MOTIVES, REASONS AND ACTION

ABSTRACT

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By

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ABSTRACT

The thesis deals with the relationship between motives, reasons and action. The thesis through a review of literature on the topic is an attempt to understand and present an assessment of the possible complex problematic of motives, reasons and action. This attempt is also to locate link and connection, if any, amongst them. The thesis attempts to bring together the scattered literature on motives, reasons and action into a complex whole to enable a better understanding and therefore to tackle the relationship which may lead us to some clarification of how the term ‘action’ may be employed.

The thesis introduces its theme on the mind body axis. Some philosophers have argued, contrary to the normal percept, that action is only a happening or an event. In contrast with these philosophers, action is understood to be a bodily movement characterized with some distinguishing features compelling the label ‘action’. It is the distinction, which Wittgenstein candidly draws
when he talks of the ‘my arm rising’ and ‘raising my arm’. It may be admitted that in both the cases the same muscles are involved. Bodily movement may be classified as voluntary and involuntary. Former is performed with purpose, aim, goal, target, etc. while the latter does not involve aim, goal or target. However, it is argued that whenever an action is performed by an agent his motives, desires, intentions or reasons are involved as such.

The word ‘desire’ is usually understood differently from ‘motive’. The term ‘desire’ has the connotations of appetite, sex etc. where ‘motive’ normally stretches beyond these connotations. Another term which is intimately connected with the term ‘motive’ is ‘intention’. Motive sometimes appears as part of intention and sometimes as an interchangeable term. But intention may be distinguished from ‘motive’, for the latter appears to be the executive part. In short, it can be said that ‘motive’ is the executive aspect of intention resulting in action.
In an analysis of the relation between 'motive' and 'action' the term 'reason' is of special interest, for it appears to explain action. It is thus justified to ask for the 'reason' behind doing something. It is on this ground that we talk of a moral agent. But 'reason' sometimes is also seen as a part of the causal relation between motives and actions, if nothing else at least by rules of meaning. A causal relation always implies an empirical regularity. However, it is sometimes asked whether the relation between 'reason' and 'action' is a mere empirical regularity. The explanation of action often contains ostensions to reasons, but the possession of 'reason' does not entail the performance of corresponding particular action.

Some philosophers, like psychological hedonists, have argued that motive is pleasure and pain. But abandoning this narrow definition some philosophers have considered 'motives' in terms of disposition, others have argued it signifies a trait or character. It is sometimes
argued that motives are embedded in goal or aim-directed-actions. However, the suggestion that motive is the force determining action would not evoke much disagreement. In other words, motive impels us or carries us to certain determined behaviour. Motive normally forms part of an explanation of an agent's behaviour. In order to clarify the use of the term 'motive' it is necessary to demarcate and define the commonly interchangeable term 'motive' and 'intention'. The appearance of feasibility to the interchangeability may be evoked due to the teleological features embedded in action. A marked difference between motive and intention is that the latter has wider application than the former. Motive may be a part of an intention. A peculiarity of motive is that once they become operative it is not possible to change them. Motives then appear to lack elements of consideration and choice. There appears to be a clear non-inclusion of 'voluntariness' in motives. In contrast intention clearly shows elements involving consideration of ends and means and of consequences. Intention includes motive as an element is seen from the
following example: A father may have intention to punish his son for doing a wrong with the motive of betterment. The example shows that intention includes motive. In this regard, it may be argued that motive is an element of intention which is chief interest to achieve the goal. It may be considered that X has misled Y to humiliate him. Here, there may be motive for the X to mislead Y. If X misled Y as a means to humiliate, then it may also be the intention. However, in this dispute, without regard to something else, we find that motive, overt or covert, is directed action that is offered as explanation of action.

'Motive' because of its involuntary dimensions needs to be distinguished from 'habit'. Normally, when a man is doing something out of habit, it is automatic and difficult to avoid with no expectation, whereas motive is identified with man's expectations or aims. The explanation of actions in terms of habit is marked by lack of reference to choice. Therefore, thesis argues that motive is goal directing.
Motives are sometimes portrayed as reasons for action. Some philosophers define the term 'reason' in the sense of cognitive faculty or rationality. But we are concerned only with reason in specific relation to motive and action. Reason may be assigned to a person to explain his action. When the agent does something there may be reason behind that act. One may ask, for example, why he did, what he did etc. Thus, reason may provides an explanation of action. Reason explanation of action is sometimes assumed as causal explanation. Causal explanation is distinguished from reason explanation. Causal explanation is empirical and contingent in its nature. While reason explanation a logical independence is required between desires, feelings and beliefs on the one hand and of human action on the other. Causal is a relationship of cause and effect. It is expected that whenever a cause occur there will be an effect. Cause and effect may not be reason as such. They are not classes of things discoverable by reason. They may be understood
through experience. We say, for example, Y is the effect of x, here x is cause and this cause may not be reason

However, our attempt is to find out the link, between motive and reason. In the relation of motive and reason we admit that both are explanations of action. For example, a man may have a motive to do an act, and it might also be the reason why he did that act. In this regard, it may be said that motive may coincide with reason. This explanation, thus, provides a ground for the conclusion that motive may be regarded as a reason for action.

It is argued by some philosophers that action is nothing more than physical or mere movement. Yet there is demarcation between mere movement and action. It is argued that action is not bodily movement or mere movement. Action is performed with motives and reasons as well. This demarcation may be easily understood, for example, by the phrases: 'my arm rising' and 'raising my arm'. In this regard, we may say that action is considered only when motive or reason are involved. If it is not so then
it is only mere movement or happening or bodily movement.

It is appears from the arguments advanced in this thesis that motives and reasons are related to action. Without motive or reason there is no possibility of any action. A man may have motive for doing something and at the same time he may also have reason for that action. For instance, a man dies and after his death it is detected that his food was poisoned. Poison is the reason of his death. If he takes a poisonous food deliberately, his motive, one can say, is death. In this case, motive and reason both may be assigned for a certain sort of explanation. Therefore, we find that motives and reasons are explanatory tools for action. In other words, motives and reasons are identifiable in relation to action.
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2007
Dedicated
To
My Beloved
Parents
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that I have gone through this thesis, 'Motives, Reasons and Action', carefully and to the best of my assessment and knowledge this is the original work of Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan Warsi. I am satisfied that this thesis is fit to be submitted for the award of the degree of doctor of philosophy of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

Tariq Islam
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PREFACE

This research work is an attempt to analyze the relation between motive, reason and action. The thesis attempts to explore how the motives and reasons are related to the term 'action'. The term 'action' is defined by some philosophers as bodily movement. The thesis argues that action is not simply bodily movement but involves motives or reasons. In other words, an action is understood in terms of motive and reason.

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CHAPTER - I
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Action is an integral aspect of human existence. The seat of the origin of action is a long-standing debate in philosophy. Philosophies of action have deliberated at length how action arises, and where it originates. The problem especially arose with the advent of Cartesian dualism and the consequent problem of mind body relation. According to Descartes, mind and body are two separate and distinctly independent substances interacting with each other, such that the body acts upon the mind in sensations and the mind acts upon the body in volitions. However, Descartes could not consistently draw the consequences of his premises. Descartes was forced into providing the pineal gland as the house of the mind.

In more modern terminology physical or bodily are understood as cerebral processes. In terms of cerebral processes we may suggest interactionism
holds that cerebral processes effect the mental and the mental effects the cerebral. But this does not solve the problem, which is how can two entirely different substances act and react with each other. Any contention of interactions is not devoid of the presupposition of a certain level of similarity in nature among the things interacting with each other. In this thesis we are concerned with the concept of action, which in the Cartesian framework is portrayed as the result or consequence of the preceding event or activity in or of the mind. The preceding mental event or activity then is supposed to be a heterogeneous set.

Since the mind-body problem remained therefore, as corollary, the problem of action also stayed, for the Cartesian framework mental event was to precede the physical event, which was termed an action. Geulincx and Malebranche, modifying the Cartesian framework, propounded 'Occasionism'; which suggests mind and body are opposed to each other and as such cannot
effect each other. ‘Occasionlism’ proposed that any correspondence between the mind and body is the result of the intervention of God. Accordingly with any changes in the body corresponding sensations arise in the mind with the intervention of God. Conversely, whenever there arises volitions in the mind God intervenes to produce corresponding bodily movements.

To overcome the difficulties faced by dualism and its explanation through interactionism Spinoza argued for a model of parallelism obtaining between mind and body. For Spinoza, there is only ‘the substance’ of which thought and extension, i.e. mind and body, are two modes. The mind and body being two modes of the same substance run parallel to each other without affecting / effecting each other. Spinoza, therefore, felt no need for interaction between them. Psycho-physical parallelism, as the theory of Spinoza has come to be known, proposes that nothing can happen in the
human body without a corresponding mental state. Spinoza’s arguments boil down to ‘where there are mental processes, there must be physical processes, and vice versa’.

However, Leibnitz tries to overcome the problem by arguing for pre-established harmony between mind and body. According to him, God established the harmony between mind-body at the time of creation. In other words, God pre-adjusted them to each other in such a way that they always correspond to each other. For Leibnitz monads the spiritual atoms or active perceiving forces make up the mind and body. Leibnitz, even with his theory of the pre-established harmony, faces the same difficulty as Occasionalism or Cartesianism does in general. Leibnitz could not explain how God established this harmony. In fact, the picture gets more complicated, since for Leibnitz monads are self-contained.
The empiricist too find themselves in a muddle over the issue. For example Hume admits that the supposed inner connection of mind and body is a mystery, it is only that experience leads us to this supposition. Further, this supposition leads to the notion of infallibility of thinking and indiscernibility of matter, held by Descartes and Locke, respectively. Hume's admission tears apart supposed relation of volition and bodily movement.

Classical western philosophy not only fell short of a consistent account of mind-body relationship, but as a consequence could not explicate clearly the concept of action. The disenchantment brought forth an attack by the twentieth century philosophers like Wittgenstein, Ryle, et al. Ryle is notably the most explicit with regard to mind and body. His book 'The Concept of Mind' was hailed as one of best general philosophy book in the past twenty-five years. Ryle argues against what he calls the 'official doctrine',
which hails chiefly from Descartes as traced out above. Ryle does not deny the mind for he admits that with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being possesses both a body and a mind. Ryle finds errors in the 'official doctrine' or interactionism, which lead to the 'Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'.

He attempts to show that the mistake is not in detail but in principle. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind, namely a 'category mistake', in fact a 'category howler'. His effort can be typified as an attempt to rectify the logic of mental concepts. According to Ryle, it is perfectly legitimate to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice that there exist bodies.

The mind-body relation has the underlying question of identifying action. This thesis is concerned with whether motive can explain action? Is motive to
be understood as reason for action? Can reason be understood as cause? And other similar questions and equations, in short, with the relation between motives, reasons, and action. Ordinarily, action is viewed as a process of doing. So walking, talking etc, are considered actions, whereas breathing, inhaling, palpitation of the heart are not actions but considered to be simple bodily movements. It can, however be argued that not all actions are bodily movements, for example, some philosophers have contented that there are mental actions, such as thinking. But, then in contemporary literature it is emphasized that not all bodily movements are actions, they may be events or happenings, reflex movements. The now well-known Wittgensteinian query—what is the difference between ‘my raising my arm’ and ‘my arm rising’—draws attention to the distinction. My arm may rise, which would be a happening or an event, but raising my arm is an action if I was signaling. In both the cases there are movements of certain muscles, may be the same
muscles, the difference lies, if it may be conceded that in the former there appears to be no place for intention but the latter can only be understood through some such notion.

Myles Brand suggests that it is only 'persons [who] perform actions'. We can always divide up bodily movement into two types, voluntary and involuntary. The former involves some kinds of willing, which may consist of aims, targets, goals, etc., but the latter has no such requirements. As Michael Scott points out in referring to William James, “...a voluntary action is a movement produced by a memory image of the experience that is distinctive of that movement...Since every voluntary action requires a memory of the feeling or appearance of the action, to be able to perform an action voluntarily, one must on some previous occasion have performed the action involuntarily”.

In other words, the contention is that an action is to be termed voluntary provided it is
accompanied by certain memories. Scott contrasts this assertion with what he thinks Wittgenstein says and goes on to argue that "...voluntary actions are distinguished by a feeling of innervation, that is, a feeling of impulsion associated..."\(^2\). Wittgenstein places several criteria for appraisal of voluntary actions. He suggests that one cannot unconsciously perform a voluntary action, one does not find one's own voluntary actions surprising and one does not have an observing attitude towards one's own voluntary actions, one knows which of one's own actions are voluntary. One can generally directly start or stop one's own voluntary movements when one chooses. In context, involuntary actions generally cannot be prevented and can only be stopped or started by means of other actions.\(^3\) It may be noted that Scott does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary classifying both as actions. It is difficult to see how under this classification reflexes are to be understood, since it would be difficult to speak of
reflexes as actions. Under Scott's classification it would be very difficult to differentiate between this terrain of argument altogether. Danto views action differently, without an indulgence in the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, by suggesting two meanings to the term 'action', basic and non-basic. Danto defines basic action as that before or preceding which there is no other action causing it to happen. But this obviously means that not every action is a basic action. Non-basic actions are identified by their being accounted for by another action. For example, if we purchase the medicine to kill mosquitoes, then killing the mosquitoes is a basic action and purchasing the medicine is a non-basic action, since it can only be understood by considering 'killing of the mosquitoes'. Danto, however, disposses of the issue of action in terms of 'truth conditions'. Smith argues, "...the terms 'basic' and 'non-basic' apply not to actions but to action descriptions. The description of an action as a turning on, of a light is a non-basic description; the
description of the same action as a moving of a finger is, it might be claimed, a basic description".  

