AMERICAN POLICY IN IRAQ SINCE 1991 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE COUNTRY

ABSTRACT OF THE

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ABSTRACT

Saddam Hussein started with encouragement from the Americans, who wanted him to destroy their great foe, Ayatollah Khomeini. On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein initiated his offensive against Iran with U.S. consent. During Iran-Iraq War, the United States turned a blind eye when Iraq used American intelligence for operations against Iran that made limitless use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. US chemical companies meanwhile sold pesticides that could be used for chemical warfare, while others supplied under department of commerce licenses biological agents including anthrax. The US had become a major customer for Iraqi oil, importing by 1987 30 million barrels. This was still minimal in comparison to later imports.

In 1988 the year of the most visible domestic atrocities initiated by Saddam’s forces U.S. imports of Iraqi oil had increased rapidly to 126 million barrels. The US sold more than twenty billion US dollars worth of arms and ammunitions to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states during this period and allowed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to transfer large quantities of US arms to Iraq during the war. On August 20, 1988, both sides ceased fighting in accordance with the terms of Resolution 598. Kuwait was a close ally of Iraq during the Iran, Iraq war. However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighboring Arab countries turned sour due to several economic, territorial and diplomatic reasons which finally resulted in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

At the conclusion of the war, Iraq had accumulated a foreign debt officially estimated at $42 billion, excluding interest. Given the debt repayment burden amounting to over 50 percent of Iraq’s oil income in 1990, the massive costs of reconstruction, the continuing
weakness in the price of oil and a military and a civil especially food import bill which far exceeded Iraq’s projected oil revenues, a more drastic solution was needed.

At the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) summit in Baghdad on 11 February 1990, Saddam Hussein for the first time revealed that he was in terrible financial crisis. He told a closed session of the summit, we cannot tolerate this type of economic warfare which is being waged against Iraq. He wanted around $27 billion from Kuwait and the Al Sabah regime flatly refused to bail him out. The invasion of Kuwait with 300 tanks and 100,000 troops moved rapidly into the Kuwait. By mid afternoon most of the city was under Iraqi control. The 16,000 strong Kuwaiti forces did not even offer token resistance. Therefore, both the GCC and the Arab League held emergency session to debate Iraq’s attack. On 3 August 1990, the ministers denounced Iraq’s invasion, called for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal and asserted their commitment to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states of the Arab League.

The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. After four days, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq. After the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait and continued for several months, a large international force gathered in Saudi Arabia. The United States sent more than 400,000 troops, and more than 200,000 additional troops came from 32 countries. When Saddam Hussein linked the Arab-Israel conflict, President Bush rejected a directing link between the Gulf crisis and any other dispute. The Iraqis argued that the UN had not forced Israel to leave Arab territories it occupied during and after the Six-Day War of 1967. It should not force Iraq to leave Kuwait. The Iraqis further implied they might leave Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Occupied Territories. All
types of diplomatic solution were rejected by the US and UN members and coalition forces invaded Iraq for liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

Thirteen years of brutal sanctions destroyed Iraq’s social and economics infrastructure from within. American power and presence were essential for Gulf security and singled out Iraq and Iran as major threats to US strategic interests in the region. For many years after the Gulf War, Washington tried to foment a coup in Baghdad. The United States also used military strikes to discredit Saddam and to weaken regime protection forces. The Unscom declared that Iraq had no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons making capability.

On September 13, 2001, two days after 9/11, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others in the Bush administration discussed a war against Iraq with President George W. Bush. While there seemed to be a general consensus for a war, the substance of the debate was whether Afghanistan or Iraq should come first. They were attacked in Afghanistan first, caused Osama bin Laden were present there. It was also feared that if the United States did not overthrow Saddam and gain control of Iraqi oil wealth quickly, the opportunity could slip out of their hands. The Bush administration appears to have determined to go to war against Saddam Hussein as a primary foreign policy goal well before 9/11. Iraq’s infrastructure which had never fully recovered from the Gulf War and sanctions remained badly compromised. In the case of Iraq, a vision for a 'New Iraq' post-Saddam was developed within the US administration. It was funded on the concept of military victory leading to the removal of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists, creating a blank space in which to install a 'Western style democracy', favorable to US political and economic interests in the West Asia.
On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a comprehensive presentation to the Security Council demonstrating Iraq's ongoing WMD efforts and their concealment from UN inspectors. The coalition forces in Iraq continue to search for WMD sites; while no weapons have yet been discovered. President Bush and his administration strongly implied that there was a link between Saddam and the al-Qaeda hijackers, despite Osama bin laden contempt for Saddam as the head of a secular state. In early October 2002, President Bush was trying to convince Congress to pass a resolution to give him unilateral authority to go to war with Iraq. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a major reason for attacking Iraq. A UN terrorism committee did not find any link between al-Qaeda and Saddam. According to the chief investigator, Michael Chandler said that, nothing has come to our notice that would indicate links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Despite the lack of solid evidence, President Bush continued to connect the war in Iraq with al-Qaeda and 9/11. But on September 18 President Bush conceded: President Bush did exploit and encourage the general public belief that Saddam was connected to the attacks of 9/11, and his strong implications served his purpose of achieving public support for war with Iraq.

The claim of Saddam's nuclear capacity was one of other strongest arguments that President Bush could make for war with Iraq. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report did say that in 1991 Iraq had been 6 to 24 months away from the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb, but that capacity had been destroyed by UN inspectors before 1998. The IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons. The economic sanctions severely limited the materials that could be brought into the country for potential use for WMD. US enforcement of the no-
fly zones also limited what the Iraqis could do, and satellite surveillance was used extensively to monitor the country. No evidence of weapons of mass destruction and no nuclear weapons could be found.

Biological agents sold to Iraq from the United States during this period included several strains of anthrax and bubonic plague. Despite the killing of 200,000 Kurds with chemical weapons and high explosives from 1987 to 1989 and the destruction of the Kurdish town of Halabjah on March 15, 1988, the United States did not stop U.S. companies from continuing to sell insecticides and other chemical components of chemical weapons to Iraq. The most serious questions about the administration's claims were raised when U.S. forces were not able to find evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons after the war, despite the diligent searching of U.S. military forces. The United Nations would not approve the invasion of Iraq, at any rate until the weapons inspectors had been given a significantly greater time to find out whether Iraq currently possessed such weapons of mass destruction. So they fell back on the 12 year old Resolution 678 of 1990 passed for the purpose of authorizing the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and the restoration of peace in the West Asia. Dr Mohamad El Baradei repeated that by December 1998 the International Atomic Energy Authority had neutralised Iraq's past nuclear programme and had to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.

The US, along with coalition partners, disapproved of the political position and apparent lack of support from the UN Security Council and chose a unilateral non-Chapter VII model approach to invade Iraq. Many governments were seen as pursuing a policy of appeasement: not of Saddam, but of the US as today's dominant power determined to get
its way by the threat of war. Almost universally, global public opinion held that the US went to war in Iraq for oil. Iraq and Saudi Arabia together account for at least 65 percent of total global oil reserves in the world. It is pretty clear that whatever Saddam did was quite irrelevant because the US had already made the decision to go to war.

Global opinion almost universally condemned the US for invasion and occupation, while the reputation and trust of the US in the international arena had fallen lowest level ever. Regime change in Iraq having been carried out in March and April 2003, it was in the hands of the United States and Great Britain, to justify the use of outright force to overthrow a sovereign regime. In reality, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an American operation and patently illegal under International law. Establishing a stable government in Iraq was going to be one of the most difficult problems which the US faced. Most Iraqis, while happy to see Saddam go, did not welcome the US occupation. A common sentiment in Iraq has been ‘No to Saddam, no to the US’. Moreover, small and relatively weak countries around the world quickly learned the dangerous lesion from the launching of a pre-emptive war. It was clear that diplomacy was used in dealing with North Korea, precisely because the country possessed nuclear weapons. The Iraqi death rate prior to the invasion was 5.5 per thousand people per year. The invasion in March 2003 raised the average figure to 13.2 for that year.

Saddam Hussein ruled over Iraq nearly 30 years. The people of Iraq were librated in little over a month, with the stated aims of the US being to democratize Iraq and to create a zone of ‘democratic peace’ at the heart of the West Asia. Out of the 18 forced regime changes in which US ground troops have been committed, only three deserve the ‘democratic’ title: Germany, Japan and Italy. Democracy in order to be stable and firmly
rooted in any society needs to be homegrown which evolves through a period and therefore, cannot be exported or imposed through coercive means.

Democratization particularly in Iraq or in West Asian region is one of the major aims of the American government. Promotion of democracy constituted one of the basic pillars of the neo-conservative worldview that guided the foreign policy of the Bush administration so forcefully. The Iraqi people had the taste of democracy from the very early days of the occupation. Once the old regime disappeared, all Iraqi cities and towns fell prey to looters. The Iraqi National Museum, which had one of the richest collections the antiquities and artifacts so much emotionally associated with the Iraqi civilization, was pillaged and destroyed. After the fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy.

L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003 with a broad mandate and plenary powers. On July 13, 2003, the CPA handpicked and imposed a twenty-five member Interim Governing Council (IGC) on Iraq. The first act in the establishment of an Iraqi government as a sectarian body became the framework for future developments in Iraqi politics, hence establishing the Iraqi state as a sectarian rather than a national and unified institution. On 28 June 2004, two days earlier than expected, Bremer formally transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people and their interim government. The coming together of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (SCIRI), Ibrahim al-Ja’afari (Da’wa), Massoud Barzani (KDP) and Jalal Talabani (PUK) underscores this fact. The first task given to the IGC by the CPA was to draft a new constitutional law by 15 December. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was drafted by 28 February 2004, which would act as an interim constitution. The plan
then envisaged that the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would be formed, again not by elections, but by a complicated three-stage selection process. The nomination of Iyad Allawi to head the interim government lacked mass support.

The election for the Iraqi National Assembly was held on 30 January 2005 amidst fears of insurgent attacks. The Shi’as wanted Iraq to be declared an Islamic Republic; the Kurds argued that it should be named as the Federal Republic of Iraq; and the Sunnis demanded that the country should be called the Arab Republic of Iraq. After three months of negotiation and three missed deadlines, the draft constitution was made ready on 28 August 2005. Islam was recognized as a fundamental source of legislation and no law shall contradict. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces.

With the constitution accepted, final election was held on 15 December 2005. Iraqis would now vote for a particular list, with 230 seats proportionately distributed across Iraq’s 18 governorates. The December 2005 Parliamentary elections sent a mixed signal about the future of Iraqi democracy. In fact, as one commentator in the Arabic press pointed out, by the time the elections were held around 100,000 Iraqis and 2000 Americans had lost their lives. Coming to the year 2006, UN sources have admitted the escalation of violence since the beginning of the year. The civilian death toll increased by more than 77 percent, from 1,778 in January to 3,194 in June.

In December 14, 2003, US, officials announced the capture of Saddam Hussein in his home town Tikrit and he was put on trial. The first trial dealt with atrocities he had
committed in 1982. On 21 August 2006 Saddam Hussein appeared for his second trial, in which he was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity. In the same month one of Saddam Hussein’s lawyers was murdered, becoming the third defence lawyer to have been killed since the trial began. On 19 June chief trial prosecutor Ja’afar al-Mussawi delivered his closing arguments, calling for Saddam Hussein and three co-defendants to be sentenced to death. In the same month one of Saddam Hussein’s lawyers was murdered, becoming the third defence lawyer to have been killed since the trial began. With respect to timing, Saddam Hussein’s sentence was carried out on the morning of 30 December, the first day of Sunnis of Id al-Adha (Eid uz-Zoha); one of Islam’s most important holidays. The President of Egypt reflected the views of many of the Muslim world when he described the decision to execute the former Iraqi leader on a Muslim holiday as unthinkable’ and ‘shameful’.

Insurgency has existed as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak to the point of violence. It is simply a strategy of desperation in which those with no other options turn to protracted, asymmetric violence, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. Indeed, between 1990 and 1996 alone, there were at least 98 conflicts worldwide, but only a few of these were waged between recognized states. The insurgency has grown during the period between the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a new Iraqi government. It has continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq as the new Iraqi government has developed.
Looting broke out almost immediately following the fall of Baghdad. On the eve of the US invasion Saddam had released thousands of ordinary criminals from Iraqi jails. Looting destroyed or damaged what little remained of Iraq infrastructure. Despite of adverse affect of widespread lawlessness, American troops did nothing to stop it. One battalion commander in Baghdad requested clarification on the rules of engagement for dealing with looters. Headquarters told him that there none, and that the lawlessness would be self-correcting problems. The Judge Advocate General Corps in the Pentagon warned officers that they had no arrest warrant and could be held accountable for any loss of life they caused trying to exercise control of civilians. The Iraqi police whom Rumsfeld and company had assumed would remain in place doing their jobs did nothing to stop the lawlessness. The willingness and ability of US forces to protect the Oil Ministry no doubt encouraged belief that they could have protected everything else as well. It also strengthened the popular believe that Washington wanted Iraqi oil more than it did Iraqi freedom.

There is a large presence of foreign militants in Iraq. These were non-Iraqi Muslims, mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq. The extent of Zarqawi’s influence was a source of controversy. Cooperation between radical Shi’a Hezbollah and radical Sunni insurgent in Iraq, groups with seemingly antithetical worldviews, illustrated the depth of anger toward the United States in the Muslim world. Both sought to kill Americans and their coalition partners and drive them from Iraq. During the summer of 2003, the insurgents expanded their target list. On October 9, a suicide bomber in Sadr City launched the first insurgent attack on a police post. Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other
means. The banning of Ba’ath Party drove 30,000-50,000 of Iraq educated elite from all 
walks of life onto the street and, quite possibly, into the arms of the insurgents. Another 
sweeping edict, CPA Order Number 2 dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. This put another 
300,000 men out of work with no compensation. De-Ba’athification and disbanding the 
security forces made a bad situation much worse. During the first year of occupation, the 
most serious security threat came from a Sunni Arab insurgency supported by foreign 
terrorist. The insurgency created gapes between the Iraqi government and the people and 
devastated economy of Iraq further.

Economic conditions have fueled anger against the coalition and the Iraqi government and 
created a large pool of unemployed and up to 70 percent of the labor force in Sunni Arab 
areas hit hardest by insurgent violence. A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs 
considers armed attacks on US forces legitimate and justified resistance. A majority of 
both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis 
are opposed to the occupation. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in 
Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country. 
In November 2003 Paul Bremer indicated there was still no reliable information on the 
size and structure of the various groups carrying out attacks or their leadership. The deaths 
of Saddam’s son, Uday and Qusay, in a firefight in Mosul in July 2003 was seen as having 
dealt a decisive blow to the burgeoning insurgency of the former regime elements because 
the two were alleged to be key players. The end of the road for Saddam did not mean an 
end to the Ba’athist element of the insurgency. The political marginalization of the Sunnis 
was at the root of the insurgency in the Sunni triangle. The de-Ba’thification carried out by 
the CPA targeted the Sunni community. One Sunni insurgent said: “Our main aim is to
drive the Americans out and then everything will go back to normal, as it was before”. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was welcome news to the vast majority of Shi’as, except perhaps those who had been associated with the Ba’athist regime. Since April 2004, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, the so-called Mahdi’s Army, has engaged in significant violence after the closure of his weekly newspaper by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the arrest of his deputy. Muktada al- Sadr had been gathering his strength since the invasion his Mahdi Army, an illegal Shi’a militia, launched attacks against US and British forces in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala. On consolidating control of Shi’a areas, and building up a militia without confronting coalition forces. The Kurds could not be expected to join an insurgency against the very forces that protected them for more than a decade and then liberated them from Saddam. Moreover, the Kurds do not care about Iraq: they care about Kurdistan.

Occupying Iraq would give the US control over the country with the second largest oil reserves in the world. It would also be in a stronger position to put pressure on Saudi Arabia, which has the largest reserves. Relations between the US and Saudi Arabia have been getting worse, especially since 9/11 (15 out of the 19 suicide hijackers were Saudi subjects). The conquest of Iraq would not only make the US less dependent on Saudi Arabia, but its military power in the Middle East-plus that in Israel, whose alignment with the US grew even closer under George W Bush than it had been under previous administrations-would give it a potential chokehold on the oil supply to the other leading powers in the world. Its seizure would not only provide the USA with a more secure base from which to dominate the West Asia. The incorporation of Iraq into ‘the democratic revolution’ would help to transform the region along liberal capitalist lines.
In the American desire to exploit Iraq’s massive oil reserves, and increase its geostrategic position within the Gulf, Iraq has been subjected to economic shocks, with the extensive state sector rapidly privatized. The high level of employment and the abandonment of service provisions for the majority of the population, along with the collapse of basic infrastructure, represent products of deliberate policies that have marked the Anglo-American occupation. Such a process of economic devastation and social fracturing is inhumane and against international laws and norms. The nationalist ethos and tradition in Iraq have been severely undermined by these developments. The Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq must be understood in the context of the grand strategy consistently pursued by the US since at least the beginning of the 20th century. The Bush administration, breaking from Washington's reliance since the Second World War on coalition building, is seeking to use one of the main comparative advantages of the US—its military supremacy—to perpetuate a favorable global balance of forces. The seizure of Iraq seemed to favour this strategy, particularly since it would enhance US capacity to deny access to West Asian oil to actual or potential rivals such as the European Union and China. But popular resistance to the occupation of Iraq is now testing this policy, perhaps to destruction.

With the United States increasingly dependent on important oil, and with China also rapidly becoming a major oil importer, the Persian Gulf had, by 2000, become a region of intense significance for the United States. By the time of the election of President Bush, Iran was to be regarded as a ‘rogue state’, Saudi Arabia had severely constrained US military operations in the Kingdom and Iraq was not subject to external control in spite of a decade of sanctions. Moreover, two aspect of the 1991 war – Iraqi missiles and CBW
systems – had had a notable impact on US military outlooks as they demonstrated instances of relatively weak states having the capacity to constrain the actions of a superpower. Coupled with political changes in the US, especially the rise of the idea of a new American Century, they provide the context for the political road to war with Iraq in 2003. With containment eroding at the end of the 1990s and increasingly regarded as an obsolete if not failed approach, the US was faced with the long term prospect of a hostile regime in Baghdad. That regime may well have been crippled by sanctions, yet, it could be argued, retained its long term aim of dominating the region, including its vast oil reserves. Removing Saddam Hussein’s regime was therefore an attractive option well before the attacks of 11 September 2001.

The Council announced that the date for national elections would be 7 March 2010; Iraq will hold its parliamentary elections for all 325 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Both Iraq and the Obama administration see the elections as starting the countdown to the final U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011. From any perspective, the election was a major impact on US policy toward Iraq and ultimately the region. No coalition is close to the 163 seats needed to control the 325-seat parliament. Allawi's Iraqiya coalition won 91 seats to 89 for al-Maliki's State of Law bloc. The Iraqi National Alliance, a Shiite religious group dominated by al-Sadr's followers, won about 70 seats, and Kurdish parties picked up 51. On 13 December American President Obama announced that his target to withdraw all forces from Iraq on the last of 2011, we want to stable government in Iraq, people are living in a democratic country.
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ALIGARH (INDIA)
2012
This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis entitled 'American Policy in Iraq Since 1991 and its Impact on the Internal Politics of the Country' Submitted by Mr. Md. Mojahid Azam under my supervision is his own original contribution and suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Ph.D.

Further certified that Mr. Md. Mojahid Azam has been engaged in full-time research and that he has put in required attendance as prescribed by the University.
DECLARATION

I solemnly declare that the research work incorporated in this thesis entitled “American Policy in Iraq Since 1991 and its Impact on the Internal Politics of the Country” submitted for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in West Asian Studies (Political Science) to Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, Utter Pradesh, India, is an original work and has been undertaken under the Supervision of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal.

The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

BELOVED WIFE AND LITTLE DAUGHTER
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“Anyone who stops learning is old,
Whether at twenty or eighty.
Anyone who keeps learning stays young”.

-Henry Ford

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Preface

This thesis is an attempt to make it possible for researchers, students, general readers and opinion-makers of West Asian politics to understand current events in the region as they unfold in the context of historical patterns that have evolved through time to time. In this my thesis context, “American policy in Iraq since 1991 and its impact on the internal politics of the country,” examine the democratic governments, internal politics and sectarian conflict between Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds, and their societies, while looking at the West Asia of today in relation to the pattern of West Asian politics in the Global age.

This thesis reflects the effort to set events in the context of patterns of continuity and change throughout the region. Chapter I introduces the little historical background of Iraqi relation with America and also cause and consequences of 1991 Gulf War, reaction of the Arabs, International reaction, oil for food programme and result of the War, the role of the UN and politics of the Multinational Nations, particularly America and Britain and internal revolt.

Chapter II, “9/11 and changing American policy towards Iraq,” is a survey how George W Bush was made aggressive policy towards West Asia after 9/11, UN sanctions, Links Al-Qaeda, containment and regime change policy, WMD and continued US diplomacy towards Iraq for overthrow Saddam Hussein from power.

Chapter III, “American and British invasion of Iraq,” considers planning of the war in 2003, invasion and its aftermath, reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and situation of Law and order in Iraq. This chapter is
concerned with that phenomenon and its role in the political road to war. It argues, in particular, that a detailed examination of the political record demonstrates that war with Iraq was all but inevitable after the 9/11 attacks, exploring this in relation to a number of trends.

Chapter IV deals with American policy towards Iraq for promoting democracy. It is suitable or not for Iraqi people, what is the opinion of the world community? First democratic election was held in Iraq in 2005 and 2010, trial and execution of Saddam Hussein. This chapter explained reaction of the Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds community after the fall of the Baghdad.

Chapter V explains insurgency and counterinsurgency movement in Iraq. What was the cause for insurgency or communal violence in the country? What are the origins, motivation and causes of the insurgency? This thesis addresses the different types of organisation. Insurgencies can not occur without some of organisation. An insurgency that may take place in a country that is divided by deep class, regional, or ethno-sectarian fissures. In this context I address the respective positions and roles of the Kurds, Shi’as and Sunnis insurgency in post Saddam Iraq. This chapter also deals the successful US counter-insurgency policies. Moreover, I have focused my attention on the insurgency.
CHAPTER I

IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
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IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Introduction

When the Second World War was over, the British domination in the Gulf was over and the US emerged as the new world power. The overall US strategy was the same as England's and France's: keep the political families' sheikdoms, emirates and kingdoms just strong enough to fight with each other, but not strong enough to destabilize the region or any one of them become a unifying force for all Arabs. That way the US could keep overall control of the oil in the area. A problem arose when, for example, Iran nationalized its oil companies in 1951. The US, response was to overthrow the elected government of Muhammad Mossadeq, and to replace it with a dictatorship by the Shah. The Western powers finally succeeded in breaking up the Arab World into several impotent client regimes. Iraq was just one of the fictional nation states; pro-west leaders were forcefully installed to execute Western instructions. They had manipulated the political environment and ensure the establishment of impotent client regimes whose social and economic administration was obedient to Western interests. This inevitably resulted in the hardship and repression of the Arab people under their newly formed illegitimate governments. Due to this programme, which involved a series of political, economic and cultural manipulations, these regimes became dependent on the West for their survival in all significant respects. The West Asia was a vital prize for any power interested in world domination, the control of the world's oil reserves also means control of the world economy.
The United States aimed to dominate and control West Asia affairs to ensure its monopoly over regional resources, namely, oil. Iraq officially has the third-largest proven oil reserves in the World. Although recent seismic data suggests that it may in fact have the largest oil reserves, as high as 350 billion barrels.

The Western powers were horrified by the 1979 Islamic in Iran revolution regardless of its domestic popularity. It implicated their expulsion from Iranian territory and the subsequent insecurity of elite interests in that region, including America's strategic designation of Iran as a 'guardian of the Gulf' subordinate to U.S. orders. The Islamic nature of the revolution gave the West further reason to fear. The Western powers expected that the events in Iran might pose a model for other Muslim nations in the region whose people suffered similarly under Western backed dictatorships. In this respect, the Iranian revolution bore the potential to severely damage US hegemony in the West Asia. The solution was to attempt to crush the revolution of Iran before it bore fruit. Iraq represented many possibilities in this regard. The US removed Iraq was from the terrorist list, so that the US plan could begin actualization.

Saddam Hussein started with encouragement from the Americans, who wanted him to destroy their great foe, Ayatollah Khomeini. Before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, America had made moves toward extending the hand of friendly relations to the Iraqi regime under the rule of Saddam Hussein. On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein initiated his offensive against Iran with US consent. On 26 February 1982, the America

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and Iraq’s special relationship was officially sealed. The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran. The Iran-Iraq war was seen as a new opportunity to recoup US losses from the Iranian revolution. Starting in 1982 the U.S. encouraged and provided arms and satellite information to the Iraqi government in its fight against Iran. The Reagan and Bush administration’s principal goal was to weaken and contain Iran in order to limit its regional influence. The Iran-Iraq war did indeed weaken Iran, as much of the human and material resources of the revolution were wanted. However, Washington became concerned over Iranian success on the battlefield and secretly began providing CIA satellite information to Baghdad.

In December 1983, in spite of reports on Iraq’s use of nerve gas to stem the Iranian advances, the Reagan administration signed a confidential directive to do ‘whatever was necessary and legal’ to prevent the country from losing the war. The White House and the State Department continued to put pressure on the Department of Agriculture and the Treasury to extend credits to Iraq because Saddam was still considered a potential ally. During Iran-Iraq War, the United States turned a blind eye when Iraq used American intelligence for operations against Iran that made limitless use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. US chemical companies meanwhile sold pesticides that could be used for chemical warfare, while others supplied—under department of commerce licenses—biological agents including anthrax. There were no reasons to check the Iraqi aggression against Iran because of dual contentment. In 1988, Iraq’s use of gases had also repeatedly been documented by UN specialists. The United Kingdom was also heavily involved, throughout the devastating eight year war.
During the Carter’s election campaign, Iran seized of the US embassy in Tehran. William Casey, the head of Reagan’s campaign and later CIA director, then entered into secret negotiations with the Iranians to delay release of the hostages in the embassy until after Reagan had been elected. He promised that the US would resume weapons supplies thereafter. The US had become a major customer for Iraqi oil, importing by 1987 30 million barrels. This was still minimal in comparison to later imports. In 1988 the year of the most visible domestic atrocities initiated by Saddam’s forces US imports of Iraqi oil had increased rapidly to 126 million barrels. This figure should be compared to the 1981 figures when the US had not imported even a single barrel of Iraqi oil. The disparity constituted a momentous increase of over 400 per cent, with US purchases bringing in $1.6 billion. Iraq became the twelfth largest market for American agricultural exports in the 1980s; for some crops the country became the number one export market. One of the groups which were particularly active in ensuring that the US did not impose sanctions on Iraq was the US Iraq Business Forum, established in 1985. Iraq neither attacked nor threatened the United States. The Bush administration, on behalf of the giant oil corporations and banks, sought to strengthen its domination of this strategic region. It did this in league with the former colonial powers of the region, namely Britain and France, and in opposition to the Iraqi people’s claim on their own land and especially their natural resources.

The US now needed a strong Iraq to oppose the newly dangerous Iranians, and so supported Saddam Hussein in his eight-year (1980-88) war against Iran. The US therefore ignored Iraq’s brutalities. The UN found evidence that Saddam had used chemical weapons four times during the Iran-Iraq war. The other three were in April 1985,
February-March 1986 and April-May 1987. Saddam was also busy violently oppressing his own people, cracking down particularly on the Kurds of northern Iraq. In February 1988; Saddam developed an even more massive campaign against the Kurds. His troops employed the traditional methods of destruction. By 16 March 1988, the Iraqi air force was bombing Halabja with mustard gas and nerve toxins. “Entire families were wiped out and the streets were occupied with the corpses of men, women and children. Such atrocities did not satisfy for the United States and its Western allies to cease military assistance to the regime.

Even the Halabja atrocities only led to the token tightening of a few export controls related to chemical weapons manufacture and the production of what amounted to an effectively meaningless condemnatory resolution in the UN Security Council. The US sold more than twenty billion US dollars worth of arms and ammunitions to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states during this period and allowed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to transfer large quantities of US arms to Iraq during the war. In 1984, because of Iranian battlefield victories and the growing US Iraqi ties, Washington launched “Operation Staunch”. This move was like a double-edged sword as it pressurized US allies to stop arms sales to Iran in an effort to dry up Iran’s source of arms while it continued supplying weapons undercutting arms sales to Iran, making the secret weapons transfers to Iran that much more valuable. In the meantime, Iraq made an apparent peace with Iran.

In 1987 Iran’s leaders prepared for what they hoped would be a last round of offensives to end the war and topple the Iraqi government. As the situation became steadily graver, international concern mounted. In July the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 598, calling for both sides to stop fighting, withdraw to the prewar border, and
submits to an international body to determine responsibility for the war. Iraq seized on the resolution, but Iran refused to end hostilities with victory so near. Iran continued its attacks but did not achieve the victory for which it had hoped.

By 1988 Iraq, sufficiently rearmed and regrouped, drove the Iranians out of Al- Faw and several other border areas. Iran was in no position to launch a counterattack, and the international situation seemed increasingly favorable to Iraq. The two countries had held their first face-to-face meeting since the 1988 cease-fire in their eight-year war, and in mid-August, Saddam Hussein offered in a letter to Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to meet virtually all Iran's terms for making peace. Many Iranian leaders concluded that the war could not be won and worked to persuade Khomeini to accept Resolution 598. Although the resolution failed to provide key Iranian aims such as an end to Hussein’s government, payment of reparations, or clear identification of Iraq as the initiator of the war Khomeini endorsed the ceasefire in July. On August 20, 1988, both sides ceased fighting in accordance with the terms of Resolution 598.

**Kuwait invasion**

The Iraqi- Kuwaiti border had been the focus of tension in the past. Kuwait was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire from the 18th century until 1899. Kuwait was a close ally of Iraq during the Iran, Iraq war. However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighboring Arab countries turned sour due to several economic, territorial and diplomatic reasons which finally resulted in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Relation between the two countries improved during the Iran- Iraq war (1980-1988), when Kuwait assisted Iraq with loans and diplomatic backing. Kuwait had heavily funded the 8 year long Iraqi
war against Iran. After the war, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the $14 billion which had borrowed from Kuwait during Iran-Iraq war. Iraq argued that the war had prevented the rise of Iranian influence in the Arab World. However, Kuwait’s unwillingness to pardon the debt created trouble in the relationship between the two Arab countries. During 1989, several official meetings were held between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders but they were unable to break the deadlock between the two countries.

After the failure of the talks, Iraq tried repaying its debts by raising the prices of oil through OPEC’s oil production cuts. However, Kuwait, a member of the OPEC, prevented a global increase in petroleum prices by increasing its own petroleum production. Iraq also accused Kuwait of producing more oil than allowed under quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), therefore, depressing the price of oil. Iraq’s complaints against Kuwait grew increasingly harsh. When Iraqi forces began to mobilize near the Kuwaiti border in the summer of 1990, several Arab states tried to mediate the dispute. Kuwait, seeking to avoid looking like a puppet of outside powers, did not call on the United States or other non Arab powers for support. The U.S. and the Western governments generally expected that Iraq would seize some border area to frighten Kuwait. So they avoided any action against Iraq. Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 1, 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and countercharges.

The US also did not take a clear cut stand on the Iraq Kuwait dispute. Ambassador Glaspie stated that, we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait … We hope you can solve this problems using suitable methods via Klibi [the head of the Arab League] or via president Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues
are solved quickly. ... I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship not in spirit of confrontation regarding your intention. Glaspie’s were not the only signals in that direction. Five months earlier, when General Schwarzkopf outlined the danger Iraq posed to its neighbors in the US Senate, Assistant Secretary of State J. Kelly told Saddam in Baghdad that the US consider him a force of moderation'. US senate delegation in March confirmed that line.³

Iraq is one of the few countries in the Arab world to have emerged within the span of less than a decade as a major militarized state. During the period of the war with Iran, it became a significant arms producer, surpassed in the Arab world only by Egypt. And Egypt, assisted by its traditional position of leadership in the Arab world had nevertheless developed its military industry only gradually, over a period of decades. Yezid Sayigh observes that: Iraqi military industrialization is especially striking because it is the first instance of an Arab country building up its indigenous productive capability between 1984 and 1990, which indicates a high rate of financial and human investment and suggests the existence of a scientific and technical base sufficient to allow such rapid expansion.⁴ From 1980 to 1988, manpower increased in the army from 222,000 to an estimated 1 million: this represents a staggering increase of 350 per cent.⁵ This massive increase in

manpower required a correspondingly high increase in acquisition. Iraq’s arsenal became so extensive that, before the Gulf war, some experts were ranking Iraq as one of the top military state in the world. During the war with Iran the number of Iraqi tanks, for example, actually increased from 1900 in 1980 to 6300 in 1987/88, while those of Iraqi combat aircraft increased from 339 to more than 500. Iraq’s overall expenditure on arms increased from $1180 million in 1973 to a peak in 1982 of approximately $25 billion. By the end of the war, that had increased only to a mare $16.5 billion. All in all, these expenditures turned oil rich Iraq from one of the most prosperous countries in the region into the third largest debater nation in the world, with estimated debts of $80 billion.

According to the Japanese Institute for Middle Eastern Economies, total Iraqi war losses from 1980 to 1985 amounted to $226 billion. According to al-Bazzaz, the war with Kuwait was inevitable. Iraq continued to let Kuwait flood the oil market, he maintains, Iraqi oil revenues would have not covered half its internal economic needs, let alone be to service its debt. The author argues further that, after eight years of attrition, Iraq can’t build on its previous economy with a high standard of living. It became necessary therefore, to find a permanent solution to the economic predicament, with its problems of debt, a solution which can only be geo-political which would provide new sources for the Iraqi economy. The economies of both Iran and Iraq were severely damaged during the war. Moreover, their economic problems were exacerbated by a steady decline in petroleum revenue that began in 1980 and resulted in a 75 percent decline in petroleum revenue by 1986. Following the 1979 energy crisis, there was a reduction in demand at the

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same time as there was a surge in production. The damage to Iraq’s infrastructure during
the war amounted to at least $120 billion more than the total value of the country’s oil
exports since 1973. The total economic cost of the war has been estimated at $644 billion
on the Iranian and side $453 billion on the Iraqi side. The GDP per capita in Iraq declined
from $6,052 in 1977 to $2,944 in 1988.8

In addition, at the conclusion of the war, Iraq had accumulated a foreign debt officially
estimated at $42 billion, excluding interest.9 In the political sphere, regional and
international pressures towards liberalization were also evident. The tremendous economic
and human losses brought about by the war with Iran from 1980-88 made it extremely
difficult for the Iraqi government to retain the always precarious allegiance of its various
ethnic minorities. Saddam Hussein was well aware of the fact that the ending of the war
with Iran, the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion and the continued effective suppression of
Shi’a Islamist organizations did not remove political challenges to his own position.

Two particular legacies of the war needed to be dealt with immediately if they were not to
undermine his own position as supreme leader. The first was the apparent corporate
solidarity of the Iraqi officer corps. The second was the economic predicament of the
country. Both of these developments presented a challenge of a particularly acute kind to
the form of neo-patrimonialism that sustained Saddam Hussein’s power in Iraq. The

7 Geoff T. Harris, Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countreis. Routledge,
2004
economic liberalization process which had begun during the war was extended & reinforced, at least on the statue book. There were many work enforced by the government for economic recovery. But these activities were benefited few individuals and family concerns. However, they led to massive inflation which became so serious that regulation had to be re-imposed in a number of areas. All of this activity, although beneficial for those in a position to profit, could not make any serious dent in the overall economic predicament of the country.

Given the debt repayment burden amounting to over 50 percent of Iraq’s oil income in 1990, the massive costs of reconstruction, the continuing weakness in the price of oil and a military and a civil especially food import bill which far exceeded Iraq’s projected oil revenues, a more drastic solution was needed. It was in these circumstances that Iraq tired to increase its oil revenues by seeking to persuade OPEC to raise the price of oil through new restrictive quotas. In particular, Saddam Hussein looked to Iraq’s Gulf countries; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to help escape it form its financial plight in a number of ways. They were supposed to cooperate in maintaining a high price for oil, through restraint of their own production pressure on others. Furthermore, they were asked repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, by Iraq to declare that the $40 billion financial aid they had given to Iraq during the war with Iran should be considered a grant and not a loan. In addition, it was suggested that they should contribute very substantially to Iraq’s economic reconstruction. At the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) summit in Baghdad on 11 February 1990, Saddam Hussein for the first time revealed that he was in terrible financial crisis. He told a closed session of the summit: “We cannot tolerate this type of economic warfare which is
being waged against Iraq". He wanted around $ 27 billion from Kuwait and the Al Sabah regime flatly refused to bail him out. In May 1990, at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, in the closed sessions, Saddam Hussein accused that some of the Gulf countries had begun early in 1990 to produce oil beyond their OPEC quotas to such an extent that the prices in certain instances had plummeted to $ 7 per barrel. He claimed that every one dollar drop in the price per barrel meant a loss of $ 1 billion per annum for Iraq. Saddam Hussein explicitly stated that in Iraq’s present economic state this over production was an “act of war”. Saddam Hussein stated: “Wars can be started by armies and great damages done through bombing, through killing or attempted coup. But the other times a war can be launched by economic means. To those countries, which do not really intend to wage war against Iraq, I have to say this is itself a kind of war against Iraq”.

