be called ‘substance ontology’. One of the reasons for Heidegger’s disagreement with substance ontology is that in this ontology, since substances are basically different, human being and nature are two basically different, separated substances in so far as their interaction becomes a problem, as we see in Cartesian dualism.* In traditional anthropology, the self is described by the attributes of substantiality, simplicity, and personality. According to Heidegger, Kant shows that the ontical thesis about the soul-substance which have been inferred from these characteristics are without justification. But in doing so, he has by no means achieved an ontological interpretation of selfhood…. Kant makes a more rigorous attempt than his predecessors to keep hold of the phenomenal content of saying ‘I’; yet even though in theory he has denied that the ontical foundations of the ontology of the substantial apply to the ‘I’, he still slips back into this same inappropriate ontology,** i.e., into the understanding of human being as a substance. For Kant, the ‘I’ or transcendental apperception is the ‘I think’ which clings to all representation and concepts. Then the ‘I’ is a bare consciousness accompanying all representations. This ‘I’ is the pure form of all consciousness, i.e., the form of all representation without being represented.*** The ‘I’ is ‘the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to have been representing’.**** Kant calls the ‘I’ a ‘logical subject’. But this, according to Heidegger, “does mean that the ‘I’ in general is the concept obtained merely by way of logic”, and through logical functions of understanding “the ‘I’ is rather the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together. ‘I think’ means ‘I bind together’.”***** This ‘I bind’ is the form of all representation and all synthesis. But does Kant mean that the ‘I’ is nothing other a universal concept or framework when he speaks of the ‘I’ as the form of representation and synthesis? According to Heidegger’s interpretation, the ‘I’ is that which makes every representing and everything represented be what it is. If Kant conceives the ‘I’ as the form of representation, this means that ‘the I’ is the ‘logical subject’ which underlines all binding and synthesising.******

Heidegger maintains that Kant’s analysis of the ‘I’ or transcendental apperception has two positive aspects: “For one thing, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the ‘I’ to a
substance; for another thing, he holds fast to the ‘I’ as ‘I think’.

Nevertheless, Heidegger believes that Kant ontologically inappropriately takes this ‘I’ as subject again. In other words, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant, like his predecessors, conceives the ‘I’ as present-at-hand, which has the attributes of selfsameness and steadiness. Put differently, Heidegger believes that Kant understands the being of the ‘I’ as the reality of the thinking thing, and this is the same thing that Heidegger calls for a challenge, i.e., the same point that the ‘I’ or the self is not a present-at-hand, fulfilled, accomplished thing which thinks. Rather this ‘I’ is, before everything, a potentiality-for-being, i.e., a possibility which must be realised by itself.

We frequently stated that for Heidegger temporality is the most important characteristic which differentiates Dasein from other entities, and that for him the meaning of the being of Dasein is temporality. According to Heidegger, temporality is an existentiale, belonging to human existence, in the sense that we ourselves exist as three temporal dimensions, and these three temporal dimensions, the future, the past, and the present, are nothing other than three modes of ecstasy of Dasein itself. In other words, since the mode of the being of Dasein is existence, Dasein is an ex-sistent, and having three modes of ecstasy. These three modes of the ecstasy of existence, that Heidegger terms temporality, are three modes of Dasein and are the ground of three dimensions or three moments of time, the future, the past, and the present. Temporality consists in “being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our past, while being concerned with the present that constitutes our being.”

Now the question is: What constitutes the unity and totality of the constitutive elements of Dasein? What unifies the different constitutive elements of Dasein? Must we believe in a soul-substance by which we justify the unity and the duration of Dasein?

We already said that Heidegger does not believe in substance and basically rejects substance ontology. Heidegger holds that the above-mentioned attributes of Dasein’s existence, i.e. Dasein’s three ecstasies which are the ground of the three moments of time, are not different, isolated facts but have a unitary structure. ‘Care’ is the concept by which Heidegger seeks to show the wholeness of the existential structure of Dasein. This concept means: “Ahead-of-itself-being already-in (the world) as being alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)”. It means that human being, unlike other entities, is not an accomplished, fulfilled, or, in Heidegger’s own words, a present-at-hand, entity. The mode of the being of human being is a potentiality-for-being. ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’ is other characteristic of existence, which indicates the mode of being that for itself its being is an issue. According to this conception, this
mode of being, *Dasein*, must realise its own being through its projection, and it is always ahead-of-itself through its projection. But the mode of being of *Dasein*, i.e., what is being-ahead-of-itself, is at the same time an already-being-in (the world). Here the word 'already' points to this meaning that *Dasein* has existed in its history, culture, and tradition before its being. The terms 'existence and existentiality' tell us that *Dasein* possesses a mode of being that it, i.e., *Dasein*, can choose the possibilities which are in front of it in order to realise itself on the basis of its choices. But the mode of the being of *Dasein* is such that it is always among some definite, predetermined possibilities without which it, i.e. the very potentiality-for-being, could not be realised. However, one main point of all these descriptions is that the mode of the being of *Dasein* must not be conceived as an accomplished, fulfilled entity or as a substance like other entities.

Now, let us come back to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s analysis of transcendental apperception and see how Heidegger again restates his own conception of *Dasein* as a potentiality-for-being, i.e., as a possibility, in the framework of Kantian thought.

It was said that Kant shows the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition as the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience, i.e. those grounds which lie in the subject itself and make the relation to object possible. It was also said that these three syntheses find the ground of their unity in transcendental apperception. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, each of these three syntheses originally corresponds to one of the three moments of time, the future, the past, and the present, and time itself in its original unity is also the ground of the unity of the three syntheses. Moreover, in the explication of the third synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of recognition, it was said that, according to Heidegger, this synthesis must be called the synthesis of pre-cognition, because its function is identification, and thus is prior to the two other syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, whereas these two latter syntheses are dependent on identification. The synthesis of pre-cognition (identification), makes it possible that something be offered in advance as the same and be taken again as the same in any return. Then in order that experience becomes possible, we need the precursory comprehension of the unity and precursory identification of object, but the very unity and identification of the object is dependent on the unity and identification of apperception. Put more clearly, the comprehension of the unity and identification of object cannot in every moment belong to a totally different ‘I’ which is not conscious of itself and its previous moments. Kant holds that there must be a fixed, binding ‘self’ which is the ground of the unity of consciousness.
and this fixed, binding self which gives unity and constancy to our knowledge, is the
transcendental apperception or transcendental ‘I think’.

In order that the unity of consciousness or, in other words, the identification of objects, is possible, this ‘I’ or transcendental apperception must be able to “become conscious of the identity of the function”.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, “the ‘I’ must by itself be capable of belonging to itself as itself the same”.

Heidegger believes that man’s substance is existence, and the mode of the being of human being is differentiated from the mode of being of other entities by this fact that he is able to establish a certain comportment to himself and develop it. Heidegger expresses this ability, having a comportment to himself, by ‘self-possession’. In Being and Time, Heidegger also describes human being as the being which has its being in each case and has it as its own. Now, here in the discussion of the essence of transcendental apperception, Heidegger again remarks that the very “self-possession constitutes the original acting self-identification of the ‘I’ with itself, upon whose basis the synthesis of identification and with it the syntheses of reproduction and apprehension first become possible”.

Briefly, the unity of experience and consciousness is grounded in the fixedness and unity of transcendental apperception. But the point which Heidegger emphasises is that the employment of the terms ‘fixedness’, ‘identity’, and ‘unity’ for the I or transcendental apperception are not in the same senses of these concepts employed for other non-Dasein entities. The fixedness and identity of transcendental apperception cannot be like the fixedness and identity of the entities which stands over against us as object. The fixedness of transcendental apperception “means the stance [Stand] which has its own way of standing”. In other words, unlike other entities, transcendental apperception possesses a self. The ‘I’ or transcendental apperception, unlike other essents, is the self-standing which possesses itself in acting.

He holds that “in the field of subjectivity, where freedom primarily determines the mode of being of the subject and this mode of being is characterised by the ‘I can’, the faculty, i.e., possibility, is higher than actuality”. In the field of subjectivity, unlike the field of other entities, it is not actuality but the ‘I can’, i.e., possibility, which constitutes human existence.

Kant believes: “[My] existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence [...] that is the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given”. This sentence of Kant quite confirms this idea of Heidegger that Dasein’s existence, unlike the being of other entities, is not a ready, accomplished fulfilled being but a mode of the given in which
this mode of being must be realised by itself. Then Kant argues for why my existence cannot be
given in the same sense that the objects are given to me:

In order that it [my existence] be given, self-intuition is required, and such intuition is conditioned
by a given *a priori* form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the
determinable [in me]"". Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining
in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, as time does in
the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I
can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my
existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is
owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, this passages of Kant means:

through intuition the self in its actual selfhood does not become accessible. The self is what is
grasped as freedom only insofar as I am free in this possibility to be myself the determining factor
for all intuiting. This spontaneity of which I thus apprehend brings it about that I entitle myself
[an]‘intelligence’ and that freedom is an intelligible object. To prevent a misunderstanding, let us
point out that granting the ‘I’s’ *intelligence* precisely on the ground of the ‘I’s’ freedom does not
mean that the ‘I’ is only a *theoretical* grasping. The expression ‘intelligence’ indicates what is non-
empirical and non-receptive— the ‘I’ is not empirical but intelligible, is intelligent, i.e., is free.”

In the explication of transcendental apperception, Kant says: “But the possibility of the
logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception *as a
faculty*.” Then the possibility of all knowledge is necessarily dependent on its relation to
transcendental apperception as a faculty. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, for Kant,
transcendental apperception is fundamentally pure possibility.” But Heidegger warns that it is
quite erroneous to suppose that in Kant’s view transcendental apperception (transcendental
consciousness) is nothing actual but merely something logical and that transcendental
apperception is only the sum of individual, factual consciousness. To be sure, Kant maintains
that transcendental apperception or transcendental consciousness is nothing actual, but it means
that transcendental apperception or transcendental consciousness is not an object among other
objects. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, that Kant says that transcendental apperception
is nothing actual, must not be taken to mean that it does not exist at all, but that transcendental
consciousness is pure possibility, and this consciousness is not an existent among other ones,
namely it is not an existent in the sense of nature.” For Heidegger, possibility is the
characteristic of existence, and existence is basically nothing other than the possibility of being
and potentiality-for-being, whereas actuality is the attribute of the entities which are non-
Dasein. Heidegger holds that the understanding of Dasein on the basis of actuality, and not possibility, i.e., what occurred in ancients' anthropology, is in fact the conception of man on the basis of the categories which are derived from the mode of the being of entities. However, Heidegger believes that in the explication of transcendental apperception, for Kant, obviously possibility, in contrast to actuality, has a higher position, but nevertheless ontologically he depends entirely on the traditional ontology of what is extant, i.e., on that mode of ontology which tries to think about the existence of Dasein through the categories derived from nature and extended things. Heidegger believes that

as clearly as the traits of self-hood, freedom, action, and sameness with respect to the transcendental subject come to light for Kant, so obscure remains the most crucial phenomena of transcendence as well as the basic relation to time and the 'I think', both to each other and in relation to transcendence. And seen in an ontologically radical manner, Kant retains the ontologically unclarified point of departure from the subject as inaugurated by Descartes.

Hitherto, following Kant and Heidegger, we endeavored to explain transcendental apperception in terms of transcendence, possibility, and freedom (the spontaneity of transcendental apperception itself). But we have already stated that knowledge and the act of thinking are not absolutely free, spontaneous, and arbitrary, rather we are always subject to the object. For this reason, Kant defines understanding as the faculty of rules, and it means that the fundamental function of understanding, i.e., conceptualisation always takes place on the basis of discovering a general rule, i.e., a unity in many. In other words, in intuitively given there is always a necessary binding, unifying element that understanding discloses in the form of a rule under which the act of conceptualisation takes place. Now, in the continuation of his interpretation of the fourth section of 'Transcendental Deduction', Heidegger asks what Kant means when he defines understanding as the faculty of rule. Kant maintains that a rule is "the representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion". Here, Kant says that a rule is a represented condition, and Heidegger, in his interpretation of this definition intends to emphasise this point that this representing and regulation occurs only in a being to whose essence transcendence and at the same time freedom belong, a being which is in itself open to that from which this rule is derived.
42) The Relation between the Transcendence of Apperception and Categories

In the last few pages, in the explication of subjectivity on the basis of transcendence, we said that according to Heidegger, transcendental apperception has the characteristic of transcendence, in the sense that it makes all relations to the object and the objectness of object essentially possible. In addition, it was said that according to Kant, through anticipating, i.e., through a precursory comprehension, transcendental apperception is related to an a priori unity, which conforms to Being in Heidegger's terminology. This a priori unity is a transcendental horizon in which all object appears and all synthesis takes place. Put more clearly, because of the character of its transcendence, transcendental apperception is open and related to Being, and Being is the a priori unity in the horizon of which the encounter with objects and all experiences take place. In other words, according to Heidegger's interpretation, the determinations of Being and the categories of this unity are one and the same.

Kant's main aim of 'Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding' is to demonstrate the objectivity of categories. Transcendental apperception, with regard to the character of its transcendence, is the original faculty which makes the relation to object a priori possible. It means that the transcendental apperception is the original faculty which provides the objectivity of objects. Therefore, according to Heidegger, if we can show the relation of categories to transcendental apperception, the main task of transcendental deduction is in fact accomplished, namely the objectivity of categories, i.e., their relatedness to object is indeed proved. In other words, for Kant, transcendental apperception possesses a consciousness of an a priori, fundamental unity in the horizon of which all relation to object, the objectness of object, and all synthesis occur. For Heidegger, it means that transcendental apperception possesses a precursory comprehension of Being, and the essence of transcendental apperception is dependent on that precursory comprehension of Being. For Heidegger, showing the relation between categories and transcendental apperception means demonstrating the ontological essence of these categories.

According to Heidegger, Kant's problem is that although he approaches the phenomenon of transcendence, he cannot understand it clearly. Heidegger explains that this kind of statement of Kant, for example, that "the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience", properly indicates Kant's approach to the phenomenon of transcendence. Because believing in transcendence in fact
means rejecting subject-object dualism and accepting the dimension in which subject and object unify, and this sentence of Kant, which indicates the sameness and identification of a priori conditions of subject and the conditions of the possibility of objects, means to accept a state of affairs in which subject and object unify. Yet Kant does not realise the transcendence of subject as the origin of categories, and he tries to prove the objectivity of categories through other ways. Heidegger maintains that "instead of a clear exposition of the structure of subjectivity [namely the transcendence of the subject] with an aim at object-relatedness as such, Kant presents no less than five deductions; and still he is not satisfied".460

Regarding transcendental apperception Kant says:

We now come to a concept which was not included in the general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be counted as belonging to that list, without, however, in the least altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment 'I think'. As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts and therefore, also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness.461

Thus, Kant holds that the concept, or the judgment, 'I think' in transcendental apperception, is a primordial category which is not counted in the list of categories, because it is not a category beside other ones but underlies all other categories, i.e., it is presupposed by all categories as such. According to Heidegger,

Kant calls transcendental apperception a 'vehicle' of all concepts as such and hence also of transcendental concepts or categories. But transcendental concepts are those which determine an object as object.... Categories can not move forward without the 'vehicle' of transcendental Apperception; that is, they only function on the basis of transcendental apperception. Strictly speaking, categories are not substance, causality, etc; but rather they are 'I think substance' and 'I think causality'—they belong to the original activity of understanding itself. All regulation of a synthesis as a regulation which is always related to a unity is possible only when the unifying subject as such can offer to itself in advance a horizon of possible unity in general.462

Here, Heidegger again emphasises that "all synthesis in all possible variations is taken within an original horizon of unity in general",463 i.e., in the same unity which the subject in advance offers to itself. This precursory consciousness of unity, in which all synthesis takes place, is not empirical or derived from experience. "Then the subject in its most inner being as activity, must accomplish this primordial activity of giving the horizon of unity in advance".464
According to Heidegger’s interpretation, since ‘I think’ is the primordial category, and all categories function on the basis of the very ‘I think’, i.e., transcendental apperception, then herein lies a central clue for the ontological understanding of categories as such. We already stated that Kant, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, tries to explain the essence of transcendental apperception on the basis of the essence of object and the consciousness of an original unity. Then all categories functions through transcendental apperception, on the basis of the essence of ‘object in general’, ‘original unity’ or in Heidegger’s terms, on the basis of the precursory comprehension of Being. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, transcendental apperception is a free binding, and it means that the subject possesses a mode of being which can freely commit itself to a binding. Now we can conclude that “all categories essentially go back to the free self-binding which characterises the subject as such”. 465

We already spoke of the necessary relation of categories and time. 466 In this part, by showing the relation of categories to transcendental apperception, Heidegger again emphasises the relation between categories and time. In other words, Heidegger endeavors to show that “the origin of categories is an origin in time”; 467 and for Heidegger it means that the origin of categories lies in the three transcendental syntheses of transcendental apperception, or in the terms of Heidegger’s own terminology, in temporality, i.e., in the mode of the being of Dasein itself. But does Heidegger intends to prove the subjectiveness of categories by assigning them to the subject? By no means. On the contrary, he endeavors to demonstrate the objectivity of all concepts, including categories, by showing the transcendence of the subject.

43) Transcendental Subjectivity as the Dimension of the Origin

Before setting forth his interpretation of the third section of ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding’, Heidegger presents a summary of his interpretation of its second section, ‘The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience’. In this summary he attempts to describe the structure of transcendental subjectivity as the dimension of the origin, in general. By the dimension of the origin is meant the dimension in which intuition and thought unify, that is, the same unification which we were seeking in the entire course of transcendental deduction. In this dimension the origin or, in other words, Being, reveals itself. Then the whole endeavor of Heidegger in the interpretation of the second section of ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’, is to show that the structure of subjectivity and transcendental apperception is such that Being, i.e., the origin of categories, and the origin of our
knowledge in general, which we were seeking in transcendental deduction, reveals itself in it (in subjectivity or transcendental apperception). Here we shall mention only those points that outline the essential lines of the previous discussion, which can provide a background for greater clarity on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. This part can be conceived as an introduction for understanding the following passages of Heidegger’s interpretation, in particular, his interpretation of schematism of the pure concepts of understanding (categories).

As Heidegger himself states: “We have already shown that the three modes of the transcendental synthesis each relates to a mode of time: The synthesis called apprehension is related to the now, the one called reproduction is related to the no-longer-now, and the synthesis called precognition is related to the not-yet-now.” In order that these three transcendental syntheses become possible, a horizon of unity must be in advance grasped and comprehended, in which something can be apprehended, reproduced, and recognised as one and the same.

