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# Introduction

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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is a detailed, critical and objective study of the Anglo-Iranian Relations during the period 1906-1919. Although a good number of important books have been written by eminent scholars, they have laid much emphasis on the internal problems of Persia. The foreign relations of Persia have been largely ignored.

A number of books have been, of course, written on the foreign relations of Persia. They, however, do not cover as a whole, the period under study.

This work is based on the following analysis:

1. The geographical and strategic importance of Persia to the two main rival Powers there- Great Britain and Russia.

2. The British policy in Persia - the four factors:
   (a) Commercial, military and political interests;
   (b) Keen rivalry with Russia in economic and political affairs.
   (c) Co-operation with Russia for the protection of the Indian borders and to check the German menace in the continent of Europe (Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907).
(d) The partition of Persia along the line of the
development of oil industry in Southern part of
the country (Secret Treaty of Constantinople of
1915).

3. An attempt to transform Persia into a British
protectorate after the termination of World War I, and
the conclusion of Anglo-Persian Treaty with that end in
view.

In addition to the standard works available, all the
original material concerning the subject has been consulted
for the purpose of this study. The work is based on the
following materials:

a) British Command Papers.
b) British and Foreign State Papers.
c) Paper relating to the foreign relations of the
United States.
d) British Documents on the Origin of War (edited) -
Goosb and Temperley
e) Documents on the British foreign policy (1919-1939)
(edited) - E.L. Woodward and Johan Butler.
f) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, (edited) -
Jane Degras
g) Parliamentary Debates (British House of Commons) and
h) Important Journals and other published materials.
The documents collected, edited and published by C.U. Aitchison; and by J.C. Hurewitz, have also been referred to frequently.

It is regretted that owing to the non-availability of the records of the Persian archives, these could not be consulted. However, attempt has been made to decipher the Persian version as far as possible by a study of the "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States", as the United States had been disinterested in the Persian politics almost during the entire period under study. Furthermore, the works of Professor E.O. Browne have been of greater help to understand the Persian points of view.

The period marks the beginning of the National Movement in Persia against foreign control and aimed at the establishment of a Constitutional Government. It ends in the attainment, although short-lived, of those important objectives. Other international factors, which have been discussed in this work, also contributed to bring about the change in the position of Persia.
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN PERSIA
Geographically speaking, Iran occupies an important strategic position. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and Russia sought to establish their domination over Iran and treated her as a pawn in their game of power politics. The Russian drive was motivated by the desire to gain access to the Warm Waters of the Persian Gulf; while the British tried to checkmate the Russian designs.

The British interests in Persia date back to the 16th and 17th centuries. In the beginning, these interests were purely commercial. ¹ But with the growth of British imperial interest in India, it became very essential for Great Britain to keep Persia and the Persian Gulf under her permanent and effective control, if not under occupation. Thus India could be kept beyond the approaches of other powers. Consequently, Britain developed strategic interests along with commercial interests in Persia. Therefore, the primary importance of Persia in the eyes of the British was due to India's defence. Other powers wanted to keep Persia under their domination so that she might be used as a base through which military expeditions might be sent to invade India. Had Britain not been in possession of India, she would not have pursued so


relentlessly a policy to keep Persia under her influence and domination. For the British, Persia was never an end in itself, it was a means to an end, and the end was the defence of India.

A - Afghan and French Dangers

Towards the closing years of the Eighteenth Century, Britain, for the first time, realized the strategic importance of Persia. In 1798, a letter from Zaman Shah, the Amir of Kabul, was received by Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of Bengal. The Amir, through this letter, expressed his desire of sending an expedition to India to expel the Marathas from the North to the Deccan and sought the cooperation of the British army in this connection. Lord Wellesley was, at that time, engaged in war with Tippu Sultan who was flirting with French and Afghans against the British. A surprise attack by Zaman Shah might have helped Tippu Sultan in his fight against the British, but by disclosing his plans, the Amir committed a political

blunder. The alarming situation was immediately felt by Wellesley and he prepared a plan to use Persia directly against Afghanistan and indirectly against Tippu Sultan.

Mohd. Ali Khan, a Persian, who was employed as the Company's Resident at Bushire, was entrusted with the task of inducing the Shah of Persia to undertake such military measures in western Afghanistan as would keep Zaman Shah engaged and thus prevent him from invading India. Fortunately, the task of Mehdi Ali Khan became easy, as, at that time, the two brothers of Zaman Shah, namely Prince Mahmood, and Prince Firoz-ud-Din had taken refuge in Persia and sought the aid of Shah of Persia to lead an expedition against the Amir of Kabul. At the same time, after the death of Agha Mohammad Khan (The first Kajar ruler, 1794-1797), Zaman Shah sent a Mission to the Persian Court to demand the restoration of Khorasan to Afghanistan. This demand outraged Fatteh Ali - the young Shah of Persia. He retorted by declaring that he would be extending his empire to its ancient limits, which meant the conquest of the whole of Afghanistan. Mehdi Ali Khan also took advantage of the sectarian differences between the two ruling dynasties. The Persian Shah was a Shia while the Amir of Kabul was a staunch Sunni. These sectarian differences were fully exploited by Mehdi Ali Khan, who wrote letters to the Persian Court from Bushire alleging that the atrocities had been perpetrated by the Afghan sunnis.

2. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 34.
on the Shias of Lahore and in consequence, thousands of them had taken refuge in the British territories. The demand for the restoration of Khorasan by Zaman Shah and the exploitation of sectarian feelings by the British envoy led to the estrangement of relations between Persia and Afghanistan. In 1798, the two refugee brothers of Zaman Shah were sent with Persian forces to invade Afghanistan. In 1799, Fatteh Ali Shah personally led an expedition to Khorasan to chastise the governors and other chiefs who had rebelled. Zaman Shah was now compelled to go to Peshawar from Lahore to meet the Persian threat. In this way, his attention was diverted from India.

Zaman Shah, afraid of the designs of the Shah of Persia, tried to come to an understanding with him. He dispatched an embassy with presents to persuade the Shah to return to Teheran. Fatteh Ali Shah agreed on the condition that Zaman Shah would receive back his brothers with honour. However, Mehdi Ali Khan persuaded the Shah of Persia to continue hostilities against Afghanistan. For this purpose, he spent a large amount of money on presents. Now, the danger of an Afghan invasion was successfully averted. In the mean time, Tippu Sultan was killed in action and Lord Wellesley heaved a sigh of relief.

In the meantime, however, the danger of an Afghan invasion had been removed, while that of Napoleon invading India had appeared. He was seeking the Persian cooperation in that adventure. Moreover, with the establishment of the Kajar dynasty, Persia was re-united under a central government which convinced the East India Company to have commercial relations with that country. So the Governor-General decided to send John Malcolm as special ambassador to Persia in December, 1799, to conclude treaties-political as well as commercial, which would be beneficial from the British point of view. Captain Malcolm was assigned the task of coming to an understanding with the Persian Shah which might remove the apprehensions caused by Zaman Shah and Napoleon's threatened invasion of India. He was also to conclude an agreement which would serve as the basis of promoting Indian trade with Persia. In 1800, a French invasion of India was planned by Napoleon with the cooperation of Tsar Paul of Russia. Napoleon had not only discussed his plan of invading India with Tsar Paul but actually the movement of the Russian army had practically begun. A secret mission, had already been sent from France to Teheran to obtain permission from the Persian Shah for


the passage of a French army, which was to join the Russians somewhere in the plains of Northern India.\(^1\) This menace made the Captain's task very difficult who, however, tactfully succeeded in concluding the two treaties - Commercial as well as political in January 1801, which the king ratified by prefixing his Firman.\(^2\) By the terms of the political treaty, the Shah of Persia engaged not to make peace or conclude any treaty of friendship with Afghanistan, unless the Amir of Afghanistan renounced his designs to invade India. The Shah also promised to treat the French as his enemies, while in the event of war between the Afghans or the French and the Persians, the English were to assist the Shah with military equipments and material. By the commercial treaty, all the privileges of the old factories were restored and several new concessions were granted. The English and Indian traders were allowed to settle anywhere in Persia and were exempted from the government taxes. The English were allowed to own building anywhere they liked in the Persian territories. Several British goods were allowed to be imported in Persia free of duty. Malcolm returned to India from Persia with complete success. No permanent British representative was,

\(^1\) Chirol, Valentinc, The Middle Eastern Quest'on or some Political Problems of Indian Defence (1903), p. 10.
however, left in Teheran which was a political error on the part of the Britishers.

B. Political Activities of the British and the French in Persia and the Russian Aggression

Since the days of Peter the Great, Russia followed a policy of expansionism towards Persia and Turkey. Peter the Great occupied certain portions of Persian territory but after his death in 1725, Nadir Shah recovered them. After his death in 1747, Chaos, disorder and disintegration prevailed in Persia. Heraculius, the ruler of Georgia, got a golden chance and decided to overthrow the Persian rule. While doing so,

++ In response to Malcolm's visit of Persia and to promote good relations with Britain's India, Fatteh Ali Shah, in return, sent an embassy to Bombay in 1832, headed by Haji Khalil Khan. The Persian envoy was killed in the quarrel between his servants and the guards. The British authorities became very much upset at the unfortunate incident and made very liberal reparation to his family. Three years later, Agha Yabi Khan was again sent to India as representative of Persia, but, at this time British authorities showed indifference to him. The disappointed Pesian envoy returned home in January 1837. In this way, the British authorities in India missed the chance of promoting friendly relations with Persia.


++ During the seventeenth and part of 18th century, the chiefs of Georgia had been tributary to Persia, and used to send every year, a number of their sons and daughters who were treated as slaves at the Court of Persia.
Heraculius foresaw a united and strong Persia under a single and ambitious ruler and in it saw the end of the independence of Georgia. To ward off this danger, he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Empress of Russia in 1733. The treaty contained provisions by which Heraculius renounced all his relations with Persia and accepted the suzerainty of the Empress Catherine. The Empress, on her side, declared to protect Heraculius and guaranteed not only his actual dominions but the territories which might be occupied by him in future.

In 1795, Heraculius was driven out of his territory by Agha Mohammad Khan. In 1796, the Russian Empress sent General Zuboff to his support. She tried to follow the policy of Peter the Great but could not achieve success. Her death and accession of Paul I alone saved Tehran from actual occupation by a Russian army. Heraculius died in 1798 and his son and successor George accepted the suzerainty of Fatteh Ali Shah, who had succeeded Agha Mohammad Shah. Differences arose between George and his brother Alexander. Emperor Paul of Russia took the advantage of the situation and issued a decree, by which he annexed Georgia in 1800 which was confirmed by the new Tsar, Alexander. General Zizianoff was appointed as the Governor-General of the provinces beyond Caucasus. It was he who immediately engaged himself in

4. According to Watson and Sykes, George of Georgia renounced willingly the crown in favour of the Emperor of Russia on September 28, 1800.
active eastward operations with a view to extend Russian frontier unto the Caspian.

The prestige of Persia was impaired by the annexation of Georgia, and she became alarmed at the Russian encroachment. But, Fatteh Ali Khan was mainly pre-occupied in crushing the rebels in the various parts of his kingdom during the first seven years of his regime (from 1797 to 1804), therefore, he could not take measures to defend his north-western frontier against Russian aggression. In the meantime, Mingrelia was captured, and Ganja was occupied by Zizianoff in 1802. From Ganja — the modern Elizabethpool the General advanced to Erivan. The Governor of Erivan had rebelled against the Persian Shah and entered into a conspiracy with General Zizianoff. The situation was quite alarming and Persian Vali Ahad (Majid — apparent) was instructed to lead an expedition into Erivan. In an encounter between Russian and Persian army near Etznadin, the Persians were defeated. But the rebel governor, Mohammad Khan was so much afraid of the presence of Abbas Mirza — the Vali Ahad (near Erivan that he refused to fulfil his pledges with the Russians. Erivan was then besieged by General Zizianoff. The Persian army succeeded in compelling the Russian General to raise the siege and Persia, once again, occupied Erivan. In 1805, General Zizianoff again took the field, and conquered the territories between Georgia and Caspian.

and prepared to reduce the fortress of Baku. The General personally went to Baku to negotiate the conditions of the concession with the Governor of Baku. During the conversation the General was treacherously killed, and the Russian army had to retreat.

Fattah Ali Shah was very much worried and upset because of the Russian aggression and he, therefore, sought the British help. Accordingly, he instructed his envoy at Bombay to request the British to assist him against Russia. The Shah was, more or less, hopeful to gain British cooperation due to the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian alliance of January, 1801. But in the earlier stages of the Russo-Persian conflict, Britain was in alliance with Russia, and, therefore, there was no response to the Persia's request. Naturally, Persia welcomed the French offer of friendship and cooperation. Fattah Ali Shah sent Mirza Mohammad Riza to the French Court early in 1807 to discuss the alliance Napoleon, who always considered Persia very good base for attaching India, hurriedly signed a treaty at Finkenstein on May 4, 1807. The treaty guaranteed the present territorial integrity of Persia.

2. For the detail (text of the Treaty), see Hurewitz, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
3. For the real purpose of alliance with Persia, which no doubt was a desire of invading India, see Hurewitz, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 78-81, under the title 'Napoleon's Instructions to the Chief of the French Mission to Persia'. However, after the unexpected Franco-Russian alliance of Tilsit (July 1907), Napoleon abandoned his plans of invading India, but he did not recall General Antonie Gardanne, who had started his journey to reach Persia.
Georgia was recognized as the legitimate part of Persia. France undertook to liberate Georgia and other parts of Persian territories from the Russian occupation. France, also agreed to furnish the Shah with military equipments and officers to organize his army on European model while the Shah on his part, undertook to sever all diplomatic and commercial relations with Britain and to permit a French army, to invade India, and to use his territory as passage. According to the treaty, the Emperor of Persia was to win over the Afghans on his side and encouraged them to launch a campaign against the British in India. General Gardanne, the French representative, accompanying seventy officers reached Persia and started organizing the Persian army on the French model. The French engineers began to build regular fortifications in the country. Napoleon expected from this treaty to open the way for a French invasion of India by land, while the Shah of Persia expected that this would enable him to recover his lost provinces and help him in resisting the Russian expansionist designs.

The shift in the situation was quite alarming. It caused a great anxiety to the British authorities in India. Captain Malcolm was dispatched to Persia to re-establish and regain the British prestige in that country. He reached the Persian Gulf in May 1808, at a time when Persian Court was under the spell of French envoy General Gardanne. Malcolm was not even allowed to

proceed to Teheran and was told to see the Prince-governor of Fars. Malcolm took it as insult and hurriedly returned to India to inform about the alarming situation and to suggest the measures to be taken. He advised the Governor-General to occupy the island of Krrack in the Persian Gulf. The occupation of the island, according to him, would compel the Persian Shah to come to friendly terms with British Government. Lord Minto accepted his proposals and the army was about to be sent when the news reached that in the present European situation, it would not be possible for France to send an expedition to India and the British authorities in India abandoned the plan of occupying the Persian island.

When General Malcolm returned to India, an Embassy under Sir Harford Jones was sent to Persia, directly, from England. In the meantime, the Persian Shah came to know about the Franco-Russian alliance of Tilsit (July 1807), in which no clause was inserted about the restoration of Georgia and other Persian territories occupied by Russia to Persia, although the French General had repeatedly assured the Shah that in case of a Franco-Russian alliance, France would ask and compel Russia to give up her claims upon Georgia in favour of Persia. This change in the situation was very favourable for the new British envoy.

The other reason for the Shah's inclination towards Britain was the fear of commencement of hostilities with British India, whose former envoy had not been allowed even to proceed to the Persian capital. Moreover, the real enemy of Persia was not Britain or British India but Russia. Now, there was no hurdle in the way of Sir Harford Jones in successfully concluding a preliminary treaty. He signed a treaty on March 12, 1809. This Treaty declared all other previous treaties or agreements with any European power and Persia, null and void, and guaranteed that no other European force would be allowed to pass through Persia. Britain undertook to assist Persia either with troops or subsidy in case she was attacked or invaded by any other European power. In case of Perso-Afghan War, Britain was not to take side except as mediator, if desired by the two parties. The terms of the Treaty were approved by the Government of Britain as well as British-India Government. This Treaty, later on, took form of Definitive Treaty. However, some misunderstanding arose between Lord Minto, the then Governor-General of British India and Harford Jones. Lord Minto insisted that

2. Aitchison, op.cit., p. 93.
3. Ibid., for the text of the Treaty, see document No.XXIV, pp. 117-120.
+ According to Aitchison, Lord Minto directed Sir H. Jones to withdraw from Persia and sent an Embassy under Malcolm to the Persian Court. However, Sir Jones received orders from England to stay at Teheran till the arrival of Sir Jore Ousley, the new English envoy whose powers superseded both the envoys - see Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 160-161.
his nominee should be authorised to execute or implement the treaty. Consequently, Malcolm was sent to Persia by him on his third mission. Accompanied by a large staff, he reached Persia in 1810, where, this time, he was warmly received. In his staff, there were officers like Pottinger, Christie, Montieth and Lindsay. The latter was regarded by Persians as Rustum and was appointed as Command-in-Chief of the Persian army. Sir Jones resigned in 1811 and was succeeded by Gore Ouseley, who concluded the Definitive Treaty on March 14, 1812, but it was not approved by the British Government. However, Britain ratified it in 1914 with some alternation. At this time, when Persia and Great Britain had removed their differences and an era of friendship and cooperation was to start between the two nations, Napoleonic danger compelled Britain to cooperate with Russia to save the continent from Napoleonic terror. In the meantime, Britain's two allies, Russia and Persia engaged themselves in active war against each other as early as 1812. The British officers, who were recently employed by Persia were included in the Persian army which was fighting against the Russian forces. The British position was awkward one. The British authorities were not in a position to please one and adopt an hostile attitude against the other. Naturally, Britain attempted to reconcile the

+ For the details of the Russo-Persian War, see Watson, op.cit., pp. 164-169.
differences of her two allies. In the Russo-Persian dispute, Britain, instead of helping Persia, acted as a mediator and in this way disregarded her promises of assistance. Russia on the other hand, took advantage of this British policy of mediation and increased her pressure upon Persia. Consequently the Russo-Persian Treaty of Julistan (October, 12, 1813) ceded Russia the provinces of Georgia, Derbend, Baku, Sheervan, Sheki, Janya, Karabagh, Nohran and part of Talish. Persia, further, gave up her all claims over Daghestan, Mingnelia, Imeritia, and Abkhasia. She also agreed not to maintain navy in the Caspian Sea. No other nation's warships except Russian, were permitted to sail on the Caspian. Russia, on her part, promised to assist the nominated Crown-prince in securing the throne of Persia in case any opposing party existed. Russia, at that time, was confronting the French invasion, therefore, she might have agreed to accept a little less - at least in view of the greater danger of Napoleon, but in order to get the promise of help against the dangers in way of his succession, the crown Prince agreed to cede to Russia all disputed territories. For his personal interest, he sacrificed the interest of his country. Persia was, however, not treating this adjustment as final. Her scheme was to strengthen her army.

1. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 44.
under the guidance of British officers, and to launch a final and decisive war against Russia.

After one year of the conclusion of Treaty of Gulistan, Henry Ellis reached Teheran. With the help of Morier, the British Minister at Teheran (Morier succeeded Gore Ouseley), Ellis concluded the final Definitive Treaty on November 25, 1814. By this Treaty, all alliances and agreements between Persia and European powers hostile to Great Britain, were nullified. The Persian Government undertook not to permit any European army to enter into Persian territories and not to allow them to proceed towards India or towards any ports of India. Furthermore, the Persian Government promised to induce the rulers of Kharizen, Taturistan, Bokhara and Samerkand etc., either through persuasion or force, to oppose any foreign army which might attempt to use their territories as a passage or base to invade India. The British Government promised to help Persia in case of invasion by a European power. The assistance might be either in shape of officers, ammunitions, or war material which would be sent from India or the British Government would pay an annual subsidy. The amount of subsidy was to be 2,00,000 tomans annually. It was to be spent under the supervision of the British Minister. It was not

4. By the Definitive Treaty, Britain agreed to lend officers for the training of the Persian army.

to be paid in case the war was started because of the Persian aggression. In case of Perso-Afghan War, Britain was to act as mediator, if desired by the two hostile nations. In case of an Anglo-Afghan war, the Persian Government undertook to send an army to help the British. It was agreed that boundaries between Persia and Russia were to be determined by Great Britain and Persia and Russia. The Treaty was declared as purely defensive.

At the time, when the Treaty of Gulistan was concluded, the Persian authorities vainly expected that Britain, in near future, would use her good offices to induce the Czar to restore, at least a part of the ceded territories to Persia. Disillusionment prevailed in Persian circle when General Alexander Yermolov, the newly appointed Governor-General of Georgia and Russian Ambassador to Persia refused not to restore to Persia even a single inch of the Persian territories occupied by Russia.

The progress of diplomatic relations between Persia and Russia and Great Britain, from the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Gulistan to the renewal of war between Persia and Russia in 1825, are of little diplomatic importance. One of the


2. Persian expectations were probably strengthened by the conclusion of Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814, in which it was declared that the limits between Persia and Russia were to be determined by Great Britain, Persia and Russia.

The main object of diplomacy during this period was to settle the Russo-Persian frontier as laid down by the Treaty of Gulistan, but no settlement could be reached. The Treaty of Gulistan had not been sufficiently definite as regards to certain portion of the line of frontier; and patches of land were claimed, on either side. After a long delay, a Commission was appointed but with no result. At last, in 1825, Russia took military possession of the district of Gokcha which belonged to Persia. Russia declared not to evacuate the territory unless her claims in other directions were conceded. However, hostilities renewed in 1826. The first attack was from the Persian side. After the initiation of war, the Persian Government demanded British assistance in money, or troops for which provision had been made in Article 4 of Definitive Treaty of 1814. Britain refused to give the assistance on the ground that Persia was aggressor while the Persian interpretation was that as Russia had occupied Gokcha first, therefore, the aggression was from her side. Britain, however, did not render any help except her good offices, consequently, the Treaty of Turkomanchai was concluded between Russia and Persia on February 23, 1828. Under the terms of this Treaty, Persia ceded to Russia the Armenian districts of Erivan and Nakhitchevan (Article III); the boundary line of the two states were

1. Watson, op. cit., p. 207.
demarcated in detail in Article IV. Persia agreed to pay as indemnity a sum of 20,000,00 silver roubles (Art VI) to Russia. Russia on her part, recognized Prince Abbas Meerza as the heir and successor to the throne of Persia (Article VII). Right of free navigation was secured for the Russian merchant vessels, on the Caspian Sea, the same right was however, granted to Persian merchant vessels. As regards the war vessels, Russia secured the right of navigation, no other power was to be permitted to sail war vessels on the Caspian Sea (Article VIII).

No less significant was the commercial treaty signed the same day. Under the term of the commercial treaty, five per cent duty was fixed on the goods being imported into Persia and exported from Persia by Russian subject or vice-versa (Article III). The Russian subjects were permitted not only to rent but also to acquire in full ownership houses for habitation and shops. The Persian Government officers were not allowed to enter by force in houses, shops and premises in possession of Russian subjects. The permission of the Russian Minister, Charge d'affaires or Consul was necessary for the entrance in the houses acquired by Russian nationals (Article V). Russian officials residing in Persia were allowed to import free of duty all kind of articles for their personal use (Article VI). Persian nationals, in service of the Russian officials, were to enjoy Russian protection. Extra territorial rights (capitulations) were granted to Russia - a right which was later on extended to
other European powers. The period of 'wars' or hostilities ended by this dictated and imposed Treaty. The Treaty however, helped Russia in robbing much of Persian independence.

The Treaty of Turkomanchai was concluded between General Paskievitch and Monsieur Obreseoff on the part of Russia, and Prince Abbas Meerza on the part of Persia. The main difficulty in implementation of the Treaty was the refusal of the Shah to provide money for the payment of indemnity. The Shah thought that money paid by Persia might be utilized to launch a new campaign against his country. The situation was exploited by Colonel Macdonald, the then British Minister in Persia. He agreed to furnish with 200,000 tomans to Persian government (equivalent to one year's subsidy) on the condition that Articles III and IV in the Definitive Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814 should be declared null and void. Declaration of exclusion of Articles III and IV from the Treaty meant the abrogation of Articles VI and VII automatically. However Colonel Macdonald, successfully purchased the abrogation of Articles III and IV and Prince Abbas Mirza signed a bond to this effect which runs as

2. Yeselson, Abraham, United States Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921, p. 16; also see Grosesclose, Elgin, Introduction to Iran, p. 67.
follows:... the heir apparent to the Persian throne... promise that if the British Government will assist us with the sum the sum of two hundred thousand tomans (2,00,000) towards the liquidation of the indemnity due by us to Russia, we will enjoin, and hereafter consider as annulled, the 3rd and 4th articles of the definitive Treaty between the two States, concluded by Mr. Ellis, and obtain the royal sanction to the same. The restoration of peace in Europe in 1815, lowered the importance of Persia so much in the eyes of British Statesmen that they ignored the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814 altogether and no effort was made to gain advantage on the basis of Treaty. Had this treaty been seriously taken by the British diplomats, it would have strengthened the ties of friendship between the two powers and the British influence might have eliminated the Russian danger from the Persian hearts. The Britishers humiliated the Treaty of 1814 to such an extent as to delegate the power of the British envoy to the representative of East India Company in 1823. This new development in the British policy towards Persia was taken by the Shah as degradation of the political status of his country. After the exclusion of articles III and IV, the Shah of Persia demanded the revision of the Treaty of 1814 and the inclusion of an article in place of abrogated articles to guarantee the integrity and independence of Persia but Britain paid no heed to Shah's request. However, when Britain

1. Aitchison, op. cit., pp. 132-133, Document No. XXVIII.
realized her mistake in 1833, it was too late and Russian
influence by that time was supreme in the Persian Court.
Napoleonic danger being removed and Russian danger not yet
coming to the fore, Britain regarded Persia as 'Quantité Nežligeable'
and never stretched her helping hand to her, although she was
bound to do so by treaties. Since the conclusion of Turkmomanchei
until well in to the twentieth century, 'Iran was to be torn
between the conflicting interests of Russia and Great Britain.
Russia was embarked on a course of expansion in Asia and had
visions of a warm water port on the Persian Gulf, while Great
Britain was faced with the need of controlling the Persian Gulf
and all land area adjacent to India, her great colonial prize'.

C. ANGLO-RUSSIAN ROLE ON THE HERAT ISSUE

Betrayed by Britain and beset by Russia, Persia made
an attempt to occupy Herat in order to compensate the territorial
losses and to restore her former prestige and position in the

1. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

Hilber, Donald, "Oo, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton New
eyes of the community of nations. In her temptations, Persia was inspired and encouraged by Russia. An occupation of Herat by Persia, which might pave the way for the annexation of Kabul and Kandhar, was regarded by Russia as beneficial to her own interests. Russian influence being supreme at the Persian Court, an occupation of these territories by Persia meant further increase of Russian influence in the occupied territories. Russia followed a very dangerous policy at that time. According to Russian plan, if Persia invaded Herat, it would be a cause of anxiety to Great Britain and provoke her intervention which might result in a clash of arms between the two nations. In case of British intervention, Persia was bound to seek Russian help for her protection and safety, which would throw her totally in the arms of Russia and in this way, a gulf of difference might be created between Persia and Britain. Moreover, if Herat was occupied by Persia, Russia, by virtue of Treaty of Turkomanchai, would be in a position to appoint her consuls there to safeguard her commercial interests. The encouragement given to Persian policy of expansionism by Russia was also due to the fact that Russia wanted to divert Persian attention from her northern border. Moreover, it was an indirect threat to British possessions in India.

Herat had once been under the Persian rule but now it was being ruled independently by Kamran Shah. Persia demanded from the ruler of Herat to accept Persian suzerainty and pay tribute to her, when this matter was not settled, Mohammed Meerza with his army advanced to Ghorian in 1833, but he could not capture that stronghold and besieged Herat. In the meantime, Abbas Meerza died, and hearing of his death Mohammed Meerza hurriedly concluded an agreement with Kamran Shah and rushed back towards the Persian capital. By this agreement, Kamran Shah promised to pay tribute to the Persian Shah and to extirpate the fortification of Ghorian. When Prince Mohammed Meerza reached Teheran, he was pronounced as the Heir Apparent. Soon Shah Fatteh Ali died and the Pro-Russian Mohammed Meerza was crowned as Shah of Persia.

Alarmed by the increasing influence of Russia in Persia, Britain directed her representative to resume negotiations for the revision of the Treaty of 1914. This directive to the British representative was sent in 1833, the negotiations continued till 1837, but in vain. There was not at that time even a single agreement for the safety of British trade and commerce in Persia except a Firman by which the export duties on horses were abolished. The Treaty of 1914 provided for the conclusion of a

2. Watson, op. cit., p. 274.
separate commercial treaty but no commercial treaty was concluded. The commercial treaty of 1800 was declared by the Persian Government abrogated by the Treaty of 1814. However Sir John Cambell tried to negotiate a fresh commercial treaty but the Persian Government paid no attention to him. As he was the representative of East India Company, he thought that a minister directly from British Government would be in a better position to influence the Persian Government, consequently Mr. Ellis was sent to Persia to congratulate the new Shah on his accession. He was entrusted with the task of concluding a commercial treaty but he could not succeed in his mission. However, in May 1836, Mohammed Shah issued a Firman, permitting British merchants to trade on the payment of the 'same public dues upon their goods as are paid by the merchants of the Russian Government'. In 1841, a commercial treaty was concluded which will be discussed later on.

Coming to Herat again, a treaty had been hurriedly concluded between Mohammed Meerza and Kamran Shah of Herat, but Kamran Shah totally ignored the treaty. He never fulfilled even a single of the pledges which he had undertaken. This was enough to arouse the anger of the Young Shah. In the meantime, Yar Mohammed, the Vazier of Kamran Shah occupied Seistan. The occupation of Seistan

+ The Province of Seistan lies between Persia and Afghanistan. It made a part of Persia but Ahmad Shah added it in Afghan Kingdom. After the death of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Chief of Seistan revolted against Afghan regime and the independent State was established. However, by the time of Mohammed Shah's accession to the Persian throne, it was considered by Kajar rulers as an integral part of Persia, although, Seistan was really not under their control even at that time.
outraged Mohammed Shah and he, with a large force besiezed Herat on November 23, 1837. A few Persians in Herat were put to death and others were compelled to leave Herat on the ground that they were engaged in a conspiracy against the Kamran regime. This was the additional reason for the siege of Herat. But the real cause behind the siege was the active Russian encouragement given to Persia. Russia was dreaming of the establishment of her strong influence as far as Indus. This situation was naturally alarming for Great Britain. Yar Mohammed Khan, the Vazier of Kamran Shah, however, heroically defended Herat. In his endeavour of defence, he was assisted by Lieutenant Eldered Pottinger. Pottinger was an English officer of artillery. The British officer, in disguise, travelling through Afghanistan, had reached Herat to help Kamran Shah. The siege of Herat was strongly opposed by Great Britain but it continued. Britain tried to solve the dispute by offering her mediation and for this


Although no proof is available but one can easily guess that he was sent to assist Kamran Shah against Persians by the British authorities in India. According to Wilber, Britain 'sent a British officer to organize the successful resistance of Herat'. Then, it is clear that the officer was no other but Pottinger see, Wilber, op. cit., p. 79, Pottinger was an English Lieutenant in the Bombay Artillery Corps. He was the nephew of the resident of Sind—See Brockelmann, Carl, History of the Islamic Peoples, London, 1949, p. 423.
purpose Mc. Neil, the British Ambassador in Persia visited the besieger's camp in the spring of 1838. He tried to persuade the Shah to withdraw his forces and abandon the siege. Russians were also very active. Count Simonich also visited the Persian camp and encouraged the Shah to continue the siege. He offered the services of the Russian officers to help the Shah in his conquering efforts of Herat. The Russian envoy promised to advance money to Persia and the Russian Captain Blaranberg joined the Persian forces. Encouraged by Russia the Shah decided not to raise the siege and refused to listen any advice of Mc Neil, who tried his best to bring about a settlement and even had drafted a treaty but the Shah of Persia rejected it. The Shah was pursuing a policy which was like a shuttle cock moving sometimes towards Russia and some times towards Britain, but on the whole it was anti-British and pro-Russian. The situation was disappointing and unfavourable, so Mc Neil decided to leave the Persian camp on June 7, 1838. At Shahrood, Mc Neil received

2. Watson, op. cit., p. 304.
3. According to Sykes, a big sum as subsidy was demanded by Persian Shah to raise the siege, which was refused by Mc Neil—See Sykes, Vol. II, p. 332.
4. Ibid., pp. 302-312.
instructions from England to lodge a strong protest with the Persian Government disapproving her action against Herat. He was instructed to state that the occupation of Herat would be considered as an hostile act by Great Britain. Accordingly, he sent Colonel Stoddar Back to the Persian camp. The colonel was also instructed to inform about the arrival of British warships in Persian Gulf and occupation of Karrack island by them. After hearing Stoddar's message, the Shah replied as follows:

'We consent to the whole of the demands of the British Government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of friendship we should not relinquish the siege of Herat'.

The strong steps taken by the British Government compelled the Shah to raise the siege. On September 9, 1838, the Persian army left the camp. The Shah had not only raised the siege but accepted the other British demands too. These demands were that the Shah should evacuate the occupied Afghan territories and that he should pay reparation for the insult incurred upon the messenger of British Legation.

4. Ibid., p. 320.

The British messenger named Mohammad 'Ali Beg was instructed to wait at Meshed a communication from Fetteh Mohammed Khan, an envoy of Herat who was to join back to his country but intended to come back with letter from Government of Herat. He was trying for a settlement of Perso-Herat dispute. He wanted to be authorised by the Government of Herat to conduct negotiations with Persian Government. A letter from Government of Herat was necessary in this connection and it was for that letter, Mohammad Ali Beg was ordered to stay at Meshed and wait for him. Convinced by the alarming situation,
Although the demands put forward by Colonel Stoddar were accepted by the Shah but soon he changed his mind. He was not prepared to evacuate Ghorian, Farrah, Selczewar and Khurukh, likewise, he was not ready to apologise for the mal treatment of the British envoy. Mc Neil adopted a very firm attitude. He gave notice to Persian Government to accept the demands within a limited time and threatened to break off the diplomatic relations on the expiry of the notified time. Meanwhile the Shah of Persia had dispatched Husayn Khan to England to induce the British Government to recall Mc Neil from Persia. The Shah through his agent, strongly protested to the British Government. The Persian envoy handed over a memorandum to the British Government in which it was stated that the real purpose of the expedition against Herat was to save Persian subject in Herat from slavery. Mc Neil wrote,

and taking into consideration that it would be difficult for the envoy of Herat to return, Mohammad Ali Beg himself proceeded to Herat with Fattah Mohammad Khan in 1837. On his way back to Persia, along with letters from Yar Mohammad Khan, the Vizier of Kamran Shah and Pottinger, he was recognized, captured and brought back to the camp of the Shah of Persia, where he was misbehaved and letters were searched from him. While in the Persian custody, he managed to reach to Colonel Stoddart's camp. The Colonel informed the Persian authorities that Mohammad Ali Beg was a British messenger but, even then, the messenger and Stoddart both were maltreated. Mc Neil demanded reparation and apology, which were accepted by the Shah of Persia.

2. Watson, op. cit., p. 324.
was accused of having encouraged the Heratees to continue the war against Persian. He also was accused of inciting and encouraging through his agents the tribes and the rulers of the suburb viz., Kandhar, Kabul, Seistan, the Hezareh, and Meimaneh to attack and plunder the camp of the Persian Shah. McNeil was also blamed for diverting the caravans of supplies proceeding to Herat towards Meshed and in this way Persian army suffered much due to the shortage of supplies. It was also stated, that in besieging Herat, the intention of Persian Government was not to jeopardize the British interests. The memorandum concluded with the expectation that Persia would not be subjected to such an extent as to compel her to seek the help of any other foreign country. While the Persian envoy was at Vienna on his way to London to submit his memorandum, he was informed that Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign secretary would not recognize him as a diplomatic agent. It was also intimated to him that the British Foreign Secretary had full confidence in his Ambassador in Persia, and McNeil had discharged his duties faithfully. However,


Not only a protest was lodged and a memorandum was submitted with the British Government but the Persian Government contacted the Russian Government and complained against the British. She expressed her full hope in Russian friendship. Russia was stated as the only country which could save Persia from British tyranny, See Watson, op. cit. pp 325-326.
Husayn Khan reached London, obtained an interview with Lord Palmerston and returned to Persia with nine fresh British demands and the Persian demands were totally rejected. The British demands were as follows:

1. A written apology, was required for what had happened with regard to the British messenger.

2. A firman must be published in Persia assuring protection to all persons employed in the British Mission.

3. Ghorgan, and other places in Afghanistan still held by the Shah, must be restored to the Afghans.

4. A written apology must be given for the illegal seizure at Teheran of the house of a British officer.

5. All persons who had been concerned in the outrage on the broker of the British Residency at Bushire must be punished.

6. The Governor of that port, who had affronted Sir F. Haltland, must be removed from his office, and the reason of his removal should be stated publicly by the Persian Government.

7. The claims of a British subject on account of some iron-works at Karadagh must be liquidated.

8. The sums due to the officers of the British detachment lately serving in Persia must be paid; and

9. Lastely, the signature of a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Persia......

These demands were made on July 11, 1839. All were accepted by the Persian Government. Diplomatic relations were re-established on October 11, 1851.


Although Britain compelled Persia to accept all her demands, yet the real winner of the game was Russia. The British influence in Persia had gone and Persia looked upon Russia as her friend. The memorandum submitted by Persian envoy to the British Government containing charges against Me Neil though exaggerated, was substantially correct. The occupation of Herat by Persia meant the increase of Russian influence towards India. Under these alarming circumstances the British Ambassador was quite justified in taking all possible measures to save Herat from Persian occupation. Herat was so much important from British strategical point of view that it was decided to establish a pro-British Government in Afghanistan by re-establishing the Suddozye dynasty at Kabul in the person of Shah Shuja and to keep Herat as a separate and independent kingdom. A tripartite Treaty between the British Government, Ranjeet Singh, and Shah Shuja was concluded which guaranteed the integrity and independence of Herat.¹ In the meantime such developments took place which made Yar Mohammad Khan hostile towards the British. He entered into a conspiracy with the Shah of Persia and Kandhar Serdars, who had taken refuge in Persia, to make a joint effort to expel Shah Shuja and Britishers from Kabul. Major D'Arcy Todd was immediately sent to Herat and on June 9, 1939, an agreement was signed by Major D'Arcy Todd on behalf of British authorities in India and Nejeeb Ollah Khan on behalf of Yar Mohammad Khan and the conspiracy ceased.

¹ Aitchison, op.cit., p. 165.
The agreement recognized Yar Mohammad Khan as the vakeel of medium of communication between the British and Herat authorities. It was stated in the Agreement that anyone who should challenge the authority of Yar Mohammad Khan, must be considered an enemy by British. It was also agreed upon that the money advanced to Herat by British Government for the development and prosperity of the kingdom was to be paid to Yar Mohammad Khan, who was to utilize the money with the consent and advice of the British Political Officer at Herat. Yar Mohammad Khan agreed not to act against advice of the British Political Officer. For the welfare of the two powers, the Vazier was to be guided by the advice of the British agent. The British agent was not to interfere in the internal affairs of Herat without the consent of the Vazier. The institution of the Kingship was recognized as hereditary one, vested in the person of Shah Kamran and his descendants, so was the case with the office of Vazier, which was also recognized as an hereditary political institution vested in the person of Yar Mohammad Khan and his descendant, provided they were found worthy of trust. In case of deposition they were to receive pensions from the British Government.

The real motive of the conclusion of this Agreement was to satisfy Yar Mohammad Khan so much as to prevent him from intriguing with Persia. To strengthen the link of the friendship between the two Governments another treaty was concluded on August 13, 1839 which was signed by Kamran Shah himself, on behalf of

1. Ibid., pp. 168-169, Document No. XXXVIII.
Herat and E. D'Arcy Todd, the envoy from the Governor-General of India. It was agreed upon that British Government would not interfere in the internal administration of Herat, and the Shah would be assisted with money and officers in case of a foreign aggression. The Shah agreed to prohibit the sale of his subject as slaves. As regards relations with other foreign powers, it was agreed that no action would be taken by Herat without the consent of Great Britain. All disputes with Shah Shuja were to be referred to Great Britain for arbitration. No foreign subject except Britishers were to be employed in Herat and steps would be taken to promote trade and commerce between the two signatory powers. A monthly subsidy of Rupees 25,000 was to be paid by Government of British India to the shah of Herat and Herat, in return, agreed to conduct all her relations with Persia through the Britishers.

In this treaty, priority was given to Kamran Shah instead of Yar Mohammed Khan, the Vazier. The treaty was signed by Kamran Shah himself, although the agreement of June 9, 1839 recognized the Vazier as the Vakeel between British and Herat authorities. Yar Mohammed Khan fell himself betrayed by Britain and renewed his intrigues with the Shah of Persia to expel the Britishers from Afghanistan. The payment of the subsidy was, therefore, stopped by the British Agent, who also withdrew from Herat.

1. Ibid., pp. 170-172, Document No. XXXIX.
3. Ibid., pp. 335-335, also see Aitchison, p. 166.
The British envoy at Kabul strongly recommended to the British-Indian Government to send a force to Herat to punish Yar Mohammed Khan but Lord Auckland disagreed with the proposal and the idea was dropped. Shortly afterwards, the famous disaster occurred at Kabul followed by the British evacuation of Afghanistan. Yar Mohammed Khan being relieved of the fear of the British intervention in Herat, deposed and killed Hannan Shah and declared himself ruler of Herat under the suzerainty of Persia in 1842.

The other developments which ran parallel to the above mentioned problem and governed the Perso-British relations were not very important. A commercial treaty was, however, concluded in 1841 between the two countries which put the trade of Britain and Persia on the same footing as that of the most favoured nation and provided for the establishment of commercial agencies in the two countries. Later on, in 1844, a Firman was obtained by British Government from the Persian Government which dealt with the procedure to be followed for the protection of merchants in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency. In 1848, an engagement was obtained by Britain from the Shah which prohibited the importation of negro slaves into Persia by sea only.

1. Aitchison, op.cit., p. 166.
2. Ibid., pp. 135-133, Document No. XXXI.
3. Ibid., pp. 138-143, Document No. XXXII.
4. Ibid., pp. 146-147, Document No. XXXIII.
D - Anglo-Russian Threat to Persia

The Pro-Russian Mohammad Shah, who had sharp differences with Britain died in the evening of the 4th September, 1848. Nasirud-Din Meerza, the Heir-Apparent, ascended to the throne of Persia on September 20, 1848. There were certain persons who wanted to create disturbances so that they might gain by the subsequent lawlessness. They tried to stop the messengers who were to be sent to announce the death of the Shah to the different provinces of the country. Their main aim was to cause delay in the arrival of the Heir-Apparent, in whose absence, they would be able to make themselves master of the situation. But, on the medical report that the Shah could not possibly survive for many hours, Colonel Farrant, in charge of the English Mission had already sent his messenger to inform Nasirud-Din Meerza, the Heir-Apparent about the serious illness of Mohammad Shah and in this way, Heir-Apparent came to know about the real situation of the capital and marched towards Tehran in time. The timely arrival of Nasirud-Din Meerza completely foiled the efforts of the conspirators.


According to Watson, "Nasirud-Din Shah was crowned as king of Persia on October 20, 1848, p. 364."
At the time of the death of Mohammad Shah, the condition of Persia was far from satisfactory. Haji Mirza Aghasi, the Minister, was the real ruler of the country. He lacked statesmanship, and was cruel and brutal. The treasury was empty and the soldiers were to be paid. He brought the country at the brink of revolution. The courtiers of Mohammad Shah were dissatisfied with Mirza Aghasi. However, they could not express their dissatisfaction during the life of Mohammad Shah, upon whom the Haji had full control. The dissatisfied and angry courtiers, after the death of Mohammad Shah, took refuge in the British Legation. They formed a council to carry on the administration smoothly till the arrival of the Young Shah. They declared themselves loyal to the Young Shah but refused to accept the authority of Haji Mirza Aghasi. They were even ready to remove him from office by force. The English Charge d' Affaires, consulted with the Russian representative, Prince Dolgorouky in this matter and decided to help the courtiers. The courtiers gave their consent, reaffirmed their loyalty to the Young Shah but demanded that Haji Mirza Aghasi should not act as Minister until the new Shah formed his government. They also demanded the removal of the armed force which Haji had surrounded his person. The British and Russian representatives, Colonel Fairvant and Dolgorouky, requested the Haji to remain in his village and not to take part in the public affairs. Haji seemingly agreed.

1. Watson, op.cit., pp. 355-356,
but treacherously appeared in Teheran, where his followers gathered around him. He could not tilt the odds in his favour and had to take refuge in the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim.

Ashurada Despute

Nasirud-Din Shah, after being crowned as the Shah of Persia, appointed Taki Khan as his Prime Minister. In order to avoid jealousy Taki Khan did not accept the title of Sadr-i-Izam (Prime Minister) but assumed the title of Amir-i-Izam (Chief of Army). He was successful in his efforts to establish peace and order in the country. He did not like foreign intervention in Persia and was determined not to bow before any foreign power.


Mirza Taki Khan disliked foreign intervention in his country or foreign assistance to his country very much. This is quite evident from the following:

'It was proposed to employ good offices of the Russian and English representatives at Teheran for the purpose of bringing about a satisfactory compromise between the government and the rebels of Khorasan... he was reported to have said, 'it would be better for Persia that the inhabitants of Mashhad should be brought back to their duty through the loss of twenty thousand men, than that, that city should be won for the Shah through foreign interference'. Watson, op.cit., pp. 382-383.
He forgot that his was a weak country. He was however, compelled to grant concessions to his powerful neighbours. The dispute regarding the occupation of Ashurada arose soon and Mirza Taki, inspite of his firm determination, had to yield to the Russian demands. The Turkoman pirates usually raided the coasts of Hazenderan. The Persian Government being unable to crush the Turkoman pirates, requested the Russian Government for assistance, which was immediately granted. In 1840, the island of Ashurada was occupied by Russian. Persian Government strongly protested and demanded the evacuation of the island, but the Russian Government replied that to have a permanent check upon the mischievous activities of the Turkomans, it was necessary to turn the island into a naval base. The Persian Government could do nothing and Russia established her full control over it. Ashurada was a very important naval station from the strategic, commercial and political points of view. The occupation of Ashurada enabled the Russians to police Caspian. It became easy for them to import the produce of the fertile Persian provinces e.g., Astrabad, Hazenderan, and Gilan into the market of Georgia. Export from Georgia to these provinces also became easy. The presence of a Russian force in Ashurada gave that power great political influence throughout the neighbouring states of Persia. The Turkomans attacked the island in 1851, and, killed or carried off all the Russians, residing there. Russia alleged
that Turkoman pirates were assisted by the Persians and so they demanded the dismissal of the governor of Mazenderan - the Shah's brother, from the office. Amir-i-Hizam knew the fact that governor had nothing to do with Ashurada's incident, therefore, he refused to accept the Russian demand, but 1 ultimately he had to yield. The consequence of this concession to Russia was that Amir-i-Hizam granted to Britain another 2 concession which up to this time had been refused. An agreement was concluded between Persia and Britain, in August 1855, which allowed the warships of British Government and of East India Company to search the Persian merchant vessels in order to prevent the trade of negro slaves.

Herat Dispute

On November 13, 1851, Mirza Taki Khan was dismissed from the office of the Prime Ministership and Mirza Agha was appointed

4. Mirza Taki Khan was very much trusted by the Shah but his enemies were indulged into a successfully plotted conspiracy against him. The Shah began to suspect and dismissed him. Later on, the Russian representative declared that the Amir was under protection of Russia and sent Cossack guards to guard the Amir's house. The Russian representative adopted this attitude because he knew that the new Prime-Minister was pro-British. He thought that if the life of the Amir was saved, he could return to office. But the Russian intervention increased the suspicion of the Shah. The Shah requested the Russian representative to withdraw the protection, which he did. Amir was
as Sadri-Azam in his place. During his Prime Ministership, Crimean war was fought. In the Turko-Russian conflict, which, later on, took shape of Crimean war, Russian instigated Persia to take her side. In the autumn of 1853, Prince Dolgourky, the Russian representative at the Persian Court sought an interview with the Shah which was granted. Great secrecy was observed. No Persian subject, not even the Prime-Minister, was allowed to take part in the discussion. Secret proposals were made. The Shah was persuaded to take Russian side in the Turko-Russian conflict, and very tempting offers were made, which were accepted, more or less at once.

When the Shah disclosed the Russian proposals to Sadri-i-Azam, he strongly opposed their acceptance. The Prime-Minister, argued that in case of Russo-Turkish war, it was expected that Britain and France should take up arms against Russia, then, the ratio of the combatants would be three to one and it would be wise to take the side of the stronger. Mirza Agha Khan added that in joining Turkish side, the Treaty of Turkomanchai would be broken up for ever, and the possibility of winning back the lost provinces would increase. The Shah was convinced with the arguments of the Sadr-i-Azam and decided to watch the developments.

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cautiously. Later on, Britain and France joined the Turkish side in the war and Persia was advised by them to remain neutral. This advice was not liked at the Persian Court, therefore, the attitude of the Sadr-i-Azam changed. He became less critical of the Russian proposals. The change in the Sadr-i-Azam's mind might have taken place due to the following reasons:

1. He might have realized the danger which he took by persuading the Shah not to accept Russian proposals. By opposing Russia, he made the Russian angry.

2. Britain was not utilising her full energy in the war. Britain made no use of her Indian army in the war.

3. A third reason might be the heated discussion between Sadr-i-Azam and English Minister in Persia on matters of trifling importance. However, by remaining neutral, there was nothing to be gained by Persia, while in joining the Russian side, remittance of Turkomanchai indemnity was promised as well as there was possibility of annexing the Turkish territories containing the holy shrines of Ali and Husain. Meanwhile, the Shah was again approached by the Russians and at this time, Shah tempted to turn back to his original intention. The news reached to

4. Ibid., p. 414.
England that the Shah of Persia was inclined to join hands with Russia. A leading English journal, taking the advantage of the appointment of a new British Minister to the Persian Court remarked that the new Minister was going to Persia with firm determination to bring the Persian Shah to the British knees. This sort of thing outraged the Young Shah and he decided to be firm and free in his dealings with the British Minister. Before the arrival of the Charles A. Murray at Teheran, some correspondence had taken place between British Charge d'Affaires and Persian Sadr-i-Azam regarding the appointment of a Persian national, named Mirza Hashem Khan in the British Mission. Mirza Hashem Khan was very much hated by Sadr-i-Azam, who objected his appointment. Mirza was formerly in Persian service but he resigned from the Persian service and joined the British Legation in 1854 as Persian Secretary to the English Mission in Teheran. On Sadr-i-Azam's objection, he was removed from the office of the secretaryship and was appointed as British agent at Shiraz to which post, the Sadr-i-Azam had proposed his name at the time when he demanded his removal from the office of Secretaryship. The Sadr-i-Azam, though gave his consent to the new assignment of Mirza Hashim Khan, yet, later on, raised objection on the ground that Mirza Hashim Khan had never obtained a discharge certificate from the Persian Government therefore, he must not be allowed to take up his new post. Further more the Sadr-i-Azam warned if Hashim Khan would leave Teheran, on his way to Shiraz, he would be arrested. The British Minister resented the warning.

+ Charles A. Murray.
and informed that Persian Government would be responsible for
the arrest of an employee of the British Mission. However, the
wife of Hashim Khan was arrested by Sadr-i-Azam's order. Mr.
Murray demanded her release with in specified time, and warned
that in case Persian Government did not release her, the
diplomatic relations would be broke off. The Turkish Charge d'Affaires in Persia and M. Bourree, the French Minister at the
Persian Court, offered their good offices and tried to bring the
dispute to an end, but in vain. Mr. Murray broke off the
diplomatic relations on December 5, 1855. One of the causes, which
compelled Britain to break off the diplomatic relations, had been
stated to be the decision of the Sadr-i-Azam to capture Herat.
Months after months passed without any communication from Britain
and it seemed as if Britain had not reacted unfavourably to the
line of action followed by the Sadr-i-Azam. The Persian Prime
Minister thought that he had won the game. This sense of triumph

1. Hashim Khan was a Persian National. It was for the Persian
Government to allow or note to one of her nationals to be
employed in British Legation. Legally as well as morally,
the British Government was bound to remove him from office,
but the British authorities did not do so. Therefore, the
British Government was responsible for the dispute.
   347-348.
2. Watson, op.cit., p. 422, One can challenge Watson's argument
   that to occupy Herat, Sadr-i-Azam created a situation which
   compelled the British Minister to break off the relations of
   course, Mr. Murray was ready to remove Mr. Hashim from
   English Service on the conditions that his wife should be
   released and Mirza should be furnished with a good pension
   or he should be provided with a good job as well as the safety
   of his life should be guaranteed. Mirza Hashim Khan was a
   Persian national and, to allow him to be employed in the
   British service was a matter to be decided by Persian Government
   The chance of breaking off relations was given by the British
   authorities which the Persian Government availed.


led him to think about the occupation of Herat, although an agreement had been concluded between Britain and Persian regarding Herat on January 25, 1853, by which Persian Government had undertaken not to send troops to Herat unless it was invaded by a foreign country. Persia had also undertaken not to interfere in internal affairs of Herat. Later on, as stated previously, the relations between British and Persian deteriorated and ended in the breaking off diplomatic relations. In the meantime, Mohammad Yusuoof, a Sadozai, grandson of Feroze, nephew and heir of Shah Kamran, put Syud Mohammad Khan to death and occupied Herat. Long before Mohammad Yusooof had taken refuge in Persia and had been residing in Meshed, therefore the occupation of Herat was looked as a design of the Persian Government. Most Mohammad, the Amir of Kabul insisted that great Britain should defend Herat, but at that time this step was considered by Great Britain as premature. Consequently, he decided himself to attack Herat. Threatened by Dost Mohammad, Mohammad Yusooof appealed to

4. Ibid., p. 349.
the Shah of Persia for help and declared himself to be under the suzerainty of Persia; offered to issue coin and to read 1 Khutba in the name of the Shah of Persia.

Early in the year 1856, Persian army marched towards Herat under Prince Sultan Murad. Dost Mohammad - the Amir of Kabul also threatened Herat at the same time. Threatened from east and west both, Yusuf Khan did not feel himself secure and declared himself under the British protection by hoisting the British flag. Lord Canning did not approve this act of Yusuf Khan. He considered Yusuf Khan to be dishonest and unreliable, who only for his personal security declared himself to be under British protection. Later on, Mohammad Yusuf was deposed by the Persian army and was sent to Persian camp as prisoner.

Isa Khan, the Deputy-Governor of Herat continued to defend Herat. In the meantime, British India Government declared war against Persia on November 1, 1856. British Government decided to encourage and assist Dost Mohammad so that he could wage a successful war against Persia. Assistance in money was also sent to Isa Khan but before this assistance could reach him, he surrendered and Herat was occupied by the Persian on October 25, 1856. Isa Khan was then appointed as the Vazier of Herat and was to rule conquered province of Herat on behalf of the Shah, but after few week, he was murdered by a group of Persian soldiers.

Not only indirect measures were taken by the British Government to defend Herat but some effective direct steps were also taken. On December 4, 1856, the British troops occupied island of Karrack in the Persian Gulf. Sir James Outram assumed the command in January 1857. He defeated the Persian army and Khushab on February 26, 1857. Mohammadregh was occupied by British forces on March 26, 1857. In the mean time, the Shah sent Farrukh Khan, the Amin-al-Mulk as plenipotentiary to Paris to negotiate peace with British through the good offices of France. On March 4, 1857 Farrukh Khan, successfully concluded a Treaty of Peace which was signed by him on behalf of Persia and by Lord Cowley on behalf of Britain. But due to the lack of adequate communications, the fighting between British and Persian forces continued for several weeks even after the conclusion of treaty of peace. By this treaty, the British Government agreed to evacuate the occupied Persian territories subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. One of the principal conditions was that the Persian forces were to be immediately withdrawn from the territory and city of Herat and from every part of Afghanistan. The Persian Shah agreed to relinquish all claims of sovereignty over territories and city of Herat and the other territories

4. Hurewitz, op.cit., p. 1616
of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the any part of Afghanistan, any symbol of obedience such as coinage, or Khutbah' or tribute'. The Shah agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and recognized the independence of Herat and the whole of Afghanistan. In case of dispute or difference between the Shah's Government and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, it was agreed upon that the matter would be referred to the British Government for friendly settlement and Persian Government promised not to go to war with them unless the good offices of Britain had failed. On the ratification of the treaty being exchanged, the British Mission was to return to Teheran and the Persians were to 'receive it with apologies and ceremonies....'.

Before the Persians evacuated Herat, they installed Sultan Ahmad Khan, a Barukzye — nephew and son-in-law of Dost Mohammad, as ruler of Herat. The new ruler of Herat accepted to strike coin and to read Khutbah in the name of the Shah of Persia. The British Government did not raise any objection of his being installed as ruler of Herat and recognized him as de facto ruler.

1. For the text of the treaty; and the separate note which explained how apologies will be tendered to the returning British Mission and how the Mission will be received — See Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 155-162, Document "o.XXVI, Hurewitz Vol.I, op.cit., pp. 161-163(The text of the Treaty is also given), Watson, op.cit., pp. 456-458, Sykes, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 351.

Although, Persia was defeated and Britain was in a position to dictate the terms of the peace to Persia, she did not wish to gain something substantial. Had Britain desired so she would have, at least, occupied certain part of the Persian territories permanently but she did nothing of the kind. From the aforesaid discussion, one can conclude that Britain was only interested in the independence of Herat and Afghanistan, so that these territories could be made as buffer states and in this way, the expansionist designs of Russia could be effectively checked. The occupation of Herat by Persia meant an increase of Russian influence in Herat and Afghanistan, which ultimately threatened the safety of India and, therefore, Britain decided to go to war with Persia on Herat Issue.

Encirclement of Persia by Russia and the Race for Economic Concessions

As stated previously, since the days of Peter the Great, Russia followed a policy of expansionism and by the first half of the nineteenth century she was able to annex considerable parts of Persia under the terms of Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828). It has been said that not a single inch of Persian soil had been ceded by Nasirud-Din Shah but Curzon points out that in 1869, Krasnovodsk and Balkan Bay were occupied by Russia and Persia could do nothing except lodging a protest. Chikishliar and Ashurada were occupied by Russia.
The Transcaspian conquest of Russia had transferred many Persian villages to the Russian side. The pastures of the Atak, the villages of Kaahka, Nehna, Chacha, and Dushak, the position at Sarakha - all were once part of Persian territory but Russia and annexed them. The Persian territories of Kulkulab, Germab, and Kelta Chenar had been absorbed by Russia under the Akhal Boundary Treaty of 1881. The Russian advance in the Central Asiatic region as well as their occupation of the Persian territories was viewed as dangerous and alarming by Great Britain. In 1859 Caucasus was conquered by the Russian army. Kerghin steppes was subdued in 1863, Tashkent was captured in 1863 and Samarkand in 1868. Khiva was occupied in 1873 and Khanate of Kohkand in 1876. In January 1881, General Mikhail Skobelev crushed the Turkomans at their main stronghold - Geok Tpe. 

"The Russia carved out for herself a new and rich Asiatic empire" Russia was pushing her advantage in every possible manner but the British diplomacy waged a hopeless struggle, unsupported either by money or force. Merv fell in the Russian's hand in 1884 and Panjdeoh was occupied in 1885. In the meantime, Trans-Caspian Railway had been constructed. It ran for nearly three hundred miles parallel with the Persian frontier. By 1885, the railway was extended up to Ashkabad. In 1880, it was extended up

to Charjui via Herv. By 1888, it reached Samarkand, from where branches were extended to Tashkent and Farghana. Russia planned to connect the line with the Persian cities and for this purpose, the territory was surveyed by the Russian engineers. The Spur from Herv to Kushk was completed in 1898. It made Russian strong enough to attack Herat at any time. Materials to extend it up to Herat were stacked at the terminus. The construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway by Russian was 'in every way a strategic success'. Moreover, Russia had got full control of the Caspian by the virtue of Treaty of Turkomanchai, yet, on November 24, 1869, the Council of the Empire of Russia published her decision by which establishment of companies for the navigation of the Caspian Sea except by Russian subjects and purchase by foreigners of shares in such companies was prohibited. The Caspian Sea had become in this way, a Russian lake. It was very important from military point of view because the Russian steamers were available at any time for the transport of troops. With the help of Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamers running in the Caspian, Russia was in a position to send her troops quickly at her will to the northern Persia. Russia's main ambition at that time was to annex the provinces of Azerbaijan, Mazenderan, Jilan and Khorasan — in other words, the whole of the northern provinces of Persia. As regards to Persian military strength, it seems

better to quote Curzon. According to him, 'The only Persian
trroops of any value in the capital are the so-called Cossack +
regiments, under Russian officers; and in the event of political
convulsion it is doubtful whether they would not prefer the
country of their uniform to the country of their birth'. The
situation was very alarming and British authorities feared that
the occupation of Merv would lead to the annexation of Khorasan,
which would make the occupation of Herat by the Russians an easy
task from where India could be easily invaded.

How Britain and Persia reacted to this alarming and
dangerous situations created by Russia, would be discussed later
on in this chapter. At present it is necessary to mention that
while Russia was engaged in establishing her position in central
Asia, the growing industrialization of the West created such a
situation that required market from where raw material could be
imported and to where manufactured products could be exported.
Industrialization originated the struggle for economic concessions
in Persia. penetration always needs political inter-
vention. In the later half of the 19th century, the race for

+ Lasirud-Din Shah gave his consent in 1879 to the creation
of Cosack Brigade. The Shah agreed that the Brigade
was to be instructed and commanded by Russian officers. -
Wilber, op.cit., p. 81.
++ The Russians had full confidence in the Cossack Brigade. They
believed that the Cossacks, will always obey them. -
Chirol, op.cit., pp. 46-47.
1. Ibid., p. 593.
concession hunting between England and the Russia started in Persia. In 1872, a naturalized British citizen, Baron Julius de Reuter, acquired from the Shah a huge concession giving him the exclusive right of exploitation of mines, the control of government forests, the construction of rail roads, tramways, irrigation network work and the establishment of nationa bank. The Shah also pledged the entire customs of his Empire for a period of twenty-five years to Reuter. The concession represented a most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of the kingdom into foreign hands. However, the Russian pressure compelled the Shah to cancel the concession. Persian public opinion also contributed in the concession being cancelled. Nevertheless, in 1889, Baron de Reuter received a concession for establishing the Imperial Bank of Persia which possessed the monopoly of issuing currency and exploiting the mineral resources of the country. The concession was valid for sixty years. Russia, promptly demanded and obtained a concession to open a Russian bank called Banque d'Escompte de Perse in 1891. The Karum river concession was granted in 1888. It was a concession for opening the Karum river for navigation not by Great Britain alone, but by all countries. On March 8, 1890, the Shah granted

2. Sykes, op.cit., p. 370, also see Wilber, op.cit., pp.80-81.
the famous tobacco concession to an English Company. The concessionnaire, Mr. J.T. Talbot was thereby granted the monopoly of buying, selling and manufacturing of all tobacco inside and outside Persia. The position of the tobacco growers, sellers, and consumers, was greatly affected. However, the public resentment, sponsored by the Ulma of the country and then, + the Fatwa issued by Haji Hasan Shirazi compelled the Shah to cancel the concession. Of course, one of the major factors which led to the cancellation of the tobacco concession was the Russia's protest. The Russian protested against the tobacco monopoly - vigorously, officially and immediately. The Shah paid compensation to the company to the value of half a million pounds sterling. The sum was borrowed from the Imperial Bank of Persia, and may be said to mark the beginning of Persian national debt. At a very early stage, in December, 1863, the British Government was granted the concession for the construction of telegraph lines in Persia and was active in promoting the


For the cancellation of the tobacco concession, Sayyid Javalud win Afghani wrote a long and impressive letter to the Chief Mujtahid Haji Hasan Shirazi. Being impressed by the letter, the Chief Mujtahid issued a Fatwa, declaring the 'use of tobacco to be unlawful, until the abrogated concession was withdrawn'. The translation of the text of the selected portions of the letter is given on pp. 51-21 and the text of Fatwa on p. 22 in the Rounds book, 'The Persian Revolution of 1905-1906'.


erection of telegraph lines across the western Persia. It was Indian Mutiny which compelled the British to think about to have a direct telegraphic communication with India. It is interesting to note that the concession race enabled Russia to obtain a concession in 1890 which was negative in its utility. The Russian Government had decided not to allow any foreign government or any foreign national to construct railways in Persia. The main reason behind this policy was to prevent the construction of a railway by Britain, which would facilitate the British troops to reach to Asiatic Russia. Russia, therefore, concluded an agreement by which the Persian Government engaged 'for the space of ten years, beginning from the date of the signature of this agreement, neither itself to construct a railway in Persian territory nor to permit or grant a concession for the construction of railways to a company or other persons'. After the expiration of ten years, the renewal of the prolongation of the concession was to be immediately discussed between the two parties.

F - Change in British Policy Regarding Persia

It is evident then, that it was the age old ambition of Russia to occupy the whole of the northern provinces of Persia

1. Aitchison, op.cit., pp.163-164, Document No.XXXVII.
and establish her supremacy over the Persian Gulf. This policy of Russia was in quite conflict with the interests of Great Britain. Therefore, she followed a policy which could either reduce or put to an end the Russian influence at the Persian Court, while Persia, being afraid of her two powerful neighbours, tried to seek co-operation and assistance of a third power i.e., U.S.A. Britain was not prepared to conceive of the interference of any third power in Persian affairs. Nevertheless on October 9, 1851, George P. Marsh, the U.S. Minister at Istanbul, on the initiative of the Persian Chargé d'Affaires there, concluded a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Persia and after a minor amendment, the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification. The Shah of Persia, however, unexpectedly, kept silence. The silence maintained by the Shah was only due to the British intrigue against the Treaty. In 1854, the Persian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople approached Carroll Spence, the U.S. Minister there, to reopen negotiations for the conclusion of a Perso-American treaty. On November 25, 1854, the U.S. Minister at Constantinople informed the U.S. Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, that Persia was interested in buying American warships and securing the services of American naval personnel. The Persian government was so eager to conclude this sort of treaty that her another diplomat at Vienna, approached the U.S. Minister Mr. Henry K. Jackson to open the talks to achieve the same end.

The Russian Government had promised to support the Perso-American negotiations. Great secrecy was being observed as the interested parties were not prepared to take the risk of British or French intrigue against the conclusion of such a Treaty. However, in December, 1856, a treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded between the two nations in which no article was
included for naval help to Persia, because at that time, the U.S.
Government was following a policy which could promote commerce and friendship with all the nations but at the same time, stuck to her policy of strict non-intervention. Persia was, however, very much interested in obtaining naval assistance from U.S.A. which she could use against British - the power which proved to be the main obstacle in the way of her policy of expansionism and occupation of Herat. Not being successful to enlist the American naval assistance, the Persian Government did not take any interest in the implementation of the treaty. The U.S. Congress too, inspite of the U.S. President's advice to make necessary appropriation for the establishment of a Legation in Teheran, did not take any action. The treaty, therefore, more or less, died. The matter was not reconsidered till 1882. It was on August 7, 1882, when a law was passed to establish diplomatic

1. Due to the Crimean War, Russia was trying to win the friendship of Persia at any cost, where as the Anglo-Persian relations deteriorated which, ultimately led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1856.


relations between the U.S. and Persia and in February, 1883, Samuel G.W. Benjamin was appointed as Charge d'affaires and Consul General of the U.S. at Teheran.

The Russian advance in Central Asia in 1870's alarmed the Shah of Persia very much and he appealed to Britain for protection but British Government did not attach much importance to the Russian advances therefore the Shah's request went unheeded. No material aid or subsidy was given by the British Government despite the desire expressed by the Shah, which was of course supported by the British Minister at Teheran. In 1875, when, the Viceroy and his Council reviewed the British policy towards Persia, the Commander-in-Chief, Napier of Magdala, strongly pleaded for supporting the Shah. He also advocated that Persian should be given British arms, supplies and officers. Eight years later, Roberts regretted that the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief did not receive favour at that time. He maintained that had Persia's request for British army officers been granted and had real efforts to regain predominance at the Persian Court been made, the Russian advance might have been checked. However, Britain made no real efforts to cultivate the Shah's friendship. The British India Government and the British Government differed much on this account. The Home Government did not take the matt

1. Ibid., p. 25.
4. Ibid., p. 36, Confidential Memorandum by Roberts, 'Isan Invasion of India by Russia possible' 31 December, 1883.
seriously. Lord Salisbury was never afraid of Russia’s power. He always underestimated her strength and thought her ‘feeble’. As Secretary of State of India, he never encouraged the idea of friendship between Persia and British Indian Government. He doubted whether even military help would keep the Shah faithful whom he suspected of being ready to exploit either party as he thought profitable. However as Foreign Secretary (1778-1780), he has evolved a new policy towards Persia. He negotiated to entrust Herat and Seistan territories to Persia. According to the terms proposed by the British Foreign Secretary, Persia was to acquire the territories of Herat and Seistan and was also to receive subsidy. In return for these concessions, Shah was to appoint British officers in Herat and to allow the construction of railways from Kandahar to Herat, as well as to resist further Russian inroads. He was to introduce projects for internal reforms of his country under the British supervision. Further more, the Shah was to give his consent to take measures for

1. Ibid, p. 46, Salisbury to Lytton, private, 15 July, 1877.
2. Ibid., p. 49, Minute by Salisbury of 6 October 1874 on the question of providing British officers for the Persian army.

+. It was an old desire of Persia to annex Herat, but whenever, she tried to occupy Herat, Britain intervened and made the occupation impossible. Really, the occupation of Herat by Persia at that time, meant an increase of Russian influence in Afghan territories. But Sheir Ali, the Amir of Kabul allied himself with Russia. This changed the whole situation. The refusal of the admission of British mission in Kabul brought British troops in Afghanistan in 1878. The campaign was successful. On the death of his father Yaqub Khan succeeded to the throne of in 1879. The members of the British
improving transport facilities to the British from Gulf to Inland. The Shah was very much pleased with the offer, but the negotiation had to be given up as the Shah demanded this agreement to be permanent. It was rather unfortunate event for Persia that Liberals returned to power in Great Britain in 1880 and the negotiations died for ever.

Later on, the eightees of the 19th Century witnessed radical change. The establishment of a Russia's Asian empire; the construction of Trans-Caspian Railway, the conversion of Caspian Sea into a Russian lake—all these facts made Russian position stronger. Russia was now in a position to threaten the security of northern Persia. With her established position in Central Asia, she was also in a position to threaten the security of India. She had her eyes not only upon northern provinces of Persia, but on the Persian Gulf also. That Russia covets Meshed because it will assist her to Herat; that she covets Seistan because it will open her Baluchistan; that she covets the whole of Northern Persia because it will supply her resources in which her own Central Asian possessions are deficient, and which will

mission in Kabul were massacred in October, 1879. Under these conditions, Lord Salisbury thought it better to entrust Herat to Persia, whom Britain could punish at any time by sending expedition in the Gulf. Moreover, through this advice he thought that Persia would be encouraged enough to resist the Russian expansionism.

1. Ibid., pp. 49-51. For an outline of the terms see Draft Convention between Her Majesty and the Shah of Persia, most secret, undated F.O. 65/1097, see Appendix IV of the same book, pp. 258-259, Salisbury to Wolff, No.14, very confidential 29th February, 1888, F.O. 60/491.
render her military and offensive strength far more formidable than it is at present; that she has an eye upon the Persian Gulf because it may give her a dock yard and ships in the Indian seas. On account of these alarming conditions, Curzon advocated a new British policy to be followed towards Persia which should guarantee the integrity of that country both in principle and in practice.

These changes in the situation caused great anxiety in Great Britain. The British diplomats were now compelled to revise their policy with regard to Persia. The new policy covered a very large field. Britain followed a dual policy. She tried to strengthen Persia by developing her economic resources and improving her administrative system. Simultaneously, she tried to reach to an understanding with Russia regarding Persia. In other words, Britain tried to follow a policy of cooperation with Russia about Persia.

In 1885, Lord Salisbury, during an interview with Malkam Khan, the Persian representative in Britain, frankly told that Britain was interested to see improvement of communication between the Gulf and northern regions, as well as reforms in the Persian administrative system, which could only save Persia from Russian occupation. He also advised the Persian representative that Teheran being within easy approaches of Russia it would be better in the interests of Persia as well as Great Britain to get the

2. Ibid., p. 605.
seat of Persian Government shifted to Isfahan. Fasirud Din Shah however, ignored the advice of Lord Salisbury. Consequently Great Britain arrived at the conclusion that there were only two solutions of the Persian problem - 'either a joint guarantee by Germany, Austria and Great Britain, or a wholesale withdrawal from northern Persia and Afghanistan - Herat included - to be accompanied by the occupation of Kandahar, Girishk and Bandar Abbas, and the recognition of Zii es-Sultan as the lawful and British-protected ruler of southern Persia'. No middle way, in their opinion was there which could solve the Persian problem. It was very difficult to extend help to Persia so that she could defend herself against the Russian expansion. Lord Salisbury favoured the idea of Anglo-German cooperation in Persia which would, however, guarantee Persia's integrity. In her attempt to purchase the German alliance, Britain decided to give implementation to the Reuter's railway concession of 1872 with the help of Germany and in this way establishing Persia as a strong bulwark against Russia (The concession was cancelled by the Shah but negotiations continued for twelve years and Britain gave unofficial diplomatic support to Reuter who tried to uphold the terms of the agreement). But Germany refused to involve herself in Persian affairs and the attempt to evolve a joint Anglo-German policy for Persia failed.

Britain, then experimented with a policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation in Persia. In the beginning of 1888, Lord Salisbury tried to come to an understanding with Russia regarding Persia by following a policy which he called a 'partition of preponderance'. By this policy Lord Salisbury meant partition of Persia into spheres of economic preponderance. The policy of partitioning of Persia was not at this stage a view to ultimately occupy her but to divide her into spheres of influence. It was simply a plan of the division of Persia in economic spheres. On the one hand, this policy would have reduced the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia and on the other, it could have strengthened the country by railways being constructed in the country, by increasing trade and commerce and industrial development, and by the flow of capital in the respective spheres. Lord Salisbury expected that once this process began, other nations like Germany and America would come forward and invest their capital in both spheres, dominated by Great Britain and Russia respectively and in this way Russian danger would be removed. He wanted to transform the Persian question from an Anglo-Russian into international one. Moreover, with her improved condition, Persia would be able to defend herself. But Bulgarian question proved to be an obstacle in the way of this policy and Russia adopted a very cold attitude.

Russia wanted the removal of Prince Ferdinand from Bulgaria, but Britain opposed the Russian scheme.
to the British proposals. However, negotiations continued and Britain was able to secure the renewal of Russia's assurance regarding the integrity and independence of Persia on March 12, 1888. As regards the joint economic development of Persia and construction of railways in that country, Russia did not agree with Britain. Russia proposed that the countries concerned would settle these matters with the Shah separately. As regards the Khorasan frontier negotiations, Russia maintained that it concerned Russia and Persia alone. In the meantime, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was appointed as British Minister at Tehran in 1883. He followed a dual policy: he tried to come to an understanding with Russia—an understanding which would cease the rivalry and would initiate a policy of cooperation in the field of trade and commerce in Persia. An understanding was possible by recognizing two spheres in Persia with the recognition of supremacy of the two powers i.e. Britain and Russia in their respective spheres. Wolff was prepared to accept the supremacy of influence, but was not ready to get the country divided between the two Great powers. He wanted the improvement and development of Persia by the joint efforts of Great Britain and Russia and its transformation into a strong and stable buffer state. On the other hand,

In 1834, Palmerston succeeded in obtaining a guarantee from Russia regarding the integrity and independence of Persia. No formal treaty was concluded, but this understanding had since been confirmed on several occasions viz., in 1853, 1863, 1873, 1874 and 1883.

For the correspondence (1834-1888) between Great Britain and Russia with reference to the integrity and independence of Persia (1888) see Shiroi, op. cit., pp. 437-444.

he sponsored measures to the Persian Government which would promote trade, improve internal security and develop the rich natural resources of Persia. He favoured the flow of western capital in Persia. By investing their capital, Wolff thought, the powers concerned would take an interest in the preservation of the integrity and independence of Persia. In his opinion, improvement of Persia was necessary for which drastic reforms were needed. These reforms should either be introduced by the Persian Government herself or be imposed upon her by the two powerful neighbours. But, inspite of his best efforts, Wolff could not reach an understanding with Russia. It was not only Russia which resisted any programme of development in Persia, but Persia herself resisted any such programme. The Shah was afraid of Russia's might and thought that any programme sponsored by Great Britain would antagonize her.

Britain was at that time, mainly interested in the development of the means of communications in Persia. A railway from Persian Gulf to Tehran and the opening of the Karun river for navigation would have enabled Britain to reinforce troops in Persia and it would have facilitated British commerce and trade too. Therefore, Britain tried to obtain concessions for the implementation of her programme. To get the railway concession granted, Britain sought

1. Ibid., pp. 120-136.
the assistance of Sultan Masud Meerza the Zil-es-Sultan, the eldest son of the Shah. The title of G.C.S.I. was conferred upon him in 1888, and while he was in Teheran to get the railway concession for Great Britain granted, the Shah suspected him and he was compelled to resign his Governorship of the provinces excepting Isfahan and so the game was over. The importance of Persia had so much increased from British point of view that the British Government thought it proper to pledge themselves to support the Shah and shortly after the Zil's downfall, British government informed the Shah about her intention to uphold the integrity of Persia, at all costs. A formal assurance to this effect was given to Persia. The Karun river concession and so many other concessions were granted to the both great powers, i.e., England.

Sultan Masud Meerza, the eldest son of Nasirud-Din Shah was not born of the Chief Queen, therefore he was not qualified for succession to the throne. He was appointed Governor of Isfahan and as the Central Government did not exercise any effective control over the provinces it was not difficult for him to establish himself over nearly half of the Persia, including the provinces of Isfahan, Arabistan, Barmird, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Kamareh, Luristan, Yezd, Fars, Nahallat, Gulpaigan, Khunsar, Irak and Bargazine. The inhabitants of southern Persia were war-like people who belonged to different tribes. Masud Meerza subdued these uncontrolable tribesmen and formed a well-drilled and disciplined army. To the Britishers, southern Persia was very important, so they tried to cultivate friendship with him. They thought it as the last alternative to recognize the Zil as the lawful and British-protected ruler of Southern Persia. Moreover the tribes of Southern Persia were pro-British. This fact also encouraged Britishers’ protectorate over Southern Persia - Crouch op.cit., p 89 and 155, also see Curzon, Vol. II, op. cit. pp. 623-624.

2. Ibid., p. 269, October 24, 1888, D.O. 93/75/14B.
and Russia. Moreover, some measures of reforms due to the insistence of Wolff were introduced in Persia. Consequently, Britain felt her position comparatively but not satisfactorily stable in Persia. The main trends in the British policy towards Persia during that period was to help Persia in becoming a strong and stable nation. Lord Salisbury in his speech at the Guildhall in July 1889, at the occasion of the banquet given to the Shah of Persia declared "...We desire above all things that Persia shall not only be prosperous, but be strong—strong in her resources, strong in her preparations, strong in her alliance...". A strong Persia was desired by Britain because it would resist Russian policy of expansionism. As the British policy was futile to the Russian interests therefore, Russia opposed any project of reform or development in Persia. So far as Persia was concerned she was afraid of both the powers. She, therefore, tried to develop close relations with U.S. After reaching America's capital on October 5, 1888, Haji Kolee Khan, the Persian representative in U.S.A., availed the opportunity of his first meeting with the American President Cleveland. On behalf of the Persian Government, Haji Kolee Khan requested the American President for such help and assistance which could save Persia from Britain and Russia. The Persian Government was keenly interested to get her natural resources exploited by U.S. and hoped for the conclusion

1. Ibid., Chapter X and XI pp. 155-191. These chapters give the details of Wolff's negotiations with the Shah which meant an strong Persia- a buffer state between the two powerful neighbours.

of a treaty of alliance which would help Persia in her defence against the aggressive designs of her powerful neighbours, Britain and Russia. Persia, hopefully sought America's intervention as a means of preserving her existence, and independence but both the U.S. Government and the capitalists were not prepared to take political and economic risk in Persia. The American President, on December 3, 1889, declared that the American involvement in Persia's political struggle was 'contrary to the basic principles of American foreign policy'. The message sent by the Shah of Persia could not induce the American Government to change her policy of non-intervention. However, by the Nineteenies, the Russian predominance over the Northern provinces of Persia had become so tangible a reality that a British publicist could confidently assert that no Russian statesman 'would pen a report on Russian policy towards Persia that did not involve as a major premise the Russian annexation of the provinces of Azerbaijan, Mazanderan, and Khoresan - in other words, of the whole of North Persia, from west to east'. Great Britain, however, viewed Russian hegemony over north Persia with comparative indifference; but indications after 1894 that St. Petersburg intended to push its influence southwards to the Gulf aroused serious concern in British circles.


+ For the message sent by the Shah of Persia through his Minister to the President of America in 1888, see Ibid., pp. 39-41. The message reveals the fact that the Persian Shah was ready to exploit her natural resources and to adopt measures for the development of his country in commercial, industrial and economic fields, but the two Great powers i.e., Britain and Russia prevented the development of the country. Whenever, Persia sought the help of an impartial nation for developing the country, the two powers did not allow her to be benefited.

Access to the Gulf was the basic commercial strategic objective of Russian policy but this policy of Russia constituted menace against the political commercial as well strategical interests of Great Britain.

In 1899, Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Minister at Teheran, addressed a memorandum to the Foreign Office analysing the Persian situation. He sketched the picture of an effete oriental monarchy around which the Russian net was drawing closer with each passing day. To defend her interest, it was essential for Great Britain to assume an active role in the country. In her naval supremacy over the Gulf, the British Government possessed a lever of pressure to which Persian statesmen were very sensitive. A blunt warning that Russian aggression in the north would result in similar moves by Great Britain in the South would stabilize the situation. Such a declaration, Durand argued, would not embarrass Teheran. On the contrary, it would strengthen its hands in refusing any demands that Russia might make in respect of the northern provinces.

When the Teheran Minister's despatch was referred to the Government of India, Curzon, on behalf of the Government of India, sent a long despatch to the secretary of state for India about the British policy in Persia and the Persian Gulf. The Government of India in her despatch of September 21, 1899, described British i.e. Anglo-Indian interests in Persia to be commercial, political, strategical, and telegraphic. After discussing in detail these

1. H.M’s Minister, Teheran to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated 12 February 1899 F.D.S.O. No. 10, November, 1899.
British interests in Persia and the danger to these interests from Russian side, the Government of India recommended an understanding with Russia in terms of demarcation of 'sphere of influence' in the country along the lines of agreement concluded in regard to China. British interests—political, strategical, commercial and telegraphic—were mainly concentrated in south and central Persia. Russian interests, on the other hand, concerned the north. A line drawn from Khanikin on the Zurco—Persian border through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Kairun and Yazd to Seistan could be taken to represent the boundary between the British and the Russian sphere of interests. Curzon confessed that the arrangement, he had suggested, suffered from certain imperfections, for instance, Teheran, the capital, would lie in the northern zone, giving Russia an advantage over Great Britain. More concretely, access to the Gulf still remained open to Russia, yet, if an agreement was reached, it would eliminate the basic point of friction between Great Britain and Russia in Asia. Curzon's views were not shared by all Englishmen, in and out of the Government. The Secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton sent a reply to the Curzon's despatch on July 6, 1900 and opposed the idea of an understanding between Great Britain and Russia regarding Persia. He wrote: 'Your Excellency discusses the

possibility of coming to an agreement with Russia, as to the spheres of influence to be exercised respectively in Persia by the two countries. There is much to be said in favour of such an understanding if it could be established and maintained. But the probability is that if any such overtures were made by Her Majesty's Government to the Russian Foreign Office the Shah would be informed of the proposal in such a manner as possibly to convey to his mind the idea that the partition of his territories between Great Britain and Russia was the immediate object of the present policy of Great Britain. For these and other reasons I see no advantage at present in making any such proposals to the Russian Government, or in making any fresh announcement to the Shah's Government on the subject of our settled and declared policy in southern Persia. Referring to the Gulf Problem, Lord Hamilton stated that on April 15, 1899, Lord Salisbury informed the Persian Government that 'it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf'. In the last, he added that 'Her Majesty's Government do not propose to adopt for the moment any departure from their past line of action' in Persia.

Curzon’s despatch reached London at a juncture when the attention of the British Cabinet was monopolised by the Boer War. Therefore, it was difficult for Great Britain to resist any Russian

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activity in Persia. It was the time for concession rather than resistance, so Russia’s influence in Persia increased.

In 1900, Russia agreed to lend Persian Government over £2,000,000 through the Russian Bank, but guaranteed by the Russian Government. This loan was supplemented by a further loan of £1,000,000 in 1902. The Russian Bank at Teheran was under the immediate control of the Russian Ministry of Finance and the nature of its business was dictated by political rather than financial considerations. The security for the loan of 1900 was the Persian customs receipts exclusive of the Gulf ports.


* When in 1898, Iftizaffer-al-Din Shah proposed to undertake a journey of Europe, he found the Persian treasury empty. To meet the expenditure of the Shah’s journey, it was decided to raise loan abroad. The British Minister at Teheran Sir Mortimer Durand recommended the British Government to furnish the Shah with the loan. The security offered was satisfactory and adequate, but the British Government as well as the British capitalists hesitated to grant the loan. Russia got the chance and granted the loan. Had the Shah been furnished with the British loan, he might have not sought the Russian loan - Chirol op.cit., pp. 49-56.


++ In October 1897, the Persian Government gave her written consent to the British Government that the customs of the Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision. In 1900, when Persia was furnished with the Russian loan, the security for the loan was the Persian customs receipts. However, an exception was made of the revenues and ports of Southern Persia. In 1900, the British charge d'affairs at Teheran called the attention of the Persian Government towards the British interests regarding the ports of ....Contd.
The loan was granted on the condition that the Persian Government should pay off the debt of the Imperial Bank of Persia, as well as the other loans, immediately after getting the loan. The Persian Government agreed not to seek loan with any other foreign power for a period of ten years. At the same time, the Persian Government renewed an earlier secret agreement not to grant any railway concession to foreigners without Russian's consent. Russia also started construction of carriage roads in the north of Persia. Taking advantage of British preoccupation with the Boer War, Russia became more active in pursuing her forward policy in Persia especially towards the Persian Gulf. In 1900, a small Russian gun boat reached Bushire, Bunder-Abbas and other ports of the Persian Gulf, and insisted to be consulted before any change was made in the administration of the customs of Mohammareh or in the position of the Sheikh. The Persian Foreign Minister replied that not only in Mohammareh, but in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the British Government should be consulted, if any change was proposed—Gooch, The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir Hardinge. F.O. Persia 649(No. 2), dated January 6, 1906.

The Persian Government had borrowed £5,000,000 in 1892 from the Imperial Bank of Persia on the security of the customs of the Persian Gulf. The loan was taken to pay compensation for the abolition of Tobacco concession.