He added, “I must frankly tell you that we have a stage where we can no longer take any more pressure”. This was a clear warning to the oil-rich states to pay Iraq. Iraq was asking them to bail it out from its dire financial straits and threatening them in case of refusal. The Iraqi position in the summit suggested that Kuwait was already identified as an enemy. Saddam Hussein sought to leave some room for maneuvering by Kuwait and said that the future summit would lead to an agreement. In a thirty seven-page memorandum, dated 15 July 1990 and addressed to the secretary General of the Arab League, which included figures and facts about the Iraqi claim, Tariq Aziz explicitly named Kuwait and

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12. Ibid., p. 63
the UAE as the two “culprits in over production”.13

The Kuwaitis were shocked by Tariq Aziz’s memorandum. It also made a counter-accusation that Iraqis were “stealing” from Kuwaiti oil well. Kuwait refused to be “cowed down by Iraq’s bullying tactics” which was obviously an attempt at writing off debts. On 17 July 1990 which marked the anniversary of the Ba’athist seizure of power in 1968, Saddam Hussein once again repeated his accusation against Kuwait and the UAE. It was on that day, Saddam Hussein, in a televised speech first threatened the use of force to halt over production. He stated: “They are trying to undermine Iraq after its military triumph...instead of rewarding Iraq, which sacrificed the blossoms of its youth in the war to protect their houses of wealth, they are severely harming it…” he also threatened, “...raising our voices against the evil is not the final resort if the evil continues... If words do not give us sufficient protection then we will have no option but to take effective action to put things right and ensure that our rights are restored...cutting a few throat is better than cutting the means of living…”14

10 July 1990, Gulf oil ministers met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study the Iraqi complaints. Both Kuwait and the UAE officially agreed to adhere to the OPEC quota, but both did not cut the production. Kuwait hoped to earn higher revenues for itself by expanding its market share than by raising prices. Therefore, Kuwait was quietly producing four hundred thousand barrels more per day than its quota of one and half million barrels.15 Iraq hinted

14. Iraq T.V. 8 P.M. (IST), 17 July 1940
that Kuwait’s trouble might be over if it was to reach an agreement on oil quotas and pay to Iraq the amount demanded. The telecast was seen and heard in the most of the Gulf and the Arab Countries. Kuwait’s ruler was shaken by the vehemence of Saddam Hussein’s attacks and open military threat. Kuwait’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah al–Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, rushed to Riyadh on 18 July 1990 to try to persuade King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to intervene. The Kuwait’s Minister of Justice, said, “The Iraqi memorandum is just the beginning, God knows how far they will go”. In response to the Iraqi letter to the Arab League, Kuwait on 19 July 1990 sent a formal letter to the Arab League Secretary General expressing “astonishment and surprise” at Iraqi accusations. Moreover, Kuwait also sent a letter to the UN Secretary General on 19 July 1990 drawing his attention to the “unmistakable threatening” in the Iraqi note against Kuwait and said “it is regrettable”. Kuwait rejected the Iraqi demand in a letter to the secretary General of the Arab League: “the sons of Kuwait, in good times as in bad, are men of principle and integrity. They will not yield to threats or extortion under any circumstances”. 16

On 24 July 1990, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt visited Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, listening to each leader’s viewpoint and stressing the need for a negotiated settlement. On his return to Cairo, he announced that a special meeting would be held between Iraqi and Kuwaitis delegates in Jeddah at the end of July. President Hosni Mubarak said that, Iraqi President had assured me that he would not take action against Kuwait unless all the diplomatic options had been exhausted. At the same time, Iraqi forces were being moved into the border of Kuwait.


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It was aimed at putting more pressure on fellow Arab countries at the forth coming Jeddah meeting. Eventually, the meeting took place in Jeddah on 31 July 1990. It changed everything, but not in the way Saddam Hussein had earlier assumed. The Iraqi team was constituted of Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council, Sa’adoun Hammadi, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Ali Hassan al- Majid, Saddam’s Cousin and the Local Government Minister. The Kuwaiti delegation was led by the Crown Prince, Sheikh Sa’ad al-Abdullah al-Salam al-Sabah, who was also the Prime Minister. John Simpson described the Jeddah meeting in the following words: It was clear to the Iraqis from the start that Saddam’s assumption that the Kuwaitis were looking for a solution of this crisis was wrong. They themselves seem to have had instructions to be as “flexible as possible” but they found the Crown Prince “arrogant and unyielding”. Kuwait, he said, had the backing of the US, Britain, and Saudi Arabia and had no need to be blackmailed into paying Iraq. His real opponent was Ali Hassan al-Majid, himself an aggressive man. During the two hour meeting the Iraqis presented a “series of Demands to Kuwait including a requirement that all debts by Iraq should be written off by Kuwait” and that Kuwait should cede to Iraq certain areas of Kuwaiti territory. In all, the Iraqis were reported to have demanded 10 billion US dollars in aid: debt write-offs of a further 10 billion dollars; relinquishing of Kuwait’s section of the Rumailah oil field which straggled the border between the two countries; 2.4 billion US dollars in payment for oil which Kuwait had legitimately extracted from its section of this field; and finally a long term lease of islands of Warbah and Bubiyan”.  

17 Ibid., p. 107
Reaction of Arab Countries

The invasion of Kuwait with 300 tanks and 100,000 troops moved rapidly into the Kuwait. By mid afternoon most of the city was under Iraqi control. The 16,000 strong Kuwaiti forces did not even offer token resistance. The Arab world strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad immediately sought to help the GCC Countries to counter the invasion. The Arab League foreign ministers were already close up in Cairo as part of a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Therefore, both the GCC and the Arab League held emergency session to debate Iraq’s attack. On 3 August 1990, the ministers denounced Iraq’s invasion, called for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal and asserted their commitment to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states of the Arab League. The foreign ministers opposed foreign intervention in the crisis, but they also rejected Kuwait’s demand that they form a joint Arab force to counter the Iraqi forces. The vote of condemnation at the foreign ministers meeting was significant: 14 voted yes and 5 abstained which was Jordan, Mauritania, the PLO, Sudan, and Yemen; Iraq was ineligible to vote and the Libyans withdrew on the government’s instructions.

The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. After four days, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq. Iraq responded to the sanctions by annexing Kuwait on August 8, prompting the exiled Sabah family to call for a stronger international response. In October, Kuwait’s rulers met with their democratic opponents in Jeddah, with the hope of uniting during the occupation. The Sabah family promised the democrats that
if returned to Kuwait, they would restore constitutional rule and parliament. In return, the
democrats pledged to support the government in exile. The unified leadership proved
useful in winning international support. The US succeeded in getting a series of anti-Iraqi
resolutions adopted in the UN Security Council. It also sent troops to protect Saudi Arabia
and the other Gulf States against possible Iraqi aggression. The Iraqis tried to deter and
split the growing international coalition through several means, but did not succeed in its
target. They hinted that, they would use chemical weapons and missile attacks on cities, as
they had against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq also detained citizens of coalition
countries who had been in Kuwait at the time of the invasion and said they would be held
in militarily sensitive areas in effect using them as human shields to deter coalition attacks.
Iraq eventually released the last of the foreigners in December 1990 under pressure from
several Arab nations. After the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait and continued for several months,
a large international force gathered in Saudi Arabia. The United States sent more than
400,000 troops, and more than 200,000 additional troops came from 32 countries. Still
other countries made other contributions: Turkey allowed air bases on its territory to be
used by coalition planes, and Japan and Germany gave financial support.

In the early morning of January 17, Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert
Storm. There were 1700 planes many of them flying from the airbase near Adana, Turkey.
Saddam Hussein threatened to strike at Israel with a new missile. On the peace front, the
Soviet Union announced that Iraq would be willing to negotiate an end to the crisis if
assured those Rumaila oil fields in Kuwait and two offshore islands. Bush rejected any
reward for Hussein's aggression and called for Iraq unconditional withdrawal from
Kuwait. Oil reached over 40 dollars a barrel. When Saddam Hussein linked the Arab-Israel
conflict, President Bush rejected a directing link between the Gulf crisis and any other dispute. The Iraqis argued that the UN had not forced Israel to leave Arab territories it occupied during and after the Six-Day War of 1967. It should not force Iraq to leave Kuwait. The Iraqis further implied they might leave Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Occupied Territories. Several Arab countries responded positively to Iraq’s statements. However, most of the Arab countries did not support the coalition forces such as Jordan and Yemen, which were not part of the coalition. Only in Morocco and Syria did government support for coalition involvement weaken as a result of Iraq’s initiative. This suggestion was roundly rejected by Western governments when it was first made in the middle of August.

Since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the PLO has been accused repeatedly of siding with Saddam Hussein. However, Palestinians argue that their position has been misunderstood, pointing out that PLO leaders have been condemning Iraq in private while working hard behind the scenes to secure a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The PLO supported Saddam Hussein proposal for linkage between the Gulf crisis and other problems in the Middle East. The PLO President Yasir Arafat said that the plan would see the withdrawal of occupation forces from Kuwait, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strips) and the Golan Heights (Syria) which was occupied by Israel in 1967 War. Arab and UN forces would replace foreign armies. Kuwait has been very important sources of funding for the PLO, and there were immediate fears about the fate of Palestinians there because Yasir Arafat was supporting Saddam Hussein. About 350,000 Palestinians lived and worked in Kuwait and as many as 100,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza relied on their

18. MEI- 31 August 1990. P. 30
remittances. PLO decision makers also had in mind the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians elsewhere in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and the crucial financial and political support which comes from those countries. The Iraqi leader said that invasion had opened the door to the solution of the Palestinian problem.

**International Reaction**

On November 29, with coalition forces massing in Saudi Arabia and Iraq showing no signs of retreat, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to allow member states to “use all necessary means” to force Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq remained in the country after January 15, 1991. The Iraqis rejected the ultimatum. Soon after the vote, the United States agreed to a direct meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq’s foreign minister. The two sides met on January 9, neither offered to compromise. The United States said that the meeting was failure and the conflict could not be resolved through negotiation. When the UN deadline of January 15 passed without an Iraqi withdrawal, a vast majority of coalition members joined in the decision to attack Iraq. A few members, such as Morocco, elected not to take part in the military strikes.

In the early morning of January 17, 1991, coalition forces began a massive air attack on Iraqi targets. Other countries contributed ships, air forces, and medical units, including Canada, Italy, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Poland, and South Korea. Still other countries made other contributions: Turkey allowed air bases on its territory to be used by coalition planes, and Japan and Germany gave financial support. The initial goal of the

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19. Ibid. p. 30
force was to prevent further Iraqi action. But the most countries were to be used to drive Iraq from Kuwait. A large minority of the U.S. population opposed military action. The air attack had three goals: first attack Iraqi air defenses, to disrupt command and control, and to weaken ground forces in and around Kuwait. The coalition made swift progress against Iraq’s air defenses, giving the coalition almost uncontested control of the skies over Iraq and Kuwait. The second task, disrupting command and control, was larger and more difficult. It required attacks on the Iraqi electrical system, communications centers, roads and bridges, and other military and government targets. These targets were often located in civilian areas. Although the coalition air force bombarded civilian areas and caused thousands and thousands innocent peoples and child died and completely disrupted Iraqi civilian life. Who suffered? The Iraqi people are suffered. They are facing lots of problem for their surviving, neither Iraqi government nor the American and the Western countries.

The third task was weakening Iraq’s ground forces.

The coalition used sophisticated weaponry to strike Iraqi defensive positions in both Iraq and Kuwait, to destroy their equipment. In retaliation Iraq fired Scud missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel, which especially disrupted Israeli civilian life. Iraq could not get positive result after that. Saddam strategy failed to split the coalition. The Israeli government did not retaliate. Iraq also issued thinly veiled threats that it would use chemical and biological weapons. The United States hinted in return that such an attack might provoke a massive response. Iraqi ground forces also initiated a limited amount of ground fighting, occupying the Saudi border town on January 30 before being driven back.

After one month air war, the Iraqis began negotiating with the Soviet Union over a plan to withdraw from Kuwait. The war made diplomacy difficult for Iraq: diplomats had to travel
to Iran and then fly to Moscow to give messages to the Soviet Union to put his demand in UN back and forth. Sensing victory, the coalition rejected his demand and said Iraq pullout their forces from Kuwait unconditional. On February 28, with the collapse of Iraqi resistance and the recapture of Kuwait after the fulfilling goals the coalition declared a ceasefire. The land war had lasted precisely 100 hours. On March 2 the UN Security Council issued a resolution laying down the conditions for the cease-fire, which were accepted by Iraq in a meeting of military commanders on March 3. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States president George Bush announced on August 8, 1990, that he was sending military forces to defend Saudi Arabia following Iraq’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait on August 2. Washington called for the “complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait”.

**UN Sanction on Iraq**

The direct human cost of the war and its aftermath has been estimated at 158,000, with 86,194 men, 39,612 women and 32,195 children dying. Soldiers accounted for just 40,000 of these deaths. The bombing campaign also decimated Iraq’s water treatment and sanitation facilities, fertilizer and power plants etc., soon after the end of the war, a series of rebellions broke out. Those in the south of the country were spontaneous, while those in the north seem to have been planed and organized by Kurdish nationalist parties. All were swiftly crushed by the Hussein regime. Immediately after the war, per capita income in Iraq fell to just $627, and it had decreased to $450 by 1995. Numerous surveys and reports conducted by the government of Iraq and UN agencies during the 1990s revealed a

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deepening of the complex humanitarian crisis that had been precipitated by the war and exacerbated by the sanctions.\textsuperscript{21}

The end of the fighting left some key issues unresolved, including UN sanctions against Iraq, which did not end with the war. On April 2, 1991, the Security Council laid out strict demands for ending the sanctions because Iraq accepted liability for damages, destroys its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, forego any nuclear weapons programs. Iraq also accepted international inspections to ensure these conditions were met. If Iraq complied with these and other resolutions, the UN would discuss removing the sanctions. Iraq resisted, claiming that its withdrawal from Kuwait was sufficient compliance. The UN attempted to ease some of the hardship suffered by the Iraqi population by offering the Iraqi government the opportunity to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil in 1992 to pay for the import of food and medicine. This was rejected by Saddam Hussein since the UN also insisted on controlling the funds and retaining some thirty percent to pay towards war reparations. Only in 1996 did the Iraqi government finally agree to the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 986, allowing Iraq to sell 2 billion worth of oil every six months for the porches of supplies for its population. Further this was raised to $5.52 billion worth of oil every six months in UNSC Resolution 1153 of 1998 and in October 1999 to $8.3 billion for the period of May- November.

According to the provisions in the UN Security Council Resolution 687, the UN established a Special Committee aimed at destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,

which together with the IAEA has conducted 8-year-long inspection and destruction of
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction since 1991. During inspection, the two sides had
constant disagreements and conflicts, which brought about arms inspection crisis for many
times and ultimately led to the "Desert Fox" military operation against Iraq launched by
the US and the UK in December, 1998. After prolonged consultation lasting nearly one
year, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999, deciding to
establish the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) to replace the Special Commission. It is confined that if Iraq gives
cooperation within 120 days, the Security Council intends to suspend the restrictions on
Iraqi import and export for periods of 120 days each, remove the ceiling put on Iraq's oil
export, and simplify the procedures for contract approval. However, it is not stipulated
explicitly as to how to start the procedure to suspend sanctions against Iraq. On January
26, 2000, Mr. Former director general of IAEA was appointed chairman of UNMOVIC.
At present, the personnel composition and system of operation of UNMOVIC is under
deliberation.

In 1997, Iraq expelled all US members of the inspection team, alleging that the United
States was using the inspections as a spy, which the U.S. was accepted. The team returned
for an even more turbulent time period between 1997 and 1999. Saddam Hussein also
alleged that the CIA was using the weapons inspection teams as a cover for confidential
operations inside Iraq. In 1999, the team was replaced by a new team which began
inspections in 2002. In April, 1991, the US, the UK and France defined the three provinces
in northern Iraq as a "security zone" and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and
administration institutions under the excuse of preventing Iraq from suppressing domestic
minority nationalities. In fact there are no such provisions in the Security Council Resolutions. The “no-fly zone” in southern Iraq was also set up by the US under the trick of protecting the Iraqi Shiite Muslims in August, 1992. In early September, 1996, the US launched retaliatory strikes against Iraq as Iraqi troops entered the “security zone” in northern Kurdish area to crack down the Kurdish pro-Iranian anti-government armed forces. The US also announced that the “no-fly zone” be expanded from North and South Iraq where the Shi’a and Kurds are living there. However, the greatest amounts of bombs were dropped during two prolonged bombing campaigns: Desert Strike, which lasted a few weeks in September 1996, and Desert Fox, in December 1998, the aim was to oust Saddam Hussein from his power in Iraq.

The sanctions on Iraq and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia contributed to the United States’ increasingly negative image within the Arab world. Therefore, the nine years of sanctions had no appreciable affect on the power of Saddam Hussein’s leadership over Iraq. The UN sanctions were contributing to the widespread and terrible suffering of the Iraqi people. The Iraqis achieved none of their initial goals. Rather than enhancing their economic, military, and political position, they were economically devastated, militarily defeated, and politically isolated. Yet because the government and many of the military forces remained intact, the Iraqis could claim mere survival as a victory. The surviving military forces were used a short time later to suppress two postwar rebellions: one involving Shi’a Muslims in southern Iraq and one involving Kurds in the north.
The oil-for-food programme

In response to the growing humanitarian crisis, the UNSC passed resolutions 706 in 1991 and 986 (the oil for food program) in April 1995. The latter was implemented following a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqi government in 1996. Notwithstanding the sanction resolutions, Iraq was permitted to export oil up to a value of $1 billion in a period of ninety days, in exchange for “medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs”. The program was administered by the UN Office of the Iraq Program, which ensured that the Iraqi government would fully comply with the provision of the resolutions.

Prior to the start of the oil-for-food program, the government had been distributing 1,300 calories per day to the population by way of food rations and foodstuff subsidies. The prevalence of malnutrition in Iraqi children under five almost doubled between 1991 and 1996: from 12 to 13 percent. Acute malnutrition in the center and southern region rose from 3 to 11 percent for the same age bracket. Indeed, the World food program (WFP) indicated that by July 1995, average shop prices of essential commodities stood at 850 times that July 1990 level. The Oil-for-Food program successfully staved off mass starvation, but the level of malnutrition within Iraq remained high and directly contributed to the high morbidity and mortality rates. In 1999, a UNICEF report estimated that

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sanctions had caused the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. In March 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged in his report that the prices of essential food items were beyond the reach of most Iraqis. The 2003 Report on the State of the World’s Children, issued by UNICEF, and agreed, stating that “Iraq’s regression over the past decade is by far the most severe of the 193 countries surveyed”. The impact of the sanctions regime on Iraq was overwhelming and multifarious. While it pauperized the Iraqi people, it strengthened the grip of the Hussein regime over a population that had become fully dependent on the state’s food-distribution system.

In operation between 1996 and 2003, the oil-for-food programme generated $69 billion dollars from Iraqi oil sales, of which $38 billion were allocated to humanitarian purchases for Iraq. Following the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, the regime of Saddam Hussein had refused a humanitarian programme on the grounds of sovereignty, preferring in effect to have control over a smaller illegal import/export sector. In 1995 the Iraqi regime agreed with the UN Secretariat to a revised programme providing it discretionary control over oil pricing and the selection of purchasers of oil exports and humanitarian (and oil industry spare parts) imports. In other words, some members of the Security Council would have allowed corruption for the sake of pursuing a sanctions-based security agenda while others financially benefitted from the regime of Saddam

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26 http://www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/331/13/PDF/N0033113.pdf?
28 Ibid., p. 127
Hussein. Beyond the case of the oil-for-food programme, Security Council members also
defacto tolerated Iraqi illicit revenues from oil smuggling (outside the programme) estimated at between $5.7 and $13.6 billion between 1997 and 2002. Again political 'realism' played out in this attitude, with the USA in particular seeking to avoid a confrontation over smuggled oil with 'friendly regimes' such as Jordan and Turkey.

The UN Secretariat itself did not tackle the problem of illicit revenues, considering it a political issue to be addressed by the Security Council. Allegations of bureaucratic corruption by the head of the programme, Benon Vahe Sevan, also appear to be true, while the exact role and possible gains of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's son Kojo-who was affiliated to a Swiss firm at the time it received the programme's inspection services contract has not yet been clarified. The official investigation into the programme led by Paul A Volcker has recognised the political interference of Security Council members in the running of the programme, but it has also strongly criticised the failure of the UN Secretariat to challenge this interference and to observe its 'own rules of fairness and accountability'. Oil has been a major driving force behind foreign interests, balance of power, and territorial conflicts in the Persian Gulf. As a result of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, debates on oil and the US security agenda in the Gulf region have significantly shifted. On one side of the debate those opposing US military intervention argue that the 'war on terror' has provided yet another convenient cover for a renewed

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30. Ibid., p. 4
'imperialist oil grab' in the region. Others have justified intervention in terms of the dismal record of human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein, continued regional instability, and the threat of state-sponsored and oil-funded political violence. Among these, the US administration has portrayed its foreign policy on Iraq and the Persian Gulf as going beyond ensuring free access to oil for the world market to ensuring that oil is supporting 'freedom' in Iraq and the region. Accordingly, the US has justified its control of the Iraqi oil sector in light of the welfare and political stability requirements of the country. Despite opposition to the Iraq war, UN Security Council members largely back this vision, provided that the right of the Iraqi people to 'control their own natural resources' be recognised, and that the management of oil revenues by occupying forces 'benefit the Iraqi people' and be adequately audited. Saddam Hussein’s first son, Uday, accumulated at one point close to 30 official positions and supervised both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ economic activities, most notably oil smuggling during the sanctions regime.

The control of part of the 'informal' market and the official control of the rationing programme enabled the government of Saddam Hussein to strengthen its 'dictatorship of force' with a 'dictatorship over needs' targeting the mainstream population.

Internal revolt (Kurds & Shi’as)

Kurds in Iraq have been in an almost constant state of revolt since Britain created Iraq after World War I. At times they also have been bitterly divided among themselves. Kurds

31. www.socialistworker.co.uk
33. Tripp, A History of Iraq; and F Rigaud, 'Irak: Le temps suspendu de l’embargo', Critique Internationale, April 2001, p. 15
are the majority in As Sulaymaniya, Irbil, and Dahuk province. Although the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly also a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq’s richest oil producing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin. The two main Kurdish parties the KDP and the PUK were founded in the early 1960s, while two of the main Shiite parties the Da’wa and SCIRI were formed in the early 1980s, and the third, the Sadr movement, in 1990. Whereas Masoud Barzani of the KDP was keen to sign an autonomy agreement with Saddam Hussein, his main rival, Jalal Talabani, leader of PUK, announced in December 1991 that “they were openly cooperating with the Iraqi opposition to overthrow the present government in Iraq”. The allies continued to maintain air cover for the ‘safe haven’ area established during relief efforts in April 1991, north of the 36th parallel in Iraq. In numerical terms, the Shi’a number approximately 60% of the Iraqi population. The Shi’a population would act as a cohesive voting block in any democratic election. Saddam pursued a ruthless policy of persecution, oppressing the Shi’a Arabs throughout his period in power and particularly after 1988. Further complicating the issue of Shi’a position in Iraq is the fact that they consider themselves to be Iraqi nationalist. The Shi’a tribes were heavily involved in the 1920 revolt against the British. For the first time since 1980, Shi’a had a leader who had a mass following and the ability to politicize the hawza and spiritualize the masses. Recognizing the threat, Saddam acted swiftly; Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr was assassinated in Najaf in 1991, along with his two eldest sons, leaving his youngest son, Muqtada, as heir to political legacy of al-Sadr al-Thani.\[34\] The Kurds and Shi’a opposition to Saddam Hussein was supported by the misjudged invasion


Iraq opposition leaders became more confident due to Saddam Hussein defeat, and repeatedly called for a democratic system in the country with autonomy for the Kurdish population. There were 300 opposition leaders of different political parties, who met in March 1991 at Beirut. They took part in the largest gathering of the Iraqi opposition to the rule of the Bath party over the past 23 years. Those attended included the Kurdish front, a coalition of eight Kurdish militia groups, the Pro-Iranian Da’wa party, the Iraqi communist party the Islamic Amal Organisation, the Pro-Syrian branch of the Bath party and the council for democratic Iraq, which was recently formed in London and has close links with Saudi Arabia. Britain, USA, Syria and Saudi Arabia openly supported the Iraqi opposition groups who concluded that Saddam Hussein might survive the uprising. The Iranian backed anti-government Shi’a Muslim group, called the Supreme Assembly for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, (SAIRI) was headed by Ayatollah Bakr Hakim. He played a crucial role in the Shi’a uprising in the two southern provinces. Hundreds were killed in large scale clashes between demonstrators and government troop in four townships near Baghdad. These four towns, Al-Thawra, shoal, Al-kadhemiya and Mashtal, witnessed scenes of massive demonstration against the government. Basra, Zubair and Ummalkhasib also witness Shi’a uprisings and the end of the March 1991, Saddam’s force had crushed

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the uprising by Shi’a fundamentalist. On March 16 1991, in his first nationally televised address since end of the Gulf war, Saddam Hussein promised wide scale political reforms, including a new parliament, constitution and cabinet. But he did not give anytime table for holding elections. The large scale destruction caused by the Iraqi Army’s action against Shi’a only aggravated the damage resulting from allied bombing and earlier from Iranian attacks. Many of the Arab worlds wanted to oust Saddam Hussein from the power. The goal was to divide the Iraqi military by building a network of opposition forces that could challenge Saddam Hussein’s control of the countryside and ultimately change his stronghold in Baghdad. There were Saudi plans to use the Kurds from the north through Turkey to overthrow Saddam Hussein, by providing weapons to Kurdish guerrillas. Syrian intelligence also cooperated with Saudi Arabia in the anti- Saddam Hussein, planning.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{36} The Times of India, February 8, 1992; March 13, 1992
CHAPTER II

9/11 AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN POLICY

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The destruction of Iraq in 1991 was motivated by the US’s desire to maintain its regional hegemony and to enhance the regional influence of Israel and the Gulf Oil States. Thirteen years of brutal sanctions destroyed Iraq’s social and economics infrastructure from within. In the early 1990s, the George Bush Senior administration tasked Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad at the Department of Defense to develop a plan for global garrisoning through military redeployment and high-tech weaponry in what came to be known as “defense transformation” or the “Global Posture Review”. The Middle East was a crucial territory for US interests, both economic and geostrategic, in this plan. The design of the Global Posture Review rested on strategically positioning US hardware and troops in foreign areas where nationalist ideologies, antipathy toward the US and energy reserves existed. Structural changes in the global political economy of oil and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 set in motion the political dynamics that eventually culminated in the US invasion of Iraq. US strategic goals in the Gulf region were outlined in the document Rebuilding American’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources, published in 2000 by a neo-conservative thin-tank Project for a New American Century. The report argued that “American power and presence” were essential for Gulf security and singled out Iraq and Iran as major threats to US strategic interests in the region.

37 Thomas Donnelly, Rebuilding America’s Defenses. Washington, DC. PNAC, 2000
38 Ibid., p. 5
At the end of the Gulf War, allied leaders assumed that the combination of military defeat and internal unrest would lead to Saddam’s fall. To this end, the United States used a range of instruments to remove Saddam from power. For many years after the Gulf War, Washington tried to foment a coup in Baghdad. The United States also used military strikes to discredit Saddam and to weaken regime protection forces. Policy makers also hoped that sanctions would foster popular and elite unrest, further destabilizing the regime.

On June 27, 1993, the US launched a cruise missile attack on Iraq’s intelligence headquarters, causing civilian casualties, including the death of the prominent Iraqi painter Leila Attar. The savage attack ostensibly aimed to punish Iraq for having allegedly plotted to assassinate President Bush during a visit to Kuwait, Clinton’s real agenda, however, was to signal a determination by the new administration to keep Iraq under the US gun and to establish a precedent for unilateral intervention. Clinton, who was able to extend the unilaterally established “no-fly” zone, began to speak as if the US had manifest destiny in Iraq.

In fact, by 1997, US leaders were openly admitting the sanctions would remain regardless of whether Unscom declared that Iraq had no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons making capability. For example President Clinton declared that the “sanction will be there until the end of time, or as long as he (Saddam) last”. Needless to say, these unequivocally arrogant statements are in direct contradiction with Security Council Resolution 687, which states that, upon compliance, the sanctions “shall have no further

force or effect”. It is important to point out that the US claim is further weakened by Security Council Resolution 687, which provided for the onsite inspections. The resolution did not grant any member the right to use force to enforce to mandate. The Anglo-American air strikes that followed Butler’s report began on December 16, 1998, before the report was considered by the Security Council, which was already in session, and after Unscom and International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) personnel had been withdrawn from Iraq for their own safety. The US not only signed the death certificate of Unscom but sapped the UN and its secretary general of all vestiges of credibility and committed an egregious violation of the UN Charter by launching aggression against a member state.

In November 1998, President Bill Clinton embraced the opposition, promising to work for “a new government” in Baghdad. Caution at home and opposition from major powers and allies in the region led Washington to avoid the direct involvement of US ground troops or aid to the Iraqi opposition that would require a major U.S. commitment. A policy more reliant on the Iraqi opposition would depend heavily on regional allies, who would be needed to provide bases, training, and support for opposition fighters. Between 1993 and 1998, fifty-four Americans had been killed in militants attacks. Then, in February 1998, Osama bin Laden issued his instruction to kill Americans: ‘To kill Americans and their allies civilians and military is proclaimed an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”

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40. Article 22 of SC Resolution 687
42. http://www.jstor.org/stable
In 1998, twelve more Americans were killed in militant attacks; in 1999, five more; in 2000, another nineteen. Inside Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban, al-Qaeda was training more than 15,000 militants in the late 1990s. The events of 9/11, therefore, did not change everything; 'most fundamentally,' explained Condoleezza Rice, '9/11, crystallized our vulnerability.' Power was not an end in itself. Bush's advisers wanted to mobilize power to thwart threats, foster peace and build freedom. 'After 9/11, Condoleezza Rice stated, 'there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, World War II, or the Cold War'. The threat emanates from the nexus of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and aggressive tyrants in command of rogue states.

Although many contemporaries and historians defined US Cold War policies in terms of containment and deterrence, America's real strategy was to pursue a preponderance of power.

The militant attacks on September 11, 2001, and the United States' military response in Afghanistan against the Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban militia that harbored it, led to a sharper focus on the Iraq problem. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, carried out by Al-Qaeda operatives trained and led from their bases in Afghanistan, demonstrated the threat posed by terrorists who could seek safe haven in rogue nations with potential access to WMD. As President Bush said in his January 2002 State of the Union address: States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of

evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.\footnote{46}

On September 12, 2002, President Bush challenged the United Nations to address the threat posed by Iraq as highlighted by its continuing defiance of the Security Council. On November 8, the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1441 to address “the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles poses to international peace and security”.\footnote{47} The resolution deplores the absence of international inspections in Iraq since December 1998 and Iraq’s continued failure to renounce international terrorism and cease the repression of its civilian population, and gives Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council”. It reminded Iraq that the Security Council has repeatedly warned that “serious consequences” would result from the continued violation of its obligations. Although Iraq responded to the resolution by permitting the resumption of inspections; it never took advantage of its final opportunity to comply with its international obligations. Iraq submitted a declaration on December 7, 2002, but the declaration was incomplete, inaccurate, and composed mostly of recycled information. Iraq's declaration clearly failed to address any of the outstanding disarmament questions that previous disarmament inspectors had publicly documented.

\footnote{46}{http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/iraq/20020129-1.html}

\footnote{47}{See SC Res. 1441}
The reports submitted by UNMOVIC to the Council confirmed these shortcomings. Iraq's submission of a declaration that did not comply with Resolution 1441 was a further material breach of its obligations. As President Bush stated on March 6, 2003, Iraq continued to produce missiles that violate the restrictions in Resolution 687 and to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by international inspectors. No permanent member of the UN Security Council claimed that Iraq had lived up to its obligations in Resolution 1441. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a comprehensive presentation to the Security Council demonstrating Iraq's ongoing WMD efforts and their concealment from UN inspectors.\textsuperscript{48} As Dr. Blix indicated to the Security Council on January 27, 2003, Iraq had not come "to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it".\textsuperscript{49}

The conclusion is inescapable that at the time of the outbreak of the 2003 conflict, Iraq had decided to refuse to comply with its disarmament obligations. This placed Iraq in material breach of Resolution 1441 as well as Resolution 687. The coalition forces in Iraq continue to search for WMD sites; while no weapons have yet been discovered, it may take months if not years to learn the fate of Iraq's WMD stockpile. It has become clearer since the war that Saddam Hussein had allowed Al-Qaeda linked terrorists to operate from Iraq. Nonetheless, these ex-post developments do not directly bear on the justification for the use of force ex ante. What the United States and its allies reasonably understood the facts to be at the start of hostilities, not what turned up afterwards.

\textsuperscript{48} \url{http://www.whitehouse.}

\textsuperscript{49} \url{http://www.unmovic.org}.
Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and 9/11

Two days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a Time CNN poll found that 78 percent of respondents thought that Saddam Hussein was involved with the attacks on the twin trade towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. From that time to the beginning of the war and into the summer of 2003, President Bush and his administration strongly implied that there was a link between Saddam and the al Qaeda hijackers, despite Osama bin laden contempt for Saddam as the head of a secular state. Although Bush probably knew that the evidence was quite sketchy at best, he used the implied link to bolster support for war with Iraq in Congress before the authorizing resolution and more generally with the American public before and after the war. In early October 2002, President Bush was trying to convince Congress to pass a resolution to give him unilateral authority to go to war with Iraq.

In a major address to the nation on October 7, he said “We know that Iraq and al-Qaeda have had high level contacts that go back a decade. . . . We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gasses”. He also said that a “very senior al Qaeda leader” received medical treatment in Baghdad. In the same speech, the president closely connected the need to attack Iraq with the 9/11 attacks: “Some citizens wonder, ‘after 11 years of living with this [Saddam Hussein] problem, why do we need to confront it now?’ And there’s a reason. We have experienced the horror of

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51 http://www.indybay.org
Thus, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a major reason for attacking Iraq. Vice President Cheney said on “Meet the Press” in late 2001 that a meeting between Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi official in Prague in 2001 was "pretty well confirmed". On September 27, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the link between Saddam and al-Qaeda was “bulletproof”. National Security Advisers Condoleezza Rice said on September 25, 2002, “There clearly are contacts between al-Qaeda and Iraq. . . . There clearly is testimony that some of the contacts have been important contacts and that there's a relationship there”. 

The problem was that evidence for a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was never very solid. The administration based part of its argument on a claim that 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi official in Prague in April 2001. An investigation by the FBI, however, concluded that there was no convincing evidence that Atta was in Prague at the time of the meeting and the CIA was doubtful about any meeting of Atta and an Iraqi official. The “very senior al-Qaeda leader” to whom Bush referred was Abu Mussab Zarqawi, a Jordanian who was not in al-Qaeda, though he was a terrorist and had had contacts with al Qaeda.

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52. http://www.jstor.org/stable
A UN terrorism committee did not find any link between al Qaeda and Saddam. According to the chief investigator, Michael Chandler, “Nothing has come to our notice that would indicate links between Iraq and al-Qaeda”\textsuperscript{57} But even if there were some evidence that al Qaeda members had been in Iraq at some time, it would not constitute proof that Iraq was connected to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Despite the lack of solid evidence, President Bush continued to connect the war in Iraq with Al-Qaeda and 9/11.

