Indonesian Struggle
for
Independence - 1914-1950

The Thesis Submitted To The Aligarh Muslim University, For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

By

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1958
The thesis entitled "Indonesian Struggle for Independence" provides a unique feature of the political struggle and social life of the Indonesian society during the last 36 years. It gives a complete picture of the importance and significance of the national movements striving for free and independent Indonesia during a period of 350 years of the Dutch colonial rule, and 38 years of the Japanese yoke, as well as after the proclamation of independence in August 17, 1945.

The following substantial factors such as religion, culture, economy, education, etc. have been examined together with international elements which have had far-reaching effects on the growth and progress of the political conditions and nationalist movement in the country.

Multifarious sources and different records have been collected for the preparation of the thesis. The sources are available in Indonesian, English, Dutch, French etc. Journals, periodicals and newspapers and others are also very significant in this respect. These materials are to be found in the Indonesian embassy, in the library of the Indian council of world affairs, Delhi public Library, All India Congress Library, the U.S.A. Information service library and others.

The scheme of the thesis consists of an introduction, chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter III, Chapter IV, epilogue, bibliography and appendices. The introduction elaborates
briefly the term Indonesia and its geography, and history, the Sri Vijaya and Majapahit empires, the establishment of Islamic kingdom, the advent of European nations and the formation of the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) in 1602, which was replaced by the Dutch colonial authority up to the outbreak of the first world war in 1914. Chapter 1 consists of the various internal and external factors such as religion education, economy, language, etc. responsible for the growth of the Indonesian nationalism. It also deals with the structure of central, provincial and local governments, judicial system, volksraad and its composition, native states and its powers and judicial system, and finally effects of the first world war on national movements in Indonesia. Chapter II is divided into Part A and Part B. Part A is composed of the causes, policies, activities, and developments of political parties and organisations as well as cooperation and non-cooperation movements. Part B reviews the Indonesian foreign relations with over 20 countries of Asia, Europe and America in political, economic, and cultural fields before the second world war. It also points out the important role of Indonesia in the international politics like the League of Nations and others. Chapter III deals with the Japanese economic imperialistic expansion before and after the outbreak of the second world war, the conquest of Indonesia, the establishment of the Japanese military authority and effects of their occupation on political, economic, educational, cultural and social life of the people as a whole, as well as the underground movements launched by nationalist leaders against the Japanese imperialism. Chapter IV finally deals with the outburst of national revolution, the establishment of the Republic of
Indonesia in 1945, significance of Lingadjati, Renville and the Hague agreements, recognition of Indonesia by the U.N.O. and other foreign states, as well as the structure of central, provincial and local governments, judiciary and parliament. The epilogue consists of the foreign policy and international relations of Indonesia, development of political parties and organisations, the first general election of 1955 for the parliament and constituent assembly, five year plan etc. There is also a bibliography, and appendices of three international agreements.

New approaches are found in this thesis in the following fields:

1. Different internal and external elements and factors are discovered in the study, responsible for the rapid growth and formation of national political parties and organisations. They include religion, Asiatic, political conception, Western political ideas and thoughts, international contacts, Indonesian language and flag, Indonesia raya, Dutch rule and its segregation policy, ruthless economic exploitation and armed forces, national and Western educational system, modern scientific inventions and effects of the two world wars, etc.

2. The author of the thesis has objectively elaborated the governmental structures of the Dutch colonial rule, the Japanese military administration and the republic of Indonesia and contrasted and systematically compiled them in the thesis.

3. With regard to foreign relations, the author has explored the most essential factors of the Indonesian
international contacts with over 20 foreign countries like the Netherlands, India, China, U.S.A., Britain, France, etc., before the second world war, in political, economic and cultural spheres. Internationally, Indonesia played an important role in world politics because of its economic and geographical importance.

4. Moreover, the author has made deliberate studies of the Indonesian national movements and political organisations along with their primary objectives, principles and activities in their struggle for the liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch imperialism and Japanese fascism. These movements used diverse tactics and adopted the cooperation and non-cooperation policy which helped to advance the spirit of national revolutionary movements throughout the country. To meet their demands, the colonial authorities were gradually compelled to give more and more civil and political rights to the people of Indonesia.

5. Finally the author has tried to discover the far reaching effects of the first and second world wars on political, economic, cultural and social life of the people all over the Indonesian archipelago.

6. The author has further studies the political structure of the native states along with their political, economic, financial and cultural relations with the Netherlands government and the central government of Indonesia before and after the war.
7. An intensive and extensive study has been made in connexion with the administration of central government, Governor General and his powers and positions, volkraad and its composition and election.

8. Lastly the author has thoroughly studied the cooperation and non-cooperation movements as well as the underground movements launched by nationalist leaders both inside and outside the parliament and councils during the Dutch rule and the Japanese occupation. Adequate evidences of the deep rooted consequences of the Japanese occupation in the political, economic, educational and cultural fields as well as social life of the people are also found in the study.
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INTRODUCTION

INDONESIA.

The word Indonesia was derived from the two Greek words, Indos and Negos which means river Indus or India and island respectively - hence the island of India. The Indonesian word Nusa has the same denotation as that of the Greek Neos. In fact Nusantara (the Empire of islands) has been used for Indonesia as well.

The name of Indonesia was originally coined by a German ethnologist called Bastian in 1884, otherwise it was Malaysia which covered all the islands of the region, consisting of Formosa, British Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines and Madagascar. Geographically, Madagascar belonged to Africa and Formosa to China but ethnologically to Indonesia.

The term Indonesia or Indonesian is originally a linguistic conception. It denotes a group of languages spoken in the former Dutch East Indies archipelago except New Guinea and northern Halmahera, off northern east coast of Borneo-the eastern part of Madagascar in the far west, Yap, the Mariannen or Ladronen and the Vulcan islands in the Far East.

Today the term Indonesia for political and other reasons is applied geographically to the former Dutch East Indies, comprising of more than 4000 islands, the chief being Java, Sumatra, Celebes (Sulawesi), New Guinea and Borneo (Kalimantan). Indonesia lies between 95 and 141 degrees east longitude and spreads

from the equator upto 6 degrees north and 11 degrees south latitude. The distance from north to south is 1300 miles and from east to west 3300 miles with a land area of 755,000 square miles. 1

Lying in such a way that the equator forms her axis, Indonesia should be a region of perpetual summer. But the temperature is lowered in most parts by elevations and moderated by oceanic winds; the temperature varies between 66 and 99 degrees Fahrenheit. Humidity is high. All regions experience a fairly heavy rainfall, in Jakarta it is over 80 inches. In Borneo and Sumatra it is 120 to 144 inches. Hot and wet climate, dense tropical vegetation and ever green forest characterise Indonesia. Bird of plumage and monkeys are common.

A range of mountains running downward from the Andaman and Nicobar islands traverses Sumatra, Java and the islands to the east. In Borneo, Celebes and the largest of Moluccas ranges diverge from the centre. In Borneo they are separated by plains. In Celebes and the Moluccas they constitute the backbone of the peninsulas. Indonesia streaked by rivers but very few are navigable. Indonesia is one of the most volcanic areas in the world. From the north-eastern part of Sumatra through Java and the Sunda islands and then upward through the Moluccas towards the Phillipines, the volcanoes succeed each other in an interrupted line.

The Indonesians as a race are descendants of the Malayas and the aboriginals. The Malayas were one of the great seafaring races of the world and in their wondering they reached the Pacific coast of America, the south of Africa, Siam, Indo-China, Ceylon, Maldives islands and the coast of south-east Africa facing Madagascar.

Their traces are still to be found in these regions. They conquered and colonised the island world in the Pacific and the Indian oceans. They intermarried with the aborigines of Melanesia and Polynesia.

Some well-known ethnologists such as Kern, Von Heine Geldern and Von Richstedt, have grouped the Indonesians into the Mongolian race. This is more recognisable among the Indonesian dwelling along the shores. They are marked chiefly by a yellowish tinge, round head, straight hair and narrow eyes. In the interior of the islands the people are marked more by a brown skin, long head and wavy hair.1

Pre-Historic Indonesia

Discoveries in Java since 1890 by Dr. Eugene Dubeis and others of primitive skeleton remains—Pithecanthropus erectus, Homo Wadjakenis, etc. of Pleistocene date about 400,000 years ago, suggest that members of human and pre-human stocks reached first this part of the world, perhaps even before implements were invented. Koningswal discovered yet another species older than that of Pithecanthropus erectus, that is, about 500,000 years back. The 11 skulls and 2 tibiae of a people known as Homo Soleensis discovered in Ngadang in east Java bear Neanderthalman’s characteristic. According to the anthropologists, this species must have existed nearly 40,000 years ago.2

With regard to the aborigines of Indonesia, the Brothers, P. and F. Sarasins advance a theory that the original population of Indonesia belonged to a race of dark skin and small stature whose descendants are called the Veda people after the well-known Veda tribes of Ceylon who belong to the same group. It has been also asserted

that the brown race of Indonesia has been recognised from early
time as a distinct type of mankind. The Malayan race has been
considered as aborigines of Jambi and Palembang in Sumatra.

Von Heine Geldern, one of the founders of the Indonesian
pre-history and a famous American pre-historian, has pointed out
that the scattering area of the square axe culture, called the
implements they brought from their ancestor's homeland, are exactly
co-extensive with these of the Indonesian languages and so the widely
acceptable theory that neolithic people who brought the square axe
culture were also at the time of the propagators of the Indonesian
languages, hence the ancestors of the Indonesian people. 1

Prof. Kern, the founder of the Indonesian philosophy, has
specifically described that the ancestors' homeland was situated on
sea-shore, that is, Champa and Comboja and adjoining regions along
the sea and they were seafaring. This square axe culture, according
to Von Heine Geldern conclusion, came somewhere from the region, where
the great rivers of east and south Asia have their course. This is
identical with culture whose ancestor's country was in Toking, an area
which come within adjoining region along the sea.

The square axe culture marches southward branching off further
to the Indian peninsula and to the Indonesian archipelago respectively
through the Malaya peninsula, taking with it the Indonesian language
and culture and northwards to the southern islands of Japan where it
mingled itself with the aborigines.

Both philological and pre-historical evidences showed that the
Indonesian migration into Indonesia in two distant waves took place
during Neolithic age and bronze age respectively.

1. In the neolithic age, about 3000 B.C., people who spoke
the language of aborigine of the present Indonesian language came

somewhere from the neighbourhood of Yunan (South Indo-China) and scattered themselves across the Indian peninsula in the south on the one hand, especially along the eastern coast, where they piled themselves to navigation and later on proceeded to Indonesia and to Indonesia on the other hand via Malay peninsula. However, they did not go further than the eastern Moluccas.

They have already reached a level of high civilisation and highly developed ceremonial system. They used beautiful stone implements and stone axes. They were good carpenters and lived in wooden houses richly decorated and ornamented. They knew the arts of pottery and weaving. The late Prof. Kern's researches revealed that the principal means of existence of the Indonesians at that early stage was agriculture of a type of highly developed including the cultivation of rice and sawahs (irrigated fields) and ladangs (dry fields). They certainly knew the science of navigation.

2. The second wave of migration which took place round about 300-200 B.C., traversed the same route and penetrated further east as far as New Guinea and spread Indonesian culture there, thus making New Guinea and northern Halmahera affixed with other isles. They possessed a culture and civilisation and practised a more highly developed navigation. Belonging to the bronze age as they were, they used metals such as iron, bronze, copper and gold.

The two cultures namely the neolithic and bronze cultures, gave rise to the Indonesian civilisation that existed before the coming of the Hindu civilisation to Indonesia.1

Sri Vijaya Empire

In the first and second century of the Christian era, the

1. Ubani: Indonesia, Merdeka, issued by I.S.I., New Delhi February, 1948, p.5
Buddhist missionaries from India came to Indonesia to spread their religion and culture. Fah Hein, the Chinese pilgrim who visited Java in 414, found almost all the population of the islands to be either Brahmins or heathens. Buddhism was first preached in Indonesia by Gunavarman of Kashmir shortly after 420. His missionary activities were concentrated in Sumatra, though he visited Java too.

Aji, a prince from India, came to Indonesia and taught the people of Java to write as also the rudiments of astronomy, and chronology and brought them civilization.

Gunavarman converted many princes to Buddhism. About the fifth or sixth century, Buddhism became the predominant religion of Sumatra. After extensive work by Sumatran missionaries most of Hindu Indonesia was ultimately converted to Buddhism. The Indonesians blended the new religion and civilisation with their own and there sprang up a new civilisation of the Sri Vijaya Empire. The capital was the large city of Sri Vijaya, the present city of Palembang in south Sumatra. It was a Malayan Buddhist kingdom which used the old Malay language.

Side by side with Sri Vijaya kingdom, there was the Malay kingdom of Jambi, which the former conquered. At first the Sri Vijaya kingdom was confined mainly to Sumatra. Later on in the eleventh century it ruled over the western half of Java, Malaya, Borneo (Kalimantan), Sulawesi, the Philippines, parts of Indo-China and Cambodia, Formosa, parts of India facing Ceylon and probably the territory on the southeast coast of India including Megapatam. Commerce and trade and shipbuilding were the chief occupation of the Sri Vijaya Empire. Hence the empire was essentially a seapower based on trade. For another three centuries the empire continued to control trade and commerce of Malaysia it was ultimately overthrown by Majapahit Empire in 1377, A.D.

2. Ubani, op. cit. p.7
The Sri Vijaya Empire was renowned as a centre of culture and learning where pilgrims from China, on their way to India, used to stop. They stayed there for several years, collecting Buddhist manuscripts, studying Buddhist Philosophy, acquiring Buddhist knowledge. One of the 7 famous priests of the Sri Vijaya was Shakakritri who had written a book known as Hastadan which was translated by I-Tsing into Chinese. The Buddhist priests in Sri Vijaya numbered more than 1000 and they studied Buddhism.

The kingdom of Sri Vijaya was known to India. It had close relations with the Pala King of Bengal. One of the Sailendra kings had a guru (perceptor) from the Gauda country (Bengal). It has been discovered that the revenues of some villages in Bihar were devoted to the support and upkeep of a Sri Vijaya monasteries as the famous Buddhist university of Nalanda and Nagapattinam. It also maintained friendly relations with the Great Cholas of south India. But later the Cholas fell out and attacked it and destroyed much of its powers. Dharmapala, a famous Prof. of Nalanda, visited Indonesia in the 7th century A.D. The famous monk and scholar, Atisa Dipankara, the head of Vikramasila university, went also to Indonesia in the 11th century in order to study Buddhism under the guidance of Candrakiti, a high priest. Indian migrants came to Indonesia probably at the beginning of the Pallava ascendancy in south India. The port of embarkation was Tramlalipi-Tamuluk in the Midnapore district in Bengal. To this port flocked intending emigrants from Bengal, Bihar, south India and Gujarat.

2. Dr. Balkrishna Gokhale: Cultural ties between India and Indonesia Sunday News of India, June 11, 1950 Delhi, p. 3
Maipahit empire

Unlike Sumatra, in Java both Shiva and Vishnu were worshipped. Both Buddhism and Shivaism existed side by side for a while. The oldest temples situated on the Dieng Plateau in central Java and groups of temples of Prambanan were solely dedicated to Shiva. The language of the ruling class of Majapahit was Sanskrit.

At the middle of the 7th century, there were either 2 or three kingdoms. One of the states was the kingdom of Taruman in West Java, under the reign of King Purnavarman, probably from south India. In central Java there was another kingdom of Kaling, whose religion was Buddhist Hina Yana. It was a Hindu state ruled by Sanyaya of Kalinga in south India.

It was also a commercial state and it depended for its prosperity on trade. Thus there was rivalry between the Sri Vijaya and Majapahit Empires and developed into bitter enmity. According to Javanese legend, the prince Sanayaya was a great conqueror, subjecting Bali, Sumatra, Cambodia, India and China.

Then a new stream of immigration flowed into Indonesia and a new dynasty known as Shailendra arrived from Kalinga in south India. The rulers of this dynasty were lovers of art, as these of Sri Vijaya were of the sea. The dynasty succeeded in building a considerable number of stone temples such as Sari, Sevu, etc. and the greatest of all monuments of Shailendra (760-860) was the Chandi Borobudur situated near the city of Jogjakarta.

First Mataram kingdom came into existence only to be substituted by the Kadiri state (925-1222). With fall of Kadiri rose Singasari

1. Visckke: p.19
2. Sanusi Pane: Sedjarah Indonesia, Djilid 1, Bab.4, Jacarta,1952
state, the last ruler of which, King Kartanegara, was the father of the crown prince Vijayaya, was about 1293, laid down the foundation of the Majapahit kingdom (1294). The Chinese troops of 20,000 men under the common of Caiasar Khubalai Khan went to Indonesia to punish the King Kettanegara and embarked at the port of Tuba in Java, ultimately the Majapahit forces were defeated and a treaty concluded. 1

Under the powerful and excellent leadership of premier Gaja Mada the empire grew rapidly at the expense of the neighbouring states. Gaja Mada became premier in 1332 and retained his office till his death in 1334. The empire grew so power that it defeated once the most powerful sri Vijaya in 1377. Ultimately the entire Indonesian islands fell into the might hands of Majapahit empire and for the first time Indonesia was united under one Indonesian government. It established good relations with the neighbouring countries and its sovereignty was recognised in Siam, Champa, Camboja, Annam, etc. The traders and priests of these countries came very often to Java and some merchants of Karnatak in south India and of Cauda in Bengal.

The government of this empire was highly centralised and efficient. The system of taxation, customs, tolls, internal revenues was excellent. Among the separate departments of government, there were a colonial department, a department of commerce, department of public welfare and public health, a department of interior and a war department. There was a supreme court consisting of 2 presiding officers and 7 judges.

Majapahit was a trading empire, having a big naval establishment and a mighty armada. The export and import were carried on chiefly with India, China and its colonies. The state of

1. Ibid: Bab 9, p.87
Majapahit lasted for about 200 years but the greatest period of the empire was from 1355 to 1380. 1

The capital of Majapahit was a fine and prosperous one with a mighty Shiva temple in the centre. There were many splendid buildings. There were several other great cities, and many ports in Java. There were over 500 temples. Most of these temples were built between 550 and 950 A.D. Indeed the whole Hindu and Buddhist Malaysia specialised in fine buildings. The Malaysians might have brought large number of builders and masters craftsmen from India and other neighbouring countries to help them to build these mighty temples.

This imperialist state did not long survive its old enemies, Sri Vijaya. There was civil war and trouble with China which resulted in a great Chinese fleet coming to Java. The colonies gradually dropped off. In 1426 there was famine and foreign trade was unfavourable and two years later Majapahit ceased to be an empire. It carried on however as an independent state for another 40 years. Ultimately it gave way to the ever growing force of Islam in 1478. 2

**Islamic Kingdom**

The down-fall of the Majapahit empire certainly led to the introduction of Islam to Indonesia. From the second century B.C. Arabs had been developing trade relations with Asiatic countries such as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, etc. Chinese annals (674 A.D.) give an account of an Arab chief and of Arab settlement on the west coast of Sumatra. But the first chronical date of coming of Islam to

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1. Ubani: Indonesia, Merdeka, I.S.I., New Delhi December 25, 1948 p.8
2. Dr. H. De Graaf: The story of Indonesia, Bandung, 1952, p.75
Indonesia was the year 1111 when some Achinese of the north-west of Sumatra embraced Islam on the hand of Arabs named Abdullah Arif. Burhanuddin, one of his disciples, later on carried on Islam down the west coast as far as Pariaman in Minangkabau. By the 13th century, the kingdom Minangkabau became virtually a Muslim state. The first Muslim state was set up in Achin in 1205 A.D. and Jahn Shah was its first ruler. 1

Besides the Arat merchants, the Indian merchants, the Indian merchants especially the Gujarat (Camboyand) merchants, also took part in the Islamic missionary work. Missionaries, say Arnold, must have also however have come to the Malay archipelago (Indonesia) from the south India, judging from certain popularities of Muslim theology adopted by the islanders. Most of the Muslims of the archipelago belong to the Shafiyah sect which is at the present day predominant on the Koomondel and Malabar coasts, as was the case also about the middle of the 14th century, when Ibnu Batutah visited these parts (1345). So when we consider that the Muslims of the neighbouring countries belong to the Hanafiyyah sect, we can only explain the prevalence of the Shafiyah teaching by assuming that it had been brought thither from Malabar coast, the parts of which were frequented by merchants from Java. From Ibnu Batutah, we learn that the Muslim sultan of Sumatra in Sumatra had entered into friendly relations with the court of Delhi. But long before this, the merchants from Deccan, had established themselves in large number in the trading parts of these islands where they sowed the seed of new religion.2

1. Dada Neuwax: Atjeh Seribu tahun den peristiwa Teungku Daud Beureueh, Cs, pp.11-14
2. Ubani and Co : op. cit. p.7
Marco Polo, who visited the north of Sumatra in 1292, found Muslims in the kingdom of Perlak, Achin. A Chinese traveller on his way to Sumatra in 1413, met a population of 1000 Muslim families in Lambiri and the people and the king of Aru kingdom were also Muslims.

The spread of Islam in Palembang and Lampung became very rapid at the end of 15th century. Missionary work in both places was carried on by Hadan Rahma from Java and Minakhamala Bumi, chieftain from Lampung.

At the end of the 12th century, prince Raja Prana, a ruler of state in western Java, introduced Islam into the island. He went to India as a merchant and returned home a Muslim missionary. A missionary movement headed by an Arab named Maulana Malik Ibrahim along with Sunan Giri, started missionary work in Grisik in east Java, in the half of the 14th century. Many missionaries were instituted from Grisik. Thousands and thousands of Javanese embraced Islam and Muslim states were set up. 1

Arab, Sumatran and Javanese merchants spread Islam among the inhabitants of Moluccas islands. But the real progress they made in their mission was in the 15th century. A heathen king of Tidor embraced Islam along with his people. The king of Ternate went to Grisik in 1495 in order to embrace Islam. These two kings, assisted by other missionaries, made tireless efforts in converting their people to Islam.

In Kalimantan Islam was mostly confined to the coastal areas. In 1521, the Spaniards found a Muslim state at Brunei. In 1521,

1. Sanusi Pane: op. cit. p.172
the Spaniards found a Muslim state at Brunei. By this time, the king of Bandjarmasin and his people had been converted to Islam. The state of Sukadana in Borneo had in 1590 a first Muslim ruler.

In Sulawesi the Maccasar and Bugis adopted Islam in 1603, while Alfoers remained heathens in the 16th century. At the beginning of the 17th century, the princes such as Sultan Hassanauddin and the population Sulawesi (Celebes) embraced Islam in large number and the sultanate of Maccasar become afterwards a very powerful state. Similarly all the other small islands of Indonesia such as Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, Roti, etc. were overwhelmed by the dynamic force of Islamic teachings. Today 95% the Indonesians are Muslims and the rest remain Hindus, Christians and heathens.

In the 16th and 17th century, Indonesia was remarked by the growth of Muslim sultanates and their resistance against the advance of European nations, e.g. Portuguese, the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch and the British. 1

Round about 1511 there were 3 Muslim states in north eastern Java. The most important was the sultanate of Demak, which controlled the north-eastern parts from Djapara to Grisik in east Java. It controlled the shipping lines from Grisik to Malacca. Its influence extended to west Java and Palembang in southern Sumatra.

Long before 1522, Bantam had become a Muslim state and subsequently became a strong Muslim state on western coast of Java. In 1527 the part of Sunda Kalapa (Jacarta) was conquered by Bantam. Abdul Fateh Arung (1651-1685) was the greatest of its ruler.

1. Ubani, O.K. and Muin: op.cit. p.8
In Sumatra there was the sultanate of Achin. This state controlled a large part of the eastern and north-western coast of Sumatra. Before the middle of the 15th century it had conquered the well-known kingdom of Minangkabau.

The ruler of Deli (Medan) and Indragiri, on the south coast of Sumatra, and the districts of Kedah and Pahang on the Malay peninsula recognised the overlordship of Achin. In 1615, the Achinese troops attacked Johore and occupied its capital. After that, Iskandar Kuda, who ruled Achin (1607-1636), controlled the whole north-western part of the Malay archipelago. The pepper trade of Sumatra, tin mines of Kedah and the deposits of Bangka and Belliton were under the control of the Sultanate.

Islam was also the official religion in the Ternate and Tidore states. During the reign of Sultan Babullah, 72 of the islands recognised and sovereignty of Ternate.

The sultanate of Demak had been divided into 4 separate states. One of these was Padjang in central Java. In the middle of the 16th century, the Sultan of Padjang gave a prosperous district of Mataram to one of his noblemen. The son and successor of the first ruler of Muslim Matram was Sultan Vijaya (Sinopati). Later on Sinopati succeeded in extending his authority over all the territory between Tjeribon in the west Java and Balambangan in the east. When the Sinopati died in 1601, only the north-eastern coastal districts, among which Grisik and Surabaya were prominent, had maintained part of their independence.1

After the Sinopati, Sultan Agung (1613-1645) was the greatest of the rulers of Mataram. He was more strictly Muslim than his predecessors and enforced the law of Koran throughout his kingdom. He was a literary man and brave warrior. He also introduced a general tax system. It consisted of exports and duties on rice and other commodities, of a head tax paid by the people selling in the market. These taxes were very moderate. Further, he succeeded in reviving coastal states and the smaller sultanates of the north eastern of Java, were under his control. He died in 1645.

There were also the Sandanese Islamic republic and Macassar Muslim states. When Ternate had surrendered to the Dutch, the king of Macassar became the defender of the faithful in a large part of the Ternate territories. The state had a glorious history in the propagation of Islam and in fighting for defending its freedom and independence against foreign imperialism.

The Coming of the Europeans.

Indonesia's commercial products had attracted much of both oriental and accidental merchants all the world over. The Arabs, Indians, Chinese and Japanese came to Indonesia long before the Europeans for the purpose of trade and commerce.

When Vasco de Gama opened a sea route to the east coast of India via Cape Good Hope, Albuquerque was in 1509 entrusted to establish Portuguese supremacy in Malaca, Malaya. In 1511 he conquered the city and soon after went at Malaca and commercial bases in Indonesian archipelago. Consequently, the flow of goods and spices from Indonesia to Europe made Lisbon a great centre of trade.

Ibid, p. 15
The Portuguese were in the first Europeans who came to Indonesia. They were tremendously inspired by the spirit of crusade in all their activities in Indonesia. They regarded Indonesian Muslims as the moors, whom they had planned to attack wherever they were. Besides carrying on trade, they always tried their best to convert Indonesian Muslims to Christianity. The Portuguese missionaries strove violently to bring Christian doctrines and its moral principles to the inhabitants of Amboina, Malahera and many other islands. 1

This was the foremost reason that caused the Indonesians to offer resistance to the Portuguese. The Indonesian sultanates simultaneously waged wars against them. The sultan of Demak had not only fought the Portuguese in Indonesia but also sent his great fleet to support of the sultan of Malacca. The Sultan of Achin in Sumatra endlessly threatened the Portuguese year after year. Many Muslim traders refused to trade with them. In Ternate they successfully concentrated their propaganda of Christianity. Its king, Sultan Harun, victoriously undermined the Portuguese position in the Moluccas. In 1565 the whole Portuguese mission was rapidly repudiated.

Though Portuguese and had conquered Malacca, yet politically they had no settlement outside it and in the Moluccas. Even Malacca itself had been continuously threatened by the sultan of Achin. Vainly the Portuguese governor of Malacca tried to threaten his opponent by an alliance with other native states. He established connections with the Bataks, the only pagan tribes that remained in Sumatra. But all his efforts were fruitless. Thus the Portuguese prestige faded away gradually. The arrival of Spaniards, the French and the Dutch changed their position from bad to worse.2

1. Ibid, chap. 4 p.10
2. Ibid, p.11
Even today the Portuguese still possess a colonial territory in the Timore island. By the treaty of 1859, ratified in August 18, 1860, the Timor island was divided between Portugal and Holland; by convention of October 1, 1902, ratified in 1908, a boundary arrangement was made between the two governments, certain enclaves being exchanged and the possession of the other territories settled. 

The discovery of America by Columbus led Spain to search for more wealth and power in the east. Fernande Magellan, a Portuguese by birth but a naturalised Spaniard, reach the spice islands, Indonesia, with a small fleet and visited a small island in the Philippines in March 16, 1521. He developed commercial relations with native population of the Indonesian archipelago.

Upto 1647, the Spaniards controlled Minado, Tindore and Sanpi Island and since then they were taken over by the Dutch. This was the perfect liquidation of the Spaniard possession in Indonesia.

At the beginning of 1530 a Frenchmen, Jean Permentier, had organised an expedition to Indonesia. He visited Bantam in Java and other spice islands in the archipelago. He traded with native people. Later on numerous French merchants came to Indonesia for the purpose of commerce.

In 1595, the first Dutch expedition commanded by Cornelis de Houtman, sailed from a port of Holland and reached Bantam in June, 1596. The voyage had lasted 14 months and of the 249 members of the crew, 145 died before they reached Indonesia. Cornelis Van

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2. Fay Cooper: op.cit. p.34
Houtman concluded a treaty with the sultan of Java and visited Sunda Kelapa (Jacarta). But in Kadura and Achin he and his crew were not welcomed because of their improper behaviour and violation of the sovereignty of the native states. He returned to Holland in 1597.

Immediately after the return of Houtman the ship owners of Amsterdam sent a second fleet in 1598, consisting of 8 ships. Again 3 squadrons sailed from Holland in 1599 and 2 more in 1600. In 1601, 4 expeditions left for Indonesia. Jacob Van Neck, the admiral of the second fleet, visited the Moluccas. Here he entered into normal commercial relations with the natives and secured economic privileges from them. Another squadron of the same fleet arrived in Ambon and was welcomed by the sultan of Ternate. 1

In September 1600, a formal treaty of alliance against the portuguese was concluded between Admiral Vander Hafhen and the inhabitants of the island of Amboina. The Dutch promised to construct a fortress on Amboina and to protect the natives in return for a monopoly of spice trade.

In Achin the Dutch were not welcomed because Admiral Van Caerdan, a reckless officer had plundered and sank native trading barks of the coast of Achin and undisciplines of his crew.

The years 1601 and 1602 brought a turn in events. The Viceroy of Goa decided to re-establish Portuguese authority in Indonesia. A fleet of 8 large and small vessels under the command of Furtado de Mendoza left Malacca for Bantam. A Dutch fleet of 5 vessels under the command of Wolfert Hermensz approached Sumatra.
from the west at the same time. They met the 30 Portuguese vessels on Christmas day, on December 27, 1601 in the battle. Ultimately the Portuguese were driven from the roadstead of Bantam. In this kingdom the reputation of the Dutch was now well-established.1

After crushing the patriotic struggle of the Bandanese people the Dutch merchants secured a monopoly of spice trade in the island of Banda. In March, 1602, the United East India Company (vereniging de Oost Indisch Compagnies or V.O.C.) was established and received from the States General of the Netherlands rights of monopoly and sovereignty. The company was given a monopoly of shipping and trade in Asia and the power to perform acts of sovereignty. The company was given a monopoly of shipping and trade in Asia and the power to perform acts of sovereignty in the name of the States General such as making alliances and contracts with princes and potentates of the east. The Dutch republic retained only a right of control. 2

A capital of 6,500,000 guilders was collected and a board of 17 directors was instituted. The new company took over all factories that had been established in Indonesia by its predecessors. Offices were built up in Bantam and Grisik.

In 3 years, 38 well equipped ships were dispatched to Indonesia not only for commerce but also for other purposes. The company was allowed to make war, conclude treaties, possess lands and establish fortresses in the country. The directors ordered Admiral Van Der Hagen to attack Portuguese in Malacca, Amboina, etc. and succeeded in capturing the Portuguese fortress on the island of Tidore.

1. Ibid: pp.75-76
The conquest of the fortress of Amboina gave the East India Company its first territorial possession in Indonesia. In February 1665, Admiral Van Der Harthen concluded a treaty with all the villages of Amboina, who recognised the suzerainty of the states general of the Netherlands. Monopoly of trade was of course included in the treaty. Freedom of religion to all Muslims, Catholics and Protestants was in the treaty but it was never fulfilled.

In 1607, the company's fleet under the command of Jan Pieterszoon Coen left for Indonesia to secure the monopoly on the spice islands. Again in 1610, 8 ships under the first Governor-General, Pieter Both sailed to Indonesia.

Peter Both became G.G. of Indonesia, dealing with the commercial matters and chief director of the company. He was assisted by a council of the Indies, with 5 members. He established his headquarters in Jakarta. He then appointed in 1613, Jan Pieterszoon Coen Chief account and director of commerce in Bantam.1

In 1618, the directors appointed Coen G.G. of Indonesia and the situation was precarious. The people of the Moluccas were grumbling against Dutch claims to monopoly. Pepper prices were going sky high through the competition of Dutch, English, and Chinese buyers. At Japara in east Java the Netherlands trading post was attacked and destroyed by troops of the prince of Mataram. On March 12 1619, Coen succeeded in defeating the Mataram troops and finally the name of Jakarta was changed to Batavia in the same year. On March 4, 1621, the directors of the company confirmed the official name to it. This was the official capital of Indonesia. In 1619 the Dutch company concluded a joint commercial and military alliance

1. Sanusi Pane: op. cit. p.195
with England. In 1626, Coen crushed the people of Banda revolting against the Dutch and secured the nutmeg trade and finally occupied the lands after fierce fighting. 1

When the Dutch tried to convert the pagan tribes of Ceram and Halmahera to the Christianity, the Moluccas Muslims and their king were at war for 50 years with the Dutch. Ultimately the Moluccas people were defeated by Governor Arnold De Vlaming.

When Coen died in September 20, 1626, a new C.G. Jacques Speck was appointed and lived in Jacarta. The Dutch tried to induce all Chinese merchants in Bantam to migrate Jacarta, but this move was strongly opposed, by the Sultan of Bantam, Abdul Fatah Agung (1651-1685). The sultan had welcomed the British and the French traders to his ports. With the help of these Europeans, he equipped his own warships and particularly resisted the Dutch in several places.

The C.G., Van Dienmen extended the Dutch commercial empire and sought to secure for his directors the treasures of all those countries that were still unexplored such as island of north Japan and east of Siberia, Australia and New Zealand. As a result, by the middle of the 17th century, the company spread its wings all over the coast lands of Asia. In 1645, both Sultan Agung and C.G. Van Dienmen died. In 1642, the statutes of Jacarta were published as the code for the Dutch Asiatic territory. During the 17th century, the 3 governors general, Johan Meetsuycker (a lawyer), Hijklof van Coens (Conqueror of Ceylon) and Cornelis Speelman (conqueror of Macassar) continued and completed the work of J.P. Coen in expanding the Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia. 2

1. B.H.M. Vlekke: op.cit p.88
2. Ibid: p.97
Under the rule of the 3 governors general, the people of Moluccas and Sultan of Mataram revolted against the Dutch authorities. The revolt was crushed down in 1678 by G.G. of Jacarta, Hijklof Van Goens. In Bandjarmasin, Borneo, the fighting against the Dutch, Portugese and British was in progress since 1669-1755.

Reforms in the policies of the company were planned by G.C. Baron Van Imhoff. The plan of reform was submitted to the board of directors during the 18th century. Van Imhoff arrived in Indonesia with a plan for administration and commercial reforms. He died in 1750.

From 1680 on, the Netherlands controlled the whole Indonesian archipelago. 70 years later, only 2 of the major islands, Bali and Lombok, remained free from interference by the dominating power. Around 1750, on Sumatra the company maintained regular trade relations with the native sultanates and discovered the two rich tin mines at Bangka and Billiton off Sumatra. In Borneo, the company found a strong Chinese colony in the sultanates of Samboja. After 1755, the E.I.C. was the greatest territorial power in Java. The majority of its 3 million inhabitants were directly governed from Jacarta. In 1855 when the Dutch authority was established, there were more than 30,000 Chinese in the north west Borneo.

Reckless financial administration at home penurids treatment of its servants in the east and the breakdown of the commercial monopoly finally led to the fall of the company. Illicit trade with Arabians and the English was so brisk in the latter part of the 18th century that more linen of foreign than of Dutch origin was sold in Jacarta. The salaries paid to its personnel

1. Ibid: p. 121
were so slight that the company failed to attract able and honest people to its service. This had the effect both of woefully lowering the standards of administration and of inducing the officials to supplement their meager salaries by dishonest practices. Nowhere was smuggling carried on a large scale in the company's own ships. The financial administration was equally bad. Large dividends were regularly paid out whether earned or not. Toward the end of the 18th century, the company collapsed; its charter was nullified in 1798 to take effect January 1, 1800. The Dutch republic took over both its assets and its liabilities or debts of 134,000,000 guilders. 1

Indonesia came under direct government control when French revolutionary ideas were abroad and after the old Dutch republic had given way to the Batavian Republic (1795-1806). Dirk Van Hogendorp had rendered great service in exposing the corruption and abuses of the company and had carried on a campaign for reforms. In 1807 the government instituted a commission of 7 members like Van Hogendorp and Nederburgh, to serve it with advice concerning the basis and the manner in which trade in the country's possessions in Indonesia, should be carried on and these possessions governed in a manner such as would produce the greatest welfare for Indonesia, the highest profits for the commerce of the republic and the greatest advantages of the country's finance. The report of the commission contained nearly all institutions such as forced labour, deliveries in kind, feudalism and monopolies, in certain products. The old idea the colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country was

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.53
The charter of the company drawn up by the commission came into force in 1804.1

Upon the recommendation of his brother Napoleon, the King of Holland, Louis Bonaparte, appointed Daendels as G.G. of Indonesia (1808-1811). Daendels not only did what he to prepare Java for defence against British attack, but also instituted a number of important reforms. The compulsory cultivation of a few products was abandoned. He attempted to remove the evils and abuses from the system of forced cultivation and delivery of products. Forced labour was increased rather than diminished especially that for the construction of public roads and bridges. However, he did put an end to the excessive amount of obligatory personal services of natives for European officials and limited those which might be demanded by the regents. The powers of the native chiefs were reduced and the emoluments of the European officials abolished. The powers of the native states in Bantam, Cheribon, and central Java were also sharply pruned. The administration of Daendels, says de Kat Angelino, effected a transformation, with roughness, of a commercial and loose organisation into a centralised state authority supported by a disciplined Dutch and Javanese administrative body. Otherwise it dovetailed into the era of the company in a way which one would not suspect.2

1. A. Vendenbosch: op. cit. pp. 53-54
2. De Kat Angelino: Colonial policy, Vol. 11, p. 26
Daendels divided the province of Cheribon into 5 prefectures and 38 regencies. All officials received military rank and a suitable salary. He undertook a reorganisation of the judiciary. He decided to give every regency and above the regencies, every prefecture, its own court of justice, composed of Indonesians with 2 European members in the courts of prefecture. These courts would judge in all cases in which natives of Java alone were involved. All cases concerning foreigners - Europeans, Chinese, Arabsians or Indonesians not natives of Java were to be handled by councils of justice, established at Jacarta, Semarang and Surabaya. The first group would render justice according to Javanese customs, the second according to the existing Dutch Indonesian statutes. The system of segregation of the national groups in matters of justice had been maintained and improved by later administration. In 1810, Daendels was recalled and replaced by Jan Willen Jansens.1

After the English conquest in August 3, 1811-1816, the former Dutch possessions in the east were placed under the chief direction of the C.G. of India, then Lord Minto, while Java and its dependencies were placed under Baffles as Lieutenant Governor. Baffles abolished the system of contingents and compulsory deliveries in kind throughout nearly all of Java. He introduced a system of taxation on Land. He proceeded from the eastern portion that all land belong to the ruler and that the occupiers or tenants of the sovereign owner, had to pay land rent. This rent he fixed at 2/5 at the harvest, which share could be paid either in money or products.

1. H.A.M.Vlekke: op.cit. p.134
2. De Kat Angelinc: op.cit.p.29
Raffles felt a strong aversion to anything which savored of feudalism and he made strenuous efforts to remove it from the governmental system. The powers of the semi-feudal regents were diminished and the contact between the European officials and the native population pushed lower down. The European administrative structure was made to rest directly upon the villages, which Raffles considered the only living indigenous units. He systematised the police system and made important reforms in the judicial organisation. He abolished the sultanates of Cheribon and Bantam and placed the territory under direct government. The native states of Jogjakarta and Surakarta saw their territory diminished and their powers further restricted.1

In 1815 Raffles was recalled and John Feudal was appointed his successor by the board of directors of the British East India Company in London. According to the treaty of London of August 13, 1814, the British promised to restore all the former Dutch colonies to the Netherlands. On August 1, 1816, the actual transfer of power took place at Jacarta. The government of new kingdom of the Netherlands sent three Commissioners General, Elaut, Van Der Capellen and Buyskes, to take over the possessions from England, to reorganise the administrative system and to draw up a new organic law. This work was completed by the end of 1818, when the government was turned over to the new C.C., Van der Capellen, assisted by the Council of the Indies.

Outside of Java, Madura and the Moluccas, Dutch control was only nominal. And even in Java the Dutch administration was limited, as much as Java was still under native rule and other

1. Ibid : p.33
sections, such as Madura had not yet been deeply penetrated by Dutch administration. In 1819, the Dutch were in effective occupation of only a few small areas in the outer territories: Padang and Palembang in Sumatra, Pontianak, Sembas, and Bandjarmasin in Borneo, Maccasar in south and the Minahasa in north Celebes, the old centre of the company activity. For a large part of the 19th century Dutch policy was dominated by intense exploitation of Java and absolute abstention in the outer territories, with the exception of Sumatra. The Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia was very largely the work of the beginning of the 20th century.

The Commissioners General (1818-1819) had encouraged the opening of Indonesia to European planters and industry and the prospects of industrial progress on the new lines seemed bright. But G.C., Van Der Capellen, failed to follow the liberal policy laid down by the commissioners and his reactionary policy of suppressing western enterprise was largely responsible for the return to old methods which shortly took place. In 1825 the king sent De Bus Chisignies as commissioner general with a mandate to institute economies and to investigate a new the questions of the advantages of the two systems, namely forced or free cultures. His report of May 1, 1827 recommended the development of the country by calling in private initiative and capital.

Haffles then became a Governor of Bengkulan in south Sumatra. He bought the islands of Singapore from the sultan of Johore and the British flag was hoisted there on January 29, 1819. According to the second treaty of London of 1824, the British

1. Colijn en Stibbe, Neerlands Indies, 11, p.1; and Kieltra en Krom, Neerlands 1, p.349
pepper, and cinnamon, and led to the introduction of tea and cinchona.1

In 1877, the Netherlands government had gained numerous profits of the culture system, amounting to about 832,000,000 florins. Of this sum 236,000,000 florins were used to reduce the Netherlands public debt, 153,000,000 florins for the construction of railways in the Netherlands, 115,000,000 florins for tax reduction, 146,000,000 florins for fortifications and other purposes. 1

Movement for reform began after 1848. Famine in two sections in Java caused the government institute reform on its own initiative. At this time the native social and economic position and organisation deteriorated. The king had been in supreme control of colonial policy and hence colonial questions were seldom discussed in Parliament. News and reports from Indonesia were strongly coloured by a strict Government censorship. The constitution revision of 1848 gave the states general some control of colonial affairs and required that the colonial act should in the future be drafted by the legislature. In the deliberations leading up to the passage of the East Indies Government Act of 1854, a small but powerful minority in the second chamber pressed for the abandonment of the policy of exploitation. This minority was led by Dr. W.H. Baron Van Hoevell and E.D. Dekker. A parliamentary resolution of 1868 on a colonial question at last definitely settled the responsibility of the ministers to parliament and not to the king. In 1864 the E.I.

1. Day: op.cit pp.249-250; and Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.58
2. Hasselman in Collijn en Gibbe: op.cit. 11, p.25
Auditing Act was passed and after 1867 the Indonesian budget came under the annual scrutiny of parliament and with it the whole Indonesian administration. With the agrarian law of 1870 the fight against the forced culture system was won. Government cultivation of product other than sugar and coffee had already been abandoned, before 1870. The abandonment of the sugar culture was decided upon in principles in 1870 and completely effected by 1890. The compulsory cultivation of coffee remained until 1915. The steady decline in the yield of the coffee culture finally led to its abolition in 1915 and with it the last vestige of the culture system.

The shift toward a more liberal policy began in 1851, with the appointment of Dumaer Van Twist as C.C. He was the first C.C. of liberal tendencies since De Bus De Ghisingnies. Toward the end of his administration the policy of leasing wild lands to Europeans began. The deliberation and the vote on the constitutional act of 1845 had revealed the presence of a fighting liberal minority. Besides Van Hoevell this group included Thorbecke (the leader of the liberal party), and Groen Van Prinsterer (the leader of the Christian party). So Indonesia in 1877 was open to private enterprise.

Numerous reforms of minor character were made during these years. A beginning was made in 1882 with the gradual reduction and transformation of the tax in labour into a money tax. The tax system was reorganised. An average of 6,500,000 florins was spent annually on the development of rail-roads throughout this period. Though the war with Achin was consuming millions, expenditures for education

were considerably increased and important irrigation projects undertaken.

The Ethical policy was generally dated from 1901 with the advent to power of the Kuyper ministry, representing a coalition of Christian parties. The founder of the Antt-revolutionaire party, Groen Van Prinsterer who was succeeded by Kuyper, had long denounced the policy of exploitation and had pleaded for a policy of moral obligation and preparation for self-government. The rise of the socialist party in the nineties and the work of leading liberals such as Van Der Lith, Vankol and Van Deventer had helped to prepare the way for a new emphasis upon the welfare of the colonies.

In the speech from throne in 1901 there occurred the following significance: As a Christian power the Netherlands is obliged in the Indonesian archipelago to regulate better the legal position of native Christians, to lend support on a firm basis to Christian missions and to imbue the whole conduct of government with the consciousness that the Netherlands has a moral duty to fulfill with respect to the people of these regions. In connection with this the diminished welfare of the population of Java merits special attention I desire to institute an investigation into the cause of this.

Because of the scarcity of food in the residency of Semarang in 1899 and 1900, the welfare investigation commission was appointed in 1902 to survey the spot. In March 18, 1905, the Netherlands government granted a sum of 40,000,000 florins to Indonesia for the improvement of economic conditions in Java and Madura. A second contribution of 25,000,000 florins was made in 1946 as compensation to Indonesia for the sacrifice involved in reserving

1. Ibid, p.64
part of its market for the Netherlands during the depression.1

The turn of the country also saw a change in the policy with respect to the outer islands. The abstention or non-penetratio-
tion policy was abandoned. Several factors influenced this change of policy. The East coast of Sumatra had become the centre of a prosperous European agricultural industry and the planters were demanding a more effective administration. Fear of foreign
intervention also prevailed at this time. The Dutch government and public opinion had become uneasy over the fierce outbreak of economic imperialism in the Far East. Finally the ethical policy itself brought a natural intensification of administration throughout the islands. Between 1900 and 1912 Dutch authority was effectively established over most of the outer territories. Several native states either because of continued resistance to Dutch authority or because of mal-administration, were incorporated with the directly governed territory. General Van Heutsz, who successfully prosecuted the war against Achin, continued and virtually completed the task of pacification of the outer territories as C.C. from 1904 to 1909. By the decentralisation law of 1903, a first step was taken in un-
burdening the central government of some of the overwhelming tasks which the extension and intensification of administration was heaping upon it. The same law provided also for a slight measure of democratisation. In 1922 the Indonesian government was given the juridical personality and the finances of the mother country and the dependency were sharply separated. Education was rapidly extended and measures for the promotion of the economic developments,

1. Ibid, p. 65
of the Indonesians introduced. The services of experts in Muslim and Indonesian social institutions like C. B. Hurgronje, Prof. Van Vollehaven, etc. were utilised by the government. Indonesian policy constituted a leading issue in the election campaign of 1913 between the left and right groups in the Netherlands. As a result, the left won the election. In 1915, G. C., Graff Van Limburg Stirum, opened the volksraad in Jakarta. In 1922, a revision of the colonial articles in the Netherlands constitution took place and in 1925 followed the revision of the East Indies government Act, providing greater independence for the Indonesian government and greater native participation in the government.1

In 1910 peace ruled everywhere and the administration of the Dutch had become highly efficient. Economically, the country had developed amazingly. On the advice of Prof. C. Hurgronje, the government introduced the western civilisation to the Indonesians. There were two native teacher's colleges in 1866 and 1867. A reform in the Indonesian school system was made by the government which spent over 60,000,000 guilders for the establishment of schools all over Java and Madura. The G. C., Heutsz, instituted village schools where elementary instruction was provided for the children in their mother tongue. In 1903, there were not more than 1,700 schools with 190,000 pupils in Indonesia.2

The population of Indonesia had been rapidly increasing for the last many years. It increased from 49,350,834 in 1920 to 60,371,025 in 1930. Java and Madura had a population of 4,499,250 (1815), 9,374,020 (1845), 11,858,700 (1853), 19,540,813 (1880), 23,609,312 (1890), 28,386,121 (1900), 29,924,558 (1905), 34,433,476 (1920) and 41,719,524 (1930). The population of other islands was:

1. Ibid: pp. 68-69
2. Vlekke: op. cit. p. 177
Sumatra, 8238,570; Borneo, 2,194,533; Celebes, 4,226,586; Bali, 1,101,000; Lombok, 701,117; Timor and the adjoining islands, 1,656,636; and the Moluccas and New Guinea, 893,030. In addition to the native population, there were also 36,000 Europeans in 1870; 36,467 (1872); 43,738 (1882); 58,806 (1892) and 242,372 (1930); 809,000 (1920) and 1,234,000 Chinese (1930); and 114,000 other foreign Asiatics (71 Arabians and 30,000 Indians). 1

The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism.

Politics in Indonesia was initiated by certain groups of Europeans who expressed their thoughts and ideas in the press. The political consciousness among the educated Indonesian began to grow. This consciousness came through books, they read, and partly through reading statements issued and resolutions passed by the European associations, unions, and clubs. In this way and through the help of and contact with some humanitarian Europeans and national leaders of other countries, political ideas spread more and more.

Moreover, the government's law of 1854 did not allow the holding of meetings and the formation of any political movement. But in 1903, the government effected a great change in the law. The law of 1902 dealt with centralization of the Indonesian administration. It provided for the establishment of local and municipal councils with limited powers. The right of entering politics was given to the people, but only for the specific purpose of advancing the people, but to the various councils established by the government. This change benefited not only civil servants but also Indonesian political movements. The year of 1903 was a year of great significance.

1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. pp. 5-15
to the Indonesian political progress.

On the initiative of the medical college students in Jacarta, an Indonesian association called Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour) was formed on May 20, 1908, under chairmanship of Mr. Sutomo. It had established many branches all over Java with 10,000 members. It held first congress in October 5-8, 1908 at Mataram. In 1909 H.M. Titidisuroyo founded the Muslim Chamber of Commerce (S.D.I.) at Jacarta. Another Serikat dagang Islam came into existence in Solo under the presidency of H. Samanhudi, a batik merchant. The S.D.I. was changed to Serikat Islam by H.M. Umar Said Tjokromminoto in 1912. The Insulande party (1907), and the Indies part (December 25, 1912), were also organised by Dr. E.F. Dauwes Dekker at Bandung. 1

Furthermore, there were too yough organisations such as Tritoro Darmo (March 7, 1915), led by R.S.W. Kardama at Jacarta, Young Java, Young Ambon, league of Young Sumatra, Indonesia association, Sekar rukun, etc. The Indonesian trade union was also organised in 1905. The Mohammadiah Movement came into being in November 12, 1912, under the chairmanship of K.H. Dahlan. The first Indonesian women movement was inspired by noble idea of Kohana Kudus (December 20, 1870) and Mrs. Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879-1904). Dewi Sartika was set up in west Java, Puteri merdeka (free women) followed suit at Jacarta in 1912. There were still other women organisations such as the Madju kemulian, the hati sutji, the keutamaan isteri in Java the keutamaan isteri Minangkabau (1915) at Padang Pandjans and the Keradjian Amai setia at Kota Gedang in central Sumatra. The Wilhelmina association was also founded by military men in September 1, 1908 at Magelang. In 1909, Dr. Tehupetoryin organised the Ambonese

1. A. Mandenbosch: op.cit pp.317-319; and Vlekke: op.cit. pp.182-184
study funds. Many other organisations like the Ambon bond (1911), the Mena Muria association (1913) at Semarang and Moluku society came into existence. The Rukun Minahasa was formed in 1912 at Semarang under the presidency of J.H. Pangeman.1

1 A.K. Pringgodigdo: Sedjarah pergerakan rakyat Indonesia, Jacarta 1950, p.50; and Lukisan revolusi Indonesia, Jacarta, 1953, p.26
The Indonesian national movement is of recent history. It started during the Queen Wilhelmina's rule in 1898-1947. Before this period, there were here and there clubs and small associations generally consisted of family members and friends. They were not politically organised bodies as at present. They were essentially social in character. There had been of course defensive fights and battles waged by local chiefs and sultans such as Diponegoro, Tenku Umar, Imam Bonjol, etc. against the Portuguese, the Dutch and British. But they could not be taken a democratically organised national movement. The first organised political movement may be said to have been started in the first decade of this century. There are many factors responsible for the development of Indonesian nationalism and consciousness as well as political structure of the country.

1. The degree of religious homogeneity in Indonesia was a significant fact for the growth of national movement. Islam embraced by 95 2 out of 85 millions of the Indonesian population was not only a common bond but also a sort of in-group symbol against imperialistic foreign aggressors and oppressors of different religions, although there are also two million Chinese Buddhists, 2 million Christians, 1 million Hindus especially in the island of Bali and the rest are animists.1

Religious liberty was much granted to western domination.

1. Indonesia, May, 1956, issued by Information service Indonesia, New Delhi.
The protestants counted in 1934, 30 ministers, 34 preachers and assistant preachers and 337 native preachers paid by the government and in addition 867 native assistants not paid out of public funds; the Roman Catholic 37 priests and 14 native preachers paid by the government, 397 priests and 9 native preachers not salaried out of the public funds. During 1935, 34 societies were allowed to practise their missionary work. On the other hand, the government did not encourage or allow the Muslim societies or organisations to propagate much freely the principles of Islam, despite of the fact that the Muslim constituted 25% of the population.

Thus Wertheim states: One can indeed sustain the paradox, the extension of Islam in Indonesian archipelago was due to the westerners. The arrival of Portuguese power in the area, he says, indeed large number of Indonesian princes to embrace the Islamic faith as a political move to counter Christian penetration. 1

2. As the Islam is the chief religion of the Indonesian population, so the Islamic modernist movement and its teaching in Cairo found an excellent response in Indonesia. The Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia was afraid of the Pan Islamic ideas which the Indonetsian scholars such as Imam Bondjol, H.Djalaluddin Taib, Wuchter Lutfi, H.K.Amarullah, etc. at Mecca and Cairo brought back with them and introduced the modern Islamic conception taught by Mohd Abduh and Djalaluddin Afganiastan in Cairo.

Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch orientalist, chief adviser to the colonial regime, observed in 1911, that Indonesians then studying in the International Mohammedan miliu of Mecca were observing Pan Islamic ideas which can make their disposition towards

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the European administration of their fatherland of unfavourable.
Happily, he continued, by giving the Indonesian population, at
least its elite, a western education, it would be turned away from
the Islam toward cultural association with the Dutch, and this
would remove all political and social significance from the
difference of religion. If these associations were not made, he held
the inevitable impulse of the civilisation of the Indonesians,
would be to move further and further away from us, for then other
than we will control the direction of their intellectual evolution.
While providing the Indonesians with western education, the government
was to control Muhammadan education, watching against all pan
Islamic propaganda and be completely intransigent against admission
of all political elements of Mohammedan doctrine and law.1

Despite the efforts of the Dutch to extinguish the Islamic
modernism, political elements of Mohammedan teaching, the modernist
political and social ideas were found in the first powerful
Indonesian nationalist movement, the Perikat Islam (c.l.). It was
a nationalistic movement, anti-imperialists and socialist too,
rather than the ideas of pan Islam.

3. The Asiatic political conceptions were not less
important than the western political ideas in the growth of
Indonesian nationalism. The struggle of the Filipinos against Spain
and the early American occupation, the success of Kamal Ataturk in
Turkey against western military power, the activity of the congress
party in India led by Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.Nehru, the rising tide
of anti-western, the Chinese nationalism represented by Mr.Sun Yat
Sen in 1912, the industrialisation of Japan and that country's

1. S.Hurgronje: Netherlands en Islam, p.58
victory over Russia in 1905, all combined to quicken the flowing
tide of national movement in Indonesia.

Modernisation of Japan had made a great impression on many
Indonesians. The example of Japan encouraged Indonesian leaders
to seek equality of rights with the European in their country.

By 1911, the imperial government in China was over-thrown
by the revolutionaries headed by Dr. Sun Yat Sen and in 1912 a
republican government was established. The throb of Chinese
political changes was also felt in Indonesia. Due to the effort
of an Indonesian doctor, Sudiro, a political club was formed.

4. A very limited numbers of Indonesian students studying
in the Netherlands in particular and in Europe in general, have
been strongly impressed by the Dutch political ideas, civil
liberties and democratic government there. The Irish and Polish
national movements, those in Finland and in the Baltic states were
also to influence the students. Back in Indonesia, they started new
nationalist movement such as study club, Budi Utomo, P.K.I. and
others.1

The writing of Bukharin, Karl Marx, Hegel, Stalin, and
other political philosophers as well as Gandhi doctrine, concerning
liberalism, imperialism and capitalism, as well as socialism had
vigorously influenced the handful of Indonesian students studying
in continental Europe and in the Asian countries. They, therefore,
advocated both full political freedom and complete economic
independence for Indonesia.2

5. The American revolution of 1778, based on democratieism
and liberalism, the French revolution of 1848 with the slogan of

1. Vlekke: op.cit. pp.178 and 186
2. Kahin: Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia, Chap.2, New York
   1952, p.49
liberty, equality and fraternity and the Russian revolution of 1917 led by Lenin and Stalin, had a profound effort on the Indonesian people. The eyes of Indonesians looked more and more to the example of Soviet Russia as a beacon light for their future.

6. The adoption of Malay in national language was another important factor to the development of national movement. Historically Malay was the state language in the Sri Vijaya (500-1400) and was the medium of instruction in the Sri Vijaya university. It was made up of different regional languages and contained Arabic, Sanskrit, Persian, English, Dutch, French etc.

The extensive use of the Indonesian language as the medium of expression throughout Indonesia was made progressively. Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the founder of Taman Siswa, introduced it first in his school curriculum. He stressed before the colonial educational congress held at the Hague in 1916, the application of the Indonesian as medium of instruction in Indonesia. In 1928, the Indonesian youths at their congress swore to have one country, Indonesia; one nation, the Indonesian; and one national language, the Indonesian language. This widespread use of the Indonesian language in schools, papers, broadcasting and so on was a great contribution to the increasingly progress of Indonesian nationalism and patriotism. In 1925, the Indonesian members of the volksraad demanded the government to recognise Indonesian as an official language of the country. In October 20, 1942, an Indonesian language commission (komisi bahasa Indonesia) headed by Dr. Mohd Hatta, was founded by the Japanese authority to progress the language. And since the proclamation of independence of the republic of Indonesia in August 17, 1945, the Indonesian language was formally declared a state language.

1. Upani, On Indonesian Language, Merdeka, No.17, I.S.I., New Delhi November 12, 1947, p.8
7. The national flag of Indonesia, the Red and white, was also an outstanding element of the ever-increasing growth of patriotic liberation movement in the country. Historically, this flag was first used by Jayakatong, revolting against the kingdom of Singasari in east Java in 1292. It was used by Sultan Agung in 1628, when Java was united under his rule. This flag was chosen by Indonesian nationalists who struggled against the foreign domination and oppression.

The Indonesian association formed in the Netherlands in 1908, introduced the red and white flag with the bull's head to Europe in 1922. It was used as the flag of national party (P.N.I) in 1927.

The hoisting of the red and white flag was prohibited by the Dutch, but it was flown publicly in Jacarta in October, 1928, during the Indonesian youth congress. Hence the red and white came to be used generally by the growing national movement and has thus become the symbol of an independent and sovereign state of the Republic of Indonesia.

8. The Indonesia Karya (Indonesian national anthem) was a unifying factor and arousing spirit of ever-growing nationalism in Indonesia. It was composed by Mr. Supratman in 1927. It was sung for the first time in the youth congress at Jacarta in 1928.

Again in 1933 when political parties led by Sukarno, Hatta and Shahrir, were suppressed and their leaders extermed, the national anthem was entirely prohibited. It was permitted again only after the Dutch were driven away by the Japanese in 1942.

1. Ubani: Indonesian national flag, Merdeka, No.18, N.D. Nov.24,1947 p.9
With the proclamation of the republic of Indonesia in 1945, the Indonesia raya was made an official national anthem of the new state. It thus became a sounding song and full of the warmth and flow of patriotism and revolutionism, calling upon the youth to be ready at any moment to crush the Dutch colonial aggressive war and defend their motherland.

9. The establishment of the Dutch authority in Indonesia welded together people of various tongues and cultures into one political unit and in so doing tended to develop in them a nation consciousness. Thereby the Dutch helped to join the archipelago's many local patriotism together into one all embracing patriotism.

10. The discriminatory policy employed by the Dutch in the political, economic, social and cultural fields between the Netherlanders and Eurasians and indigenous population had undoubtedly nourished Indonesian nationalism and political consciousness of the masses. Many Netherlanders and Eurasians practised the social discrimination toward Indonesians strictly maintained their superiority to them; even the former's education background, manners and ability were, as Colijn remarked, often inferior.

Despite some mitigating circumstances, this apathetic policy and attitude of superiority continued to be important in generating nationalistic feelings as late as 1949. Dr. Van Royen, chairman of the Netherlands delegation in Indonesia in 1949, stated that such discrimination reflects unfavourably on the political situation and is not in accordance with the Netherlands task in the country.

The judicial administration and penal legislation discriminated sharply against Indonesians. The courts to which they

1. Ubanis: The Indonesia Raya, Merdeka, No.17, Nov.12, 1947, N.Delhi pp. 5-6
2. Sim PC, June 10, 1949
had access were of much poorer quality than those provided for the European population and because of the participation of executive officers in them, offered much less protection. whereas legally trained judges sat in the courts for Europeans, Indonesians were forced to rely on courts, half of whose members combined both executive and legal functions, two of the members being active or retired and pensioned members of the Indonesian administrative civil service. Indonesian as opposed to Europeans, could be held in jail under preventive detention, even though no judicial authorisation had been made. 1

Discrimination in the economic sphere was greater and of more widespread importance. Not only the new western education elite in particular, but also educated Indonesians in general, felt strongly that the paucity of jobs and the few good positions open to them in the civil service and private enterprise were a result of employment practices which discriminated against Indonesians. Almost every nationalist felt the bitterness born of this realisation. In 1939, there were 400 Indonesians and 100 Dutch who took the examination for entrance to the government school of civil service. 23 and 3 Indonesians were accepted. This system of discrimination was also practised in other government institutions throughout Indonesia. The entrance to a law school in 1909, a medical college in 1913 and such other schools was made much more difficult to Indonesians than to the Dutch.

Acute dissatisfaction developed because of the lower rate of pay of Indonesian government employees in comparison to the Dutch and Eurasians doing similar work. For instance, in the Indonesian branch of civil service those who had passed the clerkship examination

1. Kahin: op. cit. p.50
started at 25 guilders per month, while Europeans (mostly Eurasian) passing the same examination started at 60 guilders in the European branch. Similarly in the army, Indonesian privates received either 15 or 25 guilders per month, while privates who were Netherlanders or Eurasians received 60 guilders.1

In education, the Indonesians were provided far less facilities than European children. The government's per capita expenditure on education for Indonesian children was 0.55 guilders per year as against 47.86 for European children. While Dutch and Eurasian children were tuition free unless the yearly income of their parents was more than 1,200 guilders. Income tax statistic for 1939 listed 24,059 Indonesians having incomes over 1,200 guilders per year as against 67,229 Europeans. Among Europeans 17,453 had income of less than 1,200 guilders. 2

Giving proper education to Indonesians was politically dangerous to the ruling classes and such education should be curtailed. Thus Colijn in 1928 saw in the quick growth of western education for Indonesians as danger for the peaceful development of the course of affairs in Indonesia. Such education had been too much expanded, he felt, and should be limited to the point where the indigenous economy itself could absorb it. 3

11. The exhaustible economic exploitation of national wealth of the country by the Dutch capitalists and increased poverty of the vast population living in rich soil and much greater exports than

1. Ibid
2. Indisch Verslag, 1941, pp.184-185
3. Clijn: Kolonial Vraagstukken avn heden en margen; Geen rust maar hezining, Holland, 1929, pp.14-17
imports had furnished deliberately the political consciousness and developments in Indonesia.

Also important were the price differential between the government rubber monopoly's price to Europe and Indonesian growers, leaving tax burden to be borne by the Indonesian population and its greater relative increase as compared to that borne by European residents of Indonesia and the high percentage (about 30%) of Indonesian wealth that went to non-Indonesians.

12. The army and police forces wholly officered by Dutch and Eurasians with a major proportion of their rank and file drawn from these elements and Indonesians from the Minahasa, Ambon, and Timor, were the chief instruments of the Dutch repressive power. The police and military power was supplemented and intermeshed with government regulations which narrowly circumscribed and often almost completely cut off legal organisation and prosecution of the nationalist movement. The strength of the army and the police force and their non-sympathetic attitude toward the nationalist movement in conjunction with the general ability of the political intelligence service (P.I.D), the government's secret service, made it really difficult to develop the movement effectively on the extra-legal plan. In spite of these limitations, the spirit of nationalism had been kept alive in the hearts of nationalist leaders.

13. A nationalist educational institution called Taman Siswa (children's garden school) established by Ki Hadjar Dewantara in July 3, 1922, was another pertinent factor responsible for the penetration of Indonesian national movement. His idea was that no imitation of the western world but construction from the bottom up of a civilisation initially Javanese, later Indonesian.

1. Kahin: op. cit. p. 51
He maintained the principle that the national culture of a nation could be bent but should never be broken. Wisdom, beauty, art, and science from abroad were welcome. Every body, he said, who learns foreign language gains access to a new world. But foreign elements should be absorbed into native life, enriching the already existing treasures of national civilisation.

He built up at least 250 school all over Indonesia without any government or foreign help. There were 27 branches of the Taman Siswa in 1929, 53 in 1930; 187 in 1937; and 215 in 1942.1

Similar contribution to nationalism was given by different nationalistic educational establishments such as Perti, Diniah School, Normal Islam, Islamic College, Training College, the Thawalib schools, the Indonesian national school or I.N.S. (1926) and others. Likewise, the Mohammadiah institutions developed the political consciousness of its members and its pupils taught in its many schools. The Mohammadiah movement formed by H. Ahmad Dahlan in November 18, 1912, had established 29 branches with 4000 members and built about 55 schools in 1925; 150 branches with 10,320 members in 1928; 209 with 17, 550 members in 1929; 267 with 24,383 members in 1931; and 710 (316 in Java, 236 in Sumatra, 79 in Sulawesi and 29 in Borneo) with 43,000 members in 1935. It had set up 126 schools and many clinic in Java which treated 81,000 patients in 1929. In 1930, there were considerable Mohammadiah schools and colleges in Sumatra. It was still a deep tributary of the stream of the political nationalism and a strong pillar of Indonesian movement.2

1. A.K. Pringshodimdo: op.cit. p.87
2. Ibid pp.108 and 184
The Dutch colonial government tried to hamper the development of national educational institutions by issuing an ordinance in 1923 in which the government assumed control of all private owned schools, numbering about 2000-2500 in 1936 with 100,000 and 500,000 pupils. In 1925, this regulation was tightened up by a degree which provided the government with the right, if necessary, of suspension of teaching by teachers in private owned and non-subsidied schools. But all this could not kill but inflamed the continuous growth of heroic national liberation movement among the vast masses.

In addition to the above mentioned factors, the education was also immediately responsible for the development of a new Indonesian elite. The higher demand for cheap clerical help by the Dutch imperialistic administration and private capitalistic enterprises in Indonesia, western education was exceedingly made available to Indonesians during the first four decades of this century, though the number remained extremely small.

The Dutch administration had deliberately starved the educational system. This trend is, says John Gunther, to keep the people in subjugation and to prevent the normal growth of political aspirations. Dutch policy, it had been said, is to the bellies (not even bellies) full and their minds empty. Illiteracy is 95% and the school system is myth. Indeed the record of the Dutch in education is miserable.1

According to the latest census in 1930, 92.8% of the Indonesian people were still illiterates. The Dutch children were given more educational facilities than the Indonesian people. The

percentage of the budget for the Indonesian education was only 11.4%, while 88.6% was laid aside for the western primary, middle and high education. And there was no compulsory system of education.

Mr. B.H.M. Flekke, a Dutch propagandist, said that in Indonesia education had not yet reached the masses of the people. Although 40% of the children between 6 and 9 years of age went to school in 1940, more than 80% of the population were still illiterates.

The development of education during the Dutch regime was as follows: There were public (government municipal) primary schools where instruction was given through the medium of the Dutch language, for (1) Europeans and persons assimilated with them (a 7 years course); (2) Chinese (Dutch Chinese schools with a 7 years course); (3) Natives (Dutch native schools with a 7 years course) and (4) link-schools (with a 5 years course). Public schools where instruction was given through the medium of a native tongue were (1) the second class schools with a 5 years course; (2) village schools with a 3 years course of extremely elementary instruction. Besides, there were schools with an extended primary institution in the Dutch language with a 3 years course (15 Mulo schools, 3 O.S. I.A., and 3 H.B.S.) opened to all certificated pupils of the primary schools with a 7 years course, without public schools, there were various private schools.

1. B.H.M. Flekke: Nusantara, p. 386
2. M. Epstein: op. cit. p. 1177
For secondary education there were public secondary schools with 5 and 3 years course in connection with the primary schools and also with three years course in connection with the extended primary schools.

There were 58 primary schools in 1865; 1700 in 1903 with 190,000 pupils, 1774 in 1910; 5939 in 1916; 5990 in 1919; 20242 in 1935 with 53457 teachers, 195,544,2 pupils and with the expenditure of about 437,21,300 guilders. In addition to the government institutions, there were five private secondary schools for girls with a 3 years course and 3 with 5 years course. Higher education was given at the technical college of Bandung, erected in 1920. Furthermore, a college for law opened in 1924 and a medical college erected in 1927, both at Jacarta.1

Moreover, there were in 1935 the following training colleges or schools: - 3 public schools for training in engineering architecture, electrical engineering and mining (5 years course) and 1 similar private school (4 years course), with 79 teachers and 1,348 pupils; 58 public and 7 private trade schools for native (55, two years course and to 3 years course and 4 years course), with 408 pupils; 2 agricultural colleges with 22 teachers and 265 pupils; 1 veterinary school with 13 teachers and 16 pupils; 1 training school for police with 26th students; 1 public medical college with 35 teachers and 300 students; 1 private nautical school for Europeans.2

For native teachers there were 7 schools with 104 teachers and 965 pupils; with the institution in the native tongue, 19 schools and courses with 76 teachers and 1,292 pupils. Furthermore

1. Ibid. p.1176
2. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit.pp.211-212
there were 8 schools and courses for Europeans teachers with 88 teachers and 578 pupils.