1. Sykes op. cit., p. 375.
2. Wilber, op. cit. p. 82.

Although Russia got renewed the secret agreement regarding the construction of railways, Britain did not lag behind. In March 1899, the Shah of Persia agreed that Great Britain should be given preference in the construction of the southern

Contd.
tonnes of coal from Bombay. When the coal arrived, he declared that it would be difficult for him to load the entire load of the coal on the boat and asked to land a portion of it at Bunder-Abbas. The Governor of the place thought that permission to land the coal would require Russian guards who might stay, was not in favour of the Commander's proposal but had no courage to reject the commander's proposal. In the meantime, a British cruiser arrived. Encouraged by the arrival of the cruiser, the governor refused permission and in this way the Russian attempt to create a base for keeping stores from which a coaling station might be developed failed. During the next three years, the Russian warships toured the Gulf but no attempt was made to acquire a footing. However, Russian consulates were established at Basra, Bushire and Bunder-Abbas.

Russians were not less active to exploit the Perso-Afghan Seistan boundary dispute. This boundary dispute was a continuous source of hostility between the two nations. When the dispute assumed a critical shape, the British foreign office on the request of two hostile countries, despatch a Mission under Major-General Sir Frederick Goldsmith in 1872, who drew a line of railways. He also agreed that in case, the concessions for railways constructed were granted to any foreign power in the north, similar concessions should be granted to Britain in the south and that no southern railway concession should be granted to any foreign nation without consultation with the British Government. In April 1900, Britain got these pledges renewed- Gooch and Temperley, op. cit., p. 370. The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge F.O. Persia 649, (No. 2) dated January 6, 1902.

demarcation. Although dissatisfied with the award, both parties accepted it. It was the Russian consul, M. Miller at Seistan on whose encouragement the Persian Government renewed the dispute. In 1902, the Persian Government asked for British intervention to settle the dispute. Sir Henry McMahon was sent in 1903 to settle the dispute. Russia wanted to take part in the negotiations, which was, however, refused—Russia being disqualified to take part in the settlement of the Perso-Afghan dispute. And, therefore, she tried her best to sabotage the negotiations and desired its failure. The local Persian authorities were under influence of M. Miller, therefore, it was very difficult for the British Mission to deal with them. However, the Mission started its work in January 1903, and returned to India in May 1905.

In the Russo-Persian commercial convention of 1901 the British suffered another severe blow. The Convention was highly injurious to the British commercial interests in Persia. It was concluded in November 1901. Strict secrecy was maintained in this connection for more than a year. In December 1902, the ratifications were exchanged and only then fatal contents of the convention to the British interests were disclosed to Great Britain.

+ Peace Treaty of Paris '1857 provided that differences between Persia and Afghanistan should be settled by the friendly offices of the British Government.


Lovat Fraser, has given the details of the Seistan's importance from British point of view. He has described the efforts of the British Mission to settle the dispute as well as the Russian activities to exploit the situation in detail; See Fraser, op. cit., pp.115-123.
The following tables of export and import between Persia and Great Britain and Persia and India by Baghdad-Kermanshah route between January 1902 and January 1903 shows the duty according to the old arrangement and the amount that would have had to be paid under the new tariff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Where-from</th>
<th>Value in Krans.</th>
<th>Duty under old tariff</th>
<th>Duty under the new tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cotton goods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>20,066,000</td>
<td>20,066,000</td>
<td>20,066,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bleached</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>13,850,000</td>
<td>13,850,000</td>
<td>13,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silken goods</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>107,900.</td>
<td>107,900.</td>
<td>107,900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing thread cotton</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>196,000.</td>
<td>196,000.</td>
<td>196,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen threads</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>32,00</td>
<td>32,00</td>
<td>32,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel bars</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>107,600.</td>
<td>107,600.</td>
<td>107,600.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin sheets</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5,500.</td>
<td>5,500.</td>
<td>5,500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked iron and steel</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>39,800.</td>
<td>39,800.</td>
<td>39,800.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,527,700.</td>
<td>1,527,700.</td>
<td>1,527,700.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigo</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>73,700.</td>
<td>73,700.</td>
<td>73,700.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices and paper</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1,350,000.</td>
<td>1,350,000.</td>
<td>1,350,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                      |            | 37,892,800.     | 1,912,100.            | 3,141,962.                |
### Articles Where Value in duty under duty under the
from Krans. old tariff new tariff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Value in Krans.</th>
<th>Duty under old tariff</th>
<th>Duty under new tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gum native, England</td>
<td>2,434,980</td>
<td>121,740</td>
<td>no duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain and seeds -do-</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat -do-</td>
<td>164,700</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>91,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool raw -do-</td>
<td>40,700</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>no duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium -do-and Hong Kong</td>
<td>2,387,500</td>
<td>119,350</td>
<td>420,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets England, America and Baghdad</td>
<td>1,318,800</td>
<td>65,940</td>
<td>no duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above tables show the extent to which British and Indian trade would have suffered under the new arrangement. However, a Convention between Britain and Persia was hastily concluded on February 9, 1903, to safeguard the British commercial interests in Persia.¹

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The termination of the Boer War had restored to Great Britain greater freedom of action. On May 5, 1903, Lord Lansdown declared in the House of Lords that (1) the British Government should protect and promote the British trade in the Gulf; (2) she would regard the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to the British interests and she should certainly resist it by all means; and (3) she should not exclude the legitimate trade of other powers. This warning was reinforced by Lord Curzon's visit to, and demonstration, in the Gulf in November, 1903. A Durbar was held on board the ship at Shargah, where the Chiefs of the Arab coasts in treaty relations with Britain were addressed by the Viceroy. He declared that the influence of the British Government must remain supreme in the Gulf and any challenge would be resisted by all means. Great Britain has decided now to pursue a very strong policy in Persia.

At a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held on March 22, 1905, the following decisions were taken:

1. "It is essential to maintain and if possible to increase, our influence in Teheran, in order that we may be able to control railway construction in Persia, which is by far the most important factor in the strategic situation, and also for commercial reasons.

2. "It should be our object, on commercial as well as on strategic grounds, to maintain the status quo in Persia without aggression or ostentation."

3. "It is essential to maintain our existing claim on the coast of the Persian Gulf without aggression or ostentation."

Various measures were taken to pursue this strong policy. In April 1903, a sum of £2,00,000, and in September 1904, further £100,000 were advanced to the Persian Government through the Imperial Bank of Persia. British Government was also ready to advance £200,000, on certain conditions to the Persian Government. Other steps were also taken which showed British interests of pursuance of strong policy in Persia.

The Russian Policy in Persia can be summed up as follows:

The consistent policy of Russia in Persia has been gradually and imperceptibly to establish a 'veiled protectorate' by subjugating her commercially and financially; isolating it as far as possible from all contact with foreign influences; appropriating its revenues as the security for political loans; prevailing it from progressing or developing its resources, except through Russian agencies; and then, having reduced, the Shah to a state of complete vassalage and impotence to rule through him and in his name, by means of authoritative Russian advisers, from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf and from Turkish to the Indian frontiers.

As regards to the British Policy in Persia, she has no designs upon the sovereignty of the Shah or the independence of his state. Britain wanted a strong Persia - a strong Persia, in the opinion of British statesmen was essential because in it they found a interventin; zone between the dominions of Great Britain and Russia. But, when they found that Persia was being

1. Ibid., p. 371.

crushed out of her national existence, and was being gradually absorbed by Russia, they tried another alternatives for example they tried to come to an understanding with Russia, but could not secure success. They even thought it proper to have a separate state of Southern Persia as a British protectorate and finally they pursued a very strong and active policy to counteract the Russian diplomacy in Persia. By advancing money to the Persian Shah, they broke the back of Russian financial monopoly and control. Britain was, perhaps more successful in pursuing her active policy due to the fact that Russia was engaged in a war with Japan in the Far East. Britain never wanted to make Persia a colony. To Britishers, Persia was never an end in itself, it was a means to get their control fully established and permanent over India. The primary aim was to defend India. Of course, no one can deny the British commercial interests in Persia. 'If you exclude Indian interests from Persia, British interests in themselves are a very small quantity'.

So far as Persia was concerned, being a weak country, she had to accept the dictations of her two powerful neighbours, but the Persian authorities achieved remarkable success in their foreign policy by playing off Russia and Great Britain against each other and thus preserved the integrity of Persia. Britain and Russia allowed each other at the bargain counter, and their competition kept Persia from falling under either one's complete dominance.

CHAPTER II

THE PERSIAN NAVY AND THE GREAT POWERS
Growing Discontent

National movements start whenever people realize that their rulers are either tyrants or are playing havoc with the prestige of the country. The Persian rulers were not only tyrants but they were also actually selling the country to foreigners. The Persian nation was famous for her Shah-Parasti (loyalty to the Shah). The mere fact that her rulers were tyrants would not have driven the nation to revolt. It was tyranny combined with the non-maintenance of the national prestige abroad which compelled the Persian nation to start a national movement. The Persian sought the Constitutional form of government 'not so much for its own sake as for the urgent necessity of creating a more honest, efficient, and patriotic government than the existing one'.

The internal condition of Persia was far from satisfactory. The Shahs led a luxurious life. The administrative machinery was thoroughly rotten. Officials were greedy and dishonest and Persia was suffering from poverty, mal-administration and judicial insecurity. The treasury was empty and there was always the danger of foreign intervention. To understand the


administrative system and the horrible condition of Persia, the following comment of W. Morgan Shuster is worth quoting:

' Cabins are formed and dissolved with unreal rapidity. Men high in the Councils of the nation sink in a day into perfect obscurity, — only to emerge again as the ceaseless whirl of intrigue drags them into public favour. All these men belong to what may be described as the professional governing class in Persia, and there is very distinctly such a class. Thus the fortunes and hopes of millions of voiceless subjects are largely dependent upon the line of action which some professional Cabinet officers, or governor, or self-styled general may decide to adopt at a given time!'

The nationals of the foreign countries were granted special concessions and enjoyed capitulations. Nasirud-Din Shah was found of trips and voyages. He visited Europe thrice. The Persian Treasury was empty and the Shah's trips needed large amount of money. To get the money, the Shah began to mortgage the natural resources of the country and several concessions were granted to the foreigners on terms disastrous to Persia. At last, the Persian nation realized the fatal effects of these concessions and vehemently protested against the Tobacco Concession which was granted to a British company. This protest which compelled the Shah to cancel the concession is the milestone in the history of Persian national movement.


++ First Journey in 1873, second in 1878 and the third in 1889.

+++ For the concessions granted to foreigners, see First Chapter of the thesis.

+++ Details have been given in the first Chapter.

2. Browne, op.cit., p.12-13, Shuster, op.cit., p. XVII.
The credit to create political consciousness among the Persians goes to Sayyid Jamalud-Din Afghani, and Prince

Sayyid Jamalud-Din Afghani was born in the village of Asad-abad near P naar, a dependency of Kabul, in the year 1254 (= A.D. 1638-39). According to some writers, Asad-abad is somewhere near Ramadaan. He was an ardent propagandist of Pan-Islamism and vehemently criticized the corrupt government of Persia. He visited European as well as many Asiatic countries. On the telegraphic invitation of Nasirud-Din Shah, Afghani visited Persia in 1866, where he was appointed as Minister of War. He advocated reforms and the rule of law. The Persian ruling authorities realized that it would be dangerous to retain such a man of 'revolutionary ideas' in Persia, therefore, he was expelled from the country, whereupon, he went to Russia. While Afghani was in Russia, the Shah of Persia visited the Russian capital. Shah Nasirud-Din expressed his desire to meet him but Afghani declined the royal invitation. However, the Shah met him in Munich and persuaded him to return to Persia. The Shah also offered him the Prime Ministership of Persia. Really, Nasirud-Din Shah, thinking him more dangerous abroad than in Persia, brought him back in 1889. In Persia, Afghani realized an unfavorable change in the attitude of the Shah and asked for permission to go to Europe, which was refused. Thereupon, Afghani took refuge in the Shrine of Shah Abdul Azim and remained therefor seven months. In the Shrine, he denounced the Shah, advocated his deposition and preached for the necessity of reforms in Persia. Against the tradition of the country, he was arrested and conveyed under escort to Turkish frontier from where he managed to reach London. Afghani joined there Malikom Khan and contributed articles to his magazine 'Famou' on the affairs of Persia. He also edited a bilingual monthly magazine published in Arabic and English both named 'Ziyaul Khafiqayn' to each number of which he used to contribute an article on Persian problems and censured the government and the Shah of Persia. It was his letter to Chief Mujtabah, Rafi Hassan Shirazi (the letter has been referred to in the Chapter I) which gave birth to a great movement and ultimately compelled the Shah to cancel the Tobacco concession. In 1892, Afghani went to Constantinople where he died on March 9, 1897.

Halkom Khan who by their speeches and writings denounced the despotic rule in Persia and advocated the rule of laws. The Tobacco Concession ended but the movement which was responsible for the cancellation of the concession took root, spread among the Persian people and, its ultimate result was the assassination of Nasirud-Din Shah on May 1, 1896. The assassin was Mirza Mohammad Raza of Kirman. He was a disciple of Sayyid Jamalud-Din Afghani. The correspondent of the 'Manchester Guardian' Androsion, reporting the assassination of the Shah of Persia on May 2, 1896, wrote, 'I much fear Russian and English rivalry in Persia may indirectly be accountable for his (the Shah's) ultimate death at the hands of an assassin'. To understand the real cause of the assassination of Nasirud-Din Shah, it will be better to quote Browne.

-. Halkom Khan was the Persian representative at London from 1872 to 1879. He was granted a concession for Persian lottery. Halkom Khan sold the concession and an English Company was formed to work it. The 'Ima of Persia raised objection against the concession on the ground that lottery was a form of gambling which was forbidden by the holy Quran and the Shah cancelled the concession. However, a quarrel developed between him and the Shah, Halkom Khan was dismissed from his post in November 1889. He began to publish from London a Persian newspaper named 'Jaymun' of which No. 1 was issued on February 20, 1893. The 'Jaymun' demanded fixed code of laws and a parliament.


Shaikh Jamalud-Din, apart from his personal enmities, has without doubt a great ideal - the desire to unite in one mighty nation all Mohammedan peoples, and to restore the ancient power and glory of Islam. To check European encroachment in the East is a necessary part of this scheme; and any Mohammedan potentate who encourages, or acquiesces in an extension of Western influence in his domains must be regarded by the promoters of his movement as an enemy to their cause. Thus, the blood of Nasirud-Din Shah is the price paid for successive triumphs of English and Russian diplomacy in Persia! The assassination of Nasirud-Din Shah clearly revealed the fact that Persians were no more ready to accept foreign domination in their country than were being rapidly sold out to the foreigners.

After the assassination of Nasirud-Din Shah, his son Muzaffar ud-Din Mirza was proclaimed the Shah of Persia. He was crowned on May 8, 1896. Like his father, Muzaffar ud-Din Shah was also fond of European trips. He borrowed money in return of concessions to the foreigners. The Persians were so sensitive to the foreign loans that when in 1901 Muzaffar ud-Din Shah was negotiating a second loan with Russia, a revolutionary movement started in Tehran. The Shah received letters which were full of threats and were especially directed against the Prime-Minister.

1. Ibid., p. 97. The paragraph reproduced here is a quotation from Browne's article published in the 'New Review' for June 1896.

2. Shuster, op.cit., p. 47.


The details have already been given in Chapter I. The most famous concession granted by him were L'Arcy Oil Concession of 1901 and Tariff Concessions to Russia and Great Britain.
who was regarded by the agitators a traitor and incapable
of introducing any reform in the country. A state of minor
siege was proclaimed in Tehran. However, on September 14,
1901, the Persian Government officially denied the existence
of any such revolutionary movement. But the 'Teheran Gazettes'
on October 7, 1901 reported the distribution of revolutionary
placards and pamphlets against the Government. It was also
reported by the Gazette that four persons had been arrested and
exiled in connection with the movement. The exiled persons were
accused of editing the revolutionary pamphlets.

The new tariff arrangements added much to public dis-
content. The religious leaders vehemently criticized it. The
Chief Mujtahid Aqa Sayyid Ali of Dezd strongly opposed it and
encouraged the people to resist it. The Mujtahid was arrested
and banished. People resented but in vain. However, in 1905
a new Belgian Director of Customs, M. Haysen arrived at
Bushire and enforced the tariff with greater severity.


+, In 1893, M. Haysen, a Belgian official was made incharge of the
custom-houses of Kermanshah and Tabriz. Later on, all custom
houses with the exception of Schmerah were placed under his
control. He was able to show an increase of 50 per cent
in the custom receipt of Persia. The Russo-Persian Tariff
Convention was drawn up by M. Haysen in conjunction with the
Belgian officials (The tariff convention has been referred-in Ch. I)
The Shah appreciated the services of M. Haysen very much and on
Christmas Day, 1903, M. Haysen became the Director-General of
Customs of Persia. Six more Belgian officials were appointed
to various posts in the Bixise. Later on, M. Haysen raised to the
important position of Minister of Posts and Director of Customs,
Revolution, pp. 109-110 and 112.
Consequently, the Persian merchants resented and refused to clear their goods. They telegraphically requested the Shah to withdraw the new regulations. The merchants also telegraphed to India to stop export of further goods to Persia. Thus, the Shah’s ever-increasing extravagance, his foreign trips, the new Belgian tariffs, the arrogance of Belgian officials employed in Persian customs service, exploitation of the natural resources of the country by the foreigners through the grant of concessions, and the tyranny of Ayunud-Dawla, The Prime Minister — all contributed to the popular discontent and intensified the national movement. There were many other causes of discontent also but the actual movement started by an act of Alaud-Dawla, the governor of Teheran, who bastinadoed seven or eight respected merchants and Sayyids on the alleged charge of raising the price of sugar.

B = Bast and Bastis

As a result of the above mentioned grievances, the Persians

1. Ibid., p. 111, quoted from Times, May 22, 1905.
2. Ibid., p. 111.
3. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
4. After the dismissal of Mirza Ali Asghar Khan the Aminus-Sult and Atabaki-i-Asam from the office of the prime ministership, Ayunud-Dawla, a prince of the blood and the son-in-law of the Shah was appointed as Minister of Interior in 1903. In the following years, he was appointed as the Prime-Minister of Persia and held this office till August, 1906, Sykes, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 390.
5. For detail see, Brown, op. cit., p. 112.
were very much dissatisfied with the government class. The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War as well as the Russian Revolution of 1905 encouraged the Persian liberals and nationalists. The suar case added much to the resentment, consequently, a large number of merchants took sanctuary in the Hasjidi-i-Shah in December 1905. Many mullas as well as celebrated religious leaders like Sayyid 'Abdullah Bahbahani, Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai and Aqa Sayyid Jamalud-Din joined the Bastis. On the request of 'Aymud-Sawla, the Prime Minister Mirza Abdul Azim, the Imam Juma (who was a relative of the Shah) managed to drive out the Bastis from the hasjidi where- upon many of them left the city and took refuge in the Shrine of Shah Abdul Azim. There, they were joined by many students, mullas and leaders like Shaykh Farzallah (who later on turned reactionary). The movement gained momentum. Bastis were encou- raged by Mohammad Ali Mirza, the then Vali-Ahed and by the sympathisers of the exiled ex-Prime Minister. Mirza Jaghari Ali the + Aminus-Sultan. In spite of the best efforts of 'Aymud-Sawla to prevent the Bastis to be reinforced by sympathisers and to be aided by money, the number of Bastis increased day by day.

1. Fry., op.cit., p. 57.
+ The Vali-Ahed desired the downfall of Aymud-Sawla, whom he suspected of favouring the designs of Shima-u-Saltana-Melik Nasir Mirza to become the successor to the Persian throne. Aminus-Sultan also desired the downfall of Aymud-Sawla. He might have thought to be reappointed as Prime after the dismissal of Aymud-Sawla. However, both the Vali-Ahed and the Aminus-Sultan, gave monetary help to the Bastis - Browne, op.cit., pp.113-114, Sykes, Vol.II, op.cit., p.401.
A certain Amir Bahadur Jang with 300 horsemen was sent to bring the Bastis back to Tehran by force, but in vain. The Bastis demanded the dismissal of Aymud-Dawla and the establishment of a House of Justice (Adalat-Khana). They neither demanded a constitution nor asked for reforms which entailed representative government. They protested peacefully and did not use force. The Shah yielded and promised to dismiss Aymud-Dawla and to establish the Court of Justice. The Bastis returned home happily. The Shah took no step to fulfill his promises, consequently, the malais reminded the Shah by presenting a petition in April, 1906 and requested him to give effect to the royal promises. The petition produced no effect. The Prime Minister decided to adopt a policy of repression. The streets of Tehran were full of cossacks, solders and spies, but Sayyid Abdullah, Sayyid Muhammad and Aqa Sayyid Jamal continued to criticize Aymud-Dawla, denounced autocracy, and tyranny. Aymud-Dawla issued an order for the expulsion of Aqa Sayyid Jamal, who retired to Yam. Aymud Dawla now decided to expel Shaykh Muhammad also. He was arrested on June 21, 1906. People collected and presented his arrest. When the officer in command of the solders refused to release him, the mob became violent.

2. Fraser, David, Persia and Turkey in Revolt, 1910, p.18.
and the officer ordered his soldiers to open fire but they refused to obey him. Thereupon the officer himself opened fire and a student named Sayyid Husayn was shot dead. However, the leader was rescued from captivity. The funeral of Sayyid Husayn was carried through the streets and bazaars of Tehran. When the soldiers tried to stop the procession, the people resisted and it led to firing, killing some fifteen persons including a sayyid named Abdul Hajid. The death of the two sayyids as well as of others caused much resentment among the people. However, the mob dispersed and the soldiers occupied the whole city. A large number of ulama, students, merchants and businessmen and other took refuge in Masjid-i-Jami. The soldiers besieged them. After three or four days, the Bastis sought the Shah's permission to leave the city and retire to 'um which was granted. A large number of people accompanied them. The event was known amongst the Persians as 'the trust' modus' (Hijrat-i-Kubra). On their way to 'um, they issued a notice threatening to leave the country in mass if their demands were not fulfilled. Since the Mujtahids constituted the principal judicial body, this notice was treated as an interdict.

3. Ibid., p. 118.
5. Ibid., p. 118.
Meanwhile the businessmen closed their shops in protest. The Prime Minister, Abdul Wadid, Aymud-Davla ordered shops to be opened, threatening that the shops found closed, would be looted by the soldiers. Thereupon, on July 19, 1906, representatives of merchants and bakers sought refuge in the British Legation and approached the British charge d' Affaires at Bulahak, the summer quarters of the Legation. Mr. Duff the British Charge d' Affaires replied that in view of the acknowledged traditions in Persia, it was not within his power to drive them out from the Legation. He informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of this request. However, the Persian authorities took no action to prevent what followed.

The permission to take refuge being granted, a few merchants immediately took bast in the garden of the British Legation. Their number increased day by day. In the end, near about sixteen thousand encamped themselves in the beautiful


According to Fraser, David, the Mutas first approached the Turkish Ambassador and sought permission to take refuge in the Turkish Legation, which was refused. They then requested the British Charge d' Affairs for active assistance. Mr. Duff refused to support actively any movement which would be against the Shah, however, he permitted them to take refuge in the British Legation, p. 21.

3. Fraser, David, op.cit., p. 21.
garden of the British Legation. The Persian government attempted to blockade the Legation. The British authorities made a diplomatic representation against such attempts. The Shah now yielded and decided on July 30, 1906 to accept the original demands of the Bastis. Consequently, he dismissed Aymud-Dawla and appointed Mirza Nasrullah Khan, Mushirud-Dawla as his new Prime Minister and invited the Mijtabids to return from Guz.

But people were now no longer content with the acceptance of these demands. They insisted on a regular constitution and a National Assembly to represent them. Sentiment against foreign domination, poverty, corruption and absolutism grew and led to an attempt at an orderly adaptation of Western institutions.

The British Charge d'Affaires acted as intermediary, whereupon a meeting was arranged between the Government and the popular leaders, at which the British representative was also present.

The representatives arrived at a compromise. As a result of it, the National Assembly as well as the Court of Justice were


As regards the number of the Bastis, the writers differ much. However, men between 12,000 to 16,000 were reported to have taken refuge in the Legation.

2. Balfour, op.cit., p. 84.
granted to the Persian nation on August 5, 1906. The Bastis
the left the Legation. But it was not the end of the matter
The reactionary party was very active. Aymud-Dawla successfully
persuaded the Shah not to sign the Regulations for the Assembly.
Thereupon, a crowded meeting was held. The bazaar were
again closed and the people declared that they would again
take refuge in the British Legation, if necessary by force. At
this juncture, the British and the Russian representatives
intervened. They made representation to the shah and compelled
him to sign the necessary documents. Aymud Dawla was ordered to
retire to Khorasan and business was resumed.

The Russian cooperation with the Britishers on this
occasion was not surprising. It was only due to the fact that
negotiations for an entente between Britain and Russia were
at that time in progress (these negotiations led to the
conclusion of Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907). Russia was
desirous to come to an understanding and thought it proper to
extend her cooperation in this matter. The elections for the
members of the Assembly began early in October, and, on October
7, 1906, as soon as the members of the Assembly from Tehran
were declared elected, the Majliss was opened without waiting
for the arrival of the provincial deputies. The Majliss

1. Fraser, D., op.cit., p. 23.
p.124.
appointed a Committee to frame the Constitution. When the
draft of the constitution was submitted for Royal consent,
the Shah suggested some alterations, which were not acceptable
to the Nationalists. However, the Shah yielded and signed the
constitution on New year's day, 1907. Mohammad Ali, the Vali-
Ahad had affixed his signature on this historic document two
days earlier.

Hussaffurud-Din Shah died on January 8, 1907. Mohammad
Ali Mirza succeeded him. He was crowned as the Shah of Persia
on January 19, 1907.

The nation had succeeded in having a constitution which
was described by Persian Liberals and ussophobes as 'England's
'spiritual child', but the Russians called the child illegitimate.
The Persian nationalists regarded Britain as their protectors.
They were very much grateful for the British help which enabled
them to achieve their goal. The British prestige rose very
high and the whole episode was regarded as a British diplomatic
triomphe. On October 12, 1906, Sir C. Spring-Vice wrote to
Sir ... Bray as follows:

'I have had many conversations with Malikah, Ministers
and private individuals. I gather that it is generally
believed that we encouraged the congress movement in order

   (For the Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906, constitution.)
3. Crow, J.A., and Dickinson, Page, i.e., Persia In Revolution,
p. 59.
to dish the Russians and that we have been successful. Of course, I have stated over and over again that we had no such intention - that the Persian owe their liberties to themselves and not to us - that if the popular party been on one foreign nation the reactionaries will leave on the another and that Persian independence will inevitably suffer from the consequences of foreign interference'.

One day before, Sir Spring Rice had written to Sir A. Grey as follows:

'Whatever be the immediate practical effect of the new popular institution, there appears to be little doubt that it is the outward sign of a considerable change through which Persia is passing. From all I know I gather that the spirit of patriotism has come to life and may come to stay... whatever may be the strength and practical value of the movement, I venture to submit that it should not be lost sight of.'

However, the success of the Persian nationalists was intensely resented by Russians who felt that it was engineered by the British with the object of destroying the Russian supremacy in Persia and uplifting their own prestige. Consequently, the Russian became the enemy of the constitutionalists. Moreover, the Persian national movement was also indirectly stimulated and guided by the example of the Russian Revolution, therefore, the Russian ruling class was naturally pro-royalist and anti-constitutionalists. Probably, the guiding principle of the

British policy in supporting the Persian nationalists might have been to win their hearts, so that in case of their victory, they would recognize the British as their friend and in this way British supremacy would be established in Persia at the expense of Russia. The authorities were quite successful in achieving their goal. During the time of the constitutional crisis, Britain followed a dual policy. She made a successful attempt at persuading Russia to refrain from interfering in Persian affairs and promised to remain neutral accordingly, but asked Russia to agree to some limitation of the custom of taking 'Baht'. At the same time, Britain sought and obtained Russia's consent to let the crisis in Persia take its course. To achieve her end, Britain agreed with Russia to recognize the Vakil-Shah as the successor to the Persian throne after the death of the Mozaffar-ad-Din Shah. Britain tried to satisfy Russia by explaining that this policy would not in any case prejudice Anglo-Russian negotiations. Although, posed herself as the champion of the policy of non-intervention in Persian affairs, she actually helped and encouraged the nationalists and compelled the Shah to ratify the Constitution. Russia, owing to her own internal problems, thought it better to cooperate with Britain at that juncture. The temptation to reach an


agreement with Britain on the Persian problem also contributed to the Russian policy of cooperation.

C - From Mohammad Ali's Assassination till the Council of State of December, 1907.

Mohammad Ali Shah - a worst type of despot was in no mood to accept the limitations imposed upon the royal purse and preparatives. His tutor Shapshal Than contributed much in fostering his hatred towards the nationalists. As a result of the influence of Shapshal Than, Mohammad Ali Shah became a strong enemy of constitution and was deadly opposed to the nationalists. He became a tool of the Russian Government. He tried to crush the nationalists and endeavoured to stamp out the rights of his people. The hostility of Mohammad Ali to the Constitution became evident on the occasion of his coronation to which no Deputy (Member of the Majlis) was invited. This insulting attitude of the Shah was resented by them. Their resentment increased owing to the refusal of the Ministers to appear before the House to answer their questions.

I. Shapshal Than was a Jew of Armea. He was appointed as the tutor of Mohammad Ali Mirza - the Veli-Abad, who was strongly influenced by him. When Mohammad Ali became the Shah of Persia, Shapshal Than tutored him to dissolve the constitution as it aimed at the complete abolition of the Shah's authority - see Browne, op.cit., p.105, and pp.416-20.

1. Chuster, op.cit., p. xxv.
The Shah supported the Ministers1 though, constitutionally, the Ministers were responsible to the Majlis. The Article 25 of the Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906, explicitly stated that 'State loans, under whatever title, whether internal or external, must be contracted only with the cognizance and approval of the National Consultative Assembly', but the Shah completely ignored this article and the Majlis. He contracted with Russia and Britain for a secret loan of £, 400,000.

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1. Muzaffarud-Din Shah tried his best to secure a loan either from Britain or Russia. However, Britain refused to furnish the Shah with a loan of £, 900,000. Russia and Britain both reached an understanding that an end should be put to the practice under which the Persian Government was able to obtain money by playing off one against the other. The negotiations for a general understanding on Persian problem between Russia and Great Britain as well as the inability of the former to give financial help to Persia were the factors for the successful understanding regarding the non-advancement of the loan to Persia. The Shah, in the meantime contacted Termehy to finance him. The situation now took a serious turn. Britain and Russia reacted to the Persian-German negotiations. They thought that the entrance of a third power would disturb the status quo in Persia. To remove the German danger, they decided to advance a joint loan to Persia on certain conditions. The Persians thought that the joint loan would be the first step to a granted joint protectorate. In the meantime, Muzaffarud-Din Shah granted the Persian nation a National Assembly. The Prime Minister of Persia agreed to sign the loan contracts without having obtained the consent of the National Assembly as his position was very uncertain and depended only on obtaining the loan for the Shah. But the British Government decided not to ignore the Assembly as it might cause troubles in Persia. The Persian Government shared the British view but she saw no objection to furnishing the advance on a formal demand from Persian Prime Minister even if he failed in overcoming the opposition of the Assembly. She, however, agreed that the advance should be made publicly and the responsibility would lay with the Persian Government. But the popular movement against the loan compelled the Russia and Britain to decide to inform the Persian Government that the two governments
As soon as it was discovered that Mohammad Ali Shah was trying to obtain a loan from Britain and Russia and that the two governments had agreed to furnish him with the loan, the Deputies opposed the sanctioning of this transaction. The increasing foreign debt was regarded by them as a source of danger to the independence and safety of Persia. The mullahs strongly preached against the loan. The loan was described by them as the final sale of Persia’s independence. The Prime Minister, thinking himself unsafe, refused to go forward with the loan negotiations. Thus it became evident that the National movement not only aimed at the introduction of representative government in Persia but tried to place the destiny of Persia, which was actually, under the control of the European masters in the hands of the Persians themselves.

The foreign indebtedness was regarded by the Deputies as the source of real danger to the country. Therefore, they decided to prevent any further loans at any cost. However, insisted that the withdrawal of the offer would give a chance to the third power to finance the Shah. Consequently, it was decided to furnish the Persian Government with the loan. But before the advance of money could actually be paid to Mozaffarad-Din Shah, he died. The new Shah, Mohammad Ali also applied for the loan and the two Governments, in the light of their previous decision, decided to pay the money to him.

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3. Bone and Dickinson, op.cit., p. 84.
the main task before them was to take measures which would
make the country financially stronger. To achieve their goal,
they directed their efforts to limit the Shah's expenditure over
his court and civil list; to establish a National Bank; to abolish
makedhil, or irregular and illegal profits in the collection
of revenues; and to get rid of M. Fans and other Belgian
1
customs officers. The Majliss granted the National Bank
2
concession on February 1, 1907. Its capital was to come through
the subscription raised by the Persians themselves. M. Fans
was dismissed on February 10, 1907 by the Shah under the pressure
3
of the Majliss. The growing distrust against the Shah by the
Majliss increased. Consequently the chances of conciliation
between him and the nationalists also lessened. Mushirud-Dawla
resigned the office of Prime Ministership, on March 17, 1907.
It was stated that the Premier resigned on the grounds of health
but according to Brown he resigned because 'he could not prevent,
and would not further, the Shah's selfish and unpatriotic policy
of destroying the National Assembly even at the price of foreign
intervention'. The Shah now offered the Prime Ministership
4
+ to Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, the Aminus Sultan. On his way back

6. Aminus Sultan was responsible for the two Russian loans of
1899-1900 and 1902. He was declared infidel by the Ulama and
was forced to leave the country in 1903. Since then he had
been travelling in Europe and Asia. Brown, op.cit., p.135, 
Muhtar, p. xxii.
to Persia he was warmly received in Russia. A Russian
gun-boat was provided for him to cross the Caspian. He landed
on Enseller. The people of Rasht opposed his landing on the
Persian soil. They did not allow him to proceed to Teheran
unless he took an oath to be faithful to the Constitution.
He reached Teheran on April 26, 1907 and within a week was
appointed a new President of the Council of Ministers and
Minister of the Interior.

There were two groups—moderate and extremist in the
Majliss. The Aminus Sultan tried to win the friendship of the
moderates so that he could, with their approval, raise a fresh
2
lean. He might have succeeded in carrying out his policy but,
on August 31, 1907, he was assassinated by Abbas Aqa of Tabriz.
The assassin immediately committed suicide. Throughout the
year 1907 the internal situation of Persia went from bad to
worse. The people of Isfahan revolted against the Shah's uncle
Zillus-Sultan, who had to be dismissed. Lawlessness prevailed
in Shiraz, Yazd, Meshed, Kermanshah, Tabriz, Maku, Mars and other
places. Salarud-Dowlah, the brother of the Shah revolted in the
district of Hamadan and declared his intention to depose the
Shah. An army was sent to suppress his rebellion. He was

4. His name was Abul Fazl Mirza, see Chiroli, Faee. p. 100.
defeated and took refuge in the British Consulate at Kirmanshah, but on the assurance of his safety being given by the Shah, the British authorities handed him over to Zahir ud-Dawla, the Shah's representative, on June 22, 1907. According to Fraser, the disorders throughout the country were due to the failure of the central government to exercise any effective central over the provinces. But to blame the Central Government for the lawlessness in the country, is not altogether correct. Behind the disorder which prevailed in Tabris was the Shah himself. He instigated the son of Rahim Khan to march on Tabris and to create confusions in the popular party. Rahim Khan was a robber chief, whom the Shah, when Vali-Ahad, imprisoned for various offenses. Although, Mohammed Ali Shah repeatedly took oath to be faithful to the Constitution, he always dreamt of restoring the old autocratic regime even through foreign intervention when the plot of which Rahim Khan was the agent, failed. Shaykh Fazlullah was selected as the new instrument for a fresh plot. Bribe by the royal party, the Shaykh began to denounce the constitution and popular leaders were declared by him as traitors. Through his agents, he succeeded in provoking serious riots in Enzeli, Tabris Kerman, and other places.

2. Fraser D., op. cit., p. 36.
Matters went from bad to worse. Persia had to face not only anarchy throughout the country but also the danger of foreign aggression. Russia was seeking a pretext for intervention and warned the Assembly that she would not allow continuation of disturbances in the provinces close to her frontiers. Turkey went still further and occupied a number of Persian towns and districts. The disorderly condition of Persia continued. The Shah was determined to overthrow the Constitution but the nationalists were equally determined to preserve their newly won freedom.

As described above, the Majlise regarded the foreign indebtedness as the real source of danger to the independence and integrity of the country. Therefore, it vigorously opposed any foreign loan and adopted measures to prevent it. The strong opposition of the nationalists compelled the Great Powers, namely Britain and Russia to abandon their scheme of furnishing the Shah with the joint loan. But Mohammad Ali Shah again contracted Russia for the loan. It became public in October, 1907 that the Shah had applied to the Russian Bank for a private loan of £. 50,000 but the Russian Government refused to grant the loan as the British Government was opposed to it. On November 4, 1907, the Acting Foreign Minister of Russia informed the British Embassy in Persia that the Shah had requested for the

1. Ibid., p. 149, Skuster, op. cit., p. xxii.
advance of a fresh loan and was ready to deposit jewellery in the Russian Bank as security for the advance. The Acting Foreign Minister of Russia, thereby, authorised the Russian Minister in Persia to meet the request of the Shah up to 60,000 tomans, which might be increased to 100,000 tomans. Later on the Russian Government did not communicate to British authorities any further information about the matter, and it could not be known whether Shah was actually furnished with the money or not.

Later on, the two Governments reached an understanding that a French expert should be appointed as Financial Adviser to the Persian Government, which was desirous of obtaining some advisory assistance from abroad in financial matters. The Russian Government made the appointment of French Expert conditional. The Russian Minister at Teheran insisted that the Adviser should not be engaged for the purpose of assisting the Persian Government in the establishment of a National Bank, nor should he occupy himself with foreign loan nor take any action without previous consultation with the British and Russian Legations. These conditions were agreed to by the two Governments but after some consultation between the representatives of the three Powers at Teheran it was deemed advisable to modify these


The Persian Constitutionalists intended to have advisers either from U.S.A. or Japan because these countries had no political ambitions in Persia. But the activities of a Financial Adviser from one of these countries would have proved against the political aims and ambitions of Great Britain and Russia in Persia, therefore, the two powers decided to impose upon Persia a financial adviser of their choice.

++, Britain, Russia and France.
conditions in order to assure the assent of the Persian Assembly being accorded to the contract. It was, therefore, agreed that the question of the establishment of a Persian National Bank should come within the scope of the functions of the Adviser, and that general letter of instructions which should be furnished by the French Government to the Financial adviser should deal with the question of his relations with the British and Russian Legations... Mr. Bimst was selected by the French Government for the post in question'. The Russian and British Governments were anxious that the appointment should be made as speedily as possible, as there were rumours that efforts were being made by the German Legation to Teheran to procure the appointment of a candidate of its own. The appointment of M. Bimst was however, delayed as the three Powers had still some differences with regard to his appointment. Later on, they reached an agreement and M. Bimst proceeded to Persia to assume his duties. He was appointed in 1909 and remained in Teheran for two years but accomplished no reforms. He forgot that he had gone to Persia to bring in order the financial system of the country and enjoyed his whole time drinking tea, playing bridge and riding out for his health.

2. Ibid.;
5. Ibid., p. 28.
Leaving the details of the internal crisis and anarchy of Persia at this juncture, it seems better to deal with the Anglo-Russian attitude towards the Persian crisis. Throughout the year 1907, the British Government desired to follow a policy of non-intervention. The British authorities persuaded Russia to be neutral in the internal conflict and they obtained, if not a complete, at least a considerable success in their goal. The increasing anarchy in the country caused much uneasiness in the Russian official circles from the beginning of the year and when the people took possession of arsenals and government offices in Tabriz, the Russian Minister became very much alarmed and proposed for a demonstration of force on the frontier and in the Gulf, if necessary. The British Minister at Teheran, Sir C. Spring-Rice telegraphically informed the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey as follows:

"... Russian Minister says that he thinks that a demonstration on frontier and in Gulf may become necessary if situation gets worse.

As yet no movement against foreigners personally, but on first appearance of this I think Russian Government will be bound to make some sort of military demonstration. I hope that this will be delayed until it is justified by overt act against foreigners, but preparatory arrangements should, I think, be agreed on at once between the two Governments.... I have explained to Russian Minister that I do not believe that His Majesty Government, will consent to any political demonstration in favour of Government, but only to action justified by
considerations of self-defence ..." 1 Sir Charles Hardinge, the permanent Under-Secretary of British foreign affairs stated: "The Russian Government are evidently anxious for a pretext for intervention to which we are opposed. Any discussion of arrangement for military demonstration would only encourage them in this idea. As Sir C. Spring-Rice still thinks that we should concert measures with the Russian Government for a military demonstration, I think she should be informed very categorically of our views which he does not as yet seem to understand. At present there appears to be no danger to foreigners." Sir E. Grey the British Foreign Minister replied to Sir Spring-Rice as follows:

"I entirely approve your statement that we cannot consent to any demonstration in favour of Russian Government and against the reform movement.

I see the difficulty of the Russian position but we must on no account be drawn into any show of force unless made absolutely necessary for protection of foreigners and even then for physical reasons our action must be confined to the Ports. You should therefore use all your influence to discourage the Russian from contemplating any demonstration with a view to


political effect, which would be clearly contrary to the
principle of non-intervention. The Russian Government however,
agreed to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs
of Persia and not to adopt any military measures unless it had
become absolutely necessary. The Russian Foreign Minister also
informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir A.
Nicolson, that his government would do nothing in Persia
without previous consultation with the British Government.

Russia always sought a pretext to intervene in the
internal affairs of the country but Britain was against it and
as both the powers were engaged in a negotiation to reach
an understanding regarding their points of conflicts in Asia,
therefore, both gave some margin to each other. On March 1, 1907
Sir A. Nicolson telegraphically reported his conversation about
Persia with the Russian Foreign Minister to Sir A. Troy which
runs as follows:

"Minister for Foreign affairs expressed to me last night
his anxiety as to the situation and intimated that the
Shah was desirous that Russian Government should take
some measures on the frontier, as most districts were
adjoining the Caucasus. Minister for Foreign Affairs
said that Russian Government had already taken steps
to prevent revolutionaries from crossing the Caucasus
into Persian territory... He repeated his intention
of doing nothing without previous consultation with
His Majesty's Government.

I thought that it would be well if the two Governments
were to agree beforehand upon measures to be taken respectively
in case events necessitate action.

1. Hopch and Temperley, Vol. IV, Note (1) attached with
No. 384, p. 425.
2. It was said that the revolutionaries of Caucasus were
helping the Persian revolutionaries.
I told him that all we could do would be to protect British subjects in Gulf ports. He said that he had heard that proposed national banks wished to take all custom revenues, and this should not be permitted.

I agreed with him, but said that I had no positive information on the subject.

This telegram shows that (1) the Russian Government was in communication with the Shah of Persia and was definitely against the nationalists; (2) she was desirous to intervene in the internal crisis of Persia but Britain prevented it; and (3) Britain and Russia were anxious to see the national banks' scheme a failure.

On March 8, 1907 Sir A. Nicolson telegraphically informed Sir J. Jevy that the Russian Foreign Minister had sent him a Memorandum, stating that the Russian and the British Ministers in Persia had decided to send their Governments a statement.

1. That in spite of appearance of outward calm, there are signs of a dangerous movement against the Dynasty and Europeans.

2. That the movement against the Shah shows itself in persistent reports that he wishes to dismiss Assembly, which is organizing a militia.

3. That the movement against Europeans is not against the individuals or Legations, but is directed to the removal of foreigners from Persian services, and in preventing them

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from obtaining concession in Persia.

4. That in view of the tendencies of the Assembly, Russia and Great Britain would be justified in declaring to the Persian Government that, while carefully avoiding any intervention in the internal affairs of Persia, the two powers nevertheless will not permit their interests to be injured in any respect whatever. The Russian Foreign Minister insisted that an identical declaration to the Persian Government should be made by the two Governments. The memorandum clearly showed that Russia was in no mood to tolerate the constitutional regime in Persia. She wanted to maintain the corrupt regime of Kajar dynasty in the country. Russia repeatedly alleged that the national movement was against the foreigners. Throughout the civil war the Persian nationalists took great precaution in not giving any foreign power any chance to intervene, and therefore, they took much care that no European should be molested in any way. The revolution was really carried out with much restraint.

In reply to the above mentioned telegram of Sir A. Nicolson, Sir Grey replied to him that in the present situation it was difficult for him to refuse to take action as suggested by Russia but it would be a premature; and undue


interference in the internal affairs of Persia which would be
presented by the Persians. He suggested to Sir A. Nicolson
to communicate to the Russian Government that as there was
no danger to foreign nationals in Persia, therefore, any action
on the part of the two powers would not be beneficial. At the
same time, he tried to soothe the Russians by informing them
that Britain fully realised the hostile attitude of the
National Assembly towards foreign enterprise and was ready to
co-operate with Russia for the protection of their respective
interests whenever they might be needed.

Britain was trying to avoid any interference in the
Persian internal affairs but Russia was determined to seek
British consent to intervene under the pretext of safeguarding
the interests of foreign nationals in the country. On March
23, 1907, M. Ivelinsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
submitted a pre-memoria to Sir A. Nicolson. He proposed to
occupy certain customs in the north of Persia in case of
necessity and informed that his Government was determined to
abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs, and
would take no steps unless it would be utmost necessary. He
wished to act in complete accord with His Majesty's Government
in all matters concerning Persia and desired to know what steps
Britain would take on her side. In reply to the Russia Pro-

1. F.O. 371/369, Tel. (No. 34), Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson,
Persian Office, March 9, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IV.,

2. F.O. 371/369, (No. 156), Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey,
St. Petersburg, March 22, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IV.,
Memorial Sir A. Nicolson drafted an Aide-Memoire to be communicated to the Russian Government. It stated that in the event of the lives and interests of British subjects being seriously endangered, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to despatch the ships of war to the southern ports of Persia, and in the Persian Gulf to afford such measures of protection as the circumstances might demand. But these measures would be taken in the case of serious urgency and he hoped that Russia will also avoid to intervene except in case of grave emergency.

Although, Russia repeatedly declared her intention to be neutral in the internal affairs of Persia, yet, her agents constantly encouraged the Shah to crush the national movement by force.

During the whole year of 1907, the internal condition of Persia was far from satisfactory. Lawlessness prevailed throughout the country. Russia followed to her policy of non-intervention apparently and co-operated with Great Britain. Although, the Russian officials in Persia suggested the despatch

of forces to the Russo-Persian frontier, M. Tsvolosky disagreed with their suggestion on the ground that it would be greatly resented by the Persians and might endanger the lives of the Europeans in Persia. However, the number of the consular-guards were increased at certain places - both by Russia and Britain. The German Legation was very much active in Tehran and the fear of the Russian Government that Germany might acquire a strong position in the Persian Capital and with the Assembly compelled them to act in the closest possible cooperation. By December 15, 1907, the conflict between the Shah and the Majlis reached at its zenith. It seemed that life of the Shah was in danger,

1. Ibid., p. 502.
2. Ibid., p. 509.

* The conflict arose in December, 1907 when the Shah refused to accept the demand of the Majlis for the dismissal of his certain reactionary advisers. The cabinet of Yezid-ul-Mulk Abdul Kasim Khan (who was appointed as Prime Minister after the assassination of Amir-Sultan), thereby resigned on December 14, 1907. Next day, the Shah summoned the cabinet and put them into chains. The servant of the Yezid-ul-Mulk rushed to the British Legation and reported that the life of his master was in danger. Mr. E. L. Churchill, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation immediately went to the Palace and they were released. However, the Shah had made up his mind to destroy the Majlis. He engineered a military coup with the help of the Russian officered Persian Cossack Brigade but the nationalists volunteers managed to defend the Majlis. Meanwhile, the news of this incident spread in the provinces. The people of Tabriz, Rasht, Kermanshah, and Kermanshah; others telegraphed to the deputies at Tehran that they were prepared to defend the constitution at every cost. Majolidin or volunteers hastened to Tehran to defend the Majlis, however, no fighting took place and the Shah was compelled to give way. He agreed to exile Sadruddin-Pervaiz, dismiss Husayn Rasa Khan Amir Bahadur Jang from all
then the Russian Government considered that circumstances might compel the Shah to seek refuge in one of the legations, and they suggested that in such a case he should be protected by a combined force of British and Russian guards. The British Government agreed to this proposal. The two Governments also agreed to furnish the Shah with an escort up to the frontier in case he was compelled to leave the country. However, the Shah gave way to the nationalists. He accepted all the demands and matters were amicably settled. He was, however, in no position to deal with the situation and was not dethroned and deposed because Britain and Russia were opposed to it.

D - From The Gorgievskii letter of 1907 To the Abdication Of Mohammed Ali Shah.

After the unsuccessful attempt of December, 1907, at overthrowing the Constitution, there was lull in the political atmosphere of


the country. The nationalists were anxious to improve their relations with the Shah so that the mother land could be saved from another political crisis; consequently they formed a 'Conciliation Committee'. But the wide gap between autocracy and democracy could not be bridged. The political horizon of Persia became darkest when on February 26, 1908, an attempt was made on the life of the Shah. A bomb was thrown at his car while he was driving through the streets of Teheran. The Shah had a narrow escape. He, however, suspected that the plot to assassinate him had been engineered by the Constitutionalists. Whereas the nationalists accused that it was staged by the reactionaries so that the reconciliation between the Shah and the Assembly could be prevented. The Mubabbirul-Mulk, sometime the editor of Tamaddun, in an article published in Nabul-Matein, a weekly from Calcutta claimed that the Shah himself had arranged this drama to blame the National Assembly of insincerity. As the Nationalists were aware of the fact that Britain and Russia were anxious to maintain the regime of the Shah and any attempt to assassinate him or overthrow his regime might lead to an intervention, it was difficult to believe that they

would have anything to do with this attempt at the assassination
of the king. To the misfortune of the Persian nation, the gulf
between the Shah and the Constitutionalists increased day by day
and the relations between the Assembly and Mohammad Ali Shah
became much more strained. The two great Powers ever desirous
to help the Shah, made arrangements to grant asylum to the Shah
and for his safe passage to the coast under a joint British and
Persian escort, in case of his deposition or flight. Although,
Russia and Great Britain were acting in complete harmony there
were sharp differences between the two Legations as Teheran
regarding the constitutional struggle in Persia. 'There can be
little doubt that the attitude of some Russian local officials
was not in harmony with the desires which animated both
Governments to work cordially together in Persia, and the
conduct of the Russian Minister at Teheran on certain critical
occasions was not of a character to render cooperation very
easy. The Russian Government themselves were doubtless desirous
of maintaining a close unity of action, but it was, perhaps
inevitable that they were, to a certain extent, influenced by
the reports which they received from their agents in Persia.
They were under the impression, which to a great extent was

1. F.0., 371/727/6057/6057/09/38, extract from the Annual
Report from Russia for the year 1908 (Enclosure in
Despatch from Sir, G. Nicholson (No. 92) of February 8,
1909, No. February 15, 1909), Noon and Tomperty, British
subsequently removed, that British agents had allowed their sympathies for the popular or Nationalist Party to become too active, while the British Government had good grounds for believing that the Russian agents were disposed to tend a certain support to the Shah and, therefore, indirectly to the reactionary party. Perhaps, the growing friendship between the Persian Government and Germany and the possibility of the Persian Government applying to Germany for advisors, instructors and financial assistance which meant a stronghold of Germany in Persia compelled the two great Powers to act jointly to check the growing German influence at Tehran. Germany's interest in the political affairs of Persia would have upset the whole plan of the two Powers. During a conversation, L. Isvolsky remarked that there was no threat of a convention in the case of Persia which could give an excuse of internationalising the Persian question. He emphasized, however, the need of complete cooperation between the two Governments which could only save the situation from becoming really dangerous. It was the German menace, together with the desire of maintaining Mohammad Ali Shah's regime intact, which compelled Isvolsky to advocate strongly a joint loan to Persia as the only means of restoring order and

2. Ibid., p. 724.
maintaining the Shah and the present Government. The British Government, at that time, was in no mood to furnish the Persian Government with a large loan because they considered it as pouring money into the rat-hole. Accordingly, the British Government agreed that only a small loan could be given in case of necessity in return for other advantages such as concession for railway construction in Persia. The British opposition to advancing a large loan to Persia, at that juncture, was also due to their hidden sympathy with the national movement. The loan, according to her, would have strengthened the hands of the Shah and enabled him to crush the Constitutionalists. During the Constitutional struggle, the Minister of Russia at Teheran was undoubtedly supporting the Shah, while the British representative was anxious to act as a true mediator. However despite their differences the two Governments continued their cooperation both giving margin to each other. The spread of democratic institution on the borders of the Russian Empire was considered to be a source of great anxiety and uneasiness by Russia. Therefore, her agents actively favoured the Shah, whom they persuaded to overthrow the constitution. Meanwhile the struggle between the Nationalists and the Shah entered a very crucial stage.

1. Secret Report of Charles Hardinge on June 12, 1908, about the visit of the Emperor of Russia at Reval in June, 1908, Cousin and Temperly Vol. V.
3. In 1908, the Young Turks obtained the Constitution.
On June 2, 1908, the Russian Minister, Mone de Hartwig, and the British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Marling, called on the Persian minister for Foreign Affairs and threatened the Persian Government with Russian intervention if the opposition to the Shah did not cease. Of course, the lead was taken by the Russian Minister and the British Chargé d'Affaires announced his government's approval of the Russian Minister's announcement. The encouraging attitude of Russia and the endorsement of this policy by Britain made the despotic Shah bold enough to adopt drastic and strong measures to dissolve the National Assembly. On June 3, 1908, the Shah suddenly and surprisingly left Tehran for Bagh-i-Shah, his country palace. It was a prelude to a well-planned coup.

Russia openly and actively supported the Shah but Sir E. Grey, the British Foreign Secretary refused to submit to the Russian proposal of joint declaration of maintaining and supporting the Kajar dynasty. Through his minister in Russia, Sir A. Meehlon, Sir E. Grey communicated his strong disapproval of intervention in the internal affairs of Persia. 'I am convinced', Sir E. Grey telegraphed, 'the best course is to limit our action, otherwise,

2. Ward and Gooch, op. cit., p. 419, Browne, op. cit. 201, Sunster, op. cit., p.XXX.
3. Fraser, David, Persia, and Turkey in Revolt, p. 40, Browne, op. cit. pp. 201-202, Sunster, op. cit., p. XXXVI.
we may become burdened with the responsibility of maintaining
an unpopular government. Meanwhile the Shah's actions, had
taken their course, the situation had completely changed.

Several nationalists leaders were arrested; the Shah collected
troops, arms and ammunitions at his country palace; seized the
telegraph offices, dismissed nationalists from government posts
and appointed well-known reactionaries and royalists at their
place; declared martial law in Teheran, filled the town with
Cossack patrols and placed Colonel Liakhoff in supreme command.
Volunteers assembled around the Majliss and the mosque to defend
the Majliss and prevent expulsion of prominent nationalist
leaders from the capital. Tension prevailed in the city. It
was followed by the outbreak of anti-Shah riots in many of the
provinces especially at Esht, Kirman, Isfahan, and Tabris.
The people of Tabriz telegraphed that they had deposed the Shah
and sent 300 horsemen to Teheran to defend the Constitution.
On June 23, 1908, the Majliss was surrounded by thousands of the
Cossack Brigade under the command of Colonel Liakhoff and was
bombarded by them, killing a large number of nationalist volunteers.

The building of the Majliss (Baharistan) and the Sipahsalar
mosque adjoining it were completely destroyed. A number of

+ The leaders were invited by the Shah to confer at Bagh-i-Shah
on June 8, 1908. On their arrival there, they had an
interview with the Shah, but while they were leaving the
Shah's country palace, all of them except one, were arrested.
Leaders, however, took refuge in the British Legation. Many leaders were arrested and some of them executed. For several days the houses of those who were disliked by the Shah were looted and bombarded. Colonel Liankhoff was appointed as the military governor of Tehran who declared Martial Law in the city and it seemed, though for a very brief period, that the autocracy of the Shah had been established. The Shah's efforts to overthrow the constitution in December 1907 were unsuccessful because at that time he was acting on his own account, but now as he had Russian support, he won the day. But the real victor was Hartwig, the Russian Minister, and the vanquished were the British, who had their sympathy, though hidden, with the nationalists.

Though the Shah was triumphant in Tehran, the Constitutionalists held their ground in Tabriz. After the dissolution of the Assembly, the town of Tabriz and its adjacent districts had risen in open revolt against the Shah's authority. The nationalist party, under a leader called Sattar Khan succeeded in getting the upper hand. They completely routed the forces of the Shah. The city of Tabriz was, however, besieged. The royalists took positions on the principal roads leading to the

city and in this way they cut off the supplies from outside. The disturbed state of affairs in Azerbaijan caused much anxiety to the Russian Government. The cause of the Russian Government's anxiety was not only due to the fact that her trade had suffered a lot on account of the disturbances, but the real source of anxiety was the proximity of the scene of disturbances to her Caucasian frontier. The Caucasus was one of the most disturbed districts in Russia. A large number of Russian revolutionaries crossed the border and proceeded to Tabriz to support Sattar Khan. These men, according to the Russian Government, formed the backbone of Sattar Khan's forces. The Russian government considered that the whole movement in Azerbaijan differed in character and in aims. It was, according to Russia, not a national and constitutional movement. The revolutionaries of the Azerbaijan did not want to induce the Shah to introduce a liberal and constitutional government but there aim was to establish an autonomous, independent socialistic Republic of Azerbaijan. They were afraid of this movement, which might spread in Caucasus and give rise to more serious trouble in that province. They alleged that the young Turkish Party and a few German officers were assisting the revolutionaries of Azerbaijan, though the careful enquiries made

1. Fraser, David, op. cit., p. 68.
by the British Consular Officers showed that such was not the fact. There was no doubt that the leaders of the Constitutional Party in Persia were very much encouraged by the successful revolution in Turkey in July 1908. Thus when the news of the Turkish revolution reached Tabriz on August 4, 1908, the town was placarded with a manifesto 'to the effect that, unless they could obtain a satisfactory settlement before the arrival of a Governor-General with reinforcements, the Sultan would be as good a Sovereign as the Shah. But the Azerbaijanis had no desire to lose their Persian nationality and pass under the Turkish rule', although a common faith and language - Turkish being spoken by the majority, would have inspired them to attach their destinies with Turkish people. Moreover, Turkey was engaged in her own domestic affairs and had little time to spare for Asian politics. In October, 1908, Russia decided to intervene on the pretext that the lives and properties of the Europeans, in Azerbaijan were in danger. 'It is quite possible that the reports which they received from their Consular and financial officials in Tabrez exaggerated the real position, and that the danger to the lives and properties of Russian subjects was not so

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3. Persia No. 1, Cd. 4551, No. 229, p. 197.
5. Shuster, op. cit., p. xi.
6. Russian ruling authorities.
imminent or so great as the Russian Government were given to understand. The Russian troops were, however, moved to Julfa and were on the point of being despatched to Tabriz to reinforce the Russian Consular guards. This state of affairs was very alarming for Britain. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary wrote to Sir A. Nicolson, the British Minister at St. Petersburg that at the time of Anglo-Russian Convention, it was contemplated that in the course of time confidence would grow up between Great Britain and Russia and make a favourable arrangement possible about the other points of Anglo-Russian friction and dispute. But the action of the Russian officers in Persia in suppressing the constitution had created a very bad impression on British public opinion. The news that Russian officers were being sent to put down the Nationalists at Tabriz would again make unfavourable effect on British public opinion. On October 17, 1908, the British Foreign Secretary telegraphed to Sir A. Nicolson that any act of intervention on the part of Russia in Persia would create a bad impression in Britain and he asked his Minister to induce the Russian Government not to intervene. Consequently, the Russian force, which had been despatched, was ordered on October 30, 1908 to remain at Russian

2. Ibid., p. 726.
4. Persia, No. 1 Cd. 4881, p. 192, No. 266.
Julfa and not to cross into Persian territory. Sir E. Grey expressed his great satisfaction on the news that threatened movement of Russian troops into Tabriz was stopped. He also informed Isvolasky about the bad effect upon British public opinion of the proceedings of Liakhoff and Russian officers in Persia. The British disapproval of the contemplated Russian intervention had little effect and fresh talks of intervention on the alleged ground of serious loss to the Russian trade started again. But once again the British Foreign Minister’s remonstrances on October 31, 1908, proved effective and the danger, for the time being, was averted.

The attitude of Russia regarding the national struggle in Tabriz confirmed the belief that the Russian Government was determined to crush the Constitutionalists and that it was bent upon restoring the autocratic power of Mohammad Ali Shah. The telegrams which fell into the hands of Sattar Khan sent by the reactionary leaders at Tabriz to the Shah and his Ministers made it crystal clear that the Russian legation was supplying arms and ammunitions to the royalists. As regards the alleged insecurity of European lives and properties at Tabriz, the certificates issued by three chief European firms at Tabriz,

1. Ibid., p. 194, Nos. 270, 271 and p. 200, No. 292.

+ These certificates are reproduced by Browne in his book The Persian Revolution see, pp. 284-286.
furnished Sattar Khan with ample proof that the Russians were pre-determined to intervene in the internal affairs and their allegation was without any foundation. However, by the end of October 1908, when the Nationalists were in complete possession of Tabriz, the royalist forces besieged that place. While the national struggle was gaining momentum and was taking an aggressive turn in Persia, Great Britain and Russia were urging the Shah to grant some sort of constitution in place of that which he had destroyed. The two powers were convinced that the restoration of the constitution was necessary to re-establish peace and order in the country. In their opinion, the reactionary policy of the Shah would not be disastrous to his only but it would be injurious and harmful to the interests of Britain and Russia as well. Consequently, the two big Powers decided to warn the Shah against his reactionary policy and an identical note was communicated to him on September 9, 1908. The note requested the Shah to review his declaration to maintain the constitution and to fix a date for the election and convocation of the Assembly. In the identical note the powers urged the Shah to convene the new Assembly on November 14, 1908. The Shah assured the

1. Ibid., p. 284.
Russian Minister at Tehran that after restoring peace and order in Tabriz which he expected to be done within a few days, he would take measures for the election and convocation of the Assembly. The Russian representative at Tehran was instructed to thank the Shah for the assurances. The Shah, however, sent a message to the Legations on September 18, 1906, as follows:

'I am taking steps to form a Majliss in conformity with the requirements of the country and with religion, and such as not to lead to a recurrence of disorders, and I am thus fulfilling my promises. I hope that I shall be able to issue a proclamation for the Assembly of the Majliss on the date mentioned by the two governments in their communication to me, but till after the restoration of order at Tabris, when the Persian Government will have leisure to make the necessary arrangements, the Parliament will not open. The reply of the Shah to the identical note was considered as vague and unsatisfactory by the representative of two powers at Tehran, but M. Teharykoff, Assistant Secretary of Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs thought it unwise to exercise further pressure on the Shah. He was of the opinion that Tabriz might be temporarily excluded until peace and order had been re-established, as no election could be held as long as disorder prevailed.

On September 26, 1908, Mohammad Ali Shah issued a Rescript concerning the restoration of the Constitutional government and convoking an Assembly for the 14th November, but declaring that no election would be held in the province of Azerbaijan till order and peace were fully restored there. The Rescript was examined by the representative of both the governments and was found to be ambiguous. M. Tcharykoff described it as contradictory, obscure and ornate. Sir George Barolay, the British Minister at Teheran (he replaced Sir Hardinge), described it as being generally regarded as a mockery. M. Tcharykoff expressed his readiness to join with His Majesty's Government in any steps which the latter might wish to take for the purpose of clearing up the contradictions in the document. Later the Russian Government agreed to join with His Majesty's government in urging the Shah to extend the electoral law to Tabris, and to grant an amnesty to all who had been in arms.

The representations made and counsels given to the Shah by the representatives of Russia and Britain had made very little impression upon the Shah. He intended to establish his autocratic regime at every cost and got a chance of doing it when on November 7, 1908, a demonstration against the Constitution was organized by the reactionary party at Bagh-i-Shah. This

1. Ibid., p. 725.
2. Ibid., p. 726.
3. Ibid., p. 725, Cd. 4581, No. 258, p. 190.
anti-Constitution demonstration was the result of direct efforts of the three or four Ministers, such as the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War who feared every thing to lose by the establishment of a constitutional government. The representatives of the two Powers were alarmed by this demonstration and therefore they decided to seek an audience with the Shah to make it clear that they did not regard the demonstration as manifestation of true public opinion. The demonstrators were regarded by the British Representative as inimical and fatal to the country. The audience was granted to the representatives of both the Powers separately. Sir J. Barclay reminded the Shah of his promises to re-establish the constitutional regime and told him that the events of November 7, 1906, at Bagh-i-Shah were inconsistent with his promise. He requested the Shah to grant the constitution as it was the only means to restore order and peace in the country. The Shah answered that it was wrong to say that the demonstration was not an expression of true public feeling against a constitutional regime and insisted that a very large and influential position of the people regarded constitutional government as contrary to Islam. Mohammad Ali Shah drew a distinction between the present situation and that which existed at the end of 1906. Then, he said, the government was

1. Cd. 4733, No. 9, p. 3.
2. Ibid., No. 9, p. 3.
against the constitution and the people desired it. Now, the government desired it and the people were against it. However, he informed the British representative that he was himself in favour of a Parliament and had no intention of violating his pledges and had not yielded to the demonstrations. He assured Sir J. Barclay that he was engaged in devising a constitution which would suit the country. The British representative was, however, not satisfied. 'Even if this promise is fulfilled', G. Barclay wrote to Sir Grey, 'I doubt very much whether the measures will be of a satisfactory nature'.

Another demonstration was held at Bagh-i-Shah on November 19, 1908 against the convocation of an Assembly. It was again organised by reactionaries like Sheikh Fazlullah, the Imam Juma, the Grand Vizier, Prince Waib-as-Sultaneh and Amir Bahadur Jan.;. They protested against the constitution and declared the convocation of an Assembly as contrary to Islam. The shah agreed with them and issued a rescript practically abolishing the constitution. The rescript which was addressed to the Clergy declared that 'you have shown that the institution of a Madjiliss is contrary to the laws of Islam and you have decreed its unlawfulness, and the clergy of the provinces have written and telegraphed their decrees that it is unlawful, therefore, we also have entirely given up this idea, and in future such a Madjiliss will not even be mentioned.......

1. Cd. 4753, No. 9, pp. 3-5.
3. Cd. 4753, Enclosure 17, in No 17, p. 9.
The representatives of Britain and Russia decided to present a memorandum on November 22, 1908 to the Foreign Minister of Persia, urging the Shah to reconsider his decision. The memorandum regretted that 'His Imperial Majesty, following the evil counsels of those surrounding him, and making use as a pretext of petitions which in no way represent the true feelings of his people, does not intend to convokc an assembly of Representatives of the people'. The memorandum went on.....

the two representatives, although desirous of avoiding any interference in the internal affairs of Persia, feel it to be their duty to repeat their conviction that the sole method of conciliating the people (who, owing to the Shah's attitude towards the constitution, are in revolt in the province of Azerbaijan, and in a state of effervescence and excitement in the capital as well as in the other provinces) would be for His Majesty to free himself from the counsels of the persons interested in a continuance of the present deplorable regime and to re-establish constitutional government. The memorandum had its effect and orders were issued to the government prohibiting the distribution of the rescript and efforts were also made to withdraw the copies which had already been circulated.

The Persian Foreign Minister Ala-es-Sultan called on the

1. Cd. 4733, Enclosure 17, in Fo. 17, p. 9.
British representative on November 25, 1908 and explained to him that the rescript did not mean that the Shah would not convene any Majliss. It only meant that an Assembly like the previous one would not be summoned. The Foreign Minister also argued that it was not a rescript at all, it was really an answer to the Ulama. It was not official as it had not been published through the Grand Vizier. It had been published and circulated by the clergy. Sir G. Barclay regretted its publication and asked the Foreign Minister whether he might inform his government that the publication of rescript was against the Shah's order. Ala-es-Sultaneeh agreed with him hesitatingly and informed the British Representative that the Shah was determined to convene an Assembly suitable to the needs of his country and compatible with the principles of Islam. The official reply to the joint Russo-British memorandum was sent to the British representative at Thiran on November 26, 1908. The Ala-es-Sultaneeh charged the representatives of the two Powers of having made unauthenticated rumour the basis of their representation. He informed them that the Shah intended to convene a Majliss suited to the nature of the country, the laws of Islam, and the temperament of the Persian people. Sir G. Barclay wrote to Sir E. Gray that the Anglo-Russian note had served its purpose and orders were issued to suppress the rescript. He was of the opinion that the imputation that the

2. Cd. 4733, Enclosure in No. 18, p. 10, also No. 1, p. 1.
two representatives acted on unfounded rumours might be over-looked. Mr. Churchill and M. Baranovsky, the British and Russian dragomans respectively had an audience with the Shah on November 26, 1905. During the conversation, the Shah informed them that he intended to keep his promises of convening a Majliss and explain that the phrase 'we will not even mention such a Majliss' referred to the last 'assembly. The Russian dragoman urged the Shah to keep his promises as it were the only means of re-establishing order and calming Tabriz. He said that a large section of people were resolved to have a parliamentary regime. The Shah replied that on the other hand, most of the people were opposed to it, and if he issued orders for elections to day there would certainly be bloodshed tomorrow. Mr. Churchill then said that it was the surest proof of the selfishness and narrow policy pursued by His Majesty's courtiers who had conveyed to him the wrong information of people being opposed to the Assembly. Mr. Baranovsky again urged the Shah to keep his promises. The Shah then, spoke of the Council which was to meet the following day. The Russian dragoman pointed out that a body chosen by the Shah was not at all what had been promised, and that it must be elected by the people. The Shah repeated the majority of the Persians were against an elected Majliss to which it. Baranovsky replied that it was not the case, and advised

1. Ibid No. 18, p. 10.
te Shah to order his new council to draw up an electoral law by which an assembly would be convened. The Shah replied that he would discuss the matter with those who have been opposed to an elected Majliss and would inform the two Legations of the result. Sir G. Barclay in a communication to Sir E. Grey wrote that the Council was composed of men of reactionary views and unless the Shah could be induced to summon to it men of more liberal views, it would be useless to expect the revival of the Constitutional regime. On November 30, 1908, the British Foreign Secretary telegraphically informed Sir A. Nicolson, the British Minister in Russia, the view of His Majesty's Government that only an elected Majliss would satisfy the Persian nation and only then peace could be re-established in the country. He considered that it would be well to request the Shah to issue orders to the new council for drafting out a new electoral law without further delay. Sir E. Grey also enquired about the Russian Government's view in that connection. Sir A. Nicolson replied to the British Foreign Secretary that M. Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, had received information from M. Sabline (who replaced M. Hartwig) the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Persia that the council had already begun its work and the preparation of an electoral law was to be their first occupation. The Russian Foreign Minister opposed any further representation in the present circumstances. The rescript of November 22, 1908, which practically abolished the

2. Ibid., No. 20, p. 12.
4. Ibid., No.2,pp. 1-2.
constitution alarmed the British Government and she not only made representation to the Shah to grant the Constitution but also decided to take more serious measures. It had at one time been suggested by Russia that Russia and Great Britain should respectively seize the northern and southern customs, but this project was abandoned as having too much the character of a direct and forcible intervention in the affairs of Persia. But the act of the Shah in abolishing the constitution caused much anxiety in Britain and His Majesty's Government proposed to inform the Shah that as he had failed to establish his authority in the province of Azerbaijan and had deliberately ignored the advice of the two Governments and violated his pledges regarding the constitution, as the result of which all hope of maintaining order and peace in the country, had been destroyed. Consequently, the two Governments were compelled to look to the forces of Sattar Khan to protect foreigners and trade, and would hold the Shah responsible for any further disturbances which might arise if he attempted to regain his position so long as the constitution remained suspended. But the proposal of the British Government was not favoured by Russia. It was also suggested that Sattar Khan shall be informed by the Consular Representatives of Russia and Great Britain that Russia would not intervene only on the condition that his forces offered adequate protection to foreign subjects and trade in general, and for Russian interests in particular. The Russian Government

1. Ibid., p. 727.
did not accept the proposal. M. Iswolsky maintained that it would be equivalent to an intervention on behalf of one party in the struggle and he understood that the British Government desired to let the two forces fight out their differences between themselves. He considered that the aims and objects of Sattar Khan were more than the establishment of constitutional regime and doubted that the mere grant of constitution would pacify him. He was not sure that Royal forces would not be able to re-establish Shah's authority in Azerbaijan and raised his objection to any direct official relations with Sattar Khan, which would encourage him indirectly to believe that he was in a measure an independent ruler. The quasi-recognition of Sattar Khan was viewed by the British Government, as the only means of exerting pressure on the Shah to grant the constitution, but the Russian Foreign Minister objected it. He, however, got a loop hole of escape, owing to the Shah having withdrawn his rescript ablishing the constitution. The question was dropped and two Governments continued to exercise pressure on the Shah to grant the Constitution.

Inspite of continued pressure to grant the constitution, the Shah continued to give evasive promises. The rescript of November 22, 1908 was posted all over Teheran on December 1908 although the Shah had assured the two representatives that he

would issue orders prohibiting its distribution and circulation.

The Russian and British agents at Teheran protested and demanded its withdrawal immediately. The Shah replied that the placarding of his answer to Ulma was done without his knowledge. He issued orders to the effect that placard should be torn and destroyed. He repeated his assurances to convolve the "ajliss.

The Official Gazette published a news on December 9, 1908 that the Shah had decided to establish a great Council composed of fifty members. The Council will consist of priest, merchants and men skilled in State Affairs, and others who will be elected by the people. The Persian Foreign Minister handed over a copy of the regulations of the new Council to Sir 3. Barclay. There was no provision for the election of any member. 'The composition of the Council', Sir 3. Barclay informed Sir 2. Grey telegraphically on December 12, 1908, 'make it clear that the regulations are merely intended to hoodwink us'. The Shah was not prepared for any effective change in his present rule, the most of the members of the Council were ignorant and reactionary. Sir 2. Barclay did not regard the institution of the Council as fulfillment of the royal pledges and the Russian representative and he, himself again decided to address a joint memorandu to the Shah to th t effect. The joint memorandu which was communicated to the

1. Cd. 4733, No. 6, p. 2.
2. Ibid., No. 7, p. 2.
3. Ibid., No. 11, p. 9.
4. Ibid., No. 12, p. 5. 5. Ibid., No. 14, p. 6, No. 55, p. 23.
Shah through the Persian Foreign Minister on December 14, 1906 categorically refused to acknowledge the institution of the Council of State or Notables as the fulfilment of royal promises, on the ground that its members were not elected by the people and enquired as to when the Shah would convok the promised elected assembly. The memorandum reiterated the conviction that the only means of re-establishing law and order in the country was to convene an elected Assembly and to issue proclamation of an amnesty to all the rebels. Later on, there was a change in the Russian attitude towards the Shah. The Russian Government desired that the pressure upon the Shah should not be applied so hardly. Although they were always ready to act in complete harmony with the British Government and to induce the Shah to introduce the liberal reforms and constitutional principles, yet they expressed their doubts as to whether it would be wise to compel the Shah to convene an Assembly, and 'leave him defenceless and powerless in face of popular-elements which might at a given moment display revolutionary tendencies'.

During a conversation with M. Izvolsky on December 15, 1906 Sir A. Nicolson complained about the indifferent attitude of the Shah towards the Anglo-Russian advises and proposed that he should be seriously warned. The Russian Foreign Minister

1. Cd. 4733, No. 56, pp. 23-24, for the regulations regarding the Assembly of Councillors of State, Please see C d. 4733, Enclosure 1, in No. 56, pp. 24-25.
2. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 55, p. 25.
opposed any such action for it would look like direct
intervention in favour of one party. M. Izvolsky repeatedly
stated that the Shah, with all his defects should, if possible,
be kept on the throne, as his deposition would lead to anarchy
- a situation which might compel Britain and Russia both to
intervene in the internal affairs of Persia quite against their
wishes. The Shah in the meantime, continued to give evasive
promises and exploited the situation. He thought that he might
succeed in obtaining a joint loan, which would enable him not
only to meet the ordinary expenses but to crush to revolution-
aries too. On December 17, 1908, Shad-ad-Dowlah delivered a
message from the Shah to the representatives of Russia and
Britain. The Shah's message enquired as to whether the two
governments would make an advance of 400000 l., if a constitution
were granted. Sir T. Barclay replied, on behalf of the two
governments that unless and until a constitutional regime was
established, the two governments would not furnish the Shah with
a loan. He made it clear that a mere declaration promising
a constitution would not satisfy them. Actual promulgation of
the constitution and a guarantee to the proper utilization of
the money advanced would be the essential conditions for the
grant of the loan. On December 21, 1908, during a conversation
with Sir A. Nicolson, K.a.d. Hartwig expressed his opinion that
the Shah's hesitation to act on the advice of the two Legations
would have ceased, had he been furnished with the required loan.

2. F.0. 371/727, 6057/6057/09/38, Joch and Temperley, p.727.
4. Ibid., No.21, p.14.
The Russian Government was convinced that the deplorable state of Persian finances was mainly responsible for the deterioration of the whole situation. She, however, recognized that in case an advance was made, strictest safeguards must be taken to see as to whether the money advanced was properly utilized. She also supported the view that in case an advance was made, care must be taken that the money was not being spent on the suppression of the nationalist party. The money was only to be spent on the reformation of the rotten machinery of the Persian Government. The British Foreign Office adopted a very clear policy regarding a joint loan to the Shah. The British Foreign Secretary telegraphically informed his Minister at St. Petersburg that the British Government was prepared to grant the loan provided that:

1. Assurances were received by the two legations from H. Bismarck to the effect that the grant of a loan was necessary and desirable.

2. Declaration of an electoral law and fixation of an early date for the election in Persia by the Shah.

3. Satisfactory guarantees for the proper use of the money and the smooth working of the constitution.

Later on, Sir E. Jow sent a telegram to Sir A. W. Colson that he should prefer 'to wait until a constitution has been established before making any advance to the Shah'. The Shah was in acute shortage of money. E, therefore, decided

2. Cd. 4735, No. 25, p. 15.
3. Ibid., No. 27, p. 15.
to send a Special Envoy named Mohammad Khan, Ala-ul-Mulk to St. Petersburg. The Special Envoy of Persia called on Sir A. Nicolson, the British Minister at St. Petersburg on December 24, 1908. He tried to convince the Minister that the people of Persia were not capable of shouldering the burden of modern representative institutions. He asserted that the movement in Azerbaijan under the leadership of Sattar Khan could not be regarded as a liberal one organized in order to secure a Constitution. If a Constitution was granted, it would have no effect on the activities of Sattar Khan and his adherents. Mohammad Khan pointed out that the Shah as well as the right-thinking Persians, undoubtedly, were in favour of a Constitution but emphasized that efforts should be directed towards improving the tone of the administration and restoring some order to the confusion in which the administrative machinery was thrown, before a Constitution was granted to the nation. He regretted that the two Governments were pressing the Shah to grant a Constitution even before the establishment of order in administration. What was essential to Persia, he argued was that first of all her finances should be placed on sound footings and then all the Departments of State should be efficiently organized. After the reform introduced in the various branches of the Government had ensured smooth running of the administrative machinery, an assembly might be convened provided that competent
and capable persons were available to compose it. Mahmud Khan proceeded to say that Persian intelligentsia as well as commercial classes were very much disappointed with the deeds of the Assembly while the Persian peasant, they had no capacity of mind to perceive and understand it and therefore, had no desire to get it established. By putting pressure, on the Shah he remarked, to grant a Constitution Great Britain and Russia were trying to build a house in a hurry without laying down its foundation properly. He warned that if the two Powers would force the Shah to promulgate an electoral law and to convene an Assembly, the country would be plunged into disorder, and anarchy would prevail throughout Persia which would compel the two countries to intervene in its internal affairs actively but undesirably. He requested, in the last, for an Anglo-Russian monetary assistance so that the finances of the country could be reorganized and re-established. Sir A. Nicolson refused to agree with this argument and frankly told him that he was sure that the majority of the people were in favour of a Constitution and it would not be granted, there would be renewed troubles in the country. He also informed Mahmud Khan that the two Governments would not change their policy regarding Persia. In the meantime, the representatives of Britain and Russia continued their efforts to

1. Ibid, No. 32, p. 17.
urge the Shah to grant a Constitution. On December 21, 1908 the two dragomans called on the Grand Vizier and urged that 'the Shah should order the Council, to which a few good men should be added to complete the Electoral Law'. On December 22, 1908, the Shah received the two dragomans and made it known that 'he was resolved to fulfil his promises and that he was on the point of doing so when the people, by taking bast at the Turkish Embassy sought to force his hand. His Majesty was anxious not to have the appearance of giving way on this account.' The two dragomans then insisted that the Shah should issue orders to the new Council for the elaboration of the electoral Law. The Shah replied that this was exactly the same what he proposed to do and disclosed that the new 'National Assembly and the Senate would be ready to work before the month of Muharram (beginning the 24th of January)'. The two dragomans then endeavoured to obtain an assurance to that effect from the Shah in writing so that they could persuade the bastis to leave the Turkish Embassy. The Shah hesitated and said that before giving any undertaking, he would like to discuss the matter with the Grand Vizier. The Shah then discussed it with his Ministers and finally it was agreed upon that the

+ On December 20, 1908, a small number of Nationalists sought refuge in the Turkish Embassy. Their numbers increased on the following day. Many persons applied to the British representative for permission to take bast at the British Legation, but their application was rejected. It was a political demonstration to compel the Shah to grant a Constitution.
3. Ibid, No. 56, p. 27.
desired statement, drafted by the two dragomans and signed by the Grand Vizier should be deposited with the Foreign Minister for the inspection of a delegate of the two Legations. Afterwards, the statement was drafted by the two dragomans to the effect that 'His Imperial Majesty undertakes to issue on the day following the withdrawal of the refugees in the Turkish Embassy a rescript providing for the elaboration, by a Committee selected by His Majesty and comprised in the Council of State, of an electoral law'. The dragomans left for Legations after getting the assurance that duly signed document would be available for inspection. The promise was not fulfilled and the two Legations again decided to represent. On December 24, 1903, Mr. Churchill and M. Baronowski visited the Grand Vizier to represent against the non-fulfillment of his promise. The Grand Vizier repeated the same old arguments and argued that any election by the people was against the law of Islam. M. Isvolsky's speech in the Duma which gave the impression that the Russian Government did not care whether the Shah followed the advice of the two Legation or not was responsible for the change in his attitude.

The British Minister at Teheran was much disappointed and felt very displeased and humiliated owing to the non-fulfillment of the promises and disregard shown to the Joint Russo-British

1. Ibid, No. 24, p. 14 and No. 56, p. 27.
2. Ibid, No. 26, p. 15 and No. 56, p. 27.
3. Ibid, No. 28, p. 15.
4. Ibid, No. 56, p. 27.
representations. He recommended his Foreign Office to be stiff in its dealing with the Persian Government and to demand the dismissal of the Grand Vizier and Minister of War. According to him these two reactionaries were the main hindrance in the way of a Constitution being granted. He suggested another representation by the two Legations to seek the dismissal of the two abovementioned ministers and to remind the Shah to issue orders to his Council to frame the electoral law and grant amnesty to rebels. According to him, the Shah was to be warned and plainly told that if the above mentioned measures were not taken, the two Governments would treat it as a definite refusal by the Shah to accept their advice and would allow him and his people to settle their disputes themselves.

The Shah was not showing any signs of yielding and the nationalists were determined to get the Constitution granted. The example of Tabriz was followed by Isfahan. The British Consul General at Isfahan, Mr. Grahame reported the beginning of the violent agitation there on January 1,1909. He described the agitation partly as a 'National demonstration, and partly as a protest against the Governor'. The Governor and other local officers took refuge in the British Consulate. It was Zargham-es Sultaneh, who with the help of Bakhtiyari tribesmen led the

1. Ibid, No. 29, p. 16, also No. 56, p. 27.
2. Ibid, No. 30, p. 16, and p. 46, No. 78.
revolution and the Isfahans got rid of the rule of tyranny.