Nearly two years ago, following deadly attacks on our country, we began a systematic campaign against terrorism. And we acted in Iraq, where the former regime sponsored terror. And for America, there will be no going back to the era before September the 11th, 2001, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities.\textsuperscript{58} But on September 18 President Bush conceded: “No, we’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.”\textsuperscript{59} He gave no explanation as to why the previously implied connection was abandoned. How can we judge this systematic pattern of implication and the sudden reversal by the president? It is difficult to show that there was an outright lie in the president’s rhetoric, because his use of language was too careful. Some of the statements by Bush might have been based on claims that he thought were true when he implied the connection between Saddam and 9/11. The problem is that as it became clear that the evidence was dubious, the president continued to imply that the

\textsuperscript{57} June 26, 2003, from http://www.truthout.org

\textsuperscript{58} The president's speech was printed in The New York Times, September 8, 2003, p. A10.

connection was real. President Bush did exploit and encourage the general public belief that Saddam was connected to the attacks of 9/11, and his strong implications served his purpose of achieving public support for war with Iraq.

Another claims that, Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program and was potentially “less than a year” away from possessing nuclear weapons was a powerful argument that deposing Saddam Hussein was important for U.S. national security. Even those who thought that Saddam could be deterred from using chemical and biological weapons might be persuaded that an attack was necessary if they were convinced that Saddam was closing in on nuclear weapons capability. Thus, the claim of Saddam's nuclear capacity was one of other strongest arguments that President Bush could make for war with Iraq. In his speech on August 26, 2002 laying out the administration's argument for war with Iraq, Vice President Cheney said, “Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. . . . There is no doubt he is amassing [WMD] to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us”.  

Condoleezza Rice said in September 2002, “There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly [Saddam] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud”. On September 7, 2002 at Camp David, President Bush told reporters on the issue of Iraqi nuclear capacity, “I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied, finally denied access, a report came out of the Atomic - the IAEA - that they were six months away from developing a weapon. I

60. http://www.whitehouse.gov
don't know what more evidence we need". 62 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report did say that in 1991 Iraq had been 6 to 24 months away from the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb, but that capacity had been destroyed by UN inspectors before 1998. When the inspectors left Iraq in 1998, the report said: “Based on all credible information to date, the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical capability for the production of weapon usable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material”.

On January 23 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said: "Disarming Iraq and the war on terror are not merely related. Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons program is a crucial part of winning the war on terror". 64 Then, in his State of the Union speech on January 28, 2003, President Bush said the 16 words that would become the center of controversy: “The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa”. Immediately before the war, on March 16, Vice President Cheney declared: “We know [Saddam Hussein] has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons”. 65 

65. Ibid
problem with this series of statements was that the evidence upon which the president's claims were based turned out to be questionable. Two claims of evidence for Saddam’s nuclear capacity that the administration relied upon were of dubious authenticity: the claim that Iraq sought uranium oxide, “yellowcake”, from Niger, and that aluminum tubes shipped to Iraq were intended to be used as centrifuges to create the fissile material necessary for a nuclear bomb. There is no doubt that Iraq sought nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1976, Iraq bought a nuclear reactor from France that it assembled at Osiraq, but just before it was to come on line in 1981 the Israelis launched an air attack that destroyed it. By the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq had made great progress in its nuclear program, lacking only fissile material necessary for nuclear bombs. After the war, however, UN inspectors destroyed most, if not all, of the physical capacity to construct nuclear bombs, though engineers and scientists remained in Iraq. In addition to the destruction of weapons by the UN inspectors before they left in 1998, the economic sanctions severely limited the materials that could be brought into the country for potential use for WMD. U.S. enforcement of the no-fly zones also limited what the Iraqis could do, and satellite surveillance was used extensively to monitor the country. Although knowledge of the forged letters was made public in February 2003, the sentence did not arouse public controversy until, in the wake of the U.S. war with Iraq, no evidence of weapons of mass destruction and no nuclear weapons could be found. In explaining why the president might
not have known that the claim was not accurate, a high level White House official said, "The president of the United States is not a fact checker".66

Finally, on July 30, the president said, "I take personal responsibility for everything I say, of course. I also take responsibility for making decisions on war and peace. And I analyzed a thorough body of intelligence, got solid, sound intelligence that led me to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power".67 In the summer of 2003, the administration argued that the president's words were technically truthful because he referred to British intelligence as the source of the conclusion about the Niger connection. Condoleezza Rice said, "The statement that he made was indeed accurate. The British government did say that". Donald Rumsfeld said, "It turns out that it's technically correct what the president said, that the U.K. does- did say that and still says that".68 But in spite of the lack of evidence, some U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Saddam's nuclear program had been reconstituted.

**Chemical and Biological Weapons**

Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s is certain, in part because some of the materials came from the United States and because Saddam used chemical weapons against Iran and against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Thus, it was surprising that little evidence of these programs was found by U.S. troops in the aftermath of the war, especially because the United States devoted considerable manpower and expertise to the

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68. Ibid
effort to discover them. Although Iraq purchased most of its chemical and biological weapons materials from Europe and a few other regions, significant materials came from the United States in the 1980s. Despite reports that the Iraqis were using chemical warfare weapons against the Iranians, the Reagan administration moved aggressively to support Iraq, sending Donald Rumsfeld as a special envoy to meet with Saddam Hussein in December 1983.

The United States supported Iraq during the war in a number of ways, including economic aid in Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees of more than $1 billion from 1983 to 1987 and regular intelligence help that reached the liaison level of relationship between the two countries’ intelligence agencies. But more importantly, the United States encouraged its allies, particularly France and Germany, to allow sale of weapons to Iraq, where Iraq got much of its chemical and biological weapons capacity. Biological agents sold to Iraq from the United States during this period included several strains of anthrax and bubonic plague. Despite the killing of 200,000 Kurds with chemical weapons and high explosives from 1987 to 1989 and the destruction of the Kurdish town of Halabjah on March 15, 1988, the United States did not stop U.S. companies from continuing to sell insecticides and other chemical components of chemical weapons to Iraq.

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In 1988, Iraq purchased $1.5 million worth of pesticides from Dow Chemical. The United States benefited from its support of Iraq by being allowed to purchase Iraqi oil at lower than world market prices. The most serious questions about the administration's claims were raised when U.S. forces were not able to find evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons after the war, despite the diligent searching of U.S. military forces and the 1,200 member Iraq Survey Group headed by David Kay. Most experts were perplexed at the inability of the Iraq Survey Group to find the chemical and biological weapons that were expected to be found. After the war, many Iraqi scientists denied that they existed, and no evidence was found that they did.

In an interview, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz implied that the WMD argument was not necessarily the most important for policy makers. "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on". On the other hand, in a discussion with the editors of the New York Times, Colin Powell implied that the claimed WMD were central to his own support of the war. While all executive branch agencies should take their guidance from the president and his appointees, it is dangerous for a presidential administration to pressure intelligence agencies to distort their professional judgments in order to support an administration's short-term policy goals. While evidence of undue pressure from the administration is inconclusive and circumstantial at this time, insofar as the Bush administration put pressure on U.S. intelligence agencies to suit their analyses to its policy goals, it jeopardized its own best sources of intelligence.

Bush policy towards Iraq during second term

With the advent of the Bush II administration, and as part of the reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and President Bush's “war on terror” Iraq which has not been linked to the September 11 attacks was named, together with Iran and North Korea, as part of Bush's “Axis of Evil” hence becoming a candidate for another major invasion. A number of pro-Israel, right-wing think tanks, in which Pentagon hawks were entrenched began urging a war that would create a pro-American regime in Iraq and enable Washington to remap the region. The Bush II administration equates its credibility as the lone superpower with its readiness to go to war, whether or not it has any authorisation at the domestic or international level. The assumption was that the United States is responsible for the maintenance of a stable regional security environment conducive to its own economic and strategic interests. This in turn, is equated with “international stability”, itself a self-proclaimed US responsibility in the post-cold war period. Therefore, the US government must maintain an ongoing ability and willingness to project power abroad, at two or three fronts simultaneously, if necessary, to contain, if not demolish, any challenger or would be challenger to its self-proclaimed rules.

The US hegemonic policy towards Iraq

In 1999 Clinton's Department of Defense had appointed a bipartisan commission on national security in the twenty-first century. It was chaired not by neoconservative hawks but by Gary Hart, a liberal Democrat, and Warren Rudman, a moderate Republican.

Reporting long before 9/11, their commission envisioned a more chaotic world. Some states, the report concluded, would fragment; others would fail. Ethnic and religious violence would increase; suppressed nationalisms would flower; terrorist groups would proliferate; weapons of mass destruction would spread. Consequently, the United States would become 'increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland'. In that environment, the American government would not be able to rely on traditional alliances. Deterrence, the report stressed, ‘will not work as it once did’.

The United States, therefore, required military capabilities ‘characterized by stealth, speed, range, unprecedented accuracy, lethality, strategic mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and ability to prevail’.

Almost everyone in the United States who carefully examined national security issues in the 1990s grasped the growing threat of terrorism, the links with failing and rogue states, and the threat of an attack on the United States with weapons of mass destruction. Powell and Rice have stressed that preemption 'must be treated with great caution'. It is one tool, said Colin Powell, in a toolbox filled with tools. The number of cases in which it might be justified, insisted Condoleezza Rice, 'will always be small ... It does not give a green light-to the United States or any other nation-to act first without exhausting other means ... The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

Yet there were points when the basic case for war might have been raised on December 21, 2002. Bush himself felt the case for war was less than compelling. The point was to make the case more convincingly rather than to

question the validity of the evidence. The overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination.

The Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Carter Doctrine all contemplated the deployment of force to counter Soviet advances. Not all of them prescribed preemptive military action. But Eisenhower's deployment of forces to Lebanon, Johnson's military intervention in the Dominican Republic and Reagan's attack on Libya, as well as Kennedy's blockade of Cuba and Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia and Laos, all possessed unilateral, preemptive qualities. The United States has long affirmed the right of anticipatory self-defense from the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994. Iraq's nuclear capacity was based on dubious evidence that was presented in a misleading manner. Claims about chemical and biological weapons were based on legitimate evidence that was widely accepted internationally, despite the failure to find the weapons by late 2003. Claims of Saddam's ability to deliver these weapons, however, were exaggerated. In March 2003 the United States and Britain invaded the sovereign state of Iraq to secure regime change with the aim of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. President George W. Bush said that, Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours and their refusal to do so will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.

This US led action was aimed at nullifying a rogue state. But the United States have identified other rogue states as being part of what they regard as ‘the axis of evil’. These states were identified as North Korea and Iran. Moreover, the United States have since identified Syria, Cuba and Libya as being a threat. So it becomes especially important now to weigh up whether the precedent is sound. In turn this engages the larger geo-political
question of the extent to which the United Nations and other international institutions such as the European Union can act as a check on the hegemony of the United States. The United States reflect the military weakness of Europe as compared with the power of the United States. For the weaker Europe negotiation, diplomacy and international law are the only ways in which its aims can be achieved. For Europeans, the U.N. Security Council is a substitute for the power. By contrast for the United States it is a potential restraint on their clear ability to act alone to preserve their national interest. The United States now feel freer of constraint to act in what they consider to be their own best interests regardless of the views of other countries. They see themselves, too, and rightly so, having in many ways wider responsibilities than any other country for upholding order whether in Asia or in the West Asia. These are not responsibilities that Europe can fulfill. On this basis the disparity of power will grow.

The United Nations would not approve the invasion of Iraq, at rate until the weapons inspectors had been given a significantly greater time to find out whether Iraq currently possessed such weapons of mass destruction. So in March 2003 the United States and their allies withdrew their proposed resolution seeking approval for the use of force, because they knew the majority of the Council would reject it, including Russia, Germany and France. They had to find some other way of justifying their action in international law. So they fell back on the 12 year old Resolution 678 of 1990 passed for the purpose of authorizing the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and the restoration of peace in the West Asia. It acknowledged the success of weapons inspections between 1991 and 1998 in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and associated production facilities. It claimed that there had been an increase in capabilities to
produce such weapons since 1998, but also acknowledged that these facilities are capable of dual use for petrochemical and biotech industries.

In February 2003 Dr Hans Blix reported to the United Nations that there were now more than 250 inspectors in Iraq and that although Iraqi co-operation had been less than full, access to sites had been promptly given on demand. No weapons had yet been found and there was as yet no firm evidence that they did or did not exist. He in no way suggested that there was a continuing build-up. He clearly saw his task in searching for chemical and biological weapons as unfinished.76

On the same day Dr Mohamad El Baradei repeated that by December 1998 the International Atomic Energy Authority had neutralised Iraq’s past nuclear programme and had to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.77 ‘[I]f action is taken without the authority of the Council, then the legitimacy and support for that action will be seriously impaired’.

US diplomacy for invasion of Iraq

The beginning of the antepenultimate stage in the countdown to the looming Third Gulf War may be dated to 29 January 2002, when President Bush delivered his State of the Union address to the US Congress and the American people.78 In that speech Bush branded Iraq along with Iran and North Korea as constituting a tiny but lethal 'axis of evil'.

After the successful overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the unsuccessful search for Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the suicide airborne attacks on New York and Washington the previous September 9/11, the United States turned its attention to the disarming of Iraq, the ousting of Saddam Hussein and ‘regime change’ in a ‘liberated’ Iraq.  

The logic of this next move in the American ‘war on terrorism’ was that Saddam's hatred of the United States and his possession of WMD created a ready source of state-based weaponry for a dangerous, ubiquitous but stateless enemy such as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network. Since the autumn of 2002 the Bush administration, supported ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ by Tony Blair’s government, renewed debate within the United Nations on Iraq’s WMD with the declared intention of reconstituting an effective weapons inspection and destruction process under the authority of the UN Security Council. (The official American and British line, succinctly expressed by Blair to the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, is that Saddam possesses CBW and seeks to acquire nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.)  

This insistence upon an American free hand and the necessary virtues of unilateralism lay at the heart of Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, a date chosen to highlight the presumed link between Saddam and bin Laden.  

What we have seen since 9/11 has been the blending of the

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particular concerns of the United States, first to control Saddam Hussein and his Iraq within a larger Persian Gulf strategy, both to protect oil supplies and advance more general American interests in the region as a whole, with the added complication of thereby exacerbating the chronic Israel-Palestine conflict; and second, for the United States to go on the offensive in its declared 'war on terrorism', with Osama din Laden and al-Qaida as the first and most dangerous enemies.\footnote{Fareed Mohamedi and Raad Alkadiri,'Washington makes its case for war', Middle East Report24 (Fall 2002), pp. 2-5.}

The administration issued the National Security Strategy in September 2002 just after the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks. It was released with little fanfare and did not elicit much public debate. At the time, President Bush was focused on trying to build domestic and international support for a final effort to disarm and dislodge Saddam Hussein. Just a week before, he had kicked off diplomatic efforts to draft a tough Security Council resolution with a challenge to the United Nations to show strength or risk irrelevance. On the day the president signed the Strategy, the White House Press Office gave greater attention to release of a timeline detailing “Saddam Hussein’s Deception and Defiance”, which described a dozen instances before 1998 when Baghdad had accepted inspections but then demanded conditions.\footnote{http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocusiraq/iraq_archive.html} The preoccupation with Iraq was clearly a driving force in trying to develop a doctrine that could serve two purposes one immediate and another longer term. Initially, it could provide a political justification for forceful action to remove a regime deemed threatening to the United States, particularly that of Saddam Hussein. Over time, it might enable the United States to shift the benchmarks that
define the parameters of legitimate self defense. The administration sought to ground its new approach to using force in international law.
CHAPTER III

AMERICAN AND BRITISH INVASION OF IRAQ
Prelude to invasion

As the world community entered the 21st century it faced the reality that more people were being killed by their own countrymen than by outside forces. Since 9/11 the USA, with its unrivalled military power, reasserted its dominant role in international security by increasing attention to protracted crises and failed states considered bastions of terrorism. The USA developed a common strategy against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq that called for action based on a worst case scenario involving threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and a best-case scenario if rapid intervention would occur. The USA, along with coalition partners, disapproved of the political position and apparent lack of support from the UN Security Council and chose a unilateral non-Chapter VII model approach to invade Iraq.\(^84\) The USA based its intervention on a country's right to self-defence, and not its right, or obligation, to intervene elsewhere to protect people other than their own.\(^85\) In addition, the intervention was first considered a war to remove a hostile regime. A major humanitarian component to the war was considered unlikely. This unilateral action began a world-wide unilateralism versus multilateralism policy debate that exists to this day. Articles 41 and 42 in Chapter VII lay down both the non-forceful and, as a last resort, forceful measures that the Security Council may take to counter


threats to international peace and security. If the Security Council decides that non-forceful measures under Article 41 are inadequate, Article 42 states that it may take ‘such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Article 51 contains the sole and limited provision, for one country or group of countries to go it alone without prior Security Council backing. It states that ‘[n]othing in the … Charter shall impair the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’.

Planning for war

In late 2002 US government planners, influenced by a State Department-led 'Futures of Iraq' programme, considered many possible outcomes to an invasion and assumed they might face a humanitarian catastrophe. This was based on evidence that civilian health was substantially worse than in 1990, which would be especially critical if WMD were used against already vulnerable populations. Critical indicators that had suffered decline over the previous decade were as follows: infant mortality rates rose from 47.1 to 108/1000 live births; under age five mortality rates rose from 56 to 131/1000 live births; acute malnutrition rose from 3.6 percent to 11 percent in 1996, then declined to 4% in 2003 because of extensive UN agency and NGO facilitated Iraqi feeding programmes; there were increases in reported cases of tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid fever, amoebic dysentery, and malaria. These increases cases may reflect improvements in WHO and UNICEF facilitated training of Iraqi health personnel in disease reporting and outbreak investigation. Despite the fact that, the UN did not sanction the war; international relief organisations (iros), especially those with active programmes in Iraq, unofficially began internal planning for pre-conflict evacuation of expatriate staff and post-conflict recovery
of services. There was concern that, given the already poor health situation in Iraq before the war, a major relief effort would be needed, requiring a coordinated effort of Iraqi nationals and international relief organisations to correct basic public health deficiencies, even without significant combat related civilian casualties.

On 19 March 2003, Coalition Forces (American and British forces mainly) moved from Kuwait into southern Iraq. By 14 April major combat was declared over in and around Baghdad, and on 1 May President Bush declared that the war was over. Iraq posed a challenge of heroic proportions to the UN. The Security Council repeatedly faced toughened calls from the US, UK and some others to enforce its own previous resolutions or become irrelevant to the fast moving sequence of military action. Yet in the meantime, polls consistently showed worldwide anti-war opinion to be deep, broad and strengthening. Indeed the gap between opinion around the world and the voting equation in the Security Council in New York recalled the cynicism captured in Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s remark that at the UN, the people of the world are served up to the designs of governments. Time was when those threatening to go to war had to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. Today we are asked to prove to the powerful, to their satisfaction, why they should not go to war. While compliance with Security Council resolutions was demanded of Iraq, those impatient to wage war, insisted on freedom of action from the very same font of international authority. Few outsiders were convinced of the case for war. Little evidence linked Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden. Saddam had been successfully contained and did not pose a clear and present danger to regional, world or US security.
Washington scarcely concealed its real agenda of regime change, which is why the UN inspection process was just a diplomatic weapon of mass deception. Many governments were seen as pursuing a policy of appeasement: not of Saddam, but of the US as today's dominant power determined to get its way by the threat of war. Saddam's was an odious regime that had grievously wronged its own people, neighbours and the international community. But cynicism about US motives ran deep because of its history of past material and diplomatic support for Saddam during the days when his behavior was at its worst, including the use of chemical weapons against his own people in Halabja and the attack on Iran. There was confusion about the mix of personal, oil, geo-political and military technological motives for going to war. Two things were widely believed to follow from the contrasting US policies towards Iraq and North Korea: Iraq did not have usable nuclear weapons; North Korea does not have oil. Then there was cynicism about the five permanent members of the Security Council the five nuclear powers demanding immediate non-proliferation from everyone else while permanently deferring their own nuclear disarmament.

Former UN chief weapons inspector Richard Butler neither a wimp nor a friend of Saddam has postulated an 'axiom of proliferation': “so long as any state possesses nuclear weapons others will seek to acquire them”. But he also notes that even highly educated and engaged Americans fail to grasp the basic point of the huge political impact of nuclear double standards. Moreover, Iraq was attacked by the US with its ability for self-defence sharply degraded after substantial disarmament by the UN.
US dominance Policy

There was a suggestion during the run-up to war that we were going to invoke our right to self-defence. The right to self-defence is protected by Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51, Charter of the United Nations 1945, ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’. The use of the word ‘inherent’ in that Article indicates that it is the customary international law right of self-defence that is preserved. That doctrine was formulated in the seminal case of The Caroline in 1841 when American Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that there must be a ‘necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation’. The element of necessity is to be determined by the claiming state. But once force has been initiated its legality must be assessed by an impartial body and not by the parties to the conflict. The use of force in self-defence must always be proportionate, that is, in the words of Webster, involving ‘nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it’. Article 51 refers to the use of self-defence in the event of an ‘armed attack’. This raises the question of when, if ever, a state may legally use self-defence in advance of an attack. There is a school of academic thought that considers that the wording of Article 51
precludes action in anticipation of an armed attack, or ‘anticipatory self-defence’ as it is known. Anticipatory self-defence was an accepted part of customary international law. But it maintained the high standard of necessity enunciated in The Caroline. It required a threat to be imminent before a defensive attack could be undertaken in anticipation of it. So the question at the heart of the debate is whether Article 51 qualifies or restricts the wide scope of the customary law doctrine of self-defence. Those who argue for a restrictive interpretation point out that anticipatory self-defence is contrary to the wording of Article 51 as well as to the objects and purposes of the Charter. The imminence of an attack cannot usually be easily assessed on objective criteria. So the decision whether to undertake such an attack would be left to the individual state’s discretion and this contains a manifest risk of abuse.

A newer, and much more controversial, development in international law is the doctrine of preemptive self-defence, advocated by the Bush administration in their ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’ in 2002. This doctrine is broader than anticipatory self-defence and seeks to adapt the concept of ‘imminent threat’ in order to counteract the dangers posed by rogue states and international terrorists. Most states strongly oppose these developments, believing rightly that such policies pose too great a threat to state sovereignty. With such great international opposition the policy of one state is not sufficient to create a valid rule of international law. Neither regime change nor preemptive self-defence can provide a legal justification for the use of military force in Iraq.

The Bush administration initially relied upon the rational that regime change was necessary to “disarm Saddam”, removing WMD and claimed that Saddam was linked with Al-Qaeda. These arguments failed to convince world opinion. Immediately before the war,
the Bush Administration announced that the US would go to war with Iraq, even if Saddam left the country. When no weapons of mass destruction could be found in Iraq, first by the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and later by the invading American forces of Iraq, the rationale for the war was quickly shifted to the liberation of the Iraqi people", and finally to bringing democracy to the country and the wider region. Officials attempted to deal with the glaring absence of WMD". For those paying attention, however, the shifting rational for the war was transparently revealing and, one would have thought, embarrassing for the Bush Administration. When all logic collapsed, as was most frequently the case, it was merely asserted that in any event, whatever the facts, invading Iraq was “the right thing to do”. Both US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated repeatedly that they would do nothing differently if they had the chance.

Almost universally, global public opinion held that the US went to war in Iraq for oil. While overly simplistic, this was essentially correct. More accurately, the US recognised the “stupendous prize” to be won by the control of Middle Eastern oil. Iraq and Saudi Arabia together account for at least 65 percent of total global oil reserves in the world. In the words of one prominent analyst, “the goal would be to keep the Americans in, the Iranian out and the Iraqis down”. Inquiries into the question of WMD, which some bothersome individuals persisted in refusing to forget, held in both Britain and the US, attempted to shift the blame for finding no WMD to the “failure” of intelligence services of both countries. In the US George Tanet, former head of the central Intelligence Agency,
was made a scapegoat and was forced to resign. A similar scripted act was played out in London, with more obscuring subtlety and added farce, keeping to British tradition. Blair, fearing the wrath of voters at the polls, lowered his profile considerable. But the reality of events was appalling transparent. It is pretty clear that whatever Saddam did was quite irrelevant because the US had already made the decision to go to war.

The case for “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” was laid out years before by the CIA analysts in the Clinton Administration. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director for Gulf Affairs, at the National Security Council from 1999 to 2001, wrote in 2002 that “The United States should invade Iraq, eliminate the present regime, and pave the way for a successor prepared to abide by its international commitments and live in peace with its neighbors”. The argument claimed that there were no longer any good policy options towards Iraq, but since Saddam might develop nuclear weapons and use them, the US had no choice but to overthrow Saddam in an “invasion” and occupy the country. It was argued further that neither weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that the sanctions against Iraq had begun to unravel; that US policy had led to “ludicrous Iraqi propaganda” claiming the death of a million Iraqis since 1991 due to the economic sanctions; that the smuggling of oil to Jordon, Syria, Turkey and the Persian Gulf States had doubled since 1998, benefiting these countries; that the US could not stop the smuggling of such items as the fiber-optic communications system installed by the Chinese in the 1990s; and that a policy of deterrence was too risky, since Saddam could threaten Israel. Consequently, the strategic logic for a full scale invasion was “compelling”. Sufficient forces would be deployed to make “success almost certain” and would be well within US capabilities. The oil fields would be seized early on

87. Ibid., “Next Stop Baghdad?” Foreign Affairs, 81 (2), March/April 2003, pp. 32-47.
and after the war the US troops would be on hand for occupation. Funds would be mobilized from the Gulf Cooperation Council, Europe, East Asia, and Iraqi oil for reconstruction. Clinching the argument, Pollack hammered home the idea that the “shock of September 11” was still fresh in the minds of Americans, so the US Government and the public were ready to “make sacrifices”. The rest of the world recognizes that the US is angry about September 11, and “may be leery about getting on the wrong side of it”. But time, Pollack stressed, was of the essence.88

In fact, there are compelling indications that the Bush Administration team had planned the war even before taking office. On September 13, 2001, two days after 9/11, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others in the Bush administration discussed a war against Iraq with President George W. Bush. While there seemed to be a general consensus for a war, the substance of the debate was whether Afghanistan or Iraq should come first. It is also known that Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and others brought into the Bush Administration wrote to President Clinton in 1998, asking for “regime change” to be carried out in Iraq.89 It was also feared that if the United States did not overthrow Saddam and gain control of Iraqi oil wealth quickly, the opportunity could slip out of their hands.

The “war on terrorism” was first declared, not after September 11, but at the beginning of the 1980s.90 By 1997, the “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC) had been

88. Ibid
90. Noam Chomsky and VK Ramachandran, “Iraq is a trial run,” Frontline, (India) April 2, 2003
organized. Among the original signers were Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Elliot Abrams, Francis Fukuyama and Norman Podhoretz. The PNAC is basically about using American force “wherever and whenever necessary”. The US assisted Iraq in the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war to help contain Iran. It was during this time that Iraq used chemical weapon against the Kurds in Halabja with the full knowledge of the US. Further, as revealed in the Iraqi report to the UN in December 2002, there was a long list of both American and Europeans firms which sold material to Iraq, prior to 1991, relating to weapons of mass destruction. US officials never mentioned this past record while going to war to “disarm Saddam”. The US and British media also cooperated, withholding these facts from the public.

The 2003 war

The Bush administration appears to have determined to go to war against Saddam Hussein as a primary foreign policy goal well before 9/11. The war as defined by the administration the “mission” that was declared “accomplished” on May 2, 2003 was destructive, but brief. It has now been overshadowed by the occupation, a scene of ongoing fighting, ongoing casualties among both “coalition” forces and Iraqi and foreign civilians, and ongoing destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and civil society.

As far the human casualties of war, The Lancet, the respected British medical journal, sent researchers throughout the country to gauge the effect of the war on the civilian population. The risk of death was estimated to be 2.5 fold higher after the invasion when compared with the pre-invasion period. Two-thirds of all violent deaths were reported in

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one cluster in the city of Fallujah. If we exclude the Fallujah data, the risk of death is 1.5
fold higher after invasion. The major causes of death before the invasion were myocardial
infarction, cerebrovascular accidents other chronic disorders whereas after the invasion
violence was the primary cause of death. Violent deaths were widespread, reported in 15 of
33 clusters, and were mainly attributed to coalition forces. Most individuals reportedly
killed by coalition forces were women and children. The risk of death from violence in the
period after the invasion was 58 times higher than in the period before the war.

Making conservative assumptions, we think that about 100,000 excess deaths, or more,
have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Violence accounted for most of the excess
deaths and air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths. The
Iraqbodycount.net project, run by a collective of US and British academics, put the
maximum number of civilian deaths at 17,000 by late October of 2004. In fact, more than
a year and a half after the invasion, Iraq's infrastructure which had never fully recovered
from the Gulf War and sanctions remained badly compromised. Once again, oil
production, the basis for Iraq's economy, fell steeply. Crude oil expert for May 2004
averaged 1.6 million barrels a day. The US Commerce Department's "Iraq investment and
Reconstruction Taskforce" reported that it did not foresee Iraq fulfilling its potential
production capacity of 6 million barrels a day for many years and emphasized the need for
"sizable" investment just to get oil fields functioning properly a boon for US companies
like Halliburton, but a sorry state of affairs for millions of Iraqis, who by late 2004 had yet
to fed any benefits from these investments.

Agriculture historically accounted for a bit more than one-quarter of Iraq's GDP and
provided 20 percent of all employment. Agriculture in Iraq suffered from the lack of water
65
supplies for irrigation. While US government officials rhapsodized in 2004 about the sector’s “potential for the future” in the post invasion period, the figure told a different story: recovery costs for 2004 alone were estimated by the World Bank at $3.6 billion, exceeding the funding earmarked for agriculture in the Iraq budget by over 1 billion.

Before the Gulf war, Iraq produced more than enough electricity to meet the country’s needs. Through patchwork repairs, it had partially rebuilt its electricity grid but the 2003 invasion cut capacity in half. Only after 18 months of rebuilding has production come close to pre-invasion levels. And even at these levels, there is not enough electricity to meet current and future predicted demands. Clean drinking water also remains in short supply in many parts of the country. Iraq’s sewage treatment system, never fully rebuilt after the Gulf War, was further damaged, and as of summer 2004, raw sewage was flowing into the Tigris River at Bagdad. According to August 2004 reports, some 1,000 Iraqi schools need to be rebuilt as a result of damage and looting; almost 20 percent of the country’s 18,000 school buildings need comprehensive or partial repair. The BBC reported at the end of 2003 that most of Iraq’s 2004 education budget would need to be spent for salaries alone, with little left over for investment in physical infrastructure. Even where schools exist, some parents are afraid to allow their children to attend, not wanting to expose them to the dangers of stray bullets of rampant kidnappings. Meanwhile, among adults the unemployment level remains, by various estimates, some between 25 and 50 percent.

The Iraq healthcare system is suffering from chronic shortages of all kinds. According to the World Health Organisation, unsafe streets impeding the mobility of wealth workers
and the transport of supplies is one of the roots of the problem. Doctors in major hospital
continue to complain of shortages of drugs in major used in surgery and emergency
operations, anti-inflammatory and cancer drugs, and vital antibiotics. Electricity shortages
and a lack of clean water further compound the problems faced by hospital: when
generators break down, patients can die on the operating table, while unsanitary conditions
lead to deadly infections. Equipment shortages are also crippling, with doctors attempting
to do their work without sufficient or effective X-ray machines and cardiac monitors. US
administrator L. Paul Bremer himself was reported to have said, in February 2004, that
spending on reconstruction was “not nearly enough to cover the needs in the healthcare
field, “while millions have been “committed” to the health sector in the Iraqi budget, a
September 2004 State Department weekly report showed that next to nothing was being
“disbursed”.92

The greatest threat in the immediate aftermath of intervention was a political vacuum. As
was seen in the Balkans after the fall of the Soviet Union, an absence of legitimate
political authority to manage competing claims for power resulted in a descent into chaos
and civil war. Life shifted all too easily into a cold reality where it became, as the
seventeenth century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes put it in Leviathan, 'nasty,
brutish and short'. In an unpredictable and unstable environment, people begin to look for
solidarity in social groupings to avoid insecurity. The political landscapes of Iraq become
marred by identity politics of an unprecedented complexity and aggression. Support for

92. Reverend. Baghdad Burning, A Young Woman’s Diary From A War Zone. Women
Unlimited. New Delhi. 2007. P. xx
competing bids for power in postwar Iraq was easily be manipulated and sought along ethnic, sectarian and class lines, quite possibly sponsored from abroad. Given the long-term political and economic marginalization of the majority of the Iraqi population, the Shia Muslims, as well as the violent repression of the Iraqi Kurds and their history of separatism, there were solid grounds for social conflict following regime removal.

Likewise, an economically empowered and increasingly confident Iran looked to ensure that a new Iraqi regime is dominated by the Shia majority. The location of the Shiite holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, Samara and Kazimayn in south-eastern Iraq creates a natural gravitational pull between Iraq and Iran, one that has been carefully counteracted by the secularization of Iraqi political culture by the Baath and Hussein regimes. But there exists among Shiites a 'significant potential for mobilisation around central clerical figures', both as an expression of identity and as a means to pursue political goals. If the United States is serious about democracy in the West Asia, it will need to be more tolerant of an Islamic polity.

However, on the whole much ethnic and confessional tension in Iraq can be seen as issues of representation and inequality characterized along social fault-lines. There is cause to believe that they could be contained within a federal state structure, and this has been taken as a broadly accepted solution among Iraqi opposition groups. In June 2002, exiled Shiites, sensing the international community might make a definite move on Iraq, forwarded a manifesto demanding that a post-Saddam Iraq include a representative parliamentary system; ethnic and religious pluralism; administrative decentralization along geographic, demographic and economic lines (as opposed to ethnic or religious divisions);
and recognition of the Shia as the popular majority. Similar voices have also been heard from Kurdish opposition groups. A meeting between the formerly hostile Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in September 2002 reaffirmed their commitment to a ‘joint project for federalism, normalisation of the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, security matters and formulating a united political position on regional and international levels’. Statements like these underline the precarious position in which the US finds itself while it has been running a perhaps incautiously high profile propaganda campaign against Iraq's leadership, exiled opposition groups have picked up their rhetorical tableware and put their differences aside for a slice of the democratic pie.

To be sure, in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP and PUK are bound by the Washington Accord of 1998 to the ‘territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, on the basis of a pluralistic, democratic and federal political structure’ but the durability of such commitments in the face of an open competition for the control of northern Iraq remains to be seen. Empowering these groups through American finance and arms runs the serious risk of radicalizing parties that could form the basis of a pluralistic civil society into militant and divided rebel factions. Institutionalizing warlords is not a good route to a sustainable political settlement. Rachel Bronson of the Council on Foreign Relations has noted that the ‘US military is not very well suited to the task of establishing security in precarious political environments’. Explanations for such perceived ‘weaknesses’ are provided in

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terms of institutional psychology. The ethos of the contemporary American military was largely shaped by its experience as an expeditionary war fighting force in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War and Somalia.

Iraq reconstruction

It is important to remind ourselves that Iraq is not a typical context for reconstruction. On the eve of the war it had little in common with the poor, underdeveloped, dysfunctional states that have been the subject of 'humanitarian' reconstruction interventions under the auspices of the UN. Over the past decade a diverse set of actors, such as the UN and its agencies, donor governments, international and national NGOs, national governments and global financial institutions, has increasingly focused attention on the management of post-war reconstruction and has committed specific resources to it.' This new focus suggests that reconstruction is not only part of a wider strategic agenda, beyond the familiar territory of humanitarianism, but, more importantly, that it is now recognised as a key element in achieving global stability, security and the eradication of poverty in the 21st century. In the case of Iraq, a vision for a 'New Iraq' post-Saddam was developed within the US administration. It was funded on the concept of military victory leading to the removal of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists, creating a blank space in which to install a 'Western style democracy', favorable to US political and economic interests in the West Asia.

The US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 'suspended' that state's sovereignty by forcing its regime from power. As the Bush administration never tires of telling the world, the ultimate aim is to give sovereignty back to the Iraqi people as soon as the security
situation there permits, as soon as Iraqi forces are able to stand on their own two feet, and a legitimate government is in place. All this is meant to highlight the temporary nature of this 'suspension'. In what follows it will be argued that the fact the 'situation on the ground' is nevertheless not improving in the eyes of many, it is actually worsening is the result of conflicting views of sovereignty.

In January 2003, Major General Jay Garner was appointed to lead the reconstruction efforts by the Bush administration. Two months later, he announced his plans to hold elections within ninety days, and to embark immediately on negotiations with all of the political parties in Iraq, bringing together 100 leaders from across the country in what he called the “Big Ten” on April 15. However, Garner’s vision of Iraq’s political reconstruction was quickly sidelined, as he was replaced on April 21 by L. Paul Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was formed as a transitional government following the invasion. Bremer set out to accomplish two goals: to apply free market shock therapy to Iraq’s economy, opening its markets to foreign penetration; and to ban the Ba’ath party and purge its members from their posts within the government.