For Chinese teacher there was a school with instruction in the Dutch language with 12 teachers and 178 pupils. Finally there were in 1935, 332 industrial schools giving instruction in the vernacular and 379 where Dutch was the medium used; 28 Indonesian language business schools and 48 business schools in which Dutch was the language medium.

By 1940, there were 88,223 Indonesians enrolled in all schools giving western primary education; 8,235 in Hiko schools and 1,786 in all high schools. From these 3 types in of school respectively 7,790, 1130 and 240 were graduated in 1940. In 1940 high school education was still largely reserved for the European population, 5,688 of the students in such schools being Europeans as against 1786 Indonesians.

15. The growth of the national press and radio was a torch bearer of the ideals of the nationalistic struggle for the freedom and emancipation of the motherland. Long before 1900 several newspapers in the Indonesian language had already been published in Java and Sumatra. Their contents were merely current news. With appearance of the newspaper Ne-an Pryayl (civil servant's paper) at Bandung under the leadership of R.M.Tirodisuryo, a change was beginning to be evident since 1900. The Bintang Hinoia (the star of the Indies) under the leadership of Dr. Jivai was published in Amsterdam and distributed in Indonesia.

The difference in degree of political consciousness between Java and Sumatra manifested itself in the difference found in the

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1. V. Thompson: Labour problems in S.E.A., N.York, 1952, p.120
2. Indisch: Verslag, 1941
newspapers of both the islands. Despite the fact that Java was publishing a newspaper such as the Utusan Hindia (Indonesian delegation) of the late O.S. Tjokroaminoto, which was considered very radical at that time, on account of the fact that the paper contained the aspirations for self-government. Padang in Sumatra was still publishing the newspaper like Sinar Sumatra (Sumatra ray) under whose title appeared sentences: May the Dutch live for ever, loyal to the Dutch government unto the death. The publisher of this newspaper was De Volharding, a Chinese Dutch concern under the supervision of Messrs. Lien Aus Kam and A. van Tyn. Another paper published in Padang Xhm and following the same policy was the Warta Hindia (Indonesian news). It belonged to the upper strata of society.1

But the above slavish mentality disappeared altogether in 1921 when the national movement made itself felt in Sumatra west coast. It was followed by the appearance of the newspaper Banih Merdeka (the seed of freedom) at Medan and Sinar merdeka (the ray of freedom) at Padang Sidenpuan. In Java there also appeared the Api rakjat (the fire of the people) at Medan. The Siner dianut in Sumatra changed its name into the Sinar Hindia (the ray of Indonesia). The Api (the fire) at Semarang and the Njala (flame) at Pontianak and several other newspapers made their appearance.

The Api rakjat published in 1924-1926 at Medan devoted to radical mass action for the attainment of free Indonesia. The Indonesian journalists starting from J.M. Titoedisuyo, right down to young journalists such as Mr. Batto, Subardjo, Nazir Ramontjak, Mustafa, etc. were the pioneers and messengers in the fight for

1. F. Harashap: An article in Merdeka No.28, March 22, 1948, New Delhi, p.9
national emancipation and independence were published by them in European newspapers and magazines, while Dr. A. Riva, Dr. Amir and Mr. Adinegoro together with Mr. Darsono continued as foreign correspondents of Indonesian newspapers. The articles written by these journalists especially in the Nindia baru (New Indonesia), the Bintang timur (star of the east) and the suara umum (public opinion) helped much in widening the outlook of the Indonesian people for the achievement of national liberation. During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) the national press was involved in all parts of the Japanese propaganda machine. It played the most important role during the national revolution against the Dutch imperialism and inspired the masses with the spirit of self determination and sense of national consciousness and realisation.

16. The development of transport, communication and the increased geographical mobility of the people as well as ideas of modern economic organisations in Indonesia was another vital factor which helped to spread national understanding, consciousness and nationalism as well as mutual cooperation among the vast mass of population.

On December 31, 1935, Indonesia had 36,000 miles of highways, of which 25,000 were inacadan (6,300 miles with bituminous surfaces), 50 asphalt - concrete and brick and about 11,000 low type, earth, sand-clay or gravel, garded or drained. The highway mileages of some of the larger islands were reported as follows (the numbers within parentheses stand for bituminous surface roads): Java and Madura, 15,800 (4,500); Sumatra, 11,500 (1,300); Borneo, 1,400 (50); Celebes, 4,300 (200); Moluccas, Bali

1. Ibid. p. 10
At the end of 1935, the total length of rail and tramways (State and private) was about 4,630 miles (3,404 in Java and 1226 in Sumatra); the gross receipts (1935) about 54,216,000 guilders; working expenses about 37,126,000 guilders, number of passengers about 65,424,000.1

The number of post and telegraph offices (combined), post offices (simple) and telegraph offices (simple in 1935 were respectively 226,80 and 521 for Java and Madura and 178,109 and 304 for the other islands, a total of 1418 offices.

Moreover, there were 1340 rural postal agencies and rural telegraph agencies. The number of telegraph offices including 60 government radio telegraph offices for public service (including 10 stations and 2 offices for wireless traffic with other countries), 6 private radio telegraph stations for public services and 23 radio posts erected in isolated regions for the purpose of connecting the government civil service officials of these out-stations with more populated centres. The government telegraph lines extended in 1935 over 4831 miles, the government telegraph cables over 282 miles, making a total of 5113 miles. There was a direct government radio telegraphic service from Java to the Netherlands, Germany, France, Siam, French Indo-China, Philippines islands, Mongkon, China, Japan, the U.S.A. and Portuguese Timore. The number of telegrams was 718,000 (internal) and 584,000 (foreign). Internal ordinary letters and post-cards carried in 1935 amounted to 29,238,000 while there were 31,128,000 printed matters, newspapers and C. 1,249,000 paid registered articles, 11,620,000 official letters and 1,698,000 official registered articles for the interior. The

1. N. Epstein: op. cit. p.1180
international correspondences dealt with were 9,734,000 letters and postcards 8,063,000 other articles and 650 registered articles. 1

The government telegraph phone aerial lines extended in 1935 over 16,096 miles, the government telephone exchanges and 37,302 telephones. There was a direct radio-telegraphic service to the Netherlands, Siam, Malaya, Philippines, the U.S.A., Australia and Japan.

The royal Netherlands Indies airlines Cy. (K.N.I.L.M.) maintained internal subsidized airlines between the principal towns of the islands of Java and Sumatra, the island of Bali and Singapore. In 1935 about 577,016 miles were covered on the regular lines, 12,245 passengers, 69,061 kgs. of freight and 22,836 kgs. mail were carried.

In June, 1935, the Dutch royal airlines Cy. (K.L.M.), the Hague, who maintained already (since October, 1931) a weekly service carrying mail, freight and passengers between Amsterdam and Jacarta, had commuted this service into a twice-weekly service between and Singapore via Jacarta, Surabaya, Kambang and Kupang and vice versa to link up with the imperial airway service London-Singapore. 2

17. Frequent contacts and good Understandings with nationalist leaders of different countries in international conference and the League of Nations had far-reaching effects on the rapid growth of Indonesian nationalism and national consciousness

1. Ibid. p.1181
2. Ibid.
among Indonesian intelligentsia and patriots. In 1922 the Serikat Islam led by Abdul Muiz and H.A. Salim established close relations with the Indian national congress and adopted the policy of non-cooperation. The S.I. also sent deleterions to the world Islamic conferences at Mecca in 1924 and in Cairo in 1926. Mr. Alimin and Sutjiro of the communist party attended the Pan Pacific labour conference under the comintern auspices at Canton in June 1924. Mr. Tan Malaka, president of the partai republik Indonesia (Pari) in Bangkok and comintern agent for C.E.A. and Australia, also attended the Pan Malayan movement's conference in Manila in 1927. The Indonesian delegation also took part in the general assembly of the League of Nations in 1928 and 1938.

Other world contacts which the Indonesian nationalists made for their movement were in February, 1927, at the conference of the League against Imperialism in Brussels. It coincided with large scale arrests and deportations of the nationalist leaders of the revolution in 1926-1927 in Java and Sumatra. The Indonesian delegation consisted of Dr. M. Hatta, Semaun, Nazir Pamuntjak and Subardjo, who met the Indian delegates, Mr. Nehru and K.M. Panikar.

Dr. Hatta contributed the first speech about Indonesian nationalism to an international gathering. In September, 1927 he addressed the conference held by the women's international league for peace and freedom in the Palais Armant, near Paris. He gave an outline of Indonesian resistance to Dutch rule and of development in the 20th century of a conscious nationalism. This conference in
its resolutions fully supported the liberation movement in Indonesia and condemned the Dutch imperialism.1

STRUCTURE OF THE INDO-NESIAN GOVERNMENT

After the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies Company in 1798, Indonesia was governed by the Netherlands government in Holland. The system of the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia was a mixture of direct and indirect rule, the indirect being no so much as a matter of policy or design as of expediency, for it was the only way in which vast country could be ruled by a small number of European officials.

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

The Indonesian government remained highly centralised and bureaucratic. The administration and executive authority rested in the hands of a governor general. The G.G. was appointed by the crown upon the recommendation of the ministry. He should be 30 years of age and a Dutch statesman and well acquainted with conditions in Indonesia. His term of office was generally five years. He was to take oath of fidelity to the constitution of the Netherlands.2

He also received an annual salary of 89,000 florins ($30,000) plus a 100,000 florins ($40,000) representation allowance. He was granted a small travelling allowance. Two palaces, one at Jakarta and one at Bogor all in Java were at his disposal.3

There were three limitations of the G.G.: (1) He might not lay down his office or leave Indonesia without the consent of

3. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit., p.95
the crown. (2) He might not directly or indirectly be a share-
holder in or went surey for, any business enterprises which had
entered into a contract for profit-making purposes with the
Indonesian government or any of its political sub-division. (3) Nor
might he be a share-holder in any concession or business enterprise,
of whatever nature, established in Indonesia or doing business there.

The crown also appointed a Lt. Governor-General. In the absence
of a Lt. G.G., the Vice-President of the council of the East Indies
was the first in line of succession to the office of G.G.

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNOR GENERAL

In the name of the king, the Governor General exercised all
administrative and official functions. He was responsible to the
Minister of colonies who in turn was responsible to the States
General. According to Article 64 R.R., the directors, the heads of
departments were not personally responsible members of the government
in the same way as ministers were in the mother country. He was to
supervise the work of the general secretariat, the council of the
East Indies, regional and local councils. He was to answer the
questions and criticism of the volksraad.2

The G.G. was assisted by a general secretariat (Algemeene
secretariat). It was originally intended to serve as the secretariat
bureau of the council of the Indies and the G.G., working in reality
as central department of general administration, examining them and
passing upon all recommendations, whether from the departments
or from the Council. It developed into super department. It came to
be the adviser extra-ordinary of the G.G. and exercised an influence
upon him far greater than that of department heads and council. Until
recently, the G.G. did every thing; he attempted to control even the

1. Ibid. 9,99
2. Articles 60 and 64, R.R.
The General Secretariat was charged with conducting the correspondence of the G.G., including that with the minister of colonies and of aiding him in working out his decisions and orders. Thus the work of the General Secretariat still touched the substance as well as the form of the Governor General's work.1

At the head of the general secretariat was the general secretary who was practically the governor general's adviser. He was one of the most important officials in the Indonesian government. He superintended the publications, dispatch, registration and preservation of the directions issued by the G.G. and dealt with all government correspondence as well as the contents of the Java court or official organs (Javasch courant).2

**COUNCIL OF THE EAST INDIES (RAAD VAN INDIJE)**

The G.G. was also assisted by the council of the East Indies, which was formerly established in 1611, composing 4 members. In 1811 and 1816, it had a vice president and 2 members and 1 Vice-President and 4 members in 1836. As a rule the council was made of two former governors or residents of Java or other islands, 1 ex-judicial chief officer and 1 ex-chief officer of the general secretariat. The choice of the 5th was left open to administrative department. All the five members were Netherlanders. In 1930 the membership of the council was enlarged to 7 persons and 2 Indonesians were given position in it. In 1932 it was reduced again to 5, with one place reserved for an Indonesian. The members were appointed and subject to the removal by the crown.3

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1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 102
2. M. Campbell: op. cit. Chap. XIX, p. 1184
Previous to 1836 the head of the Indonesian government was the G.G. in Council. The members of the council were co-members of the government with the G.G. With this body rested the legislative and executive in the highest legislative and executive authority in the government of Indonesia. The East Indian Government Act of 1854 restored to the council much of the powers lost in 1836. Consent of the council for important administrative measures and the issuance of ordinance was made mandatory. However, the G.G. was not altogether bound by the advice of the Council. Under special circumstances he was free to carry out his will without the concurrence of the Council.1

The revised Act of 1925 made the following position of the council.

1. The G.G. was free to consult the council with respect to all matters of general or special interest and from this provision no subject was excluded.

2. The G.G. might consult the council in a number of matters. These included the regulation of political relations with Indonesian princes and peoples, general measures taken by the civil authorities in case of war or insurrection, unusual measures of an important nature, important announcements and proposals to the volksraad, the enactment of ordinances upon the sole authority and responsibility of the G.G. alone, the drafting of government bills, appointments to important positions and suspension and removal of superior officials. In all these the G.G. alone decided, only he might notify the council of his decision.

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit.page 103
3. The G.G. might not only consult but also obtained the concurrence of the council in a small number of matters. This concurrence was necessary with respect to the prohibition of sojourn in the form of externment or exile, the assignment of specific place of sojourn, the declaration of amnesty and abolition with respect to native princes and heads, the granting of dispensation from the executive orders, the settlement of jurisdictional controversies between the judicial and administrative departments between the law courts and native princes and heads, between civil and military courts, and in declaring regulations for Europeans applicable to others not in this category. Even in the matters of required concurrence the G.G. was not entirely bound by the council. When unable to accept the advice of the council he might be endangered by further delay, he might take the measures he deemed necessary without waiting for the decision of the crown. But before taking such measures the G.G. might again exchange views, first in writing and then orally, with the members of the council as to the proposed step.

4. The council also had the right of initiative in making proposals to the G.G. When the G.G. met the council, he was its presiding officer. In his absence the vice-president of the council presided.1

5. The G.G. might charge the members of the council with special commissions within the confines of Indonesia, provided always that the vice-president and 2 members remained present at headquarters of the council. The G.G. frequently availed himself of this

1. ibid. p.105
privilege, for next to his office, the members of the council were regarded as the highest officials in the Indonesian government and their prestige weighed heavily with the native princes and peoples.2

The Council was criticised badly. For it was composed only of former civil servants who were not free from the traditional official attitude. Its members were chosen not for their general political and economic insight as for official expertise.2

The Central government possessed the following departments:

At the head of each the first 7 departments was placed a director, who was appointed by the king and responsible to the G.G. The departmental chiefs might, however, send orders or instructions to the governors or residents, etc. but beyond that their actions depended mainly on the amount of tact they displayed or otherwise. At the head of the marine department was the commander of the fleet and of the war department, the commander in chief of the forces.

Moreover, liaison officers were appointed between departments and services. The director of education for example had two advisers from the European administrative service to help him in respective of native education.

1. Ibid
2. Kluntjis; op.cit. p.269
There was also a special liaison officer between the agriculture, credit and civil service. 1

Much use was made of specialist advisers, charged with studying important problems, but without any responsibility for policy. There had been advisers on native affairs, on Chinese affairs, on Japanese affairs, on credit institutions, on native education and decentralisation. These advisers made a continual study of large issues from a broader aspect that is possible for officials, immediately concerning with the daily routine of administration. It was largely through the advice of the advisers, S. Hurgronje, on Muslim affairs that the Dutch finally succeeded in pacifying Achin.

In order to assure a closer contact between central and regional organisation, the annual administrative conferences were to be held. To these the G.G. invited all the governors and residents, the heads of departments, the central advisers and other high officials, while similar conferences were held to ascertain the views of the residents. Regional leaders in this way learnt better to understand the requirements of general policy, while the central leaders became better informed as to local variations and situations.

The G.G. was commander in chief of the army and navy and could control as he wished both these forces. The administrative officers of the navy however were under the control of the Dutch Admiralty in Holland.

In case of war or rebellion he was empowered to take all necessary measures for the safety of Indonesia, even such as would require the sovereign's authority under other conditions. He might

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1. M. Campbell: op. cit. p. 1189
declare martial law or a state of siege in the whole or any part of Indonesia and had extensive legislative authority.

The government regulations permitted and authorized him to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties with Indonesian princes and peoples, provided the sovereign's commands be observed. Judicially he also had the right of granting pardon, amnesty and abolition of death sentences.1

CRITICISM OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1. The central government was lack of integration. Several factors contributed to this. One factor was the geographic distribution of the departments of government, the main residence of the G.G. was Bencoolen, while the seat of the volksraad, the council of the East Indies and departments of justice, finance, interior, administration, education and religion, economic affairs, traffic and public-works was at Jakarta. Two departments, those of marine and war, and the public health service were located in Bandung. Thus the capital of Indonesia was scattered among three cities. The G.G. exercised control over his departments at a distance and merely in writing. He might issue a formal pronouncement in numberless departmental affairs; the most insignificant conflicts between departments might go to him for a decision and likewise differences in points of views between branches of the central government and offices of the regional governments.

2. But the most important factor impeding integration was the existence and the function of the council of Indies. The council still wielded an enormous influence. It had greater influence with the volksraad than the department heads. The G.G. came to Indonesia

1. ibid. p.1185
with only vague idea of policy and except with respect to matters on which they held strong personal views they relied upon the advice of the council. Furthermore, the East Indian government Act specifically entrusted the function of advising the G.G. to the Council and not to the department heads. The headship of a department was regarded as practically an automatic promotion for able permanent officials; the appointments were not made on the basis of views on policy.

3. According to a leading Indonesian official, the rise of the volksraad had also contributed to the undermining and disintegration of the central government organ. Department heads might often appear before the volksraad to fight for measures which they first proposed to the council, but which the council seriously altered. When the volksraad knew of this, it made the most of opportunity to embarrass the department heads. Between the council and the department heads the G.G. was in a difficult position.1

As a way out, Mr. J. Schrieke, the former head of the department of justice, proposed that the department heads be united with the council of the Indies. 2 Article 9 of the government Act of 1925 provided that the heads of the departments of general administration should be summoned to attend those meetings of the council of the East Indies, which were presided over by the G.G. unless the latter, for special reasons should decide otherwise. Department heads might also attend meetings of the council not presided over by the G.G., when the council had under consideration measures falling within the province of the department. In either

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.107
2. J. Schrieke: de Indisch Politik, pp.119-126
of these situations, the heads had only an advisory voice. 1

THE VOLKRAAD (PEOPLE'S COUNCIL)

The ministers Van Ledum in 1893 and Brock in 1903 had planned to set up a representative body for the Indonesian people. But unluckily their plan was rejected by the Netherlands government. On account of strong demand of the Serikat Islam and political parties as well as other associations for greater participation in the affairs of the government of Indonesia and the hard pressures of international crisis, the minister, Pleyte, presented his proposals in 1915 for the institution of the volkraad in Indonesia. His proposals were accepted by the States General in October 16, 1916, which, therefore, created the volkraad in May 13, 1918.

The composition of volkraad in 1918-1921, consisted of 38 members and 1 chairman was appointed by the crown. Of these 10 Indonesians and 9 Europeans and foreign Asiatics were elected, and 5 Indonesians and 14 Europeans and foreign Asiatics were appointed by the C.G. In 1921-1924, the membership was increased to 48 persons 20 Indonesians (12 elective and 8 appointive) and 28 Europeans and non-native Asiatics (12 elective and 16 appointive). In 1924-1927, the membership remained constant, e.g. 21 Indonesians and 27 non-indigenous. In 1927-1931, it was 50; 30 Indonesians (20 elective and 10 appointive) and 30 non-native members (18 elective and 12 appointive). In 1935-1939, the membership was untouched. In 1939-1943, there were 30 Indonesians (19 elective and 11 appointive) and 30 non-native members (18 elective and 12 appointive). The term of office was three years in 1918-1924 and later on it was four
years from 1925 onwards.1

Before 1927 separate electorates for each of the racial groups (Indonesia, European and non-native Asiaties) did not exist; these were introduced in the revised East Indies Government Act of 1925. The system of indirect election was retained; the members of local, regency, and municipal councils, the European, Indonesian and non-native Asiatic members forming separate electoral colleges to choose their own communal representatives in the volksraad. While the European and foreign Asiatic members of the local councils throughout Indonesia formed one common electoral college, the Indonesian members were divided into electoral circles or districts, based largely on ethical considerations. These electoral circles were west Java, middle Java, east Java, the native state of Java, south Sumatra, east Sumatra, Minangkabau, north Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and the small Sunda islands.2

The members of 18 municipal and 67 regency councils on Java and Madura and the members of municipal, 2 group commune, 9 commune and 7 local councils in the outer islands participated in the 1939 volksraad elections. The total number of electors was 2228, of whom 1817 were on Java and Madura and 411 in the outer islands. Of the electors 1452 were Indonesians, 543 were Dutchmen and 233 were non-native Asiaties. In the native states of Java, the system of election was different. Where the 4 Indonesian princes and the senior governors were the only electors. Candidates for the volksraad were elected on the basis of proportional representation. A special bureau, called the volksraad electoral bureau, had been set up to count the votes.3.

1. Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo: op. cit. p. 169
2. Article 55 of teh Indonesian govt. Act., 1926
3. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 116
In 1925 the volksraad was raised from an advisory body to a co-legislative body. For this purpose, a college of delegates or a permanent committee of 20 and later 15 in 1935, chosen by the full volksraad from amongst own members on the basis of proportional representation, was created. The chairman and the secretary of the volksraad served in the same capacity for the college of delegates, which sat when the volksraad was adjourned. The college of delegates exercised a considerable powers in the volksraad. The members of the college of delegates served for four years.¹

The legislative power in the Netherlands- the crown and the states general- might by law set up and modify the governmental organisation and further might legislate on any other subject when ever by law appeared necessary. The states general of course had the power to regulate all imperial affairs. The power of the crown to legislate by general administrative order had been limited to the specific cases enumerated by law. The power of legislation might be exercised by the G.C. after consultation of the volksraad with respect to the following:

1. All subjects not denied to it in the Netherlands constitution, East Indian Government Act, or other laws.

2. Other subjects the regulations of which in accordance with law or general administrative order, must take place by ordinance.

3. In case of emergency, subject to later confirmation by law or general administrative order, all subjects the regulation of which otherwise would have to take place by law or general administrative order, so long as this regulation has not yet taken

¹. ibid p.117
place.

4. In case of emergency, subject to later confirmation by law or general administrative order, the modification or suspension, in whole or in part, for all Indonesia or specified parts of it, of laws or general administrative orders.1

5. The G.C. might also, after mandatory consultation with the council of the Indies, issue executive orders, the execution of laws, general administrative orders and ordinances so far as this further regulation had been delegated to him.2

Though the volksraad had the power of initiation as well as amendment, the ordinary procedure was for the G.C. to initiate legislation. The G.C. had also the right of veto. He could veto a bill for amendments to a bill passed by the volksraad, if he was of the opinion that the bill was contrary to the general interests. He might also rule out the decision of the volksraad and promulgate on his own responsibilities the rejected or seriously amended bill by the volksraad, if he considered that the general interests of the country required instant action. The G.C. or the government might bring the bill in the volksraad if the latter approved it, the bill became the G.C.'s ordinance. If it was turned down, in non-urgent case, the bill did not become law, but after six months, he might present it again to the volksraad with some amendments if he thought it necessary to do so. If in the second introduction the bill was not accepted, the government could pass the bill as law with the sanction of the crown.3

In matter of finance, the annual budget had to undergo a strict scrutiny of the states general at the Hague. In the event

1. The East Indian Govt. Act, Articles 82, 92 and 93
2. Ibid Art. 81
of any contrary, the Hague had final decision. Hence there was no financial autonomy in Indonesia.

The members of the volksraad had the following rights and privileges: 1. Freedom of speech. 2. right of initiative. 3. right of addressing or petition. 4. right of interpellation. 5. right of proposing the budget. 6. right of giving advice to the government. 7. right of amendment of any bill. 8. right of legislation. 9. receiving of attendance allowances and additional grants and indemnification for loss of incomes. 10. Freedom of arrest and prosecution.

The volksraad met at Jacarta. The opening of the volksraad session was held on Tuesday in May every year. Two ordinary sessions were held annually. Its meetings were public, unless for some specific reason the public had to be excluded. Its first meeting was opened by the G.C., Van Limburg Stirum on May 18, 1918 at Jacarta. It made its own standing orders. And the last session of the volksraad was attended by the G.C. Tjarde in 1941. Dr. J.W. Meye Ranneft was the last chairman of the volksraad in 1942.

The volksraad had been criticised strongly by different leaders. Mr. Seman said that the volksraad was only an empty show, a tactic of capitalists to deceive the vast masses to attain the highest profits. It was purely an advisory body which could do more than talks and its voice was not heard in the council.

Mr. Colijn also criticised the volksraad. He pointed out that the value of the parliamentary system lies precisely in the responsibility borne by the ministers in offices and by the opposition which may be asked to assume leadership, specially if the cabinet, believing it has been unfairly criticised resigns and

1. Ibid. p.38
2. A.K. Pringshododo: op. cit. p.17
invites the opposition to take office. Now it is clear as day that this parliamentary five and take does not exist in the volksraad, the majority cannot upset the government, nor can the latter resign and compel the opposition to succeed it.1

Moreover, the volksraad had failed to win support either with the masses or with the intellectuals of Indonesian society. The masses had not yet awakened and the intellectuals were still relatively few and because of the colonial relationship many of the latter were non-cooperators.

The volksraad faced great difficulties in its function due to the governmental system. There was first of all the divided responsibility between the Hague and Indonesia. The volksraad never knew whether it had before it the Indonesian government or the colonial office. If the volksraad offered an amendment to the budget or a bill and the minister of colonies orders, it rejected, the Indonesian government naturally refused all debate over the non-acceptance; against the minister the volksraad could not contravert.

A similar difficulty existed in the relationship between the C.C. and the directors of the departments. According to the government act, the latter were subordinate to the C.C. and subject to his commands. As administration spokesmen in the volksraad they had no independent authority; they simply trumpets of the administration. A director might defend an ordinance which he had drawn up but which had undergone important changes as result of modifications made by the council of Indies and accepted by the C.C. The directors might then defend the measures against arguments which he himself used against it before the council.

1. Colijn: Over Indie, p.46
Another weakness of the volksraad was the political condition in Indonesia. Party life was still weak. Political groups were crossed and crisis-crossed by racial, ethical, economic and religious lines. 19 political parties such as Indo-European union, Christian political party, parindra, etc. were represented in the Volksraad in 1939.1

The social life of Indonesia also contributed to the weakness of the volksraad. The Europeans made Indonesia as their temporary home; their chief concern naturally was not political but economic. The number of educated Indonesians was very small. The membership of the volksraad consisted of the official class, both European and Indonesian. There had been complaints from these members that they had been called to look by their chiefs for what they had said and how they had voted in the volksraad.

The chief defect of the volksraad was undoubtedly a slight contact with the Indonesian community. The duration of the sessions was steadily becoming longer, with the result that many members who made their livelihood in business or professions could not remain until the end. As a result many measures were acted upon during the last weeks by a steadily decreasing number of members and the relative strength of the parties was changed by factors unrelated to changes in public opinion. The government transferred its officials who were elected or appointed to the volksraad, the central offices at Jakarta. This led the official lose living contact with the geographical area or the specific population group he was elected or appointed to represent. 2

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit p.121
2. ibid p.123
The volksraad had also suffered from pre-occupation with too many small and local matters. Improvement in this respect should come with further progress in decentralisation. If the sessions of the Volksraad were going to be continuous, there would be little justification for the college of delegates. The volksraad reserved all important matters for itself, leaving to the college only un-important details.

In spite of the above mentioned defects and difficulties the volksraad had served very useful purposes.

1. It had enabled the government to ascertain what was going in the minds of the people and to explain, modify and justify its policies. Even before 1927 the government accepted a large number of the amendments and adjusted a large number of complaints and other important matters upon the demand of members of the volksraad. And it had given the colonial bureaucracy a large measure of responsibility to the Indonesian society, since it might now work in the open and mightly at any time be asked to explain and defend its doings. The position of a legislative body in a dependency was at best a trying one, little less so that then of the executive. The executive had two masters, for it could not ignore a responsibility to the colonial legislature, while the legislature was in danger of oscillating between the extremes of a feeling of utter futility on the one hand of understrained criticism on the other.1

2. In the period since 1927, the government applied the reconsideration, the so-called conflict regulation, which gave the G.G. the power to issue emergency degrees upon his own initiative, 15 times. Of 21 times that the G.G. asked reconsideration of a rejected measure, agreement between the government and the volksraad

1. Ibid p. 124
was reached in 16, frequently after important concessions from the side of the government and in only 5 did the measure become law by intervention of the crown, 13 of the emergency degrees issued by the G.C. on his own responsibility in 1932-1937 and remaining in 1940-1941. Against these occasions upon which the desires of the volksraad were ignored might be placed the more than 500 government bill which reached the statute books with amendments offered by the volksraad and accepted by the government or which did not become law because the government acquiesced in the negative judgment of the volksraad. During this same period, the government accepted 37 of the 92 volksraad amendments to budget bills in 1928-1938.

3. The power of initiating legislation was used frequently only 6 times in the 15 years, 1927-1941 inclusive. On three of these occasions the government accepted the proposed legislation and placed it on the statute books. The right of petitioning the government was also sparsely used. Throughout the course of its life the volksraad issued 16 petitions, many of which were answered favourably after a short or longer period. A favourite device of the volksraad was the adoption of the resolutions in the period of 1927-1941.

4. Lastly the volksraad had represented the multiplicity of political parties of the various races and communities such as Indonesian, European, Chinese and Arab. In the latest volksraad, the 25 European members represented 8 parties, 1 belonged to no party; of the 30 Indonesian members, 23 represented 10 parties and 7 had

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1. Tien Jaar Volksraad arbeid 1928-1938. Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtlijke hervarminse en 1, iXXX, pp.116-120
2. A.Vandenboschi op. cit. p.123
no party affiliation and even in the small group of other members there were 2 and at one time three parties. To a certain extent, this was due to the system of nomination of some members of the volksraad by the C.G. This was, however, a sort of democratic parliamentary practice pursued in the country. The volksraad was also an educative institution where the representatives of the people learned and discussed various matters concerning the interests of the country.1

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Since 1870 there was a hierarchical and highly centralised form of the government. Immediately below the C.G. stood the resident who was the head of division, aided by several assistant residents as heads of sub-divisions. There was also a head region called controleur. All this formed the European administration.

Regarding the native administration, there were wedana (district official), assistant wedana (sub-district official) and lastly village heads.

Since then there was a decentralisation movement for Indonesia. Minister Van Dedum in 1893 proposed the creation of regional councils and financial decentralisation but in vain due to the dissolution of the chambers in 1894. Minister Idenburg advocated the same view successfully. Minister Hintsen Van Eek and Mr. Van Ewenter pleaded for the establishment of autonomous regencies and more liberal political decentralisation. In 1903, the states general of Holland passed a Decentralisation Act, which provided for the institution of 3 kinds of councils: (1) regional or residency councils; (2) sub-residency or local councils; (3) Urban communal councils.2

All these councils were 60 in number. They were as yet not successful and undemocratic in character. Because a large number of the councillors were ex-officio members and even the private members were appointed. The only elective members were found in the urban communal councils and even here only the Europeans were at first elective. The regional councils could never develop into an immediate unit of government, for the areas they served were too small for regional and too large local governmental units. The residency governments could not be equipped with the technical apparatus and personnel required for large regional work. There was also a lack of financial resources.

Because of the many defects of the Act 1903, the second chamber of Holland in 1914 was in favour of giving more regional provincial autonomies to Indonesia. In 1918, Mr. Pleyte, the Minister of colonies, introduced a bill in this spirit, but only for Java and Madura. De Graaf, minister of colonies, in 1919 withdrew the bill and replaced it with a new bill which, after the discussion in the volksraad in 1920, was presented to the states general in 1921 and passed into law in 1922.

Under the Act 1922, the country was divided into 3 provinces, west Java (1926), east Java (1929) and central Java (1930), under governors and sub-divided into residencies numbering about 76 residencies altogether, governed by residents, who were assisted by assistants residents and a number of subordinate European officials. Local government was almost entirely exercised by native civil servants, under the regents.

1. Ibid p.129
2. Ibid p.130
The outer islands were divided into 19 residents and 94 divisions such as Minagkabau, Bandjar (1938) and Palembang (1941) and others, governed by residents, who were assisted by 90 asstt. residents, about 180 controleurs, 100 commanders and a number of subordinate European officials. In July 1, 1938, the provinces of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East were set up and governed by governors. By 1941, 3 such ethnic municipalities, each with councils, had been established, namely Minagkabau raad, Palembang raad (Sumatra) and Bandjar raad (Borneo).

As regards the government administration in Java were in 1900, 18 residents, 78 assistant residents, about 118 controleurs, 50 asstt. controleurs, some 70 residents, 400 wedanas and 1000 asstt. wedanas. In 1930, there were 3 governors and in 1903 there were 15 residents and 38 residents and 18 asstt. residents in 1922. In 1931, the number of residents was further reduced to 19. The total number of administrative high officials declined from 222 in 1922 to 150 in 1933.

The governor was the agent of both the central and the provincial governments. He was appointed and removed by the C.G. The government of province consisted of the provincial council, the board of deputies and the governors. The provincial council comprised elected and nominated members of all three sections of the community (Netherlanders, Indoneians and non-indigenous Asiatics), with the provincial governor as chairman. The electorate consisted of the members of the regency and urban councils and was predominantly official and largely nominated. For the province of west Java the

1. M. Epstein: op.cit. p.1182
2. Dr. De Kat Angelino: op.cit. p.369
membership was 45 (20 Netherlands, 20 Indonesians and 5 non
indigenous Asiatics). Of this membership, 11 Netherlands, 13
Indonesians, 3 non-indigenous Asiatics were elected, while the
others were appointed by the C.G.I

The provincial council might legislate with respect to such
subjects as had been delegated to it by the central government. Tax
laws and joint regulations between the two or more provinces
required the approval of the C.G. This approval might also be
demanded by ordinance for other stipulated subjects. Moreover, the
C.G. had the power of suspending and vetoing acts of the council
whenever he considered them to be in conflict with the general
interest or some law or ordinance.

The East Indian government Act of 1925 created a board
of deputies. This board, formed in the 3 provinces so created, was
elected by the councils. In electing the deputies the council was
not restricted to its membership; all the deputies might be chosen
from persons not in the council. The number of deputies might range
from 2 to 6; the council itself determined the exact number within
this range. Each new council chose its own board of deputies. They
received a salary fixed by the council and subject to the approval
of the C.G. The council issued the regulations governing the deputies
in the exercise of their powers, which regulations likewise comprised
the approval of the C.G. The board of deputies was charged with the
daily administration of the provincial government. It also made the
preparation of the agenda of the council; the execution of the
council decisions; the settlement of administrative disputes; the
fixing of salaries and wages; cooperation in the execution of

1. Dr. De Kat Angelino Colonval Policy vol.11, the Hague,1:31,p.76
2. A.Vandenbosch; op.cit. p.3 132
regulation of the central government; and supervision over the regency and municipal councils. The deputies were individually and collectively responsible to the council.1

The governor was by the C.G. upon consultation with the Council of the East Indies. In case of sickness, absence or inability of the governor, the board of deputies named one of its members as his temporary successor. The governor presided on both council and board of deputies, but he executed only such decision as these bodies entrusted to his care. As agent of the central government he had its servants at his disposal and as the agent of the provincial government, he might command the provincial civil servants. As the representative of the central government he exercised a general supervision over the work of the council and board of deputies. As such he brought to attention of the C.G. such acts of these bodies as he deemed to be in conflict with law, ordinance or the general interests. If the C.G. did not suspend or veto the law within 3 months, the governor might proceed with the execution of the decision. He had a double responsibility; for his duties as representative of the central government, he was responsible to the C.G.; for the daily policy and administration of provincial affairs, he was responsible to the council. The revenues of the provincial government were largely derived from public services and others.2

According to the annual report of 1928, the functions of the provincial government consisted of education, popular health service of water ways, irrigation, roads, bridges, sluice gates,

1. Ibid p. 133
2. Ibid
habour works water distribution, a salt monopoly, an agricultural information service, a venetary service and a number of provincial hospitals.

The revenues of the province consisted of taxes (additional percentage of government taxes and independent levies), other levies (income from provincial enterprise, legal fees) payment by the government of the difference between the total of the ordinary expenditure and that of the ordinary receipt, special grants in aid from the government, and loans.1

THE REGENCY GOVERNMENT

The policy of indirect rule or the protectorate policy was adopted by the Dutch colonial authority. About 7% of the area of Java and slightly more than 50% of the area of the outer islands had been left under its own rulers. Outside of the 4 sultanates in Java the Dutch had followed a policy of semi-indirect rule by means of the Javanese officials known as regents.

The east Indian company established relations with the regents for the purpose of obtaining products; for the rest, the regents enjoyed a wide autonomy, in the time of Daendals (1909-1911) the position of the regents was diminished. They became officers of the Indonesian government and were placed under the autocratic comma of the residents. This position continued till the end of Dutch authority in 1942.

The regency ordinance of 1924 created a regency council and a board of deputies chosen by the council, with the regent as chairman of both. The regency councils of west, east and central Java provinces came into being in 1924, 1928 and 1929 respectively.2

1. Dr. De Kat Angelino: op.cit. p.396
2. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.135
The regency councils were composed of Netherlanders, Indonesians, and non-indigenous Asiatics. The regency council of Jakarta for instance, was established with the regent as chairman and 27 members, of whom only two were subjects of Dutch origin whereas 20 were indigenous people and 5 foreigners. 14 of the indigenous people were to be elected, 6 for the district of Tangerang, 4 for the district of Blaradja and four for the district of Mudek. The non-indigenous members and the non-elected indigenous members were appointed by the governor of the province of west Java from 2 persons recommended by the regent from each place that had to be filled. Electcd and nominated members sat for a period of four years.1

In 1932, out of 1583 members of the regency councils, 813 elected and 770 nominated, no less than 651 elected and 186 nominated native members were officials. Only 5% of the members were classed as cultivators but the officials apparently included village headmen, who were agriculturists and sometime large landlords.2

According to regency electoral ordinance of 1926, the election of indigenous members took place as follows: The administrative districts in the regencies formed constituencies of about 140,000 inhabitants. During May of the year when an election was to take place, electors were indicated in each desa (village); to the number of 1 elector for 500 inhabitants or less, 2 electors for 1000 inhabitants, 3 for 1500 inhabitants and so on. The appointment of electors was done in so far as possible in accordance with the local custom governing the election of the desa headman, in the presence of a electoral committee, with the sub-district chief as member and chairman. The vote was secret and on the basis of proportional representation. Every indigeneous inhabitant of the

1. Ibid pp.135-136
regency, who was deemed to have reached the age of 21 and who had been assessed in the course of previous year in respect of any government provincial or regency tax or who had the right by law to take part in the election of the desa chiefs (therefore also women) and those who in the judgement of the regency councils were entitled to take part in the election of the headman, had the right to vote. The secondary electors might satisfy the same requirements, be but/aged 25 at least, belonged to the male sex and be inhabitants of the desa in which they were elected for inhabitants of the constituency by which they were chosen. Moreover, they might be able to read and write. A report concerning the appointment of the electors was made by the electoral commission and a copy was sent to the official of the electoral district concerned. From this data this official drew up the list of the secondary voters. 1

The electors could, therefore, deliver at the office of this official on a day indicated beforehand the list of candidates, which might be signed by at least three electors. If the collective list of candidates for a district contained more names than the number of members who had to be returned for the district, the official made up a list in alphabetical order; every secondary elector received a copy and the list was also published. A day for the vote was then fixed and announced and every secondary elector received a card summoning him to the election. Voting took place in the capital of the district, in the presence of a board of consisting of three members. The voter filled in the ballot paper, with the names of his candidates in the order in which he preferred them. Every paper counted as a vote for the first candidate

1 Dr. Kat Angelino: op.cit. p.390
mentioned on it. When the necessary proportion of votes for the first candidates was reached, the ballot paper counted as a vote for the following candidates mentioned on it. This was well-known process of proportional representation.¹

The elected members of the regency council might be male, Dutch subjects, resident in Indonesia, domiciled with the regency aged 25 at least able to write in Latin character, they might not be in a state of bankruptcy, etc. The members of the council received indemnification for travel and maintenance.²

The regency council had various functions. Incorporated cities were excluded from its jurisdiction, however. It made legislations for administration of the internal affairs of the regency and issued ordinances. It also levied taxes, appointed suspended and dismissed officials in the service of the regency. It fixed the annual budget for the regency, approved by the board of deputies.

The resident (Art. 12¹ regency ordinance) had the supervision of the regency council and could make to which the board of deputies obliged the proposals he deemed necessary. All decisions of the council and of its executive board of delegates, which were in conflict with general interests or with a general or provincial ordinance might be submitted to the G.G. by the board of deputies for suspension or annulment. The decision of suspend to annul was announce in the provincial paper, with full statement of reasons. The council could cooperate with other autonomous communities in the regulations of common affairs, interests or works. These arrangements required

¹. Art. 12¹ Ibid.
the approval of the board of deputies.1

The meetings of the council were public; the regent convened and presided over the meeting. Debates might take place in the local language, in Dutch or in Indonesian.

The regency council established a board of deputies for the direction and execution of the affairs of the regency. This body consisted of the regent as member and at least 2 more members. The latter were chosen by the council from their own members together with 1 or more substitute members. They and the members of the council set for some course of years. Their travel and maintenance expenses were paid. The duties of the board of deputies included among others the task of carrying out the decisions of the council and general or provincial ordinances. If these duties were not executed with reasonable efficiency the resident could obtain powers from the governor to carry them out himself, at the expense of the regency.2

The board of deputies also carefully prepared and studied the agenda for the meetings of the council, except such items as had been left to special committees appointed by the council. It represented the regency in court and out of court. The board in its entirety as well as its chairman and members individually, was responsible to the regency council for the daily direction and execution of affairs. They might therefore provide all the information required by the council from them, whether personally or collectively. If such information was refused the council could suspend or dismiss one or more of the members of the board although this did apply to the members of the board

2. Art. 18, K.O.
the regent chairman. For actions of self-government executed upon the instruction of higher authorities, the board was responsible not to the council but these authorities. It finally exercised supervision over the village governments and their budgets, just as the provincial board of deputies exercised supervision over the regency governments. 1

The regent was chairman of the regency council and in case of absence his place was taken by the Patih. In the absence of a board, its tasks was performed by the regent. He had to execute the decisions of the regency council, when required to do so, and also those of the board of deputies. All the officials of the regency acted under his orders. He might also order, in so far as the interest of the country allowed it, all government officials subordinate to him in his capacity as regent to discharge various duties in the interest of the regency. A decision which he judged to be contrary to a general or provincial ordinance or against the public interest needed not be executed by him. In such a case he informed the regency council or its board of deputies, while he also announced his objections to the board of deputies of the province. If no suspension or annulment by the G.C. followed within three months, he was compelled to execute the council's or board's decision. 2

The regency ordinance also established a regency council of Jakarta in 1925. The functions of the council consisted of the administration, public roads, street lighting, fire station, bazaars

1. Dr. Kat Angelino: op.cit. p. 392
2. Ibid. p.394
and bazor buildings, arreision wells, general burial places and ferries situated within the regency and formerly belonging to the administration of the residency of Jacarta. The regency on the other hand might contribute in part to the redemption of and interest payable or debts previously incurred by that community.  

The regency had the supervision of indigenous communes or villages. The board of deputies had the right, formerly held by the regent, to annul village decisions. For some legal actions of the village administration, written powers had previously to be obtained from this board. This concerned matters like loans and certain contracts as well as the initiation and cessation of litigation. The regency council had a certain right of legislation in various other important matters which concerned the dese. Indigenous education would be within the council's competence.  

**SUB-DIVISION GOVERNMENT**

The Assistant resident stood at the head of a subdivision of residency, and administrative area which generally corresponded with the regency. He exercised the functions of the resident except that of legislation and at least officially, the contact between the European and the native administrative corps took place at this point. The Assistant residents constitute the lowest branch of the European administrative corps having independent sphere of action. The Assistant residents in turn, were aided by controleurs, who theoretically had no independent sphere of action; they were supposed merely to collect information and execute the orders of their superior. But in the outer islands, the controleurs

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1. Stbt, 1925, p.383  
2. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.126; and Kat Angelino: Ibid. p.395
legally enjoyed an independent sphere of action, thus carrying the contact between the European and native administrative corps, a step close to the people.1

Regarding the powers of the controleurs, Mr. Fakens enumerated their functions. 1. Execution of the administration of the Indonesian population, 2. domestic affairs of the desa, 3. agriculture and industry, 4. agrarian conditions, (5) taxation and compulsory services, 6. health and education, 7. public works, 8. exercise of considerable influence upon the understanding and cooperation between the Indonesian chiefs, the population and the Dutch authorities, 9. assisting the police in detecting the authors of misdemeanours and usually acting as magistrate, 10 contracting and supervising the village headmen and the village administration in all their activities and 11. transmitting the orders of the European authorities to the native officials and supervising their proper execution 12. and others. 2

The controleur personally investigated the desa complaints by the population. The weekly gatherings of the village chiefs in sub-districts, the monthly ones in the principal place of the district, the regular meetings of asstt. wedanas and wedanas which were prescribed by the inlandsch reglement, he tried to attend as much as possible and according to the importance of the business on the agenda.

1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p.127
2. Dr. Fakken: op. cit. p.20
Dr. Van Gorkam's guide book mentioned some of the subjects discussed by the controleurs with the native officials at these regular meetings: 1. Police (particular incidents, watch houses, watch services and criminal cases under investigation, 2. taxation, 3. cultivation, 4. agrarian questions, 5. compulsory government services and desa services, 6. cattle, 7. health.

In short, the Dutch had adopted the indirect rule of the country and through the controleurs they exercised the native governments. By this policy, said Dr. Van Gorkam, that Holland has been able to make western strength take root in the Indonesian archipelago, to assure peace and contentment to diverse populations and to make possible an administration with a relatively small number of officials. (250 men in Java and Madura). In 1937 Ruper Emerson observed, that the system of indirect rule served a highly efficient device for breaking and segregating potential nationalist movements and as something of a moral justification for denying the claims to power of the more advanced elements of native society.

Mr. Temple pointed out the real meaning of the indirect rule which maintained firmly the strong foothold of the Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. By indirect rule I mean a system of administration which had been created by the native themselves which recognises the existence of amirs, chiefs, pagan courts, native police controlled by a native executive, as real living forces and not as curious and interesting pagentry, by which European influence is brought

1. Ibid. p.21; and Ket Angelino: op.cit. p.85
2. Ruper Emerson: Malaysia, New York 1937, p.518
to bear on the native indirectly through his chiefs and not directly through European officers, political police, etc. and by which the European keeps himself as good deal in the background and leaves the mass of the native individuals to understand that the orders which came to them emanate from their own chief rather than from the all pervading white men. The underlying policy of this system is to assist the native to develop that civilisation which he can himself evolve.1

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

The regencies were divided into districts, each with an official called wedana at its head. The districts were divided into sub-districts, presided over by Asstt. wedanas. The native administrative officials had no legislative power. Below sub-district heads stood the villages, whose administrative organisation was purely indigenous. All native officials received instructions from the higher Dutch authorities and executed them accordingly.

The Decentralisation law of 1903 had established the first municipalities. Before 1905 the cities were governed by the administrative corps. The governmental reorganisation of 1922 and 1925 had set up municipal council. The composition of the council differed from the provincial and regency councils in that all of its members were elective, who were mostly Dutch men. Mayor, like the governor and the regent, served doubled capacity. He was both an official of the central and provincial governments and of the municipal council. Like the regent council, the municipal council stood under the preventive supervision of the provincial board of

1. Dr. Kat Angelino: op.cit. p.88
deputies and the repressive control of the G.G. 1

The revenue of the council came mainly from access on government taxes mostly paid by Europeans and from municipal services such as housing, the supply of electricity, water, trams, and buses. The council also dealt with theatres, swimming baths, roads, markets, primary education and so on.2

VARGADERING (ASSEMBLY)

The vergadering was a meeting in which an official discussed affairs with representatives of the people and had both educative and democratic character. From the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816, the resident was expected to hold once month a vergadering of his subordinates for the discussion of current affairs; the regent held similar meeting of his subordinates. Van den Bosch developed the practice under the culture system, till the downfall of the Dutch regime.3

The sub-district officer held a gathering of his 10 or 12 village headmen once a week; the district officer held gathering of sub-district officers and others some times a month; the regent held a gathering of district officers and others once a month and the resident or assttresident like-wise held a gathering once a month. The controleur held no gathering, but attended that of the resident or assttresident and was at liberty to attend the gathering of the regent or his sub-ordinates. Attendance was restricted to administrative officers and village headmen. At every meeting, from that of the sub-district upwards, departmental officers of the appropriate rank might ask or be invited to attend for the

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.137
2. Ibid
3. Furnivall: op.cit. p.237
discussion of affairs concerning their departments. Forest officers, public health officers, education officers and officers of the agricultural, veterinary or credit services might attend as necessary to explain policy or smooth out difficulties. Similarly at the gathering of the sub-district or district officers, the village officials, the village police-men, school master or the man in charge of irrigation might accompany the village headmen. Ordinarily only 1 or 2 services would be represented in any meeting and there was no need for specialist officers to attend unless there was some matter within their sphere of interest to discuss. The controleur might be presented at any of these meetings to represent the views of government and to help in clearing up misunderstandings and removing difficulties.1

CIVIL SERVICE

The Indonesian civil servants may be divided into European and Indonesian officials. The former were recruited and trained in the Netherlands, while the latter were recruited and trained in Indonesia. The crown had the right to appoint the members of the council of the East Indies, chairman of the volksraad, president of the high court, chairman and members of auditing chamber, governor general, and other superior European officials. All European officials had to undergo training in the royal academy at Deft and at the Leiden university in the Netherlands. The course of study was five years. After completing their studies there, they were selected for different posts in Indonesia.2

Whereas, the Indonesian civil servants had also to undergo some training at the administrative school called Osvia. The school

1. ibid p. 239
2. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. pp. 165
was 8 in number; 6 in Java, 1 at Bukit Qinggi, central Sumatra and 1 at Maccasar in Celebes. The course of study was three years. The graduates of the Osvia went into the service as asstt.wedanas (sub-district heads) or wedanas (district heads). The G.G. appointed and removed all the Indonesian officials. He had the power of conferring the power of appointment and removal upon lower authorities. 1

The salary scale of the Indonesian officials was also classified into European and Indonesian. The European civil servants received their salaries per annum as below: G.G., £ 14,000, free use of 3 palaces and allowances; each member of the council of the East Indies, £ 3000; governor, £ 1,800, free houses and allowances (from £ 150 to £ 300); representative for native princes, £ 1,600 free house and reception money, £ 300; residency adviser, £ 1200 resident £ 1100 and £ 1000 at first and free house; residency secretary (first class), £ 1000 and £ 800 at first and (second class) £ 800 and £ 600 at first; Asstt.resident, £ 75 - £ 450 at first and free house; administrative controleur, £ 300; controleur, £ 700 and £ 225 at first and free house; Asstt.controleur, £ 180 and aspirant controleur, £ 150 per annum.2

While the salary for Indonesian officials was: Bupati (regent), £ 1200 and £ 53,600 only for the regent of Tjiandur per annum; patih, £ 475 and £ 325; patih of Jakarta, who was not under any regent, £ 600 and £ 500; Demaré, £ 260; Luras £ 145 and Kliwan, £ 100. The desa headman received no regular salary but he was granted

1. Ibid, p.167
2. Cambell: op.cit. p.1190
8% of the taxes he collected, together with the produce of certain fields allotted to him.1

The Indonesian civil servants also received pension, amounting to half of their salaries, after 25 years of service. They could obtain furlough or leave only once in 10 years. Widows and orphans were also provided with liberal pensions.

The government expenditure for salaries increased from 37,000,000 florins in 1900 to 96,000,000 florines in 1917 and to 224,000,000 florins in 1928. The cost of pensions alone increased from 38,000,000 florins in 1922 to 72,000,000 florins in 1932, exclusive of the pensions in the government enterprises. From 1916 to 1928 there was a marked increase in both the number of employees and the average salary. During this period the number of employees increased 47% and the average salary 50%. The total number of employees increased from 153,795 in 1917 to 212,386 in 1928. The number of European employees remained practically constant, 29,055 in 1917 and 29,343 in 1928. Between 1928 and 1932, the number of Indonesians employed in class B civil service category rose only from 4,872 to 6,054 and in class C, from 190 to 277. Europeans (Dutch, Eurasian) Class B personnel numbered 11,164 in 1928 and 8,761 in 1932; Class C, 7,944 in 1928 and 7,951 in 1932. The total salary of B and C classes in 1928 was 47,500,000 and 58,700,000 florins respectively.2

In October, 1940, out of the 3039 high ranking civil services position only 221 were held by the Indonesians. Indonesians

1. Ibid. Chap. XIX, part v, p.1190
2. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit.p.171
in 1940 held 5023 out of the 13,172 upper middle civil service positions and 8830 out of 14,212 lower middle rank positions.1

The statistics of October, 1938, showed a distribution of the 4 civil service categories: Europeans, lower personnel, 0.6%, lower middle, 33.3%, middle 57.6%, higher 92.2%, Indonesians, 98.9%, 60.6% 38.0%; assimilated Indonesians, 0.3%, 3.3%, 2.0, 0.5%, Chinese , 0.3%, 2.3%, 1.5%, 0.3% and assimilated Chinese, lower middle, 0.4%, middle, 0.8% and higher 0.5%.1

The ordinary expenditures of the central government in 1931 amounting to 516,000,000, of which 192,000,000 florins went for salaries and another 65,000,000 florins on the public debts and retirement. The ordinary receipts declined from 521,813,000 florins in 1928 to 346,000,000 florins in 1931. Thus the expenditures on salaries, pensions and interest on the public debt about equaled the public revenues.2

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The East Indian government Act of 1854 laid down the regulation and the administration of its desa or village were left to the indigenous commune. Article 128, section 1, of the act guaranteed to these desas the right of electing their heads and administrators. Art.128, S.1., section 5 and art.26 draft ordinance granted the village or commune complete autonomy.3

After an official statement by Queen Wilhelmina in 1901, concerning the liberal policy in Indonesia, the system of local self-government was introduced in the country in 1903. In 1906, the

1. Brugman and Sunario: op. cit. p.56
2. H.Vandebosch: op.cit. p.172
3. Art. 128, S.1., section 5, and Art.26 draft ordinance.
government decided further to regulate legal position of the village autonomous units in Java and Madura. There were over 20,000 villages in these places.

The village administration in Indonesia was conducted by a village council, consisting of a village head-man and several other elected members. The composition and the election of the head of the village council were subject to the approval of the regency council.1

The incomes of the village council (headman and his assistants) were fixed by the regency council in agreement with the population. The desa headman was generally responsible for good order and for the administration of the internal unit of the rest of the commune. He supervised the finance, the lands and the establishments and other possessions of the village in accordance with the rules made by the regency council and he had to indemnity the commune for damages resulting from his bad faith or neglect.

For village credit institutions special rules had been laid down by ordinance in 1925. In the exercise of his power, the desa headman consulted as far as possible the other members of the desa administration. He represented the desa in and out of court.2

The village headman played important role in supporting the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia. He became a strong backbone of authorisation in the village. Being an agent of the company, he supplied native labour to the Dutch capitalists and forced the village population to construct roads and other public works. In Java such compulsory labour of the village population was ended in 1916 and outside Java it was never abolished, though in 1941

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1. Art. 1 in Stbl. 1907, p.212
2. Stbl. 1925, p.65C for the province of west Java
a law has passed making it possible to avoid liability for such labour by the payment of the tax. The liability for such labour in Java was 42 days per year in 1882, from 12-36 days in 1893 and 10-30 days in 1921, though by the latter date the average actually worked was only 5 days. In 1905, the population was given the alternative of making a money payment in lieu of labour. As late as 1941, the village headman was almost exclusively an instrument of the Dutch authorities.

The village council dealt with the following subjects: 1. roads and ways, 2. lock gates, 3. buildings, 4. open places, 5. market places, 6. water conduits and reservoirs, 7. preparation, spend of the village budget passed by the village assembly, 8. leasing of village to planters, 9. primary schools, 10, village bank and padi bank, stud bull and pedigree post, 11. registration of marriage and death, 12, convening of village meeting, 13. hearing and settling of small disputes among the villagers, 14. appointment and removal by the village headman of religious priests, police etc and 15. other related matters.

The electoral law was promulgated provided for the election of desa headmen in Java and Madura. Inhabitants who could be able to render personal services were entitled to vote as well as members of the desa administration, former headmen who had honourably left their function and religious teachers, mosque officials and the keeper of secret graves who had been recognised by the chief of the division. The suffrage also depended upon the possession of property and land. The electoral meeting took place in the village in the presence of a

1. Burger: op. cit. p. 167
2. Campbell: op. cit. p. 400
commission appointed for every sub-district by the chief of the
division. A commission consisted of at least 2 members. The
voters elected a desa headmen from the list of candidates proposed
by the villagers. This election should be approved by the
recrency council. The elected headmen served his term for life so
long as he was loyal to the Dutch regime. 1

Outside Java, village unions and federations of unions had
been established by the government in 1918. The village administra­
tion of the west coast of Sumatra, for example, was entrusted to
a village council and a desa headman. The council was composed of
popular chiefs or elders of the village and inhabitants of the
village appointed from a list of candidates by the head of regional
administration. These candidates might be able to read and write. The
council elected from its midst a village chief who became leader of
the council. Here decision of the council might be preceded by the
consultation prescribed by local customs. The headman of the desa
might execute the decisions of the council. He was at the day to
day administration in the desa and might call upon inhabitants to
render communal services. But the council progress was handicapped to
some extent by the adat prevailing in the country. The illiteracy
of some desa headmen and their life terms of office also hampered
the democratic development of the village institutions all over
Indonesia. 2

NATIVE STATES

For the last 3½ centuries Indonesia was under direct
and indirect rule of the Dutch government. There were 282 native

1. Stbl. 1907, 212; Ibid. p.398
2. Dr.De Kat Angelino; op. cit. Chap. V. p.401
states (indirect ruled states); 278 in the outer provinces and 4 in Java. These states had more than half the area of Indonesia outside Java and 7% of that island. They differed greatly in size, population, and importance. They ranged in population from 350 to 1,704,000 persons. The four states in Java possessed a population of 1,700,000 (Surkarta), 1,400,000 (Jokjakarta) 910,000 (Mangkunagara) and 110,000 (Pakualam).

As regards the administration of state, it was divided into regencies, divisions, sub-divisions, districts, sub-districts and villages. Under the ruler or sultan, the administrative communities could continue to exist with their corporate administration, while in other cases direct administration organised by the ruler partly took the place of the adat chiefs. In some cases a ruler or sultan governed with assistance of a council of state composed of members of his family to which were or were not added some popular chiefs; in other cases there was a council of state consisting of representatives of confederated small states with the influential sultan as their leader. This system was called the corporate form of government. In south Celebes were this form fo the government was found, the federative states were composed of so called ornamentships over which the chiefs had great authority because they were the keepers of certain sacred objects like meteoric stones, flags, etc.

Moreover, in art. 4, section 2 of the Indonesian state rules, the governments of the states were empowered to appoint an

1. H. Armstrong, op. cit. p.459
2. De Kat Angelino: op cit. p.114
advisory council if they wished it. In view of the fact that in such a council by the side grandees some popular chiefs might also be appointed, popular influence might be able to establish a link between the lower adat communities and the government of states. in Java the sultan recently had decided to establish representative advisory councils (Balai agung) whose functions might be gradually extended.1

In short, the native states were autocratic or oligarchic in character. They were outwardly ruled by their sultan, nominally hereditary and the regencies were under the leadership of regents selected by the Dutch authority from the most aristocratic family. The state law, finance and internal affairs were subject to the Dutch control, the sultan was not in reality an independent prince.

The native princes received indemnification for the loss of their power income. In Surakarta it amounted to as much as £ 73,278 annually and in Jakarta to £ 39,305. Besides this they had enormous incomes from their private estates. All the money was spent, however, in keeping up their huge establishments with their state and pomp.2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIVE STATES

in the early days of the East India Company, the relationship between the central government and the native states was on a basis of equality. Later, treaties of alliance were made between the company and some of the states and the relationship between the two was that of confederate against other states. Later still the company began to exercise some authority in some of the native states but only on the basis of agreement. In the 18th century, the relationship changed as the chapter of the company gradually shifted from

1. Art. 4 section 2 of the Indonesian state regulation
2. De Angelino, op.cit. p.116
that of merchant to ruler. The native states now began to take
a position of vassalage. The last example of an international
state was Achin before the Achin war (1870-1918). Thus the
position of the native states was gradually reduced to from that
of an independent state to a subordinate part of the Dutch East
Indies Company, while the relationship between the East India
Company and the Netherlands and the native states also shifted
more and more from a Bilateral to a unilateral basis.  

After an insurrection in Lombok in 1896 and in Achin
(1898), the government decided upon a new policy, which was later
formulated in a declaration of policy by G. G., Van Heutsz in 1907.
This policy in theory included for:

1. The judicious extension of Dutch influence in regions
where the existing circumstances were a hindrance to welfare, social
freedom, culture and civilisation, freedom and the development of
the country and the people;

2. The abandonment of the policy of abstention from
interference with the internal affairs of states left with greater
or less degree of self government;

3. Peaceful efforts so as to change the relationships with
the native states and to give satisfactory guarantee of a gradual
improvement in administration and justice;

4. Special attention to finance in order that the revenues
might serve the development of the country and its people;

5. A decisive insistence with the avoidance of anything
which might lead to the use of force, that the rulers of the
native states strived for the welfare and the improvement of the

1. De Ket Angelino: op. cit. p. 112 Van Vollenhoven; Kolonial
Tijdschrift, March, 1928, p. 127
economic conditions of the people;

6. The incorporation of the native states into the government territory only takes place at the request of the chiefs or the people or where it appeared unavoidable in the interest of the people;

7. In the Javanese principalities the administrative organisation which would lead to the gradual assimilation of social and economic conditions to those existing in the directly ruled areas.1

According to the short declaration signed by the Dutch authority and the native states, the ruler of the state recognised the sovereignty of the Netherlands or the paramountcy of the crown, promised not to enter into political relations with foreign powers and agreed to execute and maintain all regulations and rules which with the respect of the state were issued in the name of the queen or C.G. or his representatives and in general to carry out all orders given him by or in the name of the C.G. or his representative. At present there were 254 native states who signed the short declaration, while 15 others still maintained the long declaration (contract).2

The short declarations were supplemented by the native states regulations of 1914, 1919 and 1927. The native states regulation of 1927 was regarded as a constitution for all native states and had forced them into a single mould no matter how great their actual diversity in size, population, traditions, customs, institutional structures, etc. The maritime belt was always excluded from the constitution. The boundaries of each state were set by the head of the district administration after consultation with the ruler of the state. Disputes over boundary lines of the states were

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2. Kat Angelinc: op. cit. p.113; A Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.149
settled by the chief district officer, subject to appeal to the G.G. Free use or cession of land might be granted to the central government whenever the latter required it, subject restitution to individuals who had claims on it. The central government might grant concessions or licenses for the exploitation of the sub-soil within the states; the profits from these grants were divided equally between the central government and the states. The decision of the profits in each case would be made by the G.C. The G.C. might remove a ruler for misconduct in office. The successor to the office was made by the G.C. The proteges or advisers to the ruler were appointed and dismissed by the chief district officers, after consultation with the ruler. In the absence of a ruler the chief district officer temporarily took over the administration of the government. In Surakarta and Jogjakarta the G.C. appointed a special Javanese, acting as immediate between the resident and the native prince, being paid £1000 a year.

Furthermore, there was far reaching power on the part of the appropriate local officials to declare applicable to the native states rules and regulations which were in force elsewhere in directly ruled territories or alternatively by agreement with the rulers, to secure the enactment in the states of identical legislation.

The sultanates of Jogjakarta and Surakarta in central Java were ruled nominally by the sultans. To these states, governors were appointed to, who with their staff took care of the relations between the Indonesian central government and the native states.

1. Zelfbestuurs regelen, 1927, Arts. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8;
Vandenbosch: op cit pp. 150-151
Theoretically, the native states were left free in the regulation of their internal affairs, but in practice they were deprived of their jurisdiction and freedom of actions over the following subjects: 1. control of foreign affairs, 2. military defence, 3. import and export, 4. possession and trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives, 5. harbour, 6. police and administration, 7. telegraphs and telephones, 8. prospecting and exploiting of minerals, 9. regulation concerning the disposal of land or the use of land by persons not belonging to the native population of Indonesia, 10. the mutual rights and duties of employers and employees or works, 11. water board, 12. regulation of the right of association and assembly and the limitation thereon, and 13. other related matters.1

Besides, the central government sometime took over the administration of justice and large part of education. All secondary education, all lower education for Europeans and Chinese, as lower education for Indonesian children with Dutch as the medium of instruction, was in the hands of the central government. The G.G. (Art. 18) retained the exclusive right to prohibit persons regarded as threatening the public peace and orders from remaining in any state or to assign to such persons a definite place of residence outside the native state.2

The rulers of the states must accept the guidance of the European administration. The central government, under the fiction of furnishing aid, sent one of its services into a state to take over that branch of the state administration.

According to Art. 13 of the native states regulation of 1927, the following persons were excluded from the state's

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1. A. Emerson: op. cit. p. 452
2. Art. 18 of the state regulation of 1927
jurisdiction and enjoyed fully the extra territorial right. 1. Europeans and those assimilated to them. 2. Non-indigenous Asians. 3. Indonesian employees of the central government. 4. All persons settled within the boundaries of the state on land ceded to or placed at the disposal of the central government. 5. Indonesians from the outside temporarily sojourning within the state, and 5. Indonesians who had entered into a labour contract—contract coolies and free labourers.1

These subjects of the central government were under the jurisdiction of the central government in every respect, law, administration, police, justice and taxation. The number of persons enjoying extra-territoriality naturally varied from place to place. In the east coast of Sumatra, their number was almost twice as the state own subjects. Of 10 million (now 12,400,000) total population of the states, about 700,000 persons were beneficiaries of the system of extraterritoriality.

With regard to the judicial field, the central government also intervened in the judicial problems of the states. Various state's subjects had been brought before the courts of the central government. All persons who enjoyed the extraterritorial rights were under the jurisdiction of the central government. The central government's courts might take jurisdiction over offences against the security of the realm or concerning the property and revenue of the central government and over violations of general and local ordinances and regulations which were applicable to the state. Even within their own limited sphere of jurisdiction the states courts

1. A. Emerson: op cit. p.154
were of course subject to the guidance and supervision of the local Dutch administrators and elaborate provision was made in the native state regulations for the review of their decisions. To the C.G. was reserved the exclusive right of pardon as well as the right of review all death sentences before their execution. In brief, the states surrendered to the central government either the whole or some part of their judicial powers.1

In financial matters, from ancient times all the income of the state was at the free disposal of the ruler. An instruction of 1907 provided for separation between the income and expenditures of the rulers and the income and expenditure of the state; the introduction of yearly budgets and the fixing of the civil list for the ruler. As a part of Indonesia, the native states might contribute to the general expenditure of the central government. This contribution was made indirectly in the form of indirect taxes collected by the central government such as import duties, the income from theopium and salt monopolies and mining concessions.2

Of a total income for all the native states in the outer islands of 19,622,000 florins in 1935, the central government contributed 1,265,000 florins as indemnification from the rights which it had removed from them and a further sum of 4,019,000 florins (1935) was the sum paid as restitution to the central government. The states might also make partial restitution for services of the agencies of the central government in functions for which there was a joint responsibility. In short, the budget making and the budgetary

1. Ibid p.455
2. Vandenbosch: op.cit. pp.151-152
control had been passed into the hands of the European officials on the spot. The state's revenue was very limited to the income of taxes over the trade, individual income, public services, etc. They yet contributed huge amount of money to the central government annually.1

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Indonesian judicial organisation can be divided into:

The government courts for Europeans consisted of 1 high court at Jakarta, 6 courts of justice at Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Padang, Medan and Makassar, and 90 residency courts found in every capital and big towns all over Indonesia.2

The high court of Jakarta was the highest court in the country. It consisted of 1 president, 1 vice-president, 7 members, 1 attorney-general, 2 advocate generals, 1 secretary and 2 under secretaries. The president was appointed by the king, while other members were named by the G.G. with the advice of the council of the Indies. The high court had both original and appealate jurisdictions. It was also charged with the general supervision of the work of the lower courts.

The courts of justice had also both original and appealate jurisdictions in civil cases involving the Europeans and those who were subject to the European civil and commercial laws and in criminal cases over the Europeans, only. Their jurisdiction

1. Zelfbestuurmen, Encyclopaedie, IV, p.830
2. De Ket Angelinot op.cit. p.145
extended over the Europeans and natives, foreign Asiatés.

The composition of the courts of justice of Jakarta, Surabaya and Semarang respectively was: President, 1, 1, and 1; vice-president, 3, 2, and 1; members, 10, 6, and 5; officers of the justice 1, 1, and 1; secretary, 1, 1, and 1 and first deputy secretary 1, 1, and 1.

The residency courts constituted the lowest courts for the Europeans and was composed of a judge who was assisted by a secretary. The judge of the residency court served in a double capacity, as he was also chairman of the landraad. In Java and Madura he might be a law graduate but in the other islands he was often an official of the interim administration. These courts had a civil jurisdiction involving the amount not exceeding over 1500 florins and over all labour agreements irrespective of nationality of the parties. In the outer territories these courts had jurisdiction over minor offenses.

The government courts for the Indonesians consisted of 1. 90 landraad (superior indigenous courts), 2. over 79 regency courts, and 3. over 395 district courts.

The landraad was instituted in every capital of regency and other places and was composed of an official judge (chairman) and several other members as well as a secretary, a clerk and adjaksa (prosecutor). The chairman of the landraad were mostly Europeans and very few Indonesians. The landraad was a general court for civil cases for natives and non-indigenous Asiatés. Appeal could be made to the high court of justice at Jakarta.

1. Dr. Supomo: Sistem hukum di Indonesia, Jakarta, April, 1954, Chap. 2, p. 30
2. Arts. 77-80, 84-99, I.R.
3. Dr. Supomo, op. cit. pp. 146-147
The regency court was set up in every regency. It was formed by the regent or patih (governor) as its sole judge who was assisted by councillors. There were also a djaksa and penshulu as advisers. It decided both civil and criminal cases subject to appeal to the landraad.

The district court was established almost in every district all over Indonesia and consisted of the head of the district as judge who was assisted by many indigenous chiefs as advisers appointed by resident after consultation with the regent.

Besides, in some places in the outer provinces, there were magistrate courts directly under the charge of magistrate. They decided criminal cases for which there was no appeal as well as Sometimes civil cases, subject to appeal before the landraad.

Moreover, there were also 52 land tribunals (14 in Java and Madura and 8 in other islands) for all population groups, each consisting of a jurist who was assisted by a clerk. They decided minor criminal cases without appeal.