By January 5, 1909, Semsam-es-Sultanah, the Ilkhani whose arrival was expected by Jarjham-es-Sultanah and who was to be received as a national hero by the population was in possession of the city. He kept guarded the foreign firms and maintained order. Perfect peace prevailed in the city. The British and the Russian representatives at Tehran urged the Shah to appoint Ilkhani as the Governor of the city temporarily but the Shah rejected this advice on the ground that he had no confidence in the Ilkhani. Had another person been appointed Governor of Isfahan, the situation of Tabriz might be repeated at Isfahan, telegraphed Sir J. Barclay to Sir E. Grey on January 6, 1909. Despite of the Russo-British representation, Farman Farma was appointed as Governor of Isfahan on January 7, 1909. It was a device of the Shah to sow the seed of dissension amongst the Bakhtiyari chiefs, but without success. Bakhtiyari chiefs were united and were prepared to resist Farman Farma and his forces. The new development in the situation alarmed the British representative who feared that the example of the Bakhtiyari would be

1. Ibid., No. 31, p. 16.
2. Ibid., No. 33, p. 16.
4. Cad. 8753, No. 51, p. 16.
5. Ibid., No. 33, p. 18.
6. Ibid., No. 25, p. 19, No. 78, p. 46.
7. Ibid., No. 37, p. 19, also No. 78, p. 47.
8. Ibid., No. 37, p. 19.
followed by other tribes like Kalhors at Kirmanshah and Kashgais at Shiraz. Reporting telegraphically to Sir E. Grey, C. Barclay stated as follows:

"Though it may be too late to arrest the growing anarchy by the grant of a Constitution, which is sine qua non of financial assistance, I consider that in the establishment of a Constitutional regime lies the only hope of guarding against developments which it is impossible to predict with any certainty, but which might involve the disintegration of Persia, or at least the forcible dictation of terms to the Shah by the Nationalists". The growing strength of the nationalists was a source of anxiety for Russian Government so M. Isvolsky expressed his opinion on January 9, 1909 that 'something should be done to prevent the establishment of independent administration at Tabriz and Ispahan. The British Government rejected the Russian proposal and on January 13, 1909 Sir E. Grey informed that 'His Majesty's Government are opposed to any kind of intervention respecting the position in Tabreez or Ispahan' and that 'so long as there is no reform in the Shah's Government there will be no improvement of a permanent character; and while any proposals emanating from the Russian Government will be most carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, they hold

1. Ibid, No. 42, p. 20.
2. Ibid, No. 44, p. 20.
that to give the Shah money would, in the present circumstances, be worse than futile, and would amount to intervention in Persia's internal affairs. For it is probable that such money would be employed in the suppression of the national movement on behalf of a Constitution; moreover, when once the money had been spent, the situation would be as bad as ever, even if not worse. The British Foreign Office had a very clear picture of the situation in Persia and was firmly convinced that nothing could save Persia from disintegration but a Constitution. Sir E. Grey was desirous to follow such a policy in Persia which would help the nationalists to get the Constitution without antagonising Russia. Consequently the opinion of the Russian Government was sought and the British Government was awaiting a Memorandum from Russian Foreign Office which would profound a programme to be followed in Persia. On January 16, 1909, M. Isvolsky communicated the awaited memorandum to Sir A. Nicolson. The Memorandum gave a brief sketch of the deplorable and anarchic situation prevailing in Persia. It expressed grave concern over it owing to which economic interests of Russia and Great Britain had suffered considerably. It stated that on account of adhering to the policy of non-intervention, Great Britain and Russia had hitherto restricted themselves to giving only friendly advice to the Shah to re-establish constitutional regime. The two

1. Ibid, No. 52, p. 22.
Governments, the memorandum admitted, were convinced, that the restoration of the autocratic regime was impossible, but at the same time shared the view that a Constitution like previous one would throw the country in deeper state of anarchy. Under these circumstances, the memorandum expressed its view that only pressure on the Shah, to re-establish constitutional regime, would not serve the purpose. In order to get things in order, and to pacify the nationalists it was essential not only to set up a national representative government but also that the two governments should assist the Shah in introducing financial, administrative, military and judicial reform in the country. It further stated that only the introduction of reforms in finance and realization of the will of the population for some sort of Constitution would help Persia in resolving her problems. The Russian Government, therefore, proposed that while maintaining the policy of non-intervention, friendly advice should be given and energetic men like Saad-ed-Dowleh and Nasr-ul-Mulk who had already given proof of their capabilities. The two Governments should also express their desire to the Shah to see the representative government established in Persia without insisting on the recall of the old Assembly. The Shah should be advised to proceed without delay to nominate a body of enlightened men to frame the electoral law which would suit the historical uses, habits and customs of the Persian people. If the Shah follows this advice of Russia and Great Britain, then, the two Governments would assist him in obtaining a foreign loan on the condition
that a special Committee composed of the Directors of the Russian and British Banks at Teheran and of some Persian delegates, be instituted to control the expenditure of the resources of the State and to see whether the expenditure was devoted exclusively to the needs of the country. It would also supervise the several departmental estimates which were to be drawn up in conformity with a budget framed by the Persian Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the Committee. The Committee was also to assist the Persian Ministry of Finance in revising and regularizing the existing laws regarding the matlat tax. Moreover, the two Governments expressed in order to prove their sincere desire to have friendly relations with the Shah's Government would express their willingness to grant as an advance a sum of 5,000,000 fr. out of the future loan. The advance was to meet the immediate expenses necessitated by the introduction of the reforms. During conversation with M. Isvolsky Sir A. Nicolson expressed his view that the question of providing the Persian Government with a loan should be dropped until M. Bizot, the financial adviser of Persian Government had submitted his report. M. Isvolsky agreed with the proposal. The British Minister then discussed the matter relating to an advance of loan and made it known to M. Isvolsky that his Government would not give its consent in that regard until an electorate law had been

framed and published and a date for election and for convocation of an Assembly had been fixed. M. Isvolsky replied that he had carefully stated in the memorandum that the advance should be given 'if the Shah gives sufficient proof of his decision to follow the advice of Russia and England'. He had left the condition for an advance vague purposely so that we should be free to decide whether the Shah had given ample proof to be furnished with the advance or not. In case, the Shah did not give practical effect to his promises and did not hold elections and convoke an Assembly it might be said that two Powers were not satisfied and the advance would not be made. However, M. Isvolsky maintained that mere grant of a Constitution was not enough to restore peace and order in the country. He considered that it was of the utmost importance to provide the Shah with sufficient money to make some progress in the initial stages on which he was being advised to enter. On February 3, 1909, Sir E. Grey despatched the reply of British Government to Sir A. Nicolson 1 Sir A. Nicolson handed it over to M. Isvolsky on February 11, 1909. The British Government was of the opinion that 'the best course to adopt would be for Great Britain and Russia to stand entirely aloof from the internal affairs of Persia, allowing the existing chaos to endure till whatever element in the country is strongest gains the day. During this interval, they would be prepared to


to face the danger which might be involved to British commercial interests. But at the same time Sir E. Grey acknowledged that as Russia had a co-terminus frontier with the most disturbed areas of Persia, it would be difficult for her to maintain a policy of indifference as desired by the British Government and maintained that had Russia not been in a position to pursue the desired policy, the British Government would co-operate with her in regard to future action. Sir E. Grey was fully convinced that if a Constitution was granted to the Persian nation, peace and order would be restored in the whole of Persia. The Shah should, therefore, be urged to fulfill his promises. The British Government approved the Russian suggestion that energetic and capable persons should be called to the Shah's Council to assist him in framing a scheme of representative government, but considered it advisable to recommend to the Shah to dismiss his reactionary advisers such as the Grand Vizier and Amir Bahadur Jang and to proclaim a general amnesty for all under arm. The British Government suggested that a date should be fixed beyond which Shah's fulfillment of his pledge should no longer be postponed and he should also be informed that he was not likely to get any support of any kind from the two governments if he failed to establish a representative government which suited the needs of the country. He further stated that the two Governments reconsider their attitude to the Shah and take
measure to safeguard their interest in case of failure. As regards to the loan to the Shah, the British Government proposed that the question should be left until M. Bizot had submitted his report. Sir E. Grey, however, made it clear that the British Government would not give her consent in any case to make an advance to the Shah's Government until an elected Assembly had approved of this transaction. His Majesty's Government considered that the question of control of the loan should also be reserved until the constitutional government was established. The British Government was quite against the lending of money to the Shah under present situation as it meant actual intervention in Persia's internal affairs and this should be considered as an act of hostility against the nation.

The reply of the British Government to the Russian memorandum was displeasing to the Russians. However, M. Isvolsky was anxious to come to some understanding with the British Government regarding the policy to be followed in Persia. He expressed his fear that if the two Governments did not arrive at some understanding the ever-increasing anarchy would reach a point where intervention would be absolutely inevitable. On February 19, 1909, M. Isvolsky communicated certain proposals which were to be the basis of an agreement between the two

Governments regarding the policy to be followed in Persia. The proposals were as follows:

1. To require immediate dismissal by the Shah of the Saar Azam and Amir Bahadur Jang. The latter might retain his office as chief of the personal guard of the Shah.

2. To obtain from the Shah the re-establishment of the Constitutional regime by means of the reforms enumerated below.

3. The Constitution of a Cabinet composed of persons to be recommended to him by the two legations.

4. Inclusion in the Council of the Empire of enlightened persons belonging to different parties, of whom some should be recommended to him by the two legations. The council should be entrusted with the elaboration of a new electoral law.

5. General amnesty for all those who had taken up arms against the Shah.

6. Dates to be fixed for the parliamentary elections and for convocation of the Assembly. These dates to be made known without delay in the entire country.

7. That as soon as the above preparatory measures have been carried out a certain sum should be advanced to the Persian Government, and the expenditure of this sum should be supervised by the Control Commission mentioned in the Russian memorandum of 16th January.

8. A French treasurer-general with two assistants of the same nationality will assure the regular receipt of the taxes.  

1. Ibid, pp. 730-731.
During a conversation on February 23, 1909, M. Isvolsky said to Sir A. Nicolson that it was of no use 'to insist on the Shah enacting an electoral law and summoning an Assembly and leaving the Government in an absolutely penniless condition', to which Sir A. Nicolson replied that the British Government would not provide the Shah with money until it was certain that he would establish a constitutional regime. To provide the Shah with money, Sir A. Nicolson argued would mean strengthening of his hands to crush the Nationalists movement which was in no case desirable. M. Isvolsky, then, explained that he did not desire to give the Shah any funds. What he really wished was 'to insist on the Shah dismissing reactionary advisers and calling to his councils competent and liberal men; to grant an amnesty; to proclaim an electoral law and to fix dates for the elections and for the convocation of the Assembly. When all this was accomplished, then, but not till then, a moderate advance should be made - not to the Shah, but to the reformed Persian Government - to meet the immediate needs of the Government. The disbursement of this advance was to be carefully controlled and supervised, and to be solely devoted to the legitimate purpose of setting the administrative machinery going. The above were reasonable and practicable proposals. When there was some prospect of introducing a better administration, surely the whole proceeding was not to be blocked owing to the want of funds; and yet His Majesty's
Government declared to assist in giving these funds until an Assembly had accorded its approbation. The British Government carefully studied the proposals put forward by the Russian Government on February 19, 1909 and accepted point Nos. 2, 5 and 6 totally. As regards point No. 1, it was suggested that Amir Bahadur Jang should not be allowed to hold any office at the Palace and Sheikh Fazlullah should be ordered by the Shah to leave Tehran at once. Point No. 3 was opposed by the British Government on the ground that it would amount to an intervention and would involve the responsibility which was not desirable. Point No. 4 was acceptable to the British Government provided that the recommendation was only given at the request of the Shah. As regards point No. 7, the British Government made it clear that an advance should be given only after the establishment of Constitutional regime and the transaction being approved by an elected Assembly. The British Government advised to drop point No. 8 as the Shah had already consented to appoint a treasurer-General.

The insistence of the British Government on the convocation by the Shah of an elected Assembly as a pre-condition to giving an advance of funds, disappointed M. Isvolsky. He maintained that

a moderate advance under close supervision would enable the reformed Persian Government to keep the administrative machinery in order and ensure its smooth running. However, M. Isvolsky intended to cooperate with the British Government though he differed with the British policy and considered, that it would yield no fruitful result.

On March 17, 1909, M. Isvolsky communicated a fresh memorandum. He agreed with the proposal of the British Government that Amir Bahadur Jang should be dismissed from all his posts, but he thought that 'if the Shah insisted very strongly the two Governments should be content with his dismissal from the Ministry of War and from his place on the Council'. As regards to the removal of Sheikh Fazlullah from Teheran, the Russian Government considered it advisable to drop the matter as any action against him would provoke his large number of followers and discontent would prevail among them. As regard point No. 3, the Russian Government maintained that to give the Shah exclusive right to choose the members of the Cabinet would be dangerous. Moreover, several competent men would not find themselves prepared to hold any office until and unless they were sure of the support of the two Governments. However, to meet the objection of the British Government, the Russian Government agreed to remodel point No. 3 as follows:

1. Ibid, p. 731.
'The constitution of a Cabinet composed of persons who would be suggested to Shah by the British and Russian legations'. As regards point No. 4, the Russian Government considered that the composition of Council of Empire was an important as the composition of Cabinet and suggested that the same procedure should be followed in both cases and objected to the British proposal that recommendation would be given at the request of the Shah. As to the point No. 5, which dealt with the general amnesty, the Russian Government proposed that 'favour should not be extended to those who had committed crimes against the common law and all that governments need secure in such cases would be that accused should receive an impartial trial'. As regards the point No. 7, the Russian Government proposed to pay her share of advance when the provisions of points No. 1-6 had been implemented by the Shah, whereas the British Government would pay her share when all her conditions had been fulfilled by the Shah. The Russian Government agreed to abandon point No. 8. 

On April 4, 1909, the reply of the British Government was communicated to M. Isvolsky. The British Government agreed with Russian Government to abandon the idea of insisting that the Shah should issue order for the removal of Sheikh Fazlullah from Teheran. His Majesty's Government also consented not to raise any objection against the staying of Amir Bahadur Jang at

1. Ibid, pp. 731-732.
the Palace, if the Shah insisted much. As regards point Nos. 3 and 4, the British Government stated that it would be better to submit a list of competent persons to the Shah privately. This list was to be both for the Cabinet as well as for the Council; the Shah at the same time be informed that if unsuitable persons were selected for the Cabinet and Council, no money would be provided to him. Point No. 5, regarding the general amnesty was accepted by the British Government without any alternation. As to the point No. 7, the British Government informed the Russian Government to act according to her decisions so far as her own share of advance was concerned but made it clear that the British Government would not give any money in advance until the Assembly had approved the whole loan. The modified proposals of the British Government were accepted by the Russian Government. A memorandum to be communicated to Shah by both the Governments was drawn up by the Russian Government on April 8, 1909. The agreed principles between the two governments formed the basis of the memorandum. The Russian Government suggested that along with memorandum a serious warning should also be given to the Shah to the effect that if he did not accept it entirely, he would cease to receive any advice from the two Governments and should be left alone without any support either from Russia or Britain. Some minor changes were proposed by the

1. Ibid, p. 732.
British Government in the memorandum. The Russian Government accepted these changes on April 18, 1909, which were proposed by Sir E. Grey. On April 19, 1909, Sir E. Grey instructed G. Barclay to proceed with the joint Anglo-Russian representation without any delay. On April 22, 1909, the representatives of the two Governments communicated the joint Anglo-Russian Memorandum to the Shah. It was read to the Shah by Sir G. Barclay. The Shah listened with close attention and promised to communicate the reply through his Foreign Minister at the earliest possible date.

During the period, when the British and Russian Governments were engaged in exchanging notes to reach an understanding regarding a policy which could be jointly followed in Persia; the Constitutional movement was gaining momentum and spreading rapidly throughout the country. Most of the provinces and cities declared themselves to be on the side of the Constitution. Following the example of Tabriz and Isfahan, the people of Resbt, Turbat-i-Haidari, Hamadan, Shiraz, Bander-i-Abbas, Bushire and Meshed revolted against the autocratic regime of Mohammed Ali Shah and demanded a Constitution. The revolutionaries were very cautious in their dealings with the foreigners. They tried to

1. Cd. 4733, No. 193, p. 96. Sir E. Grey's telegram to Sir A. Nicolson regarding the proposed changes.
2. Ibid, No. 194, p. 96.
3. Ibid, No. 198, p. 98.
avoid any action on their part which would provide a pretext to any foreign power to intervene in the internal affairs of Persia. Consequently, no revolution ever had been carried out in the world with such order and restraint as was theirs. But Russia was, undoubtedly, against the revolutionaries and awaited her chance for intervention. Whenever, during the constitutional struggle, a town or port within the easy approaches of Russia declared herself on the side of the national movement and revolted against the authority of the Shah, the Russian troops or warships were despatched there on the pretext of maintaining order or protecting the lives of the foreigners although the nationalists maintained good order and no danger was caused to the lives and properties of the Europeans. On March 31, 1909, the Russian Consular guard at Astrabad was increased by 25 men. When, the nationalists of Astrabad arrested the Karguzar on April 1, 1909, the Russian Consul intervened and got him released. The Karguzar was 'suspected of having accompanied the Russian Consul to the Jaferbai Turkoman's camp to induce them to upset the local Assembly'. Later on, the Turkomans surrounded the city; the nationalists resisted them and fighting began. The Russian Consul requested his Government to send more troops to

2. Browne op. cit., p. 296.
3. Cd. 4733, Enclosure in No. 147, p. 72.
Astrabad. On April 7, 1909, the Russian Government decided to send a gun-boat in the gulf of Astrabad. On March 3, the Russian Government ordered to move a few troops to Baku and to the frontier at Julfa and sent fifty cossacks to Resbt to protect the Russian Consulate there. On March 4, 1909, the Russian Government again decided to send sixty or seventy soldiers with two mitrailleuses to Enzeli and Resbt vessel conveying the contingent were to be escorted by 'war-vessel, with orders to Captain to lend armed assistance for the disembarkation in case revolutionaries oppose landing. The Russian Government decided to reinforce the Russian Consulate at Meshed on April 6, 1909. The Russian detachment reached Meshed on April 26, 1909. The detachment consisted of six Turkoman levies under four officers, thirty gunners with two Maxims, and seventy-five Cossacks.

It was not only Russia which despatched troops to Persia and intervened the national affairs of that country. The British Government also did the same in the southern part of Persia but this was 'undertaken very unwillingly, and was rigorously limited both in extent and duration. When the nationalists

1. Ibid, Enclosure in No. 283, p. 124.
2. Ibid, No. 151, p. 73.
5. Ibid, No. 148, p. 72.
7. Cd. 4733, Nos. 116, 117, 118, p. 65 also Cd. 5120, Enclosure in No. 41, p. 20.
captured Bunder-i-Abbas and annexed the Custom House in the name of the Constitution, the British Government grew alarmed and consequently a British gun-boat was sent to Bunder-i-Abbas on March 18, 1909. Instructions, were, however, that it should stay at Bunder-i-Abbas if his Majesty’s Consul considers that British subjects are in danger.

Blue jackets will, of course, only be landed in case of extreme necessity. On March 20, the British Consul demanded the custom revenues from the nationalists. The Kargusar who was appointed as the Deputy Governor by the nationalists was anxious to cooperate with the British Government so that any quarrel between the nationalists and the British could be avoided. The majority of the population of the town was also keenly desirous of having friendly relations with the British and was in favour of accepting the British demand, but ‘a few Laris and bad characters influenced their Counsils adversely’.

The Kargusar, however, enquired ‘whether His Majesty’s Government wished that the whole of the customs duties should be handed over, and asked ‘whether we should not be satisfied with the daily payment to the Consulate of half of the receipt’. The British Consul at Bunder-i-Abbas recommended to Sir G. Barclay

1. Cd. 4733, Nos. 116, 117, 118, p. 65, also Cd. 5120, Enclosure in No. 41, p. 20.
2. Cd. 5120, Enclosure in No. 41, p. 20.
that it would be desirable in the interest of tranquility 'to leave the Nationalists a portion of the customs receipts for the payment of men in arms.' Sir J. Barclay agreed to this proposal and authorised Captain Shakespear to use his discretion in the matter. Next followed the rise of Bushire. The British Consul-General at Bushire suggested to have war-ship in the waters of Bushire or within easy call to protect the British interest there, though the Consul-General accepted that there was 'no reason to apprehend any deliberate molestation of foreigners'. On March 20, 1909, Sir E. Grey asked the Admiralty to send a gun-boat to Bushire to give protection to the foreigners if necessity arose. On March 23, 1909, Sayyid Murtasa Ahremi took over peacefully the control of the government on behalf of the Nationalists. Captain Trevor, who was incharge of the Consulate at Bushire in the absence of Major Cox advised the Sayyid not to annex the customes as the revenues were pledged to the British. Sir O. Barclay had no objection to the customs being annexed by the Nationalists provided that a monthly instalment which would cover the interest on British Government loan as well as the interest on the Imperial Bank of Persia's advances, was paid by the Nationalists into the Imperial Bank of Persia regularly. On the same date, Sayyid Murteza took over

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1. Cd. 4733, No. 171, p. 83, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 689.
2. Cd. 4733, No. 120, p.66.
3. Ibid, No. 125, p. 67, also No. 171, p. 83.
4. Ibid, No. 129, p. 67, also No. 171, p. 83.
5. Ibid, No. 171, p. 83.
the Customs. On March 29, 1909, Sayyid Murteza informed the British Consul-General at Bushire that 'to preserve the undoubted interests of His Majesty's Government and the British nation is one of the first duties of the Nationalists. In order to satisfy the Residency on the question of Customs receipts, Sayyid Murteza proposed that 'the Nationalist party should retain for daily expenses in connection with the maintenance of the force of riflemen a sum of 500 tomans a day, and that the balance should be placed with some trustworthy Persian merchant to be selected by both parties and should remain in trust with him for three months. During that period the Nationalist party should defer giving their final reply. In the meantime they would ascertain their duty from other centres of the Nationalist movement or His Majesty's Government should produce documents in proof of their claim'. Sir Q. Barclay attached great importance to the regular payment of monthly instalments and on March 30, 1909 telegraphically informed the British Consul-General to warn Sayyid Murteza that in case of non-payment of instalment, the British Government would take measures to secure the payment. Sayyid Murteza continuously ignored the communications from the British Resident at Bushire.

1. Ibid, No. 171, p. 85.
2. Ibid, No. 139, pp. 69-70.
3. Ibid, No. 140, p. 70.
Consequently, no agreement could be reached regarding the customs receipts. In the meantime, on April 9, 1909, the Tangistani riflemen broke loose and commenced looting the bazar and terrorising the inhabitants of the town. Goods belonging to the British merchants were also looted and a dangerous situation arose. The British Consul-General was authorised to land a force of blue-jackets if necessary, but was advised to notify to the people that this step was taken only for the protection of British subjects and foreigners. On April 10, 1909, 100 British soldiers landed. There was no opposition to their landing. Due to the apprehension aroused by the conduct of Sayyid Hurteza and his Tangistani riflemen, the inhabitants of the town closed the bazar and wanted to take bast en masse at the British Consulate. Sayyid Hurteza had become so unpopular that the chief Nationalists as well as Royalists demanded his removal from Bushire. The British Consul-General asked for

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1. A number of Tangistani riflemen were introduced in Bushire by Sayyid Hurteza. With the help of these riflemen, the Sayyid took over the control of the government on behalf of the Nationalists—see Cd. 4733, No. 129, p. 67.

2. Cd. 4733, No. 129, p. 70.


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permission to turn him out from the town, but Sir E. Grey refused on the ground that the expulsion of Sayyid 'would go beyond the object for which troops have been landed, that is, the protection of the lives and property of British subjects and residents of other nationalities'. The Sayyid did not keep his promise regarding the payment of customs revenues. On April 8, 1909, Sayyid Mirteza 'forced the merchants, in whose names the receipts had been deposited, to withdraw and pay over to him the balance'. Thus the entire income since the 23rd March, amounting to some 20,000 tomans was seized. Sir G. Barclay authorised Major Cox to use the blue-jacket at the custom-house to prevent any more seizure of custom receipts, if necessary, by force. However, as a result of the restoration of satisfactory situation, Sir G. Barclay suggested on May 13, 1909, the withdrawal of the blue-jacket from Bushire which was approved by Sir E. Grey on May 14, 1909.

Now, it seems better to return to the extents of Tabriz-the stronghold of the Nationalists. As stated above, the city was besieged by the Royalist forces and the Shah intended 'to reduce Tabreez to starvation by forming a blockade round the town'. As a result of that fuel was almost unobtainable and the

1. Ibid, No. 181, p. 92.
2. Ibid, No. 183, p. 93.
4. Cd. 5120, No. 6, p. 2.
5. Ibid, No. 12, p. 3.
prices of everything rose high by January 13, 1909. On February 7, 1909, the British Consul-General, Mr. Wratislaw reported to Sir Barclay about the situation of the town as follows:

'Tabrees is now practically beleaguered. No provisions can enter the town, the fruit-trees in the gardens are being cut down for fuel, and though there is at present sufficient supply of corn for the food of the population the pinch is being severely felt in various ways'. Financial difficulties also posed a question before the Nationalists. It was generally believed, reported the British Consul-General, that 'the Royalist will shortly try to take the town by assault', however, he added that it was doubtful whether they could achieve success, but if the blockade was continued for two or three months, the Nationalists might be forced to surrender. On February 11, 1909, bread was reported to be scarcely available in the town. The situation grew from bad to worse and the great suffering among the poorer class was reported by the British Consul-General on March 25, 1909. Rahim Khan stopped and destroyed the mails from Europe. The British commercial interests suffered much and a large number of foreign imports were plundered by Rahim Khan. On March 28, 1909, the British Consul-General sent a telegram to Sir G. Barclay to the effect that 'in three weeks at the most the

2. Ibid, Enclosure in No. 112, pp. 63-64.
3. Ibid, No. 74, p. 45.
4. Ibid, No. 131, p. 68.
5. Ibid, No. 133, p. 68.
provisions in Tabreez will be completely exhausted. Several
death from starvation were reported on March 30, 1909. Danger
to the foreign nationals at Tabreez began to be seriously
apprehended. The British Government grew alarmed and, therefore,
Sir E. Grey instructed on March 31, 1909 to Sir G. Barclay to
warn the Shah that he would be held responsible in case of any
damage done to the British Consulate or British lives and
properties at Tabriz. The British Government also requested the
Russian Government to administer similar warning to the Shah.
Warnings in the above sense had already been given on February
21, and March 29, 1909, by Sir G. Barclay to the Persian Govern­
ment. The Persian Government responded and on March 19, 1909,
Saad-ed-Dawleh informed Sir G. Barclay that necessary orders
for the safeguarding of the British lives and property had been
issued to the Commanders of the Shah’s troops besieging Tabriz.
At the same time, he informed the British Minister at Teheran
that the Persian Government would guarantee the security of and
safety of the British lives and property at Tabriz so long as
the British Consulate at Tabriz and the British subjects there
did not support the insurgents and did not in any way associate
with them who were defying the troops. However, the situation

1. Ibid, No. 137, p. 69.
2. Ibid, No. 142, p. 71.
5. Ibid, No. 167, Enclosure 1, 2 and 3, in No. 167, pp. 77-78.
deteriorated rapidly and the scarcity of food stuff in the town compelled the foreign Consuls to ask their Legations at Teheran to send them 171 kharvans of flour—seven for the use of British subjects and remainder for the other foreign subjects. The representatives of the five nations (British, French, Russian, American and Turkish) submitted notes to the above effect to the Persian Government on April 12, 1909. On April 14, 1909, the British representative at Teheran was instructed to insist on the Persian Government either allowing the foreigners in Tabreez to leave the town, or allowing sufficient supplies of food to enter it in case of necessity. On April 16, 1909, the Persian Government instructed Ain-ed-Dowleh to facilitate the departure of foreign subjects and to ensure their safety, and suggest that they should now leave the town but refused to allow the introduction of food into the town. Both the British and Russian subjects however, refused to leave the city. On April 17, 1909, the British Consul-General reported that the quantity of food was much smaller than he had first been given to understand, and that the situation of the foreign nationals was very critical. He further mentioned certain proposals put forward by the Nationalists for an armistic and for which they begged the support of the British and Russian Governments. On April 18, 1909, the British Consul reported that,

+ On April 11, a meeting was held at the British Consulate-General. The French, Turkish, Russian and United States Consuls attended the meeting. It was decided that the Consuls should ask their Legations to send them flour.

1. Ibid, No. 166, pp. 76-77.
2. Ibid, No. 190, p. 94 and No. 190, p. 95.
3. Ibid, No. 190, p. 95.
'Bread was 'very scarce today'. On April 19, 1909, the British Foreign Secretary thought it advisable that the British and Russian Governments should 'insist on their Consuls leaving Tabriz and taking with them any other foreign subjects who wish to leave the town', where as the Russian Government was considering the advisability of 'threatening the Shah that unless certain quantities of food were allowed to enter Tabriz, they would themselves take steps to introduce the same, and would, if necessary, employ force to effect that object'. However, the British Government had no objection to Russia Government's desire to send a force to Tabriz. According to the communique published in 'Official Messenger', the population of the town intended to plunder the Armenian quarters and the Russian and British Consulates at Tabriz, in search of food. The lead of the movement, the communique stated, calculated that by plundering the British and Russian Consulates or in an extreme case, by the murder of one of the Consuls, the Russian Government would necessarily be compelled to intervene which would delay the surrender of Tabriz to the Shah's troops as well as make it possible for the revolutionaries to hide themselves. Under these circumstances, the Russian Government decided on April 20, 1909,

1. Ibid, No. 200, p. 96.
2. Ibid, No. 204, p. 99.
3. Ibid, No. 199, p. 98.
to send a force to Tabriz with instructions to facilitate entry into the town of the necessary provisions; to protect Consulates and foreign subjects, and to assist those who wish to leave the town to do so. On the same date, the British and Russian representatives at Teheran, called on the Shah and handed over to him the following note:

The situation of our fellow subjects at Tabreez is serious in the extreme. It seems that the food in the town is so scarce that the people are desperate, and there is reason to apprehend that an attack on the British and Russian Consulates General is in contemplation in order to secure provisions.

In these circumstances, the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia are compelled to point out to your Majesty that the two Governments will hold him personally responsible for any harm which may come to their fellow-subjects and the Consules-General in Tabreez.

We have sought an audience today in order to indicate to your Majesty the only way of preventing the deplorable outrage threatened, and in view of the impossibility in which your Majesty's Government finds itself of protecting our subjects at Tabreez, we are compelled to insist on the immediate necessity of pacifying the population of the town by granting a trace and by promptly taking the necessary measures of the introduction of

1. Cd. 4733, Enclosure in No. 282, P. 123, Also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., pp. 708-709.
food for the starving populace'. The Shah replied that 'he had for nine months been endeavouring to get mastery over the Tabreez rebels and for that purpose he had besieged the town and stopped the entry of the supplies. They were now in sore straits—way he at this juncture to allow supplies in and thus undo all the work which had been done by his forces?' In reply Sir J. Barclay said that the two Governments only desired a declaration for temporary cessation of hostilities and permission for introduction of limited quantity of provision in the town, so that the danger to the Consulates and foreign nationals could be avoided. The Shah expressed his inability to understand the refusal of foreign consuls and nationals to leave the town to which the two representatives replied that such a course was out of question under present circumstances. The Shah, however, agreed to send a telegram to Ain-ed-Dowleb to stop fighting for six days (i.e. upto 26th April, 1909). He also instructed Ain-ed-Dowleb to permit the introduction of provisions approximately required for that period. The Shah, however, made it clear that the introduction of food would be allowed only on the condition that the nationalists would not attack the Royalists during the interval. As the result of the armistice granted by the Shah, the Russian Government decided not to send the Russian


force to Tabriz, but their troops were however held in readiness at Julfa. The local Ajuman (Assembly) was informed about the armistice and Sattar Khan ordered to stop firing immediately, but the Royalist did not observe the armistice. Ain-ed-Dowleh stated that he had received no orders from the Shah to grant the armistice. The decision of Russia to send her troops was a source of great anxiety and Taki Zadeh opened negotiation with the Shah on 24th April 1909. He urged the Shah to come to terms with the Nationalists so that Russian occupation might be avoided. However, after some discussion, he agreed to permit one road to be opened for the introduction of provisions. The new development in the situation provided a chance to the Russian Government to move her forces from Julfa to Tabriz. In the meantime, the two representatives at Teheran demanded that the armistice should be extended for an additional thirty-six hours as Ain-ed-Dowleh had not received the Shah's instructions in time. The Shah assured that orders had been issued but refused to extend the time limit. Despite the joint representations and repeated assurances from the Shah, Samad Khan's irregular troops attacked and occupied Khatib, and Royalist army officer opposed vigorously.

2. Ibid., No. 216, p. 102. See Enclosure in No. 246, p. 110, also British and Foreign State Papers, p. 700.
3. Ibid., No. 211, p. 221.
7. Ibid., No. 228, p. 105. Later on, it was known that Khatib was not actually captured - see No. 235, p. 107.
the introduction of provision into the town. Consequently on 26th April, 1909 the Shah telegraphically instructed all his generals to facilitate the free introduction of provisions in the town with no restriction as to quantity or time, and ordered 'a complete cessation of hostilities'. It was the direct result of the Russian-British representation and the Russian decision to send troops to Tabriz. The Shah's compliance came too late, for the Russian Government had already ordered her troops to move on from Julfa to Tabriz on April 23, 1909. It consisted of four squadrons of Cossacks, three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a company of sappers. It numbered some 4,000 men. The instruction given to the commander General Snarsky, were that 'he was to open the road so as to permit the introduction of food supplies, but that he was to abstain from any interference in the differences between the two contending parties, and in no wise to assume any administrative duties. He was to give the necessary protection to the foreign consulates and institutions and to all foreigners residing in the town'. The Russian force was to be withdrawn as soon the situation had returned to normalcy. The Shah's instructions of April 25, 1909 to all his generals at Tabriz to allow the introduction of food supply into the town and declaration by him of complete cessation of hostilities made the Nationalist at Tabriz much hopeful, and a deputation was

1. Ibid., Nos. 236 and 237, p. 107, Nos. 241, 242 and 245, p. 109, also Cd 5120, No. 42, p. 23.

2. Ibid., Nos. 231 and 232, p. 106, No. 252, p. 113, see Jooch and Temporley, Vol 4, Part I, p. 735, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op.cit., p. 702.
sent by them to meet the Russian and British Consuls there to beg the postponement of the advance of the Russian troops in the light of the Shah's instructions to his generals. But, the British Consul-General was of the opinion that it should proceed on its march, though it would be advisable that it should not enter the town. This was agreed by M. Isvolsky, who informed Sir A. Nicolson on April 27, 1909 that on a certain number of troops would be allowed to enter the town in order to provide guards for banks and for foreign institutions and for any Consulate. The remainder would encamp outside the city. On April 1909, 180 Russian soldiers reached the Abur bridge and on the following morning entered the town. The royalist armies began to disperse. On April 29, 1909, Sattar Khan called on the British Consul-General 'to express his profound gratitude to Great Britain'. By May 2, 1909, there were 269 Russian soldiers in the town, while there were 4,000 men under the command of Snarsky. The postal service was resumed on the 1st May, 1909. However, the Russian forces compelled the forces of the Shah to raise the siege of Tabriz and rescued the city from being captured by the Royalist forces. The raise of the siege was a welcome relief to the Nationalists. Jamsame-Sultanah and Sirdar Assad sent telegram to all the Legations at Tehran.

3. Ibid., No. 262, p.116.
4. Ibid., No. 262, p.116.
5. Ibid., No. 267, p.117, also see Cd. 5120, Enclosure in No.41, p. 17.
expressing their gratitude for the measures taken to save Tabriz, but asking at the same time, that this Powers should now interfere no further in their internal affairs.' They disclosed their intention to meet on Tehran to force the Shah to fulfill the promises he made to his people.

Now to return to the Anglo-Russian Joint memorandum communicated to the Shah on April 22, 1909. A meeting was held at Bagh-i-Shah from April 24, 1909 to April 27, 1909 to discuss the Russo-British joint representation of April 22, 1909. Saad-ed-Dowleh strongly advocated the complete acceptance of the programme put forward by the two powers. He met with stiff opposition and incurred the Shah's displeasure. On April 29, 1909, the Shah dismissed the Grand Vizier and Amir Sahadur Jang from their post in the Cabinet and appointed his uncle and father-in-law - Saib-es-Sultanah as Prime Minister and Minister of War. He was an obstinate reactionary. The representatives of Russia and Great Britain informed the Shah through Saad-ed-Dowleh that the appointment of Saib-es-Sultanah was altogether unacceptable to them. The message had no effect on the Shah and he dismissed Saad-ed-Dowleh too on April 30, 1909. Believing this step to be due to the firm stand he had taken during the few days in favour of the Shah's accepting our programme, and feeling that his dismissal, coupled with Saib-es-Sultanah appointment was calculated to cast ridicule on the representation, of the two Powers, we decided to make a strong protest, and despatched

1. Cd. 4733, No.266, p.117.
the two dragomans to Bagh-i-Shah to state to the Shah that unless Naib-es-Sultanéh was at once dismissed and Saad-es-Dowleh reinstated we should telegraph our Governments that measures taken by the Shah showed clearly that His Majesty had rejected our advice', reported Sir L. Barclay to Sir E. Grey. The Shah replied to the two dragomans that 'Naib-es-Sultanéh would not be in the Cabinet but he was determined not to have Saad-es-Dowleh' M. Baranowsky the Russian dragoman said that in case of his failure of reinstating Saad-es-Dowleh and dismissing Naib-es-Sultanéh by tomorrow, the two Representatives would telegraph accordingly to their Governments. The Shah replied that brute force was being used by the two representatives to accept their proposal and 'he apparently was no longer the Shah'. He added that he would not yield in this matter and informed the two dragomans to choose between himself and Saad-es-Dowleh. On May 1, 1909, the Shah informed British representative at Tehran through his private secretary Hashmat-es-Dowleh that he had accepted the Anglo-Russian programme in principle. On May 4, 1909, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs officially informed the British and Russian representatives at Tehran that the Shah had accepted the advice tendered to him by the two Ministers on April 22, 1909 but desired to seek clarification on certain points.


2. Cd 5120, Enclosure in No.41, p.15.

3. Cd 4733, No.270, p.118 and also see Cd.5120, No.25, p.8.
On May 5, 1909, the Shah issued a rescript promising the restoration of constitutional regime. July 19, 1909 was fixed for election which would be held according to an electoral law which was to be published shortly. The firman of the Shah promising a limited constitution was well received by the nationalists at Tabris but the nationalists at Isfahan and other places had not reacted favourably. They declared that they would be satisfied with less than the old constitution. The east revolutions captured Karvin on 5th May, 1909. The Shah's firman had made no effect on them and they were intending to march on Teheran. On 7th May, 1909, Samas, who had a force of about 4,000 strong declared that nothing less than the restoration of the old constitution could satisfy him. He again announced his intention to march on Teheran. In the meanwhile, the Shah hastily proceeded to discuss the joint Russo-British programme and a meeting was arranged at the British Legation on 7th May, 1909 in which the representatives of the two Powers and delegates from the Shah participated. The programme was discussed point by point. The Russian and British representatives insisted that Nasr-ul-Mulk and Saad-ed-Dowleh should be included in the Cabinet. They also communicated privately two lists of persons for the Cabinet and Council respectively. The delegates from the Shah tried to induce

1. Cd 4733, No. 271, p. 118, also see Cd 5120, No. 25, p. 6, Enclosure in No. 41, p. 16.
5. Cd 4733, No. 275, p. 119.
the two representative to withdraw the name of Saad-ed-Dowlah from the list but in vain. Next day, May 8, 1909, the Shah again attempted to avoid the reinstatement of Saad-ed-Dowlah. His last attempt also failed. The Persian Minister in Britain was instructed to persuade the British Foreign Office not to insist on the appointment of Saad-ed-Dowlah but Air Ha dinge, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for British Foreign Affairs replied that he regarded the inclusion of Nasr-ul-Mulk and Saad-ed-Dowlah in the 'Cabinet as a sine qua non', consequently, Saad-ed-Dowlah was reinstated on May 9, 1909 and was requested by the Shah to form the Cabinet. On May 10, 1909, the Shah issued two rescripts. By the first decree, the Shah ordered the reopening of the Parliament 'in accordance with that very same constitution without the slightest change'. The other decree dealt with the general amnesty. The Shah granted amnesty to all persons charged with political offenses. The Cabinet formed was also in accordance with the Russian-British advice, when all this had been done then Sir Dward Bray announced that if the Nationalists were not satisfied with the surrender on the part of the government of the Shah Britain could not be responsible.

3. Cd. 4733, No. 278, p.120. See Cd. 5120, No. 40, p.13. Also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p.725.
in any way, and no further effort would be made on behalf of the
"nationalists. He advised Sir J. Barclay to maintain an attitude
of strict neutrality in case of dissatisfaction of nationality.
But the Nationalists at Isfahan and Reash had no confidence in
their ruler. They knew the treacherous and revengeful nature of
the Shah too well to trust him at all. This was especially true
while the Shah was surrounded by the old reactionary gang and
their tool the formidable Colonel Liahkhoff. Moreover, they feared
that their position would never again be strong enough to enable
them to exert their pressure upon the Shah and to compel him to
yield. The prospect of his being furnished with a foreign loan,
also alarmed the Nationalists. They thought that a loan would
stimulate the Shah to crush them. Moreover, a loan would increase
the hold of foreign powers upon their country, which was, however,
quite undesirable to them. The policy of Russia was a source
of greater anxiety to the Nationalists. They had no faith in
Russia and were convinced that she had an eye upon northern
Persia. To achieve her goal they thought, Russia was using the
Shah as her tool. Their fear about Russia's intentions had,
undoubtedly, some justification. Not taking into consideration
the part played by the Russian agents which enabled the Shah to
destroy the first Kajlis and the Constitution, the recent events
were sufficient to convince the Nationalists of the ill-intention
and evil designs of Russia on their country. The army which was

II, op. cit., p. 419.
sent to Tabriz was behaving rather as an army of occupation in a conquered and subject country than as a simple relief expedition.

The Russian army was sent to Tabriz to provide protection to the foreigners, whose lives and property were alleged to be in danger due to the shortage of food stuff in the town and the intention of the Nationalists to loot them in search of food or even to kill one of the consuls, in order to achieve the Russian intervention. First of all, it was doubtful whether the Nationalists ever intended to do such a mischief. According to David Fraser the Nationalists never intended to do so and would have died of starvation rather than desiring an intervention. However, Russia despatched her troops but instructed the commander neither to interfere in the internal struggle of Persians nor to assume any administrative duties. He was to give only necessary protection to the foreigners. But the Russian Commander, General Snarsky did not follow the instructions and pursued his own policy. The town was transformed into a military camp. The population as well as the Nasmiyya police were disarmed, women were molested. Some Nationalists were arrested and their houses were blown up. The two Nationalist chiefs, Sattar Khan and Baker Khan hastened to take refuge in the Turkish Consulate. On one previous occasion (May 9, 1903) when a Russian rifleman named Petrenko was slightly wounded by a stray shot, the General took drastic measures and imposed a fine of 10,000 rupias on the town to be paid within 48 hours. The patrols in the town were increased and all barricades made to the Russian Government as to the conduct of their General. The Russian Government accepted, though not officially, that General Snarsky had been a little too hasty, and sent renewed instructions that he should keep strictly within prescribed limits. The British Government could not support these measures taken by Russians in Tabriz but it was the need of the time to be friendly with Russia, therefore, Sir A. Nicolson, the British Minister at St. Petersburg recommended to his Government not to bring 'the bow too tightly over these Persian question!' He admitted that General Snarsky had been most troublesome and had gone much too far on certain occasions but suggested that British should not break off her relations with Russia on that account, as he felt that it would be risky to be isolated.


To return, however, to the two Nationalist armies which were now preparing to advance to the capital. The Isfahan army consisted almost entirely of 'Jahshiyar.' Their leader was Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sardar Assad, the brother of Samsam joined him on May 6, 1909. The Sardar had lately returned from his European tours. The Recht army was being commanded by Sipahdar, Mohammad Vali Khan. His sympathies with the Nationals led him to resign his post of Sipahdar when sent by Mohammad Ali Shah to crush the revolutionaries at Tabriz. The two armies aimed at marching merely towards Teheran and depositing the Shah. This was, however, not acceptable to Britain and Russia. The Russian representative at Teheran instructed his consul at Recht to persuade the Sipahdar to hold up the advance along the east Teheran road. The Russian Consul's efforts failed. Sir O. Barclay suggested a joint Anglo-Russian remonstrance as the best means of effecting a reconciliation. Sir C. Grey approved the suggestion on 13th May 1909. He instructed Sir O. Barclay to point out to Sipahdar that the Nationalists ought certainly to be satisfied with the Shah's decrees, and urge him to accept them. The British Minister was also authorized to inform Sipahdar that in the even of the Shah trying to evade the fulfilment of his pledges, and not putting into execution his promises of reforms, the two representatives will give His Majesty neither support nor sympathy. In the meantime

1. Ibid., p. 298, Cd. 5120, No. 43, p. 23.
the Russian Minister made a second communication to Sipahdar through a secretary of his Legation to the effect that as the Shah had granted all the demands of the Nationalists, the revolutionaries should not advance towards Tehran, to which the Sipahdar replied that the revolutionaries were beyond his control. Thereupon, the Russian secretary advised him to return to Resht and entirely dissociate himself from the revolutionaries. On the one side, Russian Government was exerting her pressure upon Sipahdar not to march towards Tehran, on the other hand, she was contemplating the despatch of Russian troops to guard the Resht - Tehran road. Sir Nicolson, the British Minister at St. Petersburg opposed the Russian Government proposal of sending the troops as he thought that the road was open. Moreover the dispatch of troops would be equivalent to an intervention. The Russian Government thereupon, decided to keep a Russian force alert at Saku to be sent to reinforce the Cossack guard at Resht in case of emergency. It was also deemed necessary to inform the Resht revolutionaries that in case of the road being interrupted, the force would be landed in Persia. On the one side, Russia was determined to send more troops to Persia, on the other the Nationalists demanded the immediate withdrawal of even those Russian troops that were sent to Tabriz. On May 17, 1909, the Persian Cabinet received urgent messages from the Nationalists of Tabriz, Jovin, Resht, and Tehran to secure the withdrawal of the Russian forces. The Nationalists doubted that the troops had come

1. Ibid. No. 4, p. 1.
2. Ibid. No. 19, p. 6.
3. Od. 5120, No. 14, pp. 3-4.
with the consent of the Shah and their continued presence was an
obstacle in the way of reconciliation. However, in the meantime,
a Committee of Nationalist leaders of the capital had been formed,
which, with the approval of Sipahdar and Nationalists of Tabriz,
formulated and presented certain demands to the Persian Government,
of which the followings were the most important:

2. Disarmm: of the mughal at Teheran.
3. Royal firman to the effect that the old constitution
in its entirety, that is, the original Fundamental Law
of December 30, 1906 together with the Supplement of
October 7, 1907, had been restored.
4. Evacuation of Persian territories occupied by Russian
troops in the northern part of Persia.2

These demands, with the exception of that regarding the
continuous presence of Amir Bahadur Jang at the Court, were not
supported by Russian and British representatives at Teheran, on
the ground that these did not come under the joint Anglo-Russian
advice communicated to the Shah on April 22, 1909, which had
already been accepted by the Shah. However, on May 20, 1909, the
Shah issued a decree, making it quite clear that he had re-
established the very same old Constitution.3 The acceptance of joint
Anglo-Russian advice by the Shah and continued Russo-British

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1. C.I.G. No. 5120, No. 16, p. 4.
2. For details, please see C.I.G. No. 5120, No. 45, pp. 24-25.
3. Ibid., No. 45, pp. 24-25, also Browne, op. cit., p. 302. According
to Browne who quotes 'outlet's correspondent, these demands
were formulated by Sipahdar on May 17, 1909.
3. Ibid., Enclosure, No. 86, p. 37.
pressure upon the Nationalists to come to an understanding with him created a better atmosphere for improvement and it seemed that the evil days of Persia had come near their end. The Bakhtiyyar Khans in view of the Shah's concessions, decided to disband their forces and took measures to this effect, but the false report that the Shah's forces at Kashan had been ordered to march on Isfahan, alarmed them, and they recalled the 200 horsemen who had left the town. It was expected that the Khans would leave for their homes with the exception of Sardar Assad who proposed to stay there till the arrival of the new Governor, and thereafter, to proceed to Teheran for the elections. Had General Anarsky been shown enough in handling the situation at Tabriz, the joint Anglo-Russian continued pressure on both the parties would have helped in solving the Persian problem. But the drastic measures of the Russian General, ultimately compelled the important Nationalist leaders as well as several hundred nationalist volunteers to take refuge in the Turkish Consulate on May 31, 1909. This changed the situation completely. Great resentment prevailed amongst the nationalists throughout the country by the arbitrary behaviour of the Russian troops at Tabriz. The Nationalists Committee at Teheran, which had put forward certain demands to be fulfilled by the Shah to satisfy the Nationalists dissolved itself on June 1, 1909 on the

1. Ibid, Inclosure in No. 90, pp. 45-46.
ground that the Ministers failed to comply with their reasonable demands. Probably, it was a protest against the tyrannical behaviour of the Russian soldiers at Tabriz rather than against the non-compliance of their demands. The atmosphere could not be cooled even by offering the Governorship of Gilan and Masanderan to Dr. Jahdar on June 8, 1909, who, however, promised to leave Karvin for Esht shortly but nationalist forces at Karvin intended to remain under arms until the meeting of the National Assembly.

The withholding of the Shah's consent to approve the Electoral Law presented to him on May 13, 1909, for his signature, added fuel to the fire of resentment. Meanwhile, the undesirable loan contract between Russia and Persia was agreed upon which created an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion. The Ministry of Baad-ed-Dowleh failed to create confidence amongst the Nationalists. The placing of the police of Tehran under Colonel Liakhoff and his Brigade, as well as the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor of Tabriz, on May 29, 1909, were very much disliked by

1. Ibid, quoted by Browne, op. cit., p. 304.
2. Cd. 5120, No. 49, p. 27, and Enclosure in No. 90, p. 45.
3. Ibid, Enclosure in No. 90, p. 46.

† The Shah, however, agreed on June 17, 1909, to withdraw his objections; and affixed his signature on it on June 30, 1909. It was finally promulgated on July 1, 1909— for detail see Cd. 5120, No. 65, p. 31, No. 89, pp. 42-43 and Enclosure in No. 190, pp. 93-99.

++ A copy of the draft loan contract was communicated to Sir Barclay by Russian Minister at Tehran on June 15, 1909, which has been reproduced in Cd. 5120, Enclosure in No. 91, p. 50.
the Nationalists. Both were reactionary but the British agents in Persia, approved of the measures taken by the Persian Government in this connection. The gulf between the Shah and the Nationalists increased day by day and at last, on June 17, 1909, Sardar Assad informed the British Consul at Isfahan that he was leaving for Teheran with his men in order to enforce the Constitution by a Cabinet composed of Ministers of liberal views. It was reported that he had 1,000 armed men and one mountain gun at his disposal. 3. Barclay immediately despatched a message to Mr. Ibrahim, the British Consul at Isfahan, to this effect that he should point out to the Sardar that as the preparatory work for the re-establishment of a Parliamentary regime was proceeding satisfactorily, therefore, the measure which Sardar was going to take would complicate the situation. In the meantime, Sardar had left for Teheran. Mr. Ibrahim, therefore, forwarded the message of the British Minister to him by letter. The march of Sardar Assad towards Teheran greatly alarmed the Court and Cabinet. One June 21, 1909, Saad-ed-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister of Persia, talked about the serious nature of the situation with the British Minister at Teheran and informed Sir G. Barclay that Sardar had been in correspondence with Nationalists of Kavirin. He added that the patience of the Government was exhausted and it had been

1. Cd. 9120, No. 29, 31, p. 10, and No. 88, p. 41, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 761.
2. Ibid, No. 56, p. 29, see No. 175, p. 73, and also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 767.
3. Cd. 9120, No. 175, p. 73, also see British and Foreign State Paper, op.cit., p. 767.
decided to despatch a force under Amir Mufa Khan, a Bakhtiyari chief to offer resistance to Sardar Assad’s advance. Sir J. Barclay expressed his disapproval to it as it definitely meant the re-opening of civil war. He advised Saad-ed-Dowlah to adopt conciliatory measures. He also informed him about the steps which he had already taken in order to check the advance of Sardar Assad and added that in case he did not succeed in persuading the Sardar not to march towards Tehran he would try his level best to obtain authorization for himself to send out the two Consuls to overtake the Sardar and to advise him strongly to abandon his demonstration. Thereupon, Saad-ed-Dowlah promised not to despatch Amir Mufa Khan for a few days and to wait for the new developments in the light of Sir J. Barclay’s efforts. On May 22, 1909, the British Consul at Isfahan received the unsatisfactory reply from Sardar Assad to Sir J. Barclay’s message which had been forwarded to the Sardar on May 17, 1909. On May 23, 1909, Sir E. Grey instructed Sir J. Barclay that anything in the nature of intervention in the internal affairs of Persia must be avoided, but short of this efforts should be made to persuade Sardar to abandon his advance on Tehran. The British Minister at Tehran was also instructed to explain to Sardar the real nature of the programme of reforms proposed by the two Governments. Mr. Graham, was

1. Cd. 5120, No. 69, p. 30, No. 175, p. 75, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 767.
2. Cd. 5120, No. 64, p. 31.
thereupon instructed to overtake the Sardar, who was then on his way to Kum and to inform him that the Russian and British Legations were fully satisfied with the progress which had been made in the execution of the joint Russo-British programme presented to the Shah. He was also instructed to deny emphatically the story in circulation that it involved any curtailment of Persia's independence, and to explain to him that Russo-British representation had merely taken the form of friendly advice to the Shah as to measures for the restoration of constitutional government. The Russian Minister at Teheran also sent similar instructions to Bogolavlensky, the Russian Consul at Isfahan. The two Consuls met Sardar Assad at Kum on 26th June, 1909, and communicated to him the views of the two Governments. Sardar Assad replied that the Constitution had not really been restored and all that was being done in the name of restoration of the Constitution and parliamentary regime was a trick to deceive the people as well as the two Legations. To prove his statement, he cited the example of retention of Amir Bahadur Jang at the Palace and the presence of Saad-ed-Dowleh and Makhber-ed-Dowleh, the two staunch royalists in the cabinet. The two Consuls then warned the Sardar

1. Cd. 5120, No. 175, pp. 73-74, also see British and Foreign StatePapers, op. cit., p. 767.

+ It is interesting to note that all the Cabinet members were appointed by the Shah with the approval of the two Legations. As regards to Saad-ed-Dowleh, the Shah had totally refused to appoint him as Minister and had already dismissed him from the office of Foreign Ministership, but the Representatives of Russia and Britain compelled the Shah to reinstate Saad-ed-Dowleh.
that if he did not follow the advice of the two Legations, they would consider that his aim was to complicate the situation, for which he would be held personally responsible. He was also advised not to put himself in opposition to the two Legations and to return home. The Sardar, however, agreed to retire as soon as his certain demands were accepted by the Shah. The following two demands were made by him:

1. Sir Bahadur Jang and five or six noted royalists should be removed from Tehran.

2. Assurances should be given for the security of the members of the Assembly when elected, as in the other case, they would never dare to assemble.

As regards the remaining demands, the Sardar promised to present them after consultation with the members of Constitutional Committee, which he had summoned to meet him. The two Consuls asked him what step he would take in case his demands were not accepted. 'Death or unrest minister' was his prompt reply. He added that his demonstration would yield only two results; either a real constitution would be established or there would be direct foreign intervention. The two Consuls were again instructed to repeat the warning and to ask Sardar to formulate and present his demands by mid day of June 29 1909. The Sardar asked for time so as to consult the Nationalists of Kavvin and Tabriz and requested the free use of the telegraph wire for this
Meanwhile, the Bakhtiyaris were in communication with Sipahdar at Kazvin. They sent a telegram to him which was intercepted at Tehran. The telegraphic message stated that the 2,000 Bakhtiyaris, who were marching with Sardar Assad, would place themselves under the orders of Sipahdar. It was a direct invitation and encouragement to Sipahdar to work in close cooperation with the Bakhtiyaris as both the parties were fighting for the same noble cause. The nationalist forces from Kazvin also began to move towards Tehran and on June 23, 1909, the news reached Tehran that 900 nationalists volunteers (Fedai) from Kazvin were only 40 miles from the capital. These serious developments made the future of the shah dark and gloomy and he summoned the Russian and British Representatives for consultation and advice on July 2, 1909. During the conversation, the British Minister said that if the shah would have followed the joint advices a bit earlier, the present crises might have been averted. However, the two Representatives assured him of their intention to use their influence to bring about a settlement through peaceful means, if an opportunity occurred.

1. Cd. 5120, No. 67, p. 32, No. 175, p. 74; and Enclosure 1 in No. 175, pp. 75-76, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 763 and pp. 771-772.
2. Cd. 5120, No. 66, p. 31.
3. Ibid., No. 70, p. 32 and No. 175, p. 74.
4. Ibid., No. 61, pp. 35-35, and No. 175, p. 74, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 769.
The advance of the Bakhtiyaris from Isfahan and Fadais from Karsvin provided again a pretext to Russia to despatch her troops to Persia. During a conversation with Sir A. Nicolson on June 29, 1909, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia told him that though, it was the sincere desire of the Russian Government to avoid intervention in the internal affairs of Persia, yet, the necessity of sending troops to protect the lives and property of foreigners, in the light of threat and advance of the Nationalists to Tehran, had become unavoidable, especially when the Persian Cossack guard was not strong enough to cope with the situation. He informed the British Minister that vessels had been kept ready at Baku to carry troops across the Caspian to a Persian port. On June 30, 1909, he informed Sir A. Nicolson that the Russian Government had decided to take preparatory measures which would ultimately lead to the despatch of Russian troops to Karsvin. He added that the object of the Russian expedition would be to keep the full control over the road leading to Tehran. It would not proceed to occupy Tehran. He also informed that at present, preparations had been made to dispatch 1500 men and added that in case, the Bakhtiyaris abandoned their advance on the capital, he would drop the idea of sending Russian troops to Persia. However, he assured, that in any case, the Russian force would be withdrawn ultimately. The British Minister

2. Ibid, No. 72, p. 33.
for Foreign Affairs expressed his reaction to the proposed
despach of Russian force to Persia in a letter which he wrote
Sir Nicolson, on June 30, 1909, as follows:-

'I felt sure that the less foreign interference
which took place in the affairs of Persia the better, though I
fully realised the difficulty of the present situation at Teheran.
If a Russian force were to occupy Teheran, I had no doubt that
order would be restored there, but effect of this would be that
all Persians would consider that the Shah depend on the support
of Russia alone, and all the rest of the country would disown
the Shah's government and break up. My opinion is that any
great disaster can be prevented by the Persian Cossacks, who are
strong enough to effect this'. The Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs assured Sir A. Nicolson on July 1, 1909, that his govern-
ment would strictly follow the policy of non-intervention in
Persia and had no intention to assist the Shah in the present
struggle. The Russian government, he stated, was concerned only
with the security of the Enzeli-Teheran road and with the protection
of lives and property of the foreigners in the capital. He also
disclosed that no decision had been taken so far regarding the
despach of Russian troops either to Karvin or Teheran. On July 2,
1909, a communiqué was published in the Russian press, the summary
of which was as follows:-

1. Ibid, No. 74, p. 34.
2. Ibid, No. 78, p. 35.
In view of the alarming state of affairs in Persia, Viceroy of Caucasus has been ordered to prepare military detachments and also vessels for transporting these from Baku to Isfahan. These preparatory measures are being taken in good time in the event of further movement of Bakhtiyar and sedais of Kazvin on Teheran leading to anarchism, which might seriously threaten Russian and foreign institutions and subjects as well as Isfahan–Teheran road. On July 3, 1909, the Council of Ministers of Russia decided to dispatch immediately to Isfahan a regiment of infantry with guns and a regiment of Cossacks. The expedition was instructed not to proceed beyond Kazvin and not to advance on Teheran unless ordered to do so by the Russian Legation in the event of serious danger to the lives and property of the foreigners in the capital. They were also instructed not to take sides in the internal struggle of Persia. In the meantime, on July 2, 1909, the British Foreign Minister suggested that a joint warning should be conveyed to the Sipahdar and Sardar Assad that the only way to avoid intervention was to restore order and to give the constitution which had been restored, a fair trial. Consequently, on July 4, 1909, Major Stokes and Baronovsky were sent to warn the Sipahdar, and Mr. Chorhill and M. Romanovsky went to interview Sardar Assad.

1. Ibid, No. 79, p. 35.
2. Ibid, No. 92, p. 36.
3. Ibid, "o. 80, p. 35.
4. Ibid, No. 84, p. 37, No. 175, p. 74.
Sir J. Barclay gave the following instructions to Major Stokes and G.P. Churchill, the British agents, who were to warn Sipahdar and Sardar Assad respectively:

'You will do your best to meet and communicate with Sardar Assad and Sipahdar and tell them that the only way to avoid foreign intervention is to restore order and to give the constitution as now re-established a fair chance.

You should state that they are under gross misapprehension both as to the representations made by the two friendly Powers on the 22nd April and as to the measures taken by the Shah's Government to execute their recommendations. You should say that the representations took the form of friendly advice to the Shah to re-establish the constitution and to take certain measures to that end. These measures the Shah has already for the most part executed. A nationalist committee has, without interference from the Government, elaborated a most liberal electoral law which has been signed by the Shah. No obstruction whatever has been offered by those Ministers who are accused of absolutism, to the carrying out of the measures recommended.

If Sardar Assad and Sipahdar ask for guarantees, they should state what guarantees they demand and we will do our best to obtain them.

Taking into consideration that the officials of the two Legations had been sent to make representations and to warn the

1. Ibid, enclosure 5 in No. 175, p. 79.
Sipahdar and Sardar Assad, the Russian Foreign Minister stated on July 4, 1909, that it would take not less than four days for Russian force to be ready to start for Persia—the delay should be enough to know the temperaments and intentions of the leaders of the Nationalist forces advancing on Teheran. However, M. Baronovsky and Major Stokes met the Sipahdar at Keraj on 4th July, 1909 and conveyed the message of the two Legations to him. The joint warning was conveyed to Sardar Assad by M. Romanovsky and Sir J.P. Churchill at a place half way between Hassanabad and Robert Kerim, on the same day. The officials of the two Legations returned disappointed. The joint communication had made but little effect on either nationalist leader. The Sipahdar had presented eight demands as a pre-condition of the abandonment of his march towards Teheran. He insisted for an early reply, and promised to wait till 6th July, 1909. All the demands except two of them, made by the Sipahdar, were considered by the Ministers of the two Powers as unreasonable and they decided not to recommend to the Shah to negotiate on the proposed basis.

However, the other two demands, which aimed at the expulsion of traitors and dismissal of Mokhber-ad-Dinwah were found to be in conformity with the spirit of joint Anglo-British programme.

1. Ibid., No. 53, p. 35.
2. Ibid., No. 93, p. 62.
3. Ibid., enclosure 3 in No. 175, p. 70 (See for the demands of the Sipahdar).
4. Ibid., enclosure 2, in No. 175 (For detail conversation between Sipahdar and the officials of the two Legations).
5. Amir Bahadur Jung, sheikh aslullah, Nufakher-ul-kulk, Sani Hasrat and Mullah Muhammad Acoli.
Therefore, the two ministers deemed it desirable to press the Shah to accept them. Accordingly, they informed the Shapahdar that they would persuade the Shah to accept them provided the acceptance of these demands could satisfy him. He ignored the offer and replied that the restored constitution was a sham one and expressed his hope that in the view of Anglo-Russian agreement, the two Powers would not intervene in the internal affairs of Persia. As stated above, the warning to Sardar Assad also yielded no fruit. When the officials of the two Legations conveyed the message to him, he enquired as to what guarantees there was that the Shah would fulfil his promises. Mr. T. L. Churchill replied that the two Legations were prepared to obtain guarantees to this effect for him. Sardar Assad replied that the nationalists did not want foreign guarantees in any shape or form. He had come so close to Tehran, he remarked, to be able to make his demands direct. The failure of the joint communication to the leaders of the two advancing armies provided the chance to Russia to send her troops to Persia and on July 5, 1909, Count Berckendroff, the Russian Ambassador at London, communicated a memorandum announcing that it had been decided to dispatch immediately to Knevel a force consisting of a cossack regiment, a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery. The detachment was not to advance further than Kazvin. Any further advance was not to be undertaken except

1. Ibid, No. 175, p. 75, and No. 96, pp. 52-53.
2. Ibid, Enclosure 4 in No. 175, pp. 78-79 (for the conversation between the officials of the two Legations and Sardar Assad).
by the direction of the Russian Legation at Teheran. The Memorandum stated that the commander of the force would be provided with categorical instructions that the troops were to keep open the road to Kmschik and to protect the legations and foreign institutions and the foreign nationals. There were in no way to intervene in the political struggle in Persia. The Russian troops would remain in Persia, the memorandum stated, until there was no longer any danger to the foreign representative and subjects.

The British government expressed some anxiety as to the effect of sending a Russian force to Kmschik, but N. Isvolsky considered it essential. Consequently the detachment embarked for Kmschik. The Nationalists of Teheran protested against the decision of Russian government for sending the force to Persia and claimed the foreign subjects were in no way exposed to danger from the Nationalists. They assured that the lives and property of the foreigners would be protected by the constitutionalists. But this was in vain.

Part of the Russian detachment reached Kmschik on July 7, 1909. The danger of an armed Russian intervention alarmed the two nationalists leaders, Mardar Ismael and the Dipahdar and they sent telegrams on July 10, 1909 to Ahmad-ud-Dowlah for negotiations to settle the crisis. Ahmad-ud-Dowlah replied that he was prepared to receive delegates from the two Nationalists leaders to discuss their

also see Cd. 5120, No. 92, pp. 51-52, No. 97, p. 53.
2. Cd. 5120, No. 94, p. 52.
3. Ibid, No. 103, p. 52.
legitimate proposals but made it clear that the government would not consider any unconstitutional demand. The prospects of negotiations provided a further opportunity for the two legations to use their influence towards bringing about an amicable settlement. The Ministers of the two Powers, thereupon, pressed the Shah to dismiss his 'abnoxious favourites'. He, however, agreed to expel them provided the two Sardars gave him a written promise to the effect that they would desist from hostilities and disarm their followers. The two Ministers then sent a message to the two Sardars (whose forces had now joined hands and were some 16 miles west of "Sahwan") urging them to send their delegates to discuss the crises for a settlement. They also assured the two Sardars that the Shah would consider their Constitutional demands favourably. The Sardars replied on July 11, 1909, that they were not in a position to send their delegates as they were being repeatedly attacked by the royalists. Moreover, the road was blockaded by them. They, however, asked that the Persian Government should send her delegates to negotiate and promised to remain on defensive till sun set. The reply of the two Sardars was communicated to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs but Representatives of the two Powers were convinced that their efforts for the reconciliation would serve no useful purpose and they decided to let the matters take their own course.

1. Ibid, No. 105, p. 56.
2. Ibid, No. 109, pp. 56-57.
At last, the nationalist forces entered the town on July 13, 1909. Sir J. Barclay reported to Sir J. Bray about the situation of Teheran on the same day as follows:

"There has been complete absence of looting, and beyond what may possibly result from stray bullets no danger to European subjects is to be feared."

The royalists resisted the nationalists in the town and fighting began. Soon after the British Minister received a report that the Shah was about to bombard the town, Sir J. Barclay and M. Sabline, the Russian Minister in Teheran decided to lodge a joint protest against the Shah's decision of bombardment. Meanwhile a private message from the Shah was received through which the Shah assured that the bombardment would not take place.

On 14th July, 1909, the Shah broke his promise and the royalists began to bomb the town. Sir J. Barclay and M. Sabline immediately proceeded to Sultanatabad to urge the Shah to proclaim a truce for negotiations with the Nationalists. The Shah replied that he would only grant a truce if the revolutionaries laid down their arms. Under these circumstances, the two representatives considered that it would be useless to ask the nationalists to give up their arms and surrender. Some hours after the audience, it was reported that Colonel Liakhoff and his Cossack brigade could not hold ground much longer and M. Sabline decided to send N. Evrinow to discuss the terms for Colonel Liakhoff's surrender with the two

1. Ibid, No. 115, p. 58.
2. Ibid, No. 119, p. 100.
3. Ibid, No. 116, p. 59, No. 120, p. 59 and No. 199, p. 100.
Sardars. M. Enersinow contacted himself personally with the two Sardars at Baharalatan, the Nationalist head-quarters and requested them to desist from attacking the Cossack barracks. He asked 'what would be done with the officers and men if they delivered up their arms—whether they would be allowed to continue their service under the future Persian Government, and whether the Nationalist leaders could guarantee that as far as possible they would run no danger'. The two Sardars replied that they had always been on the defensive and as soon as the Cossack brigade had handed over their arms, there would be no need for the nationalists to defend themselves. The two Sardar added that Cossacks would be free to go to their homes or stay in their barracks as non-combatants. They, however, remarked that the Constitutional Government would be in need of an organised force, and therefore, the Cossack would be used and would continue to receive their pay. But M. Sabline was not satisfied with the terms and the representatives of the two powers decided to send M. Churchill and M. Baranowsky on July 16, 1909, to obtain a satisfactory undertaking in writing for the Cossacks. By the time they started to negotiate satisfactory terms for the Cossack, the Shah had taken refuge in the Russian Legation. Colonel Liakhoff's mission had now ended. However, the officials from the two Legations succeeded in obtaining a written undertaking that the Russian officers and Cossack

+ Colonel Liakhoff left Persia for Russia on August 4, 1909.

brigade would continue for the present to serve under the orders of the Minister of War.

When the news of Mohammad Ali Shah's taking refuge in Russian Legation reached to St. Petersburg, M. Lovotsky remarked that 'his Government had never wished to support the Shah although they had been suspected of doing so', he added that 'the news he had just received was a relief to him' and remarked that 'the Russian Government would intimate to whatever Government was now established that they would recognize them if they succeeded in keeping order. But Russia would be obliged to take the steps necessary to protect her interests if it appeared that the Persian Government were incapable of maintaining tranquility'. However, the necessity of the Russian force advancing from Kervin to Teheran did not fortunately arise owing to the abdication of the Shah and the absence of any disorder or of danger to the foreigners. As regards to the safety of the foreigners, Mr. G.P. Churchill reported to Sir J. Barclay on July 16, 1909, as follows:

'I venture to state my absolute conviction that at no time any foreigners been in any danger, excepting of course, from stray bullets, provided they took normal precautions'.

A meeting of the nationalists notables—an extra ordinary grand Council held on 16th July 1909, decided to proclaim the abdication of Mohammad Ali and the appointment of Vali Ahd Sultan Ahmad, as his successor, with Azad-ul-Mulk as temporary Regent. The Sipahdar was elected Minister of War and Sardar Assad as 1 Minister of Interior. On 17th July 1909, the Sipahdar and Sardar Assad issued a proclamation that Mohammad Ali Shah had voluntarily abdicated and that Sultan Ahmad Mirza, the Vali Ahd had been appointed as the Shah of Persia. It was also proclaimed that pending the convocation of Parliament, Azad-ul-Mulk, the head of the Kajar tribe, was to exercise the functions of Regent. Official notification as regard to the deposition of the Shah was made on July 18, 1909. The new Government was recognized by Russia and Great Britain on July 21, 1909.

During the internal crisis, Mohammad Ali Shah had telegraphic communications with the Emperor of Russia. On May 2, 1909, he sent a telegram to the Emperor, stating that on the friendly advice of Russia, he was intending to proclaim for the convocation of Assembly. He added that he was reorganising the Ministry and informed the Emperor about his intention to form a Committee to elaborate the Electoral Law. The Shah announced his intention of following the friendly advice, given to him by the Russian Government, and stated that he would send a private and

2. Ibid, No. 139, p. 64, Enclosure 8 in No. 199, p. 104.
4. Ibid, No. 189, p. 69.
personal message to him through the Russian Minister at Teheran. On May 11, 1909, the Emperor of Russia, through a telegraphic message expressed his satisfaction with the measures which the Shah was taking in introducing the Parliamentary regime in his country and wished him every success in his intention. On the following day, the Shah telegraphed, stating the measures which he had already taken regarding the introduction of reforms in his country and begged for the Russian protection to him, his family and his country. The Emperor replied as follows:

'That as long as His Majesty fulfilled sincerely the role of Constitutional Sovereign he would have the support and sympathy of the two representatives of Russia and Great Britain, and the two representatives would, in case of necessity, and should he seek it, afford him protection for his person. The two representatives were, however, persuaded that the best guarantees against this danger foreseen by His Majesty would be the re-establishment of a Constitutional regime and his sincere cooperation for its good working....'. The Emperor stated that the Shah could rely on his friendship and full support. He, however, avoided the word protection. On 16th July, 1909, the day he took refuge in the Russian Legation, Mohammad Ali Shah addressed the following telegram to Czar:

'Following the advice of the two Governments, he had granted the Constitution, but the anarchist movement from Constantinople,  

Kerbela, Tabreez and Teheran had plunged his country into disorder and he had had to seek the protection of His Imperial Majesty's powerful flag.

He counted on His Imperial Majesty's support for himself, his family and his country, and would wait 'His Imperial Majesty's gracious counsels'. By sending this message, perhaps, he has expected the arrival of a Russian force in Teheran to reinstate him, but the good order maintained by the constitutionalists and the continued insistence of Britain upon Russia to follow a policy of non-intervention in Persia, counted much and the Czar replied to him to the effect that 'as he had taken refuge in His Imperial Majesty's legation orders had been given to the Russian Charge d' affaires to afford him protection and to pay him the honour due to his rank. Frequent messages from the provinces now reach his promising support for his cause, and intrigue is certain to be rife in his neighbourhood as long as he remains in Persia'.

Sir J. Barclay recommended to Sir ... Irey that it should be insisted that Mohammed Ali Mirza leave the country at the earliest possible date. At first the deposed Shah intended to go to Crimea but in the meantime, he changed his mind and was reluctant to leave his country. He was, perhaps still hopeful to obtain assistance from the Russian quarters to enable him to resume the civil war. In the meantime, the new Government was recognized by the Russia and Great Britain and there was no alternative for

1. Cd. 5120 No. 130, 62.
2. Ibid, No. 145, p. 66.
Mohammad Ali but to leave the country. However, his departure was delayed due to unsettled questions of Crown Jewels, his pension, debts, his properties and other matters. However, prolonged negotiations between the National Council or Emergency Committee of the restored Constitutional Government and British and Russian Legations began. On September 7, 1909, an agreement was reached and a protocol embodying the various stipulations was signed by the Representatives of the British and Russian governments on 6th September 1909 and by all members of the Persian Cabinet on the following morning. A pension of 1,000,000 tomans was fixed for Mohammad Ali and the representatives of the two Legations undertook 'to give His Majesty Mohammad Ali Mirza strict injunctions to abstain in future from all political agitation against Persia, and the Imperial Russian Government promises on their side to take all effective steps in order to prevent any such agitation on his part. If His Majesty Mohammad Ali Mirza leaves Russia, and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the two Legations that in any country other than Russia, he has carried on political agitation against Persia, the Persian Government shall have the right to cease payment of his pension'.

However, on September 30, 1909, the Shah started from Engeli to Russia.

Throughout the whole crisis, Britain supported the Nationalist cause and persuaded Russia to act in close cooperation with her. Britain was anxious to get a constitutional monarchy established in Persia and to avoid armed Russian intervention there. Though, she was, more or less, successful in achieving her former goal, yet, she could not succeed in convincing Russia not to dispatch her troops to Persia. However, it can be safely concluded that it was British opposition that compelled Russia not to occupy Teheran. Britain might have opposed more strongly the decision of the Russian Government to send her troops to Persia, had the danger of Germany not been so imminent. On the other side, Russia would have occupied Persia, had she not been previously concluded the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Moreover, Russia too, realized the German menace. Due to the uncertain situation prevailing in Europe, the Russo-British clash was fortunately avoided in Persia and she could exist as a free nation. Russia was, however, satisfied to have her forces stationed at various important places in Persia, with the help of which, she could dictate her terms easily to the Persian Government in future.

1. Ibid, No. 235, p. 137.
C H A P T E R III

NEW PERSIA FACES ANGLO-RUSSIAN M NACE
There were a large number of Russian troops in Persia during the constitutional crisis. It was the declared intention of the Russian Government that the forces would be withdrawn as soon as normal conditions were restored in Persia as they would no longer be needed for the protection of lives and property of the foreigners. They were instructed neither to intervene in the internal affairs of Persia nor to assume any administrative duties. But the Russian troops went much beyond the declared limits, inspite of the fact that the revolutionaries were very cautious in their dealings with the foreigners and every possible measure was taken to ensure the safety of the Europeans. It was, therefore, natural for the nationalists to resent and protest against the prolonged presence and misdeeds of the Russian troops in their country.

+ The British Government also dispatched a small number of blue jackets to Persia for the protection of persons and property of the foreigners there. But, unlike the Russian troops, they neither interfered in the internal struggle nor assumed any administrative duties. Consequently, the Persians did not complain against them.

(Apart from sending gun boats to certain ports in the Persian Gulf, notably, Bushire and Bandar-i-Abbas, the reference to which has been made in Chapter II, the British Government sent fifty men and one maxia gun to Shiraz from Bushire on July 26, 1909) see Vol.3129, No.169, p. 72.
The continued presence of the Russian troops, after the over-
throw of Mohammad Ali, convinced the Persians about the
malicious designs of the Russian Government. The Nationalists
viewed the situation with anxiety. It was suspected that the
Russians had come with the intention of permanent occupation.

The mere capture of power and assumption of authority by
the revolutionaries does not necessarily mean that the
revolution has been completed. It remains in continuation till
the undesirable old institutions are replaced by desirable ones
and despised elements are crushed. During this period, re-
actionaries naturally resist and disorder prevails. It takes
time to put every thing in order. So was the case with Persia.
Locally, there were some disorders, especially in Ardebil, where
Shahsevans were playing the role of plunderers¹ and had become
a source of constant trouble to the national government. More-
over, anti-Russian agitation was common in Tabriz. These
incidents gave a pretext to the Russian Government to justify
the injustice which she did the Persian nation by sending her
troops there. Instead of withdrawing her troops, the Russian
Government warned the Persian Government with more drastic
measures. On July 22, 1909, M.Sabline, the Russian Minister
at Teheran, addressed two notes verbales to the Persian
Government dealing with the anti-Russian agitation at Tabriz

¹. CD 5129, Enclosure in No.218, p.113.
and disorders in the neighbourhood of Ardebil created by the Shahsevans tribe. He suggested the Persian Government to take immediate effective steps to control the tribe and ensure the security of the traffic. He warned that in case of failure, the Russian Government would herself take necessary measures to safeguard her rights there. The British Minister, Sir J. Barclay supported Mr. Sabline's representation.\(^1\) Desirous to avoid further Russian armed intervention, the Persian Government hurriedly issued a circular on July 24, 1909, to the Chief Provincial assemblies to take all possible measures to put an end all anti-Russian agitations.\(^2\) On July 25, 1909, the British Acting Consul-General at Tabriz, Mr. W.A. Smart informed Sir Barclay about the situation of the town as follows:

"The anti-Russian agitation has collapsed for the present, and it is unlikely to become general unless the Russian troops are not withdrawn after arrival of Governor-General with sufficient escort. The behaviour of the private soldiers continues to be on the whole, exemplary.\(^3\) He added that the

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1. Ibid., No. 163, p. 70.
2. Ibid., No. 165, p. 70.

\(^*\) On one side, the British Consul-General reported the behaviour of the private soldiers(fedais) as exemplary on the other side, the Russian authorities complained that the fedais were practising extortion to obtain money from the residents and fomenting agitation against Russian troops. This sharp difference in the two reports clearly shows the ill-intention of Russia - see Cd. 5120, No. 145, p. 66.

3. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 218, p. 113.
appointment of Muhkber-as-Sultan as Governor-General of Tabriz had soothed the feelings of the residents and caused general satisfaction. General condition of the province was, however, reported unsatisfactory; Shahsevans being a constant source of trouble. As regards to Ardebil, the report stated that the town was quiet due to arrival of 100 Russian cossacks.1

The peacefulness of Tabriz was ever recognized by K. Sazonov, the Acting Foreign Minister of Russia. On July 27, 1909, he stated that 'he had received no news of a disquieting character from Tabriz during the last two or three days', but expressed his anxiety over the prevailing disorders in Ardebil.2 On August 1, 1909, the Russian Government informed the Persian Government that 'unless a strong governor with suitable escort was dispatched to Ardebil by the 4th August, they would themselves send troops in to keep order'. The British Minister at Tehran supported the Russian government's demands regarding the governor and the escort to accompany him.3 The Persian government complied with the Russian demand by hurriedly

1. Ibid., 'Enclosure in No. 218, p. 113.
2. Ibid., No. 177, p. 84.
3. Ibid., No. 178, p. 84 and Enclosure in No. 220, p. 119.
appointing Fath-es-Sultaneh as governor of Ardebil on August 2, 1909.\(^1\) The Persian Government promised to hand over a note to M. Sabline by the evening of 4th August 1909, regarding the departure of the governor for Ardebil with a strong escort.\(^2\) There upon, the Russian Government postponed the dispatch of her troops to Ardebil. The Acting Minister for Russian Foreign Affairs informed Mr. O'Beirne on August 4, 1909 that his Government had made no preparations to dispatch an expedition to Ardebil but added that it had been decided in principle to send troops in case the Persian government failed to restore peace and order there.\(^3\)

Although the Persian Government accepted all such demands of the Russian Government which did not undermine her sovereignty, yet the Russian troops were not withdrawn. Naturally, a strong feeling of anxiety and resentment prevailed throughout the whole country. It was a test of patience and wisdom of the Persian people and they very wisely did not lose their patience. Had they not done so, they would have ceased to be a free nation? The obstinacy of Russia was, however, realized by Britain and Sir H. Grey repeatedly warned Benckendorff and Iswolsky not to make Russia unpopular in Persia or at Westminster by what looked like a permanent occupation.\(^4\) He renewed his

\(^1\) Ibid., Enclosure in No. 220, p. 119.
\(^2\) Ibid., No. 161, p. 85.
\(^3\) Ibid., No. 182, p. 88.
advice when the Russian Foreign Minister accompanied the Czar to Cowes. Isvolsky repeated his old arguments regarding the presence of the Russian troops in Persia. He explained that it was quite contrary to the policy of the Russian Government to send her troops to Persia but the deteriorating situation in that country made the dispatch of the Russian troops essential. He further stated that he was desirous to withdraw them at the earliest, and was waiting anxiously for the opportunity to do so but at the same time, he added that unless and until order was restored and all danger to foreigners and foreign interests had been removed, the withdrawal of troops would be unwise.

He remarked that 'if the troops were withdrawn, and had then to be sent back again it would be exceedingly difficult to recall them to Russia a second time'. He told that as soon as a competent Governor-General with sufficient force was established at Tabriz, the Russian troops would be withdrawn from the town. He, however, complained that against the wishes of Russian Government a man (Mukhber-es-Sultaneh), who did not enjoy the confidence of Russia had been named to Tabriz instead of

As referred above, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh was appointed as Governor-General of Tabriz. He, however, reached Tabriz on August 20, 1909 from Europe via Julfa — see Cd. 5120, Enclosure in N. 233, p. 133.
Ala-ed-Dowleh. Isvolsky bitterly criticized the new chief of police at Teheran and alleged that the man appointed as Chief of Police was a Caucasian terrorist who had committed several crimes in Caucasus. He also expressed his doubts about the nature of the Bakhtiyaris — who had played most prominent part in the revolution and who dominated the national government and remarked that they had no great reputation as peace-loving community. Sir E. Grey assured M. Isvolsky that his government would co-operate with Russia in urging upon the Persian government to take such effective steps which would hasten and facilitate the return of normal condition in the country and make the presence of the Russian troops in Persia unnecessary. At the same time, he pointed out that due to the continued presence of Russian troops, the chances of anti-Russian agitation had increased in the country. Moreover, the long stay of the Russian troops had provided an excuse to the Turkish government for delaying the evacuation of Persian territories occupied by them during the recent constitutional struggle. M. Isvolsky told that the Turks had begun

**Monsieur Yeprem (or Ephrem) was appointed as Chief of Police at Teheran. He, with Sardar Assad fought against the royalists and made the revolution successful — See Browne, The Persian Revolution, pp. 437, 440, Cd.5120, Enclosure in No. 229, p. 118.**

**During the constitutional struggle, the Turkish troops crossed the frontier and occupied a part of Persian territories. This annoyed the Russian government (as she had perhaps reserved for herself the right of sending the troops to Persia). Count Benckendorff addressed a memorandum to British government on July 8, 1909. The memorandum stated that 'the Turks were sending troops in ever-increasing numbers to the Urmia district, were occupying villages which were unquestionably Persian, and, taking advantage
of the violences committed by the Kurds, were inducing the population to ask for Turkish nationality. An indirect reference was made in the memorandum regarding the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had recognized the integrity of Persia (although, Russia had not herself observed the principles of the convention). It also referred to the strategical importance of the Urmi district from Russian point of view and proposed that a joint Russo-British protest should be made at Constantinople requesting the recall of the troops and urging them to abstain from interfering in the affairs of Persia and from according Turkish nationality to the local population. The British Government agreed with Russian proposal and accordingly a joint representation was made. The representation made a considerable impression and the Turkish Government declared that she had no desire to occupy the Persian territories, but the troops were sent only to protect the Turkish nationals. The Ottoman Government also announced to send a commission to enquire into the alleged irregularities and promised to withdraw Turkish protection where it would be found to have been improperly given. The Turkish Government further added that the Ottoman consul at Urmi would be changed. However, the troops were not withdrawn and it seemed that the withdrawal would not be ordered till the Turks were assured of evacuation of Persian territories by Russian troops. As regards Russia, she was annoyed due to the fact that a
foreigners would certainly lead to Russian intervention, would by itself, have been sufficient. Sir E. Grey also made known to the Emperor of Russia at Cowes that the continued presence of Russian troops in Persia had convinced a section of British people that Russia was determined to establish a military occupation or at least some sort of protectorate in North Persia and emphasized the need of the withdrawal of the troops. On August 10, 1909 Sir J. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that order had been speedily restored and successfully maintained in the capital by the National Government. He further reported that the news of the revolution had generally good effect in provinces but added that due to the financial embarrassment, the Government had not been able to take effective measures in subduing the lawlessness prevailing in many districts. He, however, expressed his satisfaction as to successful endeavour of the National Government in producing a detente by issuing urgent injunctions to the reactionaries of chief provincial towns, and in some cases averting imminent disorders.

strategical place like Urmia was occupied by Turkey. Moreover, she believed that the Persian national movement was much encouraged by Committee of Union and Progress — See F.O. 371/976, 159/159/10/33; Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X, Part I, No. 746, p. 739.


2. CD. 5120, No. 217, pp. 111-112.
The new rulers of Persia had, however, realised that to get the Persian territories evacuated by Russian troops, would be a difficult task, even after the restoration of peace and order. The Russian seemed to have come to stay permanently. Nevertheless, the National Government tried her level best to re-establish peace in the country and proved herself capable of maintaining law and order. At least, the situation was not out of control. But the Russians had always some pretexts at their disposal. Incapable of getting Russians withdraw, the Persians looked towards Britain, at least for moral succour. They hoped that Britain would influence Russia to withdraw. However, the European situation was not propitious for the materialisation of such a Persian aspiration. Not only the British hesitated to support the Persian cause but sometimes, they tried even to justify the Russian action. On August 17, 1909 the Persian Minister at London called on Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. He informed Sir E. Grey that the retention of Russian troops had aroused anti-Russian feelings in Persia and expressed his doubts that they might advance on Teheran. The British Foreign Secretary unexpectedly replied that these were the matters to be discussed and settled between Persian and Russian Governments and added that M. Isvolsky was desirous to recall the troops but difficulty in doing so was that no one could be sure that the law and order was firmly established. He informed the Persian Minister that Isvolsky did not think it proper to recall and then to send back the
troops to Persia. Sir E. Grey further stated that there were still much disorders in Persia; the roads in South Persia were not safe and complained of loss to the British trade there. He also remarked that had the situation been same in North Persia; it would be difficult for Russia to withdraw her troops. However, he promised to discuss the problem with Russian Government though he expected that it would yield no fruitful result in the light of disturbances which had occurred in Persia. The Persian Minister strongly denied any kind of disturbances and stated that complete order existed in Teheran and Kajvin. The British Foreign Secretary replied that he had no doubt that 'with the situation as it was at present the Russian Government could not have sent troops. But as their troops were already on the spot, they were afraid to withdraw them until they felt sure that the situation would go on improving'.

During the period, the British Foreign Office was in a state of dilemma. Britain desired the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persian territories but could not stress upon Russia emphatically to do so lest the Russian ally be antagonized and broke the entente. Consequently, a very cautious policy was followed by Britain. On the one side, she emphasized upon Persia the need for speeding restoration of complete law and order in the country, on the other hand, she mildly but persistently reminded Russia to recall her troops as there were no more disturbances in Persia. But, Russia was determined to

1. Ibid., No.201, pp.106-107.
exploit the situation. The correspondent of 'Times' from St. Petersburg reported that the Russian official was very much pessimistic regarding the situation prevailing in Persia. It was asserted by them that anarchy was increasing in many of the Persian Provinces; the roads were infested with the robbers and trade was losing heavily. Sir G. Barclay strongly contradicted the Russian allegation that things had gone from bad to worse since the Nationalists had captured power. He wrote to Sir E. Grey on September 9, 1909 that it was not due to the inefficiency of the new Government which had made the roads unsafe; the roads were infested with the robbers since long. The Russian allegation that the commerce was losing heavily was reported by the British Minister at Teheran as wrong. On the contrary, he stated that the northern custom receipts were increasing. He further stated that the assertion regarding increasing anarchic situation in Persia was also incorrect. There were, no doubt, disorders prevailing in certain districts, but he denied that it was a new development and remarked that unless and until the Persian Government was furnished with substantial monetary assistance, it would be unwise to expect any great improvement, no matter what Government ruled at Teheran.