Bremer’s first order was to disband the national army, which had long served as the chief institution for the inculcation of national identity, especially among young adult males. Next, Iraq’s state and bureaucratic infrastructure were dismantled, under the banner of “de-Baathification”. Bremer dismissed approximately 500,000 solders and thus contributed heavily to a skyrocketing unemployment rate of 60-70 percent. These two moves resulted in the collapse of the Iraqi infrastructure. Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-


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winner in economics and former chief economist at the World Bank, concluded that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would ultimately cost $3 trillion.97

The human cost to the United States has also been substantial. Moreover, the elections held in January 2005 have shown that they are unlikely to change this perception fundamentally, given the way they were conducted and the political constellations they give rise to. Overthrowing a regime, however, necessarily entails the production of a power vacuum, a period in which the territory is controlled by occupying forces and where there is no representative government of any sort. From the point of view of constitutional law, military intervention can be considered as the forceful imposition of a state of emergency: the powers of the regime are suspended (or, in this case, uplifted), and authority is transferred to the intervener-cum-occupier.

US assumptions about jubilation awaiting allied troops in Iraq were driven by a perception of a fragile Iraqi state. Such a perception of a fragile state existed notwithstanding the fact that, since the end of the 1990-91 Gulf war, no successful coup d'état attempt had materialised. Despite the curtailment of Iraqi sovereignty during the decade of sanctions in the 1990s, Iraq had maintained a minimal level of statehood and order. Only after the US invasion in March 2003, and only once the Iraqi state institutions had been dismantled by the CPA in May 2003, did Iraq become a collapsed state, where the situation resembled that of a Hobbesian war of all against all. Moreover, the fact that US and allied forces, as well as the new Iraqi Interim Government, can be criticised in their attempts to rebuild a state by radical Islamist groups on the grounds that they are un-Islamic highlights the fact

97. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article
that the scriptural strand in Islamic political thought has gained the upper hand. While the actual process of state reconstruction was marred by difficulties and characterised by frequent policy changes by the CPA, the formal hand over of sovereignty to an Iraqi government at the end of June 2004, backed by UN Resolution 1546, was intended to steer this process into calmer waters. UN Resolution 1546 limits the sovereign prerogatives of the government to the holding of parliamentary elections in January 2005, while several vague formulations in Resolution 1546 allow the USA to retain control of military and strategic matters.

There was a mandate to reconstruct not to develop. Yet, without sustainable solutions, economic growth falters, leaving open the possibility of renewed conflict. The first Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) reconstruction plan had four 'pillars': justice, security, governance and infrastructure. For infrastructure it involved big money being poured into hundreds of projects. The concept was that, with a repaired infrastructure, the economy would recover and grow naturally. However, its chief weakness laid in its lack of connection with the Iraqi people and in particular their livelihoods. There are four categories of human security that can be threatened at times of internal conflict economic, personal, and political and community. Days after Iraq regained ‘sovereignty’ the White House revealed some startling details about the reconstruction: just 2 percent of the $18.4 billion earmarked for the urgent reconstruction of Iraq had been spent. Not a penny was spent on healthcare or water and sanitation, two of the more urgent needs for Iraqis, most of the money coming out of US taxpayers’ pockets went for military operations, not reconstruction. And the reconstruction often involved soldiers handing out wads of $100
bills in the streets for repairs. But as time went on, major reconstruction contracts were handed out predominantly to US companies.

**Reconstruction of infrastructure**

The outline plans for 'rebuilding Iraq' were largely developed by the White House, US government agencies and the US Department of Defense. The US Department of State, which allegedly had experts knowledgeable about Iraq, the Arab world and post war reconstruction, was generally sidelined until the lead in to the re-establishment of the US Embassy in Iraq on 29 June 2004. This is best illustrated by reference to the process for implementation of projects associated with the $18.44 billion Supplemental Grant appropriated by the US Congress in November 2003; this grant wholly supported the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) which was the principal vehicle for reconstruction in Iraq. Over the past decade a diverse set of actors, such as the UN and its agencies, donor governments, international and national NGOs, national governments and global financial institutions, has increasingly focused attention on the management of post-war reconstruction and has committed specific resources to it. This new focus suggests that reconstruction is not only part of a wider strategic agenda, beyond the familiar territory of humanitarianism, but, more importantly, that it is now recognised as a key element in achieving global stability, security and the eradication of poverty in the 21st century. Uniquely, reconstruction in Iraq was conceived by the invading US superpower and its allies as an integral part of the deliberate destruction and dismantling of an existing, and so far functioning, state with the declared aim that 'The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the West Asia will be a watershed in the global democratic revolution'.

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In contrast to other nations that have recently emerged from war, where the lack of liquid assets, the neglect of human capital and poor institutional development have meant that there is a need for long-term dependence on international finance and technical assistance to support capacity building and development, Iraq is a rich developed country. It holds the second largest oil reserves in the world. This means that, apart from some short-term assistance to rehabilitate essential infrastructure, it can generate all the finance it requires for reconstruction because, following the war, it still has huge liquid assets with which to fund its own reconstruction.

A second reconstruction was necessary soon after, following the invasion of Kuwait, retaliation by the USA and its allies in the extraordinary violence of ‘Desert Storm’, and the short-lived revolts of the Shia in the southern cities, including Basra, and of the Kurds in the north. This time Baghdad was heavily bombed, key military installations, civil infrastructure and industry were deliberately targeted and 'smart' bombs that inevitably missed those targets also hit residential areas. Twenty hospitals as well as civil defence centers and civilian shelters were also damaged by allied bombing. Feeling as they do that they have been punished by the international community as well as by the dictator, though initially pleased to get rid of Saddam, they also believe they have the right to expect some minimum conditions from the occupying powers: a rapid restoration of services; maintenance of law and order; to be treated with respect. None of these expectations has been fulfilled.

It is crucial to recognise that the creation of an effective reconstruction process involves the establishment of a shared vision beyond the complex technical and administrative process of responding to urgent needs. In the case of Iraq, a vision for a 'New Iraq' post-
Saddam was developed within the US administration. Thus, reconstruction was planned in advance as an integral part of the military operation. Stage one was deconstruction by military means, stage two reconstructions by corporate US capital as a spoil of war and as an instant measure for privatisation. The US scheme envisages replacing, not building on existing conditions in Iraq. There is no celebration of its direct descent from the oldest human civilisation or of its huge contribution to universal knowledge, art and culture. Similarly, while denigrating the excesses of Saddam's rule there is no recognition of Iraq's achievements as a modern secular state.

Reconstruction strategies have not sought to enlist Iraq's wealth of human capacity, or to solve its short-term debt crisis in order to put its economic resources at the disposal of national development rather than international corporate profit. The contracting out of reconstruction, and the rapid privatisation of key industries that followed, marginalises Iraqi business, middle class professionals and the general public. A wider exclusion was to ignore regional and international stakeholders when developing a vision of Iraq's future. Since the invasion was focused on Iraq's past aggression against its neighbours and its supposed threat to world peace, positive economic and cultural ties within the region were ignored. Similarly, the positive roles Iraq has played in modern history as a founding and active member of the United Nations, and later of the Arab League, were not acknowledged. On the contrary, Iraq's protracted and difficult attempts to negotiate with the international community through those organisations went unrewarded throughout the sanctions regime and its final compliance was to be swept aside in favour of an illegal invasion.
Years of experiments in the reconstruction of war-torn communities in the wake of the Cold War have led us to conclude that, unlike short-term relief efforts, the success and the sustainability of long-term recovery is dependent on the existence of effective systems of governance. Therefore, whatever the challenges to creating the vision, the implementation of an effective reconstruction requires the existence, and as soon as possible, of a strong state structure that enjoys 'legitimacy' and has the 'capability' to deliver the post-conflict dividends equitably.

The US-led occupation, however, moved swiftly to implement its pre-determined concept of removing all traces of the Ba’athist regime in order to have a clean slate on which to start building the new ‘free and democratic’ Iraq. Instead of identifying and strengthening capable and legitimate elements of the existing state, it moved to dismantle it by removing key institutional and human resources. Those leading the US occupation, as we have seen, were mainly concerned to establish a new Iraqi government that would promote US interests in the region. Meanwhile, a ‘reconstruction from on high’ approach, reminiscent of that adopted in the early 1990s by Saddam Hussein, was adopted in the public sector.

All ministries were under the control of US administrators, most of whom spoke no Arabic and therefore relied heavily on the unpopular ‘Michigan bunch’ of exiles as translators and interpreters of a reality on the ground of which neither had any current knowledge. As a result, instead of identifying and promoting Iraqi best practice to find solutions to reconstruction problems, attempts were made to reproduce US administrative norms. These strategies did nothing to arrest the deterioration in the security and employment situation. Despite a tactical retreat, the USA ignored the evidence that its vision of Iraq was not shared by the majority of Iraqis and, far from collaborative governance, pursued
its original plan of installing a government sympathetic to US interests. It was in this context of intense military operations, counter-violence and mistrust, but equally of hopes that a turning point had been reached, that a moment of opportunity might, with the right kind of international support, afford the chance of a better future, that elections were held in January 2005. A substantial number of Iraqis were able and also willing to vote. Are we to interpret this as the achievement of the US vision of a democratic Iraq as the Bush administration suggests? The number of Iraqis who couldn't and didn't vote belies this. Nevertheless, it has created an opportunity for Iraqis to begin to take control of the reconstruction process and to negotiate their future.

Economic growth is a crucial component for sustainable development. However, in the context of war-affected countries like Iraq there is the added cost of reconstruction investment. Therefore the simplistic notion that, in Iraq, oil revenues alone will pay for recovery fails to recognise that there is no supporting institutional and administrative infrastructure in place to ensure the trickle-down effect. The rapid implementation of the pre-planned US recovery strategy pre-empted a more incremental approach based on an actual in country needs assessment carried out by UNDG/World Bank in October 2003 that took a more balanced view of the priorities. On this basis the World Bank proposed an interim strategy to first ‘build institutional capacity’, second, 'generate employment/kick-start economic activity, restore essential infrastructure and services' and, third, ‘lay the groundwork for Iraq’s medium term reconstruction and begin assisting in the transition from central planning to market economy’. Two different influences are apparent, which at times conflict and at other times come together.
The first is the strong relationship between the concepts and practice of development and of post-war reconstruction. Reconstruction is thus viewed as a process of reactivation of development, which at the same time addresses the root causes of conflict to establish an environment of peaceful interaction and a shared vision of the future. The second is the strategic interest of rich nations, which do not necessarily coincide with the actual needs on the ground in war-torn countries. This point can be illustrated through a simple comparison of international aid pledged for a number of recent reconstruction challenges: Rwanda, Afghanistan, East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Iraq. The reconstruction of a nation is always dependent on the conditions and relationships with its surrounding region. The reconstruction of Iraq therefore has to be tackled in the context of an agenda for peace in the West Asia, where the core problem is the unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine. It is not the Bush vision of Iraq as a springboard for democratic revolution that will resolve the problems of the West Asia. It is an Israel/Palestine settlement that holds out the prospect of sustainable peace and development in Iraq.

Iraq’s reconstruction requires a multifaceted programme but one that always has people and their perceptions in the forefront. This means starting to involve Iraqis from the community level upwards in decision making and facilitating, rather than trying to direct the work of Iraqi public servants and managerial and technical staff in restoring services and productive enterprises. Concentration should be placed on restoring livelihoods, wherever this is feasible, in state or private enterprise, family business and agriculture, not on doctrinaire privatisation. All these approaches are designed to enable Iraqi capacity. As discussed above, Iraq does not suffer from the huge human and material resource deficits
that afflict other war-torn countries: what Iraq has lacked at all levels of society is empowerment.

The international community, however, does also need to play an enabling role in Iraq's reconstruction as in other war-affected countries. It is essential that the UN resume a leading role as political facilitator but, as ESCWA has pointed out: 'The United Nations would only be given a meaningful role in Iraq if the international community demonstrated that such a role was indispensable' and insisted on its 'independence vis-a-vis the occupying power'. However, the international community has so far not given its wholehearted backing to the UN, particularly for the role that it has tried to play in establishing a representative government in Iraq.

Financial enablement is also critical but Iraq does not need the customary long-term donor support, rather it is necessary to negotiate a solution to Iraq's debt and war reparations burden and restore sovereignty over its oil revenues. This would allow Iraq to negotiate its internal resource distribution to stimulate its internal economy, to compete in the global economy and to contribute to the regional economy as before. Therefore the first priority for reconstruction and simply for improving the lives of ordinary citizens is security. However, this will not be achieved by higher and higher levels of military protection and the use of ever greater force. These will simply continue to absorb more and more resources without resolving the situation. Security will come through conflict resolution, which requires reconciliation of all parties in an accountable state building process that results in responsible and sovereign institutions whose authority and legitimacy are recognised by all. That is, a state with the authority to regulate and strength to provide security for all to participate fully in society.
The failure by the early planning teams to focus on human security and, in particular, the restoration of livelihoods as a key theme had widespread repercussions. The reconstruction plan did not target areas with poor basic infrastructure, leaving these areas to fester with high unemployment and unfulfilled dreams of receiving even the most basic of essential services in power, water and sanitation. (Food shortages were not such a problem because supply networks had been well established under the UN's oil-for-food programme.) These areas then became easy recruiting grounds for disaffected youth by rebel groups such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army. It took almost one year from the start of the Coalition's intervention in Iraq for this failure to be fully appreciated and action taken (but too late). Every city needed early development in these areas, but perhaps nowhere more than the Sadr City area of Baghdad, where over two million people lived in squatter conditions; development programmes planned to alleviate many of the severe water and sanitation problems there are only now underway. Neither did the reconstruction plan target heavy industry, rendered very ineffective by years of neglect and extensive looting during the early months of intervention. The consequence of this was threefold-poor economic recovery, severe shortages of key materials (such as cement and bitumen) to supply infrastructure reconstruction projects and, of course, further unemployment. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) set out its response to the increasingly transparent shortcomings in reconstruction policy in its Interim Country Assistance Plan (DFID, 2004) in which it set out three strategic objectives: to promote rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth; to encourage effective and accountable governance; to promote social and political cohesion and stability. Much of the support required to achieve these objectives was to be in the form of technical assistance, thus attempting to
shift the balance in moving the focus from projects to people. However, in pure financial terms DFID's contribution was relatively minor and therefore its potential impact would be limited in the overall scheme of things.

**Administrative structures**

A comprehensive overview of local governance structures in Iraq is set out in ICG. A crucial component in effective implementation of reconstruction strategies is the organisation of government, whether transitional or permanent. Reconstruction and development require a strong strategic framework to ensure that sustainable programmes are devised. The tendency with imported administrations has been to over-centralise decision making, leaving outlying districts as pariahs with economic and social peripherality. Indeed, there were some within the CPA administration who believed that a strong centralised administration was so institutionalised within Iraq that any other approach would probably fail. Yet at governorate level there were some individuals in most of the Iraqi technical directorates who were well motivated and, with suitable international support, quite capable of leading reconstruction programmes. The conclusion must be that the low priority given to institutional strengthening and capacity building in the early months of reconstruction was demonstrative of the lack of commitment to finding sustainable solutions to reconstruction. Critically the security reconstruction mix is the need to decentralize funding to local level for councils and communities to make changes for the benefit of their own people. This is a foreign concept to virtually the entire population, having lived only in a highly centralised, command economic and political Ba’athist Party model. But without empowering these communities, it will be nigh impossible for leadership to gain credibility among a people used to a cocktail of party
patronage, inefficiency in state delivery and extreme repression. Thus, the key to future stability has to be through the strengthening of local governance structures. Political empowerment would support community enablement, for which the utility directorates would form a large enabling component.

Nonetheless, despite the continuing violence, it should be registered that a huge amount of physical reconstruction activity has been achieved in the oil, electricity, water, sanitation, transport and buildings sectors, although using the amount of money dispersed as an indicator of progress is inappropriate, since the nature of engineering contracts means there is a lag in payment for work done and, anyway, as described earlier, it fails to record value. A peak of activity in construction was anticipated from 2004 to 2006, creating a large amount of temporary Iraqi employment; however, there was no plan for successive employment as construction activity tailed off.

The strategic planning for reconstruction of infrastructure and industry could have been undertaken by joint regional boards coordinated by a joint national board. In this way, identification and prioritisation of popular and national needs in terms of attaining a basic level of economic security would have been more easily facilitated and a better understanding of the holistic effect of a project's or system's construction would have also been possible. The basic requirements to aim for sustainability could have been built in to the process so that projects would have incorporated the most appropriate technology, would have been environmentally friendly and would have had well-trained people to plan and manage their design, construction, operation and maintenance as part of a whole systems approach to utility provision.
Throughout history pre-war reconstruction featured heavily in imperial ambitions, with expeditionary enterprises being justified in terms of reclaiming lost territory or exploiting the resources of lands seized in the name of the sovereign, nation, state or race. In the contemporary case of Iraq, it was the USA that played the leading role in the contingency planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. This pre-war reconstruction operated at multiple levels, involving the White House, core government agencies and departments, the domestic political process and the military. The USA admitted to beginning detailed post-war reconstruction planning in September 2002, seven months before hostilities began, but it is likely that more secretive planning was underway in advance of this. Indeed, in early August 2002 a two day Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting discussed the possibility of war on Iraq, with substantial attention devoted to the costs of the reconstruction. It was noted, by President Bush (2003) himself, that the Iraqi food distribution network established under the 'Oil for Food' programme provided a ready made platform for humanitarian relief and that it must be kept in place.

In advance of the war the White House was careful to flag its humanitarian credentials in the world beyond Iraq, drawing attention to increases in provision for development aid, the tripling of resources for the fight against AIDS, preferential trading regimes for African and developing world states, and investment in education campaigns. The clear message was that the USA was a responsible world power and that its stance on Iraq must be regarded as the pursuit of 'a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror'. President Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor told the Council on Foreign Relations that 'should it be necessary for the United States to take military action ... rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure will be an immediate priority for the post-Saddam reconstruction effort'.
The President himself was able to detail in late February 2003 that almost three million emergency rations were being moved to the region 'to feed the hungry'.

The 'corruption' of Saddam Hussein's regime has provided the US administration with one of its main official justifications for military intervention in Iraq. Although the Bush administration initially focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a threat resonating with the US public, it emphasised corruption and human rights abuses to legitimise a forceful regime change in the eyes of the Iraqi public (quickly extending this justification to the Western public as there were no WMD to be found). Iconically, the statements of the White House on corruption and the justification of a forceful change echoed those of Islamic 'terrorist' groups seeking to bring down 'corrupt regimes' in the West Asia, from Hamas in Palestine to Hezbollah in Lebanon or Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. With the world's second largest oil reserves and a population of 25 million people, Iraq is potentially a very prosperous country. The US administration has showcased the military ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003 as providing a historic opportunity for Iraq to depart from this pattern. Against the backdrop of Saddam Hussein's abuses and in the absence of WMD, the US administration has increasingly justified the occupation of Iraq in terms of a transition to democracy, security and probity for Iraqis. Although it is too early to assess the long-term impact of the initial phases of the transition, the US dominated Coalition Provisional Authority in charge of the occupation

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98. www.whitehouse.news/releases

99. M. Radler, 'Worldwide reserves increase as production holds steady', Oil & Gas Journal, 100 (52), 2002, pp 113-145
of Iraq has failed in many respects to set propitious conditions for such a transition.\textsuperscript{100} Misguided US policies have been violently confronted by the realities of local and regional power networks and powerful discourses of resistance. Reconstruction has been slow, costs have spiraled above initial estimates, and early priorities were wrongly placed on large infrastructure projects awarded to a handful of US companies.

In turn, the absence of tangible economic benefits and improvements in living conditions for most Iraqis has fuelled resentment, and contributed to both political and economic violence. Oil also remains a widespread reason for distrust of the US and its ultimate motives. As a result, Iraq faces the prospect of continued reliance on limited oil revenues and donor handouts, rather than a windfall peace dividend, which in any case many feared would have mostly benefited foreign investors if the CPA'S liberal economic policies had been implemented.\textsuperscript{101} The results of the national elections in January 2005 marked a strong departure from the patterns of Iraqi politics and the dominance of Arab Sunni minority groups that should strongly shape the future of Iraq. Whatever the outcome of a lengthy and violent transition process, oil dependence and corruption are likely to remain major challenges in Iraq. This pattern of institutionalised corruption was part of the rationale motivating the \emph{coups d'\textsuperscript{\textsc{et}}at} against the Hashemite monarchy in 1936, 1941 and 1958.

\textsuperscript{100} R Chandrasekaran, 'Promises unkept: the US occupation of Iraq', Washington Post, 19 June 2004

\textsuperscript{101} N Klein, 'Baghdad year zero. Pillaging Iraq in the pursuit of a neocon utopia', Harper's, September 2004, pp 43-53

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Economically, Iraq greatly benefited from the two oil booms of the 1970s, having nationalised its industry a few years before. Annual economic growth averaged 14% in the 1970s and by 1979 Iraq was the second largest OPEC oil exporter behind Saudi Arabia. This new wealth was used by the Ba'ath party for a massive arms build-up and served the private interests of the Ba’ath party regime's cronies. It also benefited much of the population through a rapid rise in living standards. Iraq's costly war with Iran between 1980 and 1988 and falling oil prices after 1981 resulted in a drastic turnaround. Negative growth averaged 6% per year during the 1980s. This growth collapse was further aggravated by the imposition of economic sanctions after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. By 1994, when the sanctions regime was still applied in full force, Iraq's per capita real GDP was estimated as close to that of the 1940s.\textsuperscript{102} This situation improved with the oil-for-food programme. By the time of the 2003 US-led invasion, however, the country still faced staggering financial obligations estimated at $383 billion, a devastated economic and public service infrastructure requiring an estimated $53 billion investment, and a largely destitute population.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{Humanitarian intervention}

The idea of humanitarian intervention has strong, understandable and emotional support. But the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) makes it very unlikely that any


customary international law right of unilateral humanitarian intervention survived the Charter. By contrast, under the auspices of the United Nations there have been several instances of multilateral intervention on humanitarian grounds. These operations were authorised by the Security Council exercising its powers under Chapter VII to counter threats to international peace and security. The relief of famine in Somalia in 1992, the intervention in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and humanitarian operations in East Timor in 1999 are all examples of this. Outside the United Nations; state practice reveals few clear-cut examples of humanitarian intervention before 1990. India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam’s overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea and Tanzania’s ousting of the regime of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979 all resulted, in fact, in humanitarian relief. All three states, however, preferred to justify their action in terms of self-defence. Likewise US-led interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 cited humanitarian concerns as reasons for action, although it was not suggested that these concerns were sufficient legal justifications. The imposition of safe havens and ‘no-fly zones’ by the U S, the Britain and France to protect Iraq’s ethnic minorities in the aftermath of the first Gulf war; and NATO’s bombing campaign in Serbia in 1999 to bring a halt to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The coalition in Iraq received little outright condemnation, but there was also little international support for the legality of the action.

The humanitarian situation in Iraq in March 2003, grim though it was for the Iraqis, was not claimed by the government to amount to an ‘overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe’ as required by the Foreign Office criteria. Even if a right to humanitarian intervention had developed in international law, it would not have applied to Iraq any more than to any of the arbitrary tyrannies which sadly still exist. There are many who consider that, when it
comes to removing Saddam Hussein, the end justified the means, indeed, would justify almost any means. This instinct is all too understandable. But surely it would be a most dangerous path to embark on. Careful criteria would need to be established to ensure that the oppressed are liberated in all cases of need, regardless of whether their state is rich in oil or diamonds. We must be careful when celebrating the demise of Saddam Hussein not to create a dangerous precedent in which any unilateral military action may be condoned when one of its consequences happens to be humanitarian relief. It is UN decisions and their implementation which should be the rock on which the international community sets its feet when it intervenes on humanitarian grounds. The use of the veto is a legitimate exercise of Security Council procedure under Chapter V of the Charter. The United Kingdom has itself used its veto 32 times since 1945. A doctrine that enables one member to bypass the requirement of Security Council authorisation by unilaterally deeming a use of the veto to be unreasonable is dangerously subjective, and poses an unacceptable risk that the Security Council’s monopoly on the authorisation of the use of force will be undermined.

The US and British invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003 marked a test case for the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. The country was to serve as a test case of “free market economy” and democracy in the Middle East, designed by the US, at a relatively small cost. By the summer of 2004, while the US had set up an interim government in Iraq, “transferred sovereignty,” and promised elections, the country was put under military

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104. Rabinder Singh, Legal Briefing Given to MPs, 12 March 2003.
rule by the new Iraqi government. Despite Iraq was a “sovereign” state, it was clear that the US would continue the actual occupation of the country with a large number of troops for several years, while the rest of the world demonstrated little interest in assisting the US its attempt to secure the country form the ongoing disruption of civil order. Indeed most countries felt pressure to pull out their troops as quickly as possible. The main stream view in Washington was that “no great apologies out to be made for America’s ‘unilateralism…’ For Pax-Americana, Iraq may be worth the effort and the risks.” Global opinion almost universally condemned the US for invasion and occupation, while the reputation and trust of the US in the international arena had fallen lowest level ever. As former US Assistant Secretary of State for public affairs of the Clinton Administration noted, the US continued to “pay the price” for its “false claims” about alleged Iraqi weapon of mass destruction.

In early March 2003, the Bush Administration had run into rough waters. Neither the UN Security Council nor global public opinion could be convinced that it was necessary for the US to go to war in Iraq to “disarm Saddam Hussein of weapon of mass destruction”. Secretary of State Colin Powell was not convincing in the UN Security Council, attempting to make the case for going to war to remove WMD. Dark notes were sounded

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106. Fouad Ajami, “Iraq and the Arab’s Future,” Foreign Affairs, 82 (1), January/February 2003, pp3, 10
from the Bush White House about the demise of the United Nations if it did not wise up and buckle down to American demands. Antiwar demonstrations, the most massive history, emerged across the globe. The Turkish parliament surprised the US government by voting to deny the US the right to invade Iraq with land forces from Turkey and the Turkish Government was subjected to bitter criticism in the American press. The Bush Administration seemed to be losing momentum, as events threatened to spin out of control and scuttle the best laid plans of US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair for “regime change” in Iraq.

Regime change in Iraq having been carried out in March and April 2003, it was in the hands of the United States and Great Britain, to justify the use of outright force to overthrow a sovereign regime. In reality, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an American operation and patently illegal under International law. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stressed, before the war, that Britain’s help was not needed, making it clear that the US would go to war alone if the British did not join. A few other nations did join mostly small nations with small populations, but with little effective commitment.\(^{109}\) In fact, opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom was almost universal, with public opinion running as high as 85 to 95 percent against the war in many countries.

Leaving aside the question of democracy, establishing a stable government in Iraq was going to be one of the most difficult problems which the US faced. UK – American aggression in Iraq had substantially alienated public opinion in the Arab world. Most Iraqis, while happy to see Saddam go, did not welcome the US occupation. A common

sentiment in Iraq has been “No to Saddam, no to the US”. Operation Iraqi freedom increased terrorism not only in Iraq but against American and the British around the world. While US officials claimed in public that “American are safer,” US intelligence officially predicted more terrorist attacks would occur as a result of the US occupation and continued deployment of US troops in Iraq. Moreover, small and relatively weak countries around the world quickly learned the dangerous lesson from the launching of a “preemptive war”. The message was that in the essentially lawless world of preemptive war or more accurately preventive war, as promulgated in the US national strategic security document, it is vital that defenseless countries obtain weapon mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. It was clear that diplomacy was used in dealing with North Korea, precisely because the country possessed nuclear weapons. The UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was not mean to authorise the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the US and Britain when passed. It was the intention of the US to push through another resolution authorizing the war, but when the UN Security Council held out against repeated attempts by the US to pressure hesitant members, the US was forced to launch the war without the additional resolution.

The American approach implied that Iraqis could now become “free” only if they submitted to being under the de facto occupation by a foreign power. Those who resisted, as the American Patriots did when the British were fighting for their US colonies, were seen as criminals, terrorists, and rogue elements. Progress lagged in getting even a hand-picked government up and running in Iraq. While the end of the war was officially announced on May 1, 2003, American soldiers continued to come under attacks and there
were continuous uprisings and demonstrations by militant Iraqis. Ex-General Jay Garner, named Iraq’s temporary post-war civilian administrator, came under considerable criticism in May 2003. He was fired and the US quickly rushed a replacement to Baghdad, L. Paul Bremer III, a former Foreign Service officer.

Another concern was the lack of legal cover for the US to start running Iraq. This was speedily patched up with UN Security Council Resolution 1483, presented by the US, Britain and Spain on May 9, 2003, and passed on May 22 by a vote of 14-0. Syria did not vote. The European Union and France wanted a central role of the UN, but the US would have nothing to do with this. The capitulation to US demands that the occupation be “legitimized” and the oil be controlled by the “occupying powers,” the US and Britain, nevertheless came smoothly. The US refused to accept any time limit on the period of US-British occupation. The UN Security Council was given the power to “review” the implementation of the resolution within 12 months. The US would take charge of an “Iraqi development fund” which would be derived from Iraqi oil. An “international advisory monitoring board was to be up to provide “transparency”.

In June 2003, things were not going well on the ground, and civil order in the country seemed to be collapsing besides the looting and car-jacking, and thieves robbing shopkeepers, radical shi’ite mobs began attacking cinemas and liquor stores. Some clerics called for an end to the US occupation. It was dangerous on the streets and in the countryside. The new civil administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, was dispatched two months early, to replace Garner. Bremer made a number of grievous mistakes, which later

110 Ibid., Pp. 41-2
backfired. He fired the west Baghdad police chief and declared that 30,000 former high Ba’ath party officials would be barred from jobs in the new administration. On May 24, the Iraqi Army was officially abolished, along with the former security apparatus, and Defense and information ministries. This put some 400,000 Iraqis officially out of job, leading to a riot in front of a Baghdad mosque a few days later.

**The Human consequences in Iraq**

The assault upon Iraqi society has had devastating consequences. The Iraqi death rate prior to the invasion was 5.5 per thousand people per year. The invasion in March 2003 raised the average figure to 13.2 for that year, but both U.S and Iraqi researchers found that the death rate then rose with each successive year of occupation. In 2006, according to a study published in the *Lancet*, the death rate was 19.8 per thousand people, a near-fourfold increase over pre-invasion levels.\(^\text{111}\) The study estimated that the invasion caused the deaths of 650,000 Iraqi civilians, or 2.5 percent of the country’s population.\(^\text{112}\) Subsequently, the opinion Research Business Group conducted a comprehensive survey of war-related deaths, and found that about a million Iraqis had died by the end of 2007—about 4 percent of the population in just four years.\(^\text{113}\) The Iraqi peoples are experienced or witnessed the murder of the family members, friends and colleague due to the social chaos in Iraq. Since the onset of the invasion and occupation, an estimated 2 million Iraqi

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\(^\text{111}\) www.commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/richard_horton/2007/03/counting_the_cost

\(^\text{112}\) www.envomment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn10276

\(^\text{113}\) www.wired_dispatch.com/news/?id=26001
peoples have become external refugees in the neighboring countries and also Iraqis have been internally displaced as a result of sectarian violence and criminality.
CHAPTER IV

MERICA SPONSERED DEMOCRATISATION IN IRAQ
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The transition to democracy has been evident since the mid-1970s. Now, however, worldwide attention has been directed to the momentous changes in Eastern and Central Europe followed by the unraveling of the Soviet system. We can also see a recent moving away from authoritarian rule in many other parts of the world. However, if we stand back and look at the world at large, we see momentous political change. It is not cosmetic. Rather this process of political change appears systemic and unidirectional. The new nationalism and democratization are not incompatible and, indeed, are occurring together in a number of countries. Characteristics of current political change vary from place to place, but the common denominator appears to be a moving away from an authoritarian to a participatory system.

Moreover, the proposition that democracy requires such preconditions as a middle class or a certain level of economic development is simply not supportable. Is Iraq's history a liability for democratic transformation? Since the demise of Saddam's dictatorship, leading writers on democratic transformation, as well as observers of Arab and West Asian politics, have tended to belittle the chances of democratic transformation in Iraq, dismissing these as mere dreaming. One main reason for this pessimism is the alleged lack of liberal and democratic traditions in Iraq's political culture and historical experiences. Yet it can be easily illustrated that the country and its people do not necessarily suffer from an immutable democratic deficit. Periods of liberal attitudes and practices in the pre-Republican era testify to existing traditions of political pluralism and experience with
representative government. In the monarchical era, 1921-58, Iraq adopted a parliamentary system modeled on the British political system. The constitution (known as the Basic law), which was promulgated and passed by the constituent assembly in 1924, provided for the right of free expression, publication and assembly, and the forming and joining of political parties within the law. Indeed, political parties were in existence from the early days of the country's birth. Of course, a number of these were defenders of the status quo, particularly as it pertained to Iraqi-British relations.

Others, however, were vigorous opposition parties with impressive mass followings. Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) and al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (National Democratic Party) were well known in the 1940s and 1950s for their vitriolic and ceaseless onslaught on the British and their policies at a time when the Palace and Iraq's main political figures were umbilical tied to British interests in the country. Thus, Economic performance and its impact on people's lives are key prerequisites for the success or failure of democratic transformation. The more prosperous the country, the more likely it is to be democratic. According to Samuel Huntington, 'in poor countries democratization is unlikely; in rich countries it has already occurred. In between there is a political transition zone; countries in that particular economic stratum are most likely to transit to democracy. As countries develop economically and move into this zone, they become prospects for democratization'. Rising living standards and availability of work opportunities are the hallmarks of countries boasting stable democratic political orders. 114

The final ‘theme’ relates to how authoritarian regimes, once removed by external powers, are then replaced with ‘democratic’ regimes of a design influenced, may be even prescribed, by the occupiers. A key question to ask in this regard is whether the process of regime change and democratisation in a global world enhances the consolidation of multi-ethnic states. The Soviet collapse, for instance, led to the intensification of ethnic conflict in several successor states, including Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, and changes in the ethnic balance of power in Yugoslavia quickly heralded that state’s demise. Until 2003, Iraq had largely remained isolated from the transformative effects of the global economy sanctions regime imposed on the country since 1991.

Saddam Hussein ruled over Iraq nearly 30 years, the peoples of Iraq were liberated in little over a month, with the stated aims of the US being to democratize Iraq and to create a zone of ‘democratic peace’ at the heart of the West Asia. However, how likely was it that Iraq could democratize in line with the aims of US policy, particularly when the sudden removal of Saddam’s regime granted the forces of localized communal identities the political space in which flourish? Even when stability and security in Iraq deteriorated in the months and years following Saddam’s removal, President Bush remained openly confident about the chances of democratization previously non-democratic states, associating himself with very democratic development that had occurred since the era of ancient Greece. Speaking in November 2003, he declared that ‘we have witnessed, in little generation, the swiftest advance of freedom in the 2500 year story of democracy’, nothing that, in the early 1970s, there were ‘about 40 democracy in the World’, and as the twentieth century ended, there were nearly 120 ‘and I can assure you more are on the way’. Notwithstanding the president’s optimism, the empirical evidence suggests that the
introduction of democracy-by-force is a somewhat risky strategy to follow. Out of the 18 forced regime changes in which US ground troops have been committed, only three deserve the ‘democratic’ title: Germany, Japan and Italy. Furthermore, Etzioni contends that democracy is problematic to export and that Germany and Japan are the exceptions that prove the rule’. Democracy was successfully exported to these two countries because (1) they were totally defeated, and (2) there was no danger of the emergence of a civil war. Arguably, both of these conditions were lacking in Iraq. The US administration has showed the military ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003 as providing a historic opportunity for Iraq to depart from this pattern. Against the backdrop of Saddam Hussein's abuses and in the absence of WMD, the US administration has increasingly justified the occupation of Iraq in terms of a transition to democracy, security and probity for Iraqis.

While the most visible civilian ruler of the occupation was L. Paul Bremer, President Envoy and CPA Administrator, the administration made no secret of its hope that the nation would soon be turned over to Ahmad Chalabi of the exiled Iraqi National Congress and his pro-American followers. In 1996, the CIA bankrolled Chalabi in an unsuccessful bid to overthrow Saddam with Kurdish fighters from the north. By that time, he had become the darling of the US sponsored Iraqi resistance in exile and had succeeded in getting the Iraqi National Congress named recipient of taxpayer funds under the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act. Chalabi's exile group never had seemed to amount to much, but he successfully insinuated himself among the neo-conservative foreign policy advisers in the Defense Department and elsewhere. It was Chalabi who sold Bush a bill of goods in the form of bogus intelligence purportedly showing Saddam's arsenal and factories for making
weapons of mass destruction. The existence of WMDs became Bush’s main rationale for going to war after 9/11 but since accounts from former Bush insiders now show that Bush had decided to invade Iraq earlier in his administration, it remains unclear just who was manipulation whom. Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the special presidential envoy and ambassador at large for Free Iraqis, called for “a broad-based representative and democratic government” in a post-Saddam Iraq. Indeed the Bush administration's vision for democracy extends beyond Iraq.

Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey similarly claims, “This could be a golden opportunity to begin to change the face of the Arab world”. There is, however, an unseen benefit in this cloud. Most of the barriers to democracy in a post-Saddam Iraq are related directly or indirectly to security, and the United States and other occupying powers can provide this security if they are willing to deploy considerable forces to Iraq for years. In particular, intervening powers can help quell internal unrest and deter adventurism from neighboring powers. The intervening powers can also influence Iraqi elites and make them less bellicose, particularly if they are willing to commit to a sustained military presence in the country. Thus, democratizing Iraq is feasible, if difficult, as long as intervening powers are willing to stay the course.

115. Reverbend, Baghdad Burning, A Young Woman’s Diary From A War Zone, New Delhi, 2007. P. vvi
117. Ibid.,
Democratic onset in Iraq

Democracy means of, for and by the people and is an overloaded concept. It means different things to different people. Even in the West, there is no consensus on what precisely the concept means and how the best to express it as an ideal. Further, is democracy a form of government? On the other hand, is it a method of selecting a government? In fact, at times democracy has been used to establish authoritarianism. Therefore, democracy defies a universal model. Implied in this argument is that the Western style democracy may not be suitable to non-Western countries which have their own historical, political and socio-economic culture specificities. This is particularly so with regard to the countries of the West Asian Countries, where Islam is the predominant religion with its own rich intellectual and cultural traditions. Iran, for instance, has shown that a Muslim country does not have to follow a Western model in order to be democratic. Moreover, Islam is not treated as a mere religion, but a way of life. This culture specificity argument is not merely a matter of academic concern. A stream of strategic thinking within the US also subscribe to this line of argument. For instance, during the late 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick heavily criticized President Jimmy Carter’s deep interest in human rights and democracy. He argued that the precondition of democracy were not economic, but moral and cultural. Democratic values required “time to be learned and assimilated to the society”, “Decades “it was argued, “if not centuries are normally required for people to acquire the necessary discipline and habits”.118 The central point was that democracy promotion abroad was not in US interest. Therefore, that opposition to the Clinton

administration’s agenda of nation building became part of Georg W. Bush’s 2000 election campaign.

However, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 changed the very thrust and tenor of US policy under President Bush. His speech at the National Endowment for democracy in November 2003 underlined his rejection of Kirk Patrick’s argument and preference for a more radical perspective of the new conservative movement in justifying democracy promotion. He disagreed with the culture-specificity argument and dismissed the assertion by “some skeptics of democracy....that the tradition of Islam are inhospitable to the representative government”. To justify democracy promotion in the region, Bush argued: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the West Asia did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability can’t be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as West Asia remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence”. Thus, Bush went whole hog to change the status quo in Iraq, that too through a process of forced regime change and coercive democratization. In practical terms, it has so far served neither the cause of “stability” nor “liberty”. The way, the governing council was imposed on the Iraqi people, the way the interim Government was formed, the way the elections were conducted in a hurry (turning down the appeals of Iraqi parties and leaders for their postponement), the way the draft constitution was hurried through a national referendum, all spoke enough of President Bush’s love for the “liberty and freedom” of the Iraqi people. Everything was pushed through and imposed on a people who were not fully prepared, it not very unwilling, only to adjust to an arbitrarily set timetable so that the US

119. Ibid.,

102
President can take full credit for the “establishment of democracy” in Iraq. The entire schedule was thrust upon the Iraqis keeping in view President Bush’s own political compulsion at home.

At the conceptual level, democratic imposition is a contradiction in terms. How can one impose democracy? Its imposition on certain people negates the most popular and common definition of democracy being a government “of, by and for the people”. Democracy in order to be stable and firmly rooted in any society needs to be homegrown which evolves through a period and therefore, cannot be exported or imposed through coercive means. Democratic imposition also goes against the democratic peace theory which argues that democracy settle their dispute through reason and peacefully and do not go to war with one another. How can then, democracy itself be stabilized through war?

Further Bush imposed democracy in Iraq suffered from wrong assumptions. The neo-conservative campaign for “instantaneous democratization” was based on two erroneous assumptions: that the nationalist anti US policies followed by “rogue” states like Iraq, Iran and to some extent, Syria did not find support at home; and that regional instability and violence “is the product of tyranny and failed societies. Present day newly Iraq nullifies both the assumptions. The present Iraqi rulers are as nationalist as the old regime. In fact, even the insurgency is sustained because of the strong opposition to US occupation. As regard the failed societies, can there be a better example of a failed society than the present day of Iraq? If Iraq today is on the brink of civil war, it is because of the US invasion and occupation of the country. The invasion has brought into open the sectarian and ethnic identities in full flare. Indeed, it is interesting to not that the results of the poll by Zogby International in November 2004 on the issue of reforms in the region confirmed that
people in West Asia were “far more interested in a change in US policies” like unconditional support of Israel, than “its promotion of democracy”. The issue of “expanding of democracy” ranked almost the lowest in terms of preferences; in no country did a majority want US help towards democratization.

As regards the false comparisons, the neo-conservatives cited two cases in the run up to the invasion to strengthen their case in favour of an aggressive democracy promotion in Iraq. These were the cases of post-war Japan and Germany. As said earlier, the neo-conservative agenda of regime change of Iraq was part of “grand project” which would not only bring democracy to Iraq but also to the entire region through a “domino effect”. Whenever, they had to cite historical precedents to justify their “radical and ambitious project” in Iraq, they pointed to West Germany and Japan, which of course had shown that “military conquest and occupation can bring about a successful and permanent democratization”. However, there were three important ways in which the circumstances prevailed in Germany and Japan differed from those in Iraq. These were prior liberal democratic experiences, a greater external threat perception an ethnically homogeneous population. First both Germany and Japan (as Austria and Italy) had enough experience with some from the liberal democracy, only a couple of decades before the occupation. In fact, some of the prominent leaders of the liberal democratic era were still alive Konard Adenauer in Germany and Shigeru Yoshida in Japan whose experience and help were crucial for the occupation authorities to built and stabilizes democracy in these countries. Iraq in contrast, had neither any such experience nor any leadership familiar with the ethos and institution of democratic governance. Second, in the late 1940s, both Japan and West Germany perceived a far greater external threat from the Soviet Red Army than the
occupying US military forces even though the latter were no less oppressive than the former. In addition, the Japanese had a fear of a communist revolution following a possible Soviet conquest of their country. US occupation was not welcome, but the Soviet Union occupation would have been much worse for both. Again, in the case of Iraq, the Iraqis never perceived any greater external threat. That explains the near-total opposition to US occupation not only in Iraq, but also across the nation. Therefore, the US is fighting an insurgency instead of being welcome as a “liberator”. Finally, West Germany and Japan were probably among the most ethnically homogeneous nation in the World. The ethnic minorities’ constituted less than two percent of the population and both the countries had no history of significant secessionist movement. The Iraq case in terms of ethnic homogeneity is too well known to be elaborated here. It is the heterogeneous nature of the Iraqi society, which marks a big question on the democratization process, thanks to the colonial maneuvers in the region with regard to state formation.

**Democratization in Iraq after Saddam Hussein**

Democratization particularly in Iraq or in West Asian region is one of the major aims of the American government. They have been one of its goals, in one way or another”. However, the manner in which it is being projected as a major anti-terror measure needs to be underlined. This is especially with regard to the West Asian region, which, from an American perspective, has become a fertile ground for the so-called “Islamic fundamentalist terrorism”. The underlying assumption is that it is bad governance and lack of democracy that create favorable conditions for the recruitment of future terrorists. There are both “ideological and practical reasons” for this promotion of democracy constituted one of the basic pillars of the neo-conservative worldview that guided the foreign policy of
the Bush administration so forcefully. There has been a policy consensus within the Bush administration that “fostering democracy” in the West Asian region would “drain the pool from which terrorist organizations draw recruits in their global struggle” against the US. Further, it would also help resolve disputes in the region peacefully as “democracy doesn’t go to war with one another”. This is also known as the “Democratic peace” theory. Therefore, the US has been “engaged” in what President Bush “has called a ‘generational change’ to instill democracy” in the Arab World. It argued that this “push for democracy will not only spread democratic governance, the region “will stop generating anti-American terrorism”.

While there is a continuing debate within the US in opinion and policy making circles about the relationship between “democracy and Terrorism”, the Bush administration, on its part, has adopted a dual policy with regard to democracy promotion in the West Asian region. In the case of friendly, pro-US and long time allies such as the regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, a conciliatory and gradualist approach has been adopted under the stewardship of the State Department.

In December 2002, for instance, Secretary of State of Colin Powell unveiled the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” (MEPI) which envisaged that the process of democratization would be slow and “incremental” which should be “encouraged” by the US through supporting economic development, education and civil society programme (UNDP). Arab Human Development Report of 2002, which identified three key areas for greater attention: political freedom, women’s empowerment and knowledge. Powell’s initiative


laid thrust on four crucial areas: economic, political, education and women's empowerment. These were to be promoted through a variety of country-specific and region wide projects. Concerning the political sphere, MEPI seek to attain four objectives: strengthening “democratic practices, electoral systems including political parties and parliamentarians”, encouraging the creation of “public where democratic can be heard in the political process”, strengthening the “role of free and independent media” in the country and promoting the “rule of law and accountable effective government and Judicial institution”. In four years, the initiative has devoted more that $ 293 million to reform efforts. In June 2004, second initiative lunched at the G-8 summit in Atlanta, Georgia. Even though it was not exclusively an American project, the US was the main driving force behind it. The initiative was called Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative and aimed at making democracy promotion “a cooperative enterprise between G-8 and Middle Eastern governments”. Like the first one, the second initiative also sought to promote reforms in the political, social, cultural and economic fields. At the level of public diplomacy also the Bush administration officials including the President himself, sought to highlight democratic reform in the region as one of the core objectives of US policy. About the countries of so-called “axis of evil”, like Iraq, the US has relied on a hard, aggressive and militaristic policy to promote democracy. From the perspective of neo-conservative thinking, Iraq was but a part of its grandiose vision of a new world order under US leadership. One can identify three basic tenets of neo-conservatism:

122. Middle East Partnership Initiative, at http://www.mepi.state.gov/mepi/ Access 12 August 2008
doctrine of preemptive military intervention, regime change with hard power and forcible promotion of democracy, all of which were applied to Iraq as a test case.

In early 2002 itself, Robert Kagan and William Kristol captured the essence of the neo-conservative rationale put forth to justify the forceful removal of the Iraqi President from power when they argued, "a devastating Knockout blow against Saddam Hussein followed by an American sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on a path towards democratic governance would have a seismic impact on the Arab World- for the better". The key policy announcements began with the January 2002 state of the Union addresses by Bush where in it identified Iraq as part of the so-called "axis of evil" (the other to being Iran and North Korea). This was followed by his speech before the UN General Assemble in September 2002 during which the US President almost challenged the World body to take immediate action to disarm Saddam Hussein, whose regime constituted a "grave and gathering danger" to international security, or become "irrelevant". The rest is to well known to be repeated here. The US invaded Iraq with the intention of making "that state a model" for other countries in the region, "promising that success in Iraq would be followed by efforts to transform the political system" of countries neighboring Iraq.

Since we are concerned here specifically about the process of democratization in Iraq, it would be instructive to take note the comment made by the US President himself after the occupation of the country.

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According to statements by President Bush, US goals are for an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend it and is a partner in the global war on terrorism. Administration officials have, for the most part, dropped an earlier stated goal that Iraq serve as a model of democratic reform in the Middle East.\(^{126}\) Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait came as his greatest blunder, which not only squandered all his positive gains but also forced the Iraqi people to pay a heavy price, which they are still doing. Saddam’s military defeat sufficiently weakened the Iraqi state, brought large-scale infrastructural damage and emboldened the western members of the international coalition, the US in particular, to virtually divide the country into three parts creating “safe havens” for Kurds in the North and Shi’as in the South all with UN sanction. Even though Saddam Hussein’s regime survived the Iraqi people came under a long spell of crippling, comprehensive UN economic sanctions, which “virtually destroyed” the middle class. Despite all this, there was a semblance of functioning State and Saddam Hussein was trying to reconstruct it in his own way by creating division among the permanent members of the Security council over the usefulness of continuing the UN sanctions and through a proactive regional diplomacy whereby the Iraq president was seeking to rehabilitate himself in the Arab world, specially among the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. On the issue of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the UN inspect on also, Saddam Hussein had started showing sufficient degree of moderation and compromise so as not to provide an alibi to the US to invade Iraq. As is well known, all this came to naught, thanks to the forceful implementation of the neoconservative agenda by President Bush through unilateral, pre-

emptive military intervention in Iraq disregarding the advice and input from the US intelligence community.\textsuperscript{127}

When the US-led forces invaded Iraq, few had any doubt about the ability of the invading forces to remove Saddam Hussein from power. However, what was not clear to many observers was what would follow the downfall of the regime, even though the Bush administration had pointed a very rosy picture about post-Saddam Iraq. The pulling down of the statue of the Iraqi President was symbolic enough: it not only toppled Saddam Hussein from power but also led to the collapse of the entire State structure over which Saddam Hussein had dominated for so long and with so much concentration of power. What was more important was that another, resulting in a total power vacuum stalemate and anarchy, did not replace it. The army, the police, the elaborate bureaucracy, the provincial administrative machinery were either dismantled or simply disappeared to form the nucleus of an incipient insurgency against occupation. In this context, it is instructive to take not of the prediction, which Saddam Hussein had made before the invasion. Warning about a total chaos, he had stated: “Even Saddam Hussein will not be able to control the country” after the overthrow of the legitimate Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{128} That is what is precisely happening in Iraq, even seven years after the occupation.

The Iraqi people had the taste of democracy from the very early days of the occupation. Once the old regime disappeared, all Iraqi cities and towns “fell prey to looters”. Government ministers, Ba’ath party offices, power plants pumping stations, fire stations,

and educational centers “were systematically stripped or trashed”. The Iraqi National Museum, which had one of the richest collections the antiquities and artifacts so much emotionally associated with the Iraqi civilization, was “pillaged and destroyed”. The National Archive was burnt and the Mosul Museum was looted. Even the hospitals were not spared. The only place, which was guarded by the US forces interestingly, was the oil ministry. The fact remained that the occupation authority “demonstrated an extraordinary incompetence in organizing the peace” and miserably failed to address the basic concerns of the Iraqi people like providing medicine, food, clean water, electricity, etc. The contrast between the on the ground and the rhetoric of US democracy promotion was succinctly captured by an ordinary Iraqi: “Jay Garner sits there in comfort and air-conditioning at the Sheraton. While tomorrow, I worry that my food rations will be exhausted... We don’t need freedom without food”. Further, the lack of vision and proper planning of the relief and reconstruction phase by the British administration became evident of the manner in the top American officials were changed within a month of the occupation. This refers to the replacement of Jay Garner, the Governor of occupied Iraq, and his deputy for Baghdad and the central region, Barbara Bodine (the only Arabic speaking senior American official) soon after they assumed charge. Garner was replaced by President Bush’s special envoy, Paul Bremer, who shared the vision of the hawks in the pentagon.

132. Op.cit. 4
The period of Paul Bremer

After the fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy. The administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of US government personnel to administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003. He headed the office of reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003, executive order. The Administration largely discarded the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year before the war drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam. Garner and then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, tried to establish a representative successor regime by organizing a meeting in Nassiriyah of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and ethnicities. A subsequent meeting of over 250 notables was held in Baghdad ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to name an interim administration.

L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003 with a broad mandate and plenary powers. As administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, he was charged with governing Iraq and promoting the development of a functioning democracy that, it was hoped, would serve as a model for the entire West Asia. Bremer could dispose of all Iraqi state assets and direct all Iraqi government officials. He possessed full executive, legislative and Judicial authority. In the bitter aftermath of the failed attempted to gain United Nations Security Council approval for the invasion, neither the United States nor the UN was interested in having the latter assume such a role in Iraq’s governance. On 22 May, the UN Security Council formally recognized but did not endorse the US and the UK
as occupying powers. The transition from ORHA, headed by Army Lieutenant-General (retd) Jay Garner, to the CPA did not go smoothly. Upon his arrival, on 15 May, Bremer issued order number one banning persons serving in the top four levels of the Ba'ath Party from being in the government, thus purging nearly 100,000 from the newly formed administration. One week later, on 23 May, CPA Order Number 2 demobilized and dissolved the Iraqi army, forcing some 350,000-trained soldiers into unemployment. Bremer personally recruited a number of experienced and accomplished people to serve as his senior staff, although some of these showed up late and few stayed for the duration. Non-American officials from allied countries filled a significant minority of positions within the CPA. In August, Bremer allowed the governing Council to appoint Iraqi ministers to head each agency. Thereafter, CPA advisers played a slightly less prominent role, although they retained veto authority over major decisions and controlled many of the purse strings. In early September, Bremer published a seven-step plan for the restoration of sovereignty. This plan required the drafting and ratification of a constitution and the holding of national elections to precede the formation of an Iraqi government, a sequence likely to take a couple of years. This timetable proved too slow for the Iraqi political leadership and, as it turned out, for Washington as well.

In the political sphere, the CPA continued to work with parties and leaders from the previously exiled opposition. While this was understandable neither the CPA nor the US military had managed to develop more nuanced appreciation of which 'indigenous' actors

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134. Ibid., p. 153
to deal with in the post Saddam milieu it immediately structured the political system movement. It also meant that the US was now committed to an overtly ‘top-down’ approach to state building, rather than pursuing a ‘bottom-up’ strategy of working with local communities. By autumn 2003, the original American project for Iraq was clearly faltering. Violent résistance was rising, and most Iraqis, however unfairly, blamed American for the damage and wanted them gone. The President and his advisers concluded that it was important to end the occupation as soon as possible. In mid November, Bremer secured Governing Council agreement for an expedited timetable that called for negotiation of an interim constitution, known as the transitional administrative law, a transitional national assembly to be chosen by provincial caucuses rather than by ballot, and a transitional government to be chosen by this assembly. The entire process was to be completed by mid 2004. The new plan ran into immediate opposition from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shi’a cleric. As a result, it had to be amended once against to eliminate both the caucuses and the transitional assembly. Instead, a UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, was invited by Washington and the Governing Council to help select the members of the transitional government. One was eventually formed with the secular Shi’ite Ayad Allawi at its head. During this period, Bremer and his staff focused heavily on supporting and influencing the negotiation of the transitional administrative law, which Bremer correctly believed would largely determine the contents of the permanent constitution that was to be drafted and ratified a year later.

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136. Ibid.,
137. Ibid.,
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In terms of occupation policy and the operationalisation of a political sectarian environment, the intentions of the Anglo-American authorities were clear from the early phase of occupation. On July 13, 2003, the CPA handpicked and imposed a twenty-five member Interim Governing Council (IGC) on Iraq. Its composition was overtly sectarian with little popular base, little in common with ordinary Iraqis, and no bureaucratic apparatus for decision-making. It was the US, not the Iraqi people, who created the IGC, stirring “ethnic and religious conflict, long absent from Iraqi society.”\textsuperscript{138} The first act in the establishment of an Iraqi government as a sectarian body became the framework for future developments in Iraqi politics, hence establishing the Iraqi state as a sectarian rather than a national and unified institution.

The erratic nature of US policy first signaling in early 2003 that the formation of Iraqi government was imminent, then shifting in May to a much slower timetable, then shifting in November back towards a more expedited process, and finally in early 2004 abandoning the caucus system in favour of a UN conducted selection process undoubtedly created confusion and irritation among Iraqi leaders and their constituents. In retrospect, it would probably have been better to have begun in spring 2003 with the more expedited process that was finally adopted, thereby recognizing that the United States was not going to deploy enough of the assets needed, in terms of troops, civilian official and money, to effectively secure and govern Iraq for the extended period needed to first write a constitution and then hold elections. But that conclusion was not evident at the time, and Bremer’s more deliberate plan was consistent with the best available expert advice.

Indeed, to the extent Bremer was criticized by democratisation and nation building experts throughout the first half of 2003, it was for moving too quickly toward the transfer of sovereignty, rather than too slowly. Of the three speeds at which the CPA might have moved towards restoring Iraqi sovereignty – fast, slow and immediate only the last was not tired. Some believe this might have yielded the best results, citing the Afghan example of late 2001. There is little reason, however, to think that an Iraqi government formed in spring 2003 would have performed any better than the one that was finally empowered in summer 2004. The result of such an attempt might well have been to simply accelerate the descent into civil war. In the event, the CPA adjusted to the new and much accelerated November timetable, and set in train the various steps needed to effectuate the transition by the mid 2004 deadline, including the elaboration of a liberal interim constitution, a strengthened structure for managing Iraq’s national security affairs. These contributions endured through the civil war that raged in the aftermath of the occupation, and they are the source of whatever hope there is that Iraq will not fragment nor return to the savage dictatorship it experienced under Saddam Hussein.

On 28 June 2004, two days earlier than expected, Bremer formally transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people and their interim government. He left Iraq later that same day. Following Bremer’s departure, the CPA was quietly dismantled. Neither the Defense Department nor the State Department was eager to claim its legacy. Principal responsibility for rising insecurity must be attributed to the US administration’s failure to

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140. Ibid.,
141. Ibid., p. 154
prepare its forces to assume responsibility for public safety on the collapse of the former regime, to deploy an adequate number of troops for that purpose, and to institute appropriate counter-insurgency measures once widespread, violent resistance emerged. These omissions cannot be laid solely, or even principally, at the CPA’s door. The United States went into Iraq with a maximalist agenda aiming to set up a model democracy that would serve as a beacon to the entire region and a minimalist application of money and work force.

In particular, it deployed only enough troops to topple the old regime, but not enough to deter the emergence of violent resistance or to counter and defeat the resultant insurgency. One of the administrations most serious conceptual and the rhetorical errors was to model its efforts in Iraq on those of the post-Second World War occupations of Germany and Japan. Those two countries were both highly homogenous societies, with no proclivity towards sectarian conflict. They were first-world economies whose populations did not need to be taught how to run a successful free-market system. In addition, they had surrendered unconditionally. By contrast, Iraq in 2003 looked a lot more like Yugoslavia in 1995 ethnically and religiously divided, with an economy wrecked by war and sanctions and a pattern of historic sectarian grievances. The deceptive ease with which a democratic transition had been arranged in Afghanistan 15 months earlier encouraged an underestimation of the costs and risks of nation building on this scale. Germany did not receive reconstruction aid until 1948, and Japan never did. In both cases, democratic political reforms had been put in place well before their subsequent economic take-offs.

\[142\] Ibid., p.156-7
\[143\] Ibid., p. 158
Experience in these and many other cases have dictated a prioritization of post-war tasks: start with security, then restore basic public services, stabilize the economy, and finally reform the political system. Some level of growth will automatically resume when and if people stop killing each other and go back to work.

Supporting further economic growth is helpful to consolidate political reforms and sustain peace, but is not a prerequisite to the application of security and political reforms and cannot in any case, be sustained in the absence of security. The United States should have aided Iraq’s economic development, as it did, but it should also have depressed rather than stimulated Iraqi expectations for rapid improvement in their standard of living and directed a larger share of its assistance to rebuilding the Iraqi army, police and government as a whole.¹⁴⁴

As regards the democratization process, three specific points can be made: First, it was designed, directed and controlled by the US; second, the process was marked by controversy, confusion and uncertainty almost at every stage; and, third, the ever-worsening security situation greatly undermined Iraq’s smooth transition to a stable, functioning and peaceful democracy. The process itself was quite complicated involving many stages: the formation of the governing Council, the interim government, dissolution of the CPA, election to the Transitional National Assembly, formation of a Transitional government, Drafting the constitution, holding a national referendum to ratify the Draft Constitution and yet another election to National Assemble to facilitate a constitutionally

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 159
elected government for Iraq. It needs to be mentioned that the multi-layered political transition process was largely in keeping with the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which was adopted on 8 June 2004.

Furthermore, as the prominent forces of the ex-Iraq opposition had mainly been in opposition because they failed to fit within the overtly Arab nationalist framework of the Ba’ath narrative, they were, in the main, religiously or ethnically mobilized. The coming together of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (SCIRI), Ibrahim al-Ja’afari (Da’wa), Massoud Barzani (KDP) and Jalal Talabani (PUK) underscores this fact. The leaders of the two centrist’ parties, Iyad Allawi (INA) and Ahmed Chalabi (INC), were also included, along with a token Arab Sunni representative, Nasser al-Chaderchi, to form a Leadership Council. However, the manner in which the council was assembled saw Bremer for the first time being challenged by the highest Shi’a religious authority in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Believing the Leadership Council to be illegitimate due to its unelected condition, and undoubtedly recognizing the fact that the Shi’a were in a numerical majority in Iraq, Sistani called for an elected national assembly and the writing by it of a constitution.

With unrest, continuing to grow across Iraq and with the insurgency in Sunni Arab areas now recognized as a serious threat, Bremer pushed ahead and expanded his Leadership Council into a broader body. By including other smaller parties alongside the ‘Magnificent Seven’ of the original council, a 25 person Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was formed on 13 July. The composition of the council attempted roughly to mirror Iraqi’s societal composition, with 13 being Shi’a, five Kurdish, five Sunni Arabs, one Assyrian and one Turkmen. Howe ever, while the CPA was vociferously criticized for assembling the IGC in such a way, to be fair to Bremer, no other options were available. It was certainly the
easiest action to take, but also the only realistic possibility on the table. Even if the formation of the IGC was driven by necessity, it was seen from the outset as being a creation of the US, and every structure succeeding it, including the government formed after the January 2005 elections, suffered from this stigma. This lack of legitimacy was made even more serious by the role the IGC would play in decision-making. Not only was the IGC hand-picked by the CPA, but all of its decisions had to be sanctioned by the CPA, thereby reducing the IGC to little more than an advisory body in the eyes of most Iraqis.

The first task given to the IGC by the CPA was to draft a new constitutional law by 15 December. The proposed law would then outline a mechanism by which a constitutional convention would be elected. Following this, the convention would draft a constitution, which would then be subjected to a referendum. Upon its acceptance in the referendum, multi-party elections would take place and sovereignty would be transferred to the new Iraqi government from the CPA. This sounded straightforward enough, but problems quickly emerged as each of the three most prominent groups (the Shi’a Kurds and Sunni Arabs) tabled their demands, with each group effectively presenting their own vision of what they considered a future Iraq should look like.

The Shi’a, following the example set earlier by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, demanded that delegates to the constitutional convention be democratically elected, thereby reflecting their numerical dominance. The Kurds once again presented their vision of Iraq being bi-national, with them existing autonomously in their own region. Meanwhile, Sunni Arab members of the council remained divorced from their constituents. Instead, the opposition to what was seen as a process that was disempowering Sunni Arabs from the benefit of the Shi’as and the Kurds was heard more through the increasingly aggressive actions of the
insurgency. The new plan was even more complex than the one it replaced, requiring a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) be drafted by 28 February 2004, which would act as an interim constitution. The plan then envisaged that the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would be formed, again not by elections, but by a complicated three-stage selection process. Each of Iraq’s 18 provinces was to select an organizing committee of 15 members appointed by the IGC, but approved by the CPA that would then convene a Governorate Selection Caucus. This caucus would then elect representative to the TNA by 31 May, which would then assume full sovereign rights on 30 June. The final stage of the plan involved the drafting of a permanent constitution, with final elections taking place sometime before 31 December 2005. If in the words of Bremer himself, the first plan to convene a constitutional convention was ‘straightforward and realistic’, then this second plan was rather more complicated and unrealistic, particularly as the timeframe for action had been drastically reduced, and the actions of the insurgents were continuing to degrade the fledgling Iraqi security forces.

The bombing of KDP and PUK Eid celebration by insurgents in February 2004 claimed over 100 lives, including those of several prominent political leaders, but ultimately only served to harden the Kurds’ resolve to get their own way. The Iraqi experiment with democracy began with the formation of the Governing Council on 7 July 2003. It consisted of 37 members who were selected by nine district councils; themselves selected by 88 neighborhood councils many of the councils selected by US-supervised local assemblies. Still Paul Bremer, in his press conference in Baghdad on 7 July 2003, claimed: “Today marks the resumption of a democratic system in Baghdad that has not been here for 40 years”. The fact remained that the governing Council was hand picked and enjoyed no real
power since the Coalition Provisional Authority ultimately retained the veto power. In that sense, the Council was neither truly representative nor sovereign to make independent decisions. Similarly, the interim government was formed much according to the preferences of the Bush administration and less according to the wishes of the Iraqis.

The nomination of Iyad Allawi to head the interim government lacked mass support. In fact, the very idea of nominating the government was strongly opposed by the Shi’as and Sunnis, criticizing the whole process. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s office stated that “procrastination and delay, obstinacy and intimidation: came in the way of the much more preferable option of an elected government, and that the appointed one “doesn’t represent all slices of Iraqi society and all political forces in an appropriate way.” Abd al Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was also very critical of the way the new government was hand picked.

The Shi’as, thus, preferred a government elected through a national wide general election. In fact, when UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, was making an assessment of holding direct election, Sistani had declared that any government emerging out of the CPA-supervised caucus process would lack legitimacy and amount to imposition of a government by undemocratic means. Some of the Iraq’s Sunni Arab leaders, on the other hand, argued that the interim government should have been selected by consultation between tribal sheikhs, religious leaders and other notables, without any involvement by

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147. Ibid., “Awaiting Judgment”, MEI 719: 15, 20 February
the CPA. They opposed the formation of the interim government either by nomination or by election at a time when Iraq was under occupation.

**Influence of Regional Actors**

In the immediate context, the worsening security situation in Iraq has become the main obstacle in the democratization process. The question arises: can the regional power play any meaningful role in stabilizing Iraq. Iranian role appears very critical because of its location and strategic advantage vis-à-vis the fluid situation in Iraq. The Iranian regime was more than happy to see the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein, its arch regional rival, from power. Iran’s strategic advantage flows from the following factors. The most important factor is the sectarian affinity; Shiites account for 90% of Iranians while in Iraq they are the predominant community constituting around 65% of the population. Since the invasion, Iran has able to build an “impressive network of allies and clients” in Iraq. It has been able to establish its influence over almost every sector of post Saddam Iraq from intelligence agencies to militants to key political figures in various Shiite parties. It is important to remember that many key figures of the supreme council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Da’wa spent years of exile in Iran before returning to Iraq in 2003. There are also ‘numerous soft links’ between the two countries forged because of several waves of Shiite immigration during the years of Saddam’s rule. From the religious angle too, since 2003 thousands of Iranians have visited the holy city of Najaf and Karbala every year, thereby strengthening the bonds between the two countries religious
communities. Finally, business ties between the two countries have also been greatly enhanced after the downfall of Saddam Hussein.\(^{148}\)

In view of the above, Iran is destined to play a crucial role in shaping the future of post-Saddam Iraq. Officially, Iran has played a ‘constructive role’. It became the first country to send an official delegation to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi Government Council; extended financial support and export credits to Iraq came forward to help rebuild Iraq’s energy and electricity infrastructure. During al-Ja’afari’s tenure, high-level Iraqi delegations were sent to Tehran to conclude various agreements relating to security cooperation, aid package, trade, exchange of Iraqi crude oil for refined oil products.\(^{149}\)

The current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki himself visited Tehran in September 2006. During the visit, both the countries agreed to cooperate in the field of political, economic and security. “Strengthening security in Iraq” stated Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a joint press conference, “means strengthening security and stability in the region”.\(^{150}\)

However, instead of engaging Iran in the stabilization of Iraq which is essential for the democratic transition the US is currently embroiled in a confrontation with the regime in Tehran over the nuclear issue, a scenario not very dissimilar to the one that prevailed before 2003 with regard to the US-Iraq standoff. The Bush administration is once again engaged in saber rattling as a prelude to regime change in Iran. Concerning Iraq, the US

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\(^{149}\) Ibid., July-August. 60

\(^{150}\) The Hindu, 13, September 2006, p 15
accuses Iran of providing support to the militants fighting US troops. This may be partly true as some analysts argue that Iran’s short-term objectives in Iraq lies in engineering what is called “controlled chaos”. Such a situation, Iranian policy makers believe, would keep US forces mired in Iraq so as to dampen the US ‘enthusiasm for seeking regime change’ in Tehran. In that sense, Iran short terms goals in Iraq clashes with those of the US, which desperately wants to find a way out of the Iraqi quagmire. Still in the longer term, the same analyst argues, stability in Iraq will serve the interests of both the US and Iran better. Therefore, a major challenge before the Bush administration is to recalibrate its policy towards Iran so as engage it “in helping to address Iraq’s most pressing problems.” In fact, if the leaked reports of the Baker Committee were to be believed, the US may have to ultimately rely on its arch rivals like Iran and Syria to “clear up the mess” in Iraq. Because the committee rejects the “staying the course” option and concludes that, US troops must withdraw from Iraq “without preconditions”.

As regards other regional actors, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia can play a constructive role in the stabilization of Iraq. Since all these countries share borders with Iraq, they are conscious about the destabilizing impact that prolonged instability in Iraq may have on their own domestic situation. In other words, one can assume that all these states too have a stake in stabilizing Iraq. What complicate the matter; however, are the differing perspectives that characterize their understanding of the Iraqi scene. Syria like Iran is also being accused, by both the US and the UK, of fomenting trouble in Iraq by helping the insurgency. As usual, Syria has consistently denied any involvement in the Iraqi

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151. Op-cit., 68, July-August.
insurgency. Syria, like Iran, may also be pursuing a strategy to keep the US bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire so that the Bush administration has less time and energy to turn its attention towards Syria, which has been branded as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department. Viewed from another angle, the Syrian strategy may not work for long given the continuing political turmoil in Lebanon because of the politics of assassination and other developments in which the regime of Bashar al-Asad is alleged to have a key role. Thus, in the longer term, a stable Iraq would be as much in the interest of Syria as the US.

For Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent anarchy in Iraq present a different set of problems having a sectarian dimension. Sunni leaders in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have accused Iran of creating chaos in Iraq and warned that Iran would “wield considerable influence in the region if the Iraqi Shiite came to hold the reins of power” in post-Saddam Iraq. Putting the blame on Iran partly serves the interests of these leaders to “divert attention away from their own responsibility” for Iraq’s dangerous security situation, all these three countries played a key role in sustaining Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s suicide brigade by supporting the bulk of his supporters. King Abdullah, during his visit to the US in December 2004, warned the Bush administration about such a possibility while underlining the implications of a powerful


Iranian-backed Shiite government in Iraq. Such a concern may have some basis given the experience of the Sunni leaders across the region in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the late Khomeini’s religious fervor and ideological ambitions. However, it also has an ulterior motive; it would instantly get support from the other Sunni leaders in the region to “resist US calls for domestic political reforms”. These leaders argue that if “bringing democracy” to West Asia “means empowering Shiites and strengthening Iran”, the US would be “well advised to stick to Sunni dictatorships”. Thus, the role of the regional actors is a complex issue. However, their active involvement is a pre-requisite to bringing about stability in Iraq.

**UN and the democratisation of Iraq**

Resolution 1483 provided for a UN special representative to Iraq and called on governments to contribute forces to stabilization. Resolution 1500 established UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The size of UNAMI in Iraq, with at least an equal number offshore in Jordan. It is focused on promoting political reconciliation, election assistance, and monitoring human rights practices and humanitarian affairs. In an attempt to satisfy the requirements of several nations for greater UN backing of the coalition forces presence, the United States achieved adoption of resolution 1511, in October 16, 2003, authorizing a multinational force under unified command. Resolution 1546, June 8, 2004, took UN involvement further by endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim government, spelling out the duration and legal status of US led forces in Iraq, and authorizing a coalition component forces to protect UN personnel

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155. Ibid., 15, 1 April.
and facilities. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Baghdad in March 2007 and later said that UNAMI would expand its presence in Iraq and perhaps take on additional duties to promote political reconciliation. A new UN Security Council Resolution, 1770, adopted August 10, 2007, renewed UNAMI’s mandate, and with an enhanced responsibility to be lead promoter of political reconciliation in Iraq and plan a national census.