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, these three transcendental syntheses are three ways of reaching out to the object, i.e., the three relations in which what is present, what has been, and what will be, become manifest. These three ways of reaching out to objects correspond to the three moments of time, and they unify with each other in the unity of time. Moreover, these three transcendental syntheses at the same time constitute what Kant calls transcendental apperception, i.e., the ‘I think’ which underlies all synthesis and knowledge. Then if all relation to object is grounded in these three transcendental syntheses, and if these three transcendental syntheses constitute transcendental apperception, then the emergence of the very transcendental apperception out of itself constitutes the dimension in which all relation to object becomes possible. Heidegger calls this emergence of the subject as it reaches out ‘the ecstasies of the subject’. Heidegger remarks that the word ‘ecstasy’ here should be taken quite, literally and without the tinge of rapture or ecstasy associated with emotions. Then, as we already pointed out, Kant’s three transcendental syntheses for Heidegger are the three ecstasies of subject (human existence) and at the same time are the ground of the three moments of time. Heidegger holds that in the unity of its ecstasies the subject attains to a dimension or horizon which is disclosed only through these ecstasies, in which the origin reveals itself. Heidegger believes that the ontological essence of categories must be considered only with reference to the very dimension of the origin, and by revealing this dimension the task of transcendental deduction is accomplished, and the very dimension makes the relation to the object possible. Heidegger believes that Kant could not see that the subjectivity of the subject and the dimension of the
origin, i.e., the dimension in which the origin of categories reveals itself, are essentially one and the same. It means that the encounter with Being, i.e., the precursory comprehension of Being, in advance lies in transcendental subjectivity, i.e., the subjectivity of the subject, and that the very precursory comprehension of Being constitutes the subjectivity of the subject. This is why for Heidegger the transcendental deduction of categories and revealing the dimension of the origin, namely the ontological explanation of the subjectivity of subject, are one and the same. Because subject as such possesses a structure which is essentially object-related.

According to Heidegger, the unity of the three transcendental syntheses is the unity of time, and this unity constitutes what Kant calls objectness or ‘object in general’. In other words, the unity of the three transcendental syntheses forms the horizon of time, in which the objectness of the object or ‘the object in general’ is constituted. Heidegger’s interpretation of the three transcendental syntheses and their unity, as transcendental subjectivity (apperception) is in fact the repetition of what he endeavors to show in Being and Time, i.e., to demonstrate that the understanding of Being or, in Kant’s words, the a priori consciousness of ‘object in general’, is possible only in the horizon of time. And this time is the result of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses of imagination, i.e., the result of the unity of three modes of ecstasies of existence.

For demonstrating the transcendence of human being, Heidegger needs to show a dimension or horizon in which intuition and thought, receptivity and spontaneity, or, in other words, subject and the origin unify, the horizon, which is beyond the subject-object dichotomy. This dimension simultaneously both constitutes the origin of transcendental subjectivity (the subjectivity of subject) and is that what Kant calls the objectness of object or ‘object in general’. Heidegger conceives this transcendental dimension or horizon as pure time or, more precisely, temporality. It may be said that Heidegger endeavors to show the unity of transcendental subjectivity and the transcendental truth which Kant expresses by ‘the object in general’, and Heidegger himself calls ‘Being’. Furthermore, it seems that Heidegger tries to avoid falling into a superficial monism, and at the same time, as we already explained, he rejects the existence of essentially different substances as subject and object. We must note that in Heidegger’s thought, the unity of transcendental subjectivity and ‘object in general’, i.e., the origin of objectivity, or Being, means a kind of togetherness, and we must not understand it as a sort of becoming transmuted of the self in Being, which occasionally is seen in some monistic views or in some of mystical trends. We said that Heidegger identifies this transcendental dimension or horizon, in which all relation
to the object becomes possible, with pure time. According to Heidegger's interpretation, "the unity as pure time makes up the horizon which the 'I' as transcendental ecstatic apperception holds before itself in advance as open. But at the same time we pointed out through this interpretation that this horizon of unity must have the character of resistance, and a resistance which comes from the subject, from the self itself, toward the self and binds it in its actions". Thus, pure time, as a precursory unity, on the one hand, is in relation to transcendental subjectivity, because it binds the subject in its action, and, on the other hand, as the object, has the character of resistance.

Heidegger here intends to say that Kant believes that all relation to object is dependent on our precursory comprehension of 'object in general' or the objectness of object, i.e., the precursory comprehension of a binding, regulating, unifying resistance which prevents our knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary. This precursory comprehension of the objectness of object is not derived from experience, because it belongs to the a priori grounds of experience, then lies in the subject itself. Thus, according to Heidegger, Kant believes that this precursory comprehension of the objectness of object has a double characteristics. Since the precursory comprehension of this resistance (objectness of object) is a priori, it stems from the self, and since it is binding, regulating and unifying resistance which directs our knowledge, comes toward the self. Heidegger holds that Kant delegates this pure resistance to pure time.

As we already said, Kant realised that there is an essential truth underlying our knowledge, which Kant expresses by 'object in general' or the unknowable, X. But since for him the character of transcendence of the subject is not obvious, he tries to explain the relation to this X as the essential underlying of our knowledge through ways which are not so clear. In his interpretation, Heidegger in fact seeks to make clear and highlight the problem of transcendence in Kant's own arguments. This view that pure time, on the one hand, as object possesses a kind of ontological resistance and, on the other hand, as subject, binds the actions of the subject means that pure time is the horizon in which subject and 'object in general' gather and unify. Definitely here Heidegger's interpretation is no longer what Kant himself intended to say. Heidegger claims that his interpretation in this part is the conclusion of the pursuing of Kant's inquiry.
44) Pure, Time-Related Synthesis of Imagination as the Basic, Transcendental Dimension of the Subject

Now, how does Heidegger infer his interpretation, i.e., the togetherness and unity of transcendental subjectivity and ‘object in general’ or Being from the Critique of Pure Reason? In other words, how does Heidegger conform his interpretation, to Kant’s own views?

Heidegger identifies this basic, transcendental dimension of the subject with the pure, time-related synthesis of imagination. Heidegger endeavors to analyze more radically Kantian time and apperception, ‘I think’. He maintains that the direction of his interpretation is certainly visible in Kant, although he himself does not continue his inquiry in this direction, i.e., in the direction of the more profound understanding of the pure synthesis of imagination. Put more clearly, Kant traces the subjectivity of the subject to transcendental apperception, i.e., transcendental ‘I think’, but Heidegger endeavors to reach out to the deeper layers of the subjectivity of the subject. Kant places transcendental apperception in relation to understanding and the spontaneity of subject. For Kant transcendental apperception, as fixed, constant self is free from time and essentially non-temporal. But by showing that all the three transcendental syntheses are time-related, Heidegger concludes that then the ground of the unity of these three transcendental syntheses, i.e., transcendental apperception, is itself also temporal and related to the pure synthesis of imagination. For Heidegger, the pure, transcendental time-related synthesis of imagination is this more profound layer of the subject, in which transcendental apperception is grounded, which as the common root and the origin of intuition and thought provides their essential unity.

We are well aware that in the explanation of finite, human knowledge, Kant showed that this knowledge is necessarily constituted from the two essential elements of intuition and thought. Then in his inquiry for finding a foundation for pure knowledge, a priori synthetic knowledge, or in Heidegger’s words ontological knowledge, Kant came to this conclusion that if such a pure knowledge is to be possible, then this knowledge, as pure, i.e., free from experience, must be constituted from pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories). But Kant’s inquiry, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, showed that the possibility of such a pure knowledge is dependent on pure synthesis and the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought. It is basically the very essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, which Kant seeks in
transcendental deduction, and according to Heidegger’s interpretation, this unity is nothing other than the transcendence of subject.

45) Transcendental Apperception and Its Relation to Time

Now we seek to see how Heidegger shows his explication of the structure of the subjectivity of the subject and of the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) on the basis of the direction of Kant’s own inquiry in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant conceives time as pure intuition. For him, intuition means receptivity, and pure means what is not derived from experience but is *a priori* and belongs to the subject itself. Then, time is the pure receptivity which stems from the subject. We already pointed out that time as pure intuition is pure affection, i.e., non-empirical affection. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* whenever Kant speaks of time as pure intuition, he means a pure affection, an affection which belongs to the subject itself, which does not begin from empirical entities rather, as *a priori* and belonging to the subject, begins from itself. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s this conception of time, as the pure affection which begins from itself, leads to this conclusion that “pure affection means *self-affection*”. According to this interpretation, “Kant conceives time in terms of pure *self-affection*, i.e., as that which stemming *a priori* from the self, affects the self, has to do with the self”.  

On the other hand, in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant showed that time is pure intuition, and it means that all possible object of human knowledge is representable for us only in the pure intuition of time. Then time is a horizon in which all givenness is offered, which affects the subject *a priori*. Also in ‘The *A priori* ground of the Possibility of Experience’, Kant spoke of the three transcendental syntheses which make the objectiveness of the object essentially possible, and Heidegger showed that all these three transcendental syntheses are time-related, and thus the ground of their unity, i.e., transcendental apperception, is also time-related or, better to say, essentially temporal and the ground of time itself. Therefore, “time determines in advance the how of ‘standing over against’; thus time belongs to the structure of objectness in general”. In addition, if all the objectness of object, i.e., all givenness, is dependent on transcendental apperception and if all givenness, according to Kant’s analysis in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, is offered in the horizon of time, “then self cannot be thought without an original relationship to this time”.
In *Being and Time*, division Two, chapter 3, and chapter 6, §61, Heidegger shows that how *Dasein* in its mode of being is itself the ground of time and essentially temporal. Kant conceives time as pure intuition which cannot be derived from the realm of experience as an empirical fact. For Heidegger this leads to this conclusion that pure time must stem from transcendental apperception. According to Heidegger, Kant understands time as subjective, i.e., belonging to subject. But Kant also conceives transcendental apperception (understanding) as non-temporal and free from time. It means that for Kant the subject is neither temporal nor identical with time. Heidegger criticises Kant and asks how it is possible that transcendental apperception can release time from itself in its three transcendental synthesis but it is not itself temporal. Only on the basis of the temporality, i.e., being temporal, of transcendental apperception, can the subject release time, from itself and for itself, as the horizon in which all appearances appear. That is why Heidegger maintains that the self is the ground of time. The three moments of pure time, the future, the past, the present, are the result of the three modes of ecstasies of *Dasein*, or according to Kant’s expression, the result of the three transcendental syntheses whose ground of unity is transcendental apperception.469

Heidegger believes that by showing that the subject or transcendental apperception is originally time or temporality, the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories), which we were seeking for proving the possibility of pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) is proved, because pure time as the receptivity of subject, and transcendental apperception, as the spontaneity of subjects, are originally one and the same. We must note by proving pure synthesis, i.e., the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, we have indeed demonstrated transcendence and clarified its essence.490 Therefore, according to Heidegger, only through proving the temporality of *Dasein*, i.e., through proving that subject or transcendental apperception is itself originally time, we can “grasp the unity of receptivity and spontaneity, of time and the transcendental apperception, as a possible problem”.491

46) The Unity of Subjectivity

As we have frequently pointed out, Kant, in the beginning of his inquiry, believed in two main sources for our knowledge, intuition (sense) and thought (understanding). For this reason he divided the whole of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into two main parts, ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ (the inquiry into sense and intuition) and ‘Transcendental Logic’ (the inquiry into understanding and thought). The very division on the basis of the belief in two essential aspects
for subjects, receptivity (intuition) and spontaneity (thought) confronts Kant with the problem of the split between these two realms of mind, the split which Kant could not finally overcome and he could not reach out to an proper explanation of the essential unity of subjectivity. It is on the basis of this split of sense and understanding that for Kant time and transcendental apperception are in opposition to each other. Put more clearly, Kant places sense and intuition (receptivity) and understanding and thought (spontaneity) in opposition to each other. Therefore, for him time as pure intuition is on the side of sense and transcendental aesthetic, whereas transcendental apperception, which is, according to Kant, related to understanding, is on the side of thought and transcendental logic. Thus due to the oppositeness of intuition and thought in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant understands time and apperception as independent from each other, i.e., he conceives apperception as non-temporal and free from time.

Heidegger holds that Kant did not resolve the problem of the unity of subjectivity. For this reason Kant never even once posed this problem, i.e., the unity of receptivity (intuition) and spontaneity (thought) adequately, although he had the required means for the solution at his disposal.\(^2\) Kant did not pose the problem of the unity of subjectivity because, otherwise the general plan of the whole of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was thought on the basis of the duality of the main sources of knowledge, i.e., receptivity and spontaneity, affection and function, intuition and thought, or sense and understanding, would collapse.

In contrast, in his philosophy of mind, Heidegger seeks to present the mode of the being of human being in a unity in which the split and duality of receptivity and spontaneity, affection and function, or intuition and thought (sense and understanding) disappear, and both of these aspects return to an original dimension which is their common root. As we already pointed out, Heidegger believes that this original dimension or the common root of intuition and thought, in the framework of Kantian transcendental philosophy, is pure, time-related synthesis of imagination. It is in the pure synthesis that time, or temporality in Heidegger’s terminology, as pure intuition (receptivity), and transcendental apperception, i.e., thought and the spontaneity of subject are unified. Heidegger maintains that “time is pure original receptivity and original spontaneity”,\(^3\) because as Kant shows, time is pure intuition, i.e., pure receptivity, which is not derived from experience, but stems from subject itself. Time, as pure intuition, i.e., as pure affection, is an affection which belongs to subject itself, which does not begin from experience but, as pure, i.e., as *a priori* and belonging to the subject, begins from itself. For Heidegger this point leads to this conclusion that thus pure time must stem from self by self itself. Hence, time,
as pure intuition, is pure receptivity and since time stems from self and since this self is itself the time or temporality, then time is something which is pure receptivity and at the same time, spontaneous, i.e., something which stems from itself by itself.

Heidegger believes that time is the fact in which receptivity and spontaneity, affection and function, or intuition and thought unify. By proving the temporality of Dasein, i.e., that subject, self or transcendental apperception is originally time itself, we can demonstrate the unity of receptivity and spontaneity, i.e., pure intuition (time) and pure thought (transcendental apperception).494 Thus, according to Heidegger, the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, which we were seeking for proving the possibility of pure knowledge, i.e., ontological knowledge, is proved, because pure time (the receptivity of the subject) and transcendental apperception (the spontaneity of the subject) are essentially and originally one and the same.

But what is the concrete meaning of this interpretation of the unity of subjectivity on the basis of time or temporality?

As we have frequently pointed out, one of Heidegger’s basic criticisms of the metaphysical tradition, including Kant’s philosophy, is that in this tradition, whether consciously or unconsciously, non-human entities and the things of nature are always conceived as a model for understanding the mode of the being of human being, and it has always been endeavored to explain human existence by the attributes and determinants of the mode of the being of things, called ‘categories’ in logic. But Heidegger believes that the mode of the being of man, or in his own terminology, Dasein or existence, is by no means explainable by categories, rather it must be explained through its own characteristics, i.e., through exitentiales.495

We have already pointed out that in Heidegger’s view human being is, more than an actuality or reality, a possibility and we said that for Heidegger reality, considering the origin of the term in Latin language, in the sense of extension, means thinghood, i.e. the mode of the being of natural things and extended essents. Hence, according to Heidegger, human existence is, more than everything and before everything, a potentiality-for-being which itself must stand up its being. That is why, Heidegger believes that for Dasein being is an issue. Heidegger does not mean that for Dasein being is a theoretical, contemplative issue. Rather it faces the problem of self-standing up and self-actualisation of the mode of its own being. Moreover, we must note that when Heidegger speaks of the self-standing of the being of the Dasein he by no means intends to promote human being to the rank of divinity as if man is the creator of his own being. Rather existence for man is given, but the mode of the being of man as a potentiality-for-being is such
that its realisation is dependent on its own projection. What we mentioned is the main content of
the sentence of Heidegger, when he says: "Time [i.e., the mode of the being of man] is \textit{a priori}
having-to-do-with the self and simultaneously self-standing".\textsuperscript{496}

Furthermore, in chapter One we stated that Heidegger seeks to interpret \textit{Dasein}'s existence
in its totality. For this reason Heidegger believes that the three ecstasies of \textit{Dasein}, which are the
origin of the three moments of time, are not separate, isolated moments, rather they have a
unitary structure. We pointed out there that 'care' is the concept by which Heidegger tries to
show the whole of the existential structure of \textit{Dasein} in its totality.\textsuperscript{497} Heidegger maintains that as
the future, the past and the present combine in a unity of time, the ecstasies of \textit{Dasein} unify in
the characteristic of care. Temporality, care, and also historicity\textsuperscript{498} are different concepts which
Heidegger employs for the explanation of a unitary phenomenon, which equiprimordially refer to
human existence. Care must be understood in a sense that includes \textit{Dasein}'s threefold structure.
This threefold structure of \textit{Dasein} consists in: 1) being-ahead-of-itself (projection), 2) already-
being-in (thrownness or facticity), 3) as being-beside (being forfeited or fallen). In other words,
if we intend to describe human existence in its unity and totality, according to Heidegger's
conception, we must say that \textit{Dasein} is care, which means: Ahead-of-itself-being-already-in (the
world) as being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world).\textsuperscript{499}

Now Heidegger believes that Kant could not understand this mode of the being of \textit{Dasein},
i.e., its temporality. In other words, Heidegger holds that self and its temporality, provided that
they are properly understood, have the full extension from the future via the past into the present
in each case, whereas for Kant self understands itself primarily and exclusively from the present,
in the sense that the 'I' can identify itself as the same in each now. In other words, Heidegger
holds that Kant could not realise the temporality and historicity of \textit{Dasein} completely, in the
sense that the subject or \textit{Dasein} has three modes of temporal ecstasies which are the ground of
the three moments of time. In addition, Heidegger maintains that Kant could not realise the
relationship of the subject or transcendental apperception to the future, because for him the
transcendental synthesis of recognition, which for Heidegger is the ground of the future, has no
relation to time.\textsuperscript{500} More simply, Heidegger intends to say that Kant did not understand the
temporality and historicity of \textit{Dasein}; consequently the picture that he presents of subject and
apperception is similar to the conception of human being as a thinking thing in the Cartesian
thought. In other words, in Kant's philosophy there is dangerously the risk that human existence
is reduced to an extended, categorical entity, like other entities. Put differently, the conception of
subject presented by Kant “comes dangerously close to Descartes’ res cogitants. In spite of all the difference from Descartes in conceiving the spontaneity of the ‘I’, Kant here takes the ‘I’ as something that thinks and thus can come upon itself any time as this thinking thing”. As we already stated, Heidegger maintains that the existence of the subject is determined in its core as being ahead of itself and thus is stretched out into the future as ability to be”. But, according to Heidegger, in Kant, we are “dealing with an ‘I’ which exists free from time and point for point, but also this ‘I’ is, as it were, extant beside (next to) time”. Heidegger holds that although “the togetherness of receptivity and spontaneity is again and again important for Kant, he still does not succeed in demonstrating a ground wherein both can be together”.

47) Transcendental Subjectivity and the Ontological Essence of Categories

Before explaining Heidegger’s view on the relation between transcendental subjectivity and the ontological essence of categories, let us review in brief what Heidegger has stated on categories yet.