In the native states there were four kinds of courts: 1. pradoto, 2. Surambi, 3. pradoto gede and 4. inner kraton court. All these existed only in Surakarta, Mangkunagara and Jogjakarta in Java, while the rest of the native states had lost their judicial powers. The pradoto court consisted of a judge (chairman), several members as advisers, secretary and djaksa. The surambi court was composed of wadona Jogaswara as a judge, some subordinate officials and a secretary and that of pradoto gede comprising a chairman, some members (Katibs), a secretary, djaksa and penghulu (priests).

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1. Dr. De Kat Angelino: op. cit. pp. 155
Finally the inner kraton court consisted of a chairman, 2 members, 1 secretary, penghulu and djaksa. The prince (putera mahkota) acted a chairman and appointed all other members of the court. 1

Moreover, there were also 1. priest court (readagama), 2. high priest court (makkamah Islam tinggi) at Jakarta 3. kadi court (pengadilan kadi) and 4. chief kadi court. The priest court consisted of a chairman, and 3-8 members appointed by the resident or governor. The high priest court comprised a president, 2 members a secretary and a deputy secretary. The kadi court consisted of a kadi (judge), participants of the court session and a secretary and that of the chief kadi court, a chief kadi, participants of the court's session and a secretary. These priest courts followed the rules and principles of Mohammedan law and decided exlesiastical questions such as family, marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. 2

In addition there were 1. military courts, 2. high military tribunal at Jakarta, 3. naval tribunals at Tjiwahi, Maccasar and Padang. The military court consisted of a president and 4 members appointed by the military commander and that of the high military court, 2 lawyers (one of them became president), 2 high officers of the army, 2 high officers of the navy and a secretary. The naval tribunals comprised the naval officers. 3.

Finally, the village courts still existed throughout Indonesia. In the residency of Bengkulen there was a great rapat (tribunal) presided over by the controleur, acting as the chairman

1. Dr. H. Supomo, op. cit. pp. 69-72
2. Ibid. pp. 76-79
3. Ibid. pp. 49-53
of the court, consisting of at least five chiefs of morgas (village union) and independent chiefs of passars. The village rapats in other places consisted of a few headmen. In south Tapanuli, the village court was conducted by chiefs of the village community, assisted by the village headmen. In central Sumatra the rapat negeri, rapat ninik mamak and rapat kaum was presided over by the village headman, consisting of chiefs of tribes Kadi and priests. There was a village court in Ambon in every village, composing of the village chief as chairman and members of the village council as members. The village court was based on the customary law. Appeal could be made to the district courts of the regency.

EFFECTS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ON INDONESIA

The first world war had considerably strengthened the national consciousness, progressed political reforms and influenced the economic and social conditions of the Indonesian people throughout the country. The nationalist leaders were endeavouring to spread the spirit and sense of nationalism, liberalism and democraticism and to organise political movements to attain the independence of their motherland. The Serikat Islam formed in 1915 advocated the struggle for national emancipation.

The national consciousness grew rapidly with the formation of multiferious national organisation and parties throughout the country. These organisations included the Budi utomo (1908), Minahasa association (1912), Mena Muria organisation (1913), Wilhemina association (1908), Ambon bond (1919) Mohammadiah movement (1918), national

1. Ibid. pp. 81-82
Indies party (1919), Sumatra association (1918), society of students interested in Indonesia (1919), Indonesian social democratic association (1914), the Indonesian independence association or N.I.V.B. (1916), the Christian ethical party or C.E.P. (1917), Indonesian Catholic party or I.K.P. (1918), political economic league or P.E.B. (1919), Maduran association (1920), Maduran league (1925), Timor union (1924), Ahmadiah movement (1924), Communist party of Indonesia (1920), high council of Islam or Ma'ai (1922) and nationalist party of Indonesia (1927). The serikat abang (1914), the serikat Hejo (1924), the Indonesian trade union (1918) and others were also organised. The Jambi revolution of 1916, the Padang congress of 1922, a pan Islamic congress of 1925 at Bandung, the budi utomo congress of July 30, 1924 and the Indonesian student's association in the Netherlands, all struggled for national liberation and economic emancipation of the country.1

With regard to political developments, certain reforms notably unification of the income tax, eligibility of all subjects to office, equal rights of the population in other respect as well legislation and creation of the volksraad came into effect only after the first world war (1914-1918).

The war had led to the loosening of ties which formerly bound Indonesia to Europe and consequently Indonesia had formed mercantile connections with other countries round the Pacific ocean. There had been a general congress at Jakarta in 1922 and conferences for medicine and ethnology. Experts from various countries round the Pacific had visited Indonesia to study condition and public

Even before and during the war, the political freedom for Indonesia was openly expressed by the Indonesian leader, Tjokroaminoto at the first national congress of 1916. The war compelled the Dutch government to change their policy toward Indonesia. In 1916, the Netherlands parliament passed a bill for the institution of the volksraad at Jakarta. The volksraad was materialised in May 1918. It had an advisory functions and the franchise was very much restricted. The majority of its members were Netherlanders residing in Indonesia. Some of its members were appointed by the G.C. In 1925, its membership was expanded to 60 persons. At the opening of the volksraad in 1918, the G.C., J.P.C. Van L.Stirum, said "The road has been taken, never to be abandoned, toward the goal of responsible government in Indonesia itself, which in concert with the volksraad, shall have the right to take final decisions in all matters which are not of general imperial (state) concern. In proper time and degree, so far as is compatible with due appreciation of the consequences of each new step, we must proceed directly toward this end."  

In 1918, minister, M.Colijn, (prime minister in 1925) published an article in which he declared that the institution of the volksraad would intensify the wish for a complete parliament. The second session of the volksraad in the autumn of 1918 gave further form and substance to this point of view. The volksraad was, during the discussions, declared as revelation both to the government

1. Alting Bunings: op.cit. p.111
2. Ibid p.112
and to the country.1

The radical concentration in the volksraad, consisting of the Indonesian social democratic union, the serikat islam, the insulinde part, the national Indonesian party and the budi utomo demanded for convocation of a provisional parliament to frame a new democratic constitution. For this purpose, the revision commission was appointed by the government on December 17, 1918, consisting of 30 members such as Prof. Carpentier Alting (chairman), Jacob, Utoyo, Radjiman, Sukiman, Teewan, Wewaruntu, Arus Selim, F. M. C. Koch, Derwis Bt. Madjelelo, Cramer, H. H. Kan, Kinderman, Welter, etc.2

In June, 1920, the commission submitted its report to the government the following main proposals to be included in the constitution of the kingdom of the Netherlands:

1. Recognition of Indonesia as an independent part of the kingdom, the centre of gravity of the government, being shifted to Indonesia itself;

2. Elevation of the volksraad to the status of a general co-legislative representative body, to be constitute for the greater by election;

3. Transference of government of Indonesia to a board formed by the G.G. and the council of the Netherlands India, the former having authority to over-rule the latter, and the members of this governing body, being charged with political control of the general administrative departments;

4. Limitation of the authority of the legislative body in the Netherlands, (a) settlement of questions concerning the kingdom

1. Ibid
as a whole, (b) suspension or annulment of legislative measures
adopted in Indonesia if contrary to the interest of the state,
(c) and adjustment of disputes in dealing with legislative measures,
arising between the Government and parliament of Indonesia;
5. Transfer at least in principle, of the right of establishing the
budget to the C.G. and the representative body in the Netherlands
similar to that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
6. Formation of all representative bodies, including those in
subdivisions of the country, mainly by directions and by establishing
equal rights for all races, between which, therefore, no distinction
can be made except in the government of purely native communities.1

The amended constitution of 1920 had accepted the principle
of the autonomy of Indonesia and it presupposed the creation of a
representative body to cooperate in legislation. At the same time
a decision was reached in principle to limit the authority both
of the legislative body and the government in the Netherlands as
regards the affairs of the oversea dominions.2

In the military field, the world war had increased the
importance of the defence problem in Indonesia. A navy bill was
rejected in 1923 and new measures were now being prepared. The
compulsory military service was introduced in Indonesia, in 1920,
but the regulations of 1922-23, it was imposed only upon Europeans,
not upon natives or foreign orientals. As a result of the war, an
energetic propaganda of the service was carried on by an Indonesian
committee of defence, which was composed of representatives of
various groups of inhabitants and which visited the Netherlands,

1. Alting Bunine : op. cit. p.113
2. Ibid.
in 1916 to promote this principle, meeting with cardial appreciation.

The Indonesian social democratic union was against the
Indonesian defense movement, whereas the serikat islam was in favour
of this view and was of the opinion that decision upon compulsory
military service could be made only by a really representative body
elected by the people of Indonesia and that the introduction of a
militia should be contingent upon granting political rights to the
natives. A militia bill was discussed during the second session of
the volksraad of 1919. On January 16, 1920, a motion was passed
to postpone the bill. Since 1916, natives in Indonesia might be
trained as officers and if they had received their preparation in
the Netherlands, they were on an equal footing with European
officers.1

Economically, the war had numerous consequences over the
economic life of the country. In Indonesia the price of food supplies
rose up and this led the government to intervene and take measures
to prevent. Exports of maize, ground-nuts, rice and cassava products
were prohibited; the commissariat was instructed to take steps
necessary for the purchase of essentials of life for officials
of the state and where required for the civil population; maximum
prices were fixed for some articles such as rice. In 1914, after
1 or 2 months, most of the export prohibitions were withdrawn.

The financial measures taken were the notes of Java bank
which were declared to be legal tender, the obligatory specie
covering being reduced from 40 to 20 % and the shape of activity
of the bank of issue being extended to support commerce and

1. ibid p.115
2. ibid p.116
and industry. In 1915, it became necessary to prohibit exports of gold and silver coin and to issue notes of one and two and half guilders. The gold produced in Indonesia was purchased by the Java bank at the rate of 1,648 guilders per kilo fine. Ultimately, an ordinance was promulgated which authorised the government to issue and mortgage treasury notes and exchequer bonds. As a result the price of food stuffs fell and the prices for Indonesian export produce, due to high demand in the belligerent countries, rose after their initial sharp decline.1

During the first few months of the war, absolute contraband and conditional contraband commodities might be transported freely. In the second half of August, 1914, however, freighters were again put in service, and cargoes were accepted for all destinations, though at a much higher rate. According to a communication from the section of industry and commerce this was fixed on August 1, 1914, at 15 guilders per cubic meter. On August 12, freight rates for all commodities were raised by 20%. As from November 20, the freight rate was already 30% above that of August and on December 16, another 20% was added. The freight rate for coffee for example, had risen from 19.50 guilders on August 1 to 30.50 guilders per cubic meter in December. After September 3, no cargoes were accepted for the central powers and all shipments of rice, cocoa, coffee, tapioca, tea and rubber were stopped unless destined for a French or British port. Various other products could be consigned to the Netherlands government, while shipments of coffee in small quantities of 20 tons might be sent to the Netherlands.2

1. Ibid p.119
2. Ibid p.63
In addition to the restraints upon the contraband commodities, trade was hampered by the delays in telegraphic communication due to the censorship and the closing of the Yap cable office and also in delays in the postal service. At the end of 1914, the price of refined sugar had risen from 7.50 guilders per picul in July to 12 guilders in August. Prices of tobacco, coffee, tea, rubber and other European plantation products were satisfactory. On the other hand, such native outputs as copra, peanuts, cassava products, maize and rice remained low because of export prohibitions and high freight rates. In 1915, prices of pepper cassava and copra had advanced considerably owing to high demand from America. The Netherlands overseas trust company (N.O.T.R) carried out Indonesian trade. From 1916 onward exports to U.S.A, Australia and Eastern Asia increased heavily and importers also began to order more and more goods from America and Japan. As early as 1914, the Netherlands steamship company and the Rotterdam Lloyd had begun service from Java to New York round the Cape in January, 1916.

By the end of 1916, owing to lack of cargo space, large stocks were stored in warehouses and only cinchona and tobacco could be exported freely to all destinations. Consequently the prices of rice, sugar, bread and clothing had risen to about $140 in 1916, as compared with $100 in 1914. Food stuffs of foreign origins such as flour, maizena, maize, etc. were on an average 50% dearer than in 1914, while textiles had risen by about 30% in 1916.

1. Ibid p. 65
Indonesian exports and imports with the U.S.A. and Japan in millions of guilders in 1914 and 1916 were as follows: U.S.A. imports, 10 and 31 millions and exports, 16 and 98 millions; Japan 6 and 27 m. and 19 and 18 m. In 1914 and 1916 the Japanese businessmen visited Indonesia to study economic conditions of the country and to capture Indonesian markets for their manufactured goods. Jakarta had become an important market during the war.1

In July, 1917, the Indonesian commerce and agriculture was seriously affected, when the Netherlands withdrew vessels under its flag from Indonesia traffic. Only 5 ships arrived in the Netherlands from Indonesia and only 16 vessels sailed to Indonesia. Prices of sugar, coffee, rubber, etc. fell down considerably. In 1918, Indonesia faced with an increasing shortage of food stuffs. This was due to the embargoes on the export of rice from Rangoon in October, 1917. In December, 1917, the Government of Indonesia imported 400,000 tons of rice from Rangoon and 85,000 tons of rice from other countries in 1918. Flour was purchased in Australia, soya beans were imported from Manchuria and sago was brought to Java from the outer provinces.2.

In 1918, the value of Indonesian export to Europe declined; 65 million guilders in 1918, 300 m. in 1914; to the U.S.A., 110 m. in 1918, 200 m. in 1917, 16 m. 1911; to Japan 78 m. in 1918, 31 m. in 1917, 19 m. in 1914; to Singapore, 28 m. 20 m. in 1914. In the same year Indonesia imported from Europe to the value of 95 millions

1. Ibid pp. 65-57
2. Ibid p. 68
The year 1919 and 1920 formed the period of apparent prosperity. Commodities produced by Indonesia like sugar, tea, rubber etc. were sold at fantastic prices. Commerce and agriculture profited twice. The total values of the Indonesian exports from 1913 to 1923 in million guilders were: In 1913, 684; 1914, 684; 1915, 771; 1916, 868; 1917, 793; 1918, 680; 1919, 2,167; 1920, 2,238; 1921, 1,196; 1922, 1,149, 1923, 1,378. The difference of the value in as of exports between 1913 and 1923 was about 690 million guilders. 2

The Java bank in its report published the export figures for Java and Madura in 1924 as follows: Not less than 1,829,000 tons of refined sugar were shipped from Java in 1924 and export of Java tobacco rose from 38,000 tons in 1923 to 50,000 in 1924, of coffee from 21,000 to 39,000 tons and of rice from 25,000 to 38,000 tons, of maize from 38,000 to 79,000 tons and coconut oil from 1.4 million liters to 7.9 million. The prices of most commodities were higher in 1924 than in 1923, the export value of the former should be over 1500 million guilders. 3

Another consequence of the war was the increased yields of the income taxes for 1914 to 1923, amounting to 3,378 million guilders. Before the war it was estimated at about 20 million guilders.

1. Ibid p. 70
2. Ibid p. 71
3. Ibid p. 93
annually. The handelsreningsh Amsterdam and the cultuur
maatschappij der varstende increased their capital investments in
Indonesia by 8,000,000 and over 10,000,000 guilders respectively. It
also affected the Indonesian budget. The public debt of Indonesia
increased by about 1125 million guilders, being due to deficits on
(a) ordinary expenditure, 225,000,000 guilders, (b) extra-ordinary
expenditure ,886,000,000, (c) expenditure for naval extension,
26,000,000 and (d) expenditure for food, 8,000,000; total,
1,125,000,000 guilders.2

The met ordinary expenditure amounted in 1913 to 166,600,000
guilders and 3,800,300 guilders (1914-1925). The Indonesian revenues
appeared in budget for 1926 were as follows: Taxes, 103 million
guilders (1913) and 274.m(1926); surplus monopolies, 35 m. (1913)
and 52 m. (1926); surplus establishments, 11 m. (1913) and 36 m.
(1926); surplus products, 34 m. (1913) and 44 m. (1926); and
miscellaneous, 7 m. (1913) and 13 m. (1926). The total value of the
revenue was 150,000,000 guilders in 1913 and 419,000,000 in 1926.3

The government expenditures for 1926 were 56 million
guilders in 1913 and 138 million in 1926 for civil service, self
government, judiciary, police, prison collection of taxes, pensions,
administration, etc; 57 m. in 1913 and 109 m. in 1926 for defence
4 m. in 1913 and 88 m. in 1926 for interest and sinking fund; 12 m.
in 1913 and 35 m. in 1926 for public institution; 6 m. in 1913 and
16 m. 1926 for civil medical service; 25 m. 1913 and 17 m. in 1926 for
civil public works; 2 m. in 1913 and 5 m. in 1926 for fisheries and
5 m. in 1913 and 9 m. in 1926 for miscellaneous and total 167,000,000
in 1913 and 418,000,000 in 1926.

1. Ibid . p.95
2. Ibid . p.121
3. Ibid . pp.122-123
4. Ibid . p. 125
Finally the increasing employment of official in the government offices led to increase the administrative expenditure. The officials employed in the various departments were in 1914, 56,000 in 1919, 75,500 and in 1923, over 100,500; but in 1924 the number was reduced to 93,800. It was not primarily the pay of native officials which had caused the item of salaries to become so large. Out of a total of 160,000 officials nearly 140,000 were natives and 20,000 were Europeans. Of these 140,000 natives, 117,500 received not quite 600 guilders per annum, whereas only 65 (the regents) had an annual income of more than 12,000 guilders. Of the 20,000 Europeans, on the other hands, over 750, received 120,000 guilders and more; over 4600 drew between 5,000 and 10,000 guilders and only 630 were in receipt of less than 600 guilders. The average income of the native civil servants was about 650 guilders per annum and that of his European colleges over 5 times as much. The travelling expenses for civil servants from and to Indonesia rose from about 2,770,000 guilders in 1913 to more than 17,000,000 guilders in 1926.1

1 Ibid. p.126
CHAPTER II
(1926 - 1942)

PART A: THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL PARTIES.

Nationalist Party of Indonesia (P.N.I.).

After the drastic suppression of communist activities by the Dutch government in January, the Persatuan nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.) was founded in July, 1927 by Dr. Sukarno at Bandung. This party essentially nationalistic, based not on religion as the serikat islam, nor on party doctrine as the communist party, but on nationalistic principles. It was an organised political party with a definite aim - Indonesia merdeka, that is the liberation of Indonesia from the colonial yoke through conscious popular movement based on native force and ability. By means of non-cooperation with colonial government it attempted to attain political independence and to erect a national administrative system within the frame work of the existing general administration.¹

The moving spirit behind the P.N.I. were the repatriated members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian association) in Holland and other members of general study club at Bandung. The first executive committee were composed of the following persons: Chairman Sukarno, secretary, Ishak Tjokro hadsurjo, commissary, Samsi Sastrwidagda, Sartono, Sunarjo and Anwari, Under the leadership of these persons, the P.N.I. soon became a dynamic power in nationalist movement.

Sukarno was the leader of the propaganda activities

¹ Kahin: op.cit. p.90
of the party and soon shown not only as a great orator but also as natural leader of the masses. During the first year, the party held a number of propaganda meetings at Bandung and other large cities, each meeting drawing more crowds than the last. Speeches on different subjects specially the principles of the P.N.I. were delivered by brilliant speakers of the party.1

In 1928, the propaganda activities of the P.N.I. were extended to cover small towns and villages and leaders were sent out to remote places to meet and talk with the masses at their native haunts. For this purpose, the P.N.I. set up a sort of people's university, in which members were given course in propaganda work. These trained propagandists not only sought followers for their party among the village and mountain people, but they also preached their party disciplines in other associations and institutions. In this way, within one year, the party had already 600 members, most of whom were found either in Jakarta or Bandung.

The P.N.I. leaders now stressed the Indonesian unity idea in their speeches. They used the Indonesian language in their meeting and also in their party organ. The persatuan Indonesia in which the principles and aims of the party as well as its non-cooperation tactics were set forth for the benefit of those who could not come to their meetings. They adopted the white and red flag with a bull's head on it as their party flag and held it up to the masses as their symbol to free Indonesia. They were also the first to use the Indonesia raya, now accepted as the national anthem, in their meetings.2

1. Indonesia Review, April - June, 1951 Jakarta, p.211
2. Kahin: op.cit. p.91
The P.N.I. endeavoured to form a national front. For this purpose, they took the initiative in the organisation of a federation of nationalist societies in December, 1927. This federation called Permufakatan perhimpunan - perhimpunan politik kebangsaan Indonesia or P.P.K.I.I. (a federation of the Indonesian political parties) was composed of 7 political parties: the P.N.I., the serikat Islam, budi utomo, Basundan, kaum Batavi, the Surabaya study club and the Sumatra bond. The main purpose of this federation was to unify and establish the activities of the member societies and to carry out this purpose and advisory council comprised of a representative of each party plus a chairman and secretary was set up. Dr. Sutomo, leader of the Surabaya study club, was chosen as the first chairman.

In a meeting held at Bandung in December, 1928, the P.P.P.K.I. decided to fight for the abolition of the penal sanction and certain other articles of the criminal code, to set up a commission on national education and to devise means for the release of the exiles at Boven Digoel. The Indonesian association in Holland was meanwhile appointed as their advance post for foreign propaganda. In the economic field, it organised Indonesian cooperative union for the support of the native industries and the development of cooperative societies in Indonesia.

In May, 1928, in his speech before the volksraad, the G.C. alluded to the propaganda carried on by the P.N.I., calling it revolutionary nationalist propaganda, hinting that its revolutionary nature would hurt its own cause. In July 1929, when the propaganda

1. Ibid. p.112; Blumberger, de nationalistische beweging in Netherlandsch Indie, pp.206-244
speeches of the P.N.I. had become almost violent in their attack on colonialism and capitalism, the government informed the volksraad that the P.N.I. had been sufficiently warned that they would be responsible for their words and deeds and the reaction that might be expected from the uneducated masses. In October, 1929 the governor of west Java forbade the members of his police corps from joining the P.N.I.; the same prohibition was laid down by the commander of the Dutch East Indies army (K.N.I.L.) for his entire personnel.

In December, 1929, the government searched the houses and offices of the P.N.I. leaders. 8 persons were arrested, 4 of whom were later prosecuted, namely Sukarno, Gatot Mangkupradja, Maskum and Supriadinata. The subsequent trial was going from August 18 to December 22, 1930. The sentence of four year imprisonment passed on Sukarno was later reduced, while Gatot Mangkupradja was released after one year of imprisonment. On April 25, 1931, the P.N.I. was officially dissolved.

As a result of the removal of the P.N.I. from the political field, the Surabaya study club changed in October, 1930 its name into Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian unity) and opened its membership to all Indonesians. It assumed a cooperative attitude towards local government councils but its members might not refuse to sitting in the volksraad as a protest against the government treatment of the P.N.I. leaders.

The ex-members of the P.N.I. split up into two groups after the official dissolution of the party. Those rallying around Sartono organised a new party called the partai Indonesia (partindo)

1. Indonesia review: op. cit. p.112
2. Blommberger: op. cit. p.907
at the end of April, 1931, the partindo had the same aims of the dissolved P.N.I., that is to strive for a free Indonesia on self help and self ability. Mr. Sartono was elected as president of the partindo. In October, 1931, the party established 12 branches with 1,700 members and 24 branches with about 7,000 members in October, 1932 and 71 branches with about 20,000 members in 1933. Because of the arrest of its leaders in December 28, 1933, it withdrew from P.P.I.K.I. in February and in November, 1936, it was officially dissolved.

The remainders formed the Indonesian national education party (new P.N.I.) in November, 1931, under the leadership of Dr. Mohd Hatta. Mr. Sutan Shahrir joined the party in 1932. In June 26, 1932, the P.N.I. had established 65 branches with 2,000 members. With a new vigour then, the partindo and the P.N.I., both based upon national independence, took the lead in the organisation of the Indonesian national movement. They were however not allowed to function in peace. The government stepped in with its strong measures. Early in 1938, Sukarno was re-arrested and interned on the island of Flores until 1938, whence he was removed to Bengkulu and lastly in February, 1942, to Padang. Both Hatta and Shahrir were also arrested in the same year and exiled to Digul and then to Banda Neira. Their two parties were suspended under the meetings prohibition Act.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (P.K.I.).

After the failure of the serikat Islam to accept the

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1. Indonesian review No.3: op.cit. pp.211-213 and Pringsgodigdo: op.cit. p.127
extreme proposals of Semaun's faction, he and other leaders of the social democratic association undertook to convert their organisation into the communist party of Indonesia in May 23, 1920. Semaun was elected as president, Darsono as vice-president, Bergsman as secretary and H.W. Dekker as treasurer.

The P.K.I. developed a close relationship with the comintern, joining that organisation at the end of 1920. Sneevliet, who represented Indonesia at the second congress of the comintern in 1920 established contact with the Indonesian party via Shanghai and in 1921, Darsono went to Moscow to represent Indonesia at the third congress of the comintern. Tan Malaka, one of the party's top leaders, represented Indonesia at the fourth congress in the subsequent year and took an active part in framing its policies. In August, 1923, Semaun was arrested and forced to leave the country or face exile to Timor and by the end of the year all Dutch leaders of the party had also been forced to leave. According to Semaun, the departure of the Dutch leaders from the party raised the prestige of the party in the eyes of the masses, because of existing prejudice against the Dutch, whatever their attitude towards colonialism.1

Indonesian communists look to the comintern for guidance but not to the Netherlands communist party. At the fifth congress of the comintern in 1924, Semaun bluntly indicated that the Netherlands communist party was more of a liability than an asset to the Indonesian communists.

In the meantime, the leaders of serikat Islam like Abdul Muiz were not in good term with the members of Semaun faction.

1. Blumberger: Le communisme aux Indies Neerlandaises, Paris, 1929, p.18
They made violent attack against the government which stirred the population. As a result, short insurrection in Toli-Toli in the Celebes, Tjimoreans, west Java led by a local serikat Islam leader, took place in 1919 against the government in protest against its collection of rice. By the end of December, 1929, the serikat Islam successfully managed to unite 22 Indonesian trade unions, totalling 77,000 members, under one of its leaders, R.M. Surjopranoto. At its first congress in August, 1920, Semaun was elected chairman, Surjopranoto, vice chairman, and H. Agus Salim, secretary.

Due to his failure to wrest control of the organisation from the S.I., Semaun in June, 1921, was successfully in setting up a rival association of the trade union, the revolutionary trade union central.

The struggle between the S.I. and P.K.I. came to an end when H. Agus Salim seconded by Abdul Muiz, introduced a motion at the 6th national congress of S.I. in October, 1921, calling for party disciplines and requiring that no members of S.I. could at the same time hold membership in any other party. Whereas Semaun and Tan Malaka deadly opposed the motion and accused the S.I. of being capitalist and anti-socialist. Finally, after H.A. Salim answered the questions, a vote was taken with a large majority of delegates favouring the party discipline and the communists present resigned and communists controlled branches of Semarang and its vicinity seceded.

The communists within 4 years could control most of the

1. Semaun: the situation in Indonesia, co-report to the 6th congress of the comintern, 30th session, August, 15 1928
local branches of S.I., but most of their large peasant membership melted away. This was due to two reasons: 1. the government's increasingly effective barring of contact between the leaders and the peasantry and (2) the communists alienated the peasant members by violating their religious sensitivities. By 1926 the communists had apparently realised the seriousness of this mistake and change their tactics.1

In order to win control of the S.I. branches, the communists at their congress of December, 25 1921 at Semarang decided to set a red serikat Islam headquarters to compete with the original central leadership of Tjoekrosiminoto, Salim, and Huiz. At the beginning of 1922, Tan Malaka organised a general strike of government pawn shop employees embracing all Indonesian labours. The revolutionary trade union central called upon all works to go on sympathy strike but was not successful and Tan Malaka arrested by the government and given choice of exile or leaving Indonesia, for left Russia.

After returning home from 7 months visit to Moscow to attend a Far Eastern labour conference on May 22, 1922, Semaun on September 3, 1922 at a general meeting of Indonesian labour organisations at Medium, was successful in pulling the member-unions of the trade union central away from the control of its leaders into a new all-embracing union known a Union of Indonesian labour unions in which the communist party leaders were dominant.2

In February, 1923, the leaders of the S.I. due to growing communist influence, extended party discipline to all constituent parts of the organisation. In retaliation the communists at their

1. Kahini op.cit. p.76
2. Blumberger: De nationalistisch beweging in Nedelandsch-Indies, p.35
March congress decided to establish sections of red serikat Islam wherever there was a branch of S.I., recruiting their members from these branches. The name for these new communist-controlled units was changed to Serikat Rakjat (People's Association) and they were conceived of as a foundation of the communist party in the masses.

The pan Pacific labour conference held under comintern auspices at Canton in June, 1924, and attended by 2 important Indonesian communist leaders, Alimin and Budi Sutjitro, decided to control trade union movement as it was emphasised by the 5th congress of the comintern in June-July, 1924.

The Indonesian communist party was adherent to this decision Aliarcham, a secretary of peasant party, introduced at the meeting of the party in December, 1924, a resolution calling for the dissolution of the serikat rakjats and their replacement by trade union as the party's mass base. The serikat rakjat, he argued, contained too many bourgeois nationalists who could not be counted upon in time of violent revolution. Aliarcham's proposition was strongly attacked, finally a compromise was reached. The serikat rakjats were gradually dissolved, while the communists concentrated their forces on the trade union movement. In addition it was agreed that the cadres of the O.K.I. had to be disciplined and their quality improved so that they would be able to undertake effective revolutionary action.

Finally the programme drawn up demanded the establishment of a soviet republic of Indonesia.2

1. Sitorus: op.cit. pp.30-32
2. Semaun: International imperialism and the communist party in Indonesia, 1926, p.1246
During the course of 1925, the P.K.I. controlled a greater number of trade unions and organised strikes. Though S.I. leaders had tried to bring about nationalist solidarity early in 1924 at a joint meeting with the P.K.I. and Budi Utomo, the communist appeared not to wish re-approachment with their bourgeois nationalists. Substantial cooperation was effected by the P.K.I. with the communists among the Chinese labouring community but in general the social base of the communist movement shrank greatly during 1925.1

The leadership of the comintern particularly the leaders of the soviet Russia, had taken a particular interest in Indonesian and were disturbed at the failure of Indonesian communists to follow the orthodox interpretation of the 1924 comintern directive. Stalin speaking at the end of May, 1925, accused the Indonesian communists of leftist deviation.2

The Executive committee of the comintern in its plenary session of March, 1925, specially called upon the communists in Indonesia to form a united anti-imperialist fron with the non-communists Indonesian nationalist organisations and to utilise the S.H. as an independent national revolutionary organisation linked up with the masses. A spokesman for the comintern noted some 6 months latter that despite growing pressure from the rank and file of non-communist nationalist organisations for a united front against the Dutch and the efforts of Tjokroaminoto in the summer of 1925, to start negotiations with the P.K.I. leaders for such a block, the negotiations had led to no results.3.

1. Ibid. p. 81
2. J.Stalin: Marxism and the national and colonial question, Moscow, 1940, p.192
3. The revolutionary movement in the east communist international Leningrade and London, No.18-19 m.1926, pp113-115
the Indonesian communist party came under the control of Bahlan and Sukra, leaders who refused to take orders from the regular party leadership. They continually agitated for revolution and resorted to terroristic methods in order to dominate the party. In their efforts they were backed by 2 of the important established party leaders, Alimin and Musso. This group was able to dominate a decisive meeting of the executive committee of the party and the leaders of the principal communist-controlled trade unions held at the temple of Prambanan in mid October, 1925. As a result, revolution was decided upon. A strike by the railroad workers was to be the signal for a general strike which was in turn to develop into the revolution in which the Dutch power to be overthrown and replaced by that of the communist party. For the revolution to be a success it was felt necessary to have the support of Moscow and of the prominent Indonesian communist leaders forced to remain outside Indonesia. Of these the support of Tan Malaka- the comintern's agent for south east Asia and Australia- decided by the 4th congress of the comintern in 1922, was felt to be particular essential. To ask for Moscow's support without his backing would be awkward, it was realised. In order to have time to mobilise this support and to make the necessary preparations in Indonesia this support and to make the necessary preparations in Indonesia, the date for the revolution was set for June 18, 1926.2

The activities of the communists during the interim period, however, did not develop as had been planned. On November 28, 1925 the government suspended the right of assembly throughout Indonesia

2. Annuaire de documentations coloniales compares, 1927, p. 190
for the communist party, the S.R. and most of the communist-controlled labour organisations. As a result, the strategic sequence of strikes that the communists had planned at Prambanan did not go off as scheduled. The major strikes of workers in metallurgical concerns and dock workers broke out in Surabaya in the middle of December, 1925, 6 months ahead of scheduled. 1 In the suppression of these strikes the government cracked down hard arresting most of the important labour leaders concerned in addition to 3 of the remaining top leaders still in Indonesia, Darsono, Aliarcham and Mardjoha.2

The failure of the communist revolutionary effort was due mostly to the great schism in the ranks of Indonesian communists. The Malaka had deadly opposed the prambanan decision taken at the P.K.I. congress of December, 1924, calling for the dissolution of the S.R. So he refused to come to Singapore, because he knew that the people assembled there would out-vote him and his supporters and that according to the formula of democratic centralism, he would call upon to abide by their decision. Alimin was then sent by the communists assembled at Singapore to see him in Manila. Tan Malaka refused to sanction the plans for revolution and maintained that any way the decision had to be made in Moscow in consultation with the comintern. Finally he gave Alimin a document stating his reasons against the Prambanan decision to be communicated to the group in Singapore and the P.K.I leadership on Java and Sumatra.

2. Ibid: p.45
Alimin did not deliver this document to the group in Singapore and apparently led them to believe that Tan Malaka as he and Musso did. This group then voted to support the Prambanan decision and Alimin and Musso were delegated to proceed to Moscow to ask for its clearance and support for the revolution.¹

Shortly after their departure Tan Malaka arrived in Singapore where he persuaded at least two of the communist leaders, Subakat and Djamaluddin Tamin, that conditions were not favourable for a revolution. Tamin was given a copy of the memorandum previously given to Alimin and immediately left for Indonesia. With this he travelled through Java and Sumatra contacting most of local leaders of P.K.I., many of whom he was able to dissuade from backing the projected revolution. Tamin's final efforts might have been considerably aided by the circulation of the booklet written by Tan Malaka in the middle of 1926 and printed in Singapore a few months before the revolution broke out in Java. This booklet, Mass actie, incorporated points made in his memorandum. In it he argued that a successful revolution demanded mass support. A putsch by leaders divorced from the masses never succeed, he warned. If indeed the communist leaders possessed the necessary support, they had already let the psychological and practical moment for revolt, he said. That should have occurred, he maintained, immediately upon the Dutch arrests of P.K.I. and labour leaders and the suspension of the right of assembly at the end of 1925.² He concluded by posing whether the P.K.I. had sufficient mass backing and whether Marxist education had been correctly and sufficiently given so that our work have Marxist stability and Lenist elasticity. If this were not

¹. Tan Malaka: Mass Actie, Jakarta, 1926, p. 39
If this were not the case, he foresaw, chaos in the whole revolutionary movement in Indonesia.1

Alimin and Musso arrived in Malaya in the middle of December, 1926, having returned from Moscow via Canton. On December, 18 they were arrested by the British in Johore, neither returned to Indonesia, whatever the reactions of Moscow to their proposals, they had never made it public.

The communist party was forced to operate more and more underground while deprived of its ablest leaders. Its activities became less and less coordinated, with the extremist leaders who had dominated the Prambanan conference managing to maintain their ascendancy in much of Java despite the anti-revolutionary proselytising of Tamin, leader of P.K.I. in central Sumatra. During the first 10 months of 1926 more and more of the communist leaders were arrested. Intra-organisational contact was progressively disrupted as was attested by uncoordinated sporadic out-breaks of violence at widely isolated places throughout Java. The accelerating disintegration of the communist party organisations was accompanied by a rapid loss of contact with former peasant supporters, many of whom were in any case being alienated by the policies of the inferior communist leadership in Indonesia. The communists postponed the date of the revolution and not until the night of November, 1926, did it break out. The revolution broke out first in Jakarta and a full month later in Padang, central Sumatra, after the revolution in Java had been completely crushed.2

At the end of December, 1925, there were 36 branches of the

1. Ibid. p.45
P.K.I. with 140 members and 340 branches of Serikat Hakat, totalling 31,124 members. The following years, the P.K.I membership increased to 3000 based on 65 branches. Therefore, probably the most that the communists could count on in their revolution were some 3,000 party members and a mass base of no more than 31 peasants and a somewhat smaller number of urban labourers. There were 5,000 persons actively involved in either the Java uprising or on the west coast of Sumatra. Only in Bantam and in central Sumatra were the communists able to rely on a measure of support from the local peasantry. The revolution everywhere was crushed. As Semaun himself admitted, the masses of the works in the cities as well as on the plantations adopted an attitude of indifference towards the revolutionary movement.1

The reasons of the failure of the communist revolution were substantially to limited and confined work of the communist efforts on Java and to the west coast of Sumatra and the ruthless measures taken by the government to annihilate all organisations. It was Tan Malaka and his associates that caused chiefly the failure of the communist revolution. On charge of being Trotskyist by Musso, Alimin and other leaders of the P.K.I. based upon his refusal to accept the Prambanan decision, his effort to stop the revolution, shortly after the end of the revolution, Tan Malaka established a new party, completely outside the communist fold. At the 6th meeting of the comintern in August, 1928, he made a vigorous attack against the programme and Bukharin who called him a Trotskyist.2

Tan Malaka's new organisation, Partai Indonesia Republik or Pari (Indonesian republic party) was established by him

1. Semaun: The situation in Indonesia, August, 15, 1928
2. Dr. Sakirman: Neningjaw perdjuangen partai, Jakarta, 1946, p.10
and his two lieutenants, Tamín and Subakat, in Bangkok in 1927. Pari's immediate objective was the training of Indonesian underground workers in Bangkok who were to return to Indonesia and there train additional members and build up underground cadres. Its long term objective was the building up of coordinated proletarian movement in Asia (S.E.A. and Australia). Tan Malaka envisaged an eventual fusion of the regional communist federations, Asia, West Europe, Russia, Iran, Africa, China, North America and South America. Possibly the fact that Tan Malaka had been appointed Comintern agent for S.E.A. and Australia had something to do with this idea. Tamín, however, did make some progress towards building up an underground in Indonesia. Though the membership of this underground was never large, its leadership in Java, eventually headed by Adam Malik and Sukarno, was a capable one and while attaining influential positions in legal youth organisations, usually managed to keep clear of Dutch suspicion.¹

With the failure of the 1926-27 revolutions, the communist organisation was crushed, as the large majority of communists, nationalist and religious leaders were arrested and deported to the concentration camp of Tanah Merah in New Guinea, a notorious unhealthy place, full of malaria and fatal diseases. Altogether some 13,000 people were arrested. Of these 4500 were given prison sentences and 1308 were interned, 1308 being sent to Tanah Merah. The rest were soon released.²

According to the statement of the government of Indonesia to the Volksraad in May, 1929, the number of politically active persons who had been banished to Boven Digul was as follows: 1124 men, 450 women and 52 children. The group of these called irrecusible...
were placed 35 kilo meters further in the interior.1

After the arrest the powers of the communist were broken for the remainder of the period of Dutch rule. In 1928, a relatively weak come-back was developed by a group of Surabaya communists who had laid law during the revolution. In July, 1928, under the leadership of Sunarjo and Marsuki, a close acquaintance of Musso, they established a small labour union federation (serikat kaum buruh Indonesia). Its plan of operation was to infiltrate the various unions with its own cells which would eventually come to control them. After reaching a select and disciplined membership of some 700 and after a year's existence, the organisation was dissolved by the government and its leaders arrested.2

In April, 1935, Musso managed to re-enter Indonesia, remaining nearly a year in the Surabaya area before leaving again for Russia. Here he built up what was to become the chief Stalinist-oriented-communist underground, the so-called illegal Indonesian communist party. Aspirant probationary members were organised into a close associated organisation, the partai Komunis muda (young communist party). It was probable the unjailed membership of the Indonesian trade union (S.K.B.I.) provided much of the nucleus of Musso's organisation. Both Musso and Tan Malaka's underground were however, relatively weak and the centre of the stage in the nationalist struggle during the remainder of the period of the Dutch rule was held by non-communist leaders and their organisation. During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) Tan Malaka and other communist leaders organised underground movements to fight the Japanese imperialism.3

1. F. Abdul Gani: A basic information on Indonesia, the ministry of information, K.I., Jakarta, 1949, p.34
PARATAI INDONESIA RAJA (P.I.R).

The Indonesian study club formed by Dr. Sutomo in October 16, 1930, at Surabaya, was changed to the persatuan bangsa Indonesia of P.B.I. (Indonesian association) in January 4, 1931, based on Indonesian integrity and nationalism. The members of the executive council of the P.B.I. consisted of Dr. Sutomo, Mr. Subroto and others. In 1931 it had established 15 branches and 30 branches with 2500 members in May, 1932. It adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch authority. Its annual conference of May, 1933, set up an agricultural cooperative society (rukun tani) which had established 158 branches with 2000 members in July 1933. In April 2, 1934, the P.B.I. had 38 branches and formed a scout organisation, the Suria Wiroman.

At its congress of April 18-21, 1935, at Surabaya, the P.B.I. decided to form a fusion with the Budi Utomo. As a result of the Solo conference, partai Indonesia raja or P.I.R. (Greater Indonesia party), came into being in December, 26, 1935 at Surabaya under the Presidentship of Dr. Sutomo, aiming chiefly at achieving Indonesia raja. The P.I.R. had established 53 branches with 2425 members in 1935 and 57 branches with 3425 members in 1936. It had also rukun tani organisation with 2,700 members. It organised the first congress in May 15-18, 1937 at Jakarta and adopted a policy of cooperation with the colonial government. The second congress of December 24-27, 1938, at Bandung, elected K.H.M.H. Wukjaringrat as president of the party and discussed labour problems, colonisation and reformation of justice. In 1941, it became static and passive.

1. A.K. Pringgodigdo: op.cit. p.139
2. Ibid. p.139
The partai raskat Indonesia or P.R.I. (people's party of Indonesia) was founded by Mr. Tebrani in September 14, 1930 at Jakarta, aiming to achieve the independence of Indonesia through a parliamentary system and establishing consequently a dominion status governed by the Indonesians. To this end, it would attempt:

1. to expand the volksraad and other councils which formed a real parliament, representing the entire population.
2. To have Indonesian representatives in the League of Nations.
3. To Indonesia-nise civil and military services.
4. to enact laws for the Indonesian citizenship.

It adopted a policy of cooperation with the government. Due to strong opposition and criticism of other parties and leaders, the party had set up only two or three branches and finally ceased to exist. 1

The partai persatuan Indonesia (parpindo) was also formed by Kohd Yamin in July 20, 1939 at Jakarta. This party adopted a policy of cooperation and was based on socio-nationalism and socio democracy. 2 The people's association of Jogjakarta (P.K.N.) was instituted by Surjodiningrat in June 19, 1930 at Jogjakarta. Its membership rose from 30,000 to 110,000 in May, 1931; 229,670 to 253,281 (30,471 women) in July 29, 1938. Its youth organisation had 10,000 members. The people's league of Surakarta (P.K.T.) under the initiative of Mr. Singrih came into being in June, 1932. In 1937, it had a membership of 7,500 of which 1,000 were women. 3

The people's union of Kangkunegara (P.K.M.) was formed in 1933 with 30,000 members. The Vaderlandsche club followed suit.

1. Ibid; p.135
2. Ibid: p. 135
3. Ibid: pp.129-153
in 1929 and survived until May 1940. The forward thrust organisation was also set up by Van Mook in 1930 at Jakarta and lasted up to 1942. The serikat Madura (February, 1925) perserijatan Madur (January, 1920) perhimpunan Timor (August, 1924) were established. The Indonesian Chinese party (P.T.I.) was also organised by Mr. Lien Koen Hian in December, 1932 at Jakarta. The Indonesian Arab party (P.A.I.) under the presidency of Abdur Rahman Basweden followed suit in 1934.

Lastly gerakan rakjat Indonesia (Curindo) was formed in May 24, 1937 on the basis of the independence of Indonesia and cooperation with the Dutch regime. It convened the first congress in July 20-24, 1938, at Jakarta and the second one in August 1-2, 1939, at Palembang. On October 1, 1940, the working committee of the party consisted of A.K. Cani (President), R. Silopo (Secretary), Mr. Sartono (vice-president). In 1932, the activities of the party were suspended.1

PASUNDAN ASSOCIATION

The Pasundan Association was formed by Mr. D. Kanduran Ardi Winata in September, 1914, at Jakarta and became a political party in 1919. It strived for the provincial autonomy of West Java. It held the congress in December, 1925 at Tasikmalaja and joined the P.P.P.K.i. in December 14, 1927. On May 20, 1928, it decided to liberate Indonesia from Dutch imperialism through cooperation with colonial government. At the Sesundan congress of March 30-April 1, 1929, the president of the party, Mr. Oto Subrata stressed strongly on national unity and national emancipation and cultural developments as well.2.

1. Ibid. p. 157
2. Ibid. pp. 79-80
In January, 1930, the association had established 32, branches and three women sections with 3,950 members. In 1931, it had 14 branches with 3,900 members and 52 branches with 3,317 members in 1934, while the women organisation had 11 branches with 800 members in 1931 and 25 branches with 1700 members in 1934. There was also a Pasundan youth organisation called Jasana Ober Pasundan (J.O.P.).

The 20th congress of the party was held in April, 19-22, 1935 at Bandung; the 21st congress on April 9-12, 1936; the 22nd congress in March 26-29, 1937 and the 23rd congress on April, 1938 at Sukabumi. The congresses decided among others to support the Subardjo petition, for an imperial conference and economic development as well as employment. Among the important leaders of the association were Otto Iskander Dinata and Atik Suardi. The 24th and 25th congresses were held in April 6-9, 1939 at Tjandur and in March, 1940, respectively adopting the red and white and Indonesia raya as national flag and national anthem and supporting the struggle for Indonesian parliament.

SeriKAT ISLAM (ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION)

The name of the Islamic chamber of commerce (S.D.I.) founded in 1911 by H. Semanhudi was changed into the Serikat Islam in 1912 under the leadership of H. Umar Said Tjokroaminoto. In January, 1913, and 1914, the people joined the party en mass which was based purely on the Islamic principles. In 1915 it had established

1. Ibid: p. 152
2. Ibid: p. 153
50 branches and 89 branches with 360,000 members in June 17, 1916. 1

In 1916, it became a full-fledged political party, struggling for free Indonesia (dominion status) and adopted a policy of cooperation with the colonial government. It had a membership of 800,000. The congress of October 20-27, 1927, decided to achieve a complete independence for Indonesia by evolutionary system not by revolutionary one. The third congress of September 29-October 6, 1918 at Surabaya was deadly opposed capitalism and joined the radical concentration in November 16, and had representatives (Tjokroaminoto and Abdul Muiz) in the volksraad in May 18, to fight for national freedom. The 4th congress of October 23-November 2, 1919 at Surabaya decided to institute a bicameral parliament and lead class struggle movement. The 5th and 6th congresses were held in March 2-6, 1921 at Jokjakarta and October 10, 1922 at Surabaya respectively. The 7th congress of February 17-20, 1923 at Medan denounced communism and adopted a policy of non-cooperation in May 19, 1923, Semaun was arrested, while Tjokroaminoto propagated the party ideology outside. 2

In order to achieve Muslim Unity, a Pan Islamic movement was organised by H.A. Salim. The second congress al Islam held in May 19-21, 1924 at Carut, was attended by the Muslim leaders of Islamic organisations, except the Nahdatul Ulama. The Serikat Islam meeting of December 24-26, 1924, decided to send two delegations to the Calipate congress at Cairo in March 1925 and to the world Islamic congress sponsored by the King Ibnu Saud at Mecca in June 1, 1926. It also dispatched a delegation to the congress of the

1. Vlekke: op.cit. p.184
league for the struggle against imperialist domination in Europe.  

The S.I. formed a madjelis ulama Indonesia in January 29, 1928 and in 1929 it was changed into partai serikat Islam Indonesia or P.S.I.I. (Indonesian Islamic party). The P.S.I.I. convened its first congress on April 25-27, 1929 at Surabaya and the 2nd in January 24-27, 1930, at Jokjakarta which decided to establish legislative and executive councils and struggle for the realisation of national unity, freedom, democratic society and democratic economy of the country. Its membership rose from 19,000 to 23,000 in 1930; 30,000 (1933) to 45,000 (1935). The congress of 1931, 1932 and 1933 condemned capitalism and imperialism, reviewed economic crisis and other religious problems. It established 31/2 branches of the women section with 6000 members in May 26, 1934. In 1935 it had formed 140 branches all over Indonesia. It held a congress in July 8-12, 1936 at Jakarta to re-examine the non-cooperation policy and other economic matters.  

Dr. Sukiman, a splitter of the P.S.I.I., formed a new party called Indonesian Islamic party (Paril) in 1932 at Jakarta and H.A.S Salim, Barisan Penjedjar (the conscious movement) in April, 1936. They adopted a policy of cooperation with the government and opposed the non-cooperation of the P.S.I.I. The B.P. established 47 branches in 1937. In September 17, 1937, Dr. Suliman, Wali Al Fatah and others re-joined the P.S.I.I., which condemned the Islamic high court at Jakarta and other religious affairs.  

On account of discontent of Dr. Sukiman group at the Jokja congress, partai Islam Indonesia (P.I.I) was founded in December, 1938, at Solo under the presidentship of R.M. Wivoho.  

1. Ibid p.147  
2. Ibid p.147  
3. Ibid p.146
The party joined Gapi to struggle for a parliament for Indonesia. It was based on Islam and nationalism. It had set up 115 branches and organised its first congress in April 11, 1940 at Jokja and because of the second world war, it suspended all its activities. While the P.S.I.I. held its 25th congress in January, 1940 at Palembang and participated in a parliamentary movement of Gapi and finally withdrew from the Gapi and the volksraad in December 13, 1941 as a protest against Dutch imperialism.1

Another Islamic association, the Nahdatul Ulama (Islamic conservative party) was formed in January 31, 1926 at Surabaya, based on the four Islamic sects. It organised the first congress in October 8-11, 1928 at Surabaya, opposing the modernist movement and reviewing other religious affairs. The congress of 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939 further discussed religious matters and economic situation in the country. In 1935, it established 68 branches with 67,000 members. The congress of 1940, set up a women organisation (Nahdatul Ulama Muslimat or N.U.M.) and youth movement (Ansur) in 1935, under the leadership of Mr. Tohir Bakri. Among the most outstanding leaders of the N.U. were Hasjim Asjari, Abdul Wahab, Mahfuz Siddiq and Wahid Hasjim.2

Furthermore, another Islamic organisation called the Muslim union of Indonesia (Parmi) was founded in 1930 at central Sumatra on the initiative of Muchtar Lutfi, Djalaluddin Taib, based on Islam and nationalism, struggling to achieve the independence of Indonesia. Due to its popularity among the masses, the Dutch authority took drastic measures against the party by arresting its leaders and lastly by banning the party itself. All Indonesia

1. Ibid, p.150
2. Ibid, p.160
Islamic congress of 1937 established the high council of Islam (M.I.A.I.) in Java.

Again there were also other religious bodies such as the Catholic political party (P.P.K.D.) in Java formed in February 1925 at Jokjakarta under the chairmanship of I.J.Kasimo, the Christian association (P.K.C.) in 1929, under the initiative of Mr. F.M. Notosutarso and the Indonesian Christian party (P.K.M.I) in December 13, 1930 at Jakarta led by Mr. F. Laoh. There were also the Christian ethical party (C.E.P), the Indies Catholic party (I.K.P) the Indonesian Ahmadya movement (September, 1929) Catholic political party (P.P.K.I) in July 1938, Catholic Union or B.P.K. in October, 1941 and the Christian Teacher's association (P.C.C) in 1939 at Jokjakarta.

**Budi Utomo (High Endeavour)**

The Budi Utomo formed in 1908 had established 40 branches with 10,000 members in 1914 and held a congress in August 5, 1915. It participated in the Indonesian defense committee in July 23, 1916. It joined the radical concentration in the volksraad in November, 1918 which demanded a parliament for Indonesia. In September, 28 1919 it had set up 80 branches with 20,000 members. Among the most influential leaders of the D.U. were Dr. Radjiman Wediodyiningrat, Dwidjesswojo, A.Surjo Suparto, and Mangkunegara VII. At its congress of December 21-25, 1921 and November 4-5, 1922, the B.U. discussed national education, strikes and adopted a policy of cooperation with the colonial government. It joined the P.P.K.I. in 1928. The 20th congress of the B.U. on December 23-24, 1929 at Solo demanded a free Indonesia.

1. ibid, pp.87, 156 and 157
The members of the executive committee of the party in 1930 consisted of Kusumo Utojo (president) Wurjoningrat (vice-president) and Mr. Singgih (secretary) and its membership was 1300. Finally the congress of May 25, 1935 decided to form a federal organisation called partai Indonesia raja (P.P.R.).

**INDONESIAN YOUTH MOVEMENT.**

The formation of the student association (B.U.) in 1912 was followed by Tri Koro Darmo (student movement) in March 1915, based on strength, character and service. In 1918, its name was changed to the young Java under the presidency of R. Satiman Wiryosojoyo. Its objective was to achieve a great Java by means of promoting solidarity among the students of secondary school; advancing the general knowledge among the members and stimulating and deepening the love for language and other cultural expressions of Indonesia. The young Sumatra league (1917) was followed by the formation of young Minahasa League, young Ambon league, young Celebes league, young Batak and others. All these leagues had their seats at Jakarta. There were also the Muslim youth of Indonesia of the F.S.I., the boy scouts (siap and hizbulwatan of the Mohammadya). In January 1, 1925, Mr. Sam founded the young Islam association with H.A. Salim as its adviser, based on Islam and nationalism. In order to establish close contacts among the various youth organisations, the first Indonesian youth congress was held in 1926 at Jakarta under the chairmanship of Mr. Tabrani. On August 31, 1926, the young Indonesia (Indonesia muda) came into being on the basis of Indonesian unity. At the initiative of the student's union (F.P.I) the second youth congress was convened in December 26-27, 1928 at Jakarta. At this

1. Ibid p.134
congress the youths pledged solemnly that they belonged to one
motherland, Indonesia; one nation, the Indonesian; and spoke one
language, Indonesian. Consequently an Indonesian youth union
(Indonesia muda) came into existence in December 31, 1930 under the
presidency of Mr. Kuchoro Purbo prawoto. It established 24 branches
with 2,400 members. The union aimed to achieve greater Indonesia
(Indonesia raja). The young Islam association and the Muslim
Indonesia did not join the union. The boy scouts movement of the
united organisation were united into one organisation, the Kepanduan
Indonesia.1

The third Indonesian youth congress of December, 1939 had
decided to pursue literacy campaign; helping and guiding the
farmers; abolition of the youth unemployment and rural uplift and
reconstruction. The Indonesian youth wholeheartedly supported the
Gapi's demand for a parliament for Indonesia and proposed that if
the government did not concede the Gapi's claim, the Indonesian
leaders should quit the government offices and councils.2

Besides pursuing their studies abroad, the Indonesian youth
also took great pains to make Indonesia popular with the outer world.
They established contact with youth organisations in other countries
and participated in world conferences and assemblies. When the youth
congress movement in La Courneuve, Paris, organised a rally in
August 7-23, 1937, seven students participated in it. 11 Indonesian
students were present at the international students' conference,
promoted by the world student's association in Paris in August 25-30
1937. At a conference of British, Dutch, Chinese, Indonesian

1. D. Sudjono: A general outline of the Indonesian youth movement,
    Jakarta, 1946, pp. 2-6
2. A. K. Pringgodigdo: op. cit. pp. 198-203
Indonesian students in Leiden, Holland, Indonesia was represented by 26 of her sons. The all world youth congress organised by the world youth congress movements (Geneva), in Vassor state, U.S.A., was attended by 3 Indonesian students. At the international conference of the world's youth association, Paris, in December 17-18, 1938, and Indonesian student held a speech.

On all these occasions, the Indonesian students not only delivered speeches but also arranged exhibitions of Indonesian arts. At those international conferences, besides representing the organisation of their own's universities, the Indonesian students were also given mandates by various youth organisations in Indonesia.

The Vassar congress concluded with a peace pact of which art. 1 reads as follows: we pledge our word to advance brotherhood and cooperation amongst the youth of various nations; To intensify the sense of solidarity amongst the young people, their related countries and to strive for farmery with youth of their countries, irrespective of race, religion and convections.

INDONESIAN WOMEN MOVEMENT

The national consciousness of Indonesian women appeared when the first women organisation was started by K.A.Kertini in 1911, Puteri Merdeka (1912), keutamaan imeri Minagkabau (1915) at Padang Fnadjang, keradjinan amai setia at Bukit Tinngi and Gorontalis Muslim women's association (1920) at Gorontalo in Celebes.

Some of the women organisations such as the wanita utomo at Mataram, the wanita mulia and pawijatan wanita worked purely in cultural field. There were also the Aishiah of Mohammadia, women movement of P.S.I.I., women movement of Farmi and so on.

1. D.Sudjono: op.cit. pp. 7-8
2. A.K.Pringsgodigdo: op.cit. p.31
Under the initiative of Njonja Aju Sukanto of the wanita Utomo, Nji Hadjar Dewantara of the wanita teman siswa and Non Sujanti of puteri Indonesia, the first Indonesian women's congress was held on December, 22-25, 1928 at Jakarta. The congress was attended by 30 Indonesian women's organisations. The main aim of the congress was to effect several Indonesian women's associations and the association would promote the interests of the Indonesian women. The congress would establish foundation for indigent girl students and would combat child marriage and issue a monthly magazine, isteri.1

The Indonesian women association received an invitation to attend the Pacific congress for women suffrage at Honolulu in 1928 but was unable to participate in it. 2 Indonesian women representatives attended the All Asiatic women's congress at Lahore in 1931, sponsored by Mrs. Sora Ro Naidu, Nur Hemada, Madame Sun Yat Sen and others. The principal aim of the congress was to make the Asiatic women more conscious of their task to uplift their country and people and to cooperate with each other.2

The second Indonesian women's congress of July 20, 24, 1935 at Jakarta, which was attended by many big women organisations, discussed the problems of combating illiteracy for the progress of the Indonesian people; the importance of youth in the Indonesian women's movement; the position of Indonesian labour in Indonesia and the legal status of the women in Islam. The kongres perempuan Indonesia (K.P.I.) established a body to examine the position of the Indonesian women labourers and to promote their interests. The combating of illiteracy was entrusted to a special body to examine the legal status of the women in Islam in 1931.

1. Ibid, pp. 113-115
2. Ibid, pp. 118-193
Some of the Indonesian women's organisations had already fought a long time for women suffrage. They wanted to have representatives of the Indonesian women in several councils. In February 1938, the Dutch government gave passive suffrage for the town councils to women in this country, but not active suffrage. In August, 1938 several Indonesian ladies were elected members of the town councils at Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya.

The third women congress (K.P.I.) of July 25-28, at Bandung discussed the matters of women suffrage, prostitution in Indonesia, legal position of the professional and married women and education of the Indonesian youth. The All Indonesian women congress attended all Indonesian congress (K.R.I.) at Jakarta in December 23-25, 1939, sponsored by the Gapl. The 4th Indonesian women congress of July 25-28 examined the women suffrage question. As a result, the Dutch government gave them the native suffrage in September 20, 1941. The Indonesian women organisation fully supported the nationalist movements in the struggle for free Indonesia; several Indonesian women had been in jail for political conviction such as Kasuma Said of central Sumatra.

LABOUR ORGANISATIONS

The growth of trade union in Indonesia was very slow. The first union was formed in 1908 by employees of the railways and tramway for the protection of their interests. This beginning was followed in by the formation of a union of customs officials and in 1912 by 2 unions of functionaries of the education and treasury departments. Although some members of these unions were Indonesians, other wholly native unions were soon formed. In fairly rapid

1. Maria Ulfia Santoso: On brief background of the Indonesian women movement, merdeka No. 20, I.S.I., New Delhi, November, 1947, pp. 7-11
succession custom officers in 1911, education officials in 1912
the state pawnshop in 1913, the opium regie employees in 1916
and official of public works and treasury department in 1917 and
established their own unions under the influence of the nationalist
organisations like budi utomo and serikat islam. indonesians employed
in private undertakings formed similar organisations such as the
union of agricultural labourers, in 1915 and that of factory
workers in 1917.1

During the first world war, (1914-1918) there appeared many
trade unions including the harbour board union, the Dutch Indies
teacher's union, the union of opium tax workers, the union of native
pawnshop workers, the custom house union, the union of factory
personnel(P.E.B.), the seamen union, ware-house workers union,
electrical factory trade union, driver's union and other of small size

In order to strive against Dutch imperialism, the trade
union in 1919 succeeded in forming a central authority in Jokjakarta
called united movement of workers(P.P.K.B.) consisting of 22 trade
unions, covering 72,000 members. Mr.Semaun of the union railway and
tremways personnel (V.S.T.P.) became president?Mr.Surjopranoto of
the P.F.B., vice-president and H.A.Salim, secretary. This central
authority was conducted on the basis of cooperation between the
communist party (Semaun) and the islamic party (H.A.Salim). But
this cooperation led to failure: and could maintain itself only
for a period of two years; in 1921 it split up into 2 groups. Mr.
Semaun and his group withdrew and formed the revolutionary central
organ in September 5, 1922; he made accusation against Mr.Surjopranoto
president of the P.F.B., saying that the failure of P.F.B. strike

in 1920 was a result of the P.F.B. forming the central union organisation.

There were many other unions such as native civil servant union (P.V.P.N.) in May 31, 1929, the P.P.P.H. with 25,000 members, V.I.P.W. with 3,000 members, O.R.B.H.B., with 700 members and revenue officers union with 600 members. The native official union (P.P.B.E.) founded in March, 30 1929 had established branches in every regency with 5000 members and had 6 representatives in the volksraad in 1931. In March 1933, the study club of Surabaya formed the Indonesian trade union (P.S.S.I) under the presidency of Mr. Fuslan Wangsokumo. There were also Indonesian teacher's union, railway and tramway workers union (P.B.S.T.) and native official union which had 13 organisations with 29,700 members. In 1931, the P.V.P.N. joined the international league of trade union. In January, 1933, the Indonesian teacher's union (P.G.I.) had set up 163 branches with 29,000 members; 175 branches with 20,000 members in January 5, 1934. The P.V.P.N. had 8,000 members in April 22, 1935 and 22,600 in 1936 and 22,386 in 1937. It held congresses on January 29-31 1930 at Bandung and in February 25, 1940 respectively, urging the government to increase the salaries of civil servants. It had 42,000 members of 18 organisations. In February 3, 1941, the Indonesian labour party (P.B.I) was formed at Malang. In July 27, 1941, gabungan serikat partikulir Indonesia (Gaspi) was also founded by H.P.Suroso of the P.V.P.N., consisting of 30 organisations with 18,000 members.

2. Indonesia review: issued by the ministry of information, Jakarta 1947, p.8; and A.K.Fringgodigdo: op.cit. pp.99-105 and 174 and 10 (
The year 1930 was the lowest ebb of national movements in Indonesia. It was the depression of political life, it was the depression of economic life and it was the depression of social life. Indonesia suffered unprecedented degree of economic reverse and depression. After 1930, Indonesia was flooded with the Japanese products. Political activities were strictly restricted and society was deprived of its leaders.

The communist revolution of 1926-1927, compelled the government to take strong measures which forced the Indonesian political movements to retreat from the ground they gained with great difficulties. After arrest of Sukarno, combination act was passed, the assembly and meetings were not allowed especially for those of the P.N.I. and the Partindo and other radical and revolution ary leftist movements such as P.S.I.I and the Permi.

The exorbitant rights of the G.G. were recklessly made use of, with the result that all the top most leaders and founders of the national movements were either imprisoned, interned or exiled. They were the crime of society, the sensorium of social and political life. Hence all the voices and the people's movements were silent. The government laws in practice closed the door for political activities. The P.P.P.K.I. (federation of the Indonesian national political parties) could not hold its proposed congress of 1933 at Solo. Similar was the case with the proposed congress of the Partindo in December, 1935.

Arts. 153 and 161 of the criminal code strictly prohibited strikes, publication of papers and speeches etc. As a result of this, the central working committee of the partindo
on November 7, 1936 and the chapter of its history was closed. The perm left changed its tactics and to the P.E.L.I. was born a revolt child, penjedar, headed by H.A.Salim. And the P.N.I. of Hatta lived a miserable life.1

But this political nightmare was not last long. The people had to realise some means to achieve complete independence of their motherland. This was only cooperation. So they were prepared to cooperate with the government. And fortunately they found capable leaders first in Dr.Sutomo and then in M.H.Thamrin.2

In fact, Dr.Sutomo did not agree with Dr.Sukarno's radical tactics of non-cooperation. To him non-cooperation was an implement in the political struggle but was not a principle. He favoured the method of cautious and careful action. It was for these reasons that the P.E.L.I., of which he was the chairman was much appreciated. After the apprehension of Dr.Sukarno and his party the new tendency of cooperation asserted itself more and more.

Inside the volksraad itself the same expression of national feeling was sounded by M.H.Thamrin. He stepped on to the floor of the volksraad in 1927 and on January 27, 1930, he along with other friends formed a national political fraction, consisting of different representatives of various Indonesian political parties. Among the most prominent leaders of the fraction were M.H.Thamrin (president), Kusumo Utojo, Mochtar, Soegkupon, Mohd Nur, Abdul Rashid, Wiwoho and so on. The main objectives of this united front were: 1. to get the constitution amended, 2. to abolish all political, economic, social and educational discriminations, 3. to achieve free and independent Indonesia, 4. to use all peaceful

1. Ubani and co: op.cit. pp.58-58
2. Ibid
means to attain the goal. Thamrin proved himself to be the ablest leader of opposition in the volksraad.

Outside the volksraad, the political movements began to breathe a new life and drew new inspiration. Study clubs and other bodies organised themselves as partai bangsa Indonesia or P.B.I. (Indonesian party), under the leadership of Dr. Sutomo. In 1935, Dr. Sutomo succeeded in uniting his P.B.I. with budi utomo. The new party took the name of partai Indonesia raja (parinoma). The party decided to work with the government for the amelioration of Indonesian conditions and to make its further attitude concerning cooperation dependent on the results achieved, by the government in its function for the welfare and prosperity of the people.

The other remnants, the partai Indonesia (partindo) re-grouped themselves in the gerakan rakjat Indonesia (Gerindo) which for the time being rejected non-cooperation as a political weapon. The gerindo formed in May 23, 1937, aimed to achieve free Indonesia under the leadership of Dr. Amir Sjariffuddin and Dr. Mohd Yamin.

Now the Indonesian political movements struggled again and came out with new political stand and new slogan but with the same objective, Indonesia merdeka. They proposed to cooperate and collaborate with colonial government. Almost all people's movements fought the battle of Indonesian freedom in the volksraad and in the government councils, except 2 political parties which still upheld their principles of non-cooperation and were nothing to do with the competition for seats in the volksraad and other councils. One of them was the P.B.I. which still upheld its principle of non-cooperation and the other was the P.N.I., which still struck fast to the doctrine of non-cooperation, led by Dr. Sukarno and Hatta.

1. Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia, Jakarta, 1945, p.18
2. Ubani and co; op.cit. p.60
3. Do you know more about Indonesia, I.S.I.N.Delhi, 1953. p.15
Semaun as a president of left wing in the Serikat Islam and a leader of the railway labour union (V.S.T.P.) led the opposition party. Other leftists such as Darsono and Alimin followed him in tactics. They strenuously launched non-cooperation movement against the Dutch government. They opposed the constitutional steps adopted by the S.I. This was the reason why they never became members of the volksraad created by the Dutch government in 1918.

Thus, in the local councils as well as in the volksraad, Indonesian members belonging to the moderate groups formed opposition fronts against the colonial government.

The Pasmundan party and other organisations had also adopted the cooperation tactics. This cooperation in Muslim Politics was inflamed by the partai penjedari of A.Salim who was discontented to struggle under the banner of non-cooperation. The newly founded P.S.I.I. followed suit H.A.Salim, if he was before well-known as a chairman of non-cooperation and dubbed the volksraad as the comedy of nonsense, now followed the new trend of cooperation and said that he entered the volksraad not as a star who might be laughed at, but as a conscious spectator if the volksraad showed again its old attitude. In 1923, the Indonesian association in the Hague had become a revolutionary nationalist organisation, and adopted a policy of non-cooperation and was neutral in religion.

The demand for a responsible government and for a parliamentary self-government for Indonesia had been deep rooted in the hearts of national leaders and this question was raised in

1. Ubani and co; op.cit. p.11
2. Ibid. p.62
and out of the volksraad. On July 15, 1936, Mr. Sutardjo along with many other representatives of the volksraad brought in the volksraad a motion (petition) in which the government of the Netherlands was asked to call an imperial conference to discuss the best method by which the self-government of Indonesia always within the limit of Art. 1 of the Netherlands constitution of 1922 could be realised and fix a time limit within which this self-government should become effective. Art. 1 of the constitution indicated by its wording that the Netherlands in Europe and the territories in Indonesia and the west Indies were considered separate entities with equal rights. That is to say, the territories were integral parts of the Netherlands realm. On September 29, 1936, the motion was accepted in the volksraad by a majority of 26 as against 20 votes. Thus by itself the petition became the volksraad petition and was submitted to the Queen Wilhelmina to be further considered in the states of the Hague. 1

But after 2 year's hatching it was found that the egg was not capable of producing chicken. So the koninklijk besluit, (royal decision) of November 16, 1938, rejected Sutardjo's petition on the ground that: 1. the petition was not clear and the proposed imperial conference was against the existing constitution. 2. Art 1 of the Netherlands constitution did not at all contain any explanation of the right of Indonesia to self-government within the Netherlands kingdom. 2

The crown rejection did not only affect those who were in the committee of Sutardjo's petition but also all political

1. Ibid p. 63
2. Suara F.S.I.I., Jakarta November, 1938
movements of Indonesia. Because the royal decision showed that Indonesian politics was not as yet capable of fulfilling all the conditions required by the petition.

Furthermore, Sutardjo's petition was supported not only by intellectual groups, educated class and persons of high standing and position both in Indonesia and the Netherlands but also by all political parties which adopted cooperation tactics. The rejection of the petition taught the people that more efforts, more pressure, more skill and more scientific and perfect handling were required. The refusal did not discouraged them but accelerated their effort to reach the goal of independence.