1. Ibid., No. 231, p. 127, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, pp. 819-820.
The Persian Government was not only accused of inefficiency by Russia but on one occasion, Monsieur Stolypin, the Russian Prime-Minister went so far as to remark that there was not even a single man in Persia capable of handling the situation. He claimed that it was due to the lack of men of abilities that the country was drifting helplessly about and alleged that Persian Government was determined to damage the Russian prestige. He also regretted the Persian attitude towards Russia but repeated the oft-repeated statement that the Russian Government would withdraw her troops as soon as circumstances permitted. All these allegations were made because the Persian Government had not appointed a man of Russian choice as Governor of Tabriz and had refused to accept such Russian dictations which would have undermined her sovereignty. Moreover, her repeated request to recall the troops had also enraged Russia. Although, the Russian attitude was quite stiff towards Persia, yet the British diplomacy of mild but persistent reminder for withdrawal had not gone waste.

On October 5, 1909 when Count Benckendorff called on Sir E. Grey to inform him that he was going for a holiday, the British Foreign Secretary again utilized the opportunity and urged the importance and necessity of reduction in number of Russian troops. Count Benckendorff replied that as things were not

altogether quiet and incidents were occurring constantly, it would be difficult to recall the troops. The British Foreign Secretary promptly caught the point and replied that he had not spoken of complete withdrawal, though such a step by Russian Government would be highly appreciated by Britain and remarked that he meant only reduction in number. He reminded the Count that the presence of Russian troops had aroused anti-Russian feelings amongst the Persians and pointed out to him that the recall would undoubtedly have good effect. He also requested Count Benckenorrow to convey to Russian Government the views of the British Government regarding the importance and necessity of reduction in the number of troops. On October 7, 1909 Sir J. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that Enzeli-Teheran road was safe. Complete law and order had been restored and maintained in the Capital and anti-Russian feelings had subsided. He, however, expressed his doubts as regards to the re-occurrence of anti-Russian agitations, had the Russian troops stationed at Kazvin not been withdrawn and added that the Russian troops had got no opportunity to deal with the dangers which they were intended to combat. He further stated that at present, there was no danger to the foreigners and remarked that though it was difficult to make any prophecy, but the present moment, if utilized, would be well-timed to recall the Russian troops. He strongly recommended the withdrawal of Russian force from Kazvin.

2. CD 5120, No. 237, p. 138.
The continuous British representations caused a slight change in Russian Policy and on October 10, 1909 the new Russian Minister at Teheran, M. Poklowski, informed Sir J. Barclay that his Government had decided to reduce immediately the Tabriz force by one half. The same information was given by M. Sazonow to Sir A. Nicolson at St. Petersburg. The British Minister expressed his satisfaction on the decision of Russia regarding reduction and enquired whether some reduction was not possible in the force stationed at Kazvin. M. Sazonow replied in negative as according to him, appropriate moment had not arrived for such a step. On October 12, 1909 the "Official Messenger" published a news, stating that the Russian Government had decided to recall from Tabriz four companies of infantry, a half company of engineers, and a battery of field artillery. The paper also stated that the two companies of infantry, four sotnias of Cossacks, one battery of mountain artillery, and a half company of engineers would be retained there. These, the paper further stated, would be withdrawn as soon as the Russian Government was satisfied that permanent law and order had been re-established.

On October 16, 1909 two companies of infantry and one grenadier battery left Tabriz for Russia. They were followed on 19th

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1. Ibid., No. 238, p. 138.
2. Ibid., No. 242, p. 139, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., pp. 833-834.
3. CD 5120, No. 243, p. 139.
October by two companies of infantry, a half company of Sappers and some men and horses of mountain battery. General Snarsky and his staff left on October 21, and it was announced by Russian Consul-General on October 23, that there remained 1,000 men at Tabriz, 100 infantry at Urmia, and 100 Cossacks at Ardabil. Complete withdrawal was, however, not obtained, as the Russian Government considered that the Persian Government was not supplied with sufficient force to support his authority and maintain order. The presence of the Russian force at Kazvin seemed less necessary even than that of the force at Tabriz, but the Russian Government was not prepared to make any reduction there. It was alleged that since the death of Mohammad Ali, the situation at Teheran had not been so stable as to justify the recall of the troops. Moreover, the Persian Government was accused of being unfriendly towards Russian and until, the Persian Government be friended, the Russian Government was not inclined to recall her troops. 'Be friendly' definitely meant full acceptance of all Russian dictates by Persia.

On October 30, 1909 Isvolsky informed Sir A. Nicolson that his Government had decided to recall practically all the troops from Kazvin, leaving only fifty or sixty Cossacks there.

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 269, p. 154.
3. Ibid., p. 736.
as a Consular guard. He, however, stated that some troops would stay at Resht and Bazeli but affirmed that the total number would not exceed more than a regiment of Cossacks. He further stated that he was sending a telegram to this effect to Poklowski so that he could convey the decision to the Persian Government and explain to them that Russia had no desire to cause any embarrassment to the Persian Government but had a spirit of good will towards Persia. At the same time, M. Poklowski was to warn the Persian Government that if any undesirable event occurred in future, the Russians would return with greater force and with more serious intent. On November 1, an official communique to this effect was also published. M. Poklowski was also instructed to persuade the Persian Government to settle the outstanding questions between the two Governments but was forbidden to intermix the question of the withdrawal with that of the settlement. At the same time, M. Isvolsky requested that the British Minister at Teheran should be instructed to advise the Persian Government to be more friendly and conciliatory towards Russia. The British Government agreed to instruct Sir G. Barclay in the above sense. To the misfortune of the

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2. CD 5120, No. 260, pp. 149-150, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, op.cit., p. 845.
Persian nation, the situation at Ardebil, in the meantime, deteriorated much and provided a pretext to Russia to send her army there. Perhaps, the reduction of Russian force at Tabriz and declaration of the intention for the reduction of the Russian force at Kazvin was made in order to camouflage and to create a false impression that Russia had no desire either to occupy Persian territories or transform that country into a protectorate, as Russia knew that the disquieting situation at Ardebil would enable her to return with a greater force and with a better opportunity to pursue the desired policy in Persia. By using the disorders prevailing in Ardebil, as an instance, Russia expected to prove the inefficiency and incapability of the Persian Government to restore and maintain peace and then to justify the dispatch of further troops. On November 3, 1909, the Russian Government published a communiqué in 'Official Messenger' which expressed grave concern over the situation at Ardebil. The

The Shahsevans and Kardaghis tribes under the leadership of notorious Rahim Khan, were the main source of trouble. They seriously threatened Ardebil Rahim Khan declared that he was trying to re-establish the ex-Shah's regime as he had no confidence in the constitutional Government Rahim Khan and his associates (chiefs and Shahsevans and Kardaghis) also addressed two telegrams to the ex-Shah and to the two Bakhtiyari Chiefs Amir Hafa Khan and Sardar-i-Jang to the effect that the constitutionalists had created disorders, committed murders and plundered properties. They also accused the nationalists as anti-religious and affirmed to destroy them. The British Minister at Tehran, however, believed that it was a looting rather than a political movement. The Persian Government took active measures to crush the rebels. Sattar Khan, with a force of 1,000 men, was sent to Ardebil to re-establish peace and order. Unfortunately, he met with no success and to re-inforce him, Mukhbar-e-Sultaneh dispatched 1,500 men under Baker Khan. Samad Khan at Maragha,
COMMUNIQUE STATED THAT THE SITUATION AT ARDEBIL WAS GROWING WORSE DAY BY DAY AND ACCUSED THAT THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT WAS UNABLE TO RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER. IT RESERVED FOR THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE SAFETY OF HER PEOPLE AND THEIR PROPERTY AND CONCLUDED AS FOLLOWS:

... HAD 800 MEN AT HIS DISPOSAL, READY TO MARCH ON ARDEBIL, WHEN ORDERED. MEANWHILE, THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT TABRIZ SENT NASIRUDDUL-HULK WITH 100 PERSIAN COSSACKS TO SARAB TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. FROM TEHERAN, A FORCE OF 1600 MEN OF ALL ARMS HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO ARDEBIL UNDER THE COMMAND OF M. YEPRIM, THE CHIEF OF POLICE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT AND SIR A. NICOLSON, DURING A CONVERSATION WITH M. ISVOLSKY REMARKED THAT THE TROOPS BEING SENT BY THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD CERTAINLY RELIEVE THE SITUATION BUT M. ISVOLSKY DOUBTED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE PERSIAN FORCES. NA, HOWEVER, WARNED THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSSES AND INJURY WHICH MIGHT OCCUR TO THE RUSSIAN SUBJECTS. NAHIM KHAN WAS ALSO Warned TO BE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGES DONE TO THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF THE RUSSIAN NATIONALS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE RUSSIAN CONSUL AT ARDEBIL, APPLIED TO HIS GOVT. FOR A FORCE TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF THE RUSSIAN SUBJECTS. THIS PROVIDED THE CHANCE TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO DISPATCH HER TROOPS TO ARDEBIL.

SEE CD 5100, NO. 239, P. 138, NO. 242, P. 139, NO. 244, PP. 139-140, NO. 245, P. 140, ENCLOSURE IN NO. 249, P. 143, NO. 250, P. 146, NO. 253, P. 147, NO. 255, P. 147, AND SEE CD 5658, ENCLOSURE 1, 2 AND 3 IN N. 8, PP. 4-5.
In view of such a situation, and of the unquestioned danger threatening our vice consul and Russian subjects, the Russian Government have taken measures for the immediate reinforcement of the consulate guard at Ardebil by any portion of the troops in the adjoining military district of the Caucasus, as the arrival at Ardebil of any portion of the Russian column would require much more time.  

The above decision by Russian Government was taken when Sattar Khan, who had been surrounded in Ardebil by Rahim Khan with Karadaghis and Shahsevans, escaped with a few men to Sarab and Russian Vice-Consul applied to his Government for a force to protect the Russian nationals. The delay in dispatching the Persian forces to reinforce Sattar Khan, due to certain unavoidable circumstances, had provided a fair chance to the rebels and they became the master of the situation. However, on November 5, 1909 Ardebil was captured and plundered by Rahim Khan and his followers. The local authorities and some others had taken refuge in the Russian Vice-Consulate. The rebels demanded their surrender. In the meantime, one battalion of Russian infantry, two squadrons of Cossacks with two machine guns and a detachment of

1. CD 5120, No. 261, pp. 150-151, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, pp. 844-845.  
2. Ibid., No. 255, pp. 147-148, also CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 7.
engineers were on the way to Ardebil. Another column of sufficient strength was also being dispatched to 'calm' the situation at Ardebil.\(^1\) The instructions given to them were similar to those given to the detachment at Tabriz to refrain from all interference with the administration but they were to repress plundering on the road from Astara. They were also authorised to take action against the caravans charged with plunder, and raid the stores of loot.\(^2\)

At the time, when the Russian Government decided to dispatch troops to Ardebil, M. Iswolsky had stated that this measure would not affect the Russian Government’s decision regarding the withdrawal of the troops from Kervin. But the promised withdrawal was, however, not fulfilled for two reasons. Firstly, Bahia Khan after occupying Ardebil, declared his intention to march on Teheran. Secondly, the Russian press protested against a too hasty withdrawal of the troops. The Russian press, taking Ardebil as an instance, argued that situation in Persia was exceedingly perilous and uncertain and that no order existed at the places where there were no Russian troops. The marching and counter-marching of Russian troops was strongly criticised. They argued it to be an

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2. CD 5120, No. 264, p. 152.
unsteady and unstable policy. They also urged their Government
to consider solely Russian interests and not to give much
weight to British advice.\(^1\) As referred above, by 11th November
1909, a Russian battalion was, however, on its way to Ardebil
from Astara with order to keep the road open and take action
against the caravans carrying loot. A Russian regiment was
also at Astara to march on Ardebil, if required. On November
16, 1909 two Russian battalions and 200 Cossacks arrived at
Ardebil.\(^2\) Meanwhile, the rebels appointed a certain Shafrar
Khan as Governor, retired out side the town and encamped
there. It seemed as if the authority of the rebels had been
established but the measures taken by Persian Government
compelled the Shahsevans to negotiate. A force of 3,000
men, under the supreme command of Bashid-ul-Mulk with Samad
Khan and Baker Khan as his associates, appeared at Sarab to
crush the rebels. A detachment was at Astara and other
detachment had fortified the Basht road in Khal Khal.\(^3\) Rahim
Khan, at this time, was trying to secure the open assistance
of Russian. He paid a visit to the Russian Consul, expressed
his fidelity with Russia and suggested that 'that country
(Russia) should take over all the districts in Persia where her

2. CD 5656, Enclosure in No.10, p.7.
3. Ibid., Enclosure I in No. 8, p. 4,
troops were located'. However, the Russian refused to do so. A too hasty engagement with the rebels would have proved futile to the Russian interests and would have caused a wide spread outbreak not only in Persia but in Britain also, therefore, the Russian authorities were pursuing a very careful policy. Perhaps, they would have concluded certain agreements with Bahim Khan, had they been sure about his ultimate victory. A careful analysis of the conversation between M. Isvolsky and Sir A. Nicolson, clearly throws light on Russian dilemma regarding ultimate results of the rebellion. On November 11, 1909, Sir A. Nicolson told Isvolsky that a considerable and fairly well-equipped Persian force was hastening from Teheran to Ardebil. M. Isvolsky replied that the two forces would probably come into collision, and if the Government troops were victorious, it would be a satisfactory sign that the Persian Government were capable of re-establishing order with their own resources. If, on the contrary, Bahim Khan were to obtain the upper hand, he might march on Teheran or Tabriz with the Prestige of success. He further stated that under present circumstances, it was necessary to retain the Russian force at Kazvin until the issue of conflict was decided. However, Russia, undoubtedly, was engaged in some

1. CD 5120, No. 267, p. 152.

2. CD 5120, No. 267, pp. 152-153, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, p. 847.
or other type of conspiracy with Rahim Khan against Persia. The greater friendship shown by the Russian Consulate at Tabriz towards Rahim Khan,\(^1\) confirmed this belief. The Russian officers could not hide their sympathy with that brigand and went so far as to get themselves photographed with him, holding his hand.\(^2\) Moreover, the attitude of the Russian Government in connection with the extradition of Rahim Khan (to be referred later on) furnished with a further proof of Russian Conspiracy against the integrity of Persia. However, the active measures taken by the Persian Government compelled the Shahsevans to retire to their winter quarter at Moghan and Rahim Khan fled to Karadagh of which, he was a native.\(^3\)

In the meantime, a Russian force consisting of 3,200 troops occupied Ardebil,\(^4\) but having no pretext to justify the retention of the force, the Russian Government announced the withdrawal of majority of her troops from that place.\(^5\)

Meanwhile, Rashid-ul-Walk with Government troops, reached Ardebil and assumed the Governorship of that place.\(^6\) On December 13, 1909, the Russian Government published a communiqué regarding the situation at Ardebil. The communiqué, instead

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2. Ibid., p. 347.
4. CD 5120, No. 270, p. 158.
5. CD 5120, No. 277, p. 159, also see CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 7.
of recognizing the Persian Government's successful efforts to restore peace and order, stated that since the arrival of the Russian troops, peace had been re-established in and neighbourhood of Ardebil. Recognizing the restoration of law and order, the communiqué stated that under the present peaceful situation the retention of a larger force was no more necessary and consequently declared the withdrawal of the majority of the troops, leaving with in the Ardebil district five companies of infantry, a mountain battery, three sotnias of Cossacks, and a section of engineers' to protect and guard the Russian Consulate and nationals as well as to ensure the free movement for trading caravans along the Astara-Tabriz route.

Later on, Bahim Khan was defeated by the Persian Government's force under the command of M. Yeprim and Sardar Bahadur, son of Sardar Assad. Bahim Khan, therefore, applied to Russian as well as Turkish Consuls-General for protection. Both the Consuls, however, refused to render him any protection, whereupon, he managed to escape to Russia together with 100 families.

The Russian Government, in plain defiance of Article XIV of Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828), permitted him to cross in the

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1. Ibid., No. 5, p. 2.
2. Ibid., Nos. 21 and 22, p. 17, No. 21 and Enclosure in No. 20, p. 22.

* According to Article XIV of the Treaty of Turkomanchai, the Russian Government promised 'not to permit Persian deserters to establish themselves or to remain fixed in the Khanats of Karabag or Nakhitchewan or in the part of Khanat of Crivan situated on the right bank of Arax'. See Kuragin, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 99.
Russian territory, where he was safe from pursuit and where he remained until January 1911, when he again returned to Tabriz to become a further source of trouble to the constitutional Government. The Persian Government demanded his extradition, which was refused. A communiqué in that regard was published on February 13, 1910. At all stages of Rahim Khan's rebellion, the Russian Government supported him. According to the Persian Government's version, a detachment of Russian troops supported Rahim Khan, while he was engaged in fighting with the Government forces. When the Russian detachment was withdrawn, he was defeated. The refusal to extradite him was regarded by British authorities as an embarrassing attitude of Russia towards Persia.

The embarrassing attitude of Russia continued and promised evacuation was not carried into effect. Even the speech from the Throne on 15th November 1909, on the occasion of opening of the Persian Parliament, which lamented the

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2. CP, 5656, No. 23, p. 17.
presence of foreign troops in Persia, was regarded by the Russian Press as improper and ungenerous. They argued that it was the presence of Russian troops which saved Tabriz from being captured by the ex-Shah's forces and claimed that the sense of security which prevailed during the crisis which ultimately led to the deposition of Mohamed Ali, was only due to the despatch of Russian troops to Kakan. They accused the Persians to be incapable and incompetent to maintain peace and alleged that the security which existed on trade routes was solely due to the presence of Russian troops. The serious attack of November 24, 1909 on the Russian Consul-General and his staff and carvan, near Shiraz, was cited as undisputed confirmation of the reasoning of the Russian Press. Of course, there were stray disturbances but it did not mean in any way that the Persian Government was powerless to handle the situation.

+ A large caravan which was accompanied by M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General at Bushire and M. Kadloobowsky, Secretary, of the Russian Consulate-General at Bushire was attacked on their way from Shiraz to Bushire by Poir-Ahmadis, a branch of the Khugalu tribes. Several members of the escort were wounded and a Russian Cossack was killed. Two Persian Cossacks were wounded and ten or twelve other Persians with the caravans were killed. The telegraph doctor, Woillat, accompanied by British Consul at Shiraz with an escort of Indian, Serows and Persians were immediately sent to their assistance M. Iswolsky decided to demand the punishment of the robbers and compensation for the losses from the Persian Government - See CD 5120, Nos. 271, and 272, p. 158, No. 274, pp. 158-159, also see CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 19, p. 9.

The Persians dealt firmly with the disturbances, controlled the situation and maintained peace. But Russia fabricated the facts, refused to recognize the abilities of Persians of restoring order and claimed that existing order was due to the presence of the Russian troops on Persian soil. The Russian allegation could not even satisfy the British and Sir C. Hardinge wrote to Sir A. Nicolson on January 18, 1910 that Russia did not appear to be in any hurry to move their troops from Kazvin, where there was really no need for them to remain any longer.

The continued presence of the Russian troops at Kazvin, Tabriz and Ardebil was a constant source of friction, consequently the year 1910 was marked by an increase in anti-Russian feeling in Persia. On February 5, 1910, there was a debate in the Persian Parliament on this subject. Ala-es-Sultaneh, the Foreign Minister was strongly criticised. The answers given by the Foreign Minister were considered to be unsatisfactory and when the motion was put, the Foreign Minister could not obtain a vote of confidence. Consequently, he resigned.

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2. Ibid., Vol. IX, Part I, No. 747, p. 740; Extract from the Annual Report for Russia for the year 1910 (Enclosure in Dispatch from Sir J. Buchanan, No. 66 of March 22, 1911, R. March 27, 1911.
Tabriz was the main scene of anti-Russian demonstration. It was alleged by Russia that the followers of Sattar Khan and Baker Khan in conjunction with fedais from Caucasus, who were with M. Yerim, were contemplating an attack on Russian banks. N. Isvolsky instructed the Russian Minister at Teheran to urge the Persian Government to take immediate steps for the subjugation of Sattar Khan and Baker Khan. The Russian Minister was also instructed to warn that in case of failure of the Persian Government to do that, the Russian Government would take measures which she would deem necessary.

The British Consul at Tabriz confirmed that among certain classes of the population, the agitation against the presence of Russian troops had recurred. However, the Minister of Interior assured Sir J. Barclay that the Governor-General had sufficient force at his disposal and no trouble was expected. He also stated that the Khans were coming to Teheran. Meanwhile, the British Consul at Teheran reported that unless and until the above mentioned Khans were removed from Tabriz, peace could not be expected. Consequently, Sir J. Barclay presented a note to the Persian Government to this

1. CD 5656, No. 33, p. 25.
4. Ibid., No. 44, p. 27.
effect. The Russian Minister at Teheran had already demanded their expulsion. The Persian Government ever anxious to satisfy her great neighbours, ordered the Khans on March 17, 1910, to leave the town immediately. Some difficulties arose in this connection but ultimately Khans left Tabriz for Teheran on 19th March with 100 horsemen. The town was quite and no incident was caused by their departure. The most remarkable thing throughout the events which led to the expulsion of the Khans from Tabriz was that no disturbances occurred. On an enquiry made by British Minister at Teheran regarding the anti-Russian agitations at Tabriz, Mr. Shipley reported on March 12, 1910, that the town was quiet. Nevertheless he recommended the removal of Khans from the town.

Meanwhile, the Persian Government successfully re-established peace in other parts of Northern Persia. The Shahsevan and Karadagh Chiefs, including Bahim Khan’s nephew, Kerim Khan made peace with the Government. The Shahsevans not only made their submission but also promised to restore the plunder taken during the late rising. All was quiet. The peace prevailed but the Russian withdrawal was not secured. Not only Russia did not withdraw the troops but a certain Darab Mirza

1. Ibid., No. 43, p. 27.

2. Ibid., No. 64, pp. 32-33, Nos. 56, 56, 57, p. 33 also Enclosure in No. 69, p. 37.

3. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 69, p. 37.

4. Ibid., No. 46, p. 29, and Enclosure in No. 47, p. 30.
of Persian origin, who had been naturalized as a Russian subject and was attached to Russian force, stationed at Kazvin, started a movement in the end of May, 1910 in favour of ex-Shah and threatened the authority of the Constitutional regime. The Russian Minister at Teheran stated that the officer obtained leave of absence and started for Azerbaijan in company of an official of the ex-Shah's court, where, he with the help of a small force, attacked Zinjan. Inspite of the protests of the Persians who wanted to deal with the insurrectionaries themselves, a Russian detachment consisting of sixty men was sent to arrest Darab Mirza. He was also immediately dismissed from the Russian army. The measures taken by Russia were highly appreciated by Mr. O'Seirne, Councillor of British Embassy at St. Petersburge. The Russian soldiers captured Darab Mirza on June 3, 1910. Truly speaking, he was nominally arrested. In reality, he was rescued from being captured by Persian force. While the Russian soldiers with Darab Mirza, were returning to Kazvin, they attacked the Persian force which was sent to crush the rebellion, and killed Ali Khan, the Persian General. On an

1. Ibid., No. 100, p. 49.
2. Shuster, op.cit., pp. III - IIII.
3. CD 6560, No. 1000 p. 49.
4. Ibid., No. 101, p. 49.
5. Ibid., No. 102, p. 49.
enquiry made by Sir E. Grey, regarding the incident, Sir Narling reported from Teheran that the Russian force was fired first, yet it was proved that a certain Russian Colonel at Kazvin had guaranteed the safety of the rebels. A number of Darab's associates were furnished with letters signed and sealed by the Colonel himself. The bearers of the letters were declared to be under the protection of Russia and severe punishment was threatened for those who might interfere with them or their followers. The aim of the Russians was nothing else than to foment disorders in order to justify their presence on the Persian soil. The British Government continually requested the Russians to withdraw but Russia turned a deaf ear. At last, the cat was out of the bag and in the end of May 1910, the Russian Minister at Teheran communicated the Persian Government certain demands as the precondition to the withdrawal of troops from Kazvin. Russia demanded the extension of the Russian mining concession at Karadagh and an automobile concession for the Enzeli - Teheran road. In addition to these demands, Russia put forward certain requirements to be fulfilled by Persia regarding the status of the

1. CD. 5656, No. 114, p. 57.
2. Ibid., No. 116, p. 58.
Cossack Brigade. Persia strongly protested against these demands. The British charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg stated that the imposition of these conditions was 'obviously illogical, since Russia had undertaken to withdraw her forces on the restoration of order' but tried to minimise the severity of the demands by stating that 'the conditions in themselves were not very onerous'. However, the demands were not accepted and consequently withdrawal was not ordered. It seemed that the Russian troops would remain in Persia until the doomsday unless some superior force expelled them.

B - The Increasing Lawlessness on the Southern Road: The British Ultimatum

In Northern Persia where Russian forces were stationed, British supported the Persian cause. Although, Britain refrained from addressing any protest to Russian Government yet the repeatedly advised Russia about the desirability of the withdrawal of the troops. But the British authorities did not follow exactly the same policy in Southern Persia — their own

sphere of interest, as they wished to be pursued by Russia in Northern Persia. Nevertheless, Britain did not go so far as Russia had gone. The British followed a mild and comparatively less harmful policy to Persia. However, a small number of British troops as has already been referred to, were dispatched to certain ports in the Persian Gulf, notably Bushire and Bandar-i-Abbas. As the blue jackets did not intervene in the internal affairs of Persia, no protest was lodged against them by the Persians. But the constitutional struggle witnessed rapid deterioration in the situation of Fars. There were sharp differences amongst the tribal chiefs. The Governor-General of Fars was powerless to do anything. The whole internal politics revolved around the Kawan-ul-Mulk, Sayyid Abdul Husain of Lar, Soulat Dowleh, the Kashgai Chief, and Asafedd-Dowleh, the Governor-General. Instead of the differences, a meeting was held at Shiraz on March 24, 1909, in which prominent nationalists participated. The Governor-General's Vizier was also present. The meeting decided to inaugurate the constitutional Government of Fars; to send messenger to Sheikh Zakariyeh and Sayyid Abdul Husain of Lar to induce them to remain quiet; and also to Soulat Dowleh to enlist his support. These Chiefs had long been stirring up the people to join

\[1\] CD, 4733, No. 173, p.84, also see Enclosure in No.283, p. 126.
the righteous cause of the constitution. It seemed that the differences amongst the tribes would no longer exist and they would work in complete harmony. The next day, on March 25, 1909, Hoin-ul-Islam, one of the most civilized members of the popular party visited the British Consulate and made the following statement to Mr. Bill.

'The movement had been going on for some time, but had been delayed by the necessity of obtaining unanimity by negotiation with the Kawamis, and c. All parties were now agreed on the object of the movement, which was the attainment of the national rights as provided in the Constitution to which the Shah had sworn. The leaders were all democratic reformers; but all others, including the Governor-General, had now come in. At the meeting held on the 24th it was agreed that fifty persons should be chosen, including all members of the former Local Assembly, to meet in the building which was formerly made over to the use of the local assembly, on the afternoon of the 26th. It was to be opened by the Governor-General, in conjunction with Mirza Ibrahim. The object of all parties was to conciliate the good-will of the foreign powers, especially the two neighbouring Powers, and of these especially Great Britain, as a Parliamentary country. Unfortunately, the programme of the nationalists could not make much progress. The Governor-General telegraphed to the Grand Vizier in apologetic terms, to the effect that a meeting of all the principal persons of Shiraz had decided to establish a local Assembly and he was helpless. In spite of the treacherous attitude of the Governor-General, the proposed Assembly met
under the presidency of Governor-General’s Vizier on 25th, 27th, 28th and 30th March. Several important decisions were taken. Asef-ed-Dowlah, the Governor-General also visited the Assembly, delivered a long speech and assured them that he was with them in heart all along. But it was clear like crystal that Shirazis were as hopelessly divided as ever. On April 3, 1909, Mr. Bill reported that the situation was very bad. He stated that the Shah’s authority was dead, at least temporarily but there was no faith in the Assembly too. Robbery was reported to be common on both the Isfahan and Bushire roads.  

The Kavanis had made some arrangement with the Assembly and they were supporting it, but Soulat Dowlah and Seyyid Abdul Husein Lari were against Kavani. There were difference between the Assembly and the Governor-General too. The attitude of the Governor-General was not clear. On one side, he declared his sympathies with the Constitution, on the other side, he was loyal to the Shah. At last, the Assembly decided to ask the Governor-General to explain his position in writing. He was told either to accept his appointment at the hands of the

1. CD 4733, Enclosure in No. 283, pp. 126-128.

* The Head of the Kavani Party, Masr-ed-Dowlah attended the meeting of 24th March, which decided to proclaim the establishment of a Constitutional Government of Fars. — see CD 4733, No. 173, p.84, Enclosure in No. 283, pp. 126-127.
Assembly and denounced the Shah or to resign. In the former case, he was to provide 10,000 l., which he might recover from the revenue, and another sum of the same amount which would be raised as an advance on the revenue payments. The Governor-General replied that he had always been in favour of the constitution, of which Mohammad Ali Shah was an integral part, that as the constitution was now in force in Shiraz, he considered himself a constitutional Governor, but if the constitutionalists would insist on explicitly renouncing his allegiance to the Shah, he would like to resign. The reply was evidently designed by its author to splitting up the opposition and it served its purpose. The extremists considered that it was tantamount to resignation where as the large number of those who were reluctant to commit anything, hopelessly declared that there must be a Governor-General, and it was better to have one with some status rather than the mere nominee of the Shiraz Assembly. However, Soulat-Dowlah came forward to help the Governor-General. On April 24, 1903, he informed the local Assembly that if Asef-ed-Dowlah was not maintained and properly obeyed as Governor-General, he would come himself to Shiraz and compel obedience to the Governor-General. He also disapproved the arrangement of the Assembly with the Kawanis, and of the method of selection of the Assembly, which he claimed was quite irregular. Nevertheless, he promised to co-operate with a constitutional Government of Fars which would consist with a properly constituted local council with Asef-ed-Dowlah as Governor-General. The message of Soulat upset the whole
scheme of the constitutionalists. Two prominent members of the Assembly rushed to Soulat’s camp. The Kawani also sent a messenger to him. In the meantime, Sayyid Abdul Hussein Lari had issued a notice to all Shirazis through which he instigated the inhabitants of Shiraz to take vengeance on the Kawamis. He warned those people, who had helped the Kawamis with arms and money and declared that if anyone would do this in future, he would be regarded as infidel with arms in hands, and his blood would be lawful to all Mohammedans. The Kawami-ul-Mulk called on Mr. Bill on April 25, 1909, complained against the Lari Sayyid who was openly threatening him and firmly stated that had he been forced to fight against the Sayyid, it would not only be against his will but would have also no concern with the general political situation. He sought the advice of Mr. Bill. The British representative replied that so far as the constitutional question was concerned the British had nothing to do with it. The real problem was the security of the trade routes which had effected everyone in Fars — either Persian or foreigner. Mr. Bill then suggested to the Kawami that he and Soulat being in a position to restore

+. The Kawamis brothers had led an expedition against the Lari Sayyid who was fighting for the constitution. Later on, the Kawamis associated themselves with the nationalists at Shiraz. Naturally, the Sayyid had no faith in Kawamis sincerity — See CD 4733, Enclosure in No. 81, p. 50, Enclosure in No. 110, p. 61, Enclosure in No. 174, p. 84, No. 173, p. 84.
peace, should unite and adopt joint measures to keep these roads opened and properly policed. In doing so, Mr. Bill continued to state, they would not only render greater public service, but it would be beneficial to their own interest. The Kawam-ul-Mulk replied that he had already sent a messenger to Soulat to make him known that Asef-ed-Dowleh was determined to create a gulf of difference between them. Mr. Bill then suggested that a personal interview between the two great men would tend to smoothen the difficulties, and that the Imam Jumeh, being a common friend of both parties, would be a suitable person to arrange it. Mr. Bill expected that Soulat and the Kawam might cooperate with each other as both had no real convictions on the constitution and would readily follow any government which could maintain itself. As the description of the internal politics does not come with in the scope of this work, it is sufficient to point out that the differences amongst the tribes could not be reconciled as the result of which lawlessness increased, the trade routes became more and more unsafe and there was a dead lock in business transactions. In early June of 1909 the Bushire Chamber of Commerce requested the British representative to make fresh urgent representations regarding hopelessly insecure state of the roads and continued dead lock in the trade. On 12th June, the Acting Russian Consul-General at Bushire, while on his way to Shiraz, was fired.

1. CD. 5120, Enclosure in No. 41, pp. 16-20.
upon. In the meantime, the leading Persian merchants at Shiraz telegraphed to the Persian Minister of Interior complaining bitterly of the state of public order and the incapacity of the Governor-General. The increasing lawlessness convinced Sir J. Barclay that the appointment of a new strong Governor-General of Fars was essential for the maintenance of peace and order. Consequently, he telegraphed to Sir E. Grey on June 14, 1909, that he did not expect any improvement unless the Shah appointed the Zil-es-Sultan as Governor of Fars, or, failing that, a corps of the road guards, properly drilled and paid, was instituted. One June 21, 1909, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia informed Sir J. Barclay that His Highness Zil-es-Sultan was about to return from Europe. He had been offered the governorship of Fars, which he had gladly accepted. The Kawamirs were also in favour of Zil-es-Sultan. On June 25, 1909, the Kawam informed Mr. Bill that if Zil-es-Sultan was appointed as Governor-General of Fars, he and his brother would leave for Europe as soon as

1. CD 5120, No. 53, p. 28, also see Enclosure in No. 90, p. 48.

2. Zil-es-Sultan, son of Nasirud-din Shah, once governed the most of the Southern provinces of Persia. He was hated by the Persians and was famous as an Anglophile. However, after the Anglo-Russian entente and the coup d'état of June 1908, the two Powers combined to bring about his departure from Persia. He had to go to Europe. Since then he was at Vienna.

3. Ibid., No. 54, p. 28.

4. Ibid., No. 61, pp. 30-31.
His Highness would arrive. At last, the British Minister in concert with the Russian Chargé d’affaires urged upon the Persian Government to make an announcement to the effect that Zil-es-Sultan had been appointed as Governor-General of Fars. Consequently, the declaration regarding Zil's appointment was made by Persian Government on July 13, 1909. It was also announced that Sardar Massood, the son of Zil-es-Sultan would act as his deputy, pending his return to Persia. Before the arrival of Zil-es-Sultan, the Shah was deposed and Asef-ed-Dowleh, the ex-Governor-General refused to vacate his office on the ground that the Government responsible for his dismissal and Zil's appointment, no longer existed. Mr. Bill telegraphed Sir G. Barclay that unless the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan was confirmed and ex-Governor-General was not recalled immediately, peace would not be restored. In case of the failure of the Persian Government to act in the above sense, Mr. Bill recommended the immediate dispatch of British troops from Bushire to Shiraz. Consequently, Sir G. Barclay made a representation to the Minister of Interior on July 18, 1909, regarding the situation in Fars and insisted for the confirmation of Zil’s appointment. The Minister of Interior refused to accept the British advice and informed Sir G. Barclay that he intended to appoint Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor of Shiraz.

The British Minister in concert with his Russian colleague,

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 176, p. 82.
2. Ibid., No. 111, p. 57.
3. Ibid., No. 113, p. 57.
renewed his representation next day regarding the confirmation of Zil's appointment and immediate removal of the ex-governor-general from Shiraz. He also informed the Minister of the Interior that he would defer ordering the dispatch of reinforcement, until to-morrow to see what steps were being taken by the Persian Government to restore peace in Shiraz. However, the new Persian Government refused to accept the British dictations regarding the appointment of the Governor but took immediate effective steps to re-establish peace at Shiraz. The British Minister, however, decided to wait for further report from his Consul at Shiraz before ordering the dispatch of reinforcement from Bushire.

On July 21, 1909, Sir J. Barclay reported that Ala-ed-Dowlah had been appointed as Governor-General at Shiraz and that the ex-Governor-General had been recalled. He further reported that the strict instructions had been issued to the new Governor-General to take effective steps for the restoration of peace and order. The appointment of Ala-ed-Dowlah was received with somewhat mixed feelings. The respectable class welcomed the appointment whereas the professional agitators resented it. On July 22, 1909, an agitation was started against Ala-ed-Dowlah and in favour of Zil-es-Sultan's return. On the

1. Ibid., No. 144, pp. 65-66.
2. Ibid., No. 150, p. 67.
3. Ibid., No. 158, p. 69.
23rd, Soulat Bowleh telegraphed to Asef-ed-Dowlah telling him not to leave Shiraz and that if he did so, he (Soulat) would bring him back. However, Asef-ed-Dowlah left Shiraz on the 24th July. Soulat started for Shiraz with a large force on July 25, 1909. He also sent a force to Abadan to prevent Ala-ed-Dowlah reaching Shiraz. Under these conditions, Mr. Bill requested Sir J. Barclay to allow the reinforcement of the Consular guard. The move was sanctioned. Consequently, fifty men and one maxin gun left Bushire to Shiraz to reinforce the Consular guard there. The British force reached Shiraz on August 2, 1909. Meanwhile, Soulat, who was marching towards Shiraz, encamped himself with 2,000 men at a distance of twelve miles from Shiraz. Sir J. Barclay instructed Mr. Bill to endeavour to persuade him not to advance. Mr. Bill visited him and reported to Sir J. Barclay on August 3, 1909, that Soulat did not wish to be Governor-General. He would accept anyone except Ala-ed-Dowlah whose enmity was of long standing and who was untrustworthy. Mr. Bill further reported that Soulat would withdraw every Kashgai from Shiraz the day another Governor-General was appointed. He consented not to advance and promised to wait for three days to see his demands fulfilled provided that the Kavam did not advance on Shiraz and Al-ed-Dowlah did not start to Shiraz from Teheran. However, the

1. Ibid., Enclosure, No. 220, p. 122.
2. Ibid., No. 169, p. 72.
3. Ibid., No. 180, p. 84.
Persian Government cancelled the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh and appointed Sahan-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars on August 11, 1909. 1

The main cause of the anxiety which compelled the Britishers to take active interest in the internal problem of Southern Persia, was the insecurity of the southern roads on account of which the British trade suffered considerably. As back as July 18, 1909, Major P.Z. Cox, the British Consul-General for Fars, had despatched a memorandum regarding the deplorable condition of the trade-routes. It was drawn up by H.G. Chick, the British Vice-Consul there. The memorandum stated that as the result of two years fighting amongst the Kashgai, Lur and Arab tribes in the vicinity of Shiraz and along the caravan routes leading to that business centre, the dispatch of goods in the districts which were fed by Shiraz, had become exceedingly difficult. Consequently, there was over flooding and congestion of goods in Shiraz. In addition to the unsafety of the trade-routes, political troubles and bad harvest were stated to be another cause which undermined the position of trade in Southern Persia. It was further stated that British firms like Messrs. David Sassoon and Co., Ltd., Messrs. Dixon and Co., Messrs Livingstone, Zeytoon and Co., Ltd., Messrs Grey, Paul, and Co., etc. had either collapsed or functioning in very unsatisfactory conditions.

1. Ibid., No. 189, p. 34, also Enclosure in No. 220, pp. 122-123.
A British Indian firm was stated to have decided to close up its Bushire Branch. There was a considerable reduction in the goods imported from Britain. The year 1908-1909 witnessed the decrease in the import of Manchester goods alone in Bushire from 439,937 l. to 318,375 l.; the year 1909-1910 was also exceedingly unpromising. The first quarter's figure being only 41,585 l. The memorandum declared that the proclamation or inception of a constitution did not offer any probability of the slightest improvement in the safety of the Bushire-Shiraz and Bander-i-Abbas — Kerman routes. It was feared that Pars would take years to return to normalcy. Under the sub-heading 'Extortion by Khans along Roads', the memorandum stated that the local chieftains along the 180 miles of the Bushire-Shiraz road had challenged the authority of the Governor-General of Pars and had become independent. They were fighting amongst themselves. The posts were being tampered with and robbed off commonly. The memorandum complained that against the article 4 of the Commercial Convention of 1903, rahadriwas being extorted by armed tribesmen along the route in ever-increasing amounts and when protested in 1907, the local Governor replied that he was powerless as the Minister of Finance still included this item in schedule of revenue. Dealing under the heading the 'State of the Main Route', the memorandum stated that the Imperial road, passing through Borajun, Daliki, and up the mountains to Kazerun, had been block for the last two months.
Traffic being unsafe on the main road, the native merchants endeavoured to get permission to use Firozabad route. Due to the absence of telegraph on this route, the increased chances of robbery, the dearth of forage, provisions and caravan accommodation etc., the British merchants hesitated to use this route for the transport of their goods. Under the title 'Dearth of Transport', the non-availability of the muleteers was described. Being ill-treated and plundered by the robbers and road guards, the muleteers migrated either to Yezd road or to Resht road. The another sub-heading 'Price of Transport', dealt with increasing cost of transport. An increase from 11. 3s to 51. 3s was stated. The rate of insurance was reported to have enormously increased as the result of which the risk of robbery was described to have fallen on the British exporters rather than on the Insurance Companies or on the Persian buyers. The whole memorandum after describing the darkest and gloomy picture of the situation, expressed its doubt as to the abilities of any Governor-General of Fars to restore peace and maintain order. Under these conditions, Major Cox suggested his Government either to take some definite action or to cooperate with the Central Persian Government, in any form, to enable her to restore order and maintain peace. 

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 183, pp. 87-89, also see British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op. cit., pp. 784-86.

2. CD 5120, No. 183, p. 87, also see British And Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 783.
Sir G. Grey refrained to take any action but instructed Sir G. Barclay on August 18, 1909, to insist upon the Persian Government to put an end to exaction of madari. He, however, stated that the whole matter was one of considerable importance and decided to wait till he received a report from his Minister at Teheran. On September 23, 1909, Sir G. Barclay addressed a note to Sardar Assad, the Minister of the Interior, drawing his attention towards the deplorable condition of the trade-routes in Southern Persia, and more especially to that between Bushire and Shiraz. It was stated that the Bushire-Shiraz route had been practically closed for the use of commercial transportation due to the disturbances, robberies, and illegal exactions. Sir G. Barclay expressed his great anxiety on the failure of the Persian Government to maintain peace on account of which heavy losses had been incurred on British Commerce. He urged upon the Persian Government to take immediate effective steps to make the road safe and insisted for the suppression of the illegal exactions on the roads which were against the article 4 of the Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention of 1903.


2. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 247, pp. 140-141, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 835.
was confident, would restore order on the roads.\footnote{1} Later on, it was reported that the new Governor-General of Fars, Sahamed-Dowlah, who arrived at Shiraz early in September, had turned his attention to the conditions of the roads and had dispatched troops to open them up. On October 7, 1909 Sir S. Barclay informed Sir E. Grey that he had received good reports about the abilities of the new Governor-General of Fars, who promised to deal with the situation firmly.\footnote{3} On October 30, 1909, Sir S. Barclay recognized that there was some improvement in the condition of the southern roads.\footnote{4} But the situation deteriorated again. The condition of the roads grew worse. The month of November (1909) witnessed increased lawlessness. Several robberies occurred. In addition to the robberies, M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General at Bushire, was attacked by Boir-Ahmadis while he was on way from Shiraz to Bushire. He was compelled to discontinue his journey (the incident has been referred at length). The Bushire road was quite unsafe. The telegraph line was constantly being interfered with by Kashgais who, on one occasion, detained and beat a signaller. The Boir-Ahmadis

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1} CD 5120, No. 247, p. 140, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 834.
\footnote{2} CD 5120, Enclosure in No. 249, p. 145.
\footnote{3} Ibid., No. 248, p. 142, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 837.
\footnote{4} CD 5120, No. 253, p. 153.
\end{footnotes}
were also active on Pars-Isfahan border. They plundered caravans and killed five men. It was reported that nothing short of a strong expedition would bring the Boir-Ahmadies in to order. The Governor-General was powerless to punish the tribesmen. Under these conditions, the British Minister urged the Central Government to send immediate support to the Governor-General. The Governor-General was so powerless as to declare in the end of October that he would not be responsible for the safety of Firuzabad route. Consequently, the caravans began to use the Kazerun route. But this route was placed in charge of Kawamis — the traditional enemies of Kashgais. Naturally, the Kashgais did not cooperate with the Kawamis and began to molest the caravans. In addition to this, the Khans of Daliki and Borajun began to extort illegal road tax. The growing anarchy annoyed the Britishers and Mr. J.H. Bill, the Acting British Consul at Shiraz recommended Sir O. Barclay on December 15, 1909, to notify the Central Government of Persia that on account of (a) "the extreme danger to the foreign subjects whose legitimate avocations compel them to travel from place to place in Persia; e.g. in 1909 alone, the robbery of Mr. Gentleman in March, Mr. Linton and Mr. Smith in April, Mr. Middleton in June, Messrs Wright and James in August, and the Russian Consul-General in November, every one of which robberies has remained absolutely unfurnished; (b) the ever growing list

1. CS. 5556, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 9.
of foreign claims for goods robbed on the trade route, which has risen in 1909 in Fars alone from 40,609.3 tomans to 57,063.8 tomans; (c) the regular increase in the wilful damage account of the Indo-European telegraph Department which is already about double the last year's total (1st Feb. 1908 - 1st Feb. 1909), and of yet more importance, the continual danger of assault and robbery run by the telegraphy gholams on repairing duty, which has frequently manifolded the line with total interruption owing to the natural reluctance of the men to go out, the time has come for the Persian Government to show its ability to establish and maintain order, or to acquiesce in the punishment of the most prominent offenders by a British force, the cooperation of Persian forces, if though desirable, being welcomed. On the eventual collapse of the Persian efforts, it made at all, the landing of a British punitive force would follow. Mr. Bill emphasised that there was no alternative except the above mentioned regarding the restoration of peace and pointed out that if the necessity of active measures was recognized, the sooner they were undertaken the better, as with each successful robbery, the robbers were becoming better armed, better organized and bolder. Mr. G. Barclay refrained from recommending his Government to dispatch an expedition to punish the tribes. He telegraphed to Sir E. Grey on January 1, 1910 that by deprecating such a step at the present moment, it was hard to avoid the conviction

1. Ibid. Enclosure 1 in N. 28, p. 29, for the full text of Bill's despatch, see pp. 10-20.
that we should be forced at no distant date to consider the necessity of departing from our policy as formulated in your telegram to Sir A. Nicolson of the 3rd February 1903, unless the Persian Government was promptly supplied with funds.

He stated that only prompt financial help would enable the Persians to restore peace. Citing the example of Rahim Khan's defeat at the hands of Government's forces, he claimed that this would certainly add to the prestige of the Government and advocated that the present moment was especially opportune for the grant of an advance. Meanwhile, the authority of Saham-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General of Fars was being seriously threatened by Soulat-ed-Dowleh. The Governor-General had no alternative but to present the following demands as the condition of retaining office:

1. That Soulat should be ordered to cooperate in the maintenance of order, in default of which he should be dismissed as chief of his tribe.

2. The Governor-General should be empowered to employ the entire revenue of province of Fars for the period of one year to satisfy pressing local needs, but, above all, to organize necessary force of troops.

The following policy regarding Persia was formulated by Sir E. Grey:

'His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the best course to adopt would be for Great Britain and Russia to stand entirely aloof from the internal affairs of Persia, allowing the existing chaos to endure till whatever element in the country is strongest gains the day. During this interval, they would be prepared to face the danger which might be involved to British commercial interests'. CD. 4733, Enclosure in No. 70, p. 45.

1. CD 5656, No. 11, p. 10.
2. Ibid., No. 1, p. 10.
On the other hand, Soulat put forward certain demands as the pre-condition for restoration of peace and order. He demanded that the entire road in Fars should be placed under his control and that he should be given the governorship of several districts bordering on it, independent of Saqam. The acceptance of these demands, Sir J. Barclay commented, would certainly result in the shape of resignation of Saqam had Karjuzar and would lead to the renewal of disturbances among the Khamseh tribesmen, whereas if the demands were not accepted, the British Minister believed that dis-orders on Isfahan and Bushire roads would continue. However, the Persian Government refused to accept the demands of Soulat, as the result of which, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Shiraz appeared to be on the mercy of Soulat. All traffic between Shiraz and Bushire practically ended. However, Soulat made an arrangement with the merchants by which he guaranteed the safety of the road via Jir-e-h, but the refusal of the Governor-General to endorse his guarantee prevented the merchants from using this route, the traders feared that the Central Government would repudiate the liability for losses. The incapabilities of the Governor-General to deal with the situation and growing differences between him and Soulat resulted in his dismissal sometimes in January 1910. Farman Farma was appointed in his place. Later on, on February 1, 1910, Sir J. Barclay telegraphed to Sir 2. Grey that he had

1. Ibid., No.3, p. 2.
2. Ibid., No.18, 19, p. 16 No.29, p.21, Enclosure in No. 30, p.23.
received a written communication from the Minister of the Interior that the Jirreh route, which was practically safe, had been substituted for the Shiraz – Busheir road. Sir G. Barclay interpreted this communication as the acceptance of responsibility for the safety of the route by the Persian Government and declared that she would hold the Persian Government responsible for the robberies on goods being transported on it. In the months of February and March 1910 the caravans used the route via Jirreh from Busheir to Shiraz freely but all was dependent on the good pleasure of Soulat. The Persian Government was unable to subdue him. The Kazerun route to Busheir and Isfahan road continued to be unsafe. Several posts were robbed. The telegraph line was also repeatedly interfered with. Farman Farma resigned the post of Governor-General. Zafer-es-Sultaneh was appointed in his place. In short the situation continued to be alarming. At last, a worst possible incident happened. Mr. Hill, the British Acting Consul at Shiraz was attacked by robbers on April 15, 1910, between Kumisheh and Abadeh while he was on way to Isfahan. Two Indian sowars of his escort were killed. In a telegraphic message to Sir R. Grey, Sir G. Barclay stated that recent outrage had made it absolutely necessary that "we should take some over action with a view both to rousing the Persian Government to make serious effort for the re-establishment of its authority in those regions, and to ensuring the safety

1. Ibid, No. 20, p. 16.
2. Ibid, No. 46, p. 29. Enclosure in No. 47, p. 31, No. 68.
of our officials in future against such attacks. He further stated that he was consulting the British Consular officers at Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bushire regarding the measures to be taken in Persia. On April 22, 1910, Mr. Harling the British Charge d'Affaires, reported to Sir E. Grey that the British Consular officers at Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire had unanimously recommended the occupation of the roads by British forces as it was unavoidable in order to check further attacks on European officials. Under these conditions, Mr. Harling sought the permission of Sir E. Grey to state that if within six weeks, security was not established, the British Government would take her own measures to restore peace. In reply, Sir E. Grey authorised Mr. Harling on April 26, 1910 to demand from Persian Government a compensation of 5,000 tomans each for the murder of two sowars and to inform them that the British Government would not tolerate continued outrages on European officials. He was also authorized to urge upon the Persian Government to arrange for proper policing of the roads without delay. In addition, Sir E. Grey advised the British Consular officers to avoid travelling in the interior. If at all, the necessity of travelling arose, a large escort was

1. Ibid., No. 74, p. 39.
2. Ibid., No. 75, p. 40.
advised to accompany them. On the instructions of Sir E. Grey, Mr. Marling addressed a note to the Persian Government, on April 28, 1910, claiming compensation of 10,000 tomans for murder of the two Indian sowars. He also warned the Persian Government that continuance of such outrages on European official would not be tolerated in future. But the Persian Government returned, no reply. Consequently, Mr. Marling communicated another note in this respect on May 11, 1910. On May 25, 1910 the Minister of the Interior promised to do all in his power to improve the security of trade-routes. He stated that the caravans would be able to travel in a few weeks. But as the situation in Fars was precarious, Mr. Marling, the British Charge d'Affaires doubted any real improvement. Nevertheless, he believed the sincerity of the Minister of the Interior.

The Persian Government, inspite of her repeated promise to restore peace, could not get success in improving the situation. Practically all main routes used by British traders were reported on July 2, 1910, to be unsafe. The British Charge d'Affaires urged upon the Persian Government both verbally and in writing, the paramount importance of taking effective steps to put an end of the existing state of affairs.

1. Ibid., No. 77, p. 40.
2. Ibid., No. 105, p. 52. Enclosure in No. 105, pp. 52-53, Enclosure 2 in No. 105, p. 53.
3. Ibid., No. 96, p. 48.
affairs. Mr. Harling, however, doubted as to whether the representations would serve any purpose. He recognized that the Persian Government was quite alive to the situation but she had neither money nor men to accomplish her plans regarding the re-establishment of peace. Nevertheless, he suggested that a warning should be given to Persian Government to the effect that if, by the end of September, such a degree of security as to permit ordinary caravan traffic to be resumed, was not established, the British Government would take necessary steps in this respect. The warning, Mr. Harling considered, would encourage the few Persians who realized that until European assistance in shape of advisers and instructors, was enlisted, no progress in the field of reorganization and reformation could be achieved, consequently, they would plead their views more vehemently. It would bring the Government and the Majliss face to face with their desperate financial position, to which they had shut their eyes. Mr. Harling believed that under the pressure of this kind of threat, the Persian Government would find means to restore order. He expected that the warning would compel the Persian Government to send N. Yekrim to Fars to restore peace. N. Yekrim had recently crushed the rebels in Azerbaijan successfully and Mr. Harling believed that it was Russian threat which compelled the Persian

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The financial problem and the loan negotiations will be dealt later on.
Government to afford him to Azerbaijan to control the situation there. In the meanwhile, there had been a notable increase of insecurity on the main roads. The Kashgai robbers were reported to be very active. They were terrorising the environs of Isfahan. Under these conditions, Mr. Harling decided to send Abbas Kuli Khan as his agent, to inform the Council of Ministers that the British Government would no longer tolerate the almost total suspension of her trade in Persia. Abbas Kuli Khan called on the Council of Ministers on July 7, 1910, and in the presence of all Ministers, read out the notes which Mr. Harling had written regarding the deplorable situation prevailing in southern Persia. He also inquired from the Cabinet of the ultimate result of the growing lawlessness. Sardar Assad, Minister of War, promptly replied that the Persian Government had highly appreciated the friendliness hitherto shown by the British Government in avoiding to make a military demonstration in the country and that the Government would take energetic measures to restore peace in Fars and elsewhere as she had done in north. The Sardar informed the British agent that the Bakhtiyaris had been ordered to pursue and punish the Kashgai brigands near Isfahan. As regards to Fars, he stated that a radical change in the administration of that province was absolutely necessary and that the Cabinet was engaged in discussing the matter, the result of which would be communicated to the British Legation.¹ The moneyless Government of Persia,

¹ Ibid., No.122, p. 63, No.145, pp.70-71 and Enclosure in No. 143, p. 71.
earnestly wished to restore peace so that she could avoid British armed intervention, but could do nothing. Situation in Kermanshah and Hamadan also deteriorated. Sir E. Grey decided the desirability of joint Anglo-Russian representation regarding the state of affairs and consequently, telegraphed on July 28, 1910, to Sir A. Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to urge on Isvolsky to that effect. According to the instruction, Sir A. Nicolson called on M. Isvolsky on July 29, 1910, and conveyed the message of his Foreign Minister to him. Isvolsky promised that he would shortly give his reply in this regard. But the prevailing disorders had made the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs so much annoyed that he could not even wait the reply of his proposal put forwarded to Russian Government and prepared a new scheme for the maintenance of peace in Southern Persia. On August 8, 1910, he informed Mr. O'Beirne, the Councillor of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg (sometime, Charge d’Affaires) that the British Charge d’Affaires at Tehran had recommended that the Persian Government should be informed that if order on the southern road was not restored by September, the British Government would herself undertake to perform the duty. But as the policy of active intervention, Sir E. Grey stated, was open to objection, he did not wish to commit his Government to such a policy and proposed the formation of a body of road-
guards consisting of some 1,000 or 1,200 men, levied and officered by eight or ten officers of Indian army, but by the Government of India. He hoped that this measure would prove sufficient to attain the object in view and instructed O’Beirne to explain the nature of the scheme to the Russian Government. The British Charge d’Affaires was also instructed to propose to the Russian Government that the representatives of the two nations at Teheran would insist on its acceptance by the Persian Government. According to the instructions, Mr. O’Beirne handed over an aide-memoire to Mr. Sazonow, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 12, 1910. The aide-memoire suggested that the Persian Government should be informed that if she failed to restore peace on the southern roads by the end of September, the above mentioned scheme for the policing of the trade-routes would be imposed upon her. It also proposed that the instructions should be sent to the representatives of the two nations at Teheran to make a strong joint representation to the Persian Government regarding the insecurity of the trade-routes, and to insist on the acceptance of the scheme in question by the Persian Government. On August 22, 1910, Mr. Sazonow communicated an aide-memoire to Mr. O’Beirne, in reply to the British note. It is stated that the Russian Minister at Teheran had been instructed to join his British colleague in making a strong representation regarding the insecurity prevailing on southern roads. It also

1. Ibid., No. 152, pp. 77-78, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op.cit., pp. 925–926.
declared that the Russian Government had no objection to the proposed formation of a force, analogous to the Persian Cossack Brigade, levied and officered by the Indian officers but suggested that the period of two months, given to Persian Government for restoration of peace and order, should be extended to three months. The extension of period, the Russian aide-memoire pleaded, was desirable particularly in view of the impending appointment of a new Governor-General of Fars, probably Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh. On August 24, 1910, Sir J. Barclay, the British Minister at Teheran, agreed to the Russian suggestion that a period of three months should be given to the Persian Government in order to re-establish peace. In a telegraphic communication to Sir E. Grey, Sir J. Barclay stated that the Persian Government was intending to appoint Ain-ed-Dowleh in place of Zafar-es-Sultaneh as Governor-General of Fars. He expressed his hope that the new Governor-General would be able to improve the situation. As regards to the joint Anglo-Russian representation, Sir J. Barclay stated that though, he still adhered to the advisability of such a step.

1. CD. 5656, No. 162, pp. 88-89. Enclosure I in No. 162, p. 89; Enclosure 2 in No. 162, p. 90, No. 155, p. 78.

* Zafer-es-Sultaneh was dismissed from the governorship of Fars on August 9, 1910. The recall of Zafer-es-Sultaneh was stated by Mr. Harling as an indication of healthy sign — CD 5656, No. 159, p. 81, and Enclosure in No. 159, p. 85.
yet, if the representation was not accompanied by an offer of money, it should be postponed for the present. Moreover, the new Cabinet was reported to be promising. It had already announced that the restoration of peace would be one of its first tasks. Consequently, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. O’Shea on August 27, 1910, to inform the Russian Government that the representations should be deferred for a while.

Zafer-es-Sultaneh, the ex-Governor-General had left for Teheran on August 17, 1910. Aim-ed-Dowlah was appointed as Governor-General of Pars in his place. As the new Governor-General of was in Teheran, Kavam-ul-Mulk was appointed as Acting Governor-General. He maintained good order in the town, but was powerless in the province. The Kazerun road to Bushire remained closed, but caravans used the Feruzabad road. The main road to Isfahan was practically at the mercy of Kashgai and Arab tribesmen who used to rob the post regularly. The telegraph line was being continually interrupted and the men sent out to repair them, were robbed and beaten. The Governor of Darab and all the officials were reported to have abandoned their posts, leaving the districts at the mercy of Baharlus. The Kashgais under Sulat-ed-Dowlah were reported to

+ The new Cabinet was formed on July 25, 1910, CD. 5656, No. 134, p. 67.
1. CD 5656, No. 156, p. 79.
2. Ibid., No. 157, p. 79.
be migrating south wards. They plundered the countryside, south of Abadeh and were raiding even the outskirts of Shiraz.\(^1\) In short, the situation had become very alarming. Meanwhile, the departure of Ain-ed-Dowlah was delayed, the Government being unable to find funds for equipping a force to accompany him.\(^2\) The resignation of Farman Farma, the Minister of the Interior, in the month of September 1910, from the Cabinet, added much to the anxiety. He resigned due to the difference of opinion with his colleague respecting the attitude to be adopted by the Government towards Soulat-ed-Dowlah, the Kashgai chief. The Minister of the Interior favoured the retention of Soulat as Chief of Kashgai, at least till the arrival of a Governor-General at Shiraz. He maintained that to dismiss Soulat at this juncture would bring about a worse situation in Fars than actually existed, whereas the Cabinet favoured his immediate dismissal.\(^3\) At last, Sir G. Barclay delivered the Persian Government the famous ultimatum on October 14, 1910, complaining of the condition of the southern roads and trade-routes, Sir G. Barclay warned the Persian Government that if within three months order was not restored upon the roads from Bushire to Shiraz and from Shiraz to

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1. Ibid., Enclosure in N.181, p. 101.
2. Ibid., No.181, p.98.
3. The Kashghais were divided into two groups, one under Zaygham-ed-Dowlah, the brother of Soulat-ed-Dowlah, another under Soulat-ed-Dowlah (chief of Kashgai tribe). The issue of difference was the Ilkhaniship of the Kashghais — CD. 5656, Enclosure in N.173, p. 95.
Isfahan, the British Government would herself take necessary steps for proper policing these roads. The British Minister informed the Persian Government that in case of her failure to maintain peace, the British Government would organize a local force, consisting of 1,000 to 1,200 men, levied and commanded by a number of British officers from Indian army. The expenses of the force would be met in part by a surcharge of 10 per cent on the custom duties on all goods imported at the southern ports, and in part from the revenues of province of Fars. In reply to the British ultimatum, Husein Kuli Khan, the Foreign Minister of Persia, communicated a note to Sir J. Barclay on October 21, 1910. Referring the deplorable and most disturbed condition of the country at the time when the Nationalists assumed power, the note claimed some definite improvement in the situation, although, the presence of foreign troops on the soil of Persia caused public resentment and provided pretext for incitement and intrigue to those persons who profited themselves by the former disturbances. Furthermore, the incidents at Karadagh, Ardebil, Zenjan, Veramin and other places constantly occupied the attention of the Government. The note, however, acknowledged that disorders were still prevailing at certain places but pleaded that it were due to fact that there were persons, who for their personal interests, were engaged in intrigue against the Government and who desired the country to remain in a state of unrest. These persons, when discovered used to take

refuge in various legations. Thus they availed themselves of foreign protection and considered themselves exempted from inevitable exile which was customary for such refugees. They used to intrigue with in and without the precincts of the legations. There were some others, who were foreign nationals but mixed themselves with the Persians by pretending that they were Persian subjects and committed crimes without let or hinder and declared themselves to be foreign subjects to evade the jurisdiction of the Persian Government. There were Persian subjects too, who illegally pretended to be foreign nationals and committed various crimes of sedition. These conditions were stated to be responsible for provoking disturbances in the country. Moreover, the continued presence of the foreign troops had encouraged persons, who were treacherously engaged against the Government. The prolonged stay had also encouraged the seditious people to unfoundedly hope of the return of the former regime. Further more, the financial straits and embarrassment of the Persian Government were stated to be another cause of the incompetency of the Persian Government to maintain the desired peace. The note referred to the endeavours of the Persian Government to get a loan from the two great neighbours (Russia and Britain) so that a considerable portion of it could be devoted to increase the security of roads but which could not be obtained due to the humiliating conditions imposed by these powers. The acceptance of such conditions would
have been contrary to the independence of the kingdom (the loan negotiations would be dealt later on). However, the Persian Government was engaged to secure a loan from other sources and as soon as money was obtained, she would endeavour to fully eradicate the sedition and incitement in the country. Along with the negotiations to secure a loan, the note stated, the Government was considering the ten per cent increase on the custom revenues, as suggested by the above mentioned British note. The Persian note further stated that as the suggestion contained in the British note was contrary to the independence of the Persian Government, the Government would never give her consent to it but promised that an increased ten per cent tax on custom revenues would be levied by the Government herself to maintain her independence and to remove the cause of British anxiety. Lastly, the note claimed that the commerce had not suffered at all and in proof, it drew the attention of the British Government to the extra-ordinary increase of the custom receipts from the south. Furnishing with the statistical figures, the note stated an increase of 100,000 tomans in the Arabian custom receipts in the year 'Takasouï-il' (1909-10), as compared to the previous year. Extraordinary increase during the running year was also stated. The note further claimed an increase of about 19 per cent in the whole of Persian imports during the year 1909-10 over the imports of the year 'Phichi-il'(1908-9). During the five months of that running year, an increase of 20 per cent was stated. The note concluded by stating that in view of the above facts, the foreign subjects and no reason of complain regarding the
In addition to the note, Sardar Assad called on Sir J. Barclay on November 11, 1910, and requested for an extension of the period of three months — given to the Persian Government for restoration of peace and order. Sir J. Barclay replied that unless the British Government was satisfied that the Persian Government was taking effective measures to cope with the disorders on the roads, the question of postponing the execution of the scheme did not arise. He, however, suggested to Sardar Assad that it would be in the interest of the Persian Government to draw up such a scheme for the restoration of peace which would itself create confidence in the British Government about the capabilities of the Persian Government to maintain law and order. Neither the Persian note could satisfy Sir J. Barclay nor the Sardar’s interview could create any considerable change in the attitude of the British Minister of Teheran, who addressed to Persian Government another note on November 17, 1910. It was a reply to the Persian communication of October 21, 1910. Dealing with the presence of the foreign troops on the Persian soil, a reference to which had been made in the Persian note, the new British note stated that the British Government was not

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1. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 199, pp. 106-109, also see British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op.cit., pp. 967-968, see Appendix No. 2

2. CD 5656, No. 201, p. 109.
concerned with this problem. His Majesty's Government was concerned, the note stated, with the disorders prevailing on the southern roads and the reference to the presence of the foreign troops on Persian soil in this connection was irrelevant. As regards to the Persian claim concerning the increase in the total volume of the trade for the year 1909-10 (Takdaghouli), as compared with the year 1908-9, and the further increase during the first five months of the current year, the British note pointed out that the increase in the volume of the trade had not taken place in the south but in the north. Contrary to the claim of the Persian note, the British note asserted that a considerable decrease had occurred in the Bushire customs receipts during the preceding years. However, the note acknowledged an increase in the southern customs receipts during the first five months of the running year but the increase was attributed to the exceptionally good harvest. An increase of some 12 per cent was accepted in the Bushire receipts. Notwithstanding the accepted increase, the British note stated that it could not be denied that certain southern roads were practically closed for transportation due to the prevailing disorders. The note, then suggested to the Persian Government to take effective steps to establish peace. According to it, it could be accomplished with the help of British officers, lent from the Indian army. As the officers lent from Indian army would take service under the Persian Government, the note pleaded, it would not be country to the sovereign rights of Persia. Lastly, the note declared that the contemplated 10 per cent surcharge on goods passing through
the southern customs would be consented by the British Government only on the condition that the proceeds were to be spent effectively on securing the safety of the southern trade-routes. The acceptance of the scheme proposed in the British note of October 14, 1910, the note further declared, would satisfy this condition. However, a slight change in the tone of the British note as compared with her previous note, was notable. Instead of direct execution of the scheme for policing the roads by British Government herself, the present note proposed to the Persian Government to take up the task herself. There would have been a more favourable change in the British attitude, had the riots at Shiraz not

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 206, pp. 114-115, also see British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op. cit., pp. 968-69. See Appendix No. 3.

The anti-jews riots occurred in Shiraz on October 30, 1910. The basis of the riots was reported to be alleged murder of a Muslim girl by Jews. The rioters broke into the government house, completely sacked the court of justice, and destroyed or carried away every thing including the archives. They even threatened Kawam-ul-Mulk, the Acting Governor-General, who, however, drove them out. Later on, the rioters attacked the Jewish quarters. Eleven Jews were killed and fifteen wounded. Great harm was done to the Jews, their properties were looted and houses were destroyed. Soldiers sent to defend the Jews, joined the rioters in pillaging. Kashghairs also join them. It was reported that Soulat-ed-Dowleh had instigated the riot in order to compel the Central Government to give him full powers so that he could turn out the Kawamis. However, Mr. Smart, the British agent, arranged a relief subscription with the local authorities to help the Jews. Sir J. Barclay also addressed a note to the Persian Government holding her responsible for harm to British lives and property. CD. 5656, Enclosure in No. 203, p. 112, No. 190, p. 104.
occurred and if Lingah would have not been threatened by Ghulam Husain Khan. Moreover, a Baluchis force under Jehind and Mohammed Bega Khan threatened to advance on the district of Warmashur. The situation in Kermanshah was also reported unsatisfactory. 1

The British note of 14th October caused great resentment amongst the Persians. A circular was widely distributed in Tehran, calling on all patriots to meet on 17th November, 1910 in Artillery Square to demonstrate against the continued presence of Russian troops and against the British note.

+ It was reported on October 22, 1910, that a well-known marauder named Ghulam Husain Khan of Darvazi was marching on Lingah with a large following. The situation was alarming and the British Vice-Consul asked for the presence of a warship there. Consequently, a British warship 'Fox' was ordered to proceed. It arrived off Lingah on 24th October. On 25th October, the British Minister at Tehran, authorised the landing of a sufficient force for the protection of lives and property of the foreigners, if an attack appeared eminent. At the same time, Ghulam Khan was warned against marching to Lingah. A Persian force dispatched to stop the marauders was reported to have been defeated on 27th Oct. This development in the situation alarmed the Britishers. Consequently, 160 men with 4 guns were landed from 'Fox' on Oct. 29th. The chief of Baghur was reported to have embarked 800 men at Shirah to attack Lingah. A British ship named 'Olin' was sent to deal with him. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 203 p. 113.

1. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 203, p. 112.

++ This demonstration was organized to protest against the British note of October 14, 1910. The new British note of November 17, 1910, added much to the fuel. A few weeks ago a demonstration, in favour of Persia, had already been organized at Constantinople(Turkey) against the action of Great Britain and Russia in Persia.
respecting the condition of the south. At appointed time, people assembled and the principal Mujtahid declared the proceedings opened. The action of England and Russia was characterised by the various speakers as directed towards the termination of Persia’s independence. Sir J. Barclay tried to minimize the importance of the demonstration by reporting that only few hundred people participated and that the meeting could not evoke much patriotic enthusiasm amongst the ‘indifferent’ gathering. He, however, acknowledged that the interpretation of the British note by a section of European press as fore-runner of the partition of Persia between Great Britain and Russia, had not fallen unheeded in Persia. He further reported that the articles published in European press had been translated and published with exaggerated comments. An open letter from the chief Priest of Najef to the foreign representatives at Teheran, was reported to have been published in the Persian press, in which a fervent appeal was made to justice and honour against the aggressive aims of Great Britain and Russia. Furthermore, the Persian Government was taking such steps as to satisfy the British, so that the threatened intervention could be avoided. In order to appease the British Government, the Persian Government authorities decided to appoint Zil-es-Sultaneh, the Anglophil, as Governor-General of Fars. On November 3, 1910, the Cabinet sent a telegram to Zil-es-Sultaneh, offering him the Governorship, but Jellal-es-Dowleh the Zil’s son, telegraphically advised his father not to accept

1. CD 5656, No. 207, p. 115.
Thereupon, the Persian Government appointed Nizam-es-Sultaneh as Governor-General of Fars. He had been a successful Governor of Kermanshah and had some influence in the province of Fars. The Minister of War had undertaken to despatch a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men to Shiraz. Meanwhile, it was announced that Soulat had guaranteed the safety of the main route from Bushire to Shiraz. In addition to these measures, the Persian Government constituted a Committee to deal with the disorders prevailing in Persia. The Committee was reported to be engaged in considering the desirability of organizing a force of road-guards to be commanded by Swedish officers. Sir J. Grey received favourably to this report and wrote to Sir J. Barclay that any expressed intention on the part of the Persian Government to engage as officers of proposed police force the national of a minor power must be accepted as an earnest of their sincere intention.

2. Ibid., No. 201, p. 109.

It seems desirable to point out that in order to maintain peace and to increase the impetus of reformation in the country, the Persian Majliss had decided in September 1910, to engage a French assistant for the Ministry of Justice and several Italian instructors for the gendarmerie, in addition to American advisers for the Finance Department. But considering these measures against their interest, the two big Powers (Russia and Great Britain) instructed their Minister at Teheran to dissuade the Persian Government from engaging any subjects of a European Great Power. M. Sazonov went so far as to suggest to Sir J. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on September 14, 1910, to give a joint warning to the Persian rulers to the effect that if they did not alter their generally refractory attitude in regard not only to the question of foreign advisers, but to various other questions such as conversion...
desire to see matters mended. However, he reserved the
right of the British Government to insist on the appointment
of British-Indian officers, at any moment, if necessary arose. 1

of the Russian Bank debt, the satisfaction demanded for
attacks on British and Russian Consular officers, and
the conditions attached by Russia to the withdrawal of
the Kazvin force, strong and energetic measures would
be taken by the two Governments. Among the means of
the pressure suggested by M. Sazonow were threats to
seize the customs, to increase the Russian forces, to
suspend the transit of military stores for Persia through
Caucasus. However, the British Government strongly
deprecated the course proposed, considering that it would
not be likely to result in the formation of a more con-
ciliatory Persian Cabinet, and fearing that it might
lead to an occupation of North Persia. Failing to enlist
the British Coöperation, M. Sazonow abandoned the idea
of joint pressure, though he intimated that his Government
might use pressure on its own account. Russia, in fact,
desired a more submissive Cabinet in Persia. M. Poklewski,
the Russian Minister at Tehran, endeavoured to bring about
the downfall of the Cabinet in Power, but Sir J. Barclay
thought that there was no prospect of its being replaced
by one less extremely nationalist. Consequently, a
pronounced divergence of opinion was reported to have been
driven between the two representatives. Meanwhile, the
British Government had decided to deliver an ultimatum
to the Persian Government (the ultimatum was delivered
on October 14, 1910) and the cooperation of Russia in
this respect was deemed necessary. Breaking all the rules
of international morality, the British Govt. instructed her
Minister at Tehran not to allow any divergence of view
with the Russian Minister and to give active support to
the demands made by Russia as conditions for the withdrawal
of the Russian troops, even if the joint pressure of the
two representatives should endanger the existence of the
then existing Persian Cabinet. This black mail, enabled
the British Government to secure the Russian support —

However, there was some definite improvement in the situation. Therefore, on December 28, 1910, the Persian Government confidently communicated a reply to the British note of November 17, 1910. Referring to the problem of the presence of the foreign troops on the Persian soil, which was stated by the previous Persian note as one of the sources responsible for the disturbances prevailing in southern Persia but which reference in connection with the lawlessness in Southern Persia was described by the British note as irrelevant, the new Persian note stated that the continued stay of the foreign troops had naturally engaged the attention of the Government and caused her prestige to suffer as well as caused the good intention of the Government to maintain complete order unproductive of result. Regarding the communications between Bushire and Shiraz, the note stated that in order to uphold commercial relations, Soulat-ed-Dowlah had been appointed to maintain law and order on the Bushire-Shiraz road. In addition, the note enumerated several preliminary measures being taken by the Persian Government for the maintenance of peace. The Persian note categorically rejected the British charge that the British commerce had suffered and statistically proved that the general trade in south had increased and progressed. Regarding the surtax of 10 per cent on the southern customs, the note stated that in view of the supreme importance attached by the Persian Govt. to the perfection of order and the consolidation of commercial relations, the Persian Government would institute a scheme by which the revenue derived from that source would be
effectively applied to the expenditure in view." Sir J. Barclay communicated the reply of the above Persian note on January 21, 1911. He expressed his satisfaction on the special measures being taken by the Persian Government to restore order on the southern roads. He, however, doubted on the basis of the reports sent to him by the British Consular officers that the diminution of robberies on the main route from Bushire to Shiraz during the past few weeks was due to the arrangements made by Roulat-ed-Dowlah. Unusual severity of the weather was doubted to be the cause of inactivities of the robbers. Consequently Sir J. Barclay stated until and unless, the significance of the measures taken by the Persian Government was proved, the British Government would not decide as to whether steps taken by the Persian Government were likely to form an acceptable substitute for the British scheme outlined in British note of 14th October 1910. Nevertheless, the British Minister at Teheran recognized that the Persian Government was determined to do her level best to restore peace on southern routes. This fact led him to decide not to press on the Persian Government for the implementation of the British scheme and to wait the results of the measures in question. However, Sir J. Barclay made it clearly known that in case of recrudescence of disorders on the Bushire-Isfahan road, the British Government would reconsider her

1. CD. 6104, Enclosure in No. 7, pp. 6-7, also see Appendix No. 4.
expectant attitude. He also reserved the right to insist on the engagement of British-Indian officers at any moment should his Government perceived that the measures taken by the Persian Government were not likely to suffice for the prompt re-establishment of law and order. Regarding the proposed customs surcharge, Sir J. Barclay pointed out that as the surcharge would be virtually a tax on British trade, therefore, the imposition of this additional burden would be considered by the British Government justifiable temporarily only if the British officers, responsible to the Persian Government were appointed for the organisation of the force. The British Government would, however, not give her consent to it merely as a means of enabling the Persian Government to attempt to perform a duty which ought to be a fixed charge on the ordinary Persian revenues, without any guarantee of the success.\(^1\)

C - The Financial Embarrassment: The Search for a Loan.

One of the main causes of the failure of the Persian Government to restore law and order in the country other than foreign intrigue and intervention in the internal affairs

\(^1\) Ibid., Enclosure in Mo.10, p.10, See Appendix Mo. 5.
of Persia, was her empty treasury. The financial embarrass-
ment of the Persian Government was even recognized by the
British Consul officers in Persia. The British representative
at Taheran recommended his Government to furnish the Persian
Government with a considerable loan too. Although, the Persian
nationalists, during the constitutional movement, strongly
opposed any foreign loan, yet, when they assumed the responsi-
bility of the Government, having no other alternative,
realized the necessity of raising a loan in the foreign
countries. The situation was deteriorating rapidly. The
lawlessness was increasing in the country. The Government
was quite alive to the situation and, for the maintenance
of order in the country, the Cabinet submitted to the National
Assembly the following ministerial programme on November 30,
1909:

1. To maintain a well-organized force, and to station it
   permanently in different parts of the country;

2. To employ regular road-guard for the protection of
   trade routes; and

3. To arrange an efficient police force in all the towns.

The Assembly approved the programme. But, for the
implementation of the programme, money was urgently
needed. Consequently, it was decided to raise a loan
of which 5,00,000 L. was needed at once. The engagement
of foreign advisers was also decided. On December 12,
1909, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia called
privately at the two Legations (British and Russian). He
explained the two representatives of the pressing
needs of the Persian Government and informed them that
the application for the advance would be made on the

1. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 14, p. 11.
following day. On December 13, 1909, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Minister of Finance
visited the two Legations and applied for the advance
from the two Governments of 5,00,000 l., which the two
Persian Ministers declared to be imperatively needed
for the restoration of order and for reforms in the
administration, especially in the Department of Finance.¹
Both the representatives promised to telegraph the
application to their respective Governments.² They,
however, endeavoured to elicit the views of the Persian
Government as to the security for advance, employment
of money, control of expenditure, and the engagement
of foreign agents. The Persian Ministers were unable
to state their views in this regard with more precision,
however, Sir J. Barclays gathered the following informa-
tion from the conversation, which he telegraphically
reported to Sir S. Grey:

'Persian Government offer at present no security. They
hope for a considerable loan later for consolidation at low
interest of the floating debt, which would reduce charges on
custom-house, thus enabling them to provide for necessary
security. Ministers stated that money was to be used for
restoration of order, for which formation of an army and
gendarmarie was needed and for reforms, especially financial.
They said they were preparing and would communicate to the
two Legations a detailed programme of expenditure, and also
a scheme of control, of which we could gather no clear idea
except that M. Bisot was to be given more influence than
heretofore, and was to superintend its execution. If foreign
advisers were found necessary they would be engaged, the

¹ Ibid., No. 2, p. 1.
Majliss having approved their employment in principle, but as regards finances they wished for the present to try how far changes in Persian staff and the employment of enlightened persons would suffice to effect necessary reforms⁴ commenting on the above conversation, Sir J. Barclay stated it to be not very encouraging, nevertheless, he recommended that the two Governments (Russia and Great Britain) would not refuse to discuss an advance. He acknowledged that the Persian Government was for the first time trying sincerely to prepare a sensible budget and a scheme for control.² In response to Sir J. Barclay’s recommendation to discuss an advance, Sir E. Grey telegraphically informed on December 15, 1909, that the Imperial Government and the Government of India were prepared to make a joint advance of 2,00,000 l., provided that the conditions of the advance were satisfactory and proper security could be obtained.³ On the following day, in another telegram to Sir J. Barclay, Sir E. Grey stated that to grant an advance to the Persian Government was absolutely necessary and consented to offer the advance even on minimum security. He further stated that if the Russian Government would contribute a sum of 3,00,000 l., then the British would also grant a sum equal to the Russian contribution but expressed his inability to contribute more. On January 6, 1910.

1. Ibid., No.2, p.1.
2. Ibid., No.2, p.1.
3. Ibid., No.4, p.2.
4. Ibid., No.6, p.3.
Sir A. Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported to Sir E. Grey that the Russian Government had agreed in principle to grant an advance to the Persian Govt., though they were convinced that an advance of even 400,000 l., would not lead to an effective improvement of the situation. They feared that the advance would be exhausted speedily.

Consequently, the Russian Government recommended that an advance should be made in close connection with a more considerable loan, as the latter could alone provide necessary funds for the introduction of urgent reforms and for extinguishing or conversion of floating debts, which were so burdensome to the Persian Treasury. Furthermore, the attention of the British Government was drawn by the Russian Government to the fact that only by means of negotiating a large loan, Russian and British would be in a position to insist on the institution of an effective financial control. The Russian Government, Sir A. Nicolson reported, was of the view that a control of the expenditure of the advance was absolutely necessary and it would be entrusted to a special financial commission. Expressing his views on the Russian proposal regarding the advance to the Persian Government, Sir J. Barclay, in a telegraphic message to Sir E. Grey stated that although it was impossible to assert that the financial assistance would really enable the Persian Government to restore normal condition in the country, yet, there was a chance of success, which demanded a trial. He further stated that the important factor in grant-

1. Ibid., No. 11, p. 10.
ing the advance was not the 'magnitude' of the sum to be given but it was the 'prorogative' which would count. Moreover, Sir J. Barclay commented that the authority of the Persian Government would be greatly strengthened in the provinces by the mere fact that she was being jointly assisted by Britain and Russia. However, on February 13, 1910, Sir A. Nicolson reported to Sir E. Grey from St. Petersburg the willingness of the Russian Government to join in immediate advance of 400,000 l. to the Persian Government. The Russian Government, Sir A. Nicolson's report further stated, had also agreed with the British Government that too much onerous conditions should not be attached with the advance. The agreement being reached between Britain and Russia regarding the advance to the Persian Government, the representatives of the two Powers handed over a joint note to the Sakat-ul-Mulk, the Acting Foreign Minister of Persia, on February 16, 1910, stating the conditions on which the two Powers were prepared to make a joint advance of 400,000 l. While handing over the note, the two representatives expressed their hope that the Persian Government would accept the terms, which, they stated, were consistent with the line of Policy of the two Powers under the Anglo-Russian Agreement. The conditions attached with the advance may be summarised as follows:

1. Ibid., No. 13, p. 11.
2. Ibid., No. 27, p. 18.
3. Ibid., No. 45, p. 27.
1. The Persian Government was to submit a programme of the expenditure, to be approved by the two Legations and to be controlled by a commission composed of the Financial Adviser, the Administrator-General of the Customs, two members of the Majilis and two Persian officials. The commission was to be presided by the Minister of Finance.

2. The programme of expenditure must provide for the appointment of seven French officials in the Ministry of Finance, with executive powers.

3. It must provide for the organization of a sufficient armed force for the security of trade-routes. The Persian Government was to engage foreign instructors in this regard immediately but no foreign instructor should be engaged for any armed force without the previous consent of the British and Russian Governments.

4. Persia must grant no railway concessions without previously offering the option to the British and Russian Governments. The Persian nationals could receive the railway concessions provided that they had no foreign capital behind them.

5. The concession for the Navigation on Lake Urmia to be given to the Tabriz-Julfa Road Company.

6. This advance should constitute the first installment of the loan, for which the Persian Government had applied, should it be agreed to by the British and Russian Governments. In the contrary event, this advance, at the rate of 7 per cent per annum, should be redeemed in ten annual instalments secured on the custom revenues and if those were insufficient the revenues of the mint should serve as additional security. The conditions attached with that small loan was too much onerous. Their acceptance would have certainly been contrary to the independence of the Persian Kingdom. A strong agitation against the acceptance was set on foot in Majilis. Even before the submission of conditions to the Assembly, a section of the Majilis engineered popular demonstration against their acceptance in the form of petition.

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2. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 199, p. 107.
signed by many members of the mercantile community. The clergy of Najef and other places also telegraphically protested against them. 1 So was the popular resentment against the conditions attached to the proposed advance that the Minister of Finance of Persia had no other alternative but to inform Mr. Churchill, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation on March 17, 1910 that it would be useless to submit them to the Majilis, for in their present form the Assembly would certainly reject them. 2 In the meantime, while the proposed joint advance was under consideration and had not been finally rejected by the Persian Government, a firm known as International Oriental Syndicate was reported to have offered a British firm the option of making a loan to the Persian Government. The security was reported to be as follows:

1. Interest held by Persian Government in D'Arcy oil Concession.
2. Mint profits.
3. Receipts of postal and telegraph departments, after deducting that portion of them which had been pledged to the Government of India in 1903 and 1904, and uncharged State revenues generally.