It has been said that according to Kant, it is the synthetic a priori knowledge for the sake of which his entire inquiry in the Critique of Pure Reason has been done. Since this knowledge is independent of and prior to all experience Kant calls it ‘pure knowledge’. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, what Kant calls ‘a priori synthetic judgment’ or ‘pure knowledge’ is nothing other than ontological knowledge, i.e., a precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being of the essent. In addition, the explanation of the essence of finite, human knowledge shows that this knowledge is constituted from two essential elements, intuition and thought. Thus, if synthetic a priori knowledge or pure (ontological) knowledge is to be possible, this knowledge as finite, human knowledge must be constituted from intuition and thought, and since this knowledge is pure, i.e., prior to and independent of experience and makes all experience basically possible, then this pure knowledge must be constituted from pure intuition and pure thought. In ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant’s analysis showed that the pure intuition is time, which is the universal form of all intuitions, including inner intuitions and outer intuitions. Moreover, in ‘Transcendental Logic’, through his table of judgments for discovering the forms of the unification of understanding, Kant obtains a list of the pure concepts of understanding or categories. Then if a priori synthetic knowledge, i.e., pure ontological knowledge is to be possible, it must be constituted from pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories).
Furthermore, the explanation of the essence of finite knowledge showed that the possibility of this knowledge is dependent on the reciprocal dependence of intuition and understanding on each other, and that this reciprocal dependence is not an accidental but an essential character of intuition and thought. For this reason, as long as we do not consider pure understanding (thought), i.e., categories, essentially, i.e., in its essential relation to pure intuition, we cannot clarify the origin of pure concepts or categories, which are, according to Heidegger, nothing other than ontological concepts. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s main aim in transcendental deduction is to demonstrate such a connection between two independent sources of human knowledge, i.e., sense and understanding. By showing such a connection between intuition and thought Kant proves both the essential unity of two elements of knowledge and the objectivity of the categories of understanding through their relation to intuition. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* such a task of the unification of sense and understanding is delegated to imagination. Kant conceives this essential unity of intuition and thought as a kind of synthesis which underlies our knowledge and categories. Heidegger holds that the synthesis (unity) of intuition and understanding is in fact the transcendence of subject or human being in general. Thus, in the discussion of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, Heidegger seeks to explain the structure of pure (ontological) knowledge and to clarify the origin of categories, as ontological concepts, and at the same time through this explanation to show the transcendence of the subject (human being).

Moreover, regarding the second main part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, ‘Transcendental Logic’, it was said that the task of this logic is to inquire into the essence of the second main element of pure knowledge (pure concepts of understanding or categories). In other words, the main task of ‘Transcendental Logic’, according to Heidegger, is to inquire into whether there is essentially something as pure thought (pure concepts or categories) by which an relation of thought and objects is possible. It means in ‘Transcendental Logic’ Kant looks for a relation between thought and entities, in which thought can in advance and prior to all empirical intuition gain some determinations of objects. Thus, Kant means by pure knowledge or categories the knowledge that is not derived from experience but makes the experience itself possible. Thus, in Kant’s transcendental logic, we seek the concepts which entirely originate from understanding itself and at the same time have objective reality. Kant calls these concepts ‘the pure concepts of understanding’ or ‘categories’.
In addition, it was stated that for explaining the essence of categories (the pure concepts of understanding), as an introduction, Kant first explicates the essence of concepts in general. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant believes that every concept has two main characteristics: One is generality or, in Heidegger’s words, commonness, i.e., ‘applicability to many’. The second characteristic is object-relatedness. Kant’s analysis of the essence of concepts shows that through intuition in every concept an element, in which some particulars agree, is represented. If this element were not presented by intuition, the concept would not be able to gain its character of generality and applicability to many. From this point, Kant concludes that there must be presented *something* in the pure concepts of understanding or categories through pure intuition but this *something* is not an empirical determination of object but something that makes the objectness of the object essentially possible. Then, categories are pure concepts that are in relation to the objectness of object or ‘object in general’, which, according to Heidegger, is nothing other than Being as such.

Kant holds that categories, as concepts, must be in relation to object and intuition, and since the synthesis of the manifold of intuition is the function of the synthesis of imagination, then categories must at the same time be in relation to imagination. Through his phenomenological interpretation of the structure of the subject, Heidegger attempted to make comprehensible how the categories, in their structural, functional connections, are essentially caught between pure intuition, pure power of imagination, and pure thinking, and how these three basic sources are centered in the pure power of imagination insofar as precisely this power renders intuition as well as understanding possible.

Moreover, in the discussion of the unity of subjectivity we showed how, according to Heidegger, the power of imagination and its pure time-related synthesis is the primordial dimension of the subjectivity of the subject, that is, the root of both intuition and thought, in which intuition (pure receptivity or time) with transcendental apperception (the spontaneity of understanding or categories) are unified. Heidegger believes that only with reference to this original dimension of subjectivity must the ontological essence of categories be discussed, and only through the revelation of this dimension is the task of transcendental deduction accomplished, and this original dimension is that which makes the relation to object possible *a priori*. Heidegger holds that Kant cannot see that the subjectivity of the subject and the dimension of the origin, i.e., the dimension in which the origin of categories, Being, reveals itself is essentially one and the same. It means that the encounter with Being or the precursory
comprehension of Being in advance lies in transcendental subjectivity, the subjectivity of the subject,\(^\text{509}\) and constitutes the essence of the subject. That is why, for Heidegger, the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding (categories) and the revelation of the dimension of the origin, i.e., ontological explanation of the subjectivity of the subject, are one and the same, because subject as such possesses a structure which is essentially object-related.\(^\text{510}\)

After this short review of what Heidegger has stated about categories so far, now we return to what he seeks to say concerning the ontological essence of categories. Regarding its Latin origin, the term ‘category’ in the sense of ‘stated’, refers to a relation between categories, as the determinations of the Being of things, and judgment, as ‘stating something about the determinations of the Being of things’. That is why Kant, like Aristotle, believes that there is a connection between the most general determinations of the Being of things and the most determinations of judgment,\(^\text{511}\) and since judgment is the function of understanding Kant conceives categories as the pure concepts of understanding.\(^\text{512}\) According to Heidegger, since Kant conceives knowledge as the unity of intuition and thought (concepts), and understands all concepts as related to intuition, for him the essence of categories becomes obscure.\(^\text{513}\) Because Kant conceives categories as the concepts of understanding, he tries to show the relation of categories to intuition. In other words, conceiving categories as the pure concepts of understanding in Kant shows that in his presentation of the problem of categories, which at bottom contains the problem of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, he adopts understanding, and not imagination, as his point of departure.\(^\text{514}\) Then Kant faces the problem how he can bridge the gap between categories, as concepts of understanding, and intuition, as the ground of the real content and objectivity of concepts. But we have already pointed out that, according to Heidegger, categories are not essentially pure concepts of understanding, but must be conceived as the result of the pure synthesis of the power of imagination. Put differently, for presenting the problem of categories, Heidegger, unlike Kant, adopts the pure time-related synthesis of imagination, and not understanding, as his point of departure, which is the common root and ground of both intuition and understanding, in which intuition and understanding have an essential unity. Thus, by beginning with the unity of transcendental subjectivity, i.e. with the power of transcendental imagination, the split which Kant confronts in transcendental deduction, i.e., the split between categories, as the pure concepts of understanding, and intuition, as the ground of the real content and objectivity of all concepts, including categories, is removed.
According to Kant’s analysis of concepts in general, every concept must be related to intuition for its content and objectivity. Heidegger remarks that there must be a necessary relation to intuition in categories, but, in the case of categories, this relation must be an *a priori* one to pure intuition, time.\(^5\) Kant holds that the ground and the place of categories or pure thought, as the second essential elements of pure synthesis (knowledge) is understanding and that is why he call categories ‘the pure concepts of understanding’. Moreover, in the discussion of ‘the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience’, among the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, Kant conceives the last synthesis as related to understanding, and conceives the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction as related respectively to intuition and to imagination. Thus, Kant, on the basis of these premises, believes that categories or the pure concepts of understanding are related merely to the third synthesis, i.e., and recognition. But in his interpretation, Heidegger showed that the synthesis of recognition is related to two other syntheses, and all the three transcendental syntheses are the functions of imagination, and thus all of them are the transcendental time-related syntheses of imagination. According to this interpretation, all the three transcendental syntheses are unified with each other on the basis of time-relatedness, and as we stated before, these three transcendental syntheses are the ground of the three moments of pure time.

According to these premises, in Heidegger’s interpretation, categories must be conceived as pure time-related and we must seek the ground of categories in pure time, and this is what Kant attempts to show in schematism.

Therefore, we can summarise the conclusions of Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘The *a priori* Ground of the Possibility of Experience’, i.e., the discussion of the three transcendental syntheses, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, regarding the problem of categories in this way: Firstly, the ground of categories must be sought in transcendental subjectivity, i.e., in transcendental imagination, as the dimension of the essential unity of intuition and understanding, and not in understanding as Kant supposed. Secondly, by demonstrating the transcendence of the subjectivity of the subject, namely by proving that the subject is essentially object-related, and by showing the relation of categories to transcendental subjectivity, the problem of transcendental deduction, that is, finding a ground for the objectivity of categories and proving categories’ object-relatedness, is accomplished. Thirdly, since the transcendental subjectivity is nothing other than the pure time, and transcendence, the ground of categories must
be sought in pure time. The consequence of this point is that categories are ontological concepts and not *ontic* (empirical) concepts. This point requires further explanation.

If the three transcendental syntheses are ‘the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience’, namely if they are the pure syntheses which provide the possibility of experience, i.e., any relation to object, and if all the three syntheses, as the ground of the three moments of time, are unified in pure time, and if categories are related to the unity of all the three transcendental syntheses, i.e., to transcendental subjectivity (transcendental apperception), and thus if the ground of categories must be sought in pure time, then categories belong, not to the realm of *essents* but, to the realm that makes the relation to objects essentially possible. The essence of categories requires that they belong to the constitution of the objectness of object.\(^{116}\) In other words, categories are not the determinations of beings (entities) but the determinations of Being. That is why categories are not the objects of experience, rather they make experience itself possible.

Heidegger maintains that “it is absurd to begin with categories and then to inquire into their valid application to objects”\(^{117}\) because categories are the concepts which make the objectness of object basically possible. Kant believes that categories are “fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances, and have therefore, *a priori* objective validity. This is exactly what we desired to prove”.\(^{118}\) But Heidegger criticises Kant for that basically the expression “*a priori* objective validity” is self-contradictory.\(^{119}\) “For it states that categories are valid in relation to objects and at the same time that objectness in general is first constituted by categories”.\(^{120}\) ‘Objective validity’ means to be related to an object, i.e., being the determination of object; on the other hand ‘being *a priori*’ of categories [categories’ ‘being *a priori*’] means that they make the objectness of object essentially possible. In other words, this expression states that the validity of categories is due to that they are *a priori*, i.e., they make experience itself possible, but, on the other hand, it says that categories are objective, i.e., empirical and related to objects. For this reason, Heidegger says that the expression ‘*a priori* objective validity’ is self-contradictory. Categories are *a priori*, namely they make the objectness of objects possible. Thus, what is *a priori* cannot be objective, that is, it cannot be an object or the determinations of an object. Briefly, categories are ontological concepts and we must not conceive them as *ontic* concepts.
48) Kant’s Presentation of the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

Here, we seek to explain Heidegger’s interpretation of the third section of the second part of the ‘Analytic of concepts’ in ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure concepts of Understanding’ entitled ‘The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General and the Possibility of Knowing Them A priori’. In this section, Kant endeavors to systematically present the transcendental deduction of categories, i.e., to show the relation of understanding to objects in general and the possibility of knowing them a priori. We know that this a priori knowledge of objects, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, is nothing other than ontological knowledge. Then, according to this interpretation, in this section Kant intends to show the possibility of ontological knowledge.

In transcendental deduction, Kant seeks the ground of categories or the pure concepts of understanding. For this reason, in ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’, he analyses the faculty of understanding. But since the main characteristic of understanding is object-relatedness through intuition, in the course of his analysis of understanding he faced the problem of the split between understanding and intuition. This is why in ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’, Kant also tried to attain the unity of intuition and understanding for proving the objectivity of categories. But, according to Heidegger, Kant’s inquiry into categories and his analysis of understanding ought to have lead him to discover transcendental subjectivity as the original dimension of categories and a priori synthetic knowledge (ontological knowledge).²²¹

As we stated in the passage ‘The Unity of Subjectivity’,²²² in his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger attempts to show an original dimension of the subject, which is the common root and ground of intuition and thought, from which categories also stem. But according to Heidegger, Kant could not discover such a dimension for resolving and rendering visible the problem of the unity of receptivity (intuition) and spontaneity (thought) and thus the problem of the origin of categories. Heidegger maintains that instead of unfolding this original dimension of the subject, i.e., the dimension of transcendence and the transcendence of transcendental subjectivity and attempting to explain the essence of categories on the basis of this original dimension, Kant endeavors to make an artificial inquiry into objective reality of categories. The real question concerning categories, the one that goes in the same direction as the Kantian problem would read as follows: What are categories? What is their essence? And if categories are grounded in the original dimension of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., in the unity of sensibility and
understanding, then what is their essence? Heidegger's reply to these questions is clear. Heidegger holds that categories have ontological essence, which stems from the transcendental dimension of the subject. But instead of working out the problem of the essential unity of sense and understanding in the original dimension of subjectivity and referring categories to this dimension, Kant puts sensibility and understanding beside each other in a linear fashion, without showing their essential unity, then he asks about the relation of understanding and appearances (sensibility). For bridging the split of sensibility and understanding and showing their interconnection Kant needs a mediator faculty, and the reason for the existence of the faculty called imagination lies in this mediation. Heidegger believes that the ontological essence of categories must manifest itself in the very mediation of the power of imagination. In other words, the power of imagination is the intermediate which a priori relates category both to understanding and to intuition.

Heidegger holds that for elucidating the essence of categories, i.e., showing the a priori necessary relation of understanding to sensibility (intuition) we can move in two ways. In one way, we can begin from understanding, i.e., with transcendental apperception, or, in other words, from the original unity of consciousness, and move to sensibility, i.e., to time, to the manifold. This is the way from the 'highest point' downward— in Plato. The second way is to go up ‘from below’, beginning with appearances and move to the unity of apperception in understanding. Kant moves in both ways. The first way comprises the text from A116 to A119. The second way is taken up in section A120 to A129.

Kant begins the first way of transcendental deduction with the statement: “If, now, we desire to follow up the inner ground of this connection of the representations to the point upon which they have all to converge in order that they may therein for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception.” Then, Here, Kant explicitly expresses his first way in transcendental deduction, i.e., going downward from above. Kant begins his second way in ‘Transcendental Deduction’ with the statement: “We will now, starting from below, namely with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding by means of the categories, stands to appearances”. In this way, Kant begins from below namely, from the manifold of representations and appearances in order to reach the unity of apperception. Before presenting both ways of transcendental deduction, Kant again states that ‘there are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge and its objects— sense,
imagination and apperception".518 Heidegger maintains that “as a rule he [Kant] speaks of two, occasionally of three sources. But he does not mention the three sources in random places, but only there where he necessarily has to move in the dimension of the origin”.529 According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s hesitation about the number of the essential sources of knowledge— namely whether we have only two essential sources of knowledge, intuition and understanding, or we must conceive imagination as third source— shows that he pays heed to the problem of the unity of faculties and attempts to attain an original dimension of the subject as a point of departure for resolving the problem of transcendental deduction. Heidegger holds that wherever the problem of the unity of the two faculties, sense and understanding, imposes itself on Kant, he finds himself compelled to introduce the third faculty, namely, imagination, as the original dimension of the subject. Otherwise, since Kant was worried about the general plan of the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was thought on the basis of the duality of the main sources of knowledge, i.e., sense and understanding, for him the usual presentation of the two stems of knowledge is enough.

However, in both ways of transcendental deduction, whether starting from the unity of apperception towards time and its manifold, or starting from the manifold of appearances towards the unity of apperception, Kant seeks to show the unity of sensibility and understanding, and in both ways the power of imagination, as an intermediate power between sense and understanding, has a significant role. But, according to Heidegger, even here, where Kant attempts to attain the unity of sense and understanding through imagination, there is an imbalance in Kant’s thought, because, the power of imagination, in Kant’s interpretation, “cannot absorb the two poles of sensibility and understanding as in themselves two stems of knowledge, cannot serve as the root of these two stems”.530 In Kant, whereas pure intuition, time, can more easily be taken into the power of imagination, understanding and transcendental apperception resist against reducing to the power of imagination. That is why Kant occasionally speaks of two essential faculties of knowledge, but not of sensibility and understanding, rather of imagination and understanding. But what is obvious in Kant is that the power of imagination increasingly extends its realm of domination, and in this section of his discussion of transcendental deduction, Kant manages to take back, point by point, everything into the power of imagination.”531
49) The Power of Imagination as the Origin of Transcendental Apperception

Here we seek to explicate Heidegger’s interpretation of the first way of Kant’s transcendental deduction. In this section, Heidegger intends to show how the power of imagination emerges in the course of Kant’s reflections for bridging the split of sensibility (intuition) and understanding (transcendental apperception). We already pointed out that the first way of transcendental deduction begins from transcendental apperception and ends the manifold of pure intuition (time).

We can explain the summary of Kant’s argument in the first way of transcendental deduction in this way: If experience in general, i.e., synthetic knowledge, is to be possible a priori, then the essence of transcendental apperception, as the a priori ground of the possibility of experience, presupposes that there is a necessary relation between the power of imagination and sensibility. First Kant poses a principle of the unity of all manifold of our representations. The meaning of this principle is very simple and understandable. This principle tells us that if a knowledge is to be possible, all our representations must have a unity and interconnection in one and unitary consciousness. This principle, as Heidegger interprets, says that “all representations as such must be capable of being taken up into one consciousness. Thus this is the principle of the necessary possibility of all representations belonging to one consciousness, which for its part is always conscious of the general identity with itself”. Then, not only all representations must unify in one consciousness but also this consciousness must be conscious of its own unity and identity. Transcendental apperception is the point in which all representations converge and attain a unity and interconnection, and this transcendental apperception itself must have a priori unity in order that it can make the unity and interconnection of representations and manifold essentially possible. But now the question is: Whence does the unity of transcendental apperception itself stem?

Immediately after posing the transcendental principle of the unity of all manifold of our representations, Kant says a statement which, according to Heidegger, is too crucial, but nobody has noted it yet. After posing the principle Kant says: “Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition”. Heidegger holds that what is here important is the first part of this statement, i.e., “this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic”. Heidegger asks: “What does Kant mean by stating that the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic?” According
to Heidegger's interpretation, by the above-mentioned statement Kant "wants to say that the unity of consciousness, transcendental apperception, is essentially synthetic". In other words, whatever is representable must be encountered within a horizon of unity, which is *a priori* presented by the unity of transcendental apperception. But Heidegger maintains that the crucial point in the above-mentioned statement of Kant is that the unity of transcendental apperception is itself grounded in another synthesis which is prior to transcendental apperception itself. Heidegger holds that "Kant does not clearly bring to light the reason for the necessity of the synthetic character of this unity of transcendental apperception". But we already knew in the discussion of the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience that transcendental apperception is the ground of the unity of the three transcendental synthoses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. Then the unity of transcendental apperception is itself the product of the unity (synthesis) of the three transcendental synthoses. Kant believes that this synthetic unity [of transcendental apperception] presupposes or includes a [other] synthesis, and if the former [i.e., the synthesis of transcendental apperception] is to be *a priori* necessary, the [second] synthesis must also be *a priori*. Then transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination as *a priori* condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place *a priori*; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.