In order to consolidate all national movements, various attempts had been made to form a united front to strive more effectively against the Dutch imperialism. Dr. Sukarno of P.N.I. and Dr. Sukiman of P.S.I. had succeeded in setting up a federation of Indonesian national political parties (P.P.P.K.I.) in December 17, 1927, consisting of P.N.I., Algemeene study club, P.S.I., Pasundan party, budi utomo, serikat Sumatra, kaum Betawi, Indonesian study club, serikat Madura, Tirtasasaran association and perserikatan Celebes. It had established an advisory council and cabinet executive. Its congress of September 2, 1928 and March 29-30, 1929 decided to intensity national struggle and propaganda at home and abroad for a free Indonesia. At its congress of January 12, 1930, it decided the Indonesia raja as national anthem, the red and white flag, national emblem, Indonesian, national language and Indonesian merdeka
national goal. Its executive members consisted in 1932 of Dr. Sutomo, Mr. Thamrin, and Otto Iskandardinata, etc. In 1933 Timor Verbond, partai, serikat Celebes, partai Indonesia, serikat Ambon, etc. joined the federation, while the P.N.I. (Hatta), F.S.I. and Christian organisations stayed outside it. The partindo withdrew from the organisation in February 9, 1935. The F.P.P.K.I. lasted up to 1939. 1

The cooperation and non-cooperation movements were further strengthened by the formation of a federation of Indonesian politics (G.A.P.I.). Due to the international crisis in Europe and in the Far East, and the position of Indonesia in the world conflict the greater Indonesian party (parindra) proposed all Indonesian national movements in the country to hold a grand-conference to fix up their attitudes and to forgo mutual understanding among themselves about future Indonesian policy toward the international political crisis, that had taken place. On May 21, 1939, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. Thamrin the conference of all political parties to discuss the formation of a national federation held at Jakarta was attended by the representatives of the PS.I.I., P.I.I.Pasundan, serikat Minahasa, gerindo and P.K.K. As a result, the Gabungan politik Indonesia or G.A.P.I. (federation of Indonesian politics) came into existence. The members of its cabinet executive consisted of Mr. H. Thamrin, Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin, Mr. Abikusno Tjokrsujono, etc. The Gapi adopted a policy of cooperation with the colonial authority and was an open and democratic federation. The leadership of the gapi fell into the hands of Mr. Thamrin who was the first parliamentary

Indonesian leader and the first thoroughly nationalist politician. He was also a great social worker and humanitarian. He was one of the founders of the kaum Betawi and of the P.P.P.K.I. and became vice-president of the parindra. He died in January 11, 1941.1

On September 20, 1939, the gapl held a session for the first time at the gedung permufakata Indonesia in Jakarta, attended by the delegates of different Indonesian parties and representatives of different Indonesian press. On September 29, 1939, Gapi's manifesto was circulated and on September 27, Gapi's call was published. The call contained: Indonesian press, Indonesian parties and group and all Indonesian people let us united one opinion, one effort and one voice to support, to defend and to champion the demand and the cause of a parliament for Indonesia. The gapl manifesto clearly stated that the current world crisis caused from day to day the increase in danger that threatened the authority of Indonesia and its society.2

Due to the aforesaid danger, the gapl was prepared to call upon Indonesian people to render all possible help, if the demand of Indonesia could be satisfied in a previously fixed time. The gapl, nay the people of Indonesia, had made its stand abundantly clear, the gapl could not be indifferent and silent in facing world crisis. The gapl observed carefully the world's situation especially in connection with Indonesia and accordingly chalked out its future actions which were to be achieved by peaceful constitutional means.

It demanded a parliament, the members of which were elected by, for and from the people with a government responsible

1. Umbani and Co; op.cit. p.161
2. Ibid; p.67
to the parliament.

The plenary session of the GAPI held on Wednesday night, September 9-10, 1939, in Jakarta, attended by representatives of the Gerindo, the Persatuan Minahasa, the Partai Islam Indonesia P.P.K.I., the Parindra, the P.S.I.I. etc. was of the opinion that:

1. From day to day the danger that threatened Indonesia and its society was increasing in its intensity due to the international happenings.

2. It would be much better if the cooperations between the Netherlands people and Indonesian people were started.

3. The cooperation should be started by means of giving new rights in the tasks of the government of the country to the people of Indonesia.1

The session also decided that: 1. That GAPI's members would not act individually but would act collectively as a GAPI and GAPI was prepared to work together with other organisations. 2. That a government with a parliament elected from and by the people and a government responsible to the parliament might be formed. 3. If what was said in 2 could be previously fulfilled the GAPI was prepared to call upon the Indonesian people to render all possible helps. 4. To circulate this resolution to all classes of Indonesian people calling upon all Indonesian movements and the press to declare their approval of it. Besides, the GAPI proposed to hold an Indonesian people's congress.2

While discussing the legal and constitutional aspect of the demand for parliament, Dr. Tadjudin Nur, a member of the Volksraad

1. Ibid. p.162
2. Ibid. p.70
declared in his speech in the volksraad, that the demand for a parliament was based upon the art. 62 and the following arts. of the Netherlands constitution of 1922.

It is true that in the constitutional changes of 1922, there was no mention of the actual words transferring the responsibility from the Netherlands to Indonesia, yet the phrases that were used could not mean anything else. What would be meaning of giving law making, autonomous government and self-government to Indonesia as guaranteed by the constitutional changes of 1922, if not responsible government for Indonesia.

The Netherlands constitution of 1922 maintained, in art. 62 and the following arts. that it is a duty of ordinary law giver, in enforcing any constitution, to form governments in overseas colonies in such a way that the central governments in those colonies on behalf of the monarch are left in the hands of governor generals, while only certain specific matters, previously fixed are to be dealt with by the monarch. So also the law making in connection with internal affairs in the overseas territories is to be left to the bodies in the territories leaving certain specific matters in the hands of the monarch.

In short, the monarch is responsible to the realisation of autonomy and self-government in Indonesia and West Indies. It was acknowledged in the government explanatory statement about the constitution of 1922, that whether law making or government dealing with internal affairs must be left as much as possible in the hands of these bodies and leaders in Indonesia herself.

In the volksraad, twice the government discussed the above affairs stating emphatically that the constitution of 1922, decided with all certainty the handing over of the law making and
and the government of Indonesia to Indonesians.1

The Indonesian people enthusiastically responded to the Gapis' call and whole-heartedly approved of and supported it. The Indonesian journalist union (Perdi) and the Indonesian Arab union (P.A.I.) and the Muslim youth movement (P.P.I.I.) voiced their entire approval and pledged full support to the Gapi's call. Later on the R.P.I. was accepted as a member of the Gapi.

When the Gapi launched the mass movement action demanding a parliament for Indonesia, the Indonesian youth and students whole-heartedly and solidly stood behind the Gapi. The youth put forward a radical proposal that if the government did not concede the Gapi's demand, the Indonesian leaders should quit the government offices and councils.

The federation of Indonesian Islamic political parties (Misi) headed by the P.S.I.I. was purely Islamic organisation, consisting of almost all Muslim associations in Indonesia. After hearing and reading the Gapi's manifesto demanding a parliament for Indonesia, the Misi's secretariat immediately held an emergency conference on October 12-13, 1939. The conference was attended by 9 Muslim organisations. It discussed the above said problem at length and approved and supported the Gapi's action in demanding a parliament for Indonesia. It also approved of the Gapi's holding the Indonesian people's congress. At the same time, Gapi in the volksraad prepared a petition putting forward a similar demand and sent it to the second chamber of states general at the Hague.2

1. Ibid, p.72
2. Ibid, p.76
The Gapi's meeting of 22 November, 1939, sanctioned:

1. Mass Movement action, demanding a parliament for Indonesia. The working committee of all the parties, uniting under the Gapi, were ordered to launched a mass movement action demanding a parliament for Indonesia. Whatever there was no gapi's branch, it was decided that a committee for a parliament should be formed to pass resolution demanding a parliament for Indonesia.

2. It was also decided to hold a congress of the people of Indonesia, aiming at Indonesia raja. Lastly the gapi called upon the people of Indonesia to support the gapi and the proposed congress of the people of Indonesia morally and materially.1

On 17 November, 1939, the meetings of the mass movement action were peacefully and successfully held in more than 100 places by all political parties, groups and committees throughout Indonesia. This action demonstrated that the demand for a parliament was people's demand. This showed not only political groups who were politically conscious but the masses also have spontaneously championed for an Indonesian parliament.

The demand for a parliament was furthered by the Indonesian people's congress. The people's congress (K.R.I.) was held on December, 23, 24 and 25, 1939. It passed a resolution which inter alia stated that: 1. From 24 December, 1939, permanent K.R.I. would come into existence. This K.R.I. aimed at the prosperity and security of Indonesian people. To win a parliament for Indonesia was the first step in this direction. 2. The gapi was to be made the executive of the K.R.I. The K.R.I. was to accept all parties and groups as

1. Ibid p.75
its members, the election to it was to be democratic and decision to be taken intensified and to be led by the gapi. The K.K.I. also officially declared that the national flag was to be red and white and the national anthem, Indonesia raja, Indonesian language was to be used in office and councils.1

Meanwhile, the secretariat of the gapi received a letter from the commission of colonial affairs parties, social democratic labour party and Netherlands trade union (S.D.A.P.) and N.V.V. in the Netherlands. The letter declared that the parties would raise the question of a parliament for Indonesia in the second chamber of the states general at the Hague.

The expression of sympathy by those parties created a new enthusiasm in Indonesia and added to the strength of the movement. The extended hands of the S.D.A.P. and N.V.V. were well received in Indonesia. Later on this S.D.A.P. through its representative, Stokvis, and the Christian democrates fought for Indonesia in the second chamber a losing battle. Stokvis moved a resolution which was summarily dismissed.

The Dutch second chamber met on February 20, 1940, to consider the Indonesian budget and during the course of the debate, the burning question of a parliament for Indonesia was hotly discussed when the question was raised. Minister Welker, the Dutch minister for overseas territories who was supported by all political parties except the S.D.A.P., the Christian democrats and the communist party, rejected the gapi's demand for a parliament for Indonesia even before it was officially submitted.2

1. ibid. p.76; A.K. Pringgodigdo: op.cit. p.161
2. ibid. p.77
Dr. L. N. Palar, former Indonesian ambassador to India, and secretary to colonial commission of the C.D.A.F., wrote from Holland in the magazine (Pandji Islam) of April 8, 1940, the following: Indeed for a long time right from publication of the papi's manifesto, the demand for a parliament for Indonesia, has been discussed by some of the dailies in the Netherlands. From the attitude of those newspapers it could be predicted that a great majority of those who express public opinion do not agree with the papi's slogan.

What attracts our attention most is that their attitude is formed on no good background. We say that the background is not good, because how can a man form an attitude towards a problem which is influenced by and grows from the Indonesian movement, if he is not acquainted with the A.B.C. of the Indonesian politics.

The Aneta's news (Dutch news agency) is far from enough and often then not wrong news. The Indonesian newspapers are seldom read in the Netherlands. The news in the Netherlands press is biased and very scanty. None of the editors of any newspapers in the Netherlands has sufficient knowledge of the Indonesian movement.

Therefore, the Indonesian movement and its strength and the aim of every party and its ideals are not known in the Netherlands. It is not wonder that many members in the second chamber of the Netherlands people's council, which ultimately decide how Indonesia is to be governed, put forward to the minister for overseas territories, a demand to give a general survey of Indonesian

1. Pandji Islam, Jakarta, April 8, 1940
movement to the second chamber. At the time when the demand for a parliament for Indonesia was discussed in the second chamber this general survey was not as yet given to the members. Thus, those who were ignorant of the Indonesian politics had to partake yet in forming the attitude of the second chamber towards the Indonesia demand. Although ignorant of the Indonesian situation they supported the rejection of the demand of the Indonesian movement.1

The Dutch public do not pay much attention. The interest of the other members of the second chamber was still much less. The Indonesian problems were usually handled by committee of colonial specialists. No wonder if a majority of the members of the second chamber are to be found in the coffee chamber whenever the most important Indonesian questions are being discussed. Only when they have to vote they are again seen in the second chamber. If these conditions are taken into consideration, one has to come to the conclusion that a body such as second chamber is not competent and has no right to decide Indonesian problems.2

The temporary report of the second chamber and the explanatory memorandum of minister Welter, registered strong rejection of the demand. The minister was of the opinion the demand for a parliament for Indonesia was the demand of only a small group of persons of educated classes who were conscious of their right to share in responsibility in the governance of their country.

Minister Welter viewed this demand with a mixed feeling and deplored the action of the gapit in the demanding a parliament for Indonesia. The minister added that on account of the impossibility

2. Ibidji Islam: op.cit.
of bringing fundamental change in the position of Indonesia in the political constitution of the kingdom and in that of volksraad in the constitution of Indonesia, he was of opinion that there was no reason to appoint an investigation committee in connection with the Indonesian politics.

The rejection of the demand for a parliament was based on the following reasons: 1. The time was inopportune; the world was facing crisis; it was not good time to introduce any constitutional change in Indonesia. 2. The majority of the people of Indonesia did not demand the extension of the political rights as they were illiterate. 1

After examining the groups on which the rejection of the demand by the Dutch was based, the secretariat of the gapi held a meeting which came to the conclusion that the rejection would and could not halt the mass action for winning a parliament for Indonesia. All Indonesian press expressed the same view. In other words, the mass movement action for a parliament for Indonesia was to be intensified and to be legally carried on ceaselessly.

T.J.E. Stokvis, colonial specialist of the S.I.A.P., defended the demand of the Indonesian people in the second chamber. In the government's explanatory memorandum, he said in the chamber minister of overseas territories insists upon refusing the extension autonomy for Indonesia. There are three difficulties advanced by the minister: 1. The Indonesian masses are not yet ripe; therefore the upper strata of society will dominate; 2. Before having trained the people through the lower councils (city and local councils) the parliamentary rights cannot be given to the people;

1. Obani and Co: op. cit. p. 77
3. A volksraad which has parliamentary rights cannot be reconciled to the Netherlands responsibility.

When the Nazi armies invaded the Netherlands before dawn in May 10, 1940, the Dutch government fled to England and the states general ceased to function. The exiled government continued to direct the international relations of Indonesia from London. All power in Indonesia was invested in the hands of a G.C. In fact said Mr. H. Thamrin in the annual meeting of the volksraad, while Indonesians fighting the battle for parliament, the construction of the government in Indonesia has become more or less totalitarian. Totalitarian system is much blamed by Dutch, it is much used by them. The concentration of all power in the hands of the high officials tended to widen the gulf between the government and people and immediate remedy for this must be founded.

During this international crisis, the Dutch government promised to consider constitutional change in Indonesia when the Netherlands and their power were restored. According to the explanatory memorandum said Thamrin in the annual meeting of the volksraad of 1940, the government rejection of the demand of the people was based on two excuses: 1. The situation in the world was undergoing a change and what shape democracy would take after the war was not known. 2. Because there had to be changes in the law of the Netherlands in order to alter the constitution in Indonesia, so the return of all bodies of the authority in the Netherlands must be awaited before anything could be done, because the only matters considered to be important could be changed by means of emergency

1. Ibid. p. 80
Dr. Tadjuddin Nur, a prominent member of the volksraad, warned the government of the consequence of the government's obstinacy. He said I am afraid that the decision to make this country (Indonesia) a part and parcel of the great Netherlands would be a mere mockery.

The government's spokesmen intensely deplored the attitude of the nationalist members of the volksraad who defended the right to achieve independence. Further the government representatives said that to urge the people outside the volksraad to render help to achieve independence could be interpreted as an action against the authorities in the Netherlands, because their government were strongly against the right of the Netherlands subjects to secede.

In the session of volksraad in June 3, 1940, the nationalist cooperators introduced three important bills which were warmly debated, calling for 1. changing the volksraad in full pledged parliament, 2. creating an imperial conference, 3. changing the official name of the country from the Netherlands Indies to Indonesia 4. creating an Indonesian citizenship which would be conferred on all persons who had attained a certain intellectual and cultural development regardless of race. The bills found considerable support, even among the European members, but nevertheless were withdrawn by their authors when the government declared it could not accept them.

The government on its initiative now took a step in the direction of satisfying the widespread and deeply felt desire

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1. Ibid. p.85
2. Ibid. p.86
for constitutional reform under the leadership of a united front (gapi). On September 14, 1940, it announced the appointment of a commission to ascertain the desires, aspirations and ideas with respect to the political development of Indonesia which obtained among the various races and classes of the Indonesian community and to submit to the government a carefully prepared report of its finding together with a study of the consequences to government legislation and society if the desired reform should be incorporated in the organic law. In its double function of investigation and study the commission was especially requested to consider the possibility and the consequences of instituting an Indonesian citizenship and of instituting in legislation some other term than inlanders.1

The commission which was expected to make its report within a year, was composed of seven members with Dr. F. H. Visman, a member of the council of the Indies, as chairman. Of the seven members, 3 were Netherlanders, 3 were Indonesians and 1 was Chinese. There was criticism of the commission with regard to both the scope of its charge and its composition. The commission had only a hearing privilege and consisted only of civil servants. There was no delegation or representatives from the Netherlands. It had no right to advance suggestion to form a parliament and a responsible government. The commission was nothing because it had much less power to cope with the increasing demand of the people. The commission could not

1. Vlekke: op.cit. p.205; Pringsigidlo: op.cit. p.162
give concrete form to the expressions and desires of the people. Because the majority of the commission consisted of those who had no capability of pondering over the constitutional problems, had no political experience in the matter of investigation and had no knowledge of the Indonesian society. It was not a skillful artist who undertakes the outlines of the Indonesian society, said Pedoman Masjarakat in October 10, 1945.1

In its plenary session of October, 1940, the Gapi was of the opinion that the commission was unnecessary. It forbade every party under it to establish contact with the commission individually.

The commission, however, proceeded with its work and by December 9, 1941, just three months before the fall of Indonesia, the commission furnished its report. The report of this investigation was in two parts: 1. Dealing with development of political, social and economic conditions in Indonesia between the two wars. 2. It contained the aspiration of the people. It dealt with a series of problems such as racial problems, those of common Indonesian citizenship, of the eventual organisation of the administration on a federal basis, of local government and its future development, of the reform of the volksraad and extension of franchise, of re-adjustment of the relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia and finally of the establishment of a joint imperial council for all parts of Netherlands.2

Before the Visman commission had completed its report, in April and May, 1941, the minister of colonies, Mr. R. Welter and minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Van Kleffen made a visit to Indonesia.

1. Pedoman Masjarakat, October, 10, 1945
2. Ubani and Co: op.cit. p.87
In a farewell address over the radio on May 7, minister Welter declared that in the political structure of the kingdom after the war expression would have to be given to the changed position which Indonesia had acquired in and through the war. In a broadcast to the empire from London in May 10, Queen Wilhelmina likewise promised a change in the governmental structure of the empire so as to give the various parts the position due them from the change in conditions. In July 30, 1941, the Queen again declared that as soon as the Netherlands are liberated from the oppressor, a new cabinet will be formed. This new cabinet must immediately prepare a revision of the constitution; a revision by which among other things, the relations between the mother country and the other parts of the kingdom will be re-organised. To prepare this revision a board constituted by representatives of all parts of the kingdom will be appointed. Besides, the revision of kingdom, that of administration acts now in force for each part of the kingdom must be undertaken. This will be done in the common agreement with representatives of those territories in this we can lay the foundation for a happier and more prosperous future for the entire kingdom.1

In his address opening the volksraad on June 16, G.C., Tjarda 5. Stachhouswer, made a declaration with the approval of the Queen and the ministry in London, that a chief item of the post liberation programme would be changes in the constitutional structure of the empire whereby the status of Indonesia and the West Indies would be brought into conformity with the importance of these regions.

1. Vlekke: op.cit. p.207
in the empire. Moreover, the internal political structure of the overseas territories would continue an integral part of this programme. Opportunity would be given to bring to the knowledge of the crown the desires and ideas obtaining on the subject, in order that these might be carefully considered. The Queen's government proposed after the liberation of the motherland, to call a conference of prominent persons from the various parts of the kingdom which should serve the crown with advice on the subject.1

This governmental declaration was generally welcomed but it did not completely satisfy even the moderate prominents of the constitutional reforms, for while it promised reforms it put them off until the end of the war. The desire for reforms was, therefore, still stronger and the Gapi, consisting of both cooperators and non-cooperators, strenuously strived for political independence of Indonesia. The cooperation and non-cooperation movements were in full swing to fight for human rights.

The Gapi boycotted the Vsimen commission and the fight for a parliament for Indonesia was intensified. The Indonesian women's congress (K.F.I) a federation of almost all women's movements in its meeting of July 28, 1941, passed a resolution of approval of the establishment of a parliament in Indonesia's demanded by the Gapi and decided to work with the Gapi in achieving a parliament for Indonesia.

The Indonesian people's congress(K.F.I.) held a conference at Mataram on September 13-14, 1941 passed a resolution to form a new body called Majelis Rakjat Indonesia or M.R.I.

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.427
(Indonesian people's assembly), based on democracy aiming at the
security and dignity of Indonesia. According to it this was to be
achieved: 1. by holding mass meetings and conferences where the
people could express their opinions and pass resolutions on matters
of interests for Indonesia. 2. Specially making efforts to carry
on the action for a parliament for Indonesia.

The membership of the M.R.I. consisted of all organised
Indonesian parties and groups which took part in advancing the
people, whether the parties or groups worked in the field of
politics or in social or religious field or in any other field. The
M.R.I. was administered by a body called Dewan pimpinan (executive
council), consisting of representatives of various federation under
the M.R.I. There were four big federations under the M.R.I., that
is to say, the Gapi, the Mial (religion), the E.P.I. (women) and the
V.V.P.N (labour).

On November 9, 1941, just one month before the treacherous
Pearl Harbour attack, the Gapi held its plenary session at Jakarta,
which was attended by the representatives of the Gerindo, the
persatuan Minahase, the pengjudan Basundan, the P.I.I., the partai
kaum katolik Indonesia, the P.S.L.I., the partai Arab Indonesia,
and the parindra. The session passed as many as 11 resolutions, the
most important of which were as follows:

The Gapi's plenary session decided (1) to put forward to
the working committee of every member of Gapi a question regarding
further step of Gapi in connection with the action for parliament,
for Indonesia, taking special notice of the proposal of the partai

1. Ubani and Co: op.cit. p.94
Islam Indonesia of sending the people's delegation to London.

(2) To draw a plan of demand regarding the future economic reconstruction with reference to the plenary session of the Capi of August 8, 1941 and the Capi's memorandum of January 31, 1941, section C. sub 6: (a) which guarantee to the masses of the Indonesian working class to live a human way of life and in pace with economic progress. (b) which give the state such as power over the principal and key industries as to make the purpose and the aim of those industries no more to concentrate riches in the hands of individual or of a small class of the society but to a mass the large amount of wealth for the general welfare of the people. (c) which guarantee the abolition of racial discrimination in Indonesia based on the old time considerations which nowadays creates conflicts and disturbs social harmony. (3) To propose a change in the composition of the Indonesian parliament's committee which will be named gerakan Indonesia berparlemen (a parliament for Indonesian movement), the K.R.I. will authorise the Capi to deal with every thing connected with the said gerakan Indonesia berparlemen. (4) The Cerindo along with the secretariat of the Capi are entrusted to take a step so that the policy of deportation of the Indonesian leaders may be abolished as soon as possible.1

The Capi's conference of September 19-20, 1939, and December 12, 1940, decided to continue the fight for a parliament for Indonesia. The Capi established various committees for Indonesian parliament all over the country, for the purpose. The Capi's conference of January 31, 1941, at Jakarta, drafted a plan of the parliament

1. Ibid, p.96
which consisted of two chambers, the house of representatives and senate, each having 200 and 100 members respectively. They were to be elected by the people on the basis of proportional system. The parliament was a supreme authority to make laws in the country. The Indonesian citizenship would cover the entire Dutch East Indies.1

As regards the structure of government, Indonesia was to be governed by a president. The president had a right of veto and was impeachable in relation to official functions done by the government. The executive power was vested in the hands of the president. He had powers to appoint and dismiss all ministers in consultation with the parliament. He was assisted by an advisory council (cabinet). Indonesia and the Netherlands formed together a steten bond (confederation). Presenting the draft as memorandum to the Visman commission on February 14, 1941, the general secretary of the Capi br. Abikusno said that the Capi secretariat had received the approval of 21,047 persons and 246 organisations all over Indonesia demanding a parliament for Indonesia.2

Furthermore, the defence problem or militia question had been hotly discussed by the nationalist cooperators and non-cooperators inside and outside the volksraad. When the Netherlands were occupied by the German troops in May 10, 1940, the young Netherlands in Indonesia proposed that the Indonesians should participate in defending Indonesia, because anything that was possible to happen in future, would directly affect the interest of all population of Indonesia. By the royal degree of July 15, 1940, a defence commission under the chairmanship of J.H.B. Kuneman was appointed. The commission investigated the question of the militia for Indonesia.

1. A.K. Pringgodigdo: op. cit. p. 163
2. Obani and Co: op. cit. p. 93
On October 1, 1940, the commission submitted to the government its report of inquiry in which inter alia it was stated: - The commission at least came to the conclusion that the best way to make this country capable of defending itself is to introduce a limited native militia. Mr. L. Noe, Assistant resident in Java expressed the same view in September, 1940.

As a result, on July 11, 1941, the volksraad passed a bill introducing militia. The militia was limited to Java, Madura and some regions outside Java such as Minahasa and Ambon. The island of Sumatra and other islands were left out.

In reality, the people of Indonesia had been demanding the introduction of militia for the last 26 years. In 1915, a military authority put forward its militia proposal to the government of Indonesia. In one of the meeting of the Indonesian association of military officers held on March 5, 1916 at Jakarta, the militia proposal discussed. The introduction of the militia was agreed upon in principle.

In August, 1915, the budi utomo had the share in proposing militia. But the militia might be introduced by the people. Therefore a people's council having legislative power might be instituted first. The serikat Islam was of opinion that the militia was citizen's duty in the state to protect the state against foreign aggression. That was the state might have its own sovereignty. A colony of dependency was like a lifeless object. It it was asked to ack and to protect itself, it might be animated first. Sane mind could not think of asking an inanimate object to act and defend itself or to participate in defending itself, might be given quality of

1. Ibid. p.164
Through their organisations the people objected the method of introduction of the militia bill. The militia bill was brought in the volksraad by the government. And the bill was passed in the volksraad as a government ordinance. It was not introduced and passed by a true representative parliament and responsible government.

The volksraad had no right to discuss it. The plenary session of the Gapi held at Bandung on June 21, 1941, consisted the militia a heavy duty of the people, life tax, which must be established with the consent of the willingness of the people and decided to approve the introduction of the militia only when it was introduced by a real people's parliament as explained in the Gapi's manifesto.

Mr. Suryakupan of the C.N.I. asked in the volksraad why could not militia be introduced in the big island of Sumatra and if so, the volksraad has no right to discuss the militia proposal.

In the volksraad, the nationalist members united in the national fraction of Indonesia advanced the following arguments against the G.G.'s ordinance. (1) Since the militia was limited, the volksraad had no right to discuss the subject. (2) The militia was another kind of duty imposed upon the people. Duty implied rights. Therefore, the people might be given more rights in the administration of the country in return. The rights might be given with a view to making the Indonesians to join the forces cheerfully and enthusiastically. The people might regard it as their birth right and privilege to join the militia. And these could only be satisfied by the conversion of the volksraad into a full-pledged parliament.

1. Ibid. p. 92
The militia should not be introduced by way of the G.C.'s ordinance.1

Mr. Pawoto of the retired people's association (P.F.I.) a moderate nationalist, said only a small number of well-to-do, the aristocratic and government's servants were for the ordinance, while the nationalists, the intellectuals were against. The former was supported by the Dutch members whose number in the volksraad was very much out of proportion to the size of their community. Those Dutch had, besides, no right to discuss a subject which did not affect them but rather the Indonesians.2

Dr. Sjamsuddin of F.N.I. in the volksraad, all religious bodies under the Mial, rejected the introduction of Indonesian militia in the said manner. 8 biggest political parties amalgamated under the Gapi also rejected it outrightly. All labour organisations under the P.V.P.N. had the same attitude. The Indonesian women organisation also rejected it. And the entire press evinced the same attitude. Dr. Hindromartono, the president of railway and tram union spoke in similar term.

The Mial under the suggestion of the Gapi along with the Indonesian press and many Indonesian organisations, male and female wired the authority of the Netherlands in London to cancel the decision of the volksraad regarding the Indonesian militia. The executive board of the F.S.I.I. sent wire to Her Majesty, Queen Wilhelmina in London demanding that the decision of volksraad should not be put into force. The leaders of the parindra walked out of the volksraad during the discussion of the militia bill.3

1. Ibid p. 94
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p. 101
Inspite of all above mentioned suggestions and arguments, the Dutch government who had sole authority in Indonesia, passed the militia bill and consequently the compulsory militia service was enforced to the young Indonesians. But the result was not so satisfactory and all Netherlands forces were badly defeated by overwhelming powerful Japanese forces in 1942.

PART B: INDONESIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHINA

Indonesia and China were linked together many centuries past. The Chinese were the largest alien group in Indonesia, numbering 526,000 (1900); 41,157 (1928); 36,000 (1921); 1,2,234,000 (1930); 1,500,000 (1940) and over 2 million in 1950. They originated principally in Kwangtung and Fukien and their arrival in Indonesia long antedated that of Europeans. In 1930 nearly half of all Chinese (582,431) lived in Java and Madura, in the municipalities they formed about 10% of the urban population. On the other islands the largest Chinese colony was to be found in Sumatra (448,531) where they were predominantly immigrant labourers, especially in the tin-mines and the large rubber and te-bacco plantations and some were agriculturists market gardeners and fishermen. The Chinese of Borneo (over 108,000) were mainly descendants of all immigrant families and were engaged in agriculture, lumbering and the like. In the outer islands as a whole only 11% of the Chinese population was urban.

In the early data the Chinese community was organized under its headmen who were responsible to the Dutch authorities. The Chinese had established schools and hospitals in 1729 and the Chinese Muslim

1. V. Purcell: The Chinese in S.E.A. London 1951, p.805
built a mosque in 1786, and consequently organised a Chinese Muslim party of Indonesia (P.T.I.I.) They intermarried with the native population. It was a petty republican communal organisation of the Chinese and reactionary towards the prevailing authorities. Teumuck pointed that the Kongsis were democratic communities formed with the object of exploiting for their benefit the gold and diamond mines. They were divided into public associations of which 3 accounted for the greatest number of members and these three kongsis occupied the leading position and exercised control over the smaller ones distributing through the interior. All Chinese belong to the kongsis shared in the gains and losses of the mining enterprises. The Lanpong kongsi in the Sambos residency (Borneo) had an armed force of 6,000 fighting men; the Taykong and the Lara Sinta-kiou kongsis in the Sabas residency had 10,000 and 50,000 fighting men respectively. After the termination of the great Java war in 1926, the Dutch supported the Sultan Abu Bakar Tadjuddin of Borneo against the reactionary Chinese organisation and ultimately defeated them in 1854.1

In 1870, there were only about Javanese labourers employed in estates in the east coast of Sumatra, the majority of the 4000 labourers being Chinese. Between 1888 and 1931 there were some 305,000 Chinese at Belawan. The great majority came from Swatow or Hong Kong where the association of Deli planters (D.P.V.) had recruiting officers. Between 1864 and 188 the labourers were obtained through coolies brokers in Singapore. From 1890 to 1914

1. Schlege, Prof. G.L.: Organisation de kongsis a Borneo, revile coloniale internationale, Amsterdam, de Bussy, Tone 1, 1885 p. 450
German shipping companies transported Chinese labourers backwards and forwards between Belawan and south China but from 1914 to 1931 ships of the K.P.M. brought the labourers to Sumatra. The number of the Chinese field labourers employed by Sumatra tobacco estates were 21,000(1930); 19,000(1931) and 8,000(1939).1

Upto 1824 in Java the civil affairs of the Chinese were dealt with by the European courts of justice (raden van justitie); their criminal affairs by the landraden (courts of justice) for the natives in the inner territories and in the districts of Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya by raden van justitites. The private law applied was in the case of the raden van justitie the European law (with a few exception as to Chinese law of inheritance) and the case of landraden customary. But the Chinese did not bring their marriage and divorce before the courts.2

By an order of the C.C., Van Der Capellen, in council in 1824, it was ordered that the Chinese all over Java in their criminal and civil affairs should be judged by the native courts. Those who complained of this were not the Chinese but the Dutch merchants who were of the opinion that their disputes with the Chinese were better dealt with by the raden van justitite than landraden.3

Under the Government act of 1848 foreign orientals were placed on the same footing as natives. The act did not alter the position was confined by royal degree on the principles of law. The

2. V. Purcell: op. cit. p. 506
degree was extended in 1917 to allow a person to submit himself to the whole of European civil law.

By an ordinance of the G.G. of 1855, made at the request of the Dutch merchants of Jakarta, the Dutch law property, as laid down in the Indonesian civil code, was declared applicable to foreign orientals. From 1855 onwards the ordinary jurisdiction in Chinese civil matters was the raden van justitie.1

The Chinese never complained of this ordinance of 1855 but they did complain on criminal matters which had to be judged by the landraad and not by the raden van justitie. After 1918 the criminal law for Europeans, Chinese and natives was substantially the same though the law of property differed.

The recognition in 1899 of the Japanese as Europeans in their legal relations, while the Chinese in most of their activities were left under the native courts, the Chinese received a slight upon themselves. The judicial organ which the special object of the Chinese dislike was the politie rol (police roll), a court having jurisdiction over minor offences and hearing preliminary examinations. The local civil service served as the judge in violation of the principle of the separation of the executive and the judiciary.2

The landraad, the intermediary court for native and Foreign Asiatics, was also the object of criticism both from orientals and Europeans because it was composed of a legally qualified chairman, usually European, 2 native active or pensioned

1. Ibid
2. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.356
officials, a native officer of justice, a Chinese adviser and a clerk. The non-jurist character of the laymen and the recruiting of his service from the official class subjected the court to much the same criticism as was brought against the politie rol.

Another grievance of the Chinese was that like the natives, they often subjected to along confinement before trial and in house search and criminal pleading the European had far protestation against arbitrary actions.1

Chinese agitation assisted by the unification policy of Van Deventer and other Dutch liberals led in 1914 to the abolition of the politie rol and in 1917 to a measure which permitted individual non-Europeans to submit themselves to European law, thus participating in their benefits.

Subsequent legislation from 1917 to 1925 had the effect of removing the Chinese completely from the civil jurisdiction of the landraad but by the time of Japanese invasion their demand to be placed on the same footing as Europeans in criminal procedure as well had not been granted. In 1928 a new regulation passed by the volksraad abolished the jurisdiction of the Chinese headmen.2

In 1900, the Chinese could in principle live only where there were Chinese quarters. For every trip he wished to make into the interior a Chinese merchant had to obtain a pass. The system was relaxed in 1904 by the grant of passes valid for a year instead of for a single journey and in 1910 the right was conceded of free passage along the main highways without a permit and Chinese nobles were exempted from the obligation to obtain a pass.

1. V. Furcell: op.cit. p.508
2. De Kat Angelino: op.cit. p.154
In 1887 the Chinese government had sent a committee to Indonesia to study the commercial relations of China with that country. Permission to send the committee was obtained through diplomatic channels by way of the Hague and the Indonesian government, received the members as visitors from a friendly state. Then in 1891 the Peking government requested permission to collect funds among the Chinese in Indonesia for flood relief in China. Again in 1906 a Chinese made a protracted visit to Java for the purpose of bringing about uniformity among Chinese commercial societies. In 1907 the assistant secretary of the department of agriculture, Yang Shih-Tshi visited Indonesia to discuss commercial problems and as result of his visit many addresses and petitions were sent to Peking from the Chinese in Indonesia.1

In 1908 Wang Kang Ky, secretary to the Chinese legislation at the Hague, travelled in Indonesia for several months. At Surabaya he held a semi-official census and recommended that Chinese residents in Indonesia choose between Chinese and Dutch nationality. In 1909 two Chinese cruisers appeared in the harbour at Jakarta, carrying Wa Tacheng, secretary of the department of education, who spent some time in Java for the alleged purpose of studying commercial conditions. In 1910 Caho Tsung Fan, adviser to the department of agriculture, industry and trade, came for the same purpose. In 1913 the newly appointed minister to the Hague, Wei Chen Tsu, on the way to his post, travelled through Indonesia.2

1. Van Ginkel: Overzicht van de internationall rechelijke betrekkingen van Nederlandsch indie, 1850, p. 74
2. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 360
Chinese in Indonesia were honoured with decorations and membership in Chinese orders. Directors of important commercial societies in Java were invested in office from Peking. Scholars were selected from the society school to go to China for further study at the expenses of the Chinese government. Chinese warships on their call at Indonesian ports were received with great festivity and on Chinese holidays there was a riotous display of flag. In 1911, the Siang Hwee at Surabaya and Jokjakara and other places sent out ballots for the election of members of the provincial council at Canton. In 1912, the Siang Hwee in Indonesia sent a committee to Peking to participate in the election of 6 senators who were to represent the Chinese abroad in that body. And the Chinese in Indonesia contributed liberally in men and money to the cause of the republic revolution.1

The Netherlands had obtained a most favoured nation clause treaty in 1863, giving it the right of diplomatic and consular representation and giving Dutch subjects the right to travel in China without passports. Nothing was said of the rights of Chinese subjects in the Netherlands or possessions. A consular convention with Japan had been concluded in 1908 providing for mutual rights of consular officials in each other territory. This aroused the envy of China, which now made strong demands for a consular convention.

Regarding nationality, the Indonesian government act of 1854 provided that all persons living in Indonesia were termed inhabitants or Dutch subjects. This was in conflict with the Chinese law of nationality which was based on the jus sanguinis and claimed all persons of Chinese descent through the male line as Chinese.1

1 Knobel: Koloniall bestuur in verband net buitenlandsche zaken, vragen van de Dag, 1915, p. 30 and 584
This fact delayed a consular convention between the two countries and it was not signed until May, 8, 1910. China objected strenuously to the Dutch nationality but had to accept it as the price for the right of consular representation in Indonesia.\(^1\)

In 1900 a bureau of Chinese affairs was established by the government of Jakarta. The personnel of the bureau underwent a long period of preparation in Holland, China, and Indonesia and had a thorough acquaintance with the languages and customs. The bureau which kept in close touch with movements in China and among the Chinese community in Indonesia furnished information and advice to all branches of the government, prepared a bi-monthly report on the Chinese and Chinese Indonesian press in Indonesia and gave special attention to Chinese schools.\(^2\)

Politically the Chinese held a favoured position in Indonesia. Of the 61 members of the volksraad no fewer than three and no more than 4 might be Chinese and they held about the same number of seats proportionately in the provincial, regency and municipal councils. The Chinese were not allowed to join military service in Indonesia. In 1940 there was still very strong Chinese nationalist sentiment, although among the Indonesian-Chinese there was a tendency to align themselves on the side of the Indonesian nationalists.\(^3\)

Chinese were admitted to native schools on the same footing as natives and the erection of government schools for Chinese called Dutch-Chinese schools, was begun in 1908 and in 1909 private Chinese schools were granted subsidies. The curriculum of the

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1. V. Purcell: op. cit. p. 514
2. Ibid. p. 520
3. Ibid. p. 518
Dutch-Chinese schools was the same as that of the European elementary schools, with Dutch as the language medium. English was also introduced in these schools.

According to Mr. Van Diffelen, of 200,000 Chinese children between the age of 6 and 14 in 1936, about 98,000 received education of some sort. Of these some 45,000 were education in schools conducted by the Tjong Hwa Tong; 23,000 in public and subsidized Dutch-Chinese schools; 13,000 in native primary schools and Indonesia-Chinese schools; 2,500 in the European schools (6 in grades); 13,500 in the special Dutch-Chinese and other wild cat schools under private arrangement. That is to say that about 50% of Chinese youth received education. John Lauws and others gave a total of only 5,841 Chinese Christian throughout Indonesian archipelago.1

The Chinese schools recruited large number of teachers from Canton province. There were three happenings which had strong repercussions among the Chinese of Indonesia. The first was the revolution of 1911, the second was the rise of Kuomintang and the purging of its left-wing elements in 1927 and the third was trouble between China and Japan which began a new in 1931. The Chinese and Indonesian communists came together for a time in an uneasy alliance in 1925. After the purge in 1927 there was a permanent split between Chinese communists and nationalists. At this period the Chinese were coming to Indonesia at that rate of about 50,000 a year and this ave some anxiety to the Indonesian government.2

There was much propaganda originating in China; the Kuomintang controlled a considerable press in Indonesia. The Chinese

1. Dr. R. Van Diffelen: *He onderwijs voor Chinezen, koloniaal steden* Nos. 5 and 6, 1936, p. 42
2. V. Purcell: *op. cit.* p. 544
press in Indonesia reflected all events in China. There were all disciplined branches of K.M.T. such as the So Po Sia (reading club) the Ten Men League, the Boycotte Pickets and Iron and blood brigades. When Canton was still revolutionary under the leadership of Sun Yat Sen and under the influence of Borodin, Chinese conflicts were transported to Indonesia and some disturbances broke out. The boycott against the Japanese was observed with varying degrees of rigidity in different parts of Indonesia and in some was maintained through terrorisation. The Sino-Japanese feeling run through the Chinese community. The government warned several Chinese papers against articles to violence and took precaution against outbreaks against the Japanese in Indonesia who were so small in number. There was a considerable number of Chinese non-cooperation who through press and public meetings claimed for freed from Dutch citizenship; they wanted Chinese nationality and yet wished to retain privileged position in Indonesia.1

The renewal of the war between Japan and China in 1937, had its repercussions in Indonesia. 200 Indo-Chinese students stronded in Shanghai were brought home. The Chinese government immediately called for financial aid from Chinese abroad. The Indonesian government permitted the purchase and sale of Chinese bonds, but it did not permit public action or propaganda for the sale of war loans. The Chinese in Indonesia bought war bonds to the amount of 1 1/6 million florins during the first year alone. In addition to this, 4½ million florins were contributed for Chinese relief. As secured

1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. pp. 367-368
at the time of the outbreak of war in Manchuria in 1931, the Chinese engaged in extensive boycott of Japanese to supply the goods because of the shift to war economy, the import of Japanese goods fell markedly.¹

The imperial government of China had awakened towards the end of its existence, to the advantages of cultivating China's settlement overseas and the nationalist government intensified these efforts to obtain sympathy, support and money from Chinese exiled children. It sent numerous missions to the Nanyang with variously described objectives, but with one unvarying motive. In 1930, it was demanding a consular treaty with the Netherlands which should ensure the assimilation of Chinese to Europeans in Indonesia. A point of friction between the government was the registration of Chinese overseas. Every new consular arriving in Indonesia received instructions from his government sent circulars to the residents prohibiting the practice and repeatedly informed the consulars that this was not permissible under the consular treaty. Such protests regularly brought for the apologetic explanation that a mistake had been made and that they had intended to register only the Sinkhens (newcomers) and not Indonesian-Chinese born (peranakan). Another source of conflict between the government and the Chinese consulars was over the display of flags at half-mast on the anniversary of the 21 demands. The Indonesian government had prohibited the display of flag at half-mast on these and similar days on the ground that would constitute giving of no Japan, a power with which it was in friendly relations.²

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¹ V. Purcell: op. cit. p. 544; Ibi. p. 370
² Ibid, p. 546
The Chinese were to be found in every economic structure of Indonesia society, as large capitalists, bankers and agricultural commissioners as well as the humblest labourers, but their function in economic life was far excellence that of middlemen. Of the total Chinese population of 1,233, million 485,000 in trade and commerce, 470,000 in raw material production, 94,000 in industry, 3000 in government service and 43,000 in other occupations. The Chinese in Java were most numerous in trade; those of the outer islands as miners or plantation coolies. Apart from their peculiarity, carpentry and with the Arabs, the extension of small loans, usually a usurious rate, were some of the occupation which were almost exclusively theirs. In outer islands they were to be found in large number as contract labourers in the mines of Banjka and Billiton and the European plantations of the northeast of Sumatra and in northwest of Borneo as independent farmers.1

The recruitment of Chinese coolies labour for Indonesian mines and plantations ceased in 1934 and by 1939 of the 332,539 coolies employed on European estates in the outislands, only 25,067 were Chinese and about a 1/3 of this were contract labourers. In 1930, there were about 94,000 Chinese among the 2,200 industrial workers of Indonesia or 4.7% of the whole.

The Chinese had also found in European firms and as assistant in European shops and later became more prominent in professional work as teachers, dentists and doctors and in the technical grades of mining industry. In journalism they had gained a large share and this included a share in the control of native press

1. Ibid. p.537
Timber trade was mainly in Chinese hands. In 1938, the total value of timber products exported amounted to over 4 million guilders. The capital investment of Chinese in the country was about 150 million dollars in 1937 and total income 37,000 and 32 million guilders in 1936.1

The flow of new Chinese immigration into Indonesia from 1932 to 1938 was as follows: 12,000 (1932), 9000 (1933), 12,000 (1934), 15,000 (1935), 19,000 (1936), 31,000 (1937), 200,000 (1938). Of the 1938 figures, 3,000 were males below 12 and 8,000 over 12 and 2000 females under 12 and 6000 over 12. From 1920 to 1930 the immigration of Chinese into Indonesia had been at the rate of over 40,000 a year. In 1921 it was about 43,000 and in 1928 about 41,000. The average from 1900 to 1930 was rather over 28,000.2

JAPAN

Indonesia had long the most honourable relations with Japan. Since 1600 on the Netherlands had had continual official relations with the Japanese government. Japanese came to Indonesia about the same time as the East Indian company, Japanese armed with bows and arrows were in the service of the company as soldiers in 1612. By 1623 there was also a large non-military colony of Japanese for in this year they could muster 130 armed men. Some were tax farmers and others engaged in trade. A few held the highest offices under the East India Company and in the church. Not a few of the Japanese were Christians.3

After 1640 no Japanese were permitted to leave their country, nor those abroad to return. The last reference to the

1. Ibid p. 535
3. Oud Batavi: Geden-bool unigegeven ter gelegenheid van het 300 iaring-bestaan der stad in 1919, pp.485-486
Japanese in Sakarta was of 1682. The first notice of Japanese in Indonesia in the new period was an advertisement in Java paper in 1867 of a troupe of Japanese magicians, in which were two Japanese women, the first ever permitted to their land.

The East India company was allowed limiting trading rights with Japan through an agency which it was permitted to maintain on the island of Deshima in the harbour of Nagasaki. The station was in effect a combination of a diplomatic post and a trading company agency. The Dutch on the post suffered ill-treatment.

When the Dutch government took over the E.I.C., it succeeded the company in the trade monopoly. The amount of trade was not great. An item of 20,869 florins appeared in the Indonesian government budget for 1847-48, which represented the profits of this trade. As part payment of salary the officials at Deshima were permitted to send out 4000 florins worth of goods each year. When the Netherlands was a part of Napoleonic France, Deshima was the only place in the world where the flag continued to fly.1

A great amount of western science and learning infiltrated into Japan. Through this Dutch aperture the Japanese were able to learn much about cartography, geography, military sciences, medicine, botany and astronomy. Sometimes they submitted to the Dutch officials on Deshima questions of a military political nature. An instance of this was the questionnaire submitted at the time of the Anglo-Chinese opium war of 1840-42, in which the Japanese asked a series of pertinent questions about British naval strength and tactics.2

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1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 392
2. Boxer: Jan companies in Japan, 1600-1817
The Dutch parliament declared in 1852 that it would follow toward Japan a policy of warning, counsel and stimulation, thereby avoiding everything which might give the impression of seeking our own advantage. On February 15, 1854, King William II sent a highly significant letter to the emperor of Japan, demanding it to abandon its policy of seclusion, suggesting friendly commercial relations as the best method of preventing conflict and advising a softening of the laws against foreigners. In 1845, the C.G. of Indonesia attempted to induce Japan to desert her policy of exclusion.1

The Japanese government was warned of the coming American expedition and was advised to conclude a treaty including the following provision: the opening of Nagasaki to the commerce of all nations; the levying of only moderate import and export taxes; the admission of consuls; the designation of coaling station in the north and south of Japan and most favoured nation treatment for Dutch nation also. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and other countries, Dutch was the common medium of communication both orally and in writing.

The Dutch were afraid of the Japanese expansion since the Sino-Japanese war. By the peace treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, Japan obtained the Pescadores islands and Formosa and a party in Japan began urging southward expansion overseas. In 1912, a Japanese government subsidized boat line running to Indonesia began operations and organisation called the south sea-society encouraged trade and other relations with the south-sea islands.2

In the course of the Russo-Japanese, war, when the Russian Baltic fleet on its way to the Far East approached Indonesia, the

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1. Van Kleffen; op. cit. p.32
2. Bakker; De internationale positie van Nederlandsch-Indie in de laste 50 jaren, de Indische gids 11, p.32-43
Japanese government sent a note to the Hague in which the Dutch government was warned against permitting the Russian fleet to make unneutral use of the Indonesian ports or territorial waters. Should the Netherlands government fail in its duties, the note stated the Japanese government would take such measures as it might deem necessary.

Immediately following the first world war, the Japanese and the U.S. governments demanded from the Dutch colonial authority some concessions for the exploitation of oil fields in Indonesia. The demand was granted. After the war, the Dutch government took part in the Washington conference (1920) and consequently became a party to the nine-power treaty but not to the four-power treaty and the rights of Dutch possession in the Pacific area were respected as desired by the foreign minister, Van Karnebeek, the head of the Dutch delegation.

The Japanese commercial invasion of Indonesia, long feared by the Dutch, became a reality during the world depression. The Japanese share of the Indonesian imports before 1913 was over 1%, The five year average from 1925 to 1929 was considerably higher, slightly over 10%. In 1933 the Japanese percentage of the imports reached 32%. The Dutch share of the Indonesian imports was over 32% in the year immediately proceeding 1920, but had declined to an average of about 18% for 1925-1929. In 1933, the percentage declined to 9.5%. The Japanese were aided in their trade invasion of Indonesia by the Dutch policy of maintaining the golden florin while Japan depreciated the Yen nearly 40%. Beside trade, Japanese

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.397
also tried to capture the shipping and distribution of business.1

The Indonesian Government took action to combat the Japanese trade invasion. It did this just to save a certain proportion of the Indonesian market for Dutch goods, to protect Indonesian industries and the existing distribution system as well as the market for Indonesian exports. The Dutch felt compelled to depart from the open door policy. By means of imposition of quotas and import licenses the Indonesian government was able to recover a great deal of the market for the Netherlands and other western countries. In 1937 the Japanese percentage of the Indonesian imports had fallen back to 25% while the Dutch percentage was up to 19, which was 2% higher than that the average for the five year period from 1925 to 1929.2

During this period the two countries were also engaged in a war for shipping rates. The Japanese companies took advantage of the very liberal Indonesian shipping regulations and were extending into inter-islands shipping business. Japanese rates were so much cheaper than Dutch rates, that Kobe was becoming the maritime centre of the western half of the archipelago.

Since Japan was the chief sufferer from the trade restriction measures, it naturally proposed to the Netherlands to hold a conference to seek a solution to the difficulties which had risen between them. The conference was to be held in Jakarta. The Japanese delegation was led by Nagaoka. The negotiation dragged on, the conference sitting intermittently from June to December, 1934. It finally broke up in complete failure. A year later a semi-official

1. Ibid p.398
2. Ibid. p. 399
shipping conference met at Kobe. This conference never ever got under way. Both the delegates quarrelled the language of the conference, English or Japanese. This led to no result at all.¹

The shipping controversy was suddenly brought to an end in July, 1936, when a leading figure in the Japanese shipping business made a visit to Indonesia. An agreement was reached, whereby the Nanyo Kazun Kaoushiki Kisha, the company in which all the Japanese lines with Indonesia had been merged and the Dutch Java-China-Japan line dividing the shipping business between the two countries. Of the transport from Japan to Indonesia the N.K.K.K. received 62 and J.C.J. line 38 % and of the traffic in the other direction the percentage were 60 and 40 respectively.²

On the surface, Dutch-Japanese relations began to improve after the conference. Contract between the Japanese government and the advisers of the Indonesian government was never broken and peace meal a number of issues were adjusted. Debccchi honoured Indonesia by a good will visit in 1935 and a new able young man by the name of Ishizawa was made Japanese consul general at Jakarta, who did much to improve relations. But Dutch fears of Japan were never allayed.

New Guinea was the first objective of Japanese imperialistic aim in the south seas. The Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha, a subsidiary of the oriental development company, had a concession of about 55,000 hectares in New Guinea which it took over from a German company. Here the Japanese were experimenting with growing cotton. In 1935 this company asked for permission to import 1000

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1. ibid. p. 400
2. ibid. p. 401
Japanese families, but this request was denied. The economic value of the Indonesian part of this island was very doubtful but it might serve as a useful base in support of other Japanese naval bases in the mandated islands, particularly in a war with the U.S.A. Not far from New Guinea was the Japanese settlement of Davao in the Philippines. Indeed, Davao was so near to Mindanao, the north-east Indonesian islands, that some of the children of the island were sent to Davao to go school, who knew Japanese but no Dutch.¹

New Guinea had an indigenous population of only 490,000 papuans, pygmis and near pygmis. It was undeveloped area. In 1935 the Indonesian government undertook the working military and administrative penetration and economic development. The Dutch, British and American companies explored gold and oil fields there. This foreign concession was much criticised by the Indonesian nationalist, H.H. Thamrin. ²

The Japanese southward policy was advocated by navy and other groups in Japan. Many articles had appeared in the Japanese press on the south-sea islands policy. To some it meant merely seeking more liberal trade opportunities; to other it involved asserting the right to develop actual acquisition of territory. Advocates of the policy declared that Manchu Kuo was a disappointment as a course of raw materials as well as a market for commodities that there was a danger in relying too heavily on the continent because Japan might some day be cut off from it by military action; that expansion outward overseas would bring for greater return

¹. Ibid
². Ibid. p.402
at least cost; and that any way, expansion on the continent should be balanced by overseas expansion. There was in Japan a south-sea association, of which Prince Konoe, president of the house of peers was the head. Under its auspices distinguished Japanese in all walks of life were brought together to discuss the southward policy.1

When the office of G.C. of Formosa fell vacant in 1936, Admiral Nagama, minister of the navy, suggested to the premier that since Formosa was a key position in the execution of the southward policy and in a safeguarding Japan's southern line of defence, the practice of having a civilian as G.C. should be discontinued and a naval officer should be named to fill the post. The navy minister's proposal called for vigorous protest from the peers and permanent officials. A sharp controversy prevailed for a time but moderate counsel came to prevail. The result was a compromise - a retired admiral was appointed.2

In March, 1937 an interesting interpellation took place in one of the committees of the Japanese house of representatives. Mr. Hugororo Seikurai of the Minseito party, stated that New Guinea which was more extensive in area than the mainland of Japan, was still left in an underdeveloped state and asked whether the government did not think it advisable as one means of settling the population problem, to open negotiations with the Netherlands government with a view to securing a perpetual lease of the country. In order to preclude any suspicion of territorial designs, he suggested that the government should at the same time conclude a non-aggression agreement with the Netherlands government. General Hayashi, the premier and

1. ibid p.402
2. Japanese weekly chronicle, September 10, 1936
foreign minister, said that on the whole, he shared the interpella
tions view. Japan he declared, had no territorial designs on
Indonesia but the government recognised the necessity of Japan's
economic development in the south-seas. In shaping a course to a
attain this end the government would have to take the position
and sentiment of other party into careful consideration. The
question of the lease of New Guinea, the minister declared, had not
yet been studied by the government but the interpellator's
suggestion would be given careful attention.1

It was against the background of a vague potential Japanese
threat that the Dutch viewed the rumour of a secret clause in the
Japanese-German anti-communist pact of 1935, providing for the divi-
sion of Indonesia into spheres of influence. Mr. Tanizhiro Yoshida
of the Japanese foreign office, came to Indonesia in January, 1937
apparently to seek to dispel Dutch fears of the existence of the
secret protocol. Since then events had moved rapidly and not in a
direction favourable to the Dutch. The accusation by Japan of Honai
and the Spratly islands gave reality to the southward policy.2

ARABIAN STATES

The relations between Indonesia and the Arab world were of
great importance for two reasons: 1. Indonesia is predominantly
Mohammedan and thousands of Indonesian make pilgrimage to Mecca
every year as well as a considerable Indonesian students study in
different educational # # institutions of the Arab states; 2. The
Arab community in Indonesia (111,022 persons in 1930, of whom 24,000
lived in Java) had played an important role in the country for
centuries.

1. Japanese Weekly chronicle, September 10, 1936
1. Ibid: March 4, 1937
2. New York Times, November 26, 1936
Like the Chinese, the Arabians had been in Indonesia for centuries and constitute the intermediaries in business. Some of them had been very successful and multi-millionaires. The houses of sultanates, Siak in Sumatra and Pontianak in Borneo, were Arabian. In 1931, Mr. Van Der Meulen, the former Dutch consul general and charge d'affaires at Jedah, was sent to a mission to Yemen and Hadramaut, the latter the land of origin of the Indonesian Arabians, for the purpose of bringing them under the sphere of legation at Jedah and for reasons Muslim policy. Mr. Van der Meulen, accompanied by Dr. Van Wissmann, a German geographer, successfully completed the difficult mission and so doing they were the first westerners to penetrate the interior of Hadramaut.

The great number of Indonesians went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, but the Indonesian government did not interest itself in the pilgrimage. To discourage the pilgrimage the government in 1825, made passports and the payment of tax of 110 florins a requirement of persons undertaking the pilgrimage. In 1925 this tax, the proceeds of which went to the mosques, was declared illegal by the court of cassation. The number of pilgrims thereupon increased rapidly from 413 in 1825 to 3,862 in 1858. At that time the pilgrimage often took three years and was accompanied by great hardship and even misery.

The government policy with respect to the pilgrimages was now controlled by its policy of absolute neutrality in matters of religion and hence it neither encouraged nor discouraged the pilgrimates, even though they constituted a tremendous drain on the financial resources of the capital poor Indonesians. About half of

1. Van de Meulen: A Journey in Hadramaut, the Muslim world, October, 1932
2. Vander Plas: Des relations entre les pays bas et les pays Hidjas, in Gritus, annuaire inernationale, 1931, pp. 116-144
the Mecca pilgrims from overseas came from Indonesia. In 1926-27, when occurred the largest pilgrimage of Indonesians on record, there were 52,412 Indonesian pilgrims. During the depression the number of pilgrims declined to 2260 for the 1932-33 pilgrimage. The government had undertaken health protection works of pilgrims against contingent diseases in Mecca by inoculation against cholera, typhoid and decency and exercised a careful control over their transportation. Upon their return they guaranteed for a period in order to protect Indonesians from contagion. Those regulations were incorporated in the international sanitary convention of 1926. In 1936 the number of pilgrims was 5,403. In addition there was a colony of about 10,000 Indonesians constantly in Mecca, studying religious subjects and the Arab language.1

The Dutch consulate at Jedah was established in 1872. Hijaz was then a Turkish province and the consulate was subjected to the Dutch legation at Constantinople. The consulate had manifold tasks. Besides registering the pilgrims, looking after their interests, reporting deaths and taking care of their states, the consul also exercised judicial functions over the many pilgrims as the capitulations were recognised in Hijaz. Because of non-Muslim might not enter Mecca, an Indonesian Muslim was added to the consulate staff in 1920, to reside in Mecca during the season of the pilgrimage and in 1920 an Indonesian Muslim physician was also added for the purpose of treating pilgrims, reporting a hygienic conditions in Hijaz and suggesting preventive measures for the protection of the pilgrims. The most difficult task of the consulate was the protection of the pilgrims against exactions and even pillage at the lands of Arabs.2

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p. 372
2. Ibid.
In 1915 the Sharif of Mecca revolted against the Turks and because of the disturbed conditions of the country, the Indonesian pilgrims ceased coming. The 10,000 Indonesian colonies at Mecca were destitute, since then they lived on funds brought by the pilgrims and to be repatriated. The Netherlands recognised the government of King Hussein in 1920, who, however, refused to recognise the capitulations. His government was weak and the pilgrims suffered. The Netherlands in 1926 recognised the government of King Ibn Saud, whose king of Nejd, defeated King Hussein and then united the two countries. King Ibn Saud re-established peace and order and brought about a state of security such as the country had never before known. His government at once joined the international postal union and participated in the international hygienic conference in 1926. The progressive Ibn Saud was trying to modernise the country and in this work had sought the collaboration of the Dutch. A Dutchman set up a laboratory for vaccines and serums for his government and in 1932, Mr. Van Leeuwen, a former official of the Netherlands trading company stationed for some time in the company office at Jakarta, became King Ibn Saud's financial adviser.1

The relations between Hijaz and the Netherlands were considered so important they the consulate at Jedah was made a legation in 1920 with a charge d'affaires at its head. The government relations existing between King Ibn Saud's government and the Netherlands government was not entirely free from embarrassment for the former as king was chief of the reformist Muslim school of the Wahabis, whereas the pilgrims were nearly all orthodox.

1. Ibid. p. 373
For a time after the first world war there was an active pan Islamic movement in Indonesia, under the leadership of H.A. Salim. The advance of Christian missions and of religiously neutral nationalist movement caused a defense in the Muslim community. Several pan Islamic conferences were held and delegates were sent to the world Islam congress convened by King Ibn Saud at Mecca in 1926. But the king put a stop to all political aspects of the congress as he feared would involve him in political difficulties especially with Great Britain. Hijaz was quite dependent upon the profits of the pilgrimages and the king probably feared that the Indonesian schools might put obstacles in the way of pilgrimages if the congress should take on a political character. A. Salim sought to improve the Indonesian schools at Mecca but in this he failed. Later a group of Minangkabau succeeded in establishing a good school at Mecca without political ends.\(^1\)

The Dutch consul, now charge d' affaires at Jedah was carefully chosen and received a special training. He was chosen from residents or assistant residents in the Indonesian civil service and before taking up his work he spent a year in study at Leiden, pursuing courses in the Arabic language, Muslim law and similar studies. He was appointed for a period of five years, after which he generally returned to Indonesia to serve as an adviser to the government in Muslim and native affairs. The system had produced a number of very able men, experts on Islamism and the near eastern situation. The Indonesian vice consul in Mecca (H.A. Salim and A. Kadir) had been given a wide jurisdiction over the Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca. A unique feature of this agreement was that the

\(^1\) Ibid.
Hijaz government enforced the vice consul's decision.1

The Arab community in Indonesia had also organised an organisation called the Arab Party of Indonesia (P.A.I.) in 1934, under the leadership of a revolutionary young man, Abdur Rahman Baswedan. Though the party was confronted with numerous obstacles created by both the Dutch imperialist and orthodox Arabs, yet because of its undying spirit of sacrifice and courage it contributed such to the ever-growing fraternity and brotherhood as well as the development of the Indonesian national movement.

The Indonesian students studying in Cairo formed in 1923, an association called Jamia Chairie, under the initiative of Muchtar Lutfi, Abdul Kahar Nuzakir and others. The name of the organisation was then changed to the Greater Indonesian Party (P.I.P) in 1930. It was so active not only in the Arab world but also it had established close contacts with national organisations in Indonesia such as the P.C.I., parindra, P.K.I. etc. In 1927, the Indonesian-Malay Youth Association (Perpindom), the Indonesian Malay party (Pertindo), the Indonesian student's union (C.P.S.) in Mecca in 1939 and the Malay Indonesian association (Makindom) in Baghdad in 1940, were established and functioned very satisfactorily in various national and international fields.2

HOLLAND

The relations between Indonesia and Holland had undergone important modifications during the 20 years in the direction of increased colonial autonomy. Under the present system there had been an excess of centralisation: The C.G. at Jakarta had minutely

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1. Ibid, pp. 373-374
2. Luisan revolusi rekjat, Jakarta, 1945- p. 37
controlled the whole government of the empire and he in return had been under the strict supervision of the government of Holland. The reforms gave the colonial government the power to regulate Indonesian internal affairs, subject to the ultimate control of the government of Holland which had also charge of imperial interests and foreign affairs. All ordinances passed by the Indonesian government could be suspended by the crown acting on the advice of its minister and the states general retained the right to veto them. The former very wide power of legislation possessed by the crown was greatly restricted, the states general retained the right to legislate; but it was required first to consult the Indonesian legislature. The right to draw up the budget was transferred from the government of Holland to that of Indonesia, but the approval of the states general was required before could be put into effect. The C.C. continued on his administration in accordance with its instructions. He remained completely responsible to the minister for the colonies who in return was responsible to the states general. Under the new regime the minister would lay down the broad outlines of policy and exercised a general supervision, but he would not interfere in the details of the administration which would be left to the C.C. A strong demand has arisen in Indonesia for greater degree of independence and the conquest of Holland by Germany had strengthened the development.1

The constitution of the Netherlands charged the crown with the Supreme administration over Indonesia, while it entrusted the general administration to the C.C. The crown had a large number of powers. It appointed and removed the C.C., the vice-president and members of the council of the East Indies, the chairman of

the volksraad, the commander of the navy, the president of the high court, the chairman and members of the auditing chamber, and the commander of the army. In accordance with the rules of orders of the council of ministers (cabinet), these appointments with the exception of the chairman of the volksraad and the commander of the army, might be made by the cabinet. In case of disagreement between the C.C. and the council of the East Indies, where such agreement was necessary for specific administrative acts, decision was made by the crown. The crown had in addition to these a number of other minor administrative functions.1

The Dutch cabinet was both individually and collectively responsible to the parliament. The minister of colonies had to retire when he had lost the confidence of the states general. The king and the government were a unity of which the king was irresponsible and the ministers the responsible heads. The exchange of views between the king and his ministers the latter might guard in secret.

The relationship of the minister of colonies to the C.C. had been changed by the 1922 constitution revision. The minister might exhibit himself and yet kept a controlling hand on the broad outlines of the Indonesian policy. This would be done not so much by the issuance of direction to the C.C., nor by the suspension of the Indonesian ordinances and their recommendation to parliament for veto as by the choice of a person of particular views and force for position of the C.C. in first place and his continuance in office in the second. Since the C.C. might take cognizance of the suggestion of crown, the ground was alid for a secret interaction

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. pp.85-87
between minister and C.G. in which agreement on policy could be reached. In case of minor differences of policy, the C.G. undoubtedly continued in office and loyally carried out the minister's wishes. If the two differed radically in views of policy the C.G. might be expected to resign. The minister might longer be held responsible for detailed acts of the C.G., but for his statesmanship. The new constitution required the minister of colonies not only that he exhibited himself but that he also restrained parliament from unnecessary meddling in Indonesian affairs.1

The minister of colonies might give his loyal support to the C.G. and defend him against attack in parliament. If the C.G. committed acts which the minister felt he could not defend or if the former insisted upon a policy which the latter did not approve, the minister might come before the cabinet with a recommendation for his removal or himself resigned. But the minister had failed on several occasions to come to the defence of the C.G. when attacks had been made upon him by members of parliament and one or two occasions had joined in the attack himself. More recently the minister had ruled over the head of the C.G. and openly rebuked Indonesian officials from the floor of parliaments.2

Holding the central key position in the department of colonies was the minister's cabinet or office of his private secretary. All matters of a secret, confidential or general nature the expedition of such matters, the control over the archives of these documents for the last 30 years, supervision of the cable

1. Ibid, p.88
2. Handelingen van de tweede kamer May 23, 1923, p.2340
connection with the colonies, the preparation of the annual colonial reports, personnel of the department and the granting of distributions were within the sphere of this bureau. Aside from general secretary and a library the department was divided into 7 divisions. These divisions dealt respectively with judicial affairs and international law questions; finances, auditing and disbursing, matters which in Indonesia belonged to the sphere of the departments of education, internal administration and workshop and agriculture, industry and commerce, matters which in Indonesia fell in the departments of public works and government industries, defence and miscellaneous affairs.

Commissariat for Indonesian affairs was set up in anticipation of an agency of the Indonesian government in the Netherlands. It dealt with different services of the Indonesian government such as the recruiting and sending out of personnel and the purchasing of supplies. During the provisional period the head of the commissariat was given as much as an independent sphere of action as was consistent with his position as a subordinate of the minister. Within the commissariat were also found the bureau for supervision over students which also gave aid and advice to Indonesians studying in Holland, the information bureau for the Indonesian service, the medical council for the department of colonies and the bureau for orphanage court.

The Netherlands constitution of 1814 and 1815 conferred upon the king exclusive power to direct the administration of the overseas colonies and possessions of the state. This meant a complete freedom of the states general to control the authorities of

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. pp.93-94
2. Ibid. p. 94
of the colonial countries. Many attempts to limit the power of
the crown were unsuccessful until 1814 when a new constitution
was adopted. This constitution required that the Indonesian
government act, the monetary system and the auditing system of
the colonies be established by act of the states general and that
all other subjects were to be regulated by law when the need for
it might appear.

The constitution of 1848 had definitely set up a parliamentary
system. Under the auditing act of 1864 parliamentary approval of
the Indonesian budget was necessary from 1868 on. The minister of
colonies submitted the budget to the parliament and was prepared to
answer all questions regarding all sorts of information and of
administrative detail of the G.G.

The G.G. in 1918 came before the volksraad to make
announcement in which far reaching reforms were promised. In ful­
filment of this promise, a commission for the revision of the
governmental structure of Indonesia was appointed. The commission
in its report on June 30, 1920, urged the need of the transfer of
the centre of gravity in both administration and legislation from
the Netherlands to Indonesia. Three objections were advanced
against the then existing relationship: 1. The possibility that the
Indonesian interests might be slightened in favour of Dutch
interests; (2) The lesser acquaintance in the Netherlands with the
need of Indonesia and (3) The excessive delays caused by the
continued meddling of Dutch governmental organs in purelue Indonesian
affairs.

1. Ibid Chap. V pp. 74-75
2. Verslag van de staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch Indië, 1920,
p. 94
The revised constitution of 1920 removed the words possessions and colonies from the constitution. Art. 1 of the constitution now read: the kingdom of the Netherlands comprises the territory of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surānam and Curaccaoo.1 With regard to general administration the G.G. was invested with an independent sphere of authority, while crown was left with only special powers. A large amount of legislative authority was granted to Indonesia. The governmental organs established in Indonesia was delegated the power to regulate Indonesian internal affairs, while to the crown was reserved the right to regulate only subjects and on such occasions as the law might specify. However, the crown received the right to suspend all ordinances passed by Indonesian organs when judged in conflict with the constitution, the law or the general interest, while the right of vetoing Indonesian ordinances on the same grounds was left to the states general. And finally though parliament retained the right to legislate a colonial subjects, it might first consult the representative body of the territory concerned.2

Under the Indonesian government act the crown was given the power to legislation in case of dead-locks between the G.G. and the volksraad. The act further empowered the crown to regulate a number of subjects even the internal affairs of Indonesia. But the regulation of these subjects except in case of an urgent nature, the crown might give the volksraad a hearing before issuing the rules.3

Furthermore, the Indonesian government act provided the states general might regulate purely internal affairs if it deemed this necessary. However, the states general was under the obligation of submitting the matter to the volksraad to ascertain its views before legislating. This was required for any revising of the Indonesian.

1. Art. 1 of the constitution of 1922
3. Arts. 89, section 3 and 90 of the constitution.
government act or drafting a new one. Primary control over the budget had been shifted from Holland to Indonesia and now was in the hands of the G.C. and the volksraad. But if the latter two could not reach an agreement on a section or subs-section of the budget, the dis-agreement went to the states general for settlement. The states general retained secondary control over the Indonesian budget through requirement that the budget might have the approval of the Netherlands parliament before going into operation. While the crown had the power of suspending Indonesian ordinances, the suspension fell if not approved by the states general within a year. Other non-legislative powers which lied within the competence of the states general were the charting of circulation banks, the authorisation or ratification of agreements between Indonesia and third powers, the floating and guaranting of Indonesian loans and a few other matters.1

The question of internal affairs and ministerial responsibility to the states general were re-eatedly discussed in and outside of volksraad and states general. Prof. Van Vollenhoven concluded that complete responsibility of one or more ministers to the chambers for the G.G's acts and omission that is the system was desired and which was created and that is system which still prevails. For all that occurred in Indonesia in field of control government there existed no responsibility other than to the states general. That responsibility rested squarely upon the minister of colonies, either alone or collectively with other ministers, depending upon whether affairs touched the conduct of administration as a whole.2

After the general election in Holland, Mr. Colijn, the very able leader of the anti-revolutionaire party, formed twice nations:

1. Ibid A. t. 99, 189 and 114
2. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 81
cabinet in 1937 and 1939, consisting of representatives of the Catholic party, the Christian party, liberal democrat parties and the socialist party. The entrance of socialist leaders in ministries would bring a great change in Dutch colonial policy toward Indonesia.