This change in the situation alarmed Sir H. Grey, who on March 8, 1910, telegraphically instructed Sir A. Nicolson the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to acquaint Isvolsky with the above developments and to suggest that following joint communication should be made to the Persian Government:

that the two Governments cannot sanction the pledging of any source of public revenue as security for advances other than the proposed joint advance so long as not only the two banks but also the two Governments are not

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1. CD. 5656, No. 34, p. 24.
receiving the payments due to them, and so long as negotiations are still proceeding for a joint advance, 1

Mr. Isvolsky agreed with the British proposal and instructed to the Russian Minister at Teheran to join with his British colleague in warning the Persian Government as suggested. 2 Consequently, Sir G. Barclay was instructed on March 12, 1910 to warn the Persian Government in conjunction with M. Poklewska. 3 The joint warning was handed over to the Prime-Minister of Persia on March 15, 1910. 4 Referring the loan offer of the International Syndicate (Limited) to the Persian Government and the security to be furnished with in this regard, the warning stated that 'as long as the joint advance of 400,000 l., offered to the Persian Government by the British and Russian Governments on the 13th Ultimo is under consideration, and so long as the Persian Government are in arrear in their payment of interest and of principal to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Bank of Persia, His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the hypothecation by the Persian Government of any sources of its public revenue to any advance except that now under negotiation between the British and Russian Governments on the one side and the Persian Government on the other'. 5 Mr. S. Shaffari

1. CD. 5656, No. 37, p. 25.
4. Ibid., No. 50, p. 32.
5. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 67, p. 36.
communicated the reply of the above warning to Sir J. Barclay on March 20, 1910, which runs as follows:

"Firstly, that the Persian Government is convinced, and of course your Excellency will also admit, that the only negotiation of an advance and a loan between the Persian Government and the Governments of Great Britain and Russia cannot do away with the full power of the Government over its uncharged sources of revenue which are feasible for all kinds of transaction; secondly, that my Government gives assurances that any arrangements made by the Persian Government with your well-respected Government in connection with any of the sources of the revenue of the country will always be fully respected. 1 More or less a similar reply was communicated to the Russian Government. But the reply of the Persian Govt. could not satisfy Sir J. Barclay and he suggested his Government to address another note. 2 Sir E. Grey consulted Mr. Isvolsky in this regard through his ambassador. 3 M. Isvolsky agreed 4 and consequently a joint note was addressed to the Persian Government on April 7, 1910. 5 The note recognised Persia's right to borrow money from outside quarters, provided

1. that the sources of revenue already pledged as security for the British and Russian loan were not made security for the new loans, and

1. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 67, p. 36.
2. Ibid., No. 60, p. 34.
3. Ibid., No. 61, p. 34.
4. Ibid., No. 62, p. 34.
5. Ibid., No. 63, p. 35.
2. That a previous arrangement be arrived at regarding the debts of the Persian Government to England and Russia, so that the interests, the mode of payment, and the source whence they would be paid could be known. In addition, the joint note asked that no concessions which were likely to be prejudicial to the political or strategical interests of the two Powers be granted to the subject of other Governments. The reply of the joint note being not returned, Mr. Poklowski and Mr. Marling called on the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 4, 1910 and pressed for a reply. With regards to loans, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Government had discussed the question and were willing to give the assurances required. With regard to concessions, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Government was ready to give a satisfactory assurance on that point also, if it referred to railways only. He, however, made it clearly known to the two representatives that the Persian Government had decided not to grant any railway concession at all. The representatives of the two Powers replied that the narrow interpretation of the conditions referring to concessions was not acceptable to them. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he would communicate a reply by the end of the week after consulting the Cabinet. As promised, the Persian Government communicated the reply to joint note on May 7, (20) 1910 to the representatives of the two Powers. The

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No.87, p. 43.
2. Ibid., No. 81, p. 41.
Persian Government accepted conditions 1 and 2. As to the last point of the joint note, the Persian Government stated that as it was vague they would defer their reply until the receipt of a written explanation from the two Governments. The explanation required was communicated to the Persian Government on the same day and runs as follows:

In view of the difficulty of defining concessions which might injuriously affect their political or strategic interests, the two Powers expect that before granting any concessions for means of communications for telegraph or harbours to a foreign subject, the Persian Government will enter into an exchange of views with them in order that the political or strategic interests of the two Powers may be duly safeguarded. Any act in contravention of this principle would be regarded as contrary to the traditional friendship so happily existing between Persia and Russia and Great Britain. The Persian Government was not invited to return any answer to this communication. On June 7, 1910, Sir E. Gray instructed Mr. Marling to endeavour to dissuade the Persian Government from sending reply to the above joint declaration. In case of his failure in that regard, Mr. Marling was instructed to convey the Persian Government, provided the Russian Government concurred, a verbal expression of regret pointing out the

1. Ibid., No. 99, p. 46. For the text of the letter of the Persian Government, See Enclosure 1 in No. 106, pp. 53-54.
2. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 106, p. 54.
consequences which the Persian Government would have to suffer in disregarding the British wishes. On June 9, 1910, Mr. O’Beirne informed Sir E. Grey that M. Isvolsky had expressed his entire approval regarding the communication to be made to the Persian Government in case the latter insisted on sending a reply in writing to the notes respecting concessions. Consequently, Mr. Harling was authorised to proceed on the agreed lines. But the Persian Government, inspite of the repeated Russo-British advice to leave the joint note unanswered, communicated the reply on September 3, 1910. The Persian note, while assuring the two Powers that the Persian Government will not take steps which would be contrary to 'courtesy, friendship and good relations', stated that the Government of Persia had no thought at present of granting to foreigners concessions of the kind indicated in the joint note. The note further stated that the Persian Government was, however, obliged to protect her independence and undoubted right of freedom. In other words, the note affirmed the right of the Persian Government to act as she would like in the matter. The representatives of the two Powers decided to return the note. The two dragomans, who handed over the Persian note to Husein Kuli Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, verbally stated that the Russo-British note of 7th(20) May required no answer, as it merely conveyed a

1. CD. 5656, No. 107, p. 54-55.
2. Ibid., No. 109, p. 55.
3. Ibid., Enclosure 1 in No. 172, p. 93.
warning as to the consequence of Persia's failure to comply with the 'Legitimate' desire of the two Powers. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was much surprised at the return of the note. He considered the wording of the Persian Government's note absolutely satisfactory and laid great stress on the paragraph relating to the Persian Government's resolve to take no steps contrary to the friendship and good relations existing between the Persian Government and the two Powers. The dragomans drew his attention to the words 'for the present' as well as to the portions dwelling on the obligation of the Persian Government to protect her independence and rights of freedom. Husein Kuli Khan argued the matter at great length, but the dragomans, after having reminded him that the two representatives had repeatedly urged him not to send any reply at all, left the note with him and retired. Thus, the insistence of the two Powers to accept their conditions regarding the grant of concessions, the acceptance of which would have undoubtedly rendered Persian independence illusory, led the breaking off loan negotiations. Moneyless Persian Government was helpless and could not restore law and order in the southern Persia as the consequence of which the British Govt. delivered her famous ultimatum on October 14, 1910, which has been dealt in this chapter under sub-heading 'The increasing Lawlessness on the Souther Roads: The British Ultimatum'.

1. Ibid., No. 172, pp. 92-93.
CHAPTER IV

PERSETIA'S ENDEAVOUR TO WORK OUT HER SALVATION

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN OPPOSITION
A - Search for Advisers: The Anglo-Russian Objection:

The financial difficulties of the Persian Government were great. The loan negotiations proved unsuccessful owing to the oppressive conditions laid down by the British and Russian Governments. Various attempts were made to float loans with private syndicates but Russia and Great Britain, ever bent on increasing their hold on Persia, insisted that the loan should be granted only by the two Powers. Although recognizing the right of the Persian Government to borrow money from outside quarters they attached conditions to that recognition, which if accepted, would render the Persian independence illusory. It was then clear that the two Powers would not allow the Persian Government to obtain money from countries other than their own. Finding that they could not raise money, or obtain help in Europe except with the consent of Russia and Britain, the Persian Government decided to hire American financial experts who would put the Persian treasury on its feet. It is interesting to note that the Persian Government was, at first, not in favour of Americans being appointed as financial advisers. At the sitting of the Majliss on August 11, 1910, the Cabinet proposal to engage foreign officials, not only in the Ministry of Finance but in different Ministries also, was read. The proposal was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>(7 Frenchmen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>(6 officials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Ministry and Provinces</td>
<td>1 Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>3 Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2 Swedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>(2 officials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseiller legiste</td>
<td>1 Frenchman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Administration</td>
<td>1 Egyptian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was proposed that these fifteen officials should be engaged for a period of three years. After a short discussion the matter was referred to Committee. On September 6, 1910, the Committee which was entrusted with the examination of the Ministerial programme respecting the engagement of foreign officials, submitted its report. It recommended that instead of employing Frenchmen for the Ministry of Finance, Swiss should be engaged. During the course of the debate, the clerical Prince Haji Sheikh-ul Reis moved that the financial assistants should be citizens of the United States of America. The Government's spokesman, Prince Assadullah Mirza strongly urged the employment of Frenchmen, which he declared to be desirable for reasons which the Cabinet could not publicly state. However, a great majority of the deputies were in favour of Americans being employed, and the question was
referred to the Committee again.¹

The idea to engage the Americans as financial assistants was favoured by the majority of the deputies in the hope that the officials who were free from any European influence would be able to accomplish some positive results in the 'reorganization of the archaic and chaotic treasury of Persia'². Moreover, over the employment of Americans was preferred by the Majlis because the United States had no political ambitions in Persia. The proposal to employ the Europeans was disliked by Russian and British statesmen who naturally thought it to be an effort to the Persian Government to counter the influence of Russia and Great Britain. Consequently, when in September 1910 the Persian Majlis decided in favour of engaging a French assistant for the Ministry of Justice and several Italian instructors for the gendarmerie, in addition to American advisers for the Finance Department, the two Powers decided to instruct their Ministries at Teheran to make representations to the Persian Government designed to dissuade them from engaging any subjects of a European Great Power.³ Britain, however, did not raise any objection to the employment of Americans as financial advisers, but Russia opposed the move as early as she found the idea of securing financial administrators from America was making headway among the members of

¹. CD 5656, Enclosure in 173, pp. 94-95.
the Majliss. At first, Russian emissaries attempted to employ certain "persuasive and notorious" deputies to kill the motion in the Majliss but in vain. Failing to achieve her goal, Russia approached the American State Department, which at that time, according to Shuster, had no knowledge of such a Persian move, and intimated that it would be unwise or unkind to send American financial experts to Persia. The State Department replied that it was in complete ignorance of the idea of the Persian Government, and that the question would be dealt with when it arose.\(^1\) Mr. Shuster's statement regarding the American unawareness of the Persian move to employ American financial advisers seems to be wrong. There was too much talk in Persia regarding the engagement of the American experts. A Teheran newspaper in its edition of 27th August 1910, had recommended that Americans should be hired to help the Government. On the basis of the other rumours to the same effect, then circulating in Persia, Mr. Russell, the then American Minister at Teheran, recommended to his Government that if advisers were sought, "the best such as West Point graduates, nor adventurers, will come, if requested".\(^2\) However, to get the Americans employed in Persia was not a tempting proposal for the American State Department. Consequently, the

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\(^1\) Shuster, op.cit., pp. 5-6.

\(^2\) American State Department decimal file 891.00,Feb.24, August 30, 1910, referred by Yeselson,op.cit., p.108.
decision for rejection to any such Persian move was nearly taken. But, suddenly the matter assumed great diplomatic importance. On September 14, 1910, Baron Roman R. Rosen, the Russian Ambassador to the United States submitted an aide-memoire which expressed grave concern over the possible Persian intention to apply to the American Government for financial experts. The aide-memoire declared that the appointment of the Americans in Persia would be inconvenient for Russia and Great Britain because it would serve as an example which would lead Persia to invite 'interested Powers' to serve her. While recognising the disinterestedness of the United States in Persia, the aide-memoire suggested that the nationals of the minor powers like the Netherlands or Belgium might be employed. It concluded with the hope that the United States would recognize the predominant position of Russia and Great Britain and would, therefore, reject any such Persian move! Although the American Government had already decided to refuse any such offer, if any made by the Persian Government, the Russian aide-memoire changed the whole situation. America now decided to exploit the situation in her favour. 'By appearing to be agreeable, the Department could press American demands upon Russia and Great Britain in return for a predetermined attitude'.

In a memorandum, Huntington Wilson, Assistant

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* Triple Allied countries viz., Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
Secretary of American State Department stated that as America had no real interest in Persia, it would be folly on her part to irritate any government on the Persian question and recommended granting the Russian request. He suggested, however, that the Russo-British apprehension should be turned to America's advantage either in Turkey or in the Far East. In order to use this diplomatic card, it was decided to impress upon the two Powers the appropriateness of a similar attitude in regard to America's China policy and the American participation in the construction of rail road in Turkey. However, the game ended here while the American State Department was engaged in preparing a scheme to utilize the opportunity. Russia and Great Britain were busy in exchanging views on the problem and the latter succeeded in persuading the former not to raise objections to Americans being appointed as financial experts in Persia. Accordingly, Whitelaw Reid, the United States Ambassador at London was informed on September 22, 1910, that 'the Governments of Russia and Great Britain had recently agreed that since America was not a European Power the employment of Americans was not likely to cause political difficulties.'

A joint Russo-British verbal communication to the Persian Government was also made on September 27, 1910 by Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewski Koziell. It was to the effect that 'the two Powers had no objection to the engagement of American financial

advisers but that if the Persian Government persisted further in disregarding our friendly advice to seek foreign assistants from the minor powers our Government would insist on the engagement of some of their own subjects.¹

B - Shuster's Appointment:

The Russian objection was removed and there seemed to be no difficulty now in Americans being appointed. But the American State Department had no intention to lend the American advisers to Persia. Mr. Adee, Assistant Secretary, American State Department, informed Mr. Russell, the American Minister at Teheran that the United States could neither lend government officials nor assume international responsibility for selecting private persons to act as Persian advisers. He agreed, however, to forward the names of the advisers to be employed in Persia provided that the 'bankers connected with a London House having a financial stake in Persia should care to recommend American experts'. By adopting such an attitude Mr. Adee expected to satisfy the sensitive Muscovite that the United State is not intervening, as a Great Power, in the domestic affairs of Persia. Mr. Russell replied that Persians were enthusiastic

for 'Americans and America', and would not accept advisers recommended by the British. However, while the letters were being exchanged between the State Department and Mr. Russell, President Taft intervened in the matter. In a letter to the Secretary of State, dated December 28, 1910, the President not only advised the Department to lend the advisers to Persia but also recommended the name of Mr. Shuster's to be sent there. By lending advisers to Persia, the President thought to have a business field in hand which would attract the American capitalists. As the result of the President's action, the State Department had no alternative but to accept the Persian request, if made. On December 28, 1910, the day, the American President advised the Secretary of the State about the desirability of the engagement of advisers in Persia, the Persian Minister at Washington informed the State Department that his government had instructed him to obtain the services of a Treasurer-General and Assistants for Persia. The fact that the Persian representative at Washington, under the instruction of his government, had requested the Secretary of State to help him in securing five financial advisers, was reported by Mr. Bryce, the British Ambassador at Washington, on January 26, 1911. On the basis of the Press reports, the Ambassador also informed the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Persian request would be complied with by the American State Department. As regards the policy of employment of

Americans had already been decided, the report could not create much interest in Britain. Taking into consideration their previous commitment, the British Foreign Office took the following decision:

"... as we have decided that the selection of United States citizens would not give rise to the political difficulties and therefore, cannot be interfered with."

On the one side, Britain decided to stick to her already declared policy, and on the other, Russian Foreign Office, once again, bitterly opposed the engagement of Americans in Persia. On January 29, 1911, Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador at London, made a communication to Sir E. Grey to the effect that Mr. Sazonow, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was very adverse to the idea of the employment of Americans by Persia. Mr. Sazonov apprehended that the appointment of the Americans would strengthen the cause of other great powers interested in getting their nationals to be employed in Persia. He remarked that it might serve as an example to them. Sir E. Grey replied to Count Benckendorff on February 1, 1911, as follows:

"... you will remember that the question was thoroughly discussed in Sept. of last year and that Mr. Sazonow then agreed that this step, which was desired by the Majlis, was not likely to give rise to political difficulties, Americans not being subjects of a great European power. The Persian Government were accordingly informed by Sir E. Barclay and M. Poklews on September 29 that the two Powers had no objection to the engagement of American


financial advisers, but that, if the Persian Government persisted further in disregarding the friendly advice of the two Gov(ernmen)ts to seek foreign assistance from the minor Powers, the engagement of some British and Russian subjects would be insisted on.

I do not see why the Gov(ernmen)ts should not adhere to the line then taken — that the United States of America not being a Great European Power, the employment of American citizens provides no precedent for the employment of the subjects of any other Great Power.

If however, M. Sazonow desires it, I will instruct the British Ambassador at Washington to make an unofficial enquiry whether the United States Government attach importance to the matter and are entertaining it, but it seems to me to be difficult to abandon the attitude so definitely taken by us last September.

If M. Sazonow is firmly decided to insist, in concert with Great Britain, that if the Persian Government takes advisers from any great European Power they must also employ British and Russian advisers, I do not see that there can be any danger of the matter going, in practice, beyond the employment of Americans as far as great Powers are concerned. Sir E. Grey had already sent a telegram to Sir J. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, instructing him to

1. Ibid., No. 763, pp. 755-756.
make a communication to M. Sazonow in the above sense. Sir G. Buchanan was instructed to make the above communication so that M. Sazonow's apprehension that 'the employment of Americans would almost certainly lead Germany to put forward a claim for the engagement of a German' could be removed. When Sir G. Buchanan communicated the substance of Sir E. Grey's telegram to M. Sazonow, he replied that he would be grateful if Britain would make the suggested unofficial enquiry at Washington. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated that although he had not forgotten the communication which had been made to the Persian Government last September, owing to the clearly manifested desire of Germany to get her national employed in Persia, a change had occurred in the situation. The appointment of Americans, he continued to state, would be certainly used as precedent by Germany and her claim would be strengthened, notwithstanding that America was not an European power. This would lead, he remarked, to the establishment of an international administration in Persia which must be avoided. As regards the unofficial enquiry, Mr. Bryce reported from Washington on February 3, 1911, that it

1. Ibid., No. 761, p. 754.
2. Ibid., No. 760, p. 754.
3. Ibid., No. 762, p. 755.
may have unfortunate effect here'. In the meantime, the Majilis authorized the Persian Government on February 2, 1911, to conclude contracts with the American financial advisers, and allotted a sum of £5,000 for their salaries. Consequently, Sir J. Buchanan was instructed to inform M. Sazonov that the British Ambassador at Washington had strongly depreciated the idea of addressing any enquiry to the United States Government and that, in view of the information given by Sir J. Barclay from Teheran, it was too late to open the question. M. Sazonov, however, agreed that it was too late to do anything more about American advisers and suggested that in case of Germany's insistence to get her national employment in Persia, the two Powers would use their influence on the Persian Government to prevent the engagement.

In the meantime, the friendly negotiations between the Persian representative at Washington and the American State Department proceeded smoothly. On January 27, 1911, Mr. Bryee reported from Washington that the United States Government would supply Persia with a list of financial experts, advising that two should be chosen, who would appoint their own assistants. On February 14, 1911, the appointment of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster of Washington as Treasurer General of the

1. Ibid., Note(3), attached to No. 756.
2. Ibid., No. 764, p. 756.
3. Ibid., No. 765, pp. 756-757.
4. Ibid., No. 766, p. 757.
Persian Empire was reported. On February 16, 1911 Mr. Bryee informed Sir E. Grey that the following appointment, in addition to that of Mr. Shuster as Treasurer-General had been made:

1. Frank S. Cairns to be Director of Customs.
2. Colonel C.L. Mr. Caskey was appointed as Inspector of provincial Revenues.
3. R.W. Hills to be in charge of auditing and accounting.  

A fourth man, Mr. Bruce J. Dickey was appointed as Inspector of Taxation.

Mr. Shuster had agreed to serve the Persian Government for three years, having the entire control of the financial operation and fiscal affairs of the country, under the direction of the Persian Minister of Finance. The other above mentioned assistants were also employed for three years and were to work under Mr. Shuster's supervision. Mr. Shuster, together with three of his assistants Mr. M.C. Caskey, Mr. Hills and Mr. Dickey sailed for Persia from New York on April 8, 1911. Mr. Cairns was to follow them to Teheran as soon as possible. They reached Teheran on May 12, 1911.

2. CD. 6104, No. 43, pp. 23-24.
4. Ibid., pp. 6-8, and CD. 6104, op. cit., No. 36, p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 9.
7. Ibid., p. 10.
Mons. Mornard, a Belgian Customs official, who held the post of Administrator-General of the Custom Department of Persia, was keenly interested to be appointed as Treasurer General. He was being actively supported by Belgium and Russian Legations at Teheran. However, the Majliss was determined to bring a complete change, as the result of which, he could not obtain the post for himself. Naturally, Mons. Mornard developed jealously against the American advisers and thought up such devices as would make the American Mission a failure. Shortly before the arrival of the American Mission at Teheran, the Persian Government had concluded a loan agreement of £1,250,000 sterling with the Imperial Bank of Persia. The Majliss had also approved the contract. Mons. Mornard, supported by certain well-known Russian agents in and out of the Majliss and Persian Cabinet, drafted a law, which, if passed, would have placed the entire control of the expenditures of the money derived from the loan in the hands of a Commission, consisting of fifteen members, of which he was to be head. The proposed law, had it been approved by the Majliss, would have placed the Americans in a very awkward position. They would have to decide either to work as a subordinate of Mons. Mornard or to stay away, seeing helplessly the 'only available funds' being controlled by other hands. When the project

1. Ibid., p. 23.
of the law was before the Majliss, the matter was fortunately brought to the notice of Mr. Shuster who, hurriedly, drafted a brief report on the then existing situation in the Ministry of Finance and presented it to the Persian Cabinet. With the report, was transmitted a simple project of law placing the control of the refunding operations and expenditures growing out of the £1,250,000 loan contract in the hands of Treasurer General, where it belonged. The Cabinet approved it. Then it was sent to the Majliss and was consequently passed on May 30, 1911. Thus, Mons. Bornard's intrigue was discovered in time and could be made ineffective. In the meantime, Mr. Shuster realized that until and unless he got maximum powers, it would be impossible for him to proceed with the financial reforms. To obtain the desired powers, he drafted a bill, which was submitted to the Majliss on June 8, 1911. It was passed unanimously without any modification on June 13, 1911. The law contained 12 articles. It defined Mr. Shuster's function and furnished him with very wide powers in other words, he virtually became a dictator in the domain of Persian Finance. Mr. Shuster was now entrusted with the 'direct and effective control of all financial and fiscal operations of the Persian Government, including the collection of all receipts, if every description and the control and accounts of all Govt.

1. Ibid., p. 24. For the text of the law passed by the Majliss on 30, 1911, see CD 6104, Enclosure in No. 151, pp. 72-73, also see Shuster, op. cit., pp. 355-356.
2. For the text see CD 6104, No. 153, pp. 75-77, see Appendix. No (The Preamble was drafted by the Finance Minister).
expenditure.* As the Treasurer-General was now in charge of all financial operations in Persia — either collection or disbursement, a letter was addressed to all banks engaged in business in Teheran that "from that date no cheques, drafts, warrants, orders of payment, or government obligations of any kind, were valid or payable unless they bore the signature of the Treasurer-General". The banks were also informed that "all balances or accounts standing to the credit of any government department or government official were to be turned into the credit of Treasurer-General, to be disposed of on his orders." Although, the legitimate interests of any foreign power or national, were in the way effected by the law of June 13, 1911, yet, the Russian Legation declared war upon it, the very day it had been passed. The Russian Legation announced that the Belgian Customs employees should not be subjected to the control or supervision of the American Treasurer-General and even went so far as to threaten to have Russian troops seize the customs houses in the north and put Russian officials in charge. Thus, a conflict arose between

1. Article 1, of the Law of June 13, 1911.
2. Shuster, op. cit., p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 53.
4. Of course, the corrupt officials were badly affected because whereas the government people had formerly robbed in hundreds of tomans they would now only be able to rob in ten" — Sir A. Barclay to Sir A. Nicolson (Private) Teheran, June 15, 1911, Gooch and Temperley Vol. X, Part I, No. 774, p. 763.
Mr. Shuster and Mons. Momard, the latter being actively supported by Russian Legation at Teheran. The Treasurer-General maintained that in virtue of the law of June 13, 1911 Mons. Momard should be subordinate to him. Mr. Shuster, in pursuance of the above-mentioned law, requested the Administrator General of Customs to deposit all custom receipts to his account at the English and Russian Bank. Momard did not agree to the new arrangement. In the meantime, the Imperial Bank, in pursuance of Treasurer General’s orders to recognize only his signature, refused cheques drawn by Mons. Momard on the Customs account at the Imperial Bank. However, the Cabinet intervened and passed a resolution on July 4, 1911 which approved the Treasurer-General’s demands. The resolution was communicated to Momard. He was, at the same time, law of the 13th June. On July 5, 1911, Sir E. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that the Russian Minister was inclined to support Mons. Momard, basing his attitude on the phrase in paragraph(b) of article 4 of Russian Consolidation Agreement.

**Paragraph(b) of Article 4 of the Agreement between Persian Government and the Russian Bank, concluded on December 31, 1910, runs as follows:**

'It the Discount Bank of Persia shall retain, in the second place, a sum sufficient to cover, as they respectively become due, the obligatory disbursements of the Persian Government mentioned in Article 3(b), the order for the payment of which shall be given by the Minister of Finance of His Majesty the Shah through the Customs Administration'. For the text of the Agreement, see CD. 6104, Enclosure in No. 25, pp. 14-16.
with Persia. Sir J. Barclay further reported that the 
Russian Minister at Teheran 'thinks that Russian interests 
are jeopardised by such control of northern customs as is 
pledged under this agreement being given a new comer who 
may not stay and who may be succeeded by a Persian'. In 
contradiction to the Russian Minister's stand regarding the 
control of the custom revenues by the Treasurer-general, Sir 
J. Barclay stated that in his opinion, the control of custom 
revenues and expenditures by the Treasurer-General had in no 
way jeopardised the legitimate interests either of Russia or 
of Great Britain in Persia. The Manager of the Imperial Bank 
of Persia was, as reported by Sir J. Barclay, entirely in 
favour of subordination of customs to Treasurer-General. Sir 
J. Barclay confirmed that the action of Mr. Shuster was in 
accordance with the law passed by the Majliss, and which did 
not prejudice British or Russian interests. The British 
Minister desired to withhold his support from his Russian 
colleague if the latter asked for it. He, however, intended 
to keep himself aloof from the controversy unless he received 
instructions contrary to it from his Government. Sir E. Grey 
approved Sir J. Barclay's attitude and stated that to oppose 
'Shuster's proposal would defeat a chance of introducing some 
order into Persian finances which is to advantage of us both.'

2. Ibid., No.777, p. 766.
On July 6, 1911, Sir E. Barclay reported as follows:

'Russian Minister is very indignant and announced his determination to support Mornard strongly in his conflict with Treasurer-General.

Mornard contention is that he cannot serve under anyone but the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance. Feeling assured of Russian Minister's support, there is not much chance of his yielding. On the other hand Treasurer General has the full support of Majliss and I think it possible that if Mornard remains obstinate Majliss will cancel his contract'.

On July 10, 1911, Sir E. Grey instructed Sir I. Buchanan to request the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Russian Minister at Teheran should be instructed to maintain a neutral attitude in the dispute between M. Mornard and the Persian Government was the Russian interests was in no way jeopardized by the execution of the law of June the 13th. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia refused to send the desired instructions to Russian Minister at Teheran and cited several proofs in support of the Russian stand. In the meantime, Mr. Shuster wrote to the Acting Premier, Mutashamus Saltana, stating that he could no longer permit

1. Ibid., No. 776, p. 765.
2. Ibid., No. 779, p. 767.
3. Ibid., No. 780, pp. 767-768.
the situation to continue, and that 'if immediate action were not taken to secure Mons. Mornard's recognition of the authority of the Majlis and its laws', he would refer the case before that body directly. Consequently, Mornard was summoned before the Cabinet on July 8, 1911 and was asked to state whether or not he proposed to recognize and obey the law of the Majlis. Mornard presented himself before the Cabinet and stated that he did intend to obey the law. Had Mornard not yielded, he would have got his contract cancelled. The yielding of Mornard as well as his failure to enlist the support of Great Britain, compelled Russia to drop the matter. Consequently, the controversy was settled.

C - The Appointment of Major Stokes: The Russian Opposition.

The law of the 13th June furnished Mr. Shuster with very wide powers, but nominal authority was of no value in Persia without a proper force to maintain and enforce it. So Mr. Shuster planned to organize a Treasury Gendarmerie.

2. Ibid., p. 68.
3. Hafour, op.cit., p. 100.
which should be an integral part of the office of the Treasurer-General and which should assist and cooperate with the civilian officers of the Treasury in collection of taxes throughout the country. The formation of such a force was quite essential as the collection of the taxes outside Teheran, was exceedingly difficult. For the organization of the Gendarmerie, a suitable person, acquainted with the Persian language, culture, tradition, and customs was required. Shuster found his ideal man in Major C.S. Stokes. The Major was originally an officer in the British-Indian Army, but was deputed to work as Military Attache of the British Legation in Persia for four years. He was available to Mr. Shuster as his term of service in the capacity of Military Attache was about to expire. Consequently, when on July 6, 1911, the Majlis authorised Mr. Shuster to engage a financial assistant for the organization of Treasury Gendarmerie, he addressed a letter to Major Stokes, requesting him to serve as financial aide to Treasurer-General of Persia and to be incharge of the proposed Treasury Gendarmerie. The duty of the proposed force was to give the necessary aid and support,

1. Shuster, op.cit., p. 70.
2. Ibid., p. 69.
3. Ibid., p. 69.
+ For the text of the letter, See Ibid., p. 372.
especially in the provinces of the South, to the financial agents engaged in the collection of maltat, opium, boyaux and other direct taxes'.

Telegraphically informing Sir E. Grey about Shuster's offer to Major Stokes, Sir J. Barclay stated that 'it would be impossible to persuade Persian Government expressly to limit the appointment under reference to the south, as any action on our part in this direction would convince the Medjliss that we desired to give a political significance to the appointment'.

Taking into consideration the Hormard incident, Mr. Louis Mallet, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for British Foreign Affairs feared that if Major Stokes would be appointed then, 'the Russian Government will suspect Mr. Shuster of anti-Russian designs. It will be very unfortunate if Mr. Shuster excites the hostility of the Russian Government who can thwart him and make his task impossible if they wish to do so'. He suggested that Sir J. Barclay should be instructed to give to Mr. Shuster a hint to this effect. Sir E. Grey thought that in case Major Stokes be appointed, 'He must be cautioned to suppress all anti-Russian feelings and Sir J. Barclay might tell Mr. Shuster exactly what the situation is and point out how essential it is that no employee in Mr. Shuster's administration should show anything but complete impartiality between

1. Ibid., p. 372.

nations'. However, Sir E. Grey decided to know the Russian view in this respect first and instructed Sir J. Buchanan accordingly. Consequently Sir J. Buchanan had a talk with Neratof, the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and reported to Sir E. Grey on July 11, 1911 that Neratof thought that 'should the necessities of the new service require that it be under the command of a single officer, it would be better to choose that officer from among the minor Powers. If it were found possible, on the other hand, to split up the command, he thought that the post might be filled by a Russian and British officer respectively'. Sir J. Buchanan further reported that he pointed out Neratof that it would be very difficult to secure the services of a suitable man except that of Major Stokes who appeared to be eminently qualified. Neratof replied that it would not be difficult to secure the services of a Swedish officer. Thereupon, Sir E. Grey enquired Sir J. Barclay whether the appointment of a Swedish officer or of a subject of some other minor power might not be a way out of the difficulty. Before sending a reply to Sir E. Grey, Sir J. Barclay thought it desirable to ascertain the view of Mr. Shuster in this respect. Consequently, he addressed

2. CD. 6104, No. 167, p. 84.
3. Ibid., No. 168, p. 84.
4. CD. 6104, No. 174, p. 86.
a letter to the Treasurer-General on July 14, 1911.
Informing Mr. Shuster of the view of the British Government that the appointment of Major Stokes as an organizer of Treasury Bendarmerie might cause some international jealousy, Sir G. Barclay enquired whether the appointment of a Swedish officer or of a subject of some other minor power should not be a way out of difficulty. Mr. Shuster replied that he offered the post to Major Stokes because he was the only suitable man available for the task. Mr. Shuster further stated that Major Stokes's peculiar qualification for the task, such as his military training, his four year's sojourn in Persia, his knowledge of the country, of the Persian language and of French (which was widely spoken in Persia) moreover, the respect which the commanded in the country both as an officer and as a man, had convinced him that he was the only suitable man to be appointed as an organizer of the proposed force. The Treasurer-General assured Sir G. Barclay that while offering the post to the Major, the question of nationality played no part. Had it been the case, Mr. Shuster argued, he would have certainly appointed a man from his own country. He further assured Sir G. Barclay that while engaged in the reorganization of the financial system in Persia, none of his acts were guided by political consideration, and, therefore, he would not accept any suggestion

which would cast the light of political bias upon his disinterested offer of a post to Major Stokes. Regarding the suggestion to appoint a Swedish Officer, Mr. Shuster stated that foreigners generally had no knowledge of the language, habits, and modes of thought of the Persian people and as the organizer would have to deal directly with a large number of such men, it would be exceedingly difficult for him to discharge his duties. 'A Swedish officer', Mr. Shuster remarked, 'be ever so competent, would have to spend at least a year or more here before he could possibly be of any real assistance in this line, whereas the necessity of getting my gendarmerie force organized and at work at once is urgent in the extreme'. Moreover, the Treasurer-General further stated that as it had been generally known that Major Stokes had been offered the post of the organizer, the withdrawal of the offer would be interpreted as being directed by purely political consideration which he could not permit under any circumstances.

Sir G. Barclay transmitted a copy of Mr. Shuster's letter to Sir E. Grey on July 14, 1911, with the remark that the proposal of the Russian Government that the command of the proposed Treasury Gendarmerie should be split up so as to secure a Russian as well as a British Officer, would not be

accepted by the Persian Government except under compulsion, and if we insisted, the Treasurer-General would certainly resign. As regards the proposal to entrust the command to a Swedish officer or to a subject of some other minor power, he referred to the above letter of Mr. Shuster.\footnote{1} However, after some correspondence Sir G. Barclay was authorised by Sir E. Grey on July 21, 1911 to inform Mr. Shuster that before accepting the command of the Gendarmerie, Major Stokes will have to resign his commission in the Indian Army. The British Minister at Teheran, thereupon, informed Mr. Shuster accordingly on July 22, 1911. In the meantime, Russia had sent the ex-Shah back into Persia, and had become diplomatically more active to prevent the appointment of Major Stokes lest an experienced militaryman like the Major himself be sent to the front to throw Mohammad Ali back to Russia.

The British consent to the appointment of Major Stokes in Persia caused much anxiety in Russia. Count Benckendorff protested against the British action and on July 25, 1911, requested Sir A. Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for British Foreign Affairs that the British Government

\footnotesize
2. CD. 6104, No. 208, p. 100.
4. The attempt of the Ex-Shah to regain the throne will be dealt later on.
should inform the Persian Government that if the Russian
Government asked for some appointment to counterbalance that
of Major Stokes, His Majesty's Government would support the
Russian demand. M. Neratof thought, the count stated, that
perhaps two or three Russian instructors might be appointed
under Major Stokes, if necessary. On July 26, 1911, Sir E.
Grey, during a conversation with Count Benckendorff, stated
that his Government could not interfere with the appointment
of Major Stokes in Persia. The British Foreign Secretary,
however, promised that if Major Stokes entered the service
of the Persian Government, he would have to resign his
commission from the Indian Army. Count Benckendorff insisted
that something more should be done by the British Government
to prevent the appointment and suggested that His Majesty's
Government or to Mr. Shuster the undesirability of making the
appointment. Sir E. Grey refused to accept the Count's
proposal and stated as follows:

'Mr. Shuster was acting without any political motive;
he was apparently a very good, business like man, and he
might throw up his post, if we interfered, and declared that
the British Government had made the regeneration of Persia
impossible'. Apparently, Sir E. Grey seemed to be firm on his
stand regarding the appointment of Major Stokes, but practically
he yielded and assured the Count that the British Government

would not raise objection to the Russian demand to get the Russian nationals appointed in order to ensure her interest in the region of her frontier, provided that Major Stokes superintended certain things in the Persian territory even on Russian frontier. On July 28, 1911, Count Benckendorff expressed his great anxiety about the possibility of Major Stokes taking active military operations in Persia. 'If this happened', the Count warned Sir E. Grey, 'Russian officers might take part on the other side, and the result would be to give the appearance of a most unfortunate breach between England and Russia in their policy with regard to Persia'. Sir E. Grey agreed that it was undesirable that Major Stokes 'should take part in any military operations in Persia, or that any European officers should do so'. The British Foreign Secretary now decided to follow a very cautious policy in Persia. On July 28, 1911, he instructed Sir G. Barclay that Major Stokes should clearly be given to understand that he must resign his commission in the Army before taking service or duties of any kind under the Persian Government. At the same time, Sir G. Barclay was instructed to point out to the Persian Government that if Stokes was employed in active military operations in Persia, it might provide an excuse for

Russian officers to take active part on the other side. While insisting Major Stokes to resign his commission from the army, the British Foreign Secretary might have thought that the Major would prefer to stay in the army and would refuse to accept the Persian offer, which would automatically solve the controversy. But on July 30, 1911, he was telegraphically informed by Sir G. Barclay that Major Stokes had decided to resign his commission. The Major also requested an early acceptance of his resignation as the Treasurer-General urgently needed his services. The British Foreign Office was very much annoyed owing to the unexpected developments. Sir E. Grey was determined not to antagonize Russia. The European necessities demanded complete Russo-British harmony. Consequently on August 1, 1911, Sir E. Grey instructed Sir G. Barclay to inform the Persian Government that Major Stokes had been appointed without consulting Great Britain; that his employment in the North might involve political difficulties, and that the British Government could not depreciate Russian objection to it. Sir G. Barclay made a communication to the Persian Government to this effect on August 2, 1911. The Persian Government replied on August 6, 1911, as follows:

'It is necessary to levy taxes both in the north and in the south of Persia, and in the eyes of the Persian Government there is no distinction to be made between the two

2. CD. 6104, No. 235, p. 110.
regions.

As regards the services which the Persian Government expect from Major Stokes, this officer, who has retired from the British Army, having been engaged to organize the Treasury Gendarmerie, the Imperial Government have no intention of employing him in any military operations. In the meantime, on August 2, 1911, M. Neratoff informed Sir G. Buchanan that the Russian Minister at Teheran had already warned the Persian Government that in the event of Major Stokes being appointed as an organizer of the proposed Treasury Gendarmerie, Russia would demand something of an analogous nature for herself in the North. Sir G. Buchanan explained to M. Neratoff that Major Stokes' appointment had been made without consulting Great Britain, and that Major Stokes had been required to resign his commission, and the Persian Government had been informed that as his employment in active military operations in northern Persia might involve political considerations, His Majesty's Government could not deprecate the objections that might be taken. He, however, added that, when once Major Stokes had resigned his commission, the British Government could exercise no control over his action. These explanations could not satisfy M. Neratof. The Acting Minister for Russian Foreign Affairs described the appointment of Major Stokes as most inopportune at that moment. Referring to the possibility of Major Stokes taking part in active operations against the

1. CD. 6104, Enclosure I in No. 365, p. 163, also see No. 268, p. 127.
Ex-Shah, M. Neratof draw the attention of Sir G. Buchanan to the action taken by Russia last year in the case of the Persian Prince Darab Mirza, who was then serving in the Russian Army and commanding a sotnia of Cossacks at Kazvin. Having expressed a desire to resign his commission, and having subsequently attempted to raise a revolt against the Government, Darab Mirza had been placed under arrest and sent to Russia. M. Neratof wished that a similar policy should be followed by the British Government in Major Stokes's case. He suggested that the British Government should refuse to accept the resignation of Major Stokes and should recall him to England.

On August 3, 1911, Sir G. Buchanan reported that the Russian Press was now thoroughly excited. 'Novoe Vremya', an Anglophil Journal was reported to have published an article entitled 'An undesirable complication' in its edition of 3rd August, 1911. The Journal severely criticized the British Government for allowing a former Military Attache to resign his commission and to assume command of a force whose operations would extend over the Northern Zone especially placed under Russian influence by Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. 'Novoe Vremya' stated that so long as the Anglo-Russian Agreement was in force, Russia would

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not permit herself to take interest in the events which were happening in the British sphere. Similarly, the Journal argued, it would be illegal and intolerable if a British Officer should take part in military operations in northern Persia. The Journal continued to state: 'Major Stokes is not a 'nobody'. He is a British military attache in Teheran. He cannot leave British service unless he has received the assent of the British War Office to his retirement ... Thus, the entry of Major Stokes into Persian service is without a doubt entirely dependent on the wishes of the British Government. If it does not approve of the decision of a military attache in its service to embark on adventures which threaten to cast a shadow on the good relations existing between England and Russia, then Major Stokes will withdraw his resignation. If, on the other hand, his resignation is accepted, the British Government will show that it interprets its obligation of political non-intervention in the Russian sphere in Persia very conditionally'. The article concluded by emphasising the immense importance of the Anglo-Russian entente and the necessity of carrying out its provisions with especial scrupulousness. Finally, the article pointed out that the appointment of Major Stokes might be equally dis-advantageous to both parties.1 Reactionary and germanphil papers were reported to be more severe in their criticism. When Britain

1. CD. 6104, No. 253, p. 123.
did not abide with the pledges which she had made to Russia regarding Persia, the reactionary Press argued, Russia too was at liberty to intervene in Northern Persia by force to safeguard her interests there. Russian official circle was no less critical. In case Major Stokes resigned his commission, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government 'to prevent him from taking service under the Persian Government', but the Russian Government was rightly entitled to raise an objection against his employment in the North, replied Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. Should the Russian Government wish to lodge a protest against the appointment of Major Stokes in the North, the British Foreign Secretary stated, the British Minister at Teheran would be instructed to inform the Persian Government that the objection was one which she should take in account as it was reasonable and expected. The British Government could take no exception to it. On the 4th August, 1911 Sir G. Buchanan spoke to M. Neratof in the sense of the above communication of Sir E. Grey. The Acting Minister for Russian Foreign Affairs replied that Persia had already been warned that in case of the appointment of Major Stokes, Russia would require some sort of equivalent in the North. M. Neratof, however, feared that a protest


of that kind would be effective as the Persian Government was expected to repeat her maxim that she was in no way concerned with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which divided Persia into a British and a Russian sphere of influence. He further stated that at a moment when the Persian Government was engaged in a struggle for her very existence, she would not give a thought to the proposed formation of Treasury Gendarmerie and would employ Stokes to fight the ex-Shah. 'This ought to be prevented at all costs', M. Neratof stated firmly and repeated his suggestion that the British Government should recall the Major temporarily to London. Sir J. Buchanan reiterated that once Major Stokes had resigned his commission, the British Government could not control his movements.

Nevertheless, M. Neratof requested Sir J. Buchanan 'to try and see if something done'. The following day, the 5th August 1911, M. Neratof, during a conversation with Sir J. Buchanan again expressed his anxiety over the incident. He was convinced that the British Government might still be able to recall Major Stokes to London temporarily. M. Neratof regretted the incident because it would reveal to the world the serious disagreement which had arisen between the two Powers and because Russian public opinion would believe that the British

4. Persia never approved the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907.

Government was supporting Major Stokes out of interested motives. Such an appointment, the Acting Minister for Russian Foreign Affairs pointed out, was moreover, contrary to the principle which had been agreed upon between the two Powers namely, that no subject of a European Great Power should be allowed to occupy an important post in the Persian service. If the British Government was unable to prevent the appointment of Major Stokes, M. Neratof stated, then, the two Powers should take such steps which would not only satisfy the Russian public opinion but also demonstrate complete harmony between the two Governments so far as their policy regarding Persia was concerned. He suggested that the Russian Minister at Teheran should be instructed to address a note to the Persian Government to the effect that Russia would regard the appointment of Major Stokes as an unfriendly act and would reserve to herself the right of taking such measures as she might deem necessary to safeguard her interests in Persia. The British Minister, M. Neratof further suggested, should at the same time, address a note to the Persian Government which would express entire concurrence in the terms of the Russian note and would recognize Russia’s right to take necessary steps to protect her interest. As the proposed

For the text of the proposed Note to be communicated to the Persian Government, see Cd. 6104, Enclosure 1 in No. 279, p. 134.

For the text of the proposed Note to be communicated to the Persian Government by Sir G. Barclay, see Ibid Enclosure 2 in No. 279, p. 134.
Russian note virtually threatened armed intervention, Sir J. Buchanan disagreed and suggested that the Russian Government should protest against the employment of Major Stokes in Northern Persia and should, at the same time, offer the services of a Russian officer to organize a gendarmerie for the maintenance of law and order in those provinces. The British Ambassador, however, could not satisfy M. Meratof, who remarked that 'if Russian interest were threatened, Government would be obliged to intervene'. On August 6, 1911, in a private telegram, Sir J. Buchanan stated that 'unless we give some satisfaction to Russia serious breach may be made in Anglo-Russian understanding'. He then asked, 'if His Majesty's Government could not recall Major Stokes temporarily, whether it would be possible to bring pressure on him to withdraw his resignation from the Indian Army, as his appointment would cause serious embarrassment to His Majesty's Government and expose Persia to Russian exasperation in the north'. Britain was not prepared to break off her alliance with Russia at any cost. Sir E. Grey now completely adopted the Russian standpoint. He telegraphed to Sir J. Barclay on 7th August, 1911:

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+++ Ward and Gooch (Editors), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 420.
'You should warn Persian Government that unless Major Stokes is not be employed in North of Persia they ought not to persist in the appointment, and, if they do persist we shall recognize the right of Russia to take what steps she thinks necessary to safeguard her interests in North Persia'. The telegram was repeated to St. Petersburg. In another telegram to Sir O. Barclay on the same day, Sir E. Gray instructed him to inform Major Stokes the content of the warning which he was to give to the Persian Government. The British Foreign Secretary pleaded that the 'Russian Government are as much within their right in protesting against his employment to control gendarmerie in North as we should be in protesting against employment of Russians to control Southern trade routes. It will be impossible for Persian Government to uphold appointment against Russian intervention and we cannot depreciate intervention against it unless appointment is restricted to South'. Sir E. Gray also informed Sir O. Barclay that he had enquired of India office as to whether there was any means of suspending the acceptance of Stokes's resignation. The British Ministers at Teheran was also forbidden to make any communication to Major Stokes regarding the acceptance of his resignation. The telegram was repeated to St. Petersburg.

The same day, Sir G. Buchanan was instructed to inform M. Keratof the substance of the telegram which had been sent to Teheran and through which Sir G. Barclay had been instructed to warn the Persian Government.

On August 9, 1911, Sir G. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that according to the instructions, he had warned the Persian Government and had left an aide-memoire with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia. He further reported that in the course of conversation with the Foreign Minister, he suggested that the only way out of the difficulty was to confine the appointment of Major Stokes's in Southern Persia. In reply, the Foreign Minister stated that the suggestion could not be entertained by the Persian Government as it would be tantamount to a recognition of the sphere of influence of interest under the Anglo-Russian Agreement. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to reply in writing.

On the one side, the Persian Government was determined not to accept the Russo-British dictation, which was definitely an intervention in purely internal affairs of Persia. On the other hand, Russia had fully realized the weakness of Great Britain and was firm to exploit the situation in her maximum favour. Consequently when on August 8, 1911, Sir G. Buchanan informed M. Keratof the substance of the warning which Sir G. Barclay had been instructed to communicate to the Persian

+ Ibid, No. 802, p. 786.
++ For the text of the aide-memoire communicated to Persian Government on August 8, 1911, by Sir G. Barclay see Cd. 6104, Enclosure 2 in No. 365, p. 163.
+++ Cd. 6104, No. 269, p. 127.
Government, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs unexpectedly raised another problem. M. Meratof, during the conversation with Sir J. Buchanan cunningly stated, that 'supposing the Persian Government did agree to confine Major Stokes's command to the South, it would be difficult to prevent them from eventually employing the gendarmerie thus formed with or without their commander in the north'. Would the British Government, he enquired, make a statement to the effect that this would not be allowed. He thought that a public statement to this effect by the British Foreign Secretary could satisfy the Russian public opinion. Sir J. Buchanan replied that it might be possible for the British Foreign Secretary to assure the Russian Government that Major Stokes would not be employed in the North but it would be exceedingly difficult for him to state that the force which Major Stokes would organize in the South would not be allowed to move in the North to put down the disorders there. M. Meratof admitted that it would be undoubtedly difficult and suggested that in case Major Stokes was employed to organize the Southern Gendarmerie, the British Government would support the Russian demand, if made, that the organization of the Northern Gendarmerie should be entrusted either to a Russian officer or to a national of the minor power, whom Russia might propose. Sir J. Buchanan preferred this suggestion personally in comparison to the previous one.
but expressed his inability to commit on behalf of the British Government. M. Neratof once again expressed his doubts as to the possibility of the Persian Government persisting in placing Major Stokes in command of a national gendarmerie for the whole of Persia, and suggested that the Britain might in that case declared that she would support Russia's demand to some similar appointment in Persia such as the employment of a Russian officer as Chief of Staff of Persia. Sir J. Buchanan feared that such a demand would never be consented by the Persian Government. Neratof told that he had no intention to put forward such a demand at present. He desired to obtain a guarantee from the British Government to this effect. He wished a statement to be made by the British Foreign Secretary in the above sense either in the House of Commons or in the Press which would satisfy the Russian public opinion. Sir L. Grey now yielded completely. After receiving the above communication from Sir J. Buchanan, the British Foreign Secretary telegraphically instructed him to inform M. Neratof of what he (Sir L. Grey) said in the House of Commons on August 8, 1911, and to let him


++ In a reply to a question asked by the Earl of Ronaldshay in the House of Commons on August 8, 1911, regarding the appointment of Major Stokes, Sir L. Grey said: 'I understand that Major Stokes has been offered an appointment by the Persian Government. It cannot have the approval of His Majesty's Government unless the conditions of the appointment are consistent with the terms and the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.' Parliamentary Debate, 5th Series, (House of Commons), Vol. 29, p. 939 referred by Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X. Part I, No. 803, Note (4), p. 787.
know that the appointment of Major Stokes was in suspense pending the Persian answer. In case, the Persian Government did not give way, Sir G. Buchanan was further instructed to inform, the British Government would support the Russian demand that either a Russian officer or a subject of some minor power should be employed to organize the gendarmerie in northern Persia. Sir E. Grey, however, desired the appointment of a subject of a neutral power to command the whole revenue gendarmerie. Sir G. Buchanan informed M. Neratof the substance of Sir E. Grey's telegram on 10th August 1911. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia enquired that 'what His Majesty's Government would do should Major Stokes's appointment not be confined to the south', Sir G. Buchanan pointed out that 'if Russia obtained the control of the northern gendarmerie, it naturally followed that Major Stokes would be precluded from trespassing into the Russian Zone.'

The anxiously awaited reply of the Persian Government was received by Sir J. Barclay on August 11, 1911. It was quite unexpected. The Persian Government was determined to maintain her sovereignty and integrity. The Persian note stated that the Government of Persia could not understand the attitude of the British Government regarding the appointment of Major Stokes.

+ Cd. 6104, No. 267, p. 126.
Had objection been raised on the basis of Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, the note argued, it was not just as the Convention had never been recognized by the Persian Government. Moreover, the preamble of the Agreement of 1907 had guaranteed the independence and integrity of Persia which also supported the Persian point of view. Furthermore, the preamble also declared the desire of the two governments to preserve order in Persia and by appointing Major Stokes, the note pleaded, the Persian Government desired to take necessary steps for the collection of taxes, without which the maintenance of order in any country would be a difficult task.

While handing over the above note to the British Minister at Teheran, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia sought advice of Sir J. Barclay for an honourable settlement of the dispute. Sir J. Barclay suggested that Major Stokes's work might be confined not perhaps expressly to the south, but Fars. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that had this proposal been consented, the Russian Government would demand equivalent in the North, which could not be accepted by the Persian Government as it was tantamount to the recognition of sphere of influence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then suggested that the appointment of Major Stokes might be limited for only three years, and, he was ready to guarantee that Major's term of office would not be extended. At the expiration of his

term, the Minister assured, the command of the Gendarmerie would be entrusted either to Persians or to the nationals of some minor powers. To satisfy Russia, the Minister was ready to declare that Major Stokes would not be sent to any active mission in the North. He was only to organize the Gendarmerie in Teheran.

Sir J. Buchanan communicated the reply of the Persian Government to M. Neratof on August 15, 1911. He had already received a report on the subject from M. Poklewski. In course of discussion, M. Neratof stated that the appointment would be prejudicial to the smooth working of the Anglo-Russian understanding and enquired what would have been the reaction in England, 'had it been a Russian Officer, who had accepted a post in the Persian Government which conferred on him the right to organize and control a gendarmerie force in South Persia? Sir J. Buchanan reminded him the various statements made by Sir E. Grey in the British Parliament; his promise to support any eventual demand which Russian might make respecting the gendarmerie in the North; and the serious warnings which had been addressed by the British Government to the Persian Government. Moreover, Sir J. Buchanan further reminded him that the resignation of Major Stokes had not yet been accepted and assured that it would not be accepted pending further developments. In the light of the British attitude towards the appointment Sir J. Buchanan remarked that
he did not understand what more could be done by the British Government to satisfy Russia and how the Anglo-Russian understanding could in any way be impaired. M. Meratof, however, adhered to his views and stated that all that Russia could do would be either to intervene by force or to demand some analogous appointment for a Russian officer, such as Chief of Staff. In the former case, he remarked, an entirely new situation would be created. As to the latter, he did not know whether he could count upon the support of the British Government. Sir J. Buchanan replied that the promised support of the British Government for the control of northern gendarmerie by Russia would be, however, enough to prevent any interference on the part of Stokes in the North. M. Meratof then pointed out the possibility of the ex-Shah's regaining the throne. In that case, he remarked, the Russian public opinion would force the Government to obtain from the Shah the appointment of Chief of Staff for a Russian officer. Had the ex-Shah regained the throne, Sir J. Buchanan replied, shuster and Stokes, both would probably disappear from the scene and consequently Russia would have no reason to ask for a counter balancing appointment. M. Meratof stated that it would make no difference. When a Russophil Government would be installed at Teheran, the Russian public opinion would force the Government to obtain appointments for her subjects just as England had done in case of Major Stokes when an Anglophil Government was in power. He, however, requested the British Government either to recall Major Stokes temporarily or to appoint him somewhere else and remarked that
it was still possible as the Major's resignation had not yet been accepted. Ever-yielding British Foreign Secretary, telegraphically instructed Sir G. Buchanan to endeavour to remove the misunderstanding by reminding to M. Morutof the British attitude respecting Stokes's appointment. He also expressed his readiness to repeat the warning, already given to the Persian Government. He was also ready to inform to the Persian Government that in view of well-founded Russian objections, the resignation of Major Stokes could not be accepted. In short, on August 19, 1911, the Russian Government warned the Persian Government not to appoint Major Stokes as it was incompatible with the Russian interests. In case of failure, the warning stated, the Russian Government would take such steps as she would deem necessary. On the same day, the British Minister at Teheran, repeated the warning which had already been given on 8th August and urged the Persian Government to appoint some subject of a minor power in place of Stokes. The Persian Government was also informed that in view of just and well-cou raged Russian objection, the resignation of Major Stokes would not be accepted. Unable to obtain the services of

Major Stokes for a long term, Shuster proposed that he should be allowed to engage the Major either for nine months or six months so that he could assist him in Teheran in the organization of Treasury Gendarmerie, but this proposal was also not consented by H. Wazatof. The Persian Government thought it better to preserve her independence and consequently the matter was dropped. Major Stokes was ordered by the British Government to return to India. He left Teheran for India on December 13, 1911.

3) THE DISMISSAL OF MR. SHUSTER

In the midst of Stokes's controversy, quite a new problem arose. The Persian Government decided to confiscate the properties of the Princes Shua-es-Sultan and Salar-ad-Dowleh, the two brothers of the Ex-Shah, who had joined him in his recent attempt to regain the throne. A decree for the confiscation of the properties of the rebellious princes was issued and Mr. Shuster was ordered by the Council of Ministers on October 4, 1911, to convert the properties into the Persian Treasury. When the Persian Government decided to take this step, it notified the British and Russian Legations at Teheran of its contemplated measures. The two Legations were also informed that if any foreign interests were found to be
involved in connection with these properties, all rights of the foreigners should be respected and safeguarded by the Government. No objection was raised by either of the Legations. On October 9, 1911, in the execution of the order of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Shuster sent his gendarmes to seize the estates of the insurgent princes with the instructions that they should take peaceable possession of these properties in the name of the Imperial Government, making known to the persons who might be found in actual charge of the estates the terms and conditions of the order of confiscation issued by the Council of Ministers, and calling special attention to the fact that any contracts which might exist with foreign subjects would be fully respected by the Imperial Government. But in case there should be a rental agreement with any foreign subject, the rent for the property to be paid in accordance with the agreement should be remitted to the Treasurer-General of the Government until the expiration of the term. When Shuster's men reached the Park of Shua-es-Sultanah, they found some Persian Cossacks posted there, probably by the Turkish Embassy - Shua-es-Sultanah being claimed by the Turkish Embassy as a Turkish national. The

1. Ibid, p. 136.
2. Ibid pp. 139-140.
Cossacks told them not to enter. After informing the Cossacks that the Government had issued orders for the confiscation of all the property of Shuas-es-Sultanah, the gendarmes managed to enter the garden and started preparing a list of its contents. Soon after, two members of the Russian consulate in full uniform, with ten Russian Cossacks arrived and ordered the gendarmes to retire immediately. The latter explained their mission but the Russian officials began to threaten them. The gendarmes had no alternative but to withdraw from the premises. Nevertheless, the Russian Officers and Cossacks chased them up the street. Mr. Shuster hurriedly sent telegram to Poklewski, the Russian Minister, who was at his summer quarters in Zargundah, protesting against the action of Russian Consular officers and requesting him to issue immediate orders to his consulate to withdraw the force from the Park. Mr. Shuster also despatched a letter to Poklewski informing him that he (Mr. Shuster) would send his representatives to take possession of the garden in question on October 10, 1911, with the expectations that necessary arrangements would have been made to avoid the possibility of any unpleasant incident.

N. Poklewski replied as follows:

"Your wire, letter received. Dawlatabad is a property rented by two Russian subjects and no measures against it ought to have been taken without previously assuring Consulate-general that all rights of Russian subjects will be safeguarded.

1. Ibid, p. 140, also see Cd. 6105, No. 134, p. 55.
2. Shuster, op. cit. p. 141."
and their contracts not interfered with. It is on this explicit condition that measures taken by Persian Government against property of Shau's Saltana will not be opposed by Russian Legation which will also hold Persian Government responsible for any claims subjects may have against Shau's Saltana'.

To Mr. Shuster's wonder, Poklewski did not mention anything about the withdrawal of the force from the Park but referred in his reply to the estate of Dowlatabad of which Mr. Shuster made no mention in his communications to Poklewski. As Mr. Shuster received no explicit reply on the subject of the withdrawal of the force, he decided to carry out his intention. Consequently, he sent his assistant Mr. Cairns with a force consisting of fifty Treasury gendarmes with five Persian officers and fifty gendarmes of the city police with three officers, under the command of Mr. Merrell, one of Shuster's American assistants, to take possession of the Park. The Government force was instructed to take possession of the property by peaceful methods, if possible. If the Cossacks offered forcible opposition, Shuster instructed his men, they would be allowed to fire first shot. However, the gendarmes were ordered to take possession of the property under any

1. Ibid, p. 142.
2. Ibid p. 142.
circumstances. When the expedition arrived at the gate of the property, Messrs Cairns and Merrall decided to call on Mr. Pokhiltonow, the Russian Consul-General, first. After being received by the Consul-General, they read to him the order of the confiscation, explained the instructions they had received, assured him that the rights of the foreign nationals would be safeguarded and begged him to withdraw the force from the garden. Mr. Pokhiltonow refused to withdraw the force. Mr. Cairns, thereupon, informed him that he would take possession of the property by force. However, the property was seized by the gendarmes after disarming the Cossacks posted there. Of course, the Cossacks, at first, raised objection to the entry of the gendarmes in the Park, but after being informed that if they did not allow to enter peaceably, force would be used, they kept themselves quiet. As regards the properties of the rebel prince at Dawlatabad and Mansurabad, the Government gendarmes, at first, took peaceable possession of the two properties but soon after, the officers of the Russian Consulate accompanied with some Russian Cossacks arrived. They arrested and insulted the gendarmes. However, after giving a serious warning not to repeat their action in connection with the properties of Shua-es-Sultanah and Salar-ed-Dowleh, who were 'Russian subject', the Russian officers allowed the gendarmes to go. It was a gross violation of the Persian sovereignty. The Persian

1. Ibid, p. 142, 145, also see Cd. 6105, No. 134, pp 55-56.
2. Shuster, op. cit. p. 146.
Government protested against the actions of Consul-General and demanded that the Consul-General and the staff of the Consulate-General should be recalled. On October 16, 1911, Sir O. Barclay telegraphically reported that M. Pokhitinov, the Russian Consul-General at Teheran, had 'quite unwarrantably interfered by force with the seizure by the Persian Government of certain properties of the ex-Shah's brothers which had been confiscated in consequence of the part their owners have taken in the insurrection'. M. Poklewski had disavowed M. Pokhitinov's action, but made reserves as to any Russian Claims.

At first, the Russian Government did not react to the forcible seizure of Shua's Park by the gendarmes and it seemed that no action would be taken by her in that connection. Though the Russian government was determined to oust Mr. Shuster, but any hasty step in that connection would have upset the whole Russian plan. Moreover, the consent of the British Government was necessary to achieve the goal. Consequently, Russia proceeded very tactfully and cautiously in the matter. The Russian Foreign Office started a propaganda to the effect that the general situation in Persia was dark and gloomy; that it had taken an anarchic turn; and that the Persian Government was unable to maintain law and order. On 18th October, 1911, in the course of a conversation with Mr. O'Beirne, M. Neratof stated that he had received a report from Teheran to the effect that the

outlook in Persia was exceedingly dark and the situation there was deteriorating rapidly. He remarked that the Russian Government could no longer refrain from taking measures of 'extreme rigour' which might lead to an occupation of northern provinces of Persia. He complained of the serious disorders prevailing in the region of Ardabil and the frequent attacks on the Russian convoys there. Speaking of the prospects of increasing chaos in the Persian affairs, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia referred to the alleged quarrel between the Persian Government and M. Yeprem. He stated that the pending cabinet crises in Persia might bring the 'extremists' in power and feared that in such a case, no authority would be left to deal with. Above all, M. Neratof complained strongly of Mr. Shuster's attempt to obtain a control over the whole Persian administration, which he stated, was entirely incompatible with Russia's interest. He referred to Mr. Shuster's alleged intention to obtain full powers from the Majlissa with regard to the railways and loans. Mr. O'Beirne replied that if northern Persia was occupied by Russia, it would be very difficult for the British Government to defend such a Russian action before the British public opinion and warned that it might endanger the smooth working of Anglo-Russian understanding. He, nevertheless, assured Mr. Neratof that the British Government would do her level best to remove the reasons which, in Russian's view, made the occupation necessary. O'Beirne, however, reminded
M. Novatof that Russia had vetoed the various schemes of the Persian Government, which, if implemented, would have enabled her (the Persian Government) to restore peace and maintain order in the country. Russia simply raised objections, O'Berine remarked, but suggested no proposals to take their place and enquired what Russia actually desired to be done in Persia? M. Novatof replied that Mr. Shuster should be made to understand that he must take into account the interests of the two Powers and must proceed in cooperation with them. As to the projected reforms, M. Novatof stated, Shuster must proceed gradually and in such a manner as to take Russia's interests into consideration. He further stated that Shuster must not forget the special position of Russia in Persia while working for the good of that country. If Mr. Shuster obtained full control from the Majliss regarding the loans and the railways, M. Novatof stated firmly, he must give an understanding that he would act entirely according to the wishes of the two Governments. If he would not give the required understanding, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked, Russia would be compelled to play an obstructive role. Later on, M. Novatof informed Mr. O'Berine that the Russian Government was at present only considering the necessity of a military expedition but she "counted on the assistance of His Majesty's Government in endeavouring to avoid active intervention on a large scale.

When Sir E. Grey received the above report from St. Petersburg, he requested Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador at London, to come to see and to discuss the matter with him. On October 23, 1911, the British Foreign Secretary urged upon the Russian Ambassador that 'an occupation of Northern Persia or even a military expedition would end the independence of Persia and entail a revision of the Anglo-Russian Agreement about Persia'. He also remarked that in his opinion, no necessity of such a strong step had arisen. Count Benckendorff replied that he had heard nothing of a military expedition but stated that the prospect of Mr. Shuster's getting the entire control of the whole Persian administration had annoyed his Government and was incompatible with Russia's interests. Sir E. Grey replied that if the Russian interests were being undermined, they must be protected but Shuster had not affected anything, he remarked. The British Foreign Secretary reminded the Russian Ambassador that the appointment of Major Stokes had been prevented, no loan had yet been made by Seligman.

As to the railway concession, for which a British group was applying, Sir E. Grey assured the Russian Ambassador that they would not be allowed to obtain a concession if it went into Russian sphere. He informed him that the British group had been

+ Mr. Shuster was negotiating for a loan of £4,000,000 with the representatives of Messrs Seligman Bros.
told to arrange the matter with Russia. Lastely, Sir E. Grey stated that the mere fact that a private individual like Mr. Shuster had used adverse language was not a reason for destroying the independence of Persia. Informing about the substance of his talk with the Russian Ambassador, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. O'Beirne to speak to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia in the above sense.

According to the instruction, Mr. O'Beirne communicated to M. Meratof, one October 27, 1911, the views of the British Foreign Secretary on the subject of the threatened Russian action in Northern Persia. M. Meratof replied that the despatch of a military expedition would not destroy the independence of Persia as the despatch of a Russian force to Kasvin in the past, he argued, did not have any such effect. He further pleaded that the presence of the Russian troops at Tabriz, on the contrary, saved that town from being captured by the supporters of the Ex-Shah at that time. Mr. O'Beirne then reminded him that he had used the word 'occupation' to which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs promptly replied that it was too strong a word. He, however, agreed that Mr. Shuster had so far been not able to enforce any thing to which Russian Government raised objection and assured that so long as that was the case, no action would be taken. Lastely, he reiterated

+ Mr. Shuster wrote an open letter to the Times on October 21, 1911. The letter was printed into two sections on November 10, and 11- see Appendix No. G.

that Mr. Shuster should be made to understand that he must act
in consultation with the two Powers.

The weakness of the British Foreign Office was apparent. The European situation was still disturbed and Russia was
determined to take full advantage of it. On November 2, 1911, M. Poklewski, the Russian Minister at Teheran called on the
Persian Foreign Office and made the following verbal demands:

1) That the gendarmes should be immediately withdrawn
from the Shuea's Park and the Persian Cossacks should be put
in possession of the estate.

2) That the Persian Foreign Minister should apologize
for the 'insult' which had been offered to the Russian Consulate
officers.

3) That the Persian should take back her note demanding
the recall of the Consul-General.

The demands of the withdrawal of the gendarmes was
based on the ground that the property was mortgaged to the
Russian Bank and the gendarmes were sent to take possession of the property without previous notice, having been given

1. Cd. 6105, No. 58, p. 27.

+ As has been referred to the Persian Government notified to the British and Russian Legations at Teheran of her contemplated measure regarding the confiscation of the properties. Moreover, it was also declared that if any foreign interest were found to be involved in connection with the properties, all rights of the foreigners should be respected and safeguarded.

(conti..)
to the Russian Consulate-General. The apology was demanded on the allegation that the gendarmes in possession of the property pointed their rifles at the two passing officers of the Consulate-General and the Consulate-General itself.

Sir J. Barclay advised the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia to comply with the demands, but the Persian Government stood firm and rejected the humiliating demands on November 6, 1911. The Persian Government, however, expressed her readiness to hold an impartial enquiry to elucidate the whole Shua-es-Sultaneh's incident.

According to Sir J. Barclay, the Persian Government had informally intimated to the Russian Minister at Teheran that the estates of the certain reactionaries were to be confiscated and assurances were given that any proper Russian claim would be met, but Shua-es-Sultaneh's name was not specifically mentioned — See CD 6105, No. 161, p. 170.

The claim that the property was mortgaged was also wrong — See Shuster, op.cit., pp. 151-162.

The allegation that the gendarmes pointed out their rifles at the passing Russian consulate officers, was also not correct. On the contrary, M. Petroff and M. Haiderband, the two Russian Consulate officers, drove to the gate of the Park. They abused and insulted the gendarmes and threatened to kill them. It was all to provoke them, which would have undoubtedly provided to the Russian consulate officers a pretext for further action. Fortunately, the gendarmes remained quiet — See Shuster op.cit., pp. 147-148.

Sykes also expressed his doubts as to whether the alleged incident actually happened — See Sykes, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 425.

1. Gooch and Temperley Vol. I, Part I, op.cit., No. 837, p. 817, also see CD 6105, No. 76, p. 33. For the demands made by Russia, also see Shuster, op.cit., p. 157.


Although, the Persian Government rejected the demands but it did not mean that she was not aware of its repercussions. The Russian Government was contemplating to send an expedition to Persia to get her demands complied with and the Persian Government was naturally alarmed. On November 8, 1911, the Persian Minister at London called on Sir A. Nicolson and begged for British support in the question of Shua-es-Sultaneh and the difficulty which had arisen with Russia. Sir A. Nicolson unexpectedly replied that it was exceedingly difficult for British Government to intervene in a difference between Russia and the Persian Government. He advised him to settle the matter locally. The Persian Government also endeavoured to enlist the support of United States of America. On November 8, 1911, the Persian Chargé d'Affairs presented to the State Department a communication from the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Persian Minister, after a description of the unjust and humiliating Russian demands, asserted that the true intention of Russia was to compel Persia to dismiss Mr. Shuster and thereby check the reforms which, if implemented successfully, would lead to greater Persian independence. As the Persian communication did not require a direct answer, the State Department decided to leave it unanswered. But Mirza Ali Kuli Khan, the Persian Chargé d'Affaires, addressed

a note on that subject to the State Department and stated that Persia 'expects intrinsic assistance'. Secretary Knox replied that the State Department regretted the 'difficulties now existing between the two countries with which the United States is on terms of equal friendship'. Persia was isolated and without a friend to help her.

The Russian Government was now free to dictate her conditions to the Persian Government. On November 10, 1911, the Russian Government instructed M. Poklewski to present the same demands in writing, asking for an immediate reply. The Russian Minister at Teheran was also instructed to inform the Persian Government that if the demands were not complied within forty-eight hours, diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off. In the case of non-compliance with the demands, M. Poklewski was authorised to warn the Persian Government that the Russian Government would take such measures to protect her interests in Persia as might be deemed necessary. The Russian Minister communicated a note in the above sense to the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 11, 1911, together with a warning in the sense indicated. As to the measures to be taken, M. Meratof informed O'Beirne on November 10, 1911, that the Russian Government would dispatch

1. Yeselson, op.cit., p. 119.
3. CD 6105, Enclosure in No. 101, p. 42.
a force of sufficient strength to Kazvin, a detachment of which, on being summoned by M. Poklewski, would go to Teheran to remove the gendarmes from the Shua's Park and to install Persian Cossacks in their place, after which it would return to Kazvin. Mr. O'Beirne remarked that the Persian Government would give way.¹

On account of the extensive preparations by Russia to occupy Northern Persia, the Persian Government was thoroughly frightened. Having no alternative, the Persian Cabinet again sought the advice of the British Government regarding the policy to be pursued. Sir E. Grey promptly advised to accept the Russian ultimatum and apologize as was demanded.² Consequently, the Persian Prime Minister instructed Mr. Shuster to withdraw the gendarmes from the Park of Shua-es-Sultaneh. Mr. Shuster declined to remove his men on the ground that the order of confiscation was signed by all the Ministers, and could only be revoked by a similarly authoritative document.³ The reply of the Persian Government was, however, delayed owing to the Cabinet crisis in Persia. Nevertheless, on the expiration of forty-eight hours, Sir G. Barclay again urged the Persian Government to comply with the Russian demands, but 'any disposition to yield as regards the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes', he reported to Sir E. Grey on November

³ Ibid., p. 162, also see CD 6105, No. 115, p. 47.
14, 1911, 'is likely to be counter-acted by the influence
of Shuster', regarding the other demands, he further reported,
'it will be difficult to find out a Minister who will consent
to tender an apology.' On the one side, the delay in reply
was being very much resented by Russia, on the other side, the
'recent misdeeds', as remarked by M Nerato, tested the
'patience' of the Russian Government. On November 12, 1911, in
the course of a conversation with Mr. O'Beirne, M. Nerato
strongly complained of the refusal of Mr. Shuster to cancel the
appointment of Mr. Lecoffre as Treasury agent at Tabriz,
inspite of Sir J. Barclay's protests. He also bitterly
criticized the circular of the Treasurer-General, addressed to
the Russian subjects in Persia, requiring them to furnish
him directly with the particulars of leases held by them, fail­
ing which their rights would not be recognized by the Persian

1. CD 6105, pp. 43-44.
+ Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject, who had been in the Ministry
of Finance at Teheran, for nearly two years, was appointed
by Mr. Shuster as a Treasury agent at Tabriz. Teheran was also
included in the so-called Russian sphere of influence and by
sending Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz, the Treasurer-General had
affected nothing but merely transferred him from one point
in the Russian sphere of influence to another. On the
instructions of Sir E. Grey, Sir J. Barclay warned Mr. Shuster
on November 8, 1911 that the appointment would result in a
protest by Russia to preserve her interests there but Mr.
Shuster justified the appointment - See Shuster op. cit.,
p. 160, also CD 6105, No. 77, p. 33, No. 82, p. 35, No. 89.
pp. 37-38.
Government. Such procedure, M. Neratof remarked, was contrary to the Persian Usage. Mr. O'Beirne suggested that the only way out of the difficulty was that the Persian Government should dismiss Mr. Shuster but the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia feared that the Persian Government 'would not have the courage to take this step in the teeth of opposition from the Medjliss.'

After receiving the report of the above conversation from St. Petersburg, Sir E. Grey decided to put the full responsibility of the whole incident upon the shoulders of Mr. Shuster. He instructed Mr. O'Beirne to tell the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia that the basis of the real difficulty was the anti-Russian policy being pursued by Mr. Shuster in northern Persia and therefore, he suggested, Russia should formulate her complaints against Mr. Shuster and make a formal demand respecting his anti-Russian activities. Mr. O'Beirne conveyed the substance of Sir E. Grey's communication to M. Neratof. The Acting Minister of Russian Foreign Affairs pointed out that from a formal point of view, it would be difficult for the Russian Government to protest against the appointments, such as that of Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz, since such a protest would be tantamount to an intervention in the internal affairs of

3. Ibid., No. 845, p. 823, also see CD. 6105, No. 109, p. 45.
Persia. He, however, stated that his Government was thinking to make the demand of Mr. Shuster's dismissal on the ground of his responsibility for the action of gendarmerie.

On 14th November 1911, M. Neratof informed Mr. O'Beirne that he had not yet received any report from Teheran regarding the compliance of the demands and intimated that if a satisfactory reply was not received by tomorrow, the Russian Government would take the contemplated measures. In reply, Mr. O'Beirne referred to the resignation of the Persian Cabinet and suggested that the period given for the acceptance of the demands should be extended — a week for instance — within which the demands must be fulfilled. The extension in the period was necessary, he argued, as owing to the resignation of the Cabinet, it was impossible for Persia to comply immediately with the demands. M. Neratof replied that the resignation was clearly to avoid the compliance and remarked that whoever held office would resign after the expiration of one week's duration for the same purpose.

On November 15, 1911, Sir E. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that the Russian Legation at Teheran had been instructed to break off the relations with the Persian Cabinet, if one existed. The Russian Minister had also been informed, the report stated, that a detachment of the Russian Troops would

then soon be dispatched to Kazvin. In response to the above communication M. Poklewski telegraphed to his Government that no Cabinet had yet been formed. If the Cabinet was formed and did not comply with the demands, he informed his Government, the relations would be broken off. He further informed his Government that if the compliance with the demand did not result from the despatch of the troops to Kazvin, it would be necessary to send a force consisting of 2,000 men to Teheran and a force of equal strength should necessarily be kept in reserve at Kazvin. On the same day, Mr. O’Beirne made a strong appeal to M. Neratof that the period for the compliance of the demands should at least be extended for three days. If an extension in the period was not granted, Mr. O’Beirne pointed out, the Russian Government would be accused of taking advantage of the temporary absence of a Persian Government to intervene by force in that country. M. Neratof did not give any definite answer, nevertheless, he held out some hope to pursue the course suggested but ‘if Russia accorded a further delay’, he remarked, ‘she should also increase her demands’. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia stated that in such a case, he might put forward a demand for the dismissal of the officials responsible for the action of the gendarmerie, including the Treasurer-General.

1. CD 6105, No. 110, p. 45.
The reports from St. Petersburg and Teheran were of alarming nature. M. Poklevski's recommendation that, in case of non-compliance of demands, even after the arrival of the Russian force at Kazvin, a detachment of sufficient strength should be sent to Teheran, was a source of great anxiety to the British Foreign Office. Consequently, Sir E. Grey told the Councillor of the Russian Embassy on November 16, 1911, that it was for Russia to decide and formulate her own demands. If Russia was convinced that no settlement could be reached without Mr. Shuster's dismissal, the British Foreign Secretary stated, she could demand its expulsion and assured that Britain would raise no objection. 'As a matter of fact', Sir E. Grey remarked, 'he had given me endless trouble by his inconvenient appointments of British subjects inspite of all I could say to him.' The intention of the Russian Government to despatch an expedition to Kazvin did not annoy the British Foreign Secretary, but the contemplated dispatch of a force consisting of 2,000 men, from Kazvin to Teheran, had disturbed him. 'This would mean an occupation of the capital of Persia', he told the Councillor of the Russian Embassy, which would surely have an effect upon the Mohammedan world. If Britain appeared to be a consenting party to such a step, Sir E. Grey pointed out, it would certainly excite the feelings of the Mohammedans and it might react most unfavourably in India, especially at the moment of the king's visit to that country. Pointing out the difficulties of the British Government, Sir E. Grey suggested to the Councillor
that the Russia should formulate her demands after the arrival of her troops at Kazvin and give further time to the Persian Government before taking any other step. If it became necessary to take further steps, Sir E. Grey further suggested, it would be better to seize either some of the Customs houses or to impound the revenues of Tabriz. Such an step, the British Foreign Secretary remarked, would be relevant to Mr. Shuster's action. Sir E. Grey telegraphically reported the substantes of the above talk to O'Beirne and instructed him to talk in that sense to M. Meratof. On November 17, 1911, M. Poklewski was instructed to break off the relations with the Cabinet. The Russian Government also instructed the military authorities in the Caucasus to despatch troops to Kazvin. It was


There were already 3,922 military men of Russia in Persia, stationed at various placed. The statement showing the numbers of the troops and the places where they were stationed, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ardebil</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunbad-i-Kabus</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasht</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urmia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushire</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbat-i-Haidari</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

total 3,922.

The above information was given by Sir J. Barclay to Sir E. Grey on October 31, 1911. See CD. 6105, No. 137, p. 57 and Enclosure in No. 137, p. 57.

On November 12, 1911, Mr. O'Beirne reported that the Russian Govt. had decided to increase the escort of her Consul at Astrabad by 200 Cossacks. See CD 6105, No. 114, p. 46 and Enclosure in No. 114, p. 47.
interesting to note that no Cabinet existed in Persia at that time. On the same day, M. de Betten, the Councillor of the British Embassy at London communicated a note to the British Government stating that in order to exercise pressure on the Persian Government to comply with the demands, the Russian Government had decided to dispatch to Kazvin at once a force of different arms. The Russian Minister at Tehran had been authorised, the note stated, to summon to Tehran a detachment of sufficient strength from Kazvin, to expel the gendarmes from the Shua's Park, if necessity arose. The note further stated that the step taken by the Russian Government were of a purely provisional character and assured that as soon as the incident was closed and guarantee was secured for the correct attitude of the Persian Government in future, the force would be withdrawn. On the 18th November 1911, Count Benckendorff also communicated a note to the British Government exactly in the above sense. On the same date, M. Poklewski informed the Persian Government that the diplomatic relations between the two countries had been broken off.

4. Ibid., No. 298, p. 125.
As instructed by Sir E. Grey on the 16th November, 1911, Sir G. Buchanan spoke to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia on the 18th November. He warned M. Neratof of the serious consequences which would result from the occupation of Teheran by Russia and urged him not to issue orders for an advance of the Russian troops from Kazvin till all other means of exercising pressure on the Persian Govt. such as the seizure of the Custom-houses, had been exhausted. Sir G. Buchanan suggested that sufficient time should be granted to the Persian Government to fulfil the demands before issuing the order for an advance from Kazvin to Teheran. M. Neratof rejected the idea of exercising pressure by the seizure of the Custom-houses on the ground that it was not likely to carry serious weight. He also declined to grant the Persian Government any further time after the arrival of the Russian troops at Kazvin and based his refusal on the ground that the Russian force would reach Kazvin in three days, which provided sufficient time for the Persian Government to reach a decision. To Sir G. Buchanan's suggestion that a serious warning should be given to the Persian Government as to the serious consequences which would result from the refusal to accept the demands, M. Neratof replied that as the diplomatic relations had been broken off, it was impossible to address a warning. Moreover, any communication to the Persian Government at that stage, M. Neratof remarked, would be against the prestige of Russia. He also rejected Sir G. Buchanan's proposal that a last warning message should be sent through
the Persian Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg and stated that the demands would be increased as the Russian troops would advance. The British Ambassador then enquired of M. Wera-
tof whether the thought it would answer a useful purpose were Sir G. Barclay to inform the Persian Government that we had been told that unless they gave Russia immediate satisfaction, not only would Teheran be occupied, but fresh demands be insisted upon. He replied that he would raise no objection to such a communication by Britain to the Persian Government. In the course of the conversation, M. Wera
tof stated that Russia really wanted to get rid of Mr. Shuster and expressed his readiness even to abandon the demand for the replacing of the gendarmerie by the Persian Cossacks, provided Mr. Shuster be expelled.¹ On November 19, 1911, Sir J. Buchanan called on M. Kokovtsov, the President of the Council and reported the substance of his talks with him to Sir E. Grey. In the course of conversation, the British Ambassador reported, the President of the Council assured that as soon as Russia's two demands, namely, a formal apology to the Russian Minister at Teheran by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the replacing of the gendarmerie by the Persian Cossacks, had been complied with, the Russian troops would be withdrawn. He also consented

to grant the Persian Government further time after the arrival of the Russian troops at Kazvin. On the 20th November Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Sir J. Buchanan that he was glad to hear that when the two demands were complied with, the Russian troops would be withdrawn. He also appreciated much the report that a delay would be accorded before an advance to Teheran would commence. This telegram was repeated to Teheran also. On the same day, Sir J. Buchanan reported that he had been informed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia that if the demands were complied with by the time of Russian troops reached the Persian territory, they would be recalled without further demands being formulated, but that, if they had be proceed further, the demands would be increased and Mr. Shuster's dismissal might be insisted upon. There was, however, contradiction between the statement of the President of the Council and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia. M. Kokovtsov had attached no condition to the withdrawal of the troops whereas M. Neratof made the withdrawal conditional. Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office was hopeful and Sir E. Grey informed Sir J. Barclay that 'we have every reason to believe that if Persian Government comply with Russian demands Russian troops will be withdrawn.' He also instructed his

2. Ibid., No. 859, p. 331.
3. Ibid., No. 857, p. 332, also see Cd. 6105, No. 146, p. 65.
Minister to point to the Persian Government that no time should be lost in complying with the demands. Consequently, when on November 20, 1911, Koin-al-Vezireh, the 'Chef de Cabinet' of Ex-Foreign Minister, Vosak-ed-Dowbh, called on Sir J. Barclay and stated that if the Persian Government was assured that the Russian troops would be recalled on the compliance of the two demands, and that no further demands would be formulated by Russia, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs would apologize as soon as the Cabinet was formed, and the gendarmes would be replaced by the Persian Cossacks. Sir J. Barclay replied that his Government had reason to believe that, if the demands were complied with, the Russian troops would be withdrawn. He advised the 'chef de Cabinet' that it would be wiser for the Persian Government to comply without loss of time.

On November 21, 1911, Sir J. Barclay reported that Samsan-es-Sultaneh had formed a Cabinet which would be presented to the Majlis tomorrow. The report continued to state that orders, signed by all the Ministers had been sent to Mr. Shuster to withdraw the gendarmes and hand over the properties to the delegates of the Persian Government. The Persian Cossacks had been ordered to furnish guards. The report further stated that as soon as the cabinet had been introduced to the Majlis, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs would apologize as soon as the Cabinet was formed, and the gendarmes would be replaced by the Persian Cossacks. Sir J. Barclay replied that his Government had reason to believe that, if the demands were complied with, the Russian troops would be withdrawn. He advised the 'chef de Cabinet' that it would be wiser for the Persian Government to comply without loss of time.

1. Cd. 6105, No. 145, p. 64.
2. Ibid., No. 293, p. 125.
Affairs would tender the apology to the Russian Minister at Teheran.¹ On the same day, Sir J. Barclay reported that he had been informed by Moin-el-Vezireh that the British Communication regarding the compliance with the demands had been discussed by the new Cabinet and by the prominent deputies of the Majliss and decision had been taken on comply with the demands as soon as the Cabinet would be introduced to the Majliss.

On November 22, 1911, Sir J. Buchanan called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia and stated that as the Persian Government had agreed to comply with the Russia's two demands, no difficulties would be made regarding the withdrawal of the troops. Contrary to the pledges previously made, M. Neratof replied that it would be impossible to withdraw the troops till some guarantee had been obtained with regard to the future. He argued that the situation had been changed as a result of the arrival of a portion of the Russian troops, at Baseli. Sir J. Buchanan reminded him of the assurances given by the President of the Council and pointed out that if the troops were not withdrawn, it would place the British Government in an invidious position. M. Neratof replied that the President of the Council had adhered to the assurances which he had given regarding the policy of the Russian Govt.

1. Ibid., No. 151, p. 66.
2. Ibid., No. 293, p. 125.

¹ A force consisting of 500 Russian infantry was reported to have arrived on 21st November, 1911.
and delay would be accorded at Kazvin. He further stated that while giving assurance regarding the withdrawal of the troops, the President of the Council had not intended to exclude discussion with the Persian Government of general settlement of pending questions. Moreover, the dispatch of the troops, M. Neratof pointed out, had not only been very inconvenient to the Russian Government but had involved great expense, and the question of the expenses would have to be raised. Sir J. Buchanan, however, pressed to prevent the Russian troops from advancing beyond Resht. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia replied that he thought that if satisfaction was given, troops might for the present be retained at Resht. M. Neratof then reverted to the necessity of reforming the Persian Government and getting rid of Mr. Shuster. He demanded that his country should be given a free hand to procure the dismissal of the latter. Sir J. Buchanan replied that Britain would not oppose such a Russian move but it must be accomplished by diplomatic means.

M. Neratof remarked that it could not be done until Teheran was occupied by Russia. Sir J. Buchanan reported the substance of

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the above talk to Sir E. Grey with the remarks that it seems that Russia was determined not to recall her troops till she got rid of Mr. Shuster and she would do it even if she had to send her troops to Teheran to expel him.¹

After receiving the above communication, Sir E. Grey hurriedly despatched a telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, instructing him to urge upon the Ministers for Foreign Affairs that if the demands were complied with, troops should not be landed, or if disembarked, should at once be re-shipped.² In the meantime, the Persian Cabinet was introduced to the Majliss in a somewhat incomplete form. Vosuk-ṣed-Dowḥh, the Ex-Foreign Minister resumed his portfolio but could not tender the apology due to his indisposition. He, however, expected to do so as soon as he would recover. The gendarmes could also be not withdrawn from the Shua's Park due to formalities for checking the inventory of movable. It was expected that the checking procedure would take at least four or five days, after which the gendarmes would be withdrawn.