Here what Heidegger intended to say becomes manifest, i.e., to clarify how Kant, in the first direction of transcendental deduction, becomes compelled to introduce the power of imagination. All knowledge is dependent on the unity of apperception. But this unity or, as Kant says, this synthesis, is itself synthetic and this is grounded in a more primordial unity (synthesis). Since self is essentially the *a priori* condition and ground of the possibility of all experience, the unity (synthesis) of transcendental apperception is itself *a priori*, non-empirical, and its more primordial unity (synthesis), which constitutes the self must also be an *a priori* unity (synthesis). This more primordial unity (synthesis) cannot be the product of intuition or understanding because we are dealing here with a unity (synthesis) prior to the unity of transcendental apperception, and then prior to all intuition or all thought. In other words, all intuition or all thoughts is grounded in the unity of consciousness, the unity of transcendental apperception, but we are dealing here with the ground of the very unity of consciousness (the unity of transcendental apperception). If this more primordial synthesis, which constitutes the unity of transcendental apperception, is not the product of sense (intuition) and understanding, then it
must be the function of imagination. But imagination has two functions, empirical and transcendental. Since empirical function of imagination, i.e., the synthesis of reproduction, for example in the actions of association or fancy, is dependent on empirical conditions, then the empirical function of imagination cannot be the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, which is itself the a priori ground of the possibility of all experience. Thus, it is the transcendental function of imagination (the productive synthesis of imagination)— and not empirical function of imagination (the synthesis of reproduction)— that is the origin of the unity of transcendental apperception. So, the productive synthesis of imagination is the ground of all knowledge. Therefore, transcendental apperception is not the origin of knowledge, rather transcendental apperception is itself grounded in a more original synthesis, i.e., in the pure productive synthesis of imagination. This pure, original synthesis of imagination is "the ground of the possibility of knowledge" and is "prior to apperception." 599

Heidegger here points to a literary point in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is very important for understanding of the relation of imagination to transcendental apperception. Kant occasionally uses the term "before" (vor). This term has two meanings, a spatial and an intentional sense, i.e., it means both "priority" and "in front of...". Now Heidegger wants to say that Kant employs the term "before" (vor) in both senses, i.e., in the senses of both "prior to" and "in front of...". Now the question is what Kant means when he uses the expression "before apperception"? Because it has two senses, one in the sense of "prior to apperception" and another in the sense of "in front of apperception". In his interpretation, Heidegger adopts the first sense and believes that nobody has noted this point yet, and the second sense has always been considered. This literary difference leads to very important conclusions. When we speak of something prior to apperception, it shows that for Kant there is still a more primordial fact than apperception, which is prior to apperception. It is what Heidegger seeks to demonstrate in Being and Time and in his interpretation of Kant. It means that transcendental apperception, 'I think', or understanding, cannot be conceived as the most primordial faculty in Kant. But as we frequently pointed out, Kant hesitates as to the relation between imagination and understanding. Heidegger holds that Kant here again shows his hesitation about the power of imagination, i.e., about whether this power must be conceived as the common root of sense and understanding, or imagination is only a function of the faculty of understanding itself. Kant says: "This synthetic unity [of transcendental apperception] presupposes or includes synthesis [namely the transcendental power of imagination]." 540 According to Heidegger's interpretation, the first part
of the statement says that the synthesis of transcendental apperception “presupposes” a synthesis prior to the synthesis of transcendental apperception itself. But right here where Kant approaches the power of imagination as transcendental subjectivity and as the common root and ground of understanding, he states his hesitation about the position of the power of imagination among the faculties and about its relation to understanding, and thus immediately adds to his statement “or includes a synthesis”, namely the synthesis of imagination. This latter part means that it may be possible that it is transcendental apperception, i.e., understanding which includes the synthesis of imagination, namely, it may be possible that the pure synthesis of imagination, which is the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, can be conceived as a function of the very transcendental apperception or understanding. Heidegger believes that the first option, i.e., conceiving the power of imagination as the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, is quite clear, but the second option, that is, “how the power of imagination is to be ‘included’ in transcendental apperception cannot be demonstrated phenomenologically. At any rate Kant did not show it”.

Heidegger maintains that “Kant retreats before the consequence of eliminating the priority of transcendental apperception, of understanding, that is of the traditional, unfounded privileged position of logic. Kant is afraid of sacrificing the transcendental apperception to the transcendental power of imagination”.

That is why in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant elevates transcendental apperception to its old position of supremacy and reduces the original role of imagination in favor of understanding. Regarding this reason, in his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger chiefly emphasises its first edition. But why does Heidegger emphasise so much on the role of the power of imagination among other faculties of knowledge? What does this power essentially mean for Heidegger? What does the priority of imagination to understanding concretely mean? In the next passage, by following Heidegger’s interpretation of the power of imagination we will try to answer these questions.

50) The Power of Imagination as the Original Dimension of the Subject, as Ecstatic and Possessing Transcendence

After showing the pure, productive synthesis of the power of imagination as the ground of the unity of apperception, now Heidegger seeks to describe this synthesis. Heidegger believes that the pure productive synthesis of imagination, as related to time, is the original dimension of the subject, in which receptivity and spontaneity, i.e., intuition and thought, unify. In addition, it
is the very productive synthesis which constitutes the transcendental constitution of subject as ecstatic, i.e., as having transcendence.

Let us review what we have already stated concerning the power of imagination according to Heidegger's conception. This review will help us to better understand this passage and the last sections of Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant believes that imagination, besides sense and understanding, is one of the necessary elements of knowledge. But we must note that what Kant here considers as one of the necessary elements of knowledge is not empirical function like association or fancy, but the transcendental functions of the power of imagination, which make cognition itself and all experience basically possible. But what are the transcendental functions of imagination? And why does Kant conceive imagination as one of the necessary elements of cognition so far as he believes that it is the very power of imagination that makes all experience and knowledge essentially possible?

We already stated that, accordingly to Kant, the first transcendental function of imagination is to unify the necessarily fragmented sense data. In order to explicate this point we said that we have sense intuition 1 of the object in time 1, and sense intuition 2 in time 2,.... But when we attain sense intuition 2 in time 2, sense intuition 1 in time 1 disappears in us, unless there exists in us a disposition which retains the manifold of sense intuitions in the manifold of time. Kant calls this disposition 'imagination', and terms this unification of the manifold of affections or sense intuition as the 'transcendental function' of imagination, because this unification is not derived from experience, rather the possibility of all experience is dependent on the existence of such an *a priori* unity in the object of experience. Kant maintains that "experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances". "There must then be something which, as the *a priori* ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible". Kant holds that what provides *a priori* ground of the synthetic unity of appearances is nothing other than imagination. In 'The *A priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience' Kant discusses the transcendental function of imagination under the title 'the synthesis of reproduction'. Kant also conceives two other transcendental syntheses, the syntheses of apprehension and recognition, as the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience, but delegates them respectively to intuition and understanding, and not to imagination, whereas Heidegger shows that all the three transcendental syntheses are related to imagination. But, as we stated, Kant not only conceives every *a priori* synthesis of the manifold of affections and sense
intuition as the function of imagination, rather, more important than it, he also delegates the
synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition (space and time) to the transcendental synthesis of
imagination. In other words, Kant believes that not only the unity of objects and the
transcendental synthesis of the manifold of sense intuition but also the synthesis of the manifold
of pure intuition, space and time, are the functions of imagination. The power of imagination
provides the necessary unity for the establishment of the flux of time and the unity of space. Put
more clearly, it is imagination which makes a representation of space and time essentially
possible, and since space and time are the pure forms of all cognition, namely, every object is in
advance perceived in certain spatial and temporal relations, the pure synthesis of imagination,
i.e., the synthesis of the pure, non-empirical manifold of space and time, is the ground of our
knowledge.

As we pointed out, the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are the
three modes of transcendental synthesis, which, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, are in
fact the three modes of the pure synthesis of imagination. Kant believes that these three
transcendental syntheses, as the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience, provide the
possibility of the givenness of all manifold of intuition and the possibility of object-relatedness.
According to Heidegger’s interpretation, it means that these three transcendental syntheses, all of
which, in his view, are related to imagination, in fact make all encounter with the essents
possible, and it is nothing other than saying that these three transcendental syntheses constitute
the transcendental constitution of the subject (Dasein), because the transcendence-structure of
the mode of the being of man means the very relation with essents. But since Kant, as Heidegger
interprets, does not quite realise the transcendental constitution of Dasein, and for him the
phenomenon of transcendence is not completely clear, he endeavors to show the mode of the
encounter of the subject with the essents in meandering and winding ways. Thus, according to
Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant’s inquiry into the three transcendental syntheses of subject is
nothing other than the inquiry into the transcendence-structure of the subject in confrontation
essents.

In addition, we stated that in Kant’s view the unity of time is a necessary condition of the
possibility of experience and this unity is the transcendental function of imagination. Kant
believes that the power of imagination is the mediator between intuition and understanding.
Thus, this power is necessarily related to intuition and consequently to the pure form of intuition,
time. But in his interpretation, Heidegger endeavors to go beyond what Kant says. Heidegger
believes that transcendental imagination as such is not only related to time through its relation to intuition, rather it is possible only as time-related. More simply, Heidegger holds that imagination, unlike in Kant’s conception, is not ‘within time’, but is the time which Heidegger conceives as original time, provided that here time is not understood in the ordinary sense (physical, mechanical time), but is conceived as an existentiale, namely, in the sense of the three ecstasies which originate from human existence. Moreover, in ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding’ and in ‘The Schematism of Pure Concepts of Understanding’ Kant attempts to show the relation of categories to the power of imagination, because, as we frequently pointed out, for proving the objectivity of categories (the pure concepts of understanding) Kant needs the power of imagination as a bridge the gap between understanding and sensibility. But Heidegger endeavors to show the essential unity of categories and the pure time-related synthesis of imagination. In other words, Heidegger believes that categories are not the pure concepts of understanding but are the concepts which are derived from the pure synthesis of imagination.

The other point is that, according to Kant, all relation with objects occurs in the horizon of time and in the unity of time. In addition, Kant holds that the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition make all relation with objects possible. Heidegger believes that the conclusion of these premises is that the three transcendental syntheses constitute the horizon of time and its unity. Moreover, since all the three transcendental syntheses are related to imagination, the essence of the imagination itself cannot be non-temporal, rather transcendental imagination is itself nothing other than time or, more precisely, temporality.

Kant delegates another very important task to imagination, without which no knowledge is possible. Let us first remind ourselves that all emotion, perception or experience is always the emotion, perception, or experience of a subject which unifies the manifold of perceptions and consciousness. Kant holds that this subject, which he calls transcendental apperception or transcendental consciousness, is the subject’s apprehension of its own inner states. For Kant this transcendental consciousness, ‘I think’, is the ultimate ground of all possibility of experience and thinking. But the very apperception itself and its unity cannot be the product of sense and understanding, because all sense intuition through senses and all representations through understanding are dependent on the unity of apperception or transcendental consciousness. Then the unity of apperception must be the product of imagination, and not of sense or understanding. But it is the transcendental function (productive synthesis) of imagination— and not the
empirical function (reproductive synthesis) of imagination—which is the ground of transcendental apperception, because for the possibility of all experience—and thus of the empirical function of imagination, like the act of association—the unity of apperception must be in advance presented. Thus when we speak of pure synthesis of the unity of apperception, we mean a step that is prior to all given to intuition and prior to all sense intuition and naturally prior to all thinking which is dependent on the intuitively given and sense intuition. Hence, the productive synthesis of imagination is the ground of all knowledge. Productive synthesis means a synthesis which, unlike the non-productive, i.e., reproductive, synthesis which is always dependent on previous data, is not dependent on any previous data. Then transcendental apperception, 'I think', is not the primordial fact in knowledge, rather it is itself grounded in the more primordial synthesis, i.e., in the pure productive synthesis of imagination. This pure productive synthesis of imagination is 'the ground of the possibility of all knowledge' and 'prior to apperception'.

Heidegger believes that this pure productive synthesis of imagination is the original dimension of the subject, in which receptivity (intuition) and spontaneity (thought) unify, and it means that this synthesis is the synthesis which constitutes the transcendental constitution of the subject as ecstatic, i.e., as having transcendence. In order to better understand the meaning and essence of this pure productive synthesis of imagination, let us again return to the definition which Kant presents for imagination. In this definition imagination is determined as "a faculty of intuitions without the presence of the object". Heidegger believes that this is the definition of empirical imagination, which makes two basic characters of imagination visible. According to this definition, the first character of imagination is that this faculty is an intuition, receptivity, but it is not primarily and directly a receptive intuition, rather just one without the presence of the object. On the basis of the first character, the second character of imagination becomes manifest. Since imagination is an intuition without the presence of the object and lacks the referential dependence on the object, this faculty is a special free preferring to oneself of what is intuitive. In other words, the power of imagination is an intuition and thus a receptivity, but it is also at the same time a kind of spontaneity. Hence, the power of imagination is simultaneously both receptive and spontaneous, namely it is a spontaneous receptive.

So far, we described the empirical imagination. But in the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, which is the ground of the unity of apperception, we are dealing with a pure synthesis. It means that this synthesis is dependent on and prior to all experience and sense
intuition. Since Kant shows us that the unity of apperception is *a priori* condition of all experience and cognition, and the unity of apperception is itself grounded in a more primordial synthesis, i.e., in the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, this pure, productive synthesis is itself pure,— i.e., prior to experience— a *a priori* ground which makes experience essentially possible. So, this pure, productive synthesis, as pure, unlike the empirical synthesis of imagination (for instance in the act of association), “cannot be related to an empirical intuition that we previously had in mind”. But concerning the pure, productive synthesis of imagination we confront a contradiction, and, according to Heidegger, through understanding this contradiction we can become acquaint with the inmost possibility of the subject, i.e., the unity of receptivity and spontaneity of mind, or the transcendence of the subject. The contradiction consists in that there is a pure synthesis which is the ground of the unity of apperception and then the ground of all experience and cognition. Since this synthesis is prior to all experience and all the given, it cannot be related to any intuitive given. So, this synthesis must have an original, i.e., creative, character. It means that this pure synthesis must present its object to itself. But the explanation of the essence of finite, human knowledge, in contrast to infinite, divine knowledge, shows that finite, human knowledge can never have the character of originality, in the sense that it is only infinite, divine knowledge which can be original, i.e., can present its object to itself, and by contrast, the essence of human knowledge lies in its finitude, which means that finite, human knowledge is always dependent on the given and can never create or present an object to itself originally.55

According to Heidegger’s analysis:

Finitude of knowledge consists in referential dependence on something extant, which is already given in advance empirically. By contrast, absolute intuition creates for the first time what is intuitable in intuiting. Now we see that if the productive power of imagination plays a leading role in the structure of human finite knowledge, nay, if the power of imagination is the very unifying root of intuition and thinking, then in finite Knowledge too there is something original in the sense of *originarium*. But this original faculty does not concern beings themselves, as does *intuitus originarius* [original intuition], which is *ontically* creative and brings things as such into extantness. By contrast the *exhibito originaria* [the original exhibition] of the productive synthesis of the power of imagination is only ontologically creative.55

This means that the originality of the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, unlike the originality of divine, infinite knowledge which brings extants into existence, only means that this synthesis freely forms the universal horizon of time, in which the encounter with *essents* which in advance exist, takes place. Then this is the originality of the power of imagination which
constitutes the horizon of the encounter with the essents. Thus the power of imagination is original in this sense that it can freely and *a priori* present to itself what is already extant.

Heidegger also explains this point in other way. It was said that, according to Kant, the unity of transcendental apperception presupposes a pure *a priori* synthesis which he delegates to the power of imagination. In other words, the unity of transcendental apperception is the ground of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, each of which, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, corresponds with one of the three moments of time. Then the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, as the ground of apperception, is the synthesis (unity) of the three transcendental syntheses. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, it means that the pure, productive synthesis of imagination constitutes the horizon of time, namely, the imagination can stretch itself in the three dimensions of time. More simply, the three moments of time are the product of the three transcendental syntheses and their unity in apperception, which is itself the product of the pure, productive synthesis of imagination. Heidegger holds that it does not mean other than that the productive synthesis of imagination is the original time or temporality.

From these premises that human knowledge is finite, i.e., this knowledge has referential dependence on something that already exists and it is not produced or created by us, and that the power of imagination of the subject has an original, i.e., productive (creative) character, namely it in advance presents to itself the given, Heidegger intends to draw this conclusion that the finitude of human knowledge consists in that the subjectivity of the subject is temporal and ecstatic, and it is in the temporal ecstasies of the subject that the essents which are previously extant are presented to the subject in the horizon of time.

In chapter One, in the discussion of some basic characteristics of the ontological structure of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, we pointed out that in Heidegger’s view the mode of the Being of *Dasein* and the phenomenon of understanding, which are identical, have the character which Heidegger calls projection, so far as it can be said that *Dasein* is the same as projection. Heidegger maintains that “understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call projection.” “In understanding, *Dasein* opens up its own space for the free play of its existence as well as the free space for the play of entities which become available to it within the world. The two go together.” In addition, we pointed out there that in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant the very *Dasein’s* projection and its free play to present entities which are encountered with
itself, conform with the faculty of imagination in Kant's philosophy, i.e., with the faculty that, unlike sense and understanding, freely synthesises representations.

Heidegger believes that the constitution of human being is rooted in transcendental imagination and it is, in Heidegger's own terminology, expressed by 'temporality'.\textsuperscript{561} In the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, transcendental imagination in fact refers to that which in \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger expresses by the terms 'temporality', 'existence', and 'care'. Concerning this point, Heidegger himself says that whoever feels that the discussion of imagination in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} is unnecessary and belongs to psychology, "is stuck with the words and is blind to the dimension of human \textit{Dasein}".\textsuperscript{562}

Heidegger holds that it is transcendental imagination which constitutes the horizon of objectivity, i.e., the horizon of time, without which objective experience is not possible. Heidegger endeavors to show that temporality, i.e. the three ecstasies of human existence, is that which Kant expresses by 'transcendental imagination' and 'the three transcendental syntheses of imagination'.

Moreover, Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that the common root of intuition and thought is nothing other than transcendental imagination. According to this interpretation, the essential unity of intuition and thought originates from this fact that both of them stem from a common root, i.e., from transcendental imagination. As Heidegger frequently points out, the main problem in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, is to explain the pure knowledge or \textit{a priori} synthetic knowledge, i.e., the knowledge which is not derived from experience rather makes experience essentially possible. This pure knowledge (ontological knowledge) is constituted from pure intuition (time) and pure thought (the pure concepts of understanding or categories). Now, by emphasising transcendental imagination, we are dealing with the problem of the essential unity of pure knowledge, i.e., the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought. Imagination is the same faculty which provides the essential unity of pure intuition and pure thought, i.e., time and categories. Hence, imagination, as the original dimension of the subject, is the same faculty which makes transcendence, the precursory comprehension of the Being of entities, and thus the encounter with them, or in Kant's own terminology, the formation of pure knowledge or \textit{a priori} synthetic judgment (ontological knowledge) possible.