However, it prima-facie appears that whenever an action is performed by an agent, it may involve motive, reason, intention, desire, etc. Ryle points out that motive involved in an action is a disposition and not an internal happening or force or activity which function is as an antecedent cause. A disposition to behave in a certain way when certain events occur. Motive is used in specific contexts in ordinary language and has a specific explanatory role. Motives are recognized as desires, aims, or intentions for specific object or state of affairs. It is ordinarily claimed that it is motive, which moves us or causes us to act in specific manner. An agent is not always determined completely externally but as is ordinarily claimed his character and purpose are also crucial. Morgan explains that motives are triggered behaviour, which lead to a goal and only finally after the goal is reached.
are shut off. But the noticeable aspect of motive is that motives are asked for especially when there is an unexpected action. This leads to an impression that motives justify and explain. It is obvious from the use of the term 'motive' in ordinary language that it is goal directedness. Hedonists understood motive as a tool for explaining human behaviour. Motives are ordinarily understood to play a large role in human behaviour. Although the word 'desire' is used in connection with food, drink and sex etc., but 'desire' is understood differently as a motive. However, Makenzie suggests that they are interchangeable notions. According to Broad, "If I recognized that I was desiring something which I think an unfitting object of desire, this would be a motive for suppressing the desire or overing my attention from this object no such motive would operate on me. And the presence or absence of this motive might make a profound difference to my final decision". We may be able to differentiate between
desire and motive. But then other similar concepts such as intention need also be examined.

Some philosophers have found 'motive' and 'intention' to be entirely different concepts. An example might help to explain the difference between motive and intention. A ship on the sea rocks itself against a small island making a loud noise and a man 'x' falls off the ship as it starts to sink. Another man 'y' tries to help him by throwing a log. But unfortunately, despite the best of efforts the person 'x' drowns. The motive of 'y' was to save the life of 'x' by intending to stop him from drowning. In this case, Makenzie writes, "The motive of an act, then is a part of the intention in the broadest sense of that term but does not necessarily include the whole of the intention. For example, when Brutus helped to kill Caesar in order to save his country, he certainly intended to kill Caesar, but the killing of Caesar was no part of his motive".6 Ardal talks of intentions in terms of choice, "A choice
is an intention, not mere intention but executive intention".7

Differentiating and defining 'motive' is necessary for our thesis since we intend to explore the relation between motive and action. For this purpose we need also to examine the term 'reason', which may be understood as 'cause'. The two events in a causal relation may be motives or desires and action since one may occur without the other. Reason is an explanation of action. We have a reason to give up smoking because it may cause lung cancer. Reason is understood as psychological and cause is logical but Hume explains cause and effect as a psychological connection (cause produces the effects). However, ordinarily we regard cause and reason as intertwined in action by rules of meaning. As Baier points out:

"...it can be said that Othello's reason for killing Desdemona was her believed unfaithfulness to him, even though she was
not unfaithful and he merely wrongly believed her so... We can speak of the agent's reason for doing something only if he believes that the supposed facts which make him act in this way are reasons for so acting, while this is not required in motive explanations.

"Othello's reason for killing Desdemona cannot be that he thinks her unfaithful to him unless he believes that a wife's unfaithfulness is a reason for killing her". 8

Normally, reason is attributed to a physical event when an agent is involved. It is only then that it is justified to ask for the 'reason' behind doing something. As Fainberg points out:

"A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives that the same force in
the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels, but fails of its usual effect perhaps by reason of a grain of dust which puts a stop to the whole movement...it appears not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature, but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind and has never been the subject of dispute either in philosophy or common life".9

However, we must differentiate the term 'reason' which is understood as exercise of the faculty of rationality and 'reason' as cause. Descartes talks about reason and Hegel introduces it in history. As Baier points out, "...the word 'reason' is used in a different sense...".10 Earlier he had explained that reason "...would counsel everyone always to refrain
from doing what he enjoys, from satisfying his desire "Reason" counsel self-frustration for its own sake". As Kennett, in referring to Kant points out, "Kant's emphasis on reason is right, only individuals who are capable of being moved by the thought that some consideration constitutes a reason for action can be conscientious moral agents". Some philosophers have and do regard action as a determination, for example, Richard McCarty argues, "...a long tradition of philosophers since Aristotle has distinguished between free rational determination by internal compulsion or external force. Only our actions following rationally from our principles are called free or voluntary...". But others, like Morris, while discussing the tradition from Aristotle to Hume and about psychologists, point out that they regard reason as having nothing to do with the choice of ends. Still others argue that reason cannot be taken to be only the cognitive faculty or element of the mind but it also has a dynamic aspect or moving force of its own.
However, if reasons are causes of action then they are causes of decisions too. If reasons are causes of actions then decisions are further complications introduced in the causal chain. Morris points out, "Many actions can be taken to be caused by decisions. If a decision is itself explicable by reference to the believing which explains the action it causes, then we can regard the believing as a cause of the action". In this regard, we may say that, reasons are to be differentiated from causes. As Folk says that they are different in their method. For instance, we can explain to our friend that we could not attend the marriage party because of a pain in the stomach. So the reason was the pain and the cause was the gastric trouble.

However, as Donnellan points out that for Hume, "...there are apparent regularities between motives and reasons on the one hand and actions on the other. We expect a man bent on revenge to behave in a
certain way and a man who wants a loaf of bread to do
certain things...regularity is the essence of causal
connections...[it is] an empirical regularity...connection
between reasons and actions is merely empirical has
been strongly questioned".\textsuperscript{15} He further goes on to
elaborate, “When we explain action by reference to a
person’s reasons, the explanatory force is not
exhausted by the mere conjunction of the action with
the agent's possession of reasons for acting. It is
possible for a man to do something, to have reasons
for doing and yet not to have done it because he had
those reasons".\textsuperscript{16} We find similar application to moral
action. Sometimes, when we consider the doing of an
agent as right or wrong we may be demanding reasons
for the doing. Surely, moral action is not a special kind
of action but as is argued by some, it may be
relativistic and therefore varying between the agents.
Ardal says moral action is motivated by the desire of
an end. Broad argues that, “Any action that I ought to
do would be right for me to do. But there might be
several alternative actions open to me all of which were equally right. Even if only one course of action open to me were right, or if one alternative were more right than any of the others, we should not necessarily say that I ought to do that action. We tend to confine the word "ought" in its narrower sense to case where we believe that there are motives and inclinations against doing the rightest action open to the agent".\textsuperscript{17}

The agent's action is determined by his own character, purpose, activity, etc.

However, as has been shown above, relation between mind and body the result of which may be the action performed, with which normally motives and reasons are found to be tied up. The purpose of my research work would be to explore the categories of motives in terms of reasons for actions and their interrelations. With this purpose in mind the thesis is divided into the following chapters. The chapter 'Motives' is an effort to bring together literature on the
topic with a critical examination to attempt a definition or the term 'motive', which may be understood as a determinant of action. Again, motive has to be discussed in terms of its classification: desire, aim, goal or intention. Motive may be a part of description of action as an explanation and justification. Our concern is primarily with a conceptual analysis of the term motive and its correlation with other concepts or cognates.

The chapter 'Reasons' deals with reason, which may be understood as a cause of action. Reason, again, may be identifiable as part of an explanation of action. Our focus in this chapter is whether reason is concurrent or identifiable and describable in terms of desire or reference to goals, in short, to motive. The broad scope of the chapter is to investigate possible relation of reason to action that is whether reason may be broadly understood or related as cause of action.
And the next chapter ‘Action’ deals with action falling within the problematic of ‘motive’ and ‘reason’. The distinction between action and reflex is taken up to draw out the exact import of the concept of action for motive and reason. Ordinarily, the man on the street classifies action as bodily movement. But philosophically we find that not all bodily movement is action. Action prima-facie seems to involve ‘something else’ or more than just bodily movement. This ‘something else’ which distinguishes movement or happening from action is sought to be investigated in this chapter in terms of motives and reasons.

The conclusion of the thesis will deal with the possible identification of motive and reason in terms of action. There will be an explanation of whether motive and reason may be assigned for certain sort of explanation of action.
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2. Ibid, p. 353.


5. Broad, CD: Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 28.


11. Ibid., p. 300.


16. Ibid.

CHAPTER – II
MOTIVES
MOTIVES

Motives, motivation, being motivated indicate the not static. The general impression one has about these epithets is of dynamism. The word 'motive' portrays a force or power determining action. The common sense classifies or recognizes motives as desires, aims, or intentions for specific object(s) or state(s) of affairs. The agent, it is supposed, wants or acts with the object or state of affairs insight. The situation of the agent determines his 'wants' or 'acts'. The 'want' or 'action' then can only be situationally assessed or placed and therefore it prime facie appears that motives are context-dependent. The situation then it appears is the determining factor as to when whistling is to be understood as repeating a tune and when as eve's teasing. Being contextually oriented motive words are not strictly specific. Morgan expresses this when he says, "Thus, while motives do not tells us exactly what will happen, they give us an
idea about the range of things a person will do. A person with a need to achieve will work hard in school, in business, in play, and in many other situations.¹ Morgan further explains that motives:

"...are aroused, they trigger behaviour, which leads to a goal, and finally, after the goal is reached, they are shut off.

"A motive,...is not always active,...and can be aroused when appropriate changes take place within the organism or in the stimulus situaiton".²

Avoiding the taxonomy of motives it is obvious that motives, whatever that may mean, definitely are not directly accessible and are only inferred from overt behaviour, including, one's own explanation of one's behaviour. In other words, description of motives involved, whether first or third person is out only means of access. Motives are understood by Morgan to be goals and means of identifying personality and
behavioral differences, traits and characteristics. We do not here want to enter into the debate of suitability of methodological behaviourism. It may suffice our purpose here to understand that motive-concepts are vague labels to be ascertained only in situations or contexts.

In every day parlance there are hundreds of words, which are understood or misunderstood to signify motives, for example want, drive, wish, aim, ambition, hunger, thirst love and revenge, to mention just a few, each of which is understood to be an important determinant of behaviour. As Morgan points out, "A girl wants to be a doctor. A man strives for political power. A person in great pain longs for relief. Another person is ravenously hungry and thinks of nothing but food. A boy is lonely and wishes he had a friend. A man has just committed murder, and the police say the motive was a revenge. A woman works hard at a job to achieve a feeling of success and
competence. These are a few of the motives that play so large a part in human behaviour".  

So we find goals or aims are naturally dependent on drives or needs, which lead to motives determining the individual human behaviour. Peters in his 'Concept of Motivation' elaborates the issue:

"Surely the reference to drives and emotions in relation to motivation is an attempt to answer questions at a different level. It is part and parcel of hedonistic and homeostatic theories which seek answers to questions like ‘Why do men eat?’ or ‘Why do men eat at different rates?’ In other words reference to such causal conditions is an attempt to explain the directedness and persistence of behaviour.

"As ‘motives’ state goals towards which behaviour persists, it is easy to see how particular theories explaining directedness
have become incorporated in the \textit{meaning} of 'motive'.

"The terms 'motives' and 'drive' have become almost synonymous. J. S. Brown... for instance, ... suggested that 'one of the major sources of misunderstanding is the failure to distinguish clearly between drives or motives, on the one hand, and habits or reaction tendencies on the other".\textsuperscript{5}

However, ordinarily the term motive is used quite loosely or as Ardal suggests that the term is used extremely widely but "...when we account for behaviour by use of one or...[the motive] terms, we soon see that they are used to give various different kinds of information...[to] say a man was motivated by anger this does not indicate that the man is particularly irascible as rule. The choice of one...[from among] the list rather than one of the
others may be dictated by the nature of the situation in which the agent finds himself”.⁶

Ardal referring to the long list of motive terms provided by Bentham suggests that use of anyone of these indicate a basic motive behind the action.⁷ In ordinary every day life seeking the motive carries the connotations that the action is disreputable. Peters disagrees that a motive is necessarily a discreditable reason for acting. For Peters, motive is a reason asked for in a context where there may be a suggestion that it might be discreditable. In soliciting the motive the demand is for justification, not simply explanation.⁸

Motives indicate directed action, to use Peter’s phrase, but being not directly accessible cannot be standardized to patterns of rules. Psychological hedonism defined motive as being determined by pleasure and pain, which led Mackenzie to say, “Pleasure and pain are the only possible motive to
action, the only ends at which we can aim". How far the hedonistic theory justifies motivation is a moot point; going into the details here would be digression from the present thesis. The objective of the thesis is not to work out a theory of motivation. But to seek clarification in the use of motive terms to establish or reject motives as causing action. Smith has rightly pointed out, "There is no special class of motive-words. Motives are often referred to by means of abstract nouns such as love, hatred, fear, greed, ambition, and jealously; but the corresponding adjectives are often used to give habit-explanations and therefore not to impute a motive".

Hume, Bentham and J.S.Mill, among the hedonists, have maintained the feelings of pleasure and pain are prime and determinant factors of actions. But there being no differentiation in kinds or types of actions for hedonists they are forced into admitting motives, as determinates of voluntary actions too. But
it may be noted that a voluntary action implies deliberation, choice and resolution indicating rational behaviour.

Anyway it cannot be denied that motives are powerful tools for explaining human behaviour. Motives enable us to make predictions, if only vaguely, about future course of action. Motives, no doubt, are powerful means for explaining human behaviour, which is the reason why our everyday explanation of behaviour are heavily laden with reference and hints about motives. Schreier remarks, "The theory of motivation is the explanatory part of psychology. All psychological phenomena then, including action or behaviour would be motivated". Peters has argued:

"...to ask for...motive is to suggest that this is very much a case of a directed action though the man's objective may be hidden from as well as being pursued according to no standard patterns of rules. There are, I
would suggest, three characteristics shared by explanations in terms of motives, which account for the difficulty in fitting them neatly into the framework of types of explanation, which has been outlined. In the first place we only ask about a man’s motive when we wish, in some way, to hold his conduct up for assessment. The word is used typically in moral or legal discourse where actions have to be justified and not simply explained. We ascribe or impute motives to others and avow them or confess to them in ourselves".\textsuperscript{12}

Motives of course not directly apprehensible but nevertheless may be obtained inferentially.