The delay in complying with the demands, which was undoubtedly caused owing to the unavoidable circumstances, provided further pretext to Russia to intervene in Persian activity. On the 23rd November, 1911, M. Tferatof informed Sir E. Buchanan that he had received a report from Teheran

² Cd. 6105, No. 154, p. 68.
³ Ibid., No. 155, p. 68.
to the effect that the new Persian Cabinet had been formed on provisional basis and it consisted of only three Ministers; that the gendarmes had not been replaced and would not be withdrawn for four or five days more on the pretext of arranging the necessary preliminaries, and that until the gendarmes were not removed, M. Poklewski would not receive the visit of apology. He further stated that Mr. Shuster had managed to get published a pamphlet in Persian dealing with the recent incident and got it circulated amongst the people for the purpose of fomenting anti-Russian agitation. It would not be tolerated, he remarked and stated that instructions would be sent to M. Poklewski to demand the dismissal of Mr. Shuster. He further stated that the Russian Government would also demand, for the conciliation of Mr. Lecoffre's appointment and for a declaration from the Persian Government that in future no subject of a Great Power should be employed in the Persian Service, without previous consultation with the two legations. Sir J. Buchanan replied that Britain had already informed the Russian Government that she would raise no objection to the demand of Mr. Shuster's dismissal but the march of the Russian troops on Teheran was another matter. The British Ambassador then requested Mr. Neratof to defer presenting the demand till he could consult

* A local Persian Newspaper 'Tamadun' got the letter of Mr. Shuster to the 'Times', translated, printed and circulated. See Shuster, op.cit., p. 161.
the British Foreign Secretary. Sir G. Buchanan added that Sir E. Grey might be able to induce the Persian Government to consent to Mr. Shuster's dismissal which would make the use of force quite unnecessary. M. Neratof replied that he would send the required instructions to M. Poklewsiki by tomorrow night and remarked that once demand was presented, Russia would be obliged to see it complied with, even if she had to occupy Teheran. In response to the above communication, Sir E. Grey telegraphically informed Sir G. Buchanan on the 24th November that, taking the renewed attack of Mr. Shuster on the Russian Government into consideration, the British Government could not raise objections to the Russian demands being formulated, but it was most necessary that the movements of the Russian troops should stop after the two original demands had been complied with. As regards the new demands, Sir E. Grey suggested that time should be given to Persia so that diplomatic pressure could be put on the Persian Government to accept them. The British Foreign Secretary assumed that after the compliance with the two original demands, diplomatic relations between the two Governments would be resumed.

On 24th November, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called on the Russian Minister and tendered the desired apology. By that time, the gendarmes had already been replaced by the Persian Cossacks. After receiving the

apology, M. Poklewski told the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his government had authorised him to resume the diplomatic relations. He, however, informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that as there had been much delay in compliance with the demands; and as troops had already landed on the Persian territory; and as Mr. Shuster had managed to get his recent letter to the 'Times' translated and circulated amongst the people; the Russian government would not be entirely satisfied with the compliance with the two original demands. Some further demands would be formulated and presented to the Persian Government.

The above warning of M. Poklewski to the effect that some further demands would be formulated and presented, alarmed the Persian Government much. The 'Nominal' independence of Persian was now incomplete danger. Vosuk-ed-Dowleh, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs expected that he might make the U.S. Government to give some help to Persia. Consequently, he informed the Persian Charge d'Affairs at Washington that Russia would probably demand the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, and our government would either be compelled to consent to Mr. Shuster's removal or to the actual and immediate destruction of country. Pointing out the danger facing the Persian nation, Vosuk-ed-Dowleh instructed the Charge d'Affaires to discuss with the Secretary of State the matter regarding the course of action which the Persian Government must adopt. According

to the instruction, the Charge d'Affaires discussed the matter with the U.S. Secretary of State on November 27, 1911, but the Secretary of State declined to offer any suggestion. Persia, which may rightly be called the sickman of Asia, had no alternative but to wait helplessly for the forthcoming demands. On November 29, 1911, the demands were presented to the Persian Government by M. Poklewski in the shape of an ultimatum. Russian demanded:

'Firstly, the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre; and the status of other persons invited by Mr. Shuster to serve the Persian Government will come under the second item of these demands.

Secondly, an undertaking on the part of the Persian Government not to invite any foreigners to join their service without the previous consent of the British and Russian Legations.

Thirdly, payment by the Persian Government of the expenses of the present Russian military expedition to Persia; the sum payable to the Imperial Government and the manner of its payment will be fixed after the receipt of the Persian Government's reply'. Furthermore, M. Poklewski warned that his Government 'cannot wait more than forty-eight hours for the fulfilment of these conditions, during which time the Russian troops will remain at Tesht; but if, before the expiration of this term,
no answer is received or if the answer is unsatisfactory, the
troops will advance, and this will of course increase the
sum payable by the Persian Government to the Russian Govern-
ment. The reasons for the above measures, the Russian
Minister explained, were:

1. The absolute necessity of obtaining compensation
owing to the fact that Russia had been compelled
to despatch troops to Persia and owing to the recent
insulting acts of Mr. Shuster towards Russia.

2. The sincere desire of Russia now to remove the
principal source of the differences, which had
arisen between the two Governments and to lay
the foundation upon which the two Governments
could build up friendly and stable relations in
future, as well as, to give a prompt and satisfac-
tory solution to all Russian matters and pending
questions.

The demands came to the Persian Government as a complete
surprise. Nothing was mentioned in the ultimatum regarding
the withdrawal of the troops, even if, the demands were
complied with. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs
hurriedly sent his 'chef de Cabinet' to Sir 3. Barclay to
appeal that Britain should use her good offices to obtain
some mitigation of the demands or at least an extension of
the period of grace. To the disappointment of the 'Chef de
Cabinet', the British Minister advised him to comply with the
demands immediately. The Persian Government attached not so

1. Cd.6105, Enclosure in No. 182, pp. 81-82.
2. Ibid., No. 183, p. 82.
much importance to the demands themselves as to the explanations put forward by M. Poklewski. It was feared that the 'explanations' left the Russian Government free to make further demands in future and even to compel Persia to help establish a pro-Russian Government in the country. On the 30th November 1911, the Russian Minister was, however, authorised by his Government to announce that the Russian troops would be withdrawn as soon as '(1) the first part of the first condition has been defacto fulfilled; and (2) the Persian Government have undertaken to fulfil the second part of the first condition and also condition two, and have promised to pay an indemnity'. Satisfactory assurances were also given by M. Poklewski regarding his 'explanations' attached with the ultimatum and the Persian Foreign Minister was no longer anxious on that point. But the time allotted to fulfill the demands was very short. Majliss was strongly against the compliance. It was very difficulty for the Persian Cabinet, which favoured the view that the demands would be complied with, to win over a majority of the deputies. Consequently, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the problem with Sir J. Barclay and hoped that the delay would not be utilized by the Russian Government as a pretext for putting forward further demands. The British Government was, however, disappointed at the shortness of the time given to the Persian Government for returning a satisfactory

1. Ibid., No. 187, p. 84.
2. Ibid., No. 188, p. 84.
3. Ibid., No. 189, p. 84.
answer and urged that a further delay would be accorded to the Persian Government on the arrival of the Russian troops at Kazvin. It was also insisted by the British Government that assurance would be given regarding the withdrawal of the troops after the compliance with the demands. M. Weratof replied to Sir J. Buchanan on the 30th November, 1911 as follows:

"As regards halt of troops at Kazvin, it was decided that it would be necessary to order troops to rest there for a few days, without fixing exactly length of their stay.

"We have, I think, time enough before us to discuss the question, should it arise.

"As regards question of recall of our troops, it is difficult for me to give you categorical answer, as all will depend on circumstances under which march into the interior will take place. At the present moment it is not our intention to formulate other demands beyond those already known, but if we are obliged to employ force in order to carry business through, our demands, may be increased." On the same date, Sir J. Gray informed the Persian Minister at London that if the demands were not complied with, it would inevitably mean advance of Russian troops.

The Russian threat accompanied with the British advice to accept the demands, compelled the Persian Cabinet to make up its mind to yield. Consequently, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs moved a resolution in the Majlis on December 1,

1911, to the effect that the demands would be complied with. Several speeches followed. The acceptance of the demands was firmly deprecated as incompatible with the independence of the country. Haji Ez-ul-Mamalek, after strongly opposing the acceptance of the demands moved a resolution to the effect that as the demands were incompatible with the independence of the country, the Persian people would not accept it. The motion was practically approved unanimously, only six members voted against it. Thus, the Russian ultimatum was rejected.

On December 2, 1911, Vosuk-ed-Dowlh, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed N. Poklewski that it was practically impossible for the Persian Government to accept the unjust and humiliating demands. He, nevertheless, did not close the door for negotiation and expressed his readiness to accept any just proposal which should be made to the Persian Government by Russia. Reporting the incidents that led to the rejection of the Russian demands by Persian Government to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir G. Barclay remarked as follows:

"These demands are in my opinion most ill-advised. I cannot but feel that unless Russia is playing for a protectorate she has blundered badly for, unless the Majliss is removed by a Coup d'État there is, so far as I can see, no chance of the Persian Government's complying. Russia cannot now draw back or

1. Ibid., Enclosure, 2 in No. 216, p. 93.
2. Ibid., Enclosure, 1 in No. 216, p. 92."
submit to the statement involved by the retention of her troops at Kazvin while the Majliss remains obdurate, and I fear that unless there is some Persian COUP D'ETAT she will be compelled to advance her troops to Teheran and turn out the Majliss herself. Even should the unexpected happen and the Majliss yield, I fear that Mr. Shuster's dismissal would be followed by even worse chaos in the administration than existed before his able hands took over the task of the reform.

On December 1, 1911, the day the Majliss rejected the demands, M. Neratof re-assured Sir 3. Buchanan that the Russian troops would make a halt at Kazvin for a few days inspite of the rejection of the demands. He, however, remarked that there was now no prospect of the demands being complied with by the Persian Government so long as the Majliss remained in session. He further stated that the only way out of the impasse was that the Majliss should be dissolved. He was, however, not sure whether the Regent was empowered by the Constitution to take such a step and feared that the Regent was hardly the man to make such a controversial decision. He further stated that Sardar Asad, the Bakhtiyari leader, had arrived at Baku and orders had been sent to allow his unmolested journey to the Persian Capital. His arrival in Persia, he hoped, might encourage the Bakhtiyari's to make a

COUP D'ETAT. M. Neratof was inclined to encourage the Bakhtiyaris as the Coup D'Etat meant the dissolution the Majliss. Sir J. Buchanan warned that the occupation of Tehran would cause serious implications and give rise to fresh incidents which would lead to the presentation of fresh demands by Russia. He further pointed out that the Russians, after their arrival at Tehran, would find no regular government in the capital and there was likelihood that the ex-Shah, tempted by the confusion, might try to re-instate himself in the throne. For this, Sir J. Buchanan firmly stated, the British government under no circumstances would consent. M. Neratof assured that the Russian government would not support the ex-Shah. 1 On the same day, Sir J. Barclay reported that the Russian ultimatum had caused much excitement in Tehran. There were reports of several anti-Russian demonstrations in the capital. Due to his pro-Russian sympathies, Ala-ed-Dowh.

For some time, Bakhtiyaris were contemplating a Coup. The Russian minister at Tehran inclined to encourage them but Sir E. Grey advised the desirability of maintaining an attitude of neutrality in the internal movements of Persia. Consequently, the British and Russian representatives at Tehran had made a joint communication to the Bakhtiyari Khans in the above sense. See Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X, Part I, op. cit., No. 862, pp. 837-37, No. 862, Note(2) p. 837, No. 866, Note(4), p. 842, No. 869, Note(3), p. 834.

became one of the victims. On the other day, the British Minister sent a report from Teheran that a branch of the Bakhtiyaris would not oppose the Ex-Shah and that Ala-ed-Dowbgh was assassinated on a suspicion that he was intriguing with the Russians and the Bakhtiyaris. In reply, Sir E. Grey sent a note saying that the Ex-Shah would not be recognized by the British Government under any circumstances. The envoy at Teheran was also instructed to avoid any intrigue with the Bakhtiyaris. Meanwhile, M. Neratof informed Sir S. Buchanan that the Commander of the troops had been ordered not to advance beyond Kasvin without further instructions either from St. Petersburg or from the Russian Legation at Teheran. Yet he could not guarantee that the troops would make a halt at Kasvin as disorders might make their presence at Teheran necessary to protect the Legation. As to the further demands, which might be made by Russia, M. Neratof stated as follows:

'Should circumstances arise to render necessary the presentation of further demands, those demands will not go beyond questions having a particular interest for Russia, such as the settlement of outstanding matters in dispute or other matters having an exclusive interest for Russia in the zone

3. Ibid., No. 884, p. 860.
that has been reserved to her, and will not touch questions of a general political interest'.

The contradictory statements made by the Acting Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, the fear of presenting further demands by Russia, the danger of Teheran being occupied by the Russian forces and the prospects of Ex-Shah exploiting the confusion that ensued, were cause for annoyance to the British Foreign office. Sir E. Grey telegraphically informed Sir E. Buchanan on December 2, 1911 that the attitude taken by him regarding the Ex-Shah was quite in conformity with the British policy and was gratified to note that M. Heratoft had agreed to it. He stated that it was utmost necessary that Teheran should not be occupied by Russia except in the last resort. The British Foreign Secretary further pointed out that it was also absolutely necessary that no demands of far-reaching nature should further be put forward. If, however, the situation necessitates for more demands, Sir E. Grey advised, Russia would consult Britain first. He warned that if any further far-reaching demands were made, it would be difficult for the British Government to defend them as being consistent with the Anglo-Russian Agreement. In that case, he pointed out, the necessity of major changes in British as well as Russian foreign policy would arise which might make the British cooperation with Russia exceedingly difficult.

1. Ibid., No. 886, pp. 861-862, No. 894, p. 869, also see Cd. 6105, No. 203, p. 89.
Sir E. Grey also spoke anxiously to Count Benckendorff about Persia. He stated that the first Russian ultimatum to the Persian Government was an unfortunate one as the question involved was of slight importance, and as the Russian case also was not a strong one. He further stated the retention of the Russian troops even after the compliance with the demands, inspite of the assurances given by the President of the Council, was still more unfortunate. He admitted that there had been some delay in compliance with the demands but to exploit it as a pretext for putting forward further demand, he remarked, was flimsy one. As to the three further demands made by Russia, Sir E. Grey stated that he had no objection to the first two, though he wished that it would have been better to ask the Persian Government to promise not to appoint foreign nationals in the Persian service without consulting the Russian and the British Legations instead of binding her to obtain Russo-British consent in that regard. However, he remarked that it was a matter of form only. As to the third demand of the payment of indemnity, Sir E. Grey regretted much. He stated that money was urgently needed by the Persian Government to restore peace in the South — the disturbed region. He further stated that the disorders in South had caused the British trade to suffer comparatively much than the Russian trade in North. In fact, the British Foreign Secretary pointed out, the Russian trade might have been prosperous owing to the stoppage of the British trade. The demand for the payment of
the indemnity, he further pointed out, would lessen the chance of the restoration of peace in the South and would be injurious to the British trade. He suggested that it should either not be pressed for or be commuted for some other advantage. The British Foreign Secretary then advised Count Benckendorff that Teheran should not be occupied by the Russian forces except in the last resort and no further demands should be made without consulting the British Government. He warned that if the Persian question was mismanaged, it would raise the whole question of Foreign Policy. 'If further demands were to be put forward with regard to which we might be obliged to say that they were not justified, or were inconsistent with Anglo-Russian Agreement, the Persian question would disappear, and the much more serious question of foreign policy, both for us and for Russian, would take its place'. The only way out of the difficulties, Sir E. Grey remarked, would be that Russia keep to her existing demands and avoid an occupation of the Persian Capital. In that way, he pointed out, a Persian Government 'with a good disposition towards Russian interests' might be secured. To such a Persian Government, the British Foreign Secretary desired, Britain and Russia should provide foreign advisers and facility should be given to her for concluding a loan on favourable terms.¹

In the course of a conversation with M. Neratof on December 5, 1911, Sir G. Buchanan informed him of the British point of view regarding the occupation of Teheran by the Russian forces and the presentation of further far-reaching demands by Russia to the Persian Government. Mr. Neratof replied that he could not understand the British apprehension inspite of the assurances which he had already given. Sir G. Buchanan stated that though the British Government had full confidence in his assurances yet the circumstances might arise which might change the situation to such an extent as to make it difficult if not impossible, for the Russian Government to give effect to her assurances. That was the reason, he pointed out, why the British Government was urging that the Persian capital should not be occupied except in the last resort. The British Ambassador stated that the march of the Russian troops on Teheran might lead to regrettable incidents which would compel the Russian Government to demand satisfaction of a more exemplary character. Moreover, 'a mere temporary occupation might, by the force of circumstances, be converted into an indefinite one'. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia assured that the advance on Teheran should only be ordered if the demands were not complied with before the troops had left Kazvin, or if M. Poklewski should consider their presence in the Persian capital necessary for the protection of the lives of the foreigners. He informed that it would take at least eight days to reach the Russian troops.
at Kazvin and at least a fortnight should be required to reach them to Teheran. As to the question of possible presentation of further demands, M. Keratof assured that he would not put forward any that touched the political future of Persia without first consulting the British Government. As regards the indemnity, he declared that Russia might renounce it in return for railway concession. Sir J. Buchanan then proceeded to speak regarding the question related to the Ex-Shah. He enquired of M. Keratof whether the British Foreign Secretary could state in the Parliament that the two Governments had agreed not to recognize the Ex-Shah under any circumstances? The British Ambassador pointed out that such a statement would create a good impression in Britain and would serve a pledge for Russo-British Cooperation in Persia. M. Keratof replied that he had sent a warning to the Ex-Shah a few days back to the effect that he must not count on Russia's support, but raised objection to the statement the British Foreign Secretary desired to make in the Parliament. He pointed out that such a statement, if made, would bind the two Governments never to recognize the Ex-Shah even if, he be recalled to Persia in a few years time. Sir J. Buchanan stated that it was generally believed in Persia and in certain quarters in England too, that the Russian agents were assisting the Ex-Shah in his attempt to regain the throne and the Russian troops were about to replace him on the throne. It was, therefore, the British Ambassador pointed out, necessary to remove the apprehension of the public and to show them that there was no truth in those
reports. He reminded M. Neratof that the Ex-Shah had already attempted to regain the throne and had undergone defeat after defeat. If he returned, it would be solely due to confusion caused by the march of Russian troops at Teheran as the consequence of which the Persian Government would be powerless to oppose the Ex-Shah. M. Neratof stated that he was ready to give an assurance that the Ex-Shah would not be recognized so long as the Russian troops remained in occupation of Teheran or without Russia-British consent. Sir J. Buchanan pointed out that 'a declaration to which a time limit was attached would amount to an invitation to His Majesty to return when the time specified had expired'. Finally, the British Ambassador appealed to him to act according to the British suggestion and pointed out the necessity of Russian cooperation with British to secure a government at Teheran that would be friendly disposed towards Russia. M. Neratof replied that he would endeavour to find out a formula which would satisfy the British Government.

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding between Russia and Great Britain and to record the lines of the policy which would enable the two Governments to continue to cooperate in the future, Sir J. Buchanan was instructed on December 7, 1911 to hand over to M. Neratof a memorandum in the sense of

the following communication of Sir E. Grey:

1. The solution of the present crisis must be such as to secure a government in Persia which will conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, and not disregard the special interests which the two Powers respectively have in that country.

2. I trust that the Russian Government will not allow any solution which would entail the return of the Ex-Shah. Such a restoration could only embarrass an already complicated situation, and is not essential to the object above indicated. It would be inconsistent with our dignity to recognize him now, after his recent disregard of the warnings of both Governments not to return. His restoration would, moreover, give rise to apprehension of vindictive measures on his part against persons who were instrumental in expelling him.

3. As soon as Mr. Shuster goes, it is of the greatest importance that a foreigner, whom both Powers could accept, should be appointed to succeed him. This point should be discussed by the two Ministers, and they should recommend a suitable candidate.

4. When Persian Government have complied with Russian demands they should be placed in a position to restore order in the country. They will require money for this purpose, and the two Governments should therefore assist them to obtain a loan.

5. The Persian Government would be seriously hampered in this connection were the Russian Government to insist on payment of an indemnity. I hope, therefore, that when the crisis is over some way of avoiding this difficulty may be found.

6. It is understood that occupation of Persian territory by Russia and the military measures now in progress are not permanent, but provisional, and they will cease as soon as Persian Government have carried out Russian demands and have re-established order in Northern Persia.

Sir E. Grey also instructed Sir F. Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, to hand over a memorandum on the above

lines to M. Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was at that time in Paris. According to the instructions, Sir J. Buchanan called on M. Neratof on the 7th December and handed over to him an aide-memoire embodying the six points. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia promised to give his careful consideration to the aide-memoire. As regards Mr. Shuster’s successor, he, however, remarked that it was essential that no foreign advisers should again be engaged in Persia from among the nationals of any of the Great Powers and that the attributions of the future financial adviser should carefully be defined, so that it would be impossible for him to assume dictatorial powers unlawfully. Sir J. Buchanan subsequently discussed with M. Neratof the proposed statement to be made in the Parliament with regard to the Ex-Shah by the British Foreign Secretary. The Acting Foreign Minister accepted the following text as open to no objection, though he added that he must first submit it to M. Sazonov:

"His Majesty’s Government have informed the Russian Government that they would be unable to recognize the Ex-Shah were he now to re-establish himself on the throne. The Russian Government have, on their side, assured them that, were the Ex-Shah now to attempt to regain the throne, they would equally not recognize him, and that so long as the Russian troops remain in occupation, they will do nothing either to encourage or facilitate His Majesty’s return to the throne."

As instructed, Sir F. Bertie also handed over a memorandum consisting of six points to M. Sazonow on 8th December when

1. Ibid., No. 248, p. 102.
the latter visited the British Embassy at Paris. The Russian Foreign Minister replied that personally he had no objection to the British views but expressed his inability to say anything regarding the indemnity until he had consulted the Russian Minister of Finance. He, however, promised that after reaching St. Petersburg on 13th instant, he would do his best either to drop the demand for the payment of indemnity or to evolve a formula of compromise which would mitigate the burden of it. 1

On 8th December, Sir E. Grey telegraphically instructed Sir J. Buchanan to address a supplementary memorandum to M. Neratof, explaining that point 6 was intended to mean that as soon as peace was re-established in Persia, all Russian troops, including those at Tabriz and Ardebil would be withdrawn from Northern Persia. 2

On December 9, 1911, M. Neratof communicated a note to Sir J. Buchanan referring to the point 3 of the aide-memoire. The note stated that the Russian Government had no objection to the proposal that the representatives of the two Powers should be instructed to consult together as to the selection of a foreigner to replace Mr. Shuster. The note, however, made it clear that the official in question should be chosen from among the subjects of one of the minor Powers. It also added that the functions of the officials selected should be limited strictly to those of an adviser to the


2. The same instruction was sent to F. Bertie.

2. CD 6105, No. 252, p. 103.
Persian Financial Administration. On the following day, Sir G. Buchanan received an aide-memoire from M. Meretof, which explained the views of the Russian Government concerning the Ex-Shah and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Persian territories. It stated that as had already repeatedly been declared, the military measures, which Russia had been forced to take in Persia, had absolutely no connection with Mohammad Ali Shah's aspiration to the Persian throne. Russia, the aide-memoire declared, never had an intention to impose a sovereign upon Persia as it would be against the accepted principle of non-intervention in the struggle between the Ex-Shah and the present Government. If further declared that if the Ex-Shah would take advantage of the presence of the Russian troops in Persia to realise his designs, the Russian Government would not recognize him as Sovereign of the country without a previous arrangement with the British Government. The aide-memoire expressed its gratification that the British Government had promised to lend her energetic support for the establishment of normal relations between Russia and Persia, as well as for the formation and maintenance of a Persian Cabinet, well disposed towards Russia. As regards the march of the Russian troops on the Persian capital, the aide-memoire stated that the troops concentrated at Kazvin, would not march, provided the Russian Minister did not deem their presence necessary in Teheran. As to the withdrawal of the troops, it stated that

1. Ibid., No. 255, p. 105, and Enclosure in No. 255, p. 106.
if the three demands were complied with, the troops at Kazvin would be recalled provided that, in the meanwhile, no fresh incident such as an attack on Russian Consulate occurred. In the course of a conversation with M. Neratof on the 12th December Sir G. Buchanan told him that he had been disappointed with the language of the Russian aide-memoire. M. Neratof replied that the assurances which it recorded both with regard to the Ex-Shah and to the eventual withdrawal of the troops were quite explicit. The British Ambassador then requested M. Neratof to try to find out a formula acceptable to the Persian Government with regard to the second Russian demand and suggested that it might be done by substituting the word 'consultation' for 'consent'. M. Neratof declined to accept this as well as other suggestions made by the British Ambassador and stated firmly that he would not make any concession as to the tenor of the demand in question. He was, however, willing to admit a modification of its text and stated that a declaration by the Persian Government to the effect that she would engage foreign advisers in future without a previous 'entente' or 'accord' with the two Legations, would satisfy him. On the same day, Count Benckendorff informed Sir E. Grey that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had no objection to the general lines of the policy proposed in six point-British Memorandum excepting the

1. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 257, p. 108.
proposal regarding the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Tabriz and Ardebil. M. Sazonow, the Count stated, had instructed him to inform the British Government that the Russian forces stationed at Tabriz and Ardebil could be recalled only after order was made very secure in Northern Persia. The British Foreign Secretary disagreed and suggested instead that when the three demands were complied with, the Persian Government would employ Russian officers to organize and command a Persian police force in Northern Persia. A similar force, organized and commanded by British Officers would be formed in Southern Persia. In that way, Sir E. Grey hoped, order would be restored and maintained in Northern Persia and then all Russian troops might be withdrawn. On 15th December, M. Poklewski informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the withdrawal of the troops would begin as soon as the three Russian demands were complied with by the Persian Government. The Persian Foreign Minister was also informed that a slight amendment in the formula put forward by him regarding the second demand, would


+ The formula proposed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the second demand is as follows:

‘As regards engagement of foreign officials or officers needed by Persia for the organization of the public services, Persia, animated by the desire to maintain on all occasions the best relations with Great Britain and Russia, will see to it that the choice of these persons shall not be such as to injure the legitimate interests of the two Powers in Persia. Consequently, the Persian Government will be ready, as regards these officers and officials, to enter into exchange of views with the two legations’. Cd. 6105, No. 273, p. 113.
be acceptable to the Russian Government. On the 17th December, M. Sazonow informed Mr. O'Beirne that he had decided to accept the proposed formula by the Persian Government with the modification that the concluding passage of the declaration to be made by the Persian Government would now run, 'would enter an exchange of views for the purpose of arriving at an understanding'.

On the one side, Russia and Great Britain were engaged in negotiating the lines of the general policy to be followed by the two Governments in Persia, on the other, there was a tussle going on between the Persian Cabinet and the Majliss. The Cabinet insisted that the demands would be complied with. They were ready to satisfy Russia but endeavoured to get the demands somewhat mitigated. The Majliss refused to yield as the demands were not consistent with the dignity and honour of the country. The people supported the Majliss. To meet the Russian challenge, the Majliss appealed to the United States House of Representatives for help and sent the following message:

The ultimatum of the Russian Government, threatening our independence, having been rejected with one accord by a country which, jealous of its liberties, tries to preserve it at any price, the Russian Government would impose it upon us by armed forces. Our one offence is, perhaps, that we have understood the necessity of a new regime and wish to enter upon an era of reform and organization. Convinced of our perfect innocence and of not being guilty of any aggressive act, we appeal to the humanitarian sentiment of the United States in saying to them: You who have tasted the benefits of liberty, would you witness the fall of any people whose only fault was to sympathise with your system to save its future? Would you suffer that Persia should fall for having wished to preserve its national dignity and for having understood

2. Ibid, No. 304, pp. 132-133.
the sentiments so dear to a free people? Trusting in the sentiment of honour and justice of the generous people of which you are the representatives, we are sure that our appeal will penetrate directly to your ears and will gain for us your precious aid in a solution consistent with the dignity and independence of Persia.1

But the Persian patriots were disappointed when they found that their appeal could not arise any interest in America. Although, Russian troops were in the country and they were threatening to occupy the whole of the Northern Persia, yet the Majliss stood firm. Death or independence was their slogan. The Russian ultimatum as well as the British intrigues with Russia against the independence of Persia, naturally caused great resentment amongst the people. A boycott was proclaimed against the Russian and British goods by the Muslim priests. The boycott of the English goods in South became very serious. The Chief Mullah at Shiraz issued a Fatwa forbidding Muslims to have any dealings with the British troops as a consequence of which it became very difficult for the British troops to obtain food supplies. Purchase was practically impossible and the British troops had in store articles which could meet the necessities of one day only. The Karaguzar refused to interfere with the Mullahs. Thereupon, Sir E. Grey instructed Sir J. Barclay on December 16, 1911, that the Shiraz troops should be authorised to take necessary measures

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to provide supplies for themselves. Even force, Sir E. Grey instructed, could be used in that connection. Meanwhile, the notes of the Imperial Bank of Persia were being turned into the Bank for redemption in Government-minted coins at a rate of 15,000 tomans a day in Shiraz only. However, the British authorities at Shiraz managed to obtain the supplies peacefully on the 18th December.

In spite of the strong opposition of the Majliss and the people, the Cabinet decided to satisfy Russian demands. On December 13, 1911, the Cabinet proposed to the Majliss that either full powers should be given to it to settle the Russo-Persian dispute, or the Majliss should select a committee to assist the Cabinet, without further reference to the Majliss, in dealing with the question. Both proposals were rejected.

On 20th December, the Majliss held a public sitting and the Cabinet's second proposal was voted again. Thirty-nine members favoured it and nineteen voted against it. A Committee of five

2. Cd. 6105, No. 306, p. 133, also see Cd. 6264, Enclosure in No. 89, p. 32.
3. Cd. 6105, No. 314, p. 135, also see Cd. 6264, Enclosure in No. 89, p. 32.
persons was chosen, with some difficulty. The following day the Committee and the Cabinet decided to agree with the Russian demands. The Russian Minister was informed of this decision on the 22nd verbally and on 24th December in writing. Mr. Poklewski declared himself satisfied. On 24th December, the Cabinet engineered a coup against the Majlis. It recommended to the Regent the dissolution of the Parliament, which, was alleged to have impeded the task of the Government both in foreign relations and internal administration. Consequently, the Regent issued a decree declaring the closure of the Majlis.

CHAPTER V

LONDON - ST. PETERSBURG RULE OVER PERSIA
A - Occupation of Northern Persia by Russia:

The Russians had come not to go back. They were determined either to annex the Northern Persia permanently or, at least, to transform it into a protectorate. But they had tactfully promised to withdraw the troops in case their demands were complied with and provided that fresh incidents did not arise in the mean time. Britain too, assured the Persians in the above sense. As further stay of the Russian, even after the compliance with the demands, might have made British cooperation with Russia exceedingly difficult, so the Russian, to justify the retention of the troops, planned to create disturbances at important places like Tabriz, Resht and Enzeli.

Tabriz was calm. No disorder prevailed in the town, of course, anti-foreign feeling was prevalent. This was enough for the Russian Consul-General to consider it necessary to take some precautionary measures. Consequently, he ordered the city to be patrolled by the Russian troops stationed there. Reinforcement of the Russian troops was also deemed necessary and a force consisting of 500 men was called from Ardebil.

4. A Russian force consisting of 1,000 men was already present there.
They arrived at Tabriz on 17th and 18th December. This was all to excite the anti-foreign feelings — in search of a pretext lest the compliance with the demands should compel the Russian to recall their troops. On the 20th December, 1911, the day, the Committee of five was selected to settle the Russo-Persian dispute which definitely meant the compliance with the demands, the Russian troops hurriedly discovered the flimsy pretext to make their stay in Persia indefinite. They started massacre of the inhabitants of the town on the allegation that while a party of the Russian soldiers was engaged in repairing a telephone line in the night of the 20th December they were attacked by a Persian police patrol. The Russians in self defence, fired and killed two of the patrols. On the following day, it was again alleged that the fedais fired at a Russian patrol and wounded one of them, which led to serious fighting. The fedais took position in the citadel. The Russian started to bombard it. The bombardment continued for several days. The Russian troops indulged themselves in terrible brutality, killing women and children in the streets and hundreds of other non-combatants. The Persian Minister at London complained to Sir E. Grey that some

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 89, p.33.
2. On the other hand, the Persian Govt. reported that some Russian soldiers, without previous warning, climbed on the roof of the police-station to lay a telephone wire. The Persian sentries on duty, challenged them. Thereupon, the Russians opened fire and killed two Persians. See CD 6264, Enclosure in No. 89, p.33.
3. CD 6105, Nos. 319 and 320, p.136, Nos. 326 and 327, p.138, also see CD 6264, Enclosure in No. 89, p.33.
500 women and children had been massacred, but, when the British Foreign Secretary made an enquiry through his Minister at Teheran as to the truthfulness of Persian Minister's statement, Sir S. Barclay reported that the accusation of slaughter and general inhumanity was wrong, though some women and children might have been killed during the bombardment. He further stated that the Russians had been quite generous to the inhabitants and treated them with kindness. However, it stands to reason that with a large number of fully equipped Russian soldiers along with several reinforcements on one side and poorly armed fedais on the other, a battle which lasted for several days must have resulted in a large number of casualties of the Persians. The Persian version of the situation seems to be nearer the truth.

On 26th December, Zia-ed-Dawleh, the Acting Governor of Tabriz, took refuge in the British Consulate. By 27th December the citadel in which the fedais were besieged, was entirely evacuated. It was occupied by the Persian Cossacks and the Russian troops. The Russian flag was flown over it. In the

2. CD 6264, No.29, p.6.
3. On 25th December, it was reported that a reinforcement consisting of nearly 5,000 men had left Julfa to join the Russian troops at Tabriz - see Ibid., No.19, p.5.
4. Ibid., No.21, p.6.
meantime, the disturbances at Resht and Enzeli, which were undoubtedly created by the Russians themselves, were crushed by the Russian troops. On 28th December, the Russian Government decided to take severest punitive measures in the towns mentioned above. The measures contemplated were reported to be the arrest and trial by martial law of all those who took part in the attacks; disarming of the fedais and other turbulent elements; destruction of buildings from which opposition was offered; and any other necessary steps to restore 'order' and punish the 'offenders'.

By January 1, 1912, Tabriz was completely occupied by the Russian troops. The Russian troops were posted at all public offices, the customs, and the post office. Everything was in the control of the Russians.

On the new year's day, the Russian executed in Sarbaz Khane eight persons including Sheikh Salim and the Sikat-el-Islam, the chief priest of Tabriz. The execution was carried out in accordance with the decision of the court-martial established by Russia in Tabriz.

From this time on, the Russians continued to hang or shoot any Persian whom they suspected guilty of being a constitutionalist. At Resht, a dozen Persian notables were arrested and deported to Russia, but the Russian authorities sent them back to be tried by the court-martial. There were a
large number of Russian troops stationed at Resht and Enzeli both. In the meantime, the Russian Consul at Tabriz was reported to have received an emissary of Shuja-ed-Dowlah, a supporter of the ex-shah. Shuja was intending to come to Tabriz with his followers. The Russian Consul had decided to recognize him as Governor de facto. Sir G. Barclay feared that Shuja would proclaim the authority of the ex-Shah at Tabriz. The British Foreign Secretary had no objection to raise on the assumption of the Governorship of Tabriz by Shuja provided that he did not proclaim the ex-Shah. Sir E. Gray hoped that Russia would convey an intimation to Shuja to the effect that in case of his assuming office of the Governorship he must not proclaim the ex-Shah. M. Sazonow assured that the proclamation of Mohammad Ali would not be permitted in that town so long as the Russian troops were in occupation there. Meanwhile Shuja entered Tabriz with 200 followers. In the beginning, Sir G. Barclay instructed the British Consul at Tabriz that he should receive no call from Shuja as he was in rebellion against the Persian Government and was not even a de facto governor. Later on, the British Consul was authorized to recognize Shuja as de facto

1. CD 6264, Enclosure in No. 193, p. 78.
2. Ibid., No. 32, p. 9.
3. Ibid., No. 42, p. 19.
4. Ibid., No. 51, p. 17.
5. Ibid., No. 49, p. 17.
6. Ibid., No. 59, p. 20.
governor. On September 19, 1912, Sipahdar, who had been appointed as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, long before, assumed his office. At first, Shuja made preparations to oppose Sipahdar's arrival at Tabriz by force, but on the representation made by British and Russian authorities, he agreed to hand over the administration to Sipahdar. However, the appointment of a Governor-General by the Persian Government had made no difference for Russia. Practically whole of the Northern Persia was occupied by the Russian forces. The question of the recall of the troops did not arise as the disturbances were purposely being created by Russia herself. It is interesting to note that the poor Persians had no courage even to demonstrate against the brutalism of the Russians. Therefore, the disturbances created by the Russians ended soon and the situation could not take such an alarming turn as to enable Russia to justify the retention her troops for an indefinite period. Consequently, Russia decided to excite the religious feelings of the Persians which was bound to arise anti-Russian feelings throughout the whole of Persia. On March 29, 1912, the Russian began to bombard the sacred Shrine at Meshed. There was practically no resistance, although Yusuf Herati.

1. Ibid., No. 64, p. 21.
2. CD 6807, Enclosure in No. 369, p. 185.
3. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 280, p. 130.
4. Yusuf Herati, a notorious agent provocateur, was hired by the Russian Consul at Meshed to carry on a propaganda in the interests of the ex-Shah from the shelter of the Russian consulate. The matter was reported to the British Legation at Teheran and on the protest of the British Minister, the Russian Minister instructed his Consul to expel Yusuf and his followers from the Consulate. Yusuf and his followers proceeded to the Shrine where the Russian Consul continued to employ him. Yusuf carried on his propaganda in the sacred precincts. A large number of men and women, including hundreds of pilgrims gathered (cont.)
and his followers, according to the instructions of their Russian master, replied with a few shots. A large number of innocent pilgrims and citizens were killed and wounded. Anti-Russian feeling arose not only in Persia but throughout the Muslim world. The British Foreign Secretary followed a policy in order to propitiate Russia. He was deterred not to antagonize the Russians on the Persian question. If the Persian question was mismanaged, he argued, 'the Persian question might disappear, and bigger issues would arise'.

B - British Activities in South Persia:

While Russia was sending a large number of troops to Northern Persia with the intention to occupy that part of the country permanently, British was active in South Persia, in order to maintain her interests there against the Russians. As has

.. around him. A good pretext was now provided to the Russian Consul who brought in a considerable number of troops on the ground that the lives of the Russian subjects was in danger. After the commencement of the bombardment, Yusuf and his followers were safely sent out of the city in a wagon. See Kykes, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 426.


been referred to, in October, 1910, Britain had complained of the insecurity of the roads in the South and practically demanded that a number of officers of the British-Indian army should be placed in charge of the policing for these roads. The Persian Government protested strongly. She also assured Britain that measures would be taken to eradicate the sedition and incitement in the country. Britain, at that time, however, did not insist on the implementation of her scheme. But due to several factors which have already been discussed in detail (attempt of the ex-Shah to regain the throne; financial difficulties of the Persian Governments; Russo-British determination to make every plan of the Persian Government a failure, which if implemented, would have put the Persian house in order; and etc.), the Persian Government could not restore peace and maintain order in the country. Consequently, the situation deteriorated rapidly and lawlessness prevailed. The authority of the Central Government was nominal not only in Northern Persia where a large number of the Russian troops were stationed and where a large number of forces were being sent by the Russian government but also in South Persia. The situation in South Persia was growing from bad to worse.

1. For details, see Supra, Sub-Chapter B of Chapter III.
2. To have a clear view of the deteriorating situation in South Persia, see GD 6105, Enclosure in No. 332 and Enclosure in No. 333, pp. 140-151. These are the reports, of course exaggerated, sent by Acting British Consul to Sir J. Barclay from Shiraz. The first report (Enclosure in No. 332) was despatched on September 7, 1911, and the second (Enclosure in No. 333), was sent on October 20, 1911.
Taking advantage of the situation, Britain decided to increase her consular guards at various places in South Persia. On October 10, 1911, Sir G. Barclay informed Vassuk-ed-Dowleh that owing to the possible danger to the British lives and property at Shiraz and elsewhere, it had been decided by his Government to strengthen the consular guard at Shiraz, and possibly also the consular guards at Isfahan and Bushire.1

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia communicated the reply to Sir G. Barclay the other day. The Persian note stated that top priority had always been given by the Government to the problems relating to the maintenance of peace in South Persia and improvement of affairs in Far, but due to the several factors, the Government could not succeed in maintaining security in that region. The Kawam incident and the taking of refuge by him in the British Legation; the attempt of the ex-Shah to

1. CD 6105, Enclosure, 1 in No. 29, p. 10.

2. As has been discussed, the whole internal politics of the South Persia revolved around the tribal chiefs. There were sharp differences among them. They fought against each other as the result of which, the peace of that part of the country was always disturbed and lawlessness increased. The two powerful tribes of the region - Kawamis and Kashghais - were the main source of trouble. They were traditional enemy of each other and always fought amongst themselves. The Persian Government was powerless to crush them. To keep them calm and quiet, the Government, sometimes, followed a policy of appeasement towards them. But, whenever, the Kawamis were appeased, the Kashghais resented and when the Government tried to enlist the support of the Kashghais, the Kawamis fostered their hostile attitude against the Government. However, Nizam-es-Sultanah, the new Governor-General of Fars, who arrived at Shiraz on 6th April, 1911, arrested the Kawamis brothers - Kawam-ul-Mulk and Nasr-ed-Dowleh, the ostensible reason being the failure of the latter, who commanded the forces at Shiraz, to capture some brigands in pursuit of whom he had been sent. On April 18, 1911, a large crowd, including sons of Mullahs who
were killed by the Kawamis, assembled and demanded summary execution of the two brothers from the Governor-General. Nizam-es-Sultaneh promised that they should be tried on the 20th April and said that their crimes were punishable to death. The trial did not take place as the Persian Government on the insistence of Sardar Assad, refused to sanction it and ordered Nizam-es-Sultaneh to send the Kawamis to the capital. The Governor-General opposed this course. The Government did not insist on the Kawamis being sent to Teheran and ordered the Governor-General to send them to Europe. The Acting British Consul, under instruction from British Legation, urged Nizam-es-Sultaneh to fall in with this arrangement. At first, he strongly refused, maintaining that the Kawamis would lose no time in returning to Persia, but finally he gave way and the Kawamis left Shiraz for Bushire on May 6, 1911, accompanied by a guard of 150 men supplied by Nizam-es-Sultaneh. On their way to Bushire, they were attacked by Soulat's men, Nasr-ed-Dawleh was shot dead. Kawam-ul-Mulk, however, escaped. He safely reached Shiraz and took bast at the British Consulate. The inhabitants of Shiraz protested against the asylum afforded to the Kawam-ul-Mulk. Nizam-es-Sultaneh urged the Acting British Consul that Kawam should be sent off from Shiraz without delay. The Acting British Consul replied that so long as the Governor-General could not put an end to the agitation against the Consulate, it was obviously impossible to regard any guarantee from him as sufficient to warrant Kawam-ul-Mulk's leaving. In the meantime, the
... a position. The time limit was, however, extended for twenty-four hours more, later on, it was reported that the bombardment did not take place. On the 6th July, it was reported that the movement against the Governor-General was growing. Soulat, on the invitation of the Governor-General, ordered his tribe to send every available man to Shiraz. On July 12, 1911, fighting was reported to have started between Governor-General's men and the rebels. It continued for several weeks. Kashghais rushed to Shiraz to help the Governor-General. On August 5, 1911, Nizam was reported to have been recalled by the Persian Govt., but he refused to recognize the order. On August 9, 1911, the Government revoked her order regarding the dismissal of Nizam and began to endeavour to induce the Governor-General to make terms with the Kawamis but in vain. At last, the Government again recalled Nizam on September 19, 1911. On the same day Soulat was reported to have arrived at Shiraz with 1,000 men. He declared that he had come to support Nizam. On 27th September, Soulat bombarded Kawami quarter. On 30th September, 1,500 tribesmen were reported to have arrived at Shiraz to reinforce the Kawami party. In the meantime, the Acting British Consul recommended Sir G. Barley that the Consular guards should be strengthened immediately. Severe warnings were also given to Soulat and Nizam that in case any damage was done to the British lives and property, they would be responsible. Consequently Nizam and Soulat were reported to have left Shiraz on 8th October Ala-ed-Dowleh was appointed Governor-General. Kawam was entrusted with the Deputy Governorship. Meanwhile, the British Government decided to increase the Consular guards at various places and informed to the Persian Government to that effect on October 10, 1911, CD 6104, No. 73, p. 43, No. 81, p. 45, No. 86, p. 45, No. 87, p. 46, No. 91, p. 49, No. 92, p. 49, No. 93, p. 49, No. 101, p. 50, No. 102, p. 50, No. 106, p. 54, No. 111, p. 55, No. 112, pp. 55-56, No. 117, pp. 55-57. Enclosure in No. 128, p. 56, Enclosure in No. 154, p. 80, No. 162, p. 83, No. 166, p. 84, No. 169, p. 85, No. 183, p. 89, Enclosure in No. 184, pp. 89-93, No. 193, p. 95, No. 217, p. 104, No. 243, p. 118, No. 256, p. 124, No. 270, p. 127, No. 299, p. 140, No. 351, 159, No. 352, pp. 159-160, No. 360, pp. 161-162, Enclosure in No. 366, p. 167, No. 367, p. 177, No. 364, p. 177, Enclosures CD 6105, No. 1, p. 1, No. 2, p. 1-2, No. 3, p. 2, No. 13, p. 4, No. 16, pp. 4-5, No. 17, p. 5, No. 19, p. 7, Enclosure in No. 139, p. 60.
regain the throne; and the insurrection of the Salar-ed-Dowleh and his followers - drew the attention of the Persian Government as the result of which, the Government could not direct her energy towards the settlement of affairs in South. The note further stated that the Government was now free from embarrassment and would direct her full attention to the South to restore peace there. The note enumerated the following measures which were either taken or being contemplated to be taken by the Persian Government in order to restore peace and maintain order:

1. A Cossack detachment of consisting of 350 men (horse, foot, and artillery) were to be sent to Shiraz.

2. Ala-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor-General was to shortly leave Teheran for Shiraz with necessary force.

3. The Swedish officers, specially engaged for the organisation of gendarmerie and the maintenance of security on the roads were busy with their task. A sufficient force for the protection of the southern routes was to be sent shortly.

4. Steps had been taken by the Government to bring about a reconciliation between Kawam-ul-Mulk, Soulat-ed-Dowleh and their followers. The two persons above named had agreed to make up their differences and had pledged to obey the orders of the Government.

The above measures, the note claimed, would enable the Persian Government to restore peace and maintain order in the south within a short period. It was assured that every measure would be taken to protect the lives and property of the British nationals and requested that the British Government, taking into
consideration the above steps being taken by the Persian Government, would defer from taking her contemplated measure in the southern Persia.\(^1\) On October 13, 1911, Mirza Mehdi Khan, the Persian Minister at London protested against the decision of the British Government to increase her Consular guards at various places and argued that the state of Fars did not justify the dispatch of the reinforcement to British Consulate.\(^2\) On October 18, 1911, Vosuk-ed-Dowlah again addressed a note to Sir G. Barclay requesting him to postpone the increase of the Consular guards. The note enumerated the several measures being promptly taken to remove the British anxiety,\(^3\) but in vain. The British Government decided to send necessary cavalry squadrons from India to Shiraz. They were expected to land at Bushire on the 27th October.\(^4\) Two squadrons sailed from India on 20th and 21st October. Two more squadrons were to be sent soon after.\(^5\) The escorts, Sir G. Barclay informed Vosuk-ed-Dowlah on 24th October, 1911, would not patrol the roads or make expedition and would only be used solely as Consular guards to protect the British Consulates and British lives and property in the towns where they would be stationed, provided that the Persian Government would devise an effective scheme to protect the roads and restore

\(^{1}\) CD 6105, Enclosure 2 in No. 29, pp. 10-11.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., No. 37, pp. 15-16.
\(^{3}\) Ibid., Enclosure in No. 41, pp. 17-8.
\(^{4}\) Ibid., No. 32, p. 12.
\(^{5}\) Ibid., No. 75, p. 32, Enclosure in No. 139, p. 61.
security. They were to be withdrawn as soon as the scheme of
the Persian Government would effectively be put into operation.¹
The Persian Government, however, considered the measures taken
by the British Government as the greatest obstacle to the
execution of the scheme which she had elaborated for the mainten­
ance of order in the South and maintained her protest.²

The Indian cavalry for Shiraz arrived at Bushire on the
27th October. Disembarkation was completed by the 30th
October.³ It was reported on November 14, 1911 that they reach
Shiraz without any incident.⁴ The remaining two squadrons
of Indian cavalry reached Abadeh on the 23rd November. One
proceeded to Isfahan. Later on, some unfortunate incident
such as attack on Mr. Smart, the Acting British Consul at
Shiraz etc., provided pretext for the British Government
to retain the reinforcement of the consular guards for an
indefinite period.

¹. Ibid., Enclosure 1 in No. 140, p. 62.
². Ibid., Enclosure 4, in No. 140, pp. 62-63.
³. Ibid., No. 75, p. 32, Enclosure in No. 139, p. 61.
⁴. Ibid., No. 106, p. 44.
⁵. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 302, p. 131.
⁶. For details, see CD 6264.
The destruction of the Najiss the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, and the presence of a large number of the Russian troops in northern Persia as well as the reinforcement of the British Consular guards at various important places in south Persia resulted in the consolidation of the Russian and British control over Persia. The two Great Powers were now in a position to dictate whatever they liked to the Persian Government. The independence of Persia was an illusion. Having consolidated their position in the respective spheres of interest, the two great powers proceeded with their so-called, constructive programme and the following joint Russo-British communication was addressed to the Persian Government on February 18, 1912.

"Animated by the desire to place upon a solid basis of friendship and confidence the relations between the Government of His Britannic Majesty, the Imperial Government of Russia, and the Imperial Government of Persia, and desirous of assisting the Persian Government as far as possible in their task of re-establishing and maintaining order and tranquility in the country, the Russian and British Legations have the honour, by instruction of their Governments, to make to the Persian Government the following proposals:

+ Mr. Shuster left Teheran for America on January 11, 1912."
1. The two Governments are prepared, in order to meet urgent expenditure, to advance to the Persian Government a sum of 100,000 l., each. The Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte will each open an account for this sum as soon as the two legations have received a favourable reply to the present note, and it is understood that the sum paid into the account by the Banque d'Escompte will be placed at the disposal of the Persian Government in roubles, amounting to the sum of 945,750 roubles.

2. The above mentioned sums will be lent at a rate of interest of 7 per cent., per annum, and will be repayable out of the first proceeds of the forthcoming loan of the Persian Government, and until then the surpluses of the Northern and Southern customs revenues, which have hitherto been placed by the two banks at the disposal of the Persian Government, will be wholly and respectively assigned to the amortisation of and to the payment of interest on the Russian and British advances.

3. The advances will be expended under the control of the treasurer-general, in accordance with a programme prepared by him in agreement with the Cabinet and approved by the two legations. It is understood that a considerable part will be assigned to the organisation of the Government gendarmerie with the assistance of the Swedish officers. In making this proposal, and in order to attain the ends indicated at the beginning of this note, the two

4. The well-known notorious M. Hornard was appointed as Treasurer-General.
legations hope that the Persian Government will undertake

(i) to conform their policy henceforth with the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907;

(ii) as soon as Mohamed Ali Shah and Salar-ed-Dowleh have left Persia; to dismiss the fedails and irregular forces now in the Persian service;

(iii) to discuss with the two legations a scheme for the organisation of small regular and effective army

(iv) to come to an agreement with Mohamed Ali Shah on the subject of his departure from Persia, of his pension, and of a general amnesty to his followers'.

Ominous political conditions were attached with the loan offer. Curiously enough, contrary to their declaration of July 31, 1911, to the effect that by entering Persia in an attempt to regain the throne the ex-Shah, Mohamed Ali had forfeited his all right to the pension, which he had been receiving from the Persian Government under the stipulation signed by the representatives of the two powers with Persia in September 1909, the two great Powers forced the so-called Persian Government to restore to Mohammad Ali his pension and to grant his plundering followers a general amnesty. This unjustifiable action casts a strange light on the oft-repeated protestations of the Russian Government and the frequent

1. CD. 6103, No. 1 pp. 1-2.
2. CD 6104, No. 246, and Enclosure in No. 246, p. 118.
declarations made by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to the effect that the Russian Government had no sympathy with, or participation in, the ex-shah's attempt to overthrow the constitutional government of Persia and seat himself upon the throne. The plain truth is that his filibustering expedition was initiated, executed and financed with the full connivance of the St. Petersburg Cabinet. Had there been a 'free and independent' government in Persia, she would have undoubtedly rejected these conditions, the acceptance of which certainly undermined the sovereignty of the Persian government. But, the Foreign Minister of Persia, Vosuk-ed-Dowleh informed the representatives of the two Powers on March 20, 1912, the readiness of the Persian Government to accept the joint Russo-British proposal in their entirety. On March 22, 1912, the Persian Government approved, at a Council of Ministers, the following programme of the expenditure of the advance of 200,000 toms granted by the British and Russian Governments:

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<th>Tomans</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. To His Highness Mohammad Ali Mirza</td>
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<td>2. Purchase of arms for the Gendarmerie</td>
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<td>3. Monthly pay of gendarmerie</td>
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<td>4. Tehran Police</td>
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<td>5. To the Bakhtiyarists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Pensions.</td>
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<td>7. Remittances to the provinces, including those to the Governors.</td>
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<td>8. Urgent expenditure</td>
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<td>9. Arrears due to Ministers</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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2. CD 6103, No.2, pp.3-4.
3. CD 6807, Enclosure 1 in No.83, p.35.
The programme of the expenditure was prepared by the Treasurer-General, in concert with the Cabinet and the two Legations approved it.¹

Later on, Russia commenced to agitate the question of building of the long-discussed trans-Persian Railway. This line, as originally planned, was to traverse Persia from north-west to south-east, connecting with the Russian lines at Julfa and stopping only at the Indian frontier. It was truly a sinister proposal in every respect. If constructed, it would have been purely strategic in character and would have facilitated the Russian military movement up to the Indian border. However, Russia, tactfully dropped the idea of complete realization of her scheme and proceeded with the question of partially carrying it out. On September 24, M. Sazonow communicated a memorandum regarding the construction of the desired line. The memorandum stated that Societe de' Estudes, formed with a view to construct the Trans-Persian Railway, was ready to carry out the scheme partially. It had decided to construct a line which, starting from Alat, on the Trans-Caucasus Railway, would run as far as Teheran, and would thus form a part of the Russian section of the great railway proposed. The memorandum requested that the British representative at Teheran be instructed to support the societe in getting the concession from the Persian Government.² The British

¹ Ibid., No. 83, p. 34.
agreed to co-operate with the Russian Government in getting the concession for the society provided that the proposed railway line should not be extended beyond the Russian sphere of influence without the consent of the British Government and provided that the Russian Government would support the British demand for the construction of a railway between Mohammerah and Khurammabad. Sazonow agreed with Sir. H. Grey. However, the grant of the concession was delayed. Meanwhile the financial difficulties of the Persian Government increased. The Russian Government refused to grant any loan to the Persian Government till the latter would grant a concession for the Julfa Railway. At last, at the pursuasion of the British Government, the Julfa-Tabriz Railway concession was granted to Russia on February 6, 1913. As has been referred to, the financial embarrassment of the Persian Government was also an important factor which led to the grant of the concession. The Persian Government, however, expressed her inability to accept the proposals of the British syndicate for Mohammerah - Khurammabad railway as the conditions on which the concession

3. CD 6807, No.420, p.218.
4. Ibid., No.554, p.300.
5. Ibid., No. 554, p.300.
was sought, were not favourable to the Persian Government. Sir E. Grey, in a fit of anger, instructed Sir W. Townley, the British Minister at Teheran, on February 8, 1913, that he should insist on their granting the option desired by the syndicate without further delay. Finally, the Persian Government was compelled to give the right of option to the British syndicate for construction of a railway from the Persian Gulf to Khurammabad.

The period which intervened between the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the outbreak of the Great War (1914), was miserable one for Persia. Russia acted as predatory Power, constantly seizing on, or creating pretexts for further intervention. During these seven years Russia continued to absorb Northern Persia, protected rich land lords and merchants in Khorasan, collected the revenues due to the Persian Government from the so-called Russian 'subjects' in Azerbaijan, purchased villages for nominal prices through an exercise of pressure and imported Russian subjects to work there. Had Russia continued these practices, the independence of Persia would have been lost within a generation. Fortunately,

1. Ibid., No.557, p. 301.
2. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, p. 53.
the collapse of Russia during the Great War provided a chance to Persia to work out her own salvation.¹

The continued alarming European situation, compelled Britain to co-operate with Russia. Sir E. Grey was determined not to antagonize Russia on Persian affairs. Consequently, Russia exploited the situation and pursued the desired sinister policy in Persia. Sir E. Grey, however, often protested mildly against a too hard Russian policy in Persia, but always yielded whenever, the Russian Government proved obstinate. Later on, as has been referred to, Russia poured a large number of troops in Northern Persia and, more or less, occupied that part of the country. Britain, too, to safeguard her 'interests' reinforced the Consular guards at various places in South Persia. The two Great Powers became the virtual rulers of the country. A sort of Russo-British condominium was established in Persia. However, contrary to the Russian desire to occupy the Northern Persia permanently, Britain never wished to annex the South Persia but, she pursued a policy which would enable her to strengthen her grip over that region of the country. The attack on Mr. Smart, Acting British Consul at Shiraz, the murder of Captain Likikford at Dastajin by tribesmen and other

¹. Ibid., pp. 433 - 434.
tragic incidents — provided pretext to the British Government to dispatch a large number of troops in South Persia. The necessity of sending a military expedition consisting of several thousand men; the occupation of Bushire — Shiraz road, of Kazerum and of Shiraz was advocated in many British quarters, but Sir, E. Grey opposed this course as, in his opinion, it was a policy, which might lead to the permanent occupation of South Persia and to the partition of the country, which would involve much expenditure on the British Treasury.¹

Though, Britain had not dispatched a large number of troops in South Persia, and had no intention to occupy that part of the country, yet, her dealings with the Bakhtiyari Khan and Sheikh of Mohammerah, were undoubtedly for the sole purpose of strengthening her hold in that region. The policy followed by Great Britain, was in no way consistent with the integrity and independence of Persia. To safeguard her oil interests in Persia, Britain pursued a policy which, firstly, created 'State within a state', and finally resulted, in political partition of Persia( to be discussed later On ) — which was hitherto opposed by her.

¹. CD 6807, No. 572, p. 310.
+ To be discussed in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION: A CRITICAL STUDY
The Anglo-Russian Convention, concluded on August 31, 1907, has been mentioned incidentally in Chapter II, where a full description of its scope would have interrupted the sequence of events. Moreover, the critical study of the Convention, in the light of policies followed by the two great Powers — Russia and Great Britain, in Persia, after its conclusion, would have been impossible.

1. Need of Alliance

Before discussing the actual problem, it seems better to have a bird's eye view of the factors which compelled Britain to enter into entangling alliances. "The general character of England's foreign policy" wrote Mr. Eyre Crowe, "is determined by immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State with vast oversea colonies and dependencies whose existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea power". Consequently, for the protection of her independence, and the safeguarding

her overseas commerce, England had to rely on her 'possession of preponderant sea power'. But as sea power under the circumstances was more potent than land power, it was natural that 'the power of a state supreme at sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and be ever exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination of the world.'

The only possible danger to British security, however, emanated from the continent of Europe. Britain, therefore, for obvious reasons of security opposed by nation from extending her hegemony on the whole of the continent. She consistently supported the nation or group of nations who were opposed to such hegemony. 'The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power'. In order to maintain such a balance on the continent, Britain threw 'her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time'.

The task of maintaining the balance of power on the continent led Britain to the acceptance of 'splendid isolation' with regard to Europe. But, at the turn of twentieth century, the world began to undergo a rapid change, Britain was no longer what it was Isolation had become dangerous and, therefore Britain felt the need of alliances to pursue her objectives.

1. Ibid., P. 402.
2. Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, op.cit., p. 403.
3. Ibid.
Attempt to make an alliance with Germany had failed. Rapid growth of the German navy and the threat of German commercial competition had alarmed the British statesmen. France and Russia were obviously impossible allies. The United States remained somewhat aloof from European affairs. But Great Britain was on very friendly terms with Japan. Consequently, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was made in January, 1902. It strengthened the British position in the Far East. The alliance was a direct challenge to Russia and the Dual Entente, Russia, which had succeeded in establishing better relations between France and Germany now sounded Germany as to the possibility of forming a European coalition against Great Britain. But the Kaiser refused to fall in line with the suggestion. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was revised in 1905. The Japanese now acknowledged the special claims of Great Britain on the Indian frontier, and each ally was to help the other if attacked by a single power. Russia regarded the revised Treaty as aimed at herself and serious points of differences between Russia and Great Britain remained in the Middle East. In the year 1906, the contest between Russia and England in Central Asia was approaching the stage where the rivals would have to become either open enemies or friendly partners. There was no middle course. Where two nations meet as rivals only on one point, as

2. Ibid., p. 124.
3. Ibid., pp. 132-134.
4. Ibid., p. 134.
France and Germany did in Morocco, compromise is difficult because one or other must accept defeat and humiliation; where they are rivals in many regions, as France and England were in 1904, or as England and Russia were in 1907, it is easy to bargain. The two powers decided to settle their differences. That Russia and England chose to bargain rather than to fight was due partly to this factor and partly to other causes. For one thing, there was England's recently formed friendship with France, and France was Russia's ally. Perhaps England would have joined her ally Japan against Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, had it not been for the Anglo-French entente. And then there was the growing British suspicion of Germany, which drove Great Britain into the arms of Germany's foe. Besides, since Russia was weakened by the Russo-Japanese War and also seemingly liberalized by the establishment of a Duma, the English Liberals no longer felt either the fear or the hatred for Russia that had been their's in the past years. Moreover, in 1906 at the psychological moment, the direction of Russia's foreign policy fell in to the hands of Alexander Isvolsky, who firmly believed Russia's destiny lay in alliance rather than conflict with England. Russia's advances towards the Indian frontier were the most sensitive and dangerous points. Though, she had not

1. Anglo-French Agreement of 8th April, 1904.
2. Moon op. cit. p. 278, also see Fay, Sidney Bradshaw, The Origins of The War, Two volumes in one, pp. 214-216.
reached the borders of British India, she was nevertheless threatening it from across the Pamirs, across Afghanistan and across Persia. Persia was the danger point. The inefficiency of the Persian Governments, the state of her finances and the internal disorders, not only laid Persia open to foreign intervention, but positively invited and attracted it. Teheran, the capital and the seat of the Central Government, was within easy approaches of Russia. It was quite out of British reach. Consequently, Russia took full advantage of it. The influence of Russia was supreme. It was against the British interest. British policy in Persia was, therefore, constantly in opposition to Russia. It was, however, not a forward policy pushed for the purpose of extending British territory or influence. Its object was to keep Persia as a buffer state and to maintain it as an independent country. Political atmosphere at Teheran was one of dislike and distrust between Britain and Russia. The two great Powers were intriguing against each other. The Persian Government considered that her best hope lay in playing

3. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
4. Ibid., p. 149.
5. Murray, Gilbert, op. cit. p. 50.
off one Government against the other. She tried her level best to maintain as far as she could an equipoise of bad relations between Britain and Russia. Consequently, Britain and Russia suspected each other of worse intrigue. It was this mutual suspicion and intrigue, which Sir E. Grey earnestly desired to remove, keeping in view two principles. Firstly, the territories of the two great Powers were, as far as possible, to be kept well separated. Secondly, there should from hence forth be no more intrigues, by and against the two Powers and the causes of suspicion should be removed. He desired frank and friendly relations with Russia based indeed on a treaty but to be continued as a habit of free consultation and mutual confidence. So the statesmen of the two great Powers were desirous to conclude an Agreement on Central Asian problem which would ensure the smooth and friendly relations between Great Britain and Russia.

M. Isvolsky, like Sir E. Grey, was very compromising. The record of a secret meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers on February 1, 1907, shows that Isvolsky urged the acceptance of an English proposal for the division of Persia into the sphere of influence. Until recently, he said, in Russian Government circles, 'the conviction even prevailed that Persia must come

entirely under Russian influence, and that Russia must press onward to the Persian Gulf, which would necessitate the building of a trans-Persian railway and a fortified terminal station on the shores of the abovementioned gulf. This 'plan' he considered as impossible to realize. The idea of competing with the Baghdad Railway by building a Russian line connecting the Russian railways with India by way of Afghanistan, must also be given up, as England would doubtless regard it as far more dangerous than the Baghdad Railway. Russia's best course, then, was to agree with England on Persia (and with Germany on Baghdad 1 railway).

In 1906 and 1907, there were frank and thorough discussions, between Great Britain and Russia concerning all the points where their interests clashed. Consequently, on August 31, 1907, M. Isvolsky and Sir A. Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, set their signature to a Convention embracing three agreements, one on Persia, the second on Afghanistan and the third on Tibet.

2. For the details of the discussion see Gooch and Temperley, Vol. IV op.cit. Chapter XXV and Sub-Chapter IV of Chapter XXVII.
2. The Anglo-Russian Agreement Concerning Persia

As regards Persia, the preamble of the Agreement, like most such preambles, is a dignified statement. Russia and Great Britain, the two signatories 'sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for trade and industry of all other nations' and intending, of course, 'to respect the integrity and independence of Persia', divided the country into three zones. In the northern zone, containing about half the total area, Great Britain engaged 'not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, and c.' Britain agreed not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region by the Russian Government'. This was the Russian zone. In the South zone—which was a British zone, Russia gave a similar guarantee to Great Britain. In between the two zones, there was a neutral zone, open to both. The two great Powers agreed

1. The Agreement concerning Persia is produced in full in Appendix No. 7.
2. As on, op. cit., p. 279.
to respect the existing concessions. The revenue guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans, concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Banque d'Escompte as well as the loans concluded by the Shah's Government with the Imperial Bank of Persia, the two Powers agreed, should be devoted to the same purpose. And in case of the Persian Government's failure to pay her debts to either of the Powers, and should the necessity arose either for Russian and Great Britain, to establish control over the sources of the revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans, the two Powers agreed to enter before hand into friendly exchange of views to determine the measure of the control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the Agreement.

There were two cardinal objects which Britain expected to achieve by concluding the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Firstly, the increasing menace of Germany, both by sea and land, had annoyed Great Britain much. Hence, to establish friendly relations with Russia, was the necessity of the day. The Anglo-Russian Agreement was concluded solely in the interest of the European balance of power. It was definitely an indication that Britain was not strong enough to face Germany alone. Secondly,

by concluding the Agreement, Britain hoped to put a check on the Russian advances in the direction of Indian frontier. Sir E. Grey claimed that the Agreement had made Russia, once and for all, to give up her ambitions concerning India. He was satisfied that a frequent source of friction and a possible cause of war had been removed. He was happy that Britain was now free from an anxiety which had often pre-occupied her since long. But did the Agreement actually fulfill the expectations of Sir. E. Grey? Lord Curzon supplied the answer. 'I do not think', he said in the House of Lords on February 6, 1903, 'that this treaty, in its Persian aspect, will conduce either to the security of India, to the independence of Persia, or to the place of Asia'. And in so prophesying, Curzon was correct.

As has been discussed, one of the British objects in concluding the Agreement with Russia was to enlist her support against German menace. But Russia betrayed Britain soon. On August 19, 1911, Russia concluded the Potsdam Agreement with Germany. Negotiations which led to conclusion of the Agreement had already been opened in the autumn of 1910, when the Czar and Kaiser met at Potsdam. By its terms, Germany disclaimed economic concessions (railways, navigation, and telegraph etc.)

+ For the text of the Agreement, see Appendix No.
in the Russian sphere in Persia. Russia, on her part, engaged not to place obstacle in the way of construction of the Baghdad railway or in the participation of the foreign capitals in that enterprise. Provision was made to link the Baghdad line, via Khanikin, with a Russian line from Khanikin to Teheran. A further stipulation, which constituted a menace to Great Britain, was the agreement that if Russia failed to commence the construction of the Teheran-Khanikin railway within two years of the completion of the linking line, Germany should be free to apply for the concession. Great resentment prevailed in Britain and France against the Agreement. The two Powers protested strongly against it, pointing out that it threatened the entente but in vain.

3. The Effect of Anglo-Russian Convention on Persia

Whether the Anglo-Russian Convention, in its international aspect, was basically beneficial or it prejudiced the British interests; and whether by agreeing to the inclusion of a large portion of the Persian territories into the Russian sphere of influence, Britain committed any technical mistake — are the


problems which do not come within the scope of this work. The real problem with which we are concerned is to analyse the effect of the Convention on the relations between the two contracting parties and Persia. We have to see whether the policy followed by the two great Powers in Persia after the conclusion of the Agreement was consistent with the integrity and independence of Persia or not—which Russia and Great Britain declared to maintain and respect. It is surprising to note that on the one hand, the two Powers declared to maintain and respect the integrity and independence of Persia, on the other hand they violated the sovereignty of Persia by concluding the Agreement itself as no consultation was made with Persia. 'No Power, however, impotent or decadent, likes to be slighted, and this Agreement was made without consultation with Persia'. 'To-day it is necessary that the Foreign Minister of Persia', noted one Teherani newspaper, which reflected articulate nationalist opinion in the country, 'should clearly inform the two Powers that no Agreement having reference to Persia and concluded without her knowledge is valid or entitled to the slightest consideration; and that any Power desiring to enter into relations with Persia must address itself directly to the Persian themselves, no one else having any right to intervene in any way....'

2. Hablu'l-Matin, 11 September 1907, as referred by Browne, op. cit., p. 185.
Great resentment prevailed in Persia against the Agreement. Persians believed that the arrangement of spheres of influence was merely a stage on the road to partition. At that time, the influence and popularity of Great Britain in Persia were at their zenith owing to the deep British sympathies with the Constitutionalists. Russia was regarded by them as their deadly enemy. The Anglo-Russian rapprochement aroused great suspicion. Britain was no more their friend as the Persian say, 'enemies are of three sort, the enemies, the enemies of the friends, and the friends of the enemies.' Moreover, many Persians believed that Britain's real object in concluding the Agreement was to prevent the spread of Constitutional ideas in Asia. They did not fail to note that


* One of the factors leading to the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, M. Isvolsky, the then Foreign Minister of Russia, told on April 14, 1907, was the common fear of the development of national liberation movement in the Orient. See Spectator, Tver, op. cit. p. 10.

By supporting the national movement in Persia, Britain undoubtedly secured a field free from rivals wherein she might direct her course as she pleased, but unexpectedly the news of the Persian revolution encouraged the Indians (th Russian revolution had already awakened them). They began to demand the rights which they had lost. This alarmed the British statesmen and they decided to oppose any such national movement in Asia.
all the centres of the reform in Persia were included in the Russian sphere of influence, and Russia was the ancient foe of liberty. The future of the Constitutional Government in Persia was dark and gloomy.

A majority of the Persians believed that their country would, in the long run, be partitioned and absorbed by the two great Powers. The Anglo-Russian Agreement was discussed in the Majliss and in the secret societies. The comments generally made were hostile to the two Governments and generally of a very virulent character, especially against England who was regarded as having sold Persia to Russia and as having betrayed the cause of Persian independence.

In order to allay the fears which the Persian people and the Government naturally had in consequence of the conclusion of the Agreement, the British Minister at Teheran, explaining to a gentleman connected with the Persian political societies the nature and the object of the Convention said that it had 'secured the formal recognition of the independence and integrity of Persia, and the principle of the open door, and that it contained a provision that neither party should attempt and obtain concessions in the frontier provinces injurious to others. He further assured that 'there was nothing in the

1. See Speech of Mr. H. F. B. Lynch on Anglo-Russian Convention, which he was unable to deliver in its entirety in the House of Commons on February 14, 1908, but which was published in full in the Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, April 1908, Vol. XXV, No. 50. For the reference made here, see p. 318 of the above Journal.
++ The gentlemen of the Agreement were not made public up to this time. Even the Persian Government was kept in darkness by the two Powers.
++ The name of the gentleman has not been disclosed by Sir C. Spring-Rice.
agreement to wound the susceptibilities of the Persian People* and pointed out that 'if Persia took advantage of the new situation created by the agreement, she should be able henceforth, without fear of interference, to devote herself to the task of reform and progress*. The 'gentleman' then said that 'his friends were agreed that although a guarantee by England and Russia was of undoubted value, it would be of more value, and inspire more confidence, if other Powers were invited to adhere to it. It was the intention of the Persian people, or at any rate of his friends, to demand the recognition of these principles not by the two Powers alone, but by all the Great Powers of Europe*. He hoped that no obstacle would be placed in the way of this project by the English Government. 'The reasons which he urged for making this proposal', reported Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir E. Grey, 'were mainly based on the popular conviction that a dual arrangement between England and Russia could easily be changed from one of non-intervention to one of joint intervention; but that if the adherence of other Powers was invited, this would be regarded as a proof that the clause as to the independence and integrity was not, as was thought, a mere blind, but seriously intended to be a fundamental principle to be solemnly incorporated in the public law of nations'. On the 5th September 1907, the British Minister
at Teheran, made the following communication to the Persian Government, explaining the nature and objects of the Anglo-Russian Convention:

'Information has reached me that it is rumoured in Persia that an Agreement has been concluded between England and Russia which will result in the intervention of these two Powers in Persia, and the partition of that country between them. Your Excellency is well aware that the negotiations between Russia and England are of a wholly different character; for the Mushirul-Mulk has recently been in St. Petersburg and London and has conversed with the Russian and English Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who, on behalf of their respective Government, have clearly explained the aims of the two Powers in Persia, which explanations he will no doubt have reported.

Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has informed me of the substance of his conversation with the Mushirul-Mulk, and also of the substance of his communications with M. Isvolsky, which have been officially communicated.
Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the Marshalul-Mulk that he and M. Isvolsky are in perfect accord on two essential points.

First, neither of the two Powers will interfere in Persian affairs unless some injury is inflicted on the property or persons of their subjects.

Secondly, the negotiations connected with the Agreement between the two Powers must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia.

Sir Edward Grey also explains that hitherto antagonism existed between Russia and England, each of which sought to prevent the continuance of the other in Persia; and that had this antagonism been prolonged in the present uncertain state of Persia, suspicion would have arisen on one side, or on both, that the other was interfering in the internal affairs of Persia to prevent its rival from profiting by the existing state of things, and to secure profit for itself at the expenses of the other. The object of the present negotiations between England and Russia is to obviate the occurrence of such difficulties, and as the result of which he could not see it. Mr. Morrel, taking part in the debate, pointed out that the document was known by everyone in England. He was surprised to note that the Foreign Secretary had no knowledge of it. He remarked that it was the most extraordinary instance of official ignorance that had ever come to his knowledge.

they are in truth in no way directed against Persia, as M. Isvolsky explained to the Mushirul-Mulk, saying, 'Neither of the two Powers demands anything of Persia, and so Persia can devote all her energies to the settlement of her internal affairs'. Both Ministers were in full accord as to non-intervention, and left no room for any doubt on this matter. M. Isvolsky's words, which likewise express the intention of Great Britain, are as follows:

'The Russian Government's rule will be that, so long as no injury accrues to its interests, it will avoid interfering in any way in the internal affairs of other countries. It is quite impossible that it should deviate from this rule in the present case'.

'As for the rumoured partition of Persia between England and Russia which is talked of, the two Powers above mentioned desire to define a limit of powers for themselves. Sir Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky have explicitly declared that these rumours are absolutely devoid of foundation. What the two Powers desire is that an Agreement should be made to prevent future difficulties and dissensions, by which Agreement neither Power aims at establishing its influence in those parts of Persia which are adjacent to the frontier of the other. The Agreement threatens neither Persia's own interests, nor those of any other foreign nation; it only binds Russia and England not to embark on any undertaking injurious to one another, and delivers Persia for the future from those demands which in the past have proved so hurtful to the advancement of her interests. M. Isvolsky's statement is
as follows:

"The Agreement between the two European Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, an Agreement based on a guarantee of the independence and integrity of Persia, will conduce to the advancement of Persia's interests, so that she, encouraged and aided by her two powerful neighbours, can henceforth concentrate all her energies on internal progress".

You will perceive from the above statements how unfounded are the reports recently put about in Persia concerning the political ambitions of England and Russia in that country. They have no sort of intention of attacking of Persia's independence, which it is their object in concluding this Agreement to ensure for ever. Not only do they not seek a pretext for intervention, but their aim in these friendly negotiations is not to permit one and other to intervene in Persia on the pretext of safeguarding their own interests. The two Powers above mentioned hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will enjoy complete freedom to manage her affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole world".

In addition to the above communication, the following joint note was addressed to the Persian Government on September 11, 1907, by the Russian and British Legations:

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, desiring to avoid any cause of conflict between their respective interests in certain regions in Persia contiguous to, or in the immediate neighbourhood of, the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the one hand, and the Russian frontier on the other, have signed a friendly agreement on the subject.

In that agreement the two Governments mutually agree to the strict integrity and independence of Persia, and testify that they sincerely desire the pacific development of that country as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the commerce and industry of all other nations. Each of the two States further engages, in case the Persian Government grants concessions to foreigners, not to seek concessions adjoining or in the neighbourhood of, the frontiers of the other. In order to prevent misunderstandings in future, and to avoid creating an order of things which might place the Persian Government in an embarrassing situation in any respect whatever, the abovementioned regions are clearly defined in the arrangement. In mentioning the revenues which are affected to the loans concluded by the Persian Government with the Discount and Loan Bank and the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russian and British Governments recognise that these revenues will be in future affected to the same purpose as in the past, and the two Governments equally engage, in case of irregularities in the amortisation of or in the payment of interest on the abovementioned loans, to enter on a
friendly exchange of views in order to determine by common agreement the measures which, in conformity of the law of nations, it would be necessary to take in order to safeguard the interests of the creditors and to avoid all interferences which would not be in conformity with the principles of that arrangement.

In signing that arrangement the two States have not for a moment lost sight of the fundamental principles of absolute respect of the integrity and independence of Persia. The arrangement has no other object than that of avoiding any cause of misunderstanding between the contracting parties on the ground of Persian affairs. The Government of the Shah will convince itself that that agreement arrived at between Russia and Great Britain can but contribute in the most efficacious manner to the security of the prosperity and ultimate development of Persia.

Had due publicity been given to these reassuring communications, the suspicions from the minds of the Persians, might have, at least to some extent, been removed. But as it was not the case, the Persian took it for granted that their country had been partitioned amongst two powerful neighbours. The Persian press took a violent attitude against the British Government in connection with the conclusion of the entente with Russia. The articles appearing in the Persian newspapers were directed almost entirely against England. Russia was hardly mentioned. It appeared quite impossible to convince popular opinion in Persia that Russia would ever desist from her designs on Persia and her new liberties. The

1. Cd. 6077, see Booch and Temperley, Vol IV, op. cit.
Enclosure in No. 529, pp. 589-590, also see, British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CII, p. 907.
fact that the liberal Government of liberal England had made an agreement with Russia about Persia was quoted as a proof that there had been a corrupt bargain by which England, for certain special advantages, had abandoned Persia to Russia control. 'It is not for the moment necessary for us to regard the real motives of the powers', wrote Hablul-Matin, 'we must assume that they actually intended to divide our country. In case it is clear that their method of procedure will not be to bring in troops and forcibly take possession. They will insert their claws gradually, and adopt such means and methods as will result in finishing us off in another ten or twenty years'. Not only the Persians considered the future of their country, in the light of Anglo-Russian Convention, dark, but also some British Politicians like Mr. Lynch shared their view. 'Persia is the ghost at the feast' said Mr. Lynch, 'which we are celebrating with Russia in honour of this Convention while the feasting is in progress and the toasts are being exchanged, this small nation - which has contributed so much to the artistic and intellectual wealth of the world, and whose prospects looked at least promising before this Convention was signed - is lying between life and death, parcelled out, almost dismembered, helpless and friendless at

2. Hablul-Matin, 14 September, 1907, as referred by Browne, p. 186.
our feet! The feelings of the Persian nationalists were very well depicted in a cartoon which appeared in Punch on October 2, 1907. The British lion and the Russian bear were represented as mauling a Persian cat. The lion remarks, 'You can play with his head, and I can play with his tail, and we can both stroke the small of his back'. The cat moans: I don't remember having been consulted about this.

The text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement was communicated to the Persian Government on the 24th September 1907 by Sir C. Spring-Rice. While handing over the text of the Agreement, a verbal communication, instead of written one, to the effect that there was no secret clause attached to the Convention, was made to the Persian Government. A written communication in the above sense, was opposed by the Russian Minister at Teheran, Mr. H.C. Norman, an employee of British Foreign Office, was surprised to note the Russian Minister's objection. I think a verbal communication as to the absence of secret clause, he wrote, was enough but the Russian Minister's objection to a written one is rather amusing. Sir E. Grey minuted as follows:

1. See speech of Mr. Lynch published in Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, op. cit., p. 328.
5. Ibid, Minute to No. 539, p. 599.
'The verbal communication was better and the difficulty of making any communication is that the omission of it on future occasions may be taken to imply that secret articles do exist. No doubt in this case the Russians hope that there will be other developments from the Convention indirectly and are not anxious to emphasize its present completeness.'

It was a stark reality that, at least, one of the signatories - Russia was not sincere to the Agreement. The Mushirul-Hulk rightly believed that Russia had not in any way changed her traditional policy. He considered that within few years, Russia would again be as active in Central Asia as she was in the past. The war with Japan and her internal troubles, said the Mushirul Mulk, in the course of conversation with Sir. A. Nicolson, on the 24th September, 1907, had checked Russia for a moment. It would take five or at the outside ten years for Russia, the Mushirul Mulk remarked, to become as strong as she was in the past. If within that period, Persia had not succeeded in becoming a prosperous and independent country under a constitutional regime, he feared that his country would be irrevocably lost. He, however, welcome the Russo-British Agreement as he considered that 'it did afford some hope that Russia would be more prudent and less disposed to follow an adventurous policy; and it did give some security to Persia'.

1. Ibid, Minute No. 539, p. 599.
2. Ibid No. 538, p. 598.
The Persian Government, however, refused to recognize the Agreement. In response to the communication of Sir C. Spring-Rice of September 24, 1907, through which he conveyed the text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement to the Persian Government, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on November 2, 1907 as follows:

'I have the honour, in reply, to state that, as you will readily in justice admit, the above mentioned Agreement having been concluded between the British and Russian Governments, therefore, its provisions will concern the aforementioned Governments who have signed the Agreement; and the Persian Government, in view of the independence of which by the grace of God it is in full possession, considers the full rights and freedom which it enjoys by its absolute independence, absolutely free and protected from every possible effect or influence of any kind of Agreement between two or several foreign States regarding Persia."

Let us now analyse whether the policies followed by the two great Powers, after the conclusion of the Agreement, were consistent with the integrity and independence of Persia or not— which Russia and Great Britain repeatedly declared to maintain and respect. We have also to examine critically whether the oft-

repeated assurance to the effect that the two Powers would not intervene in the internal affairs of Persia, was kept or not.

Soon after the conclusion of Anglo-Russian Agreement, the situation provided the chance for the testification of the assurance given therein and thereafter. By June, 1908, the relations between the Shah and the Majliss had become very strained. It was a trial of strength between the two forces—democracy and corrupt absolute monarchy. It was, however, an internal affair of Persia. But, the Russian and British Legations at Teheran openly intervened. The representatives of the two Powers called on the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs and threatened him with Russian intervention if the opposition to the Shah did not cease to exist. It was a gross violation of the Persian sovereignty, integrity and independence. It was the plain breach of the preamble of the Anglo-Russian Convention, of the memorandum addressed by Sir C. Spring-Rice to the Persian Government on September 5, 1907, and of the Anglo-Russian joint note of September 11, 1907. It was the Anglo-Russian intervention which directly contributed to the overthrow of the Majliss and the bombardment of Bahuristan on June 23, 1908 by the Cossack Brigade under the command of Colonel Liskhoff. It led to the killing

1. For detail see Chapter II.
of a number of nationalist volunteers, arrest of a large
number of their leaders, execution of few of them, and the
appointment of Colonel Liakhoff as military governor of Teheran,
who administered the town under the martial law and established
a record in the field of Brutalism. When representations were
made to Russia against his barbarity, M. Isolsky disclaimed
any responsibility for Colonel's action. Colonel Liakhoff,
he stated, had acted without order, knowledge and approval of
the Russian Government. It is interesting to note that the
Colonel was on the active list of the Russian army. He received
his pay from the Russian treasury and wore Russian uniform,
yet, employed in the Shah's service. Curiously enough, the
Russian Government refused to recall him on the ground that
in the existing circumstances, it would be 'hazardous' to
recall him. Sir E. Grey defended Russia on the basis that
Liakhoff being in the Shah's service, no responsibility could be
laid on the Russian Government. One can justify the Russo-
British attitude in this regard. Shah being the supreme Commander
of all the forces military and naval, had every constitutional
right to issue orders to his military officers and the officers
were bound to obey their supreme Commander. But the secret

1. Ibid.
2. Article 50 of Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7,
1907. See Browne, op. cit. p. 379.
The letters addressed by Colonel Liakhoff to the chief of the Military Staff of the Caucasus, revealed the fact that in planning and executing the overthrow of the Majliss and the Constitution, Liakhoff faithfully carried out the designs of the so-called 'forward party' which surrounded the persons of the Tsar. No one, however, can deny that it was not a case of intervention by Russia in the internal affairs of Persia.

The dispatch of the troops by the two Powers in their so-called respective spheres of influence, during the constitutional crisis, the intervention of the Russian troops in the internal affairs as well as the assumption of administrative duties by Colonel Snarsky, the officer in command of the Russian troops in Persia, proved the fact that it was a political rather than an economic partition.

Commenting on the authenticity of these letters, Brown wrote as follows:

"Owing to the dualism, or even pluralism, which as all observers agree, exist in the Russian administration, it is quite possible that Colonel Liakhoff received from quarters incitements and encouragements of which M. Izvolsky had no knowledge and indeed the allegation was that the Colonel received his instructions from the chief of Military Staff in the Caucasus, who in turn received his instructions from the reactionary Camerilla which surrounds the persons of Tsar. M. Panoff, of course, scouts the idea that Russia was not responsible for Colonel Liakhoff's actions. See Brown, op. cit., p1 227."

1. For details, see Chapter II.
The grant of asylum to Mohammad Ali Shah by Russia, the Russo-British pressure which compelled the national Government of Persia to grant a pension to the deposed Shah, and protection afforded to him by Russian and British-Indian army in his safe exit from Persia, are the instances which convince everyone that the two Powers committed great injustice with the Persian nation and violated their own assurances regarding the non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia.¹

The refusal of the Russian Government to withdraw her troops even after the maintenance of law and order in the country by the national Government, the support and encouragement given by the Russian Government to the various rebellious malcontents and brigands like Rahim Khan and Darab Mirza and finally, the insistence of the Russian Government on the acceptance of her certain onerous demands² by Persian Government as the price of the withdrawal of her troops - are the further examples of the violation of the Persian sovereignty, integrity and independence. These actions of Russia confirmed the belief that she was determined either to annex the North Persia or, at least, to transform it into a protectorate.

¹ Ibid.
² For details, see Sub-chapter (a) of Chapter III.
British, though, recognized that further stay of the Russian troops was no longer needed and, of course, advised Russia the desirability of the withdrawal of her troops, yet neither protested strongly nor accepted publicly that any injustice was being done to the Persian Government. It was undoubtedly for the sake of the European balance of power. However, Britain being the signatory of the Anglo-Russian Convention, the preamble of which guaranteed the integrity and independence of Persia is equally responsible for the Russian actions in Persia.