In the pure synthesis of imagination Heidegger seeks a structure in which two aspects of the subject, receptivity and spontaneity, intuition (object-relatedness) and understanding (thought) unify. Showing this unity in fact is proving the subject's transcendence and passing beyond the
subjectivism latent in the history of metaphysics in the sense that in the transcendental, original dimension of the subject the functions of understanding are always in a unity with the objects, and in such a unity there is no longer subject-object dichotomy. But where must we find such a unitary structure of receptivity and spontaneity?

Since the pure, productive synthesis of imagination unifies the three transcendental syntheses of the subject in the unity of apperception, obviously this pure synthesis, as synthesis, has the character of spontaneity. But since this pure synthesis belongs to finite knowledge, there must be an intuition and receptivity in it. But this pure, productive synthesis of imagination, as pure, is prior to all the givenness of intuition and all sense intuition. Then, its intuition and receptivity must be in a certain sense spontaneous. It means that because of the essential finitude of human knowledge there must be a given or the intuitable in pure synthesis of imagination. But since this synthesis is pure, i.e., prior to all sense intuitions, this given or the intuitable is not referentially dependent on the presence of something to be intuited. In other words, in pure synthesis of imagination there must be an a priori intuitable, and not through sense intuition. Heidegger believes that such a fact which is intuitable without being referable by sense, can only be time. In his Anthropology, Kant himself says that pure intuitions of time have the character of productive synthesis.  

As we frequently pointed out, Heidegger seeks to show that the pure productive synthesis of imagination, which is the ground of transcendental apperception, i.e., unifying the three transcendental syntheses in apperception, is nothing other than time or, put more precisely, temporality, and as we already stated, each of these three transcendental syntheses of imagination corresponds to one of the temporal ecstasies of Dasein.  

51) Imagination and the Ontological Essence of Categories (the First Way of Transcendental Deduction)

We said that in transcendental deduction for proving the objective validity of the concepts of understanding or categories, Kant attempts to show the connection between understanding and sensibility by the intermediate of imagination. In order to show this connection, Kant moves in two directions. In first direction, He begins from the unity of apperception (understanding) towards the manifold of appearances and the manifold of time (pure intuition). "According to this point of departure Kant must show that understanding has necessary a priori relation to
appearances. If this relation exists, then as pure concepts of understanding the categories necessarily and \textit{a priori} determine appearances, objects, then they are constitutive determinations of objectness in general'. That categories necessarily and \textit{a priori} constitute the determinations of the objectness of object in general for Kant means that categories necessarily and \textit{a priori} have objective validity.

The first direction of Kant's argument for showing the necessary connection between pure understanding, i.e., transcendental apperception, and appearances is in this way: In knowledge our all representations have a unity and interconnection. Thus our all representations must unify in one consciousness. Transcendental apperception is the point in which our all representations unify and this transcendental apperception itself must have an \textit{a priori} unity in order that it can make any unity and interconnection of representations, manifold, essentially possible. But the unity of transcendental apperception is itself the product of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. Hence, transcendental apperception is itself synthetic. Since the unity of apperception is itself transcendental and \textit{a priori}, the synthesis which is the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, i.e., the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, is also itself transcendental and \textit{a priori}. According to Heidegger's interpretation, since the pure, productive synthesis of imagination is the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, i.e., the ground of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses, or, put differently, the ground of the three temporal ecstasies of subjects, this synthesis thoroughly dominates the entire dimension of time in the sense that this synthesis "can freely give all three horizons of time at any time \textit{a priori}". In other words, through its temporal ecstasies, this synthesis can stretch itself in the three dimensions of time. This is the other expression of the temporality of subject.

Imagination is the faculty which is essentially time-related in so far as, according to Heidegger's interpretation, it must be said that imagination is time. Since imagination is time-related, or as Heidegger's interprets, since imagination is basically time, this faculty is \textit{a priori}, related to all temporal relations of the manifold of intuition. Time is the pure, universal form of all appearances, i.e., the pure, universal form of all manifold that is intuited, and imagination is related to this pure, universal form, time, and consequently to the appearances themselves through their pure form. In addition, imagination also underlies the unity of transcendental apperception in understanding, thus imagination simultaneously is the ground of both the pure synthesis of pure intuition (time) and the ground of the unity of apperception in understanding.
"consequently the pure synthesis of the productive, time-related power of imagination contains the transcendental unity of the synthesis of apperception as the synthesis of pure time as the form of appearances".569

As we frequently pointed out, for explaining the essence of the finite, human knowledge Kant needed such a transcendental synthesis of imagination, because without such a synthesis the two independent sources of human knowledge, sensibility and understanding, would never reach at a necessary connection, and then the ground of categories and the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge would collapse. In transcendental deduction Kant’s main aim is to establish such a connection between sensibility and understanding, in order that through this connection both the essential unity of the two main elements of knowledge, intuition and understanding is established and also the objectivity of the categories, through their connection to intuition is proved. Now here, in the first direction of transcendental deduction, Kant shows how the pure synthesis of imagination is related, on one side, to the manifold of intuition through the pure universal form of all appearances, time, and, on the other side, to understanding through the unity of transcendental apperception. Thus the pure synthesis of imagination can connect intuition and thought, sensibility and understanding to each other.

As we already pointed out, this pure synthesis of imagination is the ground of categories. Kant holds that the pure synthesis of imagination unifies the manifold of the given a priori space and time in one pure concept, and this unity of the manifold of the given a priori is a category. In schematism, Kant’s aim is to prove how imagination forms the categories through its pure synthesis of the manifold of time. In other words, schema is itself always the product of imagination. This pure synthesis gives us two things: The unity of time, and the categories, both of which are the product of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.570

Thus, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, by the transcendental function of imagination Kant endeavors to explain the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) in pure knowledge, which he sought in transcendental deduction. It is the very faculty of imagination which simultaneously and in a unitary act unifies both pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories); and pure intuition (time) and pure thought (categories) are essentially constituted in the very unitary act of the unification of imagination. Then pure concepts or categories must be related to pure intuition, time, because time is the pure, universal intuition which is the form of all intuition, including inner intuitions and outer intuitions. That is why in transcendental schematism Kant attempts to show that all pure concepts of understanding,
as the various modes of the function of unification of understanding, must be time-related and
grounded in time. According to Heidegger's interpretation, through showing the essential
connection between categories, i.e., the functions of unification of understanding, with the pure
intuition, time, i.e., with pure receptivity, Kant in fact puts at our disposal a foundation for
discovering the ground of pure concepts (categories) in terms of their contents out of pure
thought. In other words, according to Kant's schematism, the place of the ground of categories
does not lie only in understanding as such and in its logical unification, rather in understanding
which is dependent on and guided by pure intuition. In other words, categories are primarily
formed and grounded in pure intuition. The conclusion of these premises is that categories (the
pure concepts of understanding) are not merely the logical functions of understanding, i.e., mere
logical concepts, but are the concepts which are related to intuition, i.e., to the determinations of
the essents. Thus, categories are ontological concepts. Kant conceives categories as pure, a priori
concepts which are non-empirical and independent from all experience, which make any relation
with object and experience basically possible. For Heidegger it means that categories are not
ontic concepts but ontological ones. Categories cannot be conceived as the concepts which like
genus or species are applicable to the essents, rather they are fundamental, ontological concepts
which make the encounter with the essents and the knowledge of them in a region of nature
essentially possible. Since categories belong to the unity of both stems of knowledge, i.e., to the
unity of sensibility and understanding, and since categories co-constitute the a priori foundation
of ontological knowledge, "Kant calls them 'root-concepts'. They are called thus, not only
because all concepts are derived from them in a certain manner, but also because they themselves
belong essentially to the stem of knowledge". Kant calls categories, 'the pure concepts of
understanding', but, as already said, Heidegger holds that this designation is not correct, because
categories are not the product of logical functions of understanding but are the product of the
pure synthesis of imagination. For this reason, Heidegger believes that Kant's discussion in "the
schematism of the pure concepts of understanding which is an effort to show the relation of
categories to imagination, essentially means negating this idea that categories are the pure
concepts of understanding."

Heidegger believes that Kant could show properly the place of origin of pure concepts of
understanding or categories, i.e., Kant truly showed that the pure time-related synthesis of
imagination is the same place of origin of categories but he never worked out this origin which
reveals itself in this pure time-related synthesis of imagination, as the origin of the content of
More simply, according to Heidegger’s terminology, Kant shows us that the pure time-related synthesis of imagination is the transcendence of the subject, by which the encounter with Being takes place, but Kant never obviously reached and worked out the problem of transcendence itself and the encounter with Being as the origin of objective validity of categories. Heidegger believes that Kant’s attempts for explaining the ground of the unity of these three transcendental syntheses is nothing other than the explanation of the ontological structure of the subject.

As we already stated, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, the main problem in Kant’s inquiry into the pure concept of understanding is that he examines the elements of pure Knowledge, i.e., pure intuition and pure thought in isolation. Then Kant faces this problem of how he can bridge the gap between categories (the pure concepts of understanding) and intuition as the ground of the objective content of them. But Heidegger believes that categories are not essentially the pure concepts of understanding, rather they must be conceived as the pure synthesis of imagination. In other words, unlike Kant, Heidegger adopts as his point of departure, not understanding but the pure time-related synthesis of imagination, which is the origin and common root of both intuition and understanding, in which intuition and understanding have an essential unity. Hence, by starting from transcendental imagination, as the dimension of the unity of transcendental subjectivity, the spilt which Kant confronts in transcendental deduction, i.e., the spilt between categories, the pure concepts of understanding, and intuition as the ground of real content of categories and as their objectivity, is removed.

Moreover, in the discussion of the unity of subjectivity we showed that, according to Heidegger, imagination and its pure time-related synthesis is the original dimension of the subjectivity of the subject and the common root of intuition and thought, in which pure intuition (receptivity), time, and transcendental apperception, thought (spontaneity), and categories unify. Heidegger holds that only with reference to this original dimension of subjectivity the ontological essence of categories must be discussed and the very dimension is that which makes the relation to object a priori possible. Heidegger believes that Kant cannot realise that the subjectivity of the subject and the dimension of the origin, i.e., the dimension in which the origin of categories reveals itself, are essentially one and the same. This means that the encounter with Being or the precursory comprehension of Being already lies in transcendental subjectivity, i.e., in the subjectivity of the subject. This encounter with Being or the precursory comprehension of Being constitutes the subjectivity of the subject. That is why for Heidegger transcendental
deduction of the pure concepts of understanding or categories and demonstrating the dimension of the origin, i.e., the ontological explanation of the subjectivity of subject are one and the same, because the subject as such has a structure which is fundamentally related to objects.\(^{580}\)

Heidegger maintains that the common root of intuition and thought, i.e., transcendental imagination, provides transcendence and thus encounter with Being and the possibility of precursory comprehension of the Being of the essent, or, in Kant’s terminology, the possibility of categories and synthetic a priori judgment. Thus if we want to explain the possibility of a kind of ontology and to lay the foundation of metaphysics and ontological knowledge, we must before everything demonstrate transcendence on the basis of Dasein’s existence, which Kant approached but he could not fulfil it completely.

Already, in the discussion of the three transcendental syntheses, we said that three syntheses are the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience. It means that they make the relation to an object, the objectness of an object, possible and thus are the elements of pure Knowledge. These transcendental syntheses as transcendental functions of the subject, are in the subject itself, and the ontological essence of categories becomes possible on the basis of the very transcendental functions, i.e., transcendental syntheses.

In other words, these a priori grounds provide this possibility that categories have objective reality, and constitute something like objectness as such.\(^{581}\) All these three syntheses are, as Heidegger interprets, the pure time-related syntheses of imagination which make all givenness to intuition and the encounter with essents essentially possible. In other words, through its three transcendental syntheses imagination makes accessible the manifold for intuition and thus for the act of determination of thought.

Kant believes that categories are the product of the unification of the manifold of pure intuition (time), and imagination is the same faculty which fulfils this unification of the manifold of pure intuition. In addition, imagination is the same faculty which makes the objectness of object possible through its three transcendental syntheses. Already, in discussion of the function of the pure concepts of understanding (categories), we said that these concepts also make the objectness of object possible. In other words, categories are the product of the same three transcendental syntheses.

Kant believes that categories, as concepts, must be related to intuition and object-related, but since categories are pure concepts their object cannot be an empirical object. Then categories or the pure concepts of understanding must be related to a pure object, or in Kant’s own
expression, to ‘object in general’ or, in terms of Heidegger’s terminology, to a No-thing (Being). Moreover, we pointed out that, according to Heidegger, in the Critique of Pure Reason both the expressions ‘object in general’ and ‘unknown noumenon’ refer to Being as such. The summary of Heidegger’s discussion concerning the ontological essence of categories can be stated in this way: categories are the product of the pure synthesis of imagination. It means that they are not the product of the logical function of understanding but the product of imagination, i.e., the product of the original dimension and unity of transcendental subjectivity. In addition, Kant believes that categories are the product of the unity of the manifold of pure intuition (time). Time, as pure intuition, is pure receptivity. In this pure receptivity something reveals itself, something that cannot be the object of our sense, empirical intuition. Categories, as concepts, must be related to intuition and thus an object, but this object cannot be empirical, rather, in Kant’s expression, ‘object in general’ or, in Heidegger’ words, Being. Therefore, in Heidegger’s thought Being is what makes the objectness of object basically possible but it is not itself objectified. ‘Object in general’ or Being, as the unifying, necessary, binding element imposes itself on categories in pure intuition, time, and this unifying, necessary, binding elements manifests itself in categories and through them in a priori synthetic judgments as the principles of all empirical Knowledge.

Thus, what Kant sought in transcendental deduction, i.e., proving the objective validity of the pure concepts of understanding, categories, is proved by demonstrating the a priori, necessary connection of categories and appearances. In other words, categories determine appearances, i.e., objects, a priori and necessarily. Thus, categories are objective, i.e., related to objects, because they constitute essentially the determinations of objectness in general, i.e., they make the objectness of objects basically possible. Here, in the discussion of the relation of categories and the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, Heidegger again points out to Kant’s hesitation as to the relation of imagination and understanding, because Kant says that the pure, time-related synthesis of imagination is the ground of transcendental apperception, and right here he remarks that it is possible that understanding (transcendental apperception) itself includes such a pure productive synthesis.

52) Imagination and the Second Direction of Transcendental Deduction of Categories

In this passage, following the discussion of the ontological essence of categories, we seek to present Heidegger’s interpretation of the second direction of transcendental deduction of
categories in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first direction of transcendent deduc-
tion, as we stated, Kant starts from transcendent apperception (understanding) towards appearances. Now, in
the second direction, Kant attempts to show the unity and connection of intuition and understanding for
providing the objective validity of categories by starting from appearances (intuition) towards apperception
(understanding).

Heidegger believes that Kant's discussion in the second direction of transcendent
deduction, in the third section of 'Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
Understanding', in the first edition, is more clear. In the second passage of the mentioned
section, entitled 'The *A priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', Kant discussed the
three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. But only in the
determination of the synthesis of recognition, which is conceived as related to understanding and
not imagination, Kant suddenly sets forth this question of what the object essentially means, i.e.,
what the objectness of object basically means. But, in the second direction of transcendent
deduction, Kant immediately works out the question of the meaning of object and the problem
of the relation to object, as a transcendental relation, or in other words, the problem of the
possible objective reality of appearances (objects). Heidegger holds that the discussed theme
and problem in the second direction of transcendent deduction light up the entire discussions
in the third passage. It means that the main problem of transcendent deduction is the
question of the meaning of 'objectness' of an object or transcendental relation to an object, or,
in Heidegger's words, the explanation of transcendental structure of the subject.

But what does 'appearance' mean? Heidegger believes that "if appearance is taken in
terms of the psychic state of representing, then appearances have no objectness", i.e., they have
no objects. But "if we understand appearances as what is represented, then the 'relation to
something', the relation to the object in general, enters the game. But this relation is constituted
in the pure, original, time-related synthesis of the power of imagination, that is, in pure
knowledge *a priori*. That is why Kant says that appearances as objects exist "only in
knowledge". According to Heidegger, that Kant says that appearances as objects exist "only in
Knowledge", by no means signifies that appearances are nothing other than psychic state of
representing. Here By 'knowledge' Kant means the pure knowledge which is the product of
transcendent imagination. More simply, that appearances as objects exist "only in knowledge",
according to Heidegger's interpretation, means that appearances, as objects, exist only in pure
knowledge, i.e., only on the basis of the pure productive synthesis of imagination, namely,
merely in the subject’s transcendence. Put differently, all ontic (empirical) knowledge of appearance is possible “only on the basis of ontological knowledge, that is, on the basis of original transcendence.” Hence, Heidegger challenges the current epistemological interpretation of the concept of appearance in Kant, according to which appearance is opposite to the thing-in-itself, and it is conceived as something different from thing-in-itself.

In the second direction of transcendental deduction, Kant emphasises that without ‘the unity of consciousness’, i.e., without transcendental apperception, appearances cannot have any character of objectness. It means that the object of consciousness without such a consciousness is meaningless. As already, in the discussions of the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience and the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, we stated, Kant maintains that “since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination”. In addition, we said that Kant believes that there must be in us a disposition that retains the manifold of sense intuitions in the manifold of time. Kant calls this disposition, ‘imagination’, and this act of unification of the manifold, the ‘synthesis of reproduction’. But the synthesis of reproduction, i.e., bringing forth what is already offered, is possible only when we can recognise what we have previously intuited as the same as what we intuit now. “Re-production is impossible if I cannot reproduce what flows away in the past as the same by recognizing it again [as the same]”. It means that the synthesis of reproduction is possible only when in the succession of the affections in the sequence of the nows we can recognise all affection in a now as the same as the previous affection in previous nows.

In the second direction of transcendental deduction, Kant concludes that the apprehension of the multiplicity of appearances and their reproducibility and their identification presuppose the existence of an abiding, unchanging ‘I’, i.e., the existence of pure, transcendental apperception, because only with the existence of this abiding, unchanging ‘I’, i.e., pure, transcendental apperception, we can become conscious of representations. “The abiding and unchanging ‘I’ (Pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive, pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition namely, to time”. Already, in the discussion of the transcendental
functions of imagination, we stated that Kant delegates another very important task to imagination, without which no knowledge is possible. Kant believes that the unity of our manifold consciousness is dependent on a subjective ground which he calls the unity of apperception. Kant holds that the very unity of apperception in understanding, which is itself the ground of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, each of which, according to Heidegger's interpretation, corresponds to one of the temporal ecstasies of the subject and then corresponds to one of the three moments of time, is dependent on the pure, productive synthesis of imagination. Now, in the interpretation of the second direction of transcendental deduction, Heidegger remarks that in this direction Kant declares that "what links a priori transcendental apperception to time is the productive power of imagination". Because, as we stated in previous lines, the unity of transcendental apperception, i.e., the unity of the three transcendental syntheses, or in other words, the ground of the three temporal ecstasies, is dependent on the pure synthesis of imagination. Then productive imagination is the ground of time and thus the ground of the relation of transcendental apperception to time. This point, i.e., that Kant establishes the relation of transcendental apperception to time on the basis of the productive imagination, is a confirmation of Heidegger's analysis that Kant gradually and step by step extends the realm of imagination in contrast with the realm of the activities of understanding. As Heidegger explains, already in the second passage, in 'The A priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience', Kant conceived imagination as a reproductive faculty, and there he delegated only one of the transcendental syntheses, i.e., the synthesis of reproduction, to imagination, but now, in the third passage of 'Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding', Kant describes imagination as a productive, not merely reproductive, faculty. Here imagination is no longer only related to the synthesis of reproduction, but is the ground of the unity of transcendental apperception, i.e., the ground of the unity of all the three transcendental syntheses.