January 2005 election

The election for the Iraqi National Assembly was held on 30 January 2005 amidst fears of insurgent attacks. Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda outfit had issued warning not to participate in the elections, viewing those who did as legitimate targets. The warning achieved its desired effect, but only in Sunni Arab-dominated areas. Certain indisputable trends could be seen in the voting pattern. Most notably, the turnout in the Kurdish and Shi’a areas was very high – perhaps as high as 80% in Shi’a areas, and an astonishing 90% in Kurdistan. Meanwhile, the turnout in the Sunni Arab areas was as impressively low. Indeed, the turnout in Mosul was as low as 10%, and most of those would have been Kurds. The pattern was repeated in Tikrit, Aaquba, Ramadi, Fallujah and even parts of Baghdad. The communalization of Iraqi political life was now codified by the results of the elections. Those who voted did not do so as Sunnis. This skewed pattern of voting would have implications for the distribution of seats within the national assembly. Of the 275 seats, 140 went to the United Iraqi Alliance. The next largest block in the assembly was the Kurdish Alliance. Trailing in behind these was the ‘Iraqi List’ of Iyad Allawi, with 40 seats. The most seats any Sunni Arab list secured were the five of Ghazi al-Yawer’s ‘The Iraqis’. This polarization of voting patterns manifested itself as an unbalanced Council of
representatives, with legislative and executive power being held mainly by parties sponsored by the Shi‘a religious establishment and the political parties of Kurdistan. The new cabinet gave further credence to the view that power in ‘the new Iraq’ was being divided between the leading Shi‘a and Kurds parties, at the expense of the Sunnis. The long time Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani was elected President of Iraq by the TNA on 6 April, followed the day after by one of the leaders of Da‘wa, Ibrahim al-Ja‘afari, assuming the position of Prime Minister due to the predominance of UIA members in the TNA. Ja‘afari’s subsequent granting of 17 cabinet posts to Shi‘is, including the crucial interior and oil portfolio positions, with seven positions allocated to the Kurds and eight to Sunni Arabs, was a clear attempt to try and form a government representing the three major political groups.

The January 2005 elections to the 275 member of National Assembly as well as provincial councils were equally controversial and were not a general election in the true sense of the term. Most significantly, the election excluded an important segment of the Iraqi society the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni clerical establishment, the Muslim Scholars’ Board, had given a boycott call. There were many other aspects of the electoral process, which were not in keeping with established democratic norms. For instance, voters went to the poll without knowing even the name of the candidates and their electoral programmes. In many parts of the country, people just did not come out to vote. As expected, the percentage of voter turnout was high in the northern and southern parts of the country. However, in central Iraq, dominated by Sunnis, the participation was very low with most of the polling stations in the Sunni triangle of Fallujah, Samara and Ramadi remaining either closed or deserted.
The worst electoral irregularities took place in Sunni-dominated area, particularly in Mosul; thousands could not vote.

It was alleged that the election authorities did not send enough ballots to Sunni villages with the assumption that no one would come to vote. Further, the independent Election Commission declared the polling turnout to be above 75 percent hours before the polling station closed. The press was severely restricted to cover the elections. The commission only allowed foreign journalists with access to five polling stations. This was also aimed at sending message to the international community that the process was free and fair. Such behavior on the part of the commission naturally questioned its credibility and the entire process itself. Above all, the election were monitored by the international monitors from Amman, a thousands kilometers away from the Iraqi capital. Nevertheless, elections did set in motion the process of democratic governance, though in a limited sense. The constitution making process was not easy neither it was marked by chaos, controversy and deadlock. Further, the US officials were involved throughout the process. From the very beginning, the deliberations in the 71-member constitutional draft committee, headed by Humam Hamudi, remained deadlocked over fundamental issues: between the Kurds and Shi’as on the “pan-Arab identification”, and between the Sunnis and the Shi’as on the degree of decentralization.\textsuperscript{157}

The Shi’as wanted Iraq to be declared an Islamic Republic; the Kurds argued that it should be named as the Federal Republic of Iraq; and the Sunnis demanded that the country should be called the Arab Republic of Iraq. Similarly, the concept of federalism meant

different things to different groups. For the Kurds, who were already enjoying regional autonomy in three northern provinces, federalism implied that they should enforce regional autonomy in the ethnically complex and oil-rich province of Kirkuk. The Shi’ite parties interpreted freedom as a mechanism, which would “accommodate local preferences in how to apply Islamic law”.\footnote{Ibid., “Tearing Itself Apart”, MEI 751: 15, 27 May} For the Sunnis, who are concentrated in central and western Iraq, the idea of federalism was as a ploy to divide the country. In that sense, the idea of a “federal Iraq” remained non-negotiable for most Kurds and many Shi’ite groups.\footnote{Op. cit., “Political Deadlock”, MEI 760: 12, 14 October.} After three months of negotiation and three missed deadlines, the draft constitution was made ready on 28 August 2005. Islam was recognized as a “fundamental sources of legislation and no law shall contradict, “the principles of its jurisprudence; but neither shall “they contradict those of democracy and human rights”. The draft provided for “separation of powers and judicial review of laws”. It also granted 25 percent of seats for women in the National Assembly. Oil wealth was to be made “the property of the nation” with revenues to be divided among governorates according to population. However, the Sunnis raised a number of objections, the most important being the ban on the “Saddam Ba’th”, the idea of federalism leading to the creation of regional entities with sweeping powers including the maintenance of their own paramilitary forces on the lines of those existing the northern Kurdish provinces, etc. finally, the drafting process itself was marred by procedural problems. Since the draft was prepared behind closed doors through negotiations among the Iraq’s main political parties, a large majority of the

\footnote{Ibid., “Tearing Itself Apart”, MEI 751: 15, 27 May}
\footnote{Op. cit., “Political Deadlock”, MEI 760: 12, 14 October.}
National Assembly was excluded from the process. That was the reason the draft constitution was merely read out in the Assembly without being put into a vote. ¹⁶⁰

The new constitution was ratified in a national referendum in October 2005, but by the narrowest of the margins. At the national level 78.59 percent voted for the document while 21.41 percent voted against. However, the constitution was rejected in three main Sunni Arab provinces, but with the required two third majorities in all, which would have invalidated the documented. A controversial clause in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) stipulated that the draft constitution could be invalid if two third of the population in Iraq’s 18 provinces rejected it, even it if it was approved by majority at the national level. While predominantly Sunni Salah al-Din and overwhelmingly Sunni Anabar voted 82 percent and 97 percent, respectively, the mixed province of Ninawah voted 55 percent against the draft. In fact, the Sunni strategy of blocking the ratification mainly depended on the mixed province of Ninawah where the well-organized Kurdish population “tipped” the balance in favour of the constitution. Even though, passed by a majority, the ratification process once again reflected the deep ethnic and religious division in Iraq, with the main communities voting along sectarian lines. Throughout the Kurdish North and Shi’ite South, more than 90 percent of the population voted in favour of the constitution. In that sense, the referendum probably reflected the lack of “consensus” in Iraq “on how to govern the country” in the post-Saddam era. More significantly, Sunni leaders alleged rigging in the whole process. Even though the Election Commission refuted those

allegations, the very perception by a section of the society did not augur well for a deeply
divided country like Iraq.\textsuperscript{161}

**Permanent Constitution**

The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any
three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55 member drafting committee was appointed, but
with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as
advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007,
deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the
Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation; 25
percent electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which courts to use for
family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and
having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article 89).
Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male
family members. It made all orders of the US-led occupation authority CPA applicable
until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second
chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law.

**December 2005 election**

With the constitution accepted, ‘final’ election was held on 15 December 2005. Iraqis
would now vote for a particular list, with 230 seats proportionately distributed across
Iraq’s 18 governorates. A further 45 ‘compensatory’ seats were allocated for distribution

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., “Yes, by a Nose”, MEI 761: 8-9, 28 October
based upon the performance of parties in the election. The system was designed in order to give more weight to the Sunni Arab representation in the national assembly, even if their vote remained low. The final result, while seeing a clear increase in the number of seats going to Sunni Arab representatives, unsurprisingly still saw the same basic pattern emerge as that of the elections of January. The UIA dominated the assembly with 128 seats. The Kurdish List secured the second largest bloc with 53 seats. However, the Iraqi Accord Front, a union of various Sunni Arab parties formed in October 2005, managed to secure the third largest bloc in the assembly with 44 seats.

The gaining of a further 11 seats by Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi Front for National Dialogue effectively gave Sunni Arabs representation that simply could not be ignored by the Kurds and the Shi ‘as. Two months after the election had taken place agreement still had to be reached upon the composition of the new Iraqi government, and the identification of key figures including the president and prime minister. While it seemed likely that the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani would remain as president of Iraq, it was far from clear who would be prime minister or who would be appointed to the sensitive ministries of interior, defense and oil. Ibrahim al-Ja’afari had successfully managed to lose the support of the Kurds, who accused him making decisions without under taking the appropriate consultation, and who were furious with him for making a trip at the end of February 2006 to Ankara, without the (Kurdish) foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari. Sunni Arabs were also opposed to Ja’afari continuing as prime minister as attacks by Shi ‘a gangs, commonly associated with the Interior Ministry, had risen during his time in office. A standoff developed between the UIA on the one hand, and the Kurds and the Arab Sunnis on the other over who should be appointed prime minister.
A product of this political uncertainty was the deterioration of security. Undoubtedly, the most worrying development in the post-election period was the rapid intensification of what could already be described as a civil war between Sunnis and Shi‘as. Throughout 2005, suicide bombers had been targeting Shi‘a population centre and committing acts of violence against prominent members of the Shi‘a community. In response, Shi‘a militias, most commonly associated with SCIRI’s Badr Army and the Jaish al-Mahdi of Muqtada al-Sadr, were accused of undertaking retaliation killings against Sunni Arabs.

The December 2005 Parliamentary elections sent a mixed signal about the future of Iraqi democracy. On the one hand, the election to the National Assembly came as a very encouraging sign as far as the process of reconciliation between the Shi‘as and Sunnis was concerned. Unlike the January elections, this time the Sunnis participated in the polls in quite large numbers. The participation of the Sunnis in the country’s democratic process, however controversial it might be provided the best scope for an inclusive political process in a country known for sectarian and ethnic division. On the other hand, the Sunnis once again alleged that the elections were rigged in many places with a design to marginalize them from the country’s political process. Few days after the election, for instance, thousands of protesters took to the street in Baghdad. Some of the banners, which the protesters displayed during the demonstration, clearly reflected the Sunni perception of the elections. These included: “No democracy without real elections”, “rigged polls”, “down with electoral commission”, etc. In fact, the Sunni made an appeal to the United Nations,
the Arab League and the US administration to probe the election results, specially in northern Iraq where they alleged widespread irregularities in the conduct of election.\textsuperscript{162}

The underlying message was that the Shi’as and Kurds had a tacit understanding to deny the Sunnis their legitimate share in the Parliament. These were clearly not the positive indicators of a fledgling democracy even though both the Election Commission and the Shi’as rejected the allegations subsequently. The U\textsuperscript{11}A, which won the maximum number of seats, again nominated Ja’afari for the post of Prime Minister. However, Ja’afari’s candidature was strongly opposed by the Kurdish group which came second with 75 seats as well as the Sunnis which claimed 40 seats in the National Assembly. The Kurdish parties, who were allies in the previous government led by the UIA, opposed Ja’afari because of his insistence on a strong Central government in Iraq. Ja’afari, it may be noted, had opposed the Kurdish control of their Kirkuk oil fields in northern Iraq. The Sunnis also opposed him; ostensibly because of his failure to check the sectarian violence in the country.

Above all, the US as well as UK opposed Ja’afari’s continuance because of his close links with Iran as well as socialist leanings. In fact, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and her counterpart Jack Straw had to visit Baghdad to persuade Ja’afari to step down and make way for another candidate. Ultimately, Ja’afari had to step down in favour of Jawad al-Maliki who also belonged to the Da’wa party. Maliki’s selection was part of a compromise deal worked out after four months of protracted political bargaining and intricate negotiation involving all sections. As a result, Mahmoud al Mashhadani, a Sunni

\textsuperscript{162} The Hindu, 28 December 2005, p. 15

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Arab, was elected speaker while posts of two Deputy Speakers went to Khalid al-Attyah, a Shia, and Aref Tayfoour, a Kurd. Further, another Sunni leader Tariq al-Hashemi became one of two Vice Presidents. Kurd leader Jalal Talabani, of course, got a second term for Presidency. Such complex negotiation underlined the daunting challenges facing the new Prime Minister. Maliki faces two critical challenges after assuming office. The first related to the formation of a national unity cabinet so that his government could well be regarded as the first genuinely representative post Saddam set-up in the country after the US invasion. The second challenge before Maliki was to control violence and improve security. While he somehow succeeded in meeting the first, Maliki still confronts the second one.

As said earlier, the dangerous security scenario in Iraq greatly underlined and continues to undermine, the democratization process. Not a single day passes without some incident or the other, which kills people from every section of the Iraqi society. Improving security and bringing law and order to a near anarchical state of affairs has therefore, emerged as a single most formidable challenge before both the occupation forces as well as the Iraqi government. An intense and contentious debate is still going on within the US over what went wrong. While there are differences over what led to the ever-worsening security scenario that is pushing the country to brink of a civil war, and the prescriptions to come out of the mess, there is consensus on one thing: the security scenario is precarious and needs to be improved to stabilize the democratization process. Few example and figures may illustrate the point better.

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163. Ibid., 3-23 April 2006, p. 14
Between 1 May 2003, when President declared an end to “major fighting” and 7 July 2003, when Paul Bremer declared the formation of the governing Council, a total of 29 American and six British solders were killed. The Pentagon did not provide the total number of Iraqi deaths. During February 2004, when UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, was consulting various section of the Iraqi society about the feasibility of holding direct elections before the handover of “sovereignty.” Insurgent launched their boldest attack in Fallujah. Around 40 masked gunmen took over the local police station, freed the prisoners and killed 23 policemen. The attacked was preceded by a series of bombings that left about 100 dead a week before. The basic objective behind this violent attack to “discourage” Iraqis from dealing with the coalition, to “undermine” the credibility of the CPA and to create “an atmosphere of instability that make it very difficult to hold election”.

On 19 December 2004, just few days before the January 2005 elections, car bombs were detonated in Najaf and Karbala, which killed 60 people. It was probably for the first time in history that democratic elections were held under unprecedented security measures that included imposition of Martial Law, the absence of campaigning, and the heavy presence of US troops near polling stations. In fact, as one commentator in the Arabic press pointed out, by the time the elections were held around 100,000 Iraqis and 2000 Americans had lost their lives. In May 2005, when Ja’afari trying hard to form a cabinet by holding negotiations with various sections, insurgent attacks killed more than 300 people in the last two weeks. It needs to be mentioned that there was a reduction in insurgent attacks during February-March 2005 after the elections. This had led many American analysts to believe that the election “democratized” the Ba’athist and former military officers who “realized
after the elections that their chances of driving out the Americans and restoring Sunni Arab rule” were slim. In the same month, when the government was discussing the most viable and just method of constituting the constitutional drafting committee, at least ten clerics, both Sunni and Shi’ite, were gunned down in an “apparent series of tit-for-tat assassinations”.

In July 2005, when the drafting committee (Mijbal Isa and Hussein Ubaydi) were assassinated in drive-by shooting in southeast Baghdad. On 11 October 2005, few days before the Iraqis went to the referendum to vote for the constitution, insurgent bombed a market in Tal Afar, which killed 30 people. This was the time when the US forces were launching operations against insurgency in the Euphrates valley.

Coming to the year 2006, UN sources have admitted the escalation of violence since the beginning of the year. The civilian death toll increased by more than 77 percent, from 1,778 in January to 3,194 in June. The UN report stated that 14,338 civilian have died in violence in Iraq in the first six months of 2006: 1,778 civilians in January; 2,615 in February; 2,378 in March; 2,284 in April; 2,669 in May; and 3,194 in June. As regard the death toll in July, around 2,000 Iraqis met with violent death during the first three weeks of the month. Most of the casualties took place in the Iraqi capital and adjacent areas. Most worrying aspect is the sectarian nature of the violence and bloodshed. This explains President Bush’s decision to redeploy US troops from other areas and station more troops in Baghdad. While announcing this, at a White House press conference during Prime
Minister Maliki’s first visit to the US, President Bush himself admitted that the “violence in Baghdad is still terrible”.\textsuperscript{164}

Thus, Iraq is virtually in the midst of a very violent civil war that could severely affect the country’s transition to a stable democracy. In this context, it may be pertinent to note the observation made by the outgoing British Ambassador, William Patey in his memo to his Prime Minister, Tony Blair, before his departure from Baghdad. Patey wrote: “the prospect of the low intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probable more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable government”. The British Ambassador was quite pessimistic even about the minimum, which the US could expect from the present situation in Iraq. “Even the lowered expectation”, Patey stated, “of President Bush for Iraq a government that can sustain itself, defend itself and govern itself and is an ally in the war on terror must remain in doubt”.\textsuperscript{165} The Patey memo greatly shocked the public facing a senate debate on the subject. While testifying before the senate, two senior generals, John Abizaid (Head of US Central Command) and General Peter Pace (Chairman, US Joint Chief of Staff), publically admitted that Iraq was fast “devolving into civil war”.\textsuperscript{166}

\textbf{Execution of Saddam Hussein}

In December 14, 2003, US, officials announce capture of Saddam Hussein in his home town Tikrit and he was put on trial. The first trial dealt with atrocities he had committed in

\textsuperscript{164} The Hindu, 27 July 2006, p. 14
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 6 August 2006, p. 12
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid
1982 the year when the Reagan administration dropped Iraq from the list of states
supporting terrorism so that military and other aid could flow to the murderous tyrant, aid
that continued until he committed the first crime that mattered: disobeying US orders in
August 1990.\textsuperscript{167} The trial of Saddam Hussein began on 19 October 2005, when the
accused were brought before the Supreme Iraqi Council Tribunal in Baghdad, charged
with the killing of more than 148 Shi’a men in the village of Dujail in 1982. Questioning
the validity of the court and insisting on referring to himself as the President of his
country, Saddam pleaded not guilty. The trial continued throughout the remaining months
of 2005, despite Saddam Hussein boycotting the trial on 7 December. In July 2006,
however, the trial was postponed after the chief judge, Rizgar Amin, resigned amid
allegations that he was being too lenient towards the defendants. Although a new judge,
Raouf Abd ar-Rahman, was appointed on 23 January, further drama erupted when the trial
resumed six days later. Just minutes after the courtroom opened, Saddam Hussein walked
out in protest at the removal of four defence lawyers, whom the judge had accused to
leading the defendants to show disrespect to the court. When the trial resumed three days
later it was without Saddam Hussein and with a new defence team, which the court had
appointed. He was forcibly returned to the courtroom on 13 February on the orders of the
judge Abd ar-Rahman. The following month Saddam Hussein commenced his formal
defence, attacking the court as a ‘comedy’ and dismissing evidence as ‘fake’.

On 19 June chief trial prosecutor Ja’afar al-Mussawi delivered his closing arguments,
calling for Saddam Hussein and three co-defendants to be sentence to death. In the same

\textsuperscript{167} Chomsky Noam. Failed States, The abuse of power and the assault on democracy.

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month one of Saddam Hussein’s lawyers was murdered, becoming the third defence lawyer to have been killed since the trial began. A further boycott of the trial by Saddam Hussein, who began a hunger strike, forced the adjournment of the trial until July. However, on 24 July, the trial resumed, and two days later, the former President was brought before the court. A final session was held the next day, when in the absence of Saddam Hussein the trial was adjourned until 16 October, when a verdict was expected to be reached.

On 21 August 2006 Saddam Hussein appeared for his second trial, in which he was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity. The charges related specifically to the ‘Anfal’ campaign of 1987-88 when 182,000 people were killed in an anti-Kurdish offensive. Saddam Hussein, however, refused to enter a plea, leading to Judge Abdullah al-Amiri entering a guilty plea on his behalf. On 5 November 2006 Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against humanity for the Dujail massacre and was sentenced to death. Iraq’s Supreme Court of Appeals eventually dismissed several appeals against both the verdict and the sentence, and following a final attempt by Saddam’s lawyers to block his transfer from US to Iraq custody, Saddam Hussein was executed by hanging in the early morning of 30 December. Several aspects of the former President’s trial and execution provoked controversy. The judicial processes themselves came under scrutiny from human rights groups, with Human Rights Watch questioning whether the Supreme Iraqi Tribunal was legitimate and capable of providing a fair trial. For example, the group pointed to the fact that guilt did not have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, merely to the tribunal’s ‘satisfaction’. Even more controversial were the timing and manner of the execution.
With respect to timing, Saddam Hussein’s sentence was carried out on the morning of 30 December, the first day of Sunnis of Id al-Adha (Eid uz- Zoha), one of Islam’s most important holidays. Hosni Mubarak, the President of Egypt, reflected the views of many of the Muslim world when he described the decision to execute the former Iraqi leader on a Muslim holiday as unthinkable' and ‘shameful’. Equally troubling was the conduct of the execution, which was caught on video using a camera phone and then leaked onto the internet for global consumption. The video depicted a chaotic and highly unprofessional execution process in which a defiant Saddam Hussein was apparently taunted by his Shi’a executioners. The Times of the United Kingdom concluded that the scene resembled a ‘medieval execution or a wild hanging in Texas’, while the New York Times described it as a ‘sectarian free-for-all’. President Bush himself’ expressed regret at the manner in which the execution had been conducted, noting that it had taken on the appearance of a ‘revenge killing’.

March 2010 election

On 13 December 2009, the Presidency Council announced that the date for national elections would be 7 March 2010; Iraq will hold its parliamentary elections for all 325 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. In January 2010, will hold Iraqi parliamentary election, but was delayed by disputes between various political factions in parliament over the election law. The main issues were whether to use an open or closed ballot list electoral system, the allocation of seats in parliament and the voting in disputed territories of Iraq. The main division fell along sectarian lines, with both minority Sunni and Kurdish blocs disputing the allocation of reserved parliamentary seats, which favors the majority Shia population. After a protracted debate, a compromise agreement was
finally reached resulting in an increased number of parliamentary seats, from 275 to 325, and an open list system. Despite delays in the adoption of the Election Law, the registration of political entities and coalitions continued. A total of 6,529 candidates were nominated by 86 political entities. All candidates were under an obligatory vetting process with reference to their educational background, affiliation with the outlawed Ba’ath party, or conviction on crimes violating honor.

Approximately 18.9 million Iraqis have registered to vote. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) will establish around 10,000 polling centers throughout Iraq. Each center consists of one or more polling stations, totaling over 50,000. Each polling station is expected to serve up to 420 voters. An estimated 200,000 - 300,000 political agents and national observers are expected to participate in the election, which should provide for every polling station in Iraq to be observed. Approximately 300,000 polling staff have been selected by a public electronic lottery based on more than 500,000 applications. More than 3,000 land convoys and more than 20 international flights are planned to provide logistical support for the movement of electoral materials, with a completely integrated security plan designed by the Election Supreme Security Committee, established by Iraq’s Prime Minister. Overall, approximately 28 million ballots of 19 different types were printed to accommodate regular voting, special needs, absentee and out of country ballots, and 100,000 ballot boxes were procured for the elections.

The Political Parties

The controversy over the conduct of the elections have set the stage for a potentially bitter and disputed contest, and heightened tensions among Iraq’s main ethnic and sectarian
groups. Uncertainty was already on the rise due to the 2009 breakup of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), the ruling Shi’a coalition that had dominated the government for the previous four years, and the formation of new political lists that offered solid alternatives to Maliki and brought important new political players onto the scene. At the time of this writing, six main coalitions are likely to contend for dominance in the next Iraqi government. There was the following parties contested election in March 7, 2010.

**State of Law Coalition**, strains within the INA, comprising Maliki’s Da’wa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), prompted the prime minister to break from the Alliance and assemble an inter-sectarian coalition prior to provincial elections in 2009. Maliki calculated that such a party, running on a platform of security and a strong and united Iraq, would prove popular with voters tired of parties whose main appeal lay in their religious orientation but who failed to deliver public services or security. The gamble paid off, and candidates associated with Maliki won significant victories in the provincial vote. The State of Law coalition, reformulated for this year’s election, includes Da’wa along with a mixture of Sunni tribal leaders, Shi’a Kurds, Christians and independent politicians. The coalition advocates the same platform it did in the 2009 provincial elections security, public services and national unity. State of Law is likely to become the strongest party in the 2010 COR.

**The Iraqi National Alliance**, though weakened by the break with Da’wa and losses in the provincial elections, will remain a vigorous competitor. The Alliance now comprises ISCI along with supporters of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari, Ahmed Chalabi, the Shi’a party Fadhila, and a scattering of Sunni political figures. The coalition’s main point of attack is opposition to Maliki and an appeal to Shi’a
solidarity. Its greatest weakness, however, is its lack of a demonstrated record of effectiveness on issues most Iraqis care about, its inability to appeal more broadly outside the Shi’a community, and its perceived closeness to Iran.

**Kurdistan’s two main parties**, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by regional President Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, form the third major political alliance. The Kurdish bloc sees the 2010 elections as crucial to maintaining Kurdistan’s virtual autonomy and privileges. Thus, the KDP and the PUK have maneuvered for every advantage in the run-up to the elections. They were seeks to maximize their king making power in Baghdad and increase their leverage on issues of interest to the Kurds, particularly the future of Kirkuk and control over oil resources and revenues. Their ability to do so, however, may be limited by a new political party, Goran (or Change), which won about 25 percent of the seats in the elections for the Kurdish regional parliament in 2009. If Goran does well in March 2010, Kurdish political maneuvering vis-à-vis the central government may be circumscribed.

**The Iraqi National Movement (Iraqiyya)**, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shi’ite, joined with senior Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq, Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi (Sunni) and two other Sunni parties to run on a nonsectarian platform. The alliance intends to campaign on a theme of national unity. The JAC’s decision to ban Mutlaq, al-Ani and others from the election has thrown the coalition into disarray. Despite this, it is still seen as the most potent challenger to Maliki and State of Law.

**Tawafuq (the Iraqi Accordance Front)**, is a predominantly Sunni Arab list which since the 2005 elections has repeatedly splintered and now consists mainly of the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP), the Iraqi Peoples Gathering and various tribal leaders. It is headed by IIP Secretary General Osama Tikriti and COR Speaker Ayad al-Samurraie. The party is expected largely to reflect Sunni interests on equitable sharing of resources and constitutional reform intended to guarantee Sunni political rights.

**Unity Alliance of Iraq**, Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani, a Shi’a, and Ahmed Abu Risha, the head of the Anbar Awakening and a top leader of anti al-Qaeda Sunni tribal sheikhs, joined with others to form a broadly multi-sectarian group running on a platform of secular nationalism. Bolani and his allies formed the Alliance after failing to come to an agreement with Maliki on joining State of Law. Maliki and his supporters subsequently mounted a political attack on Bolani in an unsuccessful effort to force him step down from his government post. The group remains perhaps the most genuinely inter-sectarian political list, and intends to run on a platform of secular nationalism.

**Other players**, in the March electoral sweepstakes include tribal leaders and small minority parties representing sects and ethnic groups such as the Assyrians, Christians, Faili Kurds, Sabeans, Shabak, Turkmen, and Yazidis, who were expected to wield local influence and ally with other parties to ensure their interests, are protected. The issues on which these elections are being contested, the identity of the electoral lists that have formed to take part, and the controversies that have shaped them have deep implications for the nature of the Iraqi state and its future political path. On December 6, 2009, that provides for clarification to the amendments of the electoral law passed in November 2009. In the latter part of 2009, squabbles over a new election law for the forthcoming election nearly plunged the Iraqi political system into collapse, as Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi, the self-styled representative for Iraqi Sunnis, particularly the Sunni
refugee population, vetoed successive election laws that he felt underrepresented his Sunni constituency. The approved electoral law allowed for a round of national elections to take place in 2010, and underscores the inexorably sectarian nature of contemporary Iraqi politics. Electoral and political coalitions within contemporary Iraq remain based not on traditional ideological contrasts, functional competencies or citizenship, but on political sectarian interests. Indeed, even after the new electoral law had been largely agreed, “lawmakers were still haggling over such issues as how the Christian minority would be represented.”

On 13 December 2009, the Presidency Council announced that the date for national elections would be 7 March 2010; Iraq will hold its parliamentary elections for all 325 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) has been supporting preparations for the forthcoming national elections, which will mark the transition from the first full term of a democratically elected parliament to the next. UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon has stated his firm belief that the elections “represent an historic opportunity for Iraq and a crucial step forward for national reconciliation,” and that they will also “contribute to Iraq’s political progress and could go a long way towards strengthening Iraq’s sovereignty and independence.

Maliki is favored to remain as prime minister, although his chances have dimmed of late due to the electoral Controversies and accusations of authoritarianism. The results released Friday portend an ugly, protracted battle. No coalition is close to the 163 seats needed to control the 325-seat parliament. Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition won 91 seats to 89 for al-

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Maliki's State of Law bloc. The Iraqi National Alliance, a Shiite religious group dominated by al-Sadr's followers, won about 70 seats, and Kurdish parties picked up 51. After the election on March 7, 2010, Jalal Talabani remained President of Iraq and Nori al-Malaki, the Prime Minister and the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi are ruling the democratic of Iraq in 2011.
CHAPTER V

INSERGENCY MOVEMENT IN IRAQ
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Insurgency has existed as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak to the point of violence. It is simply a strategy of desperation in which those with no other options turn to protracted, asymmetric violence, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. In some modes, insurgents seek to attain their objectives directly by wearing down the dominant power. Today, the combination of the massive conventional military preeminence of the United States, nuclear deterrence between great powers, and multiple sources of global discontent arising from globalization, the collapse of traditional political, economic, and social orders, environmental decay, population pressure, and other factors, insurgency is again surging in strategic significance. In fact, the world has entered another “age of insurgency” analogous to the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. This is likely to continue for at least several decades.

The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, arguably new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. Indeed, between 1990 and 1996 alone, there were at least 98 conflicts worldwide,
but only a few of these were waged between recognized states. Various instances of concurrent insurgency have been categorized by different analysts in such terms as a political, traditionalist, pluralist, reformist, spiritual, and economic. Certainly Islamic fundamentalism, which might be regarded more as an ideology than an expressly religious conviction, has emerged as a new imperative behind insurgency. Examples range from the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 to the continuing conflicts in the Philippines, Indonesia, Palestine, Algeria, the Sudan, Kashmir, Chad, and, of course, Iraq, although some of these conflicts may also be characterized in other terms such as ethnic or separatist insurgencies.

The best-known alumnus of the Afghan jihad is Osama bin Laden, under whose leadership the "Afghan Arabs "prosecuted their war beyond the West Asia into the United States, Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Around the same time, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. military presence in "the land of the two holy places" became al-Qaeda's core grievance, and the United States became bin Laden's primary target. Al-Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, nearly sank the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, and attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.¹⁶⁹

The US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath illustrates both the enormous military strength possessed by the state that often, and accurately, is called the world’s sole superpower, as well as many of its weaknesses. Also, it provides an excellent insight into the difficulties of counterinsurgency, demonstrating how even an overwhelmingly powerful army may...

find it very difficult to quash insurgents and bring order to a country, particularly if that 
force is perceived as an unwelcome occupier. In October, 1991 the US President had 
signed the Iraq Liberation Act, a bill providing for support for anti-Saddam Iraqi exile 
groups and, in essence, making the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime a formal US policy 
ojective.

The United States and Britain (and, for several years, France) enforced “no-fly” zones, 
because of they would be used by the Iraqi government to attack Kurds (in the north) and 
Shi’a (in the south). Both groups had been brutally repressed in the aftermath of the 1991 
Gulf War because they had rebelled against Saddam’s rule. However, it is important to 
ote note that the Administration explicitly placed Iraq in the wider context of the US-led 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) which had begun with the destruction of the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan. From this perspective, war in Iraq was not a “stand-alone” 
effort; rather, it was campaign in a larger struggle which, the Administration warned, 
could continue for decades.

The absence of a real insurgency, however, does not make the situation less dangerous, 
and whatever the motivation of any particular group, the aim is clearly to sow divisions 
both between the Iraqis and the Coalition and also among Iraqis themselves. It is also to 
raise the costs of U.S. and Western presence since there can be little expectation on the 
part of these various groups that they are capable of challenging the Coalition’s military 
superiority. A general assumption appears to be that the suicide bombings so familiar from
the Palestinian Intifada, though also from the Shi’ite campaign against the Israelis in Lebanon, are more likely to be the work of foreign elements than Iraqis.170

An analysis of the U.S. fatality reports produced by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from May 2003 to March 2004 indicates that 30.8 percent of U.S. fatalities were the result of bombs or improvised explosive devices; 14.3 percent, the result of stand off weapons in terms of rocket-propelled grenades and mortars; and 10.5 percent, the result of small arms or grenades. Downed helicopters accounted for 13.1 percent of fatalities, with the remaining 30.6 percent the result of accidents of varying kinds and other non hostile causes. It is likely that the proportion of deaths due to small arms increased substantially with the outbreak of greater violence in April 2004, but, as the communiqués relating to U.S. Marine Corps deaths are no longer made specific for operational reasons, the calculation has become more difficult.

The insurgency has grown during the period between the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a new Iraqi government. It has continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq as the new Iraqi government has developed. The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. Terrorist groups are Iraqi insurgents who actively target civilian populations, in an attempt to communicate their political messages through violent means. These groups, both insurgents and terrorists, are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to

determine. The Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, once active members in the insurgency are supposedly not taking part in the overall violence.

**Insurgent Organisations in Iraq**

After from the above, there is a large presence of foreign militants in Iraq. These were non-Iraqi Muslims, mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters were Wahabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It was generally believed that most were freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaida and the related group Ansar al-Islam, members of whom were suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran, may be involved. The U.S. and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi was believed to be the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War"), which according to U.S. military estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

The extent of Zarqawi's influence was a source of controversy. The U.S. government described him as the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted
heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their insurgency. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made Osama bin Laden a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11th, 2001.

There are many other historical guerrilla wars in which neighboring fighters played an important role. It should be noted that many of the US-backed guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed government and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s were not Afghans. Many were Arab Islamists recruited outside Afghanistan. Neighboring fighters continued to play a role in Afghanistan’s subsequent civil wars, many fighting on the side of the Taliban. At the time of the collapse of Taliban rule, anger against these neighboring fighters was especially intense.

Neighboring Iraqi insurgents received support, training, weapons, and funding from Mujahedeen. These “holy warriors” flocked to Iraq to fight the American invaders just as their predecessors had flocked to Afghanistan in the 1980s to expel the Soviets; these foreign fighters had little difficulty getting into Iraq. Although not a haven for international terrorists before the invasion, Iraq has certainly become one since. Finding mujahedeen to fight and die for the Iraqi cause has proven very easy. Hezbollah recruited young zealots, provided them with false passports at the cost of $1,000 each, and sent them to Damascus from where they infiltrated into Iraq. The recruits received $800 a month, three times the salary of an Iraqi policeman. These recruits provided many of the suicide bombers the insurgents used with deadly effect. Mujahedeen would consider
Christian occupation of any Muslim country illegitimate, but the manner in which the US entered Iraq (without a UN mandate) made their cause more legitimate among many people in the region who might not otherwise have supported them. Jordanian Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi founded al-Qaeda of Jihad Organisation in the Land of the Two Rivers, popularly known as “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” in 2003 and affiliated with al-Qaeda proper the following year. He led the organisation until his death in June 2006.

Cooperation between radical Shi’a Hezbollah and radical Sunni insurgent in Iraq, groups with seemingly antithetical worldviews, illustrated the depth of anger toward the United States in the Muslim world. At the beginning of the conflict, the goal of foreign terrorists and domestic insurgents coincided. Both sought to kill Americans and their coalition partners and drive them from Iraq. Over time, however, their goals appear to have diverged. Sunni insurgent and Shi’a militias want power in Iraq. The evolving nature of the relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and nationalist insurgents may be seen in al-Zarqawi’s two most infamous attacks: the August 2003 bombing of the UN building in Baghdad and the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara. The first attack furthered insurgent goals of expelling the foreigners, the second merely fomented ethnic conflict.

During the first year of the occupation at least, the various insurgent groups had a clear immediate goal and a simple, effective strategy for achieving it. Although they could never defeat US forces, they did not need to do so. The tactic served two purposes: kill as many Americans as possible and provoke US forces into overreacting to attacks. During the summer of 2003, the insurgents expanded their target list. In addition to US military personnel, they attacked embassies, foreign contractors, journalists, and international
organisation. One devastating suicide attack on the UN mission building in Baghdad killed 22 people, including Chief of Mission Sergio Vieira de Mello and several of his staff, causing the United Nations to pull out of Iraq, just as the insurgents had hoped. On October 9, a suicide bomber in Sadr City launched the first insurgent attack on a police post. The insurgent also captured and beheaded American contract workers in front of television cameras. Iraqi employees of foreign companies and their families received threats warning them to resign their positions or face death.

Non-Violent Groups

Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al Khalisi includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the Iyad Allawi government and the U.S. organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament. Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition.

Trades unions have, however, themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgency. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgency group on the 3rd of January 2005. No trades unions support the armed insurgency. Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE)
opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against Halliburton over the use of foreign workers.