Motives are a powerful means of explaining behaviour is obviated by the fact that everyday explanations of behaviour is in terms of motives. The everyday expressions of actions clearly carry with
them motive terms and thus it proves to be difficult to
the extent of ridicule that action can be motiveless. As
Smith suggests, "A motiveless action 'acts gratuit' is
logically impossible; for it is not something that a man
could be said to 'decide' or 'choose' to do and so
would not count as an 'action'".\(^\text{13}\) He goes on further to
argue that we are forced to say that everything which
we choose to do entail a motive to do it, therefore we
are obliged and not free to do it.\(^\text{14}\) The argument has
often been used to show that free choice is not
possible. Some philosophers in order to escape the
conclusion have argued that duty as a very special
motive does not have an obligation.\(^\text{15}\) For Smith
obligation is not identical but contrasted with free
choice, then there are motives which do not oblige and
circumstances which oblige us are untoward and
unusual obstacles.\(^\text{16}\)

Peters understands the phrases all actions have
a motive to mean that all action can be assessed or
evaluated. But motives are normally justifications for unusual behaviour. Peters, therefore says, "When we are asked about our motives we may produce one that is a perfectly satisfactory justification...".\textsuperscript{17}

However, some have argued that motives are general states which when recognized help us to predict behaviour in varied situations.\textsuperscript{18} As already mentioned the term 'motive', as stressed by Peters, is used in specific sorts of contexts in ordinary language. "The generalized use of this term by psychologists, some of whom hold that we have a motive for everything that we do, has therefore a rather bizarre effect, which it is the philosopher's task to make explicit".\textsuperscript{19} Ryle in his 'The Concept of Mind' views motives as inducing people to do things, which help ordinary transactions between people and without which ordinary transactions would not be possible. He hints that motive is a cause to an action and motive and cause do not conflict. But in his typical style he
goes on to argue that causes of actions known to us are familiar and usually public happenings which get people to act in particular ways and in particular situations. Mackenzie specifies inducement to act as the thought of a desirable end. He is basically suggesting that motives and desirable ends are interchangeable notions. But Lillie argues, "...desires itself...appear to be two aspects, on the one hand the instinctive craving or urge impelling a man to action, and on the other hand the end or object at which he is aiming which is said to induce him to the action". In other words, the argument effects a distinction between what might be called instinctive action and actions which are induced. It appears that induced action requires desired ends whereas the instinctive actions are not goal directed. The belief of a person of the correctness or rightness of a certain course of action is a motive for doing it, whereas a belief in the wrongness would involve a motive against doing the action. But then not only rightness or not rightness of
an action may be the motives with regard to desired ends or consequences, as Smith points out, "My motive may be fear of the consequences of disobedience...because I have been trained to and obedience is now a matter of habit, and in this case I have no motive at all. But I may also obey it from a sense of duty; and this is a motive". The concept of motive needs to be distinguished to classify it apart from its attending notions. However, motive can certainly be speculated as a conscious mental process moving a person in a particular manner because of desires, the only possible exception may be the conscious process of willing. Again as Broad points out, the belief that a certain action is right is motive for doing it. The reverse that is an action is wrong is a motive for not doing it.

In the most preliminary form this thesis has to draw a distinction long lost in philosophy between intentions and motives. Jenkins has rightly pointed
out, "The criteria for saying that a person is intending and for saying that he is motivated, and the relation which exists between these two states, are subjects which, in one form or another, have frequently found a place in philosophical literature". There is no doubt that the term 'motive' is not less ambiguous than 'intention'. As we have seen motive may move us or cause us to act in directed manner. Now the term 'cause' may mean, using Aristotelian classification, either efficient or final, the efficient cause is the movement of the nerves; muscle etc., whereas a motive may be understood to be either that which impels and that which induces us to act in a particular way. Mackenzie writes, "In the former sense, we say that we are moved by feeling or emotion. Thus we say that a man's motive was anger, or jealously, or fear. or pity, or pleasure, or pain. Some writers such as (Mill, Bentham) have suggested, 'Pleasure and pain to be the ultimate motives'".
Bentham and Mill understand the term 'motive' to mean 'spring of action' or feelings and emotions. The term 'intention' as understood possesses the sense of aim, object or end of action. Motive, then, may be the efficient cause and intention the final cause, in the Aristotelian sense.

But it can easily be argued that motive and intention both are the final cause of action, since both are described as teleological features embedded in the action. The difference, at the most, is that intention is wider than motive or motive may be a part of an intention. For example, in the case of voluntary action there is an element of consideration and choice, which are not present in motive. In other words, it appears prime facie that intention has elements not present in motive. The two, therefore, cannot be used interchangeably. The difference between the two hinge not on whether they are efficient or final cause. The difference is in 'intentions' involving consideration of
the end and means to achieve it, and may be also the consequences it may entail. Motive then is the idea only of the chosen end. Intention beside the idea of the chosen end includes the idea of the chosen means. Intention thus, appears to be a wider notion than motive. Since it consists of the idea of the chosen end-means and also the consequences entailed by the action. A number of writers equate 'motive' with 'chosen end'. If that is an acceptable position then obviously 'intention' involves 'motive' as an element in its structure. For example, teacher may intend to punish the misbehaviour of a pupil with the motive of bettering the child. The example points out that intention includes motive. Mackenzie writes, "The motive of an act, then is a part of the intention in the broadest sense of that term...". However, intention and motive are often interchanged in ordinary language which leads Lillie to write, "A man's intention refers to the outside world, the world of anticipated results as they are foreseen by the agent, the motive
refers to the state of the agents own mind, the spirit in which the action is done rather than the consequences of the action, although a fully conscious motive has an aim which indicates the spirit of the action, the aim of getting money indicates an acquisitive spirit". There is another difference between motive and intention though it depends on the assumption that actions arising from motives are not actions which are a result of choice. In fact the argument suggests that ‘motive’ unlike ‘intention’ does not leave any room for choice. As Berofsky argues, "...I can not choose whether to act from hunger or thirst, unless...[it is a] synonym for ‘choosing whether to eat or to drink’". The element of choice is also pointed out by Ardal, "Regarded from the point of view of its content, a choice is an intention; not a mere intention, but an executive intention". The variation with regards to relationship between ‘intention’ and ‘motive’ might be too big to be dealt with in this thesis. In order to do justice to the relationship of ‘motive’ and ‘intention’ the minimum
requirement would be to cover the details of various positions on the issue. However, there appears to be sufficient ground to agree with Ross, when he says, "It is a highly plausible view to take that intention is a complex consisting of different elements and that motive is the name we give to one element in the intention, namely that element which is of chief interest to the agent. In this sense it seems to be roughly synonymous with aim, end and purpose". The contention is that 'motive' as an element of intention is that part which is of chief interest, namely the goal to be achieved. The point can easily be appreciated if we consider that Sam has misled Tom to humiliate him. The misleading may be the result of the desire of Sam to humiliate Tom. But this only gives the motive for the misleading. However, if it is suggested that Sam misled Tom as a means to humiliate then we are not only pointing out the desire but also laying bare the intention. However, Ardal disagrees with the classification that motive is that part of intention which
is central for the agent. He says, "...I am not happy with the identification of motive with [central] part of the intention...It seems that the motive somehow is intended to explain why the intention was formed. Even when we make a desire for a particular end the motive for an action can hardly be plausibly counted as part of the intention". However, Ardal may disagree to the classification of motive in terms of intention it nevertheless remains without dispute that motive suggests a directed action, irrespective of whether it is overt or covert. It also appears to be simpler to explain actions in terms of motives. In short, ordinarily the inference accepted that motives are offered as explanations of action is accepted.

Jenkins drawing the distinction between motive and intention argues:

"The concept of motive is primarily an explanatory one; the concept of intention is, for want of a better word, primarily
informative though contingently explanatory

That is to say, the statement of intention is meant to inform us of the goal at which an action is aimed.

“Intention is, as it were, the thread underlying all purposeful action; it connects but it does not explain”.\(^{32}\)

Intending or being motivated some are applicable only to voluntary actions. Intention syntactically indicates no impulses, but motive, as has been pointed out earlier, may be instinctive. Therefore, whenever an intention is talked about we can always look for a motive but vice-versa may not be true as Jenkins points but, “One cannot have an intention for a motive but one may have a motive for an intention ”\(^{33}\)

Kenny differentiates between motive and intention in terms of backward-and forward-looking reasons, respectively, “...the man who goes to the fire to get warm...may say that he did so because he was cold, or that
he did so in order to get warm". Kenny argues that the first is backward looking, presumably because of use of past tense, and is a motive whereas the second for him is forward looking, a report and an intention. We are not going to in this thesis dwell on the fine distinction Kenny draws, our purpose is to look at motive and its relation with action, Kenny nevertheless agrees with us to the extent that we also feel that motives are explanations but for him they are backward looking.

The difference between intention and motive has been pointed out by Jenkins, which gathers support from ordinary language. He argues that a cause of intention is never asked for, whereas a reason is always demanded of motive. Jenkins goes on to argue that difficulty in differentiating arises due to treating motive and intention as pre-action states where content of the intention cannot be enumerated without specifying that in which the intended action consists.
William Lillie not only distinguishes between remote and immediate intention but also between direct and indirect intention. For him direct intention of an act is the aim aspect of the motive. He also decries the distinction between conscious and unconscious intention but then he finds that, “It is more convenient to limit the words ‘motive’ and ‘intention’ to conscious mental processes”.

However, some philosophers have argued that motive cannot be included among voluntary activities. Since it is not possible to change motive or desire once they become operative. Whereas other philosophers have argued that there is a difference between choosing and habit. As Smith argues, “The crucial contrast...between habit – and motive-explanations;...[is that] habit explanations are logically complete...motive explanations are only complete when such a reference is contextually implied”.

The point being stressed here is what was argued at the
beginning of this chapter that motives are contextually determined. The contextual dependence is also stressed by McClelland who asserts that all motives are learnt in an affective situation. But Peters rightly points out that this is strange since the situation for McClelland is where an action produces an affect. McClelland although right in suggesting that motives are contextually dependent may be digressed into an attempt to equate motive with habit. It is obvious that if the learning process is involved then habit formation is inevitable. Peters points out that “Allport looks at motives as ‘habit-in-the-making’. Peters argues that when we ask for motives it is the goal or a man’s expectations of a goal that are up for scrutiny. McClelland claims that motives must always bring about a change. Peters points out that McClelland says the explanation of ‘the boy wants to do a good job’ is a motive-explanation because ‘wanting to do a good job’ defines an end situation which would produce positive effect. Peters suggests that
McClelland's concept of 'motive' is "...yet another example of explanation masquerading as analysis...". Peters again goes on to suggest that, "The analysis of a concept like that of 'motive' is never merely an enquiry into terminology. It is an avenue of approach to distinctions, which may well be theoretically as well as practically important. It has been argued, for instance, that the concept of 'motive' is needed to talk about the directedness of a man's behaviour in situations where he does not act out of habit and where he in some way seems to be departing from conventional expectations".

The explanations of actions in terms of habit are marked by lack of references to the choice of the action. It may be argued that habits may be deliberately acquired but this does not effect our argument. A motive explanation refers to a reason, which is used to explain the action. There is obviously then a demarcation between 'habits' and 'motives', the
involvement of the choice of the agent. It is thus that Lillie says, "On that particular occasion, and then, by his volition, the agent chooses to carry out or to refrain from the action to which the motive leads; his choice will be one factor which either helps or hinders the recurrence of the particular motive. In the developed character, as we have already seen, certain motives have become habitually predominant, and the agent’s own past choices have been important factors in determining which of his motives have become master motives".\(^{42}\)

However, intentions and motives are not distinct from the action in the way that physical cause is distinct from its effect. We can take the example of a pianist or a hockey player who plays each stroke intentionally. But are the intention and stroke playing separate from each other? The denial becomes more obvious if an attempt is made to identify intentions.\(^{43}\) The intentions it is obvious cannot be identified
separately as Ryle's adverbial account of thinking shows. The identification cannot be separated because in ordinary language and discourse far any significant piece of behaviour motive or intention is sought as the course of the particular behaviour. In other words, it appears that motives and intentions are understood as causes forming part of explanation for behaviour offered in ordinary discourse. But as Vernon points out, “It is argued by many, however, that our ordinary way of talking is misleading here. It may be true that we sometimes speak of intentions as causes; but when we think carefully we shall see important differences between intentions on the one hand and, let us say, the types of causes investigated by the natural scientist on the other”. The natural scientist views cause to be an antecedent to an event. An event for natural scientist should then only be explained in terms of cause and effect reductions. But sometimes cause is used by the natural scientist as a justification for a happening. The ambiguity leads to confusion and
it appears that Vernon intends something like what Ryle had said, "Motives are not happenings and are not therefore of the right type to be causes. The expansion of a motive-expression is a law-like sentence and not a report of an event".45

Ryle elaborates himself by pointing out that the glass was brittle is not sufficient to explain that it shattered at 10 pm. The fact that the event of a stone hitting the glass happened at 10 pm is to be brought into the description. In the same way to say that a person is disposed to act in such and such a way, under such and such circumstances is not sufficient to account for what the person did at a particular moment. For example, a man passes his neighbour the salt out of politeness; but his politeness is merely his inclination to pass the salt when it is wanted, as well as to perform a thousand other courtesies of the same general kind. So besides the question 'for what reason did he pass the salt?' There is the quite different
question 'what made him pass the salt at that moment to that neighbour?' This question is probably answered by 'he heard his neighbour ask for it', or 'he noticed his neighbour's eye wandering over the table', or something of the sort.\textsuperscript{46}

Smith differentiates between habit, character, and motive-explanations. He disagrees that motives are dispositional. His suggestion is a tendency to lump together 'motives' and suggest a law-like uniformity in the actions. Smith argues that law-like uniformity is virtually a definitional characteristic for 'habits'. Motives too have such law-like uniformity but not necessarily always. Smith argues, "Motive-explanations are usually given only in the case of characteristics and therefore regular conduct; but this is not necessarily so. A man cannot be called 'generous' unless he acts generously fairly often; but he can act once and once only on a generous impulse and we could then say that his motive was generosity,"
however uncharacteristic". He goes on further “If we wish to explain why a piece of glass broke we may either say that it was struck with a certain force or that it was brittle.”