Heidegger believes that in this passage Kant establishes an interconnection between the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition and the unity of apperception in understanding. All synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition presupposes the unity of apperception in understanding, and the unity of apperception in understanding presupposes the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition. "Here there is an original correlation which indicates that neither factor is to be derived from the other, but rather that both have a common root, neither only intuition nor only thinking but both, in terms of possibility". For Heidegger this means that
Kant further approaches the power of transcendental imagination as the original dimension of the subject and the dimension of the unity of the subject.

We know that Kant conceives categories as the pure concepts of understanding and as related to understanding, i.e., as related to transcendental apperception. In addition, according to Kant’s own analysis, understanding is essentially related to intuition and is in service of intuition. In other words, Kant believes that every concept is related to intuition. Then categories, as concepts and as the elements of understanding, must be related to intuition and at the same time be related to understanding. Thus, categories, as pure concepts, are necessarily related to pure intuition, time. Heidegger believes that for showing the essence of categories, i.e., showing how categories are simultaneously related both to understanding itself and to pure intuition, time, Kant must show how there is a necessary interconnection between transcendental apperception and the pure intuition, time, and this is what Kant does in both directions of transcendental deduction. According to Heidegger, that categories are simultaneously related both to understanding itself and pure intuition (pure time) means that “categories are such determinations as to constitute pure time as a priori ability to resist, as objectness”.

We remind ourselves again that when Kant and Heidegger speak of time as pure intuition, the current meaning of time must not misguide us, otherwise we will confront obscure and meaningless sentences in the Critique of Pure Reason and in Heidegger’s interpretation of it. Here, time means pure intuition, i.e., non-empirical intuition, which indicates the receptivity, in contrast with the spontaneity, of the subject. As Heidegger explains, Kant speaks of space and time as pure intuitions, and this means to recognise an intuition other than sense, empirical intuition. Pure intuition points to the receptivity of the mode of our Being to the essents. Husserl also employs the term ‘absolute intuition’, in contrast with empirical intuition. In order to express this pure receptivity, pure affection or, according to Husserl’s terminology, absolute intuition, Heidegger employs the term Dasein’s openness to Being in his later works.

We already stated that categories, as concepts, must be related to intuition, an object. Because all concept adopts its content from the object to which it is related. Since, in the case of categories, we are dealing with the concepts prior to all experience, which make the experience and its object as the object essentially possible, these concepts cannot be derived from sense intuition but must be related to pure intuition, and we know that in Kant’s view the pure intuition is time. Regarding the question what the real content of categories is we stated that, in Heidegger’s view, through pure intuition (time), i.e., through the pure receptivity of the subject
categories cannot be related to an empirical object, rather they are those concepts that make the objectness of the object of experience possible before any sense intuition and before any experience. In Kant's own words, categories are related, not to empirical objects but, to 'object in general'. We know that what Kant calls pure intuition (time) Heidegger terms temporality, and this temporality and its three temporal ecstasies, which correspond to the three transcendental time-related syntheses in Kant, constitute the same transcendence of the subject or Dasein. Then in Kant this point that through pure intuition (time) categories are related to 'object in general' for Heidegger means that through temporality or Dasein's transcendence categories are related to Being as such.  

In addition, already in explanation of the essence of understanding and transcendental apperception we clarified that Kant endeavors to explicate the essence of transcendental apperception on the basis of the meaning of 'object in general'. Kant holds that the meaning of 'object in general' or, in Heidegger's term, Being, is derived neither from observation, experience, nor from the logical functions of understanding, i.e., from reflection, comparison, and abstraction, rather it must be sought in the subject itself, i.e., in transcendental apperception itself. Kant maintains that 'object in general' is "that which prevents our mode of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion". Then, as we already explained, in Kant's view, 'object in general' is a resistance and, as we said, this resistance is not empirical but the binding, unifying and regulating element which prevents our knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary. Transcendental apperception is the ground of the unity of the three transcendental syntheses, and these three syntheses essentially provide the possibility of the encounter with objects. Then transcendental apperception, as the ground of the unity of these syntheses, is the ground of all encounter with the essents and the ground of the possibility of all relation to objects.

Now Heidegger says that "categories are such determinations as to constitute pure time as a priori ability to resist, as objectness". This means that categories are such determinations as to constitute pure time, i.e., our pure receptivity (sensibility), in which the objectness of object, i.e., the very resistant, binding, unifying, and regulating element which prevents us from being haphazard or arbitrary, is constituted. However, as we already, in the discussion of the pure, productive original synthesis of imagination, stated, this originality or being constituent of the objectness of object has only an ontical sense and not ontological one. It means that it is not our categories which constitute the objectness of object, rather categories are the determinations of
the general horizon of time, and all encounter with the objects occurs in the horizon of time and with regard to the \textit{a priori} determinations of time.

Now, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant believes that if categories are to be employed in pure judgments (pure knowledge), and if these pure (non-empirical) judgments are to be true, in the sense that they also conform to objects and, in other words, if the synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments (ontological knowledge) are to be possible, then there must be a criterion for the examination of the correctness or falsehood of these \textit{a priori} synthetic judgments. Kant believes that the criterion for the employment of pure concepts or categories in pure, non-empirical judgments must be sought in pure time. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Kant holds that “pure time enables a pure \textit{a priori} field for identifying such propositions, which are pure categorical propositions, that is, propositions which do not employ empirical concepts and nonetheless state something about objects themselves, namely, their objectness” \textsuperscript{606}.

We already said that Kant takes the division of formal logic as his pattern in the division of his transcendental logic, and corresponding to the division of general logics he divides the transcendental logic, too, into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. In addition, we stated that, according to Heidegger, in transcendental deduction and in schematism Kant attempts to show that the pure, \textit{a priori} knowledge is grounded in pure intuition, time. But if pure thought can apply some determinations to objects,

without any grounding in pure intuition, then empty sophistries give way to concepts of understanding which have no truth. Thus an illusion will be produced in transcendental knowledge—an ostensibly or seemingly ontological Knowledge—which dares synthetically to judge and to determine objects on the basis of pure understanding alone. In this case the employment of pure thinking would be dialectical. Thus the transcendental analysis needs likewise to be supplemented and secured by a critique of transcendental dialectical illusion.\textsuperscript{607}

We should note that, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, time is conceived as the criterion of the pure, synthetic judgments or ontological knowledge. It means that time, as pure intuition (receptivity) is a horizon in which ‘object in general’ or Being manifests itself, and by reliance on time, i.e., by reliance on the unobservable which imposes itself on categories in the horizon of time, we can make \textit{a priori} synthetic judgments.
53) The Significance of Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason

In the last passage of Phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger gives some hints of Kant’s doctrine of schematism of pure concepts. Heidegger holds that ‘Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding’, in contrast with the negative part of ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, is the main section in the positive part of the Critique of Pure Reason, provided that transcendental deduction is properly understood, i.e., as disclosure of the origin. Heidegger already explained to us that transcendental logic in the Critique of Pure Reason is by no means logic in the current sense, i.e., in the sense of formal logic, but a kind of ontology. Moreover, Heidegger clarified that corresponding to the division of general logic into analytic and dialectic Kant divides the transcendental logic, too, into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. Furthermore, we know that formal logic is divided into the doctrine of concepts, the doctrine of judgment, and the doctrine of conclusion, Accordingly Kant too divided his transcendental logic in this way. Thus the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ and the ‘Analytic of Principles’ are respectively the doctrine of concepts and the doctrine of judgment in Kant’s transcendental logic, and ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ in Kant’s logic in corresponds to the doctrine of conclusion in traditional, formal logic. But, as Heidegger explains, between the two parts the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ and the ‘Analytic of principles’, there is a section which by no means conforms to the division of formal logic, i.e., ‘Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’. Heidegger holds that this point confirms his interpretation of transcendental logic, i.e., that the theme of this logic is the inquiry of transcendence of the subject and the problem of the origin, which is alien to the current division of traditional logic, and it does not submit itself to this division.

We frequently cited Kant’s statement that it is synthetic a priori judgments “for the sake of which alone our whole critique is undertaken”. Synthetic a priori judgments or ontological knowledge are those judgments which make experience itself essentially possible a priori. In this section, in order to explicate the relation of the synthetic a priori judgments to experience and also in order to state an introduction for briefly explaining the meaning of Kant’s doctrine of schematism, Heidegger points out some of these a priori synthetic judgments, or, in Heidegger’s own terms, some of ontological principles, concretely, i.e., to the first group of dynamic principles of nature or what Kant calls the ‘analogies of experience’.
Kant believes that these principles “lie at the ground of the possibility of experience in so far as it is to connect objects in nature according to existence. These principles are properly the laws of nature and can be called dynamic”. The analogies of experience are the principles which *a priori* teach us something about the existence of nature and are related to the concepts of substance, cause, and community (interaction), i.e., to the categories corresponding to the relation of judgments. The first analogy is the principle of permanence of substance. This principle, as Kant states, is: “All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is as a way in which the object exists”. Then according to this principle, in all appearance there is a permanent fact and some changeable determinations, and the object itself is conceived as the permanent fact, and its changes are understood as the characters and determinations of the object. In traditional metaphysics, this permanent fact is expressed by ‘substance’, and the transitory changeable determinations are termed ‘accidental’. Then, briefly, according to the first principle of the analogies of experience, all appearance contains a substance and some accidentals and in all changes of appearances, substance is permanent.

The second analogy is the principle of causality. Kant’s expression of this principle is: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule”. This is the same well-known principle of causality according to which everything that happens, all effects, originates from another extant, i.e., from cause.

The third analogy is the principle of community (interaction). This principle says: “All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thorough going community, that is, in mutual interaction”.

Now, what Kant seeks to emphasise is that the synthetic *a priori* judgments, such as the analogies of experience, and their pure concepts (categories), like substance, causality, and community (interaction), all are, without any exception, temporal relations and time-related. The concept of substance or the principle of permanence of substance, the concept of causality and the principle of causality, the concept of community and the principle of interaction, point out respectively to permanence of time, succession in time, and co-existence, all of which are temporal relations. These temporal relations are expressed in certain *a priori* principles, in ontological judgments, which constitutes the objectness of the nature as such. It means that only on the basis of these *a priori* principle and in the framework of them we can experience the nature as our object. Then, synthetic *a priori* judgments, as synthetic determinations, i.e., as
object-related, are related to time. According to Heidegger, these judgments are pure time-
determinations which “articulate time in terms of the ability of resist, in terms of a priori
objectness, which in turn determines each empirical object a priori. In these synthetic judgments
a priori, as pure time-determinations, is constituted the relation to objectness in general, the
objectivity of objects”.

The major result of Heidegger’s interpretation, is that the possibility of a priori synthetic
judgments is understandable on the basis of the ontological essence of categories. It means that
categories, as time-determinations relating to pure imagination, make the relation to object in
general possible. It means that categories cannot be conceived as the concepts belonging to
understanding and as separate, isolated from intuition. Categories are time-determinations,
essentially related to pure intuition (time). In a renewed summary of the results of the
transcendental deduction Kant himself states that “we have seen...that pure a priori concepts
[categories], in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain
a priori certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely, those of inner sense (i.e. time)”.
Thus even Kant himself confesses that we cannot conceive categories only as the logical functions of
understanding and then only as logical concepts. Rather they contain the condition of pure
intuition (time) too. For Heidegger it signifies that in Kant’s view categories, besides the logical,
formal function in judgment, contain a real content too, due to their relation to pure intuition
(time). More simply, categories are, besides logical concepts, ontological concepts too. We
know that Kant divides the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason into two main parts,
‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ (inquiry into sensibility and intuition) and ‘Transcendental Logic’
(inquiry into understanding and thought), and on the basis of this division he puts pure intuition
(time) in the first main part, and categories (pure concepts of understanding) in the second main
part. But, according to Heidegger, categories are not the product of understanding but are
essentially related to pure time-related synthesis of imagination, to the original dimension of the
subject, i.e., to the common root of sensibility and understanding. Heidegger believes that in
schematism Kant endeavors to understand the pure, productive synthesis of imagination, the
original dimension of subjectivity more radically. In schematism Kant no longer discusses the
pure essence of categories but attempts to work out the a priori synthetic judgments in which
categories are employed. In schematism Kant no longer conceives categories only as the pure
concepts of understanding rather he tries to show that categories or pure concepts can function
only on the basis of a procedure of understanding according to which understanding first obtains
a pure image for its concepts in pure time. Heidegger already showed the close connection of understanding (transcendental apperception) and the three transcendental time-related syntheses. He holds that understanding as such can act in no other way than as essentially related to time, to pure intuition. Kant himself accepts that the schemata of pure concepts of understanding, categories, are a priori time-determinations and as such they are a transcendental product of the pure power of imagination.

Heidegger believes that in his interpretation of 'Transcendental Aesthetic', 'Transcendental Analytic' and in particular, 'Transcendental Deduction', schematism is the core of the Critique of Pure Reason, because it is in the discussion of schematism that Kant shows that categories are pure time-determinations and related to the pure, productive time-related synthesis of imagination as the original dimension of the subject and as the dimension of transcendence. For this reason, according to Heidegger, even in 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and in 'Transcendental Analytic' the necessity of schematism, namely the necessity of the relation of categories to time and imagination, is seen. Even regarding the arrangement of the Kantian presentation, it must be said that transcendental deduction of pure concepts is grounded in schematism. Heidegger maintains that in his own interpretation, "the schematism is a reference to the original sphere of the radical grounding of the possibility of ontological knowledge", i.e., to the original dimension of the subject, namely to pure time-related synthesis of imagination.
Endnotes

Notes to Introduction

3) Cf. Ibid., 585.
9) Cf. Ibid., 319.
10) Transcendental historicism is the term which Guignon uses and it is incidentally used for describing the mode of thinking of the thinker we are concerned with, namely, Martin Heidegger. Guignon accuse Heidegger of believing in a kind of transcendental historicism.
11) Ibid., 3.
12) Ibid., 21.
13) In Heidegger’s thought the different interpretations of Being, various ontologies, or, according to the later Heidegger’s terminology, the disclosure and manifestation of Being, is considered to be the ground of the formation and change of different historical epochs. In other words, according to Heidegger, the different historical epochs and the development of history is the result of the emergence, change, and fall of ontologies. Some critics like Guignon, interpret Heidegger’s conception of history
as a sort of transcendental historicism. Derrida criticises Heidegger's logocenterism too. He argues that Heidegger's effort to find an axis which underlies all free play in history is itself a part of the same metaphysics which Heidegger seeks to criticise, since it is not free from the absurd desire to find ultimate grounds and eternal truth. For further study also see:


15) Cf. BT 32.
17) Ibid., 64.
18) Cf. BT 27.
20) Ibid., 585.
22) [Sic]
24) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, a translation of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, was first presented in a course held during the winter semester of 1925-26 and was later repeated in lectures and series of lectures at the Herder Institute in Riga in September, 1928 and was published originally in German in 1929. Cf. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Author's preface to the first edition, p. xxiii.
25) "*The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, a translation of *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, is the text of a lecture course that Martin Heidegger gave at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927. Only after almost half of a century did Heidegger permit the text of the course to be published ... for the first time in 1975 as volume 24 of the multi-volume *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* presently in preparation (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann)". *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Translator's preface, p. xi.
27) *What is a thing?* presents the text of a lecture which was given in the winter of 1935-36, at the University of Freiburg. The lecture was entitled *Basic Questions of Metaphysics* and was first published in 1962. Cf. *What is a thing?* Author's preface, p. vii.
Notes to Chapter One


2) Here it is necessary to mention that the term Being is the most important term in Heidegger’s thought but this expression in English is somewhat different from what Heidegger means by the equivalent term in German, \( \text{sein} \), and the term Being cannot convey all the meanings of the term \( \text{sein} \). Besides being and existing, the term \( \text{sein} \) signifies activity, dynamism, motion, possibility, unfolding, refusal, disquietude, and tranquillity. In addition, in the English language the word Being, unlike the German equivalent, is caught within a stasis, as in ‘being over against becoming’.


3) Plato, Sophist, 244a, quoted from Being and Time, Translated from German to English by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, USA, 1978, p. 18.

4) Cf. BT 18.


7) Cf. The Cambridge companion to Heidegger, op. cit., p. 44.

8) Later, in the so-called Islamic philosophy, the discussion of the meaning of being was continued under the title of “the discussion of univocal or ununivocal sense of the word being” (moshtarak-e-lafzi or moshtarak-e-manavi). Under the influence of Aristotelian thought, and also for some theological reason, most Muslim philosophers and theologians believed in the multiplicity of these senses of the word Being (moshtarak-e-lafzi). They asked how it is possible that the word Being is applied both to God, as a necessary being, self subsistent, the first cause, the creator all entities, and to other creatures, which are contingent, dependent, and caused, in same way and in a unitary sense. Then, according to them, the word Being cannot be used for both creator and creature, necessary and contingent, cause and caused, in the same sense. But some of the great mystics of the Islamic world, like Muhyid-din-Ibn-al Arabi (born in the seventh lunar century), and also the founder of ‘Transcendent Philosophy’, Molla Sadra (born in tenth lunar century), believed in the unitary sense of the word being (Moshtarak-e-manavi). The latter group believe that we have a pure, simple comprehension of the meaning of Being, which is applied to all entities, including necessary or contingent, cause or caused, creator or creature, unequivocally in a unitary sense.

9) BW 110.

10) Ibid., 110.

11) BT 25,26.