Though great dependence of the Indonesian government in the states general had largely disappeared since 1925, yet the states general could still through the minister of colonies force a certain course of action upon a reluctant G.G., but it ran the danger of arousing bitter opposition in the volksraad. A skillful G.G. could lean on the volksraad for strength in a contest with the minister of colonies and the states general, should the latter attempt too much interference in Indonesian affairs.

In 1922 it was suggested that since Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao were no longer colonies but constituent parts of the empire the G.G. and governors of these territories ought no longer to be subordinate to the minister of colonies or the cabinet as a whole. The volksraad petition of 1936 for dominion status embodied a somewhat similar proposal. In order that the three overseas parts of the empire might be accorded in conformity with their new constitutional position they should received complete administrative and legislative autonomy. The G.G. should immediately be made responsible to the whole Netherlands ministry. These should be created in an imperial council, composed of representatives of the 4 parts of the empire, at first clothed with only advisory power but ultimately endowed with legislative power for imperial affairs with an imperial ministry responsible to it. The G.G. would no longer be an official of the Netherlands but of the empire.

1. Ibid. p.83
2. Day: The Dutch in Java p. 413
3. A.A. Elgeman: Indie en de ministeraad, 1929; and Vandenbosch: op.cit p. 84
The number of colonial experts in parliament was very large. Many retired Indonesian officials and other former residents of Indonesia became members of parliament. Two former governors general of Indonesia, Mr. Fock and Mr. Idenburg, were leading members of parliament. Since 1933 a Javanese Mr. Rusten Effendi, had been a member of the second chamber of the Dutch parliament. He was elected on the communist ticket. L.N. Palar was also elected to the Dutch parliament after the world war. During the second world war Farengen Adipati Ario Sujono, a Javanese nobleman, appointed a minister without portfolio in the Dutch cabinet in London under the premiership of Prof. Gerbrandy. Satadjit, a moderate Indonesian socialist, spent the war in the Dutch underground activities in Holland against the German fascism, editing the resistance newspaper, Vry Nederland (free Netherlands). 1

Economically, the prosperity of the Netherlands considerably depended upon Indonesia. Van Deventer declared in his favour gids article of 1899 on a debt of honour that the welfare of the propertied classes in the Netherlands was very closely related to the retention of our colonies in Indonesia. A weekly journal stated that the number of persons directly or indirectly employed in Dutch industries exporting to Indonesia totalled about 80,000 and that yearly approximately $160,000,000 profits flowed to the Netherlands from Indonesia, that 80,000,000 more people were employed in the consumption of this profit and that the retention of Indonesia was material bread and butter for about 400,000 Netherlands. 2

The Dutch invested a large capital in Indonesia totalling in 1938 about 2,634 million guilders, out of 3,800 million guilders

1. Ibid p. 85
2. Politiek economisch weekly blad, May 7, 1930
of all foreign capitals in the country. The Dutch capital was invested in sugar plantations and refineries, (400 million guilders), rubber (450 M), other plantations (350 m) banks (274 m) tin (10m) shipping (100 m) oil (500 m), industries (50 m.), railway and tramways (150 m.) government enterprises (100 m) and miscellaneous (250 m.). 1

Annual profits and interests accrued from Dutch investments were estimated as follows: sugar, 25 million guilders, rubber and other plantations, 48 m. banks 16.5 m, tin, 0.5 m, oil 30 m. shipping, 6 m., railways and tramway, 9 m. gas and electric industries 6 m., industries 1.5 m., miscellaneous, 15 m. interest on N.E.I. bonds (including interest paid by N.E.I. government to the Netherlands kingdom), 35 m., total 191.5 m.

To these 191.5 m. guilders should be added unpaid dividends of various corporations, which amounted to about 10 m. guilders per year. Thus the annual yield on Dutch investments in Indonesia amounted to 200 m. guilders. 2

Netherlands reports from and exports to Indonesia from 1928-1939 in million guilders were as follows: in 1928, 140 and 175 million guilders, 1929, 140 and 172 m. 1930, 92 and 136 m., 1931, 72 and 89 m.; 1932, 50 and 47 m. 1933, 51 and 31 m.; 1934, 58 and 30 m 1935, 57 and 32 m.; 1936, 79 and 44 m.; 1937, 126 and 94 m., 1938, 102 and 200. ; 1939, 91 and 101 m. Total exports of Indonesia and the Netherlands: 1928, 1580 and 1989 million guilders; 1929, 1146 and 1964 m.; 1930, 1160 and 1694 m.; 1931, 749 and 1291 m; 1932, 544 and 836m.; 1933, 470 and 723 m., 1934, 489 and 704 m. 1935, 447 and 673 m.; 1936, 533 and 743 m., 1937, 945 and 1148 m.;

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2. M. Boestein: op. cit. p. 1180
Culturally the Dutch had great influenced Indonesian culture and traditions in many respects. The Dutch system of education was adopted in Indonesia. Dutch missionaries were very active in different parts of the country. Over 30,000 Indonesians had been living in the Netherlands and many Indonesian students studied in the Dutch universities. They established various organisations there such as the Indonesian association, the Indonesian labour union, etc.

Moreover, Indonesia had set a strong contacts with the Dutch West Indies. There were about 40,000 Indonesian nationals in the Dutch Surinam. They were taken by the Dutch to the island from Indonesia as indentured labour to work in the Dutch plantations and mines between 1894 and 1931. The indenture was for the term of five years after which the Dutch undertook to repatriate them to Indonesia. Now they worked as manual labourers, small merchants and grocers but due to racial discrimination they were very ill treated and oppressed so much so that they were often ousted from their jobs.

On December 4, 1947, a group of 978 Indonesian labourers were being repatriated from Surinam, arrived at Parakan, Kedu and Semarang. There was also an Indonesian people's association, organised by the Indonesian people there, under the presidency of Mr. Iding Sumita. He was recently elected member of the legislative council of the government of Surinam. The Dutch authorities in Surinam were now going back on their word to repatriate the Indonesian nationals and forcing them to adopt Surinam nationality. The Indonesians would

1. Indonesian News service vol. 3, No. 110 Singapore, May 13, 1949 p. 4
2. Ibid p. 7
resist this Mr. Iding Sumit has requested the republican authority to intervene and take up this question in the round table conference at the Hague in 1949. As a result, Mr. Abikusno Tjokrosojoso, a member of the Indonesian delegation to the round table conference, visited Suriname in October 25, 1949.

In 1939, the Netherlands Government in Holland had granted a big amount of 25 million guilders of Indonesia for the purpose of economic development of the country. This amount included about 6.5 million guilders for irrigation works, about 3.4 m. to speed up land settlement, about 3.3 m. for roads and bridges, almost 3 m. for building purposes, almost 2 m. for sanitation, 6 m. for forestry service, 1 m. for relief of mutu, agric industry, 1 m. for the advancement of agriculture and cattle breeding, 1 m. for native industry, 1 m. for release of debt bondage, 0.8 m. toward a Madura welfare fund, 0.3 m. for fisheries and 0.2 m. for various objects in those districts of Sumatra and Borneo, the lie outside the rubber producing area.

INDIA

As regards the Indonesian ancient golden links and close relations with India and her national leaders, the president Sukarno vividly described "You are our brothers. In the veins of every one of my people flow the blood of their Indian ancestors and the culture we possess is steeped through and through Indian influences. And just as we are your debtors in culture so too are debtors in political faith. Since 1908 we have given no little attention to your aspirations and your political movements. Had Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru are names to conjure with in Indonesia. Gandhiji's civil disobedience movement and the action of the Indian national congress attracted great interest.

1. Ibid p.6
The Indonesian non-cooperation movement was much influenced by the political currents in India, said former Prime Minister, Ali Gastroamidjojo. D.Hatta, former vice-president, expressed the same view.¹

There were over 650,000 Indians in Indonesia, where they worked on plantations and were employed as overseers, clerks or police officers and still others were business and labourers in other occupations at various parts of the country. They established schools, mosques and organised associations. They came mostly from Madras, U.P. etc. They also intermarried with the native population.

There had been a considerable number of the Indonesian students, studying in the various universities of India, such as Fisuui university, Aligarh, Jamia Millia, Delhi and others. They also formed their own organisations like the Indonesian student union (Persindom) in 1938 at New Delhi, the Indonesian-Malay Association (A.M.) in 1941, which published a magazine, Pustaka Indonesia P.F.I. in 1945 and A.F.I. in 1952.²

All Indonesian women congress sent a delegation to the Asiatic women conference held at Lahore in January, 19-25, 1931. The delegation consisted of Mrs. Santoso, Mrs. Sukemi and Miss Sunarjati. The conference was organised by the All India women organisation under the presidentship of Mrs. Sirojonsaidu with the object of promoting friendly relations, mutual understanding among the women in Asia and making them more conscious of their tasks to uplift their countries and peoples. In 1935, the Indonesian government sent a cultural mission to India under the chairmanship of Suska, former press attache of Indonesia at New Delhi. In 1939, an Indian women

¹ ibid
² Suara A.F.I.N. Delhi, 1956, pp.24-27
delegation went to Indonesia to attend the women conference at Jakarta. In 1927, Rabindranath Tagore, an outstanding educator and founder of the Santiniketan University, also visited Indonesia.1

The pre-war years India imported from Indonesia large quantities of sugar cane, mineral oil, paraffin wax, teak, quinine speci and tin. India mainly exported jute goods, cotton textiles vegetable oils and seeds, coal, and shellac. India exports were worth about Rs. 2 crores and imports Rs. 2 crores. This trade came to standstill during the war years.2

AUSTRALIA

The relations between Indonesia and Australia and New Zealand had been so close in recent years. Formerly the native island of New Guinea belong to Indonesia but later on some part of it was occupied by German and British forces. No boundary agreement was concluded with Germany while it was still a colonial war. When the first world war was over an Australian force occupied the island on September 12, 1914. No boundary treaty had been made with the Australian government. The mandate from the league of nations was dated December 17, 1920 and May 9, 1921, the Australian government established administration in the country. The military training of the natives except for local police purposes, was prohibited and no naval and military base or any any fortifications might be established.

The non-indigenous population on June 30, 1936, was 5,881, of which the British numbered 3,332, Chinese 1532, Dutch 153, German 477, Japanese 48 and Americans 146.3

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1. K.A. Pringgodo: op.cit. p.139
Regarding economic sphere, trade between Indonesia and Australia was already considerable. In 1937 Indonesia exported to Australia 30,000,000 florins worth of goods and imported 12,000,000 florins worth. With the industrialisation of Australia this trade would greatly increase, the two countries exchanging manufactured goods and raw materials.  

The occupation of Indonesia by any great powers would constitute a grave danger to the security of Australia and New Zealand. The Japanese mandated islands had already brought Japan within 500 miles of Australian territory. A secret clause of the anti-commintern pact signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, was alleged to have provided for joint spheres of influence and possible annexation of Indonesia between Germany and Italy. Representatives of Australia and New Zealand as well as Great Britain met in secret session at Wellington in May 1939 to plan the defence of the two dominions and adjacent colonies, mandates and protectorates of the governments represented. Australia was also represented at the Franco-British defence conference held at Singapore in June 1939 at which the position of Indonesia was one of the subjects of discussion. In 1938, Lord Cowrie G.C.G. of Australia, paid an official visit to Indonesia and a return visit by the G.C.G. of Indonesia, was planned.  

The British occupation of Indonesia under the government of Raffles in 1818 was altogether terminated by the London treaty of 1924, thereby the British transferred all their possessions in Indonesia to the Netherlands government. By the Sumatra treaty of 1871,  

1. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.379  
2. Ibid. p.380
England gave up its claims over Achin. The treaty of 1891 established the boundary line between the Dutch territory and the British protectorates of north Borneo. The boundary between British and Dutch territory in north New Guinea was drawn in a treaty in 1895. A boundary line between German northeast New Guinea and British southeast New Guinea was agreed upon by a treaty of 1884. With the formation of the Australian commonwealth southeast New Guinea was transferred to the new commonwealth government.1

The British government had established a diplomatic relation with Indonesia. There was British consul general at Jakarta. There were also consular offices of Britain at Semarang, Surabaya, Maccassai Medan and Padang. Similarly, the Netherlands maintained consular representatives in Great Britain to preserve the interests of the kingdom of the Netherlands and colonies like Indonesia. In 1937, the Dutch envoy and minister and consul general in London were Jankheer Dr.F.de Marees van Swenderen and T.H.de Meester.2

Economically, Great Britain had invested a huge capital in Indonesia and established regular trade and missions with the Indonesian government. There were hundreds of the British people living in Indonesia and serving in different posts and occupations. Similarly a good number of Indonesians lived in England and its colonies.

The total value of trade between U.K. and Indonesia in pound sterling was as follows: U.K. exports to and imports from Indonesia; in 1900, £ 4105 and £ 4029; 1913, £ 7,302 and £ 3,914; 1914, £ 628 and £ 13227; 1932 £ 2,458,252 and £ 4,717,278; 1933, £2,147,617.

1. Vlekke: op. cit. pp. 139-150
2. M. Epstein: op.cit.pl174
and $3,01,061; 1934, $1,832,495 and $4,222,079; 1935, $180,584
and $4,302,654; 1936, $1,985,765 and $2,573,186. Re-exports to
Indonesia from U.K., in 1932, $46,688; 1933, $45,213; 1934
$40,468; 1935, $38,222; 1936, $41,434.1

The British invested a huge capital in oil and rubber, in mer-
chandising and banking and in the production of agricultural crops.
The total British capital invested in estate agriculture was
estimated to be 278 million guilders in 1929. Almost 2/3 of this sum
was invested in rubber, they had also large interests in the produc-
tion of sugar, coffee and tea. British investments in production
in 1937 were estimated at $26.5 million. Total entrepreneur or
business investments amounted to $40 million; holding in England
of Indonesian government bonds amounted to $4 million.2

The total value of the Indonesian imports from and exports
to U.K. and U.S.A. from 1925-1932 in million guilders was as follows
in 1925, 8181 and 1785 million guilders; 1927, 872 and 1625 m.; 1929
1072 and 1646 m.; 1930, 855 and 1160 m.; 1931, 752 and 749 m.; 1933
318 and 468 m., U.K.'s exports to and imports from Indonesia in
1937-1939 were: in 1937, $4382 and $7062; 1938, $3,605 and $5352
and 1939, $3,390 and $5,935.3

The British shipping companies in Indonesia gained a
huge profits: in 1929, $209 million; 1932, $103 m; 1936, $105 m
and 1937 $162 m. Total value of distribution of trade carried in
British vessels exporting to Indonesia was in 1936, $277 million
(32.3 % of British ships) and 1937, $435 m. (29.6 %), English
banks opened branches in Indonesia, where investors were particularly

   part 11, p.133
2. Ibid
3. Ibid. p 140.
invested in tea and rubber. About 1912, 50 out of 101 rubber estates in Java and Sumatra were British.1

The Portuguese colony in Indonesia consisted of a part of the island of Timor and a few small surrounding islands. Disputes between Portugal and the Netherlands continued for centuries. To put an end to these disputes the Netherlands government long sought to buy the Portuguese possessions in the Timor archipelago but Portugal would not sell. By a treaty of 1859, some of the boundary disputes were settled and Portugal relinquished her claim to certain islands north of Timor upon payment by the Netherlands of 200,000 florins. A number of the troublesome enclaves and to bring more definite boundary line. It was until 1897 that the two governments reached an agreement on the regulations which were to govern the commission of experts who were to fix the actual boundary lines. In the meanwhile, the two governments by an exchange of notes agreed not to extend to third powers the right to establish coal or naval bases in the Timor archipelago. The work of mixed commission led to the conclusion of a new treaty in 1904. Under the terms of the 1904 treaty each of the contracting powers agreed to give preference to the other in the event of partial or total cession of its territory or sovereignty in the archipelago of Timor and Solar.2

A boundary agreement with either Spain or U.S.A. with respect to the small islands south Hindeanau was never concluded. In 1906 a disagreement arose over the ownership of the small island of Palmas. The disagreement fell under the terms of an arbitration

1. Ibid page 167
2. A Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.378
treaty of 1908 between the two countries. The compromise was agreed in 1925 and the case submitted to Mr. Max Huber, then president of the permanent court for international justice, as single arbitrator. His award in April, 1928, was in favour of the Netherlands.1

From the point of view of the Netherlands in world politics the rise of Japan as a world power was upset to a considerable degree by the rise of the United States as a world power and the extension of her sovereignty to the far east in the Philippines situated between Indonesia and Japan.2

The Dutch government was invited by the big powers to attend the Washington conference to discuss the disarmament problems. The Dutch government wished to involve in political questions as little as possible and to avoid accepting any political responsibility if it could. The Netherlands did become a party to the 9 powers treaty but not the four power treaty. The fact that neither was the Netherlands a party to the four power treaty nor was Indonesia covered by the treaty disturbed foreign minister, Van Karnebeek, the head of the Dutch delegation. He and with his him the head of the Portuguese delegation, quitey approached the heads of the delegations of the four great powers in an effort to remedy the situation. He argued that with the heads of these delegations that if the object of treaty was to promote peace and tranquility in the Pacific area, the failure to include the Dutch and Portuguese possessions in that regions was bound to defeat its purpose, for this would increase rather than ally distrust. The heads of the delegations agreed with this view and the danger of breeding distrust was thought to be

1. Philip C. Jessup: The Palmas island arbitration, American Journal of international law, October, 1928
2. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 379
removed by identic notes from the British, French, United States and Japanese governments. Whereby the principles of the treaty were extended to the Pacific possessions of the Netherlands and Portugal.

The note of the United States government to the Dutch government was as follows: The U.S.A. has concluded on December 13, 1921, with the British empire, France and Japan, a treaty, with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relations to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific ocean. They have agreed thereby as between themselves to respect their rights in relations to these possessions and dominions.

The Netherlands not being signatory to the said treaty and the Netherlands possessions in the region of the Pacific ocean therefore not being included in the agreement referred to, the government of the U.S.A., anxious to forestall any conclusion contrary to the spirit of the treaty, desires to declare that it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific.

The U.S.A. also established diplomatic mission at Jakarta and several consulates in big cities of Indonesia and thousands of Americans were living in the country, working in various occupations and services.

Trade between Indonesia and U.S.A. had increased rapidly during past few years. The value of trade between the two countries for the first half of 1938 was $48,195,000; for the same period of 1939, $57,523,000; and in 1940, $77,8000. For the six months

of 1941, the U.S.A.-Indonesia trades reached the value of $146,629,000. The value of trade between the two countries for the first half of 1941 was 10% larger than the value of the trade for the whole of 1939 and 50% larger than for 1938. From January-June, 1941, U.S. exports to Indonesia amounted to $49,224,000 and imports from Indonesia, $96,896,000. In 1940, more than half the exports of ten leading Indonesian export commodities and more than 1/4 of the exports of 9 other countries went to the U.S.A.

After the first world war, the Indonesian government had given economic concessions to the U.S.A. to exploit oil fields and to establish industries in the country. A huge capital of America had flown to Indonesia. Of the foreign capital of about $1 billion and 3 million dollars invested in agriculture, it had been estimated that 75% was Dutch, 13.5% British, 5% Franco-Belgium, 2% American, 1% German and 1% Japanese. Nearly all the foreign capital invested in the Javanese sugar industry was Dutch and if the investments in this industry were excluded the Dutch fell to 60 while that of other nationalities rose somewhat. On the other hand, the Dutch held most of the Indonesian public bonds. An American company produced a third of the petroleum output of Indonesia, while Dutch-British and mixed Dutch and Indonesian government companies produced the remainders. The American standard vacuum company had put its huge capital of $100,000,000 at Sungai Gerang oil refinery in Palembang, Sumatra. The California Taxas oil company also increased its capital and produced crude oil in growing quantities. The American good year tire factory in Buitenzorg in Java increased its production of automobile and truck tires and tubes.

1. A.Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 413
and bicycle tires. The American general motor overseas corporation expanded its investment in Indonesian key industries in Jakarta and other places. Export-import firms, shipping company, air transport lines etc. had been operated by the Americans.1

Indonesia imported from Ceylon 46,381 cwt of cacao and raw at the value of Rs.7,030,874 or 15% of total value in 1948. There was also an Indonesian colony in the Cape town in South Africa. This colony was started during the great Sri Vijaya empire.

Trade relation between Indonesia and New Zealand was in good progress. Indonesian imports from New Zealand between 1931-1934 averaged only some £ 6,000 a year but its export to New Zealand ranged just over £ 1000,000 a year. The main items of exports were mineral oils, chiefly gasoline, sugar, and kapok. From 1930 on Indonesia exported sugar in great quantity. Between 1932 and 1934, exports of Indonesia averaged over £ 500,000 a year, equivalent to nearly 80% of New Zealand's total imports of sugar.2

Since 1932 the export of gasoline from Indonesia to New Zealand had increased considerably, chiefly at the expense of the U.S. In 1930 Indonesia exported it to some £ 550,000 and in 1935 imported from New Zealand valued at £ 650,000. In 1936, imports of gasoline alone from Indonesia reached over £ 1,000,000 amounting to nearly 2/3 New Zealand's total supply.

Percentages of the total New Zealand imports supplied by Indonesia were as follows: in 1930, 1.91%; 1932, 3.53%; 1934, 4.41; 1935, 3.96%; 1936, 3.90% and 1937, 3.99%.3

2. F.F.Milner: N.Zealand interest and policies in the far East, New York, 1939, p.45
3. Ibid p.46
The total value of Indonesian exports to and imports from New Zealand was as follows: in 1931, £ 8,288 and £ 933,038; 1932, £2262 and £ 873,012; 1933; £1417 and £ 999,224; 1934, £ 1364 and £ 1381,974; 1935, £ 1412 and £ 1,436,964; 1936, £ 482 and £1772,642 1937, £ 1999 and £ 2,238,413; 1938, £ 7667 and £ 2150.1

Ethnologically, culturally, geographically and economically Malaya and Indonesia were one and individed but politically, by the treaty of London in 1824 the former was separated from the latter. Since then it was ruled by the British government. The people of Malay state in Jambi founded Melacca and the people of Minangkabau in central Sumatra established Negeri Sembilan in the 18th century. Bugis from Celebes crossed the peninsula in 1550 and founded Modern Selangor in 1700 and in 1722 it was under the king of the Johore empire. The Sri Vijaya ruled Malaya till it was over-thrown by the Majapahit empire in 1403. The latter was then defeated by the Portuguese in 1511, who occupied Malacca. In 1642, Malacca was rested from Portugal by the Dutch. In 1278, an Islamic kingdom was established in Malacca which was founded by a prince of Palembang, Parameswara in 1403. In 1445, Muzaffar Shah, ruler of Malacca succeeded by his son, Mansur who governed Kedah, Patani, Rokon Kampar Indragiri, and Siak in Sumatra. Iskander Muda of Achin ruled the whole western parts of Malaya for quite long time until the European nations came to Asia. Singapore and Johore were also founded by the sultan from Siak Indragiri, Sumatra. 2

According to the census of 1931, the Indonesian settlers in Malaya formed 24 % of the population of Johore and 8.7 % of the federated Malay states and altogether they numbered 317,848 or 742 %

1. Ibid p.121
of the whole population of 4,385,346. If the figures of the entire Malay races were combined they made up 44.7% of the total population of Malaya; 39% Chinese and 14.2% Indians.1

The Indonesian people in Malaya had possessed different occupations and professions. Some of them joined the government, military and police services. Some started all sorts of business, journalism, restaurants, and hotels. Others cultivated lands in various estates in the country. In 1932, there were 15,000 Indonesian labourers employed in rubber estates.

When the labour shortage became acute in 1941, the colonial office acceded to the proposal made by Malaya employers to import more Indonesian workers to fill Malaya huge tin and rubber export quotas. But the Japanese invasion prevented to carry out the plan. In 1943, the Japanese authority in Malaya imported over 35,000 Indonesians to construct roads, build fortifications etc. in Malaya and in 1946 they were all repatriated to Indonesia by the republic of Indonesia.

The rising Indonesian nationalism, the Japanese pan Asianism as well as Indian national movement had greatly influenced the Malay national movement. Most of the Malay nationalists and conscious leaders were Indonesians. As a result, they set up different organisations such as brotherhood of pen-friends, the Malay union founded in 1926 in Singapore with a branch in Malacca in 1937.

The Malay union organised the first and second conferences of 1939 and 1940 respectively. Inspired by the Indonesian modernist movement led by H.A. Salim in 1926 and the Turk Califat movement

1. Ibid. p.25
In 1924, the pan Islamic movement was also organised by the Malay educated modernists in the country. When the Dutch colonial authority crushed the national revolution of 1926-1927, numerous Indonesian revolutionary leaders such as Tan Malaka, Alimin, Musso etc. fled away to Malaya and established the Indonesian youth organisations there to fight against the Dutch imperialism. Besides, there were other Indonesian organisations like Javanese, Bugis, Bandjarese and Minangkabawese associations and other others. A considerable number of the Malay students had been studying in various educational institutions in Indonesia.

In the economic field, Indonesia had established commercial relations with the federated states of Malaya and Singapore. The following were the percentages of the total Malay's exports to and imports from Indonesia: Exports: 1923, 12.3%; 1924, 11.8%; 1925 9.3%; 1926, 8.0%; 1926, 9.9%; 1928, 10.8%; 1926, 9.0%; 1931, 11.5 1932, 11.9%; 1933, 3.9%; 1934, 5.5%; 1935, 5.8%; 1936, 5.2%; 1937, 3.8%; and 1938, 6.3%. Imports: in 1913, 18.0%; 1921, 19.7%; 1922, 25.0%; 1923, 33.4%; 1924, 33.6%; 1925, 40.0%; 1926, 27.7%; 1927, 27.7%; 1928, 26.2%; 1929, 24.3%; 1930, 36.2%; 1931, 38.1%; 1932, 35.2%; 1933, 30.9%; 1934, 34.7%; 1935, 31.2%; 1936, 32.0%; 1937, 32.4% and 1938, 27.0%.

The total value of the Indonesian imports from and exports to Malaya states and Singapore from 1932 to 1940 in thousands guilders was as follows: Imports: 1932, 257,000 guilders (Malay states); 7,233,000 (Penang); 46,275,000 (Singapore); 1934, 170,000 (M); 4,190,000 (P); 32,406,000 (S); 1936, 209,000 (M); 28,251,000 (S); 3,332,000 (P); 1938, 296,000 (M); 4,283,000 (P); 36176,000 (S); 1940, 5,765,000 (M); 12,685,000 (P); and 184,793,000 (S).

2. L.A. Mills: op. cit. p.131
The relation between Indonesia and Indo-China was long ago before the establishment of the Sri Vjaye empire in Asia. Since then the cultural and economic ties were developed rapidly. From 1913 to 1931, Indo-China exported direct to Indonesia amounts of rice varying from 30,000 tons in 1923 to 377,000 tons in 1931 and averaging to 136,000 tons. Because of the economic depression in 1933, Indo-China's exports fell to an annual average of 33,000 tons in 1933-1937.1

The total value of Indonesian exports from and exports to Indo-China from 1932 to 1940 in thousands guilders was as follows: in 1932, 5675 and 1187; 1934, 1149 and 1189; 1936, 898 and 1076; 1938, 2112 and 1927 and 1940, 2596 and 18,106.2

Direct exports of Indonesia to Indo-China consisted of mainly mineral products - a small quantity of cannel coal and chiefly hydrocabines of which Indonesia was Indo-China's principal supplier. Indo-China also exported goods via Singapore to Indonesia. There were also about 15,000 Indonesians living in Indo-China, before the war. They were mostly agriculturists and some were traders and so on.

The commercial relations had been set up between Indonesia and Hong Kong. The following were the percentages of Hong Kong's exports and trade in merchandise with Indonesia: in 1930 2.2% and 13.3%; 1931, 2.6% and 10.9%; 1932, 2.2% and 9.9%; 1933, 2.4% and 7.8%; 1934, 2.6% and 8.3%; 1935, 2.3% and 6.2%; 1936, 2.8% and 8.5%; 1937, 3.3% and 7.6% and 1938, 2% and 6.6%.

1. Ibid. p.46 & Ch.obergwan; the eco.development of Fr. Indo-China, Chap. VIII, p.330
The total value of the Indonesian imports from and exports to Hongkong from 1932 to 1940 in thousands guilders was as follows:
in 1932, 7763 and 23,477 guilders; 1934, 4865 and 14310;
1936, 4545 and 12,790; 1937, 6467 and 13,293 and 1940, 4220 and
18,106.1

Indonesia exported to Hongkong sugar, petroleum and others.
An important branch of trade had been the transportation of
paraffin wax from Indonesia for the manufacture of candles for
the temples in China.

Burma also exported commodities to Indonesia valued at
0.12 and 18.09 lakhs in 1933-1936; 2.86 and 4.41 lakhs in 1936-37
and 5.33 and 1.83 lakhs in 1937-38.2

A close contact between Indonesia and Ceylon was established
long ago. Descendants of Indonesian soldiers in the service of the
Dutch East Indies company in 1656-1668 and 1896 constituted the
Ceylon-Malay population. According to the census of 1946, there
were 343,000 Ceylon Moors and Malays (Indonesians); in July 1,1947,
there were about 23,000 Indonesians and 380,000 Moors.3

According to the anthropologists and ethnologists like
A.L.Kroeber, Felix M.Keesing, Fay Cooper Cole, etc, that some
6000 years ago the Indonesians arrived by boats and colonised the
Philippines islands. Till 1377, the Sri Vijaya ruled over all these
islands. About the middle of the 13th century, 10 Bornean Datus led
by Datu Putih left Brunei and colonised Panay, Bantik(Antique),
Aklan(Capiz), Irang Irong Iloilo, Santanae Languan de-Bay, Bicol

3. Notes on S.E.A. section 1, p.8
Peninsula and other places in the Philippines islands. In 1364, the Sri Vijaya was overthrown by the Majapahit which was itself also subjugated by the Mohamadan Malay under Raja Bonang in 1478. Thus the Indonesian influence came to an end with the coming of Spaniards in the 16th century and advent of the U.S.A. in 1888. The Spanish rule in the Philippines lasted for 400 years while the American imperialism started from 1901 to 1946. Only about 450 years ago that Indonesia was separated from the Philippines.

According to the official census of 1948, that out of 19,234,182 inhabitants of the Philippines, 200,000 were Indonesians, living in north Luzon, Mindoro and Visayas, Palawan and so on. The Filipinoses were in fact Indonesians by race, numbering over 15,000,000 people. Most of the Filipino leaders like Dr. Adres Bonojanco, Dr. Jose Pizal, Mabini, etc. were all Indonesians.

The patriotic struggle of the Filipinos against the Spanish and American colonialism under the leadership of Andres Bonifacio had exceedingly influenced the national movement in Indonesia when the 1926-27 heroic revolution was crushed by the Dutch imperialists, a lot of Indonesian revolutionaries like Tan Malaka and others fled away to Manila. Where he contacted many Filipino leaders like Dr. Mariono Santos, Dr. Apollikio De Las Santos and others, who sympathised and supported the Indonesian national struggle against the Dutch domination and exploitation.

Regarding the economic sphere, Indonesia had set up commercial ties with the Philippines. The total value of Indonesia’s imports from and exports to the Philippines from 1932 to 1940 in

1. G.F. Zaidi: Philippines Political and cultural history vol.1 Manila Oct. 1950, Chapt.11 p.28
2. Tan Malak: Dari Pendjara Ke Pendjara Bandung, 1949
in thousand guilders was as follows: in 1932, 289 and 3541 guilders; 1934, 284 and 2386; 1936, 479 and 2415; 1938, 886 and 5945; and 1940, 915 and 6214.

In the field of international trade, Indonesia had in brief traded with both Asiatic and European countries including U.S.A. The value of the Indonesian exports to the chief countries of destination in 1000 florins was as follows: Netherlands; 1935, 100, 201; 1937, 191, 583; 1940, 324 (5.5%); Singapore, 1935, 66,620; 1937, 179,043; 1940, 184,793 (20.9%); U.S.A. 1935, 63,704; 1937, 177,859; 1940, 295,059; U.K. and Irish Free State 30,547; 50,224; 53,738 (6.0%); Japan 23,970; 42,345; 48,521 (5.50%);

Egypt and Sudan, 9569; 30,225; 11,281 (1.28%); Australia, 17,530 29,531; 32,297 (3.66%); Germany, 1935, 201, 159; 1937, 28,099; 1938 (20%); France, 14,513; 23,963; 2554 (2.29%); Denmark, 7614; 18,346; 2517 (.29%);

Hongkong, 8795; 13,458; 18,106 (2.05%); China, 8,925; 13,454; 16,099 (1.82%); and Penang, 5956; 11,719; 12,685 (1.44%).

Whereas the value of imports from the chief countries of origin in 1000 florins was as follows: Japan, 1935, 5,81,158; 1937, 124,426; 1940, 100,250; Netherlands 36,423; 93,890; 54,095 (12.51%); U.S.A., 18,871; 49,924; 99,873 (23.10%); Germany 22,041; 41,874; 8587 (1.99%); U.K. and the Irish Free State, 21,822; 40,898; 36,094 (8.35%); Singapore, 29,301,36,591; 13,590 (3.14%); India, 9272; 12,887,15,495 (5.58%); Australia, 9021; 12,126; 16,323 (3.79%); China, 5046; 8724; 17,036 (4.95%); France, 3161; 7186; 4218 (.98%); Hongkong, 3457; 6705; 42420 (98%); Italy 1534; 4596; 4179 (97%); Penang, 3697; 3532; 1012 (23%); and Philippines Islands, 357; 748 and 915 (21%)

1. R.E. Emerson: op.cit. p. 47
2. A. Vandensbosh: op.cit. p. 436
3. Ibid. p. 435
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The rise of Japan and the United States, the two naval powers besides Great Britain, weakened the position of the Netherlands in Asia. The possibility of a Pacific war always in the background of the public mind in Indonesia. While the result of the Washington conference did something to calm that fear, they by no means removed it. A section of Dutch opinion held that while the results of the Washington conference were to lessen the danger of war in the Pacific, the position of Indonesia became less secure, since the Philippines as a bulwark against Japan was gone.

This policy of the Netherlands in the event of a pacific conflict was repeatedly outlined by the Indonesian government and its military advisers. As indicated in a statement by Captain Van Baede, director of the naval war college, the Netherlands best defence was a policy of neutrality for herself and so separating the defence of Indonesia that a violation of Indonesian neutrality would involve greater disadvantages than advantages. The Indonesian defence forces should be of sufficient strength to be able to delay invasion long enough to give the opposing party time to come to the aid of the Dutch defenders.

The strategic position of Indonesia was dominated by the British naval base at Singapore. The Dutch never defined Indonesia against the British, no matter what other great power might come to their aid and hence all talk of a policy of neutrality implied defence against some great other than Great Britain. This fact might necessarily serve to deter any anti-British tendencies of Dutch foreign policy.
Great Britain could never permit the occupation of any of Indonesian islands by any other power than the Netherlands. The British authorities protested to the Dutch government against the grant of concessions of two small islands, Awi and Momoi, to Japanese in 1912 for the purpose of rubber culture and deep sea fishing and of the islands Pulau Bintang, near Singapore, to the Standard oil company of New York in 1911.

In the years following the first world war there developed a movement for a Franco-Dutch rapprochement in the far east, a movement more active in French than in Dutch circles. The idea of a rapprochement had been advocated by former minister of colonies, André Hesse in La Depeche coloniale, October 28, 1927. Senator Octave Hornberg had also advocated it in the revue de Deux and in La Depeche coloniale and had lectured on the subject in the Netherlands. One of the moving spirit behind it in Paris was Mr. van der Vlugt, a Dutchman, the editor of Le Monde nouveau. He was instrumental in getting Mr. Angoulvant to visit Indonesia and to publish a work on it. The C.G. of Indo-China and Indonesia had exchanged visits and in October, 1931, Minister of colonies, Paul Reynaud paid Java a visit. In January, 1930, prime minister Tardieu and minister of colonies, Petrie made public statements that France desired to draw into closer relations with the Netherlands in the far east and was prepared to approve a custom agreement between Indo-China and Indonesia, should governor Pasquier recommend it. There was probably nothing more behind the movement than a general feeling of desirability of an exchange of miss ideas in colonial administration.

1. De Locomotif, oversee editie, August 4, 1933
Indonesia was gradually developing an international personality and beginning to play an independent role in international relations. The diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China, Japan and Siam, were under the jurisdiction of the ministry of colonies, as the successor to the Netherlands East Indies, until 1862, when they were transferred to the ministry of foreign affairs. Until that year only the Indonesian government had relation with the Japanese government. Before that time and even after that date, the protection of Dutch citizens in the eastern countries remained with the G.G. Direct communication between the Indonesian government, and the Dutch diplomatic and consular officials in Asia had not been infrequent since then. The G.G. had during the last decades corresponded directly with the Dutch ministers at Tokyo and Peking.

The Indonesian government's power with respect to foreign relations were limited to asking for extradition in eastern countries, directly without going through the Hague. The G.C. was also a co-signatory of exequatur but the Netherlands government permitted no one to exercise consular functions except on a treaty basis and the treaty provisions carefully circumscribed the powers of the consular in order that they might exercise no diplomatic functions whatever. While consular officials might if they wished to communicate with the Dutch government, turn to their own diplomatic officials in the Hague, might in extremities communicate directly with the G.C. Moreover, under the terms of several treaties the G.C. might be empowered to withdraw exequatur. The appointment of the consular agents by consuls already functioning there might received the approval of the G.C. Since 1927, all treaties in any

1. Van Asbeek: Onderzoek naar den jurisdischen weredbouw, p.250
way affecting Indonesia were sent to the volksraad for advice
before they were submitted to the states general for obtaining
its consent to ratification.1

The desirability of attaching experts in international
law and for eastern politics to the Indonesian government began
to be urged in and outside parliament about 30 years ago. It
was pointed out that the C.C. found himself confronted with
international problems which were numerous and important. This led
to the creation of a bureau for Chinese affairs and later a
bureau for Japanese affairs. Since 1926, the C.C. had been assisted
by an expert in international law. Special Indonesian representa-
tion in international commissions and delegations was also urged and
had now become a regular practice. Mr. D. Fock, then C.C. elect of
Indonesia, was made a member of the Dutch delegation in the league
of nations assembly for the first time in 1927 and in 1928, Graaf
Van Limburg Stirum, Dutch minister at Berlin, and former C.C. of
Indonesia, was a member of the Dutch delegation. The states general
did not regard this form of Indonesian representation as sufficient
and urged the appointment of an Indonesian delegate and there were
even members of the states general who pressed desirability of
separate league membership for Indonesia. The idea of an Indonesian
member of the Dutch delegation received wide approval, even from the
extreme right, since this would not only be an act in the interest
of Indonesia but would at the same time serve as a capital peace of
propaganda in demonstrating to the world the ties which existed
between the Netherlands and the indigenous population of Indonesia.
As a result, the practice of inclusion of Indonesians in the

1. Ibid. p. 259
Netherlands delegation to the league of nations assembly meeting and to the international labour conference was begun. In 1922 the inter-parliamentary groupd of the volksraad for the first time sent a delegation to the conference of the inter-parliamentary union.1

The Indonesian government had for many years been a member of several international public unions such as the international postal union and in recent years the demand for independent membership in the league of nations had been urged. An initial step in that direction was taken in 1929 by the establishment of an Indonesian office at Geneva, with an observer in charge. He served as a connecting link between the ministry of colonies and the league of nations and the international labour office. This movement seem in part inspired by a desire to keep the world informed of conditions in Indonesia and Dutch policy there. With the existence of the league of nations, the international labour organisation and the mandate system, the Dutch felt that colonial policy and administration was no longer a purely national affairs and hence they felt the necessity both of keeping carefully informed what the world was saying and thinking about these matter in general and Dutch policy in particular and correcting false ideas of Dutch policy. The Dutch had looked with some concern upon German and Italian propaganda for a mandate and there had been some complaint that misrepresentation of the Dutch policy in Indonesia was a phase of that propaganda.2

There was a general feeling in Indonesia that the Dutch consular officials in the east were not sufficiently informed about Indonesian economy, financial and commercial interests and that they lacked an Indonesian orientation. This complaint was most vehemently

1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 387
2. Eindhoven: Aanteekning uit Geneve iloniale studen, 1928, p. 28
advanced by the large western enterprises there who were looking for eastern markets for their products. In the volksraad session of 1932, the need of a separate diplomatic and consular services of its own in Asia was pressed upon the government. It had long been urged that Dutch diplomatic and consular personnel in the far east should first have had some service in Indonesia and that Dutch consular reports from eastern countries, giving greater emphasis to the demand. It was very doubtful whether the Netherlands government would make any move in the direction of permitting diplomatic relations between the Indonesian government and Asiatic countries, but some action in giving the Dutch consular service in the east a greater Indonesian orientation might be fully expected.

The security of Indonesia was one of the chief subjects of discussion at the Franco-British defence conference at Singapore in the summer of 1939, the Dutch premier gave public assurance to the public and the world that the Netherlands was not represented at the conference, as that was against the Dutch policy of neutrality and isolation. This policy she followed to the better end. A few weeks before the German invasion of Holland, former prime minister, Colijn, warned his country through an editorial in De standard that the Netherlands ought to take sides in the disputes that is the allied powers.1

All the European nations were officially represented in Indonesia either by a consul general or a consul. Germany, France, Persia, and Turkey had their consul generals, while for the interest of Great Britain, America, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Australia, Portugal, Russia and Switzerland consuls were considered.

1. Report by acting consul, Fraser, in January 6, 1872 in Alting and Burning: op.cit. p.1195
sufficient. Japan and Siam were represented by a consul and Spain and Sweden by a vice consul.

All these chief representatives lives at Jakarta, the capital and seat of the G.G., who on special occasion such as the birthday of the Queen of Holland, received the consular body in audience as the corps diplomatique.

At coast ports such as Semarang, and Surabaya, the principal nations were represented by consuls and vice-consuls, who were under the authority of the consul general or consul as the case might be at Jakarta.1

As far as Great Britain was concerned, it may be observed that when the English gave up Java and its dependencies in 1818, no representative of the British nation or government was allowed to be stationed in Java. Sir St. Raffles in 1818 and again 1820 urged upon the British East India company, the necessity of the Great Britain having a special agent at Jakarta with certain power but it was generally assumed that the king of Holland would not consider such proposal. Commercially, the British E.I.C. was represented at Jakarta by Jessen, Trail and Co. from 1817 to 1825 and by Trail and Co. from 1825 to 1834. 2

1. Report by acting consul, Fraser, in January 6, 1872 in Alting and Burning: op.cit. p.1195
2. Ibid. p.1196
CHAPTER III

INDONESIA UNDER THE JAPANESE REGIME, 1942-1945

Japanese Plans for conquest of Indonesia.

Indonesia played an important role in world politics before the second world war, economically, politically and strategically. With the outbreak of the war in Europe in September, 1939, shortly after the establishment of Nazi Germany and the fall of Holland in May 10, 1940, the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia was at that time obliged sharply to curtail the activity of the nationalist movement in the European war effort. The nationalist leaders such as Tjipoto Mangunkusumo, Sukarno, Mohd. Hatta, Sutan Syahrir and others were successively interned. 1 Great Britain and the U.S.A. were making urgent demands of strategic stock piles of the produce of Indonesia for rubber, tin, quinine, fibres and drugs. To meet this emergency requirements the Dutch sought to place Indonesia on a semi-war footing. The people of Indonesia had to pay the increasing taxes. They contributed millions of guilders to the Netherlands government in London and Indonesia to meet war expenditure.2

Economically, Indonesia, rich in mineral and agricultural resources like oil, rubber, tin and other raw materials, was considered to be extremely valuable to Japan. The supplies of these materials were of such transcendent important to Japan, especially for war purposes, that the military and other extremists in Tokyo

2. Vlekke: op.cit. chap.XIV p.197
had long since developed schemes for securing economic, if not political control of these rich islands.1

Even during the first world war there were indications that the Japanese were beginning to direct their thoughts southward (Indonesian archipelago). The acquisition by Japan of the former German colonies in the south west Pacific as mandates of the League of nations brought the land of rising sun nearer to the Indonesian archipelago. After the war first, the Japanese government demanded equal opportunity and broad concessions for the exploitation of the oil resources in Indonesia.2

During the period of the expansion of Inter-Pacific trade following the first world war, Japan had been able to acquire a substantial position in the Indonesian import trade. Imports from Japan to Indonesia had increased from 1.25 % during 1909-1913 to 10.2 % during 1925-1929.3 The economic disaster suffered by Indonesia after the world crisis of 1929 provided a further opportunity for Japan to establish her economic supremacy in Indonesia. A Victor Purcell remarks: The Japanese commercial penetration of Indonesia became a reality during the trade depression.4

Immediately after 1930, Japan began to flood Indonesia with her cheap products. Before the economic crisis only 10 items were exported from Japan and in 1934, the imports of Indonesia from Japan exceed the exports to Japan by 7.5 million guilders, or 31 % of the imports came from Japan and only 5 % of the exports went to that country.5

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1. The challenge to isolation 1937-1940; M. A. Aziz: Japan's imperialism and Indonesia, the Hague, 1955, p. 99
2. A. Vandenbossche: op. cit. p. 396
4. World in March in 1939: op. cit. p. 98
5. B. H. K. Vlekke: op. cit. p. 363
had dropped over 32% in 1913 to 9.5% in 1933. Thus the open door policy became the entrance to the Japanese house.1

The Japanese commercial invasion of Indonesia, moreover, aimed at capturing the distribution business. Japan tried to consolidate her economic hold in Indonesia through her nationals who had migrated there, numbering 7,195 in 1930 and over 10,000 persons in 1941, as a result of the propaganda carried out by organisations subsidised by the Japanese government. The nature and extent of Japanese peaceful penetration into Indonesia during the period of economic crisis was best described by Van Mook in the following words: In the thirties penetration became definitely organised and was pushed from behind by those semi-officials, government subsidised corporations like the Nanyo Kohatsu, whose ultimate aims were revealed by naval and military participation. The rising flood of imports carried Japanese goods of Japanese importers in Japanese ships, financed by Japanese banks, to Japanese warehouses in the coastal towns of Java, to be sold directly to the consumers through Japanese retailers far in the interior. Japanese middlemen penetrated in east Java, south east Borneo, and North Celebes to buy native products, maize, rubber, and copra— for export to Japan Japanese fisheries started operations in the strategically important seas north of Jakarta and around peninsular of Celebes, continually trespassing into territorial waters and causing several incidents. Mining, agriculture and lumber rights, mostly of doubtful economic value, were bought or applied for in localities of military importance e.g. the East and West coasts of Borneo and the northern part of

1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.398
New Guinea. Small craft began to penetrate into coastal shipping.\(^1\)

Japan now hoped to follow up her commercial penetration by a political ones. A number of protective measures taken by the Indonesian government to restore economic stability of the country was described in Tokyo as the instruments of an anti-Japanese policy. The unsuccessful commercial conference of 1934 at Jakarta and as shipping conference of 1935 at Kobe were used by the Japanese delegations for political purposes. All this was in line with the general schemes of expansions fostered by the Nipponese militaries.\(^2\)

As early as 1932, Yosuke Matsuoka had expressed the view that New Guinea was to become a New Japan.\(^3\) In March, 1937, Heigoro Sakurai of the Minseito party, stated in one of the committees of the house of representatives that New Guinea, which is more extensive in area than Japan proper, was in an underdeveloped state and inquired whether the Japanese government did not think it advisable to open negotiations with the Netherlands government in order to obtain a perpetual lease of the territory.\(^5\) As a result, the atmosphere of nervousness was created, rumours of espionage were in the air.\(^6\)

In order to remove the widespread suspicion of the Dutch, Japan decided in 1936 to conclude a non-aggression treaty in Holland. This decision was in accordance with the Japanese Dutch treaty of Judicial settlement, arbitration and mediation of April 19, 1933. Further, Japan also concluded a shipping agreement with Holland.

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1. ibid p.20
2. M.A.Aziz: op.cit. p.102
4. Van Gelderen: op.cit.p.22
5. M.A.Aziz: op.cit. pp.103-104
In 1936. In pursue of this policy in January, 1937, Tonichiro Yoshida of the Japanese foreign office visited Indonesia. Japan further agreed to the Hara-Ishizawa agreement of April 7, 1937.1

Although Japan ostensibly wanted to maintain friendly relation with Indonesia, yet she deliberately pursued a subversive policy in order to undermine the Dutch authority. The Japan's policy of expansion towards the south was intensified. A large part of the Japanese population in Indonesia, held closely under the control and supervision of the Japanese consular authorities through numerous organisations, took an active part in the gathering of information of military and economic importance. The collection and dispatch of this information to Tokyo was one of the main tasks of Japanese consuls and consular agents in Indonesia. Japanese spies were attached as consular personnel to Japanese consulates. Besides, the Japanese army and navy each had its own agents in the more important places in Indonesia.2

Japanese nationals who were engaged particularly in the fishing industry in Indonesia acted as forerunners of Japanese expansionism and as auxiliaries to the Japanese navy.3 Those who operated at various key points throughout the archipelago, were frequently found fishing in prohibited areas. They were found to be operating in waters in northern Celebes near Hinado, southern Celebes near Maccasar, New Guinea, east Sumatra, the west coast of Borneo and in the area of Tarakan. Japanese government controlled developing companies also started working in the strategic areas

1. Ibid
2. Far East Mill Tribunal records pp.11649-11650
4. M. Aziz, op. cit. p.104
5.
of Indonesia. The aim of inaugurating two oil tank installations on May 21, 1939, in the island of Moluccas (Paloa group) was to expand the Japanese oil industry in Dutch New Guinea.

An extensive propaganda was also at the same time launched towards winning over the native population of Indonesia to the Japanese side. With the help of consular officials, the Japanese directed their attention to enlist the support of Indonesian and Chinese publishers and expended large sums in the form of advertising contracts to papers in the Indonesian, Dutch or Chinese languages that were willing to accept Japanese propaganda material. A plan was ever prepared by third section of the bureau for European and Asiatic affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs dated May 30, 1938 for the publication by the Japanese of a paper in the Indonesian language in Indonesia. The plan envisaged that the capital advance of 31,000 florins was to be considered as lost funds and a monthly deficit expected. The paper was to spread the Japanese propaganda among the native population.

Many Chinese were brought over from the Japanese occupied parts of China for carrying on propaganda among the Chinese population in the archipelago. Indonesian students were encouraged to go to Japan for study, so that they might be induced to give support to the Japanese pan Asiatic movement. Certain groups in Japan even began on Islamic movement and the theory was advocated that Japan was going to save Islam.

Following the outbreak of the war in September, 1939 and

1. Far East Mil. Tribunal records pp. 11649-11650
2. Far East Mil. Tribunal no. 1326 Di: Time-table No. 11; Ten years of Japanese Burrowing: op. cit. p. 32
3. B.H.M. Vlekke: op. cit. p. 370
5. B. M.H. Vlekke: op. cit. p. 37
the abrogation of the Japanese-American treaty of commerce and navigation of 1911 by the United States in July, 1939, Japan in January 16, 1940, had been on the lookout for strategic materials of Indonesia. Japan therefore, endeavoured through mingled cajolery and threats to draw Indonesia into her political and economic orbit.1

This attempt began on February 2, 1940, when the Japanese government through her minister at the Hague, presented a note to the Netherlands government, requesting the latter to enter into discussion for the abolition or modification of restrictions on the existing Japanese import and export trade with Indonesia, on immigration, for granting Japan a greater share in the development of the archipelago and also for controlling the press and publications of anti-Japanese so as to create friendly relations between the two countries.2

On January 12, 1940, she had already denounced the arbitration treaty of 1933 with the Netherlands which as result expired in August, the Japanese government declared that the action had no political significance.3

As events developed during the spring of 1940, the Japanese government was deeply concerned over the status of Indonesia. In a statement issued on April 15, 1940, the Japanese foreign minister, Hichiro Arita, said: With the south seas respectively Indonesia, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly other countries of East Asia maintain close economic

1. F.C. Jones: Japan's new order in Asia, its rise and fall 1937-45, Oxford Univ. press, London 1945, p.239
2. Far.,.Mil.Trib.Exh.No;1309 A; p.6; Timetable No.14; Van Mook op.cit. pp.24-26
3. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.405
relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these
countries and these regions together are contributing to pros-
perity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdefence. On
the same day the foreign minister informed the Dutch minister in
Tokyo, Van Pabst, of Japan's deep concern over a possible change
in the political status of Indonesia. This view was also expressed
on April, 16 by the Japanese minister in the Hague to Van Kleffend
Netherlands minister of foreign affairs.

The Japanese press now started a campaign against the
Netherlands and Indonesia. In a letter published in the Kokumin
Shimbun (the army organ in Tokyo) on April 24, the Netherlands were
called a rotten spot on earth and Hochi Shimbun of Tokyo even demand-
ed that Japanese should take the initiative and invade Indonesia
without any delay.

The German invasion of the lower countries on May 10, 1940
had its immediate effects on Far Eastern affairs. The governor
general of Indonesia, Tjarda S. Mackouwer issued a proclamation
placing the entire country under martial law. He declared that
the government was able to guard its territory and that any help
from other countries would be rejected as unwelcome.

On May 11, the Japanese foreign minister, Arita, once more
reiterated the view that events in Europe had accentuated the deep
Japanese anxiety over the status of Indonesia. Japan drew the
conclusion that allied forces would occupy Indonesia and might
jeopardise the flow of vital material to her.

1. Foreign relations of the U.S. with Japan 11, p. 281; Far E. Mil
Trib. No. 1284 Time Table No. 15
2. M. Aziz, op. cit. p. 108
p. 375
4. New York Times April 18, 1940
5. Herbert Feis: op. cit. pp. 56-59; the Gamle to Isolation 1939-1940
p. 590
She now plainly asserted that she would not permit Indonesia to change hands. On May 12, 1940, Japanese minister in the Hague demanded from the Netherlands government a guarantee that Indonesia would in the future continue to supply Japan with special war materials. 1 The governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, fearing that this might presage some Japanese military move, informed Tokyo that they would respect the status quo in the archipelago.2

Japan desired to keep every body also but of Indonesia until she was in control of it. On May 20, 1940, Arita handed a note to the Dutch minister in Tokyo demanding a categorical promise that the specified minimum quantities of 13 vital materials should be exported to Japan annually from Indonesia under any circumstances that may arise in future. The 13 vital materials were as follows: tin including ore 3000 tons; rubber 20,000 tons; manganise ore 50,000 tons; bousite 200,000 tons; nickel ore 150,000 tons; mineral oil 1,000,000 tons; wafra 1,000 tons; scrop iron 100,000 tons; salt 100,000 tons, caster seeds 4000 tons, quinine bark 600 tons and mobylbdenum 1000 tons.3

Germany intended Japan to conquer Indonesia immediately. She informed Tokyo on May 22, 1940 that she was not interested in the problem of Indonesia. Thus Hitler started publicly that Indonesia was to be the private hunting ground of the Mikado.4

Japan, however, did not strike at Indonesia at once as was expected by Germany. She was not ready for any military action.

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1. Far & Mil.Trib.Exh.No.1309 A:Timetable no.21
2. Far & MilTrib.Exh.nos.1286 and 1288; timetable nos.22,24 and 25
3. Van Hook: op.cit. p.28
against Indonesia. She, therefore, demanded on May 28, 1940, for an immediate reply to her note on February 2 and May 20. In its reply of June 6, the Netherlands offered to provide essential raw materials but refused to let the Japanese obtain a larger place in the economic life of Indonesia or control of a large part of its resources.1

That Japan did not feel satisfied with the conciliatory Dutch reply of June 6. She also rejected the American proposal of June 24, 1940, maintaining the status quo of the Pacific territories of the European powers by means of a special pact. On the other hand, the Japanese renewed their economic pressure on Indonesia, e.g. import of the specified quantities of materials.2

The secret conference of the army, navy and foreign office representatives of 12-16 June, 1940, decided to take action and to inform the Dutch ambassador in Tokyo on July 16, 1940, of the imperial government desired to send a delegation to Jakarta to negotiate to a comprehensive settlement.3 The aim of entering into political as well as economic talks in Jakarta was obviously to detach Indonesia from the Netherlands government, in London and bring the islands under complete Japanese control by peaceful infiltration. This was born out by the fact that consul general Saito in Jakarta was instructed by Matsuoka, minister of foreign affairs, on September 3, 1940, that negotiations were to be entered upon directly with the Indonesian government and that all efforts of obstruction from

1. Herbert Feis: op.cit. p.68; Aziz: op.cit. p.111
2. Van Mook: op.cit. pp.36-37
3. Far.E.Mil.Trib.xh.no.1309 A; timetables no.36; H.Feis: op.cit. p.96
4. Van Mook: op.cit. p.39
Great Britain and the U.S.A. were to be carefully observed.1

Before the negotiation started in Jakarta in September 1940 the Japanese had already prepared on August 14, 1940 the draft of their demands to Indonesia which indicated their political aim over the country. Indonesia was to cut off all relations with, recognise Japan's predominant political and economic interests and become a member of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to be established under the leadership of Japan.2

Japanese leaders wanted to bring Indonesia into their co-existence and co-prosperity sphere by means of short of war. In a telegramme to foreign minister, Matsueka on October 18, 1940, Kobayashi, leader of the Japanese delegation in Jakarta said: Because Indonesia should be inside the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere under the leadership of Japan, it was necessary to provide in the budget for the next fiscal year, for instance, for the complete equipment of overseas organisations, the foundation of a training centre for the southern areas and the propaganda among the Japanese nationals and the peoples of Indonesia, including secret fund.3

The Japanese delegation headed by Mr. Ichiro Kobayashi, minister of commerce, had arrived in Jakarta on September 12, 1940. It brought with it a 15 point programme know as measures for the economic development of Indonesia which was approved by the Japanese cabinet on October 25, 1940. The programme consisted of the following

1. Far E. Mil. Trib. Exh. no. 1314; timetable no. 45; M. Aziz; op. cit. p. 112
2. Far E. Mil. Trib. Exh. no. 1311; timetable no. 42, August 14, 1940
   M. A. Aziz; op. cit. p. 113
3. far E. M. I. Trib. no. 1313; timetable no. 57
measures to be taken:

1. To liquidate Indonesian economic relations with European and American continents so that she might become a member of the greater east Asia prosperity sphere;

2. To remove the various existing restrictions on the economic activities of Japan so as to enable her to secure preferential treatment for herself;

3. To arrange for the joint development by Japan and Indonesia in order to supply the empire with the necessary raw materials, if necessary to lease or to purchase suitable islands or regions;

4. To increase the allotments of important materials already promised to the empire and to place the supervision of merchandise especially tin, rubber, quinine etc. in Japanese hands;

5. To purchase as far as possible those agricultural products which were sources of income to the natives and to stimulate their purchasing power in order to translate co-existence co-prosperity into reality;

6. To increase the export of the Japanese merchandise to Indonesia

7. To make Indonesia a part of the monetary sphere of the greater east Asia area under Japanese leadership. This should be achieved not by absorption of the yen bloc, but by placing the exchange control under Japanese supervision and granting credits as well as other financial facilities by the Indonesian banks to the Japanese;

8. To secure the following special rights and interests with regard to traffic and communication: (a) The right of coastal trade, the right of entering unopened ports and the right of administering and using port facilities; (b) the landing and operating the right of submarine, cables, the right of participating in the management
of inland communication enterprises; (c) the inauguration of regular air services and the right of instituting air safety equipment;

9. To build a stable fishery position in the south by increasing the number of fishing boats, abolishing restrictions at ports of imports of fish, establishing fishery bases and acquiring other rights and interests pertaining to the conducting of the marine product industry;

10. To prohibit the establishment of new rights and interests of third powers in Indonesia and to endeavour to oust those already in existence likely to obstruct the expansion of the Japanese empire;

11. To make Indonesia institute an economic constructional commission in which Japanese would be included and which formulate economic policies of Indonesia for strengthening economic collaboration with the empire with regard to trade, finance, taxation, custom duties, economic agreements with third countries, enterprise, traffic and communication, etc;

12. To demand the strict control of anti-Japanese commentaries by newspapers and other periodicals at the same time ensuring freedom to Japanese to publish newspapers;

13. To exercise rigid control over Chinese residents assuming pro-Chiang Kai Shek and anti-Japanese attitude.

14. To invite the influential natives to Japan to whom the true aspect of the empire would be propagated to ensure the economic development of the empire;

15. Lastly, the economic policy should be based upon the broad viewpoint of establishing the greater east Asia co-prosperity sphere and efforts should be made towards expanding the interests of the empire in harmony with the natives.1

1. Far E.Ail Trib.exh.no.1317; Timetable no.52; Measures for the development of the N.E.I.October, ×× 25, 1940; M.A.Aziz: op.cit pp.115-116
The plan essentially aimed at the expansion of the Japanese empire into Indonesia by ousting the Dutch.

On October 27, 1940, Oshima in Yo Miuri Shimbun, stated that Tripartite pact was a clear recognition to Japan's mission in the south and that Japan must take concrete steps to establish her leadership in greater East Asia by expanding to the south. This must be done by diplomacy or by war, if diplomacy fails. That Indonesia formed a part of greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere was for the first publicly declared by Japan on January 21, 1941. And instructions were sent out on January 28 to the Japanese delegation at Jakarta that in no cases should official statements deny this fact.

The joint conference of government and military commanders in July 2, 1941, in the presence of the emperor decided to establish greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere and advance to southern regions. The prolonged negotiations at Jakarta came into a deadlock on June 17, 1941. The imperial conference of November 5, 1941, decided to start hostilities with the western powers for the creation of the greater East Asia co-prosperity. This conference also decided inter-alia, that after the occupation, apart of Indonesia would be made independent, the remaining would be directly incorporated into the Japanese empire.

The liaison conference of November 20, 1941, approved the guiding principles which provided military administrations in the occupied areas, including Indonesia. The guiding principles were:

1. Far E.Mil.Trib: Exh. no. 1299 A; timetable no. 63
2. Ibid no. 1300; timetable no. 59; Van Nook: op.cit.
3. Far E.Mil.Trib. Exh. no. 1302; timetable no. 71
4. Time-table no. 108; Aziz op.cit. p. 117
1. Military administrations to be set up to restore order and secure immediate control of resources; important for the war efforts.

2. The maximum utilisation of the existing administrative structure and minimum of interference with social and national customs.

3. Control of transportation, communication, commercial and financial facilities by the occupation forces.

4. Guidance and control of the local population which was to be made to feel dependent on the military administration. Natives will have to reconcile themselves to such acquisition of resources. One significant note caution was struck: we must avoid giving rise to any pre-mature independence movement.

5. Enforced occupation by the Chinese immigrants who must renounced their allegiance to the government of Chiang Kai Shek and sympathise with the military administration.

6. The gradual withering away of military administration and its replacement by a new organisation, the nature of which would be determined a later date.

The sixth Committee had in December 12, 1941, made an economic plan for Indonesia called the outline of the economic counter plans for the southern area. As to the future status of Indonesia, plans were prepared both by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of war.

As basic policies, the ministry of foreign affairs envisaged the establishment of Japanese military bases in the area, cooperation

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with Japan in foreign policy and national defence by the state newly to be founded, close economic collaboration with Japan and elimination of European and American influences from the whole of the area. The right of the native population to independence was rather liberally recognised in this plan (respecting to the utmost the desire of the southern people for emancipation and independence) but always with the reservation of Japan's right to annex any region considered to be necessary for the defence of the empire or the backwardness of the natives.1

An Indonesian federation was to be set up, composed of three states; Java including Madura, Bali, and Lombok; Sumatra and Celebes including the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundan islands, but excluding Timor and three dependent areas: Borneo, New Guinea and Timor, but the government of these areas was to be entrusted to Japan. Strategically important islands such as Biauw and Lingga Archipelago the Anambas and Batuna islands were to become Japanese colonies and administered by the Japanese governor general at Singapore.2

The first of the two documents presented by the research section of the ministry of war in December, 1941, emphasised the expulsion of Anglo-Saxon rule, the elimination of all British, American and Dutch influences in S.E. Asia and development of the natural resources of those areas by their inhabitants under Japanese guidance for the benefit and defence of the Japanese empire.3

The second document which detailed the political division of the empire to be created, provided the establishment of an Indonesian kingdom, embracing all Dutch possessions and the territories:

1. Hoover Document No.1112 A. op.cit
2. Exhibite: 1333 A; W.H. Elshree: op.cit. p.22; Aziz; op.cit. p.118
of British Borneo, Labuan island, Sarawak, Burnei Concos island, Christmas island, Andaman islands, Nicobar islands, and Portuguese Timor. Thus Indonesia was to be a part of the larger Indonesian kingdom within the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. This independent kingdom was to enjoy self-government in internal affairs and Japan was to remain in control of defence and foreign affairs.

Ever since the establishment of the League of Nations 1920 up to the year 1941, the idea of maintaining peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean in particular and all over the world in general had been advocated by different international figures such as Dr. Hu Shih of China, Prof. P.F. Corbert of Canada, Prof. N. Peffle and Holland of America etc. For this purpose they in 1939 proposed to set up three kinds of international organisations; 1. Indonesian union, comprising of Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, British Malaya, Thailand and Indo-China (2) Far Eastern union, consisting of China, Manchuria, Japan, the Indonesian union and India. 3. Pacific association, embracing the U.S.A. the U.S.S.R., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the principle countries on the west coast of south Africa and all units of the Far Eastern union. But this plan was never materialised till the out break of the second world war.2

About 16 months before the invasion of Indonesia the shrewd Nipponese, in pursue of their policy of incorporating Indonesia with greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere by the peaceful means, resorted to an ingenious technique of economic negotiations.

1. Art. 6 of Hoover Doc. no. 19873; op.cit; Aziz; op.cit. p.119
2. Brono Losker and W.L. Holland; Problems of the Pacific in 1933 London and Chicago, 1943, pp.37-80
The Japanese delegation, composed of 24 technicians including 1 army, 1 air and two naval officers and headed by the minister of commerce and industry, Ichiro Kobayashi. The Netherlands government appointed Dr. Van Mook, director of economic affairs, as minister plenipotentiary to lead the Indonesian delegation.1

During his first audience with the G.G., J.Tjarda, Kobayashi stated the aim of his mission and stressed the necessity of closer cooperation between Indonesia and Japan, which he regarded as an inevitable consequence of the changed circumstances. In van he attempted to force the conversation to the political field. The Dutch had always objected to negotiations of a moral or political nature.2

About after a week of the discussion, the Japanese specified their demands for the purchase of oil. They asked for 3,150,000 tons annually, over and above the usual quota of 600,000 tons. A guarantee of a regular supply of these minimum requirements for a period of five years was also demanded from the Indonesia government.3

It seemed that the main objective of the Japanese delegation was to secure concessions and control of the oil companies in Indonesia as revealed in a telegram of September 3, 1940, from foreign minister, Matsuoka to consul general, Seito, in Jakarta and another from Kobayashi to Matsuoka on September 18, 1940. In a letter of September 24, 1940, Mukai, Japanese delegate in charge of oil negotiations, requested the Indonesian delegation to give me and my party information as minutely as possible and provide us with useful pieces of reference and furthermore, to afford us opportunities for actual studies of oil producing districts and

1. Van Mook: op.cit. p.39
2. Ibid. p.38
3. Ibid. p.43; M.A.Aziz: op.cit. p.122
At the close of a general meeting of the two delegations on October 14-16, 1940, a joint communiqué issued was followed by an agreement on October 18, which was finally signed on November 12, 1940. The oil producing companies agreed to supply annually a total of 1,500,000 tons of oil over the next 12 months. Of which 1,140,000 tons were to be crude oil and 360,000 tons refined. This agreement which provisionally run for six months, was renewed in May, 1941 for another six months. The Japanese obtained no aviation gas under the agreement. The Japanese had also agreed to re-export none of the oil to Germany.2

Failed in its attempts at securing additional oil of 3,100,000 tons for 1940, the Japanese delegation insisted on granting oil exploitation and exploration rights in the area of Borneo, Celebes, New Guinea, the Archipelago and Schouten archipelago, Sumatra as mentioned in its noted of October 29, 1940, to the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government was asked to acknowledge the whole of these areas as Japan's sphere of interest.3

In reply to the Japanese notes, the Dutch minister in Tokyo handed an aide memoire on November 15, 1940, to Ohashi, Japan's vice minister of foreign affairs, stating that the negotiations had come to a standstill and be formally discontinued.4

Japan, however, was not prepared to admit defeat. In a note verbale on November 20, 1940, she announced the eminent appointment of a new special envoy who would continue the negotiations.

1. H.J. Van Look: op.cit. p.48
2. A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.424
Kankichi Yeshizawa, a former foreign minister and a member of the house of Peers, was formally appointed as the successor of Kobayashi who left Indonesia in October 22, 1940.

Yeshizawa arrived in Jakarta on December 28, 1940, apparently to continue the negotiations but with the same objective to induce Indonesia into the economic and political orbit of greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. The extravagant demands of the Japanese delegation for the exploitation of Indonesia, followed by foreign minister, Matsukas's assertion in the Diet on January 21, 1941, that Indonesia was formed a part of the great East Asia- co-prosperity sphere. On January 31, 1941, the Dutch protested and rejected any suggestion of having Indonesia incorporated in a new order in Asia under the leadership of any power (Japanese) whatsoever, On January 27, 1941 Yeshizawa finally sent a gloomy report to Tokyo in which he made clear the Indonesian tendency to neglect entirely Japan's great East Asia co-prosperity sphere, seeking support more and more from the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

Japan now made necessary preparation both military and diplomatic. In January, 1941, instructions were issued for the printing of occupation paper money for Indonesia and the delivery of which took place in March 1941.

At the end of February, 1941, the negotiations were resumed, where the Japanese delegation reduced the area of coveted oil concessions from 17.5 million hectares to 1.7 million hectares. On the instruction of premier, Konoya, on March 28, 1941, Yeshizawa had to continue the negotiations to secure its original demands.

1. H.J. Van Mook; Cpr.cit. pp64-65
2. Ibid. p.71
3. I.F.S.-oc. 7022; Far ...ill. Trib. Exh. no.840; timetable nos.72 and 76
At this time, the Japanese increased their demands for 30,000 tons of rubber and 12,5000 tons of tin. But the Dutch remained steadfast to their point of view and hence no progress was made in the discussions. The Japanese at last presented their final memorandum on May 14, 1941, detailing the terms with regard to the entry of the Japanese into Indonesia, in the sphere of enterprises and business, traffic and communications, trade and commerce.

However, the two delegations met once more on June 10, 1941. The Indonesian government formally refused to accede to the Japanese demands for greater economic and political privileges within her territories and so the delegations parted in a subdued, though friendly mood. On June 14, 1941, Natsuoka asked Yoshizawa to break off the negotiations and come back to Japan. On June 17, Yoshizawa had an audience with the G.C. of Indonesia. A joint communiqué was issued stating the break off the economic negotiation between the Dutch and Japanese delegations in Jakarta.