Earlier Ryle had argued that Aristotle in talking about motives realized such talk is about dispositions, which are different from competences. Aristotle also realized that motive unlike any competence is a propensity, which may be strong, weak etc. Smith argues that the explanation ‘struck with a certain force’ refers to an occurrence assumed to be the antecedent cause of the glass breaking. But to say that the ‘glass is brittle’ is to assert what Ryle calls, ‘law-like hypothetical proposition’ to the effect that “…the glass, if sharply struck...would not dissolve, stretch or evaporate but fly into fragments”. According to Smith, Ryle claims that motive-explanations are of the latter or dispositional type. Ryle insists that motive is not an event or force inside
you which functions as an antecedent cause but a disposition or tendency to behave in a certain way when certain events occur. This is obvious and in keeping with Ryle’s basic project in ‘The Concept of Mind’ to exorcise the ‘Ghost in the Machine’ by eradicating the notion of antecedent events. 51

Smith argues that,...Ryle is mainly concerned to refute the theory that a motive-explanation must necessarily refer to sensation...but he denies that an explanation in...[these] terms must necessarily refer to...cause to...behave...Both these contentions seem to me to be correct". 52 Peters had earlier argued that, man’s action can be explained in terms of traits or character, which may be reasons for actions but are not motives, for they are not goal directed therefore, motives may mean, "...that a man aims at a variety of goals by means of the same...action...[most important is] the directedness of motive explanations...[an] aspect...neglected in recent years both by
philosophers and psychologists. The classic philosophical discussion of motives in recent year occurred in...Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. But Peters finds *Ryle's* treatment of motives confusing because of his use of the term 'motive' in too wide a sense. Peters criticizes Ryle for his over eagerness to refute the Cartesian duality and as a result failed to distinguish between various types of dispositions. Peters says that sometimes to ask for motive, "...is only to ask for the end which explains...behaviour". But question is that what are motives and their relation to reasons? Is motive a reason or is motive a cause of action?

As Ryle argues that motive is not an event or force, not an internal happening, not inner occurrences, but it is a disposition, or tendency. He asserts, "...the class of actions done from motive coincides with the class of actions describable as more or less intelligent". Ryle goes on to argue,
"Action’s done from sheer force of habit are not characterized as sensible or silly...\(^{56}\) Ryle is suggesting that actions done from force of habit cannot involve motives or that motive is the intentional or deliberative part of action. However, he says that action is not an effect of a specified cause in terms of motives or intentions, which are subsumed under the category of propensity or behavioural trend. Ryle has consistently argued against any reference to internal happenings as part of an explanation. Here too, he argues, "...to explain an action as done from a specified motive or inclination is not to describe the action as the effect of a specified cause".\(^{57}\) He excludes motives from the category of happenings, with the argument that motive-expression is a law-like sentence and not a reported event.

He obviously prefers the dispositional analysis. The exclusion obviously debars analysis in terms of antecedents leading to an ad infinitum. Melden agrees,
that motive as antecedent cause of action cannot form an explanation. To strengthen his argument, he argues that 'a soporific drug is the cause of sleeping because it has the property of causing sleep' is not informative causal explanation. In other words, for Melden explanations in terms of antecedents are not informative and therefore not causal explanations.

Peters holds motives are reasons for action, which are demanded when an action needs justification as well as explanation. For Peters then motives justify and explain actions. Ardal too, suggests that motives are offered as explanations of actions. Psychologists in general, may be following this contention, suggest that motives are reasons that are actually operative. But Peters is quick to remind that motives might be reasons but not all reasons for actions are motives. The hint is that there may be actions, which may not have any motives, but reasons other than motives can be cited for them.
Peters argues, "Motives are a particular class of reasons. Many sorts of things can be reasons for actions, but motives are reasons of a particular sort". The particular class of reasons is identified by the exercise of directive dispositions such as lust, hunger, etc. For example, a person may steal bread to overcome his hunger and therefore may be said to have a motive. But there are lots of actions the reasons for which may not be motives. The reasons may be the character of the person, such as, honesty, which cannot be classed as motive, for this is not goal directed. Peters lays emphasis on directedness, i.e. definite goals, as a distinguishing feature of 'motives'.

Peters gives as one of the characteristic of motive, which is a class of reasons, for action,"...goal which is quoted to justify...[an] action must also be such that reference to it actually explains what a man has done". But then motives are not simply reasons if we allow 'unconscious' motive. The motive must be
the reasons why an agent did whatever he did. Motives involve goals directing behaviour. Peters explains, "This, it is implied, cannot be the reason why he bought the suit; it cannot therefore be his motive. But his reason might coincide with his motive. He might say that he bought the suit in order to impress his employer and this might also be the reason why he bought it. This would be an example of a conscious motive. If his motive was unconscious, then the reason why he bought the suit would be something likely to attract the notice of his secretary, and the implication of saying that it was unconscious would be that he did not entertain this goal as a conscious objective. In other words, the distinction between conscious and unconscious, though important in some contexts, does really effect the logical force of the term 'motive', which is to imply that, whatever he says or thinks about it, his behaviour is actually directed towards a certain type of goal."
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CHAPTER – III
REASONS
REASONS

The term 'reason' as used in ordinary language has numerous and varying connotations although related to one another. The term is as old as history of human deliberations particularly the thinking involved in organizing. The principle of organization required rationale and conformity to an evolved set of conventions, the latter bunched together may be classed under the title of 'reason'. The long history has added, apart from the natural and expected complications further intricacies to the use of the term 'reason'. Sometimes the complications even obstruct a clearer understanding.

One of the approaches in defining 'reason' has been to understand it as a faculty. Marias Julian, for example says that 'reason; in its widest sense is a faculty or condition of man. The strong shift is when we say of someone that he is not in his reason or is loosing his reason.¹ Blanshard, limits the 'faculty to a
mere function of grasping necessary connections'. However for the Greeks reason was a contemplative faculty the distinguishing feature of man as a rational animal.²

For thousands of years reason has played the role of rationalising religious faith. Descartes was the first to give reason an autonomous status. Hegel introduced reason into history. However, whatever the developments, reason is unfortunately still not out of ambiguity. The development has not been able, in spite of all efforts, to shake off the various senses and connotations attached to it. The term is sometimes used to indicate the activities of cognitions; sometimes it is restricted to inference. But as Ginsberg points out, "The term 'practical reason' has been traditionally used by philosophers for reason in its application to moral conduct".³ It is argued that actions of moral agents, implying that such agents would be rational, are explained by citing reasons and not courses for
their actions. The pointer is to the important use of the notion of reason in the explanation of one's moral conduct or, to be more general, an explanation of one's action. As Baier points out that "Reason as explanation occurs in expressions such as 'my (his etc.) reason for doing this...' or 'the reason why I (he etc.) did this...". The reasons then are understood to be part of 'moving the agent' or agent's action. Baier feels that nothing is found in explanations, which can be said to be the 'reason for agent's actions unless the agent was moved to act by a particular factor in the explanations. Reasons are not necessary elements for the agents' action. The reason might be there but may not have moved the agent. Baier points out, "In deliberation and in justification a fact may be said to be a reason for doing something although the agent was not moved by it to do that thing, or although he knows that he will not be moved by it".
Richards argues that there is a quite trivial sense in which reason is related to explanation that is when the explanation gives reason or part of the reason to explain an action. An explanation consists of a group of statements strung together that reduce the perplexity or the puzzlement of an occurrence, event, action, fact or whatever. The group of statements may even be large enough to form a story. The reduction of the perplexity or puzzlement is effected, for the occurrence, event, action, fact or whatever to be explained can in a greater or lesser degree be inferred from the group of statements. The groups of statements, in short, then are basically understood to be the ‘reasons’ for the occurrence, event, action, fact or whatever. An explanation of an action is then possible by citing reason for it. But reasons for actions are normally demanded only if the action is unusual, surprising, shocking, startling, etc. for example, if a student comes to class on time every morning no curiosity will be aroused. But if one day he comes an
hour late an explanation would normally be required. The student may reply that traffic jam delayed him. The teacher may accept the explanation, because a traffic jam can normally cause delay. In other words, from the statements constituting the explanation the fact to be explained can easily be inferred and the puzzlement about the student coming late may dissolve. However, Richards argues, when an explanation is given in terms of the agent's reason for action, then that explanation must take a special form. The special form is distinguishable from other types of explanations by certain features. One of the necessary, though not sufficient, features of this special type of explanation is that the agent must be, in a sense to be explained, aware of it. Richards then goes on to points out, "Indeed, some philosophers, e.g. Benn, Peters, and Findlay, have seen the distinction between explanations in terms of reasons for action and other types of explanation as being so profound that they have claimed, or pleaded, that to
talk truly of the agent's reasons for having acted in a certain way is to eschew the notion of causal explanation altogether”. The emphasis on causal explanation of action requires logically independent classes of events to be categorized as motives, desires, intentions, etc. and action. There may be commonality but the condition of motive etc. and action occurring independently has to be adhered to if a causal explanation is possible. Obviously if mental causes are considered a part or explanation of action it will differ from explanation in terms of reason for action in so far that the former would not imply agents rationality and its relation to explanation whereas the latter crucially implies this. The two events in a causal relation may be motives or desires and action, since one may occur without the other. In a casual connection the two terms of the relation must be independent.
Richards has pointed out, "...a person to have acted for reasons...[does not require] that the reasons in question actually were entertained prior to action, or that any reasoning process occurred at all". Reasons then are not to be entertained in this context as prior mental occurrences. The reasons then are only part of explanation of action. The explanation may very well give motive as a reason for action. Reasons to actions may involve motives. Reasons for actions are normally specific to the intention with which the action was done. This implies that there may be several and varied forms of reasons, each specific to the intention or motive of the action. A person's going to the athletics ground to jog involves reason for going to the athletics ground viz. to jog. But then his jogging occurs after his reaching the athletics ground. It appears then that the cause i.e. the jogging follows, the effect, viz. after getting to the athletics ground. It is a truism that causal statements about particular events can be true only if the cause did actually occur
or exist. But it may well be true that the person went to the athletics ground in order to jog even though he never jogged. If as is being assumed that the cause is jogging then there appears to be no cause for going to the athletics ground in case the person does not jog. This appears to be a paradoxical situation where an action or event occurs without a cause. But, as Donnellan explains, this problem arises basically because the object of desire or motive is understood as cause rather than desire itself. Donnellan further explains, "...desire...existed prior to his going, and it existed whether or not he finally gets bread". There are many valid grounds for distinguishing between reason-explanations and causal-explanations. One of the major ground for distinguishing is that causal-explanation is empirical and contingent in its nature. In the reason explanation a logical independence is required between desires, feelings and beliefs on the one hand and of human action on the other.
A cause not only is thought of as producing its effect but also as explanation of the effect, irrespective of whether the effect is substantial or a simple change. Richards gives three types of reasons for action: the first is conclusive reason for choosing something; second is a good or generally sufficient reason for choosing something, and finally there is some or a reason for choosing something.\textsuperscript{10} A choice of whatever kind entails an act of will or volition, which, as Myles Brand points out, "...can be construed as referring not to mere bodily events, but rather to motives or desires or wants, or to uses an all encompassing term, reasons".\textsuperscript{11}

Donnellan points out, "...classical reconciliation... claim[s] that acts of will cause intentional actions and are in turn caused by one's motives, desires, and beliefs; and motives, desires, and beliefs are mentioned in giving a man's reasons for acting".\textsuperscript{12} But Richards warns, "...explanations in terms of the
agent's reasons for action take a special form and must, therefore, be distinguished from the general notion of explanation which the reasons for expresses. But, of course, they are, still, causal explanations and this fact should not be obscured or denied. There might be a vast difference between determination by reason and determination by natural causes. But nevertheless, as Falk points out, "...the affinity between reasons and causes cannot be ruled out a priori...". Falk asserts that reasons and natural causes differ in their method and as such may have nothing in common. Donnellan also admits "...explanations of actions in terms of reasons...lend support to the belief that these explanations are causal...ordinary language... employs...word "caused" and frequently the word "because" where motives and reasons are involved". Reasons for action may be regarded as causes in so far as we refer to them in explanation. But cause and effect are not classes of
things discoverable by reason, they can only be apprehended through experience.

As Peters points out, Hume contrasted reason, which is inert, with passions that he regarded as what moved one to action. Peters asserts that Hume did not appreciate that passions are not distinct entities but intimately connected with the use of reason.\textsuperscript{17} Baier explains that Hume thought that our ends are to be determined by our desire, which are in turn determined by our empirical nature. The function of reason is to work out the best means to achieve our ends. This brings in the notion of choice, which is determined by reasons.\textsuperscript{18} According to Alan:

“All this helps to explain how it is that while causal language does provide a temptation to argue that casual behaviour cannot be free, it can at the same time be used in a way that seems quite compatible with freely willed decisions. In the first place the
distinction may be drawn between total and partial causes, enabling us to talk of behaviour that is free within limits. Secondly, however, this idea of a ‘partial cause’ can sometimes be very confusing, and it may often be clearer to talk rather of necessary conditions.

“For there is no reason why a necessary condition should as such and on its own have any positive tendency to bring about anything else at all”.\(^{19}\)

Baier in, ‘The Moral Point of View’ tried to show that means-ends are related to moral principle in exactly the same way as reason. Baier shuns the notion that there are two quite different types or employments of reasons, namely means-ends and moral reasons.\(^{20}\) He goes on to argue:

“Reason is not a nobler, higher, more authoritative desire, we can think of a
person without this or that desire, even without any desires.