Persia was neither allowed by Russia to exercise her territorial jurisdiction nor even to try and punish the murderers. For example, in the end of the June or the beginning of July, 1910, a Persian village on Caspian Sea was bombarded and destroyed by a Russian war-ship. Sir E. Grey enquired about the facts regarding the tragic incident from the British representative at Teheran, Mr. Marling took the incident very lightly. He neither cared to know the Persian version of the incident nor he bothered to hold an independent enquiry. He believed his Russian colleague and reported to Sir E. Grey on July 17, 1910, as follows:

'The Russian Minister informed me as follows: ' About three weeks ago a Cossack of Astrabad consular guard was killed and another dangerously wounded by Mullah in connection with some trouble over Russian fisheries at Jummastpe. Murderer and most of the villagers escaped.

Gun-boat was sent from Aushurada, and on arrival fired three shots as warning. Murderer eventually surrendered to Russian frontier post, saying that he preferred to be tried by Russians rather than by Persians. He will be tried in Russia, and will probably not to be executed, but indemnity, will be exacted from villagers.1

Supposing the version of the Russian Minister as correct, still question arises that was it proper for the Russian Government to send a gun-boat to fire shots? Was it proper to accede to the request of the 'alleged' murderer and to take him to Russia for trial as well as to decide to exact indemnity from a village under the jurisdiction of Persia? Was it not a violation of the Persian sovereignty, integrity and independence? The proper course was to inform and to lodge a protest with the Persian Government and demand a punishment for the offender.

A similar incident was repeated in February, 1911. On the alleged ground that the Galish tribe had attacked a party of the Russian Cossack near Astara as the result of which one Cossack was killed and three wounded, a detachment was sent from Ardabil, which bombarded and destroyed the village responsible for the attack.2 It was not only a violation of the Persian sovereignty but the rules of international relations were broken too.

In the early portion of November 1910, the chief of Police of Kashan, in search of an offender, broke into the house of the Russian consular agent (a Persian subject). The Russian

1. Ibid., No. 127, p. 64.
2. Cd. 6104, No. 31, p. 21, No. 37, p. 22.
Minister demanded the dismissal of the police officer and a formal apology from the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as an apology from two Bakhtiyari chiefs, on the alleged ground that some Bakhtiyaris had taken part in the proceedings. In the event of the non-compliance, the Russian Minister proposed to his Government to take 'energetic measure' and the Russian Government at one moment contemplated to seize certain northern custom houses. Sir C. Barclay induced the Persian Government to satisfy Russia, consequently, the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, after some hesitation, made a personal apology, which closed the incident. Comment seems unnecessary.

Assassins like Nawruzoff (one of the murderers of Ali Mohammad Khan, on August 2, 1910), Ivan, the Georgian, who assassinated Sani-ed-Dowleh, the Persian Minister of Finance on February 6, 1911, and Mirza Abbas Khan of Isfahan (he attempted to kill the Governor General of Isfahan, Nematordi-Khakan, but actually did kill his cousin on February 1, 1911)—all of them were taken away from the Persian custody to be tried in Russia. However, as the Russians enjoyed 'Capitulations', the Russian Government had the right to try them. But, it was also her duty to punish them, if found guilty. Nevertheless, the punishment, if ever inflicted, was not known to the Persians.2

2. Cd. 6104, Nos. 14, 17, 18, p. 9, No. 65, p. 32, No. 110, p. 55, No. 155, p. 81, also see Browne, The Persian Constitutional Movement, op.cit., p. 16.
In July, 1911, in defiance of the article XI of the Protocol of September 7, 1909, Russian and Great Britain, and particularly, the former, permitted Mohammad Ali, the Ex-Shah to escape from Russia, in order to endeavour to regain the throne of Persia. The Persian Government, as a preparatory measure to cope with the situation which had arisen due to the ex-Shah's ill designs, declared martial law at Teheran on July 22, 1911. All the Legations were informed to that effect by the Persian Government. Sir J. Barclay promised to instruct the British subjects to refrain from all acts calculated to disturb peace. He, however, pointed out that the article 7 of the Martial Law Act was contrary to treaty rights and requested the Persian Government to give orders that the authorities should not enter the houses of the British subjects without reference to the British Legation. Russian Legation adopted a far different and most unfriendly tone. The Russian Minister claimed the right to arrest directly at any time, the so-called 'illegal Russian subjects', who might take part in the events actually going on in the country.

In fact, it was the Russian support which encouraged the Ex-Shah to try to re-establish himself on the throne of Persia - See Shuster, op.cit., Chapter IV.

1. Article 7 of the Martial Law Act runs as follows:
   'In the event of suspicion, the representatives of the Government charged with the maintenance of order in the town have the right of entrance and investigation into the houses. In the event of opposition and resistance, they can enter by force and those showing opposition and resistance will be forcibly arrested, and in accordance with the order of Court-martial will be severely punished'. See 6104, Enclosure 2, pp. 101-102.

The patent objection of this claim was to provide the Russian Legation and Consuls throughout Persia, with the excuse to arrest any Persian fighting men of known reputation who might take the side of the Government against the Ex-Shah, on the mere allegation that they were a kind of Russian subject.

At Resht, the Russian Consul went further and declared that he would arrest any one on suspicion of his being a Russian citizen. He further declared that the matter related to the citizenship of the person arrested would be investigated by him at his leisure and stated to hold them until the end of the trouble. One wonders, how these actions of Russia could be justified as non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia.

On July 31, 1911, Sir G. Barclay addressed the following note to the Persian Government:

'As the Shah has returned to Persia contrary to the advice given to him repeatedly by the British and Russian Governments to abstain from any intrigue in Persia, the British Government recognize that the Ex-Shah has forfeited his right to the pension assigned to him by protocol. On the other hand, the British Government consider that, the Ex-Shah being in Persian territory, the British Government cannot interfere. In consequence, the British Government declare that in the struggle that unhappily occurred, in Persia they will take no part whatever.'

A similar note was addressed by the Russian Government to the Persian Government on the same day. The two Powers,

2. Cd. 6104, Enclosure in No. 246, p.118.
thereupon, declared their neutrality. However, it was a
defacto recognition of the Ex-Shah's belligerency in spite of the fact that the two Governments under article XI of the Protocol of 1909, had undertaken to give Mohammad Ali strict injunction to abstain in future from all political agitation against Persia.

As regards to the declared neutrality, the following incidents will prove that it was not observed too.

When Rashid-ul-Mulk, who was guilty of acts of treachery against the Government, was arrested and confined at Tabriz, the Russian Consul-General came to his rescue and took him forcibly away from the Persian custody. To the formal protest lodged by the Persian Government over this affair, the Russian Legation replied, officially admitting responsibility for the orders given to the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz to 'take necessary steps', to prevent certain punishment which was alleged to be threatened, from being inflicted on Rashid-ul-Mulk. After his release, Rashid-ul-Mulk joined the rebel forces of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, which were threatening Tabriz.

At the moment, when Shuja-ed-Dowleh was preparing to attack Tabriz and the garrison of the city for defence, the local Government received a note from the Russian Consul-

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2. Cd. 6104, Enclosure(1) in No. 251, p.120.
4. Shuja-ed-Dowleh was the title adopted by famous bandit Rahim Khan.
General there, stating that no defensive measures should be taken and that under no circumstances should there be any fighting within the city. At the same time, a Russian subject was in charge of the advance guard of Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

Shuja-Hizan accused of high treason, was arrested by the Governor of Marand. The Russian authorities took him away from the Persian custody. Later on, he succeeded in establishing himself at Marand and in capturing the Governor. The Russian authorities continued to protect him on the alleged basis that he was in the service of the Russian road company of Julfa-Tabriz.

The province of Gilan was perfectly secure and tranquil. Nevertheless, the Russian Consul interfered with. He informed the Governor of Gilan, that he will arrest or imprison any suspected person whom he considers to be a Russian subject wherever he may be and whatever costume he may be. These and other likewise actions of Russia proved what an astonishing degree the Russian interference had reached.

The Persian Government was neither allowed to float loan in countries other than Russia and Great Britain, nor she was permitted to appoint foreign nationals (especially citizens of Great European Powers) in her service. However the two Powers

1. See Shuster's, Open letter to the London Times, produced in full in Appendix No.
2. Ibid.
3. Cd. 6104, Enclosure(3) in No. 251, p. 121.
4. For detail, see Shuster's Open letter to the London Times, and Cd. 6104.
5. For detail, see sub-chapter (c) of Chapter III.
6. For detail, see sub-chapter (a) of Chapter IV.
had no objection in Americans being engaged as financial advisers, consequently, Shuster was appointed as Treasurer-General of Persia. But Russia was determined to Oust Shuster, as the result of which, she opposed and vetoed every measure of reform, taken by the Treasurer-General, of course, with the consent and approval of Great Britain. Russia, with the consent of Great Britain vetoed the appointment of Englishmen under Treasury Department, of Persia. 'Here was a test case' wrote Nation, 'as to the meaning of the Agreement. If Persia is still an independent state, she may appoint whom she pleases to supervise the collection of her taxes. If Britain and Russian are bound only to respect each other's monopoly in economic concessions in their respective spheres, then clearly the nationality of a tax collector is not a matter affected by their bargain. But if it is political predominance which they claim north and south of two arbitrary lines, then clearly the sending of an English officials into the Russian sphere may be regarded; as both parties to the Treaty do regard it, as a breach of its spirit, if not of its letter'.

Next came the Shua-es-Sultanah incident. It definitely proved that Persia was no more an independent country. If a Government may not send her gendarmes to seize the property of the rebels, who were her debtor too, she certainly ceased to be the sovereign of her territory. However, Shua's episode led

1. For details see sub-chapter (a) and (b) of Chapter IV. In the beginning, Russia raised objection on even Americans being appointed by Persia, but on persuasion of Great Britain, she consented.

2. Major Stokes and LeCoffre - see sub-chapter (d) and (e) of Chapter IV.

3. The Nation (London), December 2, 1911, as referred by Shuster, p. 407.

3. For details, see sub-chapter (e) of Chapter IV.
to the invasion of the Northern Persia by Russia. Firstly, Russia presented certain demands to be complied with by Persia. The demands were complied with, of course on the advice of the British Government. But there was some delay, which provided Russia with the pretext not only to present further humiliating demands but to pour her army in large number into Northern Persia. The three repressive demands - the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, the acceptance by Persia of an Anglo-Russian Veto on all denominations of foreign experts, and the payment of an indemnity to compensate Russia for her trouble in pressing these demands by an armed invasion, were also complied with, but the Russian troops were not withdrawn. Northern Persia was now in complete control of Russia. The Russian troops measured the inhabitants of Tabriz, appointed Shuja-ed-Dowleh (Rahim Khan) as Governor of Tabriz, executed priests like Sikat-al-Islam and bombarded the sacred Shrine of Meshed. In short, Russia treated northern Persia as her dependency.

The British Foreign Secretary followed a policy in order to propitiate Russia. He was determined not to antagonize Russia. He tried to justify the injustice which Russia had committed with the Persian nation. He consented to the Russian demand of Mr. Shuster's dismissal and defended it. He accused

1. For details, see, sub-chapter (e) of Chapter IV.

+ The British representative also recognized him as de facto Governor. However, he was, soon replaced by a Governor nominated by the Persian Government.

2. For detail see sub-chapter (a) of Chapter V.
Mr. Shuster of Anglicising the Persian service and justified his dismissal on this very basis. During a debate in the House of Commons on the 14th December 1911, he admitted Mr. Shuster's ability and his good intention but remarked that a person, however, well-intentioned would not be allowed to upset the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. 'Had I supported him', he stated, 'I should have been supporting him in the appointment of British officials in the Russian sphere of Persia, and I should at any rate have been breaking the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement'. Apart from the fact that one of the primary elements of the sovereignty is the right of a country to manage her internal affairs, at least within the limitations of the law of nations, and surely the appointment of her own officials by any country cannot be considered as anything else, the appointment of Major Stokes was permitted by the British Government herself. It was the Russian opposition which helped Sir E. Grey to discover that the Major's appointment was against the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. As regards to the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre. It was a transfer case from one point in the so-called Russian sphere to another point. Consequently the charges against Mr. Shuster for Anglicising the Persian service and breaking of the spirit of the Agreement seem to be incorrect. Sir E. Grey also accused Mr. Shuster of following a policy of 'Hands off' to Britain and Russia. He stated that
so far Britain was concerned, she should not have minded, but to the Russians, he pointed out, Mr. Shuster's method meant the destruction of their own position in their sphere, to which they had been accustomed of since long. Mr. Shuster, the British Foreign Secretary argued, did not realize that Russian interference in the north of Persia could only be ousted by force; that Britain was not prepared to embark on a great European War for that purpose; and that Britain was the only country that had any interest in seeing Russia restrained.

Shuster attempted, Sir E. Grey admitted, what was good, but what could only be done by force; and there was no force available for the purpose. One can agree with Sir E. Grey so far as 'tactical' problem of Mr. Shuster's policy was concerned but it is not the answer of the real problem. In fact, Sir E. Grey admitted that the integrity and independence of Persia was violated, but pleaded, 'would have been better on Persia's part not to raise any objection against such a violation as Russia was accustomed of pursuing such a policy far generations.

In spite of all assurances to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia, Sir E. Grey wrote that he had never expected that the Agreement would diminish Russian activities in the north of Persia. 'It was impossible that the hands of the clock, which had already marked so much time

in the lapse of Persian independence' wrote Sir E. Grey, 'should be kept back, but I hoped that the clock might be stopped. And so in a sense, it was, far the Russians kept their interference strictly to the north ... and in that sphere things were frequently done that were not consistent with integrity and independence of Persia'.

During a lengthy debate in the House of Commons on February 21, 1912, several members criticised the Russian policy of interference in Persia and accused the Government of co-operating with Russia in her ill-designs. Sir E. Grey diverted the attention of the House towards the so-called 'Spirit of the Agreement'. He pleaded that the real object of the Agreement was that the two Powers should not disturb their interest and their frontier in Asia and declared with satisfaction that the aim in view had been achieved. So long as the Indian frontier was safe, he was ready to allow Russia to follow her desired policy in Persia.

While Russia was sending a large number of troops to North Persia, Britain decided to reinforce her consular guards at various places in South Persia. The reason to increase the guards, informed Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowlah, was the possible danger to British lives and property in that part of the country. Persia assured Great Britain to maintain law and order, which she was undoubtedly unable to restore up to that

1. Ibid., pp. 161-62.
time owing to the Anglo-Russian intervention in the internal affairs of the country. She also assured to safeguard the British interests in South Persia, but Britain was not prepared to listen to a weak nation like Persia. The guards were increased 1 Persia protested but in vain.

Having their armies in their respective spheres, the two Powers succeeded in establishing a sort of condominium in Persia. They, now proceeded with their so-called 'constructive programme', to put a seal on the integrity and independence of Persia - which the two Powers had 'solemnly' and repeatedly declared to maintain and respect. From that time on, the two Powers dictated whatever they liked and the puppet Government of Persia, formed after the dissolution of the Majlis, proved herself extraordinary obedient. Persian was independent only in name. The country was really run by the British and Russian Legations. Every appointment, every

1. For details, see sub-chapter (b) of Chapter V.
2. For details, see sub-chapter (c) of chapter V.
4. For the Anglo-Russian activities in order to get the desired people like Saad-ed-Dowleh appointed to rule the country, See - Cd. 6807.
every change of government and every step in the policy was subjected to the cynical supervision of the two Legations.

As to the Russian policy in Persia one thing was clear that Russia desired to occupy or at least to transform the northern part of Persia into a protectorate. But British policy went through many changes. Firstly, she desired to maintain Persia as a buffer state, in order to safeguard her Indian frontier. Later on, with her growing oil interest in that country, she changed her policy. She then followed a policy which in the beginning created 'State Within State' and finally resulted in the political partition of Persia.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was really a creation of

+ William Know D'Arcy, an Australian Financier, made a successful effort in 1901 to obtain a sixty-year oil concession from the Shah of Persia. When D'Arcy started his work, he met with financial difficulties. At that time, it was not easy to attract capital for investment in an enterprise in remote Iran. D'Arcy's attempt to raise capital in London produced little result. As the result of which, he decided to sell his concession to foreign interests. But, at that time, there was neither a market for stock nor for entire concession. D'Arcy was, however, a man of spirit and firm determination. He succeeded in establishing the First Exploitation Company in 1903. Soon after, British Government became interested in the oil concession. Lord Fisher was appointed as first Lord of Admirality in October, 1904. He was an 'oil-maniac'. He set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Pritymans, the then Civil Lord of Admiralty, in order to consider and make recommendations about securing oil supplies for the British navy. Lord Fisher asked the Chairman of the Committee to find out way for getting the D'Arcy concession for the admiralty or treasury. Mr. Pritymans persuaded Lord Strathcona, the wealthy Scotch-Canadian Financier to take over the D'Arcy concession temporarily, thus, saving it for
British Admiralty, though, private capital participated in it. Naturally, the British Government was whole-heartedly interested in the smooth functioning of the company. The company decided to refine the oil inside Persia and planned an ambitious pipe-line from the oil-field to a refinery - which they thought to install at Abadan. This involved numerous problems on local level, to solve them, the company dealt with the local chiefs of Bakhtiyari and Arab tribes.

In May, 1909, Sir Percy Cox, on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company negotiated an agreement with Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah regarding the pipe-line which had to be

Great Britain, on the persuasion of the Committee, Lord Strothcona and the Burma Oil Company entered into negotiations with D'Arcy. But, having changed his mind of selling the concession, D'Arcy proved obstinate. The British Government, however, managed to get the Anglo-Persian Oil Company established in 1909 - See Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, pp. 10-12.

Fatemi has discussed in detail the 'tricks' through which Britain succeeded in getting the Anglo-Persian Oil Company formed, (see Fatemi, op.cit., Chapter I). But according to the British version, which has, at least not been contradicted by scholars like Kemp, Norman and Ghosh, Sunil Kanti, D'Arcy was negotiating with a large foreign syndicate to dispose of the concession. The admiralty 'approached D'Arcy and asked him if he would defer for some period any further negotiations with the foreign syndicate and would give the admiralty an opportunity to seek independent British interests who would be prepared to take the matter up with a view of finding supplies for the navy. He agreed to that. Then at the request of the admiralty, the Burma Oil Company and Lord Strothcona came forward and undertook to form a new company'.

laid down acres of his territory and the construction of the refinery at Abadan. As the Agreement with the Company, without any reference to the Central Government, would have been suicidal for Sheikh Khazal, the home Government authorized Sir Cox to give a guarantee to him to the effect that he would be assisted by Britain in maintaining his hereditary and customary rights and his property in Persia. The Guarantee was extended to the heirs and successors of Sheikh Khazal also. The Sheikh, thereupon gave the company a full way leave for the pipe-line and to build a refinery at Abadan. He also sold to them the land, which was required, on the understanding that it would revert to him on the expiration of the concession. He also agreed to provide at the Company's expense, guards for the pipe-line and buildings.

In October, 1910, Sheikh Khazal was reassured that Great Britain would not merely safeguard him to the best of her ability against unprovoked attack or encroachment by a foreign Power but also would afford him the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution in case of an encroachment on his jurisdiction or recognized rights or his property in Persia, by the Persian Government. On this occasion, the insignia of

3. This assurance was renewed in November, 1914, after Sheikh Khazal had taken side with Great Britain upon the intervention of Turkey in the General War and had assisted the British Expeditionary Force in the Capture of Basrah - Toynbee, op. cit., p. 540.
E.C.I.S. was conferred upon the Sheikh by Sir Percy Cox, under the instructions of the British Foreign Office. The direct dealings with the Sheikh of Khazal was not only the gross violation of the Persian sovereignty, independence and integrity but also a plain breach of the article 14 of D'Arch Agreement, which provided that the Government of Persia would take herself all and any necessary measures to secure the safety and the carrying out of the object of this concession of the plant and of the apparatuses, of which mention is made, for the purposes of the undertaking of the company, and to protect the representatives, agents and servants of the company... This arrangement created a 'State within State' and paved the way for the British domination of Khuzistan.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company organized a second subsidiary company known as Bakhtiyari Oil Company and allotted a share of three per cent to the Bakhtiyari Khans, in order to calm them. In this way, British domination over Bakhtiyari lands was expected to have been secured.

The Bakhtiyari Khans, however, refused to be tool in the hands of the Company. Consequently, the British officials, true to their traditional policy of 'divide and rule', openly

supported and encouraged the Sheikh Khazal, when a dispute between the Sheikh and the Khans arose on the possession of the city of Shuster. The Khans claimed that they were the possessor of several villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Shuster and therefore more genuinely interested in that district than the Sheikh of Mohammerah and Arab followers.

On the 25th April, 1912, Sir W. Townley, the British Minister at Teheran, reported to Sir E. Grey that the British Consul at Mohammerah and the British resident at Bushire had been sent to Shuster to use their influence and their good offices for a peaceful settlement. But the Bakhtiyaris had declined to await the result of the mediatory enquiry and attacked Shuster. Fearing that the quarrel might develop into a conflict in which British interests might suffer serious damage, the British Minister brought the matter to the notice of the Persian Government. Sir W. Townby further reported that the attitude of the Sheikh had been perfectly correct throughout the whole trouble and recommended that the British Government should give him every support.

On April 28, 1912, Sir W. Townby spoke strongly to the Regent about the importance of preserving order in Arabistan (Khuzistan) and reminded him that there were important British interests in that province, and that it was absolutely necessary to prevent the Bakhtiyaris plundering along the roads. The British Minister considered the Bakhtiyaris to be clearly aggressors. The Regent informed the Minister that a telegram had been sent to the Bakhtiyaris by the Prime Minister desiring them to cease the hostilities. The 'liberal' Foreign Secretary

1. Cd. 6807, No. 59, p. 28
2. Ibid., No. 65, p. 30
of the 'liberal' England, inspite of assurances regarding
the non-intervention in the internal affairs of Persia,
approved the actions of his Minister at Teheran.

The British Minister made several representations to
the Government of Persia, as the result of which, the
Bakhtiyaris were persuaded by the Government to evacuate
Shuster, but the dispute arose again. Sir W. Townby reported
to Sir E. Grey on June 14, 1912, as follows:

'You are aware, Sir, that a serious conflict between the
parties was only averted last spring by the pressure
brought to bear upon the Khans by the legation at Teheran
and by the counsels of moderation urged upon the Sheikh
by His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah. Unfortunately
these good offices have resulted in both parties consider­
ing that they have suffered serious material losses
because they listened to the advice given.

The Bakhtiyaris claim that they duly evacuated Shuster
under instructions received from the Persian Government
and at the instance of His Majesty's legation. They
assert that after they had done so the Sheikh's men not
only occupied the town but burned the crops and village
of Akili, by which deed damage to the value of 100,000
tomans (20,000 l.) was done to the property of Sardar
Moteshem, the Minister of War. They further asserted that
certain of their adherents and dependents who had remained
at Shuster were imprisoned and ill-treated by the Arabs.

The Khans, but more especially Sardar Moteshem, are
furious at what they consider to be a breach of an
agreement made under the auspices of the Persian
Government, and they are resentful towards His Majesty's
legation because they say that they never would have
adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Sheikh
had they not been assured that he would on his side
observe the terms of the contract. Sardar Moteshem
declares emphatically that, unless full compensation
is paid for the damage done, he will assemble a force
of 5,000 sowars in the autumn and drive the Sheikh into
the sea.

1. Ibid., No. 70, p. 31.
It is asserted on the part of the Sheikh that the Bakhtiaris did not evacuate Shuster, but fled on the approach of the Arabs, carrying away with them a sum of 5,000 tomans (1,000 £) belonging to the Sheikh’s adherents in the town.

... We have urged upon the Khans during Captain Gray’s visit here that they should agree to a meeting being held in the autumn at some place near Shuster, at which both the Sheikh and the Bakhtiaris should be represented by duly authorised persons. Major Haworth+ and Captain Gray++ would also attend, and a serious effort would be made to come to a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions.

The British pressure compelled the Khans to declare their willingness to send a duly accredited agent to the proposed meeting. But they made it clear that their representative could not be given full powers to conclude an arrangement on the spot. They insisted that the terms of a prospective settlement must be referred to Teheran for consideration and approval. Sheikh Khazal opposed this proposal. He insisted that as long as the prospective agreement was approved by the British Minister and was registered with the British Consulate at Ahwaz and Mohammerah, he would not worry about the Central Government. The Khans (Amir-i-Mojahad and Sardar-i-Mostashem) not only made it clear that the prospective agreement must be referred to the Central Government for her consideration and approval, but also insisted that a representative of the Central Government should be present at the proposed meeting.

+ The British Consul at Mohammerah.
++The British Vice-Consul at Ahwaz.

1. Ibid, No. 167, pp. 75-76.
2. Ibid, p. 76- (2) Fatami, op. cit. p. 47.
The British Minister at Teheran then proceeded with a new plan to divide the Bakhtiyari leadership. He decided to have his own man to rule the Bakhtiyaris. Sardar-i-Jang, a young and ambitious Bakhtiyari Khan was selected for this task. Consequently, the British Minister at Teheran compelled the four Bakhtiyari Khans (Nejfe Kuli Bakhtiyari, the Samsam-es-Sultaneh; Ali Kuli Bakhtiyari, Sardar Assad, Shulam Hussein Bakhtiyari, Sardar Mohtashem; and Lutfe Ali Bakhtiyari, Amir Mufacham) to sign an agreement, according to which Sardar-i-Jang was appointed as Governor-in-Chief of Bakhtiyari, Chabar Mahal, Kuhgelieh, and Behbehan, for five years. It was declared that Sardar-i-Jang 'will independently and powerfully, with absolute authority be independent 'ilkhani' of the Bakhtiyari tribe....' He 'will not be liable to dismissal'. The British Minister at Teheran also negotiated a loan agreement between the Bakhtiyari Khans and the Imperial Bank of Persia for a sum of 45,030 tomans, at seven per cent interest per annum, on the security of the Khan's share in the Bakhtiyari Oil Company and the first Exploitation Company.

+ The four Bakhtiyaris, who signed this agreement declared that 'We ....... by order of the Imperial Government and of our own family appointed Sardar Jang to the post mentioned above. Two of them - Samsam-es-Sultaneh and Sardar Mohtashem, were Prime Minister and Minister of War respectively. But Fatami says that the agreement was illegal. According to him, Iranian constitution provides that the appointment of Governors must be made by the minister of interior and the Shah's decree. In this case neither the responsible minister nor the Shah was consulted'. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 49.

1. Cd. 6807, Enclosure 2 in No. 281, p. 133.
Sir W. Townby, in a letter to Sardar-i-Asad, regarding the appointment of Sardar-i-Jang asserted that he was informing his Government of what had been done. He was sure that it would afford his Government great satisfaction to see that the Bakhtiyari Khans were making a determined effort to maintain order in Bakhtiyari and on the Ahwaz road. He assured him that Sardar-i-Jang would receive the fullest support from British consular officers and noted with satisfaction the desire of the Bakhtiyaris to maintain friendly and cordial relations with Sheikh of Mohammehrah. He further stated that he had asked for authority from his Government to depute two of His Majesty's consular officers in the south to act as mediators in the existing differences between the Bakhtiyaris and the Sheikh.

In a letter addressed to Sardar-i-Jang on July 13, 1912, the British Minister congratulated him on his appointment and assured that he would receive fullest support from the British Consular officers.

Sir Walter Townby instructed Captain Grey to accompany Sardar-i-Jang from Isfahan when the latter would leave for Bakhtiyari country in order to assist him at the outset of his mission to deal with the minor Khans, who were reported somewhat out of hand. Captain Grey was authorised to impress upon the minor

1. Ibid, Enclosure 5 in No. 281, pp. 135-136.
Khans 'the utmost importance of assisting in every possible way, and to threaten them if necessary with the displeasure of His Majesty's Government if they do anything to hamper the new Ilkhani and Ilbeggi in the execution of their duties'.

Having secured the appointment of Sardar-i-Jang, the British officials in Persia could easily bring him to reconcile with Sheikh Khazal. On October 19, 1912, Major Hawroth reported to Sir W. Townby that Agha Rahim, representing the Bakhtiyaris, had arrived at Mohammerah on the 14th instant to discuss Bakhtiyari differences with the Sheikh. He also reported the terms of the agreement which had been reached between the Bakhtiyari representative and the Sheikh. The agreement reached was to be signed by Sardar-i-Jang. The Sheikh, reported Major Hawroth, had made it a condition that the agreement when signed shall be registered at the British Consulate.

On November 1, 1912, upon the recommendation of the British Legation, Amir Khan, a British-Indian subject, was appointed as instructor-general of the finance department of Khuzistan. Now with Khazal established in Khuzistan, Sardar-i-Jang in control of Bakhtiyari and the arrival of a British subject was financial inspector, coupled with the presence of British officers

+ Morteza Kuli Khan was appointed as Ilbeggi of the Bakhtiyari tribe. He was to hold office during the pleasure of Sardar-i-Jang—Ibid., No. 281, Enclosure 1, p. 133.
1. Ibid., No. 281, Enclosure 7, pp. 136-137.
2. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 474, p. 238.
and advisers attached to Khazal and imposed on Sardar-i-Jang, the fate of Bakhtiari and Khuzistan was sealed.  

The British statesmen, in persuasion of their policy of creating 'States within State' went so far as to make Sheikh Khazal free in foreign relations too. Under Article 6 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29, 1913, Britain and Turkey agreed that the passage through the Shatt-el-Arab would be made passable, safe, and without hindrance, to the trade and commerce of all nationalities and especially to the ships and goods belonging to the British as well recommended by the British. The Commission, which was to be established by the Ottoman Imperial Government would have the power to grant accommodation and facilities to such persons, goods, and ships, which it will consider necessary. Britain was interested in Sheikh of Mohammerah being appointed as one of members of the Commission. Consequently, the Ottoman Government, according to the Declaration of July 29, 1913, appointed Sheikh Khazal as one of the commissioners, which was to deal about the protection of the commercial interests and navigation personnel in the Shatt-el-Arab. It was tantamount to a recognition of the Sheikh's status as an autonomous ruler. The Russian Government

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1. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 51.
3. Ibid., No. 124, Enclosure (2), p. 188.
drew the attention of the British Government to the fact that the Sheikh of Mohammerah, being a Persian subject and possessing none of the Privileges of Autonomy, could not be considered as entitled to entrust to anyone the protection of the Persian commercial and maritime interests, such right belonging exclusively to the Persian Government herself. "Independent position", stated the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs which Britain was 'claiming for Sheikh was hardly consistent with the principle of Persian integrity'.

The Agreement of the British Treasury and the Admiralty with the Anglo-Persian Company of May 20, 1914, brought a vital change in the British policy hitherto being followed in Persia. It was rightly feared that Persia would now be partitioned between Britain and England. During a lengthy debate in the British House of Commons, on June 17, 1914, members expressed their doubts regarding the future of Persia. Winstone Churchill, the then first Lord of Admiralty, and Sir E. Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, endeavoured to satisfy the House, of course, pointing out to the members of the national interests of Great Britain, but the members like Mr. Dillon could not be convinced. Mr. Dillon declared that the conclusion which he had

1. Ibid., No. 241, p.216.

drawn from the Times and the speech of Sir E. Grey was that the proposal of acquiring a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by the British Government was part and parcel of a scheme which had been slowly and more or less secretly developing for many years for the partition of Persia. England, said Mr. Dillon, had acquiesced in the seizure of the Northern Persia by Russia. Three provinces of the north were then in the hands of Russia, which had just as great control over them as if they had been incorporated in the Russian Empire. Russia was actually engaged in colonising a portion of those provinces with Russian peasants. Mr. Dillon predicted that the acquisition of the controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by the British Government would certainly result in the partition of the ancient Empire of Persia. Dillon was convinced that the new policy would lead to a partition and to the occupation of southern Persia by Britain and Northern Persia by Russia. In acquiring the controlling interest in the Company, Mr. Dillon remarked, Britain was following a policy which would add another link to the chain which had shamefully bound England in servility to Russia during the last five or six years.

*The sinister passage of the article, published in the Times, quoted by Mr. Dillon in the House, runs as follows:*

"Our point is, that the Persian question cannot be allowed to drift for ever, that is solely concerns Great Britain and Russia."

1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) Vol. LXIII (1914), session 17, June, 1914.
Later developments revealed the fact that the members of the House of Commons were correct in their misgivings. Alarmed by the tempo of the Russification of Northern Persia, Sir E. Grey had already told the Russian Ambassador at London on June 10, 1914, that what was really needed in Persia was a new arrangement between the two Governments. 'I had defended the sending of Russian troops into north of Persia', Sir E. Grey said to Count Benckendorff, 'on the ground that the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 must not be interpreted in a way that altered to her disadvantage the position of Russia in Persia as it existed in 1907; but it followed equally that the position in Persia should not be altered to our disadvantage; and, when I looked at the other side of the shield, the British and not the Russian side, it was evident that the cumulative effect of all the events and of Russian action since 1907 had been to alter the situation to our disadvantage'.

In a memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador at London on the same day, the British Foreign Office stated that Britain should be free to adopt such measures as might be necessary to secure her strategic and political interests in the British sphere and the Persian Gulf, as well as her interest

in the neutral zone. It was further stated that in the light of the new developments, it had become necessary either to take some special steps or some revision of the agreement of 1907, so that the relative interests of Russia and Great Britain in Persia, could be restored. Britain really desired to have a free hand in the neutral zone, where the oil industry was flourishing. Russia exploited this situation. Since long, one of the ambitions of the Russian Government had been to obtain possession of Constantinople and the straits, but England always followed a policy in order to keep Russia out of the straits. The British interests in the neutral zone of Persia, gave the Russian Government an opportunity to realize her ambition. So important were the oil-fields that Great Britain agreed to give a free hand to Russia not only in the Turkish Straits but also in northern and central provinces of Persia. Consequently the following Agreement was reached between Great Britain and Russia on March 20, 1915:

'Britain consents to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople, in return for a similar benevolent attitude on Russia's part towards the political aspirations of Britain in other parts. The neutral zone in Persia is to be included in the British sphere of influence. The district adjoining Isphahan and Yazd to be included in Russian sphere, in which Russia is to be granted 'full liberty of action'.

1. Ibid, Enclosure in No. 547, p. 800.
Thus, the partition of Persia, which was feared not only by the Persians, but a few liberal British Politicians also shared them, was the result of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Sir Percy Sykes, referring to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, states as follows:

'Persians regarded the Anglo-Russian Agreement as tantamount to the division of Persia between the rival powers. There was certainly some reason for this belief, which was strengthened in 1915 by the Anglo-Russian understanding, granting Russia a free hand in her zone; and as a quid pro quo for consenting to Russia dealing with Constantinople as she wished, the neutral zone in Persia was added to the British zone'.

CHAPTER VII

PERSIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR
In 1914, when the Great War broke out, Persia was nominally independent. A sort of Russo-British condominium had been established. A large number of the Russian troops were stationed in Northern Persia. The oil-fields in Southern Persia were being guarded by British-Indian troops. Persia had only two efficient military forces. One was the Cossack Brigade which was commanded by the Russian officers, while the other was Swedish Gendarmerie with Swedish officers. Both the forces were subject to foreign influence. The Persian troops which were commanded by native officers only, were of no military use. There was no navy. Under these conditions the Shah of Persia announced on November 1, 1914, by a Firman that Persia would be neutral in the War. But the Persian neutrality meant little and could not deter the big powers from using the country as a battle-field.

The presence of the Russian troops in Northern Persia was a source of great anxiety to the Turks. They constituted a menace to the Turkish frontier. Consequently, Turkey protested.
strongly but promised to respect the neutrality of Persia provided that the Russian troops were withdrawn. The Persian Government appealed to the Russian and British Ministers at Teheran to normalize the situation. She requested Russia to evacuate the Persian territory. Persia assured Russia and Great Britain that if the Turkish troops should violate the Persian territory, even after the Russian evacuation, the Persian Government would declare war on Turkey and join the Entente. Russia, however, not only refused to withdraw her troops but continued to treat the Persian territory as though it were a part of the Russian Empire. She converted Tabriz into a military base, captured the Turkish and German Consuls and nationals and deported them to Russia. The Russian attitude provoked Turkey. Consequently, Turks raided into Persian Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, even before Turkey entered the War, the Government of India had dispatched an expeditionary force to the Bahrain Islands which, at the out break of the hostilities pushed up the Shatt-al-Arab to protect the important oil refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan. Subsequently, a brigade was sent to Ahwaz to protect the vulnerable pipe-line. Arms and ammunitions were distributed among the Arabs of Khuzistan for an attack on Basra. The

Sheikh of Mohammerah had already been induced by the British Government to attack on the town of Basra, as the result of which the British troops received help from the Sheikh, who, although under the Persian suzerainty, was an British ally. Persia protested and appealed to the belligerents to respect and maintain her neutrality but in vain. She had no physical means to enforce her stand. Appreciating this weakness, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs instructed Mirza Ali Kuli Khan, the Persian Charge d'Affaires in Washington to appeal to the United States to use her good offices for 'preventing neutral territory from becoming a theatre of war, and thus sparing innocent population from the horrors of a struggle to which it is a stranger'. Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State responded on November 11, 1914, as follows:

'......I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the United States will lend its good offices to assist in doing whatever it may properly do to alleviate the conditions resulting from the situation existing in Europe'. On November 13, 1914, a number of Persian paraded to the American Embassy at

2. Yasselson, op. cit., p. 132.
4. Ibid., p. 130.
Constantinople and handed over a protest note to the Ambassador of the United States on behalf of their Government against the aggression of Russia and Great Britain. But, in spite of her assurances, America could not change the tide of the war. Persia soon became a battleground between the Central Powers — Turkey, assisted by Germany and Austria, and Entente Powers — Russia with a considerable participation of the British forces.

On the one side, Russia and Great Britain had, more or less, occupied Persia, on the other hand, the German agents were very active in that country. The object of the Central Powers was to stir up anti-Russian and Anti-British feelings not only in Persia but in Afghanistan and on the frontiers of India too. They, however, decided to persuade Persia to join them. Their plan of action as regards Persia was two-fold. It was decided to send efficient German agents to Persia with ample funds, furnished with supplies of arms and ammunition. They were to enlist levies and create anarchy throughout Persia. They were to murder the British and Russian representatives, drive out the British and Russian colonies residing in the Persian towns and seize their money and property. They were to spread rumour to the effect that the German nation and their monarch

1. Ibid., p. 149.

For the plan of the Central Powers to Stir up anti-British and Anti-Russian feelings throughout Ottoman Empire, Persia, Afghanistan and India—see Sykes, Christopher, Wassmuss, *The Geographical Journal of German Lawrence*, pp. 45-46.
had embraced Islam. They were to speak of the latter as

Haji William.

Wassmuss was chosen as the leader of the German expedition
to Persia. He directed an uprising of Kashghai Bakhtiyari and
Tangistani tribes in South Western Persia. During 1915, the
German bands swept through central and southern Persia. At
Isfahan, they murdered the Russian Vice-Consul, wounded Mr. G
Grahame, the British Consul-General and drove out the Russian
and British colonies. At Shiraz, they killed the British Vice-
Consul and made prisoners of the British community and kept
them in custody for seven months. They also expelled Kavam-
ul-Mulk, who was acting Governor-General. At Yezd, they drove
out the British and seized the treasury of the Imperial Bank
of Persia. At Kirman, they expelled the British and Russian
colonies and assassinated a leading British national. By the
end of 1915, seven branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia— a'
Kirmanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yezd and
Kirman, had fallen into the enemy hands. At Bushire, the local
tribesmen, owing to the successful efforts of Wassmuss, were in
active hostility. In July, 1915, they ambushed and killed two
British officers— Major Oliphant and Captain Ranking. However,

\[\text{1. The Geographical Journal, op. cit., p. 102, Sykes, Vol. II,}
\text{op. cit., pp. 442-445.}
\]

\[\text{+ Wassmuss, who had been German Consul at Bushire for some}
\text{years before the War, could speak the dialect of Tangistan}
\text{as well as high Persian with an intimate influence. He was}
\text{intimate friend of Sheikh Husain, the Sheikh of Char Kutab,}
\text{Zair Khidair Khan, the Sheikh of Ahrum and Ghazerfer-es-}
\text{Sultaneh, the Sheikh of Borajan. Moreover, he was very}
\text{popular amongst the tribesmen— see Sykes, Christopher, op.}
\text{cit., pp. 36-38.}\]
Bushire was occupied by the British troops and a line of defence was organized. The Indo-European telegraph line and the central Persian line had been cut. Consequently, a stop had been put to all communications between Europe and Asia. In short, the British had been driven out of the central and southern Persia, and only remained at the ports owing to the protection afforded by the troops and gunboats.

In Northern Persia, the German agents—Zugmayer and Niedermayer, supported by the German Consuls in Kirmanshah and Hamadan, managed to win over the local tribes. The Kurds, who were followers of the Sunni sect, were successfully induced to cooperate with the Turks and their allies.

Meanwhile, Prince Von Reuss, the German representative in Persia, connected himself with the leaders of the Persian Democratic party, who were emotionally pro-German as Germany was an enemy of their traditional foes—Russia and Great Britain. They were eager to develop friendly relations with Germany. Their influence in the Cabinet and the Majliss was strong. Von Reuss tried also to win the cooperation of the Swedish officer d' Gendarmerie and the nomad tribes. He, more or less, succeeded in his aim. The Gendarmes arrested the

2. Lunesowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, p. 150.
British Consul and the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Shiraz, but without the knowledge of the Persian Government. They cut the telegraph lines, robbed the road toll-houses and offices.

As has been said, Persians were emotionally pro-German and in spite of the fact that Persia was officially neutral, 'she lent what aid she could to enemy activity and intrigue'. By November, 1915, the mood of the country was definitely anti-Entente. Prince Von Reuss attempted to induce the Persian Government to give up her neutrality and declare war on Entente Powers. His diplomacy was not fruitless. Mustaui-ul-Mamalek, the Prime Minister of Persia, signed a secret treaty promising Germany the full support of the Persian administration. Germany in return, guaranteed the independence and integrity of Persia. She promised to furnish Persia with money, arms and ammunitions and assured to grant political asylum to the Shah, had he been compelled to flee his country. The Russian and the British Legations at Teheran were very vigilant. They were well informed of the Persian-German intrigue. Russia hurriedly decided to move her troops stationed at Kavvin towards Teheran in order to occupy the capital and to expell the German Minister and the Persian

partisans. Unable to defend the capital the Persian Government decided to shift the seat of the Government from Teheran to Isfahan. The nationalist leaders successfully persuaded the Shah to declare himself openly for the Central Powers and leave with them for their stronghold in Central Persia. At the juncture, when the Shah and the Government were to leave the capital, Russia strongly warned the Persian Government that if any truth was found in the rumour that Persia had concluded an special agreement with Germany and Turkey, the Anglo-Russian undertaking to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia would lapse. Referring to the warning, Sir E. Grey, the British Foreign Secretary stated in the House of Commons on November 11, 1915, that though the warning was given by the Russian Minister alone, the British and the Russian Governments were acting in complete unity in Persia. He stated that it must be obvious that the Persian Government could not make agreements with the enemies of the Entente Powers, who had instigated murderous attacks on the British and Russian Consuls and their staff, without risking the position of Persia. The British and the Russian


Ministers at Teheran warned the Shah that if he would cease to be neutral and join the Central Powers, he would endanger his throne. Farman-Farma, a Kajar Prince, persuaded the Shah not to side with the Central Powers as it would wreck the dynasty. Consequently, the Shah decided to remain, however, the capital. In the meantime, however, the evacuation of the Government offices had already begun. The German, Austrian and the Ottoman Legations had been shifted and established temporarily at Qum. The Pro-German leaders of the Democratic party, some members of the Majliss, and a few ministers had also proceeded to Qum, where a rival Persian Government was formed. Later on, the rival provisional Government transferred her seat to Kirmanshah, where it was closed to the Turkish border and where it could be protected by the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia. Teheran, however, fell under the allied control. Thus, there were two governments in Persia. The Teheran Government maintained neutrality whereas the Kirmanshah Government actively supported the Central Powers.

At Kirmanshah, Nizam-es-Sultaneh, the Governor of Luristan, was chosen as President of the rival government. The Nizam Government concluded a treaty of alliance with Germany on December 26, 1915. Under the term of the treaty the rival


government agreed to levy 60,000 troops in the area under her control. Germany on her part, promised to supply arms and ammunitions, agreed to send German instructors, pledged to pay a monthly subsidy and guaranteed the treasury of the rival government. Soon after, a German military mission was despatched to train the forces of the Nizam Government. However, the contribution of the Nizam Government to the war effort of the Central Powers was almost negligible. Some times in February, 1916 the Russian drove out the Germans out of Kirmanshah and destroyed their equipment factories.

As has been discussed, the successful intrigue of Wassmuss, which led to the rebellion of the southern tribes, seriously threatened the British position there. It was a very embarrassing situation for Great Britain. She was not in a position to spare a large number of troops to be sent to South Persia. Consequently, it was decided to raise a Persian force under the command of British Officers. Arrangements were made with the Persian Government to organize the contemplated force, consisting of 11,000 men, in south Persia. At the same time, in North Persia, the Cossack Brigade (which was commanded by Russian officers) was to be raised to the same strength. A monthly

subsidy of 200,000 tomans was granted by Russia and Great Britain to the Persian Government in return of the above benevolent permission.

A British military mission, under Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, reached Bunder-i-Abbas in March, 1916 to organize the force in south Persia. The recruiting operations were started without delay. In a comparatively short time, a force named as South Persia Rifles was collected which could efficiently guard Bunder-i-Abbas and an important section of the caravan route. In May, 1916, Brigadier Sykes marched with a column to Kirman. Before the British column left Bunder-i-Abbas, the German fled from Kirman and moved westwards to Shiraz. All of them were, however, captured by pro-British Kavm, who kept them in custody at Shiraz until the arrival of the British column there seven months later. At Kirman, Brigadier Sykes halted for six weeks with his force, restored peace and order and recruited a large number of men for a Brigade of the south Persia Rifles. Leaving three British officers at Kirman to organize the Kirman Brigade Sykes, with his column left for Yezd. Additional British Officers and N.C.O.'s were, however, sent to Kirman to help the three British officers. The Kirman Brigade grew rapidly, and within fifteen months, it was strong enough to crush the robber tribes.

While Sykes, with his column, was marching towards Yezd, he received a telegram from the Russian Commandment requesting him for help as a strong enemy force was marching on the city. Sykes rushed to Isfahan and reached there on September 11, 1916. However, they had not to fight as the enemy had already retreated. At Isfahan, the British Column met some 800 Russian Cossacks, and celebrated the meeting by 'banquets' a review, and much fraternization'. From Isfahan, Sykes sent out a force to open up the Ahwaz road and establish contact with the British troops at Ahwaz. From Isfahan, the British column advanced southwards to Shiraz. Upon reaching Shiraz Sykes took over the Swedish Gendarmerie force.

Among the most important questions which the Sykes had to handle over, were the British relations with the Kashgai tribe. Soulat Dewleh, their chief was the 'uncrowned King of Fars'. He was anti-British. Sykes followed a policy of appeasement towards Soulat. Sykes himself stated the policy, pursued by him towards Soulat and his tribe as follows:-

'Our policy was to open up friendly relations with Soulat, to humour him, to make concessions, and above all, to avoid hostilities with the Kashgais, who were the most powerful tribe in southern or central Persia. To provoke a contest during the Great War would have been folly. In the spring of 1917, the capture of Baghdad reached favourably for the time being on the

situation in Fars, and Solat became less unreasonable. We visited him in his camp near Khaneh Zirvan. Solat was suspicious and arrogant, but after several meetings he became friendly to outward appearances. In any case he restrained his tribesmen from raiding on the main roads, and did not attack us that summer, when we were weak.

The Persian Government officially recognised the South Persian Rifles on March 21, 1917. The force was divided into Brigades in the Fars and Kirman provinces with a regiment at Burdur-i-Abbas.

The position of the Sykes force was strengthened considerably due to the arrival of sorely needed help. Colonel E.F. Orton and Lieutenant-Colonel J.P. Trant joined Sykes in April 1917. Later on, the 16th Rajputs under Lieutenant-Colonel Vanrenen and three squadrons of Burma Mounted Rifles joined the Sykes column. The British Column was then in a position to face any eventuality.

By 1917, despite all the difficulties, Sykes managed to restore order and safety for the British in Southern Persia. In Eastern Persia, a Russo-British force known as East Persian Cordon was stationed. It was to guard Perso-Afghan border in order to put

1. Ibid., p. 109.
3. Ibid., p. 477.
an effective check on any German or Turkish attempt to traverse
Persia and penetrate Afghanistan.

2. EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON PERSIA.

In March, 1917, the Tsarist regime was overthrown and a
provisional government was set up with Prince Lvov as the
Prime Minister. The government of Prince Lvov 'wanted to
continue the general Persian policy of Tsarist regime, minus
its extreme aggressive features'. In July, 1917, Prince Lvov was
forced to resign. The new government which was headed by
Kerensky renounced all imperialistic designs, ordered Baratoff,
the Russian Commander, to stop his advance through Persia and
declared to withdraw all Russian troops, at the earliest possible
moment. Kerensky's policy caused unbounded rejoicing in Persia.
Czarist Russia which was enemy number one of the Persian
independence and integrity, had collapsed and the new government
had suddenly adopted a very friendly attitude. The Persians
heaved a sigh of relief. They felt that they would now be able
to develop their own political institutions of which they had

3. Ibid., p. 135, Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 83.
been deprived of for long owing to the imperialistic designs of the great powers. The entry of the United States in the War and Wilsonian idealism was also considered by the Persian patriots as a very encouraging change in the international politics.

The Kerensky regime was, however, overthrown by the Bolsheviks. A new government named as Council of People's Commissars, was set up on November 7, 1917. Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey, being Muslim States, having common frontiers with Soviet Russia, and treating Great Britain as their common enemy, were regarded strategically very important by the Bolshevik leaders. They wished to control these three Muslim States as it would enable them to dominate the whole region of the Near and Middle East. Consequently, they tried to create a chain of vassal states along the southern border of their country which they thought would prove important not only from the point of view of defence but would also clear the way for the Bolshevization of India and the East.

So far as Persia was concerned, the Bolsheviks regarded her as a 'gateway to India' and the 'citadel of revolution in the East'. They treated her as their 'Suez Canal' as well.

2. Spector, Ivar, op. cit., p. 47.
as of key importance for the future of their revolution. If Persia could be Bolshevised, they thought, the entire value of the Suez Canal would be lost. The geo-political situation of Persia, they considered, would be of great help to them for spreading the liberation movement in the East.

The Bolsheviks started an unflinching propaganda to achieve their goal. The Council of People's Commissars addressing an appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East on December 3, 1917, condemned the Tsarist imperialism in Persia, declared the treaty which partitioned Persia as null and void, announced the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Persia immediately after the cessation of hostilities, and promised to guarantee the Persians the right to free determination of their own destiny. Article 12 of the armistice agreement concluded between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers on December 15, 1917, authorised Soviet Russia and Turkey to enter into negotiations with the Persian Government for the withdrawal of the troops from Persia. Consequently, Trotsky, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in a note of January 4, 1918, to the Persian Government proposed:

'1. To work out a general plan for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Persia in the shortest possible time, and to propose

1. Troyanovsky, K, Vostok i Revolutsia as referred by Spector, op. cit., p. 47, and Lenczowski, Russia and the West In Iran, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
to Turkey, both through the Persian Government and directly through the Turkish delegation at Brest-Litovsk, to co-ordinate their plan for the evacuation of Turkish troops with the Russian plan.

2. To begin immediately the withdrawal of those whose presence in Persia serves no military purpose, and which were used to occupy Persian territory.

3. To recall from Persia the Russian military mission, acting in the capacity of instructors of the Cossack brigade.

4. To appoint Commissars immediately to the Russian authorities in Persia, for the purpose of explaining to the various detachments in Persia the general political situation in Russia and the meaning of our new foreign policy, which is based on respect for the rights of all peoples, regardless of their strength or weakness. These commissars to take measures to protect the Persian population from any affront or violence on the part of the less conscious elements of the army.

5. To take steps to secure the provisioning of the Russian army while they remain in Persia, laying as light a burden as possible on the poorer section of the Persian population. The note stated further that it would be better to take immediate practical steps in the direction indicated above. 'The greatest speed is necessary in this matter', wrote Trotsky, 'in order to wipe out as quickly as possible the effects of the acts of violence perpetrated by Tsarism and bourgeois Russian Governments.
against the Persian people'. Later on, article VII of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk concluded on March 3, 1918, confirmed the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of both Persia and Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops began soon.

The Bolshevik revolution was very much alarming to the British. It meant to them, 'first, that there would be one less ally to fight Germany; secondly, that the new communist doctrine would eventually affect British imperial interests in the East. The large scale Soviet propaganda which aroused the national feelings of the people of the East including the Persians, caused great anxiety in Britain. The Bolshevik propaganda led the Persians to aspire for a republic. It also fanned the anti-British feelings of the Persians. Encouraged by the Soviet propaganda (of course, the agents of the other Central Powers were also very active), the Persian Government in January 1918, protested to the U.S. and other Legations at Teheran that her independence and integrity were being threatened by the military forces under British and French officers at Urmiah, financed by the United States. The U.S. Minister at Teheran promptly replied that he had no information about the

2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Lenezowski, Russia and the West in Iran, op. cit., p. 6.
matter and asserted that 'our enemies are endeavouring to make capital of the accusation.' The U.S. State Department became alarmed. Mr. Polk, the Acting Secretary of State instructed on January 21, 1918, to Mr. Page the U.S. Ambassador at London to ask Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary for advice on how the U.S. might assist in preserving the integrity and independence of Persia and improving the relations between Persia and the Entente Powers. The U.S. Ambassador was also instructed to refer that Persian Government had appealed to the U.S. to guarantee her sovereignty and independence and to secure the evacuation of the foreign troops from her soil. He was also instructed to inform the British Foreign Secretary that the United States viewed the situation in Persia as serious one and that if the United States, which was being regarded by the Persians as the most disinterested friend, failed to comply with the Persian request, that country would turn to Germany and Turkey. On January 24, 1918, Mr. Polk instructed Mr. Caldwell the U.S. Minister at Teheran, to deny emphatically to the Persian Government the allegation that the United States was financing any military forces being organized at Urmiah. He added: 'Also inform Persian Government that United States strongly sympathizes

2. Ibid., pp. 897-898.
With the desire of Persia to maintain its freedom and sovereignty and would not be a party to any act which would infringe thereof. The publication of the American note in the Persian newspapers created a deep impression in Persia. The U.S. assurance to the Persian Government regarding her integrity and independence coupled with the Brest-Litovsk negotiations between Society Russia and the other Central Powers, annoyed Great Britain much. Consequently, on the instructions of his Government, Mr. Colville Barclay, the British Charge d'Affaires at Washington, on January 31, 1918, sought to persuade the U.S. to join Britain and France in making the following declaration to Persia—

"His Majesty's Government have repeatedly expressed to the Persian Government their desire and intention to uphold the independence and integrity of Persia. They wish now to renew to Your Excellency their assurance, in conjunction with the Governments of the French Republic and the United States of America, whose views in this matter are in entire harmony with their own, that it is the desire and determination of the three Governments to respect the integrity of Persia and to promote the development of the country on independent and self-determined lines as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed.

1. Ibid., pp. 898.
2. Ibid., p. 899.
3. Ibid., p. 900.
The proposal was rejected by the United States. On February 11, 1918, Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State informed the Earl of Reading, the British Ambassador as follows:

'I beg to state that it does not seem advisable for the United States Government to instruct the American Minister at Teheran to associate himself with the British Minister in making the proposed declaration to the Persian Government. As I have already indicated to the British Government, this government is genuinely desirous of assisting in the restoration of a normal condition of affairs in Persia on account of its friendship both for Great Britain and for Persia, but in view of the very different positions which Great Britain and the United States occupy towards Persia, I cannot but feel that a joint declaration by Great Britain and the United States would not be the wisest procedure at this time. Moreover, I feel that a declaration to the effect that the British French and American Governments were ready to promote the development of Persia on self-determined lines 'as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed' might be misinterpreted in Persia'.

As has been discussed, the presence of the foreign troops was very much resented by the Persians. The presence of the British troops agitated the Persians much. As early as June, 1917, after the fall of the pro-British Vosuk-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet, the new Cabinet headed by Ala-es-Saltana, had refused to recognize the south Persia Rifles. But, Britain did not bother

1. Ibid, p. 901.
about recognition. Consequently anti-British attitude of the Persian Government increased. Tribes were instigated to attack and harass the British in every possible way. Meshedi Jan Khani Arabs raided the Shiraz-Irāfan route; attached a patrol of South Persia Rifles; and robbed several caravans. A squadron of Burma Mounted Rifles was rushed to punish them. The people who made contracts with the British for the sale of supplies were also threatened with severe punishment by the Persian Government. The anti-British policy adopted by the Persian Government was undoubtedly owing to the large scale Soviet propaganda. The Persians were convinced that the British were the enemy of their freedom and independence.

In March 1918, the great final attack of the Germans in France had its repercussions in Persia. The Persian Government as has been discussed, was unfriendly towards Britain. Intense propaganda was carried on to excite the South Persia to rebel. The British Government was very much annoyed with the new developments. Consequently, to soothe the Persians, the British Government addressed a note to the Persian Government on March 12, 1918. The note guaranteed the independence and integrity of Persia; requested for friendly attitude; declared the intention of the British Government to bring troops temporarily into north west Persia to maintain order and protect the interests of the

1. Ibid., pp. 499-500.
Allies, and asked the Persians Government to agree to the frontiers of Persia by being governed by the British troops so that the return of the enemy agents could be prevented. The recognition of the South Persia Rifles was also called for till the cessation of the hostilities. The note further stated that after the termination of war, the two governments would discuss a scheme for the formation of an uniform force for the whole of Persia. It promised to welcome the Persian representative to any future international conference to which non-belligerents were invited. Liberal financial assistance, the abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, and the revision of the tariff of Persia, was promised in return for a friendly attitude.

The Persian Government, in her reply to the British note characterized the South Persia Rifles as a foreign force which constituted a threat to the Persian independence and integrity. The Persian note accused the British Government of violating the Persian neutrality, protested against the presence of the British forces, asked their withdrawal and finally requested Britain to leave Persia alone.

The notes exchanged between Persia and Great Britain were made public. Its repercussions were realized soon. Soon after,
ten coward headed by a Junior officer deserted from Abadeh. The desertion continued. However, six of the deserters were captured and executed by Lieut. Colonel T.H. Haig, the British Consul-General. The order of the execution was issued by the 1 Brigadier-General Sir Percy Bykes. Had punitive measures not been taken against the deserters and had the British officers and non-commissioned officers at Abadeh not been reinforced with a double company of 16th Rajputes, the desertion would have continued the effect of which would have certainly been disastrous.

It was feared that the tribes headed by Kashaghais would attack the Britishers. The well-organized British Intelligence network in Persia reported that Labu Mohammadis and other tribes near Miriz where a small British force was stationed, were likely to join the Kashghais in order to attack the British. A British Column under Lieut. Colonel Grant was immediately sent to punish them. 'This operation was brilliantly executed by a series of forced marches, a sharp lesson was given and neither these tribes nor their neighbours threatened Miriz or joined the Kashghais'.

Though, the British had crushed the smaller tribes, they could not succeed in allaging or suppressing the anti-British feelings of the stronger tribes. On May 22, 1918, Soulat, the chief of the Kashghai tribes, issued a proclamation in which he

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2. Ibid., p. 501.
stated that by the orders of the Persian Government, he was taking action in defence of Islam against the South Persia Rifles. He had a strong force consisting of 4500 Kashghais and 1,500 Kazerunis. The force was increased by contingents from other smaller tribes and finally totalled 7,000 to 8,000 men. They were all armed with small-bore rifles. Britain had a force consisting of 22,00 men at Shiraz. A strong British force under Major-General Douglas was stationed at Bushire. The Bushire force was marching towards Shiraz to reinforce the British force at Shiraz. The Pro-British Kawam had collected a force of 2,000 Areds. The inhabitants of Shiraz were however, hostile to the British partly due to their connection with the Kashghais and partly owing to the Ulma who were anti-British and preached a Jihad or Holy war against them. On May 24, 1918, the Kazerunis invaded Khaneh Zinian, held by a strong detachment of South Persia Rifles. The British column which marched to the relief of Khaneh Zinian was attacked by the Kashghais. While the British column was engaged in fighting with Soulat's men, the Persian officers of the South Persia Rifles, who had been induced by Soulat to rebel against the British, surrendered the post to the Kazerunis after shooting Captain Will and Sergeant Comber. On June 17, 1918, Kazerunis and Kashghais attacked the British force near Shiraz. However, heavy consulates were inflicted upon them by the British force. On the following day the Shirazis closed their bazaars and began to attack on Indians and members of the South
Persian Rifles. The Ulama issued Fatwa to the effect that it was lawful to kill everyone who had dealings with the British. The following lines are a specimen of placards issued by the clergymen in Shiraz:

"O People of Shiraz
O Careless, sleeping Nation
O ignorant Folks
O Irreligious, dishonest and lazy ones
Do not be humbler than women
Put the traitors to death
Shoot the enemies at home
Shoot all foreign foesmen"

The agitation at Shiraz, however, died soon owing to the disappointment which prevailed amongst the Shirazis at receiving no support from Soulat. At the same time, Sykes put pressure on Farman Farma, the Governor-General of Fars to dismiss Soulat, the Ilkhani (Governor), of Khashchais. Consequently, Soulat was dismissed. Sardar Eshtesham, the elder half-brother of Soulat, who was pro-British, was appointed as Ilkhani of the tribe. Kawam, joined the British. The Kazerunis broke away and returned home. Kawam and the new Ilkhani pursued Soulat, who fled to Firuzabad. Three months later, Soulat gathered a new force and marched on Shiraz. He was, however, defeated by Orton, who marched rapidly to Firuzabad. Soulat fled away. Finally, when
the armistic came, the British were in complete control of Fars.

At Teheran, Karl Bravin, a former Tsarist diplomat, who was appointed as the representative of the new regime in Persia, played a very important role in arousing the anti-British feelings of the Persians. He reached Teheran on January 12, 1918, with the following message from Lenin.

'The Workers and Peasants Government of Russia instructs comrade Bravin to engage into discussion with the Government of his Majesty the Shah with a view to the conclusion of trade and other friendly agreements the purpose of which is not only the buttressing of good neighbourly relations in the interest of both nations but together with the people of Iran the joint fight against the most rapacious imperialistic Government on earth - England, the intrigues of which have hitherto disturbed the peaceful people of Iran and destroyed your great country.

The workers and Peasant Government is prepared to repair the injustice done by the former Government of the Russian Tsar by repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. The future relations between Russia and Persia will be based upon a free agreement and mutual respect among nations.' Bravin successfully


2. Iranian State Archive, also Bagigat newspaper, January 21, 1922, as referred by Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, op. cit., p. 138.
convinced the Persian patriots that it was the British government which was responsible for the politicians followed by Tsarist Russia in Persia. He further persuaded the Persian nationalists to believe that the new regime in Russia, which had cost off the shackles of the British political tutelage, would assist them in throwing off the foreign yoke from their shoulders. Several anti-British meetings were organized in Tehran. Bravin attended all those meetings as the guest of honour. Many pro-British leaders were assassinated. Several of them had to leave Tehran. Bravin successfully persuaded the Persian Government to accept the Soviet offers and to abrogate all Perso-Russian treaties which had been concluded 'by duress and force or through illegitimate means such as threats and bribes'. Consequently, the Persian government issued a decree on July 30, 1918, announcing in effect the abolition capitulations, extraterritorial rights, etc., and annulled certain Russian concessions, treaties and conventions such as Treaty of Turkomanchel under which the other Powers claimed the most favoured nation privilege.

The British Minister and Ministers of the other Allied Powers at Teheran, demanded the resignation nationalist Cabinet. They also demanded from the Shah to set aside the decree which had annulled the Russian treaties, conventions and concession. The allied Ministers also requested the U.S. Minister at Teheran to join them in that regard. He, however, refused to do so. The Shah, under the British pressure, was, however, compelled to dismiss the nationalist Cabinet. The pro-British, Vosuk-ed-Dowleh was appointed as the Prime Minister. Martial Law was declared in Teheran.

The developments in the Northern Persia were causing real concern for the British. After the Russian Revolution, the Russian troops in Persia were disintegrated and demoralized. Under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia and Turkey agreed to withdraw their troops from Persia. The evacuation began soon. Britain decided to fill up the vacuum created by the withdrawal. Accordingly, beside the British troops in

1. Ibid., p. 910.
2. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 86.

Britain was interested to get the pro-British Vosuk-ed-Dowleh appointed as Prime Minister of Persia. Sir C. Harling, the British Minister at Teheran, offered to the Shah a monthly subsidy of 15,000 tomans in May, 1918 and in return requested the appointment of Vosuk-ed-Dowleh as Premier. The subsidy was to be continued, Sir C. Harling promised, 'so long as the Shah retained Vosugh(Vosuk-ed-Dowleh) in office and supported him loyally'. After the appointment of Vosuk-ed-Dowleh as Prime Minister in August, 1918, this subsidy was started to be paid to the Shah - See Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, Vol.IV., Note(1), attached to No. 715, pp. 1125-1126.
South Persia, independent British troops were rushed to north-west Persia under General Sir William Marshall and into Northeast Persia under Major-General Sir Wilfrid Hallsson in 1918. Major-General Dunsterville with a force rushed to Baku via, Persian port of Anzali. Dunsterville's force, while on way to Baku, was prevented to proceed by Kuchik Khan's Jangali force in northern Persia. The road from Hamadan to Caspian was barred, in its Jilan sector, by Luchik Khan's men. He had organized a party known as Ettahad-ul-Islam or Union of Islam, the members of which had taken oath to drive all foreign aggressors from the soil of Persia. They had decided not to shave their heads or beards until they accomplished their task. Kuchik Khan was supported by Germans and Turks and had gained considerable influence. The Persian Government was unable to silence him. The Dunsterville force met the Kuchik Khan's men at Nenzil, south of Jilan. Kuchik Khan was forced to retreat. Later on, he signed an agreement with the British. Kuchik Khan was given a free hand in Jilan. He, in return, promised to give no more troubles to the British force and became a British contractor for the supply of rice. Dunsterville proceeded to Baku. He succeeded in capturing Baku, but his force was too weak to resist the enemy there. Consequently, he was forced to withdraw to Hamadan in Persia. The Caspian Sea remained in British control. The Caspian had fallen into the hands of General Kuhnkin, an officer of the Tsar's General Staff.
He placed it at British disposal. Commodore D.T. Morris took over the charge of the Caspian from him. Thus, at the time of the Armistic, the whole of Persia was occupied by the British troops. In south Persia, there was south Persia Rifles. In the east, there was a cardon established at Meshed and Seistan by General Sir Wilfrid Malleson. Along the Kasr-i-Shirin, Kermanshah, Hamadan and Ka'vin line was Dunsterville's force. There were a few garrisons of Indian troops at Bushire and Gulf. Captain Norris, later on, turned the Caspian practically into a British lake.

In view of the dangers to the British interests in the East, the presence of the British troops in Persia during the War, could be justified. But the justification of the maintenance of the British troops on the Persian soil, even after the defeat of Germany and Turkey, became exceedingly difficult. In the then existing circumstances the purpose of the British troops in a neutral country like Persia was none other than creation of a front against Soviet Russia. The presence of the British army in Persia was very much resented by the Persians. The British public opinion was also, more or less, against it. A meeting of the Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet, presided over by Lord Curzon, debated on December 30, 1918, the dilemma.


of justifying the maintenance of the British troops in Persia. The general opinion favoured the liquidation. But Lord Curzon opposed this view. He argued that such a policy would be immoral, feeble and disastrous. He pleaded for the continued maintenance of a nucleus of the British forces in Persia and advocated that British should negotiate with Persian Government for the formation of a Persian national army commanded by the British officers. He also proposed the reorganization of the Persian finances under the direction of the British treasury officials. He asserted that Britain should assume towards Persia the role of a special but liberal protector. Mr. Edwin Montague, bitterly criticized Curzon's views. Nevertheless, the Committee authorized Lord Curzon to proceed with his negotiations at once. The negotiations, later, resulted in the conclusion of Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Britain, however, with her forces stationed throughout Persia and having installed a pro-British Cabinet at the Centre had, meanwhile, become the master of the destiny of the Persian nation.

1. Ibid., pp. 132-134.
The Persians had developed a sense of suspicion, hatred and fear towards Great Britain and Russia for a long time. They rightly believed that the two Great Powers were enemies of their freedom and independence. They endeavoured to enlist the support of the United States so that they might face the Russo-British menace, but the U.S. Government did not come forward to help Persia. However, the emergence of Woodrow Wilson as the President of the United States of America, his declaration that the people of small and weak states have the right to be dealt with exactly as the people of the big and powerful states; his ‘Peace Note to the Belligerent Nations’; his advocacy for the right of self-determination for all; and his famous ‘Fourteen Points’, offered great hopes to the Persians.

Encouraged by the Wilsonian idealism, Mohdi Khan, the Persian Minister at Washington, at the instruction of his Government, addressed a note to the U.S. Secretary of States on January 15, 1917, in which he stated that the Persian Government ‘ardently hopes that the Government of the United States will assist our oppressed nation to maintain its

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2. Hartmann, Frederick H. (Editor), Basic Documents of International Relations, pp. 43-48.
integrity and rights not only for the present but whenever a
Peace Conference shall take Place. In response, the Secretary
of State, in a note Verbale stated on January 17, 1917 that the
State Department had made due note of the information contained
in the Persian communication and of the request for the U.S.
assistance at the future peace conference. The U.S. reply
could not satisfy the Persian Government which though that the
United States was the only country that could secure a seat for
her in the future peace conference where she could be compensated
for the wrongs being done to her during the War by the
Belligerents. Consequently, at the instruction of his Government
Nehdi Khan addressed a long note to the U.S. Secretary of State
on December 17, 1917. Praising the 'war aims and noble sentiments
of the United States Government, so eloquently set forth by His
Excellency President Wilson, in his message to the Congress on
December 3(4), wherein a permanent peace is defined as one based
upon international justice and guaranteeing the sovereignty and
independence of every nation', the Persian note officially
sought 'the assistance of the United States Government in securing
for Persia representation in the peace conference' which was
to be convened at the termination of the war. Recounting the

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. For President Wilson's address to the U.S. Congress - See
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1917, pp. IX-XVI.
sufferings of Persia during the war, the note regretted that inspite of the best efforts of the Persian Government 'from the beginning of the war to protect her neutrality, both of the belligerent groups have time and again violated Persian neutrality, and her territory has not been free from the forces of both sides'. 'These forces', the note complained, have repeatedly inflicted severe losses upon the subjects of Persia in the north and in the south'. In addition to 'the heavy losses resulting from actual battles between hostile troops, who have burned and destroyed towns and villages', the Persian note recalled that 'the Russian troops of both the former and recent regimes have perpetrated great international wrongs upon the people of Persia, and have levied large sums upon various communities, not to mention large supplies of food which they have requisitioned and extorted from the people'. 'These losses and wrongs', the note claimed, 'necessitate and justify' the Persian Government, 'to have representation at the peace conference in order that the obstacles interposed through foreign interference with her internal affairs, which have threatened her independence and retarded her progress and development, may be wholly removed'.

Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State replied to Mehdi Khan on January 3, 1918. He stated that the note had been read 'in with 'great interest and deep sympathy' but refused any

commitment as the 'magnitude of the problems involved',
according to him, had 'precluded a hasty answer to the
question' contained in the Persian note.

With the proclamation of the Armistice on November
11, 1918, the Persian Government began to look more and more
towards the United States as the only Power which could secure
a seat for her in the Peace Conference. On November 15, 1918,
Caldwell reported from Teheran that the Persian Government was
contemplating the despatch of a Commission to Washington at
once 'with a view to and the hope of obtaining assistance from
America in getting a seat at the coming Peace Conference'.
The report further stated that the 'Shah, Cabinet and all
officials and the Persian Public attach very great importance
to such representation hoping thus to settle definitely and
forever the annoying vexatious question of their sovereign
integrity and independence'. Caldwell added in his report that
as regards the representation of Persia in the Peace Conference
he had been informed by his British colleague that 'His
British Majesty will welcome presence of official Persian
representative at the place where the said Congress will meet
to be consulted if and when any question directly affecting
Persian rights and interests comes up for discussion'. According
to the British Minister, the report further stated that the
'matter would be finally settled by allowing Persia representation
at the Peace Conference, but that she would probably have no

1. Ibid., p. 897.
voice or vote on general questions but only on matters affecting Persia during the war. Caldwell suggested to his Government that was 'the time to settle the twenty-five-century old Persian question'. He further remarked that 'Persia's hope is in America'. On the same day, Caldwell reported to the U.S. Secretary of State that in Persia 'all parties are in accord in expressing the desire that Persia should be represented at the Peace Conference. 'For the realisation of their hopes Persians of all parties', the U.S. Minister reported, 'are looking more and more towards the United States for help.' Meanwhile, the Persian Government had received a British note to the effect that 'the British Government on its own part is ready to receive the empowered representative of Persia at the place where the Peace Conference will be held so that he may give information on the occasion when matters pertaining to Persia may be discussed'. The British proposal was not acceptable to Persia. Persia, unlike the other neutral countries, had suffered heavy losses during the war and, therefore, she was not willing to be kept in the same position as the other neutral powers. Furthermore, it was expected that the matters with which Persia might be deeply concerned, would be dealt at the Peace Conference. Persia, therefore, naturally, desired that her delegation must be a member of the Conference.

2. Ibid., p. 257.
with the power to vote so that her case could be defended. Consequently, on November 16, 1918, the Persian Foreign Minister instructed his Charge d'Affaires at Washington to seek American Government's official recognition for Persia's membership and the right to vote at the Peace Conference. On November 18, 1918, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphically informed his Charge d'Affaires at Washington that Persia desired to carry out the following articles*

1. Membership of the Peace Conference.

2. Abolition of treaties, conventions, and agreements which were in contravention of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Persia as well as assurances by the Powers signatory to the International Peace Treaty for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia against all interference in future.

3. Payment for the losses inflicted upon Persia by the belligerents.

4. Economic freedom of Persia.

5. Revision of the treaties and abrogation of capitulations.

6. Conclusion of new commercial treaties and revision of customs tariff based on economic independence of Persia.

7. Assistance in the reconstitution of treaties then in force in accordance with the above articles.

8. Ratification of the Persian frontier lines and restoration of Persian territory wrongly taken.

These 'eight demands' the Persian Foreign Minister stated, 'are based upon and within the scope of the fourteen principles and conditions outlined by President Wilson, all of which have been accepted in principle by all the powers. He hoped that the

1. Ibid., pp.248-259.
United States would not refuse to assist Persia in realizing those demands and accordingly instructed his Charge d'Affaires to convey those propositions to the U.S. Government in order to enlist their support in that regard. At the same time, he reiterated that the safeguarding of Persia's interest was dependent upon the Persian delegation being a member of the Conference, and possessing the right to vote.

According to the instructions of his Government, the Persian Charge d'Affaires, conveyed the message, to the U.S. Secretary of State on November 21, 1918, and appealed to the U.S. Government to recognize Persia's right of representation at the Peace Conference with the right to vote. He pointed out that if the British attitude towards Persia's representation at the Conference continued, it would not be possible for Persia to have a voice in matters discussed at the Conference, which would directly and definitely concern her destiny. The Persian Charge d'Affaires made it clear that it was 'the aim of the sovereign state of Persia, with the help of America, to guard herself against all direct and indirect attempts upon the part of Great Britain or any other Power, to interfere with her independence and to seek to use her as their sphere of influence'. Lansings reply, which was communicated to Ali Kuli Khan, the Persian Charge d'Affaires, on December 2, 1918, was undoubtedly sympathetic but he again refused to commit in that regard.

1. Ibid., pp. 259-261.
2. Ibid., pp. 257-258.
3. Ibid., pp. 261.
Although, there was no commitment on the part of America to Persia and the attitude of Great Britain was definitely discouraging, yet, Persia sent her five-men delegation to the Peace Conference, which opened on January 18, 1919. The Persian Delegation was headed by the Foreign Minister, Moshaver-al-Namalek. Among its members were prominent Persian statesmen like Hussein Ala and Mohammad Ali Foruzhi. The delegates made public their demands as follows:

(a) Political Abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. They further demanded the abolition of consular courts and withdrawal of consular escorts.

(b) Economic Independence. Persia demanded reparation for the devastation of areas and destruction of property by the various armies which had entered Persia during the War. She also claimed freedom from concessions and a control of her own economic destinies.

(c) Territorial. This last demand was reminiscent of the old days of Persia's glory. Of the present she demanded the Oxus for the boundry, thereby claiming Transcaspia, Merv, and Khiva. In the western and northwestern directions she actually claimed Asia Minor to the Euphrates, i.e. Kurdistan, Diarbekir and Mosul.

Persian delegates were, however, not allowed to state their case. Their request was rejected on the ground that Persia, being neutral in the war, had no right to participate in the Peace Conference. This was a flimsy excuse. Curiously enough,

1. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, op.cit., p.15, also see Yesselson, op.cit., p. 149.
3. Temperley, op.cit., p. 211.
Zionists and other non-governmental delegations were accorded full hearings.

It was really Great Britain which prevented Persia from securing a seat at the Peace-table. A high-ranked official of the British Foreign Office advised the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Persia's 'salvation could be found only in Whitehall — not in Versailles'. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was not even allowed to visit England, 'because he was anti-British in his sentiments'. On February 18, 1919, at a meeting of the Council of Ten, held at Quai d' Orsay, Paris, His Excellency Baron Sonnino, suggested the hearing of the Persian statement. Mr. Balfour pointed that 'as Persia was not a belligerent the case did not arise'. At a meeting of the Council of Four, held at the residence of President Wilson, in the place does states-Unins, Paris, on April 23, 1919, the U.S. President said that 'he had received an appeal from Persia, who had sent a delegation to the Peace Conference, and complained that (not) only had she not been admitted or heard at the Peace Conference but that no reply had been made to communications addressed to the Bureau of the Conference'. Mr. Lloyd George said that he 'was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that Mr. Balfour

2. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, op.cit., p. 16.
3. Temperley, op.cit., p. 211.
was opposed to the admission of Persia to the Conference, though he did not know the reasons. He asked that the matter might be postponed until he had consulted Mr. Balfour. On May 7, 1919, at a meeting of the Council of Four, President Wilson again raised the Persian question. The President stated that he 'understood that the Persians were much depressed at not being consulted in regard to the peace settlement. They said that their interests were not being considered'. Lloyd George replied that Persia should not be heard until the Turkish question was considered. He wished 'the Council to hear what the representatives of India had to say, particularly in regard to Constantinople and the future of Islam. He thought Persia ought then to be heard'. Thus it was the British Government which prevented Persia from getting as seat or even being allowed to state her case at the Peace Conference.

According to Sir Harold Nicolson, the Persian request for an opportunity to present her case was rejected by the Supreme Council in order to avoid setting a precedent which would undoubtedly have led to similar representations by neutrals like Holland, Switzerland and Sweden. He, however, admitted that the British Delegation was certainly in error in failing to support Persia's request.

2. Ibid., p. 496.
Soviet Russia however, quickly realized the propaganda value of the Persian rebuff at Versailles. She decided to avail that chance and exploit the situation in order to discredit the Allies. Consequently, Soviet Representative Kolomietzjeff, delivered a note to the Persian Government expressing the willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude fresh treaties with Persia based on 'the principles of freedom of discussion and mutual respect of the two nations'. Furthermore, in order to indemnify the Persian people for the losses caused by the Russian troops during the war, the Soviet note pledged the annulment of all the Persian debts to Russia; declared all concessions of the Russian Government and those of her subjects as null and void; abolished capitulations; and consular jurisdiction. The Discount Bank of Persia with all its branches as well as other valuable Russian properties in Persia were declared to be the property of the Persian people. The Soviet offer, however, could not reach the Persian people owing to the censored press and by running; of Kolomietzjeff out of Teheran and his assassination at the hands of White Guards.

D - Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919

Lord Curzon had always 'dreamt of creating a chain of vassal states stretching from the Mediterranean to the Pamirs

+ For the text of the note see - Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, op.cit., pp. 326-329.
and protecting, not the Indian frontiers merely, but our communications with our further Empire. In this chain of buffer states ... Persia was to him at once the weakest and the most vital link. As Acting Foreign Secretary, he got the opportunity to realize his dream. As has been referred to, the Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet had authorized him to negotiate a Treaty with Persia. Consequently, Lord Curzon instructed Sir Percy Cox, the British Minister at Teheran to start the negotiations. Negotiations were stated at the time when the Persian Delegation to the Peace Conference was trying to secure a seat for Persia at the Peace-table and the Persian people were protesting against the presence of the British troops in their country. Great secrecy was being observed. While the negotiation was in progress, Nasravar-ol-Namaled, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was in Paris as he was the head of the Delegation. The Shah was sending him instructions and was keeping close contact with the Delegation. Suddenly, the Shah was 'maneuvered into appointing his cousin, Prince Firouz, as Foreign Minister — replacing the current

The secret negotiations resulted into an Agreement which was signed and published on August 9, 1919. Each of the Persian negotiators viz., Vosuk-ed-Dowleh, the then Prime


2. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, p. 18.

3. Ibid., p. 19.
Minister, Prince Firooz, Foreign Minister, and Sarsam-ed-Dowlah received 250,000 toman immediately after signing the document.

In this treaty, the British Government reiterated 'in the most categorical manner, the understandings which they have repeatedly given the past to respect absolutely the independence

According to Nicolson, 'Ugly rumours began to circulate to the effect that rich financial inducements had been offered to the Persian negotiators of the Treaty in order to persuade them to sign' - p. 136. Regarding the charge that the Persian negotiators of the Agreement were bribed, J.M. Balfour, a member of the British Financial Mission in Persia, wrote as follows:

"The Agreement was in some quarters regarded as a corrupt bargain, and unfortunately it is almost impossible to disapprove this accusation. It will have been noted that under Article I of the Loan Agreement the loan of two millions was 'to be paid in such instalments and at such dates as may be indicated by the Persian Government after the British Financial Adviser shall have taken up the duties of his office at Teheran'. From this it is clear that it was contemplated that the two millions, which will be remembered were, under Article 4 of the main Agreement, to be expended upon the contemplated reforms, were to be disbursed under the supervision of the Financial Adviser. At the last moment however, the Persian trib stipulated, as a precedent condition of signing the Agreement, that a sum equivalent at the then rate of exchange to £ 131,000 should be turned over to them. This was agreed to, and the payment was made very shortly after the signature of the Agreement. It is utterly impossible to explain away this payment upon any straightforward view of the transaction. Firstly, it was diametrically opposed to the intention of the Agreement that all advances thereunder should be expended under the advice and control of the Financial Adviser; and, secondly, the method of payment was so peculiar, and the ultimate destination of the money so veiled in secrecy, as to justify the most sinister inferences regarding the transaction. The money was paid direct to the three ministers, with, I believe, the express proviso that no inquiry should be made as to its expenditure. So great was the secrecy observed, that when the Siphadar Azam, who was a member of the Council which was supposed to have negotiated the Agreement, became Sadr Azam some fifteen months later, he was in absolute ignorance of the transaction. It need hardly be added that the one thing which is certain is that the money never reached the Treasury'. See Balfour, op.cit., pp. 127-128.

and integrity of Persia'. The British Government agreed to supply at the cost of the Persian Government, British expert advisers, necessary for the several departments of the Persian administration. The British Government consented to supply, at the cost of the Persian Government officers, munitions and equipments of modern type, to reorganize the Persian army on a uniform pattern. The British Government also agreed to furnish the Persian Government with a substantial loan on adequate security. The Agreement further provided for cooperation between the British and Persian Governments for the improvement of communications in the country through railway construction and other mean of transport. Finally, it was agreed that a joint Commission of experts should revise the Persian custom tariff.

A loan Agreement was also concluded on the same day. The British Government agreed to furnish the Persian Government with a loan of £ 2,000,000, at 7 per cent interest, redeemable in twenty years. The British Government was to pay the loan in instalments after 'the British financial Adviser shall have taken up the duties of his office at Teheran'.

Sir Percy Cox addressed two letters simultaneously to the Prime Minister of Persia. In the first of which, the British Minister stated that he had been authorised to inform the


Persian Government that the British Government will be prepared in due course to cooperate with the Persian Government with a view to the realisation of the following desiderata:

1. The revision of the treaties actually in force between the two Powers.

2. The claim of Persia to compensation for material damage suffered at the hands of other belligerents.

3. The rectification of the frontier of Persia at the points where it is agreed upon the parties to be justifiable.

In the second letter, Sir Percy Cox stated that 'His Majesty's Government will not claim from the Government of His Majesty the Shah the cost of the maintenance of British troops which His Majesty's Government were obliged to send to Persia owing to Persia's want of power to defend her neutrality', and asked Persia, in return, not to claim from the British Government as indemnity for any damage which may have been caused by the said troops during their presence in Persian territory.

Curzon presented this diplomatic achievement to the British Cabinet with full satisfaction. In a covering memorandum, he explained the scope and the purpose of the several articles of the Agreement as follows:

'What they mean', Curzon wrote, 'in practice is this: not that we have received or are about to receive a mandate for

1. Cmd. 300, No. 4, p. 4, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C. X, XII, pp. 763-764. See Appendix No. 10

2. Cmd. 300, No. 5, p. 4, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C. XII, p. 764, See Appendix No. 10
Persia — on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian representatives in Paris to be heard by the Peace Conference have been attended by uniform failure; not that Persia has handed over to us any part of her liberties; not that we are assuming fresh and costly obligations which will place a great strain upon us in the future; but that the Persian Government realising that we are the only neighbouring Great Power closely interested in the fate of Persia, able and willing to help her, and likely to be disinterested in that object, have decided of their own free will to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes. The memorandum further stated that Persia’s geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now — just as it would have been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years to disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the West in frontiers of Persia, we cannot permit the existence, between the frontiers of our Indian Empire in Baluchistan and those of our new Protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be left alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influences from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of oilfields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us a command
Curzon repeatedly declared that the British Government had no desire to establish a protectorate over Persia; nevertheless, the Agreement would have given Great Britain effective control over the Persian administration, finances, armed forces, and transportation, system of the country. 'But whatever be the present intention of the British Government or the legal aspect of the question', wrote Amos S. Hershey, 'It is useless to disguise the fact that in all human probability Persia will remain de facto under the virtual protection of Great Britain for an indefinite time to come'.

'What Great Britain intended', wrote Parker Thomas Moon, 'was a modern, subtle form of imperialist control no less effective, but much less candid, than what it used to be in the fashion to designate by the euphemism, 'protectorate'.

According to Haas, the Agreement was an example of ruthless imperialism. Indeed, its stipulations involved complete tutelage of Iran and the loss of independence and sovereignty which had until that time been at least formally recognized!

Ivar Spectar claims that the Treaty transformed Persia into a British protectorate'.

4. Haas, Iran, p. 139.
While concluding the Agreement certain mistakes had been made. In the first place, the Persian Delegation at Paris had been exposed to an affront which they attributed to British malignity. In the second place, the negotiations had been conducted in hurried secrecy, a method of procedure which, as Lord Grey pointed out at the time, was inconsistent with the Covenant of the League. In the third place, no provision was explicitly made for the deposit of the Treaty in the archives of the League of Nations... And in the fourth place ugly rumours began to circulate that rich financial inducements had been offered to the Persian negotiators of the Treaty in order to persuade them to sign. Furthermore, while handling the Persian problem in 1919, Curzon failed to appreciate the recent changes in the psychology of the Persian people. The Orient of 1919 was completely changed from the Orient of 1890. The defeat of Russia in 1905 at the hand of Japan—an Asiatic power, the betrayal of Persia by Great Britain in 1907 and 1915 the Russian revolution of 1917, declaration of the 'fourteen points' by President Wilson and his doctrine of self-determination— all had contributed to create a sense of self-realization amongst oppressed people of the East. They were no more prepared to be deminated and exploited by the West.