12) Cf. Ibid., 19.
13) *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger*, op. cit., 44.
14) Ibid., 44,45.
15) Cf. BT 245.
17) BT 25,26.
18) BT 23.
19) By this comparison we by no means mean that Heidegger is a platonic thinker.
20) BT 25.
21) Cf. Ibid., 41,49.
22) Ibid., 26.
23) On Heidegger's critique of the foundation of logic, see:
Heidegger, Martin, *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic*, Translated from German to English by Michael Heim, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, USA, 1992. For further studies see:
24) BT 27.
25) Cf. Ibid., 27.
26) Ibid., 27,28.
27) Cf. Ibid., 352-358
28) Cf. Ibid., 33-34.
29) It must be mentioned that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger sought to lay a foundation for metaphysics and ontology, but later, after a thoughtful turn, "Heidegger seems to have become increasingly skeptical about the enterprise of a fundamental ontology that 'lays bare' the structures of being as such"* and speaks of passing beyond metaphysics instead of laying a foundation for it. In the next chapter we shall further explain Heidegger's thoughtful turn.
* 'The Question of Being :Heidegger's Project', in *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger*, op. cit., p. 65)
30) BT 28.
31) Ibid., 33.
32) Ibid., 33.
33) CPR.B XI, note a.
34) BT 249.
36) BT 87/ BPP 297.
37) Cf. Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, Section 13, *A Founded Mode in which Being-in [-the-world] Exemplified. Knowing the World*, pp. 86-90. In this section Heidegger seeks to show how the cognitive relation between human being and the world is itself dependent on an *a priori* relationship, i.e., on being-in-the-world, and this fundamental, *a priori* relationship is not itself a kind of cognitive relation between a subject and objects.
38) *Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, op. cit., p. 37,38.
39) BT 89.
40) *Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 94.
41) [Sic]
42) Ibid., 98.
43) BPP 297.
44) BT 416.
45) Ibid., 33.
46) Ibid., 35.
48) "The Letter on Humanism" was written in reply to questions raised by the French
philosopher, Jean Beaufret, whom Heidegger went to see on his own initiative after
the war. This was the beginning of a friendship which was to last for decades. Ibid.,
p. 122.
49) Ibid., 122.
50) Ibid., 123.
51) Ibid., 124.
52) LH 289.
53) Ibid., 277.
54) Cf. BT 38.
55) Ibid., 39.
56) Cf. Ibid., 465.
57) 'The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project’, in The Cambridge companion to
Heidegger, op. cit., p. 64.
58) BT 185,86.
59) Ibid., 255.
60) Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 89.
61) BT 184.
62) Ibid., 236.
63) Ibid., 184,85.
64) Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, op. cit., p. 49.
65) Cf. BT 41, 63, 437.
67) BT 83,84.
68) Cf. BT 242.
69) BT 492, note 7.
70) Ibid., 293.
71) Ibid., 63.
72) Ibid., 41.
73) Ibid., 63.
74) Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 70.
75) Ibid., 63.

Notes to Chapter Two

1) Cf. KPM 21.
2) Cf. Ibid., 2 / PIC. 45,46.
3) KPM 3.
4) Before Heidegger, there have been people who sought to present an ontological
interpretation of Kant. For example, a Belgian scholar called P. Marshal had tried to
bridge Kant’s philosophy and scholasticism on the basis of ontology. Also a person
called Sentrou (in Bouvan) published a treatise entitled The issue of metaphysics in
Kant and Aristotle’s philosophies. See the French translator’s introduction of
Heidegger’s book on Duns Scotus:
But none of them was as strong as Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Kant, and thus they have not been considered.
5) As Charles Cuignon points out, “it is not immediately evident in *Being and Time* whether the existential analytic [of Dasein] is identical with or preparatory for fundamental ontology.” (*Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 66)
Heidegger says, for instance, that “the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology.” (BT 35) But he also says that “the analytic of Dasein is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology— the question of the meaning of Being in general”. (BT 61/227)
6) Cf. KPM 4.
7) Cf. Ibid., 15.
8) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translator’s introduction, op. cit., p. xvi
10) Ibid., 14, 15.
11) Ibid., 15.
12) Cf. PIC 49.
14) Ibid., 49.
15) Ibid., xix, xvii.
16) Thomas Lagan’s Foreword in: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. x.
17) Ibid., xi.
18) Cf. Ibid., xi.
20) Cf. KPM 167.
21) Cf. PIC 7.
22) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translator’s introduction, op. cit., p. xix.
23) Cf. Ibid., xix.
24) Ibid., xx.
Here and in the next two pages, for some citation especially from German sources, I am indebted to the following unpublished Ph.D. thesis:
30) *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*, Thomas Lagan’s Foreword, op. cit., p. xii.
31) KPM .xxv.
33) BT 49.
34) CPR. A598 / B626.
35) Cf. KTB 33.
36) Cf. Ibid., 31.
38) KPM 206,207.
39) PIC 2.
40) KPM 207.
41) PIC 1.
42) Ibid., 12.
43) Ibid., 12.
44) *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translators' foreword, op. cit., p. xiii.
45) Cf. PIC 2.
46) CPR A314/ B370.
47) PIC 2,3.
48) Ibid., 3.
49) KPM 16.
50) Cf. PIC 64.
51) For example cf. Ibid., 115, 215.
52) For example cf. Ibid., 160.
53) For example cf. Ibid., 231/ 187-188/ 222.
54) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Thomas Langan's Foreword, op. cit., p. xii.
56) BT 17.
57) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Thomas Langan’s Foreword, op. cit., p. ix.
58) CPR.B21.
59) BT 63.
60) BT 64.
61) BPP 1.
62) *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translators’ foreword, op. cit., p. xiii.
63) *The Basic problems of phenomenology*, Albert Hofstadter’s preface, op. cit., p. xi.
64) BT 63.
65) BT 64.
66) *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translators’ foreword, op. cit., op. cit., p. xiii.
67) KPM xxiii.
68) On Kant’s view about transcendental truth, or Being, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, see: Chapter Three, pp. 191- 194.
69) KTB 33.
70) On Kant’s view about transcendental apperception, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, see: Chapter Three, pp. 165, 234-244.
71) Cf. KTB 31.
Notes to Chapter Three

Section One:

1) Cf. KPM 73.
2) Cf. PIC 7,9.
4) KPM 3.
5) Ibid., 14,15.
6) Ibid., 15.
7) Cf. Ibid., 3,4.
8) Cf. Ibid., 4.
9) See: Chapter One, p 18-22.
10) About the differences between fundamental ontology and ancient anthropology and modern experimental anthropologies, see: *Being and Time*, part one, section 10: *How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology*, op. cit., pp. 71-76; *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, op. cit., p. 74; and also: *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 48.
12) See: Chapter Two, note 3.
13) KPM 3.
14) BT 31.
16) Cf. Ibid., 113.
17) See: Introduction, p. 8-10
19) KPM 5.
20) Cf. Ibid., 9.
21) Ibid., 9.
24) Ibid., 11.
26) KPM 12.
27) Cf. Ibid., 12/ PIC 11.
28) KPM 12.
29) Ibid., 12.
30) Cf. PIC 9.
31) KPM 13/ PCI 10.
32) KPM 11.
33) Cf. Ibid., 10-11/ PIC 9,10.
34) KPM 10,11.
35) Ibid., 13
36) Ibid., 13.
37) Ibid., 13.
38) CPR.B xv.
39) KPM 14.
40) Cf. Ibid., 15.
41) KPM 13,14.
42) CPR.B xv.
43) KPM 16.
44) Ibid., 16.
45) Cf. Ibid., 16.
46) Ibid., 14,15.
47) Ibid., 15.
48) CPR. Bxiii.
49) KPM 15.
50) CPR. A14/ B24.
51) KPM 15.
52) PIC 26.
53) Cf. Ibid., 24- 27.
54) Cf. KPM 15/ PIC 24-27.
55) CPR.Bxvi.
56) Cf. Ibid., xvi.
57) KPM 17/ PIC 32.
58) PIC 38.
59) Ibid., 38.
60) KPM 15.
61) PIC 37.
62) Ibid., 38.
63) Ibid., 38,39.
64) KPM 17.
65) Ibid., 17.
66) Ibid., 18.
67) We should note here that in the expression ‘the origin of truth’, truth means the correspondence of object and mind, and the expression cannot quite convey Heidegger’s conception of truth. Because he attempts to think on the origin, truth, and Being in their identity and sameness, and they are different words which signify a unitary fact. Hence, on the basis of Heidegger’s conception of truth, the origin of truth is nothing but the truth itself or, in other words, Being itself.

68) CPR.A146/ B185.
69) Ibid., A62/ B87.
70) Cf. PIC 132- 133.
71) Ibid., 8.
72) Cf. CPR.Bxxxi, 21/ PFM, Conclusion, § 57.
73) Cf. CPR.Bvii, viii.
74) Ibid., x.
75) Ibid., xii.
76) Cf. Ibid., vii- xv.
77) PIC 11.
78) Ibid., 12.
79) Cf. Ibid., 12.
80) Cf. Ibid., 12.
81) Cf. Ibid., 12.
82) Ibid., 13.
83) Ibid., 13.
84) Ibid., 13.
85) Ibid., 13.
86) Ibid., 13.
87) Ibid., 14.
89) BT 93.
90) [Sic]
92) Cf. BT 247.
93) BPP 297.
94) BT 417.
95) The Cambridge companion to Heidegger, op. cit., 150.
98) Ibid., 38.
99) BT 90.
103) Cf. Ibid., 96.
104) PIC 13,14.
105) Ibid., 14.
107) Ibid., 15.
108) Cf. BT 306.
109) Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, op. cit., p. 84.
110) Ibid., 48.
111) BT 48.
114) Ibid., 15.
115) Ibid., 15,16.
116) Ibid., 16.
117) Ibid., 16,17.
118) Ibid., 17,18.
119) Ibid., 19.
120) Ibid., 19.
121) Ibid., 19.
122) Ibid., 19.
123) Ibid., 20.
124) CPR.A598/B626.
125) PIC 20.
126) Cf. Ibid., 20.
127) BT 77.
128) PIC 20.
129) Ibid., 20.
130) Cf. Ibid., 2-22.
131) Ibid., 21,22.
132) Ibid., 22.
133) It is added by the translators of the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
134) Ibid., 22.
135) Ibid., 22.
136) Ibid., 22.
137) Ibid., 24.
138) Ibid., 26.
139) Ibid., 27.
140) Cf. CPR.A131/ B169.
141) Ibid., A835/ B863.
142) PIC 28.
144) PIC 28, 29.
145) CPR.A11.
146) CPR.Bix.
147) PIC 29/ Also see: CPR.A299/ B 356.
149) KPM 18.
150) Cf. CPP.B19.
151) KPM 18.
152) CPR.A 14/ B 28.
153) Cf. KPM 20/ 34.
154) Ibid., 20.
155) Cf. Ibid., 20/ 34.
156) For further explanation, see: same chapter, pp. 88-90, 164-165.
157) Cf. KPM 20/ 33-34.
158) Cf. Ibid., 20.
159) PIC 36.
161) KPM 20.
162) Ibid., 20.
163) Ibid., 21, 22.
164) PIC 48.
165) Cf. KPM 27, 28/ PIC 36, 37.
166) KPM 27.
167) Ibid., 27, 28.
168) CPR.A 19/ B 33.
169) KPM 28/ PIC 57.
170) Cf. KPM 28.
171) PIC 58.
172) Ibid., 58.
174) CPR.B33/A19.
175) PIC 58.
176) KPM 28/ PIC 57.
177) Cf. PIC 57.
178) Cf. Ibid., 57.
179) KPM 28.
180) Ibid., 28.
181) CPR.A320/ B377.
182) KPM 29.
183) Ibid., 29.
184) Ibid., 29.
185) Cf. Ibid., 29.
186) Ibid., 29.
187) Ibid., 29.
188) CPR.B72.
189) [Sic]. It must be ‘adaptation’.
190) KPM 29,30/ PIC 59/ and also cf. CPR.B139, 145.
191) CPR.B71.
192) KPM 30.
193) PIC 59.
194) Ibid., 59.
195) KPM 30.
196) Ibid., 30.
197) Cf. Ibid., 30.
198) CPR.A19/ B33.
199) KPM 31.
200) Cf. Ibid., 31.
201) Ibid., 31.
202) Ibid., 32.
203) CPR.B147.
204) KPM 32.
205) Ibid., 32.
206) Cf. Ibid., 32, 33/ PIC 61.
207) CPR.A50/ B74.
208) Ibid., A51/B75.
209) PIC 61.
210) KPM 33.
211) See same chapter, pp. 88-90.
212) Cf. KPM 33.
213) Ibid., 33.
214) Cf. Ibid. 33- 34
215) Ibid.,33.
216) Cf. Ibid. 34.
217) Cf. Ibid., 34.
218) Ibid., 34.
219) Ibid. 34.
220) Ibid., 35.
221) Ibid., 35.
222) Ibid., 35/ PIC 40.
223) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translator’s footnote 17, op. cit.,, p. 36.
224) Cf. KPM 35- 36.
225) Ibid., 36.
226) Ibid., 36.
227) Cf. Ibid., 36- 37/ PIC 68.
228) KPM 37/ Cf. PIC 67- 68.
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229) KPM 37.
230) PIC 69.
231) KPM 37.
232) For further discussion on this subject see: Chapter One, pp. 23-26.
233) For further discussion on this subject see: Chapter One, pp. 29-32.
234) CPR. A50/ B74.
235) CPR. A15/ B29.
236) For further discussion on this unity see: The same chapter, 'The Essential Unity of Intuition and Understanding', pp. 100-102.
237) CPR. A835/ B863.
238) PIC 63.
239) Cf. Ibid., 63/ KPM 41.
240) Cf. PIC 63.
241) Cf. Ibid., 64.
242) CPR. A94, note.
243) On this subject see: Chapter One, section 'Temporality', pp. 29-32.
244) Cf. PIC 64.
245) For further discussion on the relation between ontic knowledge and ontological knowledge see: The same chapter, 'The Relation between Science and Ontology', pp. 83-84.
246) KPM 43.
247) Ibid., 43.
248) Cf. Ibid., 47.
249) Ibid., 47.
250) On these syntheses see: The Same Chapter, pp. 88-90, 164-165.
251) KPM 43.
252) Cf. Ibid., 43-44.

Section Two:

1) KPM 48.
2) Ibid., 48
3) Cf. Ibid., 48.
4) PIC 71.
5) Ibid., 71.
6) Ibid., 71, 72.
8) Cf. KPM 48-58/ PIC 70-111.
9) Cf. PIC 78-79.
10) Ibid., 79.
11) CPR. A24/ B39.
12) PIC 79.
13) Ibid., 80.
14) Ibid., 80.
15) Cf. Ibid., 77, 80-83/ KPM 49-51.
16) Cf. PIC 77, 82-83/ KPM 49-50.
17) Cf. PIC, 96-97.
18) On this subject see: Chapter One, pp. 14-18.
19) PIC 100.
20) KPM 51/ PIC 10.
21) CPR. A33/ B49.
22) Cf. KPM 51.
23) CPR. A 34/ B50.
24) KPM 52.
25) For further discussion on the difference of Heidegger’s conception of time and traditional one see: Chapter One, pp. 29-32.
26) KPM 52.
27) Cf. Ibid., 52/ PIC 104, 106.
28) Cf. PIC 102.
29) Ibid., 103.
30) Ibid., 103.
31) Aristotle, Book IV of the Physics, Chapter 14, (223 a 15ff).
32) PIC 102.
33) Cf. Ibid., 103.
34) Cf. Ibid., 104-106.

Section Three:

1) Cf. PIC 113,114.
2) CPR. A52/ B76.
4) CPR. A68/ B93.
5) PIC 117.
6) Cf. Ibid., 116-20.
7) Cf. Ibid., 120, 124-125, 128.
8) Ibid., 125.
9) Cf. Ibid., 121.
10) CPR. A55/ B79.
11) PIC 124.
12) Cf. Ibid., 125.
13) Ibid., 126.
14) Ibid., 129.
15) Ibid., 129.
16) CPR. A58/ B82.
17) Ibid., A58/ B82.
18) Cf. PIC 134.
19) Ibid., 130.
20) Ibid., 130.
21) Cf. Ibid., 131.
22) Ibid., 131.
23) CPR. A62/ B87.
24) Cf. Ibid., A222/ B269.
26) In order to remember the meaning of pure knowledge and its constitutive elements, i.e., pure intuition and pure thought, see: The same chapter, ‘The Mode of Formation of Synthetic A Prior judgments (ontological knowledge)’, pp. 109-112.
27) CPR. A50-65/ B74-90.
29) Cf. KPM 58.
30) BT 18.
32) PIC 131.
33) Ibid., 132.
34) CPR.A64/ B89.
35) PIC 133.
36) Cf. PIC 134 / also see the diagram in page 221.
37) PIC 133,134.
38) Cf. Ibid., 115.
39) Cf. Ibid., 163.
40) Ibid., 143.
41) CPR.B134. note.
42) KPM 56.
43) Ibid., 55.
44) Cf. KPM 32-33,55/ PIC 61,116-117,151-152.
45) PIC 164.
46) It is added by the translators of Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
47) Ibid., 165.
48) Cf. Ibid., 165.
49) Cf. CPRA260/ B316.
50) Cf. KPM 56.
51) Cf. PIC 169.
52) Cf. Ibid., 170.
54) CPR.A69/ B94.
55) PIC 175.
56) Ibid., 176/ KPM 59.
57) CPR.A70/ B95.
58) PIC 176/ KPM 58.
60) Cf. KPM 59.
61) PFM §21.
62) CPR.A73/ B98.
63) Cf. KPM 59/ PIC 176.
64) Cf. PIC 177.
65) On Heidegger's critique of the foundation of logic see: The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, op. cit.
For further studies see: Heidegger: The Critique of Logic, op. cit. and Logic and Ontology in Heidegger, op. cit.
66) Cf. KPM 59-60.
67) Ibid., 60.
68) Ibid., 60.
69) PIC178,179.
70) Cf. Ibid., 179.
Section Four:
1) CPR.A 76-80/ B102-103.
2) Ibid., B151.
3) Hume, David, Treaties on Human nature, Book 1, part IV, section vii.
4) CPR. A78/ B103.
5) Cf. Ibid.,A94/ B127, note.
6) Ibid., A120.
7) Ibid., A101,102.
8) Ibid., A101.
9) Added by Norman kemp smith, the translator of the Critique of Pure Reason.
10) Ibid.A123.
11) Added by Norman kemp smith.
12) Ibid., A77,78/ B103.
13) Added by Norman kemp smith.
14) Ibid., A77,78/ B103.
15) Cf. Ibid., A78,79/ B104.
17) CPR.A102.
19) Ibid., A 102.
20) Ibid., A 102.
22) Cf. Ibid., A105-130/ B130-156.
24) CPR.A118.
25) Ibid., A118.
26) Cf. Ibid., A 77/ B103.
27) Cf. Ibid., A 77/ B103.
28) Ibid., A78/ B104.
29) Cf. Ibid., B161.
30) Cf. PIC 91-96.
31) CPR.A124.
32) For further explanation about the pure concepts of understanding or categories see: The same chapter, 'The Pure Concepts of Understanding' 124- 127.
33) Kant's Transcendental Idealism (An Interpretation and Defense) op. cit., pp. 161-162.
34) Cf. CPR.A115/ B29.
35) Cf. Ibid., A78/ B103.
36) Cf. PIC 191.
37) For example see: Henry, E. Allison's view in his book titled, Kant's transcendental Idealism (An Interpretation and Defense), op. cit. p.163.
40) Cf. KPM 60.
41) Ibid., 60.
42) Ibid., 61,62.
43) Cf. Ibid., 61.
44) Cf. Ibid., 62.
45) As Heidegger remarks, Kant puts under the term 'synthesis' many different meanings. (Cf. KPM 19) Therefore we must take care that we do not understand the term 'synthesis' only in the sense of the logical unification of understanding, i.e., only as the synthesis of subject and predicate in a judgment.