“We can also think of a person with desires, but without practical reason".21

Blanshard argues that reason may be a factor in improving moral life but theoretic reason influences conduct indirectly. Plato and Aristotle recognized a 'practical reason', which influences action more directly.22

In the above discussion there is an attempt to present or construct the term 'reason' as 'explanation of action'. The explanation is dependent on the context of an agent 'moving to action'. Baier points out, "In fact, of course, this is not part of the claim made by means of the word 'reason' in an explanatory context, where we always speak of 'someone's reason'".23 The talk of cause, reason, action as Danto points out, “...does not so much show that reasons are not causes, as that it should not be an accident that
events causally traced to a man's reason should make the latter come out true".\textsuperscript{24} He goes on to add, "That philosophers insisting upon a distinction between reasons and causes have supposed that reasons are essentially or necessarily connected with what they are reasons for. In any case, we can modify our claim this way: If \( m \) intends \( r \), he intends that \( r \) should be made true by him because he intends that \( r \), and that this not be accidental. We shall later note that not only must one believe what one believes to be true, but true for the reasons one has for believing it".\textsuperscript{25}

In order to get a clearer picture on the issue involved, we need to distinguish between justificatory and explanatory use of the term 'reason'. The justificatory element is present when reason for an action is given containing reference to factors not dependent on one's believe or thoughts, for example, to cite the stuffiness of the room as reason for stepping out of the room suggests its justification. The
explanatory aspect is present when the thought that the room is stuffy is reason for stepping out. Baier puts the matter by saying when a man says that his reason for refusing to play tennis is that it is wrong to play games on Sundays, he may speak truly even although it is Saturday and though there is nothing wrong with playing on Sunday. He has a reason for refusing and that is his reason and, therefore, this cannot be the reason (justificatorily speaking). Baier distinguishes between uses of reason in cases of deliberation and justification by pointing out, that deliberation is prior whereas justification is posterior to action. He goes on to add that if we are moved by reasons to do something then the reasons constitute the action, but “If, on the other hand, we are looking for reasons in an explanatory context, we are looking not just for reasons: we are looking for that person’s reasons, his reasons for doing what he did.” Causal explanation requires establishing the cause and effect relationship. If reasons are to be classified as causes
for action then a similar relationship is required. In continuation of our earlier argument we may agree with Alan when he says, "...we may discover the causes of an avalanche without having to believe that it had a reason for falling...however to note that there is generally a broad distinction of some sort to be drawn between reasons and causes." It is expected that whenever a cause occurs there will be an effect. In terms of behaviour, a behaviour that is not caused is normally classed as erratic and will have no possibility of generalization except for being lumped together into a heterogeneous class of erratic actions. Cause may at times be misinterpreted to mean compulsion but actually they are simply reasons for things happening. In ordinary language cause and reason for action are intertwined by rules of meaning.

It would be too large a digression to deal with the arguments related to the connection between reason and freedom, freewill or cause. It will suffice for our
purpose to accept that reason is intimately connected with these terms. In the present thesis the attempt is to find the link, if any, between motive, reason and action, even if in the negative sense that we might have to, for lack of sufficient argument, abandon the very notion of there being such a link. If such a link is at all present then it would be that motives can be viewed as reasons for action. Alan argues that simplistic and most natural suggestion is that while causes make things happen there is freedom to act according to one’s reasons. The reasons would then be viewed as causes of action as this suggests deliberation. The categories of reasons and causes are only exclusive when we are to explain freewill, for a reference to cause cannot be accounted as reference to freedom. But then the exclusivity disappears when reason is cited since this distinguishes between an agent’s action and falling of trees or avalanches occurring. The freedom does not assert the exclusivity of reason and cause but of
reason and natural causes. It is some such reason, which led Alan to argue that let us, suppose, for instance, that your aunt keeps twenty-four cats. You may explain her collection either by referring to the emotional background that has caused her to act like this or by citing the reasons that she herself gives. But it is not possible to give full weight to both sorts of explanations at the same time. And if indeed it is the causal explanation that you take more seriously, you will most probably refer to her reasons as mere rationalisations. For if causes bring about their effects, if they really do this, then caused behaviour surely cannot be considered as free.\textsuperscript{30}

Baier argues that to 'like to do something' is classified as 'want', which then is a reason for doing whatever needs to be done. He goes on to distinguish between two different senses of 'want' that is desire, or, as argued in the second chapter of this thesis motive. He cites 'I want a cup of tea' as a request but
this does not, according to him, clarify the context since he can always be asked ‘do you really want another cup’? ‘You have had five already’, the second question in fact is ‘do you really desire another cup’? Baier asserts, “The fact that one wants something in the first sense, is not a reason for having it. But if I want something in the second sense, that is, have a...desire...then I do indeed have a reason”. Baier further goes on to explain:

“We must now ask ourselves whether the way other people feel about something is regarded as a reason for us to act in certain ways.

“Precisely what we are asking? Consider the case of Aunt Elizabeth who would enjoy a visit from her nephew Charles.

“Suppose that Charles does not care for his aunt, but he cares for his mother and that his mother would be pleased if he
visited her sister. Let us say that Charles enjoys pleasing his mother, at any rate likes to please her from a sense of duty or a feeling of filial piety although he does not actually enjoy doing so. In that case, he has a reason for visiting his aunt, because doing so is also *eo-ipso* pleasing his mother and he enjoys doing, or likes to do, that. If he hesitates, his mother might appeal to him in this way: 'if you don't do it for your aunt's sake do it for mine'. This is not the exact case we want, because here the agent has at any rate a self-regarding reason, that he enjoys or likes pleasing his mother. Since we mean only 'prima-facie reason', 'reason all other things being equal', there can be no difference between the two cases. For a prima-facie reason is as much a reason for doing something as a reason against not doing it. It is only reasons on balance which
may be merely justifying without binding us".\textsuperscript{32}

Only reasons are not necessarily just the cause and effect relationship. Reason is not to mean the commonly understood causal relation in the sense of inference. Myles Brand points out:

"The logic of the causal relation is different from the reason-behaviour relation. The causal relation is transitive: if A caused B and B caused C, then the first caused the third to move. But the reason-behaviour relation is either intransitive or non-transitive; in all (or some) cases, if a reason causes certain behaviour, then the reason is not a reason for the effects of the behaviour. Suppose that I want to please Mary Smith. This desire leads me to have flowers sent to her. But unknown to me, she is dreadfully allergic to flowers and they cause her to
have an allergic attack. Though I had a reason for sending her flowers, I had no reason for initiating an attack.

"Davidson argues...a person can have a reason without knowing all that it is a reason for. I did not know that one of the consequences of giving Mary Smith flowers would be an allergic attack. Or if one claims that the total goal of the reason (desire, motive, or so on) is always known, the argument can be refuted by observing that reasons are proximate rather than remote causes. In the billiard ball case, the first ball moving is the proximate, immediate cause of the second's moving, the second is the proximate cause of the third, but the first ball moving is not the proximate cause of the third—it is the remote cause".33
Feinberg suggests that, "...transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason". The sense employed here is of a procedure which is other than action. The sense of reason in this context is not as is ordinarily used. Baier points out:

"It will be admitted that we have a reason for giving up smoking, because smokers run the risk of contracting lung cancer.

"This constitutes a reason, because, in a world of brute fact, lung cancer is the effect of smoking".

Baier further explains, "Only the fact that I would enjoy doing something if I did it can be a reason for doing it, that I would enjoy it if I continued, a reason for continuing to do it". Baier still further explains:

"Everybody must agree that the fact that he would enjoy doing something is a reason for him to do it; that he would not enjoy it is a reason for him not to do it."
“That there is a good fishing in a certain holiday resort is a reason for some people, not for others, to spend their holiday there. What makes it a reason for some is that they enjoy fishing. It is a reason for all those who enjoy fishing”.\(^{37}\)

It is that enjoying doing something is a reason for me to like to do it. Baier thinks that to like to do something can never be a reason for enjoying it. The implication is that ‘liking to do something’ is not the reason. The reason is that which is enjoyed for which I do something. In other words, the liking and enjoying are both linked to something else that is the reason. Therefore, enjoying and liking are comparatively independent of each other. When we speak or when we talk in terms of reason we normally mean choosing the best reason for doing something. Again reason in this sense is specific to the agent of action and is not necessarily reason for the action. As Stroll correctly
points out, "...use of "cause" in connection with human actions. For we speak, not of the causes of actions but of what caused agents or persons to do this or that. And among the sorts of things we cite as causes in the field of human actions—the things that cause persons to act in such-and-such ways—are reasons of peculiar sorts not encountered in the domain of physical events: reasons that are not the reasons an event took place but the reasons an agent has for doing, and which, as reasons that are relevant, good and sufficient, show the action to be right and reasonable, as distinct from the reasons we cite in physics or physiology which merely show how it is that events are brought to pass". Therefore, it might be correct to argue as Baier does, "We employ principles of the superiority of one type of reason over another. We all believe that reasons of self-interest are superior to reasons of mere pleasure, that reason of long-range interest out balance reasons of short-range interest, and reasons of law, religion, and morality
outweigh reasons of self-interest". It is these considerations which lead to such actions that may present say for example pollution and maintaining of ecological balances. It is obviously felt undesirable to allow pollutants, which in the final analysis damage us. The reason then may be said to motivate the action.

We have been arguing that reason is identifiable and describable in terms of desire or reference to goals, in short, motive. This point is expressed by Myles Brand in his 'The Nature of Human Action'. Suppose that in a meeting I have a motive (reason) for signaling to the chairman, suppose also that just as I am about to signal, someone or something prevents me. I could nonetheless identify and describe my motive, not by the resultant behaviour—which did not occur—but rather by the goal of having been recognized by the chairman. Sometimes in fact we identify or describe a motive by referring to the resultant behaviour.
It is obvious by now that our concern is not with the novel notion of reasoning which entail a level of rationality. Any view suggesting that there is such a 'novel' reason for action is distorting the whole issue. Richard points out, "...the notion of acting for reasons which is quite intelligibly applied in case of unreflective, habitual an action as can be imagined, yet I do it for a good reason".41

In any talk about reason as cause of action the sense of reason is not the novel one which entails a second reasoning behind the action but the sense that there is 'good reason' for the action. However the term 'cause' is itself ambiguous and is used in a wide variety of ways but as Stroll points out, "...we speak of causes relevant to actions in the sense in which these are the putative causes an agent has for doing what he does - causes that are the reasons he offers in his explanations and in his so-called self-justification but all of these...are...rationalizations".42
A source of confusion in the whole issue arises from our everyday ontology where mental and the physical are understood to be clearly demarcated into public and nonpublic events. The actions being public are therefore understood to be physical in nature and are distinguished from other physical events because of their understood relations to the mental events, which are supposed to be their cause or their effect. Stroll Avrun says, "...events which function as causes or effects in some sort of mechanisms of the mind, which at crucial points interact with events in the body. When...mental events produce bodily movements in the way in which the sight of a friend and the warm feeling produces the motion of the arm, then we speak of the bodily movement in the way in which we do as the action of waving one's arm in friendly greeting. To perform the action is, strictly speaking, to make the relevant bodily movement happen in causal consequence of the interior mental event".43
It is the supposed ontology, which hinders a clear perspective on reason as cause for action as Myles Brand points out:

"...a reason (that is, a desire, or motive, or event, or so on) is logically tied to its effect. For reasons cannot be identified or described without referring to the resultant behaviour. For example the only way to identify, or "pick out", a reason for one's arm rising is by referring to its effect, the arm's rising; and the only way to describe this volition is to call it 'an arm-rising volition'.

"Since reasons are not logically independent of their resultant behaviour, reasons do not cause this behaviour".44

It can be argued that just as through paddling a cycle moves similarly through the immediate control of his muscles a man raises his arm. But this sketch shows occurrence of internal bodily events. Melden argues:
"Suppose this picture to be true. Then surely I must know which muscles to move. If I cause my arm to rise by moving certain muscles, just as I cause the door to unlock by turning the key in the lock, then just as I can give a true account of the bodily movement I perform in the latter case so I must be able to give a true account of something I do in the former case. When I turn the key in the lock, I may know very little if anything about the mechanism of locks or the manner in which keys inserted and turned in locks produce their familiar effect, but surely I can tell without inspecting or observing what I am doing that I am executing a twisting maneuver with my hand as I firmly hold the key in the lock. So I can raise my arm only by doing something that causes my arm to rise, just as I can unlock the door only by turning the object called "a
key" in the thing commonly described as a
lock". Melden further goes on to explain, we should make it clear that my raising my arm is not the effect of some immediate interior bodily doing of mine. Therefore, one does not raise one's arm by performing another doing, which has the motion of one's arm as effect—one simply raises one's arm.

It is a similar reason, which might have led Stroll to say, "...a person explains his action by saying what he wanted to achieve, and in such a case it would be claimed that his desire was the cause of his action. But it is not always so easy to convert the phrases which people use when they state their reasons for their actions into phrases denoting causes". Stroll further goes on to argue, "...when an action is performed for a reason, it is caused by the agent's desire and information, and that, if he gave his reason
in full,...it was caused by that desire and that information". He further asserts:

"...a desire cannot cause an action if it is conceptually connected with it, this contention might be meant in a very ambitious way...If a desire cannot be identified except under a description which connects it in some way with the action, it cannot cause the action.