The main cause of the failure of the conference was the Japanese demands which were of such nature and magnitude that the Indonesian government could not comply with them without jeopardising the integrity of the archipelago. A Japanese view of causes of the failure of the negotiations was, however, given by Kahtaro Chya in contemporary Japan in the following words: This unsuccessful parley

1. Van Hook, op.cit. p.80
3. Van Hook, op.cit. p.97
was almost constantly hampered development of political questions which unexpectedly obstructed themselves on the council board in spite of the effort made from the outset to confine discussions to purely economic matters. When the international situation is so full of complexities as at present, it is extremely difficult to draw distributions between economic and political issues or to keep them apart and separate. To this fact more than any thing else should be attributed the failure of the Jakarta conference.

It should also be noted that sentiment in Indonesia underwent a drastic change against Japan after the conclusion of the tripartite treaty in September 27, 1940. That Japan was regarded almost as an open enemy cannot denied. This attitude was shown when Japan became allied with Germany, with whom the Netherlands were at war. It may also be said on the psychological side, that Indonesia depended on Britain's fighting power and on the aid and support of America which was becoming an arsenal for the democracies. It may equally be said that the attitude of Indonesia stiffened when they underrated the power of Japan, which was misjudged to be on the verge of military and economic exhaustion after more than four years fighting. The Dutch opposition to the co-prosperity sphere of east Asia was no doubt due to the political construction wrongly placed on the economic and peaceful designs of the Japanese government in consequence of its joining the Axis countries, as well as to the strong reliance placed by the Netherlands on Britain and America. The Dutch argument that Japan might re-export to Germany what she imported from Indonesia was only too spacious. What Japan sought from that source was to meet her
expanding industrial needs.1

With the formal breakdown of the Jakarta conference, a resort to force remained as the only alternative method of bringing Indonesia into the co-prosperity sphere, the preparations for which were already under way. Before launching military action, the bases in southern Indo-China were to be secured, since they were regarded as essential for an easy attack on Indonesia. Satsuoka admitted this to the German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, on June 21, 1941.2

Therefore, the liaison conference between the government and the imperial headquarters of June 25, 1941, which set up, especially in connection with the return of the Japanese delegation from Indonesia the programme for the south, decided that as the first step towards the southern drive, Japan should hasten to obtain air bases, the use of specified harbours and the right to station troops in southern Indo-China. This decision was endorsed by the imperial conference of July 2, 1941, and once more it was reiterated that Japan should speed up her south-ward march and remove all obstacles.3

The occupation of southern Indo-China by Japanese troops accordingly began on July 29, 1941. As a result, on July 28, 1941, the Indonesian authorities, following the example of the U.K., Great Britain and the British dominions, issued order freezing all Japanese assets in Indonesia and suspending the Dutch-Japanese financial agreement. By the edict of July 28, the Indonesian government now stopped all applies of oil, bauxite, rubber, tin and other rarer material to Japan.4

Henceforward, direct relations between Japan and Indonesia

1. A. Vandenbosch: op. cit. p. 427; Appendix 1, Ibid pp. 429-431
2. M.A. Azizi: op. cit. p. 137
3. Far E. Mill. Trib. Exh. no. 588: timetable no. 93
virtually came to an end. In August, 1941, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima, called on General Christianson, commander of the German occupation forces in Holland, possibly to collect further material on the military and political situation in Indonesia from documents in the Dutch department of colonies in the Hague.1

In order to facilitate the military campaign against Indonesia, the Japanese increased their subversive activities. Special attention was paid to influencing the Chinese nationals in Indonesia, which totalled some 1,250,000. On September 2, 1941, consul general, Ishizawa at Jakarta in a cable to Tokyo requested that more pro-Japanese agents from the occupied regions of China be sent to Indonesia, in order to counter anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese nationals there.2

It was revealed from the secret report of the office of East Asiatic affairs in Jakarta that as many as four big Japanese spy organisations were operating in Indonesia in October 27, 1941.3

As the Japanese threatened Indonesia, so the Indonesian government strengthened its defence, to resist the Japanese aggression. The Indonesian people fully cooperated with the government and served side by side in the home guard and in the civil air defence, though they lacked of modern ammunitions and weapons. The Indonesian government ordered all male German and Japanese nationals of about 7,000 persons and some Chinese pro-Japanese to be rounded and interned, while the women and children were allowed to leave for Japan and Germany. In September, 1941, 1000 Japanese women and children were repatriated and in November, 1941, 1600 including many men

1. B.H.M.Vlekke: op.cit. p.393
2. Far E.Mill Trib.exh.no.1327: time-table no.99
3. Ibid no.1325, time-table no.107
left Indonesia for Japan. But the Japanese government warned Indonesia. Dutch women and children began to move out of Japan.1

At the end of October, 1941, after General Tojo had become premier, a general re-examination of all possible questions connected with the prospective war against the Netherlands, the U.S. and Great Britain took place. The imperial conference of November 5, 1941, decided to launch war on Indonesia with the following detailed instructions. An order was given, for instance to attack Dutch ships and airoplanes in special cases even before the declaration of war. On the day of the declaration of war the southern area force would destroy the hostile navies in the territory of Indonesia and cooperate with the Japanese army in the occupation of the archipelago. It was further instructed that the beginning of the operations the strategic areas of Celebes, Dutch Borneo and southern Sumatra would be occupied. Also strategic areas in the Moluccas and Timors. Necessary air bases would be prepared in these areas. After the completion of these bases the air force would be pushed forward in order to destroy the enemy air force in Java. After that the main body of the invasion group of the army would land in Java for its occupation.2

However, the final stage in the preparation of Japan for the conquest of Indonesia was reached towards the end of November, 1941, when consul general Ishizawa at Jakarta, acting on orders from foreign minister, Tojo, instructed the Japanese consuls in various places in Indonesia to report telegraphically all movements of merchant men and warships in the Pacifics, the Indian ocean, the south China sea zones, giving full details of destinations of all

1. A. Vandenhoech op.cit. p.528
2. Far 5. Mill Trib.exh.no.1252; time-table no.102
3. Ibid no.1330; Ibid. no.115
While the Japanese government, states \textit{Vlekke}, boldly asserted that it had never more than 35,000 men in Indo-China, it was really massing strong forces along the boundary of Thailand and near its new naval bases in the neighbourhood of Saigon. It was massing air fleets at the bases north-east of Indonesia in the archipelago of the Caroline islands. An imposing force was concentrating for the attack of Indonesia.

In view of this threat of war, Indonesia economically increased its production of raw materials such as rubber, tin etc., essential for war production in the U.S. A large number of new factories had begun operations. In March 1941, the volksraad approved a government proposal to allocate 10,000,000 florins in support of essential new industries. It also voted 530,000,000 florins for the purchase of armaments.

The Indonesian armed forces were too small and lacked of modern weapons. Before the war they were 3,500 soldiers. This standing army had been increased by a few thousand men. It was furthermore reinforced by about 30,000 home and city guards and by 6,000 men of the native militia. With all auxiliary troops the total number of the enlisted men was about 100,000. The anti-air craft artillery was not sufficient to protect even the most important points. The whole Indonesian squadron of the Netherlands navy consisted of three crushers, 5 destroyers, 15 sub-marines and a number of small crafts and auxiliary vessels.

By December 6, 1941, it had become clear that war would break out in the next few days and the Indonesian government decided

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid no.1330; ibid no.115
\item Vlekke: op.cit. p.393
\item A. Vandenbosch: op.cit. pp.412-416
\end{enumerate}
to allow Australian flyers to join the Dutch at the base of Amboyna and to admit Australian troops on to Timor. When the Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbour on December 7, the G.C. of Indonesia, Tjarda, after informing the Queen Wilhelmina in London, announced a stage of war with Japan. A bomb on Pearl Harbour is a bomb on Java, was a Queen's comment.1 The Dutch had cooperated with the U.S.A., Great Britain and China in forming the A.B.C.D. powers(fronts). On January 10, the first Japanese landing took place in the island of Tarakan. On February 20-22, the Japanese troops landed on both Timor and Bali islands. On February 21, March 1942, they defeated the allied forces and occupied Java. On March 8, the Dutch commander in chief, General Ter Poorten, capitulated. In June the Japanese however successfully conquered the entire Indonesian archipelago except Merauke, capital of district of south west New Guinea, where the Dutch flag was still floating.2

THE JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

Soon after the capitulation of the Dutch in March, 1942, the Japanese military authority was established in Indonesia. Indonesia was divided into three administrative zones: 1. a military administration for Java with head-quarters at Jakarta; (2) a military administration for Sumatra and Malaya with headquarters at Singapore; (3) a naval administration for Borneo, the Celebes and the Lesser Islands, with headquarters at Maccassar. Coordination of these three zonal administrations could only take place at Tokyo by consultation between the ministries of war and navy. In order to promote cooperation between the army and navy a liaison office (Bukanfu) was set up at Jakarta under the supervision of Vice Admiral Maeda.3

1. Ibid
2. Ibid p.222
In accordance with ordinance of March 7, 1942, the military administration as set up in Java on August, 1942, showed no striking formal changes from the administrative structure of the Dutch regime except at the very top level. There the G.C., the government secretariat, the cabinet, the council of state for the Indies and the volksraad all disappeared from the scene. The reigns of all authority, executive, legislative, judicial and administrative in the new set up were held by a Gunseikan, the chief military administration, and the Japanese commander in chief for Java who was the local links in the chain of command of the southern areas to Tokyo. The key body in the military administration was the general affairs bureau which was the policy making agency and which supervised the whole administrative structure. This bureau (somubo) and the propaganda bureau (sendenbu) were the only new departments; the other seven departments in the administration followed the pattern of former regime with slight modification. These departments were as follows: 1. internal affairs (naimubu) which now included public health and education and labour, formerly independent departments; (2) finance (zairaubu); (3) Justice (shihobu); (4) police (keisubu); which was formerly under the interior department; (5) public works (kotsubu); (6) audit (kaike kantokubu) and (7) industry (sangyobu); Independent bureau, of which the most important was religious affairs bureau (shshubu).

Similarly in the field of local administration, there was no revolutionary change in structure. The former provinces of west, central and East Java were abolished and the top and most important unit became the shu (province) which corresponded to the former

1. Ibid. p. 155
residencies and of which there were 17. The four sultanates in central Java were continued with their current rulers and Jakarta a special municipality. Below the shu, the Japanese administrative pattern of prefecture, sub-prefecture, district, village and city was instituted and provincial, regional and municipal councils were eliminated. The head of the shu, the counter of former residents, was the most important figure in the local administration for he had the power to issue ordinances supplementing those of higher authorities and regulations on subjects not yet covered. These powers of appointment and dismissal gave him greater authority over his subordinates than the resident had enjoyed but on the other hand, was more directly dependent on the central administration.

Borneo, the Celebes and all the islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar straits were under the jurisdiction of the Navy.

Gunsei (military administration) in these areas was called minsei (civil administration) whose headquarters (minseiu) was at Macassar (Celebes). The whole area governed by the navy was divided into 4 administrative regions - Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands - each administered by a branch office (minseiubu). The minseiubu at Macassar was under the command of the officer commanding the second southern fleet at Surabaya, which again fell under the officer of the 7th southern fleet at Singapore.

The navy ministry at Tokyo determined the policy for the territory under the naval occupation.

A Japanese military court was established to deal with violations of army ordinances, while in September, 1942, the existing

1. exhibit 1335 and 1351
2. Dec. n9.2850, p.34, H.A. Azizi: op.cit. p.161
judicial system organised on the Japanese pattern and in 1944 a new and severe penal code was promulgated. During the session of the court only Japanese and Indonesian languages were allowed. Trials by the courts martial proper were conducted in Japanese. The police department was similarly reorganised and an auxiliary police force (keibutai) was set up in the towns and villages. As happened in all Japanese occupied territories the chief power in police and judicial affairs was wielded by the Kempei or M.P. and exercised with their usual ruthlessness. To facilitate their operations they trained and organised a Javanese branch which became an object of special hatred and fear on the part of populace in general.1

An agricultural industrial central board (saibai kogyo kami kodan) was founded early in 1942, connected with the former department of economic affairs, with numerous powers to handle over all financial procurement and requirement for agricultural industries. The S.K.K.K, was also empowered to deal with storage and distribution of the produce of these industries and to rear estate production to the needs of war effort. In June 1943, the powers of the S.K.K.K were extended still further to include not only large estate industries such as rubber, and cinchona but also the small estate, particularly those engaged in the production of febres and cacao.

Political measures including propaganda and limited concessions to the nationalists were regarded by the Japanese as means to achieve the main economic goal and to enlist popular support for total economic mobilisation. Quinine, tin, petroleum

1. Statement of De Weerd, exhibit, 1351
products, febres, textiles and food products specially rice and cassava remarkably required; the Japanese ruthless conscripted Indonesian labour in the hei ho(work corps) to increase production. Actually in the case of production except quinine which was increased by 16% Ramusha increased output considerably under Japanese direction. According to both Japanese and Indonesian statistic covering Java, rice production dropped by 25% during the Japanese occupation, corn by 36%, cassava by almost 50%, rubber by more than 80% in both Java and Sumatra, tea by over 95%, coffee by about 70% and palm oil by almost 75%. 1

The hei ho consisted of conscripted Indonesian labourers (ramusha) were incorporated into the Japanese army or labour battalions and sent as far as Burma, Siam, and Malaya to work on roads, fortification, etc. The casualty rate of these ramushas was exceedingly high and of the many thousands who left Java only a small proportion returned. Large number did not leave Java and were used by the Japanese to work plantations or roads and fortifications, etc. Consequently a social service organisation headed by Otto Iskandar Dinata was established to help the suffering families of those ramushas.

Throughout 1942 all political parties and even political meetings and propaganda were banned by the Japanese authority. The Japanese officials pointed out that we should if possible, at proper time before presenting the above mentioned requests, cause an independent movement to stir up, among the native.2 One of guiding principles of the military authority said: We must avoid giving rise to any premature independent movement. Because the Japanese wanted to Japanese Indonesia. The so-called a triple a movement

2. In the exhibit 628, Tentative plan for policy toward the southern region, Oct. 4, 1940; W. Elshree: op.cit. p.18
(pergerakan 3 A) launched in April 29, 1942 under the slogan "Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia and Japan the light for Asia and Asia for Asiatics" bore down heavily on the theme of Japan as the saviour of the Asiatic peoples from the western influences which had corrupted the eastern soul. The objective of the movement was to mobilise Indonesian support for Japan war effort and the greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere.1

In order to influence the Indonesian people, the Japanese made friendly approach to the four leaf clover (empat serangkai) of the Indonesian leaders; Dr. Sukarno, Hatta, Dewantara and Mas Mansur. These four men pretended to support the Japanese but actually they wanted to carry on the fighting for national independence. As Shahrir clearly expressed" it gives the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope and to press the Japanese for political concessions. The formation of a united nationalist movement which would include all groups was of particular concern to Sukarno for example.2

The pusat tenaga rakyat or putera (central people's power) was organised by the Japanese in March, 1943. It was founded with the attention of making it a body to attract as many Indonesian as possible for the purpose of cooperation with the Japanese. It aimed for it to replace all the national political organisations that had been in existence before the Japanese conquest. Dr. Sukarno was made president of the organisation. Other members of its working committee consisted of Indonesians like Mas Adipati Ario Kusumo Utoy, vice-president.3

The most important result of the putera was the tremendous

1. W.H. Iishree: op.cit. p.79
2. Sutan Shahrir: Out of exile Jakarta, 1946, p.82
3. Exhibit 1351; W.H. Iishree: op.cit. p.82
increase in political consciousness of the Indonesian masses and in particular their will to independence. For the putera not only allowed but even encouraged the contact between nationalist leaders and the masses with the repressive apparatus of the Dutch regime had so severely limited. The objective of this contact from standpoint of the Japanese was to indoctrinate the masses to support them and to hate, if necessary to fight the allies; to recruit labour battalions and rear area troops for the Japanese army; and to mobilise raw material resources. In a limited measure this was accomplished. But in much greater it resulted in the awakening of the national consciousness and desire for independence of the Indonesian peasant.

In September, 1943, the Sukarela tentara pembela tanah air (peta), volunteer army of defenders of the fatherland, was also organised by the Japanese. This was a Japanese trained but Indonesia officered military organisation formed to help the Japanese defend Indonesia against the allied invasion. At its peak straight in the middle of 1945 it numbered about 120,000 armed men. It was the peta which was to become the backbone of the Indonesian republic's army. The continuous objective of Sukarno, Hatta and other peta leaders was to indoctrinate the peta's members with a pro-Indonesian point of view and only outwardly a pro-Japanese and anti-allied orientation. By 1944, the average peta member was consciously strong nationalist, anti-Japanese and Dutch but for the most part favourably disposed towards the other allies, particular the United

1. Ibid
Sukarno and Gatot Mangkupradja, the Indonesian head of the peta, were able to insure the reliability according to nationalist considerations of most important peta officers. They argued to the Japanese and effectively, that in an army dedicated to defend of the motherland, it was necessary to have strong nationalist officers. In addition Sukarno convinced the Japanese that the peta could be a good defensive organisation only its rank and file as well as its officers had aroused national consciousness. Thus allowed hi and others to speak to the various peta units, inflaming them not against the allies alone but against imperialism in general. Many peta members had no difficulty in equating Japan's activities with imperialism by themselves.1

The Japanese propaganda service (the sendanbu) was established several youth organisations. They were given political indoctrination plus some military training. The first of them, the seinenosan was established at the end of 1942, as a mass youth organisation based particularly on the village. Its members were trained in simple military exercises, mass drill and anti-allies ideas by a member of their village who had attended a Japanese school for instructions. In 1943, was organised the Gakutotal, an organisation of students from the seventh grade through high school. Its members were also given intensive indoctrination against the allies and some military training. Finally was established the barisen pelopor (Pioneer column), the most heavily indoctrinated of all youth corps.2

The Japanese military command dissolved the putere and replaced it with new organisation called Djawa hokokai (perhimpunan

1. Ibid p.83
2. Exhibit1351; Doc.no.2750, p.51, M.A.Aziz; op.cit. p.225
kebaktian rakjat or people's loyalty organisation) in March 1, 1944. To help neutralise and limit the force of the nationalists, the Japanese insisted that it represented the Chinese, Arab and Eurasian community as well as Indonesian and forced it to submit to a much closer supervision and control than had been the case with the putera. Though nominally chairmanned by Sukarno, who was assisted by Hatte as vice-chairman, the new organisation stood directly under the control of the Gunseikan, the Japanese commander in chief. The highly developed organisation of the hokokai with a branch in every village, was maintained compulsively. It did not win popular lacking. By many Indonesians Sukarno and its other leaders were felt to be prisoners of the Japanese; and in fact they retained very little latitude for maneuvering the advancement of the nationalist movement.

In addition the Japanese attempted to win the support of Indonesian Islamic leaders, kias and ulamas. They were given local positions, honours and importance. The attempt was made to enroll their support in a propaganda campaing aimed at arousing resistance to the Allies on the basis of defence of Islam against infidels bent upon again enslaving the Muslim population of Indonesia. To facilitate the organisation of this effort, the Japanese established towards the end of 1943 a large Islamic organisation, subsuming all existing ones of non-political nature, including Mohamadiah, Nahdatul Ulama and M.I.A.I. (council of Indonesia Muslim association). Although through this organisation did to have increased the spirit of nationalism among the masses, they did not appear to have had much success in building anti-allied as distinguished from anti-

1. Kan po no, p.7
Japanese sentiment. Nearly all of the kias of ulamas refused to lend themselves as instruments of Japanese aims. In fact the majority of them had already been outraged by the clumsy handling of the Mohammadan religion by the Japanese. The people being forced to bow towards Tokyo rather Mecca and the exaltation of the Emperor on a religious place were particularly important in this respect. The antipathy towards the Japanese brought to emphasise Indonesian independence above all else and this was more frequently accompanied by anti-Japanese than anti-allied overtones.1

One other political organisation called the committee for the study of former customs and political system was set up in November 1942. Its purpose was declared to be to survey and study the customs and former governmental systems of the country and contribute towards administration of Java. Its members were composed of 10 Indonesians, including Sukarno, Hatta, Dewantara and Mas Mansur and nine Japanese and was divided into 2 committees of welfare and survey which supposed transmitted pertinent information to the military administration. The committee was dissolved the following October when the central advisory council was established.2

During the first period there was little change in the position of the Indonesian in the government service. The Japanese assumed that loyal officials would be respected and that all Javanese administrative personnel would be retained. Some Dutch officials in the lower ranks were kept at first but for a few months. The Sumatran administration from Singapore announced the Dutch administration system had been found suitable with only minor changes but with former official completely replaced by experienced Japanese officials.

1. Kahimi op. cit. p. 111
2. Exhibit 1951, Cf. programme in Java p. 61
According to official Japanese figures of September 1, 1945, 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the military administration of Java.1

Key position down through the provincial or former residency level were held by the Japanese, below that Indonesian personnel prevailed almost entirely. Such appointments of Indonesians did not involved any large members of important posts. One was appointed a judge of the supreme court, Hadan Supono and 60 members were added to the judicial branch of Jakarta provincial court. Some 100 others were named to governmental posts, mostly at the provincial level in May, 1942. 2

In 1944, 3 Indonesians-Sutardjo, Sutro and Eusos were appointed by the Japanese military authority as residents (political head of residency) and in the remaining residencies of Java and Madura, Indonesians sub-residents were appointed. These Indonesian sub-residents rather than Japanese superiors, who were only nominal residents, actually ran their respective administrations. The outside Java and Madura the Japanese administrations did not allow Indonesians to occupy civil service posts higher than that of district head.

After the Tokyo approval, the puppet movement was organised in March, 1943. In June, 1943, Tojo in a speech to the Diet promised measures that he would give the peoples greater participation in their governments. He referred to Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Celebes but singled out Java for special attention. If our attention to go further and in pursuance on the aspirations of the nations, to take measures step by step envisaging the participation of the

1. Shona Shimbut, March 22 and 24 and May 11, 1952
2. Ibid. April 28 and May 1, 1942
native populations with degree of their ability in the course of the year. In particular we intend to realise this state of affairs as early as possible in Java in view of the advanced conditions of the islands and in response to the desire of the people there.1

The promise announced in Tojo Diet speech was repeated by the prime minister during his visit to Java in summer of 1943. In a speech before a rally at Gambir Park in Jakarta on July 7, Tojo said it was his intention that the people of Java should take part over the management of political affairs.2

The first concrete steps to carry out this promise were announced in Java on September 5, 1943. An advisory system was introduced whereby Indonesians were appointed as advisers to the various departments of the government, advisory councils established and vice-governors appointed in 8 of the provinces. Two types of councils were set up in Java: local councils, of which there was one in each province and one for the special municipality of Jakarta and a central advisory council for all Java. The local councils were composed of 10-30 members, of whom 2 were appointed by the governors and 1 elected by the village headmen. In general, their function was to answer questions posed for them by the governor and to furnish suggestions on subject referred to them.3

Similar local councils were founded in Sumatra, Borneo, Malaya at the same time and in the Celebes a few months later, but the central advisory council was confined only to Java for the time being. This said Harad, the Japanese chief counsellor of the Java administration, was caused the more advanced character of the people

2. Osaka Asahi, July 13, 1943
3. Ibid. September 7, and July 13, 1943
Java wanted a more centralised and complex form of political participation. In Malaya the natives were not qualified for such activity and the local councils would be headed by Japanese mayors and governors.1

The central advisory council of Java set up in September 5, was composed of 43 members, 23 of whom were appointed by the commander in chief of Java, 16 elected by the local councils and 2 appointed by the sultanates. The purpose of serving so many appointments to the commander in chief was not only to ensure a safely pro-Japanese majority but also to provide representation for such special groups such as the Chinese and representatives of religious organisations. To so choose members that public opinion would be given as a wide representation as possible was an avoid aim of the whole advisory council programme. Instructions to provincial governors in Sumatra, for instance, were to appoint men of good reputation and members of religious and other organisations. The list of appointments to the central councils issued later in September read like a who's who of Javanese public life end included three Chinese, Muslim leaders such as Aqas Sali and Mansur, as well as leading political figures like Sukarno (chairman) Hatta, Soekartawanto and Subardjo.2

Japanese were carefully excluded from membership except in the local councils where Japanese served as chairman and in general the appointment of administrative officials was discouraged in order to set the voice of the native inhabitants reflected as much as possible in the military administration.

1. Harad wrote an article in the Osaka Asahi, Oct. 5, 1943
2. Programme in Java, p. 9
The administration also considered it good policy to adopt several of the proposals put forward by the councils in order to secure their general cooperation, in another words, give the natives a bit more rope to lead them more easily.1

The real centre of powers in the council could be detected easily in the first announcement of the institution. To the council there was attached a secretariat which was staffed by several experienced and skilled Japanese, whose duties were to be those of assistance and guidance. Actual supervision and direction of the council was carried on by the office which provided the question and many of the answers as well, with which the members were to deal. The same function performed in the local councils by a Japanese secretary attached to the office of the provincial governor.2

At the same time that the councils were instituted, the Japanese made several appointments of Indonesians to posts in the central and local governments. To implement the advisory system 7 Indonesians were named to posts in the departments of the military administrations. Dr. Sukarno was appointed to the general affairs department, Dewantara to the education bureau, Raden Supomo to justice and Dr. Yamin to the propaganda department. An Indonesian was named head of the religious affairs bureau and others received posts in the industry departments and public works. Two Javanese provincial governors were appointed, Indonesian advisers named to the provincial governments and received positions in the departments of provincial administration.3

1. Osaka Asahi, September 7, 1943
2. Exhibit 1351
3. Shonen Shimbun October 7, November 11, 1943
INDO*EPENDENCE FOR INDONESIA

In September 1944, under increasing pressure both from the Indonesian nationalists and deteriorating military situation in the Pacific, the Tojo cabinet was replaced by a new cabinet headed by General Koiso who was recalled from Korea. The Prime Minister made the first formal promise of independence to the Indonesian in September, 1944. The commander in chief of Java in his announcement of Koiso's speech of promising independence for Indonesia said the final victory was not won, then there would be no greater east Asia and without the latter, as a matter of course, there could be no independence for Indonesia. It, therefore, behooved all Indonesians to devote themselves to the effort of ensuring a Japanese victory.1

As far as political participation was concerned, the policy as adopted in Tokyo stated that premature enforcement was to be avoided and that the political ability of the people had to be first taken into account. Specific mention was made only of Java where measures leading toward independence were to begin at once. There was to be no radical change in the military administration but participation of the people in the government was to be still further strengthened and expanded and they were to receive political training.2

Further, instructions issued by the chief of staff of the 7th area army on September 7, repeated this wording of the announcement on political participation but added some instructions which throw a good bit of light on the motives and attitude of the Japanese at the first period. It specified the use of nationalist flowers, songs, flags (red and white), speeches, and even outlined plan

1. Quoted in exhibit, 1351
2. Exhibit, 1348
for the celebration of the promise of independence in order to
arouse national sentiment to a new pitch of intensity. Especially
during the execution of the war, this national consciousness must be
utilised to strengthen defence cooperation with the military
government and to make Japan and Java one and inseparable.1

The military administration of Java faithfully followed the
instructions. In November, the commander in chief announced the
creation of the posts of provincial vice governor which were to be
filled by experienced local personnel and late in the month,11
such appointments were announced. The seven leading Indonesian
advisers to the military administration were named to a permanent
council of advisory body to the administration when the central
council was not in session. Provision was made for the training
of young Indonesian officials, the central guiding power of the
people and the number of representatives in the central council was
slightly increased.2

Because of the strong demands of the Indonesian nationalist
leaders for independence, on January 3, 1945, the Japanese military
administration announced: 1. With regard to preparations for
Indonesian independence the army will immediately enforce the follow-
ing measures: (a) Enlarge the scope of the institution of political
participation by the native (b) Establish a general affairs bureau
and a central council (c) Strengthen and increase membership of
provincial councils (d) Plan to expand the scope of appointments
to the military administration and to strive for appointment of
native employees (2) Inculcate spirit of national rule (2) Train
personalities who are to become in future leaders and intensify

1. Exhibit: 1352
2. Shonen Shimbun, November 9, 1944
present system absolutely essential to education of future citizens.1

In May the military administration of Java proclaimed its dissatisfaction with the distressingly large number of native officials and senior government officials were named specially, who lacked sincerity and who had cast off the easy going way of the government officials of the former Netherlands administration. To remedy this sad situation the Japanese authorities systematically combed the ranks of appointed native officials to weed out those not sufficiently imbued with the spirit of the new order. Those old line officials were replaced by the capable younger men such as the Hokokai and numerous Mohammaden political leaders.2

During this period there was no marked change in the work of the central council which was primarily concerned with mobilisation of the people for the war effort. In a speech delivered to a session of the council which met just after the announcement of Koiso speech, Hatta discussed the work of the organisation. In the past he said it had been concerned chiefly with the better discipline and increased physical and spiritual training and to production increase and defence. The people should understand that this work had been the prequisites, had been made to the council to deal directly with matters pertaining to independence? The answer was no, for he proceeded to speak of the promise of independence as payable on with total mobilisation. If Indonesia failed to provide that, its national aims of independence will evaporate into the thin air.2

2. W.H.Clsbree: op.cit. p.92
On March 6, 1945 the commander in chief for Java announced that three further steps should be taken to realise Indonesian independence: (1) A committee of inquiry into preparation for independence (Badan penjelidik usaha persiapan kemerdekaan); (2) A national training institute would be founded and (3) Public opinion regarding independence would be stimulated. The committee of inquiry, in the words of orders, was to be an instrument for the achievement of cooperation between the officials and people in the study of preparatory problems for independence. The three measures, he said, are the embellishment of the feeling of confidence the Japanese forces have toward the people of Java, who under their direction have enthusiastically cooperated with them for three years.

Before it became a flesh and blood organisation, however, the Java administration had to win the approval of the area command at Singapore. As a result of pestering by the former, the 7th area army held a conference of all heads of the general affairs departments under the auspices of General Kagoki, the commander in chief at Singapore on April 30. Though Kagoki at first was not in favour of this and told Marshall Terasuchi that the time was not yet ripe, yet he then agreed to the representatives from Java who described the extent to which the national consciousness of the Indonesians had been aroused and stressed the fact that the confidence of the population could only be won if the promises of independence were fulfilled. After further exchanges and meetings, the Singapore command gave its permission and the committee for the study of preparation for independence instituted on May 28. The committee was composed of about 60 members, Japanese Eurasians, Chinese and

1. Shonen Shimbun, March 6, 1945
2. Exhibit 1351
Indonesians, appointed by the military administration, chaired by Dr. Hadjiman Mediodiningrat. 7 Japanese met with Lt. as special members and one of them, Ishaibangase Yoshi, served as vice chairman. An Indonesian, Suroso was appointed as vice-Chairman. 1

It had power to make decisions but discussed such matters as the principles to be incorporated in a constitution, defence and economic problems. Resolutions adopted by the committee and presented to the commander in chief expressed disapproval of allied landings in Morotai, Halmahera and the neighbouring islands; declared the firm opposition of the Indonesian people to a mandate; which it said the allies were planning for all of Asia; such a form of rule, the committee held, was for uncivilised, not free peoples and it reiterated the determination of the Indonesians to fight to death for their independence at the side of the Japanese. 2

After its second session in July 10-16, the committee was outmoded by the rapid course of events. The decision of the supreme war council of July 7 to the effect that the Indonesians should be given their independence as soon as possible that a committee to prepare independence should be established had provided that the details of this arrangement should be worked out by the headquarters of the southern area army at Saigon. As usual the latter was considering independence only in terms of mid 1946, but after another conference of the chiefs of the general affairs departments at Singapore, on July 30, the date was moved forward to the following spring. A few days later, telegraphic orders from Tokyo instructed Marshall Terauchi in Saigon to speed up

1. G.W. Overdijkink: De Indonesische problem de ferfen, The Hague, 1946, p.33
2. G.W. Overdijkink: opcit. pp.34-35
preparation for the new state so that it could be launched in September. Consequently on August 7, Terauchi issued the degree establishing a committee for preparation of independence (dokuritsu jumbi iin) which was to accelerate all measures concerning the preparation for the installation of the government of an independent Indonesia.1

Two days later, Sukarno, Hatta and Wediodinigrat were flown to Terauchi head-quarters at Dalat in Saigon to receive the imperial degree directly from him, the main points of the degree were as follows:

1. A committee for preparation of independence (panitia persippan kemerdekaan) was to be established;
2. The territory of the new state was to include all of the former Netherlands East Indies;
3. The date upon which independence was to be proclaimed in any territory would be decided at the discretion of the Japanese government, as soon as preparations were completed;
4. The new government first could be instituted on the island where preparations were first completed and would be extended to other area as they became ready;
5. All Japanese military demands were to be met;
6. Sukarno was appointed chairman of the committee which was to include representatives of areas outside Java and the members of which were to be appointed on nomination by the local Japanese military commanders.2

The delegation arrived back in Jakarta on August 14 and the

1. W.H. Elsbree: op.cit. p.95
2. Terauchi's proclamation of August 7, 1945
committee consisted of 21 appointed members; 13 from Java, 3 from Sumatra and 5 from the other islands. These members were Dr. Sukarno (chairman), Dr. Hatta (vice-chairman), K.H.T. Hadjiwan Wediodiningrat, Otto Iskandar Dinata, Ki A. Washid Hashim, Ki Bagus Adikusumo, B.K.P. A. Surjohamidjojo, B.P.H. Purbaja, M. Sutardjo Karti Hadikusumo, B.P. Suroso, Prof. K. Supomo and K. Abdul Kadir for Java; Dr. Amir, Mr. Abdu Abas and Tenku Mohammad Hasan for Sumatra; Dr. G.S.S. Satu Langie, Andi Pengreran for Celebes; A.A. Hamidhan for Borneo; Mr. J. Latuhahary for the Moluccas and Dr. Tjuan Bine representing the Chinese community. The first meeting of these representatives was scheduled on August 19, to discuss preparations for independence fixed by Terahchi on August 24. The surrender of the Japanese on the 14th however, speeded up the political developments in Indonesia and the committee was summoned on the 15th and informed the surrender.1

All members of the committee were compelled to take the oath of allegiance to the secret person of the Japanese emperor. They had to follow five principles (banjododai) read as follows:

1. Together with the other east Asiatic nations we shall live or die with Dai Nippon and we will offer our sacrifice willingly, knowing that the present war is waged to vindicate peace and justice;

2. We shall establish a united, independent, sovereign, just and prosperous nation which will endeavour to be worthy member of the great east Asia co-prosperity sphere under the noble and benevolent leadership of Dai Nippon;

1. Kahin: op.cit. p.127
3. We shall endeavour with utmost energy to attain our glory by preserving and developing our regional culture and civilisation by promoting Asiatic culture in general;

4. By preserving the brotherly spirit with the other east Asiatic nations, we shall serve our fatherland with the utmost strength and devotion for the almighty;

5. We shall strive with zeal for eternal world peace based on the hakka principle.1

The Committee had two co-secretaries, Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo and a Japanese. It held two plenary sessions on May 28-June 1 and July 10-17 and reached basic agreement concerning constitutional and economic questions.

During the closing stage of the war, there was a marked increase in the number of administrative posts held by Indonesians. Executive positions in both the central and provincial or local administrations were given to them and in general, they assumed all posts not directly connected with the war effort. In Sumatra and the Celebes there was a corresponding increase in political participation although the general level of activity remained below that of Java. Central and provincial councils, and advisory system and training institutes for government personnel were established and there was a steady increase in the number of Indonesians appointed to posts within the government and in public organisation.2

Special sessions of the central advisory council were held in September and November 1944, to deliberate a measure of cooperation with the Japanese in the defence of Indonesia. A statement

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by the Japanese commander in Sumatra indicated that the local administration there would keep in step with that of Java. In January, 1945, it was announced that a central advisory council would be established in Sumatra. On July 25, 1945, a committee for preparations of independence was established in Sumatra, headed by Mohd. Shafei, a founder of the national school of Indonesia in 1926 at Kaju Tanam, central Sumatra, chairman of the Sumatran central advisory council and Mr. Adingero, as secretary.1

The Japanese naval command at Macassar was much little interested in the national movement there. The Indonesian flag and national anthem, Indonesia raya, were prohibited by the Japanese authorities in Sulawesi. But the Japanese allowed the nationalist leaders such as Dr. Hatsu Lanpi and others to carry on a nationalistic propaganda and to invite Sukarno for a visit to Macassar. During Sukarno's visit the ban on national flag and national anthem was lifted and then the formational organisation was possible. In July Dr. Hatsu Lanpi, Andi Panperan, a prince of Bone and Andi Sultan, a prince of Bulukumba went to Jakarta to attend the independence conference in August 9.2

In February 1945, the naval administration established an advisory council (komon) of 30 members for south Borneo, the Celebes and the Lesser Sunda islands. Andi Panperan, a raja of Bone, was appointed the president of the council, Dr. Hatsu Lanpi, as vice-president, who was also chief Indonesian affairs of the Minsenhu (office of the Japanese governor). The naval command proceeded to appoint more Indonesians to administrative posts.3

When the Japanese emperor's broadcast of 15 August, announcing the decision of surrender, was published, Sukarno and

1. Shonan Shimbun, January 6, 1945 and March 26, 1945
2. Ibid. No.72, May, 18, 1945
3. Ibid, 22, February, and 30 May, 1945
Uatta were argued by the Indonesian youth corps which was in touch with underground movements fighting the Japanese imperialism, to proceed with the declaration of Indonesian independence. They on August 16, consulted with Admiral Koeda who agreed to present their case to the military authority. The latter was at first reluctant, pointing out that he had received no instructions from Tokyo. But his opposition was overcome at least to the point of taking no active measures against Sukarno's proceedings. He and his colleagues made hastily alteration to the draft constitution which they had drawn up in May and 17 August, the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed from Sukarno's house.1

CONSEQUENCES OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The outstanding development during the Japanese occupation was the tremendous increase in national consciousness and the will to political independence which it fostered. The harsh and arbitrary rule of the Japanese affected almost the entire population. In comparison Dutch rule had been moderate and was much less felt by most Indonesians. Japanese rule aroused a consciousness of common suffering and humiliation and a common resentment against the Japanese that enormously strengthened already existing national consciousness of Indonesia.2

The indirect rule of the Dutch administration in connection with the peasantry was succeeded by a direct and jarring instruction by the Japanese military administration which was slightly cushioned by partially operating through the putera and Java hokokai. As Sultan Shahrir has observed: During the 32 years of Japanese occupation, the foundation of rural society was shaken and undermined by forced regulations, kidnapping from homes from

from conscription as labourers abroad or as soldiers, compulsory surrender of harvest crops, compulsory planting of designed crops all imposed with limited arbitrariness.1

In many areas village societies were severely wrenched and forced to realign their structures because of the heavy demand of their labour supply made by the Japanese. The conscription of hundreds of thousands of their most able workers into the hetho, peta, etc. meant that traditional patterns of work and land apportion had to be altered. The cruelty of the Japanese, their exorbitant demands for labour and crops and their repayment in a worthless currency which would buy almost none of traditional needs such as cloth, agricultural implements, etc. aroused in most peasants an intense bitterness against them. It is true that because of the tremendous monetary inflation that development during the last two years of the Japanese occupation, the widespread monetary indebtedness of the peasantry was reduced in proportion to the value of this land. But this incidental result of Japanese rule could no longer be capitalised upon by most peasants because the severity of Japanese exactions left them on resource but to incur new debts from Chinese money lenders. By 1944 these money lenders had generally stopped advancing credit in kind (seed, cloth and agricultural implements) for payment in the increasingly inflated currency. Instead they agreed to make such advance only for a stipulated percentage of the peasant's crops. Thereby much of the benefit from the inflation bypassed the peasant.2

As a reaction to and in order to resist the heavy demands of the Japanese, the peasantry became much more politically

1. St. Shahrir: op. cit. p.11
2. Kahin: op. cit. pp.128
conscious than it had ever previously been. This and its
feeling against the Japanese was attested to by the wide-spread
and frequent local peasant revolts that accrued, particularly
during the last year of occupation. Indoctrination by the under
ground plus the skill of the nationalist leaders in the putera and
hokokai, particularly Sukarno and Hatta, who by radio and personal
appearance were given an almost unlimited contact with the peasantry
by the Japanese translated this political consciousness and will
for national independence such as peasantry had never previously
possessed. In particular this was due to the speeches of Sukarno,
broadcast as they are to almost every large village of Java and
Madura. His ability to communicate with the peasantry in terms and
concepts understandable to them allowed him to establish such
rapport with them that when the revolution broke it was primarily
to him that they looked for leadership.1

There were very few important posts in the Indonesian hands.
Native administrators were more advisers without real powers and
were strictly controlled by the Japanese higher authorities. But
their experiences in the during the occupation had great advantages
and usefulness in the formation of the republic of Indonesia. As
Dr. Hatta correctly pointed out: While under the Japanese, we laid
plans for achieving our independence and when on August 17, the last
Japanese surrendered and were unable to act effectively, we declared
our independence. There was no hindrance from the Japanese, the
reason being that all posts with the exception of few at the top
were in our hands. Then our civil servants and other officials
declared they would take orders only from the republic of Indonesia.

1. Ibid p.129
The Dutch who described themselves a democratic people, are blaming the Japanese for not making Indonesia independent impossible. Indeed, the Dutch should be covered with shame in that, the Japanese went further in recognising Indonesian independence than to the Democratic Dutch.1

By employing some important Indonesian leaders in the administration, the Japanese thought that they could control all Indonesian people and root out western influence. The Japanese were much impressed with the potent with the potentialities of education as a means of achieving their goal in the word of a member of the military administration of Singapore: The most profound of all means available to propaganda is education. This can be shaped and altered at will to suit the politic to be propaegandised. From early childhood the child's mind can be made to assimilate teachings which are conducive to the creation of a feeling of loyalty and to the awakening of a national consciousness.2

In view of this attitude, the Japanese established special schools for training of political leaders. This was in fact training for service in the government and from its graduates the occupation authorities hoped to secure reliable native officials for political affairs. These schools which were established in all of the occupied territories, varied in length of training and in general objectives. Some were very short and were intended for those already engaged in government work. For example, district heads in Java were brought to Jakarta for three weeks of study during which time they were given complete courses in Japanese history and language, oriental history and the development of the greater east Asia war as leaders in their respective districts. Others such as a special training institute

1. Ubani and associates: op.cit. p.188
in Jakarta gave many courses notably in such subjects as language
and history but also in military and defence training and agricul-
ture.1

The Muslims drew special attention. A permanent training
institute was set up at Jakarta to give three weeks courses to
kias and ulamas were brought there from all parts of Java. This sort
of training enabled the Japanese to pick out those who were willing
to cooperate with them and who were promising propagandists. More
over, it provided a method of checking of the effectiveness of their
own propaganda among the people because of the rapid turnover and
the important position of the kias and ulamas in the Indonesian
community.2

In 1944, shock brigades, Hizbullah numbering 50,000 were
organised among Muslim youth (11-25), largely the pupils of Muslim
schools and a special training centre was instituted for the leaders
of the organisation. The purpose of the Hizbullah was two fold. It
was a military organisation, trained as reserve for the home defence
army and it was also a religious vanguard to propagate Mohammadan
document and lead others in accomplishing the Muslims duty to exert
full energy for the protection of religion as well as Indonesian
Mohammadans, thus contributing to the successful construction of a
new world order in conformity with Allah's will.3

The most ambitions of the institute was the national
foundation training institute established in Java in April, 1945,
when plans for Indonesian independence were accelerated. Its purpose
was to train the men, upon whose shoulders will rest the responsi-
bility of conducting the affairs of Indonesia, for whether Indonesia

1. Programme in Java p.33
2. Exhibit: 1351
3. F.C.C. Radio report, No.61, December 22, 1944
depends after independence/entirely upon the quality of the personnel it has in its service. Asrama Indonesia merdeka (dormitory of free Indonesia) was founded in 1944 by a group of Japanese naval officers headed by a Vice Admiral Maeda. Its declared objective was to train leaders for an independent Indonesia and all leading nationalists were invited to give lectures.1

Most common were three to six months courses for native officials and promising students. Such was the one conducted by the Sumatra military administration which provided classes in special education, greater East Asia history, military administration, military training, increased production, Japanese language and other education training. Members were nominated by the heads of administration and after three months of classes were sent out to local districts to gain first hand experiences. At Macassar, the navy administration established a special middle school for 80 students whom it characterised as the ablest of the native youth of the region under navy control and the able sons of influential men of the capital and of the island. As the result of the training they were to become the leaders of the native inhabitants.2

The Japanese also organised the international students institute in Japan in order to attract more and more highly distinguished Asiatic students to make further study there. The institution itself was not an educational institution but acted as a clearing house for foreign students, providing them with living facilities, aid and advice and conducting language classes for their orientation. It provided a dependable leadership for the South East Asia. In 1942 many of foreign students returned home.

1. Ibid March 6, 1945, W.H. Elsbree: op. cit.p 104
2. Programme in Java, p.71
upon the advice of the Japanese. Of those who remained about 200 came from the countries of South East Asia, but this number was more than doubled by the arrival of students during the war. Of these 213 foreign students, 83 were Indonesians, 44 of Java, 16 of Sumatra, 11 of Celebes, 9 of Borneo and 3 of Ceram.1

These students were chosen directly by military administration or in collaboration with the local government where such existed. They were disappointed to find the number and type of schools, no technical knowledge and experience were given to them, while the Japanese history occupied a major role. The history taught was characterised by the students as largely mythology designed to strengthen pro-Japanese propaganda by representing the Japanese as a chosen subject and therefore historically destined to leadership in Asia.

Besides the military training schools at all level and national schools (primary and secondary) there were several technical and normal schools to train Indonesian teachers and then to replace the Dutch teachers. The Japanese had in consequence reduced the rate of illiteracy to a certain extent. According to statistics of the day, attendance at primary schools in Java was listed at 1200,000 in August 1943 and 1,000,000 in 1944 and attendance at National schools were as 650,000 in 1944 and at middle schools as 117,000 in 1945. In the areas of Celebes, Borneo and Ceram, the Japanese claimed 400,000 students as compared to less than 350,000 under the Dutch. They declared that the literacy in Java had risen from 7 to 34 % by 1944.2

1. Foreign students in Japan reported by the ministry of foreign affairs p.22
2. Programme in Java, p.275
The policy of Japan in Indonesia effected educated youth especially the secondary school and college students so remarkably. The forcing of Japanese language on Indonesian students coupled with their harsh and autocratic administration of the schools very quickly antagonised the students. Many of the more spirited of them were either forced to leave school because of their open resistance to the Japanese school authorities or resigned in protest. A number remained in school only to hide better the anti-Japanese underground activities that absorbed most of their time. Those who left school had to find out some sort of jobs to maintain their lives and found no time to pursue further studies. They established good contacts with the underground movements led by Shahrir and his colleagues such as Djohan Sjaruzah, Ruslan Abdul Gani (former foreign minister and present vice-chairman of the national council), Subadio, Dr. Subandrio (present foreign minister) and Dr. Sudarsono (former Indonesian ambassador to India). Finally the deep anti-imperialist, pro-communist imprint left upon these students attending the asrama schools. Hence they received thorough political education through these underground movements.1

The development and spread of the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia) during the Japanese occupation meant the strengthening of the national consciousness of the Indonesian people. Under the Japanese it became the official language for administration and for all above the third grade. Indonesian who had held the top-positions open to natives under the Dutch administration and who spoke flawless Dutch but little Indonesian were compelled to learn the latter in

1. Kahin: op. cit p.131
short order. The same was true of school teachers whose vehicle of instruction has been Dutch or Javanese, Sudanese of Madurese.1

Takdir Alishahbana observed: Because the Japanese were determined to enlist the energies of the entire Indonesian population in the war effort, they penetrated into the villages in the remotest backwater of the islands, using the Indonesian language as they went. Thus the language flourished and imbued the people with a feeling new to the most of them. As more and more of them learned to speak it freely, they became aware of a common bond. The Indonesian language became a symbol of national unity in opposition to effort of the Japanese ultimately to implant their own language and culture. By the time, therefore, of the Japanese surrender, the position of the Indonesian language had improved enormously both in strength and in prestige over not only Dutch but also the various regional languages of the archipelago which had no opportunity to develop during occupation.2

The study of Japanese was pressed on several fronts, by mass communication media, by special Japanese language training courses and by training in primary and secondary schools where it was made a compulsory subject. In spite of these efforts, however, there was little intensive development because of the superficial nature of the training courses (2 weeks or 1 month duration) and because the grounds toward whom the programme was chiefly directed, teachers and government officials, spearheaded the movement to develop a national language.3

In the meantime, Indonesian was developing intensively as well as extensively. One of the activities of the Java central

1. Kahin: op.cit. p.132
2. Takdir Alishahbana: The Indonesian language—by production of nationalism, in Pacific affairs, V.22 No.4 December 1949
3. Ubani B.A.: The Indonesian language Merdeka, no.2 December 15, 1947
Kahin: op.cit. p.132
council was to sponsor a course in Indonesian for young men entering the government service and such training schools as the Indonesian language course. The military organisations as well as the school were useful vehicles in spreading the language and Indonesian edition of the code and drill regulations of the defence army opened up a virtually new field to the language. An important contribution of this period was the work of the Indonesian language commission set up by the Japanese at the suggestion of the Indonesian in October, 1944, composed of political leaders such as Sukarno andetta as well as literary figures. The commission added to the language several thousand new terms, many of them in the technical field in which all the languages of this area were weak.1

The increased use of mass communication media by the Japanese was another good contribution to the progress of the Indonesian language. In the newspaper field, the disappearance of the Dutch press led to a sharp rise in the circulation of the Indonesian press, from 40,000 to at least 68,000 and the number of papers increased to the point where most towns of any size had an Indonesian paper. In addition to the newspapers there were several Indonesian periodicals, two of the most important being Peradjurit (warrior) published for the members of the home defence army and Sinar (light) published by the religious affairs department for the Muslim kias.2

The use of radio everywhere was very common. Anxious to reach the greatest possible number of the people in their propaganda campaign, the Japanese relied heavily on it to make contact with the local population. For example in 1944, the communication bureau of the Sumatra military administration began the task of providing

2. The press under the Japanese Merdeka, May 15, 1947
radios for publicity purposes, for every town and village throughout the island and announced that its goal was one radio for every 3000 inhabitants. Public radio stands were set up in schools, parks and at every important crossroads of the towns, so that a large audience, much of it hitherto untapped, was brought within the reach of the Japanese.2

As with the newspapers, Indonesian was the chief language employed though regional dialects were not neglected. In 1944, for example, the Surabaya radio station began daily programmes in Madurese, three hours in length, these programmes consisted of news, lectures, music and occasional speeches by prominent Madurese. The Japanese hailed this as the first regular programme in that language in history. Several of the newspapers also carried supplements in certain dialects.3

Therefore, the press and radio served as vehicles for the expansion of the Indonesian language and hence conveyed the nationalist message to a wider audience. The propaganda department with head-quarters in Jakarta was in direct contact with the case of nationalist movement which was most insistent on the need for the national unity. Speeches and statements by Sukarno, Hatta, Dewantra and other leaders were not confined to a smaller area of Java but were spread throughout Indonesia.4

There were numerous means of the propaganda campaign conducted by the Japanese authorities. There was for example oral publicity courses in which young Indonesians were trained in the substance and technique of propaganda in Jakarta and sent out to all parts of Java to enlighten the masses regarding the aims of the military administration.5

1. Programme in Sumatra p.15
2. Sularko: Music in Merdeka, January 31, 1948
3. Programme in Java p.82
4. Sularko: Literature in Merdeka, January 15, 1948
5. Shonen Shimbun, October, 26, 1944
Travelling theatrical groups which toured the islands patrolling stories and skits provided by the propaganda department proved an effective means of communication with the people and thanks to the support provided by the military administration, the theatre marked progress at least in its technical aspect during the occupation.

The Japanese adopted the devide and rule policy in Indonesia. They developed a policy of decentralised administration based on the so called historical and cultural difference. They intended to establish a federal government of Indonesia instead of unitary one. They therefore set up three separate administrative units: 1 Java and Madura administered by the 16th army with head-quarters at Jakarta; (2) Sumatra under the 25th army was combined with Malaya with headquarters at Singapore; 3. The Celebes, Borneo and the lesser Sunda islands were under navy jurisdiction with headquarters at Macassar.

The joint administration of Sumatra and Malaya was maintained on the ground of defence and economic policy. Sumatra's location so near to Singapore which was regarded as strategic and commercial centre for the whole south East Asia areas. The Japanese stressed the anthropological and linguistic ties between Sumatra and Malaya, ties which had been severed by Dutch and English imperialist activities. It was claimed that the economies of the two areas supplemented each other, that unification in such a field as transportation would provide more efficient service and the old rivalry over Singapore would end now that it would serve as a common centre for both. There was also an appeal to the local people of Sumatra. No longer they be the victims of the Dutch system which made Java the centre of administration and concealed the characteristic superiority of Sumatra.

1. Sularka: Literature in merdeka, January 15,1948
2. W.H Elsberry; op.cit. p.112
3. Programme in Sumatra p.8
In 1944, Sumatra was made a separate military administration. The Indonesians in Malaya in the meanwhile identified themselves with Indonesia and were given the opportunity to express their pro-Indonesian sentiment. In 1945, when the military administration of Sumatra was announced that it was taking measures to extend participation in administrative affairs to Sumatrans, the move was hailed in Java as an important step toward complete independence. This announcement was followed by the establishment of a Sumatra central advisory council under the chairmanship of Mohd Sjafei with its headquarters at Padang, central Sumatra. Its membership consisted of 30 persons; 15 elected and 15 appointed by the Japanese military administration. Mohd Sjafei was a nationalist leader and great educationist and declared that the council would help mould the thoughts of Indonesians as a whole and consolidate Indonesians as a united nation. In north Sumatra, provincial council was also formed in Medan consisting of 210 members, 90 were appointed by the Japanese military administration and 120 were elected from various districts.

In 1945, the Japanese allowed Sukarno and Hatta to carry appeal for independence and national unity outside Java. In June Hatta toured Borneo and returned with the report that the independence movement was active and the people especially upper and middle classes were thoroughly race conscious, giving full cooperation to the Japanese and preparing for Indonesian independence. Similarly Sukarno made tour of the Celebes where he urged the people to be ready for national liberation in cooperation with the Japanese government. This tour of leaders had strengthened the unbreakable

1. Shonan Shimbun, September 10, 1944
2. Shonan Shimbun: op. cit. p. 115
3. Shonan Shimbun, January 6, and March 26, 1945
bond between Java and other islands of Indonesia.

Contact between the areas of administration was further extended. There was some exchange of official personnel or shifting of officials of Java administration to other areas. When Sumatra was separated from Singapore, a sizeable group of Indonesian officials attached to the Java administration was transferred to Sumatra. The navy was more aloof in areas under its jurisdiction but in early 1944, Dr. Ratu Lanzi who had had a semi-official position in Jakarta, went to the Celebes to organise Indonesians for closer collaboration with Japan and prepare for national independence and national unity.

The Japanese had eliminated the provincial isolation and traditional ways of life of the Indonesian people. The old western tradition society disapproved and the severance of economic relations between the islands and outside world gave common sufferings to all sections of communities and hence led to breakdown of provincialism and sectarianism. This was however an important factor in building of a stronger unity among the vast population.

The neighbourhood associations (tonari kumi) were introduced throughout the co-prosperity sphere in 1944. All communities were divided into groups of 20 households (a kumi) and these in return formed apart of higher unit. The leader of the kumi appointed by higher body to his executive duties was trained by the Japanese in the task of explaining to the members of his unit the aims of the Japanese and the immediate measures which they involved for the everyday life of the population. Directives to guide him in this job were provided by the propaganda service. Besides its role as the basic

1. W.H. Isbrey: op.cit. p.116
2. Shonen Shim bun, June 14, 1944
3. Programme in Java, D. Woodman op.cit. 187
link in the transmission belt by means of which the military administration sought to explain its regulations to the people and to generate support for itself, the kumi were supposed to assume such civil duties as fire protection, air raid defence and police support. In the rural areas, their role in increasing food production was emphasised and they were also made the agent for distribution of feed and other supplies.1

The gumi became the lower unit of the hokokai (patriotic service organisation). The hokokai which replaced putera was regarded by the Japanese as an intermediary organ of the military administration for purpose of transmitting instructions to the people and securing their cooperation. Intended as a mass movement, the hokokai was concerned with such diverse subjects as sanitation instruction and character development, the elimination of western influences and cultivation of the spirit of thrift. Brigades were formed for labour service in the factories and on the land for all kinds of defence work to aid in the introduction of new techniques and corps. Both the hokokai and the gumi quickly disappeared after the Japanese capitulation.2

In Java shock brigades were formed every community as the vanguard to guide the activities of the hokokai. To provide leadership for these brigades, the Japanese selected persons with promising qualifications from all over Java and gave them a short training course at Jakarta after which they were sent out to organise local units.3. Village shock brigades had about 50 members, districts and provinces, larger units. In a speech delivered to them and to the provincial chiefs of the brigades in September 1944, Sukarno who

1. W.H.Elsbree: op.cit. p.127
2. Programme in Java, p.87
3. Programme in Java, p.91
served as chief of all shock brigades, referred to them as the native power of Java's total war effort which were a pre-requisite for translation Indonesian independence into reality and the director general of the military administration declared they were responsible for leading the mass to victory and independence.

In all of their activities, the hokokai and the brigades did not lose sight of nationalist objectives. Their code included the following articles; (1) We will firmly adhere to the principles for the union of the whole of Indonesian race into a single nation with a single language, (2) We will offer over all for the realisation and maintenance of independence for Indonesian, (3) We will defend with glory and honour our national flag of the red and white sun and our national song, Indonesia raja.

The youth corps (senendan) was set in 1943 on a vertical basis much like that of hokokai, although in some instances, sections were formed in the larger factories. Young men (14-25) were eligible to volunteers or to be drafted if volunteers did not appear in requisite number. A central training in the corps heavily emphasized military drill and physical education with Japanese language and music thrown in for good measures. Besides their military training, the members of the corps were often organised into labour battalions for both industrial and agricultural work and they were the chief source of man power for the home defence army. The latter, established by the Japanese in October, 1943, upon the request of Indonesians, was a military unit with its own officers and distinct for the Japanese army although under the command of the Japanese commander in chief. The officers themselves were trained, in

1. Ibid p.128
2. Exhibit, 1351
4. Ibid, p.103
special three months courses by Japanese instructions who staffed the centres. The army was organised on the basis of one battalion (about 1000 men) per province, a goal which was attained by the end of the war and was assigned various types of guard duty.1

The effect of the army as a unifying agent by producing a common experience to different social groups was described as follows by a Japanese training officer assigned to it. Since the army is made up of volunteers from all walks of life, it had resulted in the unification of the Indonesian social strata towards the realisation of its ideals. In fact, the Indonesian race had never seen such a huge comprehensive system to promote its own racial well-being. He added that the promise of independence had inspired the members of a full pledged modern, independent Indonesian army.2

Similarly a Sumatra defence army (piramun) was founded simultaneously with the one on Java and youth organisations there under the command of Chatib Sulaiman, Dahanl Djembek, etc and in the Celebes paralleled those on the central island.

Indonesian labour (romusha) was enormously affected during the Japanese occupation. The Japanese exploited ruthlessly the man power of Indonesia, especially the labour reservoir of Java. The Javanese served as coolie labour for the construction of defence works and means of communication and also were trained by the Japanese for more technical work in ship yards and factories. They were shipped by thousands to areas outside their land as local needs and the exigencies of the military situation dictated. Many of them were sent to Burma for the construction of the Burma and Isthmus rail roads, Siam and Malay for the building of roads, fortifications

1. Exhibit, 1851
2. Quoted in Shonan Shimbun, October 11, 1944
and other purposes. Some of them (400,000 persons) were employed in Lopa for the construction of railways between Paken Baru and Sawah Lunto in central Sumatra, fortifications, etc. and consequently 68000 men and 17000 women died of starvation. In 1943, thousands of Javanese labourers shipped to Borneo to work in local industries as timber and large number of them were sent to other areas of Indonesia.1

Though the grow-more food campaign was launched everywhere, yet food productions were still insufficient. Wages decreased and the payment was made in the Japanese inflated currency. Because of rapid rising cost of living they were supplemented by allowances, medals and words of promises by the Japanese. Labour legislation was passed only in negative measures of regimentation and outlawing of strikes. The Indonesian trade union and organisations were banned by the Japanese military administration.

Due to big number of the Chinese community in Indonesia, the Japanese established an office for Chinese affairs called Kakkio han (in Chinese hua chiuo pan) in Jakarta. This was directed by a single Japanese, one Toyoshima; the remainder of the staff were Chinese. In Jakarta every other Chinese settlement there was a hua chiao tsung hui (a Chinese association) which was responsible to the local Japanese commander and which through its headquarters in Jakarta was a channel for the communication of orders to the kakkio han.2 The Japanese used this organisation to cover their new regulations which include: 1. The re-introduction of the internal passport system which had been abolished by the Dutch; 2. the payment of a registration fee of $ 100 for Chinese males and $ 80 for Chinese females; (3) The

1. M.A. Azis: op. cit. p. 240
establishment of the Chinese guards (police) for protection of their community against possible violence on the part of the Indonesians; and (4) collection of money from the Chinese for war purposes. The Japanese had controlled all Chinese organisations and appointed their directors. A similar course was adopted with Eurasian, Arab and Indian communities during the occupation.¹

During the occupation, the Japanese put the screws on and showed their real iron hands. Then certain shops, theatres, restaurant hotels and many kinds of goods and foods were reserved for the Japanese. They robbed Java of rolling stock and shipped it abroad, they let plantations decline, they gobbled up thousands of cattle, they upset the rural economy by switching rice field to production of maize, cassava, they acted with increasingly cruelty and demoralise society and they caused not only a little distress by their failure to import cloth and rice. They made themselves feared and hated.²

At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 14, 1945, the number of Japanese (army, navy and civilian) in Java was approximately 70,000; in Sumatra, 75,000; Bali, 2271; Lombok 1500. In Borneo and the remaining islands of Indonesia the approximate number of Japanese was 344,000.

The total amount of ammunition in Java and Sumatra in the Japanese hands was considerably big number. In central and east Java alone there were over 38,000 bayonets, over 26,000 rifles, rifle ammunition over 11,000,000, pistol 3,646, light machine guns 604 with ammunition over 26,000,000 handgrenades over 95,000 and many other weapons including mortars, anti-tank guns and tanks. A certain amount of ammunition and weapons was taken by Indonesians from the Japanese.

1. V. Purcell: op. cit. Chap. XI, VIII, p. 551
2. David Wolf: op. cit. p. 2
through fighting. 1

The total number of Allied prisoners of war in Java and Sumatra was 25,000 persons, while the Dutch prisoners were 65,000 men. The Japanese concentrated the European civilian population in internment camps under Japanese, Korean and Indonesian (heihoko) guards with a Japanese camp commandant in command and over each camp. Men and boy were concentrated in separate camps, from the women, girls and children. The camps numbered about 12 in East Indonesia, 21 in Sumatra and 25 in Java. 2

Conditions in internment camps were very serious. Consistent under feeding was policy of the Japanese authorities. Although ample food supplies were available, they allowed to the interned civilians was inadequate to maintain normal health and by the summer of 1945, many of the men and women were lapsing into a condition of starvation. Food parcels sent from the U.S.A. were stopped by the Japanese and a parcel for one reason was finally released for 10 persons.

Overcrowding in the camps was extremely bad. At Macassar camp and Jakarta 3300 women were crowded into bamboo sheds of which the walls only partially erected. At Semarang, a kampung that had been declared unfit for native inhabitants was used as a camp for 10,000 women and children. In Tjideng camp, Jakarta 10,000 women and children lived in such overcrowded conditions that one small bungalow would accommodate 140 women and children with the bathroom as living and sleeping place for six persons. Dressing, cleaning, all had to be done outside as there was no room inside. 3

Sanitary conditions in the camps were appaling. In central Java the latrines consisted of holes in the ground covered with bamboo frames. The women internees were forced to clear these out every day.

1. Ibid, p.3
2. Ibid, p.5
3. Ibid, p.4
In some of the camps the sewage disposal completely broke down.

Malnutrition among the internees had begun as early as the summer of 1942. By the beginning of 1943, malnutrition diseases such as central neuritis and burning feet, became common and as the food became worse there were outbreaks of pellagra and beri-beri and very serious outbreaks of dysentery. The food value fell as low as 1000 cal. The daily death rate in the camps due to malnutrition averaged 33.

Men, women and children above the age of 11 were given almost every form of manual labour such as cleaning of the latrines and taking the contents out of the field to be used as manure etc. and were received all kinds of brutal punishment by the Japanese officers in charge. Red cross parcels were confiscated. No medical supplies were available to the sick. Communication between husbands and wives was almost non-existence and when it did come it took the form of a printed card with set Japanese phrase. By the summer of 1945 deaths in consequence had become so frequent.

Such were the conditions in which over a hundred thousand men, women and children lived for over three years of the Japanese occupation, with fear, hunger, disease and death as their fellow internees waiting for the day of liberation by the allied forces.

In Sulawesi, the Japanese introduced new methods of horticulture, even new vegetables such as the Japanese radish in the fertile lands of the Minahasa; they taught new methods of planting upland rice and produced two harvests in the year; they reclaimed land and increased production of flax and cotton; they imported Japanese cows and improved the stock; they built small ships and canal boats, they developed communications, building a new highway cutting across the equator and introducing the torendjas in central

1. Ibid
Sulawesi stream rollers and the preparation of asphalt; they started schools for training government officials, for post office work and agriculture and trained engineers to become the managers of Industrial concerns in Maceesar and sent batches of students to Japan. This was not philanthropic work; the Japanese increasingly needed food, raw materials and minerals as people in Sulawesi realised when they saw well-loaded ships leaving their harbour on route for Japan. But meanwhile, Indonesians were going experiences and even they were forced to bow three times to Hirohito starting their daily work. This shipment of products was followed by the peasant revolts in the country.1

Agricultural plantations and estates products numbering 900 estates in Java and 300 in Sumatra, decreased remarkably. Small scale industries sprang up throughout Indonesia. The number of industrial plants however increased from 339 including 51 sugar industries in 1942 to 549 in 1945. The textile sector got special attention. Industries were set for manufacture of agricultural implements, glass ware, nails etc. The Japanese took care of cotton planting for the textile industries. Cotton plantation was greatly expanded- 33000 hectares in 1943, 60,000 hectares in 1944 and 127,000 hectares in 1945. Though the planting was going well, yet production was very slow.2

Live stock also fell short, for the Japanese depended on the live stocks of Indonesia for the provision of meat to their occupation forces. Meat was also exported to Japan.

Fishery was badly affected by the Japanese occupation, because the Japanese demanded fish in the sea at a very low price (1/3 of the market prices) and shortage of fishing boats decrease from 25000

1. D. Woodman; op.cit. p.186
2. M.A. Aziz; op.cit. p.188
biats before the occupation of 21,000 during the occupation. The fish caught in the sea decreased also from about 70 million kg. in 1942-1943 to 45 million kg. in 1944-45. Forest products also declined considerably. But the mine products, exceedingly, for the Japanese started exploiting old mines and building new ones to meet their war needs. Because of unlimited issue of paper currency by the Japanese authority inflation was the order of the day. The Dutch guilders disappeared from circulation. Prices of goods rose up, while the wages of labourers and salaries of government civil servants were very low. The Japanese restricted the operation of Indonesian intersular shipping system. On the contrary, they encouraged to build small ships of 150 to 300 tons. To this end, they established ship yards and navigation colleges in different places in the country to train Indonesian youthsters in the matter of navigation.1

In 1942, the Japanese organized the su dinkai (women association) as the sole organisation permitted to exist and allowed some freedom of movement. Actually this su dinkai was the Japanese army's branch to attend to social work, such as the spinning of weaving yarn, tilling the fields, the mending the clothes of the Japanese soldiers etc., rather than real guidance and improvement of the lot of woman.2

The elimination of western influence was accompanied by a policy of Japanisation. Kerenseki, the Japanese calendar replaced the western one. So 1942 became 2602. The land of rising sun hence forth be called Nippon or Dai Nippon. The use of foreign names such as Japan was strongly prohibited. Dutch names of places, streets and squares were changed into Japanese and Indonesian. Java was named Djawa and Batavia, Djakarta, Harmonie plein and Oranje Boulevard.

1. Ibid p.192
2. Indonesia Review vol.1 No.2, Febr March, 1951, Jakarta p.125
respectively became Yamato basi and syoowa doori. Names of commercial concerns, trademarks, shops and even hotels were changed into Japanese; hotel de Indies for instance to be called myako boteru. The use of Japanese words was also introduced for the designation of official services, offices, their chiefs, schools and their teachers, so that the sun was no longer rose at 6 O'clock but only at 7-30 in the morning.\textsuperscript{1}

All public meetings and gatherings were commenced with the obligatory bow in the direction of Tokyo. All Japanese days of celebration such as the emperor's birthday (tentyosa - April 29), maji day (meijisetsu - Nov. 3), the empire's birthday (kigensetsu - February 11) were declared to be days of public rejoicings. The displays of any flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the above mentioned days of celebrations the Japanese had to be flown on all official and private buildings. New days of celebration were also introduced; the remembrance day of the out-break of the great Asiatic war (December 9); the remembrance of Japanese songs and games in the Japanese language were prescribed everywhere.\textsuperscript{2}

With the internment of European population, the Japanese put an end to the old social status enjoyed by them. The Europeans were deprived of their social position in the judicial branch of administration, in civil affairs and their right of bringing criminal cases before the superior courts of Justice. Their properties were placed under the control of takisan kanribu (enemy property administration bureau). Payment of pensions was discontinued. Their bank accounts were blocked. House rents were reduced to half. Their income taxes were greatly increased. Cars were requisitioned. The European schools were closed down. Dutch was no longer permitted to be used in correspondence. The censorship established by the Japanese ..................................................