**De-Ba’thification**

The banning of Ba’ath Party drove 30,000-50,000 of Iraq educated elite from all walks of life onto the street and, quite possibly, into the arms of the insurgents. Another sweeping edict, CPA Order Number 2 dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. This put another 300,000 men out of work with no compensation. All had military training and many still had weapons. Like its predecessor, this order could be challenged for its unfairness and imprudence. The de-Ba’athification and dissolution orders had immediate and noticeable effects on the street. US officers reported a significant increase in attacks against them in the immediate aftermath of the decision to de-Ba’athify Iraq. De-Ba’athification and disbanding the security forces made a bad situation much worse. The orders deprived the coalition of civil servants who could run the country and troops who might have helped to maintain order. General John Abizaid, Commander of US CENTROM after Franks retired, General David McKiernan, CLF Commander during the invasion of Iraq, and Jay Garner, Bremer’s predecessor, all opposed the dissolution order, maintained that Iraqi soldiers could have been recalled to duty, and argued vehemently for reconstituting elements of the country. Some of these disillusioned men swelled the ranks of the insurgents or various
sectarian militias that sprang up throughout Iraq. The shortage of troops caused by Rumsfeld's parsimonious planning and exacerbated by Bremer's precipitous decisions contributed more than any other factor to the deteriorating security situation.

**Sunni insurgency**

During the first year of occupation, the most serious security threat came from a Sunni Arab insurgency supported by foreign terrorist, although serious fighting between the coalition and the radical Shi’a cleric Muktada al- Sadr also occurred. The Sunni insurgents represented a variety of groups and interests within three broad categories: the secularists, the tribes, and the Islamist. The secularists consisted primarily of former Ba’athist regime members and their supporters, many of whom may have had little love for Saddam Hussein, but who, nonetheless, resented the loss of lucrative jobs and worried about their place in a Shi’a dominated Iraq. The Saddam Fedayeen provided the core of the insurgency around which these other elements gathered.

The policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the inappropriate tactics and procedures employed early on by U.S. forces further contributed to the rapid growth of the insurgency. The sweeping implementation of de-Baathification policy and the decision to dismantle the Iraqi Army deprived more than 400,000 Iraqis of their livelihoods almost overnight and infuriated many veterans who thought they would be rewarded for heeding coalition leaflets directing them not to resist advancing forces. Furthermore, in the course of broad, dragnet like sweeps of the Sunni Triangle aimed at surprising and capturing wanted insurgents during the early phases of the occupation, tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis were detained and subjected by U.S. forces to sometimes rough and degrading
treatment. Aggressive patrolling and convoy procedures earned the U.S. many enemies and helped to broaden greatly the nascent insurgency’s recruiting base. Groups may be driven by the deeply felt humiliation engendered by the coalition military victory and occupation; a sense of entitlement derived from the Sunni Arabs’ former, dominant role; anxiety over the growing power of Shiite and Kurdish parties and militias; the fear that Sunni Arabs will be politically and economically marginalized in a democratic Iraq; a potent brand of Iraqi-Arab nationalism that is deeply ingrained among many Sunni Arabs; and the increasing popularity of political Islam among sectors of the rural population. For major elements of the Sunni Arab insurgency it is about regaining power as individuals, as members of the old regime, or as a community. Some senior civilian and military officials, at least in the early going, also demonstrated a lack of understanding of the protracted nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. On several occasions after the December 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein, the June 2004 transfer of authority, and the January 2005 elections a number of officials expressed confidence that the insurgency would soon be over. In each case, hopes for a quick victory were dashed by subsequent events.

The so called Nationalists from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the coalition vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the insurgency. Most likely, the majority of the low level members of the indigenous Sunni insurgency fall under this broad category. Some of those insurgents
pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes. Many Muslim terrorist groups are Sunni extremists. One group, Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna, led by the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had encouraged and committed terrorist acts on civilian populations. Some atrocities include suicide bombing, and the beheading of civilians.

War and sanctions, years of neglect of the country’s infrastructure, coalition policies, and insurgent violence have created an economic environment favorable to the insurgents. Economic conditions have fueled anger against the coalition and the Iraqi government and created a large pool of unemployed and up to 70 percent of the labor force in Sunni Arab areas hit hardest by insurgent violence. One indication of the severity of the country’s economic problems is provided by a March 2005 opinion poll in which some 44 percent of respondents in the largely Sunni Arab Tikrit/Aqaba area indicated that they saw infrastructure and economy as the most urgent issue facing the country, as opposed to 41 percent who identified overall security as the main problem. Nearly three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, electricity production is only slightly higher than prewar levels, and well below target levels. Oil production has been consistently lower than both prewar and target levels, although revenues have soared thanks to higher oil prices. Both industries are frequently the targets of sabotage, resulting in the disruption of basic services, a decline in the standard of living, and lost government revenues.171

Insurgencies are based on the struggle to control, or win over, the “hearts and minds” of a society. In Iraq, the status of the insurgency can be measured by the degree to which it has

penetrated public and private institutions of the Sunni Arab community and its “thought world.” The insurgency has established a significant presence in broad sectors of Sunni Arab society, including the social, economic, religious, political, and criminal spheres. While the depth of penetration is uncertain, the insurgents have largely succeeded in undermining efforts to extend government institutions into Sunni Arab areas through a combination of persuasion and intimidation. This is evidenced by the repeated failures of organs of local governance in Sunni Arab areas, such as village and town councils. The results of the January elections, and perhaps to a lesser extent the October 15 referendum, reflect the powerful influence of the insurgents in the Sunni Arab community. The gradual but steady increase in incident rates over a period of more than two years (from monthly ranges of 10 to 35 attacks per day in 2003, to 25 to 80 attacks per day in 2004, to 65 to 90 attacks per day in 2005); strongly suggests that the insurgency has grown in strength and capability, despite losses, coalition countermeasures, the growing presence of ISF, and the continuing political process. For most of its initial thirty-two months, the insurgency has not been particularly intense. Attrition imposed by the Sunni Arab insurgents, measured on a monthly basis, has been steady rather than dramatic, with a few exceptions. But the costs have added up, and the insurgency is a major factor affecting U.S. domestic support for the conflict.

About 162,000 people, almost 80 per cent of them civilians, were killed in Iraq from the start of the 2003 US-led invasion up to last year's withdrawal of American forces, a British NGO said. According to U.S. government reporting, as of November 29, 2005, 1,649 U.S. troops had been killed in action in Iraq, with 15,881 wounded in action. That

comes to a total of 17,530 combat casualties incurred since May 1, 2003 roughly the period of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{173} Although the Saudis largely silenced their radical clerics following the terrorist attacks in Riyadh in May 2003, 26 clerics were still permitted late in 2004 to call for jihad against U.S. troops in Iraq. The United States must press the Saudi government to end these appeals and restrict its nationals from entering Iraq.

Iraq Body Count (IBC) warned that, contrary to apparent trends in figures released by the Iraqi government, the level of violence has changed little from mid-2009, though attacks are markedly down from when the country was in the throes of sectarian war in 2006 and 2007. The violence peaked in late 2006 but was sustained at high levels until the second half of 2008 - nearly 90 per cent of the deaths occurred by 2009,” IBC said in a statement. IBC said it had recorded more than 114,000 civilian deaths in Iraq since the invasion, and said the addition of figures from US military logs published by whistleblower website Wiki Leaks, as well as officially recorded US and Iraqi security deaths and insurgent tolls; put the overall figure at 162,000. A total of 4,474 US soldiers died in Iraq as well. The NGO’s overall toll differed markedly from that published by the Iraqi government, which said on Sunday that 2,645 people were killed in violence in 2011, compared to IBC’s toll of 4,059.\textsuperscript{174}

Iraqi government figures, unlike IBC data, indicate attacks decreased significantly last year from 2010, when 3,605 people were killed. For US military forces, the nearly nine-year-long war in Iraq officially ended earlier this month with the withdrawal of the last troops. Nearly 4,500 Americans were killed during the conflict and more than 100,000

\textsuperscript{173} . www.defenselink.mil/nes/casualty.pdf

Iraqis also died, the bloodletting continued. For the purposes of the insurgency, small but steady stream of US casualties may actually be more advantageous than large numbers of casualties produced in infrequent but high-intensity clashes.

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counter-insurgency operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons; many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counter-insurgency operations. Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major division in Iraq is not between religious/ethnic groups nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it. A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the Coalition occupation. A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs considers armed attacks on U.S. forces legitimate and justified resistance.
A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation. The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris River from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. Fallujah, once the heart of the insurgency and formerly under rebel control, has since been largely leveled and is under a permanent lockdown by U.S. forces. Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is still one of the most contested regions of the country. Insurgents maintain a campaign of terror over much of the city's population and many Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under their control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country. Iraqi security and police forces have also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, have enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street. Insurgents are also vigorously contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, with much of the city, especially the western Arab half, slipping in and out of their control.

Among the Sunnis, a variety of groups have been identified. They are united only in the sense of having what have been called “negative” goals in opposition to U.S. presence; in seeking some return to the former status quo in which the Sunni minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period; or expressing a simple nationalist reaction to defeat.
Indeed, the U.S. 4th Division’s Taskforce Ironhorse reported in November 2003 that between 70 and 80 percent of those apprehended for making attacks in their area were paid to do so, the going rate being anything between $150 and $500. Most armed opposition has been Sunni. Some leading Sunni parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Islamic Party apparently have resolved to engage in legitimate political activities, but Sunni clergies have largely condemned the Coalition presence.

By contrast, although the Coalition presence is the principal barrier between the Shi’ite and the power denied them for so long, many Shi’ite clergies have mostly condemned the failures to restore law and order, having perhaps calculated that Sunni insurgency currently lacks the ability to transform itself into anything resembling a national movement. However, there are armed militias attached to the two main Shi’ite political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Al-Da’wa, and there is clearly potential for Shi’ite participation in violence. Indeed, since April 2004, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, the so-called Mahdi’s Army, has engaged in significant violence after the closure of his weekly newspaper by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the arrest of his deputy. Former exiled groups such as the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord also maintain militias. Another armed factor in the equation is the Kurds, but they are highly unlikely to participate in any anti-Coalition insurgency. The situation is made still more complex by the tribal nature of Iraq, with its extended clan and kinship system, the CPA having recognized the problem by establishing an advisory Council of Tribal Sheikhs. It has been suggested on the basis of a letter seized in January 2004 that

there is an al-Qaeda plan to foment civil war in Iraq by attacking the Shi’ite majority, but the document also implies frustration at Iraq not proving fertile ground for jihad and foreign holy warriors. The number of foreign activists in Iraq thus far appears small. Indeed, in November 2003 Paul Bremer indicated there was still no reliable information on the size and structure of the various groups carrying out attacks or their leadership. In February 2004, however, the U.S. military released a list of 32 suspects believed to be involved in organizing the insurgency, headed by Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, a former Ba’ath official for whom a reward of $1 million was offered. Rewards of $200,000 were offered for the next top 10 names on the list, all being former regime military or party figures.

On 19 April 2003, even before the outbreak of the insurgency, thousands of Sunnis staged a major demonstration and marched through the streets of the heavily Sunni Baghdad suburb of Adhamiya demanding an end to the US occupation and the emergence of an Islamic state without any distinction between Sunni and Shi’a. Majid Hamid al-Bayati said: ‘they have destroyed our institutions, our people and our security. They have totally erased us’. The Sunni Arabs were articulating their fears of material and identity deprivation. Unlike the Shi’a or the Kurds, who had well organized political parties and ideologies, the Sunni Arabs found themselves politically and organizationally adrift from the earliest days of the post Saddam era. In one of the major anti occupation messages issued by a cleric, barely two weeks following Saddam’s ouster, Sheikh Ahmad Kubeisi

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preached at the Hanifa Mosque, ‘you are master today. But I warn you against thinking of staying. Get out before we force you out’. His message to the Iraqis was to avoid sectarian divisions: ‘We fear that sectarianism will be exploited by our enemies. On 28 April 2003 US soldiers shot and killed fifteen people at an anti-US rally close to the Al-Qaeda School in Fallujah; sixty-five were wounded. Sentiment against the United States in the city which admittedly was not particularly friendly to begin with – ‘jumped several notches’. The deaths of Saddam’s son, Uday and Qusay, in a firefight in Mosul in July 2003 was seen as having dealt a decisive blow to the burgeoning insurgency of the former regime elements because the two were alleged to be key players. Their deaths had no appreciable negative impact on the insurgency; indeed, it spiked. The capture of Saddam Hussein himself in early December 2003 was regarded as a significant victory against the insurgents because of the important role the former leader was alleged to have played. Instead, the coalition discovered that the former Iraqi leader had played more of a symbolic role in directing it. The hope that his capture would usher in 2004 on a positive note for the country was to be dashed. The end of the road for Saddam did not mean an end to the Ba’athist element of the insurgency.

The political marginalization of the Sunnis was at the root of the insurgency in the Sunni triangle and a crucial question was how the Sunnis could be accommodated in the new constitution and state to be finalized in 2005. It has been pointed out that the Sunnis enjoyed prominence in Basra and Baghdad, historically, under the Ottomans. The de-Ba’thification carried out by the CPA targeted the Sunni community. Consequently,

Sunnis saw themselves being disempowered by the new institutions set up by the occupation forces. The Sunnis were given only four of twenty-five seats on the IGC, and no Sunni member enjoyed popular grass-roots support. The community was marginalised in the writing of the interim constitution, so Sunnis realized that in the new state they would be dominated by the Shi’as. This continued to feed the Sunni insurgency and grew stronger; threatening the break up of Iraq.

Well into the occupation and the emergence of the new Iraq, the Sunni Arabs continue to lack any strong unifying leader or leadership. In this, once again, they contrast remarkably with the Shia and the Kurds. No Sunni political group or personality working legitimately in the political arena has been able to mobilize the Sunni populace, nor has such a group or person been able to reach out to the insurgents and to pull them into the process. When the Ba’ath regime was deposed and Saddam went into hiding until his capture in mid-December 2003, he apparently continued to exhort the party to pursue the struggle against the foreign presence in the country. This ‘sinister’ presence naturally needs to be fought and the fight needs an ideological justification to underpin it. The Ba’ath party issued a statement in celebration of Saddam’s birthday on 28 April 2005. It reasserted the party’s commitment to the deposed leader to continue the armed resistance and destroy the occupation, liberate and protect Iraq, and destroy the agent government. There is no doubt that the prime goals of the insurgency are to eject the foreign presence in Iraq and to overthrow the system put in place by the United States and its Iraqi allies. They do not want foreigners in their country nor their presumed ‘puppets’ and allies ruling the country. As one insurgent leader said: “We first want to expel the infidel invaders before anything

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179. Al Basrah.net, 27 April 2005
else”. Another one Sunni insurgent said: “Our main aim is to drive the Americans out and then everything will go back to normal, as it was before”.

**Insurgent Organisations**

- The General Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance and Liberation in Iraq
- Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq
- Iraqi Resistance and Liberation Command
- Al ‘Awdah (the Return)
- Harakat Ra ‘s al- ‘Afa (Snake’s Head Movement)
- Nasserites
- Thuwwar al- ‘Arak – Kata ‘ib al- Anbar al- Musallahah (Iraq’s Revolutionaries Al-Anbar Armed Brigades)
- General Secretariat for the Liberation of Democratic Iraq

The following insurgent organisations incorporate nationalist and religious element:

- Higher Command of the Mujahideen in Iraq
- Munazzamat al- Rayat al- Aswad (Black Banner Organisation)
- Unification Front for the Liberation of Iraq
- National Front for the Liberation of Iraq

The following are defined largely by their religious tendencies:

- Jaish Ansar al- Sunnah
- Mujahideen al ta ‘ifa al- Mansoura (Mujahideen of the Victorious Sect)
- Kata ‘ib al Mujahideen fi al- Jama’ah al- Salafiyyah fi al- ‘Arak (Mujahideen Battalian of the Salafi Group of Iraq)
Jihad Brigades / Cells

Armed Islamic Movement of Al Qaeda Organisation

Jaish Muhammad (Army of Muhammad)

Islamic Army of Iraq

There are a wide arrange of insurgent organisation. They vary widely in levels of skill, functional specialization, professionalism, number of personnel, modus operandi, targeting and longevity. Some come and go, change names and some claim to have merged with one another to form larger and supposedly more effective networks. On 11 October 2005, a few days before the Iraqis went to the referendum to vote for the constitution, insurgents bombed a market in Tal Afar which killed 30 people. This was the time when the US forces were launching operations against insurgency in the Euphrates valley. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Syria, like Iran, may also be pursuing a strategy to keep the US bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire so that the Bush administration has less time and energy to turn its attention towards Syria which has been branded as a state sponsor of terrorism by the state department.

Shi’ite insurgency

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was welcome news to the vast majority of Shi’as, except perhaps those who had been associated with the Ba’athist regime and even members of the party. With the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in April 2003 the Shi’a were all agreed upon one thing: the post-Saddam situation in Iraq constituted the best opportunity for them to play the key role in state and nation-building for the first time in Iraqi history. Within hours of Saddam’s fall tens of thousands of Shi’a poured into the
streets of Baghdad, fanning out first from the Shi’a shrine in the Khadimiya district, chanting, ‘The oppression is gone, however long it took. The tyrant is gone. ‘The Shi’a tried to allay the fears of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian groups – particularly the Sunni Arabs – who watched their re-emergence into the political stage with some trepidation. Signs went up on placards, posters and mosque walls saying: ‘No Shiites, no Sunnis, Islamic unity, Islamic unity.

The US decision to move aggressively against a Shi’a leader seems hard to understand in the context of the wider Iraqi security situation. Four days before the murder of the Blackwater contractors, Bremer had decided to clamp down on radical Shi’a cleric Muktada al-Sadr. Sadr had been gathering his strength since the invasion, consolidating control of Shi’a areas, and building up a militia without confronting coalition forces. The CPA suspected Sadr of murdering rival cleric Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who had been negotiating with him on behalf of the Americans. The CPA had issued an arrest warrant for Sadr but had chosen not to act on it. Concerned that inflammatory rhetoric in the cleric’s newspaper, Al-Hawsa, was encouraging attacks on US troops, Bremer shut it down just four days before the murder of the contractor in Fallujah. The move provoked six straight days of protest culminating in a massive demonstration of 200,000 in Baghdad on April 3. The militia was made up largely of disgruntled and unemployed young Shi’a men who would stand at street corners for hours on end every day. ‘I am a volunteer; I will do whatever Sadr tells us to do. I’m not sure what the aim of the army is or when we will fight, but I will follow Sadr’s order,’ said an unemployed twenty-nine-year old local.\(^\text{180}\) Nonetheless, Moqtada was unable to foment a widespread revolt among the Shi’a. Many

\(^\text{180}\) http://ebird.dtic.mil/jul2003/s20030731205186html

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were simply terrified of his political vision of an Islamic government ruled by politicized clerics.

When the Marines launched Vigilant Resolve two days later, Sadr escalated from protests to armed confrontation. His Mahdi Army, an illegal Shi’a militia, launched attacks against US and British forces in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala. The fighting raged for weeks. Superior firepower and training proved decisive in stopping the attacks, but the coalition backed off pursuing Sadr just as they had halted the assault on Fallujah, agreeing to a truce with the Shi’a cleric on May 27. On August 27, the Mahdi Army made another bid for control of Najaf, commencing a three week battle that resulted in a tactical defeat at the hands of US forces but, once again, left Sadr in place as a result of an agreement negotiated by Grand Ayatollah Sistani. In the future Sadr would avoid direct confrontation with coalition troops while gathering his forces for the coming struggle with the Sunni and Kurds for control of Iraq.

Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is largely eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. Support for violent insurgency is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite than the Sunni community since the Shiites, like the Kurds, saw persecution under the Ba’ath regime and from the Sunnis. Shiites have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Muqtada al-Sadr has drawn support from a portion of the Shiite community, mainly young and
unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely
drawing under 10% support in Najaf (a stronghold of the clerical establishment which was
occupied by Sadr's militia and has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some
polls have indicated Sadr's support among the Shiites of Baghdad may be as high as 50
percent. This support did not translate into direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters
during the January 2005 elections; however, spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared
in Shiite areas against the occupation.

The insurgency in Iraq has suffered from the contending national identities of the Kurds
and the Shi’a. The insurgent never thought that the Kurds could be seen as part of the so-
called national liberation movement. There was some regret among nationalist insurgents
that the Shi’a had not joined the ‘national resistance’, particularly when it seemed that
such a possibility existed in spring 2004. But apart from the fact that Sunni extremists
manage to alienate the Shi’a by their terrorist activities, there was never a chance that the
Shi’a or the Kurds would joint in fighting the coalition presence. For both groups the
overthrow of Saddam was liberation from tyranny (in the eyes of both community), a
chance to express their identity – indeed, to imprint it on the state – and to bring about a
redistribution of resources in their favor. The coalition facilitated this, and as long as that
international presence did not act as a hindrance there was no reason to take up arms. Of
course there were issues within each community over the rightful distribution of resources,
political and economic. This is one of the reasons for conflict between the Sadrists and
SCIRI.

The nonparticipation of the Shi’a and the Kurds, which together comprise almost 80
percent of the population, in the insurgency, has significantly benefited US counter-
insurgency campaign at a military level. The Kurds could not be expected to join an insurgency against the very forces that protected them for more than a decade and then liberated them from Saddam. Moreover, the Kurds do not care about Iraq: they care about Kurdistan. They are not going to fight to throw off a foreign presence that has allowed—indeed, encouraged them to gain as much as possible in post-Saddam Iraq. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and participate in peaceful protest instead of violence. Sistani's political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January 2005. Many Shiites and Kurds suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime, which may cause a reluctance to use violence against Coalition forces. This is in contrast to the more radical Muqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes, the uneducated, and the Shiite urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.
CONCLUSION

When the Second World War was over, the British domination in the Gulf region ended and the US emerged as the new world power. The overall US strategy was the same as England's and France's: keep the political families' sheikdoms, emirates and kingdoms just strong enough to fight with each other, but not strong enough to destabilize the region or any one of them become a unifying force for all Arabs. That way the US could keep overall control of the oil in the area. The Western powers were horrified by the 1979 Islamic in Iran revolution regardless of its domestic popularity. The solution was to attempt to crush the revolution of Iran before it bore fruit. Iraq represented many possibilities in this regard. The US removed Iraq from the terrorism list, so that the US plan could begin actualization.

Saddam Hussein started with encouragement from the Americans, who wanted him to destroy their great foe, Ayatollah Khomeini. On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein initiated his offensive against Iran with U.S. consent. During Iran-Iraq War, the United States turned a blind eye when Iraq used American intelligence for operations against Iran that made limitless use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. US chemical companies meanwhile sold pesticides that could be used for chemical warfare, while others supplied under department of commerce licenses biological agents including anthrax. The US had become a major customer for Iraqi oil, importing by 1987 30 million barrels. This was still minimal in comparison to later imports.

In 1988 the year of the most visible domestic atrocities initiated by Saddam’s forces U.S. imports of Iraqi oil had increased rapidly to 126 million barrels. The US sold more than
twenty billion US dollars worth of arms and ammunition to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states during this period and allowed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to transfer large quantities of US arms to Iraq during the war. On August 20, 1988, both sides ceased fighting in accordance with the terms of Resolution 598. Kuwait was a close ally of Iraq during the Iran, Iraq war. However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighboring Arab countries turned sour due to several economic, territorial and diplomatic reasons which finally resulted in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

At the conclusion of the war, Iraq had accumulated a foreign debt officially estimated at $42 billion, excluding interest. Given the debt repayment burden amounting to over 50 percent of Iraq’s oil income in 1990, the massive costs of reconstruction, the continuing weakness in the price of oil and a military and a civil especially food import bill which far exceeded Iraq’s projected oil revenues, a more drastic solution was needed.

After the war, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the $14 billion which had borrowed from Kuwait during Iran- Iraq war. Iraq argued that the war had prevented the rise of Iranian influence in the Arab World. However, Kuwait's unwillingness to pardon the debt created trouble in the relationship between the two Arab countries. During 1989, several official meetings were held between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders but they were unable to break the deadlock between the two countries. The US also did not take a clear cut stand on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. Ambassador Glaspie stated that, we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

At the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) summit in Baghdad on 11 February 1990, Saddam Hussein for the first time revealed that he was in terrible financial crisis. He told a
closed session of the summit, we cannot tolerate this type of economic warfare which is being waged against Iraq. He wanted around $27 billion from Kuwait and the Al Sabah regime flatly refused to bail him out. The invasion of Kuwait with 300 tanks and 100,000 troops moved rapidly into the Kuwait. By mid afternoon most of the city was under Iraqi control. The 16,000 strong Kuwaiti forces did not even offer token resistance. Therefore, both the GCC and the Arab League held emergency session to debate Iraq’s attack. On 3 August 1990, the ministers denounced Iraq’s invasion, called for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal and asserted their commitment to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states of the Arab League.

The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. After four days, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq. After the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait and continued for several months, a large international force gathered in Saudi Arabia. The United States sent more than 400,000 troops, and more than 200,000 additional troops came from 32 countries. When Saddam Hussein linked the Arab-Israel conflict, President Bush rejected a directing link between the Gulf crisis and any other dispute. The Iraqis argued that the UN had not forced Israel to leave Arab territories it occupied during and after the Six-Day War of 1967. It should not force Iraq to leave Kuwait. The Iraqis further implied they might leave Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Occupied Territories. All types of diplomatic solution were rejected by the US and UN members and coalition forces invaded Iraq for liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

The direct human cost of the war and its aftermath has been estimated at 158,000, with 86,194 men, 39,612 women and 32,195 children dying. Soldiers accounted for just 40,000
of these deaths. Numerous surveys and reports conducted by the government of Iraq and UN agencies during the 1990s revealed a deepening of the complex humanitarian crisis that had been precipitated by the war and exacerbated by the sanctions. The sanctions on Iraq and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia contributed to the United States' increasingly negative image within the Arab world. Therefore, the nine years of sanctions had no appreciable affect on the power of Saddam Hussein’s leadership over Iraq. In response to the growing humanitarian crisis, the UNSC passed resolutions 706 in 1991 and 986 (the oil for food program) in April 1995. The impact of the sanctions regime on Iraq was overwhelming and multifarious.

Thirteen years of brutal sanctions destroyed Iraq’s social and economics infrastructure from within. American power and presence were essential for Gulf security and singled out Iraq and Iran as major threats to US strategic interests in the region. For many years after the Gulf War, Washington tried to foment a coup in Baghdad. The United States also used military strikes to discredit Saddam and to weaken regime protection forces. The Unscom declared that Iraq had no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons making capability.

On September 13, 2001, two days after 9/11, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others in the Bush administration discussed a war against Iraq with President George W. Bush. While there seemed to be a general consensus for a war, the substance of the debate was whether Afghanistan or Iraq should come first. They were attacked in Afghanistan first, caused Osama bin Laden were present there. It was also feared that if the United States did not overthrow Saddam and gain control of Iraqi oil wealth quickly, the opportunity could slip out of their hands. The Bush administration appears to have determined to go to war
against Saddam Hussein as a primary foreign policy goal well before 9/11. Iraq’s infrastructure which had never fully recovered from the Gulf War and sanctions remained badly compromised. In the case of Iraq, a vision for a ‘New Iraq’ post-Saddam was developed within the US administration. It was funded on the concept of military victory leading to the removal of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists, creating a blank space in which to install a ‘Western style democracy’, favorable to US political and economic interests in the West Asia.

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a comprehensive presentation to the Security Council demonstrating Iraq’s ongoing WMD efforts and their concealment from UN inspectors. The coalition forces in Iraq continue to search for WMD sites; while no weapons have yet been discovered. President Bush and his administration strongly implied that there was a link between Saddam and the al-Qaeda hijackers, despite Osama bin laden contempt for Saddam as the head of a secular state. In early October 2002, President Bush was trying to convince Congress to pass a resolution to give him unilateral authority to go to war with Iraq. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a major reason for attacking Iraq. A UN terrorism committee did not find any link between al-Qaeda and Saddam. According to the chief investigator, Michael Chandler said that, nothing has come to our notice that would indicate links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Despite the lack of solid evidence, President Bush continued to connect the war in Iraq with al-Qaeda and 9/11. But on September 18 President Bush conceded: President Bush did exploit and encourage the general public belief that Saddam was connected to the attacks of 9/11, and his strong implications served his purpose of achieving public support for war with Iraq.
The claim of Saddam's nuclear capacity was one of other strongest arguments that President Bush could make for war with Iraq. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report did say that in 1991 Iraq had been 6 to 24 months away from the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb, but that capacity had been destroyed by UN inspectors before 1998. The IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons. The economic sanctions severely limited the materials that could be brought into the country for potential use for WMD. US enforcement of the no-fly zones also limited what the Iraqis could do, and satellite surveillance was used extensively to monitor the country. No evidence of weapons of mass destruction and no nuclear weapons could be found.

Biological agents sold to Iraq from the United States during this period included several strains of anthrax and bubonic plague. Despite the killing of 200,000 Kurds with chemical weapons and high explosives from 1987 to 1989 and the destruction of the Kurdish town of Halabjah on March 15, 1988, the United States did not stop U.S. companies from continuing to sell insecticides and other chemical components of chemical weapons to Iraq. The most serious questions about the administration's claims were raised when U.S. forces were not able to find evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons after the war, despite the diligent searching of U.S. military forces. The United Nations would not approve the invasion of Iraq, at any rate until the weapons inspectors had been given a significantly greater time to find out whether Iraq currently possessed such weapons of mass destruction. So they fell back on the 12 year old Resolution 678 of 1990 passed for the purpose of authorizing the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and the restoration of peace in the West Asia. Dr Mohamad El Baradei repeated that by December
1998 the International Atomic Energy Authority had neutralised Iraq’s past nuclear programme and had to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq.

The US, along with coalition partners, disapproved of the political position and apparent lack of support from the UN Security Council and chose a unilateral non-Chapter VII model approach to invade Iraq. Many governments were seen as pursuing a policy of appeasement: not of Saddam, but of the US as today’s dominant power determined to get its way by the threat of war. Almost universally, global public opinion held that the US went to war in Iraq for oil. Iraq and Saudi Arabia together account for at least 65 percent of total global oil reserves in the world. It is pretty clear that whatever Saddam did was quite irrelevant because the US had already made the decision to go to war.

Global opinion almost universally condemned the US for invasion and occupation, while the reputation and trust of the US in the international arena had fallen lowest level ever. Regime change in Iraq having been carried out in March and April 2003, it was in the hands of the United States and Great Britain, to justify the use of outright force to overthrow a sovereign regime. In reality, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an American operation and patently illegal under International law. Establishing a stable government in Iraq was going to be one of the most difficult problems which the US faced. Most Iraqis, while happy to see Saddam go, did not welcome the US occupation. A common sentiment in Iraq has been ‘No to Saddam, no to the US’. Moreover, small and relatively weak countries around the world quickly learned the dangerous lesion from the launching of a pre-emptive war. It was clear that diplomacy was used in dealing with North Korea, precisely because the country possessed nuclear weapons. The Iraqi death rate prior to the
invasion was 5.5 per thousand people per year. The invasion in March 2003 raised the average figure to 13.2 for that year.

Saddam Hussein ruled over Iraq nearly 30 years. The people of Iraq were liberated in little over a month, with the stated aims of the US being to democratize Iraq and to create a zone of ‘democratic peace’ at the heart of the West Asia. Out of the 18 forced regime changes in which US ground troops have been committed, only three deserve the ‘democratic’ title: Germany, Japan and Italy. Democracy in order to be stable and firmly rooted in any society needs to be homegrown which evolves through a period and therefore, cannot be exported or imposed through coercive means.

Democratization particularly in Iraq or in West Asian region is one of the major aims of the American government. Promotion of democracy constituted one of the basic pillars of the neo-conservative worldview that guided the foreign policy of the Bush administration so forcefully. The Iraqi people had the taste of democracy from the very early days of the occupation. Once the old regime disappeared, all Iraqi cities and towns fell prey to looters. The Iraqi National Museum, which had one of the richest collections the antiquities and artifacts so much emotionally associated with the Iraqi civilization, was pillaged and destroyed. After the fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy.

L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003 with a broad mandate and plenary powers. On July 13, 2003, the CPA handpicked and imposed a twenty-five member Interim Governing Council (IGC) on Iraq. The first act in the establishment of an Iraqi
government as a sectarian body became the framework for future developments in Iraqi politics, hence establishing the Iraqi state as a sectarian rather than a national and unified institution. On 28 June 2004, two days earlier than expected, Bremer formally transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people and their interim government. The coming together of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (SCIRI), Ibrahim al-Ja’afari (Da’wa), Massoud Barzani (KDP) and Jalal Talabani (PUK) underscores this fact. The first task given to the IGC by the CPA was to draft a new constitutional law by 15 December. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was drafted by 28 February 2004, which would act as an interim constitution. The plan then envisaged that the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would be formed, again not by elections, but by a complicated three-stage selection process. The nomination of Iyad Allawi to head the interim government lacked mass support.

The election for the Iraqi National Assembly was held on 30 January 2005 amidst fears of insurgent attacks. The Shi’as wanted Iraq to be declared an Islamic Republic; the Kurds argued that it should be named as the Federal Republic of Iraq; and the Sunnis demanded that the country should be called the Arab Republic of Iraq. After three months of negotiation and three missed deadlines, the draft constitution was made ready on 28 August 2005. Islam was recognized as a fundamental source of legislation and no law shall contradict. The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces.

With the constitution accepted, final election was held on 15 December 2005. Iraqis would now vote for a particular list, with 230 seats proportionately distributed across Iraq’s 18 governorates. The December 2005 Parliamentary elections sent a mixed signal about the
future of Iraqi democracy. In fact, as one commentator in the Arabic press pointed out, by the time the elections were held around 100,000 Iraqis and 2000 Americans had lost their lives. Coming to the year 2006, UN sources have admitted the escalation of violence since the beginning of the year. The civilian death toll increased by more than 77 percent, from 1,778 in January to 3,194 in June.

In December 14, 2003, US officials announced the capture of Saddam Hussein in his home town Tikrit and he was put on trial. The first trial dealt with atrocities he had committed in 1982. On 21 August 2006 Saddam Hussein appeared for his second trial, in which he was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity. In the same month one of Saddam Hussein's lawyers was murdered, becoming the third defence lawyer to have been killed since the trial began. On 19 June chief trial prosecutor Ja'afar al-Mussawi delivered his closing arguments, calling for Saddam Hussein and three co-defendants to be sentence to death. In the same month one of Saddam Hussein's lawyers was murdered, becoming the third defence lawyer to have been killed since the trial began. With respect to timing, Saddam Hussein's sentence was carried out on the morning of 30 December, the first day of Sunnis of Id al-Adha (Eid uz-Zoha); one of Islam's most important holidays.

The President of Egypt reflected the views of many of the Muslim world when he described the decision to execute the former Iraqi leader on a Muslim holiday as unthinkable' and 'shameful'.

Insurgency has existed as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak to the point of violence. It is simply a strategy of desperation in which those with no other options turn to protracted, asymmetric violence, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely
perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. Indeed, between 1990 and 1996 alone, there were at least 98 conflicts worldwide, but only a few of these were waged between recognized states. The insurgency has grown during the period between the invasion of Iraq and the establishment of a new Iraqi government. It has continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq as the new Iraqi government has developed.

While the United States does not confront a unified, coherent enemy in either Afghanistan or Iraq, insurgent elements do seem to be pursuing traditional insurgent strategies and tactics. The insurgents are clearly too weak to challenge coalition forces openly, and consequently appear to be targeting both the Iraqi population and public opinion in the coalition states. On the other hand, the counterinsurgent forces suffer from a discrimination problem— they cannot easily distinguish insurgents from the general population. Defeating them requires time, both to provide counterinsurgent forces with an understanding of the environment in which the insurgent forces are operating, and to win the hearts and minds of the population, which will produce the intelligence needed to distinguish the enemy from noncombatants.

Looting broke out almost immediately following the fall of Baghdad. On the eve of the US invasion Saddam had released thousands of ordinary criminals from Iraqi jails. Looting destroyed or damaged what little remained of Iraq infrastructure. Despite of adverse affect of widespread lawlessness, American troops did nothing to stop it. One battalion commander in Baghdad requested clarification on the rules of engagement for dealing with looters. Headquarters told him that there none, and that the lawlessness would be self-correcting problems. The Judge Advocate General Corps in the Pentagon warned officers
that they had no arrest warrant and could be held accountable for any loss of life they caused trying to exercise control of civilians. The Iraqi police whom Rumsfeld and company had assumed would remain in place doing their jobs did nothing to stop the lawlessness. The willingness and ability of US forces to protect the Oil Ministry no doubt encouraged belief that they could have protected everything else as well. It also strengthened the popular believe that Washington wanted Iraqi oil more than it did Iraqi freedom.