"It ought to be not that a cause must be identifiable under a description which does not connect it in any way with its supposed effect, but, rather, that it must be identifiable under a description which does not connect it causally with its supposed effect. This contention is much more plausible, because the suggestion that an event is caused by whatever caused it is not even mythological". 
Donnellan with a slightly different view argues, “It is not enough merely to point out some logical connection between the concepts of desire, belief, and feeling and that of action; the connection must be one which is clearly absent in undisputed case of causal connections”. The argument being presented is a long running dispute regarding the absence or presence of logical connection in causality. We do not want to indulge in the issue for two basic reasons. Firstly, the debate would be a digression not of any help to us. Secondly, the scope and space of the thesis does not permit a digression of the magnitude required for this issue. We may for our purpose dwell on the issue only so for as might be absolutely necessary without taking up too much space, our main purpose is not to argue over the logical particles of causal relationships. The purpose of the thesis is to enquire whether a relation, may be causal, exist between reason and action whereby reason may be broadly understood or related as cause of action.
In this connection we may agree with Myles Brand when he suggests that Davidson rejects the cause and effect relationship as contingent, "...the statement 'every true causal statement is empirical' is false. For him "causal statement" apparently refers to any statement that contains the words, "cause" or "effect" and hence, his claim is clearly correct; "The cause of B caused B" is indeed a non-empirical, true causal statement. But this claim does not refute the argument. The first premise says that it is logically possible that the event labeled "cause" occurs and the event to be labeled "effect" does not occur. It is logically possible, for example, that one billiard ball hits another and the second ball does not move".\textsuperscript{51} Donnellan on the other hand argues that wanting and desiring are tendencies to action and as such it would not be correct to count them as causes of action. If they cannot be counted as causes then it would be odd to construe their relation to action as contingent. But Donnellan is willing to concede, "...if the program
is the more modest one of showing that reason explanations are not causal explanations, then the prognosis seems more hopeful".52

The issue of causal description has also been taken up by Stroll who argues, "... a singular statement of a reason for an action really may be interpretable as a causal statement with general entailment...therefore need a description of the cause, or at least the possibility of a description of the cause which will not make the entailed general statement analytic. So...when I talk about the elements of desire in the cause, I shall be using the concept which I have been calling 'the core'".53 Richards argues, in a similar manner, "...when a person does an act for an insufficient reason (e.g. drinking alcohol, where this frustrates many other ends), then to explain his action is truly to apply a causal generalization about a certain type of irrational agent to his case (perhaps he lacks the full desire to be rational, though he has the
concept and capacity). A similar account seems possible for other cases where there are true explanations in terms of an agent’s reasons.” We may tend to agree with Myles Brand when he says:

“...we ordinarily talk (we say “my reason for raising my hand was to attract the chairman’s attention”, rather than “my reason for having my hand rise was to attract the chairman’s attention”), reason should be thought of as causing behaviour. What a reason causes will have to be the behaviour associated with the action if we are to elucidate “performs an action” in terms of “reasons”...if acting is a reason causing something and if this something were an action then in acting we would have to have a reason for the reason for...and so on ad infinitum”.55
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25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p. 150.


30. Ibid., p. 173.


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34. Feinberg, Joel: Reason and Responsibility, p. 144.

36. Ibid., 109.

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CHAPTER – IV

ACTION
ACTION

A number of activities such as walking, talking etc. are possibly performed only because we possess the necessary apparatus for them. We can portray the matter laying less emphasis on physical metaphors by suggesting a description in terms of our inherited tendencies. In that case, all such actions are instinctive and arise out of our inherited tendencies. There is no doubt that all our actions involve bodily movements. Apart from the bodily movements our actions, it is sometimes argued, might be completed without what might be called overt means. In most cases the means of an action is implicitly defined within the kind of action it is. The 'kind of action' is a general way of employing the phrase when we speak of doing something or performing an action. Myles Brand suggests that, "Persons perform actions. They move their muscles, raise their arms...mental activity, such as solving a mathematical problem or keeping a
secret, are also actions,... In any case, it is a fact about the world that persons perform actions”.¹ But it being evident that persons perform actions does not mean that there are no problems to be confronted concerning human action. There are a number of problems including, “... explanation of actions, causes of actions, knowledge of actions, and evaluation of actions or their consequences....”²

However, there is at least a logical possibility of a clear demarcation between simple bodily movement and action to use the Wittgensteinean pertinences, the two different phrases ‘raising his arm’ and ‘his arm rising’ indicate a difference in significance and meaning. An easiest position is that a person raises his arm includes more than his arm rising. To simply equate human action with bodily movement is to propagate naive behaviorism. Prichard is right when he points out, that according to Cook Wilson, “...in considering an action we have to distinguish three
things: first, the action itself, the originating something: second, the required willing to originate this: and third, the required desire to originate this...What we will and what we desire are the same viz. the action.”

The debate with regard to ‘action’ has oscillated between the proponents of the argument that action is nothing more than physical or bodily movement and proponents of the argument that actions are bodily movements plus something else or at least a bringing about or effecting a change. Cook, for example, belongs to the latter category of philosophers. Philosophers like Melden, belonging to the former category, argue that actions are mere happenings or bodily movements and nothing more. Davidson points out, “Melden, for example, says that actions are often identical with bodily movements, and that bodily movements have causes; yet he denies that the causes are causes of the actions. This is, I think, a
contradiction. He is led to it by the following sort of consideration: 'it is futile to attempt to explain conduct through the causal efficacy of desire—all that can explain is further happenings, not actions performed by agents. Some causes have no agents. Primary among these are those states and changes of states in persons which, because they are reasons as well as causes, make persons voluntary agents'.\(^4\) Rescher agrees:

"An action must always be something done by an agent.

"In saying an action is something an agent does, we insist on its being an instance of his agency.

"An action must have the aspect of physical activity, either positively by way of doing or negatively by way of refraining. Thus purely mental acts done solely in foro interno cannot qualify as actions."
"Every action must have an overt physical component and involves bodily activity some of sort".⁵

Again it may be argued that there is a difference between an action, which may be caused, and one, which is chosen when the aim of the doing can be enquired. In other words, actions may be classified as types of broad categories of whether they are caused or motivated. In case of motivated actions the aim, goal, intention or purpose can be legitimately sought. But as Rescher points out, “Although both causes and motives provide answers to the question, ‘what led him to do it?’ the latter alone answers the question, ‘what considerations led him to do it?’ (Both causal and motivational explanations can in many cases be given of one and the same action - e.g. Smith’s sitting down when he feels his knees giving way because of dizziness.). We can, in short, inquire into the agent’s purpose, wishes, goals, and objectives; his reason,
objectives, and intentions". However, the basic question is as Compton points out, "...is there anyway in which...physically undetermined actions may be determined by nonphysical means without violating the laws of the physical world?". The question arises because earlier Compton has suggested that we have "...an ill-defined idea that in our actions some influences are effective which are not describable by physical laws".

Another approach to the issue is in terms of not only agency but moral or ethical agency where the question of voluntary or involuntary action arises. Normally, actions performed under duress, coercion or compulsions are regarded as involuntary. We may include within the category of involuntary actions, as some philosophers do, such as are performed in ignorance. The earlier type of involuntary actions are a result of external as 'without' cause with no control of the agent. Such involuntary actions might be the result
of some natural calamity or it might be the result of some threat, etc. by another agent or agents. But as Feinberg points out, "...the case is not always so clear. One might have to consider an action performed for some fine end or through fear of something worse to follow. Actions partake of both qualities, though they look more like voluntary than involuntary act. For at the time they are performed they are the result of a deliberate choice between alternatives, and when an action is performed the end or object of that action is held to be the end it had at the movement of its performance. It follows that the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' should be used with reference to the time when the acts were being performed. Now in the imaginary case we have stated the acts are voluntary". The moral question is highly relevant and pertinent as Baier points out,"...responsibility is also incompatible with indeterminism, since if human actions are not caused at all, not even by the agent, then no one is responsible for them..." It may be
remarked here that in ordinary language, as Von Wright points out, "...the word "act' and 'action' are pretty much used as synonyms".\textsuperscript{11} To mention this is crucial here so that no confusion arises in the use of the words.

A responsibility for action is normally and usually fixed or talked of in terms of fixing only if provided the action is free or the agent is free or assumed to be free. The concept or notion of responsibility is complementary only to the notion of free agency, where a different choice or freedom to choose between alternatives is possible. As Hornsby remarks

"Chisholm only thinks that nothing is a free action if it is not caused, and that nothing is free action, if there is some event that is a sufficient causal condition for it. And because he takes it to be incontrovertible that human beings sometimes act freely, he is then led to seek a novel account of the
causation of actions. The proposal is that in cases of action, causation relates persons to events. Consequently actions are caused, but determinism, which concerns causation by events, is supposed not to touch the belief that actions are free.

"No event is the action of a person unless something about that person's states of mind occurs essentially in an explanation of that event; and so we cannot get it across that there was an action without somehow including something which entails that, that sort of explanation is in the offing". The suggestion is that there is a bringing about of an event that is a
change in the world which is categorized as human action. Von Wright argues, "...acts [are] a kind or species of events. An act is not a change in the world. But many acts may quite appropriately be described as the bringing about or effecting ('at will') of a change. To act is, in a sense, to interfere with the course of nature". Danto on the other hand argues that, "...[an] event can occur without being an action, something in excess of the event itself is required in order to fill the space between being an event and being an action". Danto states that if there is an action"...then I am entitled to a class of predictions (and to a class of explanations) to which I would not be entitled were...[there] a mere bodily movement".

Von Wright while differentiating between act category and act individual suggests, "The logical difference between acts and events is a difference between 'activity' and 'passivity'. An act requires an agent. An individual event is the taking place or
happening of some generic event on a specified occasion. An individual act again is the doing of a generic act on a specified occasion by a specified agent”. The agency of an action may be an individual or a group (unified in its action), such as when board of directors act, parliament acts etc. ‘A cause the table B to move’ is a general description, which does not distinguish between an ‘action’ and an ‘event’ or ‘happening’. Therefore, as such ‘A causes the table ‘B’ to ‘move’ cannot be claimed to be an action. However, there are actions that fall under the general category of ‘causing X to happen’. The ‘causing’ may be a hallmark of classifying an ‘action’.

The Wittgenstein’s case of ‘one’s arm rising’ and ‘raising one’s arm’ is in point. In normal circumstances it may be that my arm rises as I signal but it is not confirmed that it is an ‘action,’ it may be a happening or an event. Whereas raising of the arm is a describable action, which may be signaling to a friend
to stop him. In both cases we find movements of certain muscles, but in the first there is no cause whereas in the second there is a cause. However, as Myles Brand points out, "...this description leaves it unclear whether or not an action has been performed, performing an action cannot be one of the truth conditions for 'causing something to happen'". Taylor points out that Descartes' regarding something as an action depended on perspective. All that is actually present in an alleged action is cause and effect. In other words, for Descartes, an event can only be classified as an act if it effects a change. The event of opening a window is effecting a change in the circumstances where the window is closed. Chisholm points out:

"What more is there, then, to the concept of an act? First, there is the fact that the agent himself, as we have seen, is a causal factor. We must say that at least one of the events
that is involved in any act is caused not by any other event, but by the agent, by the man. Causation is a relation that holds, not only between states or events, but also between agents, as causes, and states or events, as effects.

"And, secondly, there is the fact that the concept of an act is essentially teleological.

"Action involves endeavour or purpose, one thing occurring in order that some other thing may occur. And this concept of endeavour, or purpose, must be distinguished from that of want or desire".¹⁹

If this position is not accepted then as Berofsky points out,"...psychology reduces to physiology, and the alleged explanations of human action have succeeded only in changing the subject, in substituting explanations of bodily movements for explanations of action".²⁰ Berofsky goes on to argue, "If this gap
between matters of physiological fact and matters of human action is to be bridged, at least some token concessions must be made to our everyday discourse about persons and their actions”\textsuperscript{21}. The ordinary sense finds it impossible to give in to the notion no difference between ‘human action’ and ‘events in the inanimate world’. Vernon is right in saying, “It seems typical of actions, \textit{in fact}, that they involve bodily movements. When I wave a greeting, my arm moves; when I get up and close the door, my body moves; I cannot kick a football without moving my leg. But, more interesting than this, there are cases where one and the same bodily movement performed in different contexts can represent different actions”.\textsuperscript{22}

The differences are differences in behaviour. The behavioural differences attributed to different persons may be divided into two broad categories, viz. self and other. But then this implies, as Danto points out that there will be two meanings of the term ‘action’
depending on whether it is ascribed to ourselves or to others, provided meaning is determined by verificatory procedures. But then, "...if the term [action] is to be employed univocally, we either must know directly which events, in the case of others, are actions and which are bodily movements; or we must, in our own case, only know the difference between them by the indirection of coherentist procedures". It appears a logical as well as conventional requirement that action has to be distinguished from mere happening for the term to be significant. The distinction needs to be drawn between 'intentionally moving one's leg' and 'unintentionally' or 'unwittingly moving one's leg'

Berofsky mentions that for Melden,* human action is not definable in terms of happenings or relationships between happenings; there can be no causal explanation of human action in terms of desire, motive, reason or intention; all causal explanation is of

happenings; there can be no causal explanation of action; some actions are done not by doing anything else.24

Action has an air of holism. If I ride a bike, the riding is viewed as my action and not the number of paddles I have gone through. The holism is a peculiarity of the attachment ‘having in mind,’ ‘intention’ or ‘motive’ for action. This also suggests the peculiarity of actions that it can not be subdivided if taken as a particular action. However, Rescher points out:

“Some “actions” are in fact courses of action: they can be partitioned into component actions, as with the opening of a combination lock. But other actions are simple and indivisible. And precisely because of the mentalistic finitude of human beings who can not have in mind an infinity of diverse items, every compound course of
action will be divisible into some terminating
- and so finite - list of component simple
actions.

“Kenny* thus suggests that, any
characterization of an action is inherently
incomplete, and capable of fuller and fuller
elaboration.

“Action descriptions can be analyzed
into specifications at varying levels of detail
of answers to manageably small number of
questions about different aspects of
action”."25

Some philosophers, such as Von Wright, to overcome
the problem, sharply demarcate acts from activity. The
distinguishing feature of act and activity, according to
them, is the difference between performing or making
something happen and keeping the happening or
happenings going on or continued. An activity is then

related to a process in the same way as an act is related to an event or a happening. The effects of the two are then very different, an act effects the happening of events whereas an activity keeps the process going. Von Wright therefore, goes on to suggest, “Running need not leave any ‘imprint’ on the world, but smoking may leave smoke. As a consequence of drinking a person may get drunk. Getting drunk is an event, and drunkenness a state”.26

It has often been argued that action presupposes or requires some activity. The prerequisite of human actions, it may be argued, is bodily movement, if we are to exclude mental acts from it. These bodily movements are an activity an agent has to be engaged in if he is to perform some acts. Most of the time human activity is found to have a beginning and an end. Von Wright points out, “The beginning and the ending of activity have, sometimes at least, the character of acts. To run is an activity, but to start
running or to stop running are acts of a kind". Von Wright in another article suggests that the events may be changes or transitions from one state of affair to another, but sometimes it is a transition from a state to a process. In a particular situation where a window is shut the opening of it may be an action. But in another case, where a window is kept open by an operation of a spring the opening is not dependent on any action but the closing would be the result of an action. Von Wright suggests, “The terms ‘change’ and ‘event’ must then be understood in the broad, generalized sense, which covers both changes (events) and not changes (not events). This correspondence between act and change is an intrinsic or logical tie”.