\textsuperscript{1} Decree No. 15, April 29, 1942, A. Zorob: op.cit. p. 74
\textsuperscript{2} M. A. Eziz: op.cit. p. 175
allowed only Japanese and Indonesian to be written languages. The postal and telegraphic service followed this example and prohibited the use of Dutch and English in the telephonic communication. It was even forbidden to preach Dutch. Total war research institute had indeed prescribed that the use of western languages should be banished from the southern sea areas.1 The possession of books in western languages also constituted a punishable offence. All colonial monuments were removed. The statute of Coen, "an Hautz and even the lion of Waterloo disappeared from the public squares.1

The Japanese wanted Indonesia a territory of low wages and prices within the great Asiatic sphere and good supplier of raw materials for the Japanese industry. They, therefore, imposed a strict wage and price control and the lowering of the standard of living of the European population (the Indoese). The price control was enforced so severely that it established the solution for about a year in spite of the inflation which was the result of excessive consequence upon the stoppage of imports and production. The Japanese also attempted to absorb surplus money by means of donation to war funds, lotteries, encouraging Chinese remittance to Nanking and various saving campaigns. But the inflation continued to increase at an ever faster rate until the middle of 1945, the paper money only had about a 1/40 of its original purchasing value.2

Strict control over banking was a requisite for this policy. Until December 1941, there were three Japanese banks that were active in Indonesia; the Yokohama specie bank, the Taiwan bank and the Mitsui banks. After all the non-Japanese banks (in Java there

1. Ibid p.8  
2. Ibid p.189
were four Dutch banks, 2 English banks and some Chinese banks) had been immediately closed down their properties were confiscated and placed under the Japanese control in October 20, 1942. Their activities were taken over by the re-opened Yokohama specie bank and the Taiwan bank and the Mitsui bank in Surabaya. The people's credit bank which had largely Indonesian clients, was re-opened in October, 1942 in 70 places under the Japanese direction and a Japanese name (syomin ginko).¹

The branch offices of these Japanese banks were scattered all over Java and Sumatra. Above them, however, was the southern development bank (nampo kaibatsu kinko) which opened 8 branches on April 1, 1943 in Java and Sumatra and began to function as the circulation bank. Through this bank, credits were furnished only to those industries which were important for the Japanese war effort, while running credits, since before March 8, 1942, were gradually paid back. In Borneo and the Great West and Taiwan bank acted as the agent of nampo.²

The nampo bank was thus the instrument by which the government in Tokyo could control the whole economic life of Indonesia. It also served as a means of bringing the western property - industries and private goods under the control of the new Japanese owners. The sugar industries in 1942 and safes of western banks, jewels and precious metal also came in possession of the Japanese hands. The institution for the custody of enemy movable property (tekisan kanribu) was therefore left in the charge of only small amounts, which were deposited in the nampo as proceeds of the sale on behalf of the original owners. The administration of immovable property such as...

¹. Ibid p.191
². H.J. Manschot: op.cit. Aziz: op.cit. 192
ground, houses, etc. was conducted by the hudoosan kanri koodan, established by Osamu seirei no. 10 in October 20, 1942.

In the economic sphere, the various sections of the population were organised in corporations with obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects, and Japanese executives. To mention only a few: the corporation of textile producers (orimonokoogyo kumi in 1943), the united corporation of sugar merchants in Java (Djava satoo hambal renngoo kumia), the united corporation of retail shop-keepers (warong kumia renngookai, 1943) etc. The activities of these bodies often overlapped but from the Japanese viewpoint of highly policy, this set up had the advantage of enabling them to maintain effective control and of promoting Nipponese leadership.

The Japanese also intended to make a nation-wide massacre of the Indonesian political, social and religious leaders in order to make Indonesia second Korea. They prepared a plan called kipas hitam (black fan) and lis hitam (black list) under the direction of Hitoshi Shimizu, in which all the names of the Indonesian leaders were written and who were to be massacred immediately. The plan had been executed in the Great East Indonesia. In the island of Java and Sumatra it could not be carried out due to sudden downfall of the Japanese empire and the black list itself was burnt by a Korean officer in charge at Bukit Tinggi at the beginning of August 1945 who had profoundly sympathised with the Indonesian struggle for independence. This was an opportune event, otherwise all leaders of Indonesia would disappear altogether from the surface of the earth.

The Japanese immediately after the occupation of Java, abruptly put an end to all political activity. Degree no. 2 of the

1. Ibid
2. Ibid
3. A Secret report in Bukit Tinggi, 1945
of the commander of the 16th army in March 8, 1942, banned all meetings, associations, publications and listening to foreign broadcasts and degree no.3 of March 20, 1942, announced that to discuss, engage in activities, encourage or make propaganda concerning the organisation and structure of government would be considered illegal. By degree no.23 of July 15, 1942, this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained but also associations were ordered to be dissolved. As a result of prohibitive regulations several Indonesian leaders were arrested in April, 1942, prohibition was not only explicitly maintained but also associations were ordered to be dissolved. As a result of prohibitive regulations several Indonesian leaders were arrested in April, 1942. Later in December 1942, and in January 1943, severe action on a much larger scale was taken by the kemp-etsi against the suspected underground activities of Indonesians. Capital punishment was resorted to as the best method of suppressing anything that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. If the prisoners escaped this fate in the first instance, death still awaited them inside the prison wall, many confined till the liberation in 1945.

The Japanese realised, however, that an outlet must be created for absorbing the political tensions and passions. Within 2 months after all political activity had been prohibited, a people's movement was initiated in April 29, 1942. The A.A.A. movement (pergerakan 3 A) led by K.Samsuddin was intended to unite all political forces into one powerful movement, directed towards the elimination of pernicious western influences which had corrupted the eastern soul and the indoctrination of the entire population of the archipelago with the ideas of Asia for the Asians and Japan the mother of Asia. The

1. Document no.2750, pp.13, 55-56; M.A.Aziz: op.cit. p.208
ultimate object of this movement was to mobilise Indonesian support for Japan's war effort and the greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere with Indonesia as a part. The A.A.A. movement stood for three slogans: Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia and Japan the light of Asia. The Japanese seemed to have launched this campaign for the glorification of Japan with the apparent belief that the liberated Indonesian people would willingly accept their all-powerful leadership without any real opposition and that they would be able to attain their objectives without having to make concessions to Indonesian nationalism.

Mr. Van Mook, former Dutch G.G. in Indonesia summarised the effects of the Japanese occupation in the following words: The official and civil servants mostly swallowed their discontent. They were more and more impoverished by inflation; they were pushed back to lower posts by an increasing number of Japanese officials. Many of them were genuinely concerned about the slow ruination of their once excellent services; others gave up and retired till better days. Quite number of incompetent upstarts filled their places.

Those who suffered more were the common people. Japanese economy was frightful, Japanese communication a force. The country has been sub-divided from the beginning into three almost water-tight compartments; two Java and Sumatra under army commanders and a third the rest under the navy. But as food and other commodities became scarce even the traffic between districts and islands was prohibited in order to facilitate pillaging by the military. The system of finance consisted of a number of printing presses, turning out crude government notes; inflation acquired disastrous proportions.

1. W.Flisbree: op.cit. p.79; K.A. Aziz; op.cit. p.299
Trade and export production were dead because Indonesia was cut off from the world markets and Japan, her shipping going the blows of allied submarines, preferred to fetch the products she needed from Indo-China, a thousands mile nearer home. She remained interested in only in oil, nickel and bauxite. Estates and factories rusted and decayed; plantations were uprooted to increase the food acreage; means of communications that broke down were no longer repaired; the import goods were gone or hoarded; clothing became almost unobtainable. Kain tarap, gunny and tikar pandan were commonly used in the country side. This meant un-employment for hundreds of thousands; it meant poverty, poverty for all but a few henchmen of the Japanese and a number of black marketeers (saudagar kilat).

In short, the fascistic and imperialistic political economic and cultural as well as social consequences of the Japanese occupation during the last 3½ years were correctly summarised by Sultan shahrir in his political manifesto in 1945 as follows:

When the Netherlands Indies government surrendered to the Japanese in Bandung in March, 1942, our unarmed population fell prey to harshness and cruelty of Japanese militarism. For 3½ years our people were bent under a cruelty which they had never before experienced throughout the last several decades of Netherlands colonial rule. Our people were treated as worthless material to be wasted in the process of war. From the law lay stations of those who were forced to accept compulsory labour and slavery and whose crops were stolen. To the intellectuals who were forced to prepare lies, the grip of Japanese militarism was universally felt. For this Dutch imperialism is responsible in that it left our 70,000,000 people to

1. Dr. Van Hook: op. cit. p. 148
the mercies of Japanese militarism without any means of protecting themselves since they had never been entrusted with fire-arms, or with the education necessary to use them.

A new realisation was born in our people, a national feeling that was sharper than ever before. This feeling was also sharpened by the Japanese propaganda for Pan Asianism. Later attempts by the Japanese to suppress the nationalist movement were to no avail. Our national feeling also made itself felt toward the Japanese in illegal ways as well as openly through sabotage and other ways as he proved from the fact that thousands of our movement's adherent were sentenced, tortured and prosecuted. The revolt of Tasikmalaya, Indramaju, Blitar on Sumatra, West Borneo and many other places were best testimony to these facts.

Others of our nationalists tried to show their nationalism through legal ways and had of course to cooperate with the Japanese to march and shout with them in their ranks. How strong nationalism actually was, is proved by those who were working with the Japanese as they continued to support their democratic ideas, even though they were forced to march in the Japanese totalitarian ranks.

During 3½ years of the Japanese occupation the whole state organisation which had been controlled by the Dutch, was handled by the Indonesians under the authority of Japanese. Our nation acquired greater confidence and far national awareness grew towards the Japanese as towards other nations.

The millions of people lost during the occupation, and the miseries under which the rest of the population lived must be attributed to the inadequate preparation which we were given by the Dutch. Because of these facts the Dutch at not the moral right to
to accuse us of having cooperated with Japanese.1

A COMMONWEALTH FOR INDONESIA

The Netherlands colonial government had been evacuated a few days before the capitulation of Java to the Japanese forces in 1942. It was headed by Lt. G. G. Van Mook with its head-quarters in Campcolumbia, Barishane, Australia. It had to maintain agencies and liaisons in London, United States (Washington and New York), with General Mac Arthus (Hollandi, Leyte and Manila), with Admiral Mountbatten (New Delhi and Kandy) with the headquarters of the Australian army and navy and of the eastern fleet (Melbourne and Colombo) and in India and South Africa. It had to take care of considerable Indonesian assets, distressed cargoes and lend-leases affairs. It had to provide civil affairs detachments and some troops for Dutch New Guinea, Morotai, Tarakan and Balik Papen as they were invaded by the allied forces; it had to do the advance planning and to make whatever purchase were possible for the so-called rehabilitation and exploitation of Indonesia.2

The Netherlands government in exile in London directed the Indonesian international relations and planned the political future of Indonesia. The plan provided for the formation of a Netherlands Commonwealth, consisting of the kingdom of the Netherlands Commonwealth, consisting of the kingdom of the Netherlands and Indonesia as well as the Dutch West Indies, based on absolute equality, fraternity, mutual cooperation and mutual understanding and goodwill. The complete scheme of the future Indonesian Politics was broadcast from London by Queen Wilhelmina on December 6, 1942 as follows:

1. Sultan Shahrir’s political manifesto, Jakarta, November 1, 1945
2. Van Mook: op.cit. p.180
it is my intention after the liberation to create occasion for a joint consultation about the structure of the kingdom, and its parts in order to adopt to the changed circumstances. The conferences of the entire kingdom which will be convoked for this purpose, has been further outlined in a government declaration of January 27, 1942. The preparation of this conference in which prominent representatives of the three overseas parts of the kingdom will be united with those of the Netherlands at a round table, had already begun in Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao, the parts of the kingdom which they still enjoyed their freedom. Especially in Indonesia, detailed material had been collected for this purpose and was transmitted to me in December 1942, by the G.G. The battle of Indonesia disrupted these promising preparations.

Although it is beyond doubt that a political reconstruction of the kingdom as a whole and of the Netherlands and the overseas territories as its parts is a natural evolution, it would be neither right nor possible to define its precise form at this moment. I realise that much which is great and good is growing in the Netherlands despite the pressure of the occupation; I know that this is the case in Indonesia where our unity is fortified by common suffering. These developing ideas can only be shaped in free consultation in which both parts of the kingdom will want to take cognisance of each others opinions. Moreover, the population of the Netherlands and of Indonesia has confined through its suffering and its resistance, its right to participate in the decision regarding the form of our responsibility as a nation towards themselves and one another.

I am convinced and history as well as reports from the

1. Ibid.
occupation territories confirm me in this, that after the war it will be possible to reconstruct the kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the consummation of all that has been developed in the past. I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can continue to exist which are not supported by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of citizenship. I know that the Netherlands more than ever feel their responsibility for the vigorous growth of the overseas territories and that the Indonesian recognise in the ever-increasing collaboration the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness. The war years have proved that both people possess the will and ability for the harmonious and voluntary cooperation.

A political unity which rests in the this foundation moves far towards a realisation of the purpose for which the United Nations are fighting as it has been embodied, for instance in the Atlantic charter and with which we could instantly agree because it contains our own conception of freedom and justice for which we have sacrificed blood and possession in the course of our history. I visualise without anticipating the recommendations of the future conference that they will be directed towards a common-wealth in which the Netherlands Indonesia, Suriname and Curacao will participate with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each regarding its internal affairs but the readiness to render mutual assistance.

It is my opinion that such a combination of independence and collaboration can give the kingdom and its parts the strength to carry fully their responsibility both internally and externally. This would leave no room for discrimination according to race or nationality; only the ability of the individual citizens and the needs of the

1. ibid p.181
various groups of the population will determine the policy of the government.1

As soon as the southern part of the Netherlands was liberated in September-October, 1944, call was issued for volunteers to serve in the armed forces both against Germany and against Japan. It met with an enthusiastic response. Recruiting for civilian assistance in Indonesia also brought most satisfactory result.

In order to restore the Dutch imperialism and colonialism in Indonesia on August 24, 1945, the British and the United States governments concluded the civil affairs agreement with the Dutch government which run among other things as follows:-

1. In area affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the supreme allied commander, to the extent necessary by the military situation, de facto possess full authority to take all necessary measures. During the phase, in order to assist the supreme allied commander in the exercise of his authority, the Netherlands government will attach to his forces sufficient Netherlands Indies civil affairs officers to conduct the administration of liberated Indonesian territory under the general control of the military commander of the allied forces in the territory in question.

The Netherlands Indies civil affairs will whenever possible be employed in all matters concerning the administration of the civilian population including the control of such subjects for the exploitation of the resources of liberated Indonesian territory as military necessity may require during first phase. It is understood that the Netherlands Indies civil affairs officers will be fully competent to take all necessary measures.

1. This text was published by the Netherlands information bureau, New York, 1945; H.R. Isaacs: op.cit. pp. 189-192
2. It is agreed that the Netherlands Indies government will resume as rapidly as practical full responsibility for the civil administration of liberated Indonesian territory. The Supreme allied commander will as soon and as fully as the military situation in his judgement permits, notify the Lt. gen. of the extent to which responsibility for the civil administration would be resumed.

3. The Netherlands Indies government and the Netherlands Indies administrative and judicial services will be re-established as rapidly as possible. Appointments in the Netherlands Indies administrative and judicial service will be made by the competent Netherlands or Netherlands Indies authorities in accordance with Netherlands Indies law.

**COOPERATION AND NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENTS**

The Nazi aggression in Europe and the Japanese fascist invasion of China found an immediate reaction in Indonesia. The whole Indonesian national movement became anti-fascists. The leftists especially were clear in their political attitude. The anti-Japanese attitude of the Surebye section of the Gerindö formed in 1937 in Jakarta under the leadership of Amir Sjarifuddin, former prime minister of Indonesia and Dr. A.K. Gani, was very clear and attracted much attention.

Indonesian newspapers were filled with anti-fascist articles every day. Dr. Sukarno and Dr. Hatta's articles written from their place of internment, strengthened the common anti-fascist feelings. Even as early as 1935, Sukarno warned against the spread of Japanese imperialism in the Pacific and demanded that the Indonesians should be trained and armed to defend their country. In 1940, when Holland was attacked by Germany, he pledged Indonesian's support for Holland in its fighting against enslavement and repeated his warning against a Japanese attack on Indonesia.
Before the Japanese has been the last warning of Dr. Sutomo to his followers. The leftist Gerindo party neatly labelled the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere a fabrication of and for Japanese fascists and in its statement of August 4, 1941 it said the greater East Asia idea as propagated by the Japanese is exclusively designed to deprive other peoples of their freedom by Japanese domination as happened in Manchukuo, China and Indo-China.

On March 8, 1944, the Netherlands government in Australia announced to the world inter alia the Japanese whenever they have aroused extreme hatred in the hearts of the people and the desire to be free from their yoke. This was absolutely true. The Japanese on the other hand, tried in their broadcasts to announce that the Indonesian people wanted to cooperate with them and the Indonesian leaders have discussed many problems inside and outside advisory council made in Japan. Notwithstanding this recently the Japanese considered it essential to dissolve the high central council.

Dr. Sukarno along with other colleagues and leaders chose to cooperate with the Japanese only to turn the battle against them because he knew very well that the Japanese imperialism was no better than the Dutch. We had hated Japanese, said Sukarno, and all totalitarian system but I admit we are so determined about our independence that we were ready to accept it even from dirty hands.

The Times correspondent reported his interview with Sukarno said, Indonesians, however were anti-Japa and from the very beginning nationalist leaders had strived to obtain independents. A formal promise of independence had only been exacted in September last, 1944, by which time the Japs had resigned themselves to losing

1. Ubeni and Associates: op.cit. p.106
parts of the co-prosperity sphere but equivocation and delay had continued right to the time of Japanese surrender. It was only after surrender that independent Indonesian republic could be proclaimed.1

In 1943 Sukarno went to Tokyo to offer thanks at the Yasukuni Shrine to the spirits of the Japanese who fell in the course of Indonesia's liberation. He was decorated by Hiranoto with the order of sacred treasure. He might have made statements against allies under the Japanese pressure and threat. He then faced the alternative of ostensibly collaborating with the Japanese and secretly organising underground resistance movement.2

The Dutch colonial power accused Sukarno as un-principled pro-Japanese collaborator. In early 1944, substantially the same charge was made by the Soviet spokesmen, it being applied by them to Hatta as well. In September, 1945, Dr. Van Mook declared that the republic of Indonesia was made in Japan. He advised Admiral Mountbatten the supreme allied commander for South East Asia, it is obvious that the republican movement is a restricted one and that its pattern is a dictatorship after the Japanese model. It is to be seriously doubted that the puppet government had much of a following and it is of particular importance that this extremist organisation not be recognised in any way directly or indirectly since it is simply a Japanese creation.3

It was true that Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur and Dewantara and other leaders cooperated with the Japanese. Public opinion in Indonesia regarded them not as having been pro-Japanese but as the leaders who cheated the Japanese by political cunning and who brought the republic to life as a result.

1. Ibid p.127
2. Van Mook: op. cit. p.104
3. D. Wolf: op. cit. p.10
Dr. Van Mook finally withdrew his early hasty appraisal of the republican leaders by admitting at Pangkal Pinang conference in October, 1946. Our knowledge of the happenings and conditions in the occupied territory of Indonesia was deficient and incomplete during the war. This was particularly in respect to Java and Sumatra. Misled by outward appearances, we originally reported the republic too much as a Japanese invention and when in October and November the movement developed with the speed of tropical growth into a sort of popular revolt comparable to the September days of 1792 in the French revolution, it was difficult to gauge properly the inherent lasting power of this phenomenon. When we look back into history, it is apparent that the republic forces were at work which signified more and were rooted deeper than a more surge of terrorism. Regarding Sukarno, Van Mook again stated in 1948, from documents later discovered it is very clear that in all his objectionable activities he (Sukarno) was always governed by the objective of an independent Indonesia.

Shahrir who was an anti-Japanese regarded the Japanese as pure fascists and felt that we must use the most subtle counter methods to get round them such as appearance of collaboration. Both Sukarno and Hatta, he continued, agreed to do everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resistance. It was expected, he said, that the Japanese would attempt to capitalise on Sukarno's popularity for propaganda purposes and the three agreed that the political concessions from the Japanese must be pressed for in return.

1. St. Sjahrir: op.cit. p.242
common cause with those Indonesians who want to work for the
Japanese because of either material designs or political sympathies.
Hatta accepted his position under the Japanese at the behest of
Sjarir's underground group. By then he was given the tasks of secur-
ing funds and facilitating the travel of its members. According to
Sjarir he acquitted himself of those tasks capably and faithfully.
He also received our reports and warned us when heard something was
brewing on the Japanese side. I heard from him everything that took
place among the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians.1

Through two exceptionally skillful underground workers at first
Djohan Sjaruzah and later Dr. Abdul Halim, Hatta was able throughout
the Japanese occupation to keep in contact with principal Indonesian
underground organisations.

Hatta because of his relationship with the underground, had
come to be considered to be dangerous by the Japanese authorities in
Java. It was their plan that for safety's sake he be interned upon
arriving in Japan and not allowed to return. For there he was assumed
to be member of the commission of thanks and along with Sukarno
and Ki Barus was presented a decoration making him free from arrest
by the Kempetai and then returned to Java with others in November, 1943.

Non-collaborationists carried on the resistance movement
against the Japanese. The anti-Japanese underground organisation
headed by Amir Sjarifuddin was established in part under the Nether-
lands East Indies aepicizes a few week before the Japanese landed. The
government supplied 25,000 guilders for this purpose, it was being
given to Sjarifuddin by Dr. Charles Vander Plas. This enrolled various

1. Ibid p. 246
people of strong anti-fascist feeling, the most enormous among whom were the members of the underground communist party (the illegal P.K.I.) contact with them being established by Sjarifuddin. During the first month of the Japanese occupation many of its members were caught and under torture gave the names of others in the organisation. Consequently in 1943, Sjarifuddin and some 300 leaders were arrested by the kempetai (Japanese secret police) and on February 29, 1944, he and more recently apprehended leaders were sentenced to death. Sukarno's intervention was responsible for commuting Sjarifuddin's sentence to life imprisonment, but 4 of the other arrested leaders—Famudji, Sukajat, Abdul Aziz and Abdurahim—were executed and 8 other jailed.1

Sutan Sjahrir also organised underground resistance movement. He went to Tjipanas in the mountains of West Java ostensibly to cultivate pine-apples but actually planned for future struggle. He and his colleagues established branches in Jakarata, Cheribon, Semarang, and Surabaya. All of which secured full support from the educated youths and intelligentsia. In the vicinity of Cheribon under the leadership of Dr. Sudarsono, it established a wide network of efficiently functioning peasant cooperatives, sanctioned by the Japanese and behind this facade gradually organised integrated but intensive revolutionary oriented peasant base. Consequently, the work of Sjahrir's growing of bands of followers roused the curiosity of the Japanese police, many were arrested and imprisoned. The long arm of the police was probing very close to Sjahrir when the war abruptly ended.2

1. Ubani and associates; op. cit. p. 121 and Amesson; Govt. and nationalism in S.E.A. New York, 1942, p. 197
2. Kahin; op. cit. pp. 112-113
The Indonesian communists who had a representative in the Dutch parliament, Roetum Effendi, declared that they were prepared to defend Indonesia against the Japanese fascism and upon the announcement of Japan's alignment with the Axis the anti-Japanese demonstrations took place throughout Indonesia. In district Biruen in 1943 orthodox and fanatic religious organised a revolt against the Japanese forces. Many other uprisings occurred in Sipaharno, Indramayu, Bliter, Sumatra and West Borneo. As a result, Dr. Soesila and 200 Indonesian intellectuals who refused to collaborate were beheaded by the Japs.1

When they came down to Indonesia in 1942, the Indonesian students were deadly against the Japanese fascism and colonialism. They organised the badan perwakilan peladjar (council of the Indonesian students). This organisation tried to help those students who were stranded because of the break of communications with parents and supporters. Jobs were found for them in business centres or in educational institutions. An asrama or hostel was founded where the students were given political training in order to make them conscious of the national problem that was facing them.

The persatuan mahasiswa (student union) was made up of the university students in Jakarta. The Indonesian students used every opportunity to fight the Japanese and often resorted to strikes and boycotts and spread anti-Japanese revolutionary sentiments among the masses. They had maintained close relations with Ukarni and Sjahrir's underground movements. As a result, the Japanese arrested their leaders. Then soon strike after strike took place and ruthlessness prevailed in the secondary schools. The Jakarta medical college was

1. R. Emerson: op.cit. p.179
responsible for all these patriotic actions. The students who joined the home guard (tentara prembela tanah air) sponsored by the Japanese later organised revolts and mutinies against the Japs in Bliter and in other places. 1

Another small nucleus of underground strength was headed by Sukarni and included among its leaders Adam Malik, Pandu Wiwiguna, Chairul Saleh and Moruto Mitmihardjo. Through Maruto it maintained fairly contact liaison with Sjahrir's group. There were also numerous small groups of young intellectuals and students who formed study clubs, such as headed by Mohd. Natsir and Sjafruddin Fawirane-gara, former premiers of the Republic, which operated partly under-ground and above and were important in disseminating anti-Japanese nationalist idea and in collecting information which they passed on to the much larger organisation.2

Djohan Sjaruzah, while serving as Hatta's secretary in 1942-43 maintained contact with all principal underground movements and was for a time their chief means of liaison. He had particularly close relations with the underground of Sjahrir and according to Adam Malik was a time co-chairman with Sukarni of the latter groups. In 1943 he along with his colleagues organised undergrounds among the youth of Surabaya and the oil workers of Tjepu.

Infiltration of the peta and the Japanese sponsored youth organisations was the chief objective of the underground organisations. The objective of this infiltration was two fold: 1. To establish as much control as possible within the units of these organisations through reliable men holding key positions and 2. To influence their membership in an anti-Japanese and pro-allied direction, especially to prepare them to rise against the Japanese whenever the expected

1. Merdeka, No.27, 1948, New-Delhi, p16
2. Adam Malik: Sedjarah dan Perdjuangan berkenan dg. prok Lamasi Indonesia merdeMka, Jakarta 1947, p.15
the Japanese in mid-1944 established the anakutan movement, consisting of educated young men of 20 to 35. Sukarno and Chairul Saleh were made to lead the Jakarta branch of the anakutan. Meanwhile, the House of Councilor and the leader of the ajihrir's group in Surabaya, was forced to become chairman of the anakutan branch there. Just to serve on its Surabaya board of 20 were a number of influential leaders such as autoke (Bung Tomo) former minister for youths, Kusin, and Prisuman occupied leading roles in the underground.

1. Kisin: op. cit. p.113
2. Ibid: p.114
activity. However, the work of these men within the anekatm muda generally resulted in making its rank and file members more anti-Japanese and more pro-allied as well as conscious of their national emancipation.1

The Peta revolt in Blitar was followed by an uprising against the Japanese at Indramayu in the middle of 1944. In June 1945, the demand of the Indonesian students for independence was more stronger and the anti-Japanese sentiment was enormous. The A.P.I. movement was so active in organising revolts against the Japanese forces.2

Ostensibly the madjelis Islam Tinggi (the Supreme council of Islam) formed in 1942 at Bukit Tinggi, central Sumatra, under the presidentialship of Shah Sulaiman Arresuli, cooperated with the Japanese authority but it actually worked to spread the spirit of holy war against the dis-believers (the Japanese) and for this end it organised Muslim youth organisations such as Hizbullah, lashkar rakijat. H. Karim Amerullah, founder of the Islamic modernism in central Sumatra, had been adopting a policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch and Japanese authorities. Because of this, he was interned by the Dutch in 1939 and passed away in 1943 in Java. Although the Pusa (All Achin Ulama League) first welcomed and cooperated with the Japanese, but later on the sentiment of anti-Japanese was developed, for the Japanese, according to them were violating their religion and customs. As a result, many revolts against the Japanese took place in several places.3

In Australia, the Indonesian nationalists who sought shelter there along with political exiles who escaped from their prisons, joined the army, navy and air force of the Dutch government to fight side by side against the Japanese fascism and imperialism.4

1. Kahin: op.cit. 112
2. Ibid: p.115
3. Atjeh 1000 tahun
In New Guinea very many people took up arms and fought against the Japanese either openly in the armies of the allied powers or members of the remarkable wide-spread and effective resistance movement. Recruiting to these movements was encouraged by broadcasts and by leaflets spread from the air, promising a higher standard of living after the defeat of invader. The resistance and guerilla groups were so successful that the whole coast of Irian between Manokawari and Mandamen was clear of Japanese troops by the end of 1944.

One of the leaders of the resistance movement in New Guinea was Silas Papare, an Irian and a member of the Indonesian parliament and leader of the partai kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian. Mr. Papare as well leading resistance groups acted as guide during allied landings in Irian and as a centre for collection of information. He fought with the American army for 8 months and then joined the Australians for the attack on Morotai in February, 1945. For his activities during the war, Mr. Papare was decorated by the allies.

In Kalimantan (Borneo) the people revolted against the Japanese authorities. When the Japanese troops landed in Pontianak, they blazed the slogan Asia for the Asians. At that time there existed 13 organisations, social, political, and religious. Their leaders met in secret and decided to watch events with a view to winning their independence. Local sultan joined the movement. Within a month the Japanese ordered the liquidation of P.A.h.i.D.k. and other political parties. The leaders met again in secret and decided on their programme of action. The plan was to have a legal front which was named Nissinkai and the former president of Parindra, Not Sudjono became its president. This too was soon liquidated. Another organisatic called Pemuda Mohammadiah was then formed, but the people were still same.

1. West Irian and the world issued by ministry of foreign affairs, Jakarta, 1954, p.25
Meanwhile in southeast Borneo with Banjarmasin as its centre, a similar resistance group was formed and its leader, Dr. Susilo, made contact with Pontianak and together they formed a general revolt. But the Japanese discovered their plans in southeast Borneo and Dr. Susilo and his friends were arrested and executed. In Pontianak preparations were continued; arms and ammunition were procured for the fighting groups called sukarelas and plans made for a revolt on December 8, 1943, to begin with an attack on the head-quarters of the kempetai. The plan also included arrangement for the future administration of the island and a provisional ministry was selected. These plans were never carried out because the Japanese discovered them. Arrests began with 12 sultans who were meeting in Pontianak. A reign of terror followed and thousands were carried off in trucks-wagons of hell to the marches nearby and executed in butcher. It was not until the summer of that year the Japanese paper, Borneo Shimbun, announced the success of the kempetai in destroying the underground movement. In the course of several months they had executed most of the leaders and 20,000 people had been rounded from the village and shot.

In Minado, 7 men were executed in 1943 for plotting against the government and all wireless sets were confiscated. This was followed by an espionage week. On the first day, July 12, 1942, the Japanese went round in cars to distribute pamphlets telling the people how to disable spies in their work. The second day, students in Japanese employment distributed propaganda in the art of counter-espionage against the U.K., U.S.A. and Holland. Day 3 an occasion for a 70 minute speech by a Japanese official, the next day songs were provided celebrating the destruction of spies and on the 7th day, music was

1. Dorothy Woodman: op.cit. p.186
used to impress the sceptical population. Bands played spiritual music to increase the spirit of the people to destroy the spies of U.K., U.S.A. and Holland.1

1. Ibid p.188
CHAPTER IV

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 1945-1950

Just after the capitulation of the Japanese to the allied forces in 1945, the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed by Sukarno-Hatta on August 17, 1945. The proclamation was supported by all youth organisations, underground movements, former civil servants, police, army except the royal Ambonese and the vast mass of the population. On August 19, Sukarno and Hatta addressed a mass meeting at the central part of Jakarta, although the meeting was hampered by the Japanese authority. The Japanese also ordered the disbandment of peta, hai ho and all other armed Indonesian organisations.

As a result, peta units in Java resisted the Japanese orders to disarm, kept their arms, clashed with the Japanese and disarmed Japanese units and took over their weapons and controlled government official buildings, post and telegraph offices, air-fields and harbours as well as some big cities. The Indonesian flag was flown from all public buildings. The independence announcements and patriotic propaganda of national revolution with different slogans were conducted by the youth organisations and leaders throughout Indonesia. The cry merdeka (freedom), the words bung and saudara (brother) were heard everywhere, as a symbol of national revolution and fraternal content all over the country.

At first meeting on August 17, 1945, the independence preparation committee added 6 people to its membership, Subardjo, Kasuma Singodimadjo, Sukarno, Wikana and Chairul Saleh. The expanded committee elected Sukarno and Hatta respectively president and vice-president of the republic of Indonesia. It appointed a commission of 7- Sukarno, Hatta, Prof. Supomo, Subardjo, Otto, Iskander Dina, Mr. Mohd Yamin, and Mr. Wamosegoro - to make necessary and final
changes in the national constitution already written in July before the Japanese capitulation. Within a week of the final draft of the Indonesian constitution was completed.  

The provisional constitution introduced a presidential form of government headed by Sukarno. The first cabinet of the republic (August 31, 1945 - November 14, 1945) consisted of 16 ministers such as Dr. Ahmad Subardjo (minister of foreign affairs), L.A.A.W. Kusuma (home minister), Prof. Supomo (minister of justice), Dr. Samsi (finance minister), Sjafruddin (information minister) and so on.  

On August 29, the independence preparatory committee was dissolved by Sukarno and its place was established the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or K.N.I.P. (central Indonesian national committee), consisting 235 members. This was to serve solely as an advisory body to the president and his cabinet, undertaking no legislative function. To this new body Sukarno, assisted in his selection by Hatta, appointed 135 members including those of the independence preparatory committee, under the chairmanship of Sutan Soehir.  

By a decree of the preparatory committee on August 19, Indonesia had been divided into 8 provinces: West Java, middle Java, East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes), Maluku (the Moluccas) and Sunda Ketjil (the Lesser Sunda). Sukarno appointed a governor for each province from among its population and the K.N.I.P. gave mandates to one of its own members from each of these to form provincial K.N.I. (Indonesian national committee), to assist those governors in their administration.  

Some of these councils (K.N.I.) were in the district and towns. These local revolutionary committees executed the real...
administrative power in their areas. In accordance with the government act of November 23, 1945, the Sultan of Jokjakarta on October 30, had established K.N.I. in his own territory. By 1946 many other K.N.I.'s were created on the basis of local elections.

By October 18, 1945, the K.N.I.P held its first meeting and decided to set up a working committee as a legislative body, consisting of 25 members who would be responsible to the K.N.I.P and would participated in making national policy. Every state's regulation in the form of laws and decrees should be submitted to the working committee for its approval who had special procedural regulations of law-making authority. When a bill was passed by it, it was sent to the president for his signature. Every member of the working committee had right to initiate, interpellate, enquire and question, freedom of speech and

According to article 20 of the procedural regulations the working committee had five sections: 1. The foreign/information section controlled the ministry of foreign affairs. 2. The internal section controlled the ministry of internal affairs, the ministry of justice and the police department and the ministry department. 3. The reconstruction section controlled the ministry of welfare, the ministry of finance, the ministry of communication, the ministry of public works, the ministry of labour, the department of food and supply. 4. The defence section controlled the ministry of finance, the youth affairs department. (5) The social section controlled ministries of education and culture, health, social affairs and religion 2

Some members of the K.N.I.P., youth organisations and leaders of underground movements were dissatisfied with the present form of government and demanded a change from the presidential to parliamentary structure of the government. Sukarno agreed with the

1. Kahin: op.cit. p.140
2. Merdeka, No.45, issued by Information service Indonesia, New-Delhi, October 5, 1948, p.10
proposal. For this purpose, he issued a presidential decree whereby the Knip was vested with full legislative power jointly with the president. He also appointed Sutan Sjahrir to form a parliamentary government, consisting of persons from opposition and two members from his cabinet, I.K.K.P. Surachman and Amir Sjarifuddin. At its session on November 25, to 27, the Knip voted confidence in Sjahrir and his cabinet by vote of 84 to 8 with 15 abstentions.1

The cabinet demanded that the working committee should be enlarged from 15 to 25 members so that the various political organisations would have representation in the Knip. The demand was granted. The members of the working committee consisted of P.N.I., 10; socialist party, 5; Masjumi, 4 Christian party, 1; P.P.I. (young women party), 1 and non-party 4. 2

Beginning with the resolution of the P.N.I. congress on January 29-31, 1946, several political organisations demanded the alteration of the composition of the Knip and the cabinet. The P.P. (national fronts) leaders including Tan Malaka, asked for the dismissal of Sjahri cabinet and its replacement by a national coalition cabinet. Realising this, Sjahrir on February 28, 1946 handed his resignation to Sukarno. Sukarno then asked Tan Malaka and the P.P. leaders to form a new cabinet. They failed to carry out the mission because of their diverse social interests and personal ambitions.

Unable to form a new government by the P.P. leaders, Sukarno again asked Sjahri to form a new cabinet. The Knip still in session, voted confidence in Sjahri and asked him to broaden his cabinet so that it represented the chief political organisations in the country. This was agreeable to Sjahri. After a week of consultation:

1. Kabinet-kabinet Republik Indonesia, Kempen, Jakarta, p.16
2. Kahin: op.cit. p.171
tion with Sukarno and Hatta, Sjahir announced the membership of his new cabinet. Ten of the 11 ministers of Sjahir first cabinet stayed on in his second cabinet. One, Mr. Mulia, resigned and was replaced by Mohd. Sjafei. Two additional ministerial posts were added: one, agriculture, went to Mr. Asaat (P.N.I.), and the other without portfolio, went to Wikana of the Pesindo. Some vice-ministers added to the new cabinet, 3 were non-party, 3 were from Masjumi, 2 from the P.N.I., 2 from the Christian party and 1 was from the socialist party. None of the new cabinet members, ministers or vice-ministers had been leaders of the P.P.I.

The cabinet programme included: 1. conduct of discussion with the Netherlands authorities based on recognition of the Indonesian republic; 2. preparation for the defence of the republic of Indonesia; 3. establishment of democratic basis for central and provincial governments; 4. provision for maximum production and fair distribution of goods and 5. finally the running of essential estates and industries under government supervision.

On July 10, Sukarno proposed for revision of the composition of the Knip membership of 200, of which 110 members were to be elected by the political parties and only 30 members would be directly appointed by the president. Until February 1947, the composition of the Knip remained the same. Out of 200 members there were 129 who were members of political parties. Of these 45 were from the P.N.I.; 35 from the Masjumi, 35 from the socialist party; 6 from the labour party; 4 from the Christian party; 2 from the Catholic party; and 2 from the P.K.I. Of the remaining 71 non-party members, 5 representing the Chinese community, 2 the Arab community and 1 the Dutch.

1. Ibid p 176
2. David Wolf: op. cit. p. 115
3. Undangno. 12 1946, Berita banda Pekerdja Knip March 4, 1946
   February, 1946, pp. 13-15
By August, 1946, at its session at Jokjakarta, the KNIP decided to call for the revision and strengthening of the government through the establishment of a coalition government. For this purpose, Sukarno with concurrence of the KNIP had designated Sjahrir as prime minister and cabinet formateur. On October 2, a complete list of the third Sjahrir cabinet members was announced, consisting of 31 members, representing different political parties and communities: 7 Nasjumi, 4 socialist party, 4 PNI, 1 labour party, 1 communist party, 7 non party, 1 Chinese community, 1 Arab community, 1 Eurasian community, 2 Christians and Sultan of Jokjakarta.

The supreme advisory council was established in December 1945, in line with the council provided in article 16 of the constitution of the republic to advise the president on questions of policy, economy of culture and of education submitted by him with additional powers to make proposals to the government.

Its members were appointed by the president and might be drawn from the ranks of those citizens who were acceptable to and representative on the community in general. They might be persons of good reputation, well educated and highly experienced. They should also be neither unduly young nor unduly old; the oldest member was 72 and no one would be acceptable under the age of 40.2

Being appointed by the president, membership of the council did not change with the fall of a cabinet and was thus able to function whatever the political crisis might be. During the national revolution, the supreme advisory council had played important part in assisting the president to act in matters best calculated to overcome the problem of the state with which he had been confronted.

2. Merdeka no. 72-73, p. 1, November 27, 1949, New Delhi, 22-23
Formerly, the supreme advisory council met only when called by the president, but it has recently been decided that it should come together at regular monthly intervals. A board of five formerly met constantly to outline day to day tasks. Due to the Dutch aggression, many of the council members returned to their homes and the day to day work was executed by the Chairman and vice-chairman who were both permanent residents of Jokjakarta city.

During the monthly sessions, experts from various governmental departments and organisations attended to explain technical matters within their province. The supreme advisory council maintained close and constant contact with the various organs of the government.

At present, there were 17 members of the Council. Sutardjo Kartodikusumo and Ki Madjar Dewantara were respectively chairman and vice-chairman. Mrs. Suwarni Pringgodigdo, Dr. Adjiman, Margono, Djojohokusumo, Murjaningrat, and others were members of the council.

The instructions of Lord Mountbatten, the allied South east Asia command, called for the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, release of allied war prisoners and civilian internees and disarmament and concentration of the Japanese in readiness for transport back to Japan. In addition they called for the establishment and maintenance of law and order in Indonesia until the Netherlands administration in Indonesia was able to function by itself. British officers in Java and Sumatra and Australia officers in parts of Celebes and the Lesser Sunda were bound by the instructions based on promises that were no longer valid as to conditions in Indonesia. In September 29, Rear Admiral Patterson, commander of the British fifth cruser squadron, proclaimed that the allied troops consisting

1. Republican review issued by Indonesian ministry of information No. 2 Jakarta, October, 1949 p.23
of 1500 Scotch had arrived to protect the people and to maintain law and order until the time that the lawful government of the Netherlands East Indies is once again functioning. Netherlands laws would be applied and enforced, he said, by Netherlands administrative officers in Java subject only to whatever commands Admiral Mountbatten might issue. The same day Lt. General Sir Philip Christian, allied commander in chief for Indonesia, announced that Japanese forces in Java would be used temporarily to maintain law and order.

These announcements were soon followed by the landing under the British cover, of small contingents of Dutch troops. Sukarno and other republican leaders were ready to cooperate with the allied forces in the execution of their tasks but they were deadly opposed to the landings of Dutch troops to restore Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In October, 1945, two small companies of volunteer combat troops from Holland arrived in Indonesia and shortly after were followed by the Netherlands Indies civil administration (N.I.C.A.) which returned to Indonesia from Australia.

The British forces occupied important cities of Indonesia such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Semarang in Java, Padang, Medan and Palembang in Sumatra, whereas the Australian troops invested in the East Indonesian islands. They put into concentration camps 283000 Japanese troops and liberated over 200,000 allied prisoners all over Indonesia.

Lt. Governor General, H. Van Mook, who in 1942-1944, headed the exiled Netherlands Indies administration in Australia, now returned to Indonesia after the capitulation of the Japanese. On November 10, 1945, he issued an official statement, at Jakarta, outlining a broad

1. New York Times, September 30, 1945
2. Nasir Thaib and Darwis: Revolusi Indonesia meletus, Bukit Tinggi 1945, p.16
policy of the so-called newly reconstructed Dutch colonial government in Indonesia. Politically he repeated the policy of the Netherlands government in London announced by Queen Wilhelmina in 1942, aiming to establish a Netherlands Commonwealth, after the liberation of motherland and Indonesia.

The general purpose of this policy was, therefore, the rapid development of Indonesia as a partner in a kingdom which will be set up to guarantee the national self-respect of all members. To that end the central government of this country will have to be reconstructed by legal process, in such a way that it will consist of a democratic representative body, with a substantial majority of Indonesian members and a council of ministers under the G.C. as the representative of the crown. This organisation will govern the internal affairs of the country, assisted by subordinate organisations to take care of the regional and local public interests. The suffrage shall be a subject of further consultation but it will have to rest on the foundation of freely shaped public opinion and of an adequate representation of all important sections of the body politics.¹

Indonesia will be considered a full partner in the kingdom which will be organised as a commonwealth consisting of the participating territories. The manner in which this basic idea will be realised is to be proposed at a round table conference and to be decided by the constitutional authorities of the kingdom. Problems like that of a regional flag, besides the flag of the kingdom, will also have to be decided on the recommendations at the same round table conference. The admission of Indonesia and non-Dutch citizens to the

¹ Ubani: op.cit. part 11, pp.145-146
general services of the kingdom can be systematically increased forthwith.

Regulations and institutions based on racial discrimination or considered as such shall be abrogated or reformed. The distinction between a Netherlands and Indonesian civil shall be abolished; the unification of Penal courts and procedure shall be completed. The admission of citizens of non-Netherlands origin to the high posts in all public services will be vigorously extended and full mutual cooperation ensured. It will also be necessary to find a place for Indonesians and other non-Netherlands citizens in the staff and the management of business.

The education system will have to be reformed in such a way that illiteracy is eradicated as rapidly as possible and that it can offer to the inhabitants every form of training needed by the community. In order to broaden its base and exchange with the Netherlands and foreign countries will be promoted. The development of Indonesian civilisation will retain full attention. The organisation of honest and full public information can be maintained in this connection.

The Indonesian language and other important native languages will be systematically developed for modern use in order to make them fully serviceable for the needs of cultural, social and economic life. The recognition of the Indonesian language as the official language beside the Dutch will be made complete. The knowledge of the Dutch and of the main world languages will be increased.

The economic policy will have for its objectives the rehabilitation and the extension of the general prosperity of the population. It will be implemented under strong and systematic

1. H. E. Issacs: op. cit. p. 190
governmental guidance, by specially designed organisations and efficient planning. Room will be made for the development of business of every size for all racial groups and the participation of Indonesians, Indo-Chinese and Indo-Arabs and in big business will be furnished. By all means, including industrialisation, and increased production and an improved distribution of income will be pursued, and the expansion of native capital will be vigorously advanced. An efficient cooperation with the Netherlands and with other countries will strengthen the base of this policy without influencing its aim.

As a result of the disorganisation caused by war and occupation, a social policy extending to all classes will be more necessary than ever. The monetary situation shall have to be strengthened out as quickly as possible by provisional measures in order to establish it, due account being taken of the economic and financial position of Indonesia.

A strong armed forces will be built up on a basis of a general integration of defence to which all races will contribute and in which they will take their part.

The citizenship of Indonesia will be clearly defined on a foundation of racial quality without neglecting the special legal needs of the several groups. Problems like the agrarian question will have to be solved within that frame-work.

The reconstruction of Indonesia can only be attained by a real cooperation between its citizens of different race and between the Netherlands and Indonesia, who are far stronger together than apart. That reconstruction will have to be quickly taken in hand as otherwise the general improvement of lawlessness will grow to such an extent that recovery may hardly be possible. The continuous
deterioration and destruction must end. Only by following the legal path of reform the process of re-construction can begin. The government, therefore, appeal to all the people who have the interests of this country to join their forces that end.

Furthermore, the lawful possessions stolen by the enemy or by others must be restored to their rightful owners as far as possible. The problem of war damages will have to be treated separately, taking into consideration the individual position of the victims and the collective capacity of the country. In solving this problem we must be guided primarily by the necessity of restoring general prosperity.

Finally all the aims which have been passed over illegally by the enemy or which have been stolen must be restored to the allies and the carrying of arms must be restricted to people legally entitled or licensed to do so.

This political plan of Van Mook was completely opposed by the Republican leaders and people in general.

The activities of Netherlands, the Nica and Netherlands colonial troops under the command of Lt. General Van Oyen, the top Dutch officer, who arrived with the British, made the situation more serious and difficult. The Nica consisting of loyal Ambonese, the loyal Eurasians, the Dutch and other agents created untold mischiefs. They by force hoisted the Dutch flag over important building, took down the Indonesian flag and ill treated men, women, children, officials, merchants and other people and above all shot down public whom they considered anti-Dutch. They arrested thousands of people and tortured them mercilessly. They issued false propaganda against the republic and its leaders. In short, the street was unsafe, life was insecure and property was in danger every were said Mohd Hatta.

2. Ubani: op.cit. p 160
They also compelled Indonesians especially rajas, minor chiefs and officials to cooperate with them under the protection of the so-called allied forces. On December 1, 1945, a certain Australian Major, Heerman, issued the following decree to support the Nica imperialistic activities in East Indonesia:

1. Nica is a part of the allied military government in South Sulawesi and is under command of the Brigadier general;

2. Officials of Nica therefore, act with the authority of the commander Macassar force;

3. Any refusal to cooperate with the Nica is defiance of the authority of the commander Macassar forces;

4. Australian army orders the population of south Sulawesi to cooperate with the Nica;

5. The Australian army will use forces if necessary that all the orders of the Nica will be obeyed strictly and immediately.

Because of continuous troubles and disorders created by the British and Dutch troops or Nica, the Republic of Indonesia was shifted to Jakarta in November to carry on national revolution. The republican army, people's armies (laskar rakjat), benteng (buffalo societies), hisbulla and sabilullah armies, student corps and other pemudas(youth) organisations, organised bloody patriotic revolution against the Dutch imperialists where they were. The first war broke out in Surabaya where in November 4, Brigadier, Malaby, the British commander was killed and 2000 civilians were affected badly. The British troops used all kinds of modern weapons to crush the Indonesian forces under the command of kr. Sutomo(Bung Tomo), former minister for youth, but the latter resisted them.

1. Notes about Sulawesi, issued by P.P.I., Bombay, February 8, 1946, p. 10
2. Charles Wolf: op. cit. p. 23
Similar fighting took place in Bandung, Padang, Medan, Makassar and other British occupied areas. Consequently, thousands over thousands of civilians suffered tremendously because of burning their houses, looting their properties and kidnapping their youngsters, etc. by British and Dutch forces who extended their colonialism under the protection of the allied forces. In 1946, Captain Westerling, the Dutch officer, and leader of the rebellion against the republic, killed 30,000 Indonesians in Makassar. More extensive battle was going on especially when the Dutch military forces under the new commander, General S.H.Spoor, were re-enforced by the fresh troops from Europe in March, 1946.

On February 10, 1946, a negotiation took place in Jakarta between the British represented by a top most diplomat, Sir Archibald Clak Keer, and the Dutch represented by the G.G. Van Mook on the one hand and the republic of Indonesia headed by the prime minister Sutan Sjahrlr with whom the Dutch agreed to negotiate. As a result the military situation was established and as more and more Dutch troops arrived from Europe the British made plans for withdrawing General Mensegh, the new British commander in chief, increasing civil authority was delegated to the Nica, now re-named the Allied military administration civil affairs branch (A.M.A.C.A.B). This was done according to the civil administration agreement of August 28, 1945, concluded by the British and the Dutch governments.

On November 30, 1946, the last British troops left Jakarta A.F.N.E.I. was officially disbanded and military as well as plenary civil control reverted to the Dutch hands. Fresh 92,000 British Dutch troops, well equipped by the British arrived in Indonesia to

1. Ibid
2. Van Mook: op.cit. p.290 M.M.Gebrandy: op.cit. p.97
replace the departed British and the British turned over all their weapons and Japanese ammunitions and other surplus war stock to the Dutch, replacements. The British had returned over 280,000 Japanese to their country and released over 200,000 war prisoners and internees and succeeded in restoring Dutch imperialism in Indonesia. This was the idea of Mr. Churchill, former prime minister and Mr. Noel Baker, M.P. of Britain in October 17, 1945. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Attlee were opposed the idea and supported Indonesian cause for national liberation.1

When Dr. Beel formed a new coalition government in Holland in May 1, 1946, a Dutch delegation consisting of 4 members, Schement bomb (chairman), Van Mook, Mr. Van Polland De Boer, was sent to Indonesia to negotiate with the republican leaders. Consequently a Linggadjati Agreement was concluded on March 25, 1947. The agreement consisted of 17 paragraphs. Paragraph 1 acknowledged the republic exercised the defacto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. It included a number of joint obligations and promises in relation to cooperate in the establishment of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis, and recognition of the right of self-determination. The new state would be called the united states of Indonesia. There would be a union to consist of the Netherlands and the West Indies territories on the one hand and the united states of Indonesia on the other. The republic would be a constituent part of the latter and the whole, having their own organs of government, would be united under the crown of the Netherlands. There was also a provision that military establishment on both sides would be reduced so that the way to pacification seemed clear.2

Many Indonesians particularly supporters of the Nasjumi, P.N.I. and Tan Malaka and others had been critical of a number of

2. Gerbrandy: op.cit. p.140
points in the Linggadjati agreement, especially articles VI, VII and XIV, providing for a Netherlands-Indonesia Union under the
Queen of the Netherlands and the restoration to all non-Indonesians
of their previous rights and goods. They were also doubtful of
Van Mook sincerity to execute the agreement honestly. They were
too joined by army organisations such as the K.K.I.© (the Celebes
armed organisation in Java) and the benteng republic (republican
fortress). Whereas the sajap kiri (left wing) a coalition of the
socialist party. Pesindo labour party and the P.K.I. were also in
opposition to the agreement. Supporting it were several small
political groups, including Christian and Catholic parties.1

In Holland, Prof. Aalberse, former leader of the Catholic
party and a member of the council of state opposed the agreement and
declared openly those Netherlands who had initiated the agreement
were guilty of punishable violation of the constitution. When some
members of the cabinet, said Gerbrandy, prime minister, recognised the
ture character of the document they had to consider they were deeply
disappointed. Other political leaders who studied the document were
shocked. The Netherlands people were reduced to a state of complete
paralysis. Because, he continued, that the independence of Indonesia
was to reduce the great empire of the Netherlands to a mere small
state in Europe and great losses to the economic interests of our
country and its people in particular and to the whole Europe in
general. Prof. Rome, chairman of the Catholic people’s party
described the agreement as Linggadjati in Sunday cloth.2

In order to obtain sufficient support in the Knip for the
ratification of the Linggadjati agreement, Sukarno’s presidential
degree of December 24, 1946, called for increasing Knip membership

1. Ibid p.142
2. Ibid.
from 200 to 514. Of the new members, 93 were to represent political parties, 40 were to represent the peasantry; 40 labour, 78 the regions of Java and Madura (Sumatra 50, Borneo 8, Celebes 10, Malucas 5 and Lesser Sundas 5) and 5 ethnic minorities; the remaining 121 members were to be appointed on the basis of general social prominence or as representatives of minor parties and irregular armed organisations.

Between February 25, and March 5, 1947, at Malang, the KNIP held its first session to discuss the president decree and finally approved it after the working committee withdrew its disapproval to the decree at its meeting on January 6 and 17, 1947. On March 2, 1947 Sukarno's new appointees were sworn in as members of greatly expanded KNIP. The old working committee was dismissed and March 3 elections for a new one were begun by the new KNIP. The composition of the new working committee consisted of 47 representatives: 5 socialist party; 5 Masjumi; 5 P.N.I., 4 P.K.I.; 2 partai rakjat 3 labour party; 2 barisan tani Indonesia; 1 serikat tani Islam Indonesia; 1 pesindo; 1 Christian party; 1 P.P.I. 3 and 2 labour and peasant; 5 from Sumatra; 1 Celebes, 1 Moluccas, 1 Lesser Sunda, 1 Chinese community, 1 Arab community, 1 Dutch community and 1 non party. The working committee was under the chairmanship of Mr. Asaat socialist party. Thus the KNIP held session of March 5, 1947, at Malang and voted confidence in Sjahrr's cabinet and then ratified the Linggadjati agreement which was formally signed by Sjahrr and the Dutch delegate on March 29.

The different interpretation charges and counter charges of violation of the agreement by both the parties rapidly increase. The Dutch were prepared to go to war to crush the republic. Realising this, Sjahrr, after a series of counter proposals to the Dutch, accepted on June 8 the principle of interim government and on June 20 agreed to the de jure special position of the Dutch crown's re-

1. Presidential decree of December 24, 1946; Kahfam: op.cit. p.120
2. Kehe: op.cit. pp.204-205
presentative in such government and to what amount the Netherlands control of Indonesia's foreign relations during the period of interim government. As a result of Sjahrir big concessions to the Dutch, all of the major political parties except the Nasjumi began to abandon support of Sjahrir. They voted non-confidence in Sjahrir's cabinet. On June 27, Sjahrir handed his resignation to Sukarno. Sukarno declared a state of emergency and asked the members of Sjahrir cabinet to remain in office until a new cabinet was formed.

On June 30, Sukarno called upon the leaders of the 4 largest parties, the Nasjumi, P.N.I. socialist party and labour to form a coalition cabinet. On July 3, Sjarifuddin was able to form a coalition government. The initial membership of Sjarifuddin cabinet consisted of 34 ministers; 6 socialist party, 7 P.N.I.; 6 P.S.S.I, 5 non party; 1 P.K.I.; 4 labour party; 1 Catholic party; 1 Christian party; 1 youth congress; 1 peasant legion; 1 Chinese community.

Now the Dutch demanded more and more concessions from the Sjarifuddin cabinet, that is acceptance of the dejure authority of the Netherlands crown representative in the interim government, control of Indonesian foreign relations, joint manning of an Indonesian gendarmerie operating inside the republic recognition of rights of foreigners to estates, etc.

Following the signature of the Kenneville agreement on January 17, 1948, both the Nasjumi and the P.N.I. would no longer support Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet. Amir Sjarifuddin who was now supported by the saijap kiri, on January 23, resigned as prime minister.

1. Ibid p.208
2. Ibid p.232
Immediately following his resignation, President Sukarno appointed Dr. Mohammad Hatta, vice-president, to form again a presidential cabinet. On January 29, 1948, the national cabinet was formed consisting of four Masjumi, 4 P.N.I., 4 nonparty, 1 Catholic party, 1 Christian party, 1 socialist party and 1 teacher's union (P.C.I.I.).

The programme of Hatta cabinet included: 1. Implementation of the Benneville-agreement and political principles and continuation of negotiations with the Dutch through the security council committee of good offices; 2. Acceleration of the formation of a sovereign, democratic united states of Indonesia; (3) Nationalisation of the republic's army and economy; (4) and reconstruction of damage caused by the war and the Japanese occupation.

Immediately Hatta's cabinet began to carry out Benneville agreement. By February 26, 1948 all regular republican army units (T.N.I.) 35,000 in number had withdrawn from their pockets and crossed over the Van Mook line into the republican held territory. There remained only 40,000 irregular troops, mostly Hizbulullah, who refused to be evacuated. But the Dutch policy quickly violated the agreement, by establishing several puppet states and by creating more troubles in the country.

Following the breakdown in negotiation between the Netherlands and the republic under the auspices of Mr. Merle Cochran, new American representative of the committee of good offices, on September, 1948, the Netherlands foreign minister Dr. D. U. Stikker, arrived in Indonesia on November 1, 1948, to talk directly with the republican leaders. This direct talks soon broke down over the vital question of the powers of the Netherlands High representative of the crown during the interim period.

1. Ibid p.232
2. Kabint 2 Republic Indonesia; op.cit. p.43
December 11, 1948, the Netherlands authorities informed the committee of good offices (C.G.O.) about the fruitless negotiations and stated they would go ahead with their plan of setting up an interim federal government without the Republic. But Hatta asked Mr. Cochran to assist in resuming negotiations, sending him a note for transmittal to the Dutch delegation. Four days after receiving Hatta's note, the Netherlands delegation rejected it. On December 12, the committee informed the security council of the military situation in Indonesia. On December 18, Cochran received a Netherlands letter stating that the Netherlands was terminating the Kenville truce agreement. The secretary general of the republican delegation in Jakarta received similar note but he was not allowed to communicate it to his government.

On December 19, President Sukarno was due to leave for India in response to the prime minister's invitation, Mr. Nehru. On December 18, at 5 A.M., the Dutch barbarously and heavily attacked the republican capital, Jokjakarta and employed all modern weapons and launched all their forces. The republican forces defended it bravely and after blood fighting they had to retreat outside the city and Republican leaders like Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahir, A. Salim and others were captured by the Dutch. On December 22, the republican leaders were flown to the island of Bangka and Perapat in Sumatra. During the next week, the Dutch armoured columns with heavy air support had reached and sized control and the principal remaining republican held cities in both Java and Sumatra.

Although the republican capital was captured, yet the Indonesian forces carried on an intensive guerrilla warfare against

1. U.N.S./1117, p.4
2. Ibid
3. U.N.S. Council report on December 26, 1948, from the C.G.O. on Indonesian question 8/1156, pp. 5 and
4. Kahin op.cit. pp.337-338
the Dutch throughout the country. The security council was so active and the Indonesian representatives and people abroad were struggling so hard for the solution of the Indonesian problem as soon as possible. An emergency government was established at Bukit Tinggi, central Sumatra, under the premiership of Sjafruddin prawiranegara, the former finance minister of the republic. Before his departure for Java, Dr. Hatta gave Sjarifuddin a mandate to form such government in case the capital of republic was captured. His cabinet members consisted of 11 ministers such as Karamis (foreign minister), Dr. Lukman Hakim (finance minister), Dr. Sukiman (home minister) etc.1

On December 23, it instructed the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations headed by L.N. Palar and informed it that the republican government was prepared to order cease fire and enter into negotiation with the Dutch government on the basis of: 1. the immediate release of the republican leaders; (2) formation of an all Indonesian government by the Indonesian national itself and without Dutch interference; 3. the withdrawal of the whole Dutch army from Indonesia immediately after the formation of an All Indonesian government; (4) the de facto and de jure recognition of the republic sovereignty over the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura; 5. the withdrawal of Dutch troops to their original positions of December 18, 1948.2

The prime minister of India, Mr. Nehru, convoked an Asian conference on Indonesia on January 20-23, 1949, at New Delhi. The conference was attended by representatives of Afghanistan, Australia

1. Kabinet B.I. op.cit. p.28
2. Merdeka No. 60 issued by I.S.I., New-Delhi, April, 10, 1949 p.16
Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Indonesia and Yemen. The conference had passed the following recommendations for the security council's attention: 1. The return of the republican government to Jokjakarta; 2. The forming of an interim government which would have freedom of foreign policy; 3. The withdrawal of all Dutch troops from the whole of Indonesia; and the transfer by January 1, 1950, of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the conference Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab states had withdrawn all their facilities both men and air from the Netherlands.

On January 28, 1949, the security council finally passed a resolution submitted jointly by the U.S., China, Cuba and Norway a week previously. The resolution called upon the government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuation of all military operation and upon the government of the republic simultaneously to order its armed forces to cease guerrilla warfare; called upon the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since December 17, 1948, in the republic of Indonesia; and to facilitate the immediate return of officials of the government of the Indonesian republic to Jokjakarta; recommended that the Netherlands and the republic again undertake negotiations on the basis of Linggadjati and Renville agreements and proposals submitted by Cochran on September 10, 1948. In addition the council reconstituted its committee of good offices as the United Nations Commissions for Indonesia, endowing it with more powers. Its membership consisted of U.S.A., Australia and Belgium.

The Dutch were reluctant to execute the security council

2. U.N.S.C.C.S. 1234 p.2
resolutions. Due to strong international pressures, the Dutch agreed to re-open talks with the republican leaders. So on April 14, negotiations were resumed between the Netherlands delegation led by M.J.H. Van Royen and the republic headed by Mr. Mohd Rum at Jakarta under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. On May 4, 1949, the agreement was finally signed by the two delegations at the Hotel Des Indies in Jakarta. By it the republican government with Sukarno and Hatta was to return forthwith to Jogja, hostilities were to end as quick as possible and the republic agreed to attend the round table conference, in the Hague to discuss a full and unconditional transfer of sovereignty from Holland to Indonesia.1

Soon after Mohd Natsir resigned from his post as adviser to the negotiating delegation whereas Sjahrir was still in doubt of the Dutch authority but he did not oppose the round table conference.

On the Dutch side there were two major opponents to the agreement. Bell, the Dutch high representative of the crown in Jakarta, resigned within 24 hours and was replaced by Mr. Lovink and Beel's confident, General Spoor, was also naturally in opposition as he considered it a terrible surrender and a betrayal of his policy in May 25, 1949.

Two days after the Sultan of Jogjakarta was officially appointed the security coordinator of the republican government. On June 25, Hatta flew to Kotaradja, Achen, in attempt to confer with Sjafruddin and his government. He failed to meet him there. On July 4 Natsir actually met him in Bukit Tinggi and brought him back to Jogja. Sjafruddin fully supported the Rum-Royen agreement.

1. John Coast: op.cit. p.251; U.N.S./1162, p.9
On June 18, the Sultan issued a cease fire to all republican troops in the residency of Jogja. On June 30, all Dutch troops withdrew from Jogja residency and republican army took over. On July 6, Sukarno and Hatta as well as other leaders returned to Jogjakarta triumphantly. On July 14, Sjafruddin handed back the mandate that Sukarno and Hatta then given him as head of the emergency government in Sumatra. On July 13, the republican cabinet/first meeting since the launching of the Dutch attack 7 months ago. The working committee of the republican parliament was soon reconvened and then supported the Rum-Royen agreement.1

From July 19 to 22 in Jogjakarta and from July 30 to August 2 in Jakarta were held the inter-Indonesian conferences between the delegations representing the Indonesian republic and the B.F.O. (representatives of the puppet states sponsored by the Dutch). As a result, the delegates agreed among others, to establish a federal government with bicameral legislature, whose official language is Indonesian, national anthem, Indonesia raya, and flag, the red and white; to build strong national economic developments, cultural and educational progresses and to re-organise national armed forces. The all Indonesian youth conference of August 14-18, 1949, at Jogjakarta, attended by 28 youth organisations all über Indésia passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all Dutch troops from Indonesia, release of all youth detained by the Dutch, determining the future national state of Indonesia on the basis of the principle of Pancha Silva.2

On August 1, 1949, a cease fire was finally agreed between the Netherlands and the republic to be issued simultaneously by both parties on August three and going into effect on August 11 in

1. Merdeka no.60, 10 April, 1948 and no.66 10 July, 1949 pp.2-3
2. Republican review, Jakarta, July 9, 1949, p.27; Merdeka, no.37 July 5, 1948, pp.8-9
Java and August 15 in Sumatra. Thereupon the republican and
B.F.O. led respectively by Mr. Van Maarseveen overseas territories
minister, Mohd. Hatta, P.M., and Sultan Hamid, president of the
East Indonesian state, met together and with important assistance
from the U.N. Commission for Indonesia. The round table conference
was opened by the Dutch prime minister, Dr. Willems Degrees. Finally
the conference hammered out an agreement. This provided for the
establishment of a federal state (Republic Indonesia Serikat),
consisting of 16 states, Dutch-Indonesia union, union court of
arbitration and cooperation in economic and cultural fields and
others.1

REPUBLIC INDONESIA SERIKAT

The Hague agreement provided for the establishment of an
independent, sovereign and legal democratic federal state known
as the united states of Indonesia (R.I.S.). This federal government
consisted of the following 16 states and autonomous territories:

1. The state of the republic of Indonesia, 2. the state of East India,
   3. the state of East Pasundan, 4. the state of East Java,
   5. the state of Madura, 6. the state of East Sumatra, (7) the state
   of South Sumatra, 8. Middle Java State, (9) Bangka state, (10)
   Belitung state, (11) West Java State, (12) West Borneo (special
territory), (13) Greater Bayak, (14) Bandjar territory, (15) South
   East Borneo and (16) East Borneo state.2

The Republic Indonesia Serikat would have the following
structure: 1. president, 2. ministers, 3. senate, 4. house of
representatives, 5. supreme court and auditing council.

1. Merdeka No. 72-73 November 25, 1949, pp. 1-15
2. Ibid pp. 28-31
The president along with the ministers would constitute govt. He would be elected by Parliament. He might be an Indonesian of the age of not below 30 years and his residence would be in the seat of the govt. On Dec. 16, 1949 a joint meeting of the house of representatives and senate unanimously elected Sukarno as the president of the U.S.I. Instead of 3, he appointed 4 cabinet formateurs (2 republicans-Mohd Hatta and the Sultan of Jogja and 2 federalists- Anak Agungj Gde Aunj from East Indonesia and Sultan Hamid from West Borneo). On the recommendation of four the president would allot portfolio to each minister. A minister or ministers without portfolio would also be appointed. Each minister would not be below 25 years of age. The cabinet was headed by Dr. Mohd Hatta, consisting of 11 republicans (4 Masjumi 2 P.N.I., 2 Christian party and 4 non-party, and 5 federalists. Among of the important minister the Hatta cabinet until September 6, 1950, were Anak Agunj (foreign minister) Hamaguru Buwono (home minister) Sjaarifuddin (defence minister) and so on.1

The cabinet was sworn in at Jakarta on the morning of December 20, 1949, by president Sukarno, On the same day the cabinet announced the 7 point programme of the govt. of U.S.I. as follows: 1. To effectuate carefully the transfer of sovereignty and power throughout Indonesia to the Indonesian nation; to effect the re-organisation of the Dutch East Indies Army(K.N.I.L.) and to evacuate the Dutch army from the whole of Indonesia to their home land as soon as possible. 2. to preserve public peace and order in order to secure the democratic rights and freedom of the people, and to guarantee the implementation of the fundamental human rights and freedom. 3. To make preparations for enforcing basic legal regulations providing for the people the ways and

1. Ibid pp.4-5; Kabinet 2: op.cit. pp.8-9
means to express their will in accordance with the provisional constitution of the U.S.I. and to make arrangement for holding a general election for the constituent assembly as provided in the provisional constitution. (4) To ameliorate the conditions of economy, finance, communication, housing and health of the people, to make arrangements for social security and to reinstate the power in society; to frame regulations providing minimum wages and to give effect to government's supervision on the economic activities of the whole people. 5. To make the universities perfect in accordance with the needs of the Indonesian society to set up a national cultural centre and to intensify anti-illiteracy campaign among the people. 6. To settle the question of New Guinea within a year in a peaceful way. 7. To evolve a foreign policy that would strengthen the position of the U.S.A.I by promoting the idea of world peace and brotherhood among the nations; to strengthen moral, political and economic relations among the nations in South East Asia; to work on a definite policy in the Netherlands Indonesian Union, that would make the union advantageous to the U.S.I. and to try to make R.S.I. a member of the U.N.O.1

The president was the head of the state and supreme commander of the armed forces. He declared war, made peace and concluded treaties with other countries. He appointed and received diplomatic representatives and consuls. He had the power to grant pardons, amenities, abolitions and rehabilitations. He had also the right to grant titles, to award decorations of merit and other insignia of honour. He appointed and dismissed the members of the high advisory council and of the supreme court. He held office for five years and was eligible for re-election on the expiration of that term.

1. Merdeka, No.72-73, November 29, 1949, N.Delhi, p.6
2. Arts. 10, 11,14,15, and 7 of the provisional constitution.
The office of president, vice-president and ministers were incompatible with the exercise of any other public office inside or outside the republic of Indonesia. The president, vice-president and the ministers should neither directly nor indirectly participate in or stand surety for any enterprises based upon an agreement for profit or gain, concluded with the R.I. or any autonomous areas of Indonesia. They should not hold any claims on the R.I. except public debentures.1

The senate would represent member states of the R.I.F. Each member state would have two representatives in the senate. Every member of the senate would have one vote. Members of the senate would be appointed by member states from a list submitted by their respective People's assemblies which consisted of three candidates for each set. Every member state would frame the necessary regulations to appoint the members of the senate. Those who were to be members of the senate might be citizens of the age of 30 years.

The house of representatives would represent the whole of Indonesia and would have 150 members, 50 from the republic of Indonesia and 100 from the 15 Dutch created states according to their respective populations. The Chinese, Eurasian and Arab minorities would have 9, 6 and 3 members respectively in the house of representatives.2

Members of the house of representatives might be from citizens who were not below the age of 25 years and could not be member of the senate. The membership of the house of representatives could not be carried out along with the membership of the senate, and also along with federal posts of presidentship, ministership,

1. Ibid art. 55
2. Merdeka No. 72-73- op. cit. p. 5
chief of Justice (djasaka azung) chairman, vice-chairman or members of the auditing council and along with the post of wali negara (head of member states, minister or head of a department of member states). Each of the 16 states was free to decide on the manner of selecting its representatives, whether by election or appointment. The house of representatives had the right to introduce legislation and the concurrence of at least half of its quorum (50%) was required to pass any legislation.

There was a supreme court of justice and its powers were regulated by federal law. The chairman, vice-chairman and members of the supreme court were appointed by the president after hearing the senate. This appointment was for life. Federal law could decide that the chairman, vice-chairman and members of the supreme court would be honourably relieved from their respective posts when they reached a certain age. They could be discharged honourably and relinquished from their respective posts in accordance with the manner and conditions ascertained by the federal law. They could be relieved of their office by the president at their own request.