46) On these syntheses see: The same chapter, pp. 88-90.

47) On this synthesis and in order to distinguish it from veritative synthesis see: The same chapter, pp. 164-165.

48) In order to avoid the prolonging and repetition, see: The same chapter, p. 124-127.

49) Cf. KPM 43, 66.

50) CPR.A 78, 79/ B104.

51) KPM 67.

52) On this synthesis see: the same chapter, p. 164-165.

53) Cf. KPM 68.

54) Cf. Ibid., 68.

55) Cf. Ibid., 69-70.


58) Cf. KPM 71.

59) Cf. Ibid., 71.

60) Cf. Ibid., 72.

61) Cf. Ibid., 72-73.

62) Cf. Ibid., 73-74, 81.

63) Cf. Ibid., 72-73.

64) Cf. Ibid., 72-73.

65) Cf. PIC 145-147.

66) Cf. Ibid., 149.

67) KPM 74.

68) Cf. Ibid., 74.

69) Cf. Ibid., 74-76.

70) Ibid., 74.

71) Cf. Ibid., 75.

72) Ibid., 75.

73) Cf. Ibid., 75.

74) Ibid., 76.

75) Cf. Ibid., 76.

76) Ibid., 76.

77) Cf. Ibid., 76.

78) In fact, as we will explain, this 'Nothing' is nothing other than the Being itself. For this reason, Heidegger conceives nothing as the main issue of metaphysics: Cf. 'What is metaphysics?' in Basic Writings, p. 110.

79) KPM 76,77.

80) Ibid., 77.

81) Cf. BT 72/ 245.

82) Cf. KPM 77.

83) Cf. Ibid., 77.

84) CPR.A 104.

85) Cf. KPM 77.

86) CPR.A 104.

87) KPM 78.
88) Cf. Ibid., 77-78.
89) Cf. Ibid., 78.
90) Cf. PIC 150-160.
91) Cf. KPM 73, 74, 81.
92) On the differences between transcendental logic and traditional logic see: The same chapter, p. 121-124.
93) PIC 151.
94) Ibid., 152.
95) Ibid., 153.
96) Ibid., 153.
97) Ibid., 153.
98) Ibid., 153.
99) Ibid., 153, 154.
100) Ibid., 154.
101) Ibid., 154.
102) Ibid., 154.
103) Quoted by Heidegger from Kant.
104) Ibid., 157.
105) Ibid., 157.
106) Ibid., 158.
107) Ibid., 158.
108) Ibid., 158.
109) Ibid., 158.
110) Ibid., 163.
111) Cf. Ibid., 164-165.
112) Ibid., 164.
113) Cf. Ibid., 164.
114) Ibid., 165.
115) It is added by translators of Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
116) Ibid., 165.
117) Ibid., 165.
118) Cf. Ibid., 165.
119) Cf. Ibid., 165.
120) Cf. Ibid., 168.
121) Ibid., 165.
122) In order to avoid of repetition see: the same chapter, 'The Logical Table of Judgment as the Method of the Discovering the Pure Concepts of Understanding, p. 131-134.
123) In order to avoid of repetition see: the same chapter, p. 124-127.
124) PIC, 172.
125) CPR, A138, 139/ B177, 178.
126) PIC 172.
127) CPR, A76/ B102.
128) It is added by translators of Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
129) PIC 182.
130) CPR, A76/ B102.
131) Cf. PIC 182.
132) CPR, A77/ B102.
133) PIC 184.
134) PIC 184.
135) It is added by the translator of the Critique of Pure Reason.
136) It is added by the translator of the Critique of Pure Reason.
137) CPR. A88/B103.
138) Cf. PIC 185.
139) Cf. Ibid., 186.
140) Cf. Ibid., 182.
141) Cf. Ibid., 182.
142) CPR. A77/B103.
143) PIC 187.
144) Ibid., 187.
145) It is added by the translators of Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
146) Ibid., 187.
147) Ibid., 187.
148) Ibid., 187.
149) Ibid., 187.
150) Cf. CPR. A15/B29.
151) Cf. Ibid., A78/B103.
152) PIC 189.
153) Ibid., 188.
154) Ibid., 188.
155) Cf. Ibid., 188, 189.
156) Ibid., 189.
157) Ibid., 189.
158) Cf. Ibid., 189.
159) Ibid., 190.
160) Ibid., 190.
161) Ibid., 190.
162) Cf. Ibid., 192.
163) The term 'pure object' is invented by the author and is used neither by Kant nor by Heidegger.
164) Cf. CPR. A250.
166) Cf. Ibid., 192- 193.
168) Cf. CPR. A126.
169) On these definitions and their connection to each other see: The same chapter, pp. 85- 87.
171) CPR. A 78, 79/ B104.
172) PIC 195.
173) Cf. Ibid., 195.
174) On the meaning of existence and care see: Chapter One, pp. 32- 36.
175) On the meaning of this ontological resistance see: Chapter One, p. 156.
176) BT 18.
177) Cf. PIC 194- 195.
178) Ibid., 196.
179) Cf. Ibid., 198/ KPM 79.
180) CPR.A79/ B105.
181) PIC 201.
182) Ibid., 201.
183) Ibid., 201.
185) Ibid., 201.
187) CPR.A 82/ B108.
188) CPR.A241.
190) Ibid., 202.
191) CPR.A 240/ B300.
192) Ibid., A 240/ B300.
193) PIC 203.
194) CPR.A 240/ B300.
195) Ibid., A 242, note.
196) Cf. PIC 206-207.
197) Cf. Ibid., 206-207.
198) Cf. Ibid., 206-207.
199) Cf. Ibid., 219.
200) Cf. Ibid., 210-212.
201) Cf. CPR.A 85/ B117.
202) Ibid., A85/ B117.
203) PIC 211.
204) CPR.A 85/ B117.
205) PIC 211.
206) Cf. Ibid., 219.
207) Ibid., 212.
208) Ibid., 212.
209) CPR.A 89/B 122.
210) PIC 212.
211) Ibid., 212.
212) Ibid., 213.
213) Ibid., 213.
214) Ibid., 213.
215) Ibid., 213.
216) Ibid., 213.
217) Ibid., 214.
218) Ibid., 216.
219) Cf. Ibid., 214/ KPM 81.
220) Cf. PIC 214.
222) Ibid., 216.
223) CPR.A/ B124.
224) PIC 216, 217.
225) Cf. CPR.A92/ B125.
226) PIC 217.
227) Ibid., 217.
228) CPR.A93/ B125.
229) Cf. PIC 218.
230) It is added by the translators of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*.
231) PIC 218.
232) Cf. Ibid., 221.
233) CPR.B218
234) PIC 222.
235) Ibid., 222.
236) CPR.A156/ B195.
237) Ibid., A217/ B264.
238) Cf. PIC 222- 223.
239) PIC 222, 223.
240) CPR.A96,97.
241) Cf. PIC 223.
242) CPR.A97.
244) Cf. Ibid., 224- 225.
245) Ibid., 225.
246) Cf. Ibid., 225.
247) The term ‘thought-determination’ means the determinations which are derived from thought itself, and not from experience, and the expression here refers to the pure concepts of understanding or categories.
248) Ibid., 225.
249) Ibid., 226.
250) On the act of objectification see: The same Chapter, pp. 78- 81.
251) Ibid., 226.
252) Ibid., 226.
253) Ibid., 226.
254) Ibid., 226.
255) Cf. Ibid., 226- 27.
256) CPR.A76/ B102.
257) It is added by the English translators of *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*.
258) PIC 182.
259) Ibid., 184.
260) Ibid., 184.
261) For avoiding the repetition see: The same Chapter, ‘Imagination and its functions’, pp. 135- 140.
262) On this theme, as an introduction, see: The same Chapter, pp. 140 –141.
263) On this theme, as an introduction see: The same Chapter, pp. 135- 140.
264) Cf. PIC 229.
265) Ibid., 228.
266) Ibid., 229.
267) On this theme see: pp. 154- 156.
268) PIC 230.
269) On the meaning of appearance see: The same chapter, pp. 103- 105.
270) Cf. PIC 230.
271) Cf. BT 51- 55.
272) Cf. PIC 230.
273) Ibid., 230.
274) CPR. A250
275) Ibid., A253.
276) PIC 230.
277) Ibid., 229.
278) Cf. Ibid., 232.
279) On this point see: The same chapter, pp. ...
280) CPR. A120.
281) Ibid., A120.
282) Cf. PIC 231.
283) Ibid., 231.
284) Ibid., 231.
285) Ibid., 232.
286) Cf. Ibid., 232.
287) Cf. Ibid., 232.
289) Cf. PIC 232.
290) Ibid., 232.
291) Ibid., 232.
292) CPR. A99.
293) PIC. 233.
294) Ibid., 233.
295) Ibid., 233.
296) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 154-157.
297) Cf. BT 18.
298) PIC 233.
299) CPR. A99.
300) PIC 233.
301) Ibid., 233.
302) CPR. A99.
303) Ibid., 234.
304) Ibid., 234.
305) Ibid., 234.
306) Ibid., 234.
307) Cf. Ibid., 234.
308) PIC 235.
309) Ibid., 235.
310) Ibid., 235.
311) Ibid., 236.
312) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 209-223.
313) Cf. PIC 236.
314) CPR. 101, 102.
315) Ibid., B151.
316) Cf. PIC 237.
318) Cf. CPR. A121, 122.
319) PIC 237.
320) Ibid., 237, 238.
321) Ibid., 238.
322) Ibid., 238.
323) Ibid., 239.
324) Ibid., 239.
325) Ibid., 239.
326) CPR.A 102.
327) It is added by the English translators of the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's the Critique of Pure Reason*.
328) PIC 240.
329) Ibid., 240.
331) Cf. PIC 240- 241.
332) Ibid., 241.
333) Ibid., 263.
334) Ibid., 242.
335) Ibid., 242.
336) CPR.A216/ B263.
338) Ibid., 242.
339) Ibid., 242.
341) For better understanding the discussions see Heidegger's own diagram: PIC 249 or the same chapter, p. 221.
342) CPR.A99.
343) PIC 244.
344) Ibid., 244.
345) It is added by the English translators of the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's the Critique of Pure Reason*.
346) Ibid., 244.
347) Ibid., 244.
348) Ibid., 244.
349) Cf. Ibid., 244- 245.
350) Ibid., 245, 246.
351) Ibid., 246.
353) PIC 246.
355) On this issue see: Chapter One, pp. 23- 29.
356) PIC 246.
358) PIC 246.
359) Ibid., 246.
360) Cf. Ibid., 246.
361) Cf. BT 99.
362) Cf. PIC 246.
363) BT 236.
364) Ibid., 184- 185.
366) PIC 246.
367) Ibid., 246.
368) Cf. BT 385.
369) Cf. PIC 246.
370) Cf. Ibid., 247.
371) Cf. Ibid., 247.
372) Ibid., 247.
373) Cf. Ibid., 247-248.
374) Cf. Ibid., 248.
375) Cf. Ibid., 248.
376) Cf. Ibid., 248.
377) Ibid., 248.
378) Cf. Ibid., 248.
380) On this issue see: Chapter One, pp. 29-32.
381) PIC 248.
382) Cf. Ibid., 248.
383) BT 87.
384) On this issue see our detailed discussion in: Chapter One, pp. 23-29.
385) Cf. PIC 249.
386) Ibid., 249,250.
387) Ibid., 250.
388) Ibid., 250.
389) CPR.A104.
390) PIC 250,251.
391) Ibid., 250,251.
392) It is added by the English translators of the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's the Critique of Pure Reason*.
393) Ibid., 251.
394) ET 303.
395) On this issue see:
   b) Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, Translated from German to English by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, USA, the Passage 44, pp. 256-278.
   c) The same chapter, 'The Essence of Finite Knowledge'. pp. 93-96.
396) Cf. BT 184-85.
398) Ibid., 85.
399) ET 308.
401) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 120-121.
402) PIC 252
403) Cf. Ibid., 251.
404) Cf. Ibid., 251.
405) Cf. Ibid., 252
407) CPR.A104.
408) PIC 253.
409) Cf. Ibid., 253.
410) Cf.BT 368.
411) CRP.A546/ B574.
412) PIC 253.
413) Ibid., 253.
414) Cf. Ibid., 254- 256.
415) Ibid., 254.
416) Ibid., 254.
417) Cf. BT 185- 186
418) On this issue see: Being and Time, pp. 351-358, and also see: Chapter One, pp. 23- 29.
419) BT 366.
420) Cf. CPR.A346/ B404.
421) BT 367.
422) Ibid., 367.
423) Ibid., 367.
425) Ibid., 367.
426) Cf. Ibid., 367.
427) Cf. Ibid., 38.
429) On this theme see: Chapter One, pp. 23- 29.
430) On this concept see: Chapter One, pp. 32- 37.
431) Cf. PIC 293.
432) Cf. CPR.A108.
433) Ibid., A108.
434) PIC 256.
435) Cf. BT 153.
436) Cf. BT 32- 33.
437) PIC 256.
438) Ibid., 256.
439) Cf. Ibid., 256.
440) Ibid., 256.
441) Cf. Ibid., 256.
442) CPR.B158, note.
443) It is added by the Norman Kemp Smith, the English translator of the Critique of Pure Reason.
444) Ibid., B158, note.
445) PIC 257.
446) CPR.A 117, note.
447) Cf. PIC 258.
448) Cf. Ibid., 258.
449) Cf. Ibid., 258.
450) Ibid., 258.
452) CPR.A115.
453) Cf. PIC 259.
454) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 230- 234.
455) Cf. Ibid., 260- 261.
456) Cf. Ibid., 261.
457) Cf. Ibid., 258.
458) CPR.A111/ A158.
459) Cf. PIC 260- 261.
460) Ibid., 261.
461) CPR.A341 / B399.
462) PIC 255.
463) Ibid., 255.
464) Ibid., 255.
465) Ibid., 255.
466) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 162-164.
467) PIC 255.
468) Ibid., 264.
469) Cf. Ibid., 263.
470) Cf. Ibid., 264.
471) Cf. Ibid., 260-261
472) Cf. Ibid., 260-261.
473) Cf. Ibid., 260-261.
474) Cf. Ibid., 260-261.
475) Cf. BT 18.
476) On this theme see: Chapter One, pp. 23-29.
477) PIC 264, 265.
478) Cf. Ibid., 265.
479) Cf. Ibid., 242.
480) Cf. Ibid., 242-243.
481) Cf. PIC 266-267.
482) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 194-195.
483) On this theme see Heidegger's diagram in p. 221.
484) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 145-146.
485) PIC 183/ 266.
486) Ibid., 265.
487) Ibid., 266.
488) Ibid., 266.
489) Cf. Ibid., 266-67.
490) Cf. KPM 74-75.
491) PIC 267.
492) Cf. Ibid., 268-269.
493) Ibid., 267.
494) Cf. Ibid., 267.
495) On this theme see: Chapter One, p. 23.
496) PIC 267.
497) On this theme see. Chapter One, pp. 32-36.
498) On historicity see: Chapter One, pp. 32-36.
499) Cf. BT 293.
500) Cf. PIC 267-268.
501) Ibid., 268.
502) Ibid., 268.
503) Ibid., 268.
504) Ibid., 268.
505) Cf. Ibid., 225.
506) Cf. Ibid., 225.
507) On this theme see. The same chapter One, pp. 145-146.
508) Cf. PIC 260.
509) Cf. Ibid., 261.
510) Cf. Ibid., 261.
511) Cf. Ibid., 201.
512) Cf. Ibid., 270.
513) Cf. Ibid., 270.
514) KPM 71.
515) Cf. PIC 271.
516) Cf. Ibid., 271.
517) Ibid., 271.
518) CPR.A111.
519) Cf. PIC 272.
520) Cf. Ibid., 272.
521) Cf. Ibid., 273.
522) See: The same chapter, pp. 250-254.
523) Cf. PIC 274.
524) Cf. Ibid., 274.
525) Cf. Ibid., 274-275.
526) CPR A116.
527) Ibid., A120.
528) Ibid., A115.
529) PIC 275, 276.
530) PIC 276.
531) Cf. Ibid., 276.
532) Cf. CPR.A116.
533) PIC 277.
534) CPR.A116.
535) PIC 277.
536) Ibid., 278.
537) Ibid., 278.
538) CPR.A118
539) Cf. PIC 278.
540) CPR A118.
541) PIC 279.
542) Ibid., 279.
544) Cf. CPR.A77-78.
545) Cf. Ibid., A122-123.
546) CPR. A101, 102.
547) Ibid., A101.
548) Cf. CPR.A78-79/ B103-104.
551) Cf. PIC 278.
552) Ibid., 280.
553) Cf. Ibid., 280.
554) Ibid., 280.
555) Cf. Ibid., 280.
556) Ibid., 282-283.
557) Cf. Ibid., 282-283.
558) Cf. Ibid., 285.
559) BT 184-185.
560) Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, op. cit., p. 49
561) Cf. PIC 283.
562) Ibid., 189.
563) Cf. Ibid., 281.
564) Cf. Ibid., 281.
565) Ibid., 285.
566) Ibid., 285.
567) Cf. Ibid., 285.
568) Cf. Ibid., 285.
569) Ibid., 285.
570) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 242-244/287-291.
571) Cf. PIC 272.
572) Ibid., 273.
573) Cf. Ibid., 273.
574) Cf. Ibid., 206.
575) Cf. Ibid., 206-207.
576) Cf. Ibid., 252.
577) Cf. KPM 60.
578) Cf. PIC 260-261.
579) Cf. Ibid., 260-261.
580) Cf. Ibid., 260-261.
581) Cf. Ibid., 240.
582) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 154-157.
583) On this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 191-194.
584) Cf. PIC 286.
585) Cf. Ibid., 286.
586) For Heidegger's detailed discussion on this theme see: The same chapter, pp. 103-105.
587) PIC 286.
588) Ibid., 286.
589) CPR.A120.
590) Ibid., 286.
591) Cf. CPR.A120.
592) Cf. Ibid., A120.
593) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 135-140.
594) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 202-205.
595) PIC 244.
596) CPR.A 123.
597) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 248-249.
598) PIC 287.
599) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 260-266.
600) PIC 287.
602) Cf. Ibid., 288.
603) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 242-244.
604) CPR.A104.
605) PIC 288.
606) PIC 288.
607) Ibid., 133.
608) Cf. Ibid., 291.
609) On this theme and for further explication see: The same chapter, pp. 120-121.
610) Cf. PIC 291.
611) Cf. Ibid., 291.
612) CPR.A14/ B28.
613) PFM, §25, p.67/CPR.A177/ B218.
615) CPP.A189/ PFM, §25, p.67.
616) CPR. A211/PM, §25, p67.
617) Cf. PIC 290.
618) Ibid., 289, 290.
619) CPR.A139/ B178.
620) Cf. PIC 292.
621) Cf. Ibid., 292.
622) Cf. CPR.B185.
623) PIC 292.
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