There is an element of deliberation in action where one can assert that bodily or muscle movements are not simple happenings. I make my arm rise by moving my muscles. Actions are something more than mere happenings or bodily movements. The whole
question rests on what distinguishes an action from mere happenings or events. Danto in his 'Basic Action' defends four theses as fundamental to the theory of action:

"(i) If there are any actions at all, there are basic actions.

(ii) There are basic actions.

(iii) Not every action is a basic action

(iv) If \( a \) is an action performed by \( m \), then either \( a \) is a basic action of \( m \), or else it is the effect of a chain of causes the originating member of which is a basic action of \( m \)."\(^{29}\)

Kenny points out that, for Aristotle an event can be qualified as an action provided the agent acts of his own volition. Danto too points out that for Hume action is an event caused by volition. Berofsky points out that the most likely candidate for human cause is events
like the sudden flare-up of anger that causes a man to beat his child.\textsuperscript{30} However, Danto goes on further to add, “Thus, when $m$ does $b$ as a basic action, this must for Hume be counted an episode of transeunt causation: there is an event, itself a volition and part of $m$, who himself is but a shower of events ontologically on a par with the volition in question, this volition causing $b$ in the only sense of ‘cause’ we now need countenance. Not every action, of course, is of this sort, for experience instructs us that some events cannot be directly caused by volitions. Some are actions only because caused by events themselves caused by volitions, these being just what we have marked out as mediated actions”.\textsuperscript{31} Kenny points out that ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ are contraries such that many things we do are neither voluntary nor involuntary. Therefore, “...it seems clear that a person’s subsequent state of mind can have very little to do with whether a particular action is voluntary, involuntary or neither”.\textsuperscript{32}
Philosophically 'will' is understood to be one of the tripartite divisions of the soul. Modern philosophy has replaced the notion with location to be found through inner sense. Volition is therefore taken to be an action of the will and is assumed to be necessary for voluntary action. As Kenny points out “The freedom of the will is to be located in the indeterminacy of these internal volitions. The occurrence of volitions, and their freedom from causal control is a matter of intimate experience”.

Hornsby clarifies the issue, “The empiricist view, that conations are causes of actions admits in its turn of two variants. It may be said that the events that are causes of actions are actions, or this may be denied”.

Ryle in the concept of mind argues against the very notion of internal action, which can be labeled 'conation'. Ryle proceeds to argue that conations cannot distinguish between 'mere movement' and the voluntary movement that are actions. The Rylean
regress basically is a pointer that if actions are causes of actions then there is an infinite regress in the series. Ryle argues that if action is viewed as a compound event wherein the end event is caused by volition then these cannot be viewed as an act of the will, as is conventional in common parlance. For if an action is the result of a volition which is itself an act then this action of the will would also require a prior or accompanying act and so on, ad infinitum. In short, if, according to Ryle, it is a precondition of action that it should be preceded by another action then the latter action would also necessarily require an action to precede it and so on leading to an infinite regress. Ryle's arguments forbid the postulation as a necessary condition of an action preceded by an event that is claimed to be an action. Hornsby points out, "...causation as a link between events in which agents participate and those events in the world beyond them for which they may be held responsible". It has been argued after Ryle that there can only be inductive
grounds for an action and there can be no necessary entailments. Danto writes, "It is rather that one could not enter the claim of actions...if...as a condition...must...do something first: for that condition then has a condition that one do[es]...something else first, and this runs viciously to infinity. So if there are mediated actions and cognitions, there must be actions and cognitions, which contain no further actions and cognitions as components. These are actions we do but not through any distinct thing which we also do,...Such actions...as these I shall call basic, and mediated one’s are accordingly non-basic".^^

The basic action may include mental action, which does not have further action or cognition as components. These basic actions may in turn be responsible for the consequential action. The trouble with interior acts, including willing, as Berofsky points out is "...a mare’s nest of confusions".^^ Berofsky further goes on to say that description of willing as an
action independent of its consequences must come forth "Let us call the act of willing 'A,' then A produces B (a muscle movement), this being taken to be a causal sequence. Now in general if A causes B, a description of A other than that it has the causal property of producing B must be forth-coming, otherwise 'A causes B' degenerates into 'the thing that produces B produces B'".\textsuperscript{38} Danto has argued that action of an agent is basic only if there is no event embedded in that action such that it causes the latter and is itself done by that agent. Danto says, "...this does not in any way entail that basic actions cannot be caused, even caused by the agent himself, if they are responses, and if it is the action which is the effect and not its component simple event".\textsuperscript{39}

Elsewhere Danto has explained his notion of basic action by suggesting that it has the quality of \textit{given-ness} as contrasted with 'action' which is caused to happen. Therefore, "Analogously, an action $a$, if $a$
basic action, is a starting point for the performance of another action \( b \), of which it is at least part of the cause. "Is caused by" and "is inferred from" are analogous relations in the theories of knowledge and of action, respectively".\(^40\) And again he goes on to argue, "Philosophers have sometimes thought, there may be two species or perhaps two concepts of causation, one of which is routinely exemplified when events are explained through other events, while the other is exemplified hardly less routinely, when we explain an event through an agent who directly caused it to happen as in basis actions".\(^41\) Danto’s theory of action can only be fully understood by contrasting basic and non-basic action. For Danto if there are to be any actions at all then there must definitely be basic actions, especially in so far that they depend on other actions for their occurrence. In other words, non-basic actions are identified by their being accounted by another action that may itself not be caused by another action. The latter are classed as basic actions.
but are not themselves caused by the actions. Danto's basic actions can then be construed as the breaking point of the Cartesian infinite series depicted by Ryle. Hornsby explains:

"Danto himself believed that cardinal dependence between actions was of a causal kind. He said (1) B is a basic action of X if and only if (i) B is an action, and (ii) whenever X performs B, there is no other action A performed by X such that B is caused by A.

"(2) B is non-basic action of X if there is some action A performed by X, such that B is caused by A".  

Basic action is over and above the physiological series as Danto explains, "If the basic action which consists of m raising his arm is identical, as I have proposed it is with a physiological series which terminates in m's arm raising, then if the first exemplifies immanent and
the second transeunt causation, we hardly can have
derived our concept of transeunt causation from our
experience of basic action. If basic action, thus is a
complex event and transeunt causation is exemplified
in compound events, there is not, in the former, the
required pair of events to be related under the concept
of transeuncy."  

Danto as a way of explanation suggests electro-
stimulation of the brain setting off a series of events
identical with the basic action, and says, "...were to it
occur to me, my experience would be of raising my
arm 'for no reason'...nor as part of mediated action.
The action whereby I activate the electro stimulator is
not a component of the basic action thus caused. What
I have performed rather, is a mediated action with a
complex effect. It is a mediated action which has a
basic action both as its starting point and terminus".  

Berofsky suggests we cannot identify what one does
with what one makes happen. The difference is that
between my arm getting raised and raising my arm. The arm getting raised may occur through no doing of mine like when someone else might raise my arm. Berofsky goes on to argue that the difference is a difference of willing the raising of the arm, which involves volition, "So I move my muscles by performing an act of volition which in turn produces muscle movement." But Berofsky admits that an objection can be raised against this argument, "Here someone may retort impatiently: 'when I will a muscle movement, I will it and that is the end of the matter; there is no other doing by virtue of which this act of volition gets done - I simply will the movement of the muscle'. But even if this reply were correct it would not serve to explain what an action is as distinguished from a mere happening - it explains the 'action' of raising the arm in terms of an internal action of willing and hence all it does at best is to change the locus of action." Hornsby argues, "And the sort of answer we expect to the question 'what did he do?' Is not 'His
body moved' ('His arm rose', 'His knee bent'), but rather 'He moved his body', ('He raised his arm', 'He bent his knee'). It is the same when we go beyond the agent's body to describe his action: what he did, we say, was melt the chocolate and we cannot say that what he did was the chocolate melted. So it appears...if there is...in an identification of actions with bodily movements, then they must be movements, not movements, that are action - his movings of his body, not his body's movings. However, Hornsby goes on to suggest, "...the account of the puzzle lead us to suppose—which is as cause to effect? The drift is plain. Unless we allow that actions are distinct from movements, we cannot say how the latter are, but the former are not, caused by the contractions of muscles. And unless we push actions right back inside the body, We cannot make good sense of talking about an action as a person's contracting his muscles. There might be a possibility of describing all actions as mere bodily movements, which imply that action can exhaustively
be described as bodily movement and all other descriptions can be replaced by bodily movement descriptions. But then we are no longer speaking of a particular action. The description of action as basic might be understood to be a basic description of action. And as Hornsby points out:

"Things done correspond to kinds of action, and descriptions of actions determine kinds of actions.

"So we are forced to say that descriptions of actions that take one inside the body are more basic than their bodily movement descriptions. But this seems to be exactly right, if a genuinely causal notion of basicness is at issue".\textsuperscript{50}

Danto sketches two different kinds of non-basic action, the composite and gestures. Both the kind of actions are dependent on some basic action. The composite is an aggregate or collection of a number of basic
actions, the events in composite action need not have any causal connections. All that is required is performing the basic action in appropriate movement, like in dance. The gestures require performing of a basic action like raising the arm in order to bless, which is non-basic. Danto in this case points out, "What we have is a basic action performed in conformity with a rule which licenses a re-description of it as a blessing, provided the agent is in a position to play the role of blesser". Danto further goes on to argue, "Now clearly, there are neither composite actions nor cognitions on the one hand, nor gestures and their cognitional counterparts on the other, unless there are basic actions. For these have basic actions and cognitions as components. So, that there are non-basic actions and cognitions other than mediated one's does not change the analysis. But concept of mediation yields the regressive argument to basic actions, and only mediated actions and cognitions comprise a non-conventional, that is, a causal or a
logical liaison between what is known (or done) and that through which it is known (or done)". What is of more interest to us in this thesis is explained by Danto when he suggests that in a mediated action one is related to an event through being directly related to another event, an event which causes the former event and hence is mediately related to it. But in basic action there are no events to be directly related to except to the performer himself therefore, "...the basic action then is an effect, and the intention, since a cause, is not a component of the effect, nor hence a component in the basic action itself. So we may consider basic actions apart from intentions, much as we may consider basic cognition apart from such beliefs as they may cause". In this sense motive can be regarded as a cause of action or basic action.

Wittgenstein's famous query about the difference between 'my arm rising' and 'raising my arm' implies a query with regard to an act of volition, which has been
argued against by Ryle. But Berofsky disagrees for whom 'raising of the arm' is different from 'my raising of the arm' in so far the latter requires certain antecedent actions therefore he says, "Hence the doing required in order to preserve the distinction between 'moving certain muscles' and 'certain muscles getting moved' must be a doing other than the doing described as 'moving certain muscles'." Berofsky considers how do I raise my arm as an unfair question. My signaling can easily be demonstrated by raising my arm and therefore a real possibility of satisfying the curiosity. My raising arm, according to Berofsky, is exercising a primitive ability. Berofsky has attempted to show that, the causal model of natural sciences does not fit the everyday explanations of actions in terms of intentions, interests, desires, etc. Berofsky goes on to say, "It is not even our concern, in asking how someone did such and such, to inquire into the natural history of his action, to probe as it were, behind the scene of human action itself, to discover
events in an area that constitutes the general causal conditional action". The description given of 'my signaling' is the kind of explanation which is required and in this as Berofsky points out, "...there is radical disparity between [these]...explanations; causal explanations of events and our familiar explanations of human actions".

Berofsky attempts to get rid of the notorious connections frequently talked about between causality of decision and choice whereby inner something is required. For him, it is absurd to distinguish between bodily movement and an action by referring to decision and choice. His argument rests on that a lot of 'doings' are without decisions and therefore decision cannot be uniformly considered to be an antecedent of an action. And therefore there is no need for a recourse to 'behind the scenes' events. Berofsky makes the point clear, "Far from carrying us behind the scenes of action to events that somehow produce actions,
decisions and choices are intelligible only within the arena of action. By reference to them we may characterize, not bodily movements as actions (for that they are actions we already know when we ask whether a person has decided or chosen to act as he does), but actions as those the agent has decided or chosen to do and hence actions for which reasons of one sort or another can be given. It is, therefore, essential to decision and choice - no mere logical accident as it were - that there be agents, actions and reasons for doing”. The reasons for not accepting causality might be the fear of determinism but this is not so as Feinberg points out, “...from the fact that my action is causally determined it does not necessarily follow that I am constrained to do it! and this is equivalent to saying that it does not necessarily follow that I am not free”.58

It is possible to distinguish action on the basis of strength of the desire involved for the actions. But
then we are talking about action, which is 'deliberates' involving choices or volitions. In other words, there are actions ranging from impulse to deliberation reciprocally related to desire. Strongest desire leads to impulsive action and deliberation tones down the desire. As Lillie William points out, "...willing appears to be a matter of degree...The essential mark of volition or willing is that the character or the personality as a whole...is thrown upon the side of one motive".  

The argument hinges on whether choosing, deciding, preferring, etc. are to be classified as doing or whether they are to be cited as motives or reasons for actions. Smith points out that, in some cases we choose without doing anything, a decision does not entail a choice. He goes on to suggest, "The fact that people choose to do what they have decided to do is not something that we discover by observation of human behaviour. A man may decide, for example, to
vote for Jones and be prevented from doing so by sickness or cancellation of the election. But, in default of such explanations, there is no logical gap between deciding and doing. The explanations are primarily reasons stated as explanations. But these reasons cannot be classified as motives. In other words, we have to distinguish between a deliberate thrust towards action, which involves motive, and action, without a thrust it may be explained by citing reason.