Structure and power of the auditing council would be regulated by federal law. The chairman, vice-Chairman and members of the financial auditing council were appointed by the president after hearing the senate. They could be relieved of their respective offices by the president at their own request and when they reached a certain age.

The official flag of the R.I.S. was Sang merah putih (red and white), the Indonesia raya, national anthem, Jakarta, the capital of the state. The state was free to decide its own official

1. Ibid pp. 5-6
The great majority of Indonesians both in the old republic of Indonesia and in all the 15 Dutch puppet states, were profoundly dissatisfied with the federal system of government. They wanted to liquidate these states and merge with the old republic. Open encouragement was given these movements by the government of the old republic and by Sukarno and other leading republicans in the republic of the United States of Indonesia government. As Dutch military and police authority were withdrawn from these states and as the several thousands strong pro-republican political prisoners were released from their jails, the forces of the unitarian government became overwhelmingly.

As a result, on February 9, 1950, Wiranata Kusuma, president of the Pasundan state, transferred his power to Soeweka, the newly appointed the R.U.S.I. commissioner for Pasundan. On February 10 the representative council of the state of South Sumatra voted to transfer the powers of the state to the republic of the U.S.A. government. On March 9, the requests of the governments of East Java, Central Java and Madura for dissolution and merge into the republic of Indonesia were approved by the R.U.S.I. The request of Pasundan and other states followed in short order were quickly approved. By April 22, the R.U.S.I. house of representatives endorsed by 50 votes to 1 the dissolution of the state of West Borneo. On April 30, the president of the state of East Indonesia announced the dissolution of his state and became a part of the republic of Indonesia. On May 13, the R.U.S. endorsed the decision of the president Sukawati for the establishment of a unitarian state.

1. Draft constitution of the U.S.I.
2. Kahin: op.cit. pp.560-461
After several weeks of negotiations between the leaders of the K.U.S.I. government and those of the republic of Indonesia, an agreement on the formation of a unitarian state was finally reached on May 19, 1950. Among the important provisions of the agreement were: the senate was to be abolished. A provisional parliament for the new state was to be formed from the combined membership of the K.U.S.I. house of representatives and the working committee of the Knip with such additional members as might be appointed by the president, after consideration by two governments. A provisional constitution for the new state was to be drawn by an assembly for changing the constitution made up of the house of representatives of the K.U.S.I. and working committee of the Knip. A constituent assembly was to be elected as soon as possible thereafter, on the basis of one member for every 300,000 inhabitants with due consideration for a fair representation of minorities, which would frame a final constitution. Sukarno would be president of the new state. The cabinet of government of the new state would be responsible to its parliament. Pending the introduction of new legislation by the unitarian state existing acts and regulations were to remain in force with the understanding that wherever possible the laws of the member states, the republic of Indonesia should be adhered to.

During a period of two months the representatives of the K.U.S.I. house of representatives and the republican Knip met together to work out draft for the unitarian constitution. By July 20, they had completed their task, presented their draft to the K.U.S.I. house of representatives and senate and the working committee of the Knip for approval. After more than three weeks of discussion general agreement was finally reached on August 14, the K.U.S.I.

1. Arts. 27, 29, and 31 of the constitution of F.I.
senate endorsed the draft by a unanimous vote and the R.U.S.I. house did so by a vote of 90 to 18. The working committee of the KNIP ratified the document by a vote of 31 to 2 with 7 abstentions. On August 15, 1950, President Sukarno signed the draft bill and with the countersignature of Prof. Supomo, minister of justice of the R.U.S.I., the bill was promulgated as the provisional constitution of the republic of Indonesia.

The provisional constitution provided for the establishment of a unicameral legislature known as Dewan perwakilan rakyat (house of representative), consisting of 237 members. Pending general elections, these provisional members had been chosen on the basis of geographic cultural and political representation with a representative ratio of one member for every 300,000 constituents. The parliament elected its own speaker (Dr. Sartono) and three vice-chairman.

The party strength in the present parliament consisted of Masjumi, 39; P.N.I., 41; P.I.R., 22; P.S.I., 15; P.M.K. I.I. 4; partai buruh 5; perindra 6; keduulatan rakyat 1; S.K.I. 4; B.T.I. 2; partai murba 4; persetuan progressif 9; Sobsi 2; G.T.I. 1; perti 1; N.U. 7 and non-party 14.2

The constitution also stipulated that the executive head should be president assisted by a vice-president. Sukarno and Hatta were unanimously elected respectively as president and vice-president. Subsequent presidents are to be elected by national vote every four years. The president can dissolve parliament, call new elections and initiate new legislation. All legislations must get the president assent before becoming law.

The government is directly responsible not to the president

1. Art. 77
2. J. Radhakrishna: Indonesia at a glance, New Delhi, 1955 p. 43
but to the parliament. In the case of the cabinet resignation, the president takes the initiative in appointing cabinet formateur(1 or more) who need not necessarily be the leader of the largest party but in his opinion, is likely to master majority support to form an alternative as the Dutch system in the Netherlands. The prime minister and his ministers were responsible for the entire policy of the government administration.1

In addition to the premier and vice premier, there were generally 18 portfolios in the cabinet; the ministries of foreign affairs, home affairs, defence, justice, information, finance, agriculture, economic affairs, communications, public works, labour, social welfare education, religious affairs, health, general and agrarian affairs.2

Administratively the republic of Indonesia was divided into 10 provinces. Each province was administered by a governor and local council. The governors were appointed by the president on the recommendation of the local council. The 10 provinces along their capitals were as follows: 1. West Java (Bandung), 2. Central Java (Semarang), 3. East Java (Surabaya), 4. North Sumatra (Medan), 5. Central Sumatra (Bukit Tinggi), 6. South Sumatra (Palembang), 7. Lesser Sunda islands (Ben Pasar, Bali), 8. Moluccas (Ambon), 9. Sulawesi or Celebes (Makasar), 10. Kalimantan or Borneo (Bandjarmasin).3

Besides these, Jogjakarta has the status of a self-governing territory (daerah istimewa) under the Sultan Hamengku Buwono who was appointed by the president and Jakarta Raya has a metropolitan administration, headed by Mr. Sudiro. The administrative heads of the various departments were designed as secretary general.4

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1. Ibid p.36
2. Ibid p.37
3. Kahn: op. cit. p.466
4. J.Kadhakrishnan: op. cit. p.37
Each province was further divided and subdivided into various regencies (kabupaten), districts (kecamatan), and subdistricts (kecamatan), all of them are respectively administered by Bupati, Wedan, and Tjamat who are appointed by the governor. The lowest organ of government is the village council, consisting of 7-10 elective members, of whom the village headman (kepala negeri) is the chairman of the council.1

With regard to judicial system, in addition to village courts, district, regency and high courts, there is a supreme court (mahkamah agung) established in 1946, at Jakarta. It has original appellate and advisory jurisdictions. It has 8 judges and 2 secretaries. There are also a supreme court of islam (mahkamah agung islam), and a supreme military tribune (mahkamah agung tentara) at Jakarta, dealing with all religious and military affairs respectively.2

On August 22, 1950, a week after the establishment of the new Unitarian state, President Sukarno instructed Mohd. Natsir, chairman of the Masjumi, to form a new cabinet consisting of 18 ministers such as Mohd. Natsir, prime minister, Assaat, home minister, Mohd. Yum, minister for foreign affairs, Abdul Hakim, defence minister, etc. This cabinet lasted up to March 1951, and its ministers had different political affiliations such as Masjumi, P.S.I.I., P.I.R. and others.3

The situation in Indonesia first came before the security council on January 12, 1946, when the Ukrainian S.S.R. charged that the military actions against the local population by British and Dutch forces were illegal.

1. Prof. Sunarko: Dasar Hukum tatanegara, Jakarta, 1953, p. 260
   Mohd. Djuana dan Sulvan: tata negara Indonesia, Jakarta, 1956, pp. 221-223
Japanese forces threatened international peace and security. A Ukrainian proposal for an investigation commission was rejected as was an Egyptian resolution declaring that British troops should not be used against the Indonesian national movement and should be withdrawn after the complete surrender of the Japanese and the liberation of allied prisoners of war and internees. The matter was then considered.1

Various military and political disturbances occurred everywhere in Indonesia. Negotiations assisted by the British mediator, Sir Archibald Kerr, were conducted for the Netherlands by Dr. H.J. Van Mook and for the republic by Sutan Sjarir, prime minister, of the republic. Finally a Linggojati agreement was concluded by the two parties on March 25, 1947. The Dutch violated the agreement and on July 20, 1947, launched their first police action and occupied many areas in the republican territory. In response to this aggression, Mr. Nehru, on July 24, stated among others, the spirit of new Asia will not tolerate such things. No European country, whatever it may be, has any business to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia. When it does so, Asia will not tolerate it.2

On July 30, 1949, Australia and India drew the council's attention to fighting between the Netherlands and the republic of Indonesia. The security council on August 1, called upon the Netherlands and the republic (1) to cease hostilities forthwith and (2) to settle their disputes by arbitration or other peaceful means and to keep the council informed of the progress toward settlement.3

Three days later, the parties issued cease fire orders. Some fighting continued however and on August 25, the council called for joint

3. S.C.Official records 2nd yr. no.66, 1702-3
reports by the consuls of its members in Jakarta. It also offered its
good offices to the parties and set up a committee of good offices
for the settlement of the disputes. This committee consisted of three
members of the council, one chosen by the Netherlands, one by the
republic and third selected by the two previously chosen. The Nether­
lands selected Belgium, the republic chose Australia, and the two
then chose the United states.

On August 26, the council rejected a Belgian proposal to ask
the international court of justice for an opinion as to whether the
Council was competent to deal with the Indonesian question. It then
adopted a proposal which called on the parties to adhere strictly to
the cease fire resolution of August 1.

The Committee of good offices arrived in Jakarta in October
1947 and set about to assist the parties to reach agreement. Meanwhile
the consuls in Jakarta reported that hostilities had not ceased. The
two parties were interpreting the cease fire differently and it was
impossible to observe whether the council's order was being carried out.
The council thereupon called on the parties to consult with each other
directly or through committee of good offices (C.G.O) as to the best
means of giving effect to the cease fire order. The parties were
advised that the use of armed force to extend control over territory
not occupied on August 4, 1947, was inconsistent with the cease fire
resolution.

This action of the Security Council (S.C.) was followed by
the committee's calling upon the parties to appoint special committees
to meet with its military and other representatives for preliminary
work toward implementing this resolution.

1. U.N.S/514
2. S.C.Official record 2 d. yr.No.103, 2750
Soon the discussions were widened in scope and official
delusions were appointed to investigate the economic and political
questions involved. On December 8, under the auspices of the C.G.O.,
negotiations were begun aboard the United States navy transport,
Benville, anchored off Jakarta port. These negotiations culminated 6
weeks later in signing on January 17, 1948, of a Benville agreement.
At the same time the parties agreed to 12 political principles and two
days later, to 6 additional principles; the 18 to form the basis of
discussion for a final political settlement.

Among other matters, the truce agreement provided that
a stand fast and cease fire order be issued by both parties with a
demarcation line dividing the areas which each controlled. It also
called for the withdrawl of any republican military forces continuing
resistance behind the forward positions of the Netherlands forces;
for the maintenance of law and order; and for allowing trade and
intercourse between areas on either side of the demarcation lines.

The S.C. on February 28, 1948, noted with satisfaction the
sign of the Benville truce agreement and acceptance of political
principles as an agreed basis for the conclusion of a political settle­
ment. Unfortunately, the Dutch violated the agreement and renewed
hostilities and the dead-lock was inevitable.

During the summer of 1948, the Australian and United States
members of the C.G.C. attempted to break the dead-lock but the Nether­
lands did not accept their suggesed proposals as a basis for negotia­
tions. The situation was still more worse. On July 29, the council
called on both governments with the assistance of the C.G.O., for a
strict observance of the military and economic articles of the Benville

1. Graham congressional record- U.S.Senate, April, 1949, p.3922
2. peaceful settlement in Indonesia, U.N.Dept.of P.I.
1952, p.8
truce agreement and for full and easily implementation of the
Penneville political principles.

In September 29, the newly appointed United States representatives
on the committee, H. Merle Cochran, produced a new plan for breaking
the deadlock. The Netherlands, however, declined to begin political
discussion until a settlement was reached on implementation of the
Penneville truce agreement. Finally in December, the Netherlands
authorities informed the C.C.O. that there was no point for further
negotiations with the republic.

On December 19, the Netherlands renewed military action. The
republican heads of the government were captured in Jogjakarta on
the first days of operations and finally succeeded in conquering the
republican territories both in Java and Sumatra. The C.C.O. reported
to the S.C. that the Netherlands had violated the Penneville agreement.
As a result, the S.C. met immediately. On December 24, the council
called for an immediate cease fire and the release of president
Sukarno and other leading republicans. It repeated these demands four
days, later.1

On January 28, 1949, the S.C. acted decisively. It called
upon the Netherlands to discontinue all military operations and the
republic to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare and
both parties to cooperate in restoring peace and maintaining law and
order. The Netherlands was asked to release all political prisoners
arrested since December 17, and to facilitate the immediate return of
republican officials to Jogjakarta. The council also recommended the
parties to negotiate as soon as possible on the basis of establishing
as interim federal government not later than March 15, 1949; that elec-
tions for an Indonesian constituent assembly be completed by October 1,

1. Ibid p.12
1949; and that the transfer of sovereignty take place not later than July 1, 1950.1

To assist the parties in these negotiations and to act as its representative in Indonesia, the S.C. transformed the C.G.O. into the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (U.N.C.I.). The new commission was authorised to make recommendations to the parties and to the S.C. on matters within its competence. It was empowered to consult with representatives of areas other than the republic and to invite them to participate in negotiations; to observe elections to be held throughout Indonesia; and to assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the republic.

On February 26, the Netherlands informed the commission that it had decided to take the initiative to convene as soon as possible a round table conference at the Hague, to consider conditions for accelerated transfer of sovereignty to a representative federal government. The commission, the republic and the federal consultative body were invited to participate in the Hague conference.

On March 23, the president of the security council wrote to the commission that it was the sense of the council that the Commission participation in such a conference would be consistent with the purpose and objectives of the resolution of January 28. The commission was also instructed to assist the parties in reaching agreement as to both the implementation of the January 28 resolution and the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at the Hague.2

Armed with this directive, the commission summoned the parties to preliminary negotiations which began in the hotel des Indies Jakarta on April 14. The republicans were led by Mohd. Rum, while Dr. J.H.

1. New York Times, December 20, 1949
Van Royen headed the Netherlands delegation. After three months intensive negotiations, an agreement called Van Royen agreement was concluded by the two parties. The agreement provided among others the restoration of the republican government to its former capital at Jokjakarta, the issuance of cease fire order and participation of the republic in the forthcoming round table conference at the Hague.

On July 5, the members of the commission flew to Jokjakarta and the following day the commission's plane brought president Sukarno and members of his government from Bangka. On August 3, the republic and the Netherlands authorities issued simultaneously cease hostilities orders.

The round table conference convened at the Hague on August 23 and continued until November 2, 1949. At the opening session held in the ancient Riddezell, the commission whole-heartedly welcomed the conference and assured the delegations of its willingness to help in any case. The commission helped the parties in various difficult problems such as New Guinea, cooperation, union partner in the field of foreign relations, the rights of self-determination of people, consultation on monetary matters, the transfer of indemnities for expropriated properties, the most favoured nations treatment on the economic field, the disposition of the Surabaya naval base and the withdrawal of Dutch troops, etc. Consequently the conference agreed on a charter of the transfer of sovereignty on November 2, 1949. The U.N.O. considered the results of the round table conference to be eminently successful.

After the round table conference, the commission returned to Jakarta in order to observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements reached at that conference. On December 29, Queen Juliana

1. Ibid, pp.14-15
2. Round Table Conference, 1949
transferred sovereignty to Dr. Hatta and the crown representative in Jakarta did the same to Sultan Hamengku Buwono, the leader of the delegation of the United States of Indonesia. The members of the U.N.C. were also present in the ceremony.

Since then the U.N.C. for Indonesia continued to observe the implementation of the agreement. One of its major tasks was to observe the withdrawal of Netherlands armed forces. When this was effected smoothly, the commission was able to reduce and then in April, 1951, relieved its military observers of an enormous duty in behalf of peace so well done.1

Meanwhile, the United Nations has continued to assist the people of Indonesia in other ways. Through the United Nations international children's emergency fund, food and medical supplies have been given to hundreds of thousands of Indonesian children and expectant mothers and Unesco doctors have been working with specialists of the World Health Organization to combat yaws, malaria and other diseases. In the summer of 1950, experts of the United Nations, K.A.O. Unesco and W.H.O. visited Indonesia and drew technical assistance proposals in such important fields as agriculture and forestry, labour public health, civilian aviation small scale industries, social welfare and education.

As a result, by the middle of 1951, a number of experts were hard to work on specific projects in Indonesia. The United Nations appointed Sir Mirza Ismail of India as resident technical assistant representative to coordinate the work of the U.N. and its related

agencies and to advise the Indonesian government in securing further technical assistance. By the end of 1951, a large number of experts were to be work in Indonesia, some deputed by the U.N., others by F.A.O., I.C.A.O., I.L.O., Unesco and W.H.O. 1

At the request of the S.C. Sjahrir along with H.A. Salim arrived in New York on August 12, 1947. He appeared before the S.C. to explain the Indonesian problems and the Dutch aggression in Indonesia. Since then, the republic of Indonesia had had a permanent representative headed by N.L. Palar. On September 29, 1950, Indonesia became the 60th member of the U.N. by unanimous votes of the General Assembly. It also became a member of the United Nations regional agencies such as Unesco, Ilo, Who, Colombo plan etc. 2

1. Ibid p.18
FOREIGN POLICY.

The republic of Indonesia had adopted an active and independent foreign policy based on the interests of the people and aimed toward world peace and security. The Indonesian foreign policy was guided by the national philosophy of Pancha Sila—Belief in Divine Omnipotence, humanity, nationalism, democracy and social justice. It was a policy of peace and pacifism, a policy of good neighbours and international brotherhood and fraternity. It was framed on the basis of national politics, economic strength, military strength, geographical conditions of the country and the general outlooks as well as inspiration of the entire population.

The main objectives of the Indonesian foreign policy were as follows:

1. To defend the freedom of the people and the safety of the state;

2. To obtain from overseas those articles of daily necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the population—food especially rice, consumer goods of various kinds, medicines and so on;

3. To obtain capital equipment to rebuild what had been destroyed or damaged and capital for industrialisation, new construction and the partial mechanisation of agriculture;

4. To strengthen principles of international law and the aid in achieving social and social justice on an international scale, in line with the U.N. charter, with special reference to articles, 1, 2 and 55 in particular by endeavouring within the U.N. framework to help the people still living within the colonial system to achieve freedom;
5. To place special emphasis on initiating good relations with neighbouring countries, the majority of which have in the past occupied a position similar to Indonesia and;

6. To seek fraternity among nations through the realisation of the ideals of enshrined in the Panch S"ila (five postulates) which constitute the basic Indonesian philosophy. In short, Indonesia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all nations on a basis of mutual respect and non-interference with each other's structure of government. 1

The Indonesian foreign policy is not a neutrality, for a neutrality had a precise meaning in international law, defining a condition on impartiality toward belligerent states. As a member of the U.N., the republic of Indonesia can not adopt an attitude of neutrality. It is committed to international solidarity. Indonesia is friend to all and enemy to none and pays no favourites between the two opposed blocs, Russian and American and follows its own path through the various international problems. This is an Indonesian active and independent policy, said Dr. Hatta. Furthermore, the Independent policy does neither mean an isolationist and opportunistic policy, nor a neutrality policy, said Hadjosurrote, a member of the parliament of Indonesia. 2

With regard to the present cold war between the Anglo-American bloc and the Russian bloc, the former prime minister, Dr. Sukiman, stated before parliament in May, 28, 1951, 1 Dr. Mohd. Hatta: Indonesian foreign policy, I.I.S., New Delhi 1954, p. 1

that the government preserve friendly relations with all states and will not aggravate conditions by taking part in the cold war, which is now raging between the two blocks. The Wihopo cabinet on May 22, 1952 and Ali Sastroamidjojo government in March 16, 1956, emphasised on the active and independent foreign policy and not neutral and positive ones as well as non-alignment with any of the two blocks; even today every government of Indonesia is pursuing the same policy.1

In short, the former prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, defending Indonesian neutralism in July 13, 1956, said "what does neutralism mean? It means that we are neutral, as meant in times of war like some European countries in the previous war. We only do our utmost to prevent a next war which we believe will only result in the extinction of human civilisation. We are not neutral in terms of ideology since the Indonesian nation believes in the Panch Sila as basic guidance for the execution of the national life.2

In order to strengthen the ideals of peace and solidarity the constitution of the republic provided that the government shall work for the inclusion of the republic of Indonesia in international organisations and shall endeavour to solve its differences with other states in a peaceful manner and in that connection to ask for and accept international arbitration or the jurisdiction of international courts.

Regarding the last Korean war and Palistine conflict, Indonesia maintained her independent policy and took no alignment with any bloc as well as endeavoured to lessen the danger of the disputes and reduced international tensions in general. Indonesia has offered her good officers to India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir dispute, Egypt on the Anglo-Egyptian conflict (1953), the People's republic of China on the Sino-American dispute over Taiwan (1955) and others.

Moreover, Indonesia has been and is to struggle for self government of every nation everywhere in the world and considers imperialism and colonialism as an ethical evil and social plague, and enemy number one and therefore it must be eradicated thoroughly. President Sukarno quoted the words of Jean Jaures: 'Imperialism is the great blackmailer, imperialism is the great interguant. At the 9th anniversary of the Indonesian independence in August, 17, 1954, at Jakarta, he said that colonial domination must be swept from the surface of the earth in whatever form, in whatever design, in whatever field it may appear. The right of self determination and extended to all nations, irrespective of colour, descent, creed, political ideology, social ideology-indeed without regard to the stage of civilization; every nation should be fully entitled to exercise its right of self determination. 1. Indonesia has been supporting the peoples of Morocco and Tunisia, Indo-China-Malaya, Pandichary and Goa and

12 Sukarno: Be in harmony with the will of god, I.I.S., N.Delhi 1954, p.21.
other colonial countries in their struggle for national liberation and emancipation of foreign dominations.

To achieve international cooperation, mutual understanding and world peace and security, Indonesia has endorsed in September 1954, the Nehru-Chou En Lai doctrine or Panch Syla (mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit and peace coexistence). 1 Indonesia has also become member of the U.N.O. and its regional organisations like Unesco, who, etc. It joined the Asian African group in the United nations formed in 1951 under the chairmanship of L.N.Pelar, consisting of 29 states at present. It attended a South East Asia conference held in Baguio, the Philippines in May 1950. The three man Indonesian delegation headed by H.A.Salim participated in the Inter Asian relations conference convened by the Indian council of world affairs in March 1947 at New Delhi. The representatives of 15 countries including Indonesia took part in the Delhi conference on Indonesia sponsored by the prime minister of India, Mr.Nehru, in January 20-23, 1949, to consider the fast deteriorating situation in Indonesia. The former prime minister of Indonesia Ali Sastroamidjojo participated in the Colombo power's conference in Ceylon in April-May, 1954. The second conference of the Colombo powers took place in Bogor, Indonesia, in December 28, 29, 1954. As a result of this conference the first Asian African conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April,

1. Press information bureau, New Delhi, June 28, 1954
28-24, 1955, which was attended by 600 delegates from 29 countries of Asia and Africa and 500 journalists from all over the world. 1

The main purpose of the conference would be: 1. to promote good will and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish further friendly and neighbourly relations; 2. to consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of countries represented; 3. to consider problems of special interests to Asian and African peoples, e.g. problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism 4. To view position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in their position in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of the world peace and cooperation. 2

The conference was inaugurated by president Sukarno and presided over by Ali Sastroamidjojo. It adopted the Dasa Sila for promotion of world peace and cooperation: 1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purpose and principles of the charter of the United Nations. 2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small. 4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country. 5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the charter of the U.N. 6. Abstention

1. Indonesian review, published by publishing institute, Jakarta, Vol.2, no.2 Jan-March, 1954, pp.5-16
2. Bogor, issued by I.S.I., New-Delhi February, 1955, p.31
tion from the use of arrangement of collective defence to serve the particular interests of the big powers. b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on the other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. 8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice in conformity with the charter of the U.N. (promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.)

As Indonesia is pursuing an active and independent policy so she is deadly opposed to any military pacts or alliances like Seato (8 Sept., 1954), the Anzus pact (1955), the Baghdad pact (1955) and the Nato as well. She is also opposed to further production, use and tests of any explosive weapons like H. and Atomic bombs. And on the contrary, she suggested for the peaceful and constructive use of these weapons and not for destructive ones. In April 20, 1956, the Indonesian parliament passed a resolution requesting the big powers to ban all atomic bomb tests any where in the world.

Indonesia has been negotiating with the Philippines govt. regarding the problem of Indonesian immigrants to the Philippines numbering between 5000 and 6000 people. A peaceful settlement is expected to be concluded forthwith. After the signing of the Japanese peace treaty in 1952 at San Francisco, U.S.A., Indonesia

1. Asian African bulletin 24 April, 1955, p.6
had demanded from the Japanese government to pay the war reparation, amounting about $800 million. Mr. Aichiro Fujiyama, foreign minister of Japan and Dr. Subardjo, foreign minister of Indonesia, signed a peace treaty and reparation agreement on 20 January, 1958 at Jakarta. An agreement on dual nationality of the Chinese community (about 3 million) in Indonesia has been signed by the prime minister, Chou en Lei and the former foreign minister of Indonesia, Mr. Sunarjo in April 22, 1955 at Jakarta. The government abolished the dual system of the Chinese nationality. 1

Indonesia has established diplomatic relations with different nations all over the world. The following countries have formally recognised the republic of Indonesia, establishing their diplomatic missions in Jakarta: Great Britain (March 20, 1947), U.S.A (April 23, 1947), Burma (November 23, 1948), Egypt (June 1, 1947), Lebanon (April 29, 1947), Syria (July 2, 1947), Iraq (July 16, 1947), Afghanistan (September 23, 1947), South Africa (December 26, 1949), Ceylon (December 26, 1949), the Philippines (December 28, 1949), Belgium, Switzerland and the Chinese nationalist government of Formose (December 30, 1949), India (1947), Turkey (December 29, 1949), Ireland (December 30, 1949), Pakistan (1947), Canada (December 30, 1949), Jordan and Italy (January 7, 1950), Israel (January 9, 1950), U.S.S.R. (January 26, 1950), Chile (February 16, 1950), Yugoslavia (February 1, 1950), Hungary (February 3, 1950), Poland (February 24, 1950), Rumania (February 17, 1950), Brussels (March 24, 1950), the Netherlands (December 29, 1950), the republic of Sudan (January 4, 1956), Tunisia

1. Republican Review, no. 2: op. cit. pp. 87-90
May 15, 1956), the republic of new China (1952) and Malaya
(31 August, 1957) and others.1

The republic of Indonesia has set up diplomatic missions
in over 35 countries such as India, Burma, U.S.A. Japan,
China, U.S.S.R., France, Britain, Netherlands, etc. And over
33 foreign countries have established their embassies and
consulates in Indonesia in 1957. Indonesia has also signed a
treaty of friendship with India, (March 3, 1951) Burma (March
31, 1951) Pakistan (1950), Syria and Egypt (1950), Thailand
December 1, 1954), Afghanistan (April 24, 1954), Iraq (May 15,
1956), the Philippines (June 21, 1951) Malaya (1955) and others.
It also signed cultural treaties with India (December 29, 1955)
and Egypt (October, 1955), etc. It has trade relations with over
52 countries like India, U.S.A, U.K etc. and obtained favourable
balance of trade since the transfer of sovereignty in 1949.2

The Republic of Indonesia has been sending numerous
delegations to participate in the I.L.O. conference in Karachi
(December 27, 1950-Jan. 2, 1951) international youth conference
(December 9-19, 1950), the 5th Ecafe conference in Singapore
(November 11, 1949), Ecafe iron and steel depart. conference
at Bangkok (August 30, 1949), Unesco conference in India (1949,
1956 and 1957), the Ecafe transport experts conference in
Singapore (October 11, 1949), Indian women congress in Madras
(July, 1948), All Asian peasant conference in Baguio (October
1948). The Ecafe conference at Baguio, Philippines (November 28

1. Perwakilan I.L. di luar negeri, diterbitkan oleh Kemlu,
Jakarta, 1956, pp. 3-21
2. Pewarta Kemlu, Djuli-Agustus dan Oktober-Nopemember, 1956;
Almenek Kempen, Jakarta, 1951, p. 307

To further international understanding and good will, Indonesia has been despatching the cultural and good missions to different countries the world over. It sent a pilgrimage mission to Mecca (September 20, 1949 and 1955) good will and parliamentary missions to Moscow (April 16, 1950 and 1956), parliamentary mission to U.K. (May 1951), good will mission to the Philippines (1950), cultural and parliamentary missions to China (1956 and 1957), good will mission to U.S.A. and Canada (1948 and 1956), president Sukarno mission to America and Canada (1956), to Russia, Eastern Europe and China (August 1956) as well as E.A.A. and Middle East (January 1958). Similarly various cultural, good will, and parliamentary missions of foreign countries were also paying visits to Indonesia.2

**Development of Political Parties**

An important movement in the history of the development of political parties, existing in free Indonesia side by side with parliament was the issuance of the government political

1. Indonesian review, no.1 Jakarta, January 1951, p.307
2. Pewarta Kealu! op.cit.
manifesto of November 3, 1945, This Political manifesto was like a trumpet and trombone heralding a general mobilisation of democracy in the form of the rise of political parties all over the country.

On November 7, 1945, there was the formation of the party Masjumi (consultative council of Indonesian Muslims) on the continuation of the religious outlook. There are still other Islamic parties such as P.S.S.I. (Islamic association party of Indonesia), Ferti, Karul Islam Movement, Nahdatul Ulama, Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia, Serikat Perang Islam Indonesia etc. The partai katholik republic Indonesia (P.K.R.I.) and Christian protestant party came into existence in 1945. The Sermi (Muslim party of Indonesia) was formed in South Borneo in 1945. Thus all these parties were based on religious principles.

On November 17, 1945, there was also the establishment of the partai socialist Indonesia led by Sutan Sjahrir and partai rachat socialist Indonesia led by Amir Sjarifuddin. The partai komunis Indonesia (P.K.I.) was formed in October 21, 1945, under the presidency of Soeh. Jusuf and now Audit. The Femuda socialist Indonesia (Persindo) Perisan Tani Indonesia (B.T.I) Central organisasi buruh seluruh Indonesia (Cobsi), followed suit. The general Indonesian trade union was replaced in November 1945 by the partai buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Labour party), under the leadership of Mr. Satiadji. The partai rachat djelata (common people's party) was formed in November 1945, under the presidency of Mr. Sutan Lewinis. All these parties were, however based on the Marxist socialism.

1. K.L. Holland: op.cit. p.190
2. Repartein di Indonesia, Kempen Jakarta 1955
On January 29, 1946, the partai nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.) was established at Kediri, East Java. Many other parties based on nationalism included Persatuan Indonesia Raja (P.I.R.), partai Indonesia Raja (Parindra), partai rakjat Indonesia (P.R.I.), partai demokrasi rakjat (P.D.R.), partai kaboanatan Indonesia (Parki), partai kedaulatan rakjat (P.K.R.), serikat kerakjatan Indonesia (S.K.I.), ikatan nasional Indonesia (I.N.I.) partai buruh Indonesia merdeka, partai rakjat, saburun rakjat revolusioner (S.R.R.) partai murba partai rakjat nasional (P.R.N.) masyarakat wanita Indonesia and others. There are also partai Tionghoa (P.T.), partai aceh Indonesia (P.A.I.), partai Indo, etc.

In short, there were in 1955, 22 parties and political groups in the provisional parliament of Indonesia. The strength of these parties in the parliament was as follows: Nasjumi 39, P.N.I. 41, P.I.R. 22, P.I.R. 15, P.R.I. 17, Demorat 9, P.N.I. 9 Kathlik, 8, Parkindo, 4, E.R.I. 4, partai buruh 5, perindra 6, kedaulatan rakjat 1, S.K.I. 4, E.R.I. 2, persatuan progressif 9, partai murba 4, jobsi 2, C.T.I. 1 Parti 1, N.U. 7, non-party 14.

Prior to the general election, local elections were successfully held in the Kinahara (June 1951) in Jogjakarta (July, 1951), and in Macassar (August-September, 1951). The Harshap cabinet conducted the first general election for parliament (September 29) and for the constituent assembly on December 15, 1955. According to the election law enacted in April 1, 1953, by the provisional parliament, the general elections should be carried on the basis of the following points:

1. F. Abdul Gani: Parlemen dan kepertain di Indonesia, Djakarta, 1954
2. J. Radhakrishna: op. cit. p. 43
1. All citizens of 18 and over and married people of younger age have the right to vote irrespective of sex, property, status or residence; (2) The electors elect directly the members of the constituent assembly and the parliament (3) The voting will be by secret ballot; 4. The election system used was to be a proportional electoral system. 5. The country was divided into 15 constituencies (3 for Java, 1 for Jakarta metropolitan area, 3 for Sumatra, 2 for Kalimantan, 2 for Sulawesi, 1 for Maluku, 2 for Lesser Sunda Islands and 1 for West Irian); 6. Provision was made for independent to stand as candidates as well as for political parties nominees. (7) The basis of voting was that for every 150,000 people one delegate should be elected for the constituent assembly (500 members) and for every 300,000 people, one delegate should be elected for the unicameral parliament (250 members).

To carry out the general elections the following committees had been appointed: 1. the central electoral committee of Indonesia, (2) the electoral district electoral committee, (3) the kabupaten electoral committee, (4) the voting committee and (5) the committee for the registration of electors.

There were about 190 parties, organisations and independent candidates contesting the general election in 280 constituencies all over Indonesia. West Irian has been allotted 3 seats. The Chinese, Arabian and European minorities would have respectively 9, 6 and 3 members in the parliament and 18, 12 and 6 in the constituent assembly.

1. Indonesian review, Jakarta, 1954, p.45
2. Indonesia, I.I.S., New Delhi, 1956
The result of the general election for parliament (September 29, 1955) was announced in March 6, 1956, by the central election commission as follows: Masjumi 57 seats; P.N.I. 57; B.U. 45; P.K.I. 4; Partai Sili; Partai 2; P.H.N. 2; P.P.P.I. 2; Murba 2; labour party 2; P.R.I. 2; P.P.I.M. 1; Peratuan Dajak 1; A.K.U.I. 1; Fakfak Desa 2; Permai 1; Gerindo 1; Mr. Sujono 1; reserved for west Irian 3; total 260 representatives.

Whereas the results of the election for constituent assembly held in December 15, 1955, were: P.N.I. 119; Masjumi 112; N.U. 91; P.K.I. 80; P.S.I.I. 16; Parkindo. 16; katholik 10; P.S.I. 10; I.P.K.I 8; Perti 7; C.P.P. 2; P.H.N. 3; P.R.I. 3; Murba 4; P. Buruh 5; P.P.I. 2; P.P.I.M. 2; Akui 1; Acoma 1; P.P.T.I. 1; partai rakjat desa 1; h.Sujono 1; P.I.R. (faction) 2; P.I.R. (faction 2; permai 2; baparki 2; Gerindo 2; partai Dajak 3; C.P.Sunda 1; P.T.I. 1; R. Keprabon 1; G. Banten R.I.I; P.I.R. (Nasateng) 1; L.M. Idurs 2; and reserved for West Irian 6; total 520 representatives.

Chairman of the Indonesian central election committee, Mr. S. Haikusumo, stated that an amount of Rp. 479,891,298 has been spent for the conduct of the general elections, 60% of a population of 77 million, 987,879 or 43,104,464 have gone to the polls. 87.65% of the voters were valid. The new constituent assembly was scheduled to meet on June 4, 1956 at Bandung under the chairmanship of Mr. Wilopo, former prime minister of the republic. The provisional parliament would thus be dissolved. The constituent assembly has been in session to frame a new permanent constitution of the republic of Indonesia.

3. Ibid.
Soon after the general election, the Harahap cabinet formed in August 12, 1955, was replaced by the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet in March 16, 1956, which consisted of 25 ministers (6 P.M.I.; 5 Masjumi; 4 N.U.; 2 Catholic party; 2 P.S.I.I.; 2 Parkindo; 1 Ipki; 1 Perti; and 1 non party). Among the important ministers were Moah Rum (dy. P.M.), Ruslan A. Gani (foreign minister), Mr. Sunario (home minister), Mr. Yusuf Wibisono (minister of economics), Mr. K.H. Fatah Jasin (information minister) and others. This cabinet has 180 representatives in the parliament.

Since the proclamation of independence in August 17, 1945, there have been 18 coalition cabinets; Sukarno presidential cabinet (August 19, 1945-November 14, 1945); Shahrir first cabinet (Nov. 14, 1945-June 29, 1946); Shahrir second cabinet (June 26, 1946-Oct. 2, 1946); Shahrir’s third cabinet (Oct. 2, 1946-June 23, 1947); Sjarifuddin cabinet (July 3, 1947-January 23, 1948); Hatta cabinet (January 29, 1948-December 19, 1948); Sjafruddin emergency cabinet (December 18, 1948-July 14, 1949); Hatta second cabinet (December 19, 1949-Sept. 6, 1950); Natcir cabinet (Sept 7, 1950-March 20, 1951); Sukiman cabinet (March 27, 1951-April 1952); Wilopo cabinet (April 11, 1953-June 3, 1953); Ali Sastroamidjojo first cabinet (August 1, 1953-July 24, 1955); Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet (August 12, 1955-April 16, 1956); Ali Sastroamidjojo second cabinet (March 16, 1956-March 14, 1957) and Djuanda Karya cabinet (April 19, 1957-......).

1 Indonesia, Vol 11, no. 3, 1956, issued by the ministry of information, Jakarta, pp. 1-3
Due to the shortcomings of the Ali Sastroamidjojo government, general regional dis-satisfactions and discontents, strong demand for provincial autonomy, resignation of vice-president, Dr. Hatta on December 1, 1956, unequal distribution of finance and national reconstructions between the centre and the various provinces and others, the provincial governments in Sumatra, Borneo, East Indonesia and Java revolted against the central government in December, 1956, up to the present moment (1958), under the military commanders who took over the provincial and regional authorities. Besides, after the Masjumi, Ipki, and Perti withdrew their ministers from the Ali cabinet, the prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, was compelled to render his resignation to president Sukarno on March 14, 1957. The president accepted it and asked him to remain in office until a new cabinet was formed. On the same day he also proclaimed a state of war and siege over the entire territory of the republic of Indonesia because of the critical situation. After unsuccessful attempts of the general chairman of the nationalist party of Indonesia, Mr. Suwirjo, to form a cabinet, on April 7, 1957, president Sukarno, on April 8, appointed himself cabinet formateur. After consultations with 69 political leaders in Jakarta, he formally announced the formation of a Karya cabinet headed by Dr. Djuanda on April 9, 1957. This cabinet is called an extra parliamentary emergency Karya cabinet with 24 ministers. Among the important members of the cabinet are H.R. Djuanda (P.M.), Mr. Hardi (dy. premier), B.K. Idham Chalid (dy. premier), Dr. Subandrio (foreign minister) Sanusi Hardjadinata (Home minister), G.A. Maengkom (minister for justice), Sudibjo (information minister), Mr. Sutikno Slamet (finance minister), etc. 1.

1. Madjallah Kotapradjo; Kabinet karya terbentuk, no. 8, 15 April 1957. DD. 3-5.
The programme of the new cabinet consists of (1) to form a national council, (2) to normalise conditions in the republic, (3) to proceed with the effectuation of the abrogation of the round table conference agreements, (4) to promote reconstruction and (5) to fight for West Irian. 1

The formation of the non-party man cabinet was in accordance with the president Sukarno's conception announced in February 21, 1957 at Jakarta. An emergency law of May 8, 1957, established a national council headed by president Sukarno himself consisting of 45 representatives of the provinces, political parties and other organisations, civil and military services, etc. All the members of the council were sworn in on Friday 12, July, 1957. They were all appointed and removed by president. Buslan Abdul Gani was appointed as a deputy chairman and general secretary of the council. The council is to give the cabinet solicited and unsolicited advice, on important national questions.2

The emergency laws set up a Moluccas province on August 10, 1957 and divided the central Sumatra into three provinces: West Sumatra, Riau and Djambl in August 8, 1957. Each is governed by a provincial council headed by a governor. Different local elections for legislative assemblies and municipal councils were taking place all over the country. On September 10-14, 1957, the central government organised a national conference at Jakarta, which was attended by over 100 representatives of all provinces, central government, armed forces and other national leaders, to discuss the present national political crisis. It is hoped that the political

1. Indonesia, Vol.VIII no.10 June1, 1958, N.Delhi pp.4-5
crisis. It is hoped that the political instability will soon be solved by a guided democracy as suggested by president Sukarno on November, 1956. The present multi-party system which is also responsible for the instability of government should be consolidated and merged into a few parties based on the conception of nationalism, Islamism and Marxism. There must however be at most four or five instead of over 38 political parties as present, namely nationalist party, Islamic political party, socialist and others.1

Regarding economic field, the republic of Indonesia has still great tasks ahead. It appointed a provisional economic planning commission headed by Dr. Hatta in March 20, 1958. It again set up a national economic planning commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Djuanda, minister of economics, to prepare a five year plan in April 7, 1955. The following are the scope and costs of the five year plan: 1. agriculture, transmigration and other projects for social improvement Rp. 1,850,000,000; 2. Transport, communications and radios, Rp. 2,850,000,000; 3. industry and mining Rp. 2,850,000,000; 4. Irrigation and multi purpose projects 2,850,000,000; 5. education, health and social projects Rp. 1,350,000,000. The total budget to finance the 5 year plan (1956-1960), is Rp. 11,400,000,000 or $1,000,000,000 of which $200,000,000 has to be spent per year.2

Large and small scale industries are in good progress at present. There are over 15,632 industrial plants and workshops with 526,797 employees throughout Indonesia in January, 1957. 

Extensive and intensive agriculture are being undertaken by both

1. Press note no. 2 issued by the I.I.S. New Delhi, 18 January 1957, p. 3; Hindustan times, August 11, 1957; Radion republic of Indonesia, Jakarta September 14, 1957.
2. Bintang Timir, September Jakarta 1956
the government and private enterprises. Agricultural products both commercial and consumption goods are increasing consider­ably from time to time. The number of cooperative societies increases remarkably that is 5,770 (1950), 7,667 (1952), 8,223 (1953), 9,000 (1955). In 1956, many new cooperative societies came into being the various parts of the country.1

Financially Indonesia is facing economic instability because of inflation and constant budget deficits every year. These budget deficits are Rp. 1,384,152,600 (1950), Rp. 2,755,700,200 (1951), Rp. 2,785,000,000 (1952), Rp. 2,068,000,000 (1953), Rp. 3,602,000,000 (1954), Rp. 1,833,000,000 (1955), Rp. 1,000,000,000 (1956), Rp. 4.7 billion (1957). 2

In order to overcome the financial difficulties, Indonesia has to take loans from various states of the world in millions rupiahs as follows:

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<th>Years</th>
<th>U.S. $</th>
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<td>9.3</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<td>824.3</td>
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<td>188.6</td>
<td>774.9</td>
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In addition, Indonesia is also confronting with the problem of ever-increasing population. The Indonesia population since 1938 to 1956 is as follows: 68.4 million (1938); 75 m.

1. Ibid October 2nd p.2
2. Ibid Statistik 1956, 17 August, Jakarta, p. 164
3. Bintang Timur, 12 October, Jakarta, 1956, p.2
In Java the density is 410.4 per sq. km., on the other islands 15 or an average of 43.2 per sq. km. The population is composed of 38% of people under 15 years of age, 57% between 15-60 years and 5% above 60. In 1950, the birth rate was 4%, the mortality 2%. This means an increase of 1.6 millions. The population increases at least 1½ % or 1.2 millions. In 1970, Indonesia will have a population of more than 100 millions.1

In order to overcome the ever-lasting increasing population the republic of Indonesia is endeavouring to carry out a plan of transmigration service. It has appointed the central transmigration service under the chairmanship of Mr. Sudarno Surjodibunto, to deal with all transmigration activities. The budget for the transmigration programme has been increased since 1950 to 1956: in 1950, Rp 48,000; 1951, Rp 5,000,000; 1954, Rp 55,000,000; 1955, Rp 64,000,000; 1956, Rp 84,000,000; and Rp 375,000,000 as estimated in the five year plan.2

In the field of social welfare, the health ministry has been attempting to improve the existing general hygienic conditions of the people all over the country. In 1950, Indonesia has 694 hospitals with 68,732 beds. In 1956, a new general hospital was to be constructed at Jakarta at a cost of Rp. 30,000,000.

The total personnel of the public health services consisted in 1956 of 1200 doctors, 150 dentists, 80 pharmacists, 650 assistant pharmacists, 1446 midwives, 3,500 nurses and 30 analysts (bacteriologists).

1. Statistik, 1956: op. cit. p.11
To face this shortage of medical personnel namely 1200 doctors for 85 million people, various attempts have been made by the government to set up more medical colleges (2 new medical colleges in Jogja and Surabaya in 1955), nursing schools, hospitals and policlinic and to get more aids and medicines from the U.N.O. (12 W.H.O. experts in 1955) and other states for the rehabilitation of the public health in Indonesia. The ministry of health is desiring to institute one hygienic office or centre for every desa in order to save more than 90% of the people living in rural areas of 28,000 desas. The government has also established a community project development and national extension services, dealing people’s welfare. The amount of Rp. 190,000,000 (1955) and Rp. 675,000,000 (1956) have been allotted for the construction of houses and buildings to accommodate a large number of the people.

Moreover, remarkable progress has been made in the field of education and culture. Since 1950, Indonesia has the following types of schools: 1. Kindergarten, (2) elementary schools, (3) lower secondary schools, (4) higher secondary schools, (5) special colleges or academies and (6) universities.

In 1952-1953, there were over 306 kindergarten (24, 180 students); 26, 670 elementary schools (5,318,024 students); 1125 lower secondary schools (205,532 students); 180 higher secondary schools (37, 395 students and 10 universities (14,677 students). There were in 1956, 495 higher secondary schools with 98,000 students and 23,984 students (21,747 government and 2237 private)

1. Ibid, p.6
in the colleges and universities). 1

The government has adopted the following system of combating adult illiteracy: (1) spell period; (2) local post literacy; (3) general post literacy combined with general course and newspaper and (4) the connection with various so-called prosperity services such as physical, cultural groups, youth organisations and boy scouts. Consequently, the ten year programme of the mass education is going ahead; the official figures of literacy are now: Java, 54.3%; Sumatra, 55.5%; Kalimantan 33.3%; Sulawesi, 54.5%; Lesser Sundas 55.5% and Molukas, 20%. The govt is also working to build up more and more schools and universities and to progress national literature, languages, press and newspapers, etc. 2

The republic of Indonesia has been endeavouring to solve the West Irian dispute peacefully. The West Irian is of course a part and parcel of Indonesia with 1 million people and area of 413,000 sq. km. According to Art. 2 of the round table conference's charter, that with regard to the residency of New Guinea, it is provided that the status quo of the residency shall be maintained, with the stipulation that with a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the republic of the United States of Indonesia, the question of the political status of New Guinea shall be determined through negotiations between the republic of the U.S.I. and the kingdom of the Netherlands. 3

In 1950, in accordance with the Hague agreement, two conferences were held in Holland at ministerial level to determine the future status of West Irian. But these conferences

1. H. A. Cani: op. cit. p.164; and Waspada 22 September Medan, 1956
2. Dept. of Mass education, issued by P.P.K. 21 Feb. 1953
3. Truth about West Irian, published by the ministry of information of R.I., Jakarta, pp.35-37
were fruitless due to stubborn attitude of the Dutch government. Again in the December 1951, a third conference was held to overcome the impass created by the Dutch. The republic of Indonesia had given much concessions to the Dutch. The fourth conference was convened in February 1952 at the Hague.

Inspite of the strong protest by Indonesia against the Dutch policy, the West Irian was unilaterally annexed by the Netherlands in February 19, 1952, in midst of pending conferences and negotiations. It was included in the Dutch constitution.

In the meanwhile, the Indonesian cabinet decided to set up Bureau Irian with the task of coordinating and executing all means to restore West Irian to Indonesian territory. The panitia aksi pembeasan Irian (Irian liberation action committee) and All Indonesia Congress were formed in December 25, 1954 to strive for the emancipation of West Irian.

In August 10, 1954, the negotiation was resumed in the Hague to terminate the Dutch Indonesian Union with its R.T.C. agreements of 1949. As a result of this conference, a new protocol was signed by foreign minister, Mr. Sunario for Indonesia and by the Dutch foreign minister, Mr. Luns, for the Netherlands. But both the parliaments of the two countries have never ratified it.

Another conference was held in the Hague in December 10-17, 1955 and continued in Geneva in January 7-February 10, 1956 to substitute the new protocol and to settle the west Irian disputes and others. The Indonesian foreign minister, Mr. Anak A.Dge Agung returned to Indonesia without any result.

In the light of the dead-lock in the negotiations between the delegations, the republic of Indonesia has unilaterally declared the abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian union statute on February 15, 1956. In February 21, the Indonesian Charge d'affairs
In Holland informed the Dutch government about this situation. In March, 1956, the Indonesian permanent representative in the U.N.O. Mr. Sudjarwo did the same to the secretary general Mr. Dag Hammerskjold. On March 1, the Indonesian parliament has adopted the abrogation bill by a 108 to 80 votes. The diplomatic relations between the two countries were maintained on the basis of international law. The Colombo Power's conference (1954), the Afro-Asian Conference (April, 1955), and A.A groups at the U.N.O. fully supported the Indonesian claim over Irian Barat. The Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Cairo (December 1957) also expressed its help and sympathy to Indonesia. The General assembly of 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957 has constantly discussed the west Irian question without any good result. This led Indonesia in January 1958, to sever economic, cultural, and to some extent diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. A central action committee for the liberation of West Irian was formed in Jakarta, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sudibjo, information minister. Public opinion and the populace as whole have been mobilised to liberate Irian from the Dutch domination. All Dutch firms and plants have been taken over by the government. These firms are 500 in number and 50,000 Dutch nationals in Indonesia may leave the country without any restriction from the Indonesian government.

The abrogation of the R.T.C. agreement resulted in

1. Politically, the republic of Indonesia has set up a West Irian province at Tidore in May, 1956. The administration of the province is conducted by a governor, Zainal Abidin Shah, who is assisted by an advisory council of five members. The functions of the governor are: 1. To fight for the return of the de facto

1. Ibid, pp.30-33; W.Suyasa Mentjakai Irian merdeka, Bandung, 1955, pp.20-38
sovereignty over West Irian to Indonesia; (2) to carry out an autonomous administration and (3) to build up broader areas.

(2) Economically, in August 4, 1956, the republic of Indonesia announced that it would not pay any debts to the Netherlands amounting to 3,664,000,000 guilders. All Dutch companies and interests will be regulated by special laws.

Internationally, Indonesia firmly condemned the Anglo-French Israel aggression on the Egyptian territory in August 1956, the British action in Comman in August 1957 and in other west Asian countries. Indonesia along with other nations demanded the immediate withdrawal of their armed forces from the Egyptian soil in conformity with the general assembly resolutions of November 2, 4 and 7 and in accordance with a joint communique of the Colombo power's Conference of November 12-14, 1956 in New-Delhi. The Indonesian delegates K.A.Cani, Ir.Subandrio, etc. participated in the London Conference on Suez Canal on August 18-24, 1956. It again sent 650 men of army unit to join the U.N. emergency forces in Egypt. Besides, Indonesia was strongly reacting against the Eisenhower doctrine in West Asia which would increase the confusion there. Regarding the Russian armed intervention in Hungary, the Asian African groups in the U.N. and Colombo powers resolutions including Indonesia, also demanded the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Hungary and supported the struggle of the people of Eastern Europe for complete self-determination. Indonesia is always supporting India and Pakistan in their fight against the segregation policy of south Africa government. It also gives full support to the admission of the

1. Indonesia Vol. VII, No.30, IIS New Delhi, Sept. 1, 1956, p.6
People's republic of China to the U.N. In September, 1957, it has recognised the independence of Malaya when the latter achieved its freedom in August 31, 1957 and supported its admission to the U.N. in September 18, 1957. It again welcomes the re-unification movements of Germany, Korea and Indo-China as well as peaceful settlements of the Kashmir dispute. It is deadly opposed to the cold war and future world war as well.

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APPENDICES

A. LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT, MARCH 25, 1947.

PREAMBLE.

The Netherlands government represented by the commission general for the Netherlands Indies and the government of the republic of Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian delegation, moved by a sincere desire to insure good relations between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia in New form of voluntary cooperation which offer the best guarantee for sound and strong development of both countries in the future and which make it possible to give a new foundation to the relationship between the two peoples; agree as follows and will submit this agreement at the shortest possible notice for the approval of the respective parliaments:

Article 1. The Netherlands government recognises the government of the republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through mutual cooperation, in republican territory. To this end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that this inclusion shall be completed at the latest on the date mentioned in article XII.

Article 11. The Netherlands government and the government of the republic shall cooperate in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia.

Article 111. The united states of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies with provision, however, that in case the population of any territory,
after due consultation with the other territories, shall decide by
democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to
join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special
relationship for such a territory to the U.S.I. and to the kingdom
of the Netherlands.

Art. IV. The component parts of the U.S.I. shall be the
republic of Indonesia, Borneo and the Great East without
projudice to the right of the population of any territory to
decide by democratic process that its position in the U.S.I. shall
be arranged otherwise.

Without derogation of the provisions of Art. III and
the first paragraph of this art., the U.S.I. shall may make
special arrangements concerning the territory of its capital.

Art. V. The constitution of the U.S.I. shall be determine
by a constituent assembly composed of the democratically
nominated representatives of the republic and of the other future
partners of the U.S.I. to which the following paragraph of this
art. shall apply.

Both parties shall consult each other on the method
of participation in this constituent assembly by the republic of
Indonesia, by the territories not under the authority of the
republic and by the groups of the population not or insufficiently
represented with due observance of the responsibility of the
Netherlands government and the republic of theirs public respective-
ly.

Art. VI. To promote the joint interests of the Netherlands
and Indonesia, the Netherlands government and the government of the
republic of Indonesia shall cooperate in the establishment of a
Netherlands Indonesian Union by which the kingdom of Netherlands,
comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies, Suriname and
Caracas, shall be converted into said union consisting of the one hand of the kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands Surinam and Curacao and on the other hand, the U.S.I.

The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between the Netherlands and Surinam and Curacao.

Art. VII. A. The Netherlands Indonesian union shall have its own organs to promote the joint interests of the kingdom of the Netherlands and the U.S.I.

B. These organs shall be formed by the governments of the kingdom of the Netherlands and the U.S.I. and if necessary, by the parliaments of these countries.

C. The joint interests shall be considered to be cooperation on foreign relations, defence and as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature.

Art. VIII. The king (Queen) of the Netherlands shall be at the head of the Netherlands Indonesian union. Decrees and resolutions concerning the joint interests shall be issued by the king's (Queen) name.

Art. IX. In order to promote the interests of the U.S.I. in the Netherlands and of the kingdom of the Netherlands in Indonesia, a High Commissioner shall be appointed by the respective governments.

Art. X. Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian union shall, furthermore, contain provision regarding:

A. Safeguarding of the rights of both parties towards one another and guarantees for the fulfilment of their mutual obligations.

B. Mutual exercise of civil rights by Netherlands and Indonesian citizens.

C. Regulations containing provisions in case no agreement
can be reached by the organs of the Union.

B. Regulations of the manner and conditions of the assistance to be given by the services of the kingdom of the Netherlands to the U.S.I. as long as the services of the later are not or are insufficiently organised; and

E. Safeguarding in both parts of the union of the fundamental human rights and liberties referred to in the charter of the united nations organisation.

Art. XI. A. The statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian union shall be drafted by a conference of representatives of the kingdom of the Netherlands and the future U.S.I.

B. The statutes shall come into effect after approval by the respective parliaments.

Art. XII. The Netherlands government and the government of the republic of Indonesia shall endeavour to establish the U.S.I. and the Netherlands Indonesian union before January 1, 1949.

Art. XIII. The Netherlands government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the U.S.I. as a member of the U.N.O. immediately after the formation of the Netherlands Indonesian union.

Art. XIV. The government of the republic of Indonesia recognises the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and the repatriation of their goods as far as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over which it exercises de facto authority. A joint commission will be set up to effect this restoration and restitution.

Art. XV. In order to reform the government of the Indies in such a way that its composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the republic of Indonesia
and to its projected constitutional structure, the Netherlands govt. pending the realisation of the U.S.I. and of the Netherlands Indonesian union, shall forthwith initiate the necessary legal measures to adjust the constitutional and international position of the kingdom of the Netherlands to the new situation.

Art.XVI. Directly after the conclusion of this agreement, both parties shall proceed to reduce their armed forces. They will consult together concerning the extent and rate of this reduction and their cooperation in military matters.

Art. XVII. A For the cooperation between the Netherlands govt. and the government of the republic contemplated in this agreement, an organisation shall be called into existence of delegations to be appointed by each of the two governments with a joint secretariat.

B. The Netherlands government and the govt. of F.I. shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation in conference between those delegations. In that case a chairman of another nationality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations or if such agreement cannot be reached, by president of the international court of justice.

Art. XVIII. This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.

B. RENVILLE AGREEMENT JANUARY 17, 1948

TRUCE AGREEMENT

The government of the kingdom of the Netherlands and the government of the republic of Indonesia referred to in this agreement as the parties hereby agree as follows:

1. That a stand-fast and cease fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of

this agreement and to be fully effective within 48 hours. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the boundary lines of the areas described in the proclamation of the Netherlands Indian government on August 29, 1957, which shall be called the status quo line and in the areas specified in the following paragraph.

2. That in the first instance and for the time being demilitarised zones be established in general conformity with the above mentioned status quo line. These zones as a rule will comprise the territories between this status quo line and on one side the line of the Netherlands forward positions and on the other side the line of the Republican forward positions, the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same.

3. That the establishment of the demilitarised zones in no way prejudices the rights, claims or positions of the parties under the resolutions of the security council of August 1, 25 and 26 and November 1, 1957.

4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties its military assistants who will be instructed to assume in the first instance responsibility for determining whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties.

5. That pending a political settlement the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and of security of life property in the demilitarised zones will remain vested in the civil forces of the respective parties (the term civil police does not
not exclude the temporary use of military personal in the capacity of civil police, it being understood that the police forces will be under civil control). The committee's military assistants will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested; among others they should:

A. Call upon pools of police officer established by each party in its demilitarised zone to accompany the military assistants in their endeavours and moves throughout that demilitarised zone. Police officers of one party will not move into and throughout the demilitarised zone of the other party unless accompanied by a military assistant of the committee of good offices and a police officer of that other party.

B. Promote cooperation between the two police forces.

6. That trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible. Such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed upon the parties with the assistance of the committee and its representatives if required.

7. That this agreement shall include all the following points already agreed to in principle by the parties:

A. To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals and property, including destruction of property of any kind and by whomever owned and to utilise every means at their command to this end.

B. To refrain from broadcasts of any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.

C. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions sub
(A) and (B).

D. To provide full opportunity for observance by military and civil assistants of the committee of good officers.

E. Cease immediately the publication of a daily operational bulletin or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action.

F. Accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and consistent implementation therefore, the release in principles without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party.

8. Then the acceptance of the foregoing the committee's military assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether and where, especially in West Java, elements of the republican military forces continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces. If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces these would withdraw as quickly as practicable and in any case within 21 days as set out in the following paragraph.

9. That all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarised zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarised zone will, under the observation of military assistants of the committee and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarised zones. Both parties undertake to facilitate a speedy and peacefully evacuation of the forces concerned.

10. This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the committee of good offices and the other party
That it considers the true regulations are not being observed by
the other party and that this agreement should therefore be term-
inated.

For the government of kingdom of the Netherlands;
Keden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, chairman of the delegation.

For the government of the R.I.; Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin, chairman
of the delegation.

The signatures appearing above were hereunto subscribed this 17 the day of January, 1948, on board the USS
Kenville in the presence of the representatives of the United
nati as security council committee of good offices on the
Indonesian question and the committee secretary, whose signatures
are hereunto subscribed as witnesses, Chairman, Mr. Justice Richard
C. Kirby (Australia). Representatives: Mr. Paul Van Zeeland
(Belgium) and Dr. Frank P. Graham (U.S.A.), Secretary; Mr. T.G.
Narayanan.

Principles forming an agreed basis for the political
discussion accepted at the 4th meeting on January 17, 1948.

POLITICAL AGREEMENT.

The committee of good offices has been informed by the
delegation of the kingdom of the Netherlands and by the delegation
of the republic of Indonesia that the truce agreement having been
signed their governments accept the following principles on which
the political discussions will be based:

1. That the assistance of the committee of good offices
be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for
the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java,
Sumarta and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Lin-
ggaadjati agreement.

2. It is understood that neither pary has the right to
prevent the free expression of popular movements looking towards political organisations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that the guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

3. It is understood that decisions concerning change in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the population of the territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured.

4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.

5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the cooperation of both parties taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.

6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year after the signing of the agreement during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed; at the end of this period free elections will be held for self determination by the people of their political relationship to the U.S.I.

7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the U.S.I.

8. It is understood that if, after the signing of the agreement referred in item 1, either party could ask the united
to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to
the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the government
of the Netherlands to the government of the U.S.I., the other
party will take this request in serious consideration. The follow­
ing 4 principles are from the Liaggadjati agreement.

9. Independence for the indonesian peoples.

10. A sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitu­
tution which will be arrived at by democratic process.

11. Cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands
and Indonesia.

12. A union between the U.S.I. and other parts of the
kingdom of the Netherlands under the king of the Netherlands.

Confirmed for the government of the kingdom of the
Netherlands; Raden Abdulkadir W., chairman of the delega­tion
Confirmed for the government of the republic of Indonesia;
Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin, Chairman of the delega­tion.

The representatives of the united nations security
council committee of good offices on the Indonesian question and
the committee secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed
on the 17th day of January, 1948, on the board the USS Newville,
testify that the above principles are agreed to as basis for the
political discussions. Chairman: Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby(
Australia). Representatives: Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium) and
Dr. F.P. Graham (U.S.A.), secretary, Mr. T.G. Narayanan. 1

1. Prof. P.S. Gerbandy: op. cit. pp. 200-203
C. CHARTER OF TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, 1949

Article 1.

1. The kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the republic of the united states of Indonesia and thereby recognises said republic of U.S.I. as an independent and sovereign state.

2. The republic of the U.S.I. accepts said sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its constitution which as draft has been brought to the knowledge of the kingdom of the Netherlands.

3. The transfer of sovereignty shall take place at the latest on 30 December, 1949.

Art. 2. "ith regard to the residency of New Guinea it is decided;

a. In view of the fact that it has not yet possible to reconcile the view of the parties on New Guinea, which remain, therfore, in dispute,

b. In view of desirability of the round table conference concluding successfully on November, 2, 1949.

c. In view of the important factors which should be taken into account in settling the question of New Guinea.

d. In view of the limited research that has been undertaken and completed with respect to the problems involved in the question of New Guinea.

e. In view of heavy talks with which the union partners will initially be confronted and,

f. In view of the dedication of the parties to the principle of resolving by peaceful and reasonable means any differences that may hereafter exist or arise between them,
That the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the republic of the U.S.I. the question of political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the republic of the U.S.I. and the kingdom of the Netherlands.

UNION STATUTE.

The kingdom of the Netherlands and the republic of the U.S.I., having resolved on a basis of free will, equality and complete independence to bring about friendly cooperation with each other and to create the Netherlands Indonesian union with a view to effectuate this future cooperation, have agreed to lay down in this statute of the union the basis of their mutual relationship as independent and sovereign states, thereby holding that nothing in this statute shall be construed as excluding any form of cooperation in any field not mentioned the rain, the need of which may be felt in the future by both parties.

CHARTER OF THE UNION.

Article 1.

1. The Netherlands Indonesian union effectuates the organised cooperation between the kingdom of the Netherlands and the republic of the U.S.I. on the basis of free will and equality in status with equal rights.

2. The union does not prejudice the status of each of the two partners as an independent and sovereign state.

PURPOSE OF THE UNION.

Art. 1.

1. The union aims at cooperation of the partners for the promotion of their common interest.
2. This cooperation shall take place with respect to subjects lying primarily in the field of foreign relations and defence and as far as necessary, finance and also in regard of subjects of an economics and cultural nature.

Art. 3.

1. The two partners undertake to base their form of government on the principles of democracy and to aim at an independent judiciary.

2. The two partners shall recognise the fundamental human rights and freedom enumerated in the appendix to this statute.

PROCEDURE OF THE UNION.

Art. 4. All decisions in the union shall be taken in agreement between the two partners.

Art. 5.

1. At the head of the union shall be Her Majesty Queen Juliana, Princess of Orange Nassau, and in case of succession her lawful successors in the crown of the Netherlands.

2. In case of minority of the head of the union, or in case the head of the union is unable to perform his office and further in case the head of the union temporarily ceases to perform his office, both partners shall make the necessary provision may be in common agreement in advance.

Art. 6. The head of the union effectuates the spirit of voluntary and lasting cooperation between the partners.

THE ORGANS OF THE UNION.

Art. 7. For the implementation of the purposes of the union the ministers or persons vested by the respective constitutions of the partners with equal or similar responsibility, having been designated for this purpose by each of the partners,
shall hold conferences twice a year and further and often as the partners shall deem necessary. Unless otherwise agreed, three ministers of each partner will participate in these conferences.

Art. 8. The ministers participating in the conference remain responsible to the respective organs on the basis of the respective constitutions of the partners.

Art. 9. The conference of the ministers shall institute committee as circumstances may require, in which each of the partners appoints members on a basis of party.

Art. 10.

1. The two partners shall effectuate good contact and regular cooperation between the parliaments of the partners.

2. The first discussion between representatives of the parliaments shall take place within 8 months after the coming into being of the provisional parliament of the U.S.I.

Art. 11.

1. The union shall be served by a permanent secretariat. Each of the partners shall appoint a secretary-general, each of whom take charge of the secretariat by yearly rotation.

2. The other personnel shall be appointed in agreement between the two secretaries-general in accordance with an instrument drawn up jointly by the two partners.

DECISIONS AND JOINT REGULATIONS.

Art. 12.

1. Decisions of the conference of ministers shall be taken by unanimity of votes between the representation of the kingdom of the Netherlands on the one side and that of the republic of the U.S.I. on the other.

2. Decisions of the conference may be given effect in accordance with the following procedure.
3. Decisions taken at the conference of the ministers for the enactment of joint regulations require approval by the respective parliaments of the partners. After approval by the two parliaments, the head of the union shall state that agreement exists between the two partners and the joint regulation shall thereupon be promulgated in the official statute book of each of the partners. By this promulgation the joint regulation shall have force of law. The joint regulations are inviolable.

4. In respect of other decisions of the conference the head of the union, upon request of the conference, may likewise state that agreement exists between the two partners.

UNION COURT OF ARBITRATION.

Art. 13.

1. There shall be a union court of arbitration for the settlement of matters of law and justice in the name of the union.

2. The court shall take cognisance of legal disputes brought before the court by one of the partners against the other, jointly by both partners, arising from the union statute from any agreement between the partners or from joint regulations.

Art. 14.

1. The union court of arbitration shall consist of 3 members appointed by the kingdom of the Netherlands and 3 members appointed by the republic of the U.S.I.

2. The members of the court shall be appointed for a period of 10 years.

3. The chairman shall be elected, every year a Netherlands and an Indonesian in turn, by and from amongst the members of the court.
4. Prior to taking up their office, the members of the court shall, before the head of the union, take the oath or make the promise in accordance with their religious faith, that they shall fulfill their office honestly, scrupulously and impartially and shall comport themselves in the exercise of their duties as befits a good member of the union court of arbitration.

Art. 15.

1. The union court of arbitration shall decide by majority of votes.

2. In case votes are equally divided the court, shall, unless the two partners otherwise request, call upon the president of the international court of justice or upon another international authority, to be designated by majority of votes, with the request to appoint a person of another nationality as special member, shall take part in a renewed consideration of the dispute and in the decision thereof.

Art. 16. Further provisions concerning the rules of procedure, the organisation and regulation of the activities of the union court of arbitration shall be established in a joint regulation. As long as such a joint regulation does not exist, the court itself shall determine its rule of procedure and the organisation and regulation of its activities, paragraph 2 of the preceding art, being applicable if no agreement can be reached in this matter.

Art. 17. The two partners undertake to comply with the decisions of the union court of arbitration and responsibility each within his territory.

Art. 18. In case of conflict between provisions of the partners and of public bodies within their jurisdiction on the one side and the union statute or any agreement between the partners or a joint regulation on the other, the latter category of provisions
shall prevail.

Art. 19. The partners reserve all their rights under international law or otherwise to solicit the decision of an international court or arbitrator in cases where both partners consider the union court of arbitration incompetent or in cases where the court declares itself incompetent.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Art. 20. Provisions concerning the cooperation between the partners in the field of foreign relations are set forth in the agreement attached to the present statute.

DEFENCE.

Art. 21. Provisions concerning the cooperation between the partners in the field of defence are set forth in the agreement attached to the present statute.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

Art. 22. Provisions concerning the cooperation between the partners in the field of financial and economic relations are set forth in the agreement attached to the present statute.

CULTURAL RELATIONS.

Art. 23. Provisions concerning the cooperation between the partners in the Cultural field are set forth in the agreement attached to the present statute.

NATIONALITY.

Art. 24. Without prejudice to the provisions made or still table made in special arrangements between the partners, with regard to the exercise of political and other rights by nationals of one partner within the jurisdiction of the other
partner the following shall apply:

a. The nationality of one partner shall not constitute an objection against serving officially within the jurisdiction of the other partner, except for:

1. Offices, the holders of which is responsible to representative body, unless the law should provide otherwise;

2. These political, authoritative, judicial and leading offices which are specified as such by law.

b. With regard to the exercise of civil rights and social activities, each partner shall always fully appreciate the special interests within his jurisdiction of the nationals and corporate bodies of the other partner, and therefore shall make no appreciable discrimination between their respective nationals and corporate bodies, without prejudice to the power of either partner to establish regulations required for the protection of their national interests or for the protection of economically weak groups.

2. On no account shall the nationals and corporate bodies of the other partner treatment less favourable than nationals and corporate bodies of a third state.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

Art. 25. To further the interests of the partners within each other's territory the government of the part of the partners shall appoint high commissioners. These shall have the stature of diplomatic representatives with the rank of ambassador.


1. Unless otherwise agreed each partner shall bear one half of the expenses of the union.

2. Further provisions in respect of the expenses of the union shall be established by joint regulation. As long as
such a joint regulation does not exist, the conference of the ministers shall make the necessary provisions.

Art. 27.

1. All Official documents, issued by the conference of ministers or by other union organs shall be in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages.

2. Both texts shall be equally authentic.

Art. 28. The union statute and the agreements pertaining thereto as well as the joint regulations and future agreements may be presented to the secretariat of the United Nations for registrations in accordance with article 102 of the charter of the United Nations. 1.