The publication of the terms of the Agreement caused great resentment amongst the Persians. The publication sentiment in Persia ran against the Cabinet—responsible for the

2. Fatemi Oil Diplomacy, p. 91.
conclusion of the Treaty. Most of the Persians considered the Agreement 'to be in effect a mandate for Great Britain over Persia, thus circumventing league of Nations'. The Persian patriots who claimed that the Treaty 'amounts to a protectorate' reported Caldwell, the U.S. Minister at Teheran to the U.S. Secretary of State, on August 16, 1919, 'are prevented from public expression of opinion or giving vent to feelings in any manner by existing martial law and controlled press, as well as the fact British Army now occupy Persia'. On August 23, 1919, the U.S. Minister reported from Teheran as follows:

'Public sentiment against the treaty unable but the people are afraid to demonstrate for the fear of punishment imprisonment, or exile, because of prevalence of martial law of more than a year's duration, controlled press and presence of British army'. The report further stated that numerous applications had been received by American and French Legations at Teheran from the Persians for bast 'as protest which have been denied'. On August 27, 1919, a number of ex-cabinet officers and citizens visited Prime Minister and voiced their indignant protestations. Numerous indignation meetings were organised and some provincial cities closed the Barzar as an act of protest.

The Agreement was received by Great disfavour at Tabriz by all classes with the exception of certain parties interested

2. Ibid., p. 699.
3. Ibid., p. 701.
4. Ibid., p. 701.
and others, such as some of merchants class who expected to be profited thereby. But Sir Percy Cox, in a telegraphic report sent to Curzon on September 1, 1919, claimed that the Agreement had been received with great favour by a majority of the people in the provinces. He asserted that it had been regarded as beneficial even by the moderate democrates. He however, recognized that a minority of the population was against the Anglo-Persian Agreement. 'Just extreme democrates and anti-foreign elements including some mullahs, Cox's report added, 'are discontented at bein; tried to Great Britain, and profess to fear loss of independence, but they are in too great minority'. Referring to the deputations which called on the Prime Minister on August 23, 1919, to voice their protestations, the report stated that it was 'organized by well-known Moin-ut-Tujjar and Imam Juma Chot and, besides them included Amin-ud-Dowleh, Mushir-ud-Dowleh — and his brother, late President of medjliss. Leaders did most of taking; said that they had no doubt (Prime Minister's) intentions were good but that Persia was now bound hand and foot to Great Britain, and agreement was against interests of country and should not have been concluded without consulting those who had a right to say in the matter —

It is believed that Amin-ud-Dowleh and Mushir and his brother are convinced but Moin and Imam Juma are still active. Moin feeling amongst local opponents is said to be no against us or against terms of agreement but against Cabinet.'

1. Ibid., p. 702.
2. Documents on the British Foreign Policy, op. cit., No. 749, p. 1150.
The publication of the term of the Treaty evoked a storm of protest in France. The French press criticised the Agreement strongly. The semi-official organ — Le Temps in its leading article on August 17, 1919, criticized the British imperialistic designs in Persia. It stated that the Treaty was prejudicial to the independence of Persia and pointed out that it was against the covenant of the League of Nations as well as against the terms of treaty of Versailles. The criticism in European circle, alarmed Great Britain. In the course of a conversation on August 18, 1919, with Mr. Davis, the U.S. Ambassador at London, Curzon stated that the Anglo-Persian Agreement was being criticized by France, and expressed some apprehension about the activities of the French Minister at Teheran, who according to Curzon, was fomenting trouble there. Curzon hoped that the U.S. Minister at Teheran would help in defending British interest. The British effort to secure U.S. support in her Middle Eastern rivalry with France boomeranged.

Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State sent the following cable to Davis on August 20, 1919:

'The Anglo-Persian Agreement has caused a very unfavourable impression upon both the President and me and we are not disposed to ask our Minister at Teheran to assist the British Government or to ask him to preserve a friendly attitude towards this  

1. Ibid., No.726, pp.1133-1135. 'See for the summary of the leading article of Le Temps'.
agreement. At Paris, I asked Mr. Balfour three times that the Persians have an opportunity to be heard before the Council of Foreign Ministers because of their claims and boundaries and because their territory had been a battle ground. Mr. Balfour was rather abrupt in refusing to permit them to have a hearing. It now appears that at the time I made these requests, Great Britain was engaged in a secret negotiation to gain at least economic control of Persia. The secrecy employed and the silence observed seem contrary to the open and frank methods which ought to have prevailed and may well impair the bases of peace inspired by friendliness. We cannot and will not do anything to encourage such secret negotiations or to assist in allaying the suspicion and dissatisfaction which we share as to an agreement negotiated in this manner.

Meanwhile the opposition to the Treaty increased in Persia. In an effort to divert the rising tide of outraged public opinion the newspaper 'Raad', organ of the Cabinet sought to place the United States the onus of the Persia's flight. The newspaper charged that 'America, the only Government able to assist Persia abandoned her; that the four great powers at Paris decided that Persia should be under protection and that it is a part of Great Britain's portion; that Persia has been deceived by President Wilson's good words (Fine words?) and that Persia is in the same position as Egypt.'

Lansing immediately instructed Caldwell on September 4, 1919 to deny 'Ishad's allegations, and ordered him to have published in all Tehran newspapers the following communiqué:

'You are instructed to deny both to Persian officials, and to anyone interested in this matter, that America has refused to aid Persia. You will also state that the United States had constantly and consistently showed its interests in the welfare of Persia and that the American Mission at Paris several times endeavoured earnestly to secure a hearing for the Persian Mission before the Peace Conference. The American Mission was surprised that it did not receive more support in this matter but the announcement of the new Anglo-Persian Treaty probably explains why the American Mission was unable to secure such hearing. It would appear too that the Persian Government at Tehran did not strongly support the efforts of its Mission at Paris.

The Government of the United States had learned with surprise of the recent Anglo-Persian Treaty which would seem to indicate that Persia does not desire American support and cooperation in the future, in spite of the fact that the Persian deleges in Paris strongly and openly sought our assistance'.

According to instruction, Caldwell protested with the Persian Government against the baseless charges made against the Government and desired to have published his protest as well as

1. Ibid., pp. 707-703.
the formal denial of Mr. Lansing but as the newspapers refused to publish his note, he, himself managed to get it printed and circulated in the form of a pamphlet.

The publication of the above pamphlet added further fuel to the already burning flames. The opposition was encouraged to come into open conflict against the Government, Bagars were closed; demonstrators threw stones at Prime Cirouz, Minister of Foreign Affairs; unsuccessful attempts were made on Prime-Minister's life and open revolt broke out in the most of the provinces. The Government attempted to quell the rebellion by force and pressure; all the leaders of the resistance were either imprisoned or banished from the capital.

The publication of Reuter's news telegram by the British in the Tehran press on September 13, 1919, saying 'reports that France and the United States have protested against the recent Anglo-Persian Treaty are entirely unfounded', brought an immediate protest from the U.S. State Department. Caldwell, commenting on the statement published in the newspapers stated 'this is doubtless for the pacification of the hopeful public whose hostility continues unabated though silenced by fear'.

Publication of the pamphlet by Caldwell, provoked Lord Curzon to write a detailed answer to the American charges of bad

2. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, op.cit., p. 36.
faith. In a letter to Mr. Davis, the U.S. Ambassador at London, Curzon stated that the United States had not been kept in ignorance of the negotiations. Colonel House had been informed and he was requested to inform President Wilson. As no hint of doubt or disapproval was convey to the British Government, it was thought that the agreement was one which would meet with the cardial approval of the U.S. Government. He requested the U.S. State Department to inform the Persian Government and the Press that United States Government did not oppose the Treaty.

The U.S. State Department replied to Curzon's note on October 4, 1919. The U.S. Note acknowledged that 'Colonel House recalls indeed a casual conversation with Lord Curzon regarding Persian affairs but it did not occur to him that he was being formally approached as the official channel of communication with the United States Government in this instance'. The note in made it crystal clear that the U.S. Government was 'not in a position... to give approval to the Anglo-Persian Agreement until and unless it is clear that the Government and people of Persia are united in their approval and support of this undertaking.' Having failed to secure the U.S. support, Curzon decided not to continue the diplomatic exchange.

1. Ibid., pp. 708-711, also see Documents on British Foreign Policy, op.cit., No.774, pp. 1163-1165.
Cox applauded this suggestion and wrote to Curzon on the 14th of August 1919, as follows:

'I have consulted Prime Minister. We are of opinion that invitation to Moshaver to London would be advantageous in some respects provided that you can tax him with (grudgingly) giving lie to statement to which he had repeatedly given currency to effect that British Government stated it was Cabinet in Teheran which was working against him ...'

Moshaver-ol-Mamlek was invited to visit London as 'guest of His Majesty's Government'. But he expressed his regret to accept the invitation as it had reached him just at moment when he has ceased to be either Minister for Foreign Affairs or President of Persian Delegation...

Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty, the Shah of Persia was invited to London. Ahmad Shah decided to visit most of the European countries. Prince Ferouz, the Foreign Minister was a member of the Shah's retinue. Cox desired that Firouz should visit London first before he proceeded to Paris. Consequently, he recommended to Curzon that Nusret-ed-Dowleh(Firouz) 'has strong French sympathies and in view of attitude of French I think it would be well if you asked him to come straight to London for a day or two (before he) becomes anchored in Paris. You could give him advice which would help

1. Ibld., No. 719, p. 1130.
2. Ibld., No. 722, and note attached to it, p. 720.
Opposition to the Agreement in Persia increased day by day. The hostility towards the Treaty gained further momentum as result of a declaration made by the Soviet Government which denounced strongly the British imperialistic policy in Persia. On August 30, 1919, Chicherin in his 'Appeal' addressed to the workers and the peasants of Persia, denouncing the imperialistic designs of Britain and Tsarist Russia, stated as follows:

"At this moment when the triumphant English robber is trying to force total slavery upon the Persian people, the Soviet worker's and Peasant's Government of the Russian Republic solemnly declares that it does not recognise the Anglo-Persian Treaty which gives effect to this enslavement... The worker's and peasant's Government of Russia... looks upon the shameful Anglo-Persian Treaty by which your rulers have sold you to the English robbers, as a scrap of paper, and will never recognize it as having legal force!"

To soothe the anti-British sentiments of the Persians, Curzon decided to honour the popular leader, Moshaver-ol-Mamalek — the bitter critic of the Anglo-Persian Treaty.

On August 11, 1919, Curzon proposed 'to invite him to London'. "This may result", he thought, 'in improvement in his attitude'.

1. Degra, Jane, op.cit., pp.161-164, (see for the text of the Appeal from Chicherin to the workers and peasants of Persia).

+. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia and head of the Persian Delegation to the Peace Conference. The Agreement was concluded while he was in Paris and he was kept in darkness. He was anti-British and was not even allowed to visit England. The Shah was maneuvered to dismiss him.

2. Documents on British Foreign Policy, op.cit., No.712, p. 1123.
him to (withstand) blandishments and intrigues to which he may be exposed'. Firouz was advised accordingly. But Firouz thought that 'as he had openly announced his intention of going to Paris on September 12, he would by going straight to London, play into the hands of chique of Persians in Paris, headed by former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who were actively working up French press against Agreement. They would point to his journey to London as another proof of Persian subserviency'. He, however, agreed to proceed to London on September 11, 1919. Lord Curzon informed Sir J. Graham (Paris) about the programme of Firouz. Sir Graham was also confidentially informed that it was not desirable that Firouz should remain long in Paris.

Firouz could reach London on September 17, 1919, and remained there until the end of the royal visit. (The Shah arrived at Dover on October 29). 'During his sojourn in England, Firouz was wined, dined and showered with flowery, meaningless words by Lord Curzon'.

1. Ibid., No. 737, p. 1143.

2. Ibid., No. 760, pp. 1156-1157. (Firouz decided to leave Switzerland (where he had already reached) on September 9, for Paris. He declared that he would reach London on September 11, 1919) Ibid., No. 760, pp. 1156-57.

3. Ibid., No. 761, p. 1157.

4. Ibid., No. 764, p. 1158.

5. Patami, Diplomatic History of Persia, op. cit., p. 84, (For the London visit of the Shah and Firouz, and speeches made there on, as well as for the comment of the press - Chapter V., pp. 83-93).
But the British policy to appease the dignitaries of Persia, could not help them in getting the treaty ratified. In fact, Lord Curzon, Sir Percy Cox and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh forgot to recollect Article 24 of the Persian Constitution which provided that all treaties concluded with foreign powers must be submitted for the approval of the Majliss. Persian popular feeling was intense enough to guarantee that the Majliss would disapprove the Treaty. The Prime Minister was afraid of to present the document to the Majliss but proceeded as if the Treaty was in fact operative. The British experts arrived at Tehran. A Persian Railway syndicate was constituted and a first installment of the loan was paid to the Persian Government.

The Treaty was not ratified in spite of strong British pressure. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, became very unpopular. Consequently, he resigned. His resignation was accepted on June 24, 1920. The new Cabinet declared the Agreement in suspense pending ratification by the Majliss. The Majlis could meet only in 1921. It was convened on June 22, 1921, 'for the first time in six years' and 'immediately denounced the Treaty'.

The failure of Curzon's policy was a great setback for Britain. 'For a hundred years, Britain and Russia had struggled against one another in Persia, and, when cataclysmic changes in Russia appeared to have removed the latter from the scene, Great Britain was unable to capitalize on the changed power situation. Certainly the policies of the United States Government were contributing factors in Britain reversal - along with such considerations as the resurgence of Persian nationalism, the Soviet Union's soft policy, and the decline in British strength'. Now, Persia was free to make her own destiny.

1. Ibid., p. 169.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION
As Iran occupies geographically and strategically an important position, both Russia and Great Britain tried to bring her under their control. Russia was attracted by the importance of the Persian Gulf, while Great Britain feared Russian influence in Persia as a menace to her Indian Empire. Consequently, 19th century witnessed a sharp rivalry between Great Britain and Russia.

Russia wanted either to occupy the northern Persia including the Gulf or, at least to establish a protectorate over that part of the country. Great Britain, on her side, desired a strong and stable Persia which could act as a buffer State between Russia and the British dominions. But, when Britain found that Persia was being crushed out of her national existence, and being gradually absorbed by Russia, she tried other alternatives. Britain favoured the idea of Anglo-Saxon cooperation in Persia which would, however, guarantee Persia's integrity in so far as it would serve their imperial interests. But Germany refused to involve herself in the Persian affairs and the attempt to evolve a joint Anglo-Saxon policy for Persia failed. Britain, then experimented with a policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation in Persia. Lord Salisbury tried to come to an understanding with Russia regarding Persia by following a policy which he called a 'partition of preponderance'. It was simply a plan of division of Persia into economic spheres. On the one hand, this policy would minimize the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia; and on the other it would strengthen the country by the construction of railways; increase in trade commerce; and
Industries... development... and... by... the... flow... of... capital... in... the... respective... spheres. Lord... Salisbury... expected... that... once... this... process... began,... nations... like... Germany... and... America... would... come... forward... and... invest... their... capital... in... both... spheres. He... desired... to... transform... the... Persian... question... from... Anglo-Russian... into... an... international... one. Moreover,... with... her... improved... conditions,... Persia... would... be... able... to... defend... herself. Unfortunately,... no... understanding... could... be... reached.

British... diplomats... then... decided... to... establish... a... British... protectorate... of... southern... provinces... of... Persia... to... be... ruled... by... Mír-as-Súltan. He... was,... however,... arrested... by... the... Shah... and... the... British... plan... failed. New...妩, the... influence... of... Russia... increased... in... Persia. To... counteract... the... Russian... influence, Britain... decided... to... follow... an... active... policy... in... Persia.

Persia... was,... however,... afraid... of... both... the... Powers... and... tried... to... develop... close... relations... with... the... United... States... of... America.

In... October... 1838,... the... Persian... representative... at... Washington... requested... the... United... States... President... for... the... conclusion... of... a... treaty... of... alliance... which... would... help... Persia... in... her... defence... against... the... aggressive... designs... of... Great... Britain... and... Russia. But... America... was... not... prepared... to... involve... herself... in... the... Persian... affairs. It... was... deemed... against... the... United... States... policy... of... non-intervention. Having... no... supporter... and... being... a... weak... country,... Persia... had... to... accept... the... dictates... of... her... two... powerful... neighbours... But... the... Persian... authorities... achieved... remarkable... success... in... their... foreign... policy... by... playing... off... Russia... and... Britain... against... each... other... and... thus... preserved... the... integrity... of... their... country.
Internal condition of Persia was quite unsatisfactory. The administrative machinery was rotten. Officials were greedy and dishonest and the country was suffering from poverty, male-administration and judicial insecurity. The Shah led a very luxurious life. They were prodigal and fond of trips and voyages. As the Treasury was empty, money was borrowed either from Great Britain or Russia. In return, monopolies, concessions (for example concessions for exploitation of minerals, bank concessions, tobacco concession, concession for construction of Railways, telegraph oil concession and others) and capitulations were granted to them. Furthermore, the Persian rulers were tyrants. The tyranny combined with the non-maintenance of the national prestige abroad led the Persian nation to start a national movement. The credit to create political consciousness amongst the Persians goes to the celebrated Muslim thinker Sayyid Jamalud-Din Afghari and Molkom Khan. The national movement gained momentum and in 1906 some 16000 Persians took part in the precinct of the British Lajation at Tahirun. It was a mass protest against the mortgaging of the natural resources of the foreigners; corruption in the administration; poverty; and the judicial insecurity. The Nationalists demanded a constitution and House of Justice. Britain supported the cause of the Persian Constitutionalists while Russia supported the Shah. The Shah had to yield and granted a Constitution and a Parliament. Persia had now a Constitutional monarchy.

The British had supported the Persian Constitutional Movement primarily because it promised to do away with Russian influence close to the throne, and secondarily, because it was
logical to support a movement directed towards the type of Constitutional monarchy common to their own country.¹

Britain was successful in her goal. The Persians regarded her as their protector. The whole episode was regarded as British diplomatic triumph. However, the success of the Persian nationalists was resented by Russian who thought that it was engineered by the British with the object of destroying the Russian supremacy and uplifting their own prestige. Consequently, the Russians became enmy of the Constitutionalists.

Meanwhile, rapid growth of German navy and the threat of German Commercial competition had alarmed the British statesmen. Consequently, Britain decided to come to an understand- ing with Russia. The defeat of Russia in 1905 at the hand of Japanese, had weakened her, as the result of which she did not prove obstinate and welcomed the negotiations for an understand- ing. M. Izvolsky, the then Foreign Minister of Russia, firmly believed that Russia's destiny lay in the alliance rather than conflict with England.

The negotiations were started and resulted in the conclusion of Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907. The Convention embraced three agreements, one on Persia, the second on Afghanistan, and the third on Tibet.

As regards Persia, the two signatories agreed to respect her integrity and independence and then proceeded to divide the country into three zones. The northern zone was reserved for Russian interests and southern for British. In between the two zones, there was a neutral zone, open to both. The Anglo-Russian Agreement was concluded solely in the interests of the European balance of Power. It was definitely an indication that Britain

was not strong enough to face Germany alone. Sir E. Grey, the then British Foreign Secretary, claimed that the Agreement had made Russia, once and for all, to give up her ambitions concerning India. He was satisfied that a frequent source of friction and a possible cause of war had been removed.

Great resentment prevailed in Persia against the Agreement. Persians believed that the Agreement of spheres of influence was merely a stage on the road of partition. At that time, the influence and popularity of Great Britain in Persia were at its zenith owing to the deep British sympathies with the Constitutionalists. Russia was regarded by them as deadly enemy. The Anglo-Russian rapprochement aroused great suspicion. Britain was no longer their friend. Many Persians believed that Britain's real object in concluding the Agreement was to prevent the spread of Constitutional ideas in Asia. The views of the Persian revolution had encouraged the Indian nationalists. This alarmed Britain and the British statesmen decided to oppose any such national movement in Asia. The Persian Government, however, refused to recognize the Agreement which was concluded without her knowledge.

Mohammed Ali Shah was a worst type despot. He was not prepared to accept limitations imposed upon the royal purse and prerogative. He hated the Constitutionalists. The Russians contributed much in fostering his hatred towards the nationalists. He completely ignored the Majlis (Parliament) and the constitution. He was determined to abolish the Constitution and destroy the Majlis and attempted twice to that end. His first attempt (December 1907) failed. The Constitutionalists were strong enough and would have deposed him, had his deposition not been opposed by Russia and Great Britain. Encouraged by the Russians, Mohammed
All successfully attempted to crush the Constitu-tionalists in 1908. On June 23, 1908, the Persian Cossack Brigade, commanded by Colonel Liahoff, bombarded Sa'aristan (the building of the Majlis). Many leaders were arrested and some of them executed. A number of nationalists leaders, however, took refuge in the British Legation. Colonel Liahoff was appointed by Shah as the military governor of Teheran who declared martial law in the city. It seemed, though for a very brief period, that the autocracy of the Shah had been established. Needless to say, the Shah was supported by the Russian, though not openly, in his adventure of crushing the nationalists, demolishing the Majlis and dissolving the Constitution.

Great resentment prevailed throughout the country against the Shah's action. Anti-Shah riots broke out in Busht, Kirman, Isfahan, Tabriz and etc. At Tabriz, the people rose in open revolt against the Shah's authority. They completely routed the forces of the Shah there. The city of Tabriz was, however, besieged by the royalists. The situation grew from bad to worse. The people of Isfahan revolted against the Shah in January 1909. Following the example of Tabriz and Isfahan, the people of Busht, Turbat-i-Najaf, Hamadan, Meshed, Bushire and Bander-i-Abbas revolted against the Shah. However, the nationalists were very cautious in their dealings with the foreigners. They tried to avoid any action on their part which would provide a pretext to any foreign power to intervene in the internal affairs of their country. Consequently, no revolution had ever been carried out in the world with such order and restraint. But Russia decided to intervene in the affairs of Persia. Britain persuaded Russia not to intervene. Russia refrained temporarily. Britain repeatedly
advised the Shah to grant a constitution to the Persian nation but in vain. The situation grew from bad to worse. The siege of Tabriz continued. At last, Russia, on the pretext that lives and property of the foreigner were in danger despatched a large number of her troops under General Snarsky to Tabriz. Britain did not oppose the Russian stand. The British statesmen decided not to antagonize Russia on the question of Persia, lest she should break the entente.

After the arrival of the Russian troops, the royalists raised the siege, General Snarsky, the Russian Commander took drastic measures to crush the nationalists at Tabriz, although he was sent with the instruction not to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. The nationalists thought that the Russian army had come in with the consent of the Shah. Moreover, it seemed from the behaviour of the Russian army that it had come to stay permanently.

Meanwhile, two nationalist armies - one from Isfahan under Sardar Assad and the other from Resht, under Veli Mohammed Khan, the Sipahdar, advanced on the capital. The nationalists armies were advised and warned by the Russian and British representatives not to march towards Teheran, but in vain. Russia got another pretext and decided to dispatch troops to Kasvin.

However, the nationalist armies entered Teheran on July 13, 1909. The Shah took refuge in the Russian Legation on July 16, 1909. On the insistence of Russia and Great Britain, a pension was granted to Mohammad Ali who left for Russia in October 1909.
Throughout the whole crisis, Britain supported the nationalists cause and persuaded Russia to act in close cooperation with her. Britain was anxious to get a constitutional monarchy established in Persia and to avoid Russian intervention in the country. Though Britain was, more or less, successful in achieving the goal, but she did not succeed in convincing Russia not to dispatch her troops to Persia. Yet, it can be safely concluded that it was the British opposition that prevented Russia from occupying Teheran. Britain might have opposed the decision of Russia to send her troops to Persia, had the danger of Germany not been imminent. On the other side, Russia would have occupied Persia, had she not been concluded the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Moreover, Russia too, realized the German menace. Due to the uncertain situation prevailing in Europe, the Russo-British clash was avoided in Persia. Russia was, however, satisfied to have her forces stationed at various important places in Persia, with the help of which, she could dictate her terms easily to the Persian Government in future.

Not only had Russia dispatched a large number of forces to Persia, but the British Government also had sent a small number of blue jackets to southern Persia. However, the British force, unlike the Russian troops, did not intervene in the internal affairs of Persia.

The nationalists Government formed after the deposition of the Shah tried its best to restore peace and order in the country. In a short period it succeeded in restoring peace in northern Persia, and demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops. Although it was the declared intention of the Russian Government that as soon as normal conditions were restored, the force would be with-
draw, yet she refused to withdraw and put forward certain demands as the pre-condition of withdrawal. The Persian Government rejected these demands. Consequently, the withdrawal did not take place and it seemed that Russia would not withdraw until doomsday unless some superior force expelled them.

In Southern Persia, Britain demanded the formation of a body of road-guards, consisting 1,000 to 12,00 men levied and commanded by British officers from Indian army. The British Government argued that the situation in Southern Persia was deteriorating and therefore, the organization of such a force was necessary. The Persian Government claimed that there was definitely an improvement in the situation and promised to take measures to restore peace and order there. Britain, however, postponed the imposition of the road-guards scheme.

One of the main causes of the failure of the Persian Government to restore complete law and order, other than foreign intrigue and intervention in the internal affairs of the country, was her empty treasury. Consequently, she approached the Russian and British Governments for a loan. They agreed to furnish the Persian Government with a loan but attached such conditions which if accepted, would have undoubtedly rendered Persian independence illusory. The Persian Government consequently, contacted private firms to get the loan. But, the two powers did not allow her to be benefited from quarters other than their own. The Persian Government also decided to borrow experts to organize the administration of Persia, but she was not allowed by Russia and Great Britain to employ any national of a Great European Power.
The Persian government then hired the services of Mr. Shuster from America. He was appointed as Treasurer-General of Persia and was expected to put the Persian Treasury on its feet. Mr. Shuster with a group of assistants, reached Teheran in May 1911. The Russian government was against Shuster's appointment but on the persuasion of the British government she did not oppose his engagement; yet, Russia promptly, started undermining Shuster's mission.

Shuster, soon after his arrival, decided to organize a Treasury Under-secretary, which would assist and cooperate with the civilian officers of the Treasury in collection of the taxes. For the organization of the Treasury Under-secretary, he selected Major Stokes. The Major was originally an officer in the Indian Army but was deputed to work as a military attaché of the British Legation at Teheran. His services in the capacity of a military attaché was about to expire; consequently, Shuster approached him. He agreed. The British government had no objection to the Major being appointed as incharge of the bazaar. Consequently Shuster was informed by the British Minister at Teheran that before accepting the command, Stokes would have to resign his commission in the Indian Army. Russia unconditionally and decidedly opposed the appointment and consequently, in order to appease her ally, Britain informed the Persian government that Stokes' appointment in the Northern Persia would involve political difficulties and that British government would not decree a Russian objection to it. In fact, Russia assured that either the command of bazaar should be split up. Should be filled up by Russian and British officers
respectively or an officer of a minor power should command the
Gendarmes. Later on, Stokes was not allowed by his Government
to accept his new assignment.

Meanwhile, the ex-Shah, encouraged by Russia, attempted
to regain the throne. The Persian Government decided to
confiscate the property of Chma-es-Sultanah and Salarr-ed-Dowlah,
the brothers of the ex-shah, who had joined him in his attempt
to regain the throne. Mr. Chuster was ordered by the Council of
Minister on October 4, 1911, to convert their properties into
Persian Treasury. Consequently, Chuster sent his gendarmes to
seize the estates of the insurgent princes. The gendarmes were not
allowed to execute the order by the members of the Russian
Consulate at first, but Chuster sent his gendarmes who took
possession of the properties. Russia resented it and demanded
that the gendarmes should be immediately withdrawn from the
properties in question and Persian Consul should be put in
possession of the estate. An apology for the alleged insult
to the Russian Consulate officers was also demanded. The Persian
Government accepted these demands on the advice of the British
Government. But as there had been some delay in the compliance
with the demands, Russia presented with an ultimatum further
demands, which included the dismissal of Chuster. The Majlis
rejected the demands. To impose her demands Russia dispatched
a large number of troops to Persia. To meet the Russian challenge,
the Majlis appealed to the U.S. House of Representative for help,
but the Persian patriots were disappointed when they found that
their request could not arise any interests in America.

Meanwhile, the Russian troops reached Karsin but the Majlis
stood firm. However, on December 24, 1911, the Persian Cabinet
engineered coup against the Majlis and it was dissolved. The same day the Cabinet accepted the Russian demands. Shuster left Tehran for America in January 1918. However, with her forces at various places in northern Persia, Russia virtually occupied that part of the country.

In South Persia, meanwhile, Britain reinforced her Consular guards at various important places. Moreover, to safeguard her oil interest in South Persia, Britain followed a policy which firstly created a 'State within State' and finally resulted in a political partition of Persia between Russia and Great Britain (Secret Agreement of Constantinople, 1918).

In short, before the initiation of the First World War, a sort of Anglo-Russian condominium was established in Persia.

After the outbreak of the War, Persia declared her neutrality. But her neutrality was violated by the belligerents and Persia became a battle ground. The Great October Revolution in Russia brought great changes. The Russian troops withdrew from Persia and the whole country was occupied by Britain.

After the War, the Peace Conference, at the insistence of Great Britain, rejected the Persia's claim. In the meanwhile, Lord Curzon instructed Sir Cox to negotiate a treaty that would assure British Political ascendancy in Persia. The treaty was signed on August 9, 1919. Popular feeling encouraged by American diplomatic protests, ran high against the Agreement. French and Russian hostile attitude against the treaty gave much support
to the national feelings. Consequently, the Treaty was not ratified in spite of strong British pressure. Later on, Britain was compelled to withdraw her forces stationed in Persia.

The developments in Persia were influenced largely by the developments in international politics. Japan, an Asian power had vanquished Russia in 1905, and the Bolsheviks had overthrown Czarist Governments in Russia. The First World War changed the pattern of big-power relationships. Wilsonian idealism and the call of the principle of self-determination coupled with the antipathy to the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 lent support to the nationalist movement in Persia. Great Britain with her broken economy had to loosen her grips over Persia. All these factors contributed to the success of the Persian nationalist movement— which grew by its own motive—freedom from foreign domination. Persia was then free to make her own destiny.
APPENDICES
Correspondence between the British Minister at Teheran and the Persian Government regarding organization of a force to be commanded by British officers in the Indian Army.

Sir J. Barclay to Persian Government

Teheran, October 14, 1910

M. Le Ministre,

I have repeatedly drawn the attention of the Persian Government to the deplorable insecurity of the roads in Southern Persia.

Unfortunately my representations have produced no result. So far from there being any improvement, the state of these roads is worse to-day than at any time since the commencement of my mission in Persia. Robberies and outrages have become more and more frequent, and the principal channels through which British trade used to pass to the interior of the country are now practically closed by the depredations of tribesmen, who appear to be completely beyond the control of the central Government.

I postpone for the moment dealing with the numerous claims presented by this legation and His Majesty's consulates to the Persian Government and the local authorities on account of outrages to British subjects and robberies of British goods on the roads in question.

Such claims, of which hardly one has been settled since I took up my post as His Majesty's Minister to Tehran, will of course, as occasion offers, continue to be pressed upon the Persian Government and the local authorities, and their settlement will be exacted in due course. I am now, however, principally concerned with the measures to be taken with a view to remedying a state of things which has at last become intolerable to His Majesty's Government, and I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, unless by three months from now order has been restored to the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government upon the roads from Bushire to Shiraz, and from Shiraz to Isphahan, which are the routes which have been marked by the most flagrant outrages and disorders, His Majesty's Government will be reluctantly compelled themselves to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the proper policing of these roads.

I may add that the measures contemplated in the first instance by His Majesty's Government, in the event of the Persian Government's failing to restore order within the period named, involves the organization for the policing of the roads in question of a local force of some 1,000 to 1,200 men levied and commanded by a number of British officers from the Indian Army. The expenses of this force
would be met in part by a surcharge of 10 per cent on the customs duties on all goods imported at the southern ports, and in part from the revenues of the province of Fars, a sufficient portion of which, would have to be paid over with the above-mentioned surcharge on the customs duties to the officer commanding the force.

I trust that this matter will receive the most earnest attention of the Persian Cabinet.

While thus warning the Persian Government of the consequence of a continuance of the present deplorable situation on the southern roads, I avail and c.

G. Barclay.
Hussein Kuli Khan to Sir I. Balfour

Tehran, October 21, 1910.

Your Excellency,

Note has been taken of the purport of your Excellency's communication of the 10th Shavval, 1328 (A.H.) (14th October, 1910), respecting the southern roads, and I now have the honour to say that His Majesty's Government, being well aware (of the fact), should therefore admit in what (a deplorable) condition the country was in when, after the decline of the former disturbances, the Persian Government last year took up the reins of government, seeing that all the affairs and government administrations - especially the finances - were in complete disorder, and that the foundations of security and public contentment were completely disturbed.

Though (the government were) daily confronted with obstacles, such as the stay of bodies of foreign troops in the interior of the country - which causes public uneasiness, and is the pretext for incitement and intrigue on the part of persons who profited by the former disturbances - as well as other incidents, such as those at Karashidagh, Ardehli, Zenjan, Varamin, and c., which constantly occupied the government forces at several points, from that date to this the affairs of the country have, in many instances, improved and are improving.

But unfortunately, in certain places, the intrigues of persons who, for their own profit wish that the country should remain in the state of disturbance of the former regime, are still going on, as explained below, and have not entirely ceased. For instance, certain persons, after being guilty of sedition and intrigue, take refuge in various legations, and, availing themselves of the protection afforded to them, consider themselves exempt from exile, which, is customary in the case of such refugees and intrigue within and without the precincts of the legation. Others again, by methods consider the illegality of the majority of which has never been contested, such as proteges, considering themselves immune, do not recoil from any kind of incitement or sedition. In the same way others who pass among the people as Persian subjects, but in reality, relying on their foreign nationality, commit crimes with audacity and in complete confidence, and afterwards, declaring themselves to be foreign subjects, evade the jurisdiction of the government. And also persons, undoubted Persian subjects, who by illegal means pretend they are foreign subjects, and then commit various kinds of sedition.

These conditions, which cause the greatest trouble to the government, provoking disturbances in the country, and, furthermore the continued stay of bodies of foreign troops, have encouraged some persons to reasonable consideration of a return of the former regime and give them unfounded hopes.
Apart from the fact that the Government's attention and time is thereby, to an extraordinary degree, directed to considerations and necessities relating to home affairs, this matter is naturally a cause of regret and sorrow, as a prolongation of this state of affairs might possibly cause a blow to and injury trade between Persian and British subjects in the southern provinces.

The Persian Government is of opinion that the principal cause of this unfortunate state of affairs, apart from the reasons above stated, is the unfortunate impression caused by the stay of bodies of foreign troops and the financial straits and embarrassment of the Government, which is one of the consequences of the mismanagement and carelessness of the former regime.

If these unfortunate impressions and financial straits did not exist, the forces at present at the Government disposal would be sufficient for the maintenance of order, and the maintenance of order on the southern roads would present no difficulty in itself.

But, as mentioned above, it is because of financial straits and embarrassments that the Government has not been able to fulfil its principal aim, which is that of increasing security.

As in the reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 28th Rabii-ul-Awval(A.H.)(7th April, 1910), it was brought to your Excellency's notice that the new Government, as soon as formed, had laid it down in the programme which they presented to the Majalis that a portion of the advance and loan which they had in view should be devoted to the increase of security on the roads. Consequently the Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs of that day entered into negotiations with your Excellency regarding an advance and loan.

The note of the 5th Safar, 1328(A.H.) (16th February, 1910), in answer to the efforts of the Persian Government, contained conditions laid down by the British Government for that small advance, the acceptance of which would have been contrary to the independence of the kingdom, the maintenance of which is the primary duty of every Government. In view of these circumstances the Persian Government sought for other means of procuring funds. In the meantime, your Excellency's note of the 3rd Rabii-ul-Awval, 1328(A.H.) (16th March, 1910), regarding the International Syndicate, brought about discussions and exchanges of notes which caused delay in the obtaining of the fund necessary for the purpose of increasing security on the roads. At the same time, besides the fact that the discussions and exchange of notes have above mentioned created results which preoccupied the Persian Government, they brought about ideas among the public, the result of which in course of time had led to the situation referred to in your Excellency's recent note.
Under these circumstances, your Excellency's sense of justice will cause you to admit that if the new Government had not at the outset been confronted with these difficulties in obtaining money, the maintenance of complete security would have been much easier for the Government than it is at present.

In spite of this the Persian Government have not for an instant swerved from their purpose, and, with the accomplishment of this object in view, they are considering the following means of obtaining funds:

They are in process of negotiation with a group regarding their recognised (consolidated) debt to the Imperial Bank with lower interest, and the Persian Government is of opinion that in this manner a sum of money will be available which will enable them quickly to put an entire stop to sedition and incitement. The guarantee which the Persian Government propose to offer for this loan is the same guarantee which was given for their recognised (consolidated) debt to the Imperial Bank, on account of the revenues of the southern customs. For this reason the guarantee of Persia's other loans will in no way suffer.

In view of the Persian Government's anxiety respecting the immediate security of the commercial highways, they consider it very appropriate that the greater part of the expenditure now necessary for increasing the security of the roads should be met by the funds obtained by this transaction, and they assure, His Majesty's Government that the Indian loan of 1904 will in no way be adversely affected by this financial measure.

In these circumstances, the Persian Government are quite confident that His Majesty's Government, in view of their anxiety respecting the development of commerce, will look favourably upon this transaction, which the Persian Government have in view chiefly on this account.

At the same time, I think it necessary to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that as the Persian Government cannot every year by successive loans meet its requirements, they must find a source of revenue to meet each requirement; and the best source of revenue obtainable at the present time, under the present conditions of Persia, which could furnish a portion of the sum required for the gendarmerie, is that very suggestion contained in your excellency's last note regarding an increase of 10 per cent on the customs revenue.

But as the proposal contained in the above-mentioned note is contrary to the undoubted independence of the Persian Government the friendly relations and the unity which up till now have existed between the two Governments, the Persian Government can never under any circumstances consent to it. But as, on the other hand, the Persian Government take particular note of the anxiety of His Majesty's Government respecting the commercial highways, and as the Persian Government consider the maintenance of their own independence and the removal of His Majesty's Government's anxieties on this score as identical, they consider it desirable that this 10 per cent tax should be levied on the
customs by the Persian Government themselves and be expended on the necessary increase of security.

The Persian Government therefore request His Majesty's Government, though the medium of your Excellency, that they should give their support to the accomplishment of this aim; and as this request of the Persian Government is made with the object of developing commerce, and the Persian Government consider its fulfilment necessary for the maintenance of the very same security which you mentioned, its acceptance should be hastened.

Before concluding this note I consider it necessary, in order to prove that commerce has not suffered, to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the extraordinary increase of the customs receipts from the south. Without, however, entirely denying that in recent times there have been any kind of troubles and obstacles in the way of a stop of commerce between Persia and England, I consider that it is shown by the statistics of customs revenue that no real commercial losses have been sustained by British subjects, while, on the other hand, the increase of 100,000 tomans in the Arabian customs receipts in the year 'Takagouli-11' (1909-10), as compared to the previous year, and the extraordinary increase during the present year, conclusively proves that southern commerce has only been temporarily diverted from its former channel.

Furthermore, the whole of Persia's commercial imports during last year showed an increase of about 19 per cent over those of the year 'Pičhi-11' (1908-9), and during the five months of the present year an increase of 20 per cent is shown.

In view of the facts above stated, the Persian Government are of opinion that foreign subjects have no cause of complaint regarding commerce with Persia.

(L.S.) Hussein Kuli
Sir G. Barclay to Persian Government

Teheran, November 17, 1910.

M.le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's note of the 21st ultimo. In reply to this communication I do not deal with your Excellency's references to the presence of foreign troops in Persia, as I consider these references to be irrelevant to the matter with which I am now specially concerned, viz., the outrages and depredations of tribesmen on the southern trade routes.

Your Excellency points to the increase in the total volume of Persian trade for 1909-10 (Takhaghai) as compared with the year 1908-9, and to the further increase which has marked the first five months of the current year, but I must point out that the increase observable in 1909-10 applied, as can be seen from the customs returns, to the north and not to the south. In particular it will be seen that the Bushire customs receipts for last year were much lower than 1908-9, just as in 1908-9 they were much lower than in the preceding year.

As regards the increase during the first five months of the current year it is true that the southern customs share in this increase, but it should be remembered that this year's harvest has been exceptionally abundant, and that the first five months of last year with which comparison is made included the period during which Bushire was in the power of Sayyid Murteza and his Tangistans and I would draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that notwithstanding this the Bushire receipts only show as increase of some 12 per cent.

But whatever may be the statistics of trade for the past months, it cannot be denied that certain of the southern roads are practically impassable. This especially refers to the main southern trade route connecting Bushire with Isphahan, the district on the confines of the provinces of Fars and Isphahan being in a state of indescribable disorder, and though traffic between Bushire and Shiraz has not latterly been entirely stopped, it has only been able to pass by an inconvenient and circuitous route where merchandise is subjected to extortionate and illegal fees, and only by the sufference of a tribal chief who is not under full control of the Government.
There can, indeed, be no hope of any lasting revival of trade so long as the present anarchy continues on these southern roads, and it was with a view to securing for this deplorable state of things a remedy to be applied if possible by the Persian Government, but if necessary with the assistance of British officers lent from the Indian army to the Persian Government, that I have addressed your Excellency on the subject. It could not be contended that the above measures would constitute any infringement of the sovereign rights of Persia, as the officers lent from the Indian army would take service under the Persian Government.

As regards the 10 per cent surcharges on the import duties on goods passing through the southern customs, I am to state that His Majesty’s Government can only agree to this charge on condition that the proceeds are spent effectively on securing the safety of the southern trade routes. The scheme foreshadowed in my note of the 14th October for the organisation of a Persian force with British officers would satisfy this condition.

I am, and c.

G. Barclay
APPENDIX NO. 4

Vazir Zadeh to Sir J. Barclay

Tehran 25, Zilhajeh, 1328
(December 23, 1910).

Your Excellency,

In reply to your answering note of the 17th November, I have the honour to say regarding your idea that the effects of the stay of foreign troops on Persian soil are not relevant, that as your sense of the importance of things will testify, there can be no doubt that the presence of foreign troops in the interior of a country naturally engagés the attention of the Government and causes its prestige to suffer, and for this cause the good intentions of the Government for complete good order as desirable are unproductive of result, but as this matter was fully dealt with in my note of the 21st October, I do not think it necessary to repeat myself on this occasion.

Regarding communications between Bushire and Shiras to which you referred, your Excellency is not unaware that the Persian Government, which has always borne in mind the necessity to uphold commercial relations, has appointed Soulât-od-Dowlah to maintain order on the Bushire-Shiras road. Besides this, the Persian Government have taken preliminary steps for the further maintenance of order, which I now communicate to your Excellency:

1. A competent governor-general, with necessary instructions, has been appointed and sent to Fars, and will shortly arrive at his post. After his arrival he will take fundamental measures for the completion of entire order in those parts.

2. The responsibility for the protection of security on the Kazerun road has been entrusted to Soulet-od-Dowlah. At present he has placed 380 mounted and unmounted guards on that road, and they are patrolling it, and according to reliable reports the Kazerun road is in perfect security.

3. A force composed of mounted and unmounted men as well as artillery is being sent; of these 700 men and three guns sent from Tehran have passed Kuh, two regiments from Hamadan, and the Jelali regiment will join the force at Isphahan. This force is ever and above the garrison at present in Fars.

4. A considerable sum out of the loan which is about to be concluded will be laid aside for the perfection of security, and the Government is engaged in elaborating a system by which the expenditure necessary for this purpose will be properly laid down and its control properly carried out.

5. Besides the appointment of to Fars of one of the European military officers serving under the Persian Government.
very shortly a number of men will be employed and will arrive from abroad for the prompt organisation of the gendarmerie.

I have no doubt whatever that in view of these measures the project of the Persian Government for the perfection of order will be fully carried out, and that your Excellency's anxieties will be dispelled.

With regard to your Excellency's statement that the increase of the customs in 'Takagouì-11(1909-10) concern the north and not the south, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the cause of the increase in the northern customs is only due to the importation of a large quantity of silver, and has no connection with the general trade of the country.

As to the statement made in your Excellency's note that the receipts of Bushire last year were less than those of 'Pichi-11 (1908-9), and that likewise the receipts of 'Pichi-11(1908-9) were much less than the year previous to that, I have the honour to inform you that although the customs receipts of 'Pichi-11 were less, on the other hand, however, the customs receipts of the other southern ports were doubled. Therefore, the whole trade of the southern ports should be taken into consideration in their entirety in order that a proper idea should be formed of the trade of the south. In these circumstances, it is perfectly clear that, even if compared to the customs receipts of the last three years, those receipts of the five months mentioned in my note show a palpable improvement.

With respect, however, to the increase in the first five months of the present year, regarding which you stated that the harvest of the present year was an exceptionally abundant one, I have the honour to say that the abundance of the harvest can only affect the receipts accruing from exports and not from imports.

Regarding your statement that the receipts of the Bushire customs have increased by 12 per cent, I do not think it superfluous to remind you that although an increase of 12 per cent is a considerable one and worthy of being taken into account, and that such an increase in the commercial statistics of other countries is a proof of a progress in trade, the increase in the customs receipts of Bushire are much in excess of 12 per cent. Since the increase of 'It-11' over 'Takagouì-11' was 20,843 tomans which makes a difference of 20 per cent. If we only take the customs receipts on imports into consideration the increase of 'It-11' over 'Takagouì-11' is 25,412 tomans, which gives an increase of 25 per cent. I have no doubt that in view of these facts your Excellency will agree that the general trade of the south has suffered and has even increased and progressed during the last (few) years.
Regarding the surtax of 10 per cent. on the southern customs, the Persian Government are grateful for the friendly assistance of the British Government, and, in view of the supreme importance attached by the Persian Government to the perfection of order and the consolidation of commercial relations they will institute a scheme by which the revenue derived from this source will be effectively applied to the expenditure in view. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that the scheme which the Persian Government have in view for the effective expenditure of this money will be considered sufficient for the fulfilment of this condition.

But in reply to the last paragraph of your Excellency's note, I have the honour to refer your Excellency to my note of the 21st October.

VAZIR ZADEH
Sir J. Barclay to Mohtashem-es-Sultanah

H.E. Minister,

I did not fail to communicate to my Government the Vazir-Zadesh's note of the 28th December, and I have been instructed to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have learned with satisfaction that the Persian Government is taking special measures to restore order on the southern roads. Reports from His Majesty's consular officers show, however, that the diminution of robberies on the main route from Bushire to Shiras which has characterised the past few weeks is due not so much to any arrangements so far made by Soulet-ed-Dowlah for the guarding of the road, as to the unusual severity of the weather. Until therefore the execution of the measures decided upon by the Persian Government has made more progress, His Majesty's Government are unable to judge whether these measures are likely to inform an acceptable substitute for the scheme outlined in my note of the 16th October.

Meanwhile, however, His Majesty's Government recognise in the Persian Government's decision to take these measures evidence that they are determined to do their utmost to restore order on the southern trade routes, and are therefore disposed to defer pressing their scheme on the Persian Government pending the results of the further development of the measures in question.

I am to state, however, that it must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government will reconsider this expectant attitude in the event of a recrudescence of disorders on the Bushire-Ispahan road, and that they reserve the right to insist on the engagement of British-Indian officers at any moment should His Majesty's government perceive that the measures taken by the Persian Government are not likely to suffice for the prompt re-establishment of security.

With regard to the proposed customs surcharge, I am instructed to point out to your Excellency that the surcharge would be virtually a tax on British trade. His Majesty's Government consider the imposition of this additional burden, in the circumstances, justifiable as a temporary expedient if British officers are responsible to the Persian Government for the organisation of the force, the cost of which the surcharge was designed to meet. They cannot, however, consent to it merely as a means of enabling the Persian Government to attempt to perform a duty which ought to be a fixed charge on the ordinary Persian revenues, without any guarantee that the attempt will be successful.

I am, etc.

J. Barclay.
MR. SHUSTER'S OPEN LETTER TO THE LONDON 'TIMES'.
TEHERAN, OCTOBER 21, 1911
(P. 358)

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR: - According to a Reuter's despatch, dated London, October 18, the Times States editorially that my recently expressed opinions of Russia's hostility to Persia's financial regeneration and of Britain's acquiescence in Russia's attitudes are unjust and unfounded.

Nurh as I dislike this class of controversy, still, the importance of the subject, my belief in the fair-mindedness of the British public and in the desire of your journal to be entirely just, and a slight regard for my own reputation, lead me to address you this letter, with the request that you give it due publicity in your columns. It is but a relation of certain facts and incidents which have either come under my personal observation or are of official record during the past five months of my stay in Teheran. My opinion was reached after a calm and impartial consideration of those facts, in addition to the corroborative impressions received in a great number of transactions in which I personally participated but which are not susceptible of legal proof. I am, of course, willing to abide by the judgement of the thinking public for whatever justification may seem necessary.

I arrived here on May 12, last, with three American assistants and with but one object in view - to do a fairly creditable piece of constructive work in behalf of Persia's finances.
On June 13 the Nadjlis passed a law, drafted by me, conferring on the Treasurer-General Plenary powers in matters fiscal. The law was a public one, voted after full and open discussion, and was manifestly designed to bring some order out of the pitiable state of chaos into which Persia's finances had fallen. The Persian Cabinet and Medjlis had almost unanimously approved it. One might expect that the foreign powers in interest here would gladly have done likewise. Unfortunately they did not. Direct legal proof, of course, being lacking, I nevertheless assert, that there is ample documentary evidence of a circumstantial nature to show that there was a deliberate agreement between a number of foreign legations here, headed by the Russian legation, to defeat my execution of that law, and to thwart the general system of centralization of collections, payments and accounting prescribed thereunder. The pretexts urged against the system were flimsy and untenable in the extreme and their manifest purpose was to prevent any material change in the old style of conducting Persia's fiscal affairs. This campaign of threats, nagging, and general opposition, which even descended to vulgar personalities against me, and into crude attempts to frighten the Persian Government, failed utterly, though it did entail a period of delay and confusion in initiating certain financial reforms. Among the threats made was that of one legation to seize the Northern Customs and put in their own officials to collect the revenues.
Last July, in defiance of Article II of the Protocol of September 7, 1909, Russia and Britain, and particularly the former permitted Muhammad Ali, ex-shah, to escape from Persia; that is, Russia failed utterly 'to take efficacious measures' to prevent political agitation against Persia on his part. In fact, he passed through Russia with a suite, a false beard and a consignment of guns and cannon marked 'mineral water', if we may believe the ante-mortem statement of his late lieutenant, Arshadu'd-Dawla. He embarked with his party from a Russian port on the Russian steamer Christoforos and landed, about July 28, at Busheh-Tappeh on Persia soil— a filibusterer in full swing.

Assuming that this escape was accidental and that the Russian passport authorities were off their guard for once, was Russia's attitude one of real regret? In the contrary, it is notorious here that her official representatives in Persia received the news of the landing with uncensured joy. Later, I shall prove that they did not even scruple to show that feeling in official communications addressed to Persia Government officers.

On July 23 the Persian Government addressed a note to all the Legations here, informing them of a law which had just been passed declaring a state of siege. Most of the Legations replied in the usual manner, merely calling attention to certain
provisions in the treaty of Turkmanchee, but the Russian
Legation adopted from the very outset a far different and
most unfriendly tone, claiming among other things the right
to arrest directly the so-called 'illegal Russian subjects'
(who were defined in the Legation's note), 'who might take
part in the events actually going on in the country'. The
patent object of this claim put forward at this time was
to give the Russian Legation and Consuls throughout Persia the
excuse to arrest, on the mere allegation that they were a kind of
Russian subject, any Persian fighting men of known reputation who
might take the side of the government against Muhammad Ali. If this
threat to arrest all Russian subjects (who might take part in events)
has been literally executed, it would have been necessary, as we
shall see shortly, to arrest most of the Russian consuls and consular
employees themselves.

At length, the Russian Consul went further and actually informing
ed the Persian Government of his intention to arrest anyone on
suspicion of his being a Russian subject, to investigate the
matter at his leisure and to hold them until the end of the trouble.

On July 31, when Muhammad Ali has barely put foot on Persian
soil, and had made no appreciable advance towards subjugating the
country, Britain and Russia addressed to the Persian Government the
following: Identique de facto recognition of the ex-Shah's
belligerency:

'Seeing that the Ex-Shah, contrary to the advice frequently given
him by the Government of England and Russia, in effect that he
should forbear from any agitation whatever in Persia, has now
landed in Persia, the British (Russian) Government declares that
the Ex-Shah has now forfeited his right to the pension fixed by
the Protocol. But, on the other hand, the British (Russian) Gov.
believes that, as the Ex-Shah is now in Persian territory, the
British (Russian) Govt. cannot intervene. Therefore, the British
(Russian) Govt. states that, in the conflict that has unfortunately
arisen in Persia, they will in no way interfere.'
Scant comfort from friends of a government plunged into the throes of civil strife through the negligence or worse of those who had solemnly pledged themselves to prevent exactly this contingency. But even this declaration of 'neutrality' (though the word itself was omitted on the demand of the British Legation) might have passed had to be observed. And here let us examine what nature of advice was given to the Shah by the Government of Russia through its ambassador at Vienna, according to the ante-mortem statement of Arshadu'd-Dawla. I quote from the account given by the Times correspondent at Teheran, who speaks Persian and heard the statement a few hours before Arshadu’d-Dawla died, (see Times of October 11,)

'Then Muhammad Ali and I met in Vienna. The Russian ambassador came to see us, and we asked for help. He told us that Russia could not help us. Russia and England had again an agreement with regard to Persia, from which neither would depart. They had resolved not to interfere in any way, internally. But on the other hand, he said, 'the field is clear. If we can do nothing for you, we equally will do nothing against you. It is for you to decide what are your chances of success. If you think you can reach the throne of Persia, then go. Only remember we cannot help you, and, if you fail, we have no responsibility.' 'Well, there is something you can do for us,' we answered 'Lend us some money,' 'O, it is quite impossible,' he replied. And, though we begged much and had a second interview, he rejected our proposal. Only he suggested that, if Muhammad Ali had a receipt for some jewels which were in the keeping of the Russian Bank at Teheran, money could be raised on that receipt. But Muhammad Ali had not got the document, and so
Perhaps this is 'advising the ex-Shah to forbear from any agitation whatever in Persia,' and perhaps it is not. Perhaps, also, the Russian Ambassador (who has never denied the interview) did not advise his Government of Khalil's projected journey through Russia, and of his purpose, but the unbiased public will probably continue to hold its own opinion. We shall now see how well Russian officials in Persia observed neutrality in the internal struggle thus precipitated.

On July 29 the Russian Acting Consul at Isfahan, proceeding upon his conception of neutrality, wrote to the Persian foreign office representative there in a plain attempt to stifle a public expression of the people in favour of the Constitutional Government. He said: 'According to information received by this Consulate, the Government of Isfahan intends to hold a meeting of the clergy nobles, prominent citizens and merchants for the purpose of framing a telegram to the representatives of foreign powers to the effect that they, the people, do not desire Muhammad Ali, and to protest against his arrival in Persian territory. I request you in advance to inform the proper quarters that, as this matter concerns Persia and the Persians (delightful sarcasm) it would be useless to give trouble (sic) to the Imperial Legation and the Consulates of Russia'.

Later he wrote:
'You must not uselessly give trouble in the matter of Muhammad Ali Shah(sic) to the Imperial Russian Legation and the Consulates. It is the duty of the Persian Foreign Office representative and of the Government to restrain and prevent any such incidents and they must fulfil it'.

Rashidu'l-Mulk, Persian subject, former Governor of Ardebil, having been in command of Government forces, had treacherously fled before an inferior number of Shahsevens, tribesmen who had always remained supporters of the ex-Shah. He was accused of high treason arrested and confined, at Tabriz. On July 27, the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz, having demanded his release of the Acting Governor, and having been informed that Rashidu'l-Mulk was held by orders of the central Government, sent three hundred Russian soldiers, fully armed, to the Governor's palace, beat off the Persian guards, insulted the Acting Governor liberated Rashidu'l-Mulk and took him away. Shortly afterwards he joined the rebel force of Shujaju'd-Dawla, which were threatening Tabriz.

To the formal protest lodged by the Persian Government over this affair, the Russian Legation replied, officially admitting responsibility for the orders given to the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz to 'take the necessary steps' to prevent certain punishment, which was alleged to be threatened, from being inflicted on Rashidu'l-Mulk. We have seen what steps the Russian Consul-General took - steps which, in the case of two equal powers, would have meant immediate war.
The sole justification attempted by the Russian Legation for this outrage was that 'the representatives of the Government of Russia have accorded a certain protection(sic) to Rashid'ul-Mulk. As a matter of fact, no sentence at all had been passed on Rashid'ul-Mulk, though, even if it had, the outrage would have been none the less.

After a full examination of the record, I unhesitatingly assert that a clearer and more flagrant case of violation of sovereignty could with difficulty be found.

At the moment when Shujaju'd-Dawla was preparing to attack Tabriz and the garrison of the city was preparing for defence, the local government received a note from the Russian Consul-General there, stating that no defensive measures should be taken and that under no circumstances should there by any fighting within the city. At the same time, a Russian subject was in charge of the advance guard of Shujaju'd Dawla.

Shuja-Nizam, likewise accused of high treason, had been arrested by the Governor of Marand. The Russian authorities took him from prison Shuja-Nizam afterwards succeeded in establishing himself at Marand and in capturing the Governor. The Russian authorities, alleging that he is in the service of the Russian road company of Djulfa-Tabriz, continue to protect him.

The citizens of Tabriz having inflicted serious losses on the forces of the rebel Shujaju'd Dawla, the commander of the Russian troops at Tabriz sent a detachment of Cossacks to the field and there, on the pretext that the director of a road
station had been slightly wounded in the forehead by a bullet (he having voluntarily gone to the neighbourhood of a skirmish), arrested seven Persian gendarmes and took them prisoners to the Russian barracks.

When the rebel leader, Mujallalu's-Sultan, was about to enter the town of Ardebil, the inhabitants prepared to resist him. The Russian vice-Consul thereupon sent his agent, Esmail Bey to the Vice-Governor and chief of police to give them the following false information: that Muhammad Ali had arrived at one day's journey from Teheran with an army of twelve thousand men and had announced a general amnesty; that he had charged His Highness the Sipahdar with the control of the city and that the later had accepted; that the prohibition ordered by the police of Ardebil about speaking of Muhammad Ali Mirza was wrong; 'I announce these facts to you privately and for your personal information. The Consulate has received instructions, in effect, telling them to watch over the security of the town'. Similar announcements were made by public criers, the inhabitants were advised to illuminate the town in honor of Muhammad Ali's victory and to prepare to receive the Governor whom he was sending to them. Later, Mujallalu's-Sultan, protected by Russian Cossacks, entered Ardebil in triumph and committed the usual act of barbarism.

After a stay at Ardebil, Mujallalu's-Sultan joined Shujaju'd-Dawla, leaving behind Shavasu's-Sultan as Governor of the town. The tribe of Khamsalous having refused to submit to Muhammad Ali's rule, the Russian Vice-Consul sent Cossacks to reduce them.
A Russian cruiser having been stationed for some time at the port of Enzeli, the commander, with the Russian Consular agent, visited all merchant vessels entering the port, searched passengers, arrested some and forced them to return to Russia.

When the force of Muhammad Ali was defeated and dispersed, many of the leaders demanded refuge at the Russian Consulate at Astarabad. The Consul received them and refused absolutely to deliver them up to the Persian Government for punishment.

The Russian Commissioner for Qombad-Shabous came to Gumash-Teppah to concert with Muhammad Ali. Later he returned to his post, whence he continued to force Turcoman-Persian subjects, by threats, to take part with Muhammad Ali. He has since come to Astarabad and made himself virtual governor of that place, while the forces of Muhammad Ali remain outside the town.

At Bender, Djez, the Russian Consular agent, with a party of Russian Cossacks, arrested the Persian frontier official and sent him a prisoner to Astarabad, treating him in a thoroughly brutal manner.

At Resht, a number of Russian subjects, armed and led by the son of an employee of the Russian Consulate there, arrested a Persian subject and beat him to the point of death. They announced at the same time that those who might come to the aid of a certain Persian officer there would be shot.

An employee of the Russian Consulate at Resht called a great number of Russian subjects to his house and discoursed to them on the lack of security in the town. Failing to arouse
sufficient response and his plan being discovered, he sent Russian deserters to make trouble in the streets - all for the manifest purpose of creating disorder as a pretext for calling in Russian troops to quell it.

After the departure of Muhammed Ali from Savad Kuh, a Russian officer came to Barfrush to visit Muhammed Ali's camp, where he remained six hours, returning to Sari with six thousand tumans in notes.

When the Teheran Government arrested the well-known reactionary, Majdu'd-Dawla, on July 23, the British Minister immediately interfered in his behalf; as a result, he was released and immediately took post in the Russian Legation. The effect produced on the excited minds of the Persian at this time was that both Britain and Russia were siding with Muhammed Ali and the reactionaries, thus making the task of the Constitutional Government vastly more difficult.

About July 31, the Consular agent of Russia at Anzali arrested several persons as deserters, while the Russian Consul at Resht sent Russian Cossacks to police headquarters to release a Persian subject who had been arrested, pretending that the latter was the 'Lanplighter' of the Cossack barracks.

According to the Convention of 1907 between Russia and Britain, which both parties are so fond of quoting to Persia, the latter's complete independence and sovereignty are fully recognized although the need for such avowal is not apparent. Yet in the face of that document Russia had put forward and still maintains, under the name of 'Protargoship', the most novel and remarkable theory ever heard of in international relations. The
Russian Legation and Consulates not only claim absolute rights in Persia over all Russian subjects, 'Legal or illegal', but they claim a species of protectorate over another class of persons, chiefly well-known reactionaries and traitors, who are admittedly Persian subjects, yet against whom Russia will not permit the simplest governmental step to be taken, under penalty of incurring her anger and her vengeance. This protege-ship is likewise used to shield these persons from paying their taxes to the Persian Government, and, as most of them are rich through methods well known in the former regime, there is not only a decided financial loss, but the loss of prestige to the Government and the encouragement thus given other to rebel against the payment of their just dues are even worse. In many instances the Russian authorities do not even claim that the protege is anything but a Persian subject; in others, some of the pretexts alleged for claiming for them Russian nationality are bizarre beyond the wildest dreams. Ask the Russian Legation to explain seriously, for instance, why the Princess Banou Uzma, of Isfahan, should not pay the Persian Government the thousands of takmans of taxes which she has been owing for the past few years, and you will be unable to restrain a smile at the answer. Or the famous Kamran Mirza, uncle of the ex-Shah. Or why the Russian Legation interfered recently when the tax collector of Teheran seized the horse of Prince Ishted Dawla for failure to pay his contributions to the Government under which he lives. Beyond all this, of course, is the trifling fact that even foreign subjects in Persia are not exempted from paying their local taxes despite the truly absurd claims as to the meaning of Article IV of the
The Persian law of naturalization is based on the consent of the sovereign, given in a formal manner through prescribed channels, yet we have such claims put forth and maintained as that a certain Persian subject, having once taken bast in a Russian Consulate, he was a Russian, or that he claimed Russian nationality under a decree (unproduced) from the Emperor of Russia. Naturalisation laws and regulations are generally esteemed to be the subject of friendly negotiation and arrangement between nations at peace, not as the pretext for abuses of the grossest description by the stronger power.

A better example of Russia's open hostility to the Persian Government could hardly be found than the very recent actions of the Russian of the Russian Consul-General at Teheran, Pokhitanof, with all the details of which I am personally familiar. The facts are still fresh in the public mind, but it may be noted that the arrest and brutal treatment of a few Treasury gendarmes by a superior force of Russian Cossacks, led by two Russian Consular officers in full uniform, and the subsequent incarceration of the Persian gendarmes in the Russian Consulate General, is but a fair sample of Russia's real attitude when it is remembered that this was done in the face of the Convention of 1907, whereby Britain and Russia mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and that Russia had completely ignored the Persian protest over this incident, and that Britain, the other signatory, has quietly looked on, the real value to Persia of the famous Convention in question becomes immediately apparent.
To Persia's protest demanding the removal of these three Consular officers, the Russian Legation returned the ludicrous answer that in certain instances in Mazandaran and Veramin the Russian sovereignty had been insulted, in that certain insurgents in arms in the field against the Government having hoisted a Russian flag over themselves, they should not have been touched. Presumably, they should have been allowed to attack the Government forces in peace.

I could go further and cite the attempts made by Russia to prevent any arrangements by which Persia might emerge from her present state of financial bondage to Russia, and the claims of Britain that, under the rescript of Nasiru'd-Din-Shah of 1888, the Persian Government itself has no right to build railroads in the south, the right being reserved to Britain, but the list grows too long.

I do want to mention the Stokes cases, not because it is transcendentally important in itself, but because of the noxious principle which both Britain and Russia have labored to have established with Persia's acquiescence. The British Minister here wrote me on July 22 that he was authorized by his Government to tell me 'that Major Stokes, before accepting the command of the gendarmerie (Treasury), will have to resign his commission in the Indian army'.

As the original tender made by me to Major Stokes did not mention that he would be required to resign from the British service, and as the situation would have been equally well met from Persia's standpoint by his being seconded for three years,
It naturally assumed that on his tendering his resignation, which he immediately did, by cable, it would be accepted. To my intense surprise, I learned that the reply of the British Government was the presentation of a note verbale on August 8, to the Persian Foreign Office, 'warning the Persian Government that they ought not to persist in the appointment of Major Stokes, unless he is not to be employed in Northern Persia. If the Persian Government do persist, His Majesty's Government will recognize Russia's right (sic) to take such steps as she thinks are necessary in order that her interests in Northern Persia may be safeguarded'.

A mere trifling threat between friends, this.

This was followed on August 19 by another note, repeating the warning given on the 8th instant to the effect that, unless Major Stokes is not to be employed in North Persia, the Persian Government ought not to persist in the appointment, and if they do persist, His Majesty's Government will recognize the right of Russia to take what steps she thinks necessary (sic) to safeguard her interests in North Persia.

Is it at all pertinent to inquire here just what are those undefined 'interests' in Northern Persia on which so much stress is thus laid? Certainly they are not defined in the Convention of 1907; and it is equally clear that the Persian Government does not know them; nor did the British Government know of them as late as July 22. Otherwise, how could she have contemplated accepting Major Stokes' resignation from the Indian Army in order that he might sign the contract offered him?
To complete the record, it should be mentioned that the Russian Legation, on August 15, addressed a memorandum to the Persian Foreign Office, stating that 'the Imperial Government of Russia, for reasons explained at the time to the Persian Government, considers the engagement by the latter of Major Stokes as chief of the armed forces — called gendarmerie — for the collection of taxes as incompatible with its interests, and I am charged to protest against that appointment. Failing satisfaction, the Imperial Government would reserve to itself the right to take such measures as it might judge to be necessary for the safeguarding of its interests in the North of Persia'.

On learning of the first note presented to the Persian Government by the British Legation, I expressed the following views to the British Minister here:

'I beg leave to address you, unofficially, on a subject of great importance to my work here. I have been intensely surprised to learn this evening that your Government has conveyed to the Persian Foreign Minister a note of warning or protest against my proposed employment of Major Stokes in the Treasury Gendarmerie. You are doubtless aware of the course of this matter up to the present. Need I say that, in view of the tone of the communication which your Government authorized you to address to me on July 22 last, in effect that Major Stokes could accept the position upon resigning from the Indian Army, the apparent volte face indicated by their note of to-day is almost incomprehensible?'
... Does your Government quite realize the position in which it is placing me before the Persian people and their Government in now suddenly joining with another power to prevent the exercise of the most elementary act of sovereignty by this country, whose independence and integrity both of those foreign powers have solemnly pledged themselves, jointly and severally, to respect?

"My personal feelings are of no importance, but the success or failure of my mission here is of moment both to Persia which entrusted her financial affairs to my care and to my countrymen who are not unnaturally interested in the creditable accomplishment of my task.

"Before accepting this work I was given clearly to understand that neither of the two principal powers having interests here offered any objection to my undertaking it, and surely such a statement was something more than an empty pledge.

"No one, I am assured, knows better than yourself that the choice of Major Stokes was actuated by no political motive in the faintest degree, and no thinking person could suspect me of any intention to engage in political jobbery here — a thing which would only make me ridiculous and spell absolute ruin for my work.

"What, then, am I to think when I see the first vital step which I undertake in the task of bringing order out of those here obstructed and relentlessly opposed by the very two nations who have time and again professed their sincere desire to see the progress and prosperity of the stricken country which I am seeking to serve?"
Does your Foreign office fully realize that, in adopting its most recent attitude in this affair, it is inevitably producing the impression on the Persian people that it is in reality opposed to the successful accomplishment of my work, in addition to forcing me to assume that I can count on no friendly moral assistance from your Government in a vital matter of this kind?

If this were a normal place, where well-trained, capable and experienced men could be had in comparative abundance, the result (though not the principle) of your Government's objections might not be so bad, but here, where, as you know, good men are extremely scarce, the attitude adopted amounts to a virtual veto of my efforts and a nullification of my chances of success.

I hope and trust that in some manner your Government may be brought to see the matter in this light, apart from what I am frank to say seems to me a totally uncalled-for interference in the purely routine and internal affairs of the financial organization which I am endeavouring to build up.

Personally, I feel so strongly on the subject that I am forced to contemplate the necessity of setting right my own country men, at least with a formal public statement of all my experiences in this connection since arriving at Teheran. Needless to say, such a course would be much to my regret, but there is such a thing as just dealing even between Government and individuals, and certainly in this case I feel that my own record is sufficiently clear to bear the light of the most thorough inspection.
From a review of this incident it is manifest that, unless the Convention of 1907 is a force or a deception, by its own terms it has no bearing whatever on the proposed appointment of Major Stokes as a financial aide to the Treasurer-General.

First, because the preamble of that document, as published to the world, avows that Britain and Russia mutually engage to respect the integrity and independence of Persia and declares the sincere desire of the two signatories for the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development. Yet one of the primary elements of sovereignty is the right to manage internal affairs, at least within the limitations of the law of nations, and surely the appointment of its own officials by any country can be considered as nothing else.

Secondly, the plain purpose of the Convention was that neither signatory power should seek for herself, or support in favor of her subjects, any concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads transport, insurance, etc., — within the so-called 'sphere of influence' of the other power.

But this is no case of a 'concession'. Major Stokes is not a bank, or a railroad, or a political or a commercial concession of any kind, and the voluntary tender to him of a post in the Persian service can, by no stretch of the imagination, be converted into a 'seeking' or 'supporting' by Britain of such a concession.

The second fallacy in the position of the two powers lies in the fact that the British Foreign Office itself never thought of construing Major Stokes' appointment into a violation of even
so-called 'spirit of the Convention' until Russia raised the point. The proof of this has been cited above.

Without in any manner recognizing the application or validity of the Convention as relating to herself, Persia might point out that, where the language of a document is plain and clear, there is no room for interpretation of the spirit.

Now that the forces of Muhammad Ali and Salaru'd-Dawla have just been routed and dispersed, and before the Persian Government can get a breathing-space after all the anxiety, expense and difficulty from which it might have been spared by a due observance of the Protocol regarding efficacious measures against the agitations of Muhammad Ali, the announcement is made that Britain proposes to send two regiments of Indian cavalry to Southern Persia to strengthen various Consular guards. The reason stated is the unsafe condition of the Southern roads and the disorders at Shiraz. Regarding the latter, it might be mentioned that the prolonged in asylum granted up to a short time ago by the British Consulate at Shiraz to Shahumul-Mulk, the sworn foe of the Kashghais, has tended in no small degree to render the task of the Persian central Government in restoring order there more difficult, especially in view of the continued efforts of the son of Shahumul-Mulk to stir up the Arab tribes against the late Governor, Niazmu's-Sultana.

The generally expected effect of this incursion of the Indian troops into Southern Persia at this time will be the despatch of even larger forces of foreign troops into Northern Persia on even smaller pretexts.
I have so far confined myself to incidents occurring during the five months of my stay here, but this account by no means exhausts the evidence of the unfriendly attitude of Russia and Britain toward Persia. The spectacle given to the world last winter, when the British and Russian Legations stooped to personal insults and had the footsteps of the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs dogged by their uniformed Legation servants, on the ground that the pension of the ex-Shah was in arrears, was sufficiently indicative of the disposition of the two powers and their representatives at Teheran towards the Persian Government.

In all the cases cited above the Persian Foreign Office has lodged formal protests against the evident violation of her sovereignty and her dignity, and in but few, if any, instances has even a pretense of reparation or satisfaction been made.

Perhaps many of these incidents do not constitute absolute acts of war - perhaps some of them may be accounted for as the unauthorized acts of subordinate agents, even though they have rarely, if ever, been disavowed by the guilty government, -but that they indicate a 'genuine friendly feeling' on the part of Russia and Britain toward Persia, I do not believe any fair-minded person will maintain.

Some one may here be tempted to ask what all this has to do with finance, and with the financial regeneration of Persia. If so, let the answer be that no one who has been in Persia a week can fail to realize that all possibility of reforming Persia's finances is absolutely dependent upon the prompt restoration of order throughout the Empire and the creation and maintenance of a strong central government, powerful enough
to make itself felt and its decree respected to the furthermost parts of the country. So long as the present policy of thwarting the up building of such a government continues - so long as it is the manifest attitude of the powers to nullify all serious efforts on one pretext or another, but always selfish - and to ruin the government's prestige in the eyes of the Persian people themselves, meanwhile keeping the country in a state of financial collapse, - just that long will any efforts at financial re-generation be as unavailing as certain documents written on the sands of temporary advantage or as promises of a neutrality which does not neutralize.

The internal difficulties of Persia are great enough to tax her resources to the uttermost limit; they alone will retard her progress for many years. If to them we are to add flagrant bullying by outsiders, varied by 'finger-on-the-nose' diplomacy, the situation is very bad.

If money is to be obtained for permanent improvements, it must be taken on impossible political terms; if railroads are to be built, they must be coterminous with our old friends, the 'spheres of influence'; if rifles are to be bought, they must be paid for to a rich and friendly foreign government at just three times their market price; if officers of experience are to be taken into the Persian service to hasten progress, they must been come from a minor power, or prove themselves to have been of the spineless, nerveless type of which the tools of foreign interests are produced; even if they are from a minor power, there must not be so many of them taken as to indicate a serious attempt at reform.
Surely in these days of humanitarian principles and international comity the land of Cyrus has fallen upon evil times.

However, even the ragged misery of the beggar and his indifference to fate does not justify us in giving him a gratuitous kick.

The incidents and facts cited in this letter do not constitute one-third of those with which I am familiar; they are merely typical, and, if anyone doubts the facts, the documentary evidence is available to substantiate them and many more of the same style.

I therefore, venture to hope that, with the knowledge of these cases before it, the Times, with that spirit of fairness for which it is noted, will withdraw the opinion expressed in its leading article of October 18, to the effect that my statements as to the attitude of certain powers toward Persia were unjust and unfounded.

I am,

Yours obedient servant,

(sgd) W. Morgan Shuster,
Treasurer-General of Persia.
APPENDIX No. 7

ANDLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION ON PERSIA, 18/31 August 1907

The Government of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia;

Having agreed on the following terms:

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, and c.—beyond a line starting from Kazer-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yazd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, road, transport, insurance, and c.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Jazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Sunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.
3. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles 1 and 2.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles 1 and 2 are maintained.

4. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the 'Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse' up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past; to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of signature of the present Agreement.

5. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the 'Banque d'Escompte et des prêts de perse' and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank and situated in the region mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agreement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agreement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter before-hand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Agreement.
APPENDIX No. 3

CONVENTION (POTSDAM) ON THE BAGHDAD RAILROAD AND
RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN PERSIA: RUSSIA AND GERMANY
8/19 August 1911.

Art. 1: The German Imperial Government declares that it has no intention to request for itself the construction of railways or the concession of navigation or telegraphic service or to support requests of that nature on the part of German or foreign citizens to the north of the line going from Casr to Shirine, passing by way of Isphahan, Yazd and Khakh and reaching the Afghan frontier at the degree latitude of Gakoch.

Art. 2: The Russian Government which intends to obtain from Russian Government a concession with a view of creating a network of railways in northern Persia engages itself on its part, among other things, to ask for the concession for the construction of railway which is to start from Teheran and to end at Kahanine, to connect this network of railways on the Turko-Persian frontier with the Sadijeh-Kahanine line as soon as the (Konia) Bagdad branch railway shall have been completed.

When this concession is obtained, the work of construction of the line indicated shall begin at the latest two years after the completion of the Sadijeh-Kahanine branch and terminated within the space of four years.

The Russian Government reserves unto itself the right to establish at a proper time the definitive location of the line under consideration; but on this occasion it shall bear in mind the desiderata of the German Government. The two governents shall favor international traffic over the lines from Kahanine to Teheran and from Kahanine to Bagdad and avoid all measures that might interfere therewith, such, for instance, as the creation of transitory customs duties or the application of differential tariffs.

If at the end of a period of two years after the completion of the Sadijeh Branch to Kahanine of the railway from Koniah to Bagdad, the construction of the line from Kahanine to Teheran is not commenced then the Russian Government shall inform the German Government of its renunciation of the concession of this latter line. The German Government, in that case, shall have the right to solicit on its part the concession of said line.

Art. 3: In view of the general importance which the realization of the Bagdad railroad has for international commerce, the Russian Government engages itself not to take any step that might prove an obstacle to the construction of the railway or prevent the participation of capital in this enterprise. Always, of course, with the understanding that no pecuniary or economic damage would accrue thereby to Russia.
Art. 4: The Russian Government reserves unto itself the right to entrust to a group of foreign financiers the construction of the projected junction between the network of railways in Persia and the Sadijah to Kharkine line in Place of undertaking itself this construction.

Art. 5: Independently of this, the Russian Government reserves unto itself the right to participate in the works in whatever form it may deem proper, whatever be the mode of construction of the line in question, and to reamuse possession of the railway by reimbursing the actual amounts expended by the constructors.

The high contracting parties engage themselves besides to participate annually in the tariff or other privileges which one of the parties may obtain with regard to this line. All the other causes of the present agreement remain valid in all events.
APPENDIX NO. 3

Decree announcing in effect abolition of capitulations, extraterritorial rights, etc.

July 30, 1918.

Since all concessions, treaties and agreements with the Russian Government and her subjects during the last one hundred years have been wrung from Persia either by force, oppression or illegal proceedings such as treaties, temptation and inducements, and to her great disadvantage;

Since all the great countries of the world from the beginning of the present war have been announcing to the public their consideration for the economic and political independence of weak nations;

Since the new Russian Government has made the liberty and perfect independence of all nations her ideal and the object of her aspirations, having often specially announced both formally and informally the abolition of certain treaties and concessions wrung from Persia;

Since said concessions, treaties and agreements, in addition to their having been taken by force and oppression to the great disadvantage of Persia, and those taken after the establishment of Constitutional Government(are) against the express provisions of the Constitution, and have either not been put into execution or in a very imperfect manner and against the plain provisions of said treaties, agreements and concessions, whereby not only the designated rights of the Government have been disregarded, but by transferring concessions and agreements and making bad use of their provisions, great and injurious political and economic abuses have followed, affecting the rights and independence of this nation;

Since Persia has, like all countries, a perfect rightful interest in its own economic resources and natural liberty, therefore these chief officials of the Persian Government have decided to abolish and annul all said treaties, agreements and concessions, and hereby announce this decision to all foreign representatives residing in our capital, and to our representatives residing in other countries and to the public.

Signed, Cabinet of the Ministers.
APPENDIX No. 1

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT, SIGNED AT TEHERAN, AUGUST 9, 1919

No. 1

Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Persia

PREAMBLE: In virtue of the close ties of friendship which have existed between the two Governments in the past, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and mutual interests of both in future, that these ties should be cemented, and that the progress and prosperity of Persia should be promoted to the utmost, it is hereby agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand, and His Britannic Majesty's Minister, acting on behalf of his Government, on the other, as follows:

1. The British Government reiterate, in the most categorical manner, the undertakings which they have repeatedly given in the past to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia.

2. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government the services of whatever expert advisers may, after consultation between the two Governments, be considered necessary for the several departments of the Persian Administration. These advisers shall be engaged on contracts and endowed with adequate powers, the nature of which shall be the matter of agreement between the Persian Government and the advisers.

3. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such officers and such munitions and equipment of modern type as may be adjudged necessary by a joint commission of military experts, British and Persian, which shall assemble forthwith, for the purpose of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the formation of a uniform force which the Persian Government proposes to create for the establishment and
and preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers.

4. For the purpose of financing the reforms indicated in clauses 2 and 3 of this agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian Government, for which adequate security shall be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the revenues of the customs or other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government. Pending the completion of negotiations for such a loan the British Government will supply on account of it such funds as may be necessary for initiating the said reforms.

5. The British Government fully recognising the urgent need which exists for the improvement of communications in Persia, with a view both to the extension of trade and the prevention of famine, are prepared to cooperate with the Persian Government for the encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprise in this direction, both by means of railway construction and other forms of transport; subject always to the examination of the problems by experts and to agreement between the two Governments as to the particular projects which may be most necessary, practicable, and profitable.

6. The two Governments agree to the appointment forthwith of a joint Committee of experts for the examination and revision of the existing Customs Tariff with a view to its reconstruction on a basis calculated to accord with the legitimate interests of the country and to promote its prosperity.

Signed at Tehera, August 9, 1919.

No. 2

Agreement relating to Loan of 2,000,000l., at 7 per cent, redeemable in Twenty Years.

PREAMBLE: Contract between the British Government and the Persian Government with reference to an agreement concluded this day between the said Governments. It is agreed as follows:
Article 1 The British Government grant a loan of 2,000,000 pounds sterling to the Persian Government, to be paid to the Persian Government, as required in such instalments and at such dates as may be indicated by the Persian Government after the British Financial Adviser shall have taken up the duties of his office at Teheran, as provided for in the aforesaid agreement.

Article 2: The Persian Government undertakes to pay interest monthly at the rate of 7 per cent per annum upon sums advanced in accordance with article 1 up to 20th March, 1921, and thereafter to pay monthly such amount as will suffice to liquidate the principal sum and interest thereon at 7 per cent per annum in twenty years.

Article 3: All the revenues and Customs receipts assigned in virtue of the contract of the 8th May, 1911, for the repayment of the loan of 1,250,000 pounds, are assigned for the repayment of the present loan with continuity of all conditions stipulated in the said contract, and with priority over all debts other than the 1911 loan and subsequent advances made by the British Government. In case of insufficiency of the receipts indicated above the Persian Government undertakes to make good the necessary sums from other resources, and for this purpose the Persian Government hereby assigns to the service of the present loan, and of the other advances above mentioned, in priority and with continuity of conditions stipulated in the aforesaid contract, the Customs receipts of all other regions, in so far as these receipts are or shall be at its disposal.

Article 4: The Persian Government will have the right of repayment of the present loan at any date out of the proceeds of any British loan which it may contract for.

Signed at Teheran, August 9, 1913.

No. 3

Article 5 of Contract between the Persian Government and the Imperial Bank of Persia relating to the Persian Government five per cent loan of 1,250,000 pounds, of May 8, 1911.

(Included for reference)
5. The Imperial Government of Persia specially assigns to the service of the loan, and as a first charge thereon, subject only to prior charges amounting to 16,714 l. ls. 10d. per annum for three years, and 30,278 l. 12s. 7d per annum from the year 1913 to the year 1928. The full net customs receipts of every description with the Government now is, or at any time hereafter may be, entitled to collect and receive at all ports or places in the Persian Gulf, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, and Ahwas, which receipts are hereby made payable to the Bank, and the Imperial Government of Persia hereby engages forthwith after receipt thereof to pay to the Bank all such Customs receipts as aforesaid without deduction other than for actual expenses of administration of the customs of the said ports disbursed prior to the date of such payment.

a) The Imperial Government of Persia undertakes that throughout the continuance of the loan all sums collected by the Customs Administration shall be paid to the Bank at the ports of collection, or at its nearest branch, week by week for meeting the prior charges referred to above and for the service of the loan, and an account of such receipts shall be submitted to the Persian Government by the Bank at the end of each month.

b) The Bank shall, out of the moneys so collected, pay the prior charges above-mentioned, and the interest and sinking fund of the loan, and shall hold the surplus at the disposal of the Imperial Government of Persia.

c) The Bank undertakes, out of the moneys so received, to pay on behalf of the Imperial Government of Persia the half-yearly coupon in London, and supervise the working of the sinking fund and service of the loan free of charges connected with the same.

d) In the event of the Customs receipts of the above-mentioned ports for any three months, falling short of the amount required for the prior charges and the service of the loan, either for interest or amortisation, the Imperial Government of Persia binds itself to make good such deficiency from other sources of Government revenue, and further, should receipts from these sources fall below the amount required as above, the Persian Government hereby assigns for this purpose the revenue derived from the receipts of the telegraphs - this assignment to constitute a second charge on the said telegraph receipts up to the year 1928, after which the telegraph receipts will be free.
Sir P. Cox to His Highness Vossug-ed-Dowleh.

Your Highness

British Legation, Tehran, August 9, 1919

I trust your Highness has been able, during your successful direction of affairs of the Persian State, to convince yourself that His Britannic Majesty's Government have always endeavoured to support to the utmost the efforts of your Highness's Cabinet on the one hand to restore order and security in the interior of the country, and on the other to maintain a policy of close co-operation between the Persian and British Governments.

As further evidence of the good will by which the Cabinet of London is inspired, I am now authorised to inform your Highness that, in the event of the agreement regarding projects of reforms which your Government contemplates introducing in Persia being concluded, His Britannic Majesty's Government will be prepared in due course to co-operate with the Persian Government with a view to the realisation of the following desiderata:

1. The revision of the treaties actually in force between the two Powers.

2. The claim of Persia to compensation for material damage suffered at the hands of other belligerents.

3. The rectification of the frontier of Persia at the point where it is agreed upon by the parties to be justifiable.

The precise manner, time and means to be chosen for pursuing these aims shall be discussed, as soon as practicable, by the two Governments.

I have, and do,

(signed) P. Z. Cox.

No. 5

Sir P. Cox to His Highness Vossug-ed-Dowleh

Your Highness

British Legation, Tehran, Aug. 9, 1919.

With reference to the second desideratum indicated in my previous letter of to-day's date, it is understood His and agreed between the two Governments reciprocally that, on the one hand His Majesty's Government will not claim from the Government of His Majesty the Shah the cost of the maintenance of British
troops which His Majesty's Government were obliged to send to Persia owing to Persia's want of power to defend her neutrality and that on the other hand the Persian Government will not claim from the British Government an indemnity for any damage which may have been caused by the said troops during their presence in Persian territory.

It is to be understood, however, that this agreement of the two parties does not in any way affect the claims of individuals and private institutions, which will be dealt with independently.

A note from your Highness informing me that you accept this position on behalf of the Persian Government will suffice to record the agreement of the two Governments on this subject.

I have, and c.

(signed) P.Z. Cos


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