There is a large presence of foreign militants in Iraq. These were non-Iraqi Muslims, mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq. The extent of Zarqawi’s influence was a source of controversy. Cooperation between radical Shi’a Hezbollah and radical Sunni insurgent in Iraq, groups with seemingly antithetical worldviews, illustrated the depth of anger toward the United States in the Muslim world. Both sought to kill Americans and their coalition partners and drive them from Iraq. During the summer of 2003, the insurgents expanded their target list. On October 9, a suicide bomber in Sadr City launched the first insurgent attack on a police post. Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The banning of Ba’ath Party drove 30,000-50,000 of Iraq educated elite from all walks of life onto the street and, quite possibly, into the arms of the insurgents. Another sweeping edict, CPA Order Number 2 dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. This put another 300,000 men out of work with no compensation. De-Ba’athification and disbanding the security forces made a bad situation much worse. During the first year of occupation, the most serious security threat came from a Sunni Arab insurgency supported by foreign
terrorist. The insurgency created gapes between the Iraqi government and the people and devastated economy of Iraq further.

Economic conditions have fueled anger against the coalition and the Iraqi government and created a large pool of unemployed and up to 70 percent of the labor force in Sunni Arab areas hit hardest by insurgent violence. A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs considers armed attacks on US forces legitimate and justified resistance. A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country.

In November 2003 Paul Bremer indicated there was still no reliable information on the size and structure of the various groups carrying out attacks or their leadership. The deaths of Saddam’s son, Uday and Qusay, in a firefight in Mosul in July 2003 was seen as having dealt a decisive blow to the burgeoning insurgency of the former regime elements because the two were alleged to be key players. The end of the road for Saddam did not mean an end to the Ba’athist element of the insurgency. The political marginalization of the Sunnis was at the root of the insurgency in the Sunni triangle. The de-Ba’thification carried out by the CPA targeted the Sunni community. One Sunni insurgent said: “Our main aim is to drive the Americans out and then everything will go back to normal, as it was before”. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was welcome news to the vast majority of Shi’as, except perhaps those who had been associated with the Ba’athist regime. Since April 2004, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, the so-called Mahdi’s Army, has engaged in significant violence after the closure of his weekly newspaper by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the arrest of his deputy. Muktada al-Sadr had been gathering his strength since the
invasion his Mahdi Army, an illegal Shi’a militia, launched attacks against US and British forces in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala. On consolidating control of Shi’a areas, and building up a militia without confronting coalition forces. The Kurds could not be expected to join an insurgency against the very forces that protected them for more than a decade and then liberated them from Saddam. Moreover, the Kurds do not care about Iraq: they care about Kurdistan.

The fundamental truth is that Iraq has become the anvil on which a gigantic test of power has been undertaken. At stake in that test has been the future course taken by the US, widely seen, since the end of the Cold War, as a state exercising unprecedented global power. To understand what is at stake requires a closer consideration of US global strategy. The Iraq war was, of course, the first test of this strategy. It is clear from a succession of books based on insider knowledge that, from the president downwards, Bush’s team came very quickly after 9/11 to focus on attacking Iraq, despite the absence of any serious evidence linking al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein. As numerous commentators have pointed out, seizing Iraq would have the obvious advantage of allowing the US to entrench its strategic dominance of Western Asia and its vast energy reserves. The 2001 war in Afghanistan introduced what looks set to be a permanent American military presence in Central Asia, another region rich in oil and natural gas.

Occupying Iraq would give the US control over the country with the second largest oil reserves in the world. It would also be in a stronger position to put pressure on Saudi Arabia, which has the largest reserves. Relations between the US and Saudi Arabia have been getting worse, especially since 9/11 (15 out of the 19 suicide hijackers were Saudi subjects). The conquest of Iraq would not only make the US less dependent on Saudi
Arabia, but its military power in the Middle East-plus that in Israel, whose alignment with the US grew even closer under George W Bush than it had been under previous administrations-would give it a potential chokehold on the oil supply to the other leading powers in the world. Its seizure would not only provide the USA with a more secure base from which to dominate the West Asia. The incorporation of Iraq into 'the democratic revolution' would help to transform the region along liberal capitalist lines.

In the American desire to exploit Iraq’s massive oil reserves, and increase its geostrategic position within the Gulf, Iraq has been subjected to economic shocks, with the extensive state sector rapidly privatized. The high level of employment and the abandonment of service provisions for the majority of the population, along with the collapse of basic infrastructure, represent products of deliberate policies that have marked the Anglo-American occupation. Such a process of economic devastation and social fracturing is inhumane and against international laws and norms. The nationalist ethos and tradition in Iraq have been severely undermined by these developments. The Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq must be understood in the context of the grand strategy consistently pursued by the US since at least the beginning of the 20th century. The Bush administration, breaking from Washington's reliance since the Second World War on coalition building, is seeking to use one of the main comparative advantages of the US-its military supremacy-to perpetuate a favorable global balance of forces. The seizure of Iraq seemed to favour this strategy, particularly since it would enhance US capacity to deny access to West Asian oil to actual or potential rivals such as the European Union and China. But popular resistance to the occupation of Iraq is now testing this policy, perhaps to destruction.
With the United States increasingly dependent on important oil, and with China also rapidly becoming a major oil importer, the Persian Gulf had, by 2000, become a region of intense significance for the United States. By the time of the election of President Bush, Iran was to be regarded as a ‘rogue state’, Saudi Arabia had severely constrained US military operations in the Kingdom and Iraq was not subject to external control in spite of a decade of sanctions. Moreover, two aspect of the 1991 war – Iraqi missiles and CBW systems – had had a notable impact on US military outlooks as they demonstrated instances of relatively weak states having the capacity to constrain the actions of a superpower. Coupled with political changes in the US, especially the rise of the idea of a new American Century, they provide the context for the political road to war with Iraq in 2003. With containment eroding at the end of the 1990s and increasingly regarded as an obsolete if not failed approach, the US was faced with the long term prospect of a hostile regime in Baghdad. That regime may well have been crippled by sanctions, yet, it could be argued, retained its long term aim of dominating the region, including its vast oil reserves. Removing Saddam Hussein’s regime was therefore an attractive option well before the attacks of 11 September 2001.

On entering office in 1993 the Clinton administration continued the previous administration’s policy of containing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his WMD programmes. Iraq was a major threat to regional security in the West Asia and US vital interests. The Clinton administration successfully contained Saddam Hussein’s regional power ambitions, reduced his sphere of influence within Iraq and for the most part thwarted his WMD and ballistic missile programmes. But as the Clinton era drew to a
close at the end of 2000 Saddam Hussein’s power base remained strong and containment was under severe pressure.

Evidence emerged that Iraq was testing ballistic missiles and rebuilding facilities destroyed by Operation Desert Fox in 1998 presumably, the administration thought, for WMD purposes. In December 2000 Saddam staged a huge show of military strength, party to quash rumours of his ill health and party as a show of force to the new US President.

President Bush came into the White House determined to review Clinton’s Iraq policy and pursue a more aggressive strategy against Saddam Hussein. For this purpose, he appointed a number of people with hard-line conservative views on national security and foreign policy to senior positions within the administration, a number of whom had developed and promoted strategies for regime change. Bush, Rice, Cheney and Rumsfeld assumed that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, or at the very least continued aggressive programmes to develop them, and that the containment-based status quo could not endure for much longer. Throughout the Bush administration’s first eight months, support for regime change continued to pour forth from conservative think-tanks in Washington and members of Congress. By September 2001, however, the smart sanctions initiative was losing ground, there was no sign of a resumption of UN inspections and serious doubts had been raised in the administration as to their intrinsic utility. Then 9/11 occurred and the threat from Iraq took on a new light.

The contemporary neo-conservative worldview while emerged in the 1990s, emphasised the necessity and legitimacy of American hegemony and unilateralism, the democratisation of tyrannical and dictatorial regimes (in the eyes of American and
European Country) through forces if necessary as part of the US national interest, military predominance, and threats from the West Asia and East Asia. Determination to change the regime in Baghdad was an important part of this perspective. The attacks of the 11 September 2001 offered an unprecedented opportunity for neo-conservatives inside and outside the administration to push their agenda. Before 9/11 the administration’s Iraq policy review was likely to produce a more confidential strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein. After 9/11 the White House became increasingly determined to change the regime in Baghdad as an urgent priority. However, the transformation was not wholesale. The neo-conservative and assertive nationalist worldviews melded on the issue of regime change in Baghdad, but the neo-conservative strategy has not been taken further in the West Asia, notable because of the failure of Saddam’s fall to lead to a peaceful Iraq. Nevertheless, the war went ahead, and the regime was terminated with apparent ease.

In the first half of 2002 the Bush administration developed its case against Iraq by placing Saddam’s regime at the very heart of the war on terrorism. The White House remained convinced that Iraq was a dangerous and impending threat, and was determined to act. As the White House tired to convince allies and other governments in the West Asia of its case, it also developed comprehensive plan for war. However, as the secretary of State acknowledged, action such as these in support of containment now held little currency in a White House geared up for confrontation and war. With the chances of Saddam Hussein complying with the president’s demands remote and serious military preparations for war under way, conflict was virtually inevitable. Richard Clarke, the administration’s counter terrorism coordinator, argued that the decision to go to the UN was a major turning point in the road to war, but that ‘all along it seemed inevitable that we would invade. It was an
idée fixe, a rigid belief, received wisdom, a decision already made and one that no fact or event could derail.

After 9 September 2001 a number of senior members of Congress in both Houses argued that Iraq should be targeted as part of the new war on terrorism. Throughout 2002 support for confronting Iraq became increasingly bi-partisan, with senior Democrats advocating regime change in Baghdad. In September 2002, when the White House submitted its draft war resolution to Congress, it found widespread support of action against Saddam Hussein, particularly if it took its case to the UN. The final resolution enjoyed considerable support from senior Republicans and Democrats. As the administration prepared for war at the start of 2003, senior Republican figures backed the President’s assertion that Iraq showed no intention of complying with US demands and UNSC resolution and that it was material breach of those resolution. Powerful member of Congress shared the administration’s view that confronting Iraq was key to the war on terrorism, that Baghdad was developing WMD and would soon have nuclear weapons, that it would readily share its WMD with al-Qaida, and that the threat was now so great that pre-emptive military action was required. The failure to find any WMD after the invasion and charges that administration exaggerated the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programmes and terrorist connections led some members of Congress to say they were misled by the administration, having now seen the evidence on which the administration based its claims.

The American and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not for protecting them or their partner. The real reason for going to war in Iraq had nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction, a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, that the Iraq might develop
nuclear weapons, nor the fact that Saddam Hussein was a dictator. The US went to war in Iraq because of the “stupendous prize” that Iraq was deemed to be, leading not only to the control of oil, but power and a basis for the control of the larger West Asian region. Saddam was effectively skirting the UN-US sanctions in 2003 and would have soon begun to market large quantities of oil in Euros, militating against the US dollar. Many of the oil contracts were in the hands of France and Russia, which militated against US companies. The US would have lost the chance to establish huge military bases in Iraq for the purpose of controlling the massive oil and natural gas reserves of the West Asia and Central Asia. The US also saw Iraq as a basis for projecting power over Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Eventually, with large oil revenues, an autonomous Saddam could have rearmed, militating against the interests of Israel. The overthrow of Saddam was seen as a golden opportunity to extend the American Empire, which was unlikely to ever come again.

American and British invasion of Iraq 2003 shows that there is a discrepancy between the international norms and practices of sovereignty. This discrepancy, rooted in conflicting understandings of the term 'sovereignty', is clearly illustrated by the case of contemporary Iraq. Whereas those states advocating the primacy of human rights and the protection of the individual will point to the existence of international 'norms' of behavior and a duty to adhere to the values inherent in the ‘community’ of states, those who feel threatened by this universalism will refer to Article 2 Para 7 of the United Nations Charter, and tell others not to interfere in their internal affairs.

Contrary to the most fervent advocates of exporting democracies across the world, democracy does not automatically produce inter-ethnic harmony. Especially during the early decades of democratisation, tensions along ethnic-religious lines may be heightened.
and lead to violence and finally the abortion of the democratic process itself. To be sure, established democracies resolve ethnic conflicts more peacefully than autocratic regimes. However, this may be because democracies are on average much richer. Moreover, richer countries have the means to accommodate ethnic claims; for example, through distribution. As soon as dynamic perspective is introduced, it emerges that introducing democracy means, more often than not, ethnic trouble. The recent history of Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Mexico, former Yugoslavia and Georgia provide some illustrations for this, and countries like South Africa look like exceptions to the rule.

The Bush administration’s purported plan to establish a western style democracy in Iraq seemed as doomed to failure as its bloody occupation and inept “reconstruction.” Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim, and his political apparatus was largely managed by a middle class of educated Sunnis, most that lived in an area around Baghdad referred to as the “Sunni Triangle.” But Sunni Muslims are a minority in Iraq, accounting for only about 32-37 percent of the population. In the north are the Kurds, dwelling in a sort of semi-autonomous no-man’s land. They have been savaged by Saddam over the years, most famously in chemical gas attacks in the 1980s. Shia Muslims account for 60-65 percent of nation’s population, and as such stand to be the majority factor in any democratically elected government. After the Gulf war, while Bush’s father sat by, Saddam Hussein brutally put down and punished a Shia uprising inspired by the war. Both Kurds and Shia are concentrated around the twin centers of the nation’s oil industry, Kirkuk in the north and Basra in the south.

All in all, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq at the end of 2004 appears to have pushed the country to the brink of a sort of civil war, with a strong Sunni insurgency
making security impossible in key parts of the country. At the same time, the Shia leaders, reportedly with the help of Iran, successfully pulled together the majority of Shia in a political coalition. With Americans unable to maintain security in the face of the continuing insurgency, the country reeled towards civil war and conceivably a breakup over the long term.

Generally people blamed the precipitous decline in their quality of life not on the Iraqis who actually did the damage, but on the invaders who made it possible by overthrowing their dictator. Amid widespread discontent Ba’ath Party stalwarts, foreign mujahedeen, and other elements within Iraq began an organized campaign against occupiers. Although most of Iraqis welcomed the collapsed of the regime, few accepted responsibility for maintaining the day to day functions of civil society.

Tensions deriving from the political transition in particular the October 2005 referendum, the December 2005 elections, and the trial of Saddam Hussein will likely create additional opportunities for the Sunnis to organize politically, and for the insurgents to broaden and deepen their influence in the Sunni Arab community. The rejection of the draft constitution by a majority of voters in three largely Sunni Arab provinces, Anbar, Salahuddin, and Ninawa, though not sufficient to defeat the constitution—suggests the strength of Sunni Arab opposition to the political transformation process in its current form. The results of the referendum even if negative from the Sunni perspective might demonstrate to Sunnis the value of participating in the political process; conversely, adoption of the draft constitution over Sunni Arab objections could lead Sunnis to conclude that the system is stacked against them, thereby providing new impetus to Sunni political opposition. At any rate, the idea that only the Shiites and Kurds could mobilize
politically and act coherently has been dashed by the Sunni Arab vote against the draft constitution.

The collapse of Sunni Arab privileges and positions was a body blow to members of the community. The coalition over through of the regime in April 2003 saw the collapse of the Iraq that the Sunni Arab community had built and known for almost eighty three years. This assault on Iraqi national identity as shaped by the Sunni could have been mitigated had there been a post-Saddam policy of reconciling the Sunni Arabs to the new order. Instead it could be argued that an insidious set of policy options were adopted by the Bush administration to deepen this assault on the Sunni Arab community and to ensure its marginalization in a future Iraq where the Kurds and the Shi’a were the favored partners. These policy options have undoubtedly been key factors in the outbreak and persistence of the insurgency. These policies have affected the Sunni materially and at times assaulting and undermining their identity. People from the various Iraqi communities are increasingly seeking succor, support and security within their own. People who are not of the same faith or ethnicity are seen as the outsider.

Tension between the two sects became worse in 2005 when senior Sunni scholars and leaders such as Harith al-Dari accused the Badr Organisation and Ministry of Interior troops were harassing Sunni Arabs, torturing detainees and killing Sunnis, including clerics, Badr Crops leaders say they are part of the solution to the insecurity plaguing Iraq. On the other hand, why can the Coalition not bring about a managed and relatively humane partition that offers the maximum benefit and least discomfort to all? Lord Carrington, a former British Foreign Minister who became the first European Union peace envoy at the time of the bloody Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s, who said something to
the effect that the twentieth century has proved that you cannot force people to remain citizens of a country at the point of a gun.

In view of the above, the least the US can do to gain the confidence of the Iraqi people is to present a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. A second step, which is needed, to ensure the significant involvement of other international actors like the UN, the EU, even the regional Arab League to stabilize Iraq so that the endemic violence can be brought under control. So far, the US has “monopolized the decision-making in post-Saddam Iraq”, relegating the UN to the role of a rubber stamp and service-provider at best. It has sought to regulate and control the entire transition process single-handedly and thereby shaping its eventual outcome. This must end.

The Council announced that the date for national elections would be 7 March 2010; Iraq will hold its parliamentary elections for all 325 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Both Iraq and the Obama administration see the elections as starting the countdown to the final U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011. From any perspective, the election was a major impact on US policy toward Iraq and ultimately the region. No coalition is close to the 163 seats needed to control the 325-seat parliament. Allawi's Iraqiya coalition won 91 seats to 89 for al-Maliki's State of Law bloc. The Iraqi National Alliance, a Shiite religious group dominated by al-Sadr's followers, won about 70 seats, and Kurdish parties picked up 51.

Iraq’s death toll from violence in 2011 fell sharply from previous years, figures showed on Sunday, as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki called for the country to kick-start rebuilding with US troops gone. The death toll represents a marked decline from previous years -- a
total of 3,605 were killed in 2010 and 3,481 in 2009 — and is sharply lower than when a brutal sectarian war engulfed Iraq in 2006 and 2007. In 2007 alone, official figures show that 17,956 people died as a result of violence. The end of the US military in Iraq, the death toll for US forces is near 4,500; estimates of Iraqi fatalities vary wildly; 100,000 is a common figure. Some 32,000 Americans have been injured in hostilities. These numbers reflect human suffering of a magnitude not justified by the decision to go to war. On 13 December American President Obama announced that his target to withdraw all forces from Iraq on the last of 2011, we want to stable government in Iraq, people are living in a democratic country.
APPENDIX

Security Council Resolutions

1990

Resolution 678 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
29 November 1990 - Authorizes Member States, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements Security Council resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. Resolution 677 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
28 November 1990 - Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait.

Resolution 676 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Resolution 674 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
29 October 1990 - Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third State nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third State nationals.

Resolution 671 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
27 September 1990 - Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group until 30 November 1990.
Resolution 670 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
25 September 1990 - Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, and shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory.

Resolution 669 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
24 September 1990 - Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

Resolution 667 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
16 September 1990 - Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals, and demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq.

Resolution 666 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
13 September 1990 - Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in order to relieve human suffering.

Resolution 665 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
25 August 1990 - Calls upon those Member States which are deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping.

Resolution 664 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
18 August 1990 - Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals.

Resolution 662 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
9 August 1990 - Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait.

Resolution 661 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
6 August 1990 - Decides restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and decides that all States shall prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.

Resolution 660 (1990) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
2 August 1990 - Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

1991

Resolution 715 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
11 October 1991 - Approves the plan of the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification.
Resolution 712 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
19 September 1991 - Provisions for financing the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.

Resolution 707 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
Demands that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

Resolution 706 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
15 August 1991 - "Oil-for-Food" - Authorizes proceeds of limited sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products to be paid into an escrow account for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.

Resolution 705 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
15 August 1991 - Decides that compensation to be paid by Iraq arising from resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.

Resolution 700 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Resolution 699 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
Confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to conduct activities under resolution 687 (1991), for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in that resolution.
Resolution 692 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
20 May 1991 - Liability of Iraq for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Resolution 689 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Resolution 688 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
5 April 1991 - Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including in Kurdish populated areas, and insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations.

Resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
8 April 1991 - Decides that, as a condition of a cease-fire, Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities, as well as all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities, and that a Special Commission shall carry out on-site inspection of any locations in Iraq.

Resolution 686 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
2 March 1991 - Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of twelve resolutions previously adopted by the Security Council.
Resolution 685 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

1992

Resolution 778 (1992) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
2 October 1992 - Decides that all funds of the Government of Iraq from the sale of Iraqi petroleum after 6 August 1990 shall be placed in the escrow account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991);

Resolution 773 (1992) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
26 August 1992 - Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission

1993

Resolution 806 (1993) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

1994

Resolution 949 (1994) demanding that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions and that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten its neighbor
15 October 1994 - Condemned and demanded the immediate and complete the withdrawal of all Iraqi military units recently deployed to southern Iraq.

Resolution 899 (1994) on compensation payments to the Iraqi private citizens whose assets remained on Kuwaiti territory following the demarcation of the boundary
between Iraq and Kuwait. 4 March 1994 - Decision on compensation payments to private citizens in Iraq.

1995

Resolution 986 (1995) on authorization to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people 14 April 1995 - Expands the "Oil-for-Food" exceptions to the trade embargo.

1996


Resolution 1051 (1996) on approval of the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to Resolutions and decisions 715 (1991) 27 March 1996 - Approves the provisions for the mechanism for export/import monitoring established by the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

1997

Resolution 1137 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
12 November 1997 - Condemns Iraqi restrictions on access by UNSCOM, and restricts international movements of Iraqi officials.

Resolution 1134 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
23 October 1997 - Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to certain sites by UNSCOM, decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996).

Resolution 1129 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
12 September 1997 - Decides that the provisions of resolution 1111 (1997) remain in force, with specified exceptions on quotas for oil exports to pay for the purchase of humanitarian supplies.

Resolution 1115 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Resolution 1111 (1997) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
4 June 1997 - Extends the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) for another period of 180 as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.

1998

UNSC Resolution 1210 ON IRAQ'S OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM 24 November 1998.


1999

Resolution 1284 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 17 December 1999 - Establishes, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).


Resolution 1280 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 3 December 1999.


Resolution 1266 on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 4 October 1999.


2000

Resolution 1302 09 June 2000 -- Iraq Oil-For-Food Program.


2002
Resolution 1441: Text of U.N. resolution on Iraq 08 November 2002, Return of
United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq.

2003

4844th meeting, on 16 October 2003, "Reaffirms the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq, and underscores, in that context, the temporary nature
of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority of the specific responsibilities,
authorities, and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set
forth in resolution 1483 (2003), which will cease when an internationally recognized,
representative government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes
the responsibilities of the Authority, inter-alia through steps envisaged in paragraphs
4 through 7 and 10 below".

Resolution 1500 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4808th meeting, on
14 August 2003.

Resolution 1490 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4783rd meeting, on 3
July 2003.

Resolution 1483 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on
22 May 2003, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
United States of America: draft resolution Provisional, 21 May 2003, "Decides that,
with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and
related materiel other than those arms and related materiel required by the Authority
to serve the purposes of this and other related resolutions, all prohibitions related to
trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic resources to Iraq

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established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no longer apply”.


Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution Provisional, 7 March 2003, “Decides that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons, weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items”.

2004

Resolution 1546 (2004): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on 8 June 2004, “Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004”. 181

181 www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq
Chronology - Life and death of Saddam Hussein

Saddam Hussein was hanged on Saturday for crimes against humanity for the killing of 148 Shiite men and boys in Dujail after a 1982 assassination attempt. Following are key dates in the life of the former Iraqi president:

**April 28, 1937** - Born in al-Awja village outside Tikrit, 150 km (90 miles) north of Baghdad.

**Oct. 1956** - Joins uprising against pro-British royalist rulers and then becomes a militant in the pan-Arab, secular Baath Party.

**Oct. 1959** - A year after overthrow of monarchy, takes part in attempt to kill Prime Minister Abdel-Karim Kassem. Flees abroad.

**Feb. 1963** - Returns to Baghdad when the Baath Party seizes power in a military coup but nine months later Ba’athists are toppled. Caught and jailed. Elected deputy secretary-general of the party while in prison.

**July 1968** - Saddam helps plot the coup that puts the Baath Party back in power, deposing President Abdul-Rahman Aref.

**March 1975** - As vice-president of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), signs border agreement with the Shah of Iran, who ends support for an Iraqi Kurdish revolt, causing its collapse.

**July 16, 1979** - Takes power after President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr steps aside as chairman of the RCC.

**Sept. 22, 1980** - Following border skirmishes, Saddam launches war on Iran that lasts eight years.
March 16, 1988 - Iraqi forces launch chemical attack on Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja, killing about 5,000 people.

Aug. 20, 1988 - A ceasefire is officially implemented in the Iran-Iraq war. The campaign against Kurds continues.


Jan. 17, 1991 - U.S.-led forces start Gulf War with air attacks on Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Hostilities end on Feb 28 with eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Oct. 15, 1995 - Saddam wins a presidential referendum and is elected unopposed with more than 99 percent of the vote.

Oct. 15, 2002 - Official results show Saddam wins 100 percent of votes in a referendum for a new term in office.

Dec. 7, 2002 - Saddam apologizes for invasion of Kuwait but blames the emirate's leadership. Kuwait rejects the apology.

Feb. 2003 - In first interview in more than a decade, Saddam denies Baghdad has any banned weapons or links to al Qaeda.

March 20 - U.S. launches war against Iraq.

April 9 - U.S. forces sweep into the heart of Baghdad as Saddam's three-decade rule crumbles.

July 22 - U.S. military confirms Saddam's two sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed in gun battle in Mosul.

Dec. 14 - U.S. officials announce capture of Saddam.
Oct. 19, 2005 - Trial opens with Saddam charged with crimes against humanity for the killing of 148 Shiite men in Dujail after a 1982 assassination attempt. He pleads not guilty.

Aug. 21, 2006 - Saddam refuses to enter a plea as the trial starts on charges of war crimes in the "Anfal" campaign that killed tens of thousands of Kurdish villagers in 1988.

Nov. 5, 2006 - A court in Baghdad finds Saddam guilty of crimes against humanity and sentences him to hang for the deaths of 148 Shi'ite men in Dujail.

Dec. 26, 2006 - An Iraqi appeals court confirms the guilty verdict and death sentence against Saddam in the Dujail case.

Dec. 30 - Saddam is hanged.¹⁸²

A chronology of key events of Iraq

1534 - 1918 - Region is part of the Ottoman Empire.

1914 - 1918 - World War I.

1917 - Britain seizes control, creates state of Iraq.

1920 - Great Iraqi Revolution - rebellion against British rule.

1920 - Britain creates state of Iraq with League of Nations approval.

1921 - Faysal, son of Hussein Bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, is crowned Iraq's first king.

1932 - Independence, followed by coups.

1939-1945 - World War II. Britain re-occupies Iraq.

1958 - The monarchy is overthrown in a military coup led by Brig Abd-al-Karim Qasim and Col Abd-al-Salam Muhammad Arif. Iraq is declared a republic.

1963 - Prime Minister Qasim is ousted in a coup led by the Arab Socialist Baath Party (ASBP). Arif becomes president.

1963 - The Baathist government is overthrown by Arif and a group of officers.

1966 - After Arif is killed in a helicopter crash on 13 April, his elder brother, Maj-Gen Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Arif, succeeds him as president.

1968 - A Baathist led-coup ousts Arif. Revolution Command Council (RCC) takes charge with Gen Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as chairman and country's president.

1972 - Iraq nationalizes the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).

Iran-Iraq war- 1980-1988

Almost one million people died in the conflict; exchanges of war dead continued for years.
1974 - Iraq grants limited autonomy to Kurdish region.

1979 - Saddam Hussein succeeds Al-Bakr as president. 1980: Iraq bombs Iran as hostilities increase.

1981 June - Israel attacks an Iraqi nuclear research centre near Baghdad.

Chemical attack on Kurds

1988- March - Iraq attacks Kurdish town of Halabjah with poison gas, killing thousands.

1990- March, Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian-born journalist with London's Observer newspaper, accused of spying on a military installation, is hanged in Baghdad.

Iraq invades Kuwait

1990 - Iraq invades Kuwait, prompting what becomes known as the first Gulf War. A massive US-led military campaign forces Iraq to withdraw in February 1991.

1991- April - Iraq subjected to weapons inspection programme.

Rebellion

1991- Mid-March/early April - Southern Shia and northern Kurdish populations - encouraged by Iraq's defeat in Kuwait - rebel, prompting a brutal crackdown.

1991 Gulf War

Iraq’s army crushed in 1991 Gulf war that followed the invasion of Kuwait.

1991- Gulf War ceasefire

1991- April - UN-approved safe-haven established in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. Iraq ordered to end all military activity in the area.

1992- August - A no-fly zone, which Iraqi planes are not allowed to enter, is set up in southern Iraq, south of latitude 32 degrees north.
1993- June - US forces launch a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for the attempted assassination of US President George Bush in Kuwait in April.

Oil-for-food

1995- April - UNSC Resolution 986 allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine (the "oil-for-food programme").

1995- October - Saddam Hussein wins a referendum allowing him to remain president for another seven years.

1996- August - After call for aid from KDP, Iraqi forces launch offensive into northern no-fly zone and capture Irbil.

1996 September - US extends northern limit of southern no-fly zone to latitude 33 degrees north, just south of Baghdad.

1998- October - Iraq ends cooperation with UN Special Commission to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Unscom).

Operation Desert Fox

1998- December - After UN staff is evacuated from Baghdad, the US and UK launches a bombing campaign, "Operation Desert Fox", to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes.

1999- February - Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, spiritual leader of the Shia community, is assassinated in Najaf.

1999- December - UNSC Resolution 1284 creates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) to replace Unscom. Iraq rejects the resolution.
Saddam’s fall

Saddam Hussein’s ouster by US forces.

2001- February - Britain, US carry out bombing raids to try to disable Iraq's air defence network. The bombings have little international support.

Weapons inspectors return

2002- September - US President George W Bush tells sceptical world leaders at a UN General to confront the "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq - or stand aside as the US acts. In the same month British Prime Minister Tony Blair publishes a "dodgy" dossier on Iraq's military capability.

2002- November - UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq backed by a UN resolution which threatens serious consequences if Iraq is in "material breach" of its terms.

2003- March - Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports that Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but says inspectors need more time to verify Iraq's compliance.

Saddam ousted

2003- March - UK’s ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic process on Iraq has ended; arms inspectors evacuate; US President George W Bush gives Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war.

2003- March - US-led invasion topples Saddam Hussein's government, marks start of years of violent conflict with different groups competing for power.

Insurgency intensifies

2003- August - Suicide truck bomb wrecks UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Car bomb in Najaf kills 125 including Shia leader Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim.

2003- 14 December - Saddam Hussein captured in Tikrit.

2004- March - Suicide bombers attack Shia festival-goers in Karbala and Baghdad, killing 140 people.

2004- April-May - Shia militias loyal to radical cleric Moqtada Sadr take on coalition forces. Hundreds are reported killed in fighting during the month-long US military siege of the Sunni Muslim city of Fallujah. Photographic evidence emerges of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US troops.

Sovereignty and elections

2004- June - US hands sovereignty to interim government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

2004- August - Fighting in Najaf between US forces and Shia militia of radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.


Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi made Al-Qaeda in Iraq the most feared insurgent group.

2005- 30 January - Some 8 million vote in elections for a Transitional National Assembly. 2005 28 February - At least 114 people are killed by a car bomb in Hilla, south of Baghdad, in the worst single such incident since the US-led invasion.
2005- April - Amid escalating violence, parliament selects Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as president. Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shia, is named as prime minister.

2005- May onwards - Surge in car bombings, bomb explosions and shootings: Iraqi ministries put the civilian death toll for May at 672, up from 364 in April.

2005- June - Massoud Barzani is sworn in as regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan.

2005- August - Draft constitution is endorsed by Shia and Kurdish negotiators, but not by Sunni representatives.

2005- October - Voters approve a new constitution, which aims to create an Islamic federal democracy.

2005- December - Iraqis vote for the first, full-term government and parliament since the US-led invasion.

Sectarian violence

2006- February onwards - A bomb attack on an important Shia shrine in Samarra unleashes a wave of sectarian violence in which hundreds of people are killed.

2006- 22 April - Newly re-elected President Talabani asks Shia compromise candidate Nouri al-Maliki to form a new government, ending months of deadlock.

Bombings

Thousands of Iraqi was killed in sectarian suicide and car bomb attack.

2006- May and June - An average of more than 100 civilians per day are killed in violence in Iraq, the UN says.

2006- 7 June - Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is killed in an air strike.
2006- November - Iraq and Syria restore diplomatic relations after nearly a quarter century.

More than 200 die in car bombings in the mostly Shia area of Sadr City in Baghdad, in the worst attack on the capital since the US-led invasion of 2003.

2006- December - Iraq Study Group report making recommendations to President Bush on future policy in Iraq describes the situation as grave and deteriorating.

Saddam executed

2006- December - Saddam Hussein is executed for crimes against humanity.

2007- January - US President Bush announces a new Iraq strategy; thousands more US troops will be dispatched to shore up security in Baghdad.

UN says more than 34,000 civilians were killed in violence during 2006; the figure surpasses official Iraqi estimates threefold.

2007- February - A bomb in Baghdad's Sadriya market kills more than 130 people. It is the worst single bombing since 2003.

2007- March - Insurgents detonate three trucks with toxic chlorine gas in Falluja and Ramadi, injuring hundreds.

2007- April - Bombings in Baghdad kill nearly 200 people in the worst day of violence since a US-led security drive began in the capital in February.

2007- August - Truck and car bombs hit two villages of Yazidi Kurds, killing at least 250 people - the deadliest attack since 2003.

Kurdish and Shia leaders form an alliance to support Prime Minister Maliki's government but fail to bring in Sunni leaders.
2009- January - Iraq takes control of security in Baghdad's fortified Green Zone and assumes more powers over foreign troops based in the country. PM Nouri al-Maliki welcomes the move as Iraq's “day of sovereignty”.

2009- March - US President Barack Obama announces withdrawal of most US troops by end of August 2010. Up to 50,000 of 142,000 troops now there will stay on into 2011 to advise Iraqi forces and protect US interests, leaving by end of 2011.

2009- June - US troops withdraw from towns and cities in Iraq, six years after the invasion, having formally handed over security duties to new Iraqi forces.

**Political groups in Iraq**

2009- July - New opposition forces make strong gains in elections to the regional parliament of Kurdistan, but the governing KDP and PUK alliance retains a reduced majority. Masoud Barzani (KDP) is re-elected in the presidential election.

2009- October - Two car bombs near the Green Zone in Baghdad kill at least 155 people, in Iraq's deadliest attack since April 2007.

2009- December - The al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq claims responsibility for a wave of suicide bombings in Baghdad that leaves at least 127 people dead, as well as attacks in August and October that killed 240 people. Tension flares with Tehran as Iranian troops briefly occupy an oilfield in Iraqi territory.

2010- January - Controversy as candidates with alleged links to Baath Party are banned from March parliamentary polls. A court later lifts the ban, prompting a delay in campaigning. “Chemical” Ali Hassan al-Majid, a key figure in Saddam Hussein's government, is executed.
2010- March - Parliamentary elections. Nine months pass before a new government is approved.

2010- August - Seven years after the US-led invasion, the last US combat brigade leaves Iraq.

2010- September - Syria and Iraq restore diplomatic ties a year after breaking them off.

2010- October - Whistle blowing website Wikileaks publishes thousands of classified US military logs on the war in Iraq. Church in Baghdad seized by militants, 52 people killed in what is described as worst single disaster to hit Iraq's Christians in modern times.

2010- November - Parliament reconvenes after long delay, re-appoints Jalal Talabani as president and Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister.

2010- December - Parliament approves a new government including all major factions, ending nine months of deadlock after inconclusive elections.

2011- January - Radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after nearly four years of self-imposed exile in Iran.

2011- February - Oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan resume, amid a lengthy dispute between the region and the central government over contracts with foreign firms. Several people killed in nationwide protests similar to unrest sweeping the Middle East. Administration of Iraqi Kurdistan is also targeted by protests calling for reform and an end to corruption.

2011- March - Iraqi Kurdistan moves troops into position around disputed city of Kirkuk, raising tension with central government.
2011- April - Army raids camp of Iranian exiles, killing 34. Government says it will shut Camp Ashraf, home to thousands of members of the People's Mujahedeen of Iran.

2011- August - Violence escalates, with more than 40 apparently co-ordinated nationwide attacks in one day.

Turkey launches retaliatory military strikes against alleged Kurdish rebels in the mountains of northern Iraq.

2011- October - US says it will complete withdrawal of remaining troops by year's end, after failing to secure agreement to leave some troops behind.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{183} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763
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