Smith further elaborates, "If a man decides to do something in the future he may fail to do it because he has changed his mind; but it would be absurd to say in this case that he had not really decided. A change of mind may be sudden and inexplicable. In this case ex hypothesi no reason can be given for it, and if a man decides to do X and suddenly changes his mind and does Y he acts irrationally. (There are other ways in which actions can be called 'irrational', for example if the agent has no good reasons for believing that they
will produce the end which he desires; and in most uses ‘irrational’ is an opprobrious word. I do not wish to imply here that every action which deviates from a decision in an inexplicable way is irrational in any of the other senses or to imply that we ought never to act in this way”).

The distinction between, choosing and deciding is made when either the person has been prevented or he has changed his mind. Man may choose from sheer habit or absence of mind in other words without being able to specify any reason for a choice. Smith dismisses these cases as ‘minimal’ and as such does not consider them. These minimal cases from our point of view might be cases involving strong motives. As has been pointed out earlier there is a reciprocity between motive and reason. The stronger the motive lesser the reason. The motive themselves then are reasons for the actions. Jagewan and Alvin point out that Aristotle distinguishes between “...rational
choice...of a course of action aiming at the good from appetite and says explicitly: ‘Appetite opposes rational choice’....” 62

Ardal points out that Barnes explains what he takes an action to be as acting in choosing and that choice is an intention but not necessarily an executive intention. Barnes only recognizes action to originate from choice. 63 we do not want to get into the argument, for it does not serve our purpose, whether omissions are also to be counted as actions involving choice and intention for which we may be responsible. The case of omission only shows a lack of motivation or reason for non-action or omission.
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CHAPTER – V
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

It is obvious and often usual to question human action in terms of the goal or end towards which it is directed or the rule to which the action conforms. Normally, the paradigm case of human action is when reason can be specified for doing whatever is being done. It can be argued that we have a motive for everything we do in our life. Thus, we might say, motive is the arena from which action springs. But it is not necessary that if a person has a motive for doing something then he is bound to do it. A man may have a motive for killing someone, but he may have excellent reasons for refraining from doing so. One definite way of explaining human behaviour is by referring or alluding to motives. This thesis has been an effort to bring out the relation between motives, reasons, and action. However, in order to clearly bring out the relationship initially motive had to be distinguished from its related concepts, especially those which are treated as interchangeable in ordinary usage.
Most actions, it has been argued, are goal directed. Apart from introducing the thesis in the first chapter we have argued that it is motive, which moves or causes us to act in specific manners. Therefore, we can understand motives as justification and explanation of action. In ordinary usage 'desire' is the most frequently interchangeable term for 'motive'. We therefore took the opportunity in the first chapter itself to distinguish between 'desire' and 'motive' in order to purge it of the connotations it has gathered. In ordinary usage desire is equated with food, drink, sex, and so on. The differentiation between 'desire' and 'motive' was necessitated primarily to separate motive as a concept related to action. Ordinarily 'motive' is used and has the connotations of being asked as part of some unexpected or disreputable action or as a requirement only in a court of law. Motive is different from desire, for example we may have desire to go somewhere or buy a car, not motive. However, we were not more concerned with desire because the purpose of the thesis is
not to elaborate the concept of desire but to explore only clarification in the use of the term 'motive'.

In the next chapter we have tried to differentiate between 'motive' and 'intention'. 'Intention' in ordinary usage is also understood as similar or interchangeable with motive. The second chapter shows that motive may be a part of an intention or intention is a term with wider connotations than motive. The chapter shows that motive primarily belongs to an explanatory model whereas intention is more informative than explanatory. It has thus been argued that intention informs us of the goal at which an action is aimed and motive gives the explanations of the actions in terms of the goal. Since, it could be seen that in demarcating 'motive', we found it to have an explanatory function with regard to action, it appeared that such an explanation may be understood to be 'reason' for action. We therefore in the third chapter explored the relationship between 'motive' and 'reason'. As pointed out earlier the paradigm case of actions would be that for which reason is
specifiable. It thus seems that reason also functions as an explanation of action. The reasons cited as explanation may be as diverse as specifying character of a person or be specifics virtually appearing to explain action in terms of causes. Normally, the terms 'cause' and 'because' seem in ordinary language to be used where motives or reasons are involved in explaining an action. Reasons treated as causes for explanation of action in terms of reasons for action may lend support to the view that such explanations are causal. However, the third chapter is an enquiry into whether reasons can be broadly understood or related as cause of action. Thus, in this chapter we find that reason is distinct from cause. Suppose that 'x' while driving the car suddenly learns of the roadblock ahead due to an accident, stops the car and turns it around to go back and proceed on a different route. In this the reason for turning around is the accident, while the cause was the steering wheel. The reason, i.e. the accident, explains the action. The reason as an explanation is identifying that which moves the agent to action. The that which moves the agent to action may be
the motive or desire. As such reason may be equated with motive.

The fourth chapter discusses the notion of 'action' in relation to bodily movement and assigning 'motive' or 'reason' to the agent. If motives or reasons are not assignable to an event then it can only be regarded as an event or a happening. The chapter discusses the classifying of action as voluntary or involuntary or, on the other hand, basic or non-basic. The discussion in the chapter, however, shows that an action is not simply bodily movement. The thesis has established so far that motives and reasons are both explanatory tools for action. The thesis now as conclusion needs to explore the possibility of identification of 'motive' and 'reason' in terms of action, which may help explain an happening as action.

For Peters, motives are a particular class of reasons. He points out, "Motives...are reasons for action which are asked for when there is an issue of justification as well as of explanation. The question then arises as to the type of
explanation that is offered when a motive is suggested. For not all reasons for action are motives. This is obvious enough; for we can ask whether a reason for an action is a motive.\(^1\) But as Peters himself points out Bentham considers pleasure, pain, or some other events as motive prompting. But for Hume the primary source or spring or motive of action is not reason, but taste. He points out that, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them".\(^2\) Mackenzie interprets Hume to be using the term 'passion' as practically synonymous to 'impulse'. He then goes on to argue that if this is the case, all actions being dependent on impulse, then it has at least to be admitted that 'reason' shows us the way to pursue a motive to the best of our advantage. Mackenzie goes on to assert that reason may then be seen as setting before us ends or motives not available to an irrational being. Therefore, Mackenzie says, "In this sense, then, reason is capable of furnishing us with motives to action".\(^3\) But as Peters points out, "We can ask of a reason for an action 'was that his
motive'? But we cannot ask of a motive, without in some way repeating ourselves 'was that the reason why he did it'? Our preliminary problem about the concept of 'motive' is to specify its delimiting criteria within the general class of 'reason for action'”. Baier, too, has argued that due to the indiscriminate interchange in the use of 'motive' and 'reason' philosophers have been confused about the distinction between reason and motive. As a result philosophers have been quite arbitrary about the intricacies of the issue, which has led to a hopelessly distorted picture. An example may show the difference between assigning of motive and reason. If Tom suddenly dies or goes mad and it is discovered that his food was poisoned. The poison may be the reason for Tom's dying or going mad but it can be asked 'Did Tom himself have a motive?' In other words, it can be suspected that Tom might have himself added the poison with some motive. Take an example where we imply motive, suppose Tom kills Jemina because she has fallen in love with another person. In this case Tom's motive of jealously is easily assignable. Thus
there was a motive to give a certain sort of explanation, one in terms of motives and not in terms of causes.

However, Baier points out, "If reasons are not distinguished from motives, it is obvious that reasons must also be something of this sort, and if they are facts, then the moving power must somehow be lodge in these facts, are the stimuli which arouse certain responses in the agent or that they are the conditions which must be satisfied if an agent's tendency to act in a certain way is to be realized...let us remember that the word 'reason' occurs in deliberation, justification and explanation. 'Motive', on the other hand, is at home only in explanation. When we distinguish 'reason' from 'motive', we are therefore merely distinguishing 'reason as used in explanation from 'motive'". Normally, where an agent is involved reason is attached as a quality to a physical event. In the third chapter we had pointed out that reason may be a part of an explanation of action. The explanation may present a motive as a reason for action and therefore is identifiable
and describable in terms of desire or reference to goals, or motive.

However, motive may affect the moral status of the agent's action. The rightness or wrongness of an action may depend on the motive involved, as Broad points out, "...that a man's belief that a certain action which is in his power is right is a motive for doing it, and that his belief that a certain state of affairs which he could help to bring about would be good is a motive for aiming at it...Kant holds that the rightness or wrongness of a volition depends wholly on the nature of its motive. It does not depend on its intended consequences except in so far as the expectations of these form part of the motive. Of course a mere idle wish is of no moral value. But provided we genuinely try to carry out our intention, and provided our motive is right, then the volition is right no matter what its consequences may be".\(^7\) Broad further goes on to explain "An action is right if and only if the agent's sufficient motive in doing it is the fact that he recognizes it to be
required in the circumstances by a right principle of conduct". However, most of the actions display a moral understanding of the agent. Often the agent may desist from doing something since it may be considered undesirable by him, which may then be a motive for some other action. Again conflicts in motives are not a very unusual phenomenon and require decision, choice or deliberation for resolution. The reason may motivate and, surely in this sense, reason may be a motive for action involving decision, choice or deliberation.

Audi argues, "Reason for action-considerations that call for or justify action. They may be subjective or objective. A subjective reason is a consideration an agent understands to support a course of action, regardless of whether the agent realizes it. What are cited as reasons may be matters either of fact or of value, but when facts are cited values are also relevant. Thus the fact that cigarette smoke contains nicotine is a reason, for not smoking only because nicotine has undesirable effects.
The most important evaluative reasons are normative reasons - i.e. considerations having (e.g.) ethical force. Reasons for action enter practical thinking as the contents to beliefs, desires, and other mental states. But not all the reasons one has need motivate the corresponding behaviours. Thus I may recognize an obligation to pay taxes, yet do so only for fear of punishment. If so, then only my fear is an explaining reason for my action.\(^9\) In this case, Baier argues, "...a reason only because it is a reason for a particular person when deliberating about a number of alternative lines of action open to him."\(^10\)

As Peters points out, "...the directive aspect of the term 'motive'-the 'contemplated result or object' or the 'consideration of reason' which influences volition. But it also stresses the notion of the 'moving', which is the etymological suggestion of the word, and its connexion with emotion and desire. And many would suggest that it is this connexion with emotion and movement which makes a reason a motive. It is an operative reason because of a
causal connexion between directedness and some inner springs in the individual".\textsuperscript{11} Kenny too argues:

"A doctor may reason out impeccably how to cure a patient; he may fail to act on his conclusion for a variety of reason (e.g. because he is lazy, or avaricious).

"Thus, the transition from the conclusion to the action is more intimately related to the nature of ethical reasoning than the execution of a technical plan is to the nature of technical planning".\textsuperscript{12}

The intimacy is not simply ethical but a motive understood as ethical reasoning motivating action. Ethical reasoning by itself evolves only principles and not necessarily any action, since ethical reasoning may break down in the relation of reason and action on count of ‘laziness, etc’.

As presented in chapter third an explanation of action requires citing of reasons, which elaborate a discernible pattern, may be acceptable to the inquirer. We can suggest
that by such explanations or citing of reasons we place actions in the widest socio-economic, linguistics or even evaluative context, such as ethical situations. However, the primary question that has to be answered is whether motive, which can be cited as a reason could be a cause of action. Melden has argued that a cause must be logically separate from the alleged effect but a reason for an action is not logically distinct from the action, so reasons are not causes of actions. However, Davidson disagree when he says that from understanding reasons as explanations or descriptions of action and cause and effect as separate it cannot be concluded that "...reasons are not causes of action". It may be necessary to remind that for our thesis we have tried to show that motives are reasons for actions, in short we have tried to show that motives and reasons are identifiable in relation to actions.

For Hume the relation of 'cause' to effect is of association, where similarity of objects of the first and second type is the determining factor. However, this
association is not a necessary connection such that if the circumstances were to be repeated the same action would follow, although depicted as ordinary singular causal statements implying generalization. According to Hart and Honore, as mentioned by Davidson, Hume is wrong in supposing motives and desires as ordinary causes of actions. The suggestion by Davidson is that some reasons, he calls them primary; are causes of actions in terms of causal explanations. He then proceeds to show that this is all part of what he calls 'rationalization'. The rationalization is explanation of action showing motive/wanting to be the cause. Davidson successfully agrees that causal explanations are involved in descriptions of actions, however, there need not be an involvement of a law like generality, for we are here dealing with "rationalizations" Davidson agrees, "If the causes of a class of events (actions) fall in a certain class (reasons) and there is a law to back each singular causal statement, it does not follow that there is any law connecting events classified as reasons with events classified as action...". Hume had
shown utter disregard for causal connections and presented only a relation of conjunction. Feinberg points out, "...the constant and regular conjunction of similar events...may possibly...[be] universally...[as] a great uniformity among the actions of men ...and that human nature remains still the same motives always produce the same action; the same event follow from the same causes".¹⁵ Davidson points out, "A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action - some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable. We cannot explain why someone did, what he did simply by saying the particular action appealed".¹⁶ The appeal may be the factor in choosing or deciding leading to an action. The choice may simply be of the motive that has come to dominate. Schreier points out, "Actions occur only in systems which necessitate evolution of alternative paths of actions and commitment to those alternatives which has been chosen".¹⁷
However, Baier points out, "We know that a line of action is in accordance with reason when it is the necessary or best or most efficient means to our ends". Feinberg points out, "All laws being founded on rewards and punishment, it is supposed, as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We may give to this influence what name we please, but as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would here establish". In other words, reason may be used in terms of motive and motive may be regarded as reason for action.
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3. Ibid., p. 61.


8. Ibid., p. 121.


15. Feinberg, Joel: Reason and Responsibility, p. 